

development program, and insure that they also make a maximum contribution to our ability to adjust to import competition.

As you know, there are some who say that there should be an over-all economic mobility program which is not tied to any specific cause of economic distress. While this is obviously beyond the bounds of a study of trade policy, I would personally think it worthy of greater consideration.

Recently, I have heard it said that the conditions for escape-clause relief are just as unrealistic as those for adjustment assistance, especially since they turn on the same causal factors. This conclusion seems to me premature. I think an examination of the escape-clause petitions made since 1962 would reveal that they involved weak cases in which the tariff concession was a very old one or in which it was not clear that there had been an increase in imports. In short, I am not persuaded that the criteria for escape-clause relief are unduly rigorous. However, I do believe that import restrictions should be an available remedy in certain cases and that we should not reject out of hand any objective attempt to reevaluate the sufficiency of the conditions for escape-clause relief.

The final topic of our study concerns the administration of trade policy. Domestically, this has to do with the organization and administration of trade policy within the executive branch and between the executive branch and the Congress. It was the Congress, of course, which was, in effect, responsible for the creation, in 1962, of the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The role of this Office has been evolving, particularly since the conclusion of the Kennedy Round. Others can best judge how effective our role has been. At the very least, however, we have raised the issue of how trade policy could be coordinated within the executive branch—and, hopefully, even shed some light on it.

I am aware of some feeling that the relationship between the Congress as delegator and the executive branch as delegate is not what it should be. It is obvious that there cannot be an effective trade policy without full congressional participation and, indeed, periodic grants of authority to the President to work in this field with other countries. I think that the institution in the Trade Expansion Act of the congressional delegates proved to be a most effective one. I would certainly hope that other mechanisms, both formal and informal, could be established to maintain even greater rapport and understanding between the two branches.

Likewise, consideration should be given to the continuing development of effective forms of cooperation between Government and business, labor, agriculture, and consumer organizations in the formulation and implementation of our trade policies.

Internationally, it is clear that there is one organization which is first and foremost in all trade matters, although there are others that play a very important role. For this reason, American support of the GATT is absolutely vital, since it is the only agreed code—however imperfect—by which countries trade with each other. For certain specific issues, the OECD and UNCTAD have proven effective. Considerably more attention, however, needs to be given to the orderly interrelationship of these and other international organizations.