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OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY-
SAFEGUARDS IN THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
75 `O 25O'~\4~
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY~ 26 AND 27, 1976
Serial No. 94-16
PART VI
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
0
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-0740 WASHINGTON 1976
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COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
HAROLD T. JOHNSON, California
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
PHILLIP BURTON, California
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin
PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
LLOYD MEEDS, Washington
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., Texas
ROBERT G. STEPHENS, JR., Georgia
JOSEPH P. VIGORITO, Pennsylvania
JOHN MELCHER, Montana
TENO RONCALIO, Wyoming
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio
HAROLD RUNNELS, New Mexico
ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT, Guam
RON DR LUGO, Virgin Islands
BOB ECKHARDT, Texas
GOODLOE E. BYRON, Maryland
JAIME BENITEZ, Puerto Rico
JIM SANTINI, Nevada
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ALLAN T. HOWE, Utah
JAMES WEAVER, Oregon
BOB CARR, Michigan
GEORGE MILLER, California
THEODORE M. (TED) RISENHOOVER,
Oklahoma
JAMES J. FLORIO, New Jersey
JAIME BENITEZ, Puerto Rico
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
BOB CARR, Michigan
RON DE LUGO, Virgin Islands
BOB ECKHARDT, Texas
JOHN MELCHER, Montana
GEORGE MILLER, California
TENO RONCALIO, Wyoming
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JOSEPH P. VIGORITO, Pennsylvania
JAMES WEAVER, Oregon
JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas,
Ranking Minority Member
SAM STEIGER, Arizona
DON H. CLAUSEN, California
PHILIP B. RUPPE, Michigan
MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico
KEITH G. SEBELIUS, Kansas
ALAN STEELMAN, Texas
DON YOUNG, Alaska
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland
STEVEN D. SYMMS, Idaho
JAMES- P. (JIM) JOHNSON, Colorado
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JAMES A. HALEY, Florida, Chairman
CHARLES CONKLIN, staff Director
LEE McELVAIN, General Counsel
HENRY MYERS, Special Consultant on Nuclear Energy Matters
MICHAEL C. MARDEN, Minority Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona, Chairman -
ALAN STEELMAN, Texas
JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas
SAM STEIGER, Arizona
MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland
STEVEN D. SYMMS, Idaho
STANLEY E. SCOVILLE, Staff Counsel
MICHAEL B. METz, Minority Staff Counsel
NOTE--The first listed minority member is counterpart to the subcommittee chairman.
(II)
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CONTENTS
Hearings held: Page
February 26, 1976 1
February 27, 1976 139
Statements:
Bell, J. Bowyer, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia
University 55,57
Chapman, Kenneth, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 140, 146
Cherry, Bernard H., manager, fuel resources, General Public Utilities 100
Cochran, Tom, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington,
D.C 208
DeNike, Douglas, technical consultant, Californians for Nuclear
Safeguards, with addenda 15,21
Edlow, Samuel, president, Edlow International Co 502
Fish, Hon. Hamilton, Jr., Congressman from the State of New York_ 2
Graham, Frank, secretary, Committee on Safeguards Policy, Atomic
Industrial Forum 334
Gravel, Hon. Mike, Senator from the State of Alaska 2
Jenkins, Brian Michael, the Rand Corp 38
Jones, Orval E., director, Nuclear Security Systems, Sandia Labora-
tories, Albuquerque, N. Mex 517, 520
Lyon, Harvey E., Director, Division of Safeguards and Security,
ERDA. 514
McCloskey, David, manager, nuclear fuel safety research department,
Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N. Mex 83
Pollard, Robert 103
Rasmussen, Norman, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology_, 98
Tamplin, Arthur, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington,
D.C 208
Taylor, Ted, coauthor, "Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards" 205, 208
Letters:
Cochran, Thomas B., Natural Resources Defense Council, to Henry
Myers, Consultant on Nuclear Energy Matters, Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, dated April 27, 1976 214
Probst, William A., Chief, Transportation Branch, U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, to Samuel Edlow, dated December 30, 1974 - 506
Worthington, J. Dean, Atomic Industrial Forum, to S. H. Smiley,
NRC dated October 24, 1975 336
Additional material:
Article, "Policing Plutonium: the Civil Liberties Fallout," by Russell
W. Ayres 259
Current SNM facility protection features (chart) - 153
Dispersal of plutonium (chart) 66
Excerpt of Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff meeting with Natural
Resources Defense Council (pages 48 to 64) 253
Executive Summary of Security Agency Study 217
Materials shipment procedures (chart) 154
Memorandum from Carl H. Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards,
NRC, to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director, Licensing,
Division of Safeguards, NRC 214
NRC responses to questions from the Subcommittee on Energy and
the Environment, House InteriOr and Insular Affairs Committee - - 182
Report, "An Upper Estimate of Safeguards for Handling Plutonium,"
prepared for Atomic Industrial Forum 340
(III)
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Additional material-Continued
Report, "Technical Options for Plutonium Safeguards," by Atomic Page
Industrial Forum 451
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle (chart) 152
"Will Terrorists go Nuclear?," testimony of Brian M. Jenkins, before
Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials, California State
Assembly, November 19, 1975 43
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SAFEGUARDS IN THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1976
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 1324,
Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Paul E. Tsongas presiding.
Mr. TSONGAS. The hearings today and tomorrow before the House
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Energy and
the Environment concern security in the domestic nuclear industry.
These hearings are held in furtherance of the subcommittee's nuclear
oversight responsibility. There are two distinct areas of public con-
cern with respect to public hazards arising from the use of nuclear
fission to generate electric power. One area involves protection against
hazards of nuclear accidents. The other, the subject of these hearings,
is protection against nuclear theft and sabotage.
If we are to have nuclear power, it is essential that not only should
the hazards be small, but that the public be aware of what those
hazards are. Mere assurances that everything is all right will not
suffice. It is the purpose of these hearings to place on the public
record information that citizens can use in making their own assess-
ment of the benefits and risks of nuclear power.
Recent events have given prominence to possible shortcomings to
protect the nuclear industry against theft and sabotage. The Direc-
tor the NRC, Division of Safeguards, has written a memorandum in
which he said, "I am concerned that some or even many of our cur-
rently licensed facilities may not have safeguards which are adequ.ate
against the lowest levels of design threat. . . the NRC is considering
in its studies."
Based on this memorandum, the Natural Resources Defense Council
has petitioned the NRC either to close down a number of facilities
or to require an immediate upgrading of security. We are also
now discovering the apparent breakdown of the system which is sup-
posed to keep track of highly enriched uranium at a plant in Ten-
nessee.
In addition to these immediate problems, there are serious ques-
tions concerning the ability to provide protection over the long run,
when it is possible that there will be greater quantities of nuclear
materials in the commercial sector than is the case today.
The focus of these hearings will be the safeguards threat and
what is needed to protect against it. We will begin this morning with
Senator Gravel and Congressman Fish, who will make a joint state-
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2
ment. Next we will hear from three experts who have considered the
question of the types of groups or persons who might attempt to
steal nuclear materials or sabotage facilities. This afternoon there will
be a panel which discusses reactor sabotage and measures to increase
the difficulty of such sabotage. Tomorrow morning, NRC safeguard
officials will appear. We will seek information on the e~ents that have
caused so much concern in recent weeks.
Following the NRC officials will be discussion of a broad range of
safeguards issued by Drs. Thomas Cochran and Arthur Tamplin of
the Natural Resources Defense Council, Mr. Frank Graham of the
Atomic Industrial Forum, and Dr. Theodore Taylor, author of
"Nuclear Theft: iRisks and Safeguards."
On Friday afternoon representatives of ERDA and industry will
address transportation security. At that time I hope we will gain
insight into the extent of the need for Federal involvement in the
transportation of nuclear materials.
Senator Gravel and Congressman Fish, welcome to these hearings.
There will be other Members joining us, but we want to start this
on time so that our schedule could be adhered to reasonably. Do you
have copies of your testimony?
JOINT STATEMENT OF HON. HAMILTON FISH, JR., A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK; AND HON.
MIKE GRAVEL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OP ALASKA
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I had one copy, which I have given to
the reporter.
Mr. TSONGAS. I might say, before we begin, that prior to Congress-
man Weaver and my coming here, you gentlemen were involved in
this issue, and have established a very worthwhile reputation in the
field. We welcome you, and you may begin.
Mr. FISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Senator has kindly allowed me to proceed first because of time
problems of mine, and our presentation will be in tandem, covering
separate parts of the problem.
Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful for the opportunity to be here
today, to express my deep concern over this Nation's civilian nuclear
power program.
Nuclear power involves literally the gamut of health, environ-
mental, social, economic, moral, and national security problems-any
one of which is sufficiently serious, in my opinion, to justify serious
consideration to a halt in construction and operation of such facil-
ities. The two areas I wish to address specifically today involve the
threat nuclear power poses to our national security and well-being
due to sabotage and terrorism, and the role of human error in a pos-
sible nuclear accident.
THE TERRORISM/SABOTAGE THREAT
Mr. Chairman, almost daily we are reminded that there are groups
and individuals in the world that are ready, willing, and able to en-
gage in the most horrendous activities in pursuit of their goals,
whether those goals be right, wrong, trivial, or even nonexistent. The
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recent bombing at LaGuardia Airport, involving totally innocent
members of the general public, is but one recent example of such
terror.
The production of plutonium through nuclear power introduces a
new age of atomic terrorism. It is estimated that 100,000 pounds may
be in commercial circulation by the year 1985. Only 20 pounds, or
perhaps less, is needed to produce an atomic bomb. Nuclear advocates
admit that the production of plutonium poses the risk that some will
be diverted for nonpeaceful purposes. They respond by saying:
"We're taking extra precautions to prevent that. Besides, we don't
live in a riskless society."
Unfortunately, those extra precautions to prevent theft of just one
flve-thousandth-0.002 percent-of this plutonium, year-in and year-
out, represent a staggering and clearly unattainable security prob-
lem that could seriously compromise the civil liberties we as Ameri-
cans deserve to enjoy, and still fail! to prevent atomic terror. Richard
Hubbard, one of the three nuclear, engineers who quit General Elec-
tric recently in protest of nuclear power, said in his letter of resig-
nation: "The power of the atom will be available to any tyrant or
dissident group."
I agree with the nuclear advocates when they say that we don't
live in a risk-free world. But I consider it the height of foolishness
and irresponsibility to deliberately and needless increase the level
of risk by several orders of magnitude.
On the basis of plutonium production alone we should call a halt
to the nuclear power program.
I will now briefly turn to the problem of direct sabotage of our
nuclear facilities. By occupying and threatening to induce a massive
release of radioactive poison from one of our nuclear powerplants,
each of which produce annually the radioactive equivalent of about
1,000 Hiroshima weapons, a group could hold millions of our people
hostage for virtually any demand !~ they may conjure up.
Even if their demands, no matter how outrageous, are granted,
such a group might still carry out their threat through accident, panic,
or sheer malice. A recent report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, The Threat to Licensed Nuclear Facilities-Mitre 7022, by a
prestigious group of terrorism experts, including six former FBI
officials, states:
Even small groups today might acquire the potential to inflict massive de-
struction through the use of nuclear bombs or through the sabotage of nuclear
facilities. Acting alone, or in concert with foreign groups, they could wreak
havoc.
Mr. Chairman, I would* like to!! note here that such an individual
or group need not be from the "outside." Employees of nuclear util-
ities have special opportunities to commit nuclear sabotage, for a
variety of goals. Worker sabotage created havoc for General Motors
when disgruntled workers purposedly built defects in Vega automo-
biles. While such activity in most industries may be expensive and
indeed inconvenient, it is downright dangerous in the nuclear in-
dustry.
This issue is of particular interest to me since the Indian Point
No. 2 plant in my district was the first in the Nation to be sub-
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jected to serious sabotage when a disgruntled employee set fire to
the plant, causing $7 million in damages and severely compromising
the safety of the plant because shortcuts were taken in repairing the
damaged electrical cables.
There is no doubt that nuclear powerplants will become increas-
ingly attractive targets for sabotage. What other industrial plant
offers such a huge threat to our population? As Gregory Minor,
another of the General .Electric engineers who resigned recently said
in his letter of resignation: "We cannot prevent * * * acts of sabo-
tage."
It doesn't make any sense at all for our country to spend billions
upon billions of dollars to prevent a nuclear attack, while we foster
an industry which offers saboteurs the capability to kill and injure
millions of our people.
AN ISSUE THAT CAN BE WON AND FINISHED
Mr. Chairman, I believe that nuclear power expansion poses a
tremendous threat to mankind. Fortunately, thanks to the growing
citizen uprising against nuclear power and the awareness generated
by the sacrifice of promising careers by GE engineers, Dale Briden-
baugh, Richard Hubbard, and Gregory Minor and by Robert Pollard
of the NRC, I believe we are going to see a reevaluation of nuclear
power in this Nation and abroad. I am determined to do my best to
help this process and, in turn, substitute a responsible policy of
energy conservation, reasonable fossil fuel development, and prompt
introduction of solar energy, our only truly clean and inexhaustible
source of power.
I urge my colleagues on the committee to examine and hopefully
cosponsor the Nuclear Energy Reappraisal Act, which now has 33
House sponsors. This bill is a very reasonable approach to the prob-
lem, allowing plants presently operating or under construction to
continue, but prohibiting construction of new ones until all the prob-
lems are assessed and resolved to the satisfaction of Congress and the
American people. I believe this legislation is the only legislation
pending in the Congress that begins to adequately deal with the
nuclear problems we face.
Again, I want to thank the committee for granting Senator Gravel
and myself the opportunity to be here today. These hearings repre-
sent an admirable effort to gather vital information and views.
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you.
Senator Gravel?
Senator GRAVEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
National concern over the desirability of nuclear power has become
increasingly intense since this committee began investigating the sub-
ject a year ago. These hearings are more than ever timely as Con-
gress considers the future of nuclear power and the nature of the
environmental, social and genetic risks of atomic energy.
* I would like to describe very briefly for the committee my own
reaction to recently pubicized questions about our nuclear program,
and my belief that a 5-year moratorium on the construction of re-
actors is the best action Congress can take in the face of these ques-
tions.
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Two problems of nuclear power have been especially prominent in
the news since the first of this year.
One is ~he unbreakable relationship between peaceful nuclear
power and the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. This
problem is so severe that David Lilienthal, first Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, told the Senate Government Operations
Committee that nuclear exports should be stopped altogether until
effective safeguards are agreed upon.
The other problem 15 the long-debated subject of reactor safety.
It is interesting that up until very recently we were told that every-
body was very safe, and we had no credibility in making the
charges. However, with the resignation of the three engineers from
General Electric, from inside the industrial area, that lack of credi-
bility that we suffered from has been rebutted by their testimony.
These engineers have described their concerns. They are the long
term genetic effects of radiation; the storage of high-level radioactive
wastes; the economic viability of nuclear power generation and of
nuclear fuel reprocessing; the size of the Nation's uranium reserves;
and the possibility of nuclear terrorism as well as the effects of exten-
sive plutonium safeguards on our traditional civil liberties.
Mr. Chairman, that is not from us. These are the concerns of
people who have devoted a major part of their professional careers
and lives to an industry. They know it from the inside. These are the
concerns of three individuals who were prepared to give up their
careers at their apexes. I think they have done something courageous,
and I think they have added a great deal to the credibility of this
issue.
The salient fact about these problems is that they are not new.
They have been well known for 10 years and longer within the
nuclear industry and the Government agencies concerned with atomic
energy. But despite this, and despite the years of effort that have
been spent addressing these problems, they are still with us.
I myself believe thib is evidence that the problems simply cannot
be solved, and I ask the committee to consider whether this may not,
indeed, be the case. I am not disparaging the technical ingenuity of
our scientists. What I am saying is that, however nearly perfect a
scientist's design may be, his machine must operate not in what Dr.
.Hannes Alfven has called a technological paradise, but rather, in the
real world of human error and malice-and in the case of nuclear
power the consequence of error could be beyond anything in peace-
time history. So that even if we could answer yes to the question "Is
nuclear power safe enough for man?" I believe we must answer no
* when we ask "Is man safe enough for nuclear power?"
In the matter of weapons proliferation, for example, it is now
reported that the safeguards required by nuclear exporters will be
strengthened. But as repeated testimony indicated at the Govern-
ment Operations Committee hearings last month, it is only the lack
of weapons grade material, not written assurances or plutonium ac-
counting, which can assure that a nation will not build nuclear
weapons. And if we consider the failure of our own Nation in try-
ing to extricate itself from the apparent need for nuclear weapons,
how can we conclude that other nations-possessing weapons mate-
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rials and perceiving national threats-will refrain year after year
from building a nuclear arsenal?
Mr. Chairman, I am struck that in the dialog of late on this sub-
ject the answer seems to be that these nations will sign the agree-
ment joining the IAEA, the organization we have in Vienna. Let me
say that any nation could sign that agreement and give 90 days'
notice after it has everything it needs in the way of technology and
just go about whatever it wants to do if it chooses to create weapons,
and in point of international law it doesn't even have to wait 90 days.
So it's a sham to think that we can all stand around and sign a
piece of paper and then we will all be good. A nation, like one ex-
ample, Pakistan, which wants the ability to reprocess its fuels so
that it can develop weapon-grade material-it has only one reactor,
and it wouldn't need a reprocessing plant, which has no rationale in
that connection.
Even if my estimate of the human factor seems too negative, I
think the recent developments in the nuclear power controversy
point unmistakably to the fact that our nuclear power program has
grown lopsided. Reactor construction has gone too far too fast while
the great supporting network of social and envinronmental safe-
guards has lagged dangerously.
The General Electric engineers have cited some two dozen design
deficiencies in current reactors-their analysis is reprinted in yester-
day's Congressional Record. These deficiencies have occurred be-
cause reactors have been constructed too rapidly. The modifications
needed in new reactors cannot be made, because there has not been
time to observe the deficiencies in previous reactors.
As was stated by my colleague from the House, Browns Ferry was
an interesting example. The fire disarmed the entire electrical system
of the reactor, knocked it out in one single blow, due to poor cable
routing. But cable routing in most U.S. reactors, according to these
engineers, is probably of a lesser quality than what existed at Browns
Ferry. In other words, Brown's Ferry was the "Cadillac" of the en-
tire nuclear industry, and it was brought to its knees with a candle-
with a candle.
If that is the "Cadillac", what is the status of all the nuclear
reactors that are in operation today? As was stated about the one
in New York, it is just an accident waiting to happen. What is the
status of every operating reactor today if these engineers tell us that
was the best and it almost had the greatest accident in our history?
Another well-known evidence that our nuclear program is out of
balance is the failure to close the so-called nuclear fuel cycle. The
economics of fuel reprocessing now appear dubious. And despite
years of effort, no final waste disposal site has been found or method
of disposal decided upon.
Recent events and recently publicized questions about nuclear
safety, therefore, call into question the ability of man to safely use
nuclear energy-and they show that our nuclear program is out of
balance.
I believe the appropriate response of Congress to these facts is a
5-year moratorium on the construction of new reactors. During this
period we may seek to restore the balance that is needed in our
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nuclear program; we can better calculate the need for fission power
and the potential of alternative energy sources; and a better-informed
Congress can debate the wisdom of bringing into our imperfect world
unimaginable quantities of radioactive poisons and nuclear explo-
sives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you very much.
It seems to me that the greatest problem that we have in this coun-
try is consciousness as to the issues, and both you gentleman have
certainly taken us a long way. But isn't that really where we are
today, that there is, in fact, no leadership, strong leadership, either
in the Congress or in the executive branch in terms of making the
American public aware of the dangers from nuclear power, and the
sacrifices necessary to go in another direction?
Senator GRAVEL. If I could just state, Mr. Chairman, you are being
very kind to the Congress and the Government, because there has
been leadership and there is leadership today to go just the opposite
direction, and that is to confuse the issue and tell the people that this
is an answer to the energy crisis, and those are statements made by
the President and certainly the major committee in the Congress,
which has advocated using nuclear fission as one of the major
alternatives.
When we look at the figures from the Office of Management and
Budget, there have been recent severe cutbacks in moneys for end-
use conservation, for solar energy, and the budget for fission and
the breeder reactor, those have been essentially untouched. What
this means is that we have a national Federal commitment to move
ahead in this area.
Mr. FIsH. Mr. Chairman, if I could comment on that, I couldn't
agree more with the Senator, and this is one reason why the legisla-
tion that we both support involves the concept of the moratorium,
because it is not enough just to say that we need these issues studied
and resolved, because we are on the threshold of a national commit-
ment to proceed on the basis of the last generation's experience with
nuclear power, and there is a strong vested interest in this.
Right after World War II, you recall, the atoms for peace pro-
gram, with the slogan "Electricity too cheap to meter." We weren't
thinking in terms then of alternative sources of energy, but it was
the dawn of this new form of energy, and a great commitment was
made to it. Today we are told that we must take off from here and
get into the prospect of literally hundreds of nuclear powerplants
around the United States, and I think the Senator and I feel that,
of course, there is no leadership iii the Congress to counteract this.
There are, outside the Government, however, several very fine
private groups that are attempting to educate the public, but it is a
slow process. It is a very difficult process. It puts you in the posture
of looking like you are antialternative sources of energy, which is not
a pleasant posture to be in. But 1 do think that time is needed in
order to bring out and bear out the prophecy of Einstein himself
decades ago, when he said that the issue of nuclear power in the
United States will be decided on the village greens.
Mr. TSONGAS. It will be curious 10 or 15 or 20 years from now
when an incident does take place that people look back at our session
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of the Congress and those perhaps that follow and ask what we were
doing about the ravages of nuclear power, and our response would be
that we were too busy dealing with the ravages of Daniel Schorr.
That is where we are.
The criticism I have heard of the approach you gentlemen are
talking about is that, that is fine, if we don't like nuclear energy, we -
can go in another direction. But that requires two things: One,-a
massive conservation effort that would radically change the lifestyle,
and the American people are simply not geared to that. I think the:
recent information we had on the kind of automobile the American
public likes, is that the American public is turning back to the larger
gas-consuming types, and there is no initiative to provide the life-
style changes necessary.
Second, the alternative is not solar. The three of us here have
sponsored a bill in that regard, but the alternative is coal, and that
given the strip mining procedures now, and given the fact that x
number of people will die due to respiratory disease for x amount
of coal consumed, `and that in both cases we are talking about- the loss
of human life. One is more immediate and more determined, and the
other more potential, and with the probability that it will be les~.
What is your response?
Senator GRAVEL. Two decades ago we could have spent $50 billion
on solar energy, and scientists inform me that we would now~b~e~-de-
pendent on solar energy for 25 percent of our energy. -
We have spent billions on nuclear, and we have 8 percent electri~al
dependence, and a total of about 2 to 3 percent. It has been a total
failure. I don't know, when people talk about coal and respiratory ill-
ness, I don't know what the answer will be. It will be a plurality, I
expect. Maybe residential will be solar, and central plant will be
coal, and other forms can avail themselves of geothermal wells. Cer-
tainly there is considerably more oil and gas than is reported in our
inventory, because the inventory increases as we make a greater
effort for discovery, and we have thwarted that effort of discovery
since 1954. We have thwarted the discovery of fossil fuels.
So we don't know what that inventory is going to be in the future,
but what we do know is that the vector that we proceeded on has not
been successful, one; and, two, threatens the very nature of our
social existence. That is, we, in order to enjoy the benefits of nuclear
power, will have to alter our system of democracy as we presently
understand it.
All you have to do is look at what they have done at Kerr-McGee,
subject their employees to lie detector tests and investigation. Every
time you go to the airport, you go through search. You are prepared
to do that because you want to fly safely.
Now, what are you prepared to give up in life in order to have
nuclear energy? I expect you are going to give up every ounce of
freedom you enjoy.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would you address the problems of the American
lifestyle and what we have become accustomed to and the inability
of the United States to continue that?
Mr. FISH. Can I be excused?
Mr. TSONGAS. Yes.
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Mr. FISH. Thank you.
Senator GRAVEL. With respect tO lifestyle, I think that that is a
strawman and certainly it is used to frighten the American people.
One, I don't think we have been very candid with the American
people with respect to energy. I think we have gone and continued
the cliche that we can provide cheap energy. I don't know what the
cost of energy is going to be, but we are going to have to pay what-
ever that cost is to have safe and clean energy.
- ~I do know, like you gentlemen, the new surge to buying big auto-
mobiles is correct. The automobile industry is asked to produce
smaller automobiles. So a democratic decision is being made to go
back to higher consumption automobiles. Obviously the only answer
is the price mechanism in the marketplace.
Congress has not chosen to undertake that.
Mr. TSONGAS. I think the reason people are buying automobiles is
that they feel the energy crisis is a phantom.
Senator GRAVEL. That is right, but it has been cast as a phantom
not only by the media, but by us, the leaders in Congress, because we
wanted to have somebody to blame. and it was convenient to blame
industry, so we blamed industry. We didn't go to the root cause of
the whole problem, and that is that we have 6 percent of the world's
population and we consumer 30 percent of the world's energy.
Now, that is selfish, profligate, and in the long-term immoral, be-
cause as the rest of the world rises to our standard of living, they
will want to call upon that inventory of energy to satisfy a quality
of life that they desire. It won't be as high as ours.
I think from what I have read on end-use conservation, that we
could atrophy severely our energy consumption and not drastically
impair the standard of living we enjoy.
In point of fact, Sweden has a higher standard of living than we
have, and the energy is 40 percent less on a per capita basis. Europe,
which has a slightly lower standard of living, uses about half the
energy.
We have become adjusted to wastefulness.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver?
Mr. WEAVER. Thank you, Senator Gravel, for your excellent testi-
mony.
I point out that in Oregon about a year ago we had some people
who ransomed some power poles. They wanted several million dol-
lars or they would blow up the Bonneville Power Administration
power poles, and they did. They blew up three or four of them, and
it cost $1 or $2 million, and certainly this would occur in the nuclear
field.
It is interesting that they are attracted now to energy, and certain
would-be terrorists will be attracted to nuclear energy.
I want to thank you.
Senator GRAVEL. Thank you.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Symms?
Mr. SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator, for coming over here this morning.
What percent of the world's goods do we produce in the United
States?
PAGENO="0014"
10
Senator GRAVEL. We probably produce close to 50 percent, some-
where between 40 and 50.
Mr. Sy~r~rs. And we use 30 percent of the world's energy. Maybe
that is not so far out of line then, because of the massive production
we have. Maybe it isn't quite as immoral a situation as you paint it
here. That is what I was wondering, if it really is as bad as what you
are painting.
Senator GRAVEL. What I was painting is the fact that, say, you
have a billion people in the world that are on the verge of starvation
and their per capita income is less than $200. You have another
billion people who are somewhere between. Then you have about
another billion that is part of what we consider the industrialized
world-ourselves, Japan, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.
As the rest of the world raises its aspirations, and when they are
realized, I don't know-I hope they are realized soon, because I
don't like to see `a fellow human being starve to death, which is the
destiny of so many-but as it rises, they have to consume more
energy.
There is only so much oil and gas available, and so as we open the
pie up, there may not be that much available unless we make some
major breakthroughs. I think we can make some major break-
throughs, but I think when we underpin our American attitude, that
"as much energy as you can go take, just go take it" is sort of a
cowboy attitude rather than the astronaut attitude to the resources
of our society, and I think that is immoral.
Mr. Sy~n~rs. I appreciate your concern about it, and notice it is a
thing that is said many times, but I sometimes get a little bothered
when people make that comparison. I think you made the point of
the massive percentage of goods that we do produce. It takes energy
to produce them.
We `are the largest exporter of foodstuffs in the world, and it takes
energy to produce the foodstuffs. We are going to have wheat to sell
that feeds the hungry people around the world, and we are going to
have to have energy sources to do that.
I think we all agree that there is a limitation on conservation, and
if you put everybody on a bicycle tomorrow, you would still have an
energy problem with respect to the total usage in the country, because
of employment and production and so forth.
I wonder, you know, concerning the starvation problem, if it isn't
the economic system. If you would agree with me that maybe the
Government of Red China and the Government in India and the
Government in Russia probably have to do more with people starv-
ing to death because they don't let people operate with an economic
system where they have an incentive or motivation to go ahead and
produce something, so they just have "bad weather."
You know, I wonder about this. We talk about-I am sorry I
missed the first part of your testimony, but I think you recommend
a 5-year moratorium. My concern is that, from what I have wit-
nessed in this Congress as far as leadership is concerned, that we
have a ban on practically any development of hydroelectric energy
in the Northwest. We recently passed the Hells Canyon bill to stop
development of 3 or 4 million kilowatts of electricity there, which
PAGENO="0015"
11
would have had very little environmental risk to the public. We know
that~
Secondly, we don't want to mine coal, and we have enough coal to
last the whole world, I guess, for 200 or 300 years, which is really
a substantial length of time.
Do you have any reservation to think that if we allowed ourselves
to, say, use all the coal we wanted to use, low-sulfur coal, that some-
where in the next 50 to 100 years that some man out here working
for some private enterprise company wouldn't come up with the
solution to controlled nuclear fusion?
Do you think there is any question but that we will solve the prob-
lem? I am just not that pessimistic, I guess is what I am saying. I
think we will solve the problem, and I think there will be a day
when we will have plenty of energy sources.
Don't you really think that there is a positive side of this, that we
are not to the bottom of the barrel now?
Senator GRAVEL. First off, I am not pessimistic at all. I don't think
I have ever received that accusation in my entire career. I am an
optimist. One, I think we ought to mine coal. I am for it.
I am chairman of a hydro subcommittee. I am pushing in Alaska
the largest hydro development outside the Soviet Union. I would be
happy to push them in your area.
Mr. SYMMS. I should have gotten together with you a month ago.
Senator GRAVEL. You can get together with me now. I am coming
up with a program that I think can almost double the amount of
hydro potential that we have in this country. I think it is a safe way
to do it.
First off, I am not for putting everybody on bicycles, and I am
for a free market on gas and oil. When I say "immoral", that is not
as a denigration to this country, which we both love. I say that as an
internal criticism. Since you and I are both authorities on the oper-
ation of our Government, to a degree, more than the average citizen,
I think we `are entitled to look at our Government and see mistakes
and criticize it. I think we make mistakes in our society.
I am for using energy to produce wheat to feed the world, and
more than that, but I can turn around and walk down the street to
my house and I can see examples of being profligate in the use of
energy. I see waste and I am really chagrined when we have a pro-
gram to do something about that waste, which is called "end-use
conservation", that the experts ask for a certain budget and the Office
of Management and Budget cut it and the administration spends
even less. And then they are prepared to spend a billion dollars in
fission.
I think it is a little lopsided. 1 don't think we have our heads
screwed on right, and I think we can do a little more screwing of
the head until we can do things in balance.
So in answer to your question, I am an optimist. I think we can
solve our energy problems, and I think we can do it as described in
a book called "Mankind at the Turning Point".
We can have growth. I am for' grow'th. I am for organic growth.
I think we have had enough of undifferentiated growth, which is
suicide.
PAGENO="0016"
12
Mr. SYMMS. Do you think the nuclear industry is one that has
grown more carefully than any other industry in the country? I
mean compared to coal and oil. Hasn't it been more regulated and
carefully developed?
Senator GRAVEL. Quite the contrary. It is probably the greatest
example of a human aberration that ever existed, for the simple
reason that we were so intent upon realizing the peaceful uses of
the atom because we used it to kill that we vectored the Nation on
a course of action, and when industry wouldn't pursue that course of
action, we lifted the liability so as to force its existence and to force
its growth. And so when you make the statement that "Boy, hasn't
this been careful," it hasn't been careful. It has been a paternalistic
decision made by Government, and we took our mallet and we
banged it right into our industrial society, and it has failed. It has
failed from day one.
It is not succeeding now, it is falling apart at the seams even in
the face of the total governmental commitment.
Mr. SYMMS. Well, what I am worried about is the 5-year mora-
torium. You just want to stop?
Senator Gn~v1~L. Well, if we are making a mistake-
Mr. S~a~nrs. Say with oil, would you rather turn it over to the
marketplace?
Senator GRAVEL. We have never had a marketplace in nuclear.
Mr. Sy~n~is. That is true. I think that is why we don't have more
reactors.
Senator GRAVEL. I can give you a bill that would give the market-
place to nuclear-repeal Price-Anderson. But the utilities that run
that say it is safe, but they don't want to have the test of insurance.
They are not prepared to put their money where their mouths are.
That is the key answer. That is the reason why this whole thing is
falling over from its own corrupt waste-not corrupt because these
are malicious people. They are sincere people, but our system is a
system of checks and balances.
You can be wrong and I can be wrong, so we need a discipline on
us that forces us to be right, but when you take away the discipline,
the normal situation would be human indulgence.
We spent $50 billion, and I make you a prediction that before my
term is up, five years, you will see the whole thing come to a halt,
and it won't come to a halt because we in the Congress will have
been wise. It will come to a screeching halt because of its own putrid-
ness. It just won't work, and there is no way you can make it work.
Now, it seems odd to me that the concern of a moratorium, we have
8-percent dependence for electrical energy on it. If we are making a
mistake, wouldn't it be wiser to pull up short and take a look at it
now?
All this moratorium says is Don't shut the plants down that are
operating, don't turn the lights out in New England now or anywhere
else. Give us a 5-year real study. We have never had one. Give us a
real study and stop the future motion, and if this study gives the
information, the information to the Congress, and we have a dialog,
and then if we decide to go ahead, let's go ahead. But if we don't
decide to go ahead, crank it down slowly. Don't shut them down
overnight.
PAGENO="0017"
13
With 8-percent dependency what do you think would happen?
If we had a major accident tomorrow, we would shut every nuclear
plant in this country. We would shut the lights out immediately.
That is what the reaction would be.
So if we had a dependency of 20 percent on nuclear and had an
accident, and reasonable people tell us it is just a question of time,
so if we had 20-percent dependency on nuclear power and had an
accident, we would shut down all the plants that have a greater im-
pact on us than the Arabs could ever think of having.
Mr. SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. Two final thoughts: I think one of the biggest prob-
lems is the fact that most Americans don't realize how energy-
intensive their lifestyle is. To give you an example, the gentleman to
my left, Mr. Weaver, who is a proponent of candles, not in the
Browns Ferry thing, but from a very strong belief that we have to
conserve, is very energy-wasteful in indulging in one of his appetites.
He eats ice cream, which is probably as energy-intensive a food-
stuff as we have ever devised. Every evening when he consumes his
pint of chocolate ice cream, he is going contrary to what he pro-
fesses as his belief. So there is an educational element.
Secondly, the 0MB, even though we are freshmen here, we have
come to learn the vast power that 0MB wields and it has done con-
siderable damage to the solar energy research effort, and we intend
to fight on this side for the restoration of those funds. We ask you
on your side to try to accomplish the same purpose.
Senator GRAVEL. Mr. Chairman, may I state one thing about
wastefulness? If I were to stand up and move this table, I would be
exercising, if I could have the attention of my colleague there, be-
cause I think that is very important on that issue.
If I were to get up, when we talk in terms of wastefulness and
move this table, I am using X amount of energy. Now that would be
efficient. However, if I brought in a bulldozer to move this table-
Mr. TSONGAS. Would the gentleman cease the conversation, because
the question has been directed to him?
Senator GRAVEL. It is a statement. If I were to bring in a bulldozer
to move the table, you would laugh and say it is ridiculous and say
that this guy should want to move the table with a bulldozer, and
that is wasteful. Using nuclear energy to power home heating is on
the magnitude of efficiency of using a howitzer to kill a fly instead
of a fly swatter.
If we are not smart enough to figure out how to use fly swatters-
Mr. 5y~ui~is. That might be true if you live on the North Slope
of Alaska, but if you live in New Hampshire and you have to buy
oil from the Arab nations or from Venezuela or somewhere else, it
puts the perspective a little differently, and I think that is the prob-
lem. It is the total of 8 percent that you talk about, and it may be 8
percent of the energy nationally, and maybe like in my area it is
probably 1 percent or less.
We don't have any electricity or very little from a nuclear plant
right in my particular area. We get most of it from hydroelectric
energy. We are starting some cOal energy now.
But if you come from New England, where they are building
heavier and heavier, it is a completely different situation, and we
71-074 0 - 76 -
PAGENO="0018"
14
can't duck the fact that we exported $25 billion last year to buy
foreign energy. I think that is a serious problem to the country. We
can't ignore that problem either.
Senator GRAVEL. But if we are making a mistake in nuclear, does
that address the problem you describe?
Mr. S~r~rs. There has been a lot of research and study done, and
I get hesitant about the talk of a moratorium. I think we ought to
be careful as we proceed, but just to stop, some of these things have
to be planned ahead. If this Congress would be willing to make the
Government policy to go to Wyoming and Montana and other places
where they have large amounts of low-sulfur coal and get on it, but
up to date this Congress hasn't had the ability to make the govern-
mental policy to even lease coal.
They are still fighting over that, with the environmental lawsuits
and so forth. Like I said, about a. month ago we passed legislation
and it passed this committee and the Senate, to not allow private
enterprise to build two low-head dams in the Lower Snake River.
There are people who don't want more energy, period, and, that
is the bottom-of-the-barrel philosophy, and I am not that pessimistic.
Mr. TSONGAS. Can I be arbitrary and cut us off here, because we
do have other witnesses?
Thank you for coming.
Senator GRAVEL. Thank you very much.
Mr. TSONGAS. Is Dr. DeNike here? Also Dr. Jenkins and Dr. Bell?
Let me suggest some ground rules. We have had hearings previ-
ously on nuclear energy. What has happened is that the witnesses
have come before us and read lengthy statements which are always
longer than anyone anticipated, and at that point we either have to
leave for quorum calls and votes-and what I would prefer to do is
this: Your testimony will be inserted in the record and we prefer that
you summarize the testimony and what we would like to have is some
dialog between you and the committee exploring some of the issues
that have been raised.
Is that satisfactory? I assume that is satisfactory. Also, if the staff
would keep track of the time and cut us off after 5 minutes, it would
be helpful.
The schedule is going to be Dr. DeNike and Dr. Jenkins will be
second and Dr. Bell third.
Before you give your presentation, if you could give us a brief
background description of what you have done, where you have
schooled and what your current professional activities are.
A PANEL ON NUCLEAR THREAT CONSISTING OF: J. BOWYER BELL,
INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE STUDIES, COLUMBIA UNIVER-
SITY; DOUGLAS DeNIKE, TECHNICAL CONSULTANT, CALIFOR-
NIANS FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS; AND BRIAN MICHAEL
JENKINS, THE RAND CORP.
Dr. DENIKE. Mr. Chairman, do I understand we have 5 minutes
or 15 or how do you suggest we proceed?
Mr. TSONGAS. I think if we kept it around 10 minutes, that would
allow for the interchange between yourselves and us later on.
PAGENO="0019"
15
I might say that the committee will go until 12 o'clock, and we
intend to use the 2 hours.
The final thought that I would offer is that there are a number of
people who will be reading these hearings, and I suspect in the
eventuality of an incident that there will be even more people who
will be reading the hearings, so, please don't hold back in your com-
ments.
All right.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS DeNIKE, TECHNICAL CONSULTANT,
CALIFORNIANS FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
Dr. DENIKE. Mr. Chairman, I am very privileged and pleased to
be here, and I am proud to state my additional affiliation as nuclear
initiative coordinator for the Los Angeles Chapter of the Sierra
Club. I am here as a private citizen.
Mr. TSONGAS. Excuse me, Dr. DeNike. Could you introduce yourself
first for those who may not know you?
Dr. DENIKE. Yes. I have included a biographical sketch in the
written statement. I am a graduate of Harvard. I received my Ph. D.
at Duke, and I served at the University of Southern California from
1964 to 1973. I have written 10 privately circulated papers and sev-
eral published articles on fission power and two of them are listed
in the biographical sketch.
Mr. TSONGAS. You may proceed, Dr. DeNike.
Dr. DENIKE. It is often said that since poisoning a municipal water
supply would be easier than destroying a nuclear powerplant by caus-
ing a core meltdown, we need not be terribly concerned about the
latter possibility. This viewpoint overlooks the demonstrated num-
bers of threats and hoaxes involving the nuclear industry which have
already occurred. At least a çlozen thefts and suspected thefts of
radioactive substances have been reported, and news media accounts
of these are included as an attachment to this statement.
Sufficient threats of violence have been received to cause the State
of California Office of Emergency Services to reluctantly issue a
nuclear-blackmail threat-response plan. It is this document here,
which has aroused sufficient public interest so that Sacramento is no
longer circulating it.
On the 10th of this month, the Los Angeles Times reported that
three Geiger counters containing dangerous strontium-90 sources had
been stolen from a waste disposal company. This particular event sug-
gests the possibility that persons planning a major criminal misuse of
nuclear materials acquired the Geiger counters the better to protect
themselves.
For $6 a person can buy a book on the safe handling of plutonium.1
In a public forum such as this it is well that we remain mindful of
the possible stimulative effects of publicity on these matters. Admit-
tedly it is to some extent dangerous even to talk about such subjects
in the presence of representatives from the news media. Yet there ap-
pears to be little alternative.
1lnternatjonal Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), "Safe Handling of Plutonium." Safety
Series No. 39. New York, Unipub, Inc., 1974.
PAGENO="0020"
16
I have concluded, with dismay, that perhaps the only thing more
dangerous than talking about nuclear malevolence is not talking
about it. Repeated private communications to the executive branch,
by myself and numerous others, have been unfruitful. Silence in pub-
lic will simply result in no preventive action being taken until a dis-
astrous evil act occurs-and in the nuclear realm even one such event
is one too many. Moreover, there is a distinct likelihood that the first
such tragedy will quickly trigger many others in imitation of it be-
fore adequate safeguards can be implemented.
It has been said, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead * * * mass casualties simply may not serve the ter-
rorist' goals." This formulation appears to be a frail reed upon which
to lean, since any newsperson will readily grant that the more peo-
ple dead in a given atrocity, the more people will be watching the
account on the evening news. And this same commentator, Brian Jen-
kins, also states, "Any sort of nuclear action by terrorists would be
assured of widespread publicity," which is just what the terrorists
would want.
There is, I am sorry to say, no one "nuclear criminal profile" which
could be used to identify all or even most of the potential evildoers
with which we are here concerned. It appears that rather often, in
connection with ordinary antisocial deeds and acts of terrorism, the
culprits are those whom one would not suspect in advance.
Prior to her dramatic kidnaping or even immediately afterward,
essentially no one would have listed Patricia Hearst as a potential
urban guerrilla. V~Tith regard to the nuclear field, we note that a se-
curity guard at the Kerr-McGee plutonium fuel fabrication plant in
Oklahoma was found to have been working there under a false name.
This fact was discovered only after the man had been arrested in con-
nection with a robbery of a loan company during which a woman was
shot.
In November 1971 arson by an employee caused several million dol-
lars' damage at the Indian Point No. 2 nuclear powerplant near Bu-
chanan, N.Y.
The most sensational nuclear-related criminal conviction to date
occurred in February 1973. At that time William T. Riley, the
Atomic Energy Commission's former top security officer, was sen-
tenced to 3 years' probation. Riley had had borrowed $239,300 from
fellow AEC employees and had failed to repay over $170,000. He
used a substantial portion of the money for racetrack gambling.
It seems unlikely that even quite sophisticated personnel screening
and surveillance methods will sufficiently prevent insiders from in-
itiating or abetting criminal acts involving radioactive materials. It
was reported on February 19 that at the Lawrence Livermore Labo-
ratory in California more than 1 ton of lead-radiation shielding was
missing, and security personnel were using unannounced home visits
and locker breakins to find it. As you are undoubtedly aware, Liver-
more is an atomic weapons design facility, and persons capable of
removing such quantities of lead without detection would certainly
be able to remove strategic amoimts of fissile materials as well.
The fallibility of the usual personality testing methods in predict-
ing antisocial behavior is known to me as a clinical psychologist. One
PAGENO="0021"
17
example of the relative failure of nuclear personnel screening pro-
grams surfaced in January 1974. Secret testimony to Congress, de-
livered several months earlier by the former Assistant Defense Secre-
tary for Atomic Energy Matters revealed that during a single year
more than 3,600 persons with access to atomic weapons were removed
from their jobs because of belatedly discovered drug abuse, mental
illness, alcoholism, or discipline problems.
My training as a social scientist has given me no confidence that
truly adequate tests for aberrant behavior predispositions can pre-
vent crime or irrational violence among employees in the nuclear in-
dustry. I must qualify that statement by admitting unfamiliarity
with recent advances in covert lie detection methods, such as the voice-
based psychological stress evaluator and similar techniques.
Another approach to nuclear personnel screening would be to form
an elite security corps of individuals who had proven their rectitude
in service with another governnient agency, such as the FBI. How-
ever, we have learned recently that the FBI in past years repeatedly
fomented and sanctioned bombings, shootings, burglaries and other
such acts while attempting to weaken and discredit black activists
and other dissident political groups.
The reliability and loyalty of persons steeped in officially condoned
illegality is never very high. The characters of some who emerged
during the Watergate investigations may be considered to be about
on the level of mercenary soldiers. Nor are `age and female gender
very promising bases for selection. Consider, for example, Sara Jane
Moore, a middle-aged FBI informant of respectable background,
wh'o was convicted of attempting to assassinate the President.
The generalization which emerges from these specific cases is this:
Antisocial behavior arises only partly from readily identifiable per-
sonal characteristics. Its immediate precursors are numerous social
and ideological influences, including the mass media. It follows that
individuals cannot `be neatly categorized as saints or sinners or some-
where inbetween. Hence, any attempt by self-anointed saints to pick
out `and thus to establish control over all the possible sinners can be
expected to fail. If such an attempt is made, it will be discovered
once again tha't some apparently virtuous people will engage in
frightful `actions which they have come to believe are necessary to
some noble goal.
Mr. TSONGAS. Doctor, why don't you read the rest of the statement
completely rather than skimming it, because it is short enough.
Dr. DENIKE. Thank you, sir.
Despite these indication's which seem to preclude complete success
I do not `advocate a policy of inaction. The general problem of crime
and violence is enormous, and it is still increasing. Nuclear violence
presents the prospect of criminal and terrorist acts whose conse-
quences could eclipse in severity all non-war-related disasters.
It is imperative to attempt to deal with the problem. Such `attempts
however, should not be formulated in isolation from the ongoing de-
bate over nuclear technology itself. If society judges that the benefits
of electricity generated from nuclear fission do not outweigh the con-
comitant costs and risks, a major source of `danger from criminals
may be removed with the phaseout of fission powerpiant's. Antisocial
exploitation of radioactive materials will not `disappear when that
occurs. I `expect that a wide-scale new policy to minimize the hazards
PAGENO="0022"
18
of criminal use of these materials will be needed. The Sierra Club
board of directors has already requested this in a resolution of Oc-
tober 1975.
MOTIVES AND CONTEXTS FOR NUCLEAR MALEFICENCE
A large range of potential motives and types of perpetrators exists
for acts of atomic theft, blackmail, and sabotage. Antisocial acts in-
volving nuclear materials might occur against a background of inter-
national rivalry, such as suggested in the MITRE Corp's recent con-
tract study for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Or they might
appear during sectional or factional enmity, such as civil war or on-
going guerrilla activity.
Domestic insurgents would be presumably disinclined to cause
semipermanent radioactive contamination of the territory they as-
pired eventually to control. However, foreign-based agents under
orders to capitalize on such civil disturbances would be under no such
felt restraint. Moreover, through ignorance or miscalculation an at-
tempt by rebels to create what they consider a small dispersal of
radionuclides may result in a large one.
A. War and anticipated war
In a study submitted to the NRC and kept secret for 2 months un-
til late November 1975, the MITRE Corp. gave this appraisal of the
threat from the communist countries, who tend to believe in the in-
evitability of an armed showdown with capitalism:
The Soviet Bloc, China, and Cuba all have * * an interest in weakening the
economic, political, and social structure of the United States * * * any of these
coulitries might consider `an act of sabotage which, because of its political re-
percussions, might severely limit the growth of the nuclear industry. A large
nuclear powerplant near a major city might be sabotaged, for example, in such
a way as to cause a meltdown and breach of containment. Given the present
volatile character of `the nuclear debate in our country, such an act might
permanently cut off our nuclear power plant option.
It might be added that the question of our retaliation in such an
event would pose a possibly excruciating dilemma to the military.
Whether or not the identity of the perpetrators could be established~
it would constitute a distinctly destabilizing occurrence, to use the
unemotional language of deterrence theorists.
B. Domestic turmoil
The second category of contexts stimulative of radioactive violence
refers to situations of internecine strife carried on by political, re-
hgious, or racial extremists. As we have seen in the Middle East and
elsewhere, fanatical commitment can reach quasi-suicidal levels. The
suicidal component of motivation appears operative in many terrorist
activities.
Dr. David 0. Hubbard, director of the Aberrant Behavior Center
in Dallas, Tex., has stated in congressional testimony on aircraft
skyjacking as follows:
We know with absoute certainty the skyjackers themselves * * * want in the
worst way to die. Very few of them have not wanted to die. They lack the guts
to kill themselves. They manipulate their society into killing them.
Psychiatrist Frederick J. Hacker, a terrorism expert who testified
in the same forum, concurred that skyjackers, "~ * * are often corn-
PAGENO="0023"
19
mitting the act to be killed." He went on to say, "The politically
motivated criminal is never deterred by the threat of the death
penalty. Much more, this is a raising of the price by which he can
prove more of his courage."
Even apparently overwhelming odds in favor of nuclear facility
security forces might not deter those possessed of this kind of men-
tality. While it is tempting to divide domestic insurgents into hot-
blooded and cold-blooded categories, such a distinction would have
limited application. The very same groups can show signs of crafty
calculative ability at some times, and intemperate quasi-delusional
behavior at others. The Symbionese Liberation Army was remark-
ably "rational" in some of its ventures, and suicidally stupid in
others. The SLA showed great craft in its kidnaping of Patricia
Hearst and its bilking of millions of dollars from her parents, but
it was romantically delusional~ in not surrendering in the police
shootout.
The charismatic leadership of unstable persons helps to account
for both phenomena.
C. Extortion threats
Involving nuclear explosives or radiological dispersal devices
in blackmail demands is a logical extension of the extortionist's
search for maximum leverage. In contrast to unannounced nuclear
violence, blackmail at least provides some options for negotiation.
Psychological instabilities in the extortionists may limit the useful-
ness of negotiation efforts. Pragmatic criminals, whose aim is money
and who have little desire to kill or be killed, will be relatively more
reachable by skilled argumentation. Even under the best of condi-
tions, the negotiators' task will be difficult and stressful.
However, a few circumstances do favor the Government, and these
are worth mentioning.
First: It should ordinarily be possible to discredit and thus to
defuse practically all hoaxes. Careful questioning and the use of
backup sources for verification of information can be expected to
disprove false claims. Can the blackmailers cite tangible evidence
of their possession of a credible atomic device ~ This would entail
blueprints, photographs, and a sample of radioactive material.
Second: In response to demands requiring distant events, such as
release of political prisoners, it might be impossible for the black-
mailers to verify fully the authorities' compliance. Hence the latter
are free to agree to some terms, which they do not intend to carry out
in fact.
Third: Government negotiators may reasonably insist that any
bargain include the turnover of the nuclear bomb or dispersal
weapon. In order to rule out the possibility of being given a counter-
feit device, they may argue for the right to examine it closely, thus
gaining valuable information about its capabilities. Moreover, since
a way of arranging for turnover must be worked out which is as free
as possible from the doublecross the malefactors would anticipate,
the authorities may gain valuable time while these details are being
deliberated.
Such strategems will not be greatly useful against fully prepared
and ruthless parties. The hardened extortionist's very first act may
be the destruction or evacuation by particulate radioactive contam-
PAGENO="0024"
20
ination of a sizable urban area. Having established himself through
an atrocity which cuts through almost all credibility issues and
creates an atmosphere of fear and urgency in officialdom, the nuclear
blackmailer is then in a very good position to enforce his follow-on
demands. It would be dangerously misleading to imply that con-
tingency planning, game-playing, and calculated deception can be
more than partially useful techniques in attempting to cope with
atomic terror threats.
D. I"iwide jobs
A fourth category of dangers may originate from psychologically
disturbed, disgruntled, or traitorous employees of nuclear facilities.
Earlier we mentioned instances in which trusted members of the
nuclear team were implicated in charges of financial default, arson,
and armed robbery. Besides acting as informants and accomplices
for intruders, employees may directly engage in theft or sabotage.
For example, it is possible for knowledgeable persons, acting inde-
pendently or under duress, to render the emergency core-cooling
system of a nuclear power plant inoperative by applying jumper
cables to the correct electrical connections in the control room. Other
vital equipment could be destroyed or made to malfunction, thus
initiating a meltdown of the fuel core.
I have gone into this matter in greater detail in testimony to a
California Assembly committee, and that testimony has been pre-
sented to the subcommittee.
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE DEFENDERS
Numerous observers have indicted the inadequate security pre-
cautions at U.S. nuclear sites. Psychological factors appear to ac-
count for some of the complacency which permits, for example, only
two guards at a nuclear powerplant where experts have estimated
at least 10 are needed.
Government regulators argue that nothing very dire has yet oc-
curred, at least not in this country. In France there were six terrorist
explosions at four nuclear sites during 1975, although apparently
none was intended to release radioactivity. The utilities shout down
new security amendments, such as those proposed by the AEC in
November 1974 but never implemented, on grounds of cost and in-
convenience.
They also take refuge under regulation 50.13 of 10 CFR, which
exempts nuclear power stations from the responsibility to protect
against "attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed
against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a
foreign government or other person."
I am incapable of justifying the continued existence of this regu-
lation given that the Department of Defense does essentially nothing
to provide special protection for civilian nuclear facilities either. It
is hoped that testimony to this subcommittee by the Department of
Defense will be requested, and that congressional spotlighting of the
acute deficiencies in nuclear security will correct them to the extent
possible before a singularly great tragedy befalls.
Thank you very much.
[The complete prepared statement with addenda follows:]
PAGENO="0025"
21
The gycho].pg~ of Nuclear-Related Crime and Terrorism
L. Douglas DeNike, Ph.D.
Invited Testimony to Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment,
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
Washington, D.C., February 26, 1976
Biographical sketch: Dr. DeNike graduated from Harvard
University in 19S9, magna cum laude, and received his
doctorate in clinical psychology at Duke University in
l96L He served on the faculty of the University of
Southern California for nine years. Since 1973, he has
devoted full time to independent study and remediation
of the formidable problems associated with the use of
nuclear fission power. He is the author of ten privately
circulated papers and twelve published articles on various
aspects of nuclear energy. His special concern is the
vulnerability of the atomic power industry to antisocial
behavior. This is discussed in ~Radioactive Malevolence,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 19Th, and
"Nuclear Ter~,F~I~ra Club ?iifletin, November 197S.
It is a singular privilege to appear here today at your invitation, Chair-
man Udall and the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment are performing a
significant service to the nation in conducting these hearings, whose subject
matter is of substantial and growing concern to the public, While my appearance
is as a private citizen, I am proud to state my affiliation as Nuclear Initiative
Coordinator for the Angeles Chapter of the Sierra Club, If this title brands me
as an "activist" to some, may I state that my discoveries in the subject to be
discussed led inevitably to activism, These discoveries include the fact that
one unskilled person possessing a few pounds of stolen plutonium can disperse
them in such a way as to create a significant cancer-induction hazard for forty
miles downwind (1).
In introducing this grave topic, I might address at the outset one frequently
heard rationale for ignoring it. This is the doctrine that antisocial persons bent
on theft, disruption, or blackmail would choose non-nuclear targets because of the
greater danger or difficulty associated with nuclear ones, For example, it is often
said that since poisoning a municipal water supply would be easier than destroying
a nuclear power plant by causing a core meltdown (2), we need not be terribly con-
cerned about the latter possibility, This viewpoint overlooks the demonstrated
interest which criminals have shown in nuclear-materials theft, and the substantial
numbers of threats and hoaxes involving the industry which have already occurred,
At least a dozen thefts and suspected thefts of radioactive substances have been
reported, and news media accounts of these~ are included as an attachment to this
statement, Sufficient threats of violence~have been received to cause the State
of California Office of Energency Services to reluctantly issue a nuclear-blackmail
threat-response plan (3), On the tenth of this month, the Los ~gu~es Times reported
that three Geiger counters containing dangerous strontium-90 sources had been stolen
(14) from a waste and disposal company, This particular event suggests the possibil-
ity that persons planning a major criminal misuse of nuclear materials acquired the
Geiger counters the better to protect themselves,
PAGENO="0026"
22
In a public forum such as this, it is well that we remain mindful of the
possible stimulative effects of publicity on these matters. Admittedly, it is
to some extent dangerous even to talk about such subjects in the presence of
representatives from the news media. Yet there appears to be little alternative.
I have concluded, with dismay, that perhaps the only thing more dangerous than
talking about nuclear malevolence is not talking about it, Repeated private
communications to the executive branch, by nyself and numerous others, have been
unfruitful. Silence in public wifl simply result in no preventive action being
taken until a disastrous evil act occurs--and in the nuclear realm, even one such
event is one too many. Moreover, there is a distinct likelihood that the first
such tragedy will quickly trigger many others in imitation of it before adequate
safeguards can be implemented.
It has been said, eTerrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of
people dead.. ,mass casualtie5 simply may not serve the terrorists' goals" (s).
This formulation appears to be a frail reed upon which to lean, since any news-
person will readily grant that the more people dead in a given atrocity, the more
people will be watching the account on the evening news. And this same corrmentator,
Brian Jenkins, also states, "Any sort of nuclear action by terrorists would be
assured of widespread publicity," which is just what the terrorists would want (6).
There is, I am sorry to say, no one "nuclear criminal profile" which could
be used to identify all or even most of the potential evildoers with which we are
here concerned. It appears that rather often, in connection with ordinary anti-
social deeds and acts of terrorism, the culprits are those whom one would not
suspect in advance. Prior to her dramatic kidnapping or even immediately after-
ward, essentially no one would have listed Patricia Hearst as a potential urban
guerrilla. With regard to the nuclear field, we note that a security guard at
the Kerr-McGee plutonium fuel fabrication plant in Oklahoma was found to have
been working there under e false name. This fact was discovered only after the
man had been arrested in connection with a robbery of a loan company, during
which a woman was shot (7). In November 1971, arson by an employee caused several
million dollars' damage at the Indian Point #2 nuclear power plant near Buchanan,
N. Y. (8). The most sensational nuclear-related criminal conviction to date oc-
curred in February 1973. At that time William T. Riley, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission's former top security officer, was sentenced to three years' probation (9).
Riley had borrowed $239 300 from fellow AEC employees and had failed to repay over
$170,000. He used a substantial portion of the money for race track gambling.
It seems unlikely that even quite sophisticated personnel screening and sur-
veillance methods will sufficiently prevent "insiders" from initiating or abetting
criminal acts involving radioactive materials. It was reported on February 19 that
at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California, more than a ton of lead radia-
tion shielding was missing, and security personnel were using unannounced home
visits and locker break-ins to find it (10). As you are undoubtedly aware, Liver-
more is an atomic weapons design facility, and persons capable of removing such
quantities of lead without detection would certainly be able to remove strategic
amounts of fissile materials as well. The fallibility of the usual personality
testing methods in predicting antisocial behavior is known to me as a clinical
psychologist. One example of the relative failure of nuclear personnel screening
programs surfaced in January 19Th. Secret testimony to Congress, delivered several
months earlier by the former assistant defense secretary for atomic energy matters,
revealed thst during a single year, more than 3,600 persons with access to atomic
weapons were removed from their jobs because of belatedly discovered drug abuse,
mental illness, alcoholism, or discipline problems (11). My training as a social
scientist has given me no confidence that truly adequate tests for aberrant behavior
PAGENO="0027"
23
predispositions can prevent crime or irrational violence among employees in
the nuclear industry. I must qualify that statement by admitting unfamiliarity
with recent advances in covert lie-detection methods, such as the voice-based
Psychological Stress Evaluator and similar techniques.
Another approach to nuclear personnel screening would be to form an elite
corps of individuals who had proven their rectitude in service with another
government agency, such as the FBI. However, we have learned recently that the
FBI in past years repeatedly fomented and sanctioned bombings, shootings, burg-
laries, and other such acts while attempting to weaken and discredit black activ-
ists and other dissident political groups (12). The reliability and loyalty of
persona steeped in officially condoned illegality is never very high. The char-
acters of some who emerged during the Watergate investigations may be considered
to be about on the level of mercenary soldiers. Nor are age and female gender
very promising bases for selection, Consider for example Sara Jane Moore, a mid-
dle-aged FBI informant of respectable background, who was convicted of attempting
to assassinate the President.
The generalization which emerges from these specific cases is this: Antisocial
behavior arises only partly from readily identifiable personal characteristics. Its
immediate precursors are numerous social and ideological influences, including the
mass media. It follows that individuals cannot be neatly categorized as saints or
sinners or somewhere in-between~ Hen~e any attempt by self-anointed saints to pick
out, and thus to establish control over, all the possible sinners can be expected
to fail, If such an attempt is made, it will be discovered once again that appar-
ently virtuous people will engage in frightful actions which they have come to be-
lieve are necessary to some noble goal.
Despite these indications which seem to preclude complete success, I do not
advocate a policy of inaction, The general problem of crime and violence is
enormous, and it is still increasing. Nuclear violence presents the prospect of
criminal and terrorist acts whose consequences could eclipse in severity all non-
war-related disasters. It is imperative to attempt to deal with the problem.
Such attempts, however, should not be formulated in isolation from the ongoing
debate over nuclear technology itself. If society judges that the benefits of
electricity generated from nuclear fission do not outweigh the concomitant costs
and risks, a major source of danger from criminals may be removed with the phaseout
of fission power plants. Antisocial exploitation of radioactive materials will not
disappear when that occurs. I expect th5t a widescale new policy to minimize the
hazards of criminal use of these materials will be needed, The Sierra Club Board
of Directors has already requested this in a resolution of October l97S (13).
Motives and Contexts for Nuclear Maleficence. A large range of potential
motives áñdtypes of perpe~tors exisEi~or acts of atomic theft, blackmail,
and sabotage. Antisocial .acts involving nuclear materials might occur against
a background of international rivalry, such as suggested in the MITRE Corpora-
tion's recent contract study for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (]li). Or they
might appear during sectional or factional enmity, such as civil war or ongoing
guerilla activity. Domestic insurgents would be presumably disinclined to cause
semi-permanent radioactive contamination of the territory they aspired eventually
to control. However, foreign-based agents under orders to capitalize on such civil
disturbances would be under no such felt restraint. Moreover, through ignorance or
miscalculation, an attempt by rebels to create what they consider a small dispersal
of radionuclides may result in a large one,
A) War and anticipated war. In a study submitted to the NRC and kept secret
for two months until late November l97S, the MITRE Corporation gave this appraisal
PAGENO="0028"
24
of the threat from the communist countries, who tend to believe in the inevitabil-
ity of an armed showdown with capitalism:
"The Soviet Bloc, China, and Cuba all have.. * an interest in weakening
the economic, political, and social structure of the United States. . . any of
these countries might consider an act of sabotage which, because of its
political repercussions, might severely limit the growth of the nuclear
industry. A large nuclear power plant near a major city might be sabotaged,
for example, in such a way as to cause a melt-down and breach of containment.
Given the present volatile character of the nuclear debate in our country,
such an act might permanently cut off our nuclear power plant option~~ (lh,
p. 13li).
It might be added that the question of our retaliation in such an event would pose
a possibly excruciating dilamna to the military. Whether or not the identity of
the perpetrators could be established, it would constitute a distinctly "destabil-
izing" occurrence, to use the unemotional language of deterrence theorists.
B) Domestic turmoil. The second category of contexts stimulative of radio-
active mi~lence refers to situations of internecene strife carried on by political,
religious or racial extremists. As we have seen in the Middle East and elsewhere,
fanatical commitment can reach quasi-suicidal levels. The suicidal component of
motivation appears operative in many terrorist activities. Dr. David 0. Hubbard,
Director of the Aberrant Behavior Center in Dallas, Texas, has stated in Congres-
sional testimony on skyjacking as follows: "We know with absolute certainty the
skyjackers themselves.. .want in the worst way to die. Very few of them have not
wanted to die. They lack the guts to kill themselves. They manipulate their
society into killing them" (lu, pp. 2977-2978). Psychiatrist Frederick J. Hacker,
a terrorism expert who testified in the same forum, concurred that skyjackers
".* .are often committing the act to be killed." He went on to say, "The polit-
ically motivated criminal is never deterred by the threat of the death penalty.
Much more, this is a raising of the price by which he can prove more of his courage"
(pp. 3012-3013).
Even overwhelming odds in favor of nuclear-facility security forces might not
deter those possessed of this kind of mentality. While it is tempting to divide
domestic insurgents into hot-blooded and cold-blooded categories, such a distinction
would have limited application. The very same groups can show signs of crafty cal-
culative ability at some times, and intemperate quasi-delusional behavior at others.
The Spmbionese Liberation Army was remarkably ~rationalR in some of its ventures,
and suicidally stupid in others. The charismatic leadership of unstable persons
helps to account for both phenomena.
C) ExtortIon threats. Involving nuclear explosives or radiological dispersal
devices iiiThlao1~ail demands is a logical extension of the extortionist's search
for maximum leverage. In contrast to unannounced nuclear violence, blackmail at
least provides some options for negotiation. Psychological instabilities in the
extortionists may limit the usefulness of negotiation efforts. Pragmatic crimin-
als, whose ainTis money and who have little desire to kill or be killed, will be
relatively more reachable by skilled argumentation. Even under the best of con-
ditions, the negotiators' task will be difficult and stressful.
However, a few circumstances favor the government, and these are worth mention-
ing. First, it should ordinarily be possible to discredit and thus to defuse prnc-
tically all hoaxes. Careful questioning and the use of backup sources for verifi-
cation of information can be expected to disprove false claims. Can the blackmailers
PAGENO="0029"
25
cite tangible evidence of their possession of a credible atomic device? This
would enteil blueprints, photographs and a sample of radioactive material.
Second, in response to demands requiring distant events, such as releaae of
political prisoners, it might be impossible for the blackmailers to verify fully
the authorities' compliance. Hence the latter are free to agree to some terms
which they do not intend to carry out in fact. Third, government negotiators
may reasonably insist that any bargain include the turnover of the nuclear bomb
or dispersal weapon. In order to rule out the possibility of being given a
counterfeit device, they may argue for the right to examine it closely, thus
gaining valuable information about its capabilities. Moreover, since a way of
arranging for turnover must be worked out which is as free as possible from the
double-cross the malefactors would anticipate, the authorities may gain valuable
time while these details are being deliberated.
Such stratagems will not be greatly useful against fully prepared and ruth-
less parties. The hardened extortionist's very first act may be the destruction
or evacuation by particulate radioactive contamination of a sizable urban area.
Having established himself through an atrocity which cuts through almost all
credibility issues and creates an atmosphere of fear and urgency in officialdom,
the nuclear blackmailer is then in a very good position to enforce his follow-on
demands. It would be dangerously misleading to imply that contingency planning,
game-playing and calculated deception cam be more than partially useful tech-
niques in attempting to cope with atomic terror threats.
D) Inside jobs. A fourth category of~ dangers may originate from psycholog-
ically dT ~e~~isgruntled or traitorous employees of nuclear facilities.
Earlier we mentioned instances in which trusted members of the nuclear team were
implicated in charges of financial default, arson, and armed robbery. Besides
acting as informants and accomplices for intruders, employees may directly engage
in theft or sabotage. For example, it is possible for knowledgeable persons,
acting independently or under duress, to render the emergency core-cooling system
of a nuclear power plant inoperative by applying jumper cables to the correct
electrical connections in the control room (16), Other vital equipment could
be destroyed or made to malfunction, thus initiating a meltdown of the fuel core.
~qho]~~ of the Defenders. Numerous observers have indicted the inadequate
security precaut~ns atI~ nuc ear sites (17). Psychological factors appear to
account for some of the complacency which permits, for example, only two guards at
a nuclear power plant (18) where experts have estimated at least ten are needed
(l7B, Table V.C.7-II; l7C, Fig. 6). Government regulators argue that nothing very
dire has yet occurred, at least not in this country. The utilities shout down new
security amendments, such as those proposed by the ARC in November 19714 but never
implemented, on gro~mds of cost and convenience. They also take refuge under
Regulation SO.l3 of 10 CFR which exempts nuclear power stations from the respon-
sibility to protect against "attacks and destructive acts including sabotage,
directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign
government or other person." I am incapable of justifying the continued existence
of this regulation given that the Department of Defense does essentially nothing
to provide special protection for civilian nuclear facilities either. It is hoped
that testimony to this Subcommittee by the Department of Defense will be requested,
and that Congressional spotlighting of the acute deficiencies in nuclear security
will correct them to the extent possible before a singularly great tragedy befalls,
PAGENO="0030"
26
References
1, USAEC draft Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuel (GESMO),
WASH-1327, August 71i~VoL~L~, p.~V1i~ V-I~~
2. Letter by Albert L. Gunby, Nucl~~ News, February 1976, p. 20.
3. State of California Office ~flGaergency Services, ~ ~c~ail Deer en
Response Plan for the State of Ca1iforp1~, Phase I. Sacramento, September 197
l~T. Lo~~ou1d RID. Thieves--Radioactivity Peril," Los ~ ~ 2-10-76.
5. Testimony by Brian Jenkins, Rand Corporation terrorism analyst, to the Cal-
ifornia Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, November 19, 1975,
pp. i~-5. (6) Ibid., p. 5.
7. "Silkwood, Initiative Campaigns Heating Up," Nuclear ~ November 1975.
8. H. Peter Metzger, The ~ Establishmer1~. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1972.
9. Michael Satchell, "Ex-AEC Aide Put on Probation," Washington Star-News, 2-21-73.
10. Report from Tom Woods, Sacramento representative of FFWB News Radio, Los Angeles.
11. "3,600 Lost Nuclear Jobs in Year, Many to Alcohol, Drugs," Los ~~!les Ii~i~,
January 27, 19Th.
12. Ronald J. Ostrow, "Grimy Specifics of FBI Actions Energe in Senate Testimony,"
Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1975. Narda Zacchino, "EX~FBI Informer Describes
~!~ht~Wing Terrorist Role," Los .)~!R Times, January 26, 1976.
13. Sierra Club National News ~ October 17, 1975, p. 2.
l1~. S. Burnham (~d]ç7~e Threat to Licensed Nuclear Facilities. MITRE Corpor-
ation, McLean, Vs., Sept~e~i~7~.
15. USGPO Terrorism Part 1. Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security,
U. S. House o~ Represen~tves, February 28 thru March 26, 19Th.
16. DPI Newsletter 2 #1 (Spring 1975). Chicago: Business and Professional
People7~rthe ii~IIc interest, p. 3.
17. (A) Report from Henry Eschwege, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Dixy Lee
Ray, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, B-l6biOS, October 16, 19Th.
(B) Undated draft report, Guards Sandia Laboratories, read at NRC Public
Document Room, Washington, D.C.,~T~7~'ry 1976.
(C) International Research and Technology Corporation, Estim~gtpg of ________
Personnel Required to Protect Nuclear Fuel ~ Components Against Theft of _______
N~dlea~aY~i1ils a~ 8~ib6tage. A~IIn~E~, Va., IR&TC August I.
~TDJ Carl El. ~II~l~lii~, Director, NRC Division of Safeguards. "Memorandum for
Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Safeguards,"
January 19, l976~ Mr. Builder states (p. 2), "1 am concerned that some or even many
of our currently licensed facilities may not have safeguards which are adequate
against the lowest (emphasis added) levels of design threat we are considering..."
(E) L. D. DeNike, "Unacceptable Security Deficiencies in the Draft EIR,
Proposed San Joaquin Nuclear Project." Presented June 16, 1975 to the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power.
(F) L. D. DeNike, "Inadequacies of Nuclear Power Plant Security Systems:
Some Shocking Truths." Presented June 25, 1975 to the State of Washington Thermal
Power Plant Site Evaluation Council, Olympia, Washington, in connection with the
proposed Skagit nuclear project.
(G) L. D. DeNike, "Terrorist Attacks on California Nuclear Power Facilities:
A Threat Analysis." Presented November 19, 1975 to State of Californie Assembly
Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy.
(H) L. D. DeNike, "Defense Implications of Coastal Nuclear Power Plant Siting
in California." Presented to State of California Senate Committee on Public Util-
ities, Transit, and Energy, November 25, 1975.
18, USAES, "Environmental Impact Appraisal of Proposed Amendments to 10 CEDE Part
73," November 6, 19Th, p. 13.
PAGENO="0031"
27
Crimea and suspected crimes involving
~T~c~I~e snateri~Is"~'~e nucI~i~ industry
Lñ~ 1-30-
Much ranium Missing
Froth Plants,. Paper~ Says
NEW YORE (RI-The New York Experts in the Industry and in uni-
Times reported Sunday that the fed- ~~im and unnamed AEC officials
couJfor thousands of pounds of were cited by the newspaper as the
aniuna and plutonium that umid ~ sources from which the account of
used to manufacture nuclear bombs. the missing elements had been con-
`The newspaper, In a story from s&ucted.
`Waohingtsn. said the nuclear materi- At one unidentified plant, the
ala were unaccounted for at 15 com- newspaper mid, about 9,000 pounds
nsercial plants in the United States of highly.icicriched uranium is urea-
regulated by the Atomic Energy counted fhr.
Commiaaioa Small arnàunts of the two nuclear
Frank Ingrain, an AEC spokesman elements can be combined to fashion
In Washington, said commission offi- a crude nuclear weapon capable of
clals would have no comment on the killing thousands of persons, the
story until they had soad it. a~ewnpapersaid.
FBI Fears Rise ~7
of A-Threats ~
WASHINGTON ta-The FBI has
expressed concern about a possible
Increase in the number of extortion.
tots threa~ening to explode nuclear
weapons in American cities.
FBI officials said Friday they be.
lieved the threats might increase be.
cause of publicity about the possibili.
ty that radioactive material might be
stolen from nuclear plants and used
by terrorists and extortionists to
fashion crude bombe
Two FBI officials familiar ndth the
situation said the agency had investi.
gated seven such threats during the
last year. more thus in any previous
years.
But, they said, there have bees no
cases of actual theft of nuclear
materials and no cases in which an
individual' actually has built a nu.
clear bomb.
"From Rome, Group W correspondent Don Larrirnore reports that
~ the old adage about not drinking the water in Europe may have to
.f~, be dusted off."
"It sounds like something out of a fantastic paperback
thriller but the government says this plot really did take place
~ and Italy is aghast. Defense Minister Giulio Andreotti has told
Parliament that right-wing terrorists planned to poison Italy's
~" water supply this fall with radioactive uranium stolen from a
~ nuclear center and placed in various aqueducts. Eight people have
~ been arrested, twelve others are being sought and fifty-five more
:c have been told they may face, legal action. According to press
~ reports,under huge headlines, the scheme also involved a plan to
assassinate the Prime ~inister, the Ccrnmunist Par~'leader, and
other top officials in the hope that large scale panic would
ensue forcing the army to intgrvene and opening the way for a
~ rightist government takeover. Andreotti, reporting on four years
n of neo-fascist subversion, also ccnfiraed that, in December, 1970,
~ rightists actually got into the Interior ~inistry ar.d stale
~ weapons from t.~e armory before that abortive coup fizzled. The
~ former head of the Intelligence Service, General Vincenzo Miceli,
~ has been officially warmed he. is under suspicion of favoring the
coup by witholding information. This is Don Larrirnore for Group' N
News, Rome."
Ap,il. 1964 th,o~gh J.~.. 1972. O,vi~, th)~ i~1~',,~l Will),,,, 1.
R,lty. sap ,,~ti',',.l ~ ~ liv ,h. Atvvv u.,,oy ~
b.'t~,v.d 6239.300 f,II',~', AEC `vpI~y,.. .~d t.~l,d tv
6170.000. A sabttt',ti,I pv~tv~ .1 lit ~vv~,y ~ iv
.,.~k gsavblvg O'~"u th,t vt,,'..) Silty htd ,,.ttvth,v,tvv',
hlgh.,t t.vtt. .vd h~. ~.~b)g ..tvay .v.t kvv.vvt,, h,.
~ Thy. h,..., p.tsthl. sate,,' Isa blsakvsail, H.
tht~. y.sat p,ybsatvv ,v y.bsa.,y. 1973. M,.h.,l S~tyh,lI, "Th,
Ril.y AS.), (2.4.73) sad E*.AEC Aidt P.t Ot~ Psab.tjyv" (2.21.73).
W.shivgto,t St.,'N.,tv
Msach. 1973. A g.sa)li. bsad tvtk tt?vpsa,,y ~
sit,, tttttss st~ tit~g ssaspl,tiss iv A,~tvty~, Tb. g..s)l.,
dtss~~t~dth,pllvtsathpslit,s.ltIsu,v,.vdltft..,iths,,t~,i,g.,0
d.vsagt. C i,c,,svsat J.,tt 1973 (Op svsv, t,stisv), sa~g Asp),,,
!,tdssty. Ap,il 1973.
ApIll. 1974. Ptvt st ts,', t,tivt it, Astt,, Is,,, fssvd ssvt,s,A,,sad
hvvstlt~ "j(~ttts. gs.,ill." t,ltphys,d 5~I5tivg th,t p,,t,vg~n'
d.vg.t. Sli,ht t,,s,t st ttd,tiyv ss,,t tsssd iv l,is. sat "sv")
eight p~~savg*t~ sad ive bst iv the b~gg~gtse,. "Mytt,,'y R~di~t,sv
Hit. Av9th~, T,.)v'~ Lot Atg,!., Ti,v.e. Aptil 20. 1974.
PAGENO="0032"
(19711)
Nuclear Device
`r1irc~ileiis Thief
l)IERFIEI,I) I1EACII. Flu.,
Jusie 8 (All-A nuclear device
that could cause hose cancer
In (be persons who slob' it was
recovered Friday us a Irviway
overpass, officials soid.
A Depsrlsdrr.l of Trauspos
(alms official said a prelossi
nary examinaiindt indicates
that the device, used to incas
ore the density 01 roodhedS,
had been ianspc~cd wilh.
