circumstances, the Court believes that this "suspension" which has entailed a discontinuance of the processing of plaintiff's clearance, has the same final effect on plaintiff's livelihood that the Supreme Court was concerned about in Greene. Moreover, although plaintiff's employer was informed by the defendants that the suspension of plaintiff's security clearance was not intended to prevent utilization of plaintiff upon any nonclassified work that may be available to plaintiff, defendants admit that plaintiff was informed by authorized agents of Lockheed that solely because of the suspension of his clearance he could no longer be employed by Lockheed and that he would be placed on "prolonged leave of absence" without pay until such time as his clearance status was settled. In light of these facts, the Court feels that plaintiff has suffered a serious deprivation of his "right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession . . . [which come] . . . within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment." Greene v. McElroy, supra, 360 U.S. 474, at 492. This Court is of the opinion that to hold otherwise would be honoring unduly the semantic difference between "final revocation" and "suspension", and would be disregarding the effect on plaintiff's livelihood so strongly emphasized in the Greene case.

The Court must next inquire whether the governmental action that was taken here deprived plaintiff of traditional forms of fair procedure which are associated with procedural Due Process. The salient facts can be briefly summarized. Plaintiff was notified that "the Screening Board [of the Department of Defense] has some <a href="mailto:new information">new information</a> that might affect . . . [his] . . . continued eligibility for a clearance", and that the Screening