

and tell the commanders to watch it closely. You have come up with a suggested second solution in the case of the high-priority requisitions; that is, there be a sampling system to catch people who might be submitting a requisition that shouldn't be high priority. Do you have this kind of a solution for the repairable spare parts problem?

Mr. STOLAROW. The Army has advised us that as soon as they have the capability at the direct support unit—that is, small computer capability—they will prepare listings of the returns of repairable items by unit. There will be some additional pressure on the commanding officers of the using units through the circulation of these listings to require turn-ins or explanations. This would be a step in the right direction.

Mr. FASICK. This is the form of a challenge system, where the supply activity takes positive action to get an explanation or the return of the repairable from the using activity.

Mr. LUMAN. This problem of repairable spare parts being returned is not a problem peculiar to Vietnam.

Mr. FASICK. Not at all.

Mr. LUMAN. You have the same situation in Europe or Korea, don't you?

Mr. FASICK. Worldwide, really, with respect to the Army.

Mr. LUMAN. But you feel that based on your past reviews of these problems a decision simply to place more command stress on it will not in itself really attack the problem unless it is followed up with some kind of a system to assure this is done?

Mr. FASICK. Yes.

Mr. ASBY. That is correct.

QUICK REACTION INVENTORY CONTROL CENTER

Mr. DAHLIN. Back to this quick reaction inventory control center that is being set up, is that in direct response to your recommendations as initially developed? Did you recommend this type of center?

Mr. FASICK. We did recommend it before we knew that the Army had already been doing something in this area. It was included in our recently issued Vietnam report, the draft of which we sent out in December. But the Army, back in June 1967, had started to give thought to this concept. We have 16 Army divisions normally that go through dry runs and maneuvers and are always ready to go. But they have never had a logistics system with trained personnel ready to support them once they deploy. There was always a question of trying to piece together a logistic organization. It was further compounded in the Army by the fact that most of their depots and supply activities back in the States at the wholesale level were manned by civilians.

But when you go to a Vietnam, you have a limited ability to use civilians. It is a military operation. They didn't have the people trained to do the job over there. So, I think this action the Army is taking is an excellent move in terms of getting themselves in a position to support their divisions in the event they may be called up to perform their missions.

Mr. DAHLIN. From the point of view of your criticism, if the Army could achieve instant standardization overnight, would such a center probably be necessary?