There is every vtrunt pus
sihility ((tat whoever tsvk it
may have received enoii~h
exposure to prove fatal:' said
Avery Sedelt Cf the l)rpart
ment of Transpsrtotdot. "It
looks as if they had soocked
on it for quite a while." -
ta~T ~
A nuclear power p1ani technician
killed is a car crash four months ago
was pushed from the road by another
vehicle, her union charged. The Oil
Chemical and.Atnmic Workers Union
alto alleged that someone might have
deliberately tried Is contaminate the
technician, Karen Silkwood. 28, with
pldtonium. Silkwsod wsa hilled Nos'.
13 as she was driving to a meeting
with a newspaper reporter and a
union official to show them evidence
allegedly documenting safety hazardo
at the Kerr-McGee plutonium plant
in Crescent, OhIo. Stale police mid
she fell asleep at the shed The
unton, however, said three more ex-
perts had found the police report in-
correct
cci, i~.'
THEFT FEB.'75' P. 5'?
Cesium sources stolen,
found; damage reported
Twos ceviom-l37 gauges stolen prior
to December 12, 1974, from a locked
room at the F. I. dii Pont de Nemoors
& Co. plant sear Gibbstown, NJ.,
were found in damaged condition after
an anonymous phone call ted to their
location. According 0 AEC regulatory,
part of one of the sources was misstng,
and "the person who took it is trying
hard not to he identified." local police
are investigating the crime.
The gauges were stated for disposal.
Their discovery several days after they
were missed caste after a widespread
search ol the Gihhxtown area and con-
siderable tiedia coverage.
The report by ARC investigators
was not expected until sometusse this
nsonth.
Radioactive
Plates Stolen
From Lab
BERKELEY 181-About
100 mildly radioactive cop-
per plates were stolen
from the Berkeley Lasv-
rence Radiation Laborato-
ry, the Atomic Energy
Commission said Wednes-
day.
AEC information officer
Dale Cook void the theft
occurred last sveek. He
said the plates present tao
public health danger.
`They are naildly costa-
minatect svith Cobalt 61)
due to the fact that llsev
had just bees removed
from the 184-iitvh esclsa-
tron,' Cook said. "Tlsere io
no health hazard to tlae
public or the thieves.'
He said no suspects Isave
Iseen apprehended. but the
l"Bl you investtgatittg.
(u~r~ LoY
4A~C4tES° 7?M~/
Radioactive Needle
Sought After Theft
Suspect Is Arrested
MODESTO (UPII-One man seas
In jail on theft charges, 11 others
were to have medical checkups and
police and civil deleusse authorities
continued their search Wednesday
for the last of nine stolen radioactive
radium needles.
Authorities said they recovered
seven of the needles when they ar-
rested Robert Ewing, 18, a night
porter at Scenic General Hospital. at
bin home earlier this week. An
eighth needle woo found at the home
of Ewing's uncle nearby, but tt woo
the ninth and still missing needle
that worried ollicials.
The needles, used several years
ago in cancer treatment, were stolen
from the storage room of the hospt-
tal last August Hospital employes
did not discover the theft until two
weeks ago when they planned to
turn them over to federal authori-
ties for disposal.
After an intensive lnvestigatinn,
authorities armed with a search
warrant found seven of the needles
In Ess'ing's home. One of them svas
lying in a dresser drasver only a fesv
feet from where Esving slept each
night.
Doctors conducted thorough med-
*lcal examinalishs of Esx'ing and saud
they could find no damage, but they
said radioactivity of that type could
take months or es'en years to show
up. After determining that Ewing
wan emitting no radioactivity, he
was jailed on theft charges.
Police said they had not learned
the motive for the theft, but they
said it wan elaborately planned, in-
cluding the removal of lead blocks
which surrounded the needles in
storage, one at a time, ox'er a period
of several days to reduce the con-
tainer's weight so the needles could
be easily carried from the hospital.
Police said it other persons svere
unknowingly exposed to the needles
after they were stolen.
`We have advised it other persons
to seek medical checkups and treat-
ment from their private physicians,'
a police spokesman said,
28
`I'
`so.
~ 2° ~
0 E ~-°5~ ~ o ~`~2 ~
28 ~2'5~'~'~ 0;~,~r0 ~
- -~ -u ~AGE39
~ `di, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER
2 Wed., Aug. 14, 1974
125 ~(
5 L~DLlC 0lCT~S -
f (3 .~ ,NF000ATIOH bands
w
PAGENO="0033"
NUCLEAR NEWS / NOVEMBER 1975
the initiative advocates is nuclear plant
security, their point of view was given
an inadvertent boost early in October
when a former Cimmaron plant security
guard was allegedly caught in the act
of robbing a loan company in nearby
Guthrie during which a woman clerk
was shot.
Guthrie police chief Dale Orndorff
verified for NUCLEAR NEws that the
former guard, now awaiting trial, was
found to have worked at Kerr-McGee
under an assumed name. The initiative
advocates believe this revelation, which
they say denotes tasity in Kerr-McGee's
_____________ screening of security personnel, greatly
Second, since one of the concerns of strengthens their case for strict state
control over nuclear and plutonium
facilities.-E,T,
SCT1LAN~D. ~
Two pulenliolly lethal radioactive "1
des'ices used for measuring soil corn-
paction u-crc vtoleo from a trailer a~ ~
a Pomona Freeway construction site `~ ~
stear Glen Avon. about seven miles c'
west of Riveraide. a stale Departrnen~ ret
of Health official said. The devices l~
are housed in doable-walled stainless t'~
ste' cylinders, each about two few ~ `~J
Jo is vaid. He scat-ned that the cy-
lindcrs could relea's lethal radioac-
tive doses if tampered with. The ~
thieves broke a sviv'lvsa `o the trader
and ansashed three tucks to gut to lIe
devices, which ore north 32,500 ~
apiece, officials said.
L.4. 7~ME$°
RADIO/-CTIVE MATE~UALS
O~icia1s Seeking Man
Wfth `Ho~ Ap~ri~iit
BERKELEY IUPI)-Neighhors say they think Lern Ga-
lahow is either writing or editing a chemistry levI book,
- but Berkeley fire department officials and ilse Atonsic En-
crgy Commi -sian would like In talk to him just the sam'.
Galabow's duplex near the University of California earn-
pun was oaitsd up by fire officials Salorday alter a huge
cache of radioactive materials and volatile chemicals were
ilkund ncatleeed around hit vaiL
Fire Chief Richard Hallb~"g onid Galabow, who is be-
lieved traveling in thu Mojavd Desert area, is wanted for
questioning and alto -would be cited for "violations too
utany to quoto" ef fire, building, zoning and safety ordi-
nanceo.
Nuclear opposition
turns to confrontation
Anti-nuclear-power groups in Ger-
many and Switzerland continaed their
plant-site sit-ins into early last month,
and a French reactor under construe-
lion suffered slight damage when two
plastic bontbs were set off by terror-
ists, as increasing hostility to nuclear
power erupted in confrontatloft along
the Rhine.
NUCLEAR NEWS / JULY 1975
RADIATION INCIDENTS
Argonne loses Pu sample
Argonne National Laboratory has
lost, probably for good, a small refer-
ence calibration sample of plutonium-
239 and has called off an ioteosive
search for it that lasted through the
month of May. The sample had been
seen on a laboratory bench oo May 2,
and was reported missing on May 9,
when it could not be found to replace
in its storage pipe. After an unsuccessful
search of the Lab trash, 00 the theory
that it might have been mistakenly
thrown out, the search was concladed.
Officials believe the plutoniuos is
still on Ihe site, and a spokesman said,
`We'll never stop looking for it." The
incident received widespread press cov-
erage, but reports that the entire trash
pile might be packaged and shipped to
Idaho for bitrial were characterized as
"a pipcdream." The spokcsisian added
that the sensitive detection devices used
on the trash could have detected the
sample if it had beeq present.
29
REWARD!!!
One RADI3ACfIVE ISOTOPE stolen from AMF TUBO.
SCOPE IN Day Ciry. This device is of no use to anyone but
oar company. It it a donut-shaped device with AMF Tubo.
Scope ntcacslcd on its aide, and it is extremely dangeroun to
the lcafth of anyone who handles it. If found, do not open or
disassc'tihle. - -
.fscei' ?c'rfo;jos~~rT,-.tgi'efirscTu-,'rotmio,, -
,,J!,s~JL,rttu: t).ft.Mui'JAo,,dJ, -
713,71,1-1390. -
$500 REWARD wilt be paid -
(no questions asked)
10 arty person who can i-slum the device or lead us to its
wbereaboua,c. -~
AMP TUBOSCOPE, INC. - -~
Houston, Texas
LA-I' C~r-7r
RadioactIve pellels found outside
the Kerr-McGee N'.iclvar Corp. facto-
ry at Cresceof, OkIa., might have
been planted there by an ernploye to
nbarrass the plant's management,
according to a government memo-
randum, It was prepared by a Nu-
clear Regulatory Comminsieti inspec-
tor and released he the General Ac-
countir.g Olfice. The commission, for-
merly Ike regilaisrv arm of Ike
Atomic Energy Commission, has keen
investigating the plutonium costa-
minufivo of Kerr.McGee employc Ea-
ten Silkwood. Uks.ood. who had
eewpfaine/ about condilions at the
plant. `Ado killed Nov. 13, 1374, a a
car crash.
EUROPE -
The bombing at Fessenheim, Fras~hie,
was intially attributed to anti-nuclear
feeling, but later reports said it was
the work of the German Baader radical
group, with whom the German demon-
strators disclaimed any relationship or
sympathy. NUCLEAR NEWS / JUNE 1975
71-074 0 - 7e - 3
PAGENO="0034"
2art 1.-Tues., Dec. 2, 1975 ~oe Tingelee ~unr~
SACRAMENTO-There have been
several threats of nuclear blackmail
in the last few years In California,
state and federal officials city..
All have been hoaxes, so far. But
they have spawned a plan with the
ominous title: `Nuclear Blackmail
Emergency Response Plan for tho
State of California (Phase 1: The
Threat)." It exists because mme day
the threat may be real and the state
or private Industry may be forced to
make the decision: pay off or suffer
the destruction of a nuclear bemb or
the deadly effects of radiation.
Officials are thinking abeut a sec-
ond plan-what to do if the threat is
real. But they said that plan has not
bees dratted yet.
Otliciats decline to outline the
threats that have been received, or
state exactly how many there have
been.
"We atready have had threats. This
plan wasn't something we just decid-
ed to do. We felt there was a need,"
Jack Kearns, radietogical and intel-
ligence officer for the state Office of
Emergency Services, said is an inter-
view.
Kearns is the chief author of the
plan that was developed and ap-
proved by a committee representing
various agencies.
It was releaseil in September to
ceunty sheriffs, police chiets and re-
gional fire t)epadtments.
"We spent.a long time hers in the
offihe before we decided to release
itt'.' Kearns said.
"We were fearful it would be a
catalyst to set something off. But yet,
to held it and not let the various
agencies in en it would be a mistake."
The plan makes the FBI the lead
agency for an investigation. The fed-
eral Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA) ptays a
key role in determining the validity
of a threat.
"Acts of extortion or blackmail in-
volving radioactive materials pose a
myriad ef complex problems and re-
quire a ceordinated reopouse from
many different federal, state and lo-
cal agencies," the plan states.
It breaks response actions into two
phases: responsibility for assessing
credibility, monitoring, searching,
deactivating and disposing, and eva-
cuation, decontansination and clean-
ing up ifs threat is tarried nut.
"The problems and actions result-
ing when a threat has actually been
carried out will be addressed in a se-
parate plan," it mid.
"Ultimately, there will be a Phase
II plan," Kearns said. "It will deal
with what we do when we do deem a
threat credible.'
Kearos sail just how Elll)A would
check ost a threat or conduct a
search a as `in house" ptan. "We
can't expeat ERDA to tell us how
they go about it."
"Califorisia is is pretty goes) shape
to react," said Dale Cook, ERDA in-
formation officer in San Francisco.
Cook said that while the carrying
out of a threat is possible, it is only
remotely so because ef the technolo-
gy required, the safeguards is use
and the high risk of radiation death
to the would.be blackmailer.
`The blackmailer is esly as geniI as
his product," Ceek said. `Everything
we've ever had has been a hoax.
They read teo much fiction. But as
long as people are feeding off the
cleareriented laberatories so Denser
at Berkeley and Lasvreitce at Liver-
more, has highly raised personnel to
help in the event of an emergency.
Search ted dccvotansination teams
already exist at these facilities, he
said, and medical teams-duelers
specializing in radiology-could be
mobilized.
"We're prep~ed, ready to respond
and provide advice," Cook said. "\Ve
have the capability to measure an al-
legation and determine where it
ceuld come from. We have taken
good, prudent safeguards."
Key elements are the forms used
when a threat is received by tele-
phone. The caller is asked certain
quwtions that, pieced together, go a
tong way toward determining validi-
tv.
bomb scare, people are seared.
"A fi'ilvsv calls, says he's gsl
lsvrsli. but it's not eves plausible.
What's she payoff?
`If iou really wattled to lilaclsorail,
it would be so nsuch easier Sc gel
your hands on material more toxic
and easier to control.'
Still, Cook said, "Yes treat every
threat as serious. Yes don't say they
are cranks at first. Some clown will
come along and say, `I've got this er
that.' We've got to be cool and calm,
check out tho system and cope with
By checking the system, Cook re-
fers to the ges'ernissest's computer-
ized system that can quickly deter-
mine if a significant amount of fis-
sionable material is missiog.
Cook said California. with such nu-
"You plan en people's tgnerance,"
Cook said.
The ptas lists six types of threats,
including detonation ef an "impro-
vised nuclear device" or a weapon
stolen frem the nsititary.
Kearns said those two types "fall
into the improbable category," but
the felloseing would be more credible.
-Dispersal of radioactive material
other than plutonium.
-Detonation of a conventional
bemb salted with radioactive materi-
al-plutonium. strontium or ether
knosen radioactive isotopes.
-Detonation or dispersal of high-
jacked radioactive materials, such as
a spent fuel shipment or radioactive
materials used in hospitats or phar-
macies.
-Dispersion of plutonium in order
to contaminate.
Several Nuclear Blackmail
Threats Received in State
All Are Hoaxes but Officials Develop Plan to
Cope With Menace of Atom Blasts or Radiation
BY RON ROACh
PAGENO="0035"
31
Terrorist Attacks on California Nuclear Power Facilities: A Threat Analysis
L. Douglas DeNike, Ph.D.
Technical Consultant
Californians for Nuclear Safeguards
Invited Testimony to the State of California Assembly Committee
on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, November 19, l97~
It is indeed a great honor to appear before this distinguished Committee
to discuss a topic of potentially immeasurable significance to Californians.
Since my conclusions will no doubt provoke controversy, an initial statement
regarding my background and qualifications is in order, I graduated magna cum
laude from Harvard University in l9S9, and obtained my doctorate in psychology
at Duke University in l96lj, I am a clinical psychologist, trained in the study
and treatment of abnormal human behavior, As such, I served on the faculty of
the TJniversity of Southern California from l96b until 1973. Since that time,
I have served without salary with Californians for Nuclear Safeguards and the
Sierra Club, studying and publicizing the problems raised bythe potential for
exploitation of radioactive materials by antisocial forces, As a behavioral
scientist and mental health specialist, I have become deeply concerned by the
possibilities for criminal and terrorist interventions against nuclear generating
atationa and radioactive cargoes. My article, "Radioactive Malevolence," which
appeared in the February 19Th issue of the~ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1),
was deemed worthy of reprinting by four periodicaTh t~-~3 The Sierra Club
Bulletin broke precedent to print my article, "Nuclear Terror," in the current
ii~ie~6), Despite its policy of omitting footnotes, the Sierra Club deemed
thia discussion of nuclear power proliferation sufficiently important to justify
the inclusion of all h1~ of my references.
My writings and presentations contain information which is admittedly
dangerous to place in public circulation, However, all of the facts which they
contain are from open sources, which are as available to the underworld as they
are to myself. While there is significant peril implicit in their wider dissem-
ination, there is much greater peril in the assumption that critical silence can
help to impart sufficient safety to a patently inadequate level of security in
the American nuclear power industry,
In the interest of time, I will state my "punch lines" and give full cor-
roboration and references in my supplemental written statement, attached, I will
then suggest some criteria whereby this Committee might further evaluate the
testimony of the day's other witnesses,
Point One. The General Accounting Office of Congress charged on October
16, 19Th, "Licensee and AEC officials agreed that a security system at a licensed
nuclear powerplant could not prevent a takeover for sabotage.~ a small number--
as few perhaps, as two or three-.~F armed iñdIviduaT~Tr73. Sinc~~t~
ago, nei~Te~tii~ A~mic Energy Commission nor its successor
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has adopted any additional power plant
security regulations (8). This despite the fact that in France, six terrorist
explosions have occurred at four nuclear-related facilities since May of this
year (9),
PAGENO="0036"
32
Point Two, The results of successful nuclear power plant sabotage could
be even more severe than the effects of the maximum accident deemed credible
in the federal goveroment's draft ?esmussen Report' (~1ASH-lb~O). Those effects
are given on page 70 of Appendix VI of the Rasmussen study as 2,300 acute deaths,
3,200 fatal cancers, ~,60O persons made acutely ill, 8b,000 cases of thyroid
nodules, and total damage costing 6.2 billion dollars (10). The reason for
expecting more severe consequences than these is that not only could saboteurs
effect a certain meltdown of the reactor core by means described in the supple-
mental statement but they could also breach the protective containment structure
with explosives ~ll), assuring the release of massive quantities of volatile
radionuclides to the atmosphere.
Point Three, The seven nuclear power reactors operating or being built in
California will annually discharge over bOO intensely radioactive spent fuel
assemblies, which must be shipped to the east coast for reprocessing (12). The
massive shipping casks used to transport these spent fuel elements could be
blown up by sophisticated saboteurs utilizing shaped explosive charges. The
resultant dispersal of particulate radionuclides could jeopardize many square
miles downwind. The cost, time, and manpower needed to restore contaminated
land and watershed in such an event is unavailable in any federal document, but
would be on the order of millions of dollars per square mile, months of time,
and thousands of specially trained, suited, and equipped workers (13). Unlike
plutonium shipments, cargoes of spent fuel are exempt from any federal require-
ment for armed guards. It is noteworthy, however, that the City of New York
recently banned both types of shipments from its streets (lb).
This Committee is strongly encouraged to seek informed and convincing contra-
diction to these assertions. Such adequate contradiction will not be forthcoming.
I think it best at this time to address some issues which I would anticipate
have been raised in other witnesses' statements. Professor Willrich and Pr. Taylor
might be expected to argue, on the basis of their past statements that the cost of
adequate safeguards and security arrangements will be of manageable proportions.
In their book (l~), which I was privileged to review for the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (16), they proposed establishment of a federally operated national nu-
clear security force. I consider it most improbable that any governmental agency
can assure a satisfactory degree of protection for nuclear facilities and materials.
We are concerned here with substances such as plutonium, of which l~ ounces spread
over a square mile would require evacuation and thorough cleanup (17), and of which
less than 20 pounds could be sufficient to make an atomic bomb (18). Absolute
prevention of theft is therefore necessary. Federal authorities have failed to
prevent the assassination of h out of 37 American presidents, not to mention two
apparently serious attempts on the life of President Ford, A near-disastrous fire,
involving gross negligence and multiple examples of incompetence, took place at the
federally operated Browns Ferry nuclear power plant last March 22nd. Furthermore,
it may be expected that unless proper internstionel enforcement is established,
fissile materials will be stolen in foreign nations. Such materials will then
migrate via channels well known to drug smugglers to the points of the highest
blackmail leverage--such as the nation's capital city, or the capital city of
the nation's most populous state. Thus any responsible social scientist would*
be compelled to conclude that it is pro~sbly impossible to create invincible
domestic safeguards for the civilian nuclear industry. In support of this con-
clusion, I submit three pages of press clippings documenting actual crimes in-
volving this industry. Finally, even perfect national safeguards in the context
of ongoing rampant international nuclear power proliferation would not prevent
unspeakable misuses of radionuclides virtually anywhere in the world.
PAGENO="0037"
33
Representat~vea of the electric uti1ities traditionally argue that no
~ ~f `u'~ty ~"n~ t~~s ~"~` ~od t~t sror -`o~i
attempts would be quickly detected, Sadly, these assertions lack essential
relevance, One cannot extrapolate from the past to the future to the effect
that terrorists are uninterested in nuclear facilities, France has learned
that lesson already. Rather, we must assume a social climate in which terror-
ists are increasing in sophistication and numbers (19), while the number of
potentially targetable nuclear facilities is projected to increase by a factor
of ten or more (20). Quantitative estimates will be upset by the fact that
imitative attempts wUl be spawned by the first successful acts of nuclear
sabotage or theft in the United States.
Moreover, detection of an intrusion or hijack attempt is far different from
successful resistance to either one, Nuclear power plants, located at a distance
from law enforcement personnel, nonetheless depend upon such personnel f or prompt
and adequate response in the event of a criminal incursion, According to the
General Accounting Office, local law enforcement agencies are poorly prepared to
provide this reinforcement function, and have no clear idea as to the level of
threat--the magnitude of the attack--whichmust be provided against (21). Some
enlightenment may be forthcoming in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Special
Safeguards Study due for submission in early 1976 (22), However, we may expect
that at least six months will elapse before any significant federally ordered
security tightening occurs at America's nuclear power plants, The Nuclear Safety
Commission of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has found, "We believe that unless
there is a substantial upgrading of security provisions within one year, presently
operating plants should be forced to close down and that there should be a mor-
atorium on further nuclear power plant construction" (23),
Given these ominous indications, the State of California should not be
satisfied with less than a thorough onsite ~gpection of security at its present
nuclear power plants, and at other f~Imies (2t~) having significant quantities
of radioactive materials. Coastal plants are of special concern since their
questionable guard forces, the proximity of the sea as an avenue for approach
and escape of malefactors, and the prevailing onshore wind make these facilities
clear, present, and imminent dangers to public health and safety in the event of
malevolent attack, In this regard, it should be evident that once knowledgeable
saboteurs have taken over a p1ant~s spent-fuel pool, control room, cable spreading
room, or reactor containment, they can hold off any degree of armed counterforce
by threatening to set off an irreversible release of airborne radioactivity through
the use of explosives or incendiaries, Fanatical motivation reaching quasi-suicidal
levels is far from unknown in today's terrorists, and the probability of their own
demise could not be relied upon to deter them, They could also be expected to take
plant personnel hostage who could be coerced into aiding their destructive intent,
To repeat, onsite inspection by representatives of the Legislature appears mandatory
if the present collision course with tragedy is to be averted.
In support of my spoken statement, I submit to the Committee copies of the
General Accounting Office's report of October 16, l97h news accounts of actual
nuclear crimes, and charges of lax security at plants disillusioned guards
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Also included are the references for
the charges I have made herein,
* *~ *
PAGENO="0038"
34
Supplenentel Statement - L. Douglas DeNike, Ph.D. - November 19, 1975
Scenarios of Nuclear Power Plant Sahotape Leading to Release of Rndioactivit~
The basic federal requirement for the security force at a nucleer power
plant is two individuals (typically armed with handguns) onsite at all times,
plus one supervisor who mans the alarm and communication systems in the security
office (25). As the GAO charged (7), two or three armed persons could overcome
this security crew and take over the plant. The scenarios below could then be
effectuated before reinforcements summoned by radio could arrive from offsite.
Plant design diagrams sufficient to plan an attack on a nuclear generating
station are maintained, under federal regulations, in public document rooms near
each plant and 5t other NRC offices. Utilising information thus gathered, free-
lance writer Joseph D. Schleimer published a credible sabotage scenario, "The
Dey They Blew Up San Onofre" (p6), which prompted ~n angry remonstrance (27)
from the management of this allegedly secure facility. The San Onofre guard
force has recently been substantially augmented. It is responsible for daily
searches of the thousand-plus construction workers building the new units there.
Spent fuel pool. The GAO report warned that the relative insecurity of
spent?~i~r ~ Ts~ems to warrant establishing additional security requirements
as soon as possible" (7). The corrugated-steel (Diablo Canyon) or concrete-block
(San Onofre #1) buildings which house them are designed neither to resist forced
entry nor to contain air-entrained rsdionudlides. Timed waterproof charges
totaling So to 100 pounds of high explosive, if armed and dropped into such an
uncovered pool, would probably explode with sufficient dispersive effect to make
en entire ~l billion plant unusable thereafter.
Control room. In earlier-built plants such as San Onofre #1 which started
up in 1967 the control room is the only point from which the reactor can be
shut down ~26). If it were destroyed by explosives, the reactor would be un-
controllable. In the absence of controlled coolant-flow maintenance, the radio-
active fuel core would heat up into an irreversible meltdown condition even if
the shutdown control rods automatically cut off the fission chain reaction, arid
even if no pipe ruptures were specifically initiatied by saboteurs. This is the
case since the fission-product afterheat produced by residual radioactivity in
the fuel is sufficient to overheat the core unless the necessary electric pumps
and valves operate in coordinated fashion. Such a circumstance nearly arose in
connection with the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant fire of Narch 22, 1975 (28).
Cable spreading room. At all American nuclear power plants vital control
wirinj~3Ih typicallyTi~mmable insulation issues through the cable spreading
room located directly beneath the control room (28), In the Browns Ferry affair,
multiple extinguishing systems were inadequate to halt a progressed fire in this
location. Thus, an ordinary chemical bomb tied to a can of gasoline could start
an uncontrollable situation in the cable spreading room of any such plant.
Sabotage within the reactor containment structure. After coerced or explos-
ive-assisted e~E~iInto the containment area, saboteurs could set time bombs sim-
ultaneously to destroy two to four "cold leg" pipes which return vital primary
coolant water to the core. Since the plant's emergency core-cooling system (ECCS)
is designed to cope with the complete severance of only one such pipe (29), mult-
iple rupture would make core cooling impossible and meltdown would follow.
PAGENO="0039"
~35
F~plosive Demolition of ~p l~-Fuel Shipping Casks
The extrexely rugeed caske ured to ti~ansport rper.t-fuel elerents provide
a protective layer consisting of about 2 inches of steel and 8 inches of lead
(30). However, they are penetrable by one or more shaped explosive charges
developed to pierce military armor. A hemispheric charge made of a few pounds
of high explosive lined with any dense metal will penetrate two feet of solid
steel (31). Since present spent-fuel casks weigh 2~ to 100 tons, it is evident
that a fully explosive-resistant cask would be too heavy to be transported.
Thus it is vital that the state of California stipulate armed guarding and
ppecial routiflg (away from urban areas) fpr spent-fuel shipments.
Probable Limitations of the Forthcoming "Special Safeguards ~ Documents
Presently the NRC is conducting two major safeguards studies scheduled for
completion in early 1976 (32). For the very first time, these studies will
attempt to gauge specific levels of security needed to protect against desig-
nated levels of threat (33). If the past is any guideline, these studies when
completed will be found to be unsatisfactory in three ways: (A) They will be
subject to veto by the utilities on criteria of cost and convenience (31);
(s) Significant portions of the studies are likely to be classified, and thus
insusceptible to evaluation by citizena;~(C) The studies are likely to recommend
federally funded guards for nuclear facilities, thus offering one more subvention
to an already multiply-subsidized industry.
Notes
1. DeNike, L. D. Radioactive Malevolence. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
~9, February 19Th, p. 16-20.
2. DeNike, L. D. Nuclear Power; Trojan Horse? ECO L~, San Francisco; Friends
of the Earth, November 1973 (serialized preprint of Radioactive Malevolence).
3. Above article reprinted by ~ Inc., Chapel Hill, N. C., December 1973.
h. Whole Cities Can Be Held for Ransom (condensation of Radioactive Malevolence)
The Vancouver ~ Vancouver, 8. C., February 21, 19Th.
3. Radioactive Nalevolence reprinted by Current, April 19Th, p. bl-19.
6. DeNike, L. D. Nuclear Terror. Sierra Club Bulletin, November/DeCember l97~.
7. Report from Henry Eschwege, U. S. General Accounting Office, to Diry Lee Ray,
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, B-l6t~lOS, October 16, 19Th.
8. Telephone conversations with Carl Gustin, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
October 29, l97S; Frank Degnan, General Accounting Office, November 3, l97~.
9. Bombs Hit Nuclear Site in France, Washington Post, May 1, l97~. Le Pro-
gramme Nucleaire Bans Lea Choux~ La Guéule Ouverte, a French radical weekly,
one of the June l97~ issues. New Bombing of a French Nuclear Plant, Nuclear
News, September l97~, p. l3b.
10 IJSAEC draft WASH-ThOO An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial
Nuclear Power Plants, August l~7i~, Appendix V!, p. 70. - - - __________
~Ll. L.~~ing Muntzing, former Director of Regulation for the AEC, conceded
"that a band of highly trained, sophisticated terrorists could conceivably take
over a nuclear power plant near a major city and destroy it in such a way as to
kill thousands--perhaps even millions-of people." Dye, L. Nuclear Energy:
Great Hopes, Great Problems. Los Aneelea ~ December 17, 1973. Moreover,
the casualty figures of the draft WASH-lI~OO may be on the order of ten times too
low. See H. W. Lewis, et ml., Report :to the American Physical Society by the
Study Group on Light Water Reactor Safety, APS, April 28, 197w.
PAGENO="0040"
36
12. Presently no spent-fuel reprocessing plant is operating, but the Barnwe)l,
South Carolina facility may be licensed to open in 1976.
13. Comparable incidents are described in these terms in N. Willrich and
T. 9. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger,
19Th, p. 108; N. Rapoport, The Great American Bomb Machine, New York: Ballantine,
1971, p. S2. These are for dispersals of plutonium. It is estimated by the gov-
ernment that l~ of a 33 million curie shipment of spent fuel could be dispersed
by sabotage (method unspecified). TJSAEC, WASH-1535 Proposed Final Environmental
Statement, Liauid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program, DeceaberT~?E, Table ~
II1. New ~ Fans Shipment Through Iti~treets. Nuclear ~ October
1975, p. 57.
15. M. Willrich & T. B. Taylor, ~. ~ p. 163.
16. DeNike, L. D. Book Review: How Safe Are the Safeguards? Bulletin of-the
Atomic Scientists, October 19Th.
17. This represents a value of one microcurie per square meter of Pu-239.
Compare Willrich & Taylor, p~. cit., Table 2-2, p. 25, bearing in mind that power-
reactor-grade plutonium is 5to~times as radiotoxic as Pu-239.
18. Wilirich & Taylor, 2E~ cit., p. 13.
19. 12 Killed by Bombings in First 9 Months of `75 FBI Data Show. Los Angeles
November 11, 1975.
20. Ultimate deployment of U.S. nuclear reactors is projected to increase from
57 operable reactors at present to about 1000 by the -turn of the century; energy
production from uranium to go from 3.6 to 70 quadrillion BTU. WASH-1535, p. 2.1-15.
21. Telephone conversation with Frank Degnan, GAO, November 3, 197~~
22. NRC Findings to Impact Significantly on Industry. Nuclear ~ August
1975, p. 100.
23. Draft report, Massachusetts Nuclear Safety Commission, September1975,
quoted in Critical ~ November 1975, p. 8.
2b. At least three California firms are engaged in nuclear fuel-fabrication
activities which potentially involve weapons-grade fissionable material, These
are General Electric's Fast Breeder Reactor Department in Sunnyvale, the Atomics
International Division of Rockwell International in Canoga Park, and the Power
Systems Company of the General Atomic Company in San Diego,
25. USAEC, Environmental Impact Appraisal of Proposed Amen~nents to 10 CFR
Part 73, November 19Th, p. 13, and main typewritten text, p. 5.
26. Schleimer, J. D. The Day They Blew TTp San Onofre. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientis~q, October 19Th, p. 7b.
27, Myers, F. A., Jr. A New Low. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Letters,
January 1975, p. 2.
28. Comey, D. D, The Incident at Browns Ferry. Not Nan Apart Mid-Sept., 1975.
29. USAEC, draft WASH-ltiOO, ~. cit., Appendix I, pp. 1O7T~U
30. USAEC, WASH-l250, The ~ of Nuclear Power Reactors (Light Water-Cooled)
and Related Facilitieg, July 1973, pTh-63, li-6E
T~i. T. B. Taylor, quoted by J. McPhee, The Curve of Binding Energy, Part II.
New Yorker, December 10, 1973.
32MM~ Studies Need for Security Agency, NRC News Release 75-220, September
9, 1975.
33. USNRC, NURED-75/O6O, Special Safeguards ~ Scopes of Work. Office
of Special Studies, June 1975. - -
3)s. Physical Protection Plan Draws Utility Opposition. Nuclear News, April
1975, p. I~8, Special Nuclear Materials Transport Proposals Arouse Controversy.
Nuclear News, bc. cit., p. 97. These two articles mark the shelving of the
extensive amendments for upgrading security of plants and materials proposed
in November 19Th.
PAGENO="0041"
Fear A-plant terror raids ____
Would peril millions--U.S study. DailyNews
1075 ChIcago Daily News ~ °~ ~ r~perCtzsslons, might severely Leftist groups in the United present is that a plant wilt be and the most tonic substance safeguard system `othgte-foit' log tusposnible without special
Terrorists could sabotage nuclear matnesals by a tenor- limit the growth nO the nuclear States have tried to avoid loss invaded and blown up by let- known, ore proof' so so single person- tools, aitd keep all ouch toots In
an atomic power ptant ~ lit 0700P would give It a power sndun'ey of life lit theIr violent actions, rorists. to the recycling process, it net or equipment failure could locked reposttortes.
release deadly amount.s of ud bttetitmmi ores' ~ ~ "Given the present vnlatite the study says, wloile rigle- `Dolt could canoe the spread would he taken from the power breach It.
radio-activity m a popalous large character of the nuclear do-. wing groups' ideologies simply of barmful amounts of radio- plunt to a reprocessing ptuoi. * ~`,~ttch a close wuritiug a Work out a police backup
area, according to a federal `1105 lscert ~ti~ betoken bate ion our country, such on aren't likely to lead to attachs activity to the environment, then to a storage facility, then relationshIp between existing system to etiittinate the possi-
study obtained by The Daily tIn-eat which ~, act might permanently cut net on atstnf c plants. the study says. to a fabricunien plant for mix- Intelligence agencies and the bUlly that terrorists could
News, very serious ~. b - our nuclear power plant op. Even an, the study euvisions The potential for sleating the ing with uranium and, finally, NRC - apparently requiring a "neulerulize" a single potice
The danger will grow ~ - The 500 de i-ed ~ - tans,... ose major motive for nuclear tttoted3.J to make a bomb back to a power plant, large NRC intelligence onto--to force with diversionary Our-
ily.in the nest few ysars tatbo ~ ~ ~nue to be -- ~`ltwnuld be a very risky sabotage by domestic tunic, won't he serious antif fuef rm It becomes a serious hesith mnuitorthreaoening ~upn. tics.
ye dastzy pm- International operotinos by s'etttttre for any foreign com- geats: worldwide publicity, cycling begins on aturge scale hazard- only a~le0r the -initial- * EnuctIaws rentrlclingpub. -a Fnrtifyseositive facilities no - -
o plan t seep Ic most f tk presently bee try b t so I the sass tins ANOTHER THREAT f i-~ cd ~ ~h f1 m ~ot cress t retevaut ~ Pret 0 t to is with
fd dign ~ Is dcd~f ~: :~ ~~b: cml flit
I ` sotoetitnes without warnlug by intelligence agencies width has "denonontrated the eve obe study says it is colt- The study nays that "given hands." sn f ego or d Improvements
Co gress ~d ~ ~ before lb I f on drain ~ t'etotd th w Id c p t ty to execut corn m ted th I be I 4t toe f th t re d mhe f h Lpgrud th pri I I a w old he boweve
last year as part of the tow es- strike, aud that some of these Not even continued detente plicated actions with planning, polonium still be recycled us- jackings," plutonium wuuld be industry's security persoanet "There is unlikely to be any
tablinhin the Nuclear Reps. groups, driven by ideology, assures that the Soviet Union co-onsfinatlon, secrecy, pa' olially In the Uiiiled Slates, must vulnerable on theft and both in numbers mod levet of siogte, simple answer which
I t r Co Issi (NRC) seed for political leverage en ss'nuld not attempt such saho- tieace and whatever Invel of Plutonium is a man-made sabotage when in transit from training. . . will assure us of complete
filch awarded the c'ostroc~ the United States, er desper. tnge, the study comments, be- ftn'ce and armament Is neces- element produced as a bypro- one facility to the next, safely ogalnst maliclinis or.
for Use study to MI'I'RE Carp, atlas, may choose the Untleil cause Mmcow :`has never ~sn'y On accomplish the tub," duct of nuclear reactors such a Require nacelar facilities to ton," the snudy says.
o prestigious East Coast lId States, and perhaps hessed shown any hesitation in direct. The study onles that the mob as tI-ste ased is genezatiug THE STUDY offers a series have closeot-rircuit television "The threat is Intrinsically
~ b nuclear f U ties tang n log esplm g t y trh eve bus bee on I d by plants It us y he e'stro ted mmestdati us I costly monitors I k d at no compbcaled bomg linked
ALTHOUGH the study says AJ.SO, THE study warm ~eas- -- tally seeded allies 5 patriotism ni-its public image. from spent fuel, reprocessed, ~e rarity me~sures to rev than can't be controtted by one the ingenuity of the threatener.
ttwoolda't be easy to sabotage there is o constant danger of - loon asic is cupable of flooding mined with oranlum and used - at a iltedly non person, and use different color The response moot be one of
a power plant or steal bomb- auelear sabotage by foreign ,, `lb y 0 cIties with herem, the study us reaconr fuel, ma - practical cloihtng In differenn arena. sensible, effective and efficient
grade material, It points out governments, particularly the rves, vi to says, sass it capsule ef nude- The proces.s is efficient, but g , with the note- measures In depth. The fate of
that ierrorisn grasps with assist bloc, China and Cuba. vi cc w th Great 0- arthefo nrsahetage. , it poses a mojornew danger ~ or power industry. Among * Redesign containers In nuclear power in nor country
"substantial capabilities" ul- . 1 0 tat There islittie quesliun that, the public because plutonium ` which nuclear materials are and the world hInges upon
ready enist in l.otin America, The mntiv~ for such subs' World War II, by stealing for a sufficient amount of mne- is both bomb-grade material * Make every nuclear trausported to make repacka,g- finding inadequate answer."
the Middle East and Japan, loge, according I the Italy, atomic secrets. ey, members of organized -.
"Ills aol difficalt to imagine would be to w~al1~O ~ 1$)MESTIC dissidents, the cnlm~ would ~atce a contract to
that sack orgonizoolosas could ~r e~ ye y mouly says, also constitute a acquire special nuclear mate-
recrall members with any - . shreat to nuclear facilIties, `tot f r another parts-, the
seeded engineering, scientific "Since nuclear energy is our thougfs a lesser one than posed atudYwal'ns,
- "anyof these cuatatnies might goomOst gen~~i~ ~l8,32 plus postuge (229 pages) from the Public Document Room, T1.3. Nuclear
malerial, the study suggests Regulatory Commission Wushinyton P. C. ~
w P0 that the mast serious threat at
PAGENO="0042"
38
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you, Doctor, and the enclosed materials will
be inserted in the record.
The statement before the California Assembly, is that the second
document?
Dr. DENIKE. Yes.
Mr. TSONGAS. That will be included above.
Dr. Jenkins?
STATEMENT OP BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, THE RAND CORP.
Mr. JENKINS. I thank the subcommittee for the award of doctorate,
however it is premature. Since 1973, the Rand Corps., sponsored by
the Defense advanced research projects agency and the Department
of State, has been engaged in research in the problem of international
terrorism. That research, which has been under my direction, has
been aimed at providing the concerned U.S. agencies with a better
understanding of international terrorism.
We also have been contarted by Sandia Laboratories in New Mexico
to examine the potential malevolent threat to the U.S. program. In
this project, we are focusing our thinking on the attributes of potential
malevolent adversaries, including their possible economic resources,
knowledge, technical expertise, armament and equipment. This study
hopefully will contribute to the design of systems and measures to
protect nuclear materials from diversion and prevent sabotage of
nuclear facilities.
I would like you to understand, however, that the views expressed
in my testimony here this morning are entirely my own. They should
not be interpreted as the views of any of my colleagues at the Rand
Corp., the Rand Corp. itself, or any of its sponsors.
The possibility that terrorists might sabotage nuclear facilities or
steal nuclear material to fabricate a bomb or to use as a contaminant
has drawn increasing attention from government, the news media,
and the public. Scientists, journalists, and novelists warn us that
nuclear blackmail by terrorists is the coming threat.
The rapid growth of a civilian nuclear industry, increasing traffic
in nuclear material, the spread of nuclear technology, all increase
the opportunities for criminals, political extremists, those we call
"terrorists," to engage in some type of "nuclear action." Increased
public concern with the potential terrorists threat to nuclear pro-
grams and the virtual guarantee of widespread publicity may in-
crease the possibilities that such actions will be attempted.
Terrorism has a direct bearing on the nuclear safeguards debate
quite apart from assessments as to what any band of would-be nu-
clear terrorists may or may not attempt, or may or may not be
able to do. The safeguards issue is an outlet for unarticulated uncer-
tarnties and anxieties about nuclear power, and even about the im-
certain times in which we live.
There is undeniably a degree of anxiety in the mind of the public
concernmg nuclear power. Nuclear power began as a bomb, not as a
powerplant; the word "nuclear" still recalls Hiroshima, not Indian
Point. Nuclear power is the most potent and to many of the most
sinister force known to man.
PAGENO="0043"
~39
Among the scientists and engineers who are supposed to under-
stand nuclear energy there is obvious disagreement. Some insist
that nuclear power is a safe source of energy. Others warn us that
not all of the technical problems have been solved; that society will
be compelled to take serious risks to meet the demand's of an accel-
erated program of nuclear expansion. Like most people, I do not
possess the requisite technical knowledge to judge whether nuclear
technology is safe, but disagreement within the community of experts
cannot be terribly reassuring to a concerned and confused public.
I realize that safety `and safeguards are two separate issues, but
most people do not make the proper distinction, and concerns about
*one tend to carry over into the other. Because most people do not
fully understand nuclear technology, they are more likely to articu-
late their anxiety in terms of safeguards-the adequacy of the meas-
ures taken to prevent diversion, theft, or sabotage, things that
terrorists may do-rather than :" in terms of the measures taken to
insure safety, which are seen mainly as problems of technology that
in time technicians will solve. Man's malevolence is something we
all know about. It is demonstrable. Bombs go off in airline terminals
without apparent reason.
People are already uneasy about nuclear power and worried about
terrorists, therefore it is not difficult to terrify them with a forecast
of some kind of nuclear action by t'errorists. The mere proximity
of the words "terrorist" and ," "nuclear" induces fear. Potential
threats to the nuclear industry and th'e consequences these pose to
public safety deserve attention. ," Unfortunately there is no clear-cut
line between alerting the public to potential threats and "threat-
mongering."
But I do believe that for reasons ranging from a sincere concern
for public safety to personal aggrandiseinent, some have inadvertent-
or deliberately exaggerated the terrorist threat. More importantly,
I am concerned that this may have the effect of making any sort of
nuclear action more attractive to existing or would-be terrorists.
Scaring the public about the perceived inadequacies of current
safeguards can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I am not suggesting
that the current discussion of nuclear safeguards will give any new
ideas to terrorists, but rather ,~ that the idea of doing something
nuclear becomes more attractive because everyone's `attention is
riveted on the issue.
The potential nuclear threat posed by terrorists `encompasses a
broad spectrum of mischievous to malevolent actions. These include
the creation of potentially alarming hoaxes, `acts of low-level sym-
bol1c sabotage, the occupation or seizure of nuclear facilities, acts
of serious sabotage aimed at ~" causing widespread casualties and
damage, thefts of nuclear material, armed attacks on nuclear wea-
pons storage sites, thefts of nuclear weapons, the dispersal of radio-
active contaminants, the manufacture of homemade nuclear weapons,
and the detonation or threatened detonation of such devices.
The spectrum of potential perpetrators is equally diverse. It may
include common criminals, disgruntled employees, political ex-
tremists, or simply authentic lunatics. Their motives may be per-
sonal or collective. Their objectives may include publicity, sabotage,
PAGENO="0044"
40
extortion, causing widespread damage and casualties, or possibly
discrediting the nuclear industry by demonstrating that current
security measures are inadequate.
It is extremely difficult to assess with any degree of confidence
the political nuclear threat posed by terrorists. Fortunately, we do
not have a large number of cases to examine. A few nuclear hoaxes
and a handful of incidents involving contamination with radioactive
material or sabotage of nuclear facilities represent the range ~o± our
practical experience. There have been no actual attempts-insofar
as I know-to overtly seize a shipment of plutomum or a nuclear
weapon, or to assemble and detonate a nuclear bomb. Any pre-
dictions about what terrorists may or may not do in the future are
conjectural and possibly dead wrong. With this caveat in mind, let
me offer the following hunches:
The primary attraction to terrorists in going nuclear is not neces-
sarily the fact that nuclear weapons would enable them to cause mass
casualties, but rather, the fact that almost any terrorist action asso-
ciated with the word "nuclear" would automatically generate fear-
or increase the fear that is already there-in the mind of the public.
There is a great deal of popular mythology about terrorists. They
are frequently described as mindless, irrational killers. But terrorism
for the most part is not mindless violence. Terrorism is violence
calculated to inspire fear, to create an atmosphere of alarm which,
in turn, causes people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists
and the importance of their cause. Since most terrorist groups are
small and have few resources, the violence they carry out must be
deliberately shocking. Terrorism is violence choreographed for its
effect on an audience. Terrorism is theater.
`While, of course, we cannot rule out the possibility of mass murder
or holding a city for ransom with a nuclear weapon, the assembly
and detonation of a nuclear bomb appears to be the least likely
terrorist threat. Incidents in which terrorists have deliberately tried
to kill large numbers of people or cause widespread damage are rare.
As I have already been quoted in the testimony of Dr. DeNike, "ter-
rorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead"-which
may explain why, apart from the technical difficulties involved, they
have not already used chemical or biological weapons, or conventional
explosives in ways that would produce mass casualties. Mass casu-
alties simply may not serve the terrorists' goals and could alienate the
population.
Scenarios involving the deliberate dispersal of toxic radioactive
material which could cause few immediate deaths, but a greater
number of serious and protracted illnesses, a statistical rise in the
mortality rate from cancer, and ultimately an increase in the number
of birth defects among the affected population do not appear to fit
the pattern of any terrorist actions carried out thus far. Terrorist
actions have tended to be aimed to producing immediate dramatic
effects, a handful of violent deaths-not lingering illnesses, and
certainly not a population of terminally ill, vengeance-seeking
victims.
Drawing attention to themselves and their causes, creating alarm,
and thereby gaining some political leverage-which have been
typical objectives of terrorists-may be achieved by undertaking
PAGENO="0045"
relatively unsophisticated actions, those at the lower end of the
spectrum of conceivable terrorists actions I have described. These
would demand less technical skill :and risk on the part of the terrorist,
and also happen to be less dangerous to public safety.
Any sort of nuclear action by terrorists would be assured of wide-
spread publicity. It would instill fear and create alarm. Almost anyone
who is believed to have a nuclear~ device or who has gained possession
of a nuclear facility is a successful terrorist.
Terrorists may try to take advantage of the fear that the word
"nuclear" generates without taking the risks or making the invest-
ment necessary to steal plutonium and build a working atomic bomb.
A well-publicized hoax could be as alarming as actual possession of
a real weapon, provided people have no way of knowing that it is a
hoax. A well-publicized attack on a civilian nuclear facility, even
if the attackers failed in their~ intended mission, could be almost
as alarming to the world as a terrorist suceess. Anything nuclear
could, in the terrorists' plan, be little more than a dramatic backdrop
or a prop that guarantees them worldwide attention.
Political extremists have demonstrated that by using terrorist
tactics, small groups can achieve disproportionately large effects.
They have attracted worldwide attention and publicized their
causes. They have created alarm and compelled governments to
devote significant resources to protection against terrorist attacks.
They have compelled governments to negotiate with them and often
to grant them concessions.
They have achieved these tactical successes without resorting to
mass murder. However, if terrorists should decide that their ob-
jectives can only be achieved by taking or threatening hundreds or
thousands of lives, and they are willing to do so, the absence of a
nuclear industry will not guarantee our security.
Ironically, among those who might contemplate some kind of low-
level action against nuclear programs are antinuclear extremists
whose primary objective would be to bring about the termination of
nuclear programs. These actions might consist of sabotage designed to
delay or prevent construction of new nuclear powerplants or the opera-
tion of existing ones, occupatiOns or seizures of nuclear facilities to
publicize opposition to nuclear~ programs, thefts or other actions de-
signed to demonstrate to the public that existing security measures are
totally inadequate. Several incidents have already occurred in which
the perpetrators were known or~ suspected to be foes of nuclear power.
On the other hand, actions which could endanger human lives are
not likely to appeal to groups whose primary concern is the quality
of life. The individual who is willing to use nuclear material to
kill hundreds of people in order to make the point that nuclear
programs are dangerous is probably an authentic lunatic.
In sum, the spread of nuclear technology and growth in the
numbers of nuclear facilities throughout the world will increase the
opportunities for some type of nuclear action by terrorists. Whether
or not terrorists will try to exploit these opportunities, we simply
don't know. We must assume that they will and be prepared to stop
them.
It is probably prudent to overprotect. At the same time, we should
not exaggerate the threat. The potential consequences of serious
PAGENO="0046"
42
sabotage, leading to a radioactive release, the fabrication of an illicit
nuclear explosive device, or plutonium contamination are serious.
But I have tried to point out why some of the more horrendous
scenarios in which hundreds or thousands of lives might be imperiled
appear less likely.
There are disincentives, even among those we call terrorists, to
carrying out these extreme acts. And they are not that easy to ac-
complish. Planting a bomb at a tourist attraction or seizing hostages
in a consulate is a far easier task than destroying a nuclear reactor
or making-not designing, but making-a nuclear bomb.
We should not overestimate the capabilities of terrorists. They
tend to operate at a low level of efficiency.
We should not assume that adequate safeguards-adequacy is a
subjective judgment-will dispel all of the anxieties about nuclear
power which have found expression in the safeguards issue. And we
should not assume that having an adequately safeguarded nuclear
industry, or even no nuclear industry at all, will guarantee our
security against those willing to commit mass murder.
Terrorists may not be interested in or be capable of building a
nuclear bomb. The point is that they don't have to. Within their
range of resources and technical proficiency, they may carry out
nuclear actions that will give them almost as much publicity and
leverage, at less risk to themselves, and with less risk of alienation
or retaliation.
As the nuclear industry expands during the next few years, it is
quite possible that we will witness a growing number of low-level
nuclear incidents: hoaxes, low-level sabotage of nuclear facilities,
occupations of nuclear facilities, the contamination of symbolic
targets with nonlethal radioactive material, perhaps a few fake
devices. There may be moments of alarm, but the inconvenience and
political repercussions that these incidents produce probably will
exceed the actual danger to public safety.
At a far more gradual rate the possibilities of serious nuclear
incidents may increase if only because the number of nuclear facili-
ties in the world and the amount of traffic in fissionable material will
increase. These will provide increased opportunities for theft or
diversion. The requisite technical knowledge to assemble nuclear
devices will also spread. At some point in the future the opportunity
and the capacity for serious nuclear terrorism could reach those
willing to take advantage of it. Before then, however, more effective
safeguards can be developed that will push that point indefinitely
into the future.
[The complete prepared statement follows:]
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43
WILL TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR?
Brian M. Jenkins
November 1975
P-5541
PAGENO="0048"
PAGENO="0049"
45
WILL TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR?
Brian M. Jenkins
November 1975
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California
The possibility that terrorists might steal fissionable material or nuclear
weapons, attack nuclear facilities, use radioactive material to contaminate, or
create alarming nuclear hoaxes has drawn increasing attention from government,
the news media, and the public. Sober scientists, sensationalist journalists,
and imaginative novelists have warned us that nuclear blackmail by terrorists is
the coming threat. These.possibilities have obviously been considered, or will
undoubtedly be considered in the future by existing or potential terrorists.
The rapid growth of a civilian nuclear industry, increasing traffic in
plutonium, enriched uranium, and radioactive waste material, the spread of
nuclear technology both in the United States and abroad all increase the oppor-
tunities for terrorists to engage in some type of "nuclear action." The increased
public concern with the potential terrorist threat to nuclear programs and the
virtual guarantee of widespread publicity may increase the possibilities that
terrorists will attempt such actions.
Since 1973, The Rand Corporation, sponsored primarily by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, and also by the Department of State, has been engaged
in research on the problem of international terrorism. This research, which has
been under my direction, has been aimed at providing the concerned U.S. government
agencies with a better understanding Of terrorist tactics, trends, and potentialities.
Testimony given before the Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials of
the California State Assembly, November 19, 1975. The Committee's Hearings were
generated by the California Nuclear Power Plant Initiative. On November 18 and 19,
the Committee dealt with the issue of power plant security and special nuclear
materials safeguards. The full-length paper from which this testimony was derived
is being published by the California Seminar on Foreign Policy and Arms Control
for release in January 1976.
71-074 0 - 76 - 4
PAGENO="0050"
46
In July of this year, we were contracted by Sandia Laboratories in
New Mexico to undertake a proposed two-year study to examine the potential
malevolent threat to U.S. nuclear programs. We will focus our attention
on the attributes of potential adversaries,including their possible
motivations, economic resources, knowledge, technical expertise, arma-
ment, and equipment. We will try to describe a range of representative
threats and consider the relative likelihood of them. This study will,
hopefully,contribute to the design, development, and application of
techniques to protect nuclear materials from theft and diversion and to
prevent sabotage of nuclear facilities.
Before going on, however, I would like you to understand that the
views expressed in my testimony and in the paper which has
already been given to the members of the committee are my own. They
shduld not be interpreted as reflecting the views of my colleagues, The
Rand Corporation itself, or any of its research sponsors.
In my view, the potential nuclear threat posed by "terrorists" en-
compasses a broad spectrum of mischievous to malevolent actions, includ-
ing the creatiun of potentially alarming hoaxes, acts of low-level
symbolic sabotage, the occupation or seizure of nuclear facilities,
acts of serious sabotage aimed at causing widespread casualties and
damage, thefts of nuclear material, armed attacks on nuclear weapons
storage sites, thefts of nuclear weapons, the dispersal of radioactive
contaminants, the manufacture of homema~1e nuclear weapons, and the
detonation or threatened detonation of such devices. Acts aimed at
causing thousands or tens of thousands of casualties, for a variety
of reasons, maybe the least likely.
PAGENO="0051"
47
The spectrum of potential perpetrators is equally diverse. It
may include common criminals, disgruntled employees, eco-guerrillas,
and political extremists among whom there may be anarchists, leftists,
racists, rightists or separatists, or simply authentic lunatics. Their
motives may be personal or collective. Their objectives may include,
but are not limited to, publicity, sabotage, extortion, causing wide-
spread damage and casualties, or possibly discrediting the nuclear
industry by demonstrating that current security measures are inadequate.
It is extremely difficult to assess with any degree of confidence
the potential nuclear threat posed by terrorists. Fortunately, we do
not have a large number of cases to examine. A few nuclear hoaxes and a
handful of incidents involving contamination with radioactive material or
sabotage of nuclear facilities represent the range of our practical expe-
rience. Outside of scenarios written by concerned scientists and imagina-
tive novelists, there have been no actual attempts -- insofar as we know --
to overtly seize a shipment of plutonium or a nuclear weapon, or to
assemble and detonate a nuclear bomb. Barring the occurrence of further
nuclear incidents, we are compelled to make some breathtaking inferential
leaps, projecting the observations and~conclusions we can now make regard-
ing terr~rism and terrorists into a new environment of an expanding nuclear
industry and growing public (and publicized) concern about its safety.
This type of forecasting is hazardous. The resultant predictions
must be viewed as highly conjectural, tentative, `and quite possibly dead
wrong. The possibility that some madman would somehow acquire and use
weapons of mass destruction is by no means a new concern. But it has not
PAGENO="0052"
48
happened yet (and it is interesting to ask why). On the other hand, it
is difficult to recall any predictions ten years ago that airline hijacking
would suddenly become a major problem of international proportions requir-
ing enormous expenditures for airport security and the rigorous searches
of baggage and person that we have become so accustomed to when boarding
an aircraft. With these caveats in mind, let me offer the following hunches:
In my view, the primary attraction to terrorists in going nuclear is
not necessarily the fact that nuclear weapons would enable terrorists
to cause mass casualties, but rather the fact that almost any terrorist
action associated with the words "atomic" or "nuclear" automatically
generates fear in the mind of the public.
There is a great deal of popular mythology about terrorists. They
are frequently described as mindless, irrational killers. But terrorism
for the most part is not mindless violence. Terrorism is a campaign of vio-
lence designed to inspire fear, to create an atmosphere of alarm which causes
people to exaggerate the strength and importance of the terrorist movement.
Since most terrorist groups are small and have few resources, the violence
they carry out must be deliberately shocking. Even apparently indiscrim-
inate violence is based on the terrible logic that indiscriminate violence
gets the most attention and is the most alarming. Terrorism is violence for
effect. Terrorists choreograph violence to achieve maximum publicity.
Terrorism is theater.
Incidents in which terrorists have deliberately tried to kill large
numbers of people or cause widespread damage are relatively rare. Terror-
ists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead - - which may
PAGENO="0053"
49
explain why, apart from the technical difficulties involved, they have
not already used chemical or bacteriological weapons, or conventional
explosives in ways that would produce mass casualties. Mass casualties
simply may not serve the terrorists' goals and could alienate the popula-
tion. You don't poison the city's water supply in the name of the popular
front.
Drawing attention to themselves and their causes, creating alarm,
and thereby gaining some political leverage -- which have been typical
objectives of terrorists -- may be achieved by undertaking relatively
unsophisticated actions. These would be at the lower end of a spectrum
of conceivable terrorist actions involving nuclear material or facilities.
That is, they would do those things that demand less technical skill and
risk on their part and also happen to be less dangerous to public safety,
instead of attempting some of the more complex `operations which potentially
could endanger tens of thousands of people.
Nuclear power, whether in the form of peaceful energy or weapons,
is the most potent and, to many people, the most sinister force known to
mankind. Any sort of nuclear action by terrorists would be assured of
widespread publicity. It would instill fear and create alarm. Almost
anyone who is believed to have a nuclear device or who has gained possession
of a nuclear facility is a successful terrorist.
Terrorists may try to take advantage of the fear that the word
"nuclear" generates without taking the risks or making the investment
necessary to steal plutonium and build a working atomic bomb. A well-
publicized hoax could be as alarming as actual possession of a real
weapon, provided people have no way of knowing that it is a hoax. A
well-publicized terrorist attack on a civilian nuclear facility, even
if the terrorists failed in their intended mission,could be almost as
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50
alarming to the world as a terrorist success. Thus, anything nuclear
could, in the terrorists' plan, be little more than a dramatic backdrop
or prop that guarantees them worldwide attention.
While we cannot rule out the possibility of a "large-scale Lod,"
or holding a city for ransom with a nuclear weapon, the assembly and
detonation of a nuclear bomb appears to be the least likely terrorist
threat.
Scenarios involving the deliberate dispersal of toxic radioactive
material which could cause a number of immediate deaths, a greater number
of serious and protracted illnesses, a statistical rise in the mortality
rate, and ultimately an increase in the number of birth defects among
the affected population do not appear to fit the pattern of any terrorist
actions carried out thus far.
Terrorist actions have tended to be aimed at producing immediate
dramatic effects, a handful of violent deaths -- not lingering illness,
and certainly not a population of terminally ill, vengeance-seeking
victims. Terrorists kill a number of people and that is the end of the
episode. However, if terrorists were to employ radioactive contaminants,
they could not halt the continuing effects of their act, not even long
after they may have achieved their ultimate political objectives. It has
not been the style of terrorists to kill hundreds or thousands. To make
hundreds or thousands of persons terminally ill would be even more out of
character.
Large, well-organized terrorist groups which might have the resources
to undertake more serious nuclear actions such as the manufacture of a
nuclear weapon are likely to be more constrained by fears of polluVing
their cause, of alienating their constituency, and of provoking reprisals.
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51
The same constraints do not apply when talking about small bands of ex-
tremists with anarchistic or nihilistic ideologies, and without large con-
stituencies. In the name of some vague objective -- the launching of a
simultaneous worldwide revolution, the creation of a new world on the
ashes of the old, the ignition of a race war, the creation of a master
race (of survivors) -- it is conceivable that a small band of conspirators
might entertain the notion of carrying out some extreme act of violence
based upon the possession of nuclear material or weapons. Substituting
universal appeals for the lack of any real support, such a group would not
necessarily be constrained by fears of alienating world opinion. On the
other hand, those most willing to undertake acts which may cause wide-
spread death and destruction may be the least able to do so. For example,
they would find it difficult to build an atomic bomb -- not an unsubstan-
tial enterprise.
Ironically, among the possible employers of nuclear terrorism are
anti-nuclear extremists whose primary objective would be to halt all
nuclear programs. Nuclear action undertaken by foes of nuclear programs
might consist of sabotage designed to delay or prevent construction of
new nuclear power plants or the operation of existing ones, occupations
or seizures of nuclear facilities to publicize their opposition to nuclear
programs, thefts or other actions designed to demonstrate to the public
that existing security measures are totally inadequate, or possibly covert
actions designed to embarrass or "frame" nuclear programs for damage done.
For example, a fanatical environmentalist might steal radioactive waste
material and use it to secretly pollute a waterway, then blame the con-
tamination on a nearby reactor. Several incidents have already occurred
in which the perpetrators were known or suspected to be foes of nuclear power.
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52
On the other hand, actions which could endanger human lives or the
environment are not likely to appeal to groups whose primary concern is
the environment. The individual who is willing to use nuclear material
to kill hundreds of people in order to make the point that nuclear pro-
grams are dangerous is probably an authentic lunatic.
In sum, the spread of nuclear technology and growth in the numbers
of nuclear facilities throughout the world will increase the opportunities
for some type of nuclear action by terrorists. Whether or not terrorists
will try to exploit these opportunities, we simply don't know. To try to
assign a numerical probability to such an attempt seems futile. There is
too little to go on. Sticking a number on the possible occurrence of an
act of terrorism involving nuclear facilities or material does not increase
our understanding of the potential threat and may serve only to provide a
false sense of predictability where none exists.
We should not exaggerate the threat. I have tried to point out why
some of the more extreme nuclear actions, the horrendous scenarios in
which hundreds or thousands of lives might be imperiled, appear less
likely. Of course the consequences of any single such incident, if it
were to occur, could be so tremendous that adequate measures must be taken
to prevent it~ In focusing our attention exclusively on these truly
frightening possibilities, however, we may tend to overlook some of the
more likely, less dangerous, but just as alarming scenarios.
Terrorists may not be interested in or capable of building a nuclear
bomb. The point is they don't have to. Within their range of resources
and technical proficiency, they may carry out nuclear actions that will
give them almost as much publicity and leverage, at less risk to themselves,
and with les~ risk of alienation or retaliation.
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53
As the nuclear industry expands during the next few years, I suspect
we will witness a growing number of low-level nuclear incidents: nuclear
hoaxes, low-level sabotage of nuclear facilities, seizures of hostages
at nuclear facilities, contamination of symbolic targets with nonlethal
radioactive material, perhaps a few fake devices. There will be moments
of alarm, but the inconvenience and political repercussions that. these
incidents produce probably will exceed the actual danger to public safety.
Apart from some hoaxes, which the government and the industry would
understandably like to keep quiet, incidents involving nuclear material
or facilities are certain to receive extensive media coverage. One inci-
dent will inspire others, and the total number of incidents may thus in-
crease rapidly in the same manner that airline hijackings seemed to
proliferate in the late sixties, or that kidnappings of diplomats and
corporate executives seemed to proliferate in the early seventies.
After several ~`ears, the number of low-level nuclear incidents may
then decline, possibly because the alarm generated by these incidents
conceivably might suffice to bring about the abandonment of nuclear power
as a safe source of energy. Or perhaps in part because security measures
and procedures capable of deterring or preventing such incidents will be
developed, and in part because such incidents will become commonplace and
no longer newsworthy and thus less attractive to individuals or groups
merely seeking publicity.
At a far more gradual rate, the possibilities of serious nuclear
incidents may increase if only because the number of nuclear facilities
in the world and the amount of traffic~in fissionable material will in-
crease. These will provide increased opportunities for diversion. The
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54
requisite technical knowledge to assemble nuclear devices will also
spread. At some point in the future, the opportunity and capacity for
serious nuclear terrorism could reach those willing to take advantage
of it. Before then, however, more effective safeguards may be developed
that will push that point indefinitely into the future.
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55
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Bell ~
STATEMENT OP J. BOWYER BELL, INSTITUTE OP WAR AND PEACE
STUDIES, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Dr. BELL. I am a senior research associate at Columbia University.
My Ph. D. is from Duke in history. My academic specialty is revolu-
tionary violence. I have written 6 books and 50 articles and 3
monographs, the last one being entitled "Transnational Terror." My
means of research is to travel around the world and interview active
or recently retired revolutionaries. The statements are based on 10
years of interviews in Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe, and
the United States areas.
Since we are pressed for time, I will skip and start on the bottom
of page 5.
There are then organizations, certainly abroad, who might under
certain circumstances be tempted by such options, but not many.
Most revolutionaries tend their own violent gardens, content with
the strategies and tactics of the past, seeking respectability as well
as power. Most are usually stretched to the limit, few have time to
reflect on strategic options, and new tactics are rare, often copied from
television coverage of another struggle.
For hunted and desperate men building bombs in the basements
of Belfast or Bologna, the theft of plutonium and the construction
of an atomic device would appear bizarre. As Schlesinger suggested,
they have better, or at least more pressing, things to do. Then, too,
for many revolutionaries atomic weapons are imperialist devices,
symbols of a sinful system.
There are those, however, whoP are less restrained, more ambitious
and less pressed for time, who to enter the nuclear club might act
as patron. No matter that stolen plutonium will not be weapons
grade or that the eventual device hardly more powerful than con-
ventional explosives, a previously scorned state will join the nuclear
club.
Even a frustrated revolutionary organization might seek a way out
of the corner by choosing a soft target in the United States, acquiring
by theft or extortion the basic ingredient, purchasing the appropriate
U.S. Government publications and technical manuals, underwriting a
sympathetic engineer or physici~t, and by the end of the year be in
a position to blackmail its way into the world headlines if not into
power.
It is, however, a complicated~ and difficult route. Still, although
anthrax in the reservoir or botulism in the waterworks would be as
effective and more dreadful to the victims, the attraction of the
word "nuclear" is undeniable. The most likely eventuality or cer-
tainly the most practical, if the plutonium were not stolen for a
patron or by one of the very fe~ groups with real scientific capacity,
would be to use the plutonium as a bargaining tool and ignore the
difficulties involved in constructing a "basement bomb."
First, any security system can be broken, especially the first time.
Second, there are those with the capacity to do so. As long as plu-
tonium exists someplace in the production chain, theft is possible,
almost probable if it is shipped about unguarded and clearly labeled,
increasingly improbable as more effective safeguards are devised.
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56
The key is not so much the vulnerability as the reality of the
threat-do terrorists or their patrons really want to possess pluton-
ium? And there is no satisfactory answer.
So far there is no evidence to this effect. There have been no recent
ideological pronouncements on the subjects, no visible revolutionary
campaign so directed, and no hints and guesses from activists. On the
other hand, there are several revolutionary organizations-and sev-
eral patrons-that could well see the virtue of such a course. That
such an operation, especially within the United States, would be far
more complex than machine gumning innocents or bombing trains
might not be an insurmountable obstacle. That security is better than
might be assumed by alarmist reports and that theft is no longer an
easy matter, even if discovered, are factors that might not deter the
dedicated.
The power that would accrue from the capacity to put a bit of
plutonium oxide in the air conditioning of a world trade center tower
and threaten to repeat the act might be tempting. Certainly if the
dozen men of the maniacal group got out with their plutonium and
in the name of some revolutionary dream threaten a catastrophe there
would, indeed, be terror in the streets. That no one has attempted t.o
do so yet, that there are few signs that everyone has such an inten-
tion, and that such a course faces massive obstacles does not provide
absolute certainty, only less anguish.
The prospects of sabotage or seizure of a nuclear facility should
engender even more anguish. First, just to do damage is relatively
easy. A couple of mortar rounds into the dome or a bazooka shell
into a wall is within the capacity of even a second-class revolution-
ary. And, in fact, in the last decade there have been regular attacks
on nuclear facilities, but without doing serious damage and without
attracting great publicity.
It seems quite likely that there will continue to be such hit-and-run
attacks and surely within the United States where symbolic bombing
has become a cottage industry. A serious problem is how these attacks
are perceived since they are unlikely to do serious damage. A handful
of sand in the right place in a Consolidated Edison conventional
generator will cause more real inconvenience to New Yorkers than a
rocket into the dome of Indian Point.
The prospect of a core meltdown and the subsequent release of
radiation would forestall most American "revolutionaries". In any
case the prospect of a meltdown even after a massive explosion re-
mains unlikely. The general public, however, if there were a series
of such attacks, might perceive the danger as far from remote despite
accurate assurances to the contrary.
A far more complicated operation would be to seize a nuclear fa-
cility. Assuming again the presence of the maniacal band with ap-
propriate military skills, intent not on t.heft but occupation, the pur-
pose served at some cost and great risks would be uncertain. Very few
terrorists have the technological skills *to make a blackmail threat
viable once inside the facility. And again it seems unlikely that any
would want a core meltdown and even if they did, existing safeguards
make such a prospect dim-not so dim, however, as to remove the
possibility from the board entirely.
The hypothetical revolutionary, unaware that present safeguards
reduce both the scope of his threat and his action time, might assume
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57
his problems were over once the military phase of the operation had
passed. Then he could bask in media attention, issue his unnegotiable
demands and proclamations, and demand to be flown to the country
of his choice. If he had sufficient conventional explosives, he might
get his way, no matter what the experts said about effective safeguards
or the Government about no concessions to blackmail. But it does not
seem very likely, especially since, the "military phase" might prove
more costly than anticipated.
There is about the entire subject of nuclear terrorism a dreadful
lack of precision. There can be no absolute assurances. There may be
those with the `will, capacity, and the desire to steal plutonium or
detonate a bomb in a power plant to cause a meltdown. The chances
are slim that there are many so inclined in the United States and
slimmer that a foreign organization will be so attracted.
But in nuclear matters a qualitative estimate that the threat is
remote is cold comfort. Somewhat more reassuring is the obstacles
facing `any such terrorist venture; yet the terrorist may assume a
vulnerability where little exists,, may launch a failed operation so
spectacular that a frightened public will perceive a present danger.
Then, too, those installations and targets beyond the scope of this
committee's interest may prove more vulnerable, more tempting to
the ambitious revolutionary-a reactor bombed in Europe may have
an extensive impact in the United States.
At the moment the prospects of a terrorist group stealing plutonium
and constructing a bomb appears remote, the theft of plutonium some-
what less remote and far more frightening. Most unlikely of all is an
attempt by any group to cause a meltdown, certainly within the
United States and most probable, even likely, would be a symbolic
attack on a nuclear facility. Properly structured and with the impact
escalated by the media, such an operation might have a devastating
impact on public opinion. In fact, I am most concerned that the
dangerous fallout of any such spectacular terrorist attack would be
economic, political and social, not nuclear.
I should not like to see the future of the American nuclear industry
determined by a bazooka in the hands of a fanatic or a bomb
detonated for distant purposes.
[The complete prepared statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF DR. J. BowYEn BELL, INSTITUTE OF WAR AND PEACE STUDIES,
COLUMBIA UNI~ER5ITY, NEW YORK
POTENTIAL THREATS TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES
For over 2 years there has been an increasingly open debate on the vul-
nerability of nuclear facilities to either `theft or sabotage. The level of concern
has ranged from the reasoned criticisms of Wilirich and Taylor in their Nu-
cZear Theft to scenarios more appropriate for James Bond films. Excluding the
general public, the concerned and knowledgeable have reached no consensus on
the degree of vulnerability to hypothetical sabotage of various nuclear facilities
or the actual dangers of theft, much less on an effective program of safeguards.
James Schlesinger, when Chairm'an of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated
that "A self-respecting ambitious terrorist has better things to do than to take
nuclear material." And he may have been right-and then again he may have
been too sanguine. General Michael S. Davison, as commander of the United
States Army in Europe noted that ". . . it would be difficult to protect any tar-
get which was the objective of a well trained and properly armed and maniacal
group." And he is `almost certainly right. The crucial question is whether such
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58
a trained, armed and maniacal group exists now or may come into being with
the desire to seek a nuclear target.
Certainly, there appear to have been a variety of very violent and spectacu-
lar organizations in the recent past-the Symbionese Liberation Army, Black
September, the urban guerrillas of Latin America, the Provisional IRA and the
Japanese lied Army. Then some have suggested a Mafia or other criminal in-
terest and the attractiion of the target for tfle demented. In point of fact, the
list of potential maniacal groups is tar more limited. Criminals, the odd great
train robbery aside, are marginal men with limited talent and less interest iii
selecting hard targets for dubious purpose. The Mafia resorts to violence, and
often ineffectually, for internal discipline and crime pay best where there is
least need for such means. And what easy profit is there in the theft of plu-
tonium or the sabotage of a power plant? If criminals are unlikely candidates,
then even more so is the psychopath by definition a disturbed and ill-organized
individual incapable of effective personal relationships or a conventional life.
An organization of mad men is all but a contradiction in terms, but not quite.
In America in recent years two groups, the Symbionese Liberation Army and the
Black Liberation Army have waged violent and spectacular campaigns against the
symbols of order explaining their acts in the garbled language of the current
political fashions. Both had as a core former convicts, brutalized by a system
they never made, frustrated without a future, hating themselves, self-destruc-
tive and futile. In the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army their violence
and rhetoric attracted the unstable and innocent, but the end result was a
murder, a kidnapping, and one bank robbery, the easiest serious crime for the
beginner, and then a spectacular shoot-out. The Black Liberation Army shot
several policemen, issued their proclamations and ended being shot in turn or
captured. Without fashionable names and the media coverage, few would have
considered the two `political" at all and few should be concerned that any
future "liberation army" composed of the frantic could be a serious threat to
nuclear facilities. This does not mean that a single mad-bomber might not be
drawn to such a target but the prospect of real damage to the facility would be
remote. Less remote is the prospect of the selection of a nuclear target by a
serious, rational, highly motivated revolutionary organization.
Although there are between ten and twenty thousand Americans living clan-
destinely and despite the flood of radical rhetoric, a true native revolutionary
organization dedicated to bombing its way to power or shooting the enemies of
the revolution does not exist-yet. The American militant underground, schis-
matic and highly compartmentalized, inhibited by both serious radicals and
those acting out fantasies, has been involved over the years in a long series of
symbolic bombings-banks. major transnational companies, electricity com-
panies and other targets of the "imperialist system." It may well be that some
small band with a romantic name may any day decide a nuclear facility is an
appropriate target-a symbol of the system, a pollutant of the environment, a
lever to move the media or reach the front page. There is comfort that such an
underground operation would do minimal damage-if any-to the target if the
target is considered the nuclear facility rather than public opinion. It is most
unlikely that anyone in the American underground has any desire to achieve
a core melt-down, that would really pollute the atmosphere, or steal plutonium
to construct a bomb in the basement for the bomb has been the ultimate symbol
of imperialism. There are those, however, who may have grander ambitions and
more extensive capabilities.
There are abroad more violent revolutionaries, some plying the terrorist trade
within national boundaries and others who move through a transnational me-
dium striking at targets of opportunity, usually when assured of prime time
coverage and ultimate sanctuary furnished by a distant patron. Certainly the
kidnapping of an entire international organization-OPEC in Vienna-indicates
the determination and capacity of the new transnational terrorists. More dis-
concertthg many of the terrorists seem quite willing to take the most dispro-
portionate risks with their own lives. The three Japanese members of the Red
Army who in revolutionary co-operation with the Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine massacred twenty-five people on May 30, 1972 at Lod Air-
port did not expect to survive the operation. Often the operations of the Pales-
tinian fedayeen appear to be an elaborate form of suicide. And failure has not
deterred subsequent volunteers. There is a certain charm in martyrdom, always
the prospect of success, and extortion often frees the captured. Thus General
PAGENO="0063"
59
Davison's maniacal groups exist in unpleasant abundance. There are now or
recently have been revolutionary guerrilla groups in most Latin American
countries. At the moment several have created chaos in Argentina, engendered
a brutal vigilante movement, and may precipitate a military takeover. In
southern Africa there are a dozen liberation movements and elsewhere on the
continent separtists pursuing an armed struggle. There are insurrections in
Thailand and Malaya and bombers in London and Madrid. The essential point
is that the existence of such revolutionaries may be a threat to order but not
to the American nuclear industry.
The only such revolutionary group actively operating in the United States is
the Puerto Rican National Liberation Armed Forces that has the capacity for
small bombs but apparently no ability or desire to escalate the threat. The
FALN like many revolutionary groups is not interested in killing large num-
bers of people but rather keeping the organization intact, publicizing the cause
and at best intimidating authority. If the focus is limited to the vulnerability
of the continental nuclear facilities then the threat is substantially diminished
but does not disappear. There may be such a maniacal organization, but the
FALN aside it would have to be an alien group or a new stage in the evolution
of the American underground. Both threats are improbable hut not impossible;
in fact, if the subject of discussion were conventional facilities tl1e threat would
be considered too remote for consideration. It is the very awe and lure of the
word "nuclear" that might persuade the distant to strike unexpectedly or the
local to escalate. There are then four options for such hypothetical revolu-
tionaries: to acquire illicitly plutonium, to use it to construct a nuclear device,
to attack a nuclear facility, and to seize a nuclear facility.
There are, then, organizations, certainly abroad, who might under certain
circumstances be tempted by such options, but not many. Most revolutionaries
tend their own violent gardens, content with the strategies and tactics of the
past, seeking respectability as well as power. Most are usually stretched to the
limit, few have time to reflect on strategic options, and new tactics are rare,
often copied from television coverage of another struggle. or hunted and des-
perate men building bombs in the basements of Belfast or Bologna, the theft
of plutonium and the construction of an atomic device would appear bizarre.
