Program authority for procurement of a quantity of 60 each XM–3 subsystems in the simplified nonflexible configuration was released to the field in October 1962.

The QMR for armed helicopter weapons systems, October 24, 1962, expanded on the pertinent CDOG paragraph referred to above and defined the following mission requirements:

(*a*) Light weapons systems
(*b*) Point target weapons systems
(*c*) Area target weapons systems

Since the XM–3 subsystem was developed to provide an interim area rocket system in the shortest possible time, all requirements of the latest QMR were not fully satisfied. The XM–3 subsystem because of size and weight did not lend itself to the above mission requirements because of need to combine both small arms fire with rocket capabilities on Army helicopters. Further feasibility studies indicated the most expeditious and economical course of action to satisfy Army launcher requirements was to modify the design of existing rocket launchers being procured by the Navy.

Design of Navy nonreusable type LAU 32B/A, seven tube and LAU 3A/A, 19 tube rocket launchers was modified by the manufacturer (Chromcraft Corp., St. Louis, Mo.) to meet Army rocket launcher requirements as follows:

(*a*) Replaced paper tubes with aluminum to make the launcher reusable.
(*b*) Removed fairing, which is not required with low-speed helicopters.
(*c*) Remove intervalometer from launchers. (More substantial intervalometer in aircraft cockpit provides pilot with selectivity of fire; i.e., choice of firing single rounds or continuous ripple).

The modified rocket launchers were redesignated XM–157 and XM–159 respectively.

First production contract for the XM–157 and XM–159 rocket launchers was awarded in June 1965.

M. Roback. After all, you are being commissioned as a single agent for the launcher as well as the rocket, and you are not the biggest user of the launcher, you see.

General Anderson. No.

SINGLE SERVICE ASSIGNMENT

Mr. Roback. And so this goes against the grain of the dominant user concept for the executive agency. You are acquiring responsibilities beyond your major involvement, and therefore one might ask a legitimate question whether you are going to be responsive to the other services, and whether your expertise in procurement is going to exceed that of the Navy. At this stage of the game and for this particular item it ought not to be too difficult.

General Anderson. Mr. Roback, one of the guiding premises, I believe, in our recommendation that we assume this responsibility was the marrying together of the entire weapons system, the rocket and its launchers.

Mr. Roback. I wonder if you could inform us—you know, some years ago when Mr. McNamara was proudly displaying his cost reduction program, one of the savings items was the fact that there were a lot of 2.75 rockets floating around that he was going to save money on by redistributing them. I do not know whether in the MAP program or to other services or what. I think they were Navy-purchased rockets. In other words, the Mighty Mouse, as I think it was then called, was a drug on the market. There were too many of them. And the Air Force and the Navy had said, "We don't even need any launchers any more." This was about 1960, 1959. And then Mr.