

Mr. FASICK. Yes, you do. In the Air Force they have a philosophy overseas that most of the replenishment material for aircraft support is shipped by air. They defend this on the basis that they can minimize stocks. They have an in-house capability, being Air Force, for flying much of the material.

I think within the Air Force they also have a high incidence, possibly not as high as the Army, but a high incidence of using high priority requisitions.

Mr. HORTON. Is there some means at a higher level where this whole challenge system could be studied and reviewed, say, in the Department of Defense?

Mr. FASICK. We have recommended this, yes, particularly with respect to the Department of the Army; but I think it is applicable to the other two services also. For example, in Vietnam, the 1st Logistical Command, if they were in a position to question or challenge the requisitions coming from the combat units, for the types of noncombat essential supplies Mr. Roback had in mind, I think this would help immensely.

Mr. HORTON. I certainly would not agree with any combat challenge system on combat equipment. But it would certainly seem to me in the noncombat area there could be some challenge instituted not only at the lower level of command, but at the top level as well, so that you make certain that there is some equalization. I can understand, for example, the Air Force flying planes over might take advantage of the fact that it is their items that are going over, so they utilize air space.

There ought to be some sort of adjustment between the services there.

Mr. FASICK. I agree.

Mr. DAHLIN. You said 50 percent of the items were in the higher priorities. I think that is the way you put it. Do you have any breakdown of just what the rates are that you are talking about of high priority requisitions?

Mr. FASICK. We have some statistics here in the Army area, showing how it has gone up over the years. For example, in 1962—these are the high priority requisitions received by the inventory control points in the United States—in 1962 it was 13 percent. In 1963 it was 14. In 1964 it was 17. In 1965 it was 31. We are in the Vietnam era now—in 1966 it is 53 and in 1967 it is 54 percent.

In this current year it ranges between 49 and 56 percent that they are receiving that are high priority requisitions.

Mr. DAHLIN. They are all not high priorities?

Mr. FASICK. Not the highest. They are priorities 1 through 8, of the 20 priorities that exist in the supply system. The Army admits that they have a problem, and they have reduced the number to some extent. I think those in Vietnam are somewhere in the neighborhood of 32 percent or less now, and they are reducing it through command emphasis. They admit that they would like to get down to a lower figure.

They are shooting for 25 percent, but possibly something even better is desirable. I am not in a position to give a figure. The command emphasis will work to a certain point, but I still think that a challenge system on the part of the inventory control center in Vietnam or