As Schlesinger suggested they have better, or at least more pressing, things to
do. Then, too, for many revolutionaries atomic weapons are imperialist devices,
symbols of a sinful system. There are those, however, who are less restrained,
more ambitious, and less pressed for time who to enter the nuclear club might
act as patron. No matter that stolen plutonium will not be weapons grade or
that the eventual device hardly more, powerful than conventional explosives, a
previously scorned state will join the nuclear club. Even a frustrated revolu-
tionary organization might seek a way out of the corner by choosing a soft
target in the United States acquiring by tl1eft or extortion the basic ingredi-
ent, purchasing the appropriate United States government publicatioi~ and
technical manuals, underwriting a sympathetic eligineer or physicist, and by
the end of the year be in a position to backmail its way into the world head-
lines if not into power. it is, however, a compicated and difficult route. Still,
although anthrax in the reservoir or botulism in the water works would he as
effective and more dreadful to the victims, the attraction of the word nuclear
is undeniable. The most likely eventuality or certainly the most practical if the
plutonium were not stolen for a patron or by one of the very few groups with
real scientific capacity would be to use the plutonium as a bargaining tool and
ignore the difficulties involved in constructing a basement-bomb.
First any security system can be broken, especially the first time. Second
there are those with the capacity to~ do so. As long as plutonium exists some-
place in the production chain theft is possible, almost probable if it is shipped
about unguarded and clearly labeled, increasingly improbable as more effective
safeguards are devised. The key is not so much the vulnerability as the reality
of the threat-do terrorists or their patrons really want to possess plutonium?
And there is no satisfactory answer. So far there is not evidence to this effect.
There have been no recent ideological pronouncements on the subject, no visible
revolutionary campaign so directed, and no hints and guesses from the active.
On the other hand there are several revolutionary organizations-and several
patrons-that could well see the virtue of such a course. That such an opera-
tion, especially within the United States, would be far more complex than ma-
chine gunning innocents or bombing trains might not be an insurmountable ob-
PAGENO="0064"
60
stacle. That security is better than might be assumed by alarmist reports, and
that theft is no longer an easy matter, even if discovered, are factors that might
not deter the dedicated. The power that would accrue from the capacity to
put a bit of plutonium oxide in the airconditioning of a World Trade Center
tower and threaten to repeat the act might be tempting. Certainly if the dozen
men of the maniacal group got out with their plutonium and in the name of
some revolutionary dream threaten a catastrophe there would, indeed, be terror
in the streets. That no one has attempted to do so yet, that there are few signs
that anyone has such an intention, and that such a course faces massive ob-
stacles does not provide absolute certainty, only less anguish.
The prospects of sabotage or seizure of a nuclear facility should engender
even more anguish. First just to do damage is relatively easy. A couple of mor-
tar rounds into the dome or a bazooka shell into a wall is within the capacity
of even a second-class revolutionary. And in fact in the last decade there have
been regular attacks on nuclear facilities but without doing serious damage
and without attracting great publicity. It seems quite likely that there will
continue to be such hit-and-run attacks and surely within the United States
where symbolic bombing has become a cottage industry. A serious problem is
how these attacks are perceived since they are unlikely to do serious damage-
a handful of sand in the right place in a Consolidated Edison conventional
generator will cause more real inconvenience to New Yorkers than a rocket
into the dome of Indian Point. The prospect of a core melt-down and the
subsequent release of radiation would forestall most American "revolution-
aries." In any case the prospect of a melt-down even after a massive explosion
remains unlikely. The general pubic, however, if there were a series of such
attacks might perceive the danger as far from remote despite accurate assur-
ances to the contrary.
A far more complicated operation would be to seize a nuclear facility. As-
suming, again, the presence of the maniacal band with appropriate military
skills, intent not on theft but occupation, the purpose served at some cost and
great risks would be uncertain. Very few terrorists have the technological skills
to make a blackmail threat viable once inside the facility. And again it seems
unlikely that any would want a core melt-down and even if they did existing
safeguards make such a prospect dim-not so dim, however, as to remove the
possibility from the board entirely. The hypothetical revolutionary unaware
that present safeguards reduce both the scope of his threat and his action time
might assume his problems were over once the military phase of the operation
had passed. Then he could bask in media attention, issue his unnegotiable de-
mands and proclamations, and demand to be flown to the country of his choice.
If he had sufficient conventional explosives, he might get his way, no matter
what the experts said about effective safeguards or the government about no
concessions to blackmail. But it does not seem very likely, especially since the
"military phase" might prove more costly than anticipated.
There is about the entire subject of nuclear terrorism, a dreadful lack of
precision. There can be no absolute assurances. There may be those with the
will, capacity, and the desire to steal plutonium or detonate a bomb in a power
plant to cause a melt-down. The chances are slim that they are mny so inclined
in the United States and slimmer that a foreign organization will be so attracted.
But in huclear matters a qualitative estimate that the threat is remote is
cold comfort. Somewhat more reassuring is the obstacles facing any such ter-
rorist venture-yet the terrorist may assume a vulnerability where little ex-
ists, may launch a failed operation so spectacular that a frightened public will
perceive a present danger. Then, too, those installations and targets beyond
the scope of this committee's interest may prove more vulnerable, more tempt-
ing to the ambitious revolutionary-a reactor bombed in Europe may have an
extensive impact in the United States.
The question of nuclear terrorism is obviously an international problem. Yet
even in the United States the responsibiity for appropriate safeguards and an
effective response to threat or reality is divided between a variety of bureau-
cracies, between private industry and the government, between civilian concerns
and those of the military. What over-arching position that does exist seems to
be the administration's refusal to let the government give in to blackmail-
individuals or industries may do se-a posture that a viable nuclear terrorist
threat may undo. And abroad there is the whole spectrum of governmental re-
PAGENO="0065"
61
sponses to terrorists demands from the adamant refusal to bargain ever on to
swift compliance and in some suspect cases complicity. With nuclear facilities
spreading across the world, so too does nuclear vulnerability and as a con-
comitant factor the public discussion of that vulnerability. Rather than revolu-
tionaries, a government is more likely illicitly or not attempting to go nuclear
fashioning a radiation device or a low-yield bomb. Yet there is never going
to be any assurance that at some point a revoutionary's attention will be at-
tracted by the possibility, by noting an unexpected vulnerability, by the very
debate on safeguards.
At the moment the prospects of a terrorist group stealing plutonium and
constructing a bomb appears remote, the theft of plutonium somewhat less re-
mote and far more frightening. Most unlikely of all is an attempt by any group
to cause a melt-down, certainly within the United States, and most probable,
even likely, would be a symbolic attack on a nuclear facility. Properly struc-
tured and with the impact escalated by the media such an operation might
have a devastating impact on public opinion. In fact, I am most concerned that
the dangerous fall-out of any such spectacular terrorist attack would be eco-
nomic, political, and social, not nuclear. I should not like to see the future of
the American nuclear industry determined by a bazooka in the hands of a
fanatic or a bomb detonated for distant purposes.
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Bell, as a point of departure, at the bottom of
page 10 you list the probabilities. The least probable would be a
terrorist, and the second most likeJy would be, basically, a saboteur
meltdown operation; is that right?
Dr. BELL. Right.
Mr. TSONGAS. And third-the third most likely?
Dr. BELL. The most likely is the symbolic attack on a nuclear
facility. This seems almost predictable.
The least likely would be a core meltdown. This is limiting myself
to revolutionary organizations.
Mr. TSONGAS. You are separating out capacity?
Dr. BELL. Well, if you had a helpful patron, the theft of plutonium
and the construction of a nuclear bomb would be a high-level
probability.
Mr. TSONGAS. Does that raise a spectrum of organized crime?
Dr. BELL. No, criminals are not particularly well organized. Vio-
lence, where it is organized in the Mafia, is used for internal discipline
and as rarely as possible. Murder is not good business.
Mr. TSONGAS. You have never experienced a numbers racket in my
district. Are you suggesting that there is no-shall we discount or-
ganized crime as far as theft fOr a potential client? Do you both
agree to that assessment?
Dr. BELL. I do. I really feel that the criminal is the least of our
worries. There is not a big market in plutonium. It is a lot easier if
you want to extoit yourself into a position of great amounts of money,
it is better to use individuals.
Dr. DENIKE. I might comment that Colonel Qad'affi of Libya has
offered a million dollars for anyone to provide him with nuclear
weapons. That might be an incentive to organized crime.
Dr. BELL. He doesn't have to offer it to anybody if he gets the right
people in the cause.
Mr. JENKINS. You brought up the possibility of the numbers racket
in your own district. The "take"-
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me say before I have to spend the next month
explaining that, I meant that facetiously.
71-074 0 - 76 - 5
PAGENO="0066"
62
Mr. JENKINS. Fine. Let's talk about the numbers racket anywhere.
The "take" from such enterprises as narcotics, the numbers racket,
and prostitution is enormous. There are various estimates, but they
run into the billions of dollars annually in this country.
To jeopardize that annual take by a spectacular episode, a nuclear
episode, is simply not good business, and for the most part organized
criminals do have a certain capability to make calculations about
what is good for business.
Organized crime has tended to avoid violence outside of its own
community, as Dr. Bell has pointed out. They have also tended to avoid
the spectacular sorts of crimes that imperil human life and cause wide-
spread revulsion such as kidnappings. A good many `of the kidnap-
pmgs in this country `have not been carried out by members of orga-
nized crime. They have been carried out by amateurs. Organized crime
does not like kidnappings, because they bring a lot of FBI agents into
town and put a. lot of heat on the organization. That hurts business.
The notion that a handful of plutonium might be worth $10 or $15
million to organized crime may appear to seem to be trivial. One study
I knew of has estimated that annual profits from illegal gambling in
two precincts in New York City, was, as I recall about $12 million,
which turned out to be more than the Federal and State governments
was able to collect from the same area through taxation.
It appears to me perhaps remote that a good business like that would
be jeopardized by the less socially acceptable crime of mass extortion-
this is not to say that prostituton, narcotics, and the numbers racket
are socially acceptable, but there are markets for these services and
products and there is a great deal of participation by the public in the
commerce.
In a sense, organized crime is a conservative service industry; it is
a profitmaking service industry. The idea of organized crime making a
few million bucks off a spectacular crime seems remote. As Dr. Bell
points out, one can make no assurance about any of this. One has to
make judgments; the judgments suggests that the Mafia might steal
plutonium in order to hijack a city seems unlikely.
Mr. TSONGAS. There is not a clear distinction. Terrorists versus psy-
chotics or people who are simply not unbalanced for their own inter-
nal reasons and might commit that type of action. Can we distinguish
between the groups, and assess which ones offer the greatest threat?
Dr. DENIKE. I think we can also lose sight of unorganized crime.
The Director of the NRC Division of Safeguards has stated in his
famous memorandum of January 19 that he is concerned that many
of our currently licensed facilities may not have safeguards against
the lowest level of design threats under consideration. That consists
of one insider, or three outsiders, and if this is the case, and consider-
ing the recent lead theft last week at Livermore, we might define our
population more broadly and get away from the Mafia issue.
Mr. JENKINS. I think there are three broad categories that one can
talk about. One, there is the criminal who is on for profit.
Second, there is the category of the political extremist who may want
to achieve some political goal. Third, there is the category which
I will call for lack of precision, the authentic lunatic, the psychotic,
the crazy, who may have his own bizarre goals, but who is not a mem-
PAGENO="0067"
63
her of any organized group, and *does not necessarily possess an
ideology.
A man such as the "alphabet bomber" who 2 years ago planted bombs
to protest sexual taboos in southern California. I `am from southern
California, and I didn't know there were any sexual taboos left. But
all of this is quite apart from any arguments about the capabilities of
the industry as it exists now to protect against anything.
I think that we ought to keep separate, the questions of whether
we are making an assessment of the ability to protect, or whether we
are talking about the existing threat. If we are talking about the
former, that is current and needed security arrangements, I don't have
expertise.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me pose a question.
The LaGuardia bombing, which is the most singularly shocking an
incident as has taken place in this country, where would you put that?
Dr. BELL. Nobody knows.
Mr. JENKINS. We don't know.
Dr. DENIKE. This points out the category we are prone to overlook,
sheer human maliciousness and destructiveness, which we see in every-
thing from vandalism to heinous acts which are perpetrated with a
pseudopolitical rationale overlying sheer viciousness.
A malicious person, a violent `person, may simply paste a political
or social motive or justification over whatever `he wished to do out of
sheer brutality. This is a very real category `of human behaviors, and
since events of any degree of destructiveness can be justified with one
phrase or another-for example; the two atomic bombs that were
dropped upon Japan at the end of World War TI-were done with
the noblest of motives: To save human lives. This same rationale can
be used to justify any atrocity in war, or in peacetime as well, once an
ideology is assumed.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver?
Mr. WEAVER. On that doctrine, what you are really saying is that
the mentally ill person who might `assassinate a President isn't likely
to be motivated to kill a mass of people unless he has some degree of
social approbation; is that it?
Dr. DENIKE. No, sir. I was saying that he might put a label of social
approbation upon it if he were to kill a number of people, but whether
the absence of this motive would have deterred him is very probable-
matical. I doubt it in many cases.,'
In the case of the LaGuardia bombing, I doubt there was any social
goal whatever that was promulgated in coiinection with that incident.
This seems to have been done purely out of destructiveness.
Mr. JENKINS. That assertion must be challenged.
Dr. BELL. It is inaccurate. No one knows.
Mr. JENKINS. We don't know who placed the bomb at LaGuardia
or what their motives may have,' been. It is entirely possible that the
bomb was meant to go off at a later time, when it would have been
only a symbolic bombing producing very few casualties. However,
as Dr. Bell can tell, terrorists are not always efficient; they make
mistakes; bombs go off at the wrong time-this one went off at
6:30 p.m., when the terminal happened to be filled with people.
It is possible that that bomb was meant to have a political objective,
that that bomb had been planted by some political extremist group,
PAGENO="0068"
64
but that when it went off ea.rly and caused the casualties it did, and
provoked the degree of revulsion it did, the responsible group was
simply unwilling to come forward and take credit for it.
That is only a hypothesis, but in the absence of hard evidence, I
don't think we can go a.head and simply label it as an act of individual
maliciousness.
Mr. WEAvER. If I may get back to the same point, I would like to
pursue it. That is, that it takes-it would appear to me that it would
take a form of-I didn't say application-but approbation for a per-
son to commit a mass murder.
The individual psyche goes against the commitment of the mass
murder, doesn't it?
Dr. DENIKE. I would question that, sir. The means available to
mass murderers have been limited in the past, but we have had the
man who climbed up in a university tower and killed 15 people
through rifle fire. A man in Chicago killed eight nurses. These deeds
were not motivated by any overriding social goal or political
objective.
These are aspects of what people are very inclined to disregard in
human behavior, namely, a destructiveness, which although normally
controlled and channeled, is nonetheless latent in many persons, and
whose existence I as a specialist in abnormal behavior would simply
be irresponsible to deny.
Mr. WEAVER. Is it within the human psyche possible to have a desire
to kill everybody in the world?
Dr. DENIKE. Many deluded people have fantasies of destroying the
whole world, and you hea.r people saying the world is going to be
destroyed by something else, and this seems to give them satisfaction
many times.
Mr. WEAVER. In my view of history the only people I have seen
who had this feeling were the leaders of nations, and they did so with
a strong social approbation.
Dr. DENIKE. That is an excellent point, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Do the other gentlemen have any feeling whether this
is a strong motive, mass murder?
Dr. BELL. Not on mass murder, but in the case of a psychopath it
is generally considered that to organize the theft of plutonium or
entry into a nuclear facility requires organization. Psychopaths are
not well organized, they have unorganized lives, and when they get
into groups like the Symbionese Liberation Army and the Black
Liberation Army, they tend to be incompetent and self-destructive.
Mr. WEAVER. That is a good point, but in the human psyche is there
a feeling for mass murder?
Dr. BELL. That is not my field of specialty.
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. In the menta.l institutions of any one of our States
we probably can find individuals working on plans to blow up the
world. At least in some portion of the population there may be such
desires.
Mr. WEAVER. What would be the easiest way to do this, if a per-
son actually wanted to carry this out? Let's assume it exists, and there
is the desire, and some sick individuals who manifest it to the point
PAGENO="0069"
65
that they would want to carry it c~ut, what are the easiest means to
carry it. out in today's society?
Mr. JENKINS. Conventional explosive or chemical toxins.
Mr. WEAVER. We mentioned toxins in the cities' drmkrng water.
How easy would that be? I think Washington's water already has it.
Mr. JENKINS. The scenarios invol~ing poisoning water supplies tend
to be somewhat exaggerated. There is a problem in poisoning a city's
water supply in that water moves through the system in such large
volumes that small vials of anthrax or other agents would be diluted
and not achieve the effect.
One would have to have large quantities of a toxin to poison a city's
water supply, to overcome the dilutipn problem.
Mr. WEAVER. You are not speculating on this, you ~re saying this
is true, that it would take enormous quantities? I would assume botu-
lism bacilli would be hard to come by.
Mr. JENKINS. In small quantities, some of these things can be made
in a high school laboratory. To make them in large quantities and to
disperse them effectively becomes a more difficult matter.
Mr. WEAVER. Your terrorists wouldn't have botulism bacilli at
hand?
Mr. JENKINS. A terrorist might be able to develop small quantities.
Mr. WEAVER. It might have beBn tried and we don't know it, be-
cause it was so diluted?
Mr. JENKINS. There have been known instances of attempts. It is
a potential, of course. I cannot say that it could not happen.
Mr. WEAVER. What does the terrorist have at hand to perform this,
given that he wants a mass murder~? What technique does he have?
Mr. JENKINS. Conventional explosives, incendiary devices, chemical
toxins. By the way, there is a study which has bBen done by Bernard
Cohen about the effects of plutonium dispersal.
According to the study a deliberate dispersal of plutonium over a
city would result in, through inhalation, approximately one death per
15 grams of dispersed plutonium,; or approximately 400 deaths per
6 kilograms of plutonium, which happens to be the minimum amount
necessary to construct a~rude nuclear device.
Dr. DENIKE. Mr. Weaver, I am forced to quote from a report
which I brought here precisely in case somebody raised this issue.
This is the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission draft statement on plu-
tonium recycle, the GESMO study of August 1974. It shows that if
4.4 pounds, namely, 2 kilograms,' of plutonium oxide particles were
dispersed in a city, this could create a lung cancer hazard for 40 miles
downwind and would at the very least have a decidedly detrimental
effect on real estate values.
It is a statement of which I only brought 25 copies, but I will make
it available to the subcommittee, `and the only reason for mentioning
it is that it is already public knowledge.
[The document referred to follows:]
PAGENO="0070"
66
Copini from ".S. Atomic ~loercy Ccmninnion drnft WAFH-1321, "~)eneric Fnviror.mentol
Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuel" (plutonium recycle), J.uguot 19Th, Vol. ii, p. V-laO.
The clarifying notes were added by Dr. DeNike.
2. D~opersion c~ Plutonium
Several calculations were perforoud which deal with the aisrersisu of plutonium in the air, on
the land or in water.
Note: 2000 grams la.b pounds
One group of calculations centers around the dispersion o~ cng~gjof plutonium in the oxide
form to the atmosphere. The theft of larger quentitiesof olutonium would most probably be
Involved in the production of a nuclear weapon and not for contamination purposes. Thu area
considered for these calculations (see Figure V-l) was that area encoopussed by a segment of
a circle starting from a point in the center of the circle at which the release occurred (or
far the case of an elevated release, starting at the paint where the maximum ground-level con-
centration of plutonium would occur downwind from the release) to a point located farther
ds~mwind.
2.4gn*OECn~
`10~ gm~SEC,v3
/
ELEVATED RELEAsE:
EDGE OF DENSELY
POPULATED AREA
(40 MILES)
/
POINT OF MAXIMUM
GROUNDLE VOL
cONcErITRATI5N
1.7 pn-5ECn,3
FIGURE V.1 CONTAMINATED AREA FOR A DISPECSAL OF PLUTON(UM
~"1 8.lXlO4ç,n*OECm3
Thu farthent point was se)ected at a distance downwind or: the arc of the circle which
represents the outermost boundary of a densely populated area (approximately 40 miles).
FIgure V-l also gives the air concentration time integrals resulting from two of the calcu-
latIons representIng cases which tend to produce the highest concentrations of plutonion. An
Inhabitant at toe location of nauincm coscentratior indicated in Figaro V-l would have unity
risk of developing bone or lung cancer. At 40 miles the risk would be about 10, which is one
fifteenth of the natural center incident risk. Bose estimates are subjnct to many variables
and ccoditioms relating tc each specific dispersai - e.g., weather conditions prevailing at the
time of release, height of release, method usud to dispersn the material, properties of the
material releasad, etc.
PAGENO="0071"
67
Dr. DENIKE. Now, if you are interested in a scenario by which a very
small number of persons could initiate or trigger World War III, I
would like to make sure that you would welcome my putting it in the
record.
Mr. TSONGAS. Why don't we take that into consideration.
When we first met among ourselves on the issue of plutonium dis-
persal, my initial understanding was that if one released plutonium,
say, on the Empire State Building, that it would have immediate im-
pact. The fact is that it would not, that the impact in terms of death
would be long term, cancer-producing, et cetera. That would not lend
itself, I would think, to the kind of immediate shock value that your
psychotic or the terrorist is looking for.
Dr. DENIKE. I have to go into technique, but since this is also
public, I would state that it would not be efficient to release it from
the Empire State Building, it should be released from ground leveL
Also, the effect would be immediate if the terrorists were to release
leaflets explaining what had happened, or seize a radio station and
broadcast the event.
Mr. WEAVER. I would like to pursue my question which I made
earlier. You mentioned, Mr. Jenkins, botulism bacilli, and yet when
we question you closely, it turns Out to be not an effective means of
mass murder. What would be easier than nuclear?
Mr. JENKINS. I did not specify, any particular toxin, you did. But
to answer your question, nerve gas.
Mr. WEAVER. Does the run-of-the-mill terrorist have nerve gas?
Mr. JENKINS. No. He has submachineguns, dynamite, bazookas and
handgrenades.
Mr. WEAVER. But nuclear plants are available to them, to your
everyday terrorist.
Mr. JENKINS. I am not quite sure what you mean by that.
Mr. WEAVER. I mean they exist. They are next to cities, and if you
own an automobile, you could go Out to them.
Mr. JENKINS. Yes.
Mr. WEAVER. I don't think nerve gas would be as handy.
Mr. JENKINS. It could be manufactured.
Mr. WEAVER. In a high school laboratory.
Mr. JENKINS. I am not sure.
Mr. WEAVER. In a college laboratory?
Mr. JENKINS. Perhaps. The ingredients are available. There are
known episodes in which the ingredients have been or were being as-
sembled by individuals.
Mr. WEAVER. How would you place that with the ability to create
mass damage with a nuclear plant? If you were a terrorist and you
wanted to do something, what technique would you pick?
Mr. JENKINS. I don't want to answer that question. I really don't.
Mr. WEAVER. Going back to your thesis that we must blame the
people raising the issues for any potential nuclear damage?
Mr. JENKINS. First, I have not said that we must blame the people
raising the issues for any potential nuclear damage. Second, I could
tell you scenarios, and Dr. Bell cpuld tell you scenarios, too, by which
an individual could assemble the devices or the materials to cause mass
casualties, easier ways than using nuclear devices. These and the use
PAGENO="0072"
68
of conventional explosives, the use of fire, that is simply arson, the use
of chemical toxins.
I don't think that is in anyone's interest to go into detailed scenarios
in public, at least I don't see myself doing anyone a service by out-
lining a plan by which one can easily cause 500, 600 or 1,000 deaths.
Mr. WEAVER. Fine. We will stick to generalities in this area, and
that is perfectly satisfactory to me.
Do you place the ability to create mass havoc with nuclear and
these other things in the same category?
Mr. JENKINS. I would say that using nuclear means is probably
harder and less certain. Conventional explosives can be set off in
heavily trafficked areas in such a way as to cause immediate heavy
casualties and perhaps more casualties in the ensuing panic.
Conventional explosives are available in great quantities through-
out the world. The techniques for the handling and detonation of
conventional explosives are well known. There are experienced peo-
ple, thousands and thousands of people who have been trained in
the military or elsewhere to handle explosives.
Terrorists have already shown proclivity toward using conventional
explosives, although they have used these in ways that generally would
not cause mass destruction.
Mr. WEAVER. It is common usage?
Mr. JENKINS. It is common. Explosives are widely available com-
mercially-you can buy them, you can steal them, or obtain them by
subverting someone in some military establishment in the world. Or
you can make them at home.
Mr. WEAVER. What if you had a thousand nuclear plants in this
country? That would be about 20 to each State. That would make
them very common, very easy to reach.
Mr. JENKINS. It certainly would increase the opportunities for do-
ing something. It would increase the opportunities in the sense that
there would be more targets around. It would not make the penetration
of any one of those targets easier because there are a lot of them.
There are hundreds of sites throughout the world in which nuclear
weapons are stored. That doesn't make getting into any one of them
any easier.
Mr. WEAVER. You want to give my colleague from California an
opportunity here, and I have one question.
On t.he eighth page of the testimony you say that we should not
assume that having an adequately safeguarded nuclear industry or
even no nuclear industry at all against those who would commit mass
murder.
What do you mean by that., that would guarantee our security
against those who would commit mass murder?
Mr. JENKINS. The presumption I am making in that statement is
that there are other ways of commiting mass murder. If you remove
nuclear facilities from the environment, those other ways are still
going to be there.
1\'Ir. WEAVER. You mean we are not going to solve all our problems
in this world if we don't have nuclear? I am surprised.
Mr. JENKINS. The ability to commit mass murder preceded the
nuclear age. If there is an end to the nuclear age, terrorism will
survive in it.
PAGENO="0073"
69,
Mr. WEAVER. I intend to, but no~ at this moment, because we are
going, Mr. Chairman, to continue today, are we?
Mr. TSONGAS. Yes, as long as there is not an explosion in the room,
it will continue.
Mr. WEAVER. What I want to go into later is exactly what safe-
guard we are going to have to have, but I will now defer to the
gentleman from California.
Mr. MILLER. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins, you are currently with RAND?
Mr. JENKiNS. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. And you are also a consultant to the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission,?
Mr. JENKINS. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. With RAND, as I see your statement here, you are
looking to the makeup of guerrilla warfare and terrorist organiza-
tions and so forth?
Mr. JENKINS. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. Somewhere along the line, you tell how the people
look like and how they act and so forth?
Mr. JENKINS. Yes, sir.
Mr. MILLER. At the NRC you do what?
Mr. JENKINS. My duties as a consultant are really unspecified. That
perhaps is why it is a consultant's role. Thus far it has involved review-
ing documents, reports done for the Commission, offering opinions,
`that sort of thing.
Mr. MILLER. Reviewing documents? What do you mean by review-
ing documents?
Mr. JENKINs. Reviewing drafts.
Mr. MILLER. As released to-
Mr. JENKINS. Those areas that relate to my particular area of
study, those -areas where I feel may have some competence.
Mr. MILLER. What can you tell this committee `about your assess-
ment of any dramatic vulnerability of the nuclear cycle from fuels
to waste to the plant itself, to the transportation, in light of what you
know about terrorist activity in this country?
Mr. JENKINS. I really have to tell you that my area of research has
been on the nature of the potential threat, not on the security arrange-
ments at the industry. I am not really an expert on `the nuclear industry.
I can't tell you how many guards they have at any particular facility.
I can't `tell you how high the fences are.
Mr. MILLER. Can you tell us how they have responded so far to
your comments based upon your expertise with regard to the threat?
Mr. JENKINS. I was appointed a consultant to the NRC in October.
I was notified of the appointment in November. I did my `first review
for `the Commission in February. J can't tell you how they will respond.
Mr. MILLER. So it is not complete `by any means.
Mr. JENKINS. No.
Mr. MILLER. How extreme do you see the threat as being in various
stages of the cycle.
Mr. JENKINS. There are obvious areas of vulnerability which have
been identified in studies commissioned by the NRC. One of them
has been referred to already here this morning, the report done by
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70
the Mitre Corp. It identified transportation as the most vulnerable
component.
Mr. MILLER. IDo you agree with that?
Dr. DENIKE. I would agree with that, yes.
Mr. JENKINs. I would tend to agree with that myself.
Mr. Mu~n~R. From what you know, as we have heard testified here,
about the inefficiency of terrorists, do you think transportation is the
most vulnerable?
Mr. JENJiINS. There is an areaS where one has analogous events to go
on. If we are talking about truck hijacking, then there is a history, and
the history suggests that the capabilities to hijack shipments in transit
is not `an overwhelming undertaking. There have been such things as
the great train robbery, the Armored Express Co. robbery, the Brinks
job, and so on.
Mr. MILLER. It is a different element. Maybe you are going to stop
the truck a.nd relieve the driver of his duties. But you don't end up
with money. You end up with a product you h'ave to do something
with.
What is the capability of that same terrorist group in dealing with
the goods, so to speak?
Mr. JENKINS. Probably low. You are quite right: the hijackings that
we have seen have been of commodities such as cigarettes and cameras.
There is not a street market for plutonium. It would be difficult to
fence.
The only value that I would see in it, based upon `an assumption that
it would be rather difficult for these groups to do something with, that
is that they may not have the skill to do something with, would be to
ransom it back.
In other words, they have it, it is not valuable in the sense that it
can be converted directly to currency, but it is valuable simply because
they have it, and would brandish it as a threat.
Mr. MILLER. What is the threat you pose in the ransom? If you
don't pay, what can they do ?
Mr. JENKINs. The threat could be specified, or unspecified.
Mr. MILLER. 1 mean realistically, given what you know of the
makeup of the likely terrorist group, are they going to make it into
a bomb?
Mr. JENKINS. That is not an insubstantial enterprise. It would be
difficult, but they could threaten that.
Here is where we get into one of those situations where one would
have to make judgments of credibility, and the point is that if some-
body were to successfully seize a shipment of plutonium and have a
quantity of it under their control and can demonstrate that they
indeed have this quantity under their control, then one would have to
make judgments about whether or not they can do anything with it,
whether or not they can do what they might claim they will do, unless
the ransom is paid.
But the real point is, would you want to run the test. You know,
there is a famous example of the lady who comes into the bank with a
small vial of liquid which she claims is nitroglycerin, and demands
that her shopping bag be filled with money, or she will dash the vial to
the floor and blow up the bank. One has to ask:
PAGENO="0075"
71
Is it nitroglycerin? Will she throw it? Will it go off? The answers
may be no. But the real question may be, "Do you want to run the
test?" The answer probably is no.
Mr. MILLER. Given your 10-year study of terrorists here and
abroad, Dr. Bell, are there other types of terrorists?
There are others, well financed?
Let me tell you my reason for asking. I see that you can hire former
soldiers from Vietnam to go to Angola for $1,500 a month and run
the risk of getting killed. You can hire a former soldier who is spe-
cially trained to carry out an activity on your behalf?
Dr. BELL. Most revolutionary organizations do not like to pur-
chase services, because someone else can pull the pigeon.
By the way, I never met a terrorist, only revolutionaries and guer-
rillas. There are no terrorists.
Mr. MILLER. OK. But that is not a viable scenario, because it seems
to me that if the plant itself is vulnerable or is a prize to be taken,
the facilities I have visited lend themselves very well to be taken by
combat trained soldiers. That is, in small numbers.
Dr. BELL. The rule is 10 or 12.
Mr. MILLER. $15,000.
Dr. BELL. When you allocate resources in an organization such as
this, do you do it today or tomorrow.
The reason I think this will not be the case is that your planning
can go someplace else. Many organizations do not want a bad press in
spite of how it looks. Those desperate enough to have a spectacular,
there are other ways of doing it, a mason jar of water is a deadly
weapon until you prove otherwise. Planes can be hijacked with a
paper bag.
There is a considerable amount of resources, planning, ingenuity
and time, and they are perhaps about, those who have all that, but
there are not many of them. Maybe they haven't thought of it yet.
Mr. MILLER. What do you see-and any of you feel free to com-
ment-as sort of the overriding problem from within the nuclear estab-
lishment in protecting itself from the threat, given your various views
and understandings of what that threat might be, either because of
the relationship with such organizations in terms of firsthand dis-
cussions, or from studying their~ activities in the past from some
distance?
Dr. BELL. Because it is nuclear, I think a disproportionate amount
of money is going to be spent to eliminate the threat-not the threat,
but to improve the safeguards as well as possible.
If plutonium never existed until it got to the reactors, I would feel
much more comfortable.
Mr. MILLER. What?
Dr. BELL. Even if the plutonium never existed in the reaction chain
until it got to the plant, I would be more comfortable. I am in favor
of spending more money on safeguards than would ordinarily be
necessary if it weren't a nuclear problem.
Mr. MILLER. Do you agree with that?
Mr. JENKINS. I said in my testimony, and I will say it again, that
one can talk about disincentives; one can talk about lack of capa-
bilities. Nonetheless, it is prudent to overprotect. So, therefore, re-
gardless of what I would say about the disincentives to terrorists
PAGENO="0076"
72
going nuclear, or their lack of capability to stage a spectacular episode
for which nuclear material or facilities would be the backdrop, none-
theless, I t.hink it is prudent to spend enough resources to have ade-
quate safeguards.
Now adequacy is a terribly subjective judgment. It comes down to
a lot of small judgments that really at this point I do not have the
knowledge to comment upon. Whether "adequate" means that you must
have 15 guards and they are armed with this or that type of weapon,
or 12 guards armed with another type of weapon, or an 18-foot fence
or a 10-foot wall, I don't know, I don't know what "adequate" trans-
lates to operationally.
There are organizations filled with engineers who spend a great
deal of time trying to figure out what those requirements are. The
thing that we have tried to contribute to these studies, is an analysis of
what are the most likely attributes of adversaries they may face. I think
that is important. For example, it is possible to think about a band of
adversaries in terms of a number of attributes. Let's take two: Dedi-
cation in terms of willingness to accept risks and skill or technical
sophistication. WTe can list armament, financing, and so on.
On any one of those, one can find a historical example where the
adversaries will have to be accorded the maximum qualitative capa-
bility. If we are talking about dedication, we can find examples of
people dedicated to the point of suicide. If we are talking about tech-
nical sophistication, we caii find examples of very sophisticated opera-
tions. However, it is very rare to find a maximum on all of the attri-
butes. So you end up with different combinations. We are attempting
to describe what those combinations are.
Now, it is for someone else, someone that has expertise in these
things-I don't-to decide what is the best mixture of physical,
active, and passive defense measures to deal with the spectrum of
threats.
Again I don't know- precisely what these may translate to opera-
tionally, but, again, as a qualitative judgment, I would say "over-
protect."
Mr. TsoxoAs. Could I interject at that point? It seems to me that
what you and Dr. Bell are saying in essence is that those who have
the will, whether it is the crazies, or whoever, usually don't have the
capacity for a number of reasons, and those who have the capacity
don't have the will because it is better to engage in other kinds of
terrorism or other kinds of games through criminal activity.
Is that a fair restatement?
Mr. JENKINs. In the pamphlet, the one published by the California
seminar on arms control and foreign policy-I don't know whether
you have that in front of you.
Mr. TsoxoAs. I noted it was a Bicenteimial brochure.
Mr. JENKINS. There is an illustration, figure 2, toward the end of it,
which makes that point. By the way, those curves in all those illustra-
tions are entirely free-hand. They do not represent any sort of quanti-
tative analysis. They are there to illustrate a point. But if you look at
that illustration, you see that is precisely that point, as you have
stated it, that I am trying to make, that is, that those who have the
fewest constraints upon them, the madmen, in the name of creat-
PAGENO="0077"
73~'
ing a new master race of survivors, or igniting a race war, or doing
what God `bids them to do, something which elevates them above `all
human considerations, probably have the least capability to carry out
a serious act.
Those that have the most capability to carry out a serious operation,
the large, sophisticated organizations, have to worry about things that
other political organizations, even those that don't use terrorist tac-
tics have to consider such things as~ "How will this go down with our
constituency; how will this go down with the public audience." That
imposes constraints. In sum, I would fully agree with your statement
fully.
Mr. TS0NGA5. Mr. Miller?
Mr. MILLER. So while we have a rather exotic topic, it would be
your contention that there was a great deal of exaggeration in the
actual threat to the nuclear establishment `by terrorists?
Mr. JENKINS. I think there has been some exaggeration, because the
term "nuclear" is inherently frightening. It began as a bomb, not a
powerplant. It began at Hiroshima, not Indian Point. The stuff is
scarey.
Mr. MILLER. So, while there is a nuclear establishment and there
are terrorists, there are not necessarily nuclear terrorists?
Dr. DENIKE. Not so far.
Mr. JENKINS. Not thus far.
There have been some incidents, of course. I refer to these in that
book. Some of these incidents have been carried out by political ex-
tremists. However, for the most part-in fact, all of them-have been
low level incidents in which it appears that the nuclear facility or
material was only the backdrop. It was the setting as opposed to being
the target of a serious attempt.
Mr. MILLER. Do you see anything that is happening in our society
that would change that? We are told often, as elected officials, by vari-
ous people who `are experts in public opinion that conceivably out
there there is a great deal of unrest in the future, that we `are in a
quiet period, `and there will be tremendous unrest, and once again the
cities will burn, and it may not be the black, but the white middle
class, because of the economic situation, because of people who have
had their futures dashed on the rocks, because of the rising costs of
living, and their expectations are not going to be fulfilled.
Does that interplay at all with the idea of protecting the nuclear
establishment if that situation should exist.
Mr. JENKINS. Is that question directed to me?
Mr. MILLER. Generally to the panel. I think there have been in-
stances where people have been irate at Pacific Gas & Electric, and
have blown up the towers. Do they turn? Is that conceivable? We may
be fostering a class of terrorists or urban guerrillas that will be
different that will be more sophisticated.
Mr. JENKINS. It is a potentiaL I am a historian. As a historian, I
know that our historical memory tends to be rather short. We tend to
forget that this country has had a rich history of violence; we forget
that bombings of transmission towers seem to be new events. But we
have had this type of thing throughout our history. As I say, we have a
rich history of violence. There have been incidents of violence associ-
PAGENO="0078"
74
ated with almost every major economic, social, and political change in
this country.
I am not a high-level public official. I am not a Congressman,
and therefore I feel somewhat uncomfortable in making sweeping
judgments-
Mr. MILLER. It comes natural with us.
Mr. JENKINS. But let me make a sweeping judgment, one which is
kind of a philosophic observation. That is, in addition to violence, we
also have a political system in this country which has a tremendous
capacity to co-opt grievances, and to bring the people who express
those grievances, and the constituency for whom they are being ex-
pressed into our political system. This has meant that while there have
been political extremist groups in our society, while there have been
bombers, they have always been isolated on the extremist fringe. They
never have been `able to mobilize a constituency to get support .to mount
a serious threat to society.
There may always be bombings a.nd things of this sort. But as long
as the system keeps working, I don't think the creation of a revolu-
tionary environment, if that is what you are referring to, in this coun-
try is going to occur.
Mr. MILLER. Maybe my question is in general. I wonder what hap-
pens to people when they see their neighbors being infected with
plutonium and losing their nervous system, or what happens as in the
town in Michigan that is now drinking bottled water, because of
industrialization, and the widows and the children of people who
were destroyed by vinyl chloride or asbestos. I just wonder whether
you are creating that constituency to turn against that industrial com-
plex, and nuclear is sort of the exotic one in the industrial complex.
You can't get terribly excited about blowing up United States Steel,
but you could be about Indian Point, or San Onofre.
Mr. JENKINS. But can you rationally undertake an action that
threatens thousands of lives ~
Mr. MILLER. No, but in industrial areas you have seen hazards to
thousands of lives and nobody has gone to jail. We have had the
bombings, and we have had the actions on the other side, in the board
rooms, if you will, and that is kind of gone along with. Now you have
a very exotic target, and you have a very disturbed society which is
going under a reevaluation or adjustment in terms of what they
already thought it was going to be.
Mr. JENKINS. I must agree with you that it is a potential.
Mr. MILLER. I am not suggesting that you go any further.
Mr. JENKINS. Whether or not it will occur would call for a degree
of prescience on my part which I don't have.
Mr. MILLER. I thank you for your answer. If it were something you
were considering at RAND, and you know what brought them into
existence in the past, and are you concerned about what is going to
bring them into existence in the future ~ You have to be concerned
about that, because you are designing plants for 10 years in the future.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver?
Mr. WEAvER. You say that the existence of revolutionaries may be
a threat to order, but not to the American nuclear industry. I don't
see material in your paper to explain why revolutionaries are not a
threat to the American nuclear industry.
PAGENO="0079"
75
Dr. BELL. Well, inside the United States, those individuals that I
consider serious revolutionaries are at the moment limited to Puerto
Rican nationalists. There are no serious revolutionaries.
Mr. WEAVER. You are basically saying they are incompetent to do
such a thing? :1
Dr. BELL. No. Those people that I would call radical are quite ca-
pable of putting off bombs in nuclear facilities. The way they are or-
ganized, the sizes of the group, if they are rational radicals, it is
unlikely that they have the capacity or the desire to cause a meltdown.
Mr. WEAVER. What if we had a subversive group, well trained, 10
people well trained, well financed, and they came into this country to
try to disrupt, seriously disrupt our economy. One, could they do it?
Two, would nuclear be a good target for them?
Dr. BELL. First of all, you would have to have a group that would
decide that they want to disrupt the American economy.
Mr. WEAVER. Financed by a foreign nation, and that is the
motivation.
Dr. BELL. You would have to have people who thought of the act as
being to their benefit, unless you have pure mercenaries.
First, you have the target, and Chinese mercenaries would be visible
in Iowa City. But if you brought in a group of well armed people,
you can use chaos. I won't go into details.
There are, in fact, several groups, revolutionary groups that might
potentially see some use in this. But why bother about the nuclear,
when there is so much horror you can perform, so much faster, and
so much easier.
Mr. WEAVER. Dr. DeNike?
Dr. DENIKE. I would like to pose a hypothetical: Suppose we put
up big billboards by the freeways which say "Mr. Terrorist, if you are
considering a nuclear threat, you should know there are nonnuclear
threats which can serve your purpose more readily." Could we then
expect more nonnuclear incidents, more of both, or more nuclear inci-
dents exclusively, and I think the middle answer is the correct one,
that namely, this kind of publicity, or this kind of instigation, which
goes on constantly in the imaginative media, would result in more
incidents involving nuclear materials as well as conventional
incidents.
it has been stated that the skills required are of a high order. I
maintain that the skills required for malicious contamination are of a
low order, and within limits the dumber the person assigned to do
the task, the better, since such a person would be less likely to con-
sider the possible exposure risk to himself. It is necessary to under-
stand that alpha and beta rays do not penetrate ordinary containers,
and pure alpha and beta emitting radionuclides are perfectly safe to
handle in air-tight containers.
Mr. TSONGAS. Could I interject at this `point?
Your testimony here is on-
Dr. DENIKE. I have done considerable study of the actual possibili-
ties, and thus I feel capable of discussing them.
Mr. TSONGAS. You feel plutonium should not be separated where
one could with gloves handle the,' material, but always mixed in plu-
tonium there should be highly raçlioactive material?
PAGENO="0080"
76
Dr. DENIKE. Yes. The so-called spiking option is one that would
minimize the risk. I would not say it would be sufficient as a safe-
guard measure.
Mr. TSONGAS. You may proceed, Dr. Bell.
Dr. BELL. I can introduce you to several people who can eliminate
the seniority system very quickly.
Dr. DENIKE. I would say mixtures of plutonium and uranium
oxide nuclear powerplant fuel could be used to create horrific dis-
persals in populated areas.
Mr. TSONGAS. One thing we haven't gone into, is that you stated
that there were 3,600 people last year who had been moved from the
proximity of nuclear materials for one reason or another.
Would you focus in on that, for instance, the insider, as opposed
to the outsider?
What do we have to worry about with this, and how does that
change the perspective?
Dr. DENIKE. With particular regard to nuclear weapons, to which
the 3,600 persons refers, it is possible, for instance, to cause these
weapons to detonate their ordinarily high explosive component in such
a way as to disperse plutonium. This would not result in a nuclear
yield, but would result in a horrendous contamination event. The
guarding of the igloos in which the weapons are stored is discussed
in a public document, which is available in the document room of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.' Thus, it would be possible for ter-
rorists to plan an attack on stored nuclear warheads.
This has been a subject o,f concern to retired Adm. Gene B.
LaRocque, who founded the Center for Defense Information here in
Washington.
Mr. TSONGAS. Are you suggesting that a group go through the long,
protracted scenario of infiltrating a nuclear powerplant?
Dr. DENIKE. It is a mistake to consider this a long and complicated
thing. I have estimated that one or two armed squads could take over
any nuclear powerplant in the country. There are only two guards
mandated by Federal regulations, and the utilities are inclined to
rely on elaborate detection devices and outside response forces rather
than on onsite armed guards to quell intrusion attempts.
It would seem generally conceded that 8 to 16 persons could take
over a nuclear powerpla.nt. In October 1974, the General Accounting
Office estimated that two or three armed individuals might succeed.
Guards are not armed with automatic weapons. Shotguns might be
the limit of their firepower. I believe a level of 10 guards at plants,
qualified and equipped with automatic weapons, is a reasonable re-
quirement for the American nuclear industry.
Mr. TSONGAS. One other question.
Mitre Corp. went through the Russian threat scenario. How seri-
ously do you take that?
Dr. DENIKE. The threat from the Russians?
Mr. TSONGAS. The Russians, or the French, or whoever.
1 International Research and Technology Corp., "Estimates of Security Personnel Re-
quired to Protect Nuclear Fuel Cycle Components Against Theft of Special Nuclear Ma-
terials and Sabotage," August 19Th, p. 26. This study refers to Army Regulations AR
50-5 (Nuclear Weapons and Materials), eff. Jan. 1, 1975.
PAGENO="0081"
77
Dr. DENIirn. I would state generally the threat from persons over-
seas would be much more likely to come from Third World powers
than from Russia, China, or Cuba. When I quoted the Mitre Corp.
on that, I was simply indicating that reputable analysts do believe
that these countries would be motivated to cause such events, and I
can't say that they would not, but since we are selling wheat to the
Soviets, `they `are not likely to contaminate our wheat belt.
Since we are `hoping to establish better relationships with China
and Cuba, we can hope that this will provide sufficient incentive to
at least deter organized threats! from these countries.
Now, di'ssident groups which are not under the control of national
governments, could do massive damage, as I believe Dr. Bell said,
in small groups, and there would be very little which foreign govern-
ments could do to control their, own nationals.
Mr. TSONGAS. Isn't there a very serious logistical problem? Assume
you have the problem of identification of the Chinese-let's take the
Soviets. I can't imagine that they would train 10 persons in ballet
and bring them over with Bolshoi and they can gain entry into the
country `and therefore do their damage. How would you get these
people in the country and give them enough freedom so that they
would be able to commit the offense.
Dr. DENIKE. I don't think you mean to suggest th'at it is difficult
to get people into the United ," States illegally. There is evidence to
show that there are literally millions of `aliens living illegally in the
United States.
The problem of ethnicity, that is, the problem of Chinese in Iowa
City, is not a problem if you can train other nationals. For example
Mexicans could be `employed, and `they would be very' unobtrusive in
southern California, for example.
Smugglers use techniques as! diverse as aircraft, boats, `and automo-
biles to bring in ton quantities of `marijuana across the border. Get-
ting 400 feet from a nuclear facility is of no difficulty whatever. In
fact, the public has been able tO go fishing and surfing that near to the
San Onofre plant. A nuclear weapon in a picnic basket could be
brought that close, and the saboteurs could `disappear into the fog
before it `detonated.
It seems that megaton-level weapons would be more effective if
used against cities, but small atomic weapons with a one-tenth kilo-
ton yiel'd woul'd be better used against `a nuclear power station, where
they would produce fallout effects comparable to th'at from hundreds
of bombs.
Mr. WEAVER. We have been addressing ourselves mainly to the
kind of people we have today. Congressman Miller was concerned
wi'th this fact that society may be changing. We may have far more
aggressive revolutionary `elements abroad in the world in years to
come. We have the economic shifts that would change this. What
kind's, using different hypotheses for society, could we not see emerge
in thi's `society `and make nuclear plants targets `of revolutionary
groups? ` `
Dr. BELL. Generally, democratic societi'es can accommodate a legiti-
mate change, except for the problem of nationality. It is rare to
have an effective revolutionary organization in a democratic society,
71-074 0 - 76 - 6
PAGENO="0082"
78
just as it is in a totalitarian society, because the security is so good.
Mr. WEAVER. A John Brown, could he emerge and raid, instead of
Harpers Ferry, Indian Point?
Mr. JENKINS. It is possible. I do not know if it will happen. I can-
not say that it will not.
Mr. WEAVER. We have to legislate on this. Are there people who
can become real threats to our society through their potential to
attack nuclear plants. You see no possibility of these kinds of groups
emerging?
Dr. BELL. There are already a variety of disgruntled people.
Mr. WEAVER. Yes: but could such groups emerge that would be
serious threats. That is what I am asking you.
Dr. BELL. It is like everything else. It is possible, but not probable.
Mr. WEAVER. Why isn't it probable?
Dr. BELL. Because we so far have not had them. I cannot foresee
conditions changing in this country changing so much-this is in-
digenous revolution you are talking about-that it would be a fertile
field for this kind of activity.
Do you have one group seeking Puerto Rican independence, and
since the Puerto Rican diaspora is in the United States, they can
move freely, and they have detonated the bombs on Wall Street.
A symbolic operation, nuclear-
Mr. WEAVER. You have studied this present situation. Are you ac-
quainted with the history, way back into time, and have such groups
operated?
Dr. BELL. Most modern revolutionaries have appeared over the
last 176 years, or 200 years, and many of the techniques were quite
similar, and in fact are still similar, except the media have been
able to exaggerate a very small number of acts.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Bingham?
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, but at the moment I won't ask any
questions. I am sorry that I was delayed in another committee.
Mr. TSONGAS. I yield to Mr. Weaver.
Mr. WEAVER. Do you have questions?
Mr. MILLER. No.
Mr. TSONGAS. I might suggest that this is a very interesting issue,
and I hope we are not being tiresome to you. We are very interested
in the issue.
Mr. MILLER. In one of your statements, and I think it was Dr. De
Nike, you talked about some of the problems that studies have shown
regarding the dismissals of employees, where employees had been
asked to leave.
I wonder if you might comment on that, or, also, whether you
think there is a threat from some types of people who are employed,
and you talked about alcoholism, and mental instability, and you men-
tioned 3,600 people a year, and I suppose that is the total nuclear
establishment, both military and civilian.
Dr. DENIKE. This is military. These are people having access to
military devices. This testimony was given by Carl Walske. At the
time, he was associated with the Pentagon.
One fear is that these people would endanger the weapons them-
selves. The other is that they could be subjected to blackmail threats
PAGENO="0083"
79
from without which would force them to do these things because of
the threat of exposure of their drug problem, alcohol problem, or
whatever.
The latter possibility was the main concern with respect to William
Riley, who aside from the gambling pattern appeared to be a man
of probity and decency. He was~ caught in a process of taking greater
and greater risks.
At any time during 8 years he could have been subjected to pres-
sure to release atomic secrets or the like. He had ~access to top level
security information.
Mr. TSONGAS. Could I impose a question before we have to go?
You gentlemen represent a spectrum of opinion, obviously, and
that is why you were invited here. Here are Dr. Bell and Mr. Jenkins
basically subscribing to the thoughts on one hand and you, Dr. De
Nike, feeling quite different.
Is there, however, agreement that steps should be taken by the
NRC and others to raise the level at which an incident can take
place~ whether it is the spiking proposal, or increased guards at a
site, or whether it is design changes that would make sabotage more
difficult? Is it worth our effort in terms of expense, et cetera, to move
in that direction?
Dr. DENIKE. I would like to begin by saying it is decidedly worth
your while, and to say that I have to go against my initial instinct
as regards providing additional subsidies to an industry th~t is
already oversubsidized.
The facilities should be required to have 10 guards armed with
automatic weapons at all times. But if this proves impractical, then
the Government should provide that guard force.
Mr. TSONGAS. Not looking at it so much from a technological point
of view, but from the standpOint of mindset, what kind of obstacles
c'an we place between the terrorist or the psychotic other than spik-
ing and so forth, just as increasing guards?
Dr. DENIKE. Putting the facilities together-colocation. Any
time when spent fuel is transported, it is subject to terrorist attack
using shaped charges, which can penetrate the shipping casks.
There are possibilities for underground nuclear facilities, which
have `been advocated for years by Dr. Edward Teller. Dr. Teller be-
lieves these plants should be :200 feet underground, and in fact the
California Legislature is presently considering a bill to study the
undergrounding issue. I think this kind of `study deserves support.
Now, the main leakage in, this kind of security thinking is the
international leakage. The fact that if any nuclear industry, any-
where in the world, has weak security links in it, these `are the ones
that international terrorists are likely to focus upon. Since `smuggling
into `the United States is `so easy, if we are to believe the figures on
illicit drug traffic, then we could expect that stolen plutonium from
careless or corrupt third world nations would migrate to the points
of highest blackmail leverage. Without being too dramatic, I would
submit this area here represents the highest blackmail leverage point
in the world.
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Bell? ,:
Dr. BELL. Yes; I would like to have overprotection.
PAGENO="0084"
80
The propaganda would persuade revolutionaries that such an at-
tack on nuclear facilities would be unprotected, and to try to per-
suade the media and the press that coverage should be curtailed.
People don't hijack airplanes, not because it can't be done, but
because they are going to be caught.
Mr. JENKINS. I would prefer to be overprotective, even if I regard
the possibility of anything occurring as being quite low. I would
agree with Dr. Bell's statement that one would like to see something
in the area of deterrence in the form of how well protected this can
become or, alternatively, the consequences that will befall any orga-
nization that may attempt this type of activity.
I also think that there is a broad area of activities that can be done
that can be called public education. I think Dr. Bell and I agree that
one of the major attractions to anybody doing anything nuclear
right now is that they are going to get a lot of publicity out of, it, a
lot of mileage out of the media aspects of the event, and they are
going to get that mileage because this thing is inherently frightening
to a lot of people.
Now, a lot can be done in hearings such as this one to explain what
disincentives as well as incentives there are to our actions, what
things can and cam~ot happen.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would it also be fair to restate your positions that
there is nothing to be gained, in essence, in going nonnuclear, in other
words, abolishing our nuclear industry, because there still exists the
capacity for sabotage and mass slaughter. You don't eliminate the
problem by eliminating the industry.
Dr. DeNike?
Dr. DENIKE. It has been my position since the end of 1912 that
the costs and risk associated with nuclear fission power will prove it
to be the most costly way of generating turbine steam. I don't think
the nuclear fission option is worth pursuing, since it is impossible to
establish reasonable assurances on an international scale for the safe-
guarding of it.
I would also like to point out that the Federal Government has at
no time given cost estimates of the eventual damages from criminals,
terrorists, international blackmailers and additional war damage to
be expected as the result of nuclear power deployment in the United
States.
Moreover, it has formally refused to make cost estimates on the
ground that there is not rational basis for so doing.
I would point out that first of all they do not have to make a mean
estimates if they are simply willing to say over what range of costs
associated with malevolent deeds that nuclear would still remain
reasonably competitive with coal, of which this country has perhaps
200 years' supply `at a minimum.
I myself, on an extremely low budget and using rather conserva-
tive assumptions, calculate that the combined cost of nuclear malevo-
lence in this country could well run to $16 or $17 billion per year
averaged over a century.2 Now, these costs are not the final word by
2 L. D. DeNike, "Antisocial Interventions Against the Proposed Liquid Metal Fast
Breeder Reactor Program (Provisional Cost Estimates)," reprinted in USAEC Proposed
Final Environmental 5~tatement, LMFBR Program wASH-1535, December 1974, p. V.
12-2 to V. 12-15.
PAGENO="0085"
81
any means. They are quite preliminary, but I think the more im-
portant point is that they are the only figures as far as I am aware,
on this planet of the actual financial detriments which may accrue
through antisocial exploitation `of this particular means of heating
water, essentially, to run a turbine.
Now, it would seem a minimum requirement for a responsible regu-
latory agency to come up with `at least ranges of costs which could
be use'd to refute my figures. I believe you will find my estimates in
no way irrelevant or alarmist in terms of the assumptions on which
they are based. They assume that safeguards will be adequate during
the great majority of years, and only during a few years per cen-
tury will dire deeds by malfactors be successful.
However, the dollar costs of thos'e successful deeds can reach `un-
acceptable levels very qui'ckly, and if you will consult people who are
better informed on the cost of decontamination, such as Dr. Theodore
Taylor, who is on the agenda ,~ later, you will recognize that these
costs are indeed staggering, and moreover, the Federal Government
has minimum public data as to what they are. The executive branch
seems quite uninterested in pro~dding for full debate by the electorate
on the particular consequences if plutonium or spent fuel should be
deliberately dispersed.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would you go beyond that to express the same
doubts with the fusion process?
Dr. DENIKE. It is much more minor. With fusion you are dealing
with several hundred megacuries of tritium, which if released would
diffuse rapidly, and would not concentrate in the food chain the way
heavy fission products can. At the Savannah River Plant, 50 grams of
tritium were lost, and it went up the stack and was diffused over
the ocean before it could `be of any danger. It is at least a more com-
forting prospect to think of that rather than to think of several bil-
lion curies, 20 percent volatile, that exist in a nuclear fission power
complex at peak fuel irradiation. As reactors tend to be located 2, 3,
and 4 together, the danger from extensive sabotage, of course, rises
proportionately.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Bingham?
Mr. BINGHAM. Th'ank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. DeNike, what about nonnuclear attacks on, let us say, the
air-conditioning system, or water supplies that could be lethal to
thousands of people? Have you figured anything in terms of that,
the costs of that, of remedying the `damages caused by attacks of that
sort?
Dr. DENIKE. I have not made such calculations. On the other
hand, Theodore Taylor has considered the use of plutonium
oxide-
Mr. BINGHAM. No, I am talking about nonnuclear poisons.
Dr. DENIKE. No, I have not. I operate on an extremely low budget,
and I would like a full comparison on the health cost of fossil-fuel
plants, for in'stance, versus nuelear plants.
Mr. BINGHAM. It seems to me you haven't quite dealt head-on with
the chairman's question, which I take it is that aside from the nuclear
ph'ase of our society, there are possibilities for madmen, organized or
otherwise, to do incredible amounts of damage, to kill large numbers
of people, and yet that does not happen to any extent.
PAGENO="0086"
82
Aside from the fact that the word "nuclear" and the concept of
nuclear poisons or what have you has a certain dramatic appeal that
perhaps botulism or something else doesn't, what makes you think
that the threat from the existence of the nuclear plants and qther
nuclear facilities is different in quantity and quality than has existed
and still exists from normuclear sources?
Dr. DENIKE. Yes. First of all, the economic consequences that
could ensue would be greater in the nuclear occurrence because of
the greater persistence of radioactivity.
Radioactivity would have a singular advantage to the terrorist, be-
cause it would not produce just one incident of publicity, but a
steady stream which would result from the evacuations and subse-
quent actions that would be necessary. The evacuation level is roughly
one microcurie per square meter, which indicates that 1 pound of plu-
tonium-239 could evacuate, if spread evenly, 10 square miles. The
publicity that would accrue and the aftershocks, let's say, of this
event, would provide the terrorists themselves, in their perverse
mentality, with a great sense of personal satisfaction. I hate to use
that word for such a bizarre and horrendous event, but I think that
is how they would view it subjectively.
Also, nuclear events would be of gravity to the public because of
the costs of remaining outside affected areas until they could be
cleaned up, so that they constitute a matter for concern that is rather
unique to radionuclides.
If we are talking about the use of nerve gas, or chlorine gas re-
leases, all of these materials dissipate rapidly in the environment or
are biodegraded or chemicaly degraded so that after a short period
of time they are not hzardous. Radionuclides persist until they are
physically removed and the processes of removal are extremely labo-
rious.
In November 1959-
Mr. BINGI1AM. May I interrupt you, because you are really not
talking to the point.
I understand, and I think this committee understands, the kinds
of threats that flow from nuclear radiation and meltdowns and so
forth. What we are talking about here is, as I understand it, what
is the risk that this kind of thing is going to be deliberately brought
about by terrorists or madmen or otherwise.
You are not, to my mind, meeting the point, as I take it. The other
two witnesses have made the point that there is no historical evidence
that people of `this sort really want to kill large numbers of people.
Is that a fair statement? May I ask the other two witnesses, of
your points of view?
That is the point I don't think you are meeting. Admittedly, there
is capacity for damage through the nuclear medium that is perhaps
unprecedented. What evidence is that of a real threat-
Dr. DENIKE. One occasion occurred in two different trains in
Austria, in which a man protesting prison conditions spread radio-
iodine fluid over train seats and did succeed in contaminating some
of the passengers and baggage.
The second incident refers to the contamination of Karen Silk-
wood, a plutonium worker in Oklahoma, which she may have done
herself. Karen Silkwood's apartment and food were found to be
PAGENO="0087"
83
contaminated with plutonium. She reported to work contaminated
whereas she had left the previOus evening clean.
There are threats, and one occurred in Italy in the summer of
1974. That is reported in the latter two pages of my testimony t.oday
on the sheets which give the actual occurrences of radioactive threats
and the like.
It was reported by the Italian Government, after several arrests
had been made, that right-wing terrorists had conspired to steal
radioactive material from a nuclear center and contaminate aqueducts
with it. The attempted coup was aborted as a result of the arrests,
but the actual threat in terms of plans was formulated. This was also
discussed in a Los Angeles Times article of January 1, 1975.
Now, an additional item which did not appear in the domestic
press, but which I saw in the London Times of June 15, 1975, indi-
cated that an Arab country had thought awhile under the code name
of "Ibis" to contaminate Israeli territory with small strontium-90 or
cesium-137. This did not come to completion. I think a nation plotting
to take over another nation is not eager to have contamination on
that territory.
Now, this is as far as I can go in terms of actual events that have
transpired two deliberate contamination events and two sets of plans.
Beyond this, I think we will have to wait for the newspapers.
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. Well, let me thank you for coming. I think that
those of us who were here certainly know a lot more about the issues
than we did when we began.
This afternoon at 2 o'clock we will reconvene and hear about
reactor sabotage.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene at 2 p.m. of the same day.]
AFTER RECESS
[The subcommittee reconvened at 2:15 p.m., Hon. Paul E. Tsongas,
presiding.]
STATEMENTS OP DR. DAVID McCLOSKEY, SANDIA CORP.; DR.
NORMAN RASMUSSEN, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OP TECH-
NOLOGY; BERNARD CHERRY, GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES; AND
ROBERT POLLARD
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, my name is David J. McCloskey.
I am the manager of the nuclear fuel safety research department at
Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N. Mex. I received a B.S. in
chemical engineering and a M.S. in mechanical engineering from
Stanford University in 1959. Following this I instructed nuclear
reactor physics and engineering courses in the U.S. Naval Nuclear
Power School for 3 years. Later I was a consultant to the physics
department of the RAND Corp. I received my Ph.D. in engineering
science and applied matematics from the California Institute of
Technology in 1966. In the last 9 years at Sandia, I have worked in
weapons effects research, systems analysis studies, and nuclear safety
research.
PAGENO="0088"
84
During my talk on safety and security of nuclear power reactors
to acts of sabotage, I will refer to slides, copies of which are attached
to my testimony which I have submitted.
Early in 1974, the AEC Division of Reactor Safety Research be-
gan a series of studies at Sandia Laboratories on the vulnerability of
nuclear powerplants to sabotage. Principal emphasis has been placed
on sabotage which could lead to a significant radioactive hazard to
the public health and safety. Sabotage which would cause only finan-
cial loss to the operating utility company, but which would not jeop-
ardize public safety is of secondary interest.
The recently published reactor safety study calculated the risk to
the public due to equipment failure, human error, and external events
such as earthquakes. The study predicted that the public risk due to
these causes is extremely small. However, the safety study did not
attempt to determine the contribution to the risk due to sabotage.
In order to calculate the risk due to sabotage of any target, three
factors would have to be considered: (1) The likelihood that sabotage
will be attempted; (2) the susceptibility of the target to sabotage;
and (3) the consequences of a successful attempt.
\Ve have not identified any means of predicting the likelihood of
attempt of sabotage which could endanger the public. Therefore, the
risk due to sabotage cannot be quantitatively determined. However,
the susceptibility of various targets to sabotage, and the consequences
of a successful attack, are amenable to analysis. Relative comparison
of these factors can be made for various targets, and subjective judg-
ments can then be inferred regarding relative risks.
The objectives of the Sandia study are shown on slide 2. We have
developed conclusions regarding the susceptibility of nuclear plants
to sabotage and the consequences of a successful attack. In addition,
countermeasures to prevent sabotage or to mitigate the extent of
radioactive release were recommended for consideration by NRC.
We have performed detailed case studies for a typical pressurized
water reactor plant and a typical boiling water reactor plant. In addi-
tion, a number of other plants of both reactor types were visited and
studied in order to locate plant-to-plant differences and to assure
general applicability of our results.
The study methodology combines systematic analysis and empirical
gaming to identify plant vulnerabilities and to determine counter-
measures. Fault trees were developed to systematically inventory all
combinations of sabotage actions that could lead to a radioactive re-
lease from the plant. Specific scenarios developed by adversary teams
were used to evaluate the susceptibility of the plants to sabotage.
The studies employed several adversary teams. Team members in-
cluded scientists and engineers having expertise in reacthr plant sys-
tems, nuclear safeguards, security systems, explosive technology, and
military weapons. Many have participated in other studies employing
adversary gaming. Differing amounts of information and plant access
were afforded to the teams. The teams developed realistic sabotage Se-
quences which would maximize the offsite radiological hazard. They
also evaluated the resources required to accomplish sabotage and
estimated their chance of achieving success. We did not actually test
plant defenses. However, the results were reviewed with the utility
personnel.
PAGENO="0089"
85
The same combination of fault~ tree analysis and empirical gaming
was employed to determine countermeasures to reduce the vulner-
ability of the plants to sabotage. The fault trees were analyzed to
define conditions sufficient to prevent a radioactive release and to
identify vital plant systems that should be protected.
Measures to thwart sabotage were also formulated by members of
the adversary teams by drawing upon their experience gained in
determining how to penetrate the plant defenses. The combined inputs
from both the fault tree and the adversary studies are reflected in
the recommendations that we have submitted.
The consequences of the sabotage sequences developed by the ad-
versary teams were estimated for both reactor types under various sit-
ing conditions. The reactor safety study consequence model was used
to estimate the consequences. Finally, a comparison was made of the
susceptibility of a nuclear power reactor to sabotage and the conse-
quences of an attack with these factors for other civil and industrial
targets.
Our major conclusions regarding the susceptibility of nuclear
powerplants to sabotage are summarized here. First design features
of nuclear plants provide inherent resistance to sabotage. These de-
sign features include:
One: The defense-in-depth concept of reactor plant design.
Two: The massive structure of the plant, which protects critical
components from external attack.
Three: The safety design basis of the plant, which emphasizes sys-
tem reliability, flexibility, redundancy, and protection against com-
mon mode failures.
Four: Engineered safety features, which are added to the basic
system to cope with abnormal operations or accidents.
These factors greatly increase the difficulty of achieving a radio-
active release by deliberate sabotage actions.
Mr. TsoNGAs. Are you going to go into depth in terms of what
these involve?
For example, the defense-in-depth concept, what does that mean
exactly?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. We can certainly answer that in the questions.
Mr. TSONGAS. All right; why don't you make a note of that.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. OK.
Dr. MOCLOSKEY. Next, we have concluded that ordinary acts of
willful destruction present negligible radiological risk to the public
health and safety. Such acts include those that might be perpetrated
by disgruntled employees, fanatics, mentally deranged individuals, or
extremists during periods of civil unrest or discordant labor relations.
These acts of sabotage in a nuclear powerplant could be highly
destructive and expensive to the operating utility, but we feel that it
is extremely unlikely that they would cause a radioactive release.
Sabotage which might endanger the public could only be carried
out by knowledgeable, capable personnel having a high degree of
technical competence. Such an attack would require thorough plan-
ning and coordination in order l~o mount an effort to bypass the plant
security system and to disable or destroy elements of several plant
systems in the multiple plant defenses against a radioactive release.
PAGENO="0090"
86
Many public comments have speculated whether saboteurs could
create worse consequences than were considered by the reactor safety
study. All sabotage options that we have identified lead to plant fail-
ure sequences identical to those considered by the reactor safety
study. Therefore, sabotage cannot create more severe consequences
than the maximum consequences predicted by the reactor safety
study. Evaluation of the expected consequences for the scenarios that
were developed by the adversary teams showed consequences that are
a few percent or less of these maximum consequences. Many factors
influence the consequences that might result from successful sabotage.
Among these are: The sabotage option chosen, the operating status
of the engineered safety features, the containment failure mode, the
time and space variation of the wind and meteorological conditions,
the site population distribution, and the extent of emergency response
by onsite and offsite personnel.
Control of all of these factors is well beyond the capabilities of a
credible sabotage operation.
In order to put our results in perspective, we have compared for a
wide variety of targets their susceptibility to sabotage and the conse-
quences of a successful attack.
I might remark that our conclusions regarding the susceptibility of
nuclear powerplants to sabotage were developed while requirements
of regulatory guide 1.17 were being implemented and while the pro-
posed new regulations for physical protection of nuclear plants from
industrial sabotage were being formulated.
Even without increased security measures, nuclear power reactors
appear far less susceptible to sabotage than most other civil or indus-
trial targets. The expected consequences of successful sabotage of a
power reactor are comparable to the consequences that could be pro-
duced by sabotage of other industrial or civil targets and are much
less than certain of these targets. The very low susceptibility of
nuclear power reactors to sabotage reduces the likelihood of credible
attacks being mounted by unsophisticated elements. However, insuffi-
cient information is available to make definitive statements concern-
ing the relative likelihood of attack on various targets. Of course, if
we assume equal attack likelihood, then targets near the upper right-
hand corner of slide 6-high susceptibility, high consequences-pre-
sent the greatest risk.
Our recommendations for plant countermeasures fall into three
categories: plant design, administrative control, and emergency plan-
ning. The proposed NRC regulations published in November 1974 for
comment took account of our recommendations and would implement
certain of these. Further studies are in progress as part of the ongoing
safeguards research program to evaluate the effectiveness and the
impact of the remaining recommendations.
Our recommendations for plant design are somewhat plant spe-
cific. Their generic impact is shown here in slide 8. We recommend
that all critical plant systems be given high physical protection in
order to prevent a radioactive release, the immediate loss of reactor
coolant, or the permanent loss of plant monitoring and control. In
general, this is not difficult to achieve since the safety design basis of
the plants has already located these systems deep within the plant
behind massive physical barriers. Relatively minor plant modifica-
PAGENO="0091"
87
tions would be required to prevent unauthorized access to adversaries
employing force or deceit.
A flexible combination of physical protection and emergency plant
damage control response is recommended to assure that transient in-
cidents created by sabotage cannot lead to a radioactive release.
Physical protection of some systems may be required to prevent those
transient sequences which might cause a release in times which are
too short for plant damage control actions to be effective. Since these
systems are highly redundant and are provided with great flexibility,
adequate protection appears to require relatively minor plant modi-
fications.
Control of personnel access and activity during shutdown repair or
operation of `the plant would preclude sabotage actions by unauthor-
ized personnel. The specific recommendations that were developed
~re shown here in slide 9. We feel that implementation of these rec-
ommendations would have considerable spinoff in terms of increased
plant availability and safety.
Essentially, all of these administrative control measures are in-
cluded in the proposed regulations.
Mr. TSONGAS. Could you read those for the record, please ~
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. Procedures should be developed to permit access
~o containment and other areas only by authorized personnel. Close
supervision by knowledgeable personnel should be given to mainte-
nance or repair being performed on equipment of vital systems or in
vital areas.
Only those persons who are required to operate, maintain, or in-
spect the reactor plant should be admitted to the control room. Plant
tours for the general public should not be conducted in vital areas.
Our final recommendation involves emergency planning. A flexible
preplanned response by trained plant personnel of the plant operat-
ing staff would be a very effective countermeasure against certain
sabotage sequences.
There are various plant transients, which could be caused by equip-
ment failure, human error, ex:ternal events, or sabotage in which many
hours would be available before core heatup would occur.
Thus, ample time would be available for a damage control team to
nullify or mitigate the results of the sabotage. The concept involves:
One. Developing damage control plans which provide an effective
response to a wide variety of emergencies.
Two. Providing required equipment and plant modifications to
support damage control operations.
Three. The formation and training of damage control teams con-
sisting of trained plant operating personnel.
In summary, our studies have not identified any reason to single
out nuclear power reactors from the many targets which could be
impacted by sabotage. Additional protection against an escalated
sabotage threat could be obtained by further supplementing increased
plant security with additional, countermeasures involving elements
of plant design, administrative control, and emergency planning.
Studies are currently in progress to evaluate the effectiveness of
these countermeasures and to determine their impact on plant oper-
ability and safety.
[Attachments follow:]
PAGENO="0092"
FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK
RISK = LI KELI HOOD (Probability of Attempt)
X SUSCEPTIBILITY (Probability of Success)
X CONSEQUENCES
PAGENO="0093"
* SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR POWER
REACTORS TO ACTS OF SABOTAGE
OBJECTIVES
* EVALUATE -SUSCEPTIbILITY OF PLANTS ~TO SABOTAGE ~
IDENTIFY PLANT VULNERABILITIES
DEVELOP SABOTAGE SCENARIOS
DETERMINE DIFFICULTY OF SABOTAGE
* ESTIMATE CONSEQUENCES -
* RECOMMEND COUNTERMEASURES
PAGENO="0094"
STUDY METHODOLOGY
-UI F
I I1~NVENTORY I
IFAULITREEL ~i SABOTAGE ~ -~
_____ LOP~IONn
EVALUATE
COUNTERMEASU RES
____I PROVIDE I
~[RECOMMEN DAT IONS]
ADVERSARY
STUDY
__J~[~ABoTAcj~
EVALUATE
PLANT
SUSCEPTI BILITY
COMPARE WITH
OTHER CIVIL AND
INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE
r~~i
`REACTOR SAFETY
STUDY
PAGENO="0095"
STUDY CONCLUSIONS. SUSCEPTIBILITY
1. DESIGN FEATURES OF NUCLEAR PLANTS PROVIDE INHERENT
* RESISTANCE TO SABOTAGE.
2. ORDINARY ACTS OF WILLFUL DESTRUCTION PRESENT NEGLIGIBLE
RADIOLOGICAL RISK TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
3. SABOTAGE WHICH COULD ENDANGER THE PUBLIC WOULD
REQUIRE A HIGH DEGREE OF TECHNICAL COMPETENCE,
CAPABLE PERSONNEL, AND THOROUGH PLANNING.
PAGENO="0096"
STUDY CONCLUSIONS CONSEQUENCES
1. ALL IDENTiFIED SABOTAGE OPTIONS LEAD TO PLANT FAILURE SEQUENCES
IDEN11CAL TO THOSE CONSIDERED BY THE REACTOR SAFETY STUDY.
2. SABOTAGE CANNOT CREATE, MORE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES THAN THE
MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES PREDICTED BY THE REACTOR SAFETY STUDY.
3. THE EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESSFUL SABOTAGE WOULD BE A
SMALL FRACTION OF THESE MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES.
PAGENO="0097"
C')
LU
0
z
-LU
LU
C/)
z
0
0
0
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS SABOTAGE TARGETS
I
~
I
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WARFARE CHEMICALS
DAM
.
WATER SUPPLY
.
FOOD SUPPLY
PUBLIC GATHERING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
MUNITIONSDEPOT
-
PUBLIC BUILDING
BRIDGE -~
TUNNEL
AIRPORT AND AIRCRAFT
EXPLOS I VES
RAILROAD YARD AND TRAINS
DOCKSANDSHIPS
TOXIC CHEM1CALS
-
PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
0
~
MILITARY BASE
BANK
FOSSIL FUEL POWER PLANT
COMMUNICATIONS
POWER TRANSMISSION
LOW MEDIUM
HIGH
SUSCEPTJBILITy
PAGENO="0098"
CATEGORIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS
* PLANT DESIGN
* PHYSICAL PROTECTiON
DESIGN MODIFICATIONS
* ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
* EMERGENCY PLANS
PAGENO="0099"
PLANT DESIGN
1. SYSTEMS WHOSE DISABLEMENT, DESTRUCTION, OR MISUSE COULD
CAUSE A RADIOACTIVE RELEASE, THE IMMEDIATE LOSS OF REACTOR
COOLANT, OR THE PERMANENT LOSS OF PLANT MONITORING AND
CONTROLSHOULD BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY PHYSICAL
BARRIERS, INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS, AND ACTIVE RESPONSE.
2. SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE RECOVERY FROM SHORT-TERM
TRANSIENT INCIDENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A RADIOACTIVE
RELEASE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY PHYSICAL
BARRiERS, INTRUSION DETECTiON SYSTEMS, AND ACTIVE RESPONSE.
PAGENO="0100"
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
1. PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO PERMIT ACCESS TO CONTAINMENT AND
OTHER VITAL AREAS ONLY BY AUTHORiZED PERSONNEL DURING SHUTDOWN,
REPAIR, OR OPERATION.
2. CLOSE SUPERVISION, BY KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL, SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
MAINTENANCE OR REPAIR BEING PERFORMED ON EQUIPMENT OF VITAL SYSTEMS,
OR IN VITAL AREAS.
3. ONLY THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE, MAINTAIN, OR INSPECT
THE REACTOR PLANT SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE CONTROL ROOM.
4. PLANT TOURS FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED IN VITAL
AREAS.
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EMERGENCY PLANNING
1. EMERGENCY PLANS SHOULD INCLUDE A DAMAGE CONTROL
TEAM TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE, TO ACTS OF SABOTAGE.
2. EQUiPMENT REQUIRED BY THE TEAM SHOULD BE PROVIDED.
3. PLANT MODIFICATIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE
FEATURES TO EXPEDITE USE OF THE EQUIPMENT.
4. THE TEAM SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF RESTORING LONG.TERM
EMERGENCY COOLING TO EFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING
A SABOTAGE ATTACK.'
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98
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you.
Dr. RASMUSSEN ~
STATEMENT OF NORMAN RASMUSSEN, MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OP TECHNOLOGY
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I didn't have a chance to discuss this testimony with Dr. MeCloskey
beforehand, and you will find some of this sounds like repeated com-
ments, but I will read my statement.
