

Mr. DAHLIN. You have some systems and the Marine Corps has some systems and the Air Force has some systems, in fact those very aircraft systems you were talking about. Sometimes there are common interchangeable parts that you cannot identify because the catalog still has problems. Sometimes there are items that get lost because the inventory cannot be kept up properly, because of changes.

Admiral COSGROVE. If an item has a Federal stock number assigned, there is no identity problem insofar as the services are concerned. Now we do not have to know, if we get a requirement from the Air Force for a certain Federal stock number where he is going to use it. It is just the fact that he wants it. He can put it in a missile, he can put it in a lawnmower or whatever he has to do. But when you get down to the file I am talking about in the Navy, we have to have a capability today to be able on a real time basis to be able to pull out all items that are peculiar to the Poseidon weapon, for example, and know what the usage rate on these items has been and to be able to give Admiral Smith, who directs the total nuclear submarine program, how he stands in this area, what are our support capabilities.

If he wants to deploy—the CNO wants to deploy additional nuclear subs into some area, can we support them, and this is why we have to have this capability. Today we do not have it.

Mr. ROBACK. You need tighter control in the catalog identification system; is that right?

Admiral COSGROVE. Another round of the catalogs—

Mr. ROBACK. Tighter control oriented around weapons systems capability.

Admiral COSGROVE. I think that this should be a service responsibility; yes. I think we need it, and I am not sure how far the Air Force is along on this, but I am sure they have the same problem, and I am sure the Army and the Marine Corps do, too. But I cannot see—envision myself how this could be done centrally as economically and as quickly as it can be done within each service. In other words, you might have an awful lot of data at some central point that would take a tremendous amount of time to get it, and then a lot of it would not be of use to anybody except one service. So my point is why—

Mr. DAHLIN. Everybody thought the machines were going to solve some of those problems with masses of data but they have not yet because they still have to be managed one way or another, that is by system or by commodity.

Admiral COSGROVE. Right.

Mr. DAHLIN. And that is still a problem. In GAO report B-133118 of September 1967, Admiral, the GAO talked about some problems in the \$2.2 billion worth of aeronautical spare parts and equipment. It said, "We found that the systems did not provide management with the information necessary for efficient and economical operations and management of its resources." It said at that time, "The Navy is implementing immediate and comprehensive plans for effectiveness improvements in the inventory accounting systems."

So apparently it is not just a catalog matter and may not be even the weapons system orientation.

Can you describe what kind of action was taken in response to that report, Admiral?