subsequent occasions, the parties consented to extensions of the Restraining Order until February 4, 1968.

The crux of this case is the validity of Section V. B. and the procedures contained therein under which plaintiff's security clearance was to be suspended. First,/ Plaintiff asserts that this Section is invalid because it is not expressly authorized by Congress or the President. Secondly, plaintiff asserts that if Section V. B. is authorized, it deprives plaintiff of a security clearance without Due Process of law.

Plaintiff relies on Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), in support of his argument that Section V. B. is invalid for lack of specific authorization. In Greene v. McElroy, supra, the Supreme Court defined the issue before it in that case as "whether the Department of Defense has been authorized to create an industrial security clearance program under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be restrained in following their chose professions on the basis of fact determinations concerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings in which they are denied the traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." (Id., at 508.)

This Court believes that the teaching of Greene is that an agency of the federal government cannot, without affording the traditional forms of fair procedure, take administrative action which effectively deprives an individual of his means of livelihood on loyalty or security grounds unless, at the least, Congress (or the President, if he is the source of the power) has expressly authorized the lesser procedure. See Garrot v. United States, 340 F.2d 615, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1965).

At the outset, defendants attempt to distinguish Greene by asserting that the suspension here is not a final revocation because plaintiff has it within his power to reopen the proceedings