Mr. Chairman, my name is Dr. Norman C. Rasmussen. I am a pro-
fessor of nuclear engineering and head of the Department of Nuclear
Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
I am happy to have been invited to appear here today to discuss
the possibility of sabotage at nuclear powerplants. As I explained to
your staff, I am not an expert in sabotage and, although I am aware
generally of reactor security procedures, I am not knowledgeable of
their specific details since for very good reasons such information is
not available in the public record.
However, as director of the recently released reactor safety study-
WASH 1400-I am knowledgeable in the various kinds of potential
reactor failures that a successful saboteur might cause and what the
public consequences of such failures might be.
In the course of the reactor safety study, we reviewed the issue of
sabotage. We concluded several things:
(1) We would find no way to predict the likelihood that sabotage
attempts would be made upon nuclear powerplants; (2) it would be
very difficult to sabotage a nuclear powerplant in such a way as to
cause serious public damage; (3) the possible consequences of a suc-
cessful sabotage attempt are covered by the ranges of consequences
considered in the reactor safety study.
Since we were unable to predict the likelihood of sabotage, this
risk was not included in the risk curves in the reactor safety study.
This is clearly stated in the report. I would like to explain briefly
why we reached these conclusions.
Although one might believe some estimate of the likelihood of a
sabotage attempt could be obtained from our experience to date, we
do not believe this to be the case.
The reason is that such irrational acts seem to follow fads. For
example, the number of attempted airline hijackings has changed
dramatically in recent years; the same is true of political kidnapings.
The conclusion that it would be difficult to cause serious public
damage was not based upon the degree of difficulty in overcoming the
security system of the plant, but rather the difficulty of damaging
all the equipment necessary to cause a large release of radioactivity.
As you know, nuclear plants have numerous systems whose func-
tion is to minimize such a risk. It would take a person very knowl-
edgeable in the details of the plant as well as sabotage techniques tp
accomplish this.
If one looks at the senseless, terrorist acts that have been carried
out in recent years, one finds that rarely do they exhibit the degree
of sophistication required for successful nuclear plant sabotage.
PAGENO="0103"
99
In our review of potential reactOr accidents we considered a spec-
trum of accidents from minor to very severe in terms of the possible
consequences.
The consequences depended upon the exact sequence of events inside
the plant as well as the weather conditions and locations of populated
areas outside the plant.
Many of these conditions could not be controlled even in the best
planned sabotage attempt. For example, changes in wind direction
are so frequent that it would be impossible to be sure just where any
released activity might go. The worst consequences occurred when
rain began to fall just as the contaminated cloud passed over a popu-
lated area.
Clearly, this could not be controlled. Likewise, the saboteur could
not be certain of creating the largest release we considered. For all
these reasons the magnitude of the consequence versus its likelihood
would almost surely follow a curve with a shape similar to those we
developed.
These indicate that the most likely consequence of a core melt
would be rather modest and that the largest consequences would be
very much less likely.
I would like to conclude this statement with some of my personal
observations on this issue. On several occasions in recent years, I
have discussed the issue of terrorist acts with people knowledgeable
in this area.
We considered just how `an irrational person or group of persons,
intent on causing social disruption, might achieve their purposes.
These discussions always lead to a general agreement that our
highly technological society is very vulnerable to well organized ter-
rorist activities.
These discussions always considered nuclear plants as one of the
possible targets. However, it was always concluded that there were
a number of other acts of sabotage that would be both easier to carry
out and more certain of producing social disruption than attacks upon
nuclear plants.
I would enumerate some of these, but I do not believe it is in the
public interest to do so. My only point is that nuclear powerplants
are not the unique targets of opportunity for terrorist acts that some
of those opposed to nuclear power would imply.
Unfortunately, however, if those opposed to nuclear power con-
tinue to stress this point, it will~ surely increase the likelihood that
some irrational person will attempt nuclear plant sabotage.
Considering this, and in light of the number of terrorist acts that
are occurring in the world today, I think it is very important that all
nuclear plants have a high level of physical security.
I know from personal experience that the security procedures
around these plants have been upgraded considerably in recent years.
Certainly, today they are much better guarded than many other
potential targets.
Finally, I would like to say that there are those who suggest that
we should abandon nuclear power because the plants could be targets
of terrorist acts. I cannot imagine a more foolish course of action.
PAGENO="0104"
100
If followed to its logical conclusion, we would have to abandon
much of the technology we have come to depend upon. This great
Nation has never capitulated to such threats in the past.
Surely, if such threats exist, we have the resources to meet them
head on and make the price of such acts prohibitive to those who
would perpetrate them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Cherry?
STATEMENT OP BERNARD H. CHERRY, MANAGER, PIJEL
RESOURCES, GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES
Mr. Cin~ny. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment that like Dr.
Rasmussen and Dr. McCloskey, I have not had a chance to discuss
this testimony with them, but I think you will find that my conclu-
sions follow along the same lines as theirs do.
My name is Bernard H. Cherry. I reside in Katonah, N.Y. I am
employed by the GPU Service Corp., an affiliate of General Public
Utilities Corp., where I am currently manager of fuel resources.
I am also chairman of the Nuclear Fuels Committee of the Edison
Electric Institute. I hold a master of science degree in nuclear engi-
neering. I have been employed in the nuclear power industry as an
analyst, engineer, and manager for almost 14 years.
I appear today as a private citizen and upon the invitation of the
subcommittee.
Energy consumption in the United States is projected to expand
between 2 and 4 percent per year until the end of the century.
In order to decrease reliance on imported fuel, the United States
must pursue a balanced energy policy which, among other things, in-
cludes the maximum utilization of domestically available energy re-
sources.
For the near and intermediate term, these resources are coal and
uranium. Increases in the production of coal up to and beyond cur-
rently projected expansion levels are subject to constraints inherent
in the coal industry.
Furthermore, potential application of coal as a resource to be util-
ized in petrochemicals and synthetic fuels is an additional factor to
be considered in decisions regarding the expansion of the utilization
of coal as a boiler fuel.
Thus, the current U.S. commitment to expanded utilization of
nuclear power is essential if increased oil imports are to be avoided.
It is, therefore, important that any issues surrounding the public
acceptance of a continued commitment to nuclear power be resolved.
The current worldwide commitment to nuclear power indicates that
the United States and other nations have determined that the bene-
fits of nuclear power outweight the potential risk of its utilization.
This position was reinforced with the completion and publication
of the reactor safety study, WASH 1400. This report concludes that
the utilization of nuclear power on a wide scale results in a risk of
injury or death to the general population that is significantly lower
than other man-caused and natural phenomena.
This low risk coupled with favorable nuclear power economics and
domestic nuclear fuel availability provides the incentive to utilize
PAGENO="0105"
:i~oi
nuclear powerplants to supply a significant portion of United States
energy needs.
The question of whether potential acts of sabotage could result in
an adverse impact on the health and safety of the public, and thus
impact the United States and world decisionmaking regarding their
nuclear power commitment has been the subject of much speculation.
The opportunity for discussion of this subject in a public forum
is welcomed.
An analysis of the incentive for, or the probability of attempts of
nuclear powerplant sabotage will, not be performed in this presenta-
tion.
Rather, the potential risks and consequences of acts of nuclear
powerplant sabotage will be reviewed under the assumption that the
acts of sabotage is initiated. The review of the effect of sabotage acts
can be divided into two areas: (1) The likelihood that a transient or
accident sequence can be initiated by an act of sabotage; and (2) The
likelihood that a sabotage initiated sequence of events could adversely
impact the health and safety of the public.
A. On the likelihood that a transient or accident sequence can be
initiated by an act of sabotage: Nuclear powerplant design philos-
ophy~ with such careful attention to safety and thorough consider-
ation of possible adverse events, results in an inherently difficult
target for sabotage. Redundant and multiple protective systems pre-
sent a highly complex and sophisticated problem for the potential
saboteur.
The implementation of an act of sabotage resulting in a transient
or accident sequence requires the acquisition of adequate personnel
and resources to carry out the effort, the penetration of plant security
systems, and the disabling of plant safety systems and equipment.
This requires precise execution of both simultaneous and sequential
events. The skills required of a sabotage team range from, those
usually associated with sabotage efforts to detailed technical knowl-
edge of nuclear powerplants.
The technical knowledge required includes a detailed understand-
ing of the operation of nuclear powerplants, the accident sequences
involved, and potential results from such sequences.
Additionally, specific knowledge of the systems and layout of the
plant of interest are required. This information could only be ob-
tained and assimiliated by those with indepth training in nuclear
powerplant operation, engineering and analysis.
Once the sabotage team is assembled, in order to initiate a serious
transient or accident, plant security must be penetrated. Operating
plants are required to have security plans that equal or exceed cur-
rent regulatory requirements.
These plans include the use of, physical barriers, sophisticated elec-
tronic communication, surveillance and detection devices, and armed
guards at strategic locations.
While individual minor violations of such security systems have
occurred, it is viewed by those who are knowledgeable in these mat-
ters to be unlikely that a full sabotage team could penetrate current
plant security systems.
Assuming the penetration of security, plant systems must be dis-
abled on a well-coordinated and tightly' controlled sequence of actions.
PAGENO="0106"
102
Unless the actions are precisely executed and occur in the correct se-
quence over a precisely required period of time, the effort will not
lead to an accident and will simply shut the plant down.
Moreover, to set up an accident sequence that is even potentially
serious, all relevant safety systems must be disabled, since if only
one safety system remains operable the potential attempt at accident
initiation can be defeated or sharply curtailed.
Based on these observations, it is concluded that it is highly un-
likely that an attempted act of sabotage could result in the initiation
of a potentially serious accident sequence.
B. On the likelihood that a sabotage initiated sequence of events
could adversely impact the health and safety of the public: The
severity of an event initiated by an act of sabotage depends upon the
accident sequence, the length of time that system disablement per-
sists, and the resultant behavior of the system under the accident
sequence.
A review of potential accident sequences initiated through acts of
sabotage indicates that there are no credible sequences which can be
initiated through the acts of sabotage which have not been consid-
ered in WASH 1400, the reactor safety study, or in normal transient
and accident evaluations of nuclear powerplants.
The acts of the saboteur can only alter the probability of the
initiation of these accident sequences. The severity of the. accident is
governed by the path the accident takes after initiation.
It is strongly noted that this path cannot be made more severe by
saboteur actions since it involves other phenomena beyond his con-
trol and these phenomena have been discussed by the previous
speakers.
The consequence also depends upon the length of time plant sys-
tems remain disabled. There are safety systems which may be acti-
vated manually to mitigate the severity of many accident sequences
as long as several hours after the initiation of the sequence.
Based upon these observations, it is concluded that even if a poten-
tial act of sabotage results in the initiation of an accident sequence,
it is extremely unlikely that this accident could result in harm to
the public.
It is concluded that the saboteur can at best alter the probability of
the occurrence of a particular transient or accident sequence of events.
Moreover, the ultimate impact of any sequence of events, once
initiated, is controlled by the existence of phenomena outside the
control of any saboteur.
It is extremely unlikely that an act of sabotage can result in harm
to the general public.
In view of the difficulties in initiating potentially serious accident
sequences, the favorable conclusions regarding nuclear powerplant
safety are not diminished by the threat of acts of sabotage. There-
fore, my view is that the general conclusions of WASH 1400, the re-
actor safety study, are not significantly modified by the consideration
of hypothetical acts of sabotage.
Further, it is my view that the difficulties faced by a potential
saboteur in assembling a competent sabotage team, planning an
attack, penetrating plant security, and successfully initiating the
PAGENO="0107"
103
sabotage act in a nuclear plant result in a formidable and extremely
complex problem, a problem many times more complex than the
initiation of similar actions against conventional industrial targets.
This, coupled with the observation that the result of the act of
sabotage and the probability of causing injury to the public are well
beyond the control of the saboteur, make it extremely unlikely that a
nuclear powerplant would be a target for the activities of saboteurs
intent on harming the public.
In summary, nuclear power is a necessary part of a balanced energy
policy leading to decreased dependence upon foreign energy supply.
Nuclear powerplants have been demonstrated to be safe, economical,
and environmentally acceptable.
The results of the activities of potential saboteurs do not pose an
additional threat to the health and safety of the public, and there-
fore, do not adversely affect the favorable determination of the bene-
fits of nuclear power.
Thank you for this opportunity to present my views to this sub-
committee.
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you.
Dr. Pollard, if your statement is going to be similar to the other
three-I assume that we are going to have a discordant note here.
STATEMENT OP ROBERT POLLARD
Mr. POLLARD. I would like to give the committee a brief statement
on my background, at least.
I was in the U.S. naval nuclear power program for 6 years, where
I studied and taught school in reactor operation as well as mainte-
nance and repair of the instrumentation and control systems.
I earned a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering at
Syracuse University in 1969 and then joined the Atomic Energy Com-
mission.
I worked there for 61/2 years,~ primarily in the area of reviewing
the designs for instrumentation and control systems for the safety
systems designed to protect the1 health and safety of the public in
the event of an accident.
I also had assignments working with industry groups in writing
the criteria and standards for these systems.
In our review of license applications on the NRC staff, we do not
consider at all the possibility for sabotage in deciding whether or
not a particular design is acceptable.
We do have a regulatory guide but I think the committee should
recognize that it is not a mandatory requirement to follow any regu-
latory guide.
We do not have any criteria for judging a design as to whether or
not it should be accepted on the basis of whether or not it is easily
disabled. II
Most of our work just goes tOward assessing the safety whether it
does meet today's regulations.
I think that is all I have as far as my statement.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would you like to comment on the statement that
have been made by the other witnesses in terms of the likelihood of
sabotage?
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104
That seems to be a bit more hazy in terms of probability, but as-
suming a saboteur entered a nuclear powerplant, it would be unlikely
that he would be able to set in motion a sequence of events that
would cause a meltdown or catastrophic situation.
Mr. POLLARD. Yes, I would. I would like to point out that I have
not been involved at all in reviewing the security plans for physical
security of the plants, so I don't know what obstacle that presents.
As far as the designs themselves, the idea that we have many back-
up systems and therefore it would be difficult to disable them all, I
think that is not quite accurate because they all have common points
of vulnerability.
In other words, it is not necessary in disabling safety systems to
first disable the emergency core cooling system and then disable the
containment isolation systems. You could instead, of course, disable
the electric power systems, which are necessary for all of the safety
systems.
Then, as far as the likelihood, I can't comment on how often some-
one might try to do this, I think what I see, though, in reviewing the
activities at the operating plants, is that the plant personnel them-
selves accidentally remove redundant safety systems from operable
status.
~Te have had occasions where, for example, both doors to the con-
tainment were left open simultaneously. It is a double-door system
and at least one door is supposed to be closed. We have had people
accidentally override the interlock and have both doors open at the
same time.
We also have had plants run for months with both backup systems
out of service because they didn't recognize they were out of service.
So, as far as disabling backup systems, I would think that since
we have seen it being done by the plant personnel without even in-
tending to do it, it would take some study but the information on
how to is available to the public.
Most of the plant diagrams of the plants are put in the safety
analysis report submitted by the utilities and those show enough of
the detailed layout where, for example, you could locate the main
switch gear for the electric power systems for the safety systems.
So, you don't have to know the plant details. You just have to iden-
tify the room.
As far as the problem of evaluating designs, I think a lot could be
done to today's designs that would improve their ability or rather
make it more difficult to sabotage the safety systems.
Many of our system designs today are such that the system can-
not be adequately tested. By that I mean, we cannot test that it actu-
ally performs in the way that it would need to perform in the event
of an accident.
The tests that we do attempt to simulate the required performance
but don't actually call on the system to perform as it would need to
in the event of an accident.
If I could give you one example: during an accident, of course, we
have to actually start the safety equipment running and pump water
into the reactor vessel.
PAGENO="0109"
105
The testing that is done during most of the year just simply checks
the continuity of those circuits using on ohm meter.
We don't actually call on the circuits to perform.
When I became involved in the work the Sandia Corp. was doing
with the Commission and I started looking at control systems with
the idea of finding how they could be sabotaged, there seemed to be
one vulnerable area where if you had access-and here I talk more
about plant personnel rather than someone coming from outside-
but with sufficient knowledge and access time you could modify the
system such that the testing that was done would indicate that the
safety systems were perfectly all right when in fact if an accident
came along they would not perform satisfactorily.
Mr. TSONGAS. Can we narrow the spectrum a bit? This morning
we had as our witnesses people who were knowledgeable in the mind
set and psychology of terrorism and psychotic behavior. There were
categories, one was the sophisticated intent saboteur, singularly or in
a group, as distinguished from the psychotic; the legitimate lunatic,
I believe, was the term. [Laughter.]
There are none to my right sO I would have to look to my left.
[Laughter.]
Given the highly complex workings of the nuclear powerplant, is
it possible for the second category, the psychotic, whether inhouse
as an employee or let's say someone on a tour and somehow pentrates
the security-can he cause danger or is it simply far too complex for
him to be expected to do anything of that nature?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Do you want me to answer?
Mr. CHERRY. It would be my view, after reviewing this-and I am
not an expert in sabotage, but in discussions I have had with my
colleagues over the last week it has been indicated that it is extremely
unlikely and highly improbable that a single individual whose motive
was industrial sabotage or some single irrational act could in fact
disable the plant to the point where even the chance of an offsite
dose were set up-
Mr. TSONGAS. What about Brown's Ferry? You know, we are lay
people and we understand the situation where a man with all good
intentions with a candle comes very close to causing a meltdown. Now,
how are we supposed to react to that, given what you have just said?
Mr. CHERRY. I would react to it-and perhaps others would like to-
without diminishing the seriousness of what happened at Brown's
Ferry because I think that was something that was important and
industry has to take note of that and deal with it effectively but the
fact is that a meltdown did not occur, there was no damage to the
fuel in the reactor core, and that the operators at the site, after
initial confusion in attempting to deal with the problem, were able to
shut down the plant using procedures that were available to them.
That is the way I would react! to that. An accident did not occur.
Mr. MILLER. Would the gentleman. yield?
The initial confusion, the article in Business Week, said it was
some 5 hours before they put the fire out; is that correct?
Mr. CHERRY. That is what I read in the paper. It was a matter of
hours rather than minutes.
PAGENO="0110"
106
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I think that is right.
Mr. TSONGAS. So you said industry must take that into account.
What has industry done? There are many Brown's Ferries across
the landscape. Have there been any modifications to powerplants to
take into account the threat of candles?
Mr. CHERRY. Well, I think the NRC certainly made a detailed study
of the causes of the accident in terms of the physical factors that
entered into it, and I think the recommendations developed by Dr.
McCloskey regarding the development of procedures to be followed
in the event of an emergency in the plant are steps in the direction
that the industry is moving to accommodate those kinds of instances.
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. I would like to-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. All right, go ahead.
Dr. MGCLOSKEY. First, to answer what defense in depth means.
This refers to the philosophy by which nuclear powerplants are de-
signed.
First of all, they are designed to operate with a very high. degree
of safety and reliability under normal operating conditions and to
have a maximum tolerance to normal plant incidents or accidents.
This represents the first level of defense.
Second, they are designed to accommodate a range of plant in-
cidents, transients as well as accidents, that would be expected to
occur very infrequently. This, provides another level of defense.
Further, to provide additional assurance of safety for the public
they are designed to handle a hypothetical design basis accident
which for the case of light water reactors involves a maximum rup-
ture of the primary coolant piping.
In order to accommodate this accident, special systems are in-
cluded in the plant; in particular, the engineered safety features,
which consist of the containment building, the emergency core cool-
ing, the radioactive removal systems, and the heat removal systems.
Now, in regard to Brown's Ferry. First of all, I think Professor
Rasmussen's report, the reactor safety study, has performed an
analysis of that incident which Professor Rasmussen-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. We did that after the fire, let the record show.
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. The analysis indicated that there was a very low
probability of radioactivity actually being released from the plant.
The fire was a very serious incident at a very critical plant loca-
tion. However, the plant operating force was able to shut down the
plant safely.
I think that this is indicative, almost an experiment, of the great
tolerance that nuclear powerplants have to actions, involving human
operating error, perhaps even sabotage.
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Rasmussen, how close did we come at Brown's
Ferry?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, on a probability scale, we were probably
about halfway there. That is, we say that the likelihood of such an
event, of a core melt is one in 20,000 per plant per year.
We might have been about halfway to that; that is, some systems
that might have prevented core melt were in fact out of service, sev-
eral others that could prevent it were not, one was called upon and it
worked and there was at least one more that could have been called
upon if necessary.
PAGENO="0111"
107
Certainly, about half of the defense had been wiped out by that
fire.
Mr. WEAVER. If the gentleman would yield.
How many Brown's Ferries were assumed in WASH 1400? How
many actually happened?
I am talking about the accidents that actually happened.
What frequency is there of that kind of accident? I am talking
prior to Brown's Ferry.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Prior to the Brown's Ferry fire itself, let me try
to explain this in the following way, Mr. Weaver.
That fire would be characterized as a transient in the WASH 1400
.analysis which means any set of conditions that asks for the plant to
stop for either planned or unplanned reasons, the sequence of events
that must follow that in order to protect the public are that the re-
actor must shut down, a process we call reactor trip, and a series of
heat removal systems much smaller in capacity than the normal heat
removal system must come on arid remove the residual heat that is
there as a result of the radioactivity in the core.
If, when the plant is asked to shut down, it trips and the decay
heat removal process works, then the core will not melt because you
have to get a lack of heat removal to melt it.
In the Brown's Ferry fire, the reactor was asked to shut down, in
this case for an unexplained reason; namely, the fire.
It did trip when called upon to trip.
Then the next question is, could the decay heat be removed or not.
The study had a probability of that involved the number of systems
that could remove the heat. In fact, in one of the plants two of the
systems that we said could be used were the high-pressure cooling
system and the low-pressure cooling system, both of which were un-
able to operate as a result of the burning of the cables to their con-
trol system.
We had a probability in our study of what the likelihood of those
two systems being simultaneously failed would be, and it was about
1 hour out of every 50,000 hours: of operation that one might antic-
ipate them to be simultaneously failed, and that is-
Mr. WEAVER. The probability that 1 hour in 50,0000-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is a probability, but I think it is easier to
understand. One hour out of every 50,000 hours one might expect
those two systems to be simultaneously failed.
Mr. WEAVER. One in 50,000. How many hours in a year?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, there are about 8,700.
Mr. WEAVER. And if we had 1,000 nuclear plants, we could have
quite a few Brown's Ferries; couldn't we?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No, sir, the above numbers do not relate to the
chance of a fire.
Mr. TSONGAS. Could we finish the analysis? You have taken us
along the sequence and let's finish that.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, I would like to finish.
This fire represented a period of 5 to 10 hours when they were
simultaneously failed out of some 300,000 hours or so of boiling water
reactor operation, which means those numbers were quite consistent
with our prediction that they would be simultaneously failed. Now,
we did not predict that the cause would be a man with the candle.
PAGENO="0112"
108
You know, we had other reasons why we thought they might be
failed, but that's OK with our report because we are only trying
to identify the likelihood based on the most likely causes of it to get
a rough idea of the probability of failure.
We don't think these fires will occur very often; in fact, we think
this is an unusual way we got into that kind of trouble. One should
not expect, with our kind of analysis, to be able to find exactly every
stage of every accident in the analysis but the major situations that
can lead to serious release of activity should in fact be identified
with the right probability.
Now, your question, I think, was how many Brown's Ferry fires
is there likely to be. The answer, on the basis of present knowledge,
is that we have had 1 in 200 plant years of operation so the numbers
are in the order of 1 in 200 per plant per year initiating fires; if we
don't do anything, the likelihood may be less.
Now, that's poor statistics with one point.
Mr. WEAVER. I understand. What was in the WASH 1400, what
was your incidence there?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is what I explained to you, the chance that
some event would wipe out two important safety systems that could
be used to remove decay heat was if I recall it either 1 in 50,000 or
1 in 60,000 hours.
That is not core melt. There are other things that can work and
prevent core melt.
Mr. WEAVER. I am not talking about core melt; just what happened
at Brown's Ferry. No more, no less. If we had 1,000 nuclear plants,
are you saying that we could expect 1 every 60,000 hours?
Dr. RAs~1ussEN. No, no. If we had 1,000 plants, the probability in
any 1 plant is that 1 hour in every 60,000 hours those 2 systems
would be simultaneously out of service.
That is, no accident unless they are called upon to be used.
Mr. WEAVER. Statistics would show if you had 1,000 plants you
would have 1 every 60,000 hours in 1 of those 1,000 plants.
Dr. RASMUsSEN. Well, Mr. Weaver, you don't-
Mr. WEAVER. No?
Dr. RAsMUssEN. No, it doesn't really show that.
Mr. WTEAVER. Two and two doesn't equal four?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, this is what we call the likelihood of the sys-
tem coming on when demanded. OK?
Mr. WEAVER. Yes.
IDr. RASMUSSEN. It is what we call availability on demand. It is like
what is the chance your car will start when you turn the switch.
The chance is 1 in 60,000 that when you push those 2 buttons
neither one will come on. That is nothing to do with whether there
is 1 million or 100 million cars.
Mr. WEAVER. If you have 60,000 cars, 1 of those 60,000-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Once in every 60,000 starts.
Mr. WEAVER. So, if you have 60,000 cars-if all 60,000 start up at
the same point, 1 of them won't.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is correct.
Now we agree; OK?
Mr. WEAVER. Then how do we apply this to 60,000 hours at 1,000
plants?
PAGENO="0113"
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Dr. RASMUSSEN. It depends on how many times in those-the criti-
cal question is how many times do you demand the system, not how
many plants there are.
If you want to have a number for that, say 10 per year, and 1,000
plants, then there would be 10,000 demand for that system per year
if that were the case and you could multiply it out that way.
I don't think that is appropriate to do for the following reason:
In 1945 no one would have used the operating statistics of the DC-3
to predict the reliability of the 747, and by the thousandth plant we
are talking about 50 years from now.
I don't think anybody who has followed the development of tech-
nology, where one pays attention to trying to improve safety, would
believe that the risk level will be the same in 50 years as it is today.
Mr. WEAVER. It could be worse; couldn't it?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Indeed, it could be worse if we were foolish about
it; absolutely. But, if you look at technology, they tend to improve
if they are ones where people have paid attention to safety.
Mr. WEAVER. When did you, sir, publish your report, WASH
1400?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. November of 1975 was the final report.
Mr. WEAVER. November 1975, and you had this Brown's Ferry
situation occurring one in every 60,000 hours?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No. The simultaneous failure of the two things,
not the probability of a fire.
Mr. ~W EAVER. Perhaps you are not answering my question, sir.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes?
Mr. WEAVER. I asked the question: What was the frequency of in-
cidence in WASH 1400 of something similar to Brown's Ferry oc-
curring?
That was my question.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I am sorry. I thought you were referring to the
frequency of a fire that would burn up the cables.
Mr. WEAVER. I am saying what happened at Brown's Ferry; no
more, no less.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. OK.
Mr. WEAVER. What is the incidence of frequency in your WASH
1400 report of that occurring?
Mr. TSONGAS. Could I interject for a second?
Mr. WEAVER. Sure.
Mr. TSONGAS. I think, if I may, what Congressman Weaver is talk-
ing about is in the total, Brown's Ferry-what you are talking about
is one system failing so you are not both talking to the same area.
Mr. WEAVER. You have my question now.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. All right.
If you want to view this in the broadest sense, we say the chance
of getting to core melt is 1 in 20,000 per year. Now, halfway there is
the square root of that, or 1 in 140 times 1 in 140. So much events
occur by our prediction at the rate of once every 140 reactor years.
Mr. TSONGAS. What was the final figure that you came up with?
[Laughter.]
Mr. MILLER. Still struggling.
Mr. TSONGAS. I just want to know the square root.
71-074 0 - 76 - 8
PAGENO="0114"
110
Dr. RASMUSSEN. 140. Once every 140 years, you get halfway there.
One over 140, times 1 over 140 is 1 over 20,000.
Mr. WEAVER. Is that the Brown's Ferry accident now?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Any accident that in fact wipes out half of the
protection that would be expected once in 100 to 200 years of plant
operation.
Mr. WEAVER. Once in 140 years. You published your report in 1975.
When did Brown's Ferry occur?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Sir, let's not have any misunderstanding. We
published a draft prior to the Brown's Ferry incident and I am talk-
ing about what we said prior to the fire.
We discussed the Brown's Ferry fire in some detail in the final
report.
Mr. WEAVER. You published your WASH 1400 in November
1975?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. The final report, and the initial was in August
1974.
Mr. WEAVER. August of 1974.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. The Brown's Ferry fire occurred about a year ago.
Mr. WEAVER. In other words, within 6 or 8 months after you pub-
lished your report, the occurrence occurred that was supposed to
happen once every 140 years?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Plant-years-and we have had about 200 plant-
years of experience.
Mr. WEAVER. Plant-years?
Mr. MILLER. Would the gentleman yield?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is consistent with the operating history.
Mr. MILLER. Is it fair to say that in your draft report when you
talked about an incident occurring once every 60,000 hours, and you
take the incident that occurred at Brown's Ferry, the incident you
talked about in the draft report did not necessarily have to be a fire.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. This is correct; only something that wiped out
those two systems simultaneously.
Mr. MILLER. That happened almost on schedule.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That happened almost on schedule.
Mr. MILLER. The fact that it was down 5 or 10 hours consumed sort
of surplus hours at that point. You had 300,000 hours on the meter
and you have consumed now 10 hours of that system's time in 1 out
of the 200 operating plants.
Is that not correct?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is correct.
Mr. MILLER. So, what he is saying is that Brown's Ferry showed
up on schedule; they just didn't know which one it was going to be.
[Laughter.]
Dr. MOCLOSKEY. I would like to remark on an analysis that was
done by the reactor safety study and published in the final report
looking at the specific probability of Brown's Ferry leading to a core
meltdown.
That probability was assessed to be something between 1 in 500 to
1 in 1,000. I think that this indicates that Brown's Ferry was not
near to being a core meltdown. Even if a core meltdown had occurred,
the safety study indicates that the expected consequences would be
quite modest.
PAGENO="0115"
Ill
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Bingham?
Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like, if I could, to have both Dr. Pollard and Dr. Ras-
mussen-
Mr. POLLARD. Just Mr. Pollard.
Mr. BINGHAM. All right, Mr. Thank you.
I would like to know where the differences of opinion are between
the two of them in light of Mr. Pollard's area. I would say I live
close to Indian Point No. 2 and your resignation came as a real shock
to me and to many other people in the city of New York.
You have had a great responsibility and you have responded to
that responsibility by resigning.
Now, you must-and I also was very impressed with Dr. Ras-
mussen's study. We watched that develop and he has testified before
us before and it seem like a very good work, and frankly I was im-
pressed with it but you don't seem to be particularly impressed with
it.
Now, where is the difference between the two of you?
Mr. POLLARD. I think the difference is, I guess, I have seen enough
of the abnormal occurrences like Brown's Ferry where what brings
us to the brink of core meltdowns is something that people didn't
think of.
Dr. Rasmussen did think of the possibility that the two systems
might be out but in my area we were talking about making sure we
had adequate physical separation between cables so that if another
fire did start, it would not damage backup cables.
We don't work with probabilities in reviewing the designs. We
simply had a criterion that said~ any single event such as a fire shall
not be capable of damaging more than one safety system.
I think this is what concerns me about accidents like Brown's
Ferry. I think there you see that there was nothing wrong with the
reactor plant itself; there was no break in its cooling system, but we
had a man with a candle able to bring us to the brink of a core melt
and knock the plant out of servièe for a year.
Mr. BTNGHAM. How can you say there was nothing wrong with
the plant itself-
Mr. POLLARD. Nothing wrong with the cooling system.
Mr. BINGHAM. But the cooling system is the electrical system,
which is an integral part of the plant; isn't it?
Mr. POLLARD. I meant to say nothing was wrong with the reactor
piping system, which brings us back to the usual accident we an-
alyze on `the staff, the loss of coolant accident.
I think what is import~ant h'ere to emphasize is this, which I men-
tion'ed before: We have many, many backup system's and I think I
am correct that it was more than just two systems `at Brown's Ferry
that were knocked out of service by the fire.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. There were indeed but only two were important in
getting the decay heat removed.
Mr. POLLARD. I will have to go back and look at the report. I am
not sure about that.
As I mentioned before, we have many, many systems but they have
common points of vulnerability. They are `all dependent on electric
power or they are all dependent on cooling water.
PAGENO="0116"
112
So, here we had a case where the fire knocked out-maybe it is
two, maybe it is many-knocked out the normal systems for decay
heat removal.
The operators were able to use another system to get water into the
reactor vessel, `a system which had never been thought of as being
used for that and so in my mind there was no reason why the cable
for the pump that was finally used couldn't also have been consumed
by the fire.
To go back to your question, then, why don't I have a great deal of
confidence in the WASH 1400, I think it is because of what I have
seen. When something gets us in `trouble it is something no one ever
thought of before and when you are talking `about sabotage, if you
go, and at the same time, you knock out all the electrical power `and
then go into the containment and open both `doors and leave them
open, and then strap Dr. McCloskey's charge `around the pipe and
cause your LOCA, I don't think then you have this series of highly
unlikely events leading to the direct release.
You have disabled all the power to the safety systems; you have
caused the accident and you have created a path for release.
Mr. BINGHAM. Do you have a coiument?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes.
There are two ways of looking at a set of facts and neither one
necessarily is wrong.
Let me show you how I believe that Mr. Pollard and I differ.
He points out that we have been on the brink of disaster time and
time again, I think is the phrase `he used.
We have had many unexpected failures in the sense that we didn't
expect that valve woud stick at tha.t time or that that cable would
burn at that time, or something.
In fact, I think in 1974 there were 876 of these incidents reported.
Now, not one of those times did the fuel overheat or was signifi-
cant radioactivity released.
Yet, as he describes them, they were unexpected events and in one
sense they were but they were expected events in another sense
because the design philosophy says prepare for the unexpected more
or less, design the system so that no matter whether or not you can
think of how that failure might come about that you are defended
against it.
It is this philosophy that means that these plants are very insensi-
tive to failure to various components in them, at least in terms of
whether they release significant amounts of radioactivity.
So, I would take the 800-some incidents and the Brown's Ferry
fire as indications that defense in depth is in fact just that. It really
protected us from a situation we were not fully prepared to deal
with.
Because the plant had so many design features and so much
redundancy, we always seemed to be able to find a way so that the
problem doesn't get serious.
Now, the system that was used I believe he is correct in saying
was not one normally planned to be used for this event, although it
was the way that small amounts of heat were normally removed in
the normal startup procedure.
PAGENO="0117"
113
They used the bypass system used during low-power operation
that the operators were quite familiar with how to use because that
was the normal startup procedure. I think that Mr. Pollard is right,
it was not a system intended to be used for this kind of emergency
but it~worked.
Mr. POLLARD. And, therefore, I think the point is that the cable
for that system which had no review on it, was installed somewhere
just simply in a way that it happened to get installed in a different
location.
It could have been in the fire as well.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes; there is always the what-if problem.
Mr. POLLARD. My point is that the staff does not even look at those
kinds of cables.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, and I think that is a case, where doggone it,
if the staff doesn't start looking at it after this eye opener, they darn
well ought to.
I don't know, I understand the Regulatory Commission is prepar-
ing a complete analysis of Brown's Ferry that will answer your
question, Mr. Chairman. I trust it will. I have not seen it. It is due
to be released shortly, I am told.
Mr. BINGHAM. It seems inconceivable to me if what Mr. Pollard
says is correct, that all safety systems and everything could be
knocked out if you have no power at all, if something happens to
your supply.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Mr. Pollard is, I think, correct that if you lose
all electric power at one of these plants you are in very serious trou-
ble, but, of course, all electric power is not one system.
There are several connections to the utility grid at these plants
and in addition they are required to have local onsite generating
schemes to service the plant in case the grid connections fail or the
grid itself goes down.
Mr. POLLARD. That is true, sir, but the physical arrangement in the
plant and the design of the electric sysems are such that the normal
source of power, and this backup source of power which we have all
pass through a common point.
In fact-well, we have one station today-
Mr. BINGHAM. Could that not be corrected, though?
Mr. POLLARD. It could be corrected, yes, sir, but I am talking
about todays' designs and the fact that in evaluating our designs,
when I was on the NRC staff, ~ve gave no weight to the potential
for sabotage in deciding whether or not a design was acceptable.
Mr. BINGIJAM. What is the fact at Indian Point No. 2 today in
regard to the coming together of all the electrical systems?
Mr. POLLARD. As far as the power supply for the safety systems?
They all pass through the same switch gear. We have another
plant running in this country, not at Indian Point and I don't thinl~
I should name it, but all the power for the entire plant runs through
one room.
So, when Dr. Rasmussen talked before, about if someone did
potentially sabotage a plant, that we had the capability to mitigate
that by reducing the time someting would be out of service, it con-
cerns me that if you did destroy, through explosives, this common
PAGENO="0118"
114
switch gear, that you don't have an opportunity for rapid restora-
tion of electrical power even if you do have highly competent techni-
cal staff people at the plant.
Mr. BINGII~r. What were some of the other failures that were
caused by the Brown's Ferry fire? You said they, were multiple.
Can anybody answer that?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. What were the other systems that failed?
There was a fan system that ventilated the containment that I
don't think-I don't remember.
Mr. POLLARD. We lost the air supply for the pressurized-
Mr. BINGHAM. Speak up, please, so we can hear you.
Mr. POLLARD. I am trying to remember. We lost the high-pressure
system.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. The low-pressure system.
Mr. POLLARD. Low pressure core cooling.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Right.
Mr. POLLARD. We ran out of air to the automatic depressurization
system and they couldn't get the relief valves open.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Right, but, of course, there are safety valves that
didn't need air that could have opened.
Mr. POLLARD. But we had to get them open, had the pressure gone
higher the relief valves would have opened up but that was not the
problem we had with the relief valves.
Mr. MILLER. Did you use the ventilation system in the control
system?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I don't know. The ones I remember were the
fans in the containment that didn't work.
Mr. POLLARD. There was another point I discussed last week before
the Joint Committee-the regulations governing control of the plant
from outside the main control room. I think perhaps even the luna-
tic we were referencing before might search out the control room as
a likely target.
Plant designs today require a station outside the main control
room where you can safely shut the plant down and maintain it in a
hot shutdown condition and continue to remove decay heat.
The designs are such that you must assume that the equipment in
the control room remains in perfect working order, whereas, foreign
countries-and I have not found out yet which ones-they interpret
that rule as saying if you have to control the reactor from outside
the control room, you should design it on the assumption that the
equipment in the control room is destroyed.
We do not do that today in our designs.
Mr. MILLER. You mean the equipment in the interior control
room?
Mr. POLLARD. That is correct.
In some of our designs today, if the equipment in the main con-
trol room were destroyed, the remote shutdown stations that we have
outside the control room may not be operable.
Mr. MILLER. Wasn't one of the problems at Brown's Ferry that
you had a control room which you pretty soon were not going to be
able to man because of smoke and so forth?
Mr. POLLARD. The equipment was not damaged.
PAGENO="0119"
115
Mr. MILLER. But the question was whether the personnel could stay
in there.
Mr. POLLARD. I think in that case if the equipment was not dam-
aged and the people had to leave, today's plants are designed for that
kind of an event.
Mr. MILLER. How many of the existing plants are designed in that
fashion so there is a place to go to shut it down?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is a requirement-you may know better
than I but as far as I know it is a requirement on all plants.
Mr. POLLARD. Today's criteria require that design. How long ago
that was in effect, I don't know.
Mr. TsoNGAs. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER. Sure.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Pollard, you suggested a scenario where some-
one on the inside could indeed cause a meltdown.
Mr. POLLARD. Someone inside?
Mr. TSONGAS. Yes.
You would say knockout the electrical system and leave the doors
open to allow for escape-
Mr. POLLARD. A terrorist team could do that if they had a little
bit of training. I dont' mean to imply that had to be done by some-
one inside.
Mr. TsoNGAs. But it is doable?
Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. Could the rest of you respond to that?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Mr. Chairman, do you really want to discuss in
gory detail how you might sabotage a nuclear plant in a public
hearing?
Mr. TSONGAS. What I want to do is establish that there are things
that can be done to obviate these problems. We sure should do them
now than do them later.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I don't disagree with that point, but I don't
think there is much to be gained by saying if you went to door A
and blew this piece of equipment, you might be able to do it.
I think there are general principles that one could talk about
installing and making sure we prevent likelihood of a lot of these
events, but I personally don't feel comfortable about discussing how
I would sabotage a powerplant in public.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Pollard knows of a scenario-there are many
people who work in nuclear powerplants who I assume are quali-
fiedly knowledgeable.
Dr. RAs~russEN. That is absolutely correct. I would agree on that.
Mr. TSONGAS. Assume they are no more mentally stable than the
average Congressman or the average physicist, that there are people
on the edge who have this information.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is right.
Mr. TSONGAS. Now, the question is: What do we do about it?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes.
Mr. POLLARD. I think Dr. Rasmussen is correct, and the scenario I
outlined can be seen simply by looking at Dr. Rasmussen's report.
When I was asked to come here-I mentioned this to your staff-I
said that I didn't think it was very wise to get too far into the details
of how we might prevent it, in an open hearing.
PAGENO="0120"
116
Mr. TSONGAS. I agree. I have no problem with that, but I want to
establish that if there is a mechanism, a procedure which would
cause it, there is no point in describing it, but if there is that proce-
dure, what do we do?
What steps do we take? What safeguards do we implement to
lower the probabilities of it being effective?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, let me say one thing. What I would say is
that I think we all agree that someone knowledgeable with enough
resources could do this.
What you are asking, what I think is a reasonable question to ask
is what can we do to make it very difficult for him to achieve that
goal.
I believe that is your question; is that correct?
Mr. TSONGAS. Yes.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Go ahead.
Mr. CHERRY. Let me say that I totally agree with Dr. Rasmussen
that we should make it as difficult as possible. Let me point out that
even in the scenario that Mr. Pollard talks about, that a serious acci-
dent sequence is set up, there are manual opportunities following the
initiation of that sequence to mitigate the consequences; that is, in
some plants I know there is an ability to introduce cooling water
into the core without depending on in-plant or out-plant electrical
systems.
Things as simple as hydrants on the outside of the plant pulling
up fire department pumpers and pumping water in that hydrant,
that water eventually ends up in the emergency core cooling system~
Mr. TSONGAS. Does every plant have that?
Mr. CHERRY. I don't know if every plant has that.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I suspect not.
Mr. WEAVER. If the gentleman would yield, did I hear you cor-
rectly to say that it is possible for a saboteur to disrupt a nuclear
powerplant?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I said a saboteur who is knowledgeable enough
and has enough resources could do it, yes.
Mr. WEAVER. Dr. Cherry, you say here that even if it is concluded
that a potential act of sabotage results in an accident, it is unlikely
to cause harm to the public.
Mr. CHERRY. I think we need to differentiate between the ability
to set up the accident sequence and then the result of that accident
sequence being harmful to the public.
For example, Brown's Ferry is an example which I might discuss.
There is a situation where the accident sequence was in fact set
up, or call it a transient sequence, and in fact no harm to the public
resulted.
Mr. WEAVER. In the Brown's Ferry, suppose a saboteur had been
holding the candle.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is about the same thing.
Mr. WEAVER. We are not going into detail, but I wonder if we can
be worrying about desribing this to the public if we were talking
about a coal mine or a solar energy plant.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Do you, really? I feel strongly it is not in the
public interest to tell people how to cause trouble. No matter what
system we are talking about.
PAGENO="0121"
117
Mr. WEAVER. I have heard witness after witness say that somehow
or other the people who are investigating these things are the ones
who cause the destruction, the kind of thing that boggles the mind.
I do understand your logic, but we did want to go into detail. I
am not asking about the detail, but to go into the detail, because
there seems to be a discrepancy here.
Some say a saboteur could disrupt a nuclear plant and others say
he could not.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I think we all agree. Do you want to comment?
Mr. CHERRY. I think we all agree-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Maybe not Mr. Pollard.
Mr. CHERRY. Let me say some of the things that Dr. McCloskey
said earlier, and that is that once the accident sequence is initiated
and even if that accident sequence leads to a core melt, there are a
number of phenomena following that that determine the conse-
quences of an accident.
Those things include meteorology, distribution of population,
whether or not it rains, how the containment is violated, and all
those kinds of things which impact the severity of the result.
Traditionally, the ability to bring systems back into operation
once they have been disabled-and there is a period of several hours
available in most cases for the plant operators and outside people to
take actions that can mitigate the consequences of even a success-
fully initiated act of sabotage and the consequences stemming from
it.
Mr. POLLARD. If I could just comment on this, if you take your
Indian Point plant, there, I don't think it matters much which way
the wind is blowing.
You have enough people in alidirections from it.
The other point about being able to mitigate if after the core
starts melting, it was my understanding-and here I don't know, but
I thought we had to keep the core in a coolable geometry and that
once it does start melting, even adding water after it starts melting
may not terminate it.
In fact, it could make it worse.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is correct.
I think what we are saying, though, is that every core melt does
not lead to the same release of radioactivity.
Mr. POLLARD. Oh, that is true, I agree. You must have a path
through the containment.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Some of them might be small, and others might
be much larger.
Mr. TSONGAS. If I could, let me see where everybody stands.
Mr. Pollard, you are the dissenting opinion here. Is it your posi-
tion that we should abandon nuclear power, that `the dangers are so
great, the designs cannot be made safe, that we should simply aban-
don nuclear power; accept the moratorium principle and go on from
there?
Mr. POLLARD. Are you speaking just with respect to sabotage?
Is that in the context of the question?
Well, let me try to answer it both ways.
As I said earlier, I do not have any experience in trying to look at
designs to figure out how they could be sabotaged. My work has all
been trying to make sure they were safe.
PAGENO="0122"
118
What my position is, and I will say it again, as to why I resigned,
I came to believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was
evading its responsibilities, which I saw to be solely to protect the
public health and safety. That is why I resigned.
I have mentioned my concerns about sabotage, and nuclear waste
and transportation and whether or not the plants really are cheaper
than fossile plants, but as to the question of what we ought to do,
my position I think I have made very clear. I support the type of
legislation which was introduced as the Nuclear Reappraisal Act
last year.
I think we need to stop constructing any new plants until we get
this valid controversy over safety and the other issues resolved.
Mr. TSONGAS. So you do dismiss the possibility that we can, by
design and by regulation, make nuclear plants safe?
Mr. POLLARD. As a person, as a citizen, I think yes, from what I
know.
I think we really ought to look very hard for something else, but
that is not my position in terms of what I am trying to accomplish
by my public resignation.
I would be happy if all I accomplished was to get a stop and to
get us to have an objective reassessment of the safety, of the prob-
lems of nuclear waste storage, of the risk for sabotage, and once we
have settled the valid debate that is going on, then we could decide
whether we are going forward.
I think if we continue the way we are now, you will never get an
objective decision process, simply because of the political and eco-
nomic pressures to license more and more plants.
Mr. BINGHAM. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. TSONGAS. Does that mean you don't regard the Rasmussen
study as objective, or not complete enough, not detailed enough?
Would you challenge the methods, or what?
Mr. POLLARD. I think I regard the Rasmussen report in awe.
[Laughter.]
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I wish you would explain that further.
Mr. POLLARD. Will you tell us how many man-years and money?
I keep forgetting.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. We spent about $4 million and somewhere
around 70 to 100 man-years.
Mr. POLLARD. We came up with a report based upon probability
statistics, where I am not an expert in the technique.
I did have an opportunity to work on the task force that was
appointed in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review his draft
report.
I worked for a period of 6 weeks just looking at the system analy-
sis, a very small part of his study. What I found there in digging
down into the study itself in just a little area was that you can
either believe it or you can choose not to believe it, but you cannot
verify it.
There are too many assumptions made down in the depths of the
work that was done and you don't have any reason as to why those
assumptions were made.
So, you can, like I say, either believe it or you cannot believe it.
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My feeling was when I looked at the way the study was done, and
I am not trying to say Dr. Rasmussen is not a man of integrity, but
the impression I gained from the staff, talking to people who were
working on the study, was that they set out to confirm a predeter-
mined conclusion. That in fact we knew all along, before we even
started this study, that the probability of a reactor accident was
much lower than the other risk the public was exposed to.
I think everyone agrees with that. We see more people killed by
other means than by reactors.
I think what bothers me, even if the report is correct in that the
probability of the accident is low, is the consequences that Dr. Ras-
mussen has come up with.
I still think that the consequences are just so great that it doesn't
seem to me to be worth the benefits of nuclear power, which are
themselves in dispute.
We have public utilities commissions saying that they don't know
how to do an economic analysis of nuclear power to determine if it
is cheaper, because they don't know what the cost is for the fuel
cycle, and they don't know what the cost is for waste disposal.
So, when you are hinging on a scale of benefits where you are
really talking about a differenct~ of cost, it seems to me the risk is
not worth those few benefits.
I know that is a long answer, but I guess in my gut I don't
believe the Rasmussen report, because I have seen too many exam-
ples where we thought we were doing something conservatively and
later find out that we didn't even understand the basic phenomena
that were being analyzed.
Mr. BINGHAM. Let's go through it one more time, Mr. Chairman.
Are you really being fair, then, when you say that you think the
program ought to be stopped until an objective study could be
made? Or aren't you really saying that the risk of an intolerable
accident being there at all, it just should stop, and that no study, no
matter how objective or how extensive, is really going to satisfy you
that we should go ahead?
Mr. POLLARD. No; I am sorry that I confused you there. To back
up and try it one more time shortly-I resigned because I felt the
agency was not doing the job that I was hired to do. In the regula-
tions which I was enforcing, we did not have rules about: You don't
have to worry about failures that have a low probability."
We have laws that say you shall design the system such that no
single failure shall disable redundant systems. I know that the crite-
ria we are using for separation have no scientific basis for making
that finding, but we still go forward and license the plants.
I said yesterday or Wednesday-excuse me, Monday-when I tes-
tified that I resigned principally because I felt the public was not
being told all the facts that we knew about the safety of nuclear
powerplants.
They were being told only those facts which supported the major-
ity conclusions to go forward wfth them.
So, with respect to the Rasmussen report, I say I am studying the
report, there was a lot of work that went into it. I personally have
this feeling-I don't believe it, but I am not saying-that is not
what I meant by the objective reassessment.
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What I meant there was opening up the regulatory process so that
we know we can talk about the safety problems we don't have
answers for. We can talk about the significance in terms of the effect
on the public if the judgments that we are making today are wrong.
That is why I resigned, and that is why I think we need the mor-
atorium, not only with respect to Dr. Rasmussen's work.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me pose a question to you, Dr. Cherry. If a sit-
uation, either by sabotage or accident takes place in which we
would then be dependent on an outside manual system for cooling
down the reactors, and it happens that in that particular reactor
there isn't one-if you were on the spot at that point: Would your
reaction be "Gee, I wish we had one"?
Mr. CHERRY. Yes, of course.
Mr. TSONGAS. It seems to me, then, that our responsibility in this
committee and indeed in the Congress is to make sure that the NRC-
I accept your report-big deal.
Dr. RAS1~IUSsEN. At least two people from Massachusetts agree on
it.
Mr. TsoNGAs. What I don't accept, I don't have the sense that the
NRC is putting the constraints on industry that it should, that
every plant, that when something happens we don't say, "See, I wish
it had not been so," that every plant is as safe as we can possibly
make it. We are going to have it live with nuclear energy, or if we
have to live with it, let's live with it in a context where every pre-
caution has been taken. I don't have the sense now that that is being
done. That is where I am coming from.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Could I answer that?
You said, "I don't know whether you really mean it, Mr. Chair-
man, whether everything is being done to make it safe."
I can make it safer, if you give me all the money I want. You
could make all the reactors 10 megawatts and spread them around
the country.
Mr. TS0NGAS. You are not taking it to the point of absurdity.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is my point.
Mr. TSONGAS. Is it absurd to require that all the cables not go
through one place?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No, sir. In fact, as Mr. Pollard points out, it is a
requirement that they don't.
Mr. TSONGAS. But a lot of them operating today is true.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is, I believe, what you said.
What he said, that in some plants some wires do, and that is not
in accordance with the regulation. Now, they may have been built
before the regulations were put in.
Mr. TSONGAS. Which has no effect whatsoever to persons living
next to the plant to say to that person, `9Vell, you have to live with
it, because the plant was built prior to regulations." 12~Te have the
same responsibility to that person as the person living next to the
new plant.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Sure. That was one of the points raised, and it
was raised by the three GE engineers as well, that there hasn't been
a vigorous enough check to see that all the older plants have not
been upgraded. That is a fair question to ask, and we ought to be
sure we understand the answers.
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Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Miller?
Mr. MILLER. What was the impact of Brown's Ferry on plants of
similar design?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. You know, yOu ought to get Mr. Anders down
here to ask that, because I haven't followed that in detail, and I
don't know. I know they had a whole group that studied it, and I
don't know what the Regulatory Commission had done about what
they found out. Mr. Pollard might know. Do you know?
Mr. POLLARD. No, I don't know.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. But I think it is a fair question if you want to
know that.
Mr. MILLER. One of the problems seems to be that we do get
locked in on designs at a very early stage of nuclear plants because
of the long time it takes to, in fact, construct them. So this process
of constant reevaluation is going to have to continue. That is, 10
years from today, if we continue to build nuclear powerplants, we
are going to find that the state of the art is maybe dramatically dif-
ferent, and-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Sure.
Mr. MILLER. The ones designed or came on line this year.
Do we go back and require they be retrofitted, or do you shut
them down?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Some have been shut down because of that. I
think Indian Point I is a case. It did not have an emergency core-
cooling system that would meet today's requirements, and so it was
shut down rather than install the expensive equipment that was
needed.
Mr. MILLER. When you testified before us before, I don't remem-
ber what your testimony was, or even whether the point was raised,
but in your testimony, what considerations did you give to the con-
struction phase of the nuclear cycle of the plant? There was a report
some time ago-I believe it was in the Wall Street Journal-that
out in Illinois where under an inspection they found that, or at least
the article implied, in an effort to cut costs, shortcuts were being
taken at the construction phase, and, in fact, safety standards were
not being followed because they were more expensive, and, in fact,
certain types of hardware that were specified were not being put on
something, and something of a lesser standard, or at least that was
the implication, was, in fact, being used. What weight did you give
that?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, we handle that in two ways. One was, we
did a study to see how well the design objectives had, in fact, been
implemented in the plant. That is, we had a group of competent
engineers review whether the plant met its design criteria. We did
find some places where it didn't. But by and large, the correlation
was pretty good. It mostly did meet the requirements; but not
always, so we gave a probability hat it would fail.
The other way we handled that, is through our failures of pipes
and pumps and valves and other components-it is based on the fail-
ure rate of this equipment in normal industrial service today, in
nuclear plants, and in oil refineries and in oil and coal-fired plants,
and since those plants are built with the same kind of construction
techniques, in fact, with less stringent controls than nuclear plants
PAGENO="0126"
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by and large, and the same kinds of procedures and pressures to cut
corners, and so on, we believe our data base includes these effects.
We don't rule out something because it was built wrong-so we
think our data base reflects about the level of quality that today's
construction industry produces, because the numbers were quite con-
sistent in a variety of different industries that use this kind of
equipment under roughly these kind of conditions.
Do you follow what I am saying?
Mr. MILLER. Yes, I follow what you are saying. I think we just
put a $1 million add-on to an oil refinery, and construction workers
tell me stories about how it is being done.
Dr. RAsi~IussEx. They don't meet the same construction codes.
Mr. MILLER. Are you aware of pressures that might be placed on
the agency from the operators of nuclear powerplants, Mr. Pollard,
the owners in terms of-I am trying to think how to correctly
phrase it. I get in light of inflation and increasing costs, to scale
down some of the safety requirements, and, in fact, you look back
on previous systems, and you say they held out for 8 or 10 years,
and the plants are going all right, and do we need to invest this
kind of money in stainless steel of these standards, or do we need
separate requirements? And can't we change it, and can't we do this
modification?
Mr. POLLARD. I guess the direct answer to your question is yes, but
certainly I have to explain that.
Mr. MILLER. I don't mean to imply that it is inappropriate behav-
ior on the part of the utility.
Mr. POLLARD. No, it is not inappropriate at all. Let me use the
example of the separation document I worked on. What we were
trying to do there was, we were trying to write a standard to spec-
ify how far apart the backup systems ought to be from one another
so that in the event of something like a fire, we would damage only
one. There is no way we can stop damaging one, and that is why we
had the defense in depth and the backup systems.
The way standards are written today in our government-industrial
relationships, we started working, we in the AEC, started working
on a standard for separation, to specify how far apart these ought
to be. The industry-I don't know how it came about-but there
came to be an agreement where the industry decided it could take
over this task, and the nuclear regulatory commission said, "Fine."
Mr. MILLER. Wait a minute.
Mr. POLLARD. Take over the task of writing a standard on how far
apart equipment could be placed. I was appointed to that committee
supposedly as an individual knowledgeable in NRC practices and
policy. On the committee with me were seven other people from the
reactor vendors, the architect-engineers who built the plant and
from the utilities who buy them.
We did not do any testing to determine how far a fire might jump
if cables did start on fire. We simply voted on how much distance
we thought was necessary. We settled on 3 feet horizontal separation
and 5 feet vertical separation between cables.
We were unable to define precisely what we meant by flame-retar-
dant. We were unable to define any other hazard other than fires
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123
started by the cable itself. We were unable to define what kind of
missiles had to be protected agaiiist. We were unable to define what
other types of fires, such as the insulation fire at Brown's Ferry
might do.
So, we voted in the next industry committee, our parent commit-
tee, which has many more members. Again, we voted. I think there
are something like 50 people. Two of the people on that parent com-
mittee are from NRC. So, it is a very democratic process here where
we are voting on whether or not we think we have adequate separa-
tion.
Now, in the course of these discussions, I think any of the people
were very competent. I don't think anyone that I knew serving on
those committees was not competent to serve on the committee.
Mr. MILLER. So, when you say you voted, you voted with some
informed judgment. This isn't a guess of five versus three?
Mr. POLLARD. Yes, it was, because we got valid comments back
that said 3 feet and 5 feet were not too much, and we got other valid
comments back saying it was too much-no reasons.
Mr. MILLER. Based on training and. your sole decision?
Mr. POLLARD. We decided because we had some people voting more
and some that we needed less, it was about the right thing.
Mr. MILLER. Do you, as an expert, say it was not a good decision?
Mr. POLLARD. No, and let me go into that. The people who were
voting, and we worked on this several years. One of the people on
the committee is on an architect-engineering firm. And, of course, I
was advancing the philosophy that we ought to require that cables
ought to be put in separate rooms, not worry about how many feet,
that one safety system be put in one room and the other safety
system be put in another room.
Other people voted that that was too expensive, and it could not
be shown it was necessary. The architect-engineer argued it might be
cheaper to put them in separate rooms, because although the build-
ing might cost more, you would save labor costs in trying to keep
track of the cables when they were running through the same room
to try and make sure one didn~t get into the wrong tray. You could
just set up two rooms, and tell the workmen, "Put them in this room
anywhere," and tell the other group to put the backup cables in the
other room. So, there was a question of whether or not it wasn't
even cheaper the way I wanted tO do it.
But the point I wanted to make is that we didn't do any scientific
testing, we didn't do fire tests and say, "With this type of cable we
need 10 feet."
Mr. MILLER. Was that changeover at the point where the agency
was writing the regulations to the compilation?
Mr. POLLARD. No. This has been the process in the AEC and con-
tinues in the NRC.
So when you ask me about pressures, there were pressures on the
people on the committee. They had to remember what their compa-
nies' design was and how much it would cost if they changed the
standard.
Mr. MILLER. Those are not the kind of pressures that I expected.
You are telling me that we have an agency here that writes the
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standard, and the public representative is one, and the vendors and
the ancillary agencies are six?
Mr. POLLARD. Yes, but I must go on and say after the industry
votes on the standard and accepts it, we still have the opportunity to
modify it, and we did modify the separation standard in many ways.
However, I think an example here, and I am pretty certain I am
correct here, but I don't have the document with me. In the course
of voting on the standard, the Atomic Energy Commission officials
who voted on the standard early in the process voted "no" on the
standard on the basis it did not require separate rooms.
That was only one vote, or two votes. So, the standard was
adopted without separate rooms.
Now, when we took it over and we had the opportunity to modify
the standard, we did not modify that section. WTe just simply sug-
gested that where practical, it would be a good idea to use separate
rooms, but we did not require it, even on new plants.
Mr. MILLER. How was a variance from those standards granted, or
is, in fact, a variance ever granted once the standard is adopted?
Mr. POLLARD. The variance is granted in the regulatory guides
that we mentioned today. The regulatory guides, in essence, are ways
acceptable to the staff of meeting the rules and regulations, which is
the only *thing that people have to meet. So that this regulatory
guide is really only one suggested way to meet the rule, which says
you shall not have a single fire which can destroy two safety sys-
tems.
Mr. MILLER. So you adopt a standard to meet that rule?
Mr. POLLARD. We adopt a standard as an acceptable way of imple-
menting that rule.
Mr. MILLER. If I have a different method that I think will work,
do I make a case to the agency for variance?
Dr. RAsMUsSEN. Yes, indeed.
Mr. POLLARD. The industry may disagree with you, because every
time they try it, they have a difficult time, but yes, they do have the
opportunity.
Mr. MILLER. How often are the standards modified after the
industrial group votes on them, with your participation?
Mr. POLLARD. How often does the industry modify them?
Mr. MILLER. You have these two votes that are taken, or the two
methods of setting standards, and you say the agency, after that is
adopted, has the ability to modify it. How often is that, in fact,
done?
Dr. RASMUSsEN. I think what happens is, is that the industry
comes up with a proposed standard, and the regulatory commission
says whether they will accept that for nuclear plants or not. They
don't have to change it. They don't have to accept it. They review it.
If it is acceptable to them, they say, "OK, if you will follow that,
we will accept it."
Mr. MILLER. And send it back for modification?
Mr. POLLARD. No. I am afraid I misled you when I said we modify
it. \Ve don't modify the standard. We write a regulatory guide that
says, "You may use this industry standard as an acceptable way of
meeting this rule, provided you also do the following." We don't
actually modify the industry standard.
PAGENO="0129"
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Mr. MILLER. But back to the method by which the panel on which
you served arrived at the standards, you find fundamental flaws in
the fact that no scientific testing is done?
Mr. POLLARD. Yes. I want to make it clear, though, that I think
the industry participation is essential, but I think the NRC ought to
have the upper hand rather than the regulated industry.
Mr. MILLER. Does the industry do testing on their suggested sys-
tems as to-let's go back to your separation case.
Mr. POLLARD. I think the Edison Electric Institute is doing fire
testing like this.
Mr. CHERRY. This is certainly testing in the industry. It may or
may not be part of the decisionmaking revolving around the arriv-
ing at-
Mr. MILLER. We are going back to the decision on which the deci-
sion was made on 3 feet by 5 feet. The question is, was there scien-
tific evaluation as to the vulnerability of the cables with that
separation? I mean, if General Electric was looking for a 3- by 5-
foot separation, was there some testing by General Electric to sub-
stantiate that claim, or another vendor, or what have you, or the
Government when they were proposing that, or was that simply the
individual's saying, " think that is sufficient?"
Mr. CHERRY. May I comment? I think we are talking about here-
what we are talking about is probably a valid technical disagree-
ment between equally informed people who have looked at a situa-
tion and have arrived at different conclusions. I think this is some-
thing one encounters in technology all the time, that three or four or
five engineers look at the thing and arrive at conclusions that might
differ.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Pollard expressed concern with the Rasmussen
report. He said when you get deep down in there and you look at
some of the assumptions that were made, and the assumptions were
made, I assume, when you looked at the design, if there was a valid
reason why separation was 3 by, 5 feet. Is that not correct? I don't
want to say something that isn't true, but at some point along the
line the decision was made with governmental approval that the
separation would be 3 by 5 feet. Is that assumption valid, so you can
assume something about that in the Rasmussen report?
Mr. CHERRY. I think the answer is that Mr. Pollard thinks it isn't,
and there are others who think it is.
Mr. POLLARD. I think we saw in Brown's Ferry that it isn't.
Mr. MILLER. How is that assumption made in your report, Dr.
Rasmussen? That is what I am concerned about.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, you know, there are a lot of assumptions
in the report. I don't think they are as critical as Mr. Pollard does.
We always assume the thing will fail. We don't argue about that.
We always assume that the fire can move between cables, or what-
ever we are worried about. The question is, how likely is it? That is
where the judgment comes in sometimes, whose data to use and what
to believe about how likely it is. The kind of judgments that we
often made were that "Here is an accident that produces consequence
A. Here is another one that will produce the same consequence, but
it has four more failures, each one of which have a probability of
71-074 0 - 76 - 9
PAGENO="0130"
126
one more hundred. So if we have included the first one, it doesn't
make any differences whether we include the second one." Those
kinds of assumptions are in the report, because we only analyzed a
few hundred of the tens of thousands of the accidents that were pos-
sible.
Mr. POLLARD. If I could give you another example in line with
what you were talking about earlier.
I think the example of Indian Point No. 1 finally being required to
shut down is a good example of how the decision process gets dis-
torted by pressure.
I started working on Indian Point No. 1 in January 1970, and it
became clear soon after I began work that the reactor shutdown
system for Indian Point No. 1 was susceptible to many, many single
failures, that is, single components, which if they didn't work cor-
rectly would completely disable or partly disable the reactor shut-
down system.
Also, around this time, from 1970 to .1974, when it was finally shut
down, the emergency core cooling systems hearings were being held
in Bethesda for about a period of 2 years discussing whether or not,
if the water was injected into the reactor vessel, the core could be
cooled adequately.
Indian Point No. 1 did not have any emergency core cooling system.
So it wasn't a question of whether or not would they work ade-
quately. They had some normal systems that could have taken care
of small breaks.
Well, of course, it was very difficult to get that plant shut down,
because normally it is the applicant who must prove that the plant
is safe before it can get a license and the staff has to agree with
that, but once he receives a license, the law says then the burden of
proof is on the staff to get it shut down.
So, we went from at least 1970, and the reactor ran before that,
until October of 1974 before we ordered that plant shut down. When
we had tried earlier, the applicant there, Consolidated Edison, was
saying, "Please let us run a little longer so that we can burn up the
uranium we now have in the reactor so we don't waste it."
That puts in perspective the type of pressure in the decision proc-
ess. There was no question that the plant was unsafe if it had a loss
of coolant accident. The reason why we didn't have an accident that
affected the public was simply because part of the defense indepth
worked, the pipe didn't break.
Mr. CHERRY. May I comment?
Mr. MILLER. Sure.
Mr. CHERRY. I think the example of Indian Point I perhaps,
again, is a relevant one, and without getting into the details of what
happened, I think as we said earlier, the mission of NRC is to insure
reactor safety. The mission of the operating utility is also to assure
reactor safety, and that is their primary mission. But they have other
missions besides that, and this is to provide electricity, and provide
it economically.
So, the operating utility must review all requests by NRC to
determine whether or not, in fact, they are consistent with the other
goals. To the extent that there may be other ways of arriving at the
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127
increment of safety that is associated with the change in regulation,
the utilities must review that to make a determination as to whether
or not they are fulfilling their responsibility to their consumers and
their rate payers, and not just going off and making a change in a
perhaps nonoptimum economic approach, again keeping in mind the
principal objective is safety.
I think in the case of Indian Point No. 1 again, perhaps we have a
valid technical disagreement between Mr. Pollard, who was the guy
on the case, and some others at NRC, because in that case, there has
been a determination that continued operation of that plant did not
result in an increased potential effect on the health and safety of the
public.
Mr. MILLER. That was a proper point, providing you have the
public entity fulfilling its No. 1 and only function, and not terribly
concerned about the other one. It is like setting at the prosecution
table and the defense table. You, ought not to be terribly concerned
about whether the prosecutor is doing a good job or not. You ought
to be concerned about your job as a defense attorney.
What I am afraid we see in some instances in all regulatory agen-
cies, is that there is a little bit of concern for the client.
Mr. CHERRY. Mr. Miller, I can state categorically that in my 7
years in the utility industry, and in that 7 years those involved
numerous and lengthy discussions in AEC and NRC, and I can say
there was not one time when the NRC compromised their interests
in safety. I say that categorically.
Mr. MILLER. Well, I am happy to have that testimony on the record,
but that doesn't mitigate the circumstances that have got to be main-
tained.
If you are going to have these pressures, and you are going to
have the arguments by the utilities, I think they are proper argu-
ments. They are there with a dual purpose, but when you are talk-
ing about the public concern, safety over nuclear energy, we have
got to be sure that the NRC is, as pure as can possibly be in that
regard, and that they flex all their muscles. That is not to say to be
arbitrary, and capricious, but to flex every bit of muscle so that we
reach the standards of safety that the members of this committee
and a lot of other people are very concerned about.
That is why we are trying to get some descriptions of how the
standards were set and how the pressures are, because I think it is
important that we know what is the makeup of these entities that
design the standards, what is the power and how is that power used
by the public to determine that~ the public interest is, in fact, being
served. That is all.
I think what we have seen, what we talk about, we were told this
morning that the makeup of guerilla groups and terrorist groups,
and so forth, and we were told they can't deliver a devastating blow,
but I suspect that perhaps even within the range of the Rasmussen
report that we are told at least there is one plant in this country
that if they go to the right room and cut off the power, they are
going to be a very successful group, and so I think that the NRC
had better look at that, because that all of a sudden comes within
the realm of the real possible.
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You see, I don't have a great deal of respect for these groups in
terms of taking over a plant and operating it and doing something
with the casket that carries plutonium, and so forth, but if you are
telling me we can blow up that one tunnel of electrical power, I
expect they might be able to do that, and to say, you know, that we
are going to let them operate or we are going to submit to pressure
by that utility and say, "well, let us keep operating it because we
don't want to waste the uranium," or "we can't afford the double-
time," I don't think we ought to consider that. The question is
public safety. That is why we should really understand the frame-
work in which the NRC has got to work, and I think we have to be
very candid on that point.
Mr. CHERRY. I absolutely agree with you, and I again point out, I
think, hat the safety record of the industry speaks for itself, and I
think that also speaks for itself, is that there has been one plant shut
down by regulatory action, and as a consequence of backfitting and
after the fact, there have been a number of plants derated for
extended periods of time to make sure that the operation of those
plants did not in fact, endanger public safety, and the economic con-
sequences of those derates ad shutdowns were severe and substantial.
Mr. MILLER. Tha.nk you very much.
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. I would like to answer a question introduced by
Mr. Miller, which dealt with whether research is being done on sepa-
ration criteria.
In fact, there has been a program of research at Sandia which is
being funded by the Office of Standards Development at NRC. This
research was well underway before the Brown's Ferry fire. It does
indicate that the problems that are recognized are being subject to
independent assessment.
Mr. MILLER. Is it safe for the committee to assume that if the sep-
aration shows other than what is in existence in powerplants that
they will be changed, that that is a normal part of it?
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. That is judgment which I can't make obviously.
Dr. RASMUSsEN. Clearly, that is a regulatory decision, but I think
you should get them down and ask them what they did.
Mr. MILLER. I suspect we will.
Mr. TSONGAS. We get them at the end so at least we have an idea
what we are talking about when they come in.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Good.
Mr. TSONGAS. As you see, we have a long way to go.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. May I comment on one thing?
Mr. Pollard stated that he had a feeling that the study reached a
predetermined conclusion in its assessment of the probabilities and
likelihoods of accidents.
I would like to say for the record that that is not so, and in fact
if you will look at a paper I published before the start of the study,
I made a rough estimate that the probability of core melt was less
than one in a million per plant per year, and, in fact, many people
in the nuclear industry felt it was that small, and, in fact, we found
it to be 50 times larger one in 20,000, not one in a million.
We also found that the consequences of accidents had a wide
range of magnitudes, and like all other accidents, the most likely
PAGENO="0133"
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accidents were ones with small effects and the ones with the very
largest effects were, of course, the most unlikely by a great margin.
So, our study came to two conclusions that weren't generally
agreed before. One was that the probability of core melt was sub-
stantially larger than most people in the nuclear industry had felt.
The second was that the concept that an accident in a nuclear
plant was an unmitigated disaster in terms of public consequences
was not true.
They are not very serious accidents at all, even if the core melts,
but they get more and more serious as more and more unlikely
events come into play. This is a characteristic of all accidents, and
we showed a lot of accidents in, the reports, including first, plane
crashes, and so on, and all had similar shaped curves.
I think, Mr. Pollard, you will find, unless you don't think the
factor of 50 is significant, that we came to a different conclusion
than people felt before we came to that study.
Mr. TSONGAS. I can see a newspaper headline saying, "Nuclear
experts say nuclear power is 50 times less safe than expected."
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That was one of our friendly reporters, but that
is true in a sense.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me pose a final question suggested by-not the
final question, but a question. Would I be correct when I say that
you three gentlemen believe that reactors at a reasonable cost can
protect against sabotage, (a) by individual psychotics who would be
inside experts: or (b) by six armed men. Given those two possibili-
ties: First is by an individual psychotic, and the second is by six
armed individuals. Is that a correct statement?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Did you say they can be defended at reasonable
cost against those two threats?
Mr. TSONGAS. Yes.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes; I believe:they can.
Mr. CHERRY. I do also.
Mr. POLLARD. I am going to have to say I don't know, sir. I don't
know the cost of doing this. I don't think that these plants could
stand it.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me pose a second question of my own.
My understanding is that the NRC from its AEC beginnings, that
the standards are much tougher than they were before. And what
the AEC did previously would now be reviewed as sloppy, and that
the pressure, whether it is from the Congress, or one's own con-
science, or whatever, has made the program safer now than if we
had adhered to the standards of 15 or 20 years ago. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. CHERRY. I think your reason for the determination is that
nuclear power might be considered safer now than it was in its
inception is incorrect. I think the reason that it is safer now than it
was 10 or 15 years ago, perhaps, is that we know more about it. Our
techniques and abilities to analyze consequences, to put together
components to evaluate components, to evaluate failures is substan-
tially more complete than it was at the time nuclear energy was first
evolving, and as Dr. Rasmussen said earlier, we expect these capabil-
ities to continue to grow in sophistication and in depth. So that 15
PAGENO="0134"
130
or 20 years from now we would expect we would be in a still better
situation if we were prudent in how we stewarded the growth of the
industry than it is now.
I do not think that the reason for the increased safety is the result
of pressure.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Mr. Chairman, I understand your question to
mean in the sense of the security procedures around the plant.
As you may imagine, I have visited many nuclear plants in the
last decade. The security systems that I observed when I approach a
plant and am subjected to when I enter it are at a much higher level
today than they were 10 years ago, and in that sense I believe your
observation is absolutely correct.
Mr. TSONGAS. That is not based on technology.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I believe that is based on the fact that it has
become a public issue, and that we see a number of irrational acts, so
everybody believes it is more sensible to take these precautions.
Mr. TSONGAS. Is that not to the good?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, it is. I agree with it 100 percent.
Mr. CHERRY. I misunderstood the context of the question. You are
talking about security. I would agree with Dr. Rasmussen, with
respect to the consent of security and plant safeguards, yes.
Mr. TSONGAS. I might state for your own information that, by
definition, those of us who come to the hearings are more interested
in the issues than those who do not come.
For instance, Mr. Weaver is a cosponsor of the moratorium bill,
and Mr. Bingham and I are not, but I think we share the concern of
the Congress, and we take that very seriously.
Mr. Weaver?
Mr. WEAVER. I am biased.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That makes us equal.
Mr. WEAVER. I know that. I am aware of it.
You said, Dr. Rasmussen, earlier, you said that we were talking
about details of how a nuclear plant might be disrupted. Do you
want to know how to disrupt a nuclear plant? Do you want me to
tell you? We agreed we had better not. So a nuclear plant can be
disrupted.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Absolutely. I have said that several times. But
then when asked if an individual worker inside the plant, decided to
destroy it, you said he couldn't.
That was not the question, sir. The question was, could we install
security procedures at reasonable cost to defend against this, and my
answer was "Yes." That is different from saying it could be done.
Mr. WEAVER. You are quite familiar with Brown's Ferry?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Not in any great detail.
Mr. WEAVER. Let's take any plant you are familiar with. To do
what you just said, would it require considerably more security pro-
visions than that plant has now?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, as I said in my initial statement, the exact
details of today's security procedures are not released to the public,
and I do not have detailed knowledge of what they are. So I cannot
answer your question. I was able to answer the other question,
because I thought he mea.nt by a reasonable cost anything that was a
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131
small fraction of the cost of the ~lant, and for a small fraction of a
half a billion dollars, I can feel confident I can put in a security
system that will protect the plant.
Mr. WEAVER. A half a billion dollars?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is roughly the cost of the large 1,000-mega-
watt plant.
Mr. WEAVER. I am sorry. The last estimate we got is $1,200 million.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, it depends what year they are expected to
come on line. There is an escalatiOn. It could be a billion, for one in
the middle .1980's delivery. That is correct. That would make it
easier to make it a small fraction of the cost.
Mr. WEAVER. I understand.
Nuclear, in my estimation, is going to fall from the economics of
its own deadweight, but I still feel we should be very concerned
about what might happen to us now with existing plants.
You said that nuclear plants are designed to operate with great
reliability. How reliable are the existing nuclear pants?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, I only recall the numbers roughly, but
they have capacity factors now in the 60 percent and availability
factors in the low 70 percent of the total time, and that makes them
equivalent or better than the oil and coal plants that they are com-
peting with.
Mr. WEAVER. You think 50-percent capacity is better than oil and
coal?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That is what I am told by the utilities who oper-
ate them.
Mr. CHERRY. May I comment?
Mr. WEAVER. Yes.
Mr. CHERRY. The average capacity operation of nuclear plants in
the United States over the past year was on the order of 60 percent,
and it was several percentage points higher than the fossil units
serving the same kind of load.
The analyses I have done in powerplants in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey indicate that the nuclear powerplants even at the lower
capacity enjoy a 20 to 25-percent advantage over a comparable coal
unit. So recognize when you are quoting very high numbers for
installed capacity, the installed capacity of the alternate energy
source, coal, has increased a commensurate overall, the economic
advantages perceived for nuclear power still hold up.
Mr. WEAVER. Yes, I understand. I won't get into an argument
with you on the economics now, but you consider 60-percent capac-
ity, therefore, satisfactory.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No, I don't, sir.
Mr. CHERRY. No, I would like to improve that.
Mr. WEAVER. We would all like to do a lot of things. What I
mean is that you consider that to be reliable?
