fect in the 1970 to 1975 period which was the time frame stipulated in the study charter.

EFFECT OF C–5A CAPABILITY

Mr. ROBACK. Who is conducting the studies of the C–5A potential? Is that your responsibility?

General MILLER. We have a part of it. We have LOG–ALOG study, that is the Air LOC. We are working rather closely with the Air Force in this regard to take advantage of this tremendous capability that we have. This is going to cause some revamping of our thinking, the going from a 10-ton capacity to a 100-ton capacity in one load.

We have studies that are quite well down the track in this area. Our major problems are gearing our units and activities at either end of the line to take advantage of this capability, and we are working on those now.

Mr. ROBACK. Do you conceive that this would eliminate some of the overseas depots? That is, if you had a well-developed C–5A capability and resource?

General MILLER. I would say this, and again I go back to what I said earlier: that really we primarily are talking about repair parts and major assemblies, because I cannot visualize the bulk of our supplies going by air. Let's take, for example, today. At the time I left Vietnam not quite a year ago, we were feeding 11 million rations a month. We were receiving 85,000 short tons per month of ammunition. We were expending 2 million barrels of oil per month, and I mean barrels, not gallons. That is a tremendous tonnage. I do not know what we would require in the way of C–5A capability to lift that kind of tonnage. So I do not see at least in the near future, that we are going to go anywhere near an all Air LOC. I cannot even see it out in the 1985 time frame. Maybe it's simply beyond my perspective.

What I do see is a very rapid response and a cut down of intermediate stockages on this very difficult to manage repair parts area. I will give you another for instance.

I watched the 8th Aerial Port at Tan Son Nhut for a year and a half and this is one of the problems that we have to think about and face. They had berthing spaces for the equivalent of five C–141's and storage space to allow 4 million pounds to be put in there at any one time. This is about 2,000 short tons.

That was a normal 3-day backlog of the in-country air capability to move it out of that port. And that 2,000 tons represents only 20 sorties of a C–5A. This is the kind of problem that we are looking at to determine how are we going to take maximum advantage of this tremendous lift capability in a theater of operations.

It does no good to compress your time of delivery, if after you get it there you cannot distribute it.

By the same token, we have problems on the other end. Where is this C–5A going to go to pick up that hundred tons of specific supplies that are needed by specific units in the theater on the other end? I cannot see a C–5A hopping around to 26 different locations in the United States picking up a little bit of cargo before it starts off, or we will have lost the effectiveness of this rapid movement capability.

Mr. ROBACK. Maybe you need a LOGAIR type of operation in the United States.