

AMENDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL ACT OF 1950 1661

an individual's security clearance, thereby nullifying employment opportunity, without any statement of charges or other specific notice, without any opportunity to answer specific facts alleged to be jeopardizing an individual's security clearance, without any confrontation or cross-examination, and without any factual basis given as the reason for the suspension.

The Court is not dissuaded from the opinion by the defendant's argument that a suspension so long as there is a refusal to furnish relevant information is reasonable and procedurally proper. The instant case does not present the question whether the refusal on unprivileged grounds to answer questions in a properly convened hearing could serve as the basis for the type of suspension which was prescribed here. Defendants strenuously rely on Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) and on In Re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). The government action involved in each of those cases occurred after the refusal to answer questions by an applicant for admission to a state bar in the midst of a hearing fully consonant with procedural Due Process requirements. Also, it is significant that those administrative decisions were subject to judicial review.

Nor is the Court persuaded by the cases which defendants cite which stand for the proposition that an incomplete initial or renewal application entitles a governmental agency to discontinue processing the application.^{7/} In reaching this conclusion

7/ Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960); Cronan v. FCC, 285 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1961); Blumenthal v. FCC, 318 F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963); Schneider v. Roland, 263 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Wash. 1967), rev'd. on other grounds, 36 Law Week (January 16, 1968).