Mr. CHERRY. That is, in fact; the record that was compiled by the
operating plant in the United States.
Mr. WEAVER. When?
Mr. CHERRY. In the last year.
Mr. WEAVER. But with 60 percent, you can make the statement
that nuclear plants are reliable based on the 60 percent?
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132
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I think that is good.
Mr. WEAVER. I don't consider them reliable, but you do.
Mr. CHERRY. I think we have a disagreement in semantics, but
they are as reliable as anything else we have to produce power.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Only in that sense.
Mr. CHERRY. But nobody in the utility industry is satisfied that
that is all we should have.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I guess you understand that reliability is the
other side of the safety coin, that every time you are concerned
about the safety issue you shut down, and you are reliable on the
safety issue, but not on reliability.
Mr. WEAVER. This Nation has spent $50 billion in nuclear power,
and roughly one-two thousandth of that in solar energy.
If we had to do it over again, as a scientists, do you think putting
all our eggs in one basket is a wise thing?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No, sir. If I could have made the decisions with
ihe information I have now back in 1950, certainly the clean burn-
ing of coal should have been a priority of a government R. & D. proj-
ect, and forward thinking planners would have tried to develop any
alternative they saw for energy.
1\Te can't reverse the procedure. I would not have invested, neces-
sarily, less in nuclear, because it is a very promising way, and we
are now generating 8 or 9 percent of our energy. It is almost equal
to the output of hydroelectric dams.
Mr. WEAVER. Would you have put more money in another system?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. On the basis of 20-20 hindsight I would.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WEAVER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, my dis-
tinguished chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. Right downtown, today, right now, 0MB is doing
damage to the Solar Energy Research Institute, and downgrading
that from what ERDA is suggesting.
We are not talking about 20-20. Even within our own context,
there are people who don't believe as we do, who think that solar is
something very academic as esoteric.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. OK. Let me answer that. I think a lot of energy
can be obtained from solar power. We are pretty close to being able
to use it to heat homes and heat hot water now. I think we are a long,
long way from being able to generate electricity in a practical way
with it.
Whether a specific solar project should be supported by 0MB or
not, I certainly am not going to say until I look at the project and
see if it has the right goals and objectives, but I believe with you
that there is useful energy to be gained from solar power and that
deserves substantial R. & D. support.
Mr. TSONGAS. Do you instinctively trust the scientific analysis of
ERDA, or 0MB? [Laughter.]
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Sir, that is a difficult question to answer.
Finally, I know, because many of them were with the old AEC, a
number of the people who make analyses in ERDA, and I have
talked with them, and I have a great deal of respect for them. I
think as Government servants they are some of the best and most
qualified we have.
PAGENO="0137"
133
Now, on the other hand, a couple of my students, in fact, are in
0MB, helping make decisions, and they always look at things with a
different set of criteria, and often come out with a different answer,
and being a scientist, I lean toward the more scientific one more
often than the 0MB one, but it is hard for me to say which is right
or wrong.
Mr. T50NGA5. As you perceive it, ERDA is manned by your
students.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No, my students are in both, you see. In fact, one
of them just left 0MB and is now directing a project in ERDA.
Mr. WEAVER. May I go on the reliability issue, and with respect to
Brown's Ferry, that accident
Dr. RASMUSSEN. There has never been one like it before, but Gen-
eral Motors had a very serious fire associated with cable trays.
Mr. WEAVER. I meant in nuclear. Sorry.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, I think that is correct, as far as I know.
Mr. WEAVER. And the two systems failed?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. As far as I know, caused by a fire.
Mr. POLLARD. We have had other fires that damaged redundant
systems, but it was not the same set of circumstances. Indian Point
No. 2 had a fire caused by arson. So we have not had anything close to
Brown's Ferry in significance.
Mr. WEAVER. It is one in every 140 operating years.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. We have had none that got us that far toward
core melt.
Mr. WEAVER. A point was made when we were going into statistics
this morning, that it occurred once in every 140 years, and Brown's
Ferry was our once in 140 years. Have there been others? Have we
had more than one in 140 years or in 200 years?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. WEAVER. I thought you just said we did have others.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. It wasn't in an operating plant. It was a plant
under construction, where a workman set fire to the plant.
Mr. WEAVER. Have we had other fires in operating nuclear plants?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. My answer is that I am not aware of any. San
Onofre had some sort of a fire.
Mr. POLLARD. There was a fire in San Onofre. I don't know
whether the plant was operating, but we had a major fire in San
Onofre, which was a cable fire.
Mr. WEAVER. So your statistics are only once in 140 years? That is
all I wanted to know.
Mr. Cherry, you made the statement in your testimony that it has
been demonstrated that nuclear~ plants are completely safe, ai~d a
number of others-well, have we resolved the question on how to
store wastes?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Excuse me. Have we resolved the question on
how to store waste?
Mr. WEAVER. I assume we have-
Mr. CHERRY. Let me comment first. My statement relating to the
safety of nuclear plants, I would reaffirm and say that the safety
record of the industry is in my mind a very clear and adequate dem-
onstration that, in fact, nuclear p:0w plants are safe.
PAGENO="0138"
134
Mr. WEAVER. The waste would be part of the plant, wouldn't it?
Mr. CHERRY. It is part of the fuel cycle. It is not part of the
plant. It is certainly involved in the commerce of the nuclear indus-
try, and I wouldn't get into the discussion on the score. The fact it
is my understanding, the high-level wastes storage question is that it
is on the road to being resolved. It has not yet been formally resolved.
Mr. WEAVER. What bothers me, and I have a bias, and I have
made my judgments on the best facts I knew, and I think you gen-
tlemen did the same with your bias, but the generalities, I have, con-
stantly, and particularly from people of your eminence in the field,
of reliability, and safe and economical-gee whiz.
Dr. RASMUssEN. Well, sir, I tried to put those down in real numbers.
I don't think our report was very general. It was rather specific.
Mr. WEAVER. I am saying you make a statement that nuclear is
safe, and we argue about whether it is safe or not.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. When I say it is safe, I mean it is safer than
any alternative you can suggest, in my opinion.
You know, the medical profession has a phrase they use "is the
treatment safe enough? It is safe enough if it is safer than the dis-
ease and safer than any other treatment."
Mr. WEAVER. At this late hour, I tend to get philosophical. In
1940, we used 8 percent of the energy we use today.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I know.
Mr. WEAVER. I am not sure we can lead as good a life. I am won-
dering how much better the quality of our life is.
Dr. RASMUSSEN: When you ask yourself what are all you people
down here in the Legislature doing here today because 1 year ago
our production faltered a little bit and unemployment raised to 9
percent. Whether you are Democrats or Republicans, we have you
all agree to get the economy going again, and you and I know that
means we have to have more power.
I don't necessarily think that is the right solution, but doggone, I
am no smarter than anyone else.
Mr. WEAVER. You are a physicist, Dr. Rasmussen.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I call myself an engineer now. That doesn't make
me ar~ economist.
Mr. WEAVER. I am an economist, and jobs are not equated with
energy. To use a generality I have been hearing, the more energy we
get, the fewer jobs we have. Actually, energy takes jobs away, and
this-
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Do you really believe that?
Mr. WEAVER. I know it.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Then why does energy correlate with the gross
national product so closely?
Mr. WEAVER. Production of goods. That is a different thing than
jobs.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. But it does equate with standard of living.
Mr. WEAVER. We can produce all kinds of junk. You realize that
you could have-well, I can't take everybody's time on that. It is one
of my favorite little stories. You can have a gross national product
as large as you want. Have the barber charge $1 million for a hair-
cut.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. That wouldn't be a problem for me, sir.
PAGENO="0139"
135
Mr. WEAVER. I can only say that I really appreciate your coming
before us. I have not only learned a great deal, but I wish to thank
you so much.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you, sir. I enjoyed having the chance.
Mr. TSONGAS. Before you jump up and leave; on fusion, the same
concerns we discussed and the parameters we discussed relative to
fission, they also apply equally to fusion, or is fusion an order of
magnitude different?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. With regard to safety?
Mr. TSONGAS. Safety.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Safety? Well, a fusion machine will have to
have tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen, so it will be subject to
accidents in which substantial amounts of radioactivity could be
released. Tritium is a long-lived isotope, with an 111/2 year life. It
gives off a weak radiation, and biologically it is not considered to be
as dangerous as some other radioactive substances, but nevertheless
it does get into biological tissue, and could be serious, so the idea
that fusion brings with it no risk isn't quite true. This is a substan-
tial problem in trying to contain that tritium, and since there is a
very intense source of neutrons, some of the components will become
radioactive so that there will be, a radioactive waste disposal prob-
lem as those machines wear out and have to be disposed of. So,
again, fusion is not as clean as sometimes the newspapers say. It is
kind of characteristic in the early stages of any technology that
everything is glorious, and nothing is bad, and you know, the glow
wears off.
Mr. TSONGAS. It is like getting elected.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. But on the average if you could make a 1,000
megawatt fusion plant, I would think that the risks from the
radioactivity involved would be substantially less than those in a
fission plant of the same size and that the waste disposal problem
would also be less.
Mr. TSONGAS. What about the susceptibility to sabotage or acci-
dents?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Oh, well. By~ comparison, a fusion plant is a fine
watch as compared to an alarm clock in the fission plant. The
fission plant is a rather simple set of pipes, pumps, and valves rela-
tive to what it would take, for fusion. So, I would judge-having
not ever seen one because you can't built it yet, that the machine will
be much more sophisticated and hence easier to tinker with and
cause problems. That is just a guess.
Mr. TSONGAS. So in-so we are not wasting our time totally look-
ing forward to fusion? I
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Fusion is a great hope because the fuel supply is
so large and if we can ever master the technology, the payoff will be
enormous to us because it will mean we will really have an abundant
fuel supply. But those who feel that it is going to have any impact
before the turn of the century are, in my opinion, extreme optimists
and maybe early next century we can begin to hope that it will
make some contribution.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Pollard, the local police in a particular situa-
tion, are they at this point as far as you know geared into respond-
ing to a nuclear accident or would-be nuclear accident?
PAGENO="0140"
136
Mr. POLLARD. I don't know much about that area, sir. I did not
look at the emergency plans, but generally all the emergency plans
for a facility certainly make use of the local police. I would say, yes,
yes to your question, but I don't know of my own knowledge.
Dr. IRA5MU55EN. Well, I could say, that in emergencies they are
usually coupled, from the plants I know, to the State civil defense
agency whatever that State has set up to deal with emergencies,
that is coupled directly to the plant.
Mr. TsoxGAs. I will pose that question to NRC.
Dr. RAsMUSSEN. They will be able to answer it specifically.
Mr. TSONGAS. A question from minority counsel, Mr. McCloskey.
What are the printed and unclassified differences between safe-
guards for ERDA weapons facilities and powerplants?
Dr. MCCL0SKEY. I am having trouble hearing the question, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. What are the differences between ERDA facilities
which are your weapons plants, et cetera; and the conventional util-
ity type plants? What are the differences in terms of safety, and if
there are differences can we impose ERDA standards upon the com-
mercial enterprises?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. The question deals with the fact that ERDA is
not regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and are the
safeguards used by ERDA in its weapons program different or better
or worse than in the conventional nuclear?
I don't know.
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. I think the same set of safeguards developed for
the ERDA facilities, same sort of methodology being developed for
protection, can be applied to any nuclear installation or nonnuclear
installation.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. The question is more specific. Is there a differ-
ence and is it significant between ERDA facilities and Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission controlled facilities?
Dr. MCCLOSKEY. I think the difference is that the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission has review over the plants for the commercial
facilities which have different safety and security requirements.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes.
Mr. TSONGAS. Are there other differences?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Mr. Chairman, I just don't know that. I have
been in both and they have high security levels, but you know those
are not the programs that anyone gets to examine without a need to
know. So, I don't know specifically what the differences are.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would you consider the Pilgrim powerplant to be
a typical nuclear facility?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, it is a typical boiler water reactor. That is
correct.
Mr. TSONGAS. In terms of security measures around the plant?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. Well, let's see, I was down there last 2 years ago,
it seemed to be, as far as I can recollect, although you know I-I do
recall that our Massachusetts Commission on Safety had some com-
ments about that. I don't remember what they said now.
But from my own knowledge, I am sketchy because I only visited
once in the last 2 years.
PAGENO="0141"
137
Mr. TSONGAS. Perhaps we can visit that together with the commit-
tee perhaps
Dr. RASMUSSEN. With me? I would be glad to visit with you if
you want to come up there, sure.
Mr. TSONGAS. I happen to live up there.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I know you are one of our Representatives, yes.
Certainly if you would find it useful to have me go through with
you, I would be glad to.
Mr. TSONGA5. A lot of this to us is very academic and I think we
would like to see exactly what we are talking about.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. I think that is worthwhile. I think everybody
ought to understand what one of these machine is when they talk
about it. I once had an engineer who was working on the design
come to my summer class and part of that class was to take a tour
of a nuclear plant. This designer of that plant had never been in a
real, live plant, and he came back and said, "You know that circle I
was drawing, a circle with an X through it for a value, I saw it
together, my goodness what a valve, 3-foot diameter and 10 feet
high." He was a little surprised. So, everybody ought to see what
this machine looks like and get a feel for it.
Mr. TSONGAS. There is a danger to that, too. Somebody might go
to the gallery in the House, but really has no idea how it operates
and knows less having seen it than they did before they saw it. So, I
suspect you can run into the same, problems in nuclear plants.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. But you, at least could get an understanding of
what a 600-megawat plant is like. You will get some concept of how
big it is, how much is this there, and so on, that most people don't
realize. A coal plant that size burns 10,000 tons of coal a day. It is a
big piece of machinery.
Mr. TSONGAS. Would you be willing to try to infiltrate it comman-
do-like with me unannounced and see what happens?
Dr. RASMUSSEN. No, sir, Congressman, you are on your own on
that. [Laughter.]
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you very much.
Dr. RASMUSSEN. You are welcome.
VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE. What time tomorrow, please?
Mr. TSONGAS. 9:45 a.m.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned to recon-
vene at 9:45 a.m. Friday, February 27, 1976.]
PAGENO="0142"
PAGENO="0143"
SAFEGUARDS IN THE DOM~ESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1976
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
COMMITPEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
Wa~shington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 9 :45 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room
1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Paul E. Tsongas
presiding.
Mr. TSONGAS. Why don't we start off the way we did yesterday. I
will provide an opening statement for the record. If the witnesses
could have your statements made available on the press table and
anyone who wants it, get it now so we don't have our stampede later
on.
It is important for everyone here to recognize that there can be no
nuclear industry without public confidence in the process that pro-
tects public health and safety. At present a series of events have
caused severe erosion of such confidence. The purpose of these and
subsequent hearings by this subcommittee is to establish whether
there is adequate protection against the effects of accidents and
malevolent acts. This will be the second day of hearings on matters
having to do with security in the~domestic nuclear industry.
Among matters of interest is that the NRC Director of the Divi-
sion of Safeguards has expressed concern about the sufficiency of
existing security arrangements. Major defects have been uncovered
in the system which keeps track of highly enriched uranium at a
facility in Erwin, Tenn. There are in fact allegations of criminal
manipulation of records.
Today we will hear testimony both on matters of current interest
and upon the prognosis for the long term.
This morning's witnesses include Mr. Kenneth Chapman who is
Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safe-
guards. Accompanying Mr. Chapman will be his deputy for safe-
guards, Mr. Carl Builder. Following the NRC witnesses will be Drs.
Thomas Cochran and Arthur Tamplin representing the Natural
Resources Defense Council. Following them will be Mr. Frank
Graham who represents the Atomic Industrial Forum. After Mr.
Graham will be Dr. Theodore Taylor who is the coauthor of
"Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards."
The afternoon session will be concerned with transportation safe-
guards. The witnesses will inélude Harvey Lyon who is ERDA's
Director of Safeguards and Security. Mr. Lyon will be accompanied
(139)
PAGENO="0144"
140
by Orvill Jones from the Sandia Corp. Our final witness will be Mr.
Sam Edlow, president of Edlow International which arranges for
movement of certain nuclear materials.
A PANEL ON NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SAFEGUARDS
CONSISTING OF: KENNETH CHAPMAN, DIRECTOR, NRC OFFICE
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS; HOWARD
K. SHAPAR, EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR, NRC; CARL BUILDER,
DIRECTOR, NRC DIVISION OF SAFEGUARDS; AND EDSON CASE,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, NRC
Mr. CHAPMAN. May I introduce the members at the table. This is
Mr. Shapar who is Executive Legal Director of the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission. I am Mr. Chapman. Mr. Builder is on my left,
your right, and Mr. Ed Case, who is Deputy Director of the Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Mr. Chairman, I have shortened my statement, if it is in the inter-
est of the Chair to use an abbreviated form. I can go through the
entire statement.
Mr. TSONGAS. The House is not in session today so we have no
problem as far as time and I am here. I would assume Mr. Weaver
is also without time constraints so I would rather do it in full. Sub-
sequent to your testimony the other panel will testify and if possible
we would like that to spill out into the afternoon so we can do it
thoroughly. The final panel which was scheduled at 2 p.m. would be
put in order probably around 2:30 or 3 p.m. Is that acceptable?
Mr. Chapman, why don't you proceed.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to pro-
vide this testimony at your safeguards hearings today. My testimony
will cover the areas of current safeguards to prevent the theft of
strategic special nuclear material; that is, plutonium and high-en-
riched uranium; reactor sabotage; threats to the nuclear industry;
and future safeguards considerations if wide-scale use of recycled
plutonium should be approved.
CURRENT SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT AGAINST THEFT OF STRATEGIC
MATERIAL
Background
Today's licensed nuclear power industry-chart 1-is one which
depends upon low-enriched uranium, that is, uranium enriched to
approximately 3 percent in the fissile uranium 235 isotope. The cur-
rent industry consists of 57 licensed power reactors-one operating
on high-enriched uranium-and 9 low-enriched uranium fuel fabri-
cation facilities. The low-enriched uranium is a product of ERDA's
gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah, Ky. and Oak Ridge, Tenn. A
nuclear explosive cannot be made of such low-enriched uranium.
However, there are also quantities of plutonium and high-enriched
uranium in the private sector, 12 licensees possessing high-enriched
uranium, 6 possessing plutonium. The greatest percentage of this
high-enriched uranium is Government-owned and is being processed
in licensed facilities for national security programs. High-enriched
PAGENO="0145"
141
uranium for commercial purposes-about 6 percent of the total
quantity in the private sector-is mostly in storage vaults and is
likely to stay there unless additional high temperature gas-cooled
reactors are built and operated. A small amount of high-enriched
uranium is being used to fabricate research reactor fuel.
About half of the plutonium in commercial plants is Govern-
ment-owned. Certain licensed facilities process plutonium for devel-
opment programs related to the liquid metal fast breeder reactor.
Otherwise, the material is being used in small quantities for R. & D.
purposes or is in vault storage. All licensed facilities must adhere to
NRC safeguards regulations. Thus, the amount of special nuclear
material-plutonium and high-enriched uranium-being used outside
national security programs is very small and at the moment is
largely in vault storage.
Current rules and practices
Each person who is licensed to possess or use specified quantities
of high-enriched uranium or plutonium must comply with published
safeguards requirements. One of these requires that a physical pro-
tection plan be submitted to the NRC for approval. The plan must
demonstrate how the licensee will protect his plant against sabotage
and the strategic materials in his possession against theft. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgates regulations and
imposes license conditions to make it clear to the licensee what he is
expected to do in order to obtain and keep a license. I would like to
summarize these for you-chart 2. The NRC safeguards program
requires that the licensee employ safeguards measures in depth;
onsite guards with access to law enforcement agencies; intrusion
alarms backed up by structural barriers; access controls over limited
access areas; exit searches and material control and accounting.
Theft of plutonium by an employee would be extremely difficult to
accomplish. Let me describe for you in general terms the difficulties
to covertly steal plutonium. As I mentioned earlier, most of the
material now present in the private sector is in vault storage and
essentially inaccessible to a lone insider. The material not in storage
is handled or processed in enclosed, sealed containment or glove box
process lines. Individuals are not allowed to work unobserved in
areas housing these process lines nor can a single individual make an
authorized removal of material from such lines. If, under the scru-
tiny of his fellow employees, an individual is able to circumvent the
above measures, remove material and conceal it on his person, he
would still be subject to an exit search. As a check on the perform-
ance of safeguards, bimonthly inventories are conducted to assure
material has not been stolen.
An outside intruder must either force an entry at an access point
which is manned by an armed guard or attempt covert entry. To
gain entrance covertly, the intruder must surmount the fence line
where intrusion alarms are located and the walls of the building
housing the nuclear materials. Such buildings present significant
delay times to anyone attempting to breach them since they are of
substantial construction.
Any time strategic material is shipped-chart 3-plans are made
before the shipment takes place. Routes are chosen to bypass areas
71-074 0 - 76 - 10
PAGENO="0146"
142
of natural disaster or where civil disorder might occur. The ship-
ment is picked up at the shipper's plant at a prearranged time by
the convoy personnel, including armed guards, responsible for carry-
ing and protecting the shipment. The material itself has already
been assayed and placed into a. safe container with tamper-indicating
seals attached. During the shipment, no intermediate stops are made
to pick up or drop off other cargo. Periodic radiotelephone calls are
made to report progress of the shipment. After arrival at the receiv-
er's plant, the seals are checked, the nuclear material is unloaded
and NRC and the shipper are notified. Within a short time of
receipt, the receiver assays the material to verify the quantity of
nuclear material shipped.
At the present time, there are approximately 500 shipments of
strategic quantities of special nuclear material per year. Licensees
are responsible for the protection of only 20 to 30 of these. The
shipment of Government-owned material to and from licensed facili-
ties-100 to 150 per year-and here for the record I want to insert a
correction in the testimony, if I may. I would like to insert "involve
similar procedures but Government contract guards are used when
the shipments are classified." If I may explain, EIRDA is revising
their transportation procedures. They will be fully effective next
fall, probably September or October. We have based part of our
testimony on these 100 to 150 shipments per year. They are not at
this time completely covered by the revised ERDA procedures but
they will be in the future. So accuracy, I suggest my statement be
modified.
The remainder of the shipments are protected according to ERDA
procedures including in some cases special vehicles, cleared and
armed escort personnel, and continuous communication.
The NRC is continuously upgrading its safeguards requirements
and has under consideration several changes to its present regula-
tions to further protect against theft. One of these changes, relating
to in-transit security, has been issued for public comment. It would
require greater numbers of armed guards to accompany certain ship-
ments of strategic material. A regulation change to require security
clearance for licensee employees in certain job functions involving
access to strategic material is now being developed by the NRC staff.
We believe the current regulations and those under development
provide adequate safeguards for today's limited commerce in stra-
tegic material. This situation will probably be subject to change,
however. The NRC decision to consider certain limited interim
licensing of mixed oxide fuel cycle facilities will probably be accom-
panied by some further upgrading of the current safeguards regula-
tions. My office is now preparing proposed upgrading measures that
are expected to be published for public comment some time this
spring.
CURRENT SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SABOTAGE AT NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS
Background
While the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation within NRC is
responsible for reactor protection, I would like to address this sub-
ject briefly at this time. Mr. Case, Deputy Director of NRR, will be
happy to respond to your questions in this area.
PAGENO="0147"
143
Currently operating light-water nuclear powerplants do not utilize
strategic special nuclear material. Our safeguards in this area, there-
fore, focus on the potential for acts of industrial sabotage rather
than on the theft of materials. The Commission has defined
industrial sabotage as "any deliberate act directed against a plant-
which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and
safety by exposure to radiation. * ~" It should be understood that
our primary focus is not on events that prevent the plant from gen-
erating electricity, but rather on concerted destructive acts which
might create significant radiologi~al hazards.
The principal sources of potentially hazardous radioactive mate-
rials within a nuclear powerplant are the fission products contained
within the fuel. Such fuel is located either within the reactor or in
storage as spent fuel. Safeguards measures at nuclear powerplants
are designed to protect against deliberate acts which could lead to a
release of fission products from these sources into the environment.
The character and complexity of safety and control features
designed into nuclear powerplants strongly militate against any seri-
ous public health and safety consequences resulting from acts of sab-
otage. Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of a series of complex
acts that could cause a breakdown or failure of the physical barriers
that normally act to contain the fission product activity. The
recently completed reactor safety study provides a useful back-
ground for the analysis of this problem. Although this report deals
with accidental events, some of the failure sequences considered
could, in theory, be deliberately caused. This possibility is also dis-
cussed in a classified ractor sabotage vulnerability study performed
for the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research by Sandia Laborato-
ries. While acts of sabotage which might lead to the meltdown of a
reactor core cannot be ruled out, it is important to note that the
expected radiological consequences of acts of sabotage at a nuclear
powerplant, including those resulting from a reactor core melt-
down, do not necessarily lead to catastrophic offsite radiological
consequences.
CURRENT RULES AND PRACTICES FOR REACTOR PROTECTION
Since November 1973, our rules have included a requirement that
physical security plans be developed and implemented at all operat-
ing nuclear powerplants. These plans, which are evaluated by the
NRC staff, are based upon published guidance setting forth the nec-
essary elements of an adequate physical security program for protec-
tion of the plants. The principal features of this protection are a
combination of physical systems and barriers to prevent or deter
overt intrusions by unauthorized persons; administrative control
mechanisms to permit access by authorized persons, and to deny
access to unauthorized persons; background screening of persons
assigned to work at the plant on a regular basis; general security
surveillance by a trained security force; and a response capability
by armed guards to a forced instrusion, supplemented by arrange-
ments with local law enforcement authorites for their assistance.
It is our judgment that: First, plant designs hardened for safety
purposes significantly reduce the susceptibility of nuclear plants to
PAGENO="0148"
144
sabotage; and second an intimate knowledge of equipment locations
and capabilities is required of a group of saboteurs to assure success-
ful accomplishment of an act of industrial sabotage. When these fac-
tors are combined with security features which are employed to
detect, deter, and counter hostile acts, the overall risk to public
health and safety is judged to be very low.
In November 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission published for
comment proposed new rules setting forth specific details for the
physical protection of nuclear powerplants. If the rules are adopted
by the NRC, their effect should be to make security programs at
nuclear powerplants more uniform and to reduce further the risk to
public health and safety from sabotage of the powerplants.
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
NRC has a program of inspection and enforcement to insure that
licensees comply with its safeguards requirements. If items of non-
compliance are found, the licensee is expected to take prompt correc-
tive action. If the situation warrants it, the NRC can assess a civil
penalty and/or modify, suspend or revoke a license for failure to
comply.
THREAT LEVEL
Prior to 1970, threat of public harm as related to licensed nuclear
facilities was considered primarily in terms of industrial sabotage
which could endanger the public health and safety through dispersal
of radioactive material. A panel of experts reviewing safeguards for
the AEC in 1967 also expressed some concern that a black market
might develop for low-enriched uranium.
In the 1970-74 period, greater emphasis began to be given to the
possibility that a terrorist group might decide to steal strategic spe-
cial nuclear material and fashion a crude nuclear explosive in order
to achieve its ends, be they political, social, or financial. Two factors
which emphasized this consideration were the increase in terrorist
violence and the possibility that plutonium might play a larger part
in the fuel cycle for power reactors. Reacting to this concern, AEC
significantly strengthened its safeguards regulations. Additional
requirements were published for public comment in February 1973
and issued in effective form in November 1973, with industry being
required to meet them by the spring of 1974. Improvements have
been made in safeguards on a continuous basis since that time.
The concern about increased dangers to the public from hostile
actions was apparent in the 1974 congressional hearings on the
Energy Reorganization Act. The interest and concern of the Con-
gress was such that, when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was
established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, it contained,
by express language of the statute, the Office which I now head-the
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
In the past year we have conducted extensive studies dealing with
the problem of threat. We have utilized expert contractors and con-
sultants, and our people have worked extensively with others in
Federal, State, and local law enforcement communities. Keeping in
mind that in over 20 years of industry utilization of nuclear mate-
PAGENO="0149"
145
rials, not one member of the public has been injured by the theft
and subsequent misuse of such materials or by sabotage, I believe the
threat of nuclear material theft Or reactor sabotage can be character-
ized today as follows:
There is no information available to us which indicates that any
group is planning an act of theElt or sabotage against the licensed
nuclear industry at this time.
Nevertheless, there is a continuing potential for insiders to execute
malevolent acts or to provide assistance to outsiders in the execution
of acts which could result in adverse impacts on the Nation.
Furthermore, there are organizations with malevolent intent
which could develop the capability to carry out operations against
the licensed nuclear power industry.
Our studies have concluded that there is evidence to support the
possibility that present threat groups may be: Highly motivated
and disciplined; well equipped and financed; well trained; and well
prepared to execute the tasks they have selected.
Historical data on the size of terrorist groups indicates that ter-
rorist assault groups larger than six persons are not likely to be
formed. We have examined over 4,000 incidents of terrorism and
other antisocial behavior and were able to find 1,271 cases where the
number of perpetrators could be identified. The number of incidents
involving groups of more than six persons account for only about
2.5 percent of the cases. Groups with as many as 12 persons have
been very rare. By far the largest percentage-96 percent-involved
groups of three persons or fewer.
There have been no instances of armed attack on licensed nuclear
facilities in the 20-plus years that they have been operating. We
have records of the types of violence and threats of violence which
the licensed nuclear industry has experienced. These records show
that during the 3-year period after 1969, there were increasing num-
bers of bomb threats, hoaxes against power reactor sites and associ-
ated industry and education facilities, along with other acts of har-
rassment. Since 1972, there has been a fairly constant number of
hoaxes. In concert with other Government agencies we are continu-
ing to record and examine incidents, be they real acts or hoaxes, in
order to track the data, observe if trends are developing and analyze
these trends to determine their relevance, if any.
Such incidents as we have observed are not uncommon to any
industry or institution. However, the number of theats against the
licensed nuclear industry, particularly in the past 3 years, is indica-
tive of the tenor of the times and serves to convince us that effective
nuclear safeguards measures continue to be essential and that contin-
ued vigilance and prudent protective actions are required.
The exact threat then, to summarize, cannot be predicted with
confidence, since it is an inherently uncertain problem and history is
an unsure guide to the future. My ussessment, however, based on
currently available evidence and expert opinion is that an attack on
nuclear facilities would likely stem from a relatively small number
of persons, possibly aided by an insider. Present nuclear industry
security measures are expected to deter most attacks and to prevent
the success of such attacks as are attempted. It should be noted that
PAGENO="0150"
146
the nuclear industry has customarily taken the approach of going
beyond the normal precautions taken elsewhere in society in facing
uncertain contingencies. The same conservative approach is being
taken in nuclear safeguards, to the extent that we believe the total
safeguards system for the industry, including onsite and offsite secu-
rity forces, can protect against theft or sabotage attempts by groups
larger than those thought to constitute the most likely threat.
FUTURE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THEFT
The question of whether low-enriched uranium fuel might be sup-
plemented with recycled plutonium is under consideration. If, after
the careful review now in progress, this is allowed to occur, pluton-
ium will be recovered from spent reactor fuel and processed
mixed uranium-plutonium reactor fuel. The advent of plutonium
recycle would increase the quantities of this material handled in the
private sector. For planning purposes, design threat levels and safe-
guards measures to protect against them `are being evaluated in a
safeguards supplement to an environmental impact statement on
plutonium recycle. This safeguards supplement is scheduled for
release by the Commission for comment some time this spring.
Public hearings will be held on the supplement before any final deci-
sion is reached.
Use of Federal guard forces has been considered in an intensive
NRC study specifically required under the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974. While the study report, which is to be submitted to
Congress in the near future, is not yet in final form, the NRC does
not envision recommending at this time any major change in the
allocation of guard responsibilities between the Federal and private
sectors.
May I say in closing, Mr. Chairman, that my operating philoso-
phy is that one should never be quite satisfied with the status quo in
safeguards. Safeguards will always be under review and will always
be evolving. We will continue to make changes in our programs as
conditions warrant and as new technologies develop. We are confi-
dent we can now design cost-effective systems for the future by
using practical, available solutions; by keeping closely attuned to
ERDA's R. & D. programs; and by striving to attain inherently secure
plant designs utilizing the proper balance of guards, security
devices, and material control and accounting systems.
It has been a pleasure to appear before your committee. We are
prepared to respond to your questions.
[The statement and charts referred to follow:]
STATEMENT OF KEN~ETH R. CHAPMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, ilLS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMissioN, FEBRU-
ARY 27,1976
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to provide this
testimony at your safeguards hearings today. My testimony will cover the
areas of current safeguards to prevent the theft of strategic special nuclear
material-that is, plutonium and high-enriched uranium-and reactor sabo-
tage; threats to the nuclear industry; and future safeguards considerations if
widescale use of recycle plutonium should be approved.
PAGENO="0151"
147
CURRENT SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT AGAINST THEFT OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL
Background
Today's licensed nuclear power industry (chart 1) is one which depends
upon low-enriched uranium, that is, uranium enriched to approximately 3 per-
cent in the fissile uranium-235 isotope. The current industry consists of 57
licensed power reactors-i operating on high-enriched uranium-and 9 low-en-
riched uranium fuel fabrication facilities. The low-enriched uranium is a prod-
uct of ERDA's gaseous diffusion plants at Oak Ridge, Tenn. A nuclear explo-
sive cannot be made of such low-enriched uranium.
However, there are also quantities of plutonium and high-enriched uranium
in the private sector, 12 licensees possessing high-enriched uranium, 6 possess-
ing plutonium. The greatest percentage of this high-enriched uranium is Gov-
ernment owned and is being processed in licensed facilities for national secu-
rity programs. High-enriched uranium for commercial purposes-about 6
percent of the total quantity in the private sector-is mostly in storage vaults
and is likely to stay there unless aduitional high temperature gas-cooled reac-
tors are built and operated. A small amount of high-enriched uranium is being
used to fabricate research reactor fuel.
About half of the plutonium in commercial plants is government owned. Cer-
tain licensed facilities process plutonium for aevelopment programs related to
the liquid metal fast breeder reactor. Otherwise, the material is being used in
small quantities for R. & D. purposes or is in vault storage. All licensed facili-
ties must adhere to NRC sareguards regulations. Thus, the amount of special
nuclear material, plutonium and high-enriched uranium, being used outside
national security programs is very small and at the moment is largely in vault
storage.
Current rules and practices
Each person who is licensed to posses or use specified quantities of high-en-
riched uranium or plutonium must comply with published safeguards require-
ments. One of these requires that a physical protection plan be submitted to
the NRC for approval. The plan must demonstrate how the licensee will pro-
tect his plant against sabotage and the strategic materials in his possession
against theft. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgates regulations
and imposes license conditions to make it clear to the licensee what he is
expected to do in order to obtain and keep a license. I would like to summa-
rize these for you (chart 2). The NRC safeguards program requires that the
licensee employ safeguards measures in depth; onsite guards with access to
law enforcement agencies; intrusion alarms backed up by structural barriers;
access controls over limited access areas; exit searches and material control
and accounting.
Theft of plutonium by an employee would be extremely difficult to accom-
plish. Let me describe for you in general terms the difficulties to covertly steal
plutonium. As I mentioned earlier, most of the material now present in the
private sector is in vault storage and essentially inaccessible to a lone insider.
The material not in storage is handled or processed in enclosed, sealed con-
tainment or glove box process lines. Individuals are not allowed to work unob-
served in areas housing these process lines nor can a single individual make
an authorized removal of material from such lines. If, under the scrutiny of
his fellow employees, an individual is able to circumvent the above measures,
remove material and conceal it on his person, he would still be subject to an
exit search. As a check on the performance of safeguards, bimonthly invento-
ries are conducted to assure material has not been stolen.
An outside intruder must either force an entry at an access point which is
manned by an armed guard or attempt covert entry. To gain entrance covertly,
the intruder must surmount the fence line where intrusion alarms are located
and the walls of the building housing the nuclear materials. Such buildings
present significant delay times to anyone attempting to breach them since they
are of substantial construction.
Any time strategic material is shipped (chart 3), plans are made before the
shipment takes place. Routes are chosen to bypass areas of natural disaster or
where civil disorder might occur. The shipment is picked up at the shipper's
plant at a prearranged time by the convoy personnel, including armed guards,
responsible for carrying and protecting the shipment. The material itself has
PAGENO="0152"
148
already been assayed and placed into a safe container with tamper-indicating
seals attached. During the shipment no intermediate stops are made to pick up
or drop off other cargo. Periodic radiotelephone calls are made to report prog-
ress of the shipment. After arrival at the receiver's plant, the seals are
checked, the nuclear material is unloaded and NRC and the shipper are noti-
fied. Within a short time of receipt, the receiver assays the material to verify
the quantity of nuclear material shipped.
At the present time, there are approximately 500 shipments of strategic
quantities of special nuclear material per year. Licensees are responsible for
the protection of only 20 to 30 of these. The shipment of Government-owned
material to and from licensed facilities-100 to 150 per year involve similar
procedures but Government contract guards are used when the shipments are
classified. The remainder of the shipments are protected according to ERDA
procedures including in some cases special vehicles, cleared and armed escort
personnel, and continuous communication.
The NRC is continuously upgrading its safeguards requirements and has
under consideration several changes to its present regulations to further pro-
tect against theft. One of these changes, relating to in-transit security, has
been issued for public comment. It would require greater numbers of armed
guards to accompany certain shipments of strategic material. A regulation
change to require an NRC security clearance for employees in certain job
functions involving access to strategic material is now being developed by the
NRC staff.
We believe the current regulations and those under development provide ade-
quate safeguards for today's limited commerce in strategic material. This situ-
ation will probably be subject to change, however. The NRC decision to con-
sider certain limited interim licensing of mixed-oxide fuel cycle facilities will
probably be accompanied by some further upgrading of the current safeguards
regulations. My office is now preparing proposed upgrading measures that are
expected to be published for public comments sometime this spring.
CURRENT SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SABOTAGE AT NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS
Background
While the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation within NRC is responsible
for reactor protection, I would like to address this subject briefly at this time.
Mr. Case, Deputy Director of NRR, will be happy to respond to your questions
in this area.
Currently operating light water nuclear powerplants do not utilize strategic
special nuclear material. Our safeguards in this area, therefore, focus on the
potential for acts of industrial sabotage rather than on the theft of materials.
The Commission has defined 1 industrial sabotage as "any deliberate act
directed against a plant-which could directly or indirectly endanger the public
health and safety by exposure to radiation * * k." It should be understood
that our primary focus is not on events that prevent the plant from generating
electricity, but rather on concerted destructive acts which might create signifi-
cant radiological hazards.
The principal sources of potentially hazardous radioactive materials within
a nuclear powerplant are the fission products contained within the fuel. Such
fuel is located either within the reactor or in storage as spent fuel. Safeguards
measures at nuclear powerplants are designed to protect against deliberate
acts which could lead to a release of fission products from these sources into
the environment.
The character and complexity of safety and control features designed into
nuclear powerplants strongly militate against any serious public health and
safety consequences resulting from acts of sabotage. Nevertheless, it is possible
to conceive of a series of complex acts that could cause a breakdown or fail-
ure of the physical barriers that normally act to contain the fission product
activity. The recently completed reactor safety study 2 provides a useful back-
ground for the analysis of this problem. Although this report deals with acci-
dental events, some of the failure sequences considered could, in theory, be
deliberately caused. This possibility is also discussed in a classified reactor
1 10 CFR pt 73.2 (p).
2 Reactor Safety Study-An assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear
Power Plants, USNRC, October 1975 (WASH-1400/NUREG-75/014).
PAGENO="0153"
149
sabotage vulnerability study performed for the Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research by Sandia Laboratories. While acts of sabotage which might lead to
the meltdown of a reactor core cannot be ruled out, it is important to note
that the expected radiological consequences of acts of sabotage at a nuclear
powerplant, including those resulting from a reactor core meltdown, do not
necessarily lead to catastrophic offsite radiological consequences.
CURRENT RULES AND PRACTICES FOR REACTOR PROTECTION
Since November 1973, our rules have included a requirement that physical
security plans be developed and implemented at all operating nuclear power-
plants. These plans, which are evaluated by the NRC staff, are based upon
published guidance setting forth the necessary elements of an adequate physi-
cal security program for protection of the plants. The principal features of
this protection are a combination of physical systems and barriers to prevent
or deter overt intrusions by unauthorized persons; administrative control
mechanisms to permit access by authorized persons, and to deny access to
unauthorized persons; background screening of persons assigned to work at
the plant on a regular basis; general, security surveillance by a trained secu-
rity force; and a response capability to a forced intrusion by armed guards
supplemented by arrangements with local law enforcement authorities for their
assistance.
It is our judgment that (1) plant designs hardened for safety purposes sig-
nificantly reduce the susceptibility of nuclear plants to sabotage; and (2) an
intimate knowledge of equipment locations and capabilities is required of a
group of saboteurs to assure successful accomplishment of an act of industrial
sabotage. When these factors are combined with security features which are
employed to detect, deter, and counter hostile acts, the overall risk to public
health and safety is judged to be very low.
In November 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission published for comment
proposed new rules setting forth specific details for the physical protection of
nuclear powerplants. If the rules are adopted by the NRC, their effect should
be to make security programs at nuclear powerplants more uniform and to
reduce further the risk to public health and safety from sabotage of the
powerplants.
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
NRC has a program of inspection and enforcement to ensure that licensees
comply with its safeguards requirements. If items of noncompliance are found,
the licensee is expected to take prompt corrective action. If the situation war-
rants it, the NRC can assess a civil penalty and/or modify, suspend, or revoke
a license for failure to comply.
THREAT LEVEL
Prior to 1970, threat of public harm as related to licensed nuclear facilities
was considered primarily in terms of industrial sabotage which could endanger
the public health and safety through dispersal of radioactive material. A panel
of experts reviewing safeguards for the AEC in 1967 also expressed some con-
cern that a black market might develop for low-enriched uranium.
In the 1970-74 period, greater emphasis began to be given to the possibility
that a terrorist group might decide to steal strategic special nuclear material
and fashion a crude nuclear explosive in order to achieve its ends, be they
political, social, or financial. Two factors which emphasized this consideration
were the increase in terrorist violence and the possibility that plutonium might
play a larger part in the fuel cycle for power reactors. Reacting to this con-
cern, AEC significantly strengthened its safeguards regulations. Additional
requirements were published for public comment in February 1973 and issued
in effective form in November 1973, with industry being required to meet them
by the spring of 1974. Improvements have been made in safeguards in a con-
tinuous basis since that time.
The concern about increased dangers to the public from hostile actions was
apparent in the 1974 congressional hearings on the Energy Reorganization Act.
The interest and concern of the Congress was such that, when the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission was established by the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, it contained, by express language of the statute, the Office which I now
head-the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
PAGENO="0154"
150
In the past year we have conducted extensive studies dealing with the prob-
lem of threat. We have utilized expert contractors and consultants, and our
people have worked extensively with others in Federal, State, and local law
enforcement communities. Keeping in mind that in over 20 years of industry
utilization of nuclear materials, not one member of the public has been injured
by the theft and subsequent misuse of such materials or by sabotage, I believe
the threat of nuclear material theft or reactor sabotage can be characterized
today as follows:
There is no information available to us which indicates that any group is
planning an act of theft or sabotage against the licensed nuclear industry at
this time.
Nevertheless, there is a continuing potential for insiders to execute malevo-
lent acts or to provide assistance to outsiders in the execution of acts which
could result in adverse impacts on the Nation.
Furthermore, there are organizations with malevolent intent which could
develop the capability to carry out operations against the licensed nuclear
power industry.
Our studies have concluded that there is evidence to support the possibility
that present threat groups may be: Highly motivated and disciplined; well-
equipped and financed; well trained; well prepared to execute the tasks they
have selected.
Historical data on the size of terrorist groups indicates that terrorist assault
groups larger than six persons are not likely to be formed. We have examined
over 4,000 incidents of terrorism and other antisocial behavior and were able
to find 1,271 cases where the number of perpetrators could be identified. The
number of incidents involving groups of more than six persons account for
only about 2.5 percent of the cases. Groups with as many as 12 persons have
been very rare. By far the largest percentage-86 percent-involved groups of
three persons or fewer.
There have been no instances of armed attack on licensed nuclear facilities
in the 20-plus years that they have been operating. We have records of the
types of violence and threats of violence which the licensed nuclear industry
has experienced. These records show that during the 3-year period after 1969,
there were increasing numbers of bomb threats, hoaxes against power reactor
sites and associated industry and education facilities, along with other acts of
harassment. Since 1972, there has been a fairly constant number of hoaxes. In
concert with other Government agencies we are continuing to record and
examine incidents, be they real acts or hoaxes, in order to track the data,
observe if trends are developing and analyze these trends to determine their
relevance, if any.
Such incidents as we have observed are not uncommon to any industry or
institution. However, the number of threats against the licensed nuclear indus-
try, particularly in the past 3 years, is indicative of the tenor of the times and
serves to convince us that effective nuclear safeguards measures continue to be
essential and that continued vigilance and prudent protective actions are
required.
The exact threat then, to summarize, cannot be predicted with confidence,
since it is an inherently uncertain problem and history is an unsure guide to
the future. My assessment, however, based on currently available evidence and
expert opinion is that an attack on nuclear facilities would likely stem from a
relatively small number of persons, possibly aided by an insider. Present
nuclear industry security measures are expected to deter most attacks and to
prevent the success of such attacks as are attempted. It should be noted that
the nuclear industry has customarily taken the approach of going beyond the
normal precautions taken elsewhere in society in facing uncertain contingen-
cies. The same conservative approach is being taken in nuclear safeguards, to
the extent that we believe the total safeguards system for the industry, includ-
ing onsite and offsite security forces, can protect against theft or sabotage
attempts by groups larger than those thought to constitute the most likely
threat.
FUTURE SAFEGUARDS AGAIN5T THEFT
The question of whether low-enriched uranium fuel might be supplemented
with recycled plutonium is under consideration. If, after the careful review
now in progress, this is allowed to occur, plutonium will be recovered from
spent reactor fuel and processed into mixed uranium/plutonium reactor fuel.
PAGENO="0155"
151
The advent of plutonium recycle would increase the quantities of this material
handled in the private sector. For planning purposes, design threat levels and
safeguards measures to protect against them are being evaluated in a safe-
guards supplement to an environmental impact statement on plutonium recycle.
This safeguards supplement is scheduled for release by the Commission for
comment some time this spring. Public hearings will be held on the supplement
before any final decision is reached.
Use of Federal guard forces has been considered in an intensive NRC study
specifically required under the Energy~ Reorganization Act of 1974. While the
study report, which is to be submitted to Congress in the near future, is not
yet in final form, the NRC does not envision recommending at this time any
major change in the allocation of guard responsibilities between the Federal
and private sectors.
May I say in closing, Mr. Chairman, that my operating philosophy is that
one should never be quite satisfied with the status quo in safeguards. Safe-
guards will always be under review and will always be evolving. We will con-
tinue to make changes in our programs as conditions warrant and as new
technologies develop. We are confident we can now design cost-effective sys-
tems for the future by using practical, available solutions; by keeping closely
attuned to ERDA's R. & D. programs; and by striving to attain inherently
secure plant designs utilizing the proper balance of guards, security devices,
and material control and accounting systems.
It has been a pleasure to appear before your committee. We are prepared to
respond to your questions.
PAGENO="0156"
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
URANIUM MINES CONVERSION ENRICHING CONVERSION
& MILLS TO UF6 1TO FUEL
I _~1'
RECOVERED *I
URANIUM I
~___
REPROCESSING
WASTE STORAGE ~RADIOISOTOPES
The Recycling of Plutonium as a Reactor Fuel (Represanted by a Dotted Line) has
Not been Approved for Widespread Use in Commercial Light Water Power Reactors.
PLUTONIUM
REACTOR
J
C.Ys
CHART 1
Flaw
PAGENO="0157"
CURRENT SNM FACILITY ~1OTECTION FEATURES-'
___
-Et3* PERIMETER
PROTECTED AREA
F- 1 PORTAL
CONTROL , _~. MATERIAL
1 ACCESSOR
/ I VITAL AREA
GUARDS I ALARM T ~
IPEJ~
[~F-SITE
RESPONSE
* FORCES
ISOLATION ZONE PROTECTED AREA - - - -
MONITORED PERIMETER BARRIER
PORTAL,PICTUREID POATAL
ILLUMINATED ` INTRUSION ALARMS
ARMED GUARDS AREA SURVEILLANCE, ALARMS
COMMUNICATIONS TO LLEA FORCES (MAA)
VAULT, (MAA)
MATERIAL ACCESS OR VITAL AREA
CHART 2
PAGENO="0158"
MATERIALS SHIPMENT PROCEDURES
* COMMUNICATION LINK WITH LOCAL LAW
* VISUAL SURVEILLANCE
* CONTAINER SEALS
* HAND-TO-HAND RECEIPTS
\1~I
* SHIPMENTS PREPLANNED
- - S TIME IN MOVEMENT MINIMIZED; ARMED ESCORTS
* AREAS OF DISORDER Er DISASTER AVOIDED
* GUARDS REQUALIFIED ANNUALLY
* SEPARATE RULES FOR SHIPMENTS BY ROAD, AIR, RAIL, SEA
* RECORDS KEPT; MISSING SHIPMENTS REPORTED
REQUIRED BY CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS TITLE 10, PART 73
APPLIES TO U235 OF +20% AND TO U233 4 PLUTONIUM
CHART 3
BY WATER
BY ROAD
PAGENO="0159"
155
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chapman.
Mr. Builder, you have achieved a degree of notoriety as a result
of your memorandum. Would you care to comment at this point?
Mr. BUILDER. I would, Mr. Chairman.
The memorandum which has been widely publicized was written
to the licensing part of the Safeguards Division to alert them to
new analytical tools which we were developing for the safeguard
supplement to the environmental statement on mixed oxide fuels or
plutonium recycle. We are, in that safeguard supplement, as Mr.
Chapman just noted, looking at new analytical concepts that are
used for planning purposes to evaluate the adequacy of safeguards.
As these tools emerge, it is obvious that they will be used and
should be used to evaluate the adequacy of current safeguards, not
just future safeguards. I was alerting the licensing part of our orga-
nization to the existence of these tools and asking them to start
taking the measures now to review and evaluate our current safe-
guards in the light of these planning tools which are being devel-
oped for future safeguards.
Mr. TSONGAS. Translated that means that more can be done?
Mr. BUILDER. More can always be done. There is a continuing
process of reviewing, evaluating, and upgrading our safeguards as
technology changes, as the threat appears to change, and as society
appears to change, as we gain better appreciation for better analyti-
cal tools to address safeguards, yes, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. So the final comment was "yes"?
Mr. BUILDER. Yes.
Mr. TSONGAS. If you get any better at this, you ought to run for
public office.
Let me ask some questions in terms of cost.
If indeed we arrive at the conclusion that we have to upgrade the
security measures vis-a-vis sabOtage, taking just one example, not
design change, but simply the number of guards, probably the most
obvious single recommendation, taking the outside limits, if we or
you should mandate 10 guards at a site at all times which would be
equivalent of some 50 people because of shift changes and holidays
and so forth, and to assume a $20,000 per year cost per guard, that
is $1 million, which, I think, we would agree is the outside limit of
what one could reasonably impose upon the industry. That $1 million
in a year would be what percent of an average plant's operating
budget?
Mr. CHAPMAN. May I give you a rather lengthy answer to that?
This is a nonuniform industry. I think that is one of the things
that is not well understood in all cases. For some plants, $1 million
would be catastrophic; it would simply put them out of business. In
other plants $1 million is a very small part of the operating costs.
The reason I made the remark in my prepared statement about
where the plutonium is and where the various plants are, is that it is
a very nonuniform industry. In general, if I could average this
across an industry which is nOt average in any sense, $1 million
would be a very small part of their total investment and operating
cost.
PAGENO="0160"
156
Mr. TSONGAS. As we become a more sophisticated industry, the
plants are getting bigger. As time goes on the percentage of security
costs is a diminishing part of the operation of the powerplants, is
that correct?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Our projections show in connection with the safe-
guard supplements, Mr. Chairman, that the industry is not driven
by the cost of safeguards.
Mr. TSONGAS. One of the issues that was raised yesterday is the
disparity between safeguards that exist in one place and the stand-
ards that exist in another, and so forth. Mr. Pollard referred
obliquely to one example where there is in existence today a power-
plant which is very vulnerable to sabotage because all of the electri-
cal systems are in one room and indeed if one were to detonate a
device in that room there would be no way of stopping a meltdown.
The concern is that if we have old powerplants and new power
plants in differing designs and we impose standards, which you do,
what happens to the existing powerplants that don't have these
design changes and don't have the security measures? Do we allow a
disparity of standards and safeguards to exist?
Mr. CHAPMAN. In the conceptual aspect the answer is "no." The
regulatory base provides for certain minimum standards which must
be met in order for those plants to be operated. Now, in fact, there
is a great disparity in the design of the plants, the locations, the
particular vulnerabilities and so on. Each plant is judged on its own
merits and stands on its own merits and for safeguard or safety rea-
sons we will indeed go back into a plant and cause that plant to be
reworked, reconfigured, additional guards or whatever to bring it up
to a minimal standard in both the safety and safeguard area. There
is a formal organization within the NRC that reviews what we call
the "backfitting" process, to backfit against the plants already built
any new standard or regulation that is brought into existence. So
that is normal to our business.
Mr. TSONGAS. Is one of your standards that the electrical feed sys-
tems cannot be in one place and cannot be destroyed at one time?
Mr. CHAPMAN. That would be with regard to a reactor. I would
like to defer to Mr. Case on that, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CASE. We don't have a standard that says that in that kind of
language, Mr. Chairman. What you should appreciate is that for
hazards of this kind there are alternative ways of protection. One
was is separation. That is the kind of problem you are talking
about, where things are not separated. There are alternatives such as
fire protection and fire prevention, and what you have to look at is
the various lines of defense that can contribute to protecting the
public from a hazard.
So my answer to your question is: We don't have a regulation that
says don't put everything in one place, but we do have requirements
that there be adequate protection taking into account the various
alternative measures in protecting the public.
I was not here yesterday so I do not know the details of Mr. Pol-
lard's assertions here. So I cannot respond with any specificity. I
can only tell you, as you perhaps know, Mr. Pollard has made a
number of other allegations in the safety area concerning operating
PAGENO="0161"
157
plants and plants he has reviewed. We have mounted an intensive
effort in the last 2 or 3 weeks j~ light of these charges and allega-
tions to assure ourselves that the points he has raised do or do not
have any merit.
I can tell you at this point that, as you perhaps know, we are
having a hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
next Tuesday to discuss this in detail. But none of the things that
we have looked at that Mr. Pollard has raised-or that we are aware
of in any detail so we can look at them-have caused us to change
any licensing requirements, have caused us to conclude that any
aspects of any of the plants that he mentioned are unsafe. In other
words, all of the charges that we have looked into have not changed
our views as to the safety of these plants.
So I can say with regard to the one he mentioned yesterday,
although I have not looked at the details, I would doubt if there is
any merit to his allegations.
Mr. TSONGAS. There is a difference between saying what he says is
not true and saying what he says does not bother us. Which one are
you saying?
Mr. CASE. The specifics, sir, or the general charges he is making?
The specifics I am not bothered with. I have not found anything
to be concerned with. To the extent that Mr. Pollard's views become
part of the public lore and are accepted, that the NRC does not do
what is necessary to protect public health and safety, of course I am
bothered. That is why we have spent all of this time and effort to
assure ourselves and hopefully the public that there is no basis for
them. To say I am not bothered is far from true in light of all the
effort we have spent in assuring ourselves there is no basis for his
concerns.
Mr. TSONGAS. Before I yield; `there are certain place names that
are becoming folklore; Brown's Ferry, Hanford, Erwin, Tenn. I
think those things have to be addressed.
Mr. CASE. We intend to address the Brown's Ferry situation. As
you perhaps know, we have had a special review group reviewing
the occurrence there, its implications and what should be done with
regard to changes in regulations or in regulatory practices. That
report will be due out shortly~. During the approximate period of
time of 1 year that it has taken to prepare this report, the NRC has
been doing things in regard to~ the fire prevention area and as soon
as the report is issued this will, be discussed with the Joint Commit-
tee and all of the efforts that we have taken in the last year will be
discussed with the Congress.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver.
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Chapman, I didn't hear your answer-it was my
fault-to the chairman's question as to what part of the operating
cost are the costs of guarding a nuclear plant.
Mr. CHAPMAN. What I said `was to give a fixed percentage would
be misleading because each plant is different. The operating costs, the
employees, the location, they are all quite different. For some plants
a change in the guard force such as the chairman proposed would
simply drive them out of business if you were to put that many
guards on. What I said finally, then, on the average our cost analy-
71-074 0 - 76 - 11
PAGENO="0162"
158
sis which we are doing in connection with the so-called GESMO
plutonium recycle question, the cost analysis shows that the safe-
guards features are not an overriding or driving part of the
industrial operating costs.
Mr. W]~&vI~R. Do you consider the chairman's hypothesis of 50
guards a year that would cost $1 million generally accurate or a con-
ceivable cost?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Let me try to answer that as I understand the
question.
He proposed a certain number of guards per year at a hypothe-
sized cost. I agree that the number of guards he suggested would cost
that much. Does that answer your question?
Mr. WEAVER. Is 50 guards reasonable?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think I would say the 50 guards are probably a
reasonable number in some circumstances.
The focus on guards is an incorrect focus because guards alone are
not the basis for a security program at these plants.
Mr. WEAVER. It would cost much more for other things also?
Mr. CHAPMAN. There are a number of other features, the fencing,
the lighting, protection devices, the intrusion alarms, the security
guards.
Mr. WEAVER. The guard cost is just a part of the whole cost?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir. In some cases that number of guards
might be appropriate.
Mr. WEAVER. The reason I did not hear your answer is that I was
doing some estimates. A thousand megawatt plant produces $40 mil-
lion worth of electricity a year and on the average a million dollars
would be 2.5 percent of the amount of electricity. I find that a sig-
nificant amount and you say it would be much greater than that.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I thought I said in our analysis we had deter-
mined that the safeguard cost was not a major aspect of industrial
operations.
Mr. WEAVER. I would say that 2.5 percent of the amount of elec-
tricity sold going to guard costs is a significant amount and that is
just the guards, not all the others.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I guess it depends on what value you put on
security.
Mr. WEAVER. I am not making a value judgment, I am just talking
about plain, ordinary statistics. A million dollars in guards for a
plant producing $40 million in electricity would be 2.5 percent and
operational costs I believe would run around 10 or 15 percent. So it
would be a rather large a.mount, actually.
Have we ever lost any fuel at any plants since we have had
nuclear reactors in this country?
Mr. CHAPMAN. May I go back to your earlier question and then
come to that?
I would not like to leave that subject with the notion that we have
come to 2.5 percent as the correct number. What I am bothered by is
the notion that we have hypothesized a number of guards and then
drawn some arithmetic. What I would like to leave on that impres-
sion is that the overall cost of safeguarding in the nuclear industry,
not just guards but the relationship of guards, plants and all the
PAGENO="0163"
159
other things, we do not believe is a major impact on the industry.
That is our tentative conclusion out of the studies that we have
done.
Mr. WEAVER. Do other types of plants, oil refineries, coal-produc-
ing electrical plants, require this kind of a system?
Mr. CHAPMAN. That is a disparity that bothers me. When one
makes allegations regarding the security of the nuclear system, there
are obviously other techniques of causing public harm that would be
equally as damaging as the radioactive aspects.
Mr. WEAVER. But we do have mOre guards and safeguards?
Mr. CHAPMAN. We generally protect the nuclear industry to a
much higher degree.
Mr. WEAVER. Why?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I presume because of the background of the
nuclear business going back to the weapons days of the 1940's and
1950's and because of the general public concern about radioactivity
as a harmful mechanism.
Mr. WEAVER. Is this public concern misguided.
Mr. CHAPMAN. No, I don't think so.
Mr. WEAVER. There is a real danger, in other words, in the nuclear
industry?
Mr. CHAPMAN. There is obviously a danger if the radioactivity
would be realeased in a harmful way, yes. There are also dangers
from other sources, as you know.
Now let me answer your questions about the loss.
Mr. WEAVER. Have we ever lost any fuel in these laboratories, or
other facilities, that it is your duty to protect? Have we ever lost
any?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Going back over the history of the operation of
the nuclear industry, there are materials unaccounted for so that we
cannot guarantee you or the American public in any way that no
fuel has ever been lost from this system. There is no way to guaran-
tee that.
Mr. WEAVER. How much has been unaccounted for?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I am sorry, I don't know that number. I don't
know what the total number is.
Mr. WEAVER. Does anybody know?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I am not sure that number could be arrived at.
Mr. WEAVER. Nobody knows how much nuclear fuel we have lost
in this Nation since the advent?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I didn't say how much lost, I said how much mate-
rial is unaccounted for.
Mr. WEAVER. What is the difference between being unaccounted
for and lost?
Mr. CHAPMAN. "Lost" implies somehow that it unknowingly dis-
appeared. In these kinds of plants we always have, because of meas-
urement problems, a certain degree of uncertainty regarding the
inventory of fuel at a given time, so that when one talks about mate-
rial unaccounted for it means you are examining it in light of
uncertainties with regard to hOw it was measured. To imply it was
lost, in my view, means that somehow it disappeared out of the
system.
PAGENO="0164"
160
Mr. WEAVER. That is like a bank that has a faulty cash register
and they are not sure whether somebody embezzled any money or
not because the cash register does not work? In other words, we
really don't know how much fuel we have lost nobody knows?
Mr. CHAPMAN. If you want to pursue the word "lost"-I would
prefer to say "material unaccounted for."
Mr. WTEAVER. Unaccounted for?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Plutonium, is that included?
Mr. CHAPMAN. There is plutonium included in those amounts of
material over the years. The plutonium amount is very small,
comparatively.
Mr. WEAVER. What is that small? How much is that-any
guesses?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The amount of plutonium in the system over the
years has been fractions, very small fractions of the amounts of ura-
nium in the system.
Mr. WEAVER. Your office has been in effect for how long? May I
assume it was something the AEC created?
Mr. CHAPMAN. We began in January and were staffed in May of
last year, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Didn't the AEC have something comparable?
Mr. CHAPMAN. They had a safeguards licensing branch which
consisted of eight or nine people.
The statutes give us quite a different mandate than that office had.
Mr. WEAYER. Do you recall the woman in Oklahoma who was
killed in an automobile accident who worked for a nuclear facility
there?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, I do.
Mr. WEAVER. I have forgotten the name right now.
Did your office investigate that, both what she was doing and-
Mr. CHAPMAN. I was not in this position. The background of that
Karen Silkwood circumstance-
Mr. WEAVER. V~That was her name?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Karen Silkwood. The incident was investigated by
the AEC, not by my office, and it was investigated later by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. WEAVER. But your office made no attempt to go in?
Mr. CHAPMAN. My office has reviewed all of the investigations of
that case, the AEC, the FBI and the others.
Mr. WEAVER. What is your conclusion?
Mr. CHAPMAN. With regard to what, sir?
Mr. WEAVER. That case. I read about people questioning it in the
newspaper, that there was some fuel unaccounted for or things unac-
counted for and the background of that.
Mr. CHAPMAN. The Kerr-McGee plant in Oklahoma has, I would
say, a normal occurrence of materiat unaccounted for over its
history.
Mr. WTEAVER. How much is "normal occurrence of unaccounted
for" nuclear fuel?
Mr. CHAPMAN. What we consider normal is something on the
order of a percent of the throughput of the plant.
PAGENO="0165"
161
Mr. WEAVER. Of 1 percent?
Mr. CHAPMAN. More like half a percent.
Mr. WEAVER. A half of a percent of the entire fuels? Is that like a
grocery store where they turn over quite a bit every week?
Mr. CHAPMAN. As I said earlier in the testimony, this is a nonuni-
form industry. You have to be careful about generalizing. Some of
the plants have a fairly high throughput. Other plants have essen-
tially no throughput today. So we are talking about-
Mr. WEAVER. So it could be a half of a percent of something that
turns over frequently?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Is it classified to say how much one of these plants
might have so we could make an estimate of how much might be
unaccounted for?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir; it is.
Mr. WEAVER. It is classified?
Mr. CHAPMAN. We have recommended that material inventories be
classified and we are treating this information as proprietary pend-
ing the decision.
Mr. WEAVER. So we could no1~ make an estimate on the half of a
percent. How do you feel about the loss of a half of a percent?
Mr. CHAPMAN. In terms of industrial practice, I think a half of a
percent-in fact in many plants it is much lower than that-I think
that is probably pretty good for these types of plants. On the other
hand, in terms of the material they are handling and our responsi-
bility to the public, I don't feel very good about it. We have been
and are continuing to look at some evolutionary changes to hope-
fully reduce that number.
In terms of reducing it through pure technology, I see nothing in
the immediate offing to improve the measuring processes in the
plants. We are looking at other auditing techniques that we might
use to try to bring those numbers down. I might point out this
material accounting business has considerably improved over the
past few years and is really the basis for the international program
in safeguards.
Mr. T50NGA5. Mr. Seiberling.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nothing has been said this morning yet about the Mitre Corp.'s
study which was commissioned by NRC last year and came out in
September. Of course you gentlemen are undoubtedly very inti-
mately familiar with that.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I would just like to ask a couple of questions
about some of the things in your statement, Mr. Chapman.
On page 4 you say any time strategic material is shipped plans
are made before the shipment takes place.
What about the waste material, either the materials that are en
route from a powerplant to a reprocessing plant or materials that
are en route to a permanent storage location? What volume would
we expect from, say, a 9OO~megawatt plant per year?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The number of shipments?
Mr. SEIBERLING. In terms of physical volume and weight?
PAGENO="0166"
162
Mr. CHAPMAN. I am sorry, I will have to supply that for the
record, Mr. Seiberling.
[The information referred to is as follows:]
For a typical 900 electrical megawatt light water reactor, approximately 30
metric tons of uranium is removed each year and requires an average of 60
truck shipments or 10 rail car shipments to a fuel storage facility.
Each year, on the average, from one-fifth (approximately 150 boiling water
reactor fuel assemblies) to one-third (approximately 60 pressurized water reac-
tor assemblies) of the fuel in a reactor is replaced with fresh fuel. A boiling
water reactor fuel assembly is about 5.4 by 5.4 by 175 inches and contains
approximately 200 kilograms of uranium. A PWR fuel assembly is about 8.5
by 8.5 by 165 inches and contains approximately 500 kilograms of uranium.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I visited the Davis-Besse plant, which is between
Toledo and Sandusky, Ohio, on Lake Erie a couple of weeks ago. It
is expected to start up next June. They told me that a couple of tele-
phone booths would be sufficient to store the high-level long-life
radioactive wastes that would be produced by the plant in a year,
once it was consolidated and solidified. But I understand from talk-
ing to other people since I visited the plant that there is a much
larger volume of low-level or short-life waste, and by short I mean
maybe up to 100 years, which the plant will generate-perhaps on
the order of several truckloads a year.
I would think that if these are in a form where they could be per-
haps dynamited and blow radioactive wastes into the atmosphere,
that these would represent a very attractive target to some terrorist
group who would hijack a truckload, stash it away somewhere and
then announce that they have it secreted in one of our major cities
and they are prepared to blow it up unless their demands are met.
I wonder if you can give us some kind of evaluation of that.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I now understand. Let me say first both statements
that were given during your visit are correct. Once the waste is sep-
arated the volume of the high-level waste reduces considerably below
the volume in which it came out of the reactors. So both statements
are correct. The shipments from the reactor, however, are composed
of both the high-level and low-level wastes. Those shipments are
very, very large.
Mr. SEIBERLING. At the plants they do not separate the two, that
is done in the reprocessing?
Mr. CHAPMAN. That is right-storage pools, and then is moved
and separated later.
Mr. SEIBERLING. In what form are these wastes when they leave
the plants?
Mr. CHAPMAN. In the form of fuel rods, long metal fuel-filled
rods stretching 12 feet or so, in bundles.
Now, let me describe my thoughts on your concern. These rods
then leaving the reactor are shipped in huge shipping casks. Those
shipping casks are qualifed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in great detail against all sorts of hazards including road accidents,
dropping off the truck, fires, railroad car accidents and so on. There
is the possibility-I think the most likely possibility of sabotaging
one of those casks is to, in some way, remove the heat-removal
capacity from the cask, whatever it is. It may be cooled by water or
some other technique and that could be done. In that case, the vola-
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tile material, not all of the waste material but the volatile material
in that cask, would indeed be dispersed.
We have done many calculations on that. If one were to try to
proceed beyond that to blow up the casks to disperse the solid mate-
rial, it would be a very difficult task for three reasons: One, it is
intensely radioactive.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Aren't they in some kind of containers?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes. If one wanted to violate that and to try to
get into this material he would be faced with a significant hazard to
his own person.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Why not blow up the whole cask?
Mr. CHAPMAN. They are extremely massive and qualified for a
very high hazard as against road accidents. So blowing them up is
not a trivial matter, just to blow up a whole cask.
We have also done calculations not only on the dispersal of the
volatiles from those casks but also on the dispersal of the solids. In
no case do we find any calculation that shows us that there would be
extreme hazard outside the immediate vicinity of where that event
might occur. We think it would be very, very difficult to cause that
event to occur.
Mr. SEIBERLING. These are sufficiently large so just stashing them
away somewhere would not be very easy?
Mr: CHAPMAN. They are full railroad car size and very massive;
yes, sir.
Mr. SEIBERLING. So the likelihood of some threat it would be hard
to track down-
Mr. CHAPMAN. You could not handle it without massive handling
equipment and you can't even open it without handling equipment.
These are not things that you walk up to and turn the knob on a
door.
Mr. SEIBERLING. So it would be difficult to secrete them inside of
Cleveland or New York, is that what you are saying?
Mr. CHAPMAN. These things weigh over 100 tons and I don't think
they are picked up casually and moved from one Ford truck to
another one.
Mr. SETBERLING. I think we have covered that one pretty well.
Let me go to another point of your statement.
On page 11 it says, "Historical data on size of terrorist groups
indicates that terrorist assault groups larger than six persons are not
likely to be formed."
Now that may be true so far in this country, and yet the Mitre
study, which is a fascinating piece of research, points out that in
such fairly developed countries as Argentina and Uruguay the
urban guerrilla groups, of which there are numerous ones, have
seized whole towns, that they, have sometimes done it with very
small numbers of people and also they are capable of having much
larger numbers of people. So I just wonder how much comfort we
can really take in this particular statement, looking down the road.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I am glad to respond to that, Mr. Seiberling. Let
me start by making a comment or two about the Mitre report. We
think the Mitre report was well done, also. We spent-not on that
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report but on a number of studies last year-something approaching
$2 million related to the safeguards.
The Mitre report was one of some 40 reports that we contracted
for in that regard. The reason for that expenditure was to try to
give us a background of data from all perspectives on what the his-
tory told us or tells us regarding threat groups and terrorism.
Now subsequent to that time we have also had, adding to those
reports, some 45 to 50 working arrangements established with other
government agencies including some in the international area to try
to go beyond the history and see what is happening today, what is
the current situation. What we are trying to do is to set a frame-
work in which we can look at where this threat business may be.
Now one of the problems is that in talking about it people tradi-
tionally tend to talk about 2, 3, 6, 12, or some number. It is not
purely a numbers game. It is a game of motivation, it is a game of
financing, scenarios, group peculiarities, and we are trying to look at
all of those things. We think there is a very reasonable chance on
the order of a few percent that a group of 12 people could be
formed into some kind of a threat capability. Then you have to ask
yourself are you talking about 12 highly trained people or 12 rather
radical people, where would they come from, how would they be
financed and so on. These are the considerations that go into our
threat. So we don't disagree that threat groups of that size have
been formed, that they have been active. We are trying to determine
the validity of those lines of logic in terms of our job in licensing
the nuclear industry. From the history of the nuclear business, and
from the history of the kinds of activities that have been seen in
this country, generally we think the credible threat size, what we are
calling our design threat, is something smaller than that and we are
looking at numbers like six and in Mr. Builder's memo numbers like
three as a way of analyzing the problem.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you.
Mr. TSONGAS. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Builder's memorandum had as the low-level
threat the figures of one and three, one insider and three outsiders.
The suggestion of the memorandum is there are existing nuclear
powerplants that are not capable of sustaining that kind of threat.
It is significantly different from saying that if you look at the inci-
dence of groups involving more than 6, which is 7-plus, the fact that
7-plus is only 2.5 percent, which itself is 100 incidents out of 4,000,
that does not speak to the fact that what NRC is addressing, at least
in the memorandum, is a design threat much lower in terms of
personnel.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think, Mr. Chairman, there is a difference; and I
would like to explain that.
We have had teams both in the field and in Washington involved
in record review and interaction with other agencies over the past
several months really looking at three conditions, if you will. One
question is, what performance do we get from a licensed plant if
they are responding in a minimal way to our regulatory require-
ments? What do we expect in the way of performance from that
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kind of a plant? I might add, ü I said earlier, that is not true of
most of the plants in the business. Most of them have at least twice
and sometimes three times as many guards as the minimal require-
ments.
The second point we have been looking at-
Mr. TSONGAS. Which suggests that maybe the minimum require-
ment is not high enough?
Mr. CHAPMAN. That is what we are looking at. We also postulated
in Mr. Builder's memo, and that is what it was intended to do, that
we ought to look at the nature of three and one. Also, although it is
not in the memo, I directed the staff over this period of time to look
at threats of six and two, six outsiders and two insiders. So we have
been looking at all of those as a way of evaluating where we stand
today in our security programing. I don't think what we are
saying is inconsistent. We are, as a matter of fact, trying to look at
all of these conditions. Our current guides, which interpret our
rules, actually require the plants to be able to deter threats up to
platoon size, which is about 12 people. Even today we recognize that
as a possibility. But we are trying to postulate the best place to fix
the security requirements on the industry as we move ahead in our
program.
Mr. TSONGAS. I would like to pursue that but I will yield back.
Mr. SEIBERLING. This statement that groups with as many as 12
persons have been very rare, is that based on U.S. experience or
worldwide?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Worldwide. It turns out that it is so rare that it
has never happened in terms of the kind of situation we are talking
about, the nuclear industry or any related industry.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I am baffled by that. I want to read on page 46
of the Mitre study, and this is about Argentina:
An operation of particular interest is the occupation March 25, 1973, of the
nuclear powerplant in Atucha by members of the People's Revolutionary Army,
the ERP. The plant was open to the public on Sundays. It was guarded by a
seven-man detachment of the BuenOs Aires police and several plant guards.
There were no elaborate security precautions, nor were there any controls on
the plant's access road. The guerrillas, numbering between 10 and 15 and trav-
eling in a car and a van, drove unmolested to the police station adjacent to
the plant. Armed with machine guns, automatic rifles, grenades, and Mol-
otov cocktails, the terrorists rushed the station and quickly overpowered the
five policemen there.
While some members of the band, guarded the prisoners, others moved into
the plant and two reached the entrance to the reactor. There, on one of the
large cement blocks that were to be used to seal the reactor, one of the guer-
rillas painted the slogan "For the unity of the people's forces," and the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Army five-pointed star, followed by the organization's acro-
nym, ERP.
Then it talks about how they withdrew, they got in a gun fight
with the police, killed two policemen. It goes on to say:
These examples illustrate the extreme vulnerability of small towns and
isolated facilities in Argentina to terrorist attacks.
It cited several other cases where guerrillas captured the local
police stations with no difficulty.
Itgoesontosay:
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The implications of this for the security of nuclear plants are obvious. The
ease with which the guerrillas cut the links between their targets and the
local police departments, as well as between the police departments and out-
side support suggests that these may constitute one of the weakest links in the
security chain.
Now, here we have 15 guerrillas, 10 to 15 guerrillas who actually
seized a nuclear plant. It does not sound like it was very well
guarded. It was not operating yet so maybe that is one reason why.
But when we talk about nuclear plants we find that the one case
where one has been seized was involving 10 to 15. So I am baffled at
how we talk about six persons.
It looks to me that the can get whatever number of persons are
needed together to attack a particular facility. I wonder if you
could comment on this apparent contradiction.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I would be glad to. I think the comment is that, in
looking at that one incident, I have no disagreement that there can
be 12 people involved in some kind of a terrorist act. I have some
concern that in the Mitre study that that particular incident which
occurred in another country could somehow be broadened in its
interpretation to include all of our nuclear industry.
Mr. SEIBERLING. We have 8 million unemployed in this country.
We have an awful lot of dissidents and people who are alienated. I
don't know how you can assume that just because we have had a
rather tranquil history compared to other countries that that is
going to be the situation down the road.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I don't assume that. I do not assume that. I do
assume, however, that there have to be certain motivations and there
have to be certain purposes and certain scenarios in order for groups
of 12 to get together. There are reasons why we bound the problem
of 12 because these purposes of motivation will usually lead to some
knowledge of their activities if they get bigger. So considering all of
these factors, in working with the other Government agencies we see
no evidence today that kind of group will be formed. We are not
saying that it will not be.
Mr. SEIBERLING. What you are saying is with our more sophisti-
cated FBI and other police and investigative agencies that we do
not see a likelihood that a group of, any group of a size larger than
12 could exist very long without someone knowing about it?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I would rather the FBI respond, but that is my
response to it.
Mr. SEIBERLING. These groups in Argentina, everybody knew
about them, but the problem was to know about what they were
going to do. They managed to do an awful lot of things that the
police could not stop. In fact, they kidnaped the police chief in
Uruguay.
Mr. CHAPMAN. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Don't you think these assumptions, while they
may be statistically valid, have inherently a certain risk in them?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I don't think they have a risk in the sense that
we treat them. We are recognizing and have recognized in all of our
plants that groups of this size might be formed. What we are trying
to judge is the likelihood that such a group would be motivated to
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do the sorts of things that they thight succeed in doing in the nuclear
industry and to set our security arrangements against the likelihood
that group would be involved.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I just have a couple more questions.
On page 11 of your statement,~ it is also stated there have been no
instances of armed attack on licensed nuclear facilities in the 20-
years-plus that they have been in operation. Here again this
obviously is the U.S. experience. But in addition to the one in Argen-
tina that I have read, let me read something else from the Mitre
study on page 81, and I am quoting:
Such incidents occur even more frequently abroad. In May 1975, for
instance, two bombs exploded near a nuclear reactor at a power station under
construction in France, causing a fire but no casualties.
