Roosa bonds has been diminishing. In contrast, as shown in table 2, the U.S. Government's 4½ year "offset" bonds introduced by the 1967 offset agreements have been rising as a component of the Bundesbank's foreign assets of limited usability. Without implying a strict 1 for 1 relationship, we are suggesting that the "offsetting by lending" thus far has essentially meant that the Bundesbank has replaced maturing Roosa bonds with newly issued "offset" bonds.

TABLE 1.—GOLD HOLDINGS AND FREELY USABLE EXTERNAL ASSETS OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, 1961-66
[In millions of deutsche marks]

Yearend	Gold	U.S. dollars DM bonds of the U.S. Treasury ("Roosa" bonds)		Other assets	Total	
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965	14, 654 14, 716 15, 374 16, 992 17, 639 17, 167	10, 886 10, 785 11, 668 7, 712 5, 167 8, 307	1, 100 2, 700 2, 400 1, 400	625 285 267 475 204 211	26, 165 25, 786 28, 409 27, 879 25, 410 27, 085	

Source: Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1966, p. 96.

TABLE 2.—THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK'S EXTERNAL ASSETS OF LIMITED USABILITY, 1966-67

## [In millions of deutsche marks]

End of month	Medium-term bonds of the U.S. Treasury <sup>1</sup>	IBRD debt certificates	Bilateral claims from former credits to EPU	Total
966: December967:		1, 454	420	1,874
March		1, 454 1, 454 1, 454 1, 454 1, 454 1, 454 1, 454	420 420 420 420 420 331 331 331	1, 874 1, 874 1, 874 1, 874 2, 374 2, 285 2, 285 2, 285
	500 500 500			

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 1}$  "These bonds were taken over by the Bundesbank under the United States-German agreement, concluded at the beginning of May 1967, on foreign exchange assistance in favor of the United States."  $^{\rm 2}$  Provisional.

Source: "Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, October 1967," vol. 19, No. 10, p. 115.

Such replacement of Roosa bonds with "offset" bonds is admittedly helpful to the U.S. Treasury in that the German acquisition of Roosa bonds would not diminish the liquidity deficit in the U.S. balance of payments while the German acquisition of "offset" bonds does reduce the deficit. This is so because Roosa bonds, being convertible, are considered a liquid U.S. liability; while "offset" bonds being nonconvertible, are considered a nonliquid U.S. liability. There is thus involved a stretchout in the dollar-asset structure of the Bundesbank even when the "offset" bonds merely replace Roosa bonds. Given, however, the German policy of avoiding the exchange of dollars for gold, the replacement of convertible with nonconvertible notes is largely a matter of switching labels without changing the content. Alternatively stated, the 1967 agreement is significant for its reaffirmation of the German pledge not to exchange dollars for gold; it is not significant as