

Mr. ROBACK. Will you clarify this paragraph in this sense: that you are discussing the Army experience with standard systems, military standard systems in support of combat, but you are really discussing what is sometimes referred to as the stovepipe system.

General HEISER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Special systems that have been developed either because the supply system, the standard system does not accommodate itself, or because these particular items are of critical importance, or for some other reason?

General HEISER. Yes, sir.

In fact, Mr. Roback, you have covered it very well. This paragraph is meant to cover Red Ball and meant to cover intensive management, and intensive management particularly as demonstrated under the stovepipes that we have established.

The main reason we put this paragraph in here, sir, was to indicate that while it could be considered that we have set up special systems, recognizing that the organization and the procedures that we are using today have been combat-tested for the first time, we are not in our minds establishing special systems. We are implementing the standard system as it has to be done, in order to manage the equipment in the hands of troops, so that we do not consider that Red Ball in support of deadline equipment in a combat zone is a special system that is only for the time being. We think it is a necessary thing, and in reality MILSTRIP procedures call for issue group priority 1 to be handled in a certain length of time.

This is our experience in how can we issue priority group 1.

Mr. ROBACK. I see two contrary formulations.

Somewhat in the testimony yesterday the formulation was that special systems are devised because the general system is not fully adaptable. You are saying that the experience of the general system leads you to perfect it by special treatment of given categories.

General HEISER. Yes, sir; and we are taking a leaf—let's face it, on the stovepipe we are taking a leaf from the Air Force system, and we are using weapons system management which is in reality somewhat a replacement of the technical services management that occurred before the reorganization.

What we are saying is that you have to have a straight-line responsibility for the items in the hand of the combat soldier to be sure that he gets what he needs in terms of that item being operable in the combat zone.

Mr. ROBACK. Later on we will want to discuss why it is, then, that for certain kinds of items, high value items or critical items of a weapon system type, it is more appropriate or suitable for the Army Materiel Command to exert overseas control than it is for other secondary types of supply.

General HEISER. We can talk to this now, sir, or we can talk to it subsequently.

Mr. ROBACK. Let's talk to it now and later on you will probably cover some other aspect. If this is a refinement of a system, why is the Army Materiel Command suitable for overseas control of it and not of other supplies?

General HEISER. May I point out, sir, that the Army Materiel Command, and I am afraid we are going to perhaps get ahead of our