

Mr. RANDALL. I am trying to get you to tell us in what categories—what did you find? We are going to get to these thousands of items that were not needed in inventory or hadn't been moving you said. What did you find down there that hadn't been moving?

Mr. FASICK. I can't directly relate through our report here a specific item. I would venture to say that it covered all ranges of Army commodities.

Mr. RANDALL. Everything in other words? Big items or little items?

Mr. FASICK. Big items and little items.

Mr. RANDALL. Jeeps and everything?

Mr. FASICK. Jeeps, spark plugs, tires; any commodity that the Army uses in its operations overseas.

As we point out in our report, the Army in Vietnam has approximately 120,000 different types of items they stock and keep on hand to support the troops. According to their own records, which they admit were unreliable because of the conditions we spoke of earlier, they recognized—

Mr. RANDALL. What condition could that be except you are in a combat area down there? That is why I think we ought to get a dividing line between the two different situations. In what conditions did they say they were unreliable?

Mr. FASICK. In the sense the records didn't really reflect what they had on hand and the quantities that they had on hand.

Mr. RANDALL. I think we ought to put in the record—

Mr. FASICK. Now, some of this is a reflection of this mass of material that was turned in. This was a desirable exercise, it was a good start. The next step, and they have been in the process for the last several months, is trying to get control of the stocks in their depots, to find out what they have and how much they have and then correct the records so that they can properly manage their supplies.

The Army is very conscientious about this. I think they are doing a magnificent job considering the conditions under which they work. You say combat.

Mr. RANDALL. I think there is where we have to stop right there. Many of the places that our subcommittee have visited are now in the direct line of fire. I think this touches on the whole problem. We are all interested, of course, in efficiency and in control and not having anything that you don't need, but there it is a pretty nasty war and it is getting as bad as it ever was. I want you to say, if you can, what can be done under those conditions that isn't being done?

Mr. FASICK. I think the five things that we state in our report.

Mr. RANDALL. In the conclusion here, your recommendations are on page 36?

Mr. FASICK. It is really on pages 3 and 4, and then possibly 36.

Mr. ROBACK. Which are you referring to?

Mr. FASICK. True, the Army is under fire to some extent. Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon, they have been subject to some fire, but they have relatively fixed bases now with competent people, and they are getting more competent people daily. They have the capabilities in terms of equipment and computers to do a better job of managing what they have. I think the Army will be the first to admit that you can't hide under the excuse we are under fire in terms of losing control over our stocks and our inventory, because if they don't know what they