Prior to the explosion, a call was made to a newspaper warning of and
claiming credit for the bombing. The caller stated it was the work of the
Meinhof-Puig Antioch group. The authorities felt the group represented terror-
ists in Germany and Spain. Within the last two months-
As of September, I guess-
two attacks on French operating nuclear plants have been reported in the
press.
Attacks on nuclear plants have been widely discussed in recent publications
in the European underground publications, according to a report issued by
committees of the U.S. Senate May 14, 1975. These incidents and ideas are
bound to be picked up in the underground press here and may cause further
consideration of licensed nuclear targets by violence-prone groups in this
country.
I wonder if the fact that there have been no armed attacks in this
country in the last 20-plus years really gives us any cause to feel
that is not likely in the future, particularly as we have more and
more plants operating? Iwonder if you would comment on. that.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, sir.
Obviously we are not taking comfort in the history. I have been to
France and spoken to the French officials. I am quite familiar with
those two incidents. Again, the only arguments I have with regard
to the Mitre report is what I consider rather gross extrapolation
saying that all of those conditions would pertain in this country.
The two incidents that were referred to were very, in my opinion,
"unique." One was unique to the local environment, where there was
some local opposition to the plant. The other was unique in regard
to its location and the way it .~ was attacked. So I have no disagree-
ment at all with the facts in the matter. I am not comforted by the
history.
Mr. SEIBERLING. You know every situation is unique. I recall
during the early days of the space program they finally had to
develop a slogan to get fail-safe systems and the slogan was, "If it
can fail, it will."
It seems to me that we are in that kind of situation here.
Let me go to one other thing, Mr. Chairman.
Assuming that there are going to be some attacks, and I think
we have to make that assumption, the next question is whether we can
have adequate defenses.
First of all let me turn again to the Mitre study. On page 103
there is this statement:
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At least 15 separate militant organizations have used firearms and explo-
sives in terrorist actions or sabotage efforts in this country in recent years.
They launched attacks on power companies, industrial firms, banks, and police
facilities.
Terrorism has become commonplace in the western world and weapons of
large caliber or full-automatic fire can be easily procured. The Department of
the Army has said there are 10,345 arms storage structures and 19,652 ammu-
nition and explosive storage areas throughout the world. According to one
Department of the Army report: "The discipline and organizational intelli-
gence capability of terrorist groups indicate ability to penetrate U.S. conven-
tional weapons, ammunition and explosives storage facilities.
The procurement of the appropriate explosives and weapons is not likely to
be a serious obstacle to any well organized group that wishes to attack a
licensed nuclear facility.
And then over in the "recommendations" they in effect repeat this
and say that we must be prepared, that the NRC should insure that
the safeguard plans are adequate to cope with an attack in which
such weapons are used and they are referring to mortars and bazoo-
kas and other more powerful weapons. So my question is: What
level of weaponry are you going to require guards in nuclear plants
and on transit vehicles to be prepared to cope with?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The level to cope with?
Mr. SEII~EI~i~ING.Yes.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I am not sure I can answer that explicitly in terms
of saying bazookas or antitank weapons. The guards currently have
38's and shotguns. There are some reasons for that, both from local
jurisdictions and Federal rules. Part of the security agency study
which we are about to give to the Congress, which Dr. Myers of this
staff worked on, looks at the question of arming guards and of the
jurisdictional questions or the liabilities that might be imposed by a
guard using arms across various jurisdictions. I think it is very likely
in the case of transportation, that we may seek authority for auto-
matic weapons. So we are looking at that question. I would not like
to say at this time that we must be prepared against a certain caliber
of weapons or a certain size and a certain range.
There is another factor and that is the guards themselves are not
the total security program. In other words, the facilities themselves,
their access points and so on, also have a bearing on the utility of
certain kinds of weapons that might be used in an attack.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I am not sure that is an answer to my question. I
did not ask you what kind of weapons the guards should be
equipped with, although that is relevant to the question. My ques-
tion was what should they be prepared to cope with.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I understand your question. I am saying I am not
prepared to answer that yet. I am not sure. We are still looking at
that.
Mr. SEIBERLING. In other words, that recommendation of the
Mitre study is not yet-you have not been able to come up with a
response to that?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think it is unfortunate if the Mitre study is
being used as an authoritative document in this sense. There are a
great number of other studies, as I said, that we have done in the
last year or so.
Mr. SEIBERLING. This is the study which was done at the direction
of Congress. It is the only one that we are generally-
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Mr. CHAPMAN. No, it was not, sir. It was not done at the direction
of Congress. It was done at our instigation on a contract with Mitre
not even associated with a congressional mandate.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Is it not true that in legislation a couple of years
ago the Congress directed the NRC to make a study?
Mr. CHAPMAN. That was the so-called security agency study that
was conducted by Dr. Myers sitting behind you.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Has that been released?
Mr. CHAPMAN. This document was not associated with that study.
This document was purchased with regard to our normal safeguard
activities under a special safeguards study.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Has the other, study been released?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think 18 of the other study documents have been
released; yes, sir.
Mr. SEIBERLING. And they are, available?
The Mitre study happens to be the only one I have read. It is an
officially supported study and it does seem to me that whether or not
it is the complete answer, it certainly raises some very important
questions which apparently have not been answered entirely. Not
knowing a better hole than this one, I am going to stay in this one
until we find something else.
I just think that the dilemma we are in with the whole nuclear
program is illustrated by this security problem. If we are prepared
to cope with the maximum threats we are going to have guards
armed like the armed forces around every single nuclear facility and
every transportation vehicle and if we think that creates problems
from the standpoint of turning our country into an armed camp,
then we are going to have to take the risk that guerrillas or crime or
other groups could more easily sabotage these facilities. I hope you
can find a way out of this dilemma because it seems to me it is a
very serious one.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Miller, before you begin I am going to accord
you the same time constraints that we have imposed on the others.
Mr. MILLER. I will be brief. I apologize for coming in late, but the
Subcommittee on Water and Power was also meeting.
I would like to ask one question. It was a point on which I raised
a question last year at the first part of these hearings and that was
the question of storage of the, spent fuel at the commercial reactor
sites and whether or not that was done in accordance with guidelines
set out by the NRC, whether or not storage has now reached the
point at which it exceeds those guidelines. At that point somebody
said, "We don't know because we are redefining the guidelines."
I wonder what has transpired or what is happening.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I could address that. Maybe Mr. Case would, also.
We have been looking at the so-called spent fuel pool storage
which is the technique by which the fuel coming out of the reactor
is stored at the reactor site. There have been allegations and, in fact,
I think there is a petition operating at the NRC to react to the so-
called problem of lack of storage capacity in that regard.
Now as a matter of fact, there is ample capacity in the industry to
carry us into about 1985. The capacity that would be required would
be reduced somewhat if the Commission should make a judgment to
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reprocess or recycle the fuel, because then the fuel will be returned
to a usable form, and we would be left with a different kind of
waste product.
Mr. MILLER. What is the earliest date that could happen?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The earliest date that could happen would be
about a year from now for the Commission to make that judgment.
We do not have any reprocessing plants operating in this country at
this time.
Just to finish a comment, then, the allegation is that there is
insufficient storage. In fact, there is sufficient storage. The problem
is, it is not all located at the reactor which may be generating the
spent fuel. So there is some relocation and redistribution required.
We are currently involved in doing an environmental impact
study on this spent fuel pool storage problem which should be com-
pleted, I hope, within about a year. I don't know the exact schedule
on that. The overall assessment is that we have, by proper distribu-
tion of the waste fuel, storage capacity to about 1985.
Mr. MILLER. What are the problems inherent in that storage of the
spent fuel? I assume it is placed in a coolant.
Mr. CHAPMAN. What are the Problems? So far as I know there
are really no problems once the fuel is in the pool storage. I don't
think there have been any recognized environmental problems associ-
ated with that.
Mr. MILLER. What would happen if you lost the coolant?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Obviously the fuel is hot. I suppose there could be
some sort of a meltdown and some of the volatiles could be released.
Mr. CASE. This is not an instantaneous problem, Mr. Miller. There
is ample time, like hours, for recovering the fuel, should you lose the
water, before there would be any meltdown. It is not something that
happens just like that. It is not that kind of a concern.
Mr. MILLER. In terms of the concerns that were raised about the
security problems and the storage of the fuel in the pools, whether
or not they were more easily subject to acts of terrorists or sabotage
or what have you, what you are saying is there would have to be a
long, sustained position of vulnerability before you would run into
any real risk?
Mr. CASE. They are in a vital area. They are accorded security
protection commensurate with the kind of action needed and the
timely necessity of action in case it would be attacked.
Mr. MILLER. What kind of emergency systems surround them?
Mr. CASE. We have alternate systems for replenishing the water
and in addition it is completely adequate to run a fire hose up and
pour water in that way. It is that kind of problem you have to deal
with. That will take care of the situation.
Mr. MILLER. Does the release of the coolant itself pose a problem?
Mr. CASE. No.
Mr. MILLER. Thank you.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER. Certainly.
Mr. SEIBERLING. We are talking now about the reactor loss of
coolant?
Mr. CASE. No, the fuel pool, the fuel storage pool.
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Mr. SEIBERLING. You could not run a fire hose into a reactor,
could you?
Mr. CASE. That is a more immediate problem, sir. But we have
numerous backup systems to get the water quickly into the reactor
core for the kind of problem you, are talking about.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Chapman,, you referred to such methods as
standard procedure. Was that imposed at Erwin?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The regulations require that there be a search con-
ducted. In the first place, two people should be in an access area in
which there are particular kinds of special nuclear materials. What
happened at Erwin was they had three egress points, if you will,
which in our opinion should have had a guard on them monitoring
the departures.
What they were doing, instead, was using what has now become
known in the newspapers as an honor system, which meant that one
employee at the plant was being checked by another employee at the
plant at egress. The technique Of checking was actually by a super-
visor over an employee, in general, so it was not an employee peer
group situation. Nonetheless, it was not in accord with what we
think was the proper procedure. There was a patdown check at the
door and, at one of the points, there was a hand check with a radio.
In addition to that, there was a random sampling and a check by
the guard force at the exit to the plant perimeter, in other words
through the external guard gatç.
As soon as that situation was recognized at Erwin, we put instruc-
tions in to stop it because, even though it is a door check, the notion
of this kind of an honor system which might be violated by two
people in collusion at the door ~yas not acceptable to us.
Mr. TSONGAS. Was there not, a door at Erwin that had an egress
door that had no guards at it but simply had an alarm mechanism?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Had no guard but had what?
Mr. TSONGAS. An alarm mechanism.
Mr. CHAPMAN. There were two doors that had detection devices. I
thought the question was, were there detection devices there but no
guards.
Mr. TSONGAS. Right.
Mr. CHAPMAN. The answer is there were two detection devices, one
each on two of the three doors. They were not operable. Those detec-
tion devices were not operable at a point last fall and that is the
point at which we became concerned. So they were there and that is
why the guard was not there. The protective device was supposed to
be working but they were not operable.
Mr. TSONGAS. Has NRC, given that example, were any penalties
imposed by NRC in that situation?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Not to date.
Mr. TS0NGAS. Has NRC imposed penalties on anyone so far?
Mr. CHAPMAN. There have been a number of penalties imposed in
the reactor area. I am not familiar with those. Perhaps Mr. Case is.
We have not, so far as I know, imposed any penalties in the fuel-cy-
cle support piants, yet.
Mr. CASE. There have been a number of fines. I do not remember
the details but there have beenthousands of dollars worth of fines.
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Mr. TSONGAS. In a situation like Erwin where there was, com-
pletely, a breakdown of the system, what level of fine would you be
imposing?
Mr. CASE. It would be, I think, in the same category of fines that
we have imposed so far, thousands of dollars for violations in that
category.
Mr. TSONGAS. Give me a ball park figure.
Mr. CASE. $5,000, $10,000, in that range.
Mr. TSONGAS. If I were operating a plant and it cost me $5,000
for a violation and $20,000 for a guard, don't the economics suggest
that you take the chances?
Mr. CASE. No, sir. It is not the fine that is the real penalty. The
real penalty is the public notoriety and the public pressure. That is
one of the things that results from NRC imposing these fines, a lot
of newspaper publicity, and that by far is a more expensive penalty
on the company.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Let me correct something I said. Mr. Page tells me
that in 1974 there were two fuel cycle plants that received penalties
of a few thousand dollars because they failed to implement the
revised security procedures at that time quickly enough and they
were fined. So I was correct in saying I did not know of any. There
were two in 1974.
Mr. TSONGAS. If the suggestion is what deters is not financial pen-
alty but rather publicity, when you find something do you call a
press conference and announce that to the local media?
Mr. CASE. We issue a press announcement; yes, sir. I don't know
that in each case we call a press conference, but a news release is
made and phoned to the news services.
I should poiut out, Mr. Chairman, if these techniques don't work,
we, of course, have the authority to shut down a facility and revoke
its license.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver. I yield to you.
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Case, in responding to Congressman Miller's
question about the spent fuel storage loss of coolant you said you
could come up with a firehose if you want to.
Mr. CASE. I am saying we have alternative systems available. If
that alternative does not work you could use a firehose. I am trying
to characterize the degree of the problem rather than saying this is
the way we would take care of the problem.
Mr. WEAVER. I think I would rest a lot easier to know that the
firehose is not all that stands between us.
Mr. Chapman, the subcommittee has received information to the
effect that no one knows how much scrap 11-235 has been shipped
from Erwin to the burial ground in Mound, Ky. Is this correct? No
one knows how much scrap 11-235 has been shipped from Erwin to
the burial grounds in Mound, Ky., is this incorrect?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think that must be incorrect. All of those ship-
ments are measured. I don't know how that statement could be
made.
Mr. WEAVER. Would you check and submit that for the record?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Surely.
Mr. TSONGAS. So ordered.
PAGENO="0177"
173
[The information referred to is as follows:]
NRC personnel know of no occurrence where waste material for land burial
was not measured prior to shipment. NFS management has also stated that it
knows of no such occurrence. NFS stated further that no shipments have been
made to the burial facility at Morehead, Ky., in the last 2 years; during this
period, shipments have been made to the burial facility in Barnwell, S.C.
The amount of special nuclear material-uranium or plutonium-in a waste
shipment is very small and the quantity is computed on the basis of an instru-
inent scan of the gamma activity emanating from the container. This technique
gives the most accurate measurement obtainable; however, in an absolute
sense it is somewhat crude. Since the, amount of special nuclear material is
quite small in a container for burial-the NFS-established economic limit is 5
grams plutonium or 15 grams uranium-235 per 55-gallon drum-the inaccuracy
of the measurement is not significant for material accountability purposes.
Mr. WEAVER. Are you aware of an incident where labeling on bar-
rels containing scrap, I assume scrap TJ-235, was washed off?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I am sorry. Am I aware of-
Mr. WEAVER. Are you aware of, an incident where labeling on bar-
r&s containing scrap was washed off?
Mr. CHAPMAN. No, I am not.
Mr. WEAVER. How could you check that? If you would, do a check
of that, Mr. Chapman.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Yes, I will.
Mr. TSONGA5. So ordered.
[The information referred to is as follows:]
Prior to September 1969, a large number of drums containing uranium and
plutonium scrap were stored outside at NFS-Erwin. While stored outside, the
labels or tags containing identification and inventory information for some
drums became illegible or detached. At inventory, therefore, these drums had
to be reidentified or reweighed, and the amount of material redetermined.
Although there were no overall NRC regulations prohibiting outside storage
at the time, the NFS license was cOnditioned to prohibit outside storage of
scrap in certain forms and concentrations. Based on inspections in late 1968
* and early 1969, NFS was cited on two occasions for noncompliance with these
license conditions.
Since September 1969 all drums containing scrap at NFS-Erwin have been
stored inside.
Mr. TSONGAS. The issue of vehicles was brought up earlier. To put
it in lay terms, could you corn~are the safety of a Brinks armored
car, for example, vis-a-vis the transportation vehicle containing
nuclear materials?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Again, I would like to generalize the answer, if I
can. Many shipments of nuclear materials are made in all different
kinds of containers and vehicles all the way from radioisotopes,
heart pacers, all sorts of things. So I am not sure what we are talk-
ing about.
Now, we talked a minute ago about spent fuel coming in a 100-ton
cask. When plutonium is shipped by air, those containers have a cer-
tain size and integrity.
I would like to deal with the specific part of that but I am not
sure how to unless we generalize the answer, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let's take prçbably the most dangerous situation
which would be plutonium without having been comixed with very
radioactive materials which is then handled by a person with a
glove-something in that magnitude.
71-074 0 - 76 - 12
PAGENO="0178"
174
Mr. CHAPMAN. The normal shipments, for example, of reactor
fuel. When I earlier corrected my testimony, the reason was because
EIRDA handles something like 94 percent of all the material moving
in the so-called commercial sector-most of which is related to
national security programs and are considered classified shipments.
EIRDA is preparing to ship those in specially designed trucks with
unique guard arrangements and so on, and I think Admiral Lyons
can address that this afternoon in more detail.
In the commercial sector for the other percentage, again using the
same base with which fuel is being shipped, I would say the security
on the truck shipments is probably equivalent to a Brinks shipment,
although I am not sure about the penetrability of the vehicle itself.
At the moment I would say the vehicle itself perhaps might be no
more penetrable than a Brinks armored truck.
Mr. TSONGAS. Your response to a number of inquiries has been
that the matter is under study and that recommendations will be
forthcoming. It would suggest that there is a consensus that what
exists now is not adequate, it has to be dealt with.
I would ask that the staff distill from the testimony those various
areas and that in x months from now we come back and see indeed
what improvements have been made.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Seiberling.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you.
iMir. Chapman, we discussed the possibility of diversion, theft, or
hijacking of the spent fuel going from the plants to reprocessing
plants, from powerpiants to reprocessing plants. After the reprocess-
ing takes place, there is a considerable amount of waste materials
left over at the reprocessing plants, is that correct?
Mr. CHAPMAN. That is correct.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Where is that disposed of and under what physi-
cal form is it?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Let me say, Mr. Seiberling, we do not have any
operable reprocessing plants in the commercial sector today, so we
have none that are operating.
Let me hypothesize that if we did have plants operating we would
again be dealing with two forms of waste that you mentioned ear-
lier, the low-level waste that is created incidentally to the reprocess-
ing operation, that normally in the past has been disposed of in con-
tainers and buried.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Buried at the plantsite?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Generally at the plantsite. We are relooking at
that, as you perhaps have heard, based upon some experience in the
GAO study of the Maxey Flats burial grounds situation and some
other places. So we are relooking at that technique. The wastes are
generally buried in large tanks underground near the plants.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Tinder any kind of security?
Mr. CHAPMAN. During the burial or long-term security?
Mr. SEIBERLING. Afterward?
Mr. CHAPMAN. No. There is no long-term physical security outside
of the physical security provided by the general plantsite. There are
not guards on location at the burial sites.
Mr. SETBERLING. But these are in such a dispersed form that there
would be no point in someone trying to use them for terrorist pur-
poses, is that what you are saying?
PAGENO="0179"
1,5
Mr. CHAPMAN. Let me again try to see if I can describe that. The
low-level wastes are like coveralls and glove box things and pieces of
material that somehow were associated with the operation at one
time and have been discarded. There are other kinds of low-level
wastes that are generated directly from the pieces of the equipment
that might have come out of the radioactive area. Those are, I
would say, of no value to anyone. They are discarded. They are cov-
ered in drums and then the trenches are dug and these things are
buried.
There is another category in which there is a higher level of
radioactivity. Momentarily, those kinds of wastes are placed in very,
very large steel containers, underground, very massive structures. I
don't know how anyone could do anything with that. It is usually in
liquid form. One of the questions being addressed by both ERDA
and ourselves is the question of solidifying that to reduce the
volume and then finding a permanent storage arrangement for it. I
just don't believe it is susceptible to any kind of sabotage.
Mr. SEIBERLING. How large ai~e the containers in the process of
being transported to the storage location, or is this done through
pipes?
Mr. CHAPMAN. A lot of that is done through pipes. I am not sure
that I know of any-Does anyone in my group know the answer to
that question? Do you know?
The question was: How large are the containers by which high-
level wastes are removed from the reprocessing plants to the storage?
I will try to get an answer to that. I am not sure.
[Response to the question follows:]
There are presently no containers designed for the shipment of high level
wastes from reprocessing plants to storage. Containers are expected to be simi-
lar to those used to ship irradiated fuel assemblies. Such a cask is expected to
be cylindrical in shape, approximately 2 meters in diameter and 5 meters long
and will weigh up to 110 metric tons. Each container is expected to have a
capacity of 60 to 75 cubic feet of solidified high level waste contained in 9 to
12 canisters within the cask. Approximately 2 cubic feet of high level wastes
are generated per metric ton of fuel reprocessed.
Mr. SEIBERLING. The thrust of my question is whether these could
1)e seized by some group and again secreted somewhere and used as
the means of some sort of threats to a concentrated population area.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I suppose it is likely, but I would question-
Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you mean, likely or possible?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think it is possible. I would question the motiva-
tion. I thank you for the correction. I am sitting here trying to rec-
ollect. It seems to me that at Barnwell waste materials move
through piping to underground storage. I am reminded that it is
inside, as I think about it, it is inside the plant's security perimeter,
so in that sense there is some security. I can certainly try to answer
that question more specifically.~ I just do not know. I am trying to
recall now. I think in the Barnwell case it is inside as I mentioned.
Mr. SEIBERLING. And if techniques were developed to solidify it I
suppose it would be in the form of concrete blocks of some sort?
Mr. CHAPMAN. There are a number of techniques. The one that
apparently is going to be the approved technique in Europe is to put
it in the form of silicone glass,~ as opposed to concrete.
PAGENO="0180"
176
One of the things we are looking at in this country is the cement
approach. I am not sure which ERDA will eventually choose.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Will these be very heavy and large?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The solidification itself would not necessarily make
it large but I think the surrounding containment of the solidified
form would make it fairly massive; ye~, sir.
Mr. SEIBERLING. These would be in steel or lead containers or some-
thing like that?
Mr. CHAPMAN. They will have to be in some kind of containment
which then itself will have to be buried in some kind of disposal
area.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Miller.
Mr. MILLER. In the report that you have mentioned in your state-
ment regarding sabotage, acts of terrorism, if I read it correctly you
deal with the question of whether a number of people from the outside
of a plant gain entrance into that plant to do some form of destruc-
tion, not in the delivery of services but in disrupting the operation
of the plant so as to expose the core to the meltdown process, is that
correct, and/or whether they could do that in collusion with two or
three people inside of the facility. Did that study look at whether or
not in the very simplest of forms that we have seen repeated time
and again throughout this country of a single person's act of sabo-
tage against its employer could result in that happening to the com-
mercial facility?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The answer to your question is "Yes." We did look
at that.
Mr. CASE. We have Dr. Roger Mattson from the NRC Office of
Standards Development which is resoponsible for the study to
answer the question.
Dr. MATTSON. My name is Roger Mattson. I am Director, Division
of Siting, Health, and Safeguards Standards in the Office of Stand-
ards Development at NRC.
Let me make sure I understand the question first. You are speak-
ing of the Sandia study on reactor vulnerability that is mentioned
in Mr. Chapman's testimony?
Mr. MILLER. Yes.
Dr. MATTSON. The study is a classified study.
The people did look at internal acts of sabotage in addition to
people coming in from the outside and trying acts of sabotage. It
was a study which primarily looked at systems, that is valves,
pumps, pieces of equipment, electrical supply. The basic question
posed in the study was: What could you break or sabotage and
cause damage to the reactor facility?"
In a short answer, it makes little difference whether the person
attempting sabotage comes from the inside or from the outside,
except if he comes from the outside you have longer to deter him,
but the actual sabotage action he takes is not different.
Mr. MILLER. What did you find in terms of what was available to
break, sabotage, destroy, that would lead to the kind of vulnerability
that we are concerned about, or that you might be concerned about?
Dr. MATTSON. Sandia found that because of the diversity of safety
PAGENO="0181"
177
systems and the separation of safety systems, one individual would
be hard pressed to come up with the proper placement of charges-
in a way that was not observed by other people-to cause damage to
the reactor.
Mr. MILLER. Does that include someone who is, in fact, an
employee for the purposes of operating and has the technical under-
standing of the operation of the plant?
Dr. MATTSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. MILLER. What about the testimony we had yesterday that at
least in one facility of this country all of the electrical systems in-
cluding the backup systems run through one room, if you will, or
one operation? There is no separation?
Dr. MArrsoN. If those specifics are true we still have security sys-
tems which require that the individual is searched, that he is
observed, and that he be granted: access to the vital area. He could
not do it alone.
Mr. MILLER. I wonder if that is the room he is employed to work
in.
Dr. MATTSON. The room you speak of, if it exists, has no one in it.
It is a vital area, and it is locked and alarmed; to obtain access to
the room there would have to be other people there and you would
have to be searched before entering.
Mr. MILLER. Is that also true of the control room? What of those
individuals who are in the so-called control room?
Dr. MATTSON. Generally there is more than one individual in
the control room, so individuals ~: are under constant observation. In
addition, reactor operators are licensed by NRC; they are trained;
they are subject to background : investigations; their behavior pat-
terns are monitored by coworkers; and access to the control room
must be granted.
Mr. MILLER. Is the ability within access in the control room to
cause that kind of vulnerability to the core?
Dr. MATTSON. For one man?
Mr. MILLER. For one man.
Dr. MATTSON. No, we have looked at that.
Mr. MILLER. Yesterday we heard testimony of the study that was
presented to, I believe, the Joint Committee on the military side of
nuclear materials in terms, .1 believe, related also to arms that some
3,600 people were released because of mental instability, alcoholism,
drugs, other personal habits that made them a risk, obviously on
their job. What do we know about the employees in commercial
establishments running nuclear generating plants?
Mr. CASE. I don't believe we have any statistics on that.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Let me respond to that. We are not, per se, keep-
ing records on individual employees across the industry. On the
other hand, those employees who work in certain facilities where
clearances are required, are given the same screening as they are
given in ERDA or the military.
Mr. MILLER. Is that Southern California Edison-if you are going
to work inside the plant there is that the kind of Q and L security
clearance you have to have?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I don't know what clearance requirements are
imposed.
PAGENO="0182"
178
Mr. CASE. We don't have class Q and L requirements.
Mr. MILLER. Who is responsible for that?
Mr. CASE. The company is.
Mr. MILLER. In that case that would be-I don't want to type Cal-
ifornia Edison~ or \Tepco or whoever it is. They are the operators of
that plant. They are responsible for the screening and maintenance
of their personnel or would they in some instances do that on con-
tract with General Electric or Westinghouse?
Mr. CASE. I would not think they would do it. The utilities are
responsible for the screening of their personnel. Our regulations
require that be done.
Mr. MILLER. What do we know about those people? I mean if we
know that on the military side if in fact that study, and I want to
make that clear I am not prepared to buy that is factually correct or
anything else, it was simply brought up in testimony, here we con-
tinue to talk about sabotage in terms of whether it is going to be the
black liberation group or SLA or some demented person, and yet we
saw a sailor throw a monkey wrench into the turbines of an aircraft
carrier because he wanted to stay in Alameda instead of going out
to sea. I suspect he had some other problems, but he did it and all
hell broke loose. We have seen that happen time and again across
this country. You see reports of major construction jobs in Alaska,
the pipeline, where maybe up to $1 billion of material has been
stolen, sabotaged, by workers.
So my concern is whether or not we have spent-I am impressed
with what you said in terms of the controls on the facilities access
and so forth, themselves, but my concern is what we really know
about these people. You know. I think we have some idea in the
Congress or at least we believe that the military in terms of screen-
ing people who sit in the silos around this country are kind of spe-
cial people, that their activities are monitored, that we know a great
deal about them, and they are watching one another. Again, they are
dealing with a slightly different object than the nuclear generating
plant. But I would be concerned when we know the rather frighten-
ing statistics about alcoholism, about drug use among executives, if
you will, or among highly skilled people, it is rather frightening. I
think the public ought to know who is in charge of these facilities
because maybe it need not be some romantic, infantile revolutionary
group that has to try to come over the fence may be it is just as is-
enchanted or severely disturbed individual who could lay that plant
to waste.
Mr. CASE. As we have already pointed out, Mr. Miller, any one
person cannot do that. I hope that came through to you.
Mr. MILLER. That is the agreement of this panel, that no single
individual could lay one of these plants away except some guy with
a candle did at Brown's Ferry.
Mr. CASE. He caused a lot of damage but there was no release of
radioactivity.
Mr. MILLER. And the system failed on schedule, 1 in 60,000 hours,
I understand all of that, but let's back up a little bit.
To place the system in that vulnerable state, is that possible?
Could a single individual once again start a Brown's Ferry fire, an
PAGENO="0183"
19
employee who understood where the cables were and the running of
the facility?
Mr. CASE. I can't say that is impossible, sir, because it obviously
happened.
Mr. MILLER. That was an accident. I understand that was an acci-
dent. There was no intent.
Mr. CASE. It could have been done deliberately. The thrusts of our
safeguard regulations are to protect public health and safety and
not the investment of the utility. So your sailor who throws the
monkey wrench in the main gears; he is ruining an investment, he is
not harming public health and safety so there is not a one-to-one
correspondence with our problem here.
Mr. MILLER. I understand that. But for the employee who might
light the insulation on fire, he may be doing both, he may be strik-
ing out at the utility.
Mr. CASE. I am no psychologist but it takes quite a different men-
tality to deliberately harm a number of people than to take care of
an investment problem.
Mr. MILLER. There is some assumption in that statement that a
person rationally thought out the throwing of the monkey wrench.
Mr. CASE. Yes, sir; there is.
Mr. MILLER. Your intent may be to `strike out at the Vepco or
anybody else, but the results may be other than that.
My question is: What is the degree of vulnerability?
I am happy that Brown's Ferry did not melt down but I *d'on't
think we would want to go through that again. I am sure the indus-
try would not be terribly excited because it is sort of like the oil
spill, it causes a lot more headaches than cleaning up the beaches.
Mr. CASE. And we are not satisfied with the safety margins that
were left after that fire so we are taking steps to increase the safety
margins, even though there was no harm. We want more margins
and we are taking steps.
Mr. MILLER. I understand that and so you are going to do a better
job in the backup and the reliability of the systems but my question
is the ability of an individual to call those systems into use. They
may all work and we will all applaud that they work but what is
the ability of one individual to Call the systems into use I think is a
very serious question because if he can start that process~
Mr. CASE. The system is automatic, so we are not relying on indi-
viduals in emergencies to make needed systems work. But we are
getting into safety problems as distinguished from sabotage prob-
lems, I think.
Mr. MILLER. I don't think so., For yesterday and this morning we
have treated sabotage as an exotic subject. It may not be that exotic
because we see it repeated time, and again across this country. Just
ask General Motors how many cars come off that assembly line that
have been intentionally sabotaged. What is the distinction in the cal-
iber of person and what `do we know about the person who is
responsible for running the generators and `these plants as opposed
to that which you like to believe is `some ordinary assembly line
operator or construction worker, that there is some distinction; and
I want to know is in fact that really true?
PAGENO="0184"
180
Mr. CHAPMAN. Let me respond to that.
I think there is a problem of understanding here that comes from
the fact that we believe that the nuclear systems are inherently safe,
they are designed that way. The probability of a catastrophic event
is very small.
Now, if one wants to hypothesize that an individual would try to
go through the sequence of events, it is possible, it is possible that an
employee could do that. It has no bearing in my mind to any kind
of industrial situation because the plants have no relationship to
ships or cars or General Motors production lines. They are quite dif-
ferent. The degree of difficulty is much, much higher in the nuclear
field than it would be in other normal industrial situations.
Now, we have been looking at, and there are very strong pros and
cons, as you well know. Congressman, we are looking at clearing,
putting a much stronger clearance program into effect in this indus-
try. But I might point out that you don't know who is working your
water supply. There are a lot of other risks in this business and to
single out nuclear as the fall guy in this business of public risk is, in
my mind, unfortunate. We are trying to put all of that in perspec-
tive and we are looking at clearing employees.
Mr. MILLER. I appreciate that. It is very clear that I don't know
who is working in my water supply or who is working in the Camp-
bell Soup factory or Bon Vivant's soup or whatever it will tell you
about the problems. But to say that I don't know who is working in
the water factory, that I should not care who is working in the
nuclear plant is proper because I do want to know who is working
there.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I agree with you.
Mr. MILLER. If you tell me that you are undergoing consideration
of clearances, of periodic testing and so forth, and background of
these people, I think that is important to know. Because we are told
time and again that the system itself on the drawing board as it sits
there on the site is inherently safe and that you have this very low
probability of anything happening that is going to damage the
public.
Then you interject the human element, whether it is the Browns
Ferry fire, whether it is the guy forgetting to report how fast the
waste was running out in Washington, or all of these minor errors
that end up in accidents. The question is, then, for the most respon-
sible people who are in charge of running that, what are the stand-
ards that we set.
I think that is my question. I am not quarreling with you. My
question is whether or not you have considered that, whether or not
you are undertaking that kind of evaluation.
Mr. CHAPMAN. As I say, we already have certain clearance
requirements on the fuel cycle side and we are looking at clearance
requirements on the power side.
Mr. TSONGA5. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MILLER. I will be happy to.
Mr. T50NGA5. Dr. DeNike testified yesterday, secret testimony to
Congress revealed that during the single year more than 3,600 per-
sons with access to atomic weapons were removed from their jobs
PAGENO="0185"
181
because of drug abuse, mental illness, alcoholism, or emotional prob-
lems. Thirty-six hundred is a lot of people in a single year. There
are other examples that he gave including the Indian Point arson,
an example of the chief security Officer of the AEC in his $239,000
g~ambling problem, et cetera, that there are examples, it has
happened.
I think it should be taken very seriously.
I would ask unanimous consent that the staff questions relative to
the studies that have been done be submitted in the record at this
point, and that at some subsequent point we will hear testimony
from you as to exactly where we stand.
[The staff questions with responses from NRC follow:]
PAGENO="0186"
182
UNITED STATES
~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~ (11 9 WASHINGTON D. C. 20555
Honorable Paul E. Tsongas
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
U. S. House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Tsongas:
In your letter of March 18, 1976, you requested the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to provide answers to nineteen questions
related to the recent hearings held by the House Interior and
Insular Mfa~ors Subcommittee. The Commission is pleased to
provide the requested information which is enclosed.
We trust that the additional information will satisfactorily
answer the Subcommittee's questions.
Sincerely,
Lee V. Gossick
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
NRC Response to Questions
from the House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee
PAGENO="0187"
183
NRC RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
FROM THE HOUSE INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
1. How does NRC rate the likelihood of sabotage, vis-a-vis theft?
RESPONSE:
There are no objective means for assessing the relative likelihood
of sabotage versus theft. Adversary motivation, objectives, and
tactics would be significantly different for either act, but
current NRC safeguards regulations are designed to prevent both
successful theft and a successful sabotage. In addition, NRC is
continually evaluating and, where necessary, strengthening safeguards
to meet changing requirements. In the analysis cf current or future
requirements, either event (sabotage~or theft) is assumed equally likely.
2. How does NRC rate the likelihood of a group gaining access to a
facility by assault vis-a-vis gaining entry by subterfuge? By use
of hostages? By inside assistance?
RESPONSE:
Assessment of the likelihood of a group gaining access to a facility
by one method or another is a very difficult and subjective problem,
being highly dependent on the type and size of assault vis-a-vis the
type and subtlety of the subterfuge, etc. With regard to assault,
subterfuge, or inside assistance, current safeguards provide a relatively
balanced deterrent against each act. In the case of hostages, however,
some unique problems exist and these problems are being examined at the
present time.
In accordance with PL 93-~~38, NRC is "developing. . .contingency plans
for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear
materials, high-level radioactive wastes, and nuclear facilities....'1.
These safeguards contingency plans are based on the assumption that any
of the abcve actions (plus many others) are possible.
3. What does NRC consider the greatest threat? Terrorists (foreign or
domestic)? Organized crime? Criminals bent on extortion? Psychotics?
RESPONSE:
There is no information available to NRC which indicates that any group
is planning an act of theft or sabotage against the licensed nuclear
industry at this time. Certainly, any of the above threats are capable
of attempting to sabotage a facility or steal nuclear materials. Current
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184
safeguards, as well as planned improvements, are' based on the assumption
that any of the above threats are possible. It is also important to
realize that, although different groups exist which sight pose a threat
to nuclear facilities, there are only a limited number of general tactics
available, e.g., armed assault, inside covert diversion (small amounts -
at a time) or theft, hurling explosives over a plant boundary, placing
explosives inside the boundary, etc. NRC's approach is to safeguard
against the possible modes of theft or sabotage instead of one or
another specific groups, although continued study of terrorist groups is
important to understanding possible specific tactics.
What kinds of resources, expertise, and capabilities are assumed to be
possessed by threatening persons or groups?
RESPONSE:
NRC feels that it is possible that adversaries may possess any of the
following:
~Q1~I~MENT
Semi-automatic pistols and rifles
Automatic pistols and rifles
Sub-machine guns
Shot guns
Hand grenades
Machine guns (up to 50 caliber)
Dynamite
Plastic explosives
Shaped charges
Citizen band radios
Two-way radios
General and special purpose vehicles
Aircraft (fixed-wing and helicopter)
Tear gas, MACE, etc.
* Light mortars
* Hand held air-defense weapons
* Light anti-tank weapons
* NOTE: While not as readily available as the other items, these
are known to be available to terrorist groups.
INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM SKILLS
Nuclear materials identification and handling
Radiation monitoring and safety
Communications
PAGENO="0189"
185
Intelligence and security (reconnaissance, surveillance and alarm
systems, etc.)
Tactical operaticns (combat experience)
Pioneer (demolition, structure and barrier breeching)
Transportation
Managerial
Terrorist groups (especially foreign) and organized crime are well
known to have adequate resources to mount highly organized, well-
planned, and extremely violent and disruptive acts. Therefore, NRC
feels that it is prudent to assume that potential adversaries might
possess any of the above described resources, expertise, and
capabilities.
5. What is the NRC position regarding the plausibility of the threats
specified in the MITRE threat analysis? Does the NRC believe, for
example, that it is necessary to protect nuclear power plants from
sabotage by conspiracies planned and/or supported by foreign powers
such as the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba?
RESPONSE:
The following statement appears in the Conclusion of the MITRE study:
"There is no possible, simple, numeridal characterization of the threat
to licensed facilities. . . .The threat is intrinsically complicated,
being linked to the ingenuity of the threatener." In fact, the MITRE
study makes no mention of a set of specific threats, instead looking
first at general vulnerabilities of licensed nuclear facilities to
sabotage and theft (in general), and then speculating on the possibility
that various groups (foreign and domestic) might pose a general threat
against nuclear facilities.
Concerning the possibility of sabotage by foreign planned and/or supported
conspiracies, NRC has developed and is continuing to improve a safeguards
system designed to prevent the sabotage of nuclear facilities (or the
theft or diversion of SNM) by ~py grdup regardless of their motives,
political ties, etc. NRCs safeguards are based upon the presumption
that continued civil order will exist in the United States, and, therefore,
the safeguards measures which must exist in the public sector of our
society will not be designed to repel armies, air strikes, or other
actions normally associated with conventional warfare. NRC's safeguards
are, however, designed to thwart highly sophisticated internally and
externally mounted acts, regardless of the adversary group involved.
These safeguards are being continually evaluated and improved as required.
6. What is the NRC policy regarding classification of safeguards informa-
tion? What assumptions underlay this policy? How was it arrived at?
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RESPONSE:
The NRC believes that certain sensitive safeguards information
should be classified as National Security Information. Presently
we are so classifying any report which discloses vulnerabilities
of particular plants to theft or sabotage on the ground that the
information bears directly on the effectiveness of our national
defense and the conduct of our foreign relations, and requires
restraint on disclosure in the interest of national security and
the safety of our people, and to protect against actions hostile
to the United States (see Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972
37FR52O9). The decision to classify this information was dictated
by the nature of the information and the requirements of the
Executive Order.
We are aaso awaiting a decision of the National Security Council
as to other types of sensitive safeguards information which may
need to be classified. In the interim, we are withholding from
public disclosure as proprietary data, under the provisions of
10 CFR 2.790(d) and 10 CFR 9.5(a)(14), all correspondence and
reports to and from NRC which identify a licensee's or applicant's
control and accounting procedures for safeguarding special nuclear
material or detailed security measures for physical protection of a
licensed facility.
7. What did Mr. Builder mean in his memorandum when he wrote that he,
`was concerned that some or even many of currently licensed facilities
may not have safeguards which are adequate against the lowest level
of design threat. . ." being considered by the NRC?
RESPONSE:
Over the past year the NRC has had underway, through numerous avenues,
a review of current safeguards regulations. This review has involved
several major studies, extensive contacts with other federal agencies
and individual experts, and nuclear facility visits. The purpose of
this activity has been twofold: to judge the effectiveness of present
safeguards arrangements, and to evaluate the merits of and need for
new concepts in the future treatment of safeguards for special nuclear
material. Mr. Builder's memorandum of January 19 reflects the develop-
ment and examination of new conceptual approaches that would involve
threat-specific criteria for the evaluation of safeguards. It served to
place his staff on notice that threat-specific criteria might be utilized
in the future for judging the adequacy of safeguards. Mr. Builder was
expressing a concern in his memorandum that current safeguards systems
at licensed facilities were not designed against specific threat criteria.
Thus, ~`1r. Builder was expressing an analytical rather than an operational
concern about the adequacy of current safeguards.
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8. In answering a question with regard to the memorandum in which he
expressed his concern about the adequacy of existing safeguards, Mr.
Builder noted that he was alerting the Safeguards Division to the
existence of new analytical tools. What are those tools and what in-
sights did they provide which enabled Mr. Builder to make a judgement
which he had not previously been able to make; e.g., that, ". . .currently
licensed facilities may not have safeguards which are adequate against
the lowest levels of design threat we are considering in GESMO,"?
RESPONSE:
Mr. Builder was referring to the logic which has been found and the
structures which have been assembled during the past year for viewing
and defining the safeguards concern.
The application of system analysis techniques led to specific insights
as to how safeguards problems can best be solved. For example, it is
helpful to think of safeguards objectives in terms of sub-goals;
preventing ,thefts, guarding against sabotage, assuring swift and adequate
response to theft or sabotage, and providing timely information to the
public.
Systematic approaches were developed to assess range of threats, levels
of defense, and severity of consequences. After considerable analysis
and debate, a body of safeguards policies is emerging which the staff
believe to be logical, rational, and explainable. Examples of these
general precepts are listed below.
- Safeguards should take into account the nature of material to
be protected.
- Depending on the nature of material or sensitivity of the plant
to be guarded, there may be at least three degrees of physical
protection measures utilized: (1) defense with a very high degree
of assurance, (2) protection with sufficient force to deter by
imposing substantial and apparent risks, and (3) surveillance
and notification of authorities.
- Accompanying physical protection systems should be material
control systems to guard against covert diversion. Material
control strategies can be considered in three categories;
containment, access controls, and accounting systems.
- NRC and industry share the responsibility for assuring that
adequate safeguards are applied to nuclear activities.
- U.S. safeguards controls musl~ consider international policy.
In his memorandum, Mr. Builder was pointing out that the framework was
at hand for assessing the adequacy of safeguards systems. In that
regard, he expressed concern, that safeguards at some existing facilities
may not be completely consistent with the new analytical frameworks and
assessment criteria.
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9. In his testimony, Mr. Pollard suggested that some reactors were
particularly vulnerable to sabotage. What steps are being taken.
to determine whether Mr. Pollard's allegations in this area have
merit? To the extent that such vulnerabilities do exist, what
steps are being taken to eliminate them?
RESPONSE:
Mr. Pollard's allegations "that some reactors were particularly
vulnerable to sabotage" appear to relate to the routing of electrical
control and monitor wiring. The wiring paths start from sensing
devices on reactor system components and typically lead through
cable spreading areas to the control room. Cable spreading rooms
are recognized as areas which are vulnerable to both fire and
sabotage. -
Although the layout of wiring in cable spreading rooms is such that
the probability of a single detonating device succeeding in the
disabling of all control and monitor systems is very low, multiple
devices placed in carefully selected locations or widespread fire
would be considered to have a somewhat greater chance of success.
However, the disabling of all control circuits leading into a control
room does not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of the reactor.
As a consequence of the Browns Ferry fire, the staff Is re-examining
all aspects of fire protection in cable spreading rooms, including
`fire detection and suppression systems. These provisions will also
offer increased protection against certain kinds of potential acts
of sabotage. In addition, cable spreading rooms are among those areas
within a plant which are defined as vital areas, and as such, are
subject to specific physical security requirements, e.g., doors to
the area are normally locked and are equipped with alarms that annunciate
in at least two places that are continuously manned so that surreptitious
entry by unauthorized persons is unlikely to occur.
10. When did the NRC first learn of material accounting problems at Erwin,
Tennessee? What steps were taken to remedy these deficiencies? On
what date were these steps taken? When and how did NRC learn that
there was an honor system in effect to detect theft of uranium at Erwin?
What did NRC do, and on what date did the NRC take steps to replace the
honor system with more thorough protective measures? What confidence
is there that material has not been stolen from this facility?
RESPONSE:
NFS notified the NRC regional office of the accounting discrepancy
on December 1, 1975. NFS agreed to shutdown the production and scrap
processing plants for reinventory and investigation of th~problems. The
production plant was shutdown on December 1; the scrap recovery plant was
PAGENO="0193"
189
shutdown on December 18 after the scrap from the production plant was
processed to a more amenable measurement form. During the reinventory
period, NFS discovered plugged lines man accountability tank in the
scrap recovery plant. These plugged lines could have affected the
representativeness of accountability samples, which, In turn, could
have affected the physical inventory results for both plants. NRC
Inspectors were at the site to observe the reinventories, review the
investigation results, and review the physical protection practices at
the facility.
In March 1974, certain licensees, including NFS, were required to
implement methods to search individuals exiting material access areas
to assure that special nuclear material is not diverted. During an
onsite visit January 13-15, 1976, an NRC Task Force noted that exit
searches from material access areas were conducted on an honor basis.
The licensee was informed verbally on January 23, 1976 and In writing
on January 26, 1976 to station a watchman at each authorized exit point
to assure that proper searches were conducted. Corrective action was
promptly taken by NFS.
NRC has no evidence that special nuclear material has been stolen from
NFS. With respect to overt attempts to steal special nuclear material,
the NRC believes there were none, but there have been two cases where
unauthorized entry was gained to protected areas. In those cases, the
entries were promptly detected and the intruders did not attempt to
penetrate interior protective barriers.
11. Is NRC aware of any long standing proF~lems in accounting for material at
the Erwin scrap reco~ery facility? The Subcommittee has received informa-
tion to the effect that no one knows how much scrap U-235 has been shipped
from Erwin to the burial ground at Mound, Kentucky. Is there validity to
this report? Is NRC aware of an incident where labelling on barrels
containing waste was washed off with the result that a substantial uncer-
tainty was introduced concerning the amount of material sent to the burial
ground?
RESPONSE:
In May L974, new regulatory requirements for physical Inventories and
associated nuclear measurements became effective. The NRC staff is and
has been aware that NFS has had difficulty in meeting the new require-
ments especially in the scrap recovery plant. Continued improvements
in material control and accounting practices and physical security plans
have been required of NFS and have been monitored by the NRC staff.
Prior to mid-1970, NFS was not required to report to the AEC the quantity
of U-235 waste shipped to burial. They were, however, required to main-
tain records at the plant of such quantities. Since 1970, NFS has reported
to the AEC (now NRC) the quantity of waste U-235 shipped to burial.
71-074 0 - 76 - 13
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190
The NRC staff is not aware of an incident at NFS which resulted in substan-
tial uncertainty about the amount, of U-235 waste sent to burial due to
labels being washed off drums. A waste drum may not be sent to burial
until its U-235 content is measured and source documents have been generated
and maintained by NFS.
12. What does the Erwin experience indicate with regard to the ability to
account for nuclear materials?
RESPONSE:
The Erwin experience indicates that there continue to be basic and
inherent limitations on the techniques for accurately accounting for
special nuclear material. These limitations are caused by the uncer-
tainties associated with the measurement of nuclear materials. Because
of these measurement uncertainties, inventory discrepancies will continue
to occur in nuclear operations, particularly in plants where chemical pro-
cessing and scrap recovery are required. At the same time, however, the
Erwin exper'ience demonstrated that the accounting system can be an important
means of detecting and identifying malfunctions in the control system for
SNM. The need for designing prompt internal control systems to continuously
track the location and movement of SNM through item control and the monitoring
of in-process control parameters was indicated.
Finally, it is apparent that at the present time accounting systems cannot
be depended upon exclusively to control nuclear materials. Physical
security, access controls, and containment measures, in addition to
accounting systems are required to assure protection of special nuclear
material.
13. How accurate does NRC expect nuclear material accounting systems to be?
RESPONSE:
Capabilities to exactly account for special nuclear material are limited
by the inherent measurement uncertainties associated with closing material
balances. The following limits on measurement uncertainties for closing
material balances at plants are specified by regulation:
Throughput
Plutonium element or uranium-233 in a chemical
reprocessing plant 1.0%
Uranium element and fissile isotope in a
reprocessing plant 0.7%
Plutonium element, uranium-233, or high enriched
uranium element and fissile isotope-all other 0.5%
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Low enriched uranium element and fissile
isotope-all other 0.5%
Licensees are also required to establish and maintain systems of storage
and internal handling controls to provide current knowledge of the
identity, quantity, and location of all SNM contained within a plant
in discrete items and containers. In addition, shipper-receiver
evaluations are required on all SNM shipments. These programs should
be capable of detecting a loss ofa single item or container of material,
or the diversion of a significant quantity of material from a series of
containers. -
l1~. What is the role of material accounting systems in the overall safeguards
system?
RESPONSE:
The overall safeguards program is made up of a number of diverse and redun-
dant systems which, when combined, are designed to provide a high degree of
protection against the theft or diversion of plutonium and high enriched
uranium. These activities fall into two broad categories: physical
security and material control. Physical security--including physical
barriers, intrusion alarms, and armed guards--provides the first line of
safeguards protection. Material control--comprised of access controls,
containment, and material accounting--reinforce the protection provided
by physical security measures and provides a quantitative basis for material
accountability. Material control measures are especially effective against
internal diversion where the participants have authorized passage through
barriers and access to material in the normal course of business.
The material accounting system can deter and detect, but not prevent the
theft or diversion of material. The accounting system should be capable
of continuously tracking the location and the movement of all discrete items
and containers of SNM on inventory and of monitoring the in-process inven-
tory for indicators of diversion. Through shipper-receiver comparisons,
data monitoring programs, and periodic physical inventory checks, the
accounting system provides positive assurance that SNM is indeed present.
Should a significant loss of material occur, the system should be capable of
identifying the general location and the quantity of material involved. The
accounting system provides backup detection capability for theft and diver-
sion which circumvent detection capabilities provided by physical security
and other material control measures. Internal audits are directed to assur-
ing that records have not been falsified.
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192
Reliance cannot be placed solely on material accounting to detect theft
and diversion because the effectiveness of the system is limited by
timeliness and measurement uncertainties. Inventory discrepancies
caused by measurement uncertainties will continue to occur in nuclear
plants,especially, where chemical processing and scrap recovery are required.
Accordingly, NRC is working on in-depth protection systems to prevent,
deter, detect, and defeat any attempt to illicitly remove nuclear
material from facilities.
15. Is the safeguards system at Erwin capable of providing protection against
the threats being considered in the NRC safeguards studies?
RESPONSE:
The design threats being considered in the NRC safeguards studies are
divided into an internal (diversion) and an external (assault) threat.
Many parameters or considerations must be taken into account in describing
or specifyThg such threats. To simplify these descriptions, it has been
assumed that all of these parameters (e.g., motivation, training, arms,
equipment, employment position, etc.) are fixed at worst-case values with
respect to safeguards, and that the only remaining variable is the number
of people involved in the threat. For a nominal or baseline threat, as a
point of departure, the internal and external threats of two and six persons,
respectively have been assumed. The range of numbers suggested by threat
researchers, expert opinion, and partisan comments generally lie within a
factor of two, up and down, from this baseline specification. Nistorical
data indicate that the number of incidents involving groups of more than six
persons account for only about 2.5 percent of the cases. By far the largest
percentage (86%) involved groups of three persons or fewer.
The exact threat cannot be predicted with confidence, since it is an
inherently uncertain problem and history is an unsure guide to the
future. Nowever, based on currently available evidence and expert opinion,
an attack on nuclear facilities would likely stem from a relatively small
number of persons, possibly aided by an insider. Present nuclear industry
security measures are expected to deter most attacks and to prevent the
success of such attacks as are attempted.
In-depth assessments have recently been completed of the safeguards program
for the protection of special nuclear material at the NFS plant at Erwin,
Tennessee. A number of weaknesses in the security and material control
programs were observed and subsequently corrected. As a result of these actions,
PAGENO="0197"
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it is believed that the safeguards program at the Erwin plant is capable
of providing protection against the threat of attack by a small group,
including a well-planned assault by t1~ree well-trained and equipped
persons, one of whom may be an insider.
16. There have been reports of possible fraudulent manipulation of
records at Erwin, Tennessee. Does the NRC have a special group
for detecting much fraud? If so, what is the experience of the
members of this group? What is the FBI's responsibility? At
what point would the FBI be called in?
RESPONSE.:
The NRC has the expertise to detect manipulation of records for
fraudulent purposes. There is no special group but rather a team
is formed to meet the specific nature of the problem or allegation.
Within the Regional Offices and in Headquarters there are auditors,
production specialists, chemists, and investigators who can be
brought together for special investigations.
Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for investigating
criminal violations of the Act. They are notified by the NRC staff
as soon as there are indications or evidence of illegal activity. It
is their decision and that of the Justice Department as to whether or
not the FBI investigates an incident~.
17. We have received a report that workers at Erwin, Tennessee could have
removed highly enriched uranium through an alarmed but unguarded side
door and have left the premises before the guard at the gate could do
anything about it. Is this report accurate? How long did this
situation exist? What remedial steps were taken and on what date?
RESPONSE:
Safety demands that material access areas contain doors that can be used
as emergency exits. Such doors arenecessarily not locked on the inside
but are alarmed to alert the central alarm station that a door has been
opened. NFS has remained in compliance with this regulatory requirement.
While it would be possible to leave, a material access area through an
emergency exit with SNM, an individual would likely be stopped before
leaving the facility boundary.
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On January 26, 1976, NFS was informed that tamper-indicating seals
were also to be applied to all emergency exits. A search outside
the exit (defined by 100 foot- radius sector) for SNM must be
conducted if a seal is broken.
18. Mr. Chapman testified that calculations indicated that sabotage of
spent fuel would not lead to an ". . extreme hazard outside the
immediate vicinity of where the event might occur." Please provide
the calculations which lead to this conclusion.
RESPONSE:
Assuming a small bore penetration of a spent fuel cask, as might be
produceR by a well constructed shaped charge well coupled to the
external surface of the cask, a conservative estimate of the source
strength for escaping radioactive material has been made to obtain an
upper bound estimate of the radiological doses that might be absorbed
by the surrounding population. For a cask carrying fifty percent more
fuel tl)an is currently authorized, the estimated releases of radioactive
gases and aerosols are 1.6 x lO~ curies of Krypton-85, 0.3 curies of
Iodine-13l, and 1.9 x 103 curies of gross fission products. Assuming
average weather conditions based on Pasquill stability categories A-F,
the whole-body dose to an adult standing 50 meters away and downwind
from the sabotaged cask is estimated to be about 20 rem. The threshold
for noticeable physiological effects from whole-body radiation averages
50 rem. In an area equivalent to a 22.5 degree sector extending from 50
meters to 20 miles, the population dose is estimated to be 2, 20, and 200
person-rem for population densities of 100, 1000, and 10,000 persons/sq.
mi. respectively. Accepting the conclusion of the BEIR report that
the fatality rate is 1.80 x lO~ cancer fatalities/person-rem, the number
of fatalities in a population of density 10,000 persons/sq.mi. does not
exceed one. From these estimates, it may be concluded that sabotage
of a spent fuel cask does not represent an extreme radiological health
hazard.
The calculations are presented in the appendix.
19. During the hearing a Subcommittee member expressed concern that fines
levied for violation of safeguards regulations were insufficient to
constitute a real deterrent. In response to this expression of concern
Mr. Case said:
"The real penalty (for violation of safeguards regulations) is the
public notoriety and the public pressure. That is one of the
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things that results from NRC imposing these fines, a lot of news-
paper publicity, and that by far is a more expensive penalty on
the company."
Does the NRC agree with Mr. Case that the prime deterrent against
these violations is the prospect of adverse publicity? Enumerate
fines levied as a consequence of safeguards violations since
establishment of NRC. What is the rationale for setting fines at
these levels?
RESPONSE:
We believe that licensees suffer from the attendant public notoriety
as well a~ from the monetary penalty; perhaps in some cases the former
has the greater impact. The implication should not be drawn from
Mr. Case's remarks that the civil penalty is the ultimate sanction
available to the NRC staff. The staff has a spectrum of sanctions
which include Notices of Violation, Civil~Penalties and Orders to
show causp why a license should not be modified, suspended or revoked.
The civil monetary penalties fit in the middle of this spectrum. One
of the great impacts that a civil penalty should have on licensees is
an indication that the NRC staff is escalating the enforcement action
and that further acts of similiar noncompliance may result in an
order to suspend or to revoke the license. We believe that this
provides the greatest incentive for the licensee to achieve corrective
action and to prevent future items of noncompliance.
Since January 19, 1975, the NRC has imposed six civil penalties in which
all or part of the items of noncompliance were related to safeguards.
The monetary value of the penalties for safeguards violations is
$1~5,6OO. Additionally, NRC recently issued a notice of intent to impose
civil penalties on a licensee amounting to $26,500 for failure to comply
with safeguards requirements. The rationale for setting fines at these
levels is:
(1) The limits for a civil penalty are established in the Act as
$5,000 for any one violation per day not to exceed $25,000 for
all violations during any 30-day period.
(2) A range of penalties has been established for different types
of licensees based on the quantity, the form, and the strategic
value of the radioactive materialsauthorized in the licenses;
and the potential threat to the health and safety of the public.
(3) In determining the particular amount in any specific instance,
all relevant factors are considered, including the nature and
number of items of noncompliance, the licensee's past performance,
the frequency of noncompliance, the length of time the noncom-
pliance existed, whether the items of noncompliance are repetitive,
the steps taken to correct the noncompliance, and the licensee's
stated intentions or performance in correcting them promptly.
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196
Appendix
18. Mr. Chapman testified that calculations indicated that
sabotage of spent fuel would not lead to an . .extreme
hazard outside the immediate vicinity of where the event
might occur." Please provide the calculations which
lead to this conclusion.
RESPONSE:
Assuming a small bore penetration of the cask (shaped charge),
a conservative'estimate of the source strength for escaping radioactive
material is made to obtain an upper bound estimate of the radiological
doses tht might be absorbed by the surrounding population. Other
conservative estimates, which will be identified later, also enter
the dose calculations. These estimates are called conservative because
they lead to results for radiological doses that are thought to be
too large. Realistic estimates would lead to smaller dose results.
The intention is to show that the upper bound doses are small, at
least for a region of space not too close to the ruptured cask. The
difference between the dose results corresponding to the conservative
and realistic estimates, respectively, then represent safety factors.
The largest of the currently approved spent fuel casks can accommodate
7 fuel elements from a pressurized water reactor (PWR), or 18 fuel
elements from a boiling water reactor (BWR). A PWR element contains
about ~5O kilograms of uranium, and a BWR element contains about 200
kilograms of uranium. The uranium in either element is limited to
an enrichment in the uranium-235 isotope of 14 percent. Because of
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197
A-2
the heat load limitation (210,000 lttu/hr), a full fuel
sertted by 3.1 metric tons of uranium, corresponding to
time. A cask capable of transpoiting about 50 percent
currently authorized is assumed in this analysis. The
activity content is approximately given as follows:
Material Physical Form ________________________
Krypton-85 Gas
Xenpn-131m Gas
Iodine-13l Gas
Gross Fission Products Solid
Grass Actinides Solid
Coolant Water Liquid
(Fission Product
Contamination)
These data are based on published data in WASII-1238i
The assumed sabotage scenario is a small bore penetration of the cask.
All the coolant is released and all the fuel rods attain perforation
temperature, releasing the entire gaseous and volatile inventory in the
void space in the fuel. For Krypton-85, the activity in the void space is
about 30 percent of the total activity in the fuel; for I,-131, this
quantity is about 2 percent; and for other fission products, it is about
0.01 percent. he quinn t.i ties of actn ides preset in the void space
are so small as to sake their contri huti on to the (lose negligibi e.
The radioactivity released is given as follows:
Estimated Release of
Radioactivity in Sabotage
________________ (fun_es)
1.GxlO4
0.3
l.OxlO3
load is repre-
a 150 day cooling
more fuel than
total radio-
Radioactivity (Curies)
5.2x104
1.SxlO'
1.OxlO'
2. lxl07
6.3x10~
1.5
Material
Krypton-85
lodine-13l
Gross Fission Pnoducti
Physical Form
Gas
Gas
Aerosol
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198
A-3
After radioactivity is relcased from the S1)Cnt fuel cask in the
form of a gas or aerosol, the dose absorbed by a person situated
away from the cask is calculated from the formula:
x(x)
D(x) = KQ0Q
-~i
where Q is the atmospheric concentration of radioactivity per
curie released per unit time as a function of distance x.
in the direction of the wind away from the cask,
(Ci/m3)/(Ci released/see),
Q0 is the number of curies released,
K is a dose conversion coefficient, mapping atmospheric
concentration of radioactivity into radiological dose
rate (rem/sec)/(Ci/m3), and
D(x) is the radiological dose absorbed at a distance x
downwind from the cask, rem.
The values of Q0 are given above for Krypton-85, lodine-13l, and
gross fission products.
The values of K are given in KASII-1238 for Krypton-~5 and Iodine-131.
The value of K for gross fission products is taken to be that of an
absorber at g ron uI 1 eve I n an n Ii n to c I otid of 0 . 11eV ganuna
radiation. /
I CCII1/SCC
1latcrial Dose ~7i~ /
Krypton-S5 Skin - doe to suit- 0.053
mersion in the cloud
lodine-131 Adult thyroid - due 320
to inhalation
Gross Fission lOcale lady - due to ~ 0.12
Products mba lotion and i miners ion
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199
A-4
Thc KQ0 products are the same fcft a1l~subsequent calculations, so
they are tabulated as follows:
Material KQ0(rem.m)
Krypton-85 850
Iodine-131 96
Gross Fission Products 230
Total 1176
Since all these contaminants are treated similarly as components of
an infinite cloud, the dose to an individual adult becomes just the
product of the x/Q factor dependent pn meteorological conditions and
the sum of the KQ products for all materials.
The values of x(x)/Q are graphed in WAS1I-1238 with the Pasquill
weather stability classification as a parameter. The least stable
weather conditions, and hence the least favorable for close absorption,
are denoted by Class A. The most stable of appreciably common weather
conditions, and hence the most favorable for dose absorption, are
denoted by Class F. An even score s~ab1e set of weather conditions,
Class G, ex:i ate, cit occurs rarely. l)i smissiul: Class C and rciioriiial--
izing the probal)il1 ties given in gASII-1238, one obtains an average
x/Q factor for a posit ion 5(1 teeters downwi cid from the ground level
release as follows:
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200
A-5
Pasquill ~(SOrn) Probability Weighted
Weather Q of x/Q
Stability (ciim3~ Occurrence (Curs3
Class \Ci/secl ___________ `,~T)sec
A 2.Ox1O3 0.021 4.2x105
B 2.5x103 .088 2.2x104
C 3.0x103 .148 4.4x104
0 6.0xl03 .479 2.9x103
E 2.5xlO2 .132 3.3x103
F 8.OxlO2 .132 l.lxlO~
Average x(5Om)/Q l.75x102
The dose to an adult at 50 meters downwind is given by: S
( rem.m3 ~ ( 2
D(SOm) = ~ll76 ~jJ \,l.75xl0 -~
= 20.6 rem
The dose absorbed by a population situated away from the cask is
estimated from Table 1, Appendix "B", of IiASI1-1238. This table is
essentially a plot of dose per unit KQ0 factor, which is analogous
to the x/Q factor used above for an individual, vs area for the Pasquill
weather stability classes. After a release incident, the radiation
dose field may be represented by a contour map. The contour lines
are characterized by the same concentration (D/KQ0) of radioactivity
at all points of the lines. The area within each contour is called
an isopleth and is characterized by a dose that is larger than that
fuund at tire irurirrri~r ry . As sum i rrg tire pujru lit i on s d St I mi ted
un 1 form 1 y, the 101)11 at i on dose is found from tire noire) Coal) ins ti on
of D/KQ0 values on isopletim boundaries and area values within the boundarie~.
Prom Figure 1, the variation of l)/KQ0 with isopleth area is approximated
by a series of rectangles. For isopletir i, the ordinate width of the
rectangle is given by 10' sec/a3 (tire units of D/KQ0) and the abscissa
PAGENO="0205"
Isopleth Area (ci 2) ~
Figure 1. Representation of Radiological Dose Field After Release Incideot
--
- :t-
e~ -
)irection
ernal
:o Wind
t
Direction of Wind -~
KQ0
1' sec)
Not drawn
to scale
A1
A,
A-
A4
A5
PAGENO="0206"
202
A-7
width is given by the area A_~ mi2. The population dose is given
approximately by
PD = P(KQ0) [A_6x106
all +A5x(l05-l0~)
nuclides +A_~1x(10~-105)
+A_3x(10~-l0~)
+A_2x(102-103)
+A_1x(l0*102)]
where P is the population density in people/mi2. A sample evaluation
of this formula for Class D weather, which is the most probable set
of weather conditions, is given below.
Isopleth i Area A_1(mi2) A_~x9xl0(1~1)(mi 2 ~S)
5 7.7x102 6.9x107
4 5.8xl0~ 5.2x107
3 4.2x104 3.8x107
2 4.2x105 3.9x107
1 3.8xl06 3.4xl0~
-7
Sum 23.2xlO
÷A_6+106 l.2x106
3.5x~~
rem.m 2 SCC
(PD)Class D= P(l176 sec ) (3.5x106 mi ~3 )
weather
= 4.1x103 p rem'mi 2
The corresponding results for all weather stability cate~ories are
given as follows:
Pa squ ill 1~e:it her Prohahi I ty of P1)/P ,
Stab ii tyC1a~s Occurrence (rcm.nhi'~)
A 0.021 2.9x1O~
11 .083 3.3x105
C .148 3.1x103
D .479 4.1x103
P .132 2.1x102
p .132 1.3x101
2.3x102
Average
PAGENO="0207"
203
A-8
Population doses corresponding to several population densities
which follow from these calculations for all weathers are given below.
Population Density Population Dose
çpersons/mi2) (person-rem)
100 2
1,000 20
10,000 200
The total area considered in this analysis is 77 square miles. Since
the isopleth areas are roughly shaped as a sector of a circle, the
total area,corresponds roughly to a sector of angle 22.5 degrees
extending from a small radius, say 50 meters, to a radius of about
20 miles. For weathers E and F, the individual at 50 meters is
within the isopleth for which the concentration equals or exceeds
102sec/m3. For all other weathers, the individual at 50 meters is
within the isopleth for which the concentration equals or exceeds
103 sec/rn3. As seen above, i02 sec/rn3 corresponds to about 12 rem
and io~ sec/m3 corresponds to about 1 rem.
The expected health effects fromthese doses are small. ~The NCRP
recommended limits for routine exposure of radiation workers are
15 reni to the I and 3() rem to tic 1 liyro d . The I breslin d for
noticeable physiological effects from whole-body radiation is 50 rem
to the whole body. The conclusion of the 0111k Report is that the
fatality rate from such an incident is 1.8x104 cancer fatalitics/
person-rem. This rate is applicable to single large exposures as
well as chronic exposures.3 T1i~is, for a population density of
PAGENO="0208"
204
A-9
10,000 persons/mi2, the number of fatalities is less than
one for this postulated incident:
(1.8xlO4 cancer fatalities/person-rem) (200 person-rem)
= 0.036 cancer fatality
1 "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive
Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants," U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, NASII-1238(1972).
2 BE1R Report, 1972, National Academy of Sciences -
National Rescarch Council, "lEe Effects on Populations of
Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation."
3 Cohen, 13. L. "Conclusions of the I3EIR and UNSCEAR Reports
on Radiation Effects per Man-Rem," health Phyaics 30, 351 (1976).
PAGENO="0209"
205
Mr. TSONGAS. The response in i~erms of questions that have been
raised is that they are under study, which is legitimate. You are a
new agency, but there is a point at which the answers have to be
given. I think that point is rapidly approaching, and I think we
should have a different accountability at the next session.
It is the Chair's intent to hear~ testimony from the second panel.
We will adjourn after that testimony and have questions in `the
afternoon.
Thank you very much.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A PANEL ON SAFEGUARDS OVERVIEW, CONSISTING OF: TOM
COCHRAN AND ARTHUR TAMPLIN OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL; FRANK GRAHAM, ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL
FORUM; TED TAYLOR, COAUTHOR, "NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND
SAFEGUARDS"
Mr. TSONGAS. Gentlemen, is your testimony available on the press
tables so we can have only one surge to that table?
Mr. GRAHAM. Mine is.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me arrive at a consensus as to how we will pro-
ceed. We have no session this afternoon in the Congress so our time
is quite unlimited. We want to explore these issues in depth as we
did yesterday and this morning. Are you available to come back
after lunch?
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
Mr. T50NGA5. Why don't we do this: We will proceed with the
testimony until about 20 past and reconvene at 2 and continue with
the questions and then the afternoon panels may begin about 3 or
3 :30. Is that reasonable? Maybe we can convene before 2. Let's see
how it goes.
I think, Dr. Taylor, is yours a two-page statement?
Dr. TAYLOR. The statement J; prepared for the committee, for rea-
sons I tried to explain in the introduction of the statement, is quite
brief. I had planned to say a bit more about domestic safeguards in
my oral testimony.
Mr. TSONGAS. Gentlemen, the testimony will be inserted in the
record in full, but I think those of you who have testified before
realize that the give and take is always much better, especially with
statements by a number of people, that it can be condensed if we get
right into the discussion period.
So, Dr. Taylor, why don't you begin.
STATEMENT OF TED TAYLOR, COAUTHOR, "NUCLEAR THEFT:
RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS"
Dr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I will
apologize for not submitting a lengthy statement to the staff well in
advance of the hearings. I intended to do that originally. My inten-
tion was to try to describe a strategy that could be use for reducing
the risk of malevolent human behavior in facilities handling nuclear
materials in the Tjnited States and worldwide that would lead to an
unacceptable situation.
71-074 0 - 76 - 14
PAGENO="0210"
206
That was my intent several weeks ago. I found I was unable to
derive a suggested strategy that I could say with conviction, at least
in my own mind, would in fact bring these problems under control.
I would like to spend a couple of minutes telling the committee why
this happened in the course of trying to prepare this testimony.
First of all, I find that the question of domestic safeguards in the
United States is very closely coupled to a much larger question
about safeguards worldwide of several types. There are safeguards
applied to national governments, essentially, the purpose of which is
to detect but not prevent the unauthorized acquisition of nuclear
weapons by countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty or bilateral agreements of various kinds. Whether or not the
safeguarding of materials for that purpose can be adequately carried
out worldwide to reach a level of assurance that nuclear violence for
military purposes will not take place is a question I have pondered
for many years and cannot answer. I don't know whether this is
going to be possible or not.
There are two main questions I have that I cannot answer that
bear on this question. The first question is how are we to expect
countries that do not have nuclear weapons to forego acquiring
them, given the fact, which is a technical fact, that many countries,
if they want nuclear weapons, can now make them, many more than
have them. How can we expect them not to as long as the five major
nuclear weapons states and perhaps India are behaving as though
they are more secure with nuclear weapons than without them?
I cannot answer that question.
The second question has to do with the process by which it is con-
ceivable that those countries that now have nuclear weapons will
relinquish them and in fact ultimately get rid of them. As long as
the situation is as it is today, I see no logical basis for not expecting
proliferation by new countries to take place. I expect it will happen.
With regard to physical security and other measures that have to
do not with national acquisition of nuclear weapons but terrorists,
criminals, whatever, no national groups breaking into facilities and
either sabotaging them or stealing material and clandestinely
making their own explosives, the central question I have, that I
cannot answer, is by what process is the risk to members of Amen-
can society and to society worldwide to be estimated or stated in a
way that is reasonably definite? I don't know how to do this and I
do not believe that there is any organization, any group of people
that now have a procedure that is technically defensible by which
the level of residual risk to society of unauthorized use of nuclear
facilities or materials can, in fact, be stated.
A coupled question I cannot answer is what level of risk is to be
considered acceptable. Who will decide what that acceptable level of
risk is?
I find these are extremely difficult questions to even have any very
constructive answers to, let alone flatly answer. As far as domestic
safeguards are concerned, I think the central question, which in my
mind remains unanswered, is what are the risks now and how are
the risks to be reduced to a level that will be evidently publicly
acceptable.
PAGENO="0211"
207
There are two parts to that question, actually three parts. What
are the risks, what risks are acceptable, and how is the public to be
given the assurance that what is being done reduces the risks to an
acceptable level.
I do want to say on a somewhat more positive note that there are
many actions which have been described-I think many in great
detail to this subcommittee, not just at these hearings but hearings
that took place in May and later in July-about options for increas-
ing the effectiveness of domestic safeguards in the TJnited States.
There are many possibilities. Some of these were described in the
original form of the environmental impact statement issued by the
AEC before the reorganization; the safeguards-related parts of this
so-called GESMO report are now under review by NRC and we
were told this morning this would be published very soon, some time
this spring.
I think that when that technical and economic background for a
description of the basis for safeguards improvements by NRC is
published for public comment, then it will be possible to get down to
real cases in getting an external review of just exactly what the
basis can be for decision, whether or not to recycle plutonium. I
would like to conclude this statement with a very strong conviction
I have' which is shared by many people within the government,
within the executive branch, the legislative branch and by the
nuclear industry as well as rnany~ members of the public and that is
this: That recycling of plutonium, that is the extraction of pluton-
ium from spent fuel and its subsequent use in fresh fuel in power
reactors, should not take place until an effective safeguard system
has been demonstrated. There are two difficulties with what I just
said. One refers back to the question I am unable to answer, what is
effective and how is that to be determined, and the second point is
how is the public to be given assurance that whatever is done is
effective enough.
I have a suggestion. It is something I have not worked out in
complete detail, a possible approach to how to assure the public that
what is being done is adequate. The cornerstone of that should be a
public release by NRC at whatever time it is able to do so, of all of
the details concerning the method, the technique by which NRC will
review the physical security plans of licensees and determine whether
or not the standards set by NCR are met by what is proposed to
them.
That method, I think, whenever it exists-and as far as I know it
does not exist today-could be published without revealing the gory
details concerning exactly what physical security measures are being
used at a particular facility. I think most of us would agree that
should not be public information. The method by which NRC will
review such plans should, I think, be made public and subject to
intensive review by people whO will take the trouble to review what
I am sure will be a very cornpli~x technique.
Thank you very much.
[The statement referred to is as follows:]
PAGENO="0212"
208
STATEMENT BY THEODORE B. TAYLOR, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT, BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENuRGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, FEBRUARY 27, 1976
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I appreciate this opportu-
nity to testify at these hearings on safeguards to prevent purposeful, destruc-
tive uses of nuclear energy.
In testimony that I presented to this subcommittee at hearings on this sub-
ject on May 2, 1975 and July 24, 1975, I summarized information related to
the risks of theft or diversion of nuclear materials that could be used by
national governments or by nongovernmental groups, such as terrorists, for
making nuclear explosives, and to current and possible future safeguards
designed to reduce those risks.
While trying to prepare my statement for today's hearings, however, I have
found myself faced with four critical questions I cannot answer.
First, how can countries that do not now have nuclear weapons be expected
to decide it is not in their best interests to acquire them, as long as the five
nuclear weapons states and India continue to behave as though they feel much
more secure with nuclear weapons than without them?
Second, by what process is it conceivable that the nuclear weapons states
themselves will relinquish their military reliance on nuclear weapons, and get
rid of them?
Third, what levels of risks of nuclear violence, whether caused by nations or
criminal groups, are acceptable to society worldwide, and who should decide
what these levels should be?
Fourth: By what process is the worldwide public to be assured that interna-
tional and domestic safeguards against purposeful nuclear violence will, in
fact, be effective, in the sense that residual risks will be both known and con-
sidered acceptable by the public?
Not being able to answer these questions, I find that I cannot, with any
solid conviction, present this subcommittee with a substantive strategy for
bringing the problems of nuclear proliferation by nations or by nongovernmen-
tal groups under effective control.
I do not want to suggest that formulating and implementing such a strategy
is beyond possibility, but only that, today, I am unable to describe it, in spite
of having spent many years trying to do so.
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you.
Messrs. Tamplin and Cochran, how have you arranged your testi-
mony?
STATEMENT OF ARTHUR TAMPLIN AND TOM COCHRAN, NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
Dr. TAMPLIN. I, Arthur Tamphin, was going to present it, We
have prepared something which seems that it is now too lengthy for
the time constraints, so I guess what we would do then would be to
try to highlight it for you. We sent to Mr. Myers of the staff yester-
day copies of testimony which included material that we hoped would
be included in the record. I assume the committee now has that. The
point we were requested to present, our overview of safeguards as
applied to domestic nuclear industry, and we want to make two points
in this presentation. The first one is existing domestic safeguards are
totally inadequate. We believe that the situation existing today is
critical and have petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
take far-reaching action and immediately.
The second point is that the development of an adequate system of
domestic safeguards for a large civilian plutonium industry will most
likely prove to be an impossibility.
Mr. TSONGAS. Let me interrupt you there.
PAGENO="0213"
209
If you and your colleague could give your background at this
point in the record, your professional background, that may be
included.
Dr. TAMPLIN. We had a brief description on the front page of the
testimony.
I am Arthur Tamplin. I have a Ph. D. in biophysics from the
University of California in Berkeley. I spent some 4 years working
for the RAND Corp. in Santa MOnica and then 13 years with the
AEC's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., and for
the past 2 years I have been with the Natural Resources Defense
Council here in their Washington office, working on problems
related to nuclear energy, the breeder reactor and plutonium recy-
cling.
