

We have it on the horizon. We are looking at this in the C-5A, our fast deployment logistics ships and so on. But you have to mesh these things together in the most economical fashion in order to get this response.

Now if you move into the overseas theater, it is the same thing. We are not sure whether we would gain by extending AMC control to the depots in Vietnam at this time. We might or might not.

The problem is the degree of responsiveness to the fellow that is out there forward in the field. Today you talk to any combat commander in Vietnam and he will tell you he has never had such support in his life. This is responsiveness to the field commander's requirements.

The same thing is true in Europe. So what we have to do in studying this is ask ourselves what are we doing to our system insofar as responsiveness to the commander in the field. That is the final criteria.

Mr. ROBACK. But when you get into a problem area as, for example, critical items or high dollar value items, you find AMC being extended overseas in the selective sense; is that not so?

General MILLER. Well, we are trying this as a test. We are trying this as a test to gain visibility.

We have visibility worldwide today for at least the accountable reportable assets. Now when we get into our automated system that we contemplate here, I am not so sure where we will want to put the responsibility for those stocks. If we know at the national level where the stocks are, I do not think it makes much difference who is controlling in between.

Mr. ROBACK. As I made clear to General Heiser, we were not necessarily arguing the case for AMC, but this was the thrust of the General Accounting Office study, at least that there were some benefits to be gained. I do not know whether they made that kind of finding, but I think it was implied. Would you not say so, Mr. Luman?

Mr. LUMAN. Yes. Also, the AMC extension overseas study refers to these earlier studies and makes the same point.

Mr. ROBACK. The Army studies and contract studies seem to be converging toward that kind of a solution, and so the question then comes up whether the issues are really not yet well enough defined or the problems are not yet well enough known, or is it simple reluctance perhaps at your level to make a change like that?

General MILLER. No. I do not think there is any reluctance to make the change, as I have tried to point out. We have not yet reached the point where AMC has the capability to do much more than they are already doing.

Mr. ROBACK. Let me ask you this: Is that the logic of the evolution of the supply system in the Army, as far as the control of the theater depots is concerned?

General MILLER. I am not sure I understood your question.

Mr. ROBACK. The AMC control of the theater depot, is that the logic of the evolution of the Army supply system?

General MILLER. No; I would not say that that is an evolutionary idea within the Army, because again I go back to our organizational structure, and we are studying this, for example, right now as you know in the 1980 time frame.

We have not yet reached the state of the art within AMC, that permits extending them overseas command and controlwise and so forth.