This results, in some instances, to damage to those being regulated in one division when beneficial regulation is imposed on those regulated in another division. It also results in the neglect of the rights of those regulated in one division when the Corporation Commission must devote the major portion of its time to the regulation of those in another division. The Committee also finds that there is not a clearly defined separation of duties and responsibilities in each division of the Corporation Commission.

3. The Corporation Commissioners serve a term of six years, with one commissioner being elected every two years in a statewide election. This has resulted in those commissioners not running, usually lending their support to the commissioner who is running and likewise, in the employees of the Corporation Commission generally giving their support to the person running for re-election or to the person endorsed by a majority of the members of the Corporation Commission and this in turn makes it difficult, if not impossible, to have a change of administration in the Corporation Commission. The Committee further finds that the conduct of a statewide campaign necessitates the seeking of large campaign contributions by the candidates.

4. By the very nature of the work of the attorneys of the Corporation Commission, particularly in the division regulating utilities, there is a close association with the attorneys representing public utility companies, and this gives rise to the question as to whether the attorneys for the utility company may not unduly influence the decisions of the attorneys for the Corporation Commission. This question is further emphasized by the fact that former attorneys of the Corporation Commission, in order to receive a greater income, have left the Corporation Commission to become attorneys for the utility companies. Likewise, the question is further emphasized by the fact that some attorneys in the Corporation Commission have associated themselves, while employed by the commission, with attorneys representing utility companies allegedly in cases not involving the regulation of the Corporation Commission.

5. There is strong evidence of lax administration and inadequate supervision on the part of the members of the Corporation Commission and the administrative heads in said commission of those under their supervision, particularly with reference to the checking to see that policies of the Corporation Commission are carried out, and likewise with reference to seeing that those who are assigned to do a particular job, actually perform the job they are assigned to do, and that persons designated to travel in connection with their duties, actually make the trips they are designated to make.

6. Members of the Corporation Commission and certain employees of the commission accepted free transportation on planes owned by oil companies, but the Committee finds that this is not the type of free transportation in and of itself prohibited by law, and the Committee further finds that in many instances said travel would have otherwise been paid by the State of Oklahoma.

7. Clyde Hale, Sr., during his lifetime, and the law firm of Hale, Welch and Hale, offered rooms to members of the Corporation Commission and to certain employees of the commission during the Oklahoma-Texas football games and at meetings of associations and likewise provided tickets for the games in Dallas and likewise furnished small presents at Christmas time to members of the Corporation Commission, employees of the commission and other state officials, but there is a conflict of evidence as to whether the rooms in Dallas and elsewhere, and the Texas-O.U. football tickets were accepted in all instances and whether or not Clyde Hale, Sr., and the law firm of Hale, Welch and Hale, were reimbursed for the tickets and the rooms used. The Committee further finds that the mere acceptance of these gratuities is not a violation of law.

8. Harold Freeman and Ray C. Jones, while they were members of the Corporation Commission, and Ferrill Rogers, while he was an employee of said commission, were instrumental in obtaining financial support for Oklahoma Well Servicing Company, Inc., an oil well servicing company doing business in Oklahoma, and likewise assisted Eugene Blalock, the manager of said company, in making contacts with oil companies which resulted in said oil well servicing company obtaining some business from said oil companies. The business of an oil well servicing company in Oklahoma is not directly subject to the regulation of the Corporation Commission but it is indirectly subject to the regulation of the Corporation Commission in its authority over the regulation of correlative rights in the production of oil and gas in Oklahoma. There is evidence that either Ray C. Jones or Harold Freeman, or both, recommended to Skelly Oil Company and other companies, that said oil well servicing company be given business by