

developed which will require armywide adoption of the management principles and techniques contained therein. While we recognize that the status of logistic system development, integration and standardization is not as advanced as we would like, we believe that our phased approach is sound and realistic considering our requirement to operate the worldwide logistic system, in existence today, including our commitments in Southeast Asia.

I want to assure you that our ultimate product will be an integrated, uniform logistics system which will provide—

Rapid and effective logistics response to the requirements of Army forces;

Centralization of essential data required for management of material assets and requirements;

Operational capability for peace and war without radical augmentation or alteration;

Uniform and compatible procedures for each support echelon to permit worldwide unit and personnel transfers without need for additional training.

That concludes my statement, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, sir.

SUPPLY PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM

Mr. MOORHEAD. General, on page 5 of your testimony, the next to the last line, you say:

"We would be having fewer supply problems there" in Vietnam today. What are the particular supply problems that we have today?

I remember being over there in late 1965, when there was nothing but problems with the rapid buildup. When we were there in the beginning of this year, most of the supply problems seemed to have been licked.

What are the problems?

General MILLER. Yes, sir, if I could explain that a little further. I was assigned there for duty in March of 1966 in the midst of that trouble and served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, and then later as Chief of Staff. I can assure you we had many difficulties because we were operating our logistics system manually.

As you know, the decision was made to bring our combat forces into Vietnam ahead of the establishment of an adequate logistics support capability. However, there were very good reasons why this was done.

Those of us who were operating the logistics system had many, many problems that we had to overcome, and it was not until we got the 14th Inventory Control Center, and we got trained people and machinery at the depots at Qui Nhon, at Cam Ranh Bay, at Saigon and more recently at Danang, were we able to begin to sort out and be responsive in all areas of logistics support.

No troops in Vietnam ever suffered from lack of logistics support, but we did it the brute force way.

What we are saying here now is that had we had the Inventory Control Center with trained personnel ready to operate a system at the beginning, and had moved them in there, there would have been a more orderly flow of supplies.