

At the same time, within the Army we were taking part in this reorganization.

For example, I think it was only about a year ago—check me, Leo, if I am not right—it was only about a year ago that we completed the reorganization of field units from a technical service organization to what we call a COSTAR organization based upon functional supply and maintenance as opposed to technical services-oriented type of organization and mission.

So in examining the system, sir, I would say that in answer to your question, we were and still are in the process of solving some of the problems that emanated of necessity from just reorganizing, not that there was anything wrong with the reorganization.

Mr. ROBACK. Give us an example. What was the problem that grew up here as between "logistics doctrine" and "systems development"? In other words, why was there this fragmentation?

Were there too many separate centers of decision? Or policy determination? What was the problem?

General HEISER. In the present environment as to the term "fragmentation" to an undesirable degree, they were pointing to the fact that we did have under the reorganization a system based upon functional supply and maintenance, which did have command responsibility at the various echelons beginning with the Department of Army, with a breakout at the Army Materiel Command level for all types of Army-managed items, all commodities, and then going further into the field having the Commander in Chief of the Overseas Command with his responsibilities and at each level down.

Now what they were actually saying was that we should examine this to determine to what extent these were undesirable, and therefore attempt to eliminate them, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. In the 1962 recommendations—

General HEISER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Reorganization, the thrust of it was to try to get all these separate centers of the Technical Corps with their own depot systems, their own logistics responsibilities somehow reorganized?

General HEISER. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. So it was not as an outgrowth of reorganization as such? It is just that reorganization did not necessarily resolve all the problems, is that not the case?

General HEISER. That is essentially correct, and this ties in with what I was trying to say earlier, sir.

Part of this is still in the process of implementation, the results and the objectives of the reorganization of 1962.

Mr. ROBACK. Five or 6 years, you do not think that is a slow process?

General HEISER. Sir, it is a slow process if you look at it from one point of view, but I have to say, Mr. Roback, that slow is a relative term. The reason I say that is this:

We had a system that was in operation for many, many years. This system had already started in terms of the use, for example, of ADP, and the committee has shown an interest in this, so maybe this is a good example to talk to.

Before the reorganization in 1962, I do not believe there is anyone in the Army knowledgeable of the situation but what he would admit