

has been woven of flexible material which stretches and bends and re-forms, accommodating social change while still maintaining the integrity of a working society. Today, however, the social web is stretched in many places to the breaking point. The sounds we hear from the streets of Watts, and Detroit, and Washington, D.C., and from the campuses of Columbia and Berkeley and their counterparts across the Nation are the strands of that web snapping under tensions they cannot stand.

I do not pretend to be able to sort out the rights and wrongs—to be able to say how much the sharp increase in tensions arises from unreasonable rigidity in our social institutions and how much from unreasonable pressure for instantaneous social change. Nor have I a list of program measures, which—if we could only get them adopted by President and Congress, Governors and mayors—would guarantee the elimination of these social tensions and the causes which give them rise.

I do have a more modest and certainly a more prosaic objective. There are certain commonly accepted views about the solution to the Nation's social problems which, if allowed to persist, can be misleading if not downright dangerous. The most prevalent of these combines two widely held premises into an equally widely held conclusion.

The first premise is that the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam will release some \$30 billion or so in Federal budgetary resources for use in domestic public programs. The second premise is that all we basically need to solve the social problems now facing the Nation is a fistful of money to expand existing public social programs or initiate new ones along the lines of the old. Put the two premises together, and one is forced to conclude that once we end the Vietnam war, we will be quickly on our way to the solution of the Nation's social ills.

The first premise is, I believe, false. The second is a half-truth. Cessation of hostilities in Vietnam will most likely *not* release substantial funds for other purposes. And, large injections of budgetary funds are not alone sufficient to meet the problems which confront us. Now I want to be quite clear about what I am saying. We cannot attack poverty, the decay of the inner city, and the pollution of the environment without committing to this effort large expenditures of public funds. We can't buy solutions on the cheap. But at the same time effective solutions will not be achieved simply by smothering the problems in money. We will have to face up to major changes in governmental organization, in social institutions, and in private attitudes. To put it yet another way, a large increase in budgetary funds is a necessary, but far from a sufficient, condition to reduce the tensions which threaten the social fabric.

Let me start by examining the assumption that an end to the Vietnam war would make available a huge kitty of resources for use in public programs of education, health, urban rehabilitation, pollution control, and the like. The Federal budget for fiscal 1969, submitted to the Congress last January, estimated military expenditures for Vietnam at \$26 billion. Since that time President Johnson has revised that estimate upward by \$2½ billion, for a total of \$28½, or nearly \$30 billion. But this is no measure of what reductions might be forthcoming with a cessation of hostilities.

In the first place some of the costs attributable to Vietnam would have occurred in any event. B-52's would be flying practice missions instead of combat missions. Some of the aircraft now being bought to replace combat losses in Vietnam would have been bought to replace obsolescence and to make up for losses in training flights and non-combat operations. Moreover the Vietnam war—compared to other wars—has been fought on a tightly controlled inventory basis. During the Korean war all the bars were let down on the procurement of military equipment and supplies. We accumulated excess stores of military items sufficient to last far into the future. Under Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, procurement for Vietnam was much more carefully adjusted to combat requirements. Excess stocks have not been accumulated—indeed some stockpiles have been run down. Moreover, during the past three years, many items of routine military procurement—family housing for military personnel, for example—have been postponed and stretched out. They cannot be postponed indefinitely.

There is no good way in the light of all these factors, to calculate exactly how much of a reduction in military expenditures an end to the Vietnam war would make possible. But we can get an idea from some crude estimates.

If defense expenditures after the hostilities end should run at the same level as they did before Vietnam, allowing for increases in prices and in military pay