

The curfew was certainly a very valuable tool to us because the curfew provides the police and the Military, if they are on duty, the provision that is needed to get people off the streets. Of course, in a large city, with many hundreds of thousands of people who live in it and are in it every day working or as visitors, without some kind of control over the movement of people on the streets, it is very difficult, especially at night, to prevent all looting, even with thousands of troops and National Guardsmen supplementing the regular Police force.

Like you, Congressman, I agree that we have to think awfully long and hard about just how far we want to go with increasing our Police force and what kind of additional talent, if any, we might want to give to our Police Department; because in my view, the manner in which the people in our kind of society police themselves—and really, that is very much what the system—it is a system of policing by the people themselves, using the Police as their tool, I think to the extent that we accept that system, which I think is a fine system—we do begin to move toward the kind of Government control and even the Police State that has never been a part of our tradition in this nation.

Mr. Diggins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dowdy. I might comment that I have heard very few complaints about the Police. The complaints I have heard have not been about the actions of the Police, but have been of the undue restraints that were put upon the Police in their attempts to enforce the law and preserve order.

Where have we got to?

Mr. Horton.

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Commissioner, yesterday you spoke at length in regard to the several disturbances, and I had the impression that Chief Layton was prepared to make some comments. At this point, at least, I haven't heard any comments from him.

I would like to ask Chief Layton if you have anything you would like to add to the testimony which was given yesterday with regard to the disturbances of early April?

Chief LAYTON. Mr. Horton, as the disturbance developed on the evening of April 4, it first began with some group at around 14th and U Streets. The violence that attended this didn't begin until later in the evening, first, with a window-breaking at one of a couple of places.

We had, at the first news of Dr. King's shooting and then his death, had sent out messages by Teletype to the Force to be alert for any developments on the streets. Then the group at around 14th and U was the first indication.

We did, at one of the decisive points that was available, there on the street in No. 13 Precinct—we had a detail of 100 officers who were sent from the location of the detail at the Washington Hilton Hotel—were sent to the area that was concerned after the crowd began building up.

So that we had 100 additional officers who were sent there.

Mr. HORTON. Did you participate in the decisions with regard to the mobilization of the Force, or was this something done by the Commissioner without your knowledge, or with your knowledge—how was it handled?

Chief LAYTON. I participated in the decisions that were made, Mr. Horton. The early decision to send the 100 men there—I wasn't imme-