

I think we have to accept that we cannot meet all these objectives with one program. We have to decide which principle is partially sacrifice. I personally am more concerned with adequacy, because I think that a decent level of living will have a bigger effect upon people than providing a relatively small incentive to work might have. I think people on welfare, by and large, despite the popular cry, are likely to work. Most of those who are available for work could work, are working, and with relatively minor incentive changes, we could induce more to work, though I think there will still be malingerers. Though, as I argue in my printed statement, I think it is a mistake to construct a law in terms of its abuse rather than in terms of its fundamental contribution.

We come to the point that I think it is important to think about our income cash policies in the larger context of our economic policies in the country. We need to move on the two fronts of jobs and cash programs. They should not be thought of as separate kinds of activities or that one can perform the role of the other. I think it is important to bring them together, whether we are dealing with a rural area or an urban area. An income program can help in handling some of the problems, but it cannot handle all of the problems in any particular area in the United States.

There are degrees of conflict and divergence among our programs. I think we lack a good deal of basic information that is needed today, but most of all, I think we have to get away from the notion that there is a magic in any kind of program, whether the heavy emphasis is put upon incentive, or upon some other major reform in administration of public welfare. I do not believe in magic. I think we have to decide on a monastay and priorities; my emphasis is upon adequacy and coverage, as the foremost issues today in income maintenance.

(The prepared statement of Professor Miller follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF S. M. MILLER*

In the last year we have seen a pronounced concern with cash, transfer or income maintenance programs. This interest is in contrast with the beginning stages of the war on poverty and deserves analysis. Frequently, when we get the kind of convergence of concerns that we have now, it turns out that individuals have quite different agendas, even though their interests appear merged into one particular concern.

We do not have an adequate social history to paint a full picture of why cash programs have become important. But there seem to be some obviously important pigments to which we can point.

The war on poverty which was declared in 1964 lacked both job and cash components. Consequently, the best of programs would be very limited in impact. The war on poverty essentially started out as a rehabilitation and community coordination effort. As such, the main components of a war on poverty—cash and job programs—were very limited.

The years since the beginning of the war on poverty have shown that training is an inadequate strategy for improving the prospects of many of the poor. Training without a guarantee of jobs at the end of, or intermixed with, the training cycle has proved to be of only limited value in dealing with the problems of the unemployed or underemployed poor.

The recognition of this failure is leading us now into programs which put the poor into jobs and building services and training around the jobs, rather than those which provide training in the hope that jobs will somehow eventually emerge.

*I present my personal views, not those of the organizations with which I am connected. I have been aided by Martin Rein of Bryn Mawr College in preparing this statement.