

diately available at that time. I was at a location nearby and I was reached by telephone when the numbers of people began developing, and so the first decision to move the 100 officers there was not mine, but I would have agreed with it.

Later decisions, I did participate in.

The next decision that was made was to assemble our Civil Disturbance Unit. We have members of the Civil Disturbance Unit assigned to the various units so that they are on duty three tours of duty.

These Civil Disturbance Unit men, then, were drawn from the units in which they are ordinarily assigned and assembled to be deployed in that area that is affected. About the same time, a directive was issued to all the precincts, not to release any of the men working at 4:00 p.m. to midnight tour of duty until further orders were given.

Very shortly thereafter, a directive went out to recall, or have the midnight section, the section working midnight to 8:00 a.m., report in as soon as possible.

In the early stages, there was not the kind of widespread looting that we had on Friday afternoon and evening, but it was a matter of window-breaking and some stealing of merchandise and running, before Police officers could be deployed on the scene.

In any event, the effort was to build up the Force along 14th Street and to bring back into control.

TROOPS

Mr. HORTON. Did there come a time during the evening of April 4 that you made any recommendations to the Commissioner, one way or the other, with regard to the mobilization or the calling in of National Guard or Army Forces?

Chief LAYTON. I would say not, during—my recollection is that we didn't discuss that specifically during the evening, late hours of April 4th, but the early hours of April 5 we had some discussion of it.

Following that discussion, Mr. Murphy went to a meeting at the Pentagon about 3:00 o'clock.

Mr. HORTON. Three a.m.?

Chief LAYTON. Three a.m., yes, sir.

Mr. HORTON. Was that in accordance with your recommendations? Had you agreed with him in regard to calling at that point for Federal Forces?

Chief LAYTON. This wasn't a specific recommendation, Mr. Horton, that National Guard troops be requested at that time. This was—and it wasn't a specific recommendation of mine—this was a matter of discussion, as we had about a number of things, a number of tactics, that it was one that the purpose of Mr. Murphy's going to the Pentagon then was to report the situation as we saw it and to refine the procedures for calling out troops if that was necessary.

Actually, by 3:00 o'clock in the morning, by that time we had called back all of our off-duty personnel. We had better than 2500 men reporting back. So that by 3:00 in the morning, the number of cases that were being reported was declining, and it continued to decline with that large force that we had available at that time—declined until about 7:00 o'clock. It was back to a normal rate of incidents reported to the Police.