

positive actions to be taken by the Military Departments to upgrade their in-house capabilities. Out of this came—

1. A sensible approach to taking full and complete advantage of the PL-313 provisions and a more rational approach to compensation rates under this authority.

2. The establishment of a Laboratory Director's Fund for work judged by the laboratory director to be of promise or importance, with only after-the-fact review by higher authority.

3. The pinpointing of responsibilities with the Assistant Secretaries (R&D) of the Military Departments for the health and environment of the in-house laboratories.

However, other actions recommended were not implemented as readily. These included: (1) that Department of Defense (DoD) in-house laboratories would be used as a primary means of carrying our Defense Department programs; (2) delegating greater decision-making authority to the laboratory directors; (3) solving the many administrative difficulties that prevented laboratories from being as effective as they should be; and (4) establishing clear lines of technical management and responsibility for each in-house laboratory.

Just as Task 97 was completing its report, the Bureau of the Budget began organizing an interdepartmental task force to study the problems of government contracting for R&D. This activity, which must be familiar to most of you, became the first broad Executive Branch Policy on R&D activities in the history of this country.

This "Bell report,"¹ superimposed upon the Department of Defense findings, placed even greater emphasis on taking constructive actions in many areas. In fact, the Bell Report specifically cited this task force's activities as an appropriate procedure to follow.

On 30 March 1963, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, reconstituted "Task 97" as the "Task 97 Action Group," in recognition of the fact that strengthening the in-house laboratories "is not only a matter of study but one of action." Its concept of operations was to establish a core of permanent members, generally six, with the responsibility for its continuing operation. These members were from ODDR&E staff and from the Office of the Assistant Secretaries (R&D) of the Military Departments. Additional members, problem-area specialists, were to be added, depending upon the problem being examined. Also every level of management was represented in all visits to laboratories so that, as a problem was raised, we could follow the problem up the chain of command on the spot and either obtain an immediate solution or find a basis for pinpointing an individual for action. It also provided a rare opportunity to communicate the rationale behind many decisions to the people directly affected—the laboratory personnel.

The "Task 97 Action Group" dealt with many administrative problems affecting the creative climate of laboratories. Listed below are several examples of the actions which resulted from the activities of the Group:

Important input, based upon specific examples, was provided to the Civil Service Commission, and thus had direct influence upon many features of the Salary Reform Act of 1962 and subsequent legislation.

Some relief was obtained for laboratories in securing foreign periodicals and scientific equipment vis-a-vis the gold-flow problem.

Security review of scientific papers was delegated to the laboratory level.

New policies relating to air-conditioning equipment or laboratories, treating them the same as any other type of technical equipment, were established.

There were more favorable interpretations of the Government Employees Training Act, 7 July 1958, particularly in the restrictions on the 1-year-in-10 rule.

The need for some relief in the rigid manpower ceilings to enhance training and career development was dramatized. This is now represented by central pools of manpower spaces and dollars to support technical training without hampering laboratory operations.

Block funding or "core funding" of Air Force laboratories in Research and Exploratory Development.

¹ Bureau of the Budget (David E. Bell, Director), *Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development*, 30 April 1962.