

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Tunney.

Mr. TUNNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Palmer, what would you say were the two or three main policy objectives in Nigeria of our foreign policy?

Mr. PALMER. I would say the first and most immediate objective is to try to get effective humanitarian assistance available to all those on both sides who are affected by the civil war.

I would say that our second objective is to see just as early as possible a peaceful resolution of the problem within the framework of the maintenance of the unity of Nigeria, which we have supported from the beginning, and to see this worked out in such a way as to provide protection to all of the peoples that inhabit Nigeria.

Thirdly, from this point to see Nigeria resume its potential in the field of economic development to bring about a better life for the people of Nigeria.

Mr. TUNNEY. I think that is a very articulate expression of our foreign policy goals. However, in Vietnam we proclaimed that in a conflict between two political subdivisions of one people that there should be self-determination by peoples of both subdivisions, particularly in South Vietnam. In Nigeria we have a civil war involving mainly tribal rivalries, with apparently a desire of the Ibos to secede from the Federal Government and establish an independent state.

Why do we have a different theory of self-determination in Vietnam than in Nigeria?

Mr. PALMER. The problem of self-determination obviously has limits to it. I think the situation in South Vietnam is very much complicated by the fact that there are other forces that are at work here. There are outside forces, which I do not think is the case with respect to Nigeria. Granted that there are four African countries who have supported Biafra and do recognize it, I would not say that the weight of opinion within the rest of Africa supports this position. I think there are great dangers that if the principle of self-determination is carried to its logical conclusion. Instead of having 40 countries in Africa, that number could be greatly augmented beyond the 40. I do not think it is up to the United States to support secessionist movements of this kind. I think it is primarily up to the countries in the area concerned to bring about the solution to this problem in an African and Nigerian context.

Mr. TUNNEY. What you are saying is that it is a pragmatic evaluation based on the circumstances that exist in the continent of Africa. That self-determination as a policy, which we proclaim and seemed to have proclaimed since Woodrow Wilson, is going to be tempered by a pragmatic decision that it would not be in the case of Nigeria.

Mr. PALMER. I think that self-determination, as it has been generally applied, is related primarily to the decolonization process. I think there are other elements besides the element of self-determination in the Vietnamese situation that differentiate it from the Nigerian situation. There is a factor of aggression. I would not say there is a factor of aggression here. Nigeria was one country. One part is trying to split off.