

the computer to logistic and other management tasks. I will return to a discussion of future opportunities in this area later in this statement.

As the committee's hearings have brought out, there are many apparent differences in concept and coverage among the supply management and control systems of the four services. Before examining these differences, and our future objectives for improvement, I would like next to review—

B. HOW OUR SUPPLY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS HAVE FUNCTIONED UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In January 1965, U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam was 23,000, and the logistic base consisted of one deepwater port, three jet airfields, and virtually no capability outside of Saigon to deploy and support forces. By June 1968, our forces had grown to 534,000, with the growth occurring at the following rates:

June 1965	59, 900
June 1966	267, 500
June 1967	448, 800
June 1968	534, 000

The most difficult problems were experienced during the first year of the buildup when 200,000 men were deployed concurrently with the construction of the logistical base. Today—3 years later—we have moved almost 13 million short tons of materiel into the Pacific area—including 400,000 end items—and constructed 29 deepwater berths, 50 forward airfields, four major depots, petroleum storage for 4.5 million barrels, and 21 million square feet of improved open-storage area.

The major problems of the buildup were, of course, experienced by Army, which has deployed over two-thirds of the men and materiel, and has the problem of operating in a highly mobile environment without the benefit of fixed bases, such as characterize the Navy and Air Force environment. In addition, for most of Vietnam, Army operates all ports and supplies food, petroleum and selected common items to other services and the ARVN. Navy has these responsibilities in I Corps.

I have just returned from my third inspection trip to Vietnam in 2 years and can summarize the story of SEA logistics supports in four findings:

1. The U.S. forces have never been restricted in combat operations for want of essential supplies, and have enjoyed the highest quality of personal supplies—food, clothing, medical—during wartime. Even among units deployed in the north of SVN today, freshly baked bread, fresh fruits and vegetables, milk and ice cream are regularly available. The availability of spare parts for aircraft, trucks, tanks, vehicles and other equipment is as high or higher than that experienced anywhere else in the world. These results have been achieved by the most intensive logistics management effort in our history, including, when required, visibility of critical supplies and equipment up to the level of the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

Example: Every week a report is received in my office showing the percent of major Army equipments out-of-service awaiting parts.