

problems which are quite well known, and we don't want to deny them at all. It is coming out of those problems, but I suspect it is a matter of 6 months before they should start expanding support on additional common items.

Mr. DAHLIN. Was this kind of changeover between—in Vietnam you have had changeover of service, you have had changeover of systems, you have had change in the ADP. Do you think planning is going to take care of these problems a little better in the future?

For instance, there is no triservice input into the Quick Reaction Inventory Control Center. Should you look at that problem?

Mr. MORRIS. We are learning all manner of lessons from this experience. Of course, one doesn't go into a contingency like this expecting, necessarily, to put on a peacetime highly efficient management system. What we are learning is that we can be more efficient much faster, however, through the Quick Reaction Inventory Control Center.

I don't think it needs to concern the other services, because the Army, as it does in Thailand and Korea as well as Vietnam would still be the principal housekeeper and supplier of such items in any future contingency. We want to be sure that the Army system is perfected.

Mr. DAHLIN. The Air Force, for instance, had to put in some special supply support units, as one of these little deviations in the system, just to provide better support out in the field, even though it has this concept which is supposed to work entirely out of CONUS depots.

Mr. MORRIS. True, but the ability to improvise and to innovate under stress and unknown conditions, I think, is one of the great characteristics that we have all seen happen in this Vietnam experience, and we should preserve that.

Mr. DAHLIN. The question is how are you going to preserve it? Do you put the Air Force effort, for instance, in quick reaction, strictly within its own system or do you want the services coordinating from the start?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't believe they have had problems of housekeeping support from the Army, or petroleum or subsistence support.

Mr. ROBACK. You don't know really how much these other services will be involved in any given contingency situation?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. ROBACK. You therefore can't plan too well for common support or interservicing. One might add that it has taken the U.S. military 3 or 4 years to learn how to fight the war in Vietnam and maybe your quick reaction inventory control center is not going to be too efficient until the services really know what they want in the way of war goods. Certain goods they will obviously need. They will need consumables, guns, and things like this, but there are many weapon developments and requirements which don't emerge too quickly, at least if the Vietnam experience is going to be instructive.

Mr. MORRIS. We must emphasize that we are learning much and I think that is the greatness of the system, that it causes our commanders to want to learn.

Mr. ROBACK. There are some Members of Congress that wish the learning period would be over and that some results would be achieved.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.