Dr. COCHRAN. I am Thomas B. Cochran. I have a Ph. D. from
Vanderbilt University in physics. 1 spent 2 years in the Navy teach-
ing physics at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2 years with Litton
Industries, 2 years with Resources for the Future here in Washing-
ton, where I wrote a book called "The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactor, an Environmental and Economic Critique."
For the past 3 years I have been a staff scientist with the Natural
Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C., where I have been
concentrating on the same issues that Dr. Tamplin just mentioned.
Mr. T50NGA5. Thank you.
Dr. TAMPIJIN. I will just simply repeat our second point. The
development of an adequate system of domestic safeguards for a
large civilian plutonium industry will most likely prove to be an
impossibility. Moreover, in trying to develop and sustain such a
safeguard system we will be forced to accept major alterations in
our open society and its institutions. We have grave doubts that a
plutonium-fueled economy is compatible with civil liberties as we
know them today.
We go on in the first few pages of our testimony mentioning the
number of studies that have been done over the past few years
which indicate that our existing safeguards systems are seriously
deficient. We point out that one of the safeguard studies which was
a special safeguard study funded by the AEC and has now become
known as the Rosenbaum report, was published after the AEC had
modified its regulations. The ROsenbaum report concluded with this
statement:
Even though safeguards regulations have just been revised and strengthened,
we feel that the new regulations are inadequate and that immediate steps
should be ta1~en to greatly strengthen the protection of special nuclear mate-
rials. We hope that this paper will contribute in a positive way to the speedy
implementation of such steps.
Now the Rosenbaum report probably was part of the concern that
Congress had in passing the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
when they requested in the newly created Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission to undertake the security agency study which is nearing
completion. We are aware from the hearings this morning that the
committee has seen the Mitre report which formed part of the back-
ground for this security agency study. There are a number of other
reports in the security agency study that were severely critical of
PAGENO="0214"
210
our existing safeguards system. This served to heighten our concern
about the adequacy of existing safeguards.
Now in late January of this year we at NRDC obtained two inter-
nal Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents. Now, one of those
was the builder memorandum which we also heard referred to ear-
lier in these hearings. Another one was a draft executive summary
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's security agency study. It
was these two documents that precipitated us to petition the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to undertake immediate action relative to
existing safeguards.
Now, in Mr. Builder's memorandum he conceded that he was not
in a position to judge current safeguards as adequate or inadequate.
Later on in the memorandum he said:
I am concerned that some or even many of our currently licensed facilities
may not have safeguards which are adequate against the lowest levels of
design threat we are considering in GESMO.
Now, this lowest level of design threat that lie referred to in his
memo was a small threat from one individual inside or a total of
three individuals, one who may be inside. This small level of threat
that he was concerned about has to be contrasted with what is con-
sidered the credible level of threat or the maximum credible level of
threat.
Now, in a way the maximum credible threat was that defined in
the Rosenbaum report as 15 highly trained men, 3 of whom might
be insiders who could assist the outsiders. In the draft executive
summary of the Security Agency study they indicate that to esti-
mate the credible threat the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards researched 19 relevant studies and conducted 9 inter-
views of individuals and groups of professional analysts from the
FBI, the intelligence community, the Departments of Defense and
State and local law enforcement agencies. What emerged from this
was the consensus estimate that an external threat group will proba-
bly number 6 to 8 persons and very likely not exceed 12. A credible
internal threat to safeguard purposes is estimated to consist of two
to three persons in collusion.
Well, given threats of this size, one must seriously question
whether any of the licensed facilities are adequate to protect against
that threat. The present requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are that the facilities require two guards armed with
pistols. Now, these two guards could be confronted by 6 to 15 com-
mandos, armed with automatic weapons, grenades and bazookas.
Moreover, one or both of the guards could be part of the attacking
force. I will say this again is why we were moved to petition for
immediate action on the part of the NRC.
Besides the inadequate number of guards relative to the threat,
the executive summary, Security Agency study, and the various con-
sultants' reports which were part of that study, point out other seri-
ous problems.
Now for example, one of the consultants' reports-that of the U.S.
Marshal's Service-begins with this statement: "The image of secu-
rity is all that is wanted." This quotation from a study entitled
"Private Security in the Public Interest," effectively illustrates one
PAGENO="0215"
211
problem with guard forces employed by the private sector of the
nuclear industry throughout the United States. Too often the image
has little substance behind it.
I might say that was no idle comment on the part of the marshals,
because it indicated they had made onsite inspection of guards at
selected nuclear facilities.
Now, another consultant who was associated with the Mitre group-
Mr. Carl Brandon, He is a former Assistant Director of the FBI
for Domestic Intelligence. He recently stated in a U.S. News &
World Report article, "The safeguards are a joke. The companies
involved are interested mostly in saving money. They are doing only
the bare minimum of security required by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission."
We indicate in here that the statements of the U.S. marshals and
Mr. Brandon are certainly borne out by the recent events at Erwin,
Tenn., where the workers worked under the honor system and would
call a guard if they felt they should be searched.
Now, among the other problems that were identified in the secu-
rity agency study and the various consultants' reports were recruit-
ing, clearing, training and equipping sufficient guard personnel,
securing the necessary legal authority to permit the guards to obtain
the necessary weapons and to transport them across State lines,
acquiring the legal authority to permit guards to use force or deadly
force in their duties, and certainly such authority could be justified
only if the guards were well qualified and trained, establish an ade-
quate system of communication and other protective systems during
the critical phase of transport for special nuclear materials, and
finally, establishing reaction forces capable of responding quickly
with adequate assistance during an attempted theft..
Now, these aren't problems that can be solved quickly or easily
and this is why we requested immediate action on the part of the
NRC which would involve putting the material presently in the
hands of these commercial facilities, putting the responsibilities for
its security in the hands of the! U.S. Marshals' Service and halting
all transportation of this special nuclear material except that neces-
sary for national defense.
Well, subsequent to filing our petition, we requested and were
granted a meeting with the NRC's staff on February 31. That meet-
ing was open to the public and a transcript of the meeting was
made. Shortly after the meeting the NRC staff requested us not to
release the transcripts because staff felt that discussion of the evalu-
ation criteria relative to safeguards used by the staff should not be
made public.
Before we could respond to! that request the Commission deter-
mined on its own that NRC would release the transcripts. These
transcripts revealed that the situation is actually worse than the
Builder memorandum suggests. We have submitted for the record
pages 48 to 64 of these transcripts.
On pages 48 to 50 of the transcripts, they disclose that contrary to
che consultant's opinion, all these consultants' opinions, the NRC
staff considers two guards armed with pistols and shotguns are ade-
quate. They indicated that they felt these two guards could effec-
PAGENO="0216"
212
tively overcome two aggressors and would stand up to 10 aggressors
long enough for assistance to arrive.
Furthermore, they indicated that they felt that the aggressors
would only be armed with small weapons, that is pistols. I can't
imagine somebody deciding to steal a bunch of plutonium would
appear at the facility only with pistols. It is unbelievable.
We were asked if we had any evidence that these aggressors
would be armed otherwise. Dr. Cochran indicated that Patty Hearst
was certainly much better armed whenever she appeared in public.
On page 61 to 64 of the transcript, it is demonstrated that the sit-
uation is even worse relative to the transportation phase. This was
also a conclusion of many of the consultants, of course.
Now, Mr. Page of the NRC staff suggested with regard to the
transportation sector that the easily jammed citizens' band radio
provided an effective communication system for safeguards in areas
of the country where radiotelephone communication with police was
impossible.
We submit that anyone who reads the total transcript of that
meeting with the staff of NRC will end up with a well chilled spine.
The meeting only confirmed and reinforced our conclusion that the
existing safeguards system is totally inadequate and the situation is
critical and immediate remedial actions are necessary.
I might go on to say that while requesting this immediate reme-
dial action in the present facilities that have special nuclear materi-
als, we do not mean to imply that an adequate and socially accepta-
ble system of safeguards is possible for the proposed plutonium
economy of the future. Instead, as we said earlier, we doubt that
such a safeguard system is possible. We believe that the spread of
nuclear technology throughout the world will lead to the steady
spread of nuclear arms, first to nation states but then to subnational
groups, terrorist organizations, blackmailers and even fanatical indi-
viduals. The process is already underway and we only need to cite
India for that. But as we move into the plutonium economy of the
future there will be thousands of tons of plutonium in the private
sectors of society, hundreds of tons in the transportation networks
of the world. When this happens plutonium will be stolen or
diverted for direct use in atomic bombs or for sale on the black
market. We shall then move into an era where it will be next to
impossible to prevent terrorists and other subnational groups from
becoming armed with atomic bombs. In this respect it is important
to recognize that nuclear reactors and fuel-cycle facilities are also
attractive terrorist targets or targets for sabotage.
At the very minimum to provide adequate safeguards, the facili-
ties and transportation sector t.hat handles strategic quantities of
special nuclear materials should be secure against the maximum
credible threats. To provide the necessary level of protection these
facilities would have to be turned into armed camps and transporta-
tion would be by armed convoy.
We do not believe the trivial economic advantages of plutonium
recycling-if any advantage exists at all-is worth turning our utili-
ties and their support facilities into a series of armed camps. But
more importantly, the proposed response by the industry and NRC
PAGENO="0217"
213
to the threat of nuclear terrorism goes far beyond providing more
physical security. The nature of the proposed safeguards is the dras-
tic increase in police powers and a concomitant decrease in civil lib-
erties and personal privacy.
1~7e have submitted for the record a paper by Russell Ayres which
discusses the civil liberties implications of safeguards.
I would like to highlight a few~ of the civil liberties and privacy
and right-to-work issues that are covered in this paper. First, the
safeguards, and we heard this this morning, contemplate security
clearance for employees in the nuclear industries. At best such clear-
ances infringe on the privacy of individuals being cleared and upon
the family and friends. In my own case my security clearance
involved some 40 individuals. At worst, the security clearances are
instruments of suppression and reprisal. But in addition to these
security clearances, and I think we heard this mentioned this morn-
ing also, it is proposed that the employees be given yearly psycho-
logical profile tests. I wonder how many Congressmen would want
to do that before they stood up for reelection. But such tests are as
insidious as security clearance, and a recent report on the congres-
sional Committee on Government Operations recommended that such
procedures be stopped and even that the purchase of such equipment
as polygraphs be stopped.
The safeguard plans also call for intelligence gathering to deter-
mine potential terrorists and terrorist groups and it was reported
that the Texas State Police were collecting dossiers on antinuclear
individuals and groups in that State, supposedly for this reason.
Such intimidation has a stifling effect upon dissent and debate,
which are essential in a free society. How much more governmental
investigations in the private lives of its citizens can a free society
tolerate? The actions of the Texas State Police and the recent con-
gressional investigations concerning Watergate, the CIA, the FBI,
the IRS, demonstrate that even at the present level these investiga-
tive powers are abused. But because of the threat posed by stolen
plutonium-and this could be plutonium stolen outside the United
States-recovery operations can be expected to be as severe and
involve no-knock search, search without warrants, area search and
detention and interrogation without warrants. It seems likely that in
the presence of a nuclear blackmail threat that something like mar-
tial law will transpire.
All of this must inevitably be put under the direction and control
of a central agency which would maintain close liaison with State
and local law enforcement agencies and those of foreign nations.
The FBI has just suspended its plans for regional computer centers
whose purpose was to expedite the exchange of information among
State and local law enforcement agencies. The reason given is that
this would be close to the creation of a Federal police force. This
central agency for safeguards would be a Federal police force and
one with expanded power.
While we can contemplate pUtting checks and restraints on Fed-
eral investigative agencies, banning polygraphs and holding firm
against Federal police powers, while we can contemplate that today,
it is important to realize that in the presence of nuclear blackmail
PAGENO="0218"
214
and terrorism these restraints would have to be removed and these
breaches in our civil liberties would become essential.
Another point, which I think was brought out in the questioning,
is it should be noted that those who claim that safeguards can be
devised which will keep the risk acceptably low, never tell us how
large a risk they think is acceptable. They concede that the risk
cannot be reduced to zero but they do not tell us to what it can be
reduced. We urge you to ask these people, the NRC among them,
how many successful nuclear thefts, how many credible nuclear
blackout threats, how large a plutonium black market, and how
many illicit nuclear explosions per decade are acceptable.
Thank you.
[The documents referred to follow:]
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNcIL, Ixc.,
Washington, D.C., April 27, 1976.
Mr. HENRY MYERS,
Subcommittee on Energy and the Env~ironnient, Committee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. MYERS: In our February 27, 1976 statement before the Subcommittee
on Energy and the Environment, we referred to certain documents we wished
incorporated in the record. These are:
(1) Memorandum from Carl H. Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for
Licensing, Division of Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 3anuary 19,
1976;
(2) Draft Executive Summary of NRC Security Agency Study;
(3) Pages 48-64 of the transcript of the February 13, 1976 meeting between
NRDC and NRC staff members; and
(4) Russell W. Ayres, "Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout,"
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 10, 1975, pp. 369-443.
Sincerely,
THOMAS B. COCHRAN.
u.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 19, 1976.
Memorandum for: Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for Licensing, Divi-
sion of Safeguards.
From: Carl H. Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards.
Subject: Adequacy of Current Safeguards.
The adequacy of safeguards is the central question that we have been strug-
gling to approach in our GESMO-related activities over the past 6 months.
The orientation of GESMO is toward the future: What is an adequate safe-
guards posture if the Nation embarks upon the wide-scale use of mixed oxide
(recycled plutonium) fuel in light water reactors? The draft safeguards sup-
plement to GESMO, scheduled for publication in March, should provide the
analytical and technical frameworks within which that question can be judged.
As these frameworks emerge, however, it becomes apparent that they are not
limited to future safeguards; they may be equally suited to judge the ade-
quacy of current safeguards.
We recognized this eventuality some time ago. Over the past 6 months, I
have been questioned several times as to the adequacy of current safeguards. I
have replied that I was not in a position to judge current safeguards as ade-
quate or inadequate until we had logically structured both the safeguards
problem and our approach to solutions. Only then, I argued, would we under-
stand the measures by which we could judge the adequacy of safeguards. In
response to the question of when we would be in a position to make such judg-
ments, I have stated that the safeguards portion of GESMO could not be com-
pleted until we possessed these logical structures or frameworks.
Fortunately, the logic has been found and the structures have been assem-
bled by some very capable people who have worked very hard. The safeguards
PAGENO="0219"
215
supplement to the GESMO is now being drafted around these frameworks, as
are interim licensing rules. The next 6 to 8 weeks will see the denouement of our
6-month struggle to gain a position where the adequacy of safeguards might be
rationally judged.
Thus, the time is almost upon us now, where we shall not only want to
make judgments about future safeguards for mixed oxide fuel cycles, but be
compelled by our public obligations to make judgments about the adequacy or
inadequacy of current safeguards. The moment such judgments are possible,
we must be prepared to more promptly to advise the Commissioners of any
apparent inadequacies. We must be prepared to support such judgments with
the available facts, but we should not allow factfinding activities to become
an excuse for delaying reasonable judgments where public safety and security
are involved. I am soliciting your assistance in preparation for the eventuality
that we may judge current safeguards to be inadequate at one or more
licensed facilities.
The analytical and technical frameworks developed for GESMO focus on the
theft of nuclear materials, suitable iii quantity and form for the illicit manu-
facture of nuclear explosives, as the overriding concern of safeguards. We
must have a safeguards posture that provides high confidence in our ability to
prevent the theft of significant quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM).
Significant quantities have been established at 5 formula kilograms [as defined
in 10 CFR Section 73.1(b)], about half the minimum required for the
manufacture of an illicit nuclear explosive. Thus, physical protection meas-
ures and material controls (i.e., containment, access, and accounting proce-
dures) must be deemed adequate to prevent (not just detect) the theft of 5
formula kilograms of SNM.
We have tried to avoid the specifics of potential threats in developing the
analytical framework for GESMO because such specifics are fraught with
uncertainty and are invitations to argument. But we have not succeeded; there
does not appear to be any way that we can analytically divorce the design of
adequate safeguards from the specification of threat capabilities. Since there is
no way to establish an absolute level of threat capabilities, we have been
forced to design safeguards across a range of threat levels, recognizing that
the final choice of design threat is a judgment call. We have varied the design
threat from lowest to the highest levels that have been suggested. In between
these extremes, we must admit that there is room for opinion as to where the
design threat should be set and, hence, what constitutes adequate safeguards.
But at the lowest levels of design threat, we have the opportunity to define
what have been called "insufficiency criteria," to define how much safeguards
are not enough. If safeguards are nOt adequate against the lowest levels of
design threat that have been suggested, then we must logically conclude that
such safeguards are inadequate, quite apart from the uncertainty we may
accept about what constitutes adequate safeguards. I am concerned that some
or even many of our currently licensed facilities may not have safeguards
which are adequate against the lowest levels of design threat we are consider-
ing in GESMO.
The design threats in the safeguards supplement to GESMO are divided into
an internal (diversion) and an external (assault) threat. Many parameters or
considerations must be taken into account in describing or specifying such
threats. To simplify these descriptions, we have assumed that all of these
parameters (e.g., motivation, training, arms, equipment, employment position,
etc.) are fixed at worst-case values with respect to safeguards, and that the
only remaining variable is the number of people involved in the threat. For a
nominal or baseline threat, as a point of departure, we have assumed that the
internal and external threats are two and six persons, respectively. The range
of numbers suggested by threat researchers, expert opinion, and partisan com-
ments generally lie within a factor of two, up and down, from this baseline
specification. Thus, the lowest levels of design threat being considered in
GESMO are, for an internal threat, one person and, for an external threat,
three persons. I don't know of any serious suggestion that these levels are too
high and that we should consider even lower levels as design threats for ade-
quate safeguards.
The logical conclusion from all this is that current safeguards must be pre-
sumed inadequate if they cannot effectively counter internal threats of one
person or external threats of three persons. It does not, of course, say that
PAGENO="0220"
216
they are adequate if they can effectively counter these same threats. But there
should be a higher urgency to correct what is clearly inadequate, even before
finally determining what is adequate. Thus, while we are awaiting further
judgments about what may be a prudent design threat level, I think we are
obliged to act promptly where safeguards are insufficient against threat levels
that are at the lower extreme of what may be judged prudent.
The tough questions we may soon have to answer for ourselves about cur-
rently licensed facilities (and associated transportation) are these:
1. Are present material control procedures sufficient to prevent, with a high
degree of assurance, the theft of more than 5 formula kilograms of SNM by
any single employee in any position in any single theft or in any continuing
series of thefts over a period of up to 1 year?
2. Are present physical protection procedures sufficient to prevent, with a
high degree of assurance, the theft of more than 5 formula kilograms of
SNM by means of a well-planned and coordinated assault by three persons,
one of whom may be an employee in collusion, having the equivalent of mili-
tary training and equipment?
If a high degree of assurance needs to be quantified, I would suggest that
something like 99-percent confidence should be invoked.
If the answers to these questions really depend upon further definition or
explanation of the questions, we should engage in that dialogue immediately.
If the answers are "no," we should move promptly to establish why and, in
general terms, what would be required to change the answer to "yes." I think
you can help us get these answers soon.
In the weeks just ahead, we must act with due care toward our several
responsibilities to the public, the Commissioners, and the licensees. We should
not be precipitous, for there is potential for great harm if we rush to or act
on erroneous conclusions. But caution should not paralyze us in view of our
enormous responsibilities for public safety and security. We are approaching a
crossroads for safeguards from which there may be no easy avenues. I would
urge that we act with both the care and courage that these times deserve, now
and when we look back upon what we did at this important juncture.
CARL H. BUILDER,
Director, Division of Safeguards.
PAGENO="0221"
217
DRAFT: RE: rpc : 1/25/75
* EXECUTIVE SUM1ARY OF SECURITY A(ENCY STUDY
* IUTRODUCTIOU
Purpose
The Security Agency Study was cOnducted pursuant to Section
204 (b)(2)(c) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. That
section required the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Director
of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)
to assess the need for and feasibility of establishing a security
agency within hic office to perform safeguards functions.
I
~round
Congressional concern for adequate safeguards was height-
ened as a result of a special safeguards study done for the
Atomic Energy Cormiiission in 1974. That study, by David Rosenbatirn
an~ others, was placed in the Conqressional Rccord on April 30,
PAGENO="0222"
218
1974; by ,Senator Ribicoff. It described a variety of potential
problems and short comings in the area of nuclear safeguards
and made recommendations for their solution. Since the publi~
cation of that report, many of its recommendations have been
adopted. For one, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been
established, to include an Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards (NMSS).~~ Among other things, the Director of
that office is reviewing safety and safeguards of all licensed
facilities, monitoring and testing internal accounting systems
* for special nuclear materials (SUM) and developing contingency
plans for dealing with threats, thefts and sabotage relating
to SNM and licensed facilities. *
The Rosenbaum report expressed concern about the adequacy
I.
of protection afforded SUM by the private industrial security
systems of licensees. One aspect of concern was the level of
threat to facilities and SUM. The authors postulated a maximum
credible threat consisting of 15 highly trained men, three of
whom might be "insiders", employed by the licensee target firm.
Another aspect of security concern involved the legal use of
weapons by private guards and the question of whether such
guards can carry arms across state borders. As a blanket
solution to the problem, the authors recommended establishment
of a federal nuclear protection and transportation service.
PAGENO="0223"
219
It is against this background that the Security Agency
Study was undertaken, -
When it established the Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards (NMSS), the Congress charged its Director to
provide and maintain protection against threats, .thefts, and
* sabotage of licensed facilities and materials and to assess the
need for a security a~ençy to perform these safeguards functions.
Aside from operational responsibility for security forces, all
safeguards functions that might be assigned to an NRC Security
Agency are already performed by the NRC or dome other Federal
agency. Therefore, the principal feature that would distinguis.h
an NRC Security Agency would be its operational~ control over
security forces.
PAGENO="0224"
220
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE
FEDERAL OR PRIVATE SECURITY FORCES
Federal Involvement in Security
The federal government is already involved in every aspect
of nuclear safeguards in the commercial sector except actual
security operations; Thus, security operations are the obvious
functional area in which to, assess the need for and feasibility
of a federal security agency.
At present, the NRC promulgates the rules and regulations
governing corruiiercial plant and material security. Licensees,
in turn, establish and operate the required security apparatus.
The NRC then insures compliance through its inspection and
enforcement operations. The need for a federal ~ecurity agency
therefore hinges upon the question ofgreater federal involvement
In security operations. Is there aneed for more direct fed~i~l
involvement in routine security operations at licensed facilities
or in the protection of SNM shipments between facilities?
PAGENO="0225"
221
FACTORS BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF
FEDERAL VS. PRIVATE SECURITY FORCES
Threat
Threats to nuclear facilities and material can come from
external or internal sources. External threats would include
overt acts of the-ft-andsabotage. They span a scale ranging
frorn mischief and minor nuisance through coordinated attacks,
which at some point would take on the character of civil war.
Internal threats are most often postulated as being covert and
might involve diversion of material, the per~ietration of hoaxes
and, perhaps, sabotage. They span a scale from minor pilferage
by individuals, through collusion,, all the way tfcrough revolu-
tionary conspiracies, in whic)j entire plants might be covertly
controlled.
* Practical limitations on the levels of threat, with which~
the safeguards system must cope, can be derived from the pre-
sumption of civil order. Safeguards must be adequate to protect
licensed facilities and material against threats which are
credible in times of civil order. Contingency planning should
extend beyond credible threats toward the rcalm of r~vi1 disorder.
Estimates of Credible Threat in the Context of Civil Order
To estimate the credible threat, the office of Nuclear
~1aterials Safety and Safeguards researched 19 relevant studies
and conducted 9 interviews with individuals and groups of
professional analysts from the r~.
the Department of Defense and SEa t0 and mci 1 law enforcement aqencies
71-074 0 - 76 - 15
PAGENO="0226"
222
What emerged from this was a consensus estimate that an
external threat group will probably number about 6-8 persons
and very likely not exceed 12 persons. Interestingly, this
estimate is quite consistent with estimates that might be
drawn from historical data alone. For example, in July 1975,
the Defense liuclear Agency completed a study of adver~ary
capabilities which ihcluçledan analysis of 4000 cases of
terrorism recorded since 1870. It revealed that 96% of these
involved fewer than 12 persons while the other 4% was accounted
for by guerrillas, bandits or mobs operating in an atmosphere
of revolution and general resistance to established order.
Interviews and studies yielded less upon which to base
estimates of threats internal to the industry. In~genera1,
the internal threat was characterized as follows:
o One person operating alone will probably remain unde-~-
tected.
o Instances of collusion involving 2-3 persons have been
encountered in industry.
o Most hijackings involve internal collusion.
o Key internal persons can be influenced by threats
against their families or other forms of blackmail.
As a result, a credible internal threat, for safeguards purposes,
is esti~mated to consist of 2-3 persons in collusion.
`~ Both internal and external adversary groups comprising the
threat are assumed to have the requisite training, equipment,
PAGENO="0227"
223
and motivation to make them credible. The internal adversary
will not be armed buLwill have access to equipment normally..
within the facility as.well as smuggled tools, substitute items,
etc. The intelligence arid police communities acknowledge that
automatic weapons, machine guns, plastic explosives and shaped
chargescould be accumulated in a private arsenal. Heavier
weapons like mortars ahd hand-held air defense weapons might
also be available but these would be detected more easily
during movement so they are less likely tb be employed than
lighter weapons.
PAGENO="0228"
224
Impact of Federal Security Force on Fixed Site Operations & Safety
At fixed sites, the various security elements involve
plant, equipment and procedures which are an integral part of
the licensees facilities and workaday operations. Therefore,
direct federal involvement (other than through regulation,
inspection and enforcement) could have considerable impact
upon the productive processes and management activities of
licensees.
This point was raised by several co.rporations recently
when they responded to a call for public comments published
by the NRC in the Federal Register. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation expressed opposition to federal guards at lic~nsee
facilities because security measures in the form!of vaults,
storage, barriers, detectors are either directly or indirectly
associated with plant safety. The Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF)
noted that routine security functions have a close interaction
with individual plant operational procedures and personnel, and
a guard force responsible to plant management affords a smooth
working relationship in support of plant operation. Maint.nance
PAGENO="0229"
225
* of security systems, tests of security.equipment and facility
emergency drills require interaction between guards. and manage-
:ment. Therefore, because of the close relationship between
plant security and plant safety, plant management must direct
guards in responding to emergencies. The Tennessee Valley
* Authority (TVA) said that at reactor sites the functions of
operations, safety and security are so interrelated that to
split theauthority for these functions could result in conflict
* during an emergency situation which might render one or more
of these functions ineffective.
Altogether, ten corporations and utilities responded to
the NRC on the subject of federal security forces at fixed
sites. They all objected to the concept of federal security
forces at fixed sites, as did the States of New York and
Virginia. West Virginia, alone, of ~ll respondents, indorsed
the idea of federal on-site guards.
~~pact of Federal Security Force on Transportation
The comments of industrial firms, utilities and States
generally favored the idea of federal responsibility for
in-transit security of 5MW. Westinghouse supports the use of
an existing federal security forée for the protection 5MM in
transit. The Mew York State Atomic EnergyCouncil, commenting
for the State, said that the transportation of SMM is potentially
the weakest point, most susceptible to having 5MM diverted;
PAGENO="0230"
226
therefore, the federal government should accept responsibility
for providing security for transport of SflM. In all, three
nuclear firms, one utility and two States clearly favor federal
responsibility for safeguarding SMM in-transit. Alabama acknow-
ledged that federal convoy guards or special communications may
be needed for the transport of SUM. Only two respondents flatly
objected to federal invo)vernent in the transportof SNM. These
were the Virginia Electric Power Company and Burns International
Security Services. .
PAGENO="0231"
227
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
General
Current NRC safeguards rules and the conditions that can
be~imposed under those rules have provided adequate protection
for special nuclear material activities up to the present time.
To date there is no evidence to indicate loss by theft, or
diversion to unauthbriz?d use, of sianifican~ quantities of
special nuclear materials, or any act of sabotage against an
operating U.S. nuclear facility. Never.theleSS, measures pre-
scribed for the protection of licensed facilities and material
must be continually reviewed in light of new credible threats
and, new technology.
As noted earlier in this report, factors such as worldwide
terrorism affect intelligence estimates of credible threat.
In light of current conditions, the credible external threat~
is estimated to consist of about 7 well trained and equipped
persons bent on theft of SNM or.sabotage. The current estimate
of internal threat is about 2 knowledgable persons with access
to SNM and facilities.
Relative Import~Qce of Nuclear Safeguards
A recent report on the safety and security of nuclear power
reactors (Sandia Laboratories Report SAND-0069) provides a
PAGENO="0232"
228
rudimentary framework for evaluating the relative importance
of nuclear safeguards. It notes, for exa~iple, that there are
many potential targets for sabotage in our country. But in order
to evaluate objectively the risk due to sabotage of a given target,
the following factors should be known:
1. the likelihood of an attempt
2. the susceptibility of the target
3.. the conseqQences of a successfulact
The first, likelihood of attempt, shou~d logically be based on
the analysis and synthesis of human beñavior. However, reliable
methods have not been developed for predicting future human
actions on the basis of past experience. Thus, judgments of
the seriousness of the threat must be based dn. perception and
intuition. The latter two factors, susceptibilitS' and consequences,
are more amenable to analysis. Comparisons of the susceptibility
of various targets to sabotage and estimates of the consequences
can be made.
On this basis, nuclear pow~r reactors appear far less
susceptible to sabotage than most other civil or industrial
targets. Technical requirements, planning, and necessary man-.
power a~d equipment are much greater for a credible sabotage
attempt on a nuclear power reactor than are required for an
attack on other potentially dangerous industrial targets.
Because of the greater susceptibility of ottier industrial
PAGENO="0233"
229
targets to sabotage, higher confidence scenarios can be devel-
oped which lead to large consequences events. The possible
consequences to public lives and health from sabotage of many
industrial targe~ts is much greater than the maximum consequences
predicted for sabotage of a nuclear power reactor.
* The lower susceptibility of nuälear reactors to sabotage
attack reduces the likelihood of credible attacks being mounted
by unsophisticated elements. However, insufficient information
is available to make definitive statements concerning the relative
likelihood of attack on various targets. *
Figure 1 shows a qualitative ranking of the magnitude of
the susceptibility of various targets to sabota~é, along ~iith
the magnitude of the consequences of successful sabotage. For
equal attack likelihood, targets near.!the upper right hand
corner (high susceptibility., high consequences) present the
greatest risk. *
PAGENO="0234"
230
FIgure 1. Comparison of VaTious Sabotage Ta~gets
m
.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WARFARE CHEMICALS
.
DAM
*
.
. . *
WATER SUPPLY
FOOD SUPPLY
PUBLIC GATHERING
*
*
~
~
~
SPECIAL NUCLEAR ILATERIALS
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR
.
.
MILITARY BASE
PUBLIC BUILDING
BRIDGE
TUNNEL
AIRPORT. AND AIRCRAFT
EXPLOSIVES
BANK *
FOSSIL FUEL POWER PLANT
RAILROAD YARD AND TRJ\INS
DOCY~S AND SHIPS
..
TOXIC CHEMICALS
PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
..
COMMUNICATIONS
J
*
POWER TRANSMISSION
~1
LOW
MEDIUM
SUSCEPTIBILITY ~
111GM
PAGENO="0235"
231
Impact of Federal Security Force on Secority Strate~jy
There is nothing inherent in a federal security force
that would change the security strategy underlying physical
protection of nuclear plants and materials. F~deral guards
are already used at some locations to protect government-owned
SNM. They are also used in some instances to protect govern-
ment-owned SNM in-transit. Under these circumstances, security
measures are taken in compliance with ERDA Manual, Chapter 2405,
rather than 10 CFR Part 73. There are some differences in the
security measures specified in these two sets of regulations.
But their similarities far outweigh their differences and they
both i~eflect the same underlying philosophy, or ~trategy of
security.
PAGENO="0236"
232
Differences Between 10 CFR Part 73 and ERDA Manual Chapter 2405.
The. principal differences between security requirements
of 10 CFR Part 73 and ERDA Manual Chapter 2405 are as follows:
Security of SUM at Fixed Sites Part 73 2405
o Training programs for guards No Yes
o Firearms training & annual
qualification No Yes
o Physical st~ndards for guards No Yes
o "Vital areas' for protection
of vital equipment Yes No
o "Isolation zone" around
outer barrier Yes No
.o Persons subject to search
entering or leaving Y~s No
o Only approved alarms * .
authorized N~ Yes
o "Q" clearance for persons
with access to SUM : No Yes
o National agency check of
* personnel No Yes
Security Requirements for SUM In-Transit
o 2 "Q"-cleared armed couriers No Yes
o Secure communicatior~s system * No Yes
o Escort report every 2 hours Yes~ Continuously
o Escort in air shipments No . Yes *
PAGENO="0237"
233
~pecific Securityj~quirement~S. . .
In recognition of the current credible threat, the NRC
has proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 73 which would increase
the physical protection.of nuclear plants and materials.. To
a considerable extent, these would reduce the differences
which now exist between requirements for the protection of
government-owned plants and SNM specified by ERDA Manual,
Chapter 240~ and reciuirements for the protection of private
plants and 5MM. Public comments, on these proposals have been
received. The NRC is now analyzing th~ costs and benefits of
the new rules and preparing them for publication.
The remaining differences between requirements of 10 CFR
Part 73 and those of ERDA Manual Chapter 2405 .irvolve primarily
guard force qualifications. A federal guard must' meet certain.
physical standards, undergo training programs, qualify annually
with firearms and hold a security clearance (Q clearance).
* Sir~ce these requirements do not apply to private guards, they
raise a qUestion concerning the relative effectiveness of federal
and private guard forces, which is central to the Security Agency
Study.
PAGENO="0238"
234
* SECURITYFORCE EFFECTIVENESS
General
* A direct measure of the effectiveness of guard forces would
be their probability of successfully countering a threat. But
the study group was unable to quantitatively relate guard force
characteristics to such a probability. Instead, they identified
criteria which related.tothe probability of security failure/
success and could be used to discern differences between federal
and private guards. .
* Effectiveness Criteria
Following are *the effectiveness criteria ,jdentified in
* the Security Agency Study: . " ; .
1. ~gal Authority - pertains to the circumstances in
which a guard may question,.:search, detain, arrest
and use force (deadly or otherwise) ,.*
2. General Security Knowledge - relates to general know-
ledge of security procedures and skills.
3. Local Security Knowledge - knowledge related to a
specific facility, site and equipment.
4. Mental Fitness - psychological and emotional fitness
* * for duties and responsibilities.
5. Physical Fitness A minimum standard of physical
fitness should.be met. *
6. !~yal~y - adherence to intent of security regulations
and guides.
7. Alertness - state of readiness and level of vigilance.
8. Motivation - willingness to endure hardships in
* performance of duty *
PAGENO="0239"
235
9. Firepower - presence and quality of weapons and
* skill and experience in~ their, use.
10. Lack of Vulnerability - availability and quality of
protective facilities and equipment.
11. Deterrence Image - potential adversary's perception
of guard capabilities.
12. Liaison communications and rapportw~kh. reaction
forces.
13. ~j~j~' of Com~nand - clarity of lines of authority
in emergency.
14. ç~patibi]j~,y~ - absence of interference in plant
* operations.
15. Economics - monetary costs ofachieving guard effect-
iveness vs. expected costs (injuries, deaths, environ-.
mental damage, political costs, etc.) of failing to
achieve it.
16. Custom- consideration for precedent andtradition
in the United States. *
17. ~jght to Strike - potential for loss o?f ~ecurity from
a strike.
* /
18. Civil Liberties - implications of guard force struc~jire
relative to civil liberties.
Cor~iparison of Federal and Private Guards *
When Federal and private guard forces were assessed and
compared on the basis of the effectiveness criteria, it tncame
clearthat existing private guard forces had many deficiencies.
But, it was also clear that many of these deficiencies could be
overcome by measures other than federalization. Consequently, a
third security force concept was also evaluated which consisted
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236
of upgraded private guards. A summary comparison of the three
guard concepts appears in Table 1. Detailed justifications for
the ratings assigned under each criterion are contained in
Appendix B of the study.
PAGENO="0241"
237
Table 1 COMPARISON OF CONCEPTS
* Existing
Upgraded
*Conceptual
Private
Private
Federal
* Guards
Guards
Guards
EFFECTEVENESS *
Legal Authority
:
*~
***
General Security Knowledge
** :
***
*
***
Local Security Knowledge *
**
~**
**
Mental Fitness *
* **
***
***
. Physical Fitness -
**
***
*
Loyalty
~:
* *
**
***_
*
Alertness -
* **
***
Motivation
**
***
**~,
Firepower
. *
**
****
.
***
*
Lack of Vulnerability
*
*
Deterrence Image
**
***
***
Liaison
*
***
***
Unity of Command in Crisis
*
**
***
:
Compatability *
***
***
.
*
.
Economics *
*
**
***
***
Custom
***
***
*
Likelihood of Strike *
**
~*.
.
Civil Liberties
***
* ***
* Low Ratinq
~ Intermediate Rating
~ High Rating
***
* **
71-074 0 - 76 - 16
PAGENO="0242"
238
Reaction Forces . .
Reaction forces come into play only in emergencies when an
attack of some kind has been staged or is being staged against
a nuclear installatiOn or shipment. Specifically, the task
of the reaction force is to reinforce and back up the guard
force, to provide an additional force on the scene in case of
hostage or other cCitical situations, to prevent the escape of
* perpetrators with or without nuclear materials in their possess-
ion and, when necessary, to assist in the recovery of stolen.
SUM. There clearly is some inverse ratioat work between guard
and reaction forces. The stronger and better the guard force,
the less capabilities needed by the reaction force. .
Current Reaction Force Capabilities
At present, State and loc~al police reaction forces are the
main source of armed assistance to threatened facilities. ~Cich
reaction forces are discussed in security plans submitted with
applications for licenses invoh'ing production, processing or
possession of special nuclear materials. These plans are
PAGENO="0243"
239
supposed to cover procedures for suninoning reaction forces and
the size and responsiveness of such forces.
* In the course of this study, the security plans of 10
facilities yiere reviewed. Some of these listed only the minimum
number of local police available, while others gave detailed lists
covering local police (city or county), state.police, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and police from neighboring communities.
The best documented res~orise by local authorities was three police
personnel available within five minutes; the worst response was
* or~e car in fifteen minutes. On an average, state police can
respond with 2-4 men in 10-30 minutes. In some cases, a facility
can expect approximately lOrnen, state and local police, within
30 minutes. These findingsare summarized in.Table2.
PAGENO="0244"
LLEA
(City or County)
Site
3 peoplei5 ruin.
4 people/iS ruin. 2 people/b ruin.
6 people/25 ruin. 5 people/20 rin.
8 people/SO ruin.
1 car/lO ruin. 0 people/60 ruin. 45 ruin.
2nd caiii5 ruin. -
6 nun/40 ruin.
-2 cars/15 ruin.
1 car/iS mm. -4 cars/30 ruin.
-10 cars/SO ruin.
* ________ _____
person/5 ruin. 4 peooie/30 ruin.
~ puople/10 ruin. 20 ueople/60 ruin.
~5 peopie/30 ruin. _____
.ThTpërson/bS rrin.
5-7 peopie/30 nrin~
20-30/2 hrs. I
heiicopter/30 ruin ______________
7
i0rrrin.
*
8
.5-10 ruin.
L____
*
9
~
1 person/S ruin.
~
~::~:
240
REACTIOU FORCES
Table 2
State
Police
Federal
(FBI)
Uei ghbori ng
Police
1
2.
3
4
.5
.6
2 peopbe/ 15 ruin.
4 people/20 nm.
8 people/30 ruin.
PAGENO="0245"
241
Effectiveness Criteria For Reaction Forces
The criteria for effective guard forces apply equally to
reaction forces. Aided by studies from RAND Corporation(Reaction
Forces Against Nuclear Diversion Or Sabot~ge, t'JN 9245-NRC, October,
1975) and Sandia Laboratories (Response Forces for Fixed Sites,
September 11, 1975) the study group identified the following
additional effectiveness criteria for reaction forces:
1. Area FamiliaHty - knowledg~ of site and surrounding
* geography. *
2. Chain of Command - clear lines of authority.
* 3. Liaison - communication and rapport with supported
facility and other lawenforcement agencies.
: 4. Mobi1ity~ - ability to respond quickly and mount-a
* pursuit, if necessary. .
5. Procedures - clear plans of action for all situations.
6. Public Confidence - deterrent image. *
7. Training - individual ançi unit skills. *
* * 8. Intelligence - warning information to insure preparedness.
9. Viable Response - ability to respond as a team,
* ~quipped and capable. : *
10. Timely Response - response should occur while threat
1s still contained. * * -
Comparison of Reaction Forces * *
Various reaction force schemes were evaluated against effect-
iveness criteria. The alternatives considered were: *
PAGENO="0246"
242
L Off-duty guards who are on stand-by off-site
2. Non-nuclear operational personnel who are on-site
3. Local Law Enforcement 1\gencies (LLEA)
4.. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
5. U.S. Marshals Service (Us~is)
6. Department of Defense (DOD)
7. Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Energy Research and
* Development Agency (NRC/ERDA)
* Before comparing the various options, consideration was
given to practical and cost-effective upgrading of each potential
reaction force. All upgraded forces were considered to be equal
in armament; protective equipment, legal authority, reliable
background, physical condition and motivation.-. The results
of ~this comparison are summarized in Table 3. pet~ailed rationale
for the ratings is found in Appendix~C of the report.
Conclusion Concerning~Reaction Forces
* Analyses performed for the Security Agency Study by the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the International Association of
* Chiefs of Police, and several consultants lead to the conclusion
that reaction forces are th& least tractable element of a safe-
guards system. All concepts have sufficient liability so that
none would be optimum for all situations. This is due to
several circumstances. For example, unless reaction forces are
permanently posted adjacent to a protected facility, there are
PAGENO="0247"
* Low rating
** Intermediate rating
~ high rating
243
* -27-
Table 3. COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL RESPONSE FORCES
Guards
RI'-_~~~ Off-duty
Off-site
al Person-
Operation-
nd On-
site
[LEA
USMS
FBI
DOD
NRC!
ERDA
Facility Familiarity
***
***
*
*
*
*
Chain of Command
Between Force & Company)
***
***
*
*
*
.
*
.
**
With Company
Liaison *-.-- ~
R1tJi...LL.~A
***
***
**
*
*
*
**
**
*
.--.
***
-
**
**
*
**
Mobility within Facility
****
*
*
*.
*
**
Proceckires with Guards
***
***
*
*
*
*
***
Public Confidence
**
*
***
*
***
*
***
*
**
*
***
**
Tt~aining with Guards
4*
Intelligence Information
*
**
***
***
*
**
Viable Response
* .
**
*
***
***
***
Response Time
**
**
*
*.
*
**
PAGENO="0248"
244
irreducible uncertainties with regard to their ability to
arrive at the site in a timely manner and as a coordinated
group. The ability of reaction forces to play a significant
role in containing an attacking group is more subject to the
details of the attack and the characteristics of the facility
than is the ability o~ the on-site guard force to play the role
expected of them. Moreover, unless reaction forces were legally
bound to be respons{ve to requirements stipulated by the NRC,
it would be difficult to verify the existence of desired cap-
abilities.
* The study group concluded that the best way to satisfy
reaction force requirements is to allow licensees flexibility
to develop securfty plans which provid~ for reaction forces
from any of a variety of sources which best meet thejr needs.
p
The NRC would then review and approve such plans.
PAGENO="0249"
245
SOME SPECIAL SENSITIVE ISSUES
Use of Lethal Force
Following, extensive legal research into the matter (See
Appendix D), the study group concluded that, under existing
law, deadly force may be used, without liability against most
attacks on SUM and licensed facilities. The reasonsare:
1) because unlicensed possession of SUM is a felony under federal
law, and 2) under the 1950 Presidential declaration of emergency
(still in effect), sabotage of licensed facilities would probably
be considered a felony under federal anti-sabotage laws. For
every theft of SUM and every act `of sabotage that is a felony
under federal or state law, use of deadly force. would be
privileged. . p.
Almost every conceivable attack on SUM or licensed facilities
is likely to involve the type of~felonies as to which virtuaiJy.
`all states recognize a privilege to use deadly force, when necessary
in `the response. Presumably anyOne attackingSNM or sabotaging
licensed facilities will have to,' overcome physical barriers
(fences, alarms, `clear zones," and the like) and to cope with armed
guards. Most attacks will therefore probably utilize considerable
force. It is hard to imagine any such attack that would not
involve the type oflife-endangéring felony (serious assaults,
mayhem, homicide) recognized by,: states as giving rise to a privilege
to use.deadly force. "
PAGENO="0250"
246
* To provide uniform guidance tà se~urity forces, the study
group recommends that the use of deadly force be required when
It is the minimum needed to protect SNM and licensed facilities.
They also recommend that a change in law be sought which would'
afford private guards the status of peace officers. This would
make their use of deadly force privileged as long as they
reasonably believe a felony has been committed, even if that
belief is wrong. Nnally,. to encourage full compliance with
the federal requirement, guards should~be immunized from criminal
and civil liability that might attach to use of deadly force.
Their employers should be immunized from at least criminal
liability. * * * * :
~Hostages *
The Department of Defense has issued specific instructions
to guards at military installations to the effect that nuclear.
weapons are to be protected against theft, with deadly force if
nec!essary, and that the use of hostages against guards is to
* be ignored. ERDA has issued similar instructions, though some-
what less explicit, with respect to government-owned nuclear
installations. .~.
* Use of hostages is a relatively easy blackmail technique
which has been widely publicized and generally successful. If
intruders could gain entry into private nuclear facilities or
PAGENO="0251"
247
escape therefrom with toxic or critical mass materials by capturing
or threatening hostages, a grave weak spot would exist in any
security safeguards system. Any instruction less forthright than
the DOD instruction on this point would be made the focus of
differing interpretations, and would lead to variable and unpre-
dictable weaknesses in~ the guard force's protection of SNM. Thus,
regardless of whether a federal security agency is established or
the present private guard system is maintained, clear policy
*directives should be set regarding hostages, by NRC regulation
or by congressional legislation. . . .
Gun Laws and the Protection of SNM in Transit
There are numerous and highl~ diverse fede~al, state, and
* local regulations of the possession and transpo~tbf weapons.
Any guards to whom Congress has not s~pecifically granted the
authority to carry all necessary weapons may be impeded in ~1{~e
discharge of their duties by questions about that authority;
their weapons might even be confiscated. NRC could either use
* as guards only those individua1s~(all federal employees) to whom
Congress has already granted express authority to carry firearms,
or obtain new legislation for giving the guard force chosen by
NRC authority to carry, under regulations promulgated by. the
Coninission, all necessary weapons. *
PAGENO="0252"
248
It is clear that the problem of varying gun laws is a major
factor underlying assertions that security is inadequate for SNM
In transit. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation, for example,
in corrinenting upon the Security Agency Study, cited the lack of
uniform state gun laws as its reason for recommending federal
guard~s for SNM in tran~sit. Burns International Security Services
commented on the need for legislation to allow transportation
guards to carry fir~arnis~ in interstate commerce when required by
1OCFR Part 7~.
.ACornment on Trarsporthtion.CO111municatiP1i~i
Regardless of the transportation mode, its owner, or operator,
the study group concluded that there is a need-to.insure that
reliable and effective communications exist at alJ. times during
the shipment. That is, should any iI)cident occur, the vehicle
*must be able to instantaneously communicate with both the control
center and escort vehicles, if any. The present system was found
inadequate because of its blind, spots in coverage and problems
due to voice transmissions. . .
Since government-owned SF~M shipments will be handled. by an
ERDA transportation system, and a communications system already
exists which when fully developed in the near future will provide
its users with secure, reliable communication, NRC should require
private carriers to use this system. .
PAGENO="0253"
249
Clvii Liberties
The NRC sponsored several studies on the impict of nuclear
safeguards upon civil liberties. A working conference on this
Subject was also held at Stanford University Law School, October
l7.~l8, 1975. A Report of that conference has been received from
Professor John Carlton of Stanford. Other reports have been
prepared by William C1~une of the Wisconsin Law School and by
the law firm of Wilmer~ Cutler and Pickering of Washington, D.C.
These reports all reflect the opinion that damage to ci~'il
liberties is relatively insensitive to~any decision regarding
the use of federal or private guard forces. Legal consultants
and experts are much more concerned about the broad general
impairment of civil liberties which they considerinevitable if
plutonium recycling is approved. That issue wiilbe addressed in
the NRC final Generic Environmental rmpact Statement on the Use
of Mixed Oxide Fuel (GESt1O).
PAGENO="0254"
250
CONCLUSIOUS. AIiD RECOM~1EUDATIONS
I. Analysis of the existing safeguards structure indicates that
it is rationally designed and workable; that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission can adequately fulfill *its security obligations, through
appropriate and stringently enforced regulations.
Recommendation .
The NRC shouldTho~'a~Sume operating responsibility for
security forces in the industry it reg~ulates.
II. The effectiveness of the. safeguards system is determined
principally by the quality and quantity of detection and barrier
systems and by numbers and capabilities of guards. Private
guards whose qualifications are specified by ~egul.ations can be
expected to protect fixed sites or rn~terials in transit with the
same degree of effectiveness as federal guards. Special tra~Lning
for guards is essential to insure capabilities equivalent to that
wh~ch would be expected to be f,ound in a high quality federal
guard ,force. . . . .
Recommendatipft . . ...
Procedures for certifying guard quality should be established
as a means of insuring guard effectiveness. Regulations should
provide for guard certification and licensing in the same manner
as now required for reactor operators. .
PAGENO="0255"
251
III. The safeguards system is flexible and can be upgraded to
any desired level within its present framework to provide protection
against threats substantially in excess of those for which there
is current evidence. There is no reason to believe that such
developments as the plutonium recycle will alter this conclusion
in the reasonably foreseeable future. *
Recommendation ...
1. NRC should specify, on a:contthuing basis, the level of
threat against which licensee security.systems must protect.
2. Safeguards systems should be designed in such a manner
asto insure rapid adjustment to the level of perceived threat.
Such a strategy implies strong emphasis on ph~ical security
elements as a constant, and flexibility in ~iuard and reactionforce
strength. .r
3. Contingency plans~ should be developed, and inteç~at~1
into safeguards systems, against. the very high level of threat
represented by a para-military attack by terrorists on facilities
of shipments. While such attacks are conceivable, they must (in
* the absence of contrary evi~ence) be considered to have a low
probability and are unlikely to appear without advance warning.
Countermeasures are of sufficient magnitude as not to be justifi-
able except in terms of emergency, standby regulations. *
4. The NRC safeguards Inspection and/Enforcement organiza-
tion should.be expanded and strengthened to provide for closer
PAGENO="0256"
252
supervisions as well as frequent and unannounced inspections.
Regulations should provide for periodic testing of security force
"reflexes." Drills should be conducted by the safeguards inspectors
* and performance of licensees evaluated.
IV. Effectiveness of reaction forces isa generic problem, and
is the least tractable element in safeguards system design. The
capabilities of potential reaction forces are variable and difficult
to deter~ine. * *.
* Recommendation *
Safeguards systemsdesign should plice as little dependence
as possible on this element. .~ . * *
V. While the transport link in the fuel cycle thain has been
characterized as the weakest, closer~examinatiOn shows this may
not be true once appropriate security measures are taken. Th~
principal obstacle to secure transport by commercial means lies
in the arming of guards crossing several state jurisdictions.
PAGENO="0257"
253
EXCERPT OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF MEETING WITH
MESSRS. TAMPLIN, COCHRAN AND SPETH OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL [PAGE 48 TO 64]
* * * where are we standing today? What is the situation at a given plant?
Are the guards informed? Are the gates locked? Et cetera.
The second focus is more of an analystic approach. We are trying to gather
a better feeling for the impact that might be created by a significant change in
our safeguards approach. We are looking at shifting from material accounting
to a security containment concept.
We felt we needed to understand on a plant-by-plant basis exactly what was
involved in the way of capital expenditures, what would be involved in the
way of local concerns regarding members of guards and fence and so on.
It has two aspects, and always has had, I guess.
Mr. SPETH. Is the purpose of this review to determine whether the individ-
ual facilities are protected against the maximum credible threat? In what way
are you using the maximum credible threat concept in analyzing these facili-
ties?
Mr. CHAPMAN. This maximum credible threat thing troubles me because it is
a subjective notion. We are, in fact, looking at those facilities and their capa-
bility to protect against what we believe is the existing today threat.
Mr. TAMPLIN. What is that?
Mr. COCHRAN. Could you define that for the facilities and for the
transportation?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I don't know whether I can.
Mr. TAMPLIN. It is difficult to do a: study if you don't know what you are
looking for.
Mr. CHAPMAN. The reason I hesitate is because no matter what I say, you
will disagree.
Mr. TAMPLIN. All we are asking is what are you using as a threat. Whether
we agree with it is irrelevant.
Mr. CHAPMAN. The threat to which: the current security system is based is a
threat that provides for the guards at the site to effectively overcome two aggres-
sors and to withstand for certain periods of time larger numbers of aggressors
until local police or other law enforcement agencies can respond, and these are
all laid out in standard review criteria, which are used by the staff as the
basis for the current security program.:
Mr. COCHRAN. What is that larger number?
Mr. CHAPMAN. The larger number ranges up to 10 aggressors.
Mr. PAGE. Again we have never published in the literature numbers. We
established criteria when we backfitted the security requirements to existing
facilities in i\Iarch of 1974. We said there would have to be two armed guards
onsite at any time. We required more if it was a large plant.
We also had a formulation which said there had to be at least 10 armed
people onsite within 30 minutes. That could include onsite force, plus police
response. Eight within 25 minutes, six within 20 minutes, and four within 15
minutes.
That was the formulas we used for determining the adequacy of present
applied requirements.
Mr. COCHRAN. These guards onsitC that can overcome two aggressors, what
weapons are available to the threatening aggressors and what weapons are avail-
able to the armed guards?
Mr. PAGE. Handguns, .38 revolvers, and shotguns, for the most part.
Mr. COCHRAN. What about the aggressors in your postulated threat? You
postulated two aggressors.
Mr. PAGE. We assumed small weapOns.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Do you have evidence that there is something else that is
being used? ~
71-074 0 - 76 - 17
PAGENO="0258"
254
Mr. COCHRAN. I saw Patty Hearst fire with a lot of good rapid-fire weapons
going off.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Do you relate Patty Hearst to the nuclear industry?
Mr. COCHRAN. Certainly Rosenbaum does. I think his statements with respect
to Patty Hearst incident are relevant. I don't see any reason for postulating
that aggressors against a facility like the Erwin, Tenn., facilities are going to
come in with a couple of .38 s like some Tox Mix western.
Mr. TAMPLIN. I understand the nuclear facilities were on the Manson family
list.
Mr. CHAPMAN. They were.
Mr. TAMPLIN. Yes; and so was NRDC.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I think we were also.
Mr. SPETH. You mentioned something called the staff evaluation criteria.
Mr. CHAPMAN. That is what Jerry has been talking about.
Mr. SPETH. Could we have a copy of these criteria?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I don't know if they were made available.
Mr. PAGE. They are internal review criteria to give guidance to the staff as to
the adequacy in the license application.
Mr. TAMPLIN. Were these materials available to the U.S. marshals?
Mr. PAGE. Our licensing criteria?
Mr. TAMPLIN. Yes, when they did their review study for NRC.
Mr. PAGE. I was not associated with that particular study, so I cannot answer
that.
Mr. TAMPLIN. Were these criteria and so forth available to the U.S. marshal
service at the time they did their study?
Mr. CHAPMAN. I can't answer that because I would have to speak to the
people who wrote those contracts. My impression is they were, but I can't
answer that question.
Mr. COCHRAN. When were they developed?
Mr. PAGE. Prior to January 1974, in anticipation of our review of the
physical security plants. I don't know what the exact date was. We had these
repaired to enable us to make uniform reviews of physical security plans sub-
mitted by license applicants and licensees.
Mr. COCHRAN. Is this level of threat the same as applied to the transportation
of strategic material?
Mr. PAGE. What I'm talking about. was the guard onsite. We are not saying
that they were protecting against 10 people coming in
Mr. COCHRAN. You said you had a sort of-that the guard would have to
overcome two aggressors and withstand a larger number until some sort of
backup force was changed.
Is that the same postulated threat you would apply on a load shipment?
Mr. PAGE. Yes.
Mr. SPETH. We would like to request formally that w-e be given a copy of the
evaluation criteria developed prior to January 1974, and are still in use with
regard to safeguards of the plan and shipments.
Mr. TAMPLIN. The U.S. marshal had available the NRC guidelines, it indicates,
and they indicated they had actual onsite observations of the guard at nuclear
facilities, and yet they concluded that too often the image of security at
nuclear stations has little substance behind it.
* Mr. COCHRAN. They are at one extreme.
Mr. SPETH. Is this threat as stated here, and as defined in the staff evalua-
tion criteria, in your judgment, which I take it that is the threat that is being
used today to examine the adequacy of safeguards and your review that you are
undertaking, pursuant to the petition?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Basically, yes.
Mr. SPETH. Is it your judgment that that is the maximum credible threat
that you ought to be protecting against today?
Mr. CHAPMAN. Today, at this point in time, yes.
Mr. SPETH. I can understand w-hy Mr. Builder was concerned.
Mr. TAMPLIN. In reviewing some of the data that was part of the special
safeguards studies, I don't see how it is possible to look at that information and
come away w-ith the conclusion that you have adequate reaction forces such as
the local law enforcement agencies or anything to respond to a threat at the
licensed nuclear facility, and that was-
Mr. CHAPMAN. We have not so concluded. I don't understand what you are
referring to.
PAGENO="0259"
255
Mr. TAMPLIN. You indicated that the threat-
Mr. CHAPMAN. You are not in possession of documents that I know of that
you could draw that conclusion from.
Mr. TAMPLIN. The point I'm trying to get at is that I couldn't come to the
conclusion that reaction forces are adequate.
You indicated the designed threat you are considering today was two armed
individuals, that the guard could repel those, plus within 30 minutes receive ade-
quate help-
Mr. CHAPMAN. There is a varying scale of time.
Mr. TAMPLIN. Whatever it was you said previously.
I just wondered how all of a sudden the various reaction forces become ade-
quate when as one reviewed the studies that were part of the special safeguards
studies, all indications are that this was the most intractable portion of safe-
guards, and particularly would be applicable in terms of the transportation, as
well as to the sites.
Mr. CHAPMAN. I would like to know what you are citing that says we have
come out publicly saying that reaction forces are not possible or credible.
Mr. TAMPLIN. I didn't say you did. We did have all of the draft of the execu-
tive summary which you may decide to not honor. But-they stated in this draft
executive summary which must have represented someone's opinion within the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission that reaction forces were the most intractable
portion of the-
Mr. CHAPMAN. While he is lookin, how much more time did you plan?
Mr. TAMPLIN. It says effectiveness of reaction forces is a generic problem and is
the least tractable element of safeguar~ls systems design. The potential of reac-
tion forces is difficult to determine.
Mr. BUILDER. In analytical handling, dimensioning, if you like, of their
capabilities when one is designing a system it is difficult to analyze and design.
Mr. TAMPLIN. And to determine their adequacy.
Mr. BUILDER. In an analytical sense.
Mr. TAMPLIN. The U.S. Marshal Service looked into that whole thing. I don't
see how-somehow or another, if you are going to determine that existing safe-
guards are adequate, you are going to have more information and capabilities in
terms of reaction forces than is indicated in the material which we have available
to us.
Mr. BUILDER. If one is going to make an analytical quantitative determination
of adequacy, I would certainly agree that the design of reaction forces, offsite
reaction forces, is a problem in analytic design and quantification.
Mr. SPETH. Let me state, it seems to me the threat-could you tell us what
the inside, internal postulated threat is that the staff is using as part of its
review?
Mr. PAGE. The regulations were based upon the concept of buddy-protect. In
other words, having no individual in a position where he could divert material
without detection.
We have a system of collection and cross-collection set up in the material and
contract and accounting system, as well as the physical security, against that.
Mr. SPETH. Basically the only threat that this examination is accorded with
regard to is the external threat. The number of minimum or maximum-the
internal threat, employee threat, collusion, inside theft, threat is zero?
Mr. PAGE. No, we consider the threat of inside theft very much. We assure
that no individual has access to nuclear materials without someone being there
to maintain him under surveillance, either personally or by direct observation
television.
Mr. SPETH. The theory of this approach is someone goes undetected. My ques-
tion is, how many people working on the inside are you assuming-
Mr. PAGE. Minimizing something here.
Mr. COCHRAN. The memorandum postulated a one-man diversion threat.
Mr. SPETH. As a minimum threat.
Mr. PAGE. Our present regulations and the security plans or material control
and accounting plans that we have reviewed against, we look at the possibility
of diversion by a single employee of the company, and we have taken measures
to assure against that from happening.
Mr. SPETH. It is two in one, basically. Two external and one internal.
Mr. PAGE. Yes, basically.
PAGENO="0260"
256
Mr. SPETH. I think that is worth pointing out, that that is several times
smaller than the threat that has been repeatedly referred to in the literature
we have cited and documents we have cited as a maximum credible threat.
Mr. BUILDER. Could I stop there, Gus, and ask you, could you help me cite
what the threat is in the Mitre report?
Mr. SPETH. The page we would refer you to is the page in the Rosenbaum
report of April 1974 where the external threat was 2 to 15 armed individuals.
Obviously in your own memorandum, you suggested it is 12 external and 3 to
4 internal.
Mr. BUILDER. This is a more recent effort by Rosenbaum and his team.
Am I correct in assuming that there is no threat quoted here?
Would you like to speak or speculate with me why there is no threat number
quoted in here? In fact, he says any prediction of a future threat to licensed
nuclear facilities is speculation.
Mr. TAMPLIN. We agree with that.
Mr. COCHRAN. We agree with that.
Mr. BUILDER. Now you are saying there is a maximum credible threat of 12
or 15.
Mr. SPETH. What I said was I think it stated exactly the way I would want it
stated in the petition that we filed, was that I thought given the present uncer-
tainties with regard to determining what was the maximum credible threat, that
it was the Commission's obligation to assume an ample margin of safety in
addition to determining what the maximum credible threat was, and that is
the staff's obligation.
If there are uncertainties with regard to determining what is the maximum
credible threat, they should be resolved in favor of postulating a larger threat,
and not in subjecting the public to risks for the sake of private corporations'
profit.
Mr. CHAPMAN. We keep speaking in a gross way. We talk about maximum
credible as though it is w number of people or v number of people.
I can take a position that says there are a thousand people killed in New York
City a year. Therefore, I must have a policeman to stop every one of those
murders.
One has to acknowledge maximum credible in terms of numbers. In the sense
of probability of occurrence, we have not disagreed with you that there is a
possibility that there could be as many as 12 organized souls-I hope not-but
there could be. What is the probability of that happening?
Mr. SPETH. The notion of credibility-I think the phrase "maximum credible,"
which is one well understood within the context of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's approach to disruptive events, whether it be mechanical or hu-
man-this approach has been used repeatedly in the analyses which have been
carried out by numerous experts.
Mr. BUILDER. For safety.
Now you are making an advocacy of safety criteria being applied to safe-
guards.
Mr. SPETH. They have been made by numerous experts in evaluating current
safeguards. It is an approach used by Miller and Taylor in their book. It is the
approach used by the Rosenbaum group in April of 1974. It has been used in
the draft version of the Security Agency study.
What this is suggesting is the staff of the Commission is backtracking for
the sake of the corporations who got the material at the risk of subjecting the
public to the risk.
It sounds like you were backing up on positions that you would otherwise be
taking, and it is disturbing.
Isn't that the case?
Mr. CHAPMAN. You are saying we are not overreacting to a minority group
such as yours, who are taking an extreme position that we must protect against
15 armed people.
You have no evidence of that.
Mr. COCHRAN. We have cited the Rosenbaum report and Mitre study report.
Mr. CHAPMAN. Those are my own studies. You haven't given me the honor of
citing all of my studies. You have dted a few that have made your point.
Mr. COCHRAN. We have asked what the evidence is that the threat is less-
1~Ir. CHAPMAN. I say what do you have to say that would show me it isn't?
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Mr. PAGE. Talking about the threat of two and one under present regulations,
the onsite guard force will protect against the attacking force of two. An im-
portant consideration is our redundant communication system to call in for
police assistance.
Our thinking is the present system would protect against more than two if
you couple the onsite guard force with the offsite guard force.
Mr. COCHRAN. Let's pin this down more. Tristate Motor Transit Co., as I under-
stand, has two approved safeguard plans.
Are you, in fact, saying that both o~ those plans meet the requirements for
these backup forces being there in the times you are talking about?
Mr. PAGE. No, sir. No.
Mr. COCHRAN. In fact, this capability to withstand a larger threat-
Mr. PAGE. That is for site protection only, and not for transportation. Obvi-
ously during transit, the vehicle is Oil the road and could at times be farther
away from police assistance, so that a longer period of time would be required
for this level to appear at the scene.
Mr. COCHRAN. Then you have presumably lesser level of threat that you
postulate for materials in transit than you do against fixed facilities?
You are telling me your reaction forces don't have the same capability and
don't meet the same criteria?
Mr. PAGE. We have required that arrangements be made by the transporting
firms to contact police stations along the route so that they are always within
a specified distance of a contact point, so they can call for assistance.
We believe that State police and local law enforcement assistance could
arrive within 30 minutes, perhaps a shorter period of time.
But the actual numbers will vary.
Mr. COCHRAN. 30 minutes of the time they call in?
Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.
Mr. COCHRAN. Do they have a communications link this entire period?
Mr. PAGE. In most areas of the country, they do.
Mr. COCHRAN. Let's talk about Tristate plans A and B.
Do they have communication links over the entire period of transit?
Mr. PAGE. They have radiotelephones on board in the transport vehicle where
they can communicate with police assistants along the way in most areas of the
country.
In some areas, mountainous roads where the radiotelephone could lose the
contact point-I cannot say that every place along the way they would aiways
have continuous communication.
I would say in most instances they would have.
Mr. COCHRAN. Well, my problem is in those instances where they wouldn't have.
If I was going to postulate what an aggressor might do, I would think the
aggressor would have sense enough to identify those areas where they didn't
have good radio control.
Mr. BUILDER. That is scenario knowledge. If one wants to look at the actual
operations, we have had safeguards people ride on these shipments to see what
is actually going on.
There are other communications available to them other than the radio-
telephone which our safeguards people would judge would be very effective, and
even more effective than the radiotelephone.
Mr. COCHRAN. These are things overlooked by these people that reviewed the
adequacy of the reaction force in the transportation sector.
Mr. BUILDER. I'm saying the actual operations include citizen band radios, for
example, on these trucks. They are in frequent communication with trucks up
and down the line.
There are lots of people on the rOad with whom they communicate. If you
start painting scenarios about what about a blackout area, you ought to take
the whole scenario into perspective.
Mr. COCHRAN. I'm trying to determine what the criteria are for the trans-
portation sectors and for the fixed facilities.
Mr. BUILDER. The requirements only go so far, as you rightly point out. They
point out he must have a radiotelephone.
Now you are going into the realities about the blackout area. I want to bring
into account the other realities of other types of communication equipment.
Mr. TAMPLIN. These aren't in the regulations, are they?
Mr. BUILDER. No.
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Mr. COCHRAN. Is it a fact that all of Tristate carriers carry a citizen band
radio?
Mr. CARTER. Yes; they do.
Mr. COCHRAN. That is true of the Transnuclear and Elco shipment as well?
Mr. CARTER. I can answer for Tristate only.
Mr. PAGE. I would think they do have, but I can't speak authoritatively to
that.
Mr. Rudolph is shaking his head in the affirmative that they have citizens
band radios.
Mr. SPETH. I think the next question is-let me say before we leave that
question, it strikes me that Mr. Builder has expressed concern that some or
many of the existing facilities are not adequately safeguarded against a threat
of three external people and one internal person.
That is a threat which is comparable to the threat *
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HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW
Vol. 10, 1975, pp. 369-443
COMMENTS
POLICING PLUTONIUM:
THE CIVIL LIBERTIES FALLOUT
Since the beginning of the atomic age thirty years ago, the
awesome power of nuclear weapons has been perceived as an
unprecedented threat to human liberty as well as to human life.'
Most speculation about life in this country in the aftermath of a
nuclear attack assumes that personal freedoms would be sharply
curtailed.2 On the other hand, the development of atomic power for
peaceful purposes, primarily for the generation of electricity, has
proceeded without much concern about its impact on civil liberties.
This peaceful coexistence between the civilian nuclear power industry
and civil liberties interests may be profoundly disturbed by the
expanded use of the manmade element plutonium. Plutonium, it
appears, is one of the most dangerous substances in existence3 and
the problems of keeping it in responsible hands are extraordinary.
In August, 1974, the United States Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC)4 released a major environmental impact statements
`See generally Cushman, CiyilLiberiies in the~Azomic Age. 249 ANNALS 54-65
(1947).
`R. Rankin & W. Dailmayr, FREEDOM AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN
THE COLD WAR 19-95 (1964); B. Menke, Martial Law-Its Use in Case of Atomic
Attack, May 1, 1956 (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Term Paper No. 360); J.
Wagner, Martial Law-Its Use in Case of Atomic Attack, April 30, 1956 (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, Term Paper No. 409).
`See pp. 380-83 infra.
The AEC was abolished in February, 1975, and its functions transferred to two
new government agencies under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-438 (Oct. 11, 1974). Its nonregulatóry research and promotional operations were
taken over by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), Id. §
104(c), and its licensing and regulatory functions were assigned to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Id. § 201. The separation of regulatory and
promotional functions was a responseto charges that their presence together in the
AEC constituted a basic conflict of interest. See 4 CCI-I ATOM. EN. L. REP. ¶
13,201.10 (1974).
The responsibility for licensing nuclear reactors now rests with the Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and the responsibility for establishing nuclear material
safeguards rests with the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. Both
offices are subdivisions of the NRC. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Pub. L. No.
93-438, §~ 203-04 (Oct. 11, 1974). Since the Reorganization Act did not affect the
substantive body of licensing and safeguards regulations with which this Comment is
concerned, and since that body of regulations was developed by and through the AEC,
reference will be made to that agency rather than to the NRC.
`U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, DRAFT GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL
STATEMENT ON THE USE OF RECYCLE PLUTONIUM IN MIXED OXIDE
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37() Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
concerning its plans to license the "recycling" of plutonium in the
civilian nuclear power industry. That industry has undergone
enormous growth in the past two decades and is expected, at least by
the AFC,' to occupy an increasingly important position in the
energy arena as supplies of fossil fuels become scarce.7 Nuclear
power plants run on uranium fuel8 and there is concern whether the
existing reserves of uranium are sufficient to meet the needs of the
next several decades.8 The AEC's recycling proposal is an attempt to
deal with this problem by allowing plutonium, which is created as a
by-product in nuclear reactor cores,° to be used as additional fuel for
the reactor;, thereby decreasing the demand for new uranium.
Plutor.ium recycling represents a majof change in the nuclear
reactor fuel cycle, and it is open to attack from many different
FUEL IN LIGHT WATER REACTORS, WASH-1327 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
DRAFT STATEMENT]..The statement is intended to meet the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970). A final version of the
statement is expected to be issued in late 1975.
Most AEC projections of the growth of nuclear power are based on assumptions
of increased energy demand which the "energy crisis" has called into question. Studies
comparing th.~ ratio of per capita energy consumption to per capita income in the
United States with that in Europe suggest that the United States could meet many of
its energy requirements through conservation without affecting economic growth. See
Nichols, Energy Report: Federal Energy Analysts Stress Conservation to Ease
Shortages, 6 NAT. J. REP. 1506-08 (1974). The Federal Energy Administration believes
that conservation could bring the energy demand growth rate down to two or three
percent per annum, id.. which is considerably less than the eight to ten percent rate
that the AEC assumes. See I DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at S-22.
`At the end of 1960, nuclear power plants in the United States had a capacity of
297 megawatts of power and accounted for 0.2 percent of the country's total electric
generating capacity. U.S. Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 516 (93d ed. 1972). By 1974, there was a nuclear power
capacity of 28.183 megawatts, amounting to about live percent of the total, with
another 173,918 megawau~ of capacity on order or under construction. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, Prets .~!case, July 23, 1974. If developed according to AEC
projections, nuclear reactors will account for 40 to 60 percent of electrical generating
capacity by the year 2000. 1 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at S-22; Holdren,
Fia:ards of the Nuclear Fuel C'ycle. 30 BULL. ATOM. SC!., Oct., 1974, at 14.
`See p. 377 infra.
`The extent to which potential uranium shortages- justify crush programs
designed to develop techniques for using uranium more efficienty is a hotly debated
subject. See' Barfield, Energy Report: U.S. Retains Conunitmeni to Breeder Reactor
Despite Eni'iro'unenta/, Eronom(c (`liallenges. 5 NAT. J. REP. 1864 (1973). The AEC's
concern about uranium shortages is based on incomplete exploration of less than ten
percent of the probable uranium sites in this country, and on an assumption that
scarcity will not raise the price of uranium sufficiently to make further exploration and
mining worthwhile. Id. at 1872.
See p. :177 infra.
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19751 Plutonium Recycling 371
directions. Economically, it is argued that the actual savings in
uranium are too slight to justify either the additional expenditures in
plants and technology or the increased risks. Environmentalists
contend that the addition of several new stages to the fuel cycle
increases the dangers of ecological contamination caused by
equipment malfunctions or acts of God.2 From an international
standpoint, there is reluctance to introduce a nuclear process that
uses large quantities of plutonium into countries that might be
tempted to divert the substance fOr use in nuclear weapons.'3 Finally,
the extremely hazardous properties of plutonium generate concern
for keeping it out of the hands of persons who might use it for social
blackmail or destruction on an unprecedented scale.'4
This Comment adopts a different perspective and examines the
effect on civil liberties of measures which might be used to deal with
this last-mentioned problem. Both the AEC and its critics agree that
"See Barfield, supra note 9, at 1865; Speth, Tamplin, & Cochran, Plutonium
Recvele: The Fateful Step, 30 BULL. ATOM. SCI., N~'i. 1974, at 15, 22 [hereinafter
-cited as Plutonium Recycle). By reducing annual uranium requirements by ten to
fifteen percent, it is calculated, plutonium recycling would result in an economic
saving of only one-half of one percent through 1985. See id. In general, the empirical
underpinnings of the A EC's projections and proposals aie currently being subjected to
serious challenges. For the most part, this Comment takes no position on- those
debates except to note their existence. The aim here is not to evaluate the economic
justifications for plutonium recycling but rather to analyze some of the civil liberties
consequences of recycling if the AEC's proposal is put into effect.
2 See, e.g., Block, Nuclear Power Plant Prohferation, 2 ENVIR. L. 376 (1972);
Gofman & Tamplin, Nudear Power, Technology, and Environmental Law, 2 ENVIR.
1. 57(1971).. .
See generally INTERNATIONAL -SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY (M. Willrich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS). These fears were dramatically confirmed in May, 1974, when India
exploded a nuclear bomb which it had built using plutonium acquired from a -
Canadian-supplied power plant. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1974, at I, col. 8; id., May
21, 1974, at 1, col. 7. More recently a proposed sale of American nuclear reactors to
Iran has led to controversy regarding the degree to which the United States could
control the use of plutonium produced by the reactors. Id., Mar. 27, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
Thus, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has ceased issuing licenses to import and
export plutonium pending a review of its regulations. id., Mar. 27, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
`4See generally PREVENTING NUCLEAR THEFT: GUIDELINES FOR
INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT (R, Leachman & P. Althoff eds. 1972); M.
WiUrich & T. Taylor, NUCLEAR TI-lEEr: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS (1974),
Congressman Aspin has introduced legislation which would prohibit the licensing of
plutonium until expressly authorized by Congress, pending a review of the security
risks. H.R. 3618, 94th Cong., 1st Ses!~. (1975). Recent congressional activity
concerning plutonium regulation is summarized in N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, at 26,
col.4.
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372 l-lar'~ard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
plutonium is one of the most dangerous substances in existence'5 due
to its extremely high toxicity16 and its potential for use in nuclear
explosives.'7 Therefore any system which produces and uses large
quantities of piutonium must adopt measures designed to prevent its
appropriation by persons bent on destruction.8 Most discussions of
this question deal with such "safeguard'~ measures in terms of their
practicality, their economic costs, and thei~ effectiveness in reducing
the risk of theft or sabotage.'9 Less often taken into account is the
inevitable impact almost all safeguards have on the civil liberties of
persons both within and without the nuclear power industry.20
Although safeguard procedures have existed in the private nuclear
industry since its beginnings two decades ago without posing serious
threats to civil liberties,2' the existing safeguards system is conceded
to be inadequate to deal with the risks posed by plutonium recycling22
~ See 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-9; Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, at 12-16.
~See pp. 382-83 infra.
`7Sce pp. 380-81 infra.
"Measures to prevent the accidental release of plutonium into the environment
are also necessary, and in some cases the same techniques can be used to protect the
plutonium from both natural and human interference. Enclosing the nuclear reactor in*
heavy concrete shielding is a simple example. See 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra
note 5, at V-31; cf 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 50-57 (1973). It is clear,
however, that iii dealing with human agents one must consider the possibilities of both
surreptitious diversion and attack by armed force. Measures sufficien.t to prevent
accidental mishaps are therefore insufficient to prevent appropriation of plutonium by
determined thieves.
`~ See. e.g., Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 135-66; 9 PROCEEDINGS OF
TIlE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES
OF ATOMIC ENERGY 303-536 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE].
The only published discussion of the problem appears to be in Plutonium
Recycle, supra note 11, at 19-20. In its draft environmental impact statement, the AEC
is silent even as to the existence of a civil liberties problem. It has since recognized such
a problem but has taken the position that there can be effective safeguard techniques
that do not have unacceptable costs in terms of civil liberties. Letter from L. Manning
Muntzing, AEC Director of Regulation, to Sen. Walter F. Mondale, Oct. 7, 1974
[hereinafter cited us Muntzing letter). Congressman Aspin's bill requires the Office of
Technology Assessment to investigate "the full range of economic costs and
institutional implications. includ!'zg threats to civil liberties, of the safeguards measures
needed to minimize the unauthorized diversion or use oiplutonium." H.R. 3618,*
3(a)(3), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (emphasis added).
21 But see note 91 infra.
See generally U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
THE PROGRAM FOR THE PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL (1973) [hereinafter cited as GAO Report]. This study, which reviewed
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 373
and stronger measures are clearly called for.23 It is thus appropriate
that plutonium recycling be evaluated from a civil liberties
perspective as well as from economic and environmental
perspectives.
