Winters v. *New York,* 333 U. S. 507; *Thornhill* v. *Alabama,* 310 U. S. 88; *Hague* v. *C. I. O.,* 307 U. S. 496; *Herndon* v. *Lowry,* 301 U. S. 242.

First. The failure to provide adequate standards in § 5 (a)(1)(D) reflects Congress' failure to have made a "legislative judgment," *Cantwell* v. *Connecticut, supra,* 310 U. S., at 307, on the extent to which the prophylactic measure should be applied. Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite standards, this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the people. "[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict . . ." in protected areas. *NAACP* v. *Button, supra,* 371 U. S., at 432. "Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under our system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them." *Greene* v. *McElroy,* 360 U. S. 474, 507.

Congress has the resources and the power to inform itself, and is the appropriate forum where the conflicting pros and cons should have been presented and considered. But instead of a determination by Congress reflected in guiding standards of the types of facilities to which § 5 (a)(1)(D) should be applied, the statute provides for a resolution by the Secretary of Defense acting on his own accord. It is true that the Secretary presumably has at his disposal the information and expertise necessary to make reasoned judgments on which facilities are important to national security. But that is not the question to be resolved under this statute. Compare *Hague* v. *CIO,* 307 U. S. 496. Rather, the Secretary is in effect determining which facilities are so important to the national security that Party members, active or inactive, well-intentioned