

Mr. FASICK. I had the pleasure of meeting with some people out at MAC, including the commander of the Military Airlift Command. They are pointing out that the cost of air transportation is constantly coming down so that someday many of the systems and concepts we have for distribution will and should change. I even asked the question about the Army's stockpiling of railroad cars for transporting people when today we are moving all of our people through airlift and other rapid forms of transportation as opposed to railroads.

Mr. ROBACK. You refer to the rolling stock?

Mr. FASICK. Rolling stock that they have stored.

Mr. ROBACK. 5,000 or whatever old cars in rolling stock, and narrow gauge, no doubt.

Mr. FASICK. Then we were also talking to General Norton, commander of the Army Aviation Materiel Command. He was pointing out that they didn't have the availability of airlift and needed to move, for example, engines for helicopters, by surface, but they had at that day reached a new agreement with the Air Force people for increased air availability and he was pleased. I think this all ties in, Mr. Roback, to what the Army should be thinking in terms of its logistics concepts. Should we be thinking in terms of massive, large overseas stockage organizations or should we be thinking in terms of rapid resupply? But that is down the road a bit.

Mr. DAHLIN. On page 20 of your statement you talk about several supply systems for the support of the forces. Have you developed a list of just how many systems you are talking about? Are you talking about regular systems or all of these as priority systems?

Mr. FASICK. I would like to be a little bit careful how I describe these because I think Mr. Roback hit a very valid point where he pointed out that all supply systems need, in some cases, extraordinary actions in situations such as we are finding in Vietnam.

Let me give you an illustration.

The Marine Corps, for example, never did trust the communication systems until very recently between Vietnam and Okinawa.

So they not only sent some of their requisitions through the transceiver transmission system but they duplicated it by having a courier fly daily from Vietnam to Okinawa to carry the requisitions to be sure they got them. Here is an illustration where they compensated for a weakness in the system with something else that was less efficient; but it was the only way they could assure themselves that they would get their requisitions there.

Mr. DAHLIN. This was before they introduced computers into the Marine Corps system.

Mr. FASICK. Well, no; it wasn't. They had the computers in the Marine system, but it was a question of not having faith in the communications system that the Army was using between Vietnam and Okinawa. They just refused to accept—

Mr. DAHLIN. They were afraid the data would get scrambled?

Mr. FASICK. Scrambled or lost. A clerk walking to one of the switching stations could trip and lose a box of cards and you would lose your requisitions.

Mr. RANDALL. There have been some instances of that and we know of some. I am not sure it is a question of faith but rather a question of faith shaken on the part of the Marines.