

lengthy but I can summarize it by saying that an examination of previous legislation shows that there is precedent for congressional authorization of bank stabilization projects. Details on a number of examples are given in the written statement.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement.

Mr. BLATNIK. How many examples do you have?

Colonel HALL. I think it is about eight, sir.

Mr. BLATNIK. Aside from the number, is there anything peculiar about these particular eight? What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is: While the bank stabilization may not be related directly to the navigation or flood control aspects, is there some emergency or some secondary reason for holding bank stabilization, such as undue raising of the levels of the water because of a dam, and Congress felt it was justifiable, that since there is some liability, either direct or indirect, we would carry on this remedial or emergency corrective bank stabilization?

Colonel HALL. Well, the primary purpose of some of these examples was purely bank stabilization and prevention—

Mr. BLATNIK. Per se; bank stabilization, per se?

Colonel HALL. It was prevention of damages, for example, the project on the Red River itself at Garland City, Ark. This is carried out under authority provided by the Congress in the omnibus bill of 1960. This project cost in the neighborhood of a million and a quarter dollars.

This was for the protection of a railroad bridge and a State highway bridge. But it was purely for the—it was bank stabilization.

Mr. BLATNIK. We will review the projects later in more detail.

Colonel HALL. All right, sir.

Mr. BLATNIK. Because there will be some policy questions, policy aspects to decide, and the Chair feels there ought to be much more time to study the consideration given to bank stabilization projects which run on the order of a quarter of a billion dollars, which would be the total cost, on page 2 of your summary.

Colonel HALL. Yes, sir.

ANSWER TO QUESTION CONCERNING RED RIVER BANK PROTECTION PROPOSAL

During the discussion of the report on the Red River below Denison Dam it was mentioned that in commenting thereon the Bureau of the Budget had stated that it was unaware of any authorized bank stabilization project that is not related to a navigation improvement, or to the protection of flood control measures. Representatives of the Corps of Engineers were asked if there were not instances in which bank stabilization, as such, had been authorized by Congress. It was not possible to provide a clear-cut answer to this question without a careful examination of the record. This statement summarizes the result of such an examination.

It was found that a number of precedents exist for Congressional authorization of streambank protection projects which are not "related" to navigation or flood control projects; in the sense in which that term is used in the Bureau of the Budget's letter of 13 April 1968. More specifically, it was found that in some instances Congress authorized the installation of bank protection measures on streams where no navigation or flood control works had been, or were to be, provided. In other instances, Congress authorized bank protection measures on streams where navigation or flood control works also exist, but where the sole, or main, reason for the bank protection measures was to stop the destruction of land by bank erosion.

The example most pertinent to the Committee's consideration of the Red River Report is a project authorized in 1944 for the purpose of preventing bank caving in the vicinity of Shreveport, La. This project was proposed in a report, printed