by over 400 percent. The line items needed to supoprt this increase grew from 25,000 to 1.2 million. Several new bases were built and others were greatly expanded.

To supply this was a great challenge that had to be met. An enormous amount of work had to be done to support the buildup. In Southeast Asia we had to expand our base supplies from one to 17 new locations, all using manual accounting systems. We also moved preassembled packages of field-type equipment and supplies which provided the items needed to initially bed down the incoming troops. These packages had been in existence as part of our war readiness materiel program. Ammunition and other combat consumables were also available through this program.

When units first arrived at the new bases few facilities existed, so the level of maintenance remained at the remove and replace stage until facilities could be built. During this period reparable items were evacuated to other established theater bases or to our AMA's for repair.

Back at AFLC they organized the Logistics Activation Task Force (LATAF), within the command post, with the assigned top-priority mission of insuring orderly and timely logistics actions to the expanding bases. LATAF is composed of experienced logistics specialists drawn from the functional staff agencies. They monitored and assisted in the equipping of newly constructed bases in order that proper facilities were prepared in advance of the arrival of assigned tactical units. In this way the time lag between deployment of a combat unit and its operational readiness within the theater was held to the minimum or eliminated altogether. Also the combat unit was assured that its weapons systems would have equipment needed to stay at peak efficiency.

LATAF established a program called Bitter Wine for determining new base equipment and supplies requirements, requisitioning and assembling functional packages and shipping them direct to SEA bases. By September 1967, 339,000 line items consisting of 29 million units, weighing 124 million pounds, had been moved to SEA.

As maintenance and other facilities came into being the materiel shipped under the Bitter Wine program was readily available for use.

During the 1965 and 1966 buildup our basic framework of direct depot to base support was sound. However, the startup of a new base supply activity necessarily encompasses much more work and activity than operating an already established base. We made some mistakes and our controlled system gave us the data we needed to take corrective action. For example, early in 1967 an equipment redistribution program was started in the Pacific which has resulted in the redistribution of equipment valued at approximately $53 million. A supply redistribution program started in June 1967, which is still continuing, has resulted in a redistribution of supplies valued at $7½ million. We are currently participating in the Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency program in the Pacific and have offered $29 million of excess materiel as available.

Manpower for surge work periods was provided by the AFLC through their rapid area supply support (RASS) teams. RASS teams are composed of AFLC AMA civilian or military personnel of various supply skills selected to meet the specific requirements of the workload that had been generated as a result of extreme emergencies. Size of the various teams and length of stay at SEA bases varied depending on work to be done. Use of RASS teams was effective in providing newly formed supply activities the temporary help they needed to meet peak workloads.

A total of 53 teams was provided to SEA from September 1965 through January 1968. At the peak of effort in 1967, approximately 300 RASS personnel were continuously assigned.

To further assist SEA bases in resolving difficulties with CONUS suppliers and to monitor intratheater redistributions, supply control points were established at 7AF/13AF and PACAF. Their primary job was to act as the area focal point in redirecting critical parts between bases as the need arose. These centers were very effective in reducing our overall NORS rates in Southeast Asia.

Another highly successful innovation during the buildup period was the "special express" system of air munitions control. It was developed to provide a fast, even flow of munitions directly from the west coast of the United States to Southeast Asia. Originally it was a five-ship shuttle system which was later expanded to include 10 additional vessels. The ships were loaded like retail stores carrying various types of munitions, each in its own temperature-controlled section of the hold. Arriving in the combat zone, they anchored offshore to be-