

system. However, the prevention of runs is not and never will be the sole or even the most important function of the discount window.

In a highly fragmented banking system such as that existing in the United States, it is important that there be some method whereby all member banks can obtain Reserve Bank credit quickly and efficiently to meet their individual reserve needs.

The net reserve needs of the banking system as a whole can be and are promptly and effectively met by open market operations. However, at least two factors that can combine to prevent these operations from adequately responding to the needs of individual banks. The size and timing of short-term reserve pressures often varies from bank to bank. Thus, individual banks may be experiencing shortages of funds far in excess of reasonable expectations given current monetary conditions, whether of ease or restraint. Their problems with these needs cannot be allowed to dilute the effectiveness of monetary policy, but neither should these institutions be exclusively dependent because of their special needs for funds, which may be quite different from the national credit conditions being dealt with by open market operations.

A second and closely related factor is the imperfection of distributional mechanisms in the United States. With perfect mobility of credit, the impact of any general monetary policy would be equitably distributed throughout the financial system relative to the opportunity for profitable employment of funds. However, this degree of mobility simply does not exist. Financial markets and mechanisms do not function with sufficient speed and elasticity to guarantee that a bank can always effect its needed adjustments through these markets. In a system with a very large number of member banks, practically speaking, not all banks have adequate access to such markets. These markets have improved in the past, and doubtless will continue to do so. For numerous banks, the ability to tap these markets expeditiously has developed commensurately with local credit demands, and the ability to borrow from time to time from the Federal Reserve has made such banks more efficient in serving their communities by providing them the needed flexibility for an orderly working out of reserve adjustments.

In addition, it is important to recognize that the discount mechanism serves, in effect, as a "safety valve" for open market operations. If such a mechanism, open market operations would have to be modified by the need to avoid impact on individual institutions. However, since individual banks do have the ability through borrowings from the central bank to offset temporarily what at times may be a particularly harsh impact of open market operations, such operations can be conducted more vigorously and in accordance with the credit needs of the economy as a whole. Thus, it is my judgment that the existence of the discount window not only does not detract from the task of overall monetary management, but in fact enhances it.

Furthermore, I believe that this latter beneficial effect would be enhanced with the adoption of the proposal for its redesign. One of the effects of the change would be to shift a somewhat larger part of the reserve adjustment initiative to the individual member bank. The probability this can relieve open market operations of a portion