

logical one, it is effective and it is efficient; and, as I mentioned in my statement, the people who operate these areas in the agencies involved here are constantly talking to one another, and having meetings, and they work on a common basis.

EXTENSION OF AMC OVERSEAS

Mr. ROBACK. From where you sit, and let's say from where AMC sits, the problems might look different. Do they believe that they ought to have control over the theater depots?

This issue was discussed with General Heiser. There have been some study references. In his testimony there was a reference which he did not identify right there, but I believe it was the so-called Brown report, was it not?

Mr. LUMAN. It was a study entitled "Study of Extension of AMC Overseas."

Mr. ROBACK. Who made that study; was that AMC?

General MILLER. No; this was a Headquarters, Department of the Army, study.

Mr. ROBACK. Was this a study that he said had some unrealistic conclusions?

Mr. LUMAN. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. I wondered what were—

General MILLER. I was talking to Mr. Luman before the committee assembled this morning about this particular facet, and the status of the study, because my office monitors the activities with regard to what is done with that study.

It has been processed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, with a recommendation that the study results be held in abeyance until the NAPALM program becomes operational. This was done for two reasons.

First, we have a test of high-dollar-value items; that is, AMC's control of high dollar value items, going on now. These are some 1,780 high-dollar-value items that they are controlling worldwide.

Second, the machines at the national inventory control points currently are saturated. This is one reason we are going into NAPALM as fast as we can, in order to take advantage of the greater capacity of the new machinery. Until it is installed, the NICP's cannot handle the additional workload imposed by overseas extension.

This is why we recommended deferment of action on the study recommendations. Philosophically the question of how far we should extend AMC is still debatable; because, as I mentioned, the key criterion to any logistics support system is responsiveness, specifically, response to the man who is in command of that field unit fighting a battle, and such responsiveness must be geared to three things: time, distance, and geography.

If you can do it geographically, and I cited some examples where we could skip intermediate levels of supply, this is distance and time both. We are developing automated systems today which are going to allow us, for example, to take a matter of hours to put a requirement from a unit in Germany back to the national inventory control point; but the state of the art today does not allow the supplies to move to that man in the same time frame.