

Mr. SISK. Why the delay there? Was it going to take from 3:00 o'clock in the morning until that night to get the Guard on the street?

Mr. MURPHY. By 3:00 a.m., Friday morning, sir, the situation was under relatively good control.

Mr. SISK. Did you have anything, though, to lead you to believe it would stay under control?

Mr. MURPHY. We had no good evidence to indicate either way, sir.

Mr. SISK. You see, I happen to agree, Mr. Murphy, with you to some extent with reference to hesitancy in using the ultimate force—of going out and mowing people down with machine guns. Frankly, I know a lot of other people who were very upset because that had not been done. I agree with you that is not the way. But it seems to me that the only way, then, you can offset that is through a show of force—with what the Secretary called a massive force.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISK. So I think to someone there is justifiable criticism, why a decision wasn't immediately made to have on the streets those troops Friday morning. This, to me, is a real criticism. I am trying to get the exact time the request was made for the first troops, Guard or otherwise?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, sir, that request for the Guard, a preliminary request for the Guard, was made at that time to be confirmed Friday a.m. The situation in the city at that particular time had been pretty much limited to one street, a section of 14th Street, and both the looting and the window-breaking and the larceny and the fires were under good control by 3:00 a.m.

As a matter of fact, by between 4:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., activities in the city were close to normal and that schools opened, people came to work. We had many additional police officers on duty. We did not assume—far from it—we did not assume that we were back to a totally normal situation. But we were hopeful that perhaps this outbreak on Thursday night would subside, and as soon as we had sufficient officers in that it might not flare up again.

Mr. SISK. Actually, then, as I understand what you are saying, really, there was no request made for troops on the street to be available before late Friday afternoon or Friday night? Well, we all agree, then, a substantial error in judgment was made here?

Mr. MURPHY. From the present position, knowing what did happen—of course, if we had known that—that there would have been another outbreak—

Mr. SISK. This is hindsight, and it is always better than foresight. But, as I say, there was an error in judgment. Of course, this goes to the matter of intelligence. I would assume certainly you do have in so-called trouble spots in Washington some type of intelligence, that is in the way of information.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISK. What I am trying to say is, people who feed information in, and apparently, there was a failure or breakdown, if you did have such a force.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I might point out, Congressman, that when I went to the Pentagon—I am not familiar with everything that happened, but I know that alert systems were escalating within the Military. I know the difficult situation that existed in the Pentagon dur-