

Mr. FASICK. Yes; it still would be necessary.

Mr. DAHLIN. Still would be?

Mr. FASICK. Because we have in mind here logistics units—skilled logistics people, equipment and a set of operating procedures—that would be capable of working with the military units wherever they may have to go to perform their missions. You can't pick up civilians out of the depots in the States and expect to do this.

Mr. DAHLIN. If the center were standardized with some system, it presumably would be standardized with the CONUS system.

Mr. FASICK. Oh, yes. It would have to be standardized or compatible with the CONUS system, and I should hope that the Army has in mind down the road again the concept that we are pushing, and that is, to get standardization. To get, in effect, plug-in type units that can be picked up and moved anywhere in the world and operate without any undue difficulty.

Mr. DAHLIN. That doesn't necessarily happen though. After all, the Army did form these Pacific ICC's or the logistics commands, as nucleus organizations back in the States. They went out and produced their own peculiar organizations in Vietnam, didn't they?

Mr. FASICK. Under the present Army concepts there is nothing to prevent that from happening again, but I think the Army is working on devising the technique, the plan, the policy, the operating procedures for this new quick reaction team or unit.

But they will still have problems once they are called upon to go to Europe and then they move from Europe to the Pacific. Unless the Army comes up with standardization, and the types of things we are suggesting, then this unit or organization would have problems adjusting to the new command.

Mr. DAHLIN. Does it make entire sense that such a quick reaction capability—which is presumably for some crisis in the future—be just a single service effort, from your point of view?

Mr. FASICK. Well, sometimes types of commodities that the different services have and the peculiarities of the problems they face requires them to have some autonomous or independent type organizations. It seems to me it makes sense in the case of the Army to have their own. This particular one they are devising is, as I understand it, to be capable of supporting corps-type operations.

They would need several of them for anything larger. So I think that the Army would be justified, at least within the framework of the near future, as I see it, to have this type of organization itself.

Mr. DAHLIN. You are recommending one. Did you recommend anything of the sort to the Navy and the Air Force? Do you think they need something in the case of a crisis?

Mr. FASICK. The Air Force—I can't describe it in detail—does have something like this, a kit or a package they pick up supplywise which enables them to open up a new base and be in a position to support the base quickly.

#### ADAPTATIONS OF SUPPLY SYSTEMS

Mr. ROBACK. Is the theory of this quick reaction capability to try to adjust the going system to crises, or is it something over and above that? You have pointed out in your statement that the supply in Vietnam has been done quite well but at high cost and with possible inefficiencies because of all the special adaptations that had to be made.