

have, in this statement, simply tried to emphasize one or perhaps two points which are covered in those reports. There is nothing here, so far as I know, inconsistent with them, but this does represent an emphasis on two points—the first of which is this very stubborn fact that now, after 7 years of uninterrupted, unprecedented economic expansion, there is an extraordinary amount of remaining unemployment, which is hanging on. At this point, almost by definition, that unemployment is what is left after we have pressed the economy to what most of us consider its maximum effective point, so that it could not be pressed further without danger of what is recognized generally—although I realize there is disagreement on this—of overheating. So, what we are talking about here has been called hard-core unemployment; it has been called structural unemployment more traditionally. It could also be identified as subemployment, or long-term unemployment. For purposes, I believe, of the committee's current analysis, it is that unemployment which remains when the economy has done all that it can, and when fiscal and monetary policy have been pressed as far as they can be pressed, and what it leaves is a picture of 3 million unemployed as of a particular time; 10 to 11 million unemployed at one point or another during the year, with a concentration of that unemployment in particular areas—

Mr. Ross. Ten to eleven million unemployed—

Secretary WIRTZ. At one time or another during the year, and with a concentration of that unemployment in particular areas, and among particular groups, particularly the minority groups and, in age terms, the group between 18 and 19. And so, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my statement is an attempt to focus as sharply as possible on that particular fact, and on what we are trying to do about it.

I have summarized in the statement the approach that is being taken to this problem on two fronts. First, we are increasingly a country which does whatever we can measure, whether for better or for worse. And there has been a little-noticed development of very real significance—I think particularly in the kind of thinking for which this committee is responsible—a real development in the last 12 or 24 months in the identification and measurement of the hard-core kind of unemployment we are talking about, which, from here on, I will use as a shorthand phrase, referring to that unemployment which fiscal and monetary policy and the expansion of the economy alone will not meet.

In this last 2-year period we have tried, under Mr. Ross' leadership in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and throughout the Department, to try to bring our forms of measurement of the problem, of personal economic disability, into line with the recognition of this hard-core kind of unemployment. And, in this statement, there is a summary of what has been done there.

There are really three steps in it. First, we have taken those monthly reports which the country is familiar with in terms of only a single percentage—you pick up the paper and read that unemployment is 4 percent, or 4.1 percent, or 3.8 percent, and the matter is left in the headlines there. Very frequently, we have tried to get behind that, and bring out what has been in those figures but has not been emphasized promptly—the facts of the unemployment rate for minority groups, the facts of the unemployment rate for women, the facts of