

Mr. MOORHEAD. Some of the material that was shipped over in the early times you have had to go out——

General MILLER. It was forced.

Mr. MOORHEAD (continuing). And physically inventory?

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Maybe all of your records are not complete.

General MILLER. Yes, sir; the Army supply system by and large is based upon what we call a pull system. In other words, the customer asks for what he wants, and so it is pulled out of the CONUS depots. In the early days of the war in Vietnam, many times, to insure that we had adequate support for our troops, we pushed supplies to them. They did not ask for them. We just pushed them because we knew from experience they were going to need them.

We now recognize that we have excesses over there. We are sorting these out and getting them back. But what we are saying here is to prevent this in the future we want to have the capability to deploy an inventory control organization right with the forces when they go.

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Moorhead, I suppose in comparing those two states, one might say, and I would ask the general to confirm, that the big concern of Members of Congress in the earlier years was whether there were enough supplies, and the big concern a little later on is whether there were too many supplies.

The problems were of a different order a little later on. What they are grappling with now is really not shortages. Shortages is always the problem in the early part of the war. Now the problem is excesses. Is that not so?

General MILLER. That is correct, and this is why we are using our automated system over there today. They have just recently developed the capability to control these things, and in many instances now our problem is identifying the inventories that were brought in there and getting those on the stock records so they can get into the machines and be controlled.

We recognized that in October–November of 1965. You will remember all the ships that were backed up at Vung Tau that could not get unloaded and so on. This is partly because of the way they were loaded, but also because we did not have port facilities to offload them. Then when we did get them offloaded, we did not have our depots and trained people to man these things.

Mr. MOORHEAD. They were warehoused just out in the open?

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

As our commanders now say, they have got the faucet turned on, how do you shut it off? Once you get your supply system in gear, and this is true not only of the Army, it is true of other activities, how do you shut it off?

Mr. ROBACK. In that context, may I ask this question: The policy now appears to be increasing development, increasing attention to the capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces so they can assume an increasing role and responsibility. Now what happens to the supply system?

Do we adjust it to supply the South Vietnamese forces, or is that to be a separate, unrelated issue?

General MILLER. Maybe I had better clarify that a little bit. I notice that today is the 1st of July. We have our new 10 classes of supply in