The argument will proceed in three stages. First, a brief account
of the elementary scientific principles of nuclear reactors and nuclear
fuel cycles will be presented in order to show how terrorists or
criminals might steal and use small quantities of plutonium to cause
unprecedented destruction.24 Next, the importance of preventing
thefts of plutonium and recovering it swiftly if it is stolen will be
shown to justify a range of extraordinary safeguard measures.
Stringent security programs designed to insure the loyalty of civilian
employees having access to plutonium25 and wiretapping and other
forms of covert surveillance dósigned to monitor the activities of
suspected terrorists26 may seem necessary in order to prevent thefts of
plutonium. Citywide search and seizure campaigns27 and temporary
declarations of martial law28 may be required to recover stolen
plutonium before it is used to cause harm. Finally, since each of these
the security programs of three nuclear material licensees, found two of them to be
"significantly limited" in their ability to prevent thefts. Id. at 15. In one instance, a
storage area containing strategic nuclear materials was accessible by reaching over the
top of the door and opening it from the inside. Id. at 42. The GAO concluded that
enforcement of existing regulations was lax and that the regulations themselves were
too lenient. The AEC responded by issuing new, more stringent regulations. 38 Fed.
Reg. 30538 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 35430 (1973). However, the AEC admits that even
these regulations are inadequate to cope with the increased risks which would be posed
by large-scale plutonium recycling. 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-6.
23 Theoretical difficulties are created by the lack of consensus on what an
allowable risk of theft ought to be. Some environmentalists contend that any degree
greater than zero is unacceptable because of the enormous harm which could result
from a single successful theft. Gofman & Tamplin, Nuclear Power, Technology, and
Environmental Law, 2 ENVIR. L. 57 (1971). The AEC has refused to state whether it is
willing to accept a nonLzero risk. AEC REGULATORY STAFF RESPONSE TO
QUESTIONS ON PLUTONIUM RECYCLE 1(1974), in Muntzing letter, supra nose
20 thereinafter cited as REGULATORY STAFF RESPONSEI. Others argue only
that the risk should be "as low as practicable." Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at
125. The latter position is probably the most defensible since the existence of zero risk
could never be proved, only disproved; in any case, it will become clear thai any
safeguards s~ hich are capable of significantly reducing the risks of theft will have civil
liberties implications,
`~ St'e pp. 375-84 infra.
" See pp. 388-400 infra.
26 See pp. 401-Il Infra.
"See pp. 412-23 in/pa.
~` See pp. 424-35 infra.
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374 harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
riieasures would seriously compromise the civil liberties interests of
large numbers of people, it will be concluded that those interests
ought to he weighed heavily before the decision to allow plutonium
recycling is made.
Advance consideration of the civil hib~rties consequences of
plutonium recycling is essential. Once recycling begins and the risks
of plutonium theft become reaF rather than hypothetical, the case for
governmental infringement of protected rights will seem compelling.
Courts, fearful that the consequences of a mistaken judgment could
be socially catastrophic, ~vihl face overwhelming pressure to carve out
exceptions to the traditional doctrinal guarantees of personal
liberty.29 Legislatures, attempting to balance conflicting values of
civil liberties and public protection, may find a reasoned approach
impossible. An important social cost of plutonium recycling, this
Comment will argue, will therefore be the toss or diminution of basic
civil liberties.
Analysis of the civil liberties effects of plutonium recycling
suggests a more general argument about the duties of government in
making decisions implementing new technology. When the effect of a
governmental decision is to give rise to circum~tances in which
significant new infringements of personal liberties are justified, such
infringements ought to be counted as costs, along with economic,
environmental and other costs, in the original decisionmaking
process.30. This argument is illustrated by another area of great
concern over physical security, namely air travel. If the government
In his concurring opinion in in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368-75 (1970) (holding
that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency
p~ocecdings), Justice Harlan recited the familiar belief that we prefer acquitting a
guilty man to convicting an innocent one. Lying behind this preference may be an
assumption that erring in favor of any particular guilty person will not result in an
intolerable amount of harm to society. But where one is suspected of having stolen
plutonium, thc harm to society from mistakenly letting him go could be enormous,
involving tens of thousands of deaths. See note 61 inTro. Whether or not this kind of
efficiency calculus is a traditional element of judicial reasoning, it is difficult to believe
that a principled disposition to acquit in the face of uncertainty about guilt will be
maintained when the stakes are so high. Analogously, the dire consequences of a
mistaken decision in favor of the individual will affect de~kions about employee
security, searches ol personal dwcllin~s, and other state.imposed burdens.
Cf Trit,e, leelnwlogt' ~lssc~vsn,~'nt and the Fowi/: Dfwoniinuity: The limits of
lnsiru,m'ntaI Rationafil;', 4( S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973) (assessment of new
technology should examine not only whether the technology achieves the social ends
sought for it hut also whgther it alters the ends themselves). The argument naturally
arises that government agencies contemplating technological policy decisions should
piesent a "civil liberties impact statement" along with the environmental impact
PAGENO="0269"
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19751 Plutonium Recycling 375
decided to rely on personal searches instead of electronic rn~etal
detectors at airport terminals, a court might find that the importance
of preventing hijacking justified full body searches of all passengers
boarding airplanes whether or not there was probable cause to
suspect each individual searched~ The passengers could contend that
the reason their foUrth amendment rights were compromised lay in
the government's failure to provide a less offensive alternative means
of detecting hijackers. The government had a duty, they would
argue, to consider their interests in personal privacy as a factor in its
original decision not to use metal detectors.
Where the civil liberties costs of governmental action are serious
and foreseeable, as they are in the case of plutonium recycling, those
costs must be taken into accoUnt before such action is initiated.
Exactly how serious are the civil liberties costs of plutonium
recycling is the subject of the sections that follow. From that
discussion should emerge a conclusion as to whether any of the
alleged benefits of recycling are sufficient to justify its costs.
I. THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
AND THE RISKS POSED BY PLUTONIUM
Nuclear reactors produce energy, and ultimately electrical
power, from the process of nuclear fission,3' which, simply stated, is
"[t]he division of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal
parts."32 When .a heavy nucleus is struck by a neutron of sufficient
energy, it splits into two medium-sized nuclei, giving off additional
neutrons and radiation." The production of additional neutrons
makes possible a self-sustaining chain reaction, in which each fission
statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)
(1970). The concluding section of this Comment will contend that review of the civil
liberties impact of proposed action is in fact required by the Act. See pp. 436-41
infra.
"See generally D. Rennet, THE ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR POWER (1972);
A. Foster & R. Wright, Jr., BASIC NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (1968); S.
Glasstone, SOURCEBOOK ON ATOMIC ENERGY (2d ed. 1958); D. Inglis,
NUCLEAR ENERGY: ITS PHYSICS AND iTS CHALLENGE (1973). Chemi~al
fuels, such as oil, natural gas, coal, and wood, produce energy by reacting with other
chemicals (usually oxygen~ in ways which alter their molecular structure but do not
change the identity of the chemical elements present. Nuclear fuels, on the other hand,
produce energy in nuclear reactions, which by affecting the nuclei of the atoms create
different elements.
321 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. ¶25 (1972).
"Bennet, supra note 31, at 28.
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376 1 1~irvard Civil R1ghts-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
of a nucleus produces at least one neutron capable of causing another
fission." l'he goal of nuclear reactor technology is to create
conditions in which nuclear fissions occur at a steady rate and to
convert the energy produced by the fissions into usable form.
Most fissionable materials arc useless in the hands of would-be
terrorists. Only very heavy elements (those with many protons and
neutrons in their nuclei) are theoretically fissionable, and of these
only a handful will fission readily enough to sustain a. chain reaction
and he useful in nuclear reactors. Fortunately, elements which will
sustain a chain reaction, and hence a nuclear explosion, do not occur
naturally in appreciable quantities." Fuel for nuclear reactors must
be prepared, either by enriching natural uranium to increase the
concentration of the easily fissionable uranium isotope U-235 to the
point where the material will chain reactTM' or by artificially producing
elements, such as plutonium1 which can be used as reactor fuel by
themselves." Since the.technology and capital necessary to carry out
If each fission produces several neutrons, each of which causes another fission,
the resulting process is a nuclear explosion. Both nuclear bombs and nuclear power
reactors operate by chain reaction, the difference being that a reactor contains devices
which absorb some of the neutrons produced so that the reaction proceeds in a stable
manner. See Id. at 53.
" Of the elements that undergo fission with low energy neutrons, referred to as
fissile elements, only the uranium isotope U-235 occurs in nature in significant
amounts, constituting 0.715 percent of natural uranium. Id. at 27. (On the other hand,
isotopes undergoing fission only with high energy neutrons, such as U-238, occur in
relative abundance.) If the fissilc elements occurred naturally in large quantities,
fabrication of nuclear weapons would simply be a matter of mining and processing
natural ores rather than using costly and difficult synthesizing techniques and hence
would be wit'~in the reach of private groups.
~ Natural uranium contains about 99 percent U-238 and less than one percent U~
235 and is theoretically incapable of sustaining a chain reaction. Id. at 54. Once it has
been enriched to contain between two and four percent of U-235, it is usable in nuclear
reactors though not in nuclear explosives. Enrichment to around ten percent U-235 is
required for the latter purpose. Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 16, 31. All the
known techniques for enrichment are exceedingly expensive and probably beyond the
reach of private groups, at least for the foreseeable future. Id. at 17-18.
" Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors by neutrons reacting with atoms of
U.238. Slow moving neutrons are captured by U-238, which instead of fissioning
becomes U-239. U-239 is unstable, having a half life of about 23 minutes; it decays
into neptunium (Np-239). The neptunium is also unstable, having a half-tile of 2.3
days; it decays into the plutonium isotope Pu-239. The latter is extremely stable,
having a half.iife of 24,400 years. l3ennet, supra note 31, at 60. (`~Half-life" means the
time in which half the atoms of a radioactive material will disintegrate into another
form. I CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. ¶ 25(1972)).
The process by which uranium atoms are used to produce plutonium is called
breeding. Altnough minute amounts of plutonium are formed this way naturally in
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large-scale preparations of reactor- or weapons-grade fuels from
natural ores are not available to small private groups,'~ one can
conclude that, but for the operation of the civilian nuclear power
industry, the basic materials necessary to fashion nuclear weapons
would not be available to such groups.39
Plutonium in accessible and transportable form is not produced
until late in the reactor process. Most nuclear reactors currently in
use in the United States, with the exception of a few small
demonstration plants, are of the light water reactor (LWR) type.4
Light water reactors "burn" uranium, which must undergo a series
of milling and enrichment processes before it is usable as fuel.4' The
enriched uranium then undergoes a controlled chain reaction in the
reactor core, producing heat which is used to create steam which may
in turn he used to generate electricity. The fission process in the
reactor produces radioactive waste products,42 plutonium,43 and
some unused uranium.44 These materials may be separated from each
other by chemical processes.45 Prior to separation, however, the
uranium ore (about five parts in a trillion), it is safe to say that plutonium exists only
to the extent that it is produced artificially by breeding. See Foster & Wright, supra
note 31, at 272. It is highly unlikely that a private group would have the resources to
operate a clandestine breeding facility.
"See notes 36, 37 supra.
"Nuclear weapons material was produced by the government for ten years before
the advent of the civilian nuclear power industry, though only in quantities necessary
for the military arsenal.
~° Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 30.
The following separate stages are involved: uranium mining; conversion to
oxide ("yellowcake"); conversion to héxafluouride (a gas); enrichment by gaseous
diffusion; conversion of enriched uraniUm to oxide; fabrication into fuel assemblies;
use in LWR power plants. Id. at 32-34; 3 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at IV
13.3 At no stage in this process is the uranium usable in a nuclear weapon. Willrich &
Taylor, supra note 14, at 16, 36.
~` The waste products consist of the medium-sized nuclei which result from the
splitting of the uranium atom. They are very unstable and their decay produces
radiation. Bennet, .cupra note 31, at 29~ These highly radioactive waste products are
dangerous to handle, hazardous to the environment, and must be stored in special
containers. See Swan, Management of High-Level Radioactive Wastes: The AEC and
the Legal Process. 1973 LAW & THE SOC. ORDER 263. They are not, however,
uselul as fission material, for either reactors or explosives, although their disper~aI in
the environment following the sabotage of a nuclear reactor installation could be
calamitous. See l-loldren, supra note 7, at 16-21.
~` See note 37 supra.
44.The unused uranium contains only about one percent U-235 and hence is not
usable in reactors without subsequent enrichment. Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at
35.
~` id.
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presence of the radioactive wastes effectively deters thefts of the
material by requiring that it be handled in massive lead containers.
The plutonium, once recovered, is potentially useful as fuel for
nuclear reactors. Until 1972, the practice was to transfer it to the
military for use in fabricating nuclear weapons or to place it in long
term storage.4~ Currently only the latter course is followed,41 and the
plutonium is left mixed with the other radioactive waste products.
The present LWR fuel cycle,48 therefore, effectively removes from
commerce all significant amounts of the plutonium which are
produced.49
The proposal to recycle plutonium would decisively transform
the current treatment of plutonium and vastly increase the
opportunities for its abuse. Under the proposal, relatively pure
plutonium would he separated from the radioactive waste products
and transferred out of storage to mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants5"
where it would be combined with enriched uranium5' to produce new
fuel assemblies for use in light water reactors.52 This procedure would
add to the nuclear fuel cycle several new stages in which plutonium
would be present and vulnerable to theft: shipment of plutonium
from storage to mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants,53 conversion of
plutonium to oxide and fabrication of mixed oxide fuel, shipment of
fabricated mixed oxide fuel to LWRs, and storage of fabricated f~~i
Statement of T. Taylor before the Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization,
Research ~nd Organizations, 120 CONG. REC. S4178 (daily ed. March 21, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Taylor statement].
41 In 1971, the Nuclear Fuel Services fuel reprocessing plant at West Valley, New
York, was closed for renovation. Since that time, no plutonium has been extracted by
commercial rcprocessing plants. Id. -
4'For diagrams illustrating the flow of material through the present LWR fOcI
cycle, see 3 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at IV B.3; Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, at 33.
Wilirich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 37; Taylor statement, supra note 47, at
S4l 78.
The term "mixed oxide" refers to the fact that both uranium and plutonium are
used as oxides (U03 and Pu01 respectively) rather than in pure metallic form in
nuclear reactcrs.
The uranium would come from gaseous diffusion or other enrichment plants,
which would he fed by both freshly mined uranium and used uranium from reactors.
For diagrams illustrating the LWR fuel cycle with plutonium recycling, see 3
DRAFT STATEMENT, .vupra note 5, at IV 8-5. See also Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14.at38-4l.
"The AEC maintains that it is impractical to place the plutonium storage and
fuel fabrication facilities at the nuclear reactor site in order to avoid transporting the
plutonium. See note 88 infra.
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at reactor sites.54 Plutonium recycling would therefore greatly
increase both the amount of plutánium in commercial circulation"
and the number of different opportunities for successful acquisition
of it.56
If plutonium recycling is implemented, private parties will be
`~` 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra noteS, at V-4.
The following figures illustrate two estimates of the volume of traffic in
plutonium through 1990 (amounts are expressed in kilograms):
1974 1975 l976~ 1977, 1978 1979 1980 1990
92000-
o 0 0 42ö0 11300 17300 20600 211090
0 0 400 2400 7000 6800 7900 44300
The higher estimates are from Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 52, 65; the lower are
from 1 DRAFT STATEMENT, süpra note 5, at S-43. Neither source expects
plutonium recycling to begin on a significant scale before 1977. The significance of
these figures lies in the fact that the amount of plutonium required for a nuclear bomb
* is about four kilograms. See note 59 infra. (A kilogram is approximately 2.2 pounds).
Whether or not plutonium recycling for LWRs is undertaken in the next few
years, the amount of plutonium in circulation will increqse dramatically in the period
from 1980 to 2000 if the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFIJR) becomes
operational. This projected increase is shown for the year 1990 in the table. The
LMFBR produces more plutonium than it consumes; consequently, a system of
LMFI3Rs, using only unenriched uranium as an input, could produce plutonium in
sufficient quantities to fuel other LMFBRs, thereby eliminating the need for the costly
uranium enrichment process. Indeed, thd LMFBR is regarded by some scientists as the
only way in which all of the world's reserves of uranium could be efficiently used to
produce energy. See Bennet, supra note 31, at 59-60; Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14,
at 47. LMFBR development is not inevitable, however. The case for the LMFBR is
compelling only if uranium proves to be as scarceas the AEC currently claims and if
other energy sources, such as solar, geothermal, and fusion power, prove infeasible.
The LMFBR fuel cycle is similar to the LWR-plus-plutonium recycling fuel cycle
in terms of the vulnerability of plutonium to theft, and it involves much larger
quantities of plutonium. Id. at 49. Because the rate of development of LMFBRs is
somewhat speculative, estimates of the amounts of plutonium involved in the LMFBR
fuel cycle are difficult to make. The annual production of plutonium in the year 2000
could be as high as 100,000 or even 1,000,000 kilograms. Id. at 65.
The future of LMFBRs is currently the subject of intense debate, stimulated in
part by the dramatic rise in the cos(s of breeder development. See Barfield, supia note
9, at 1865 (51 percent cost increase in two years). It is quite possible, however, that a
short-term decision against plutonium recycling in LWRs would~ not permanently
foreclose the safeguards question.
"The envisioned plutonium industry would, by the end of the century, involve a
score of fuel reprocessing and fabricating plants and thousands of interstate shipments
of plutonium, primarily by truck over public highways. See Plutonium Recycle, supra
note U, at 16.
71-074 0 - 76 - 18
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able to use stolen plutonium to vastly increase their power in relation
to the rest of society. For example, individuals will be able to build
their own nuclear explosives. Although the first atomic weapons
were developed in. great secrecy, the techniques for constructing
crude nuclear weapons have become public knowledge in the
intervening thirty years. Sophisticated methods for building efficient
and powerful weapons for military use remain classified, but it is
generally believed that the information necessary to design and build
a crude fission explosive is now available in unclassified scientific
literature." Since all the material, other than plutonium, needed to
build a bomb is available from commercial hardware and chemical
suppliers,59 the present obstacle to the private construction of nuclear
weapons is the unavailability of plutonium.59 The yield of a privately
Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 9, 14-15. Of course, a certain amount Qf
scientific skill is required to understand the information and use it as the basis for
designing and building a nuclear explosive. Dr. Taylor identifies three classes of
people who would qualify in this regard: those who have had direct experience in
designing nuclear explosives for the military (estimated to number in the thousands);
those with trai~iing in the specific technical areas involved, i.e., reactor physics, nuclear
engineering, and high explosive technology (estimated to number in the tens of
thousands); arid those with basic skills in science and engineering who could teach
themselves thc relevant specifics (estimated to number in the millions). Taylor,
Diversion by Non-Governmental Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL SAFE-
GUARDS, supra note 13, at 176, 185-186. The Rosenbaum Report to the AEC
describes "widespread and increasing dissemination of precise and accurate
instructions on how to make a nuclear weapon in your basement." D. Rosenbaum, J.
Googin, R. Jefferson, D. Kleitman, W. Sullivan, A Special Safeguards Study: Report
To The Atomic Energy Commission, in 120 CONG. REC. S6623 (daily ed. April 30,
1974) [hereinafter cited as Rosenbaum Report].
~` Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 21. Several thousand dollars worth of
equipment and materials would probably be required. Id. at 14.
~ The AEC concedes as much: "It is generally accepted that a technically
competent group with the necessary plutonium and equipment could construct a
workable nuclear explosive device." 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-9.
The amount of plutonium required by a private bomb manufacturer in order to build
a working device is usually discussed in terms of the requisite "critical mass," whichis
the amount needed to sustain an explosive chain reaction. The critical mass varies,
depending on mw cleverly the weapon is designed. Wilirich and Taylor suggest that
fbr safeguards purposes the critical mass be taken us the smallest amount needed to
build a low-yield weapon using techniques discussed in unclassified literature, This
conies to about four kilograms (8.8 pounds) of plutonium. Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, at 19-20. See a/ru 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, .cztpra note 5, at V-9.
An undergraduate student at the Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology was
asked to design a nuclear bomb in his spare time without consulting any experts and
using only publicly available reference works. The student's design was reviewed by a
nuclear physicist on the staff of the Swedish Minister of Defense who concluded that
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 381
constructed nuclear weapon could be as much as a kiloton,60 and if
used resourcefully it could wreak havoc on a scale many thousands
of times greater than that achieved by other acts of political violence
in the past.61
Private parties might also use plutonium for widespread
destruction by exploiting its extreme toxicity. Plutonium is not
there was a "fair chance" that it could produce an explosion with a yield of as much as
a kiloton. The student, who disclaimed having any special knowledge of nuclear
weapons design, estimated that the bomb could be built in a few months using
commercially available materials costing 510-530,000 (exclusive of plutonium), and
that it would be light enough to be transportable in a pickup van. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,
1975, at 12, col. 2.
It should be noted that elements other than plutonium are also usable in nuclear
weapons. These include uranium enriched to more than ten percent U~235 (critical
mass ii kilograms) and U-233 (critical mass 4.5 kilograms). Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, ati9~20. The AEC refers to these materials generically as "special nuclear
material." See 42 U.S.C. §~ 2014 (aa), 2071 (1970). Neither highly enriched uranium
nor U-233 figure in the LWR fuel cycle, either with or without plutonium recycling,
and are thus unlikely to fall into the wrong hands. They may figure in fuel cycles
involving other types of reactors in the future, however. See. e.g.. Willrich & Taylor,
supra note 14, at 41.47 (HTGR fuel cycle).
60 That is, it would have the explosive force of 1000 tons of TNT. See Willrich &
Taylor, supra note 14, at 21. The nuclear bomb that was exploded at Hiroshima in
1945 had a yield of 20 kilotons. See THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 6
(S. Glasstone ed. 1964).
61 See generally Glasstone, supra note 60. Nuclear weapons differ from
conventional explosives in several important regards: they generate much more
explosive force per unit weight; they emit a large proportion of their energy as thermal
radiation, which means that they can produce skin burns and fires at some distance
from the blast site; they produce lethal radiation at the time of the explosion; and they
produce radioactive fission products ("fallout") which can contaminate a large area
for a considerable time. id. at 1-3. Although one can only speculate, the public
psychological effects of a nuclear explosion would probably be enormous. Various
possibilities for the use of private nuclear explosives are discussed in J. McPhee, THE
CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY assim (1974), and in Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, at 22.24. A nuclear explosive detonated in the middle of a large football
stadium during a game would kill everyone present, hence upwards to 60,000 people.
A bomb set off just outside the restricted area of the Capitol Building during a State of
the Union Address would wipe out the entire legislative branch of the federal
government as well us the upper levels of the executive and judicial branches. The well-
publicized terrorist events of the last few years, shocking as they were, would pale by
comparison. See. e.g.. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1972, at 49, col. 5(11 Olympic athletes and
4 Arab terrorists killed at Munich);N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1971, at I, col. 6(13 persons
killed in explosion in Belfast pub). Nuclear weapons would allow small groups of
terrorists to wreak destruction on a scale hitherto limited to large governments in
times of war.
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hazardous on external exposure but is deadly if ingested.62 It is
especially dangerous if inhaled, and hence it is possible to cause large
numbers of fatalities merely by dispersing a small amount of it in the
air.63 An area contaminated by plutonium would be uninhabitable
for an indefinite period of time. And most noteworthy, effective
dispersal of plutonium in the air would not require the Construction
of a nuclear explosive; it could be achieved using conventional
explosives or simply by relying on the wind.64 Indeed, one could
achieve this result by sabotaging a container of plutonium during
shipment or storage; it would not even be necessary to steal it.65
Unfortunately, the hazardous nature of plutonium does not
render it immune from theft. Despite its extraordinary toxicity,
plutonium may be handled with relative ease without using heavy
62 Alpha ray emitters such as plutonium are highly dangerous if absorbed
internally; plutonium in particular is chemically similar to calcium and tends to collect
in bone tissue where it rapidly induces cancer. C.R.C. HANDBOOK OF
CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS B-25 (55th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as C.R.C.
HANDBOOK]; See Foster & Wright, supra note 31, at 42. Much of the literature
concerning th~ effects of ingesting plutonium is collected in 3 DRAFT STATEMENT,
supra note 5, ch. IV, § J (App 5). It is not known whether any amount of plutonium
may be safely ingested. Current estimates are that the adult body can maintain
indefinitely u~ to 0.6 millionths of a gram without suffering "significant harm."
C.R.C. HANDBOOK, supra, at B.25. The lethal dosage is estimated at 50 millionths
of a gram. Willrich & Taylor, Lipra note 14, at 24-25. A gram being 0.035 ounces, an
ounce of plutonium in theory contains half a million lethal doses. In practice, of
course, it would be impossible to distribute a single ounce equally among that many
people. Nonetheless, the hazards of plutonium are plainly substantial.
63 The maximum safe concentration of plutonium in the air is now, set at 0.00003
millionths of .i gram per cubic meter. C.R.C. HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at B-25.
Even these strict standards have been criticized as too lenient; the Natural Resources
Defense Council has petitioned the AEC to reduce them by a factor of 100,000. See
Plutoniuni Recycle. supra note 11, at 16.
Three or four ounces of plutonium introduced into the air-conditioning system of
a~ large office building would be fatal to all the inhabitants. Since the presence of
plutonium in the air would be undetectable (unless the building were equipped with
elaborate sen';ing equipment, which is unlikely), they would be unable to take
measures to protect themselves in time. See Willrieh & Taylor, supra note 14, at 25.
64 See 4 DRAFT STATEMENT supra note 5, at V-9.
65 Besides the danger that it will intentionally be used destructively, stolen
plutonium also poses "environmental" hazards. It is not likely that the thi~vcs would
store it as securely as a nuclear facility would or choose the storage site with as much
care. Moreover, the possibility of a black market in stolen plutonium has been
recognized, see Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 119, and one can imagine rival
terrorists or organized criminal groups battling each other for control of a quantity of
plutonium. Under such conditions the risks of accidental release of plutonium into the
environment would be great.
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shielding.'~ Although care must be taken to keep it enclosed in
airtight containers,67 these may be light enough to be transportable
by an individual or a small group of people without special
equipment. Such persons could work with large quantities of
plutonium for as long as it took to fabricate a nuclear weapon or a
dispersal device without being exposed to dangerous levels of
radiation.
Plutonium is perhaps the most dangerous substance known to
man. Since its half-life is 24,400 years,68 it retains its hazardous
characteristics over a period of time longer than the entire history of
civilization. Most importantly for legal analysis, the potential
consequences of a single irresponsible use of plutonium are many
times deadlier than those of any~ other dangerous acts that the law
operates to deter.69 A serious question thus arises regarding what
level of risk of such events our sOciety is willing to tolerate and what
sacrifices of personal freedom it is willing to demand in order to
control that level of risk.
The question is complicated by the need to devise plutonium
safeguard strategies sufficiently broad to anticipate and deal with the
numerous types of persons seeking to acquire plutonium and their
possible motivations for attempting to do so.7° Most such persons
66 Although plutonium is radioactive, its radiation consists primarily of alpha
particles, which are effectively shielded by a few centimeters of air or a piece of paper
or clothing. C.R.C. HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at F-82; Foster & Wright, .supra
note 31, at 42.
"The usual method for handling: plutonium is to keep it enclosed in "glove
boxes," which allow a person to work with the substance in an airtight environment.
Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 13. Glove boxes are available commercially;
moreover, a determined plutonium thief might be willing to assume higher than usual
risks of exposure. Id. at 21.
"See note 37 supra.
For example, a single nuclear explosion or dispersal of plutonium could double
or triple the annual homicide rate. See:U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES.-UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-197l, at 6 (1972)
(17,600 murders and non.negligent manslaughters were committed in the United
States in 1971).
7°A person acting alone, see Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 109, might wish
to sell the plutonium on the black market. The current price of plutonium is $9,000 per
kilogram, which is comparable to the retail price of heroin. See Taylor, supra note 57,
at 192. He might also ransom the material to the government, or he might build a
bomb and threaten to use it. He might be acting from self.perceived virtuous motives,
for example, a belief that society needed to witness a dramatic demonstration of the
dangers of plutonium. Similarly, organized criminals, see Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, at 112, might be interested in the black market value of plutonium or in the
use of a nuclear threat to pressure law enforcement authorities into granting immunity
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would have the incentive and the means to keep their identities
secret;7 in the society at large, therefore, everyone would be a
potential suspect and the basic presumption of innocence would be
threatened.7! Since the motives and interests of these persons and
groups vary widely, any attempt to spot them all in advance would
probably fail. In the end, it is probable that no system of safeguards,
however restrictive, will be entirely effective in deterring all thefts
and sabotage attempts. It would be tragically ironic if society decided
to surrender substantial individual liberties for security reasons and
then experienced the very disaster it sought to avoid. Nevertheless, if.
recycling is implemented, the need to safeguard plutonium against
theft will create pressure for stringent security measures which courts
and legislatures may find difficult to resist.
II. PREVENTING THEFTS OF PLUTONIUM
The need for safeguard measures has been recognized since the
decision was first made in 1954 to develop the peaceful uses of atomic
energy through the private enterprise system.73 Safeguards in the
to their other illegal operations.' Political terrorists' uses of nuclear weapons might
include the extortion of political concessions from the government and the actual
detonation of a device as a means to create political and social chaos. See Id. at 114.
Finally, non-nuclear nations may see the theft of plutonium as a short-cut to becoming
.a nuclear power. See Id. at 215-35.
~` Cf Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6623 (expressing the belief that
international terrorist organizations could successfully infiltrate fifteen men into the
United States undetected).
`2 See note 29 supra.
" On the historical decision to develop a civilian nuclear industry, see Green,
Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MICI-1. L. REV. 479, 480 (1973).
Originally, all special nuclear material, including plutonium, was owned by the
government. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § S(a)(2), 60 Stat. 755. By 1954, it
was decided that the lifting of secrecy surrounding the basic facts of nuclear reactions
and reactor design plus the desire to use the competitive private market to spur
domestic development of nuclear energy made continuation of the restriction on
ownership unwise. Green, supra, at 480. Accordingly, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C. §* 2011-2281(1970), established the Atomic Energy Commission and gave it
authority to license the use of plutonium by private parties. See Id. § 2073(a). See
general/v Syinposiui~i: The Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process. 1$ WM. & MARY
L. REV. 487 (1974). A 1964 amendment to the Act extinguished the government's
claim of title to special nuclear material and allowed the licensing of private
ownership. Act of Aug. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78 Stat. 603.
Private utility companies were initially reluctant to invest in nuclear technology,
largely because they feared potentially disastrous liability in damages in the event of
accidents. A study prepared for the AEC by the Brookhaven National Laboratory,
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 385
form of criminal sanctions for unlicensed po~e~sion of special
nuclear material were established by the Atomic Energy Act of
l954.'~ The Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955Th established
rewards of up to $500,000 for information leading to the discovery of
special nuclear material or atomic weapons which have been
introduced into or acquired in the United States contrary to law.
These provisions have not yet been used as grounds for prosecution.
The AEC's obvious concern, of course, is in preventing situations in
which these sanctions would have to be invoked, and the
Commission seems to think that they have some deterrent effect.'6
The Atomic Energy Act also gives the AEC authority to impose
terms and conditions on the ownership of special nuclear material'7
and commands that it require safety measures which will guarantee
"the common defense and security" and preserve "the health and
safety of the public."5 Until quite recently, safeguards philosophy
has centered around materialsaccounting, focusing on monitoring
concluding that a serious nuclear reactor accident couI~ kill 3,400 people and cause
seven bifliori dollars in property damage, helped substantiate such fears. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comni'n, THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, WASH-740
(1957); see Green, stipra. at 483-86. Congress overcame these fears by passing the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970), which provided for government
indemnity to the extent of $500 million and a ceiling on liability of $560 million. See
Green, supra, at 501-05. Subsequent amendments have raised the contribution
required from the utility companies and their private insurers to $1 10 million, 10
C.F.R. § 140.1 I(a)(4) (1974), and reduced the government's share to $450 million. 42
U.S.C. § 2210(c) (l97~4.
~` It is unlawful under the Act to possess special nuclear material without a
license, 42 U.S.C. § 2077 (1970), to :possess any atomic weapon, Id. § 2122, and to
possess facilities which may be used to produce special nuclear material without a
license, Id. § 2131. The penalty for violation of any of these provisions is ten years
imprisonment or a fine of $10,000 or both, and if the violation is committed with
intent to injure the United States or to secure advantage to a foreign nation the penalty
is life imprisonment or a $20,000 fine or both. Id. § 2272.
~` 50 U.S.C. § 47a (1970).
"St'r 4 1) RA FT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-25.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2073(e) (1970).
~ Id. § 2073(h). The AEC has used its power to establish safeguard requirements
by issuing rules collected at 10 C.F.R. Pts. 50, 70, 73 (1973). The most impottant
safeguard measures, however, are often embodied in `security plans prepared by
individual licensees rather than in the rules. See Wilirich & Taylor, siipra note 14, at
82. These plans are normally kept~ confidential since disclosure might aid potential
thieves in planning their strategy. Se'e 10 C.F.R. § 2.790(d) (1973); Willrich & Taylor,
supra note 14, at 89. On the other hand, the GAO study of actual licensee practice
regarding safeguards questions the v illingness of licensees to adopt stringent physical
security measures. GAO Report, supra note 22, at 15-26.
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the flow of special nuclear material through the fuel cycle and
detecting and accounting for missing materials.'9 Efforts are directed
at minimizing the amount of material unaccounted for(MUF). Since
nu system is precise enough to keep track of a substance down to the
last atom, finite amounts of MUF must he tolerateq. The AEC
therefore has established limits of error (LEMUF) which must be
observed; the limit for plutonium is 0.5 percent.'°
Exclusive reliance on materials accounting is clearly inadequate,
however.' First, a determined thief intent on seizing large amounts
of plutonium by armed assault will not be stopped by the possibility
that the licensee's inventory system will notice that material is
missing.82 Thus, preparations for the use of force to repel attacks on
nuclear facilities are also necessary. Second, the 0.5 percent LEMUF
allows diversion of small amounts of plutonium to escape detection.
A careful employee with access to plutonium could gradually acquire
an amount sufficient to construct a bomb before the accounting
system indicated that a diversion of plutonium had occurred.'3 An
adequate safeguards system, therefore, requires advance security
clearance of employees and close monitoring of their activities.
Recently the AEC has issued new regulations which reflect a
shift away from the materials accounting system.84 These concern
See generally 10 C.F.R. §~ 70.5 I-.58 (1973); Häfele, Systems Analysis in
Safeguards of Nuclear Material, in 9 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra
note 19, at 303, 309; K outs, Bennett, & Lawroski, A Review of tile Goals, Methods and
7'echnic,ue.c of iVuclear Iii alerials Saj~'guards, in id., at 323.
10 (`FR. § 70.51(c)(5) (1973).
The Roseribaum Report recommends abandonment of the material balance
phtlosophy as a basis for safeguards. Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6625.
~ The material balance system also seems ill-designed to deter thefts by insiders.
From the inside, the system's "very complexity. .. invites tampering of a kind which
defies detection." Id. at S6625. Only thieves who are unaware of the limitations of the
accounting system will be deterred by the threat of discovery; but insiders are likely to
be aware of both the limitations and ways to circumvent them.
Id. at S6625. Approximately 10,000 kilograms of plutonium will be in
circulation in th~ late 1970's. See note 55 supra. One-half percent of this quantity is 50
kilograms, or enough plutonium for aho a dozen bombs. See note 59 supra.
Sufficient M1JF has already been recorded in the operation of nuclear reactors that it
is impossible to be certain that some person or group has not already acquired enough
plutonium to build a bomb. See Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 123. Recently
several newspapers have reported allegations that enough plutonium is missing from
nuclear fuel processing facilities in the United States to make several bombs. Boston
Globe, I)ec. 29, 1974. at 59, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1975, at 46, col. 3.
~See. e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 73.50 (1973): 10 C.F.R. §~ 73.30..36, 73.50 (1973). See
generally 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-l3-V.22.
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matters such as improved communications,85 use of heavy containers
during shipment and storage,86 and reinforcement of reactor sites87
th~,t have no adverse effects on individual liberties. Indeed, one can
conceive of safeguards which would go far towards reducing the risks
of plutonium theft an~J which would have little or no impact on civil
liberties.'8 It appears, however, that the AEC, which admits that the
present safeguards system is inadequate to deal with plutonium
recycling,'9 is seriously considering safeguard methods which would
have profound effects on civil liberties. Two broad classes of
methods will be considered here: those designed to insure employee
loyalty and those designed to identify and monitor the activities of
potential thieves outside the~ nuclear industry. Measures for
recovering plutonium following a successful theft will be considered
in the next section.
A. Employee Security
Whatever means of safeguarding plutonium are adopted,
human beings will have access to and responsibility for quantities of
~s 10 C.F.R.*73.50(e) (1973).
id. § 73.30(c).
Id. §73.50app. A.
"Two such methods have received considerable attention. One would reduce the
attractiveness of plutonium to thieves by "spiking" it with some highly radioactive
substance at every stage except during its actual use in reactors. See 4 DRAFT
STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V.44. This would make the plutonium extremely
difficult to steal and use and would also facilitate the detection of unauthorized
movements of plutonium by using Geiger counters. (It should be noted that plutonium
is already "spiked" when it is first removed from reactors, before reprocessing, due to
the presence of radioactive waste products. See note 42, supra.) The costs of "spiking"
plutonium, estimated at three billion dollars during the period 1975-95 and resulting
mainly from the increased difficulties in handling and processing, may make the
process commercially infeasible. See 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-45,
VIll-75.
The other method would eliminate most or all of the transportation stages of the
fuel cycle by locating the various production and processing facilities at a single site.
See id. at V-39: Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 68-69. This would remove one of
the most vulnerable points in the fuel cycle. The AEC appears to favor this concc~t, at
least as far as the various fuel processing facilities are cpncerned. See 4 DRAFT
STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-39; However, there are economic and environ-
mental obstacles to placing the reactors themselves within the fuel processing complex
(so-called "nuclear parks"). See Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 69-71. Therefore
elimination of all transportation of special nuclear material does not appear likely.
"See 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra noteS, at V-6.
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plutonium at many stages in the fuel cycle.40 Moreover, the safeguard
measures themselves, including materials accounting, will require
human supervision. Some means to insure that persons working
within the nuclear power industry are not inclined to steal plutonium
or subvert the safeguards system would therefore seem appropriate.9'
Although the AEC has recognized constitutional obstacles to
the implementation of effective employee security programs,92 it
appeared to believe that the only significant barrier to such programs
was the lack of express statutory authorization.93 Having secured in
1974 the passage of an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
which purports to grant it authority to investigate the "character,
associations, and loyalty" of plutonium workers,94 the Commission is
now prepared to establish "standards and specifications"" that will
determine who can and cannot obtain such jobs.96 After briefly
reviewing the existing judicial precedents, this section will analyse the
question whether the new statute, or any similar statute, could
overcome the constitutional problems surrounding employee
security programs.
~1) This is particularly true of the transportation stage, which will be accomplished
primarily by tr~ck.
`Willrich and Taylor note that a nuclear facility employee might be dangerous in
three capacities: as an internal saboteur, as an individual tempted to steal small
amounts of plutonium for his own use, and as an insider working with an outside
group contemplating an arm~d attack. Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 137.
The AEC has been involved in employee security controversies in the past,
primarily in the area of information control. The celebrated Oppenheimer case is the
most notable iistancc. See generally P. Stern, THE OPPENHE1MER CASE (1969).
The AEC security program in the 1950's was strongly influenced by fears of
communism and the intense concern with loyalty at the time. See generally Shils, ed.,
Secrecy, Security, and Loyalty. 11 BULL ATOM. SC!., April, 1955, at 109-69.
~ "\`arious court rulings in recent years have been favorable to the protection of
individual privacy and of individual right-to-work. These rulings have made it difficult
to make a personal background check of an individual in commercial activities to
assure with high probability that he is trustworthy and, hence, potentially acceptable
as a steward fcr the protection of plutonium." 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note
5, at V-42.
REGULATORY STAFF RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 3.
Pub. I,. ~o. 93-377, § 7, Aug. 17, 1974.
~` Id.
The AEC implies that it is primarily concerned with the employee selection
process. 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-42. The Rosenbaum Report
goes further, recommending "an ongoing analysis of the people in the plant and of the
community around tile plant." Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6626 (emphasis
added).
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1. The Rights of Public Employees
Most plutonium workers will be employed by privately owned
nuclear power plants and fuel processing facilities rather than by
government agencies. However, since important conditions of
employment will probably be dictated by regulations drafted and en-
forced by the AEC, the proposed security procedures would involve
state action enabling the employees to mount a constitutional
challenge.97
Judicial discussion of the constitutional limitations on the
government's ability to regulate the conditions of individual
employment has proceeded along several paths. One area of concern
involves the government's power to acquire information about a
prospective employee in order to decide whether to hire him, or
about an incumbent employee in order to decide whether to retain
him.98 Courts have been concerned with the effects of such
investigations on the individual's freedoms of speech and
association,99 the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
" The effect of the regulations wil! probably amount to licensing of nuclear
employees. See 120 CONG. REC. H7507 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1974) (remarks of Rep.
Hosmer, noting that the 1974 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 clarifies
and expands AEC "authority with respect to licensing people who handle nuclear
fuels"). Government licensing of occupations, whether or not the licensee is employed
by the government, has long been regarded as state action. Cf. Baird v. State Bar of
Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (licensc to practice law); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17
(1968) (license to serve on private merchant marine vessels). If the AEC established
security requirements but delegated their enforcement to the nuclear power industry,
the fact that the latter could handle plutonium only under an AEC license would imply
the existence of government participation for the purposes of the state action doctrine.
Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961), wit/i
Public Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1952). It is highly unlikely that
the AEC would leave employee securitywbolly to the initiative of the private nuclear
power industry. Such a course of action would be contrary to the overwhelming
weight of recommendations for a federally supervised employee security program and
would probably be a breach of the AEC's duty to regulate the distribution of
plutonium in order to preserve the national security and public health and safety. See
42 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1970).
"See generally Developments in the Law: The National Security interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 I-IARV. L. REV. 1130, 1177-89 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
,nents-National Securityj.
"First amendment questions are raised whenever an applicant for employment is
required to disclose information concerning his activities ~r associations. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disclosure cannot be compelled in the absence
of a nexus between the information sought and an overriding and compelling state
interest. See Gibson v. Florida L~,Jative Investigation Comm. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
Thus, an employee of a private defense contractor has a first amendment right to keep
private the details of his admitted homosexual activities where there was no indication
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390 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
seizures,' and the right to privacy.'0 Another path .of discussion is
that of suhst.intive due process, in which the courts have inquired
that his homosexuality affected his ability to protect classified information. Gayer v.
Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971), off d on other grounds sub non;. Gayer v.
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. I
(1971) (plurality opinion), the Court held unconstitutional the denial of admission to
the bar of an applicant who refused to list (lie organizations with which she had been
associated since the age of 16 and who refused to answer specific questions about
membership in the Communist Party. Justice Black, for the plurality, wrote that an
inquiry into a persons associations solely to withhold a benefit was impermissibic. Id.
at 7. Justice Stewart. concurring, stated that at the very least the inquiry must ask ii the
association was with knowledge of the organization's unlawful intentions. ld. at 9.
However, in Law Students' Research Council v.Wadmond, 40! U.S. 154 (1971), the
Court upheld a New York State Bar questionnaire which asked if the applicant had
belonged to an organization which lie knew advocated the overthrow of the
government and if he had had at the time of membership a specific intent to further the
aims of the organization to overthrow the government. This inquiry into otherwise
protected association was justified as "preliminary" to further investigation and a
decision based on information about unprotected activity. Id. at 165.66. Refusal to
answer the question was held to be grounds for excluding the applicant.
There is an air of unreality about these decisions, since it would seem that the
mere a person's associations are of legitimate concern to the state, the more likely he
will wish to keep them secret and the less likely he will be deterred by the possibility of
criminal penalties for falsifying information on the application form. Nevertheless, the
All apparently believes that application forms are a useful device to screen out
undesirables. (~J 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-42.
l'he likely context for fourth amendment questions in security clearance cases*
involves the use of informers. It has been clearly established, however, that there is no
fourth amendment right of privacy in conversations with an informer. United States v.
~Vhite, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoff~t v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hence the
AEC should experience little difficulty in gathering information in this manner. See
pp. 403-04 inJm. On the other hand, the encouragement of persons, particularly
present employees, to inform against each other is rightly deplored as destructive of
stall efficiency and morale. See Stern, .vupra note 91, at ix. It is also probable that the
AEC will use wiretaps to monitor nuclear industry employees. For a discussion of the
general problem of wiretapping suspected plutonium thieves and saboteurs, see pp.
404.11 inTro.
The compilation and retention of derogatory information, either by the AEC
or ~y other t~over.nment agencies, may violate the individual's right of privacy. The
leading cases in this area concern the retention of arrest records by law enforcement
agencies. In Mcnard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court considerably
narrowed the grounds on which the FBI could justify retention ~f state arrest records.
The court questkned the retention of such records whert. `c original arrest had been
unLiwlul, or where it had bee;; lawful hut further investigation had exonerated the
accused. Id. at 491-92. However, on remand~ the district court permitted the retention
of records where there had been probable cause for the arrest but held that they could
not be disclosed to prospective employers other than the federal government. Menard
v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971). The federal employment exception was
justified by the government's "national security" needs and the existence of due
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19751 Plutonium Recycling 391
whether certain justifications for dismissal or discipline of employees
are constitutionally permissible.'°2 In this area, protected
constitutional rights must be balanced against the state's interest in
hiring and retaining only persons who are "trustworthy" and
"1oyal~"°3 Finally, there is the path of procedural due process, which
concerns the employee's right to notice and a hearing before the
government may dismiss him.'°4 In general, the decided cases favor
the rights of the employee by erecting constitutional barriers to
process restrictions on the use of the information. Id. at 727. The court of appeals
subsequently held that the FBI lacked statutory authority to retain records of unlawful
arrests and directed the district court to order expungement. Menard v. Saxbe, 498
F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The appellate court declined to pass on the consti-
tutionality of the retention of arrest records by the FBI, or of the federal employment
exception to the nondisclosure rule. Id. at 1027. This exception should serve the needs
of the AEC if it desires access to FBI records; it is not known whether the AEC seeks a
broader e'cception. See generally Note, Retention and Dissemination ofArrest Records:
Judicial Response, 38 U. CHI. 1. REV. 850(1971).
See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Comment, The Right of Federal
Security Agencies to Control the Private Lives of Their Employees-Some Recent
Developments, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 596 (1972); Comment, Application of the
Constitutio,,al Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals from Public Employment,
1973 DUKE U. 1037; Developments-National Security. supra note 98, at 1161-77.
`°`The old notion that government employment, which may be denied altogether,
may be conditioned on surrender of constitutional rights, see McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.), was firmly cast aside in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The modern view is that the
government cannot use its power to grant or withhold benefits to discourage the
exercise of constitutional rights. Most often the right asserted is one of privacy, Gayer
v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1973), association, United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967), or speech, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1967). If
denial or termination of employmeni is found to infringe such a right, the
infringement must be justified by a compelling state interest. See. e.g.. Thompson v.
Gallagher, 489 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1973) (city ordinance which required city employees
who were veterans to have honorable discharge held invalid); Norton v. Macy, 417
F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(no showing of connection between evidence of homosexual
activities and efficiency of service); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D.Neb. 1972),
off' d, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (teacher's out-of-class relations with men did not
materially interfere with the school's work or with students' rights); Bruns v.
Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D.Md. 1970) (membership in nudist organization did not
indicate inability to do police work). These cases illustrate a growing judicial
skepticism about whether off-the-job conduct which is generally disapproved, such as
homosexuality, has any reliability in a particular case as an indicator of
untrustworthiness.
`°~ The drastic measure of summary dismissal was upheld in Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). There a short-order cook was summarily discharged
from her position in a privately-operated cafeteria located at a. defense plant after the
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compelled disclosures of information, by demanding strong
justilication for discharges based on protected conduct, and by
requiring procedural safeguards prior to dismissal.
The most serious civil liberties problems for nuclear industry
employees will concern their due process rights not to be denied
employment or fired for constitutionally impermissible reasons.'°5
Two kinds of cases may arise: first, where the asserted grounds for
dismissal are themselves unconstitutional, for example, where the
employee is a member of a dissident group; second, where the
asserted grounds for dismissal are themselves proper but where the
actual motive for the dismissal is an attempt to stifle dissent. The
following discussion will show that the AEC's statutory authority
to regulate employment in nuclear facilities may be abused. The
point to be observed is that established precedents do not necessarily
imply that the resulting controversies will be resolved in favor of
the employee. In seeking to protect the rights of employees
in the extensive litigation involving employee security programs
security officer determined that she was a security risk. The action was deemed
justified by the government's "proprietary military capacity" to "manage the internal
operatio.n of an irrportant federal military establishment." Id. at 896. The more recent
cases of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1973), however, indicate that notice and a hearing are required before
dismissal where the employee can show some form of entitlement to continued
employment, or where the discharge seriously forecloses future employment
opportunities to the employee or imposes some serious stigma upon him.
The AEC has apparently attempted to draft its regulations to survive judicial
scrutiny on procedural due process grounds. An employee whose eligibility for access
authorization is in question is entitled to notice and a hearing. 10 C.F.R. §10.27 (1973).
However, where there is suspicion that an employee may be about to steal plutonium
or sabotage a facility, there may be a case for immediate dismissal. Moreover, there
may be a governmental interest in circumscribing the notice afforded to the suspect in
order to protect the identities of counterintelligence agents. See Developments-
National Security. supra note 98, at 1188. Thus, the AEC regulations provide for*
notice of the basis for suspecting an employee only to the extent that "the national
security permits." W C.F.R. § 10.22(b) (1973). They permit a hearing only when the
question .of the employee's eligibility for access authorization "cannot be favorably
resolved by interview or other investigation." Id. § 10.20.
" Some commentators seem to believe that the process of investigating
applicants for jobs itself raises constitutional questions. See Willrich & Taylor, supra
nole 14, at 137. The AlEC's authority to investigate j~b applicants, developed in the
context of limiting access to classified information, seems too well established to be
seriously questioned. See p. 393 iizfra. Acquisition of information about job
applicants is regarded as objectionable primarily because the information may be used
as the basis for a constitutionally impermissible denial of employment. Cf. Baird v.
State BarofAriz.,401 U.S. 1,7 (1971).
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 393
in the past, the courts have failed to articulate a rule in which
the sensitivity of the job is a factor in the decision.06 The
advent of plutonium recycling, however, will involve far greater
numbers of employees than ever before in critical positions in the
nuclear fuel cycle, ranging from teamsters to nuclear physicists. The
courts may then be forced to alter their perspective, and regulatory
draftsmen may be required to seek more precise and rational
standards for employee security.
2. Recently Enacted Legislation
Since its establishment in 1954, the AEC has been authorized to
regulate the access of its employees and the employees of its private
contractors to classified information'07 following the statutory
language giving the Commission authority "to control the dis-
semination. . . of Restricted Data."°' Investigations of the character,
associations, and loyalty of applicants for positions entailing access
to restricted data are ordinarily made by the Civil Service
Commission,'°9 although either the President"° or the AEC" may
determine that the position is sufficiently sensitive that an FBI
investigation of the applicant is required."2 Pursuant to the statutory
command,"3 the AEC has promulgated regulations which establish
substantive criteria for determining an applicant's access to restricted
data."4 Though certain of these appear to be at odds with judicially
See Developments-National Security, supra note 98, at 1161, 1189. The few
cases which have explicitly mentioned the sensitivity of the position are of doubtful
validity. E.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Dew v. Halaby, 317
F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), petition forcer:. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (upholding
removal of FAA air traffic controller for homosexual conduct, noting that the
position involved responsibility for lives of many people; however, FAA subsequently
reinstated the employee, an action deemed tantamount to a confession of error in the
decision. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
107 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42U.S.C. § 2165 (1970).
`~` Id. § 2161.
`°` Id. § 2165(a) (b).
1(1. * 21('5(e).
Id. § 2l6~(f).
" If the Civil Service Commission discovers data casting doubt on the applicant's
loyalty, it may refer the matter to the FBI itself. Id. § 2165(d),
Id. § 2 165(g).
E.g., knowing membership in subversive organizations; advocacy of revol-
ution; conviction of crimes indicating habitual criminal activities; family members in
hostile countries; nonreligious refusal to serve in the armed forces; homosexuality. 10
C.F.R.* 10.11 (1973).
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established due process requirements,"5 the AEC allows an
individual to rebut any information which is derogatory to him"6 and
provides that some aspects of the applicant's character or
background are not conclusive for denial of access authorization."7
Until enactment of the 1974 amendments to the Atomic Energy
Act,"8 however, the statute was silent on the power of the AEC to
regulate access to plutonium and other special nuclear material, and
the Commission read the Supreme Court's decision in Schneider v.
Smith'9 as indicating that a personnel background check program
for plutonium workers would not be valid unless expressly
authorized.'2' Sc/welder involved a challenge to regulations prom-
ulgated by President Truman under the Magnuson Act,'2' which
authorized the President, upon a determination that national security
was endangered by subversive activity, to issue rules and regulations
`~to safeguard against destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or
other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of similar nature,
vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities in the United
States...." 22 The regulations authorized the Coast Guard
Commandant to prohibit seamen from serving on American
merchant vessels unless he was satisfied that their character and
habits were compatible with the national security.123 .Petitioner was
denied validation of a permit to act as a second assistant engineer on
steam vessels, a position for which he was otherwise qualified, when
he refused to answer detailed questions about his past membership in
the Communist Party.
All of the Justices agreed that no authority for the regulations,
either express or implied, could be found in the Magnuson Act.'24
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, maintained that the Act must
be read narrowly to avoid the conclusion that it authorized an
kg.. homosexuality. See note 103 supra; Note, Security Clearances for
!IOfllO.V('Xl((ZLV, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403 (1973).
IOC.F.R.* l0.10(d)(l) (1973).
Id. ~ 10.10(d) (2).
Pub. 1.. No. 93-377, § 7 (Aug. 17, 1974).
39() U.S. 17 (1967).
Letter from Comm'r William 0. Doub to then Rep: Gerald R. Ford, enclosure
2,at4, May9, 1974.
50 U.S.C. § 191 (1070).
Id. § 19 1(b).
`"33 C.F.R. § 6.10-I (1952).
1~390 U.S. at 22, 27.
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 395
unconstitutionally broad search of the employee's past.'25 Justice
Fortas, joined by Justice Stewart, asserted flatly that if the Act did
authorize the questions which petitioner refused to answer, it was
unconstitutional.'2' He added, however, that Congress could
authorize an "appropriate" screening program on authority of
United States v. Robe!.'27 None of the Justices delineated the scope of
the inquiry which Congress could constitutionally authorize.
The underlying issue in Schneider-whether the government can
deny employment in sensitive positions to members of dissident
groups-will arise again in the nuclear power industry if plutonium
recycling is implemented. One wonders how the AEC could conclude
from the Schneider case that~ the only impediment to creating a
personnel screening program for plutonium workers was lack of
express statutory authorization.~Schneider makes it fairly, plain that a
congressionally authorized employee screening program that
infringes first amendment rights will be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
Since the recently enacted legislation which the AEC believes
overcomes the Schneider problem appears on its face to be very
similar to the Magnuson Act, the question remains whether the new
screening program would satisfy constitutiopal requirements.
The new statute amends section 16l(i)(2) of the Atomic Energy
Act of 195428 so as to grant the AEC authority
to guard against the loss or diversion of any special nuclear
material acquired by any person pursuant to section 53 or
produced by any person in connection with any activity
authorized pursuant to this Act, to prevent any use or
disposition thereof which the Commission may determine to
be inimical to the common defense and security, including
regulations or orders designating activities involving
2$ Id. at 26. The decision has been cited most frequently for this point. See. e.g.,
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6(1971).
26 390 U.S. at 27, (Fortas, J., concurring).
" 389 U.S. 258 (1967). In Robe'! the Court sustained the dismissal of an
indictment under the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(l)(L))
(1970), of a Communist Party member for working at a designated "defense facility"
with the knowledge that the Party had been declared a "communist action
organization." The Court held that the section of the Act in question was "an
unconstitutional abridgement of the right of association protected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 261. It added that "nothing we hold today should be read to deny
Congress the power under narrowly drawn legislation to keep from sensitive positions
in defense facilities those who would' use their positions to disrupt the Nation's
production facilities." Id. at 266-67,
`~` 42 U.S.C. § 2201(i)(2)(1970).
71-074 0 - 76 - 19
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quantities ol special nuclear material which in the opinion of
the (ommission are important to the common defense and
security, that may be conducted only by persons whose
character, associations, and loyalty shall have been
investigated under standards and specifications established
by the Commission and as to whom the Commission shall
have determined' that permitting each such person to
conduct the activity will not be inimical to the common
defense and security.'29
While there is no doubt that this legislation "make[s} explicit the
authority of the Commission to conduct a program for approval of
persons to have access to, or control over, significant quantities of
special nuclear material,"3' the question that must be addressed in
light of Schneider and Robe! is what kind of program it authorizes.
The statute speaks of investigations of "character, associations, and
loyalty"; so also in Schneider the Coast Guard Commandant was
seeking to assess the "character and habits of life" of merchant
seamen.'2' Since the AEC has not yet promulgated regulations under
the new statute, it is not yet apparent whether it seeks to utilize the
searching background inquiries found in Schneider to be un-
authorized.'32 However, the contrast between the innocuous manner
Pub. L. No. 93-377, § 7 (Aug. 17, 1974).
3t) Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Comments on S. 3669, Pub. L. No. 93-377,
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 2875.76 (July 9, 1974). The
sketchy legislative history of Pub. L. No. 93-377 makes it doubtful that Congress
believed' it was authorizing a security program so broad that ii would raise
constitutional questions. The legislation was passed as part of a package of
amendments which was described as "an AEC hou«=ekeeping bill." 120 CONG. REC.
H7507 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hosmer). There was no discussion in
the House of the section in question here beyond Congressman Hosmer's observation
that it is a "clarification and expansion ol the Commission's authority with respect to
licensing people who handle nuclear fuels." id. There is no record of any Senate debate
on the provision. 120 CONG. REiC. S 12272 (daily ed. July Il, 1974).
~9O U.S. at 19.
An example of the inquiry found offensive in Schneider is the following:
"If you~answer is `YES' to the following Questions, explain fully in the space provided
at the end of the Interrogatories:
"1. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of or affiliated with, in any way,
the Communist Party, its Subdivisions, Subsidiaries, or Affiliates? (Answer `Yes' or
`No'.)
"2. Uavc you at any time been a subscriber to the `People's World'? (Answer `Yes' or
`No'.) If your answer is `Yes', give dates.
"3. Have you at any time engaged in any activities in behalf of the `People's World'?
(Answer `Yes' or `No'). If your answer is `Yes', furnish details." 390 U.S. at 20 n.2.
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in which the AEC presented its statute to the Congress'33 and the
extensive powers it feels it derives from it'34 raises questions about its
intentions.
Where the need for employee security is as compelling as it is in
the nuclear power industry, the operational bias of the security
system will probably tend to disfavor the rights of employees.
Employees who express opposition to nuclear energy or nuclear
industry policies or who associate themselves with dissident
organizations may be regarded as untrustworthy custodians of
plutonium by their employers and by the AEC.'35 Aspects of
employees' private lives, such as sexual conduct or personal finances,
may be used as grounds for dismissal or demotion.'36 The excessive
suspicion which some nuclear industry officials feel toward
employees has recently received, attention in the press. Workers at the
Kerr-McGee nuclear fuel processing plant at Cimarron, Oklahoma,
were required to take lie detector tests before being allowed to work;
those who refused to take the tests were demoted and transferred to
menial jobs.'37 The workers were asked, among other things, whether
they had ever talked to newsp~per reporters, whether they belonged
to the union, whether they had ever been iavolved in "anti-nuclear
activities," and whether they had ever had an affair with another
plant employee.'38 Whether an affirmative answer to any of these
questions would support an inference that a worker was likely to
See note 130 supra.
`~` The AEC believes that it is empowered to conduct "background checks of
individuals with access to plutonium" so as to "assure that [they are] trustworthy
4 DRAFT STATEMENT, .supra noteS, at V-42.
`"On November 13, 1974, Karen Silkwood, an employee at the Kerr-McGee
nuclear fuel processing plant at Cimarron, Oklahoma, was killed in an automobile
accident. She had been travelling to a meeting with an officer of the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Union and a reporter for the New York Times to discuss with them
her belief that inadequate plant safety conditions failed to protect the workers from
exposure to plutonium. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1974, at 28, col. I. Traces of plutonium
found in her body and in her apartment led to suspicion that she may have been
smuggling plutonium put of the plant, although an investigation by the AEC found no
evidence of smuggling. !d., Jan. 7, 1975, at 14, cot. 5. At the request of the Union, the
FBI began an investigation of the causes of the automobile accident. Id.
" An AEC security officer was dismissed from his position in 1973 when it was
discovered that hc owed over $170,000 to his fellow employees on loans used primarily
to finance race track gambling. DeNiké, Radioactive Malevolence, 30 BULL. ATOM.
SCI., Feb., 1974, at 16.
`"NY, Tinws, Jan. 7, 1975 at 14, col. I.
"` Letter from J. Gustave Speth,~ Natural Resources Defense Counsel, to the
author, Feb. 5, 1975, on file at the Harvard Civil Righis~Clvil Liberties Law Review.
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attempt to steal plutonium is difficult to determine in the abstract.'39
However, in light of the disasters which could occur as a result of a
plutonium theft, measures which even minimally increase the
chances of preventing such thefts might seem justified and might be
adopted by the AEC.
Insight into the likely substance of future security regulations in
the nuclear industry and their effects on the rights of employees may
be gained by examining the military security regulations governing
access to nuclear weapons. Indeed, as a policy matter it is logical that
security regulations in the civilian nuclear power industry should be
no less stringent than those in the military nuclear weapons
program.'4° The military approach to security is open ended:
although the applicable regulations specify certain factors which
have a clear bearing on a candidate's reIi~biIity for nuclear weapons
duty, the list is short and principle reliance is placed on "the exercise
of sound judgment by commanders."4' It is likely that the civilian
security system will be similarly discretionary. The recommendation
was made to the AEC 20 years ago, during the original controversy
over nuclear security, that each decision to grant or withhold security
clearance be "a subjective determination undertaken with reason and
couragc."~ A system like the military's, demanding an mdi-
vidualized determination of an employee's trustworthiness, might be
preferable to one which made mechanical decisions based on a
checklist of "reliability factors." On the other hand, a system based
on discretion could easily be abused, and its decisions would be
nearly impossible to review.
One way to mitigate the effects of the discretionary element in
the security system would be to ensure that an adverse decision about
reliability does not become a brand, barring the applicant from even
nonsensitive positions elsewhere in the nuclear power industry.'43 The
~ See Leachman & Althoff, supra note 14, at 188 (discussing the difficulty of
identifying criminals based on outward characteristics).
`i" See Willrich & Taylor, .rupra note 14, at 137.
" DOD Directive No. 5210.42, V-B (1970), in I BNA GOV. SECURITY &
LOYALTY L. REP. 15:830 (1970). The list of factors includes overindulgence in
alcohol, misuse of drugs or narcotics, mental instability, record of judicial or
nonjudicial punishment, and adverse police record. A catch.aH provision is included
for other character traits which "in the judgment of the commander, would be
prejudicial to reliable performance of nuclear duties."
`~` Green, The Vex v.cu'niaIie Security System, in Shils, stipra note 91, at 118, 122.
Willrich and Taylor note the possibility that "denial of clearance to an
employee may prejudice his subsequent career anywhere in the nuclear power
industry, even in less sensitive positions." Wilirich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 136.
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Supreme Court has more than once struck down security programs
on grounds that they assigned the unsuccessful applicant a "badge of
infamy."44 The AEC should therefore establish regulations
forbidding the use of adverse security determinations as a screening
device for less sensitive positions by other nuclear industry licensees.
It should also establish regulations guaranteeing the confidentiality
of the recOrds made in employee security cases.
The ultimate question is whether the courts will perceive the
dangers of plutonium to be so overwhelming as to allow them to
distinguish Schneider and hold that the new statute authorizes the
AEC to restrict the civil rights of plutonium workers in the interests
of national security. At stake are the civil liberties of thousands'45 of
civilian employees in the nuclear power industry. Their claims to
freedom from prying investigations and from restrictions on private.
associational activities confront the courts with a difficult dilemma.
On the one hand, it is persuasively argued that only a thoroughgoing
security investigation program will identify significant numbers of
potentially disloyal employees.'46 On the other hand, it is probable
that a determined infiltrator~ of a nuclear facility would take
particular care to present himself innocently.'47 Moreover, an
employee originally found trustworthy might later become a security
risk for a number of reasons which the safeguards.system may very
`"E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952).
`"The statute does not specify which employees in the plutonium industry will be
subject to the new security requirements. Rather than referring to persons having
"access" to plutonium, it grants the AEC power to "designat~e] activities involving
quantities of special nuclear material" as sufficiently "important to the common
defense and security" to merit security clearances. Pub. .L. No. 93-377, §7 (Aug. 17,
1974). Confining the security program to employees having actual access to plutonium
would make little sense as a matter of policy. The Rosenbaum Report concluded that
"anyone up to the higher levels of management of the organization involved" could
play a role as an "insider" in a theft or sabotage attempt. Rosenbaum Report, supra
note 57, at S6623.
The AEC has estimated that 5,000 plutonium workers will require security
clearance in the year 1990. This figure, however, assumes that only personnel who
have "access" to plutonium will need clearances. 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra
note 5, at V11I-74. More recently, the AEC has confirmed that truck drivers
responsible for nuclear shipments wou!d be covered by the new security regulations.
AEC staff response to inquiry from the author, in letter from Martin Malsch,
Assistant Chief Regulations Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, to the author,
Jan. 10, 1975, on file at the harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review.
`~ See Wilirich & Taylor, slipra note 14, at 137.
`~` It is difficult to Imagine, for instance, that such a person would admit an
association with the Communist Party.
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well fail to detect.'48 The result must be fundamental tension between
judicial skepticism about the rationality of security clearance
guidelines'49 and judicial reluctance to err on the side of the employee
when a mistaken decision in his favor could have serious destructive
consequences.'5° In view of the enormous stakes involved, it seems
likely that the courts will allow the AEC broad latitude in drafting its
employee security regulations, to the extent of imposing a military
order of rights and obligations on civilian workers in the plutonium
industry.'5'
If plutonium is so dangerous that we must tolerate such serious
restrictions on the freedoms of plutonium workers, then perhaps the
decision to use plutonium is unacceptably costly in terms of our civil
liberties. Chief Justice Warren expressed a similar view in his opinion
in the Robe! case, in which he declared that
[thej concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an
end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power
designed to promote such a goal. . . . It would indeed be
ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction
the subversion of one of those liberties-the freedom of
association-which makes the defense of this nation
worthwhile.'52 -
A clinical psychologist suggests that too little is known about the myriad
reasons why a person might suddenly choose to steal plutonium to allow reasonable
predictions. DeNike, supra note 136, at 16. He observes that it is difficult in general to
predict when an employee might become angry or depressed, or perhaps persuaded by
a forceful argument which appealed to a latent political sympathy. Id.
`~` See note 103 supra.
"~ See note 29 supra.
" Plutonium workers will be regarded as government employees for the purposes
of the state action doctrine, see p. 389 supra, and the AEC may adopt the
recommendations of commentators that they be regarded as soldiers. C~f. Wilirich &
Taylor, supra note 14, at 137. Given the extraordinary discipline that will be required
of plutonium workers, they may have to be instructed to regard themselves as
members of a military society. cj, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Army
captain, convicted under Articles 133 and 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. §* 933.34 (1970), for making public statements urging black enlisted men to
refuse to obey orders to go to Vietnam, cannot challenge the Articles on grounds they
are impermissibly vague and ovcrbroad. Holding that Levy's conduct was not
protected by the first amendment, Justice Rehnquist declared that "Congress is
permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when
prescribing the rules by which [military society] shall be governed than it is when
prescribing rules for [civilian societyj." Id. at 756).
52 389 U.S. at 264 (footnotes omitted).
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It would be equally ironic if the subversion of civil liberties were
sanctioned by a decision to utilize a hazardous new source of energy.
Indeed, plutonium recycling presents a double irony for our
constitutional system: in addition to the civil liberties infringements
which undermine the very purposes justifying the defense of the
nation, there is the additional possibility that a thief or saboteur will
slip through the security system anyway, no matter how strictly it is
enforced, and thereby make the~ defense of the nation impossible.
B. Covert Surveillance
Plutonium safeguards must seek to deter thefts by persons
outside the nuclear power industry as well as by persons within it.
The kinds of persons and groups who are regarded as likely to want
to steal plutonium are numerous: organized criminals, domestic and
foreign radical and terrorist groups, and agents of foreign govern-
ments.'53 The Rosenbaum Report to the AEC recommended that
nuclear safeguards be designed to deter a "maximum credible threat"
consisting of an armed attack on a nuclear facility or transportation
element by "fifteen highly trained men, no~more than three of which
work within the facility or transportation company from which the
material is to be taken."54
There are of course many ways for the AEC and the nuclear
power industry to handle the possibility of a "maximum credible
threat." Certainly they will want to make plutonium harder to steal,
either by "spiking" it with highly radioactive materials'" or by
adding more concrete and armàr to the facilities in which it is stored
and transported.'56 In addition, the number, training, and equipment
of armed guards charged with protecting nuclear plants and
transportation facilities could be significantly improved.'57 These
" See p. 383 supra; See also Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6623
("Terrorist groups, have increased their professional skills, intelligence , networks,
finances, and levels of armaments throughout the world.")
"~ Id. The authors of the report describe their threat estimate as "informed and
conservative," adding that "it was arrived at after informal discussions with the FBI
and CIA."
`"See note 88 supra.
" See note 87 supra.
`"The AEC is considering the establishment of a federal nuclear police force for
this purpose, arguing that the present policy of entrusting the protection of plutonium
to private guards is inadequate. 4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, at V-37. Most
commentators have also concluded that adequate protection of plutonium requires
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measures arc designed to insure that, if an aitack on a nuclear facility
occurred, the attackers would he prevented from taking any
plutonium. Equally important are measures that seek to prevent
attacks from occurring at all or that provide advance information to
authorities of the time and place of the attack.'58 Even unsuccessful
attacks could be catastrophic if the use of large amounts of force by
either attackers or defenders caused damage to the nuclear facility
and released dangerous radioactive material into the environment.'59
These considerations suggest that information gathering through
covert surveillance will probably be a major weapon in the arsenal of
plutonium safeguards. Curiously, the AEC makes no mention at all
of covert surveillance in its draft environmental impact statement.'6°
However, the need for surveillance was clearly perceived by the
authors of the Rosenbaum Report, who wrote:
The first and one of the most important lines of defense
against groups which might attempt to illegally acquire
special nuclear materials to make a weapon, is timely and in
depth intelligence. Such intelligence may involve electronic
and other means of surveillance, but its most important
aspect is infiltration of the groups themselves. It is not the
AEC's business to conduct this sort of intelligence, but it is
the AEC's business to see that those agencies of the United
States Government which have intelligence gathering
responsibilities, including the FBI, CIA, and NSA, focus
their attention upon this particular threat to our national
defense and security. . . . -
The AEC should establish a continual and strong
liaison with the CIA, FBI, and other appropriate agencies,
supervision by a federal security force. See, e.g., Wilirich & Taylor, supra note 14, at
144-45. If a federal nuclear police force is created, its size, scope of authority, and
operating procedures could have significant impacts on civilian life. At this point it is
only possible to speculate about such effects since the AEC has not announced its
position on "the exact nature of the measures that should be established to protect
plutonium." REGULATORY STAFF RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 2.
"\Vc need to design safcguard systems to assure that no single failure of an
active or passive feature of any system will lead to the inability of that system to
perform its function." Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6623.
See Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 90.
160 Willrich and Taylor also omit surveillance from their discussion of theft
preventive safeguards. Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 135-48.
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and should exert every effort to see that these agencies
expend a level of resources on safeguards problems
commensurate with the importance of the issue.'6'
In light of the great risks involved in even a slight breach of nuclear
security, this rather startling reèommendation. may well be adopted
by the AEC~ This section examines whether the AEC has authority to
engage in infiltration, wiretapping, and bugging and assesses the
prospects for substantial invasions of privacy and chills df important
constitutional rights in a plutonium economy.
1. Informers and Infiltrators
Generally speaking, decisions of the Supreme Court allow
virtually unlimited use of informers and infiltrators.'62 This result
seems inconsistent with recent judicial insistence that personal
privacy is the touchstone of the fourth amendment.'63 It has been
suggested that the lack of empirical data on the nature and extent of
infiltration and the sense that infiltration is less offensive and less
susceptible to abuse than electronic eavesdropping have produced a
judicial preoccupation with eavesdropping ~at the expense of careful
consideration of the use of informers.'" Whatever the reasOn, the
courts have so far resisted attempts to challenge the use of informers
on grounds that they chill rights~ of association and speech protected
by the first amendment,'65 invade rights of privacy protected by the
fourth amendment,'66 and violate the privilege against self-
~ Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6624.
" E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206 (1966). But see Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the
United States, 95 S. Ct. 425 (1974) (denying stay of order by Court of Appeals,
vacating injunction barring FBI from attending Young Socialist Allilance convention,
but upholding order prohibiting FBI from transmitting names of convention
participants to Civil Service Commission.) See generally Note, Police Undercover
Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 634
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Police Undercover Agents); Developments-National
Securi~', .cupra note 98, at 1270-84; Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agetils, 76 YALE
L.J.994(1967).
" See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S~ 347 (1967).
`"See Poilce Undercover Agei,ts. supra note 162, at 637-39.
" See Developmenls-.Narianal Security, supra note ~8, at 1274-77.
" See United States v, White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966).
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incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment.'67
Consequently, an argument that it is constitutionally imper-
niissiblc to use informers and infiltrators to safeguard against thefts
of plutonium would probably not meet with success. The likelihood
that informers will be used on a large scale for plutonium safeguards
purposes appears great. In addition to the Rosenbaum Report,'68
even commentators who are critical of the widespread use of
informers agree that they play a vital role in dealing with highly
organized groups capable of committing serious crimes.'69 Given the
legislative and judicial climate, it seems safe to assume that the AEC
will ask other federal law enforcement agencies to send infiltrators
into groups regarded as inclined to steal plutonium.
2. Wiretapping
In 1967, after deciding that wiretapping was within the fourth
amendment conception of a search, the Supreme Court suggested
that Congress establish regulations for the use of wiretaps which
would incorporate the procedural restrictions on searches required
by the amendment.'7° Congress responded by enacting the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.'~' Title III of that Act
specifies circumstances in which the government may engage in
wiretapping, bugging, and other "interception of wire or oral
communication"72 and establishes procedures governing the use of
`~ See Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, supra note 162, at 1003.06. But see
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (use of wired-for-sound informer to
interrogate defendant after indictment violated sixth amendment right to counsel).
6~ Rosenbaum Report, supra note 57, at S6624. This recommendation is
consistent with the federal government's philosophy of control of subversive groups as
expressed in recent legislation. Thus, the draftsmen of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-35 1, 82 Stat. 197, wrote that among the
"normal investigative procedures" expected to be followed before wiretaps would be
authorized Was the "infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or
informants." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1968). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 25 18(3) (c) (1970).
" See Police Undercover Agents. supra note 162, at 636 ("The sophisticated
racketeer, the secret conspirator, the foreign intelligence agent will not be
apprehended by the policeman on the beat."); Developments-National Security. supra
note. 98, at 1277 ("proper ultimate objectives for the use of informers" include
prevention and detection of "crimes such as sabotage, assassination, and inciting or
instigating widespread civil disorder").
`~° Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967).
`~` Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
.`°~ 18 U.s.c. § 2510 (1970).
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such techniques. Statutory authority to use wiretaps against
suspected plutonium thieves may well exist under this Act.
The Act provides express authority to use wiretapping for the
preventiOn and detection of certain criminal offenses, including "any
offense punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one
year. under sections 2274 through 2277 of title 42 of the United States
Code (relating to the enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954)."" The provision as written does not authorize the use of
wiretaps against persons suspócted of planning to steal plutonium
since the sections of the Atomic Energy Act referred to deal only with
the control of restricted information.'74 This omission is odd in light
of the legislative history of Title HI. The Senate Judiciary Committee
reported that offenses were chosen for inclusion in the section
authorizing wiretaps if they were either "intrinsically serious" or
"characteristic of the operations of organized crime."" Thefts of
plutonium are if anything even more intrinsically serious than thefts
of classified information since the techniques for constructing
nuclear weapons are now fairly widely known and the only thing
standing in the way of private construction of nuclear weapons is
lack of access to plutonium.'76 Moreover, organized criminals may
make nuclear theft one of their operations.'77 The use of wiretaps
against potential nuclear thieves, though not expressly authorized,
would seem to fit within even a narrow reading of the purpose of
Title HI. It is unclear why the Omnibus Crime Control Act failed to
expressly authorize wiretapping to detect possible nuclear theft
attempts. Possibly Congress in 1968 was not as keenly aware of
nuclear theft as it is today and the omission was simply oversight.
In any case, it may be that such wiretapping is permissible under
"3/d.*2516(l)(a).
`"Sections 2274 to 2277 of Title 42 respectively prohibit the communication,
unauthorized acquisition, alteratiOn or destruction, and disclosure of "restricted
data," which is def,ned as "all data concerning (I) design, manufacture, or utilization
of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material or (3) the use of
special nuclear material in the production of energy unless the data has been
declassified by the AEC. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2014(y) (1970). The section th~it provides
penalties for theft or unauthorized possession of special nuclear material is Id. § 2~72.
"S. Rep. NO. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1968).
`~` See p. 380 supra.
`"See note 70 supra. There was some debate over whether Title III was aimed
solely at organized crime or whether it was intended to have a broader reach. Senator
McClellan, who sponsored the legislation in the Senate, took the latter view, arguing
that wiretapping was a necessary technique for dealing with domestic subversive
groups. 114 CONG. REC. l4.70203 (1968.). See Developments-National Security.
supra note 98, at 1252.
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other provisions of Title III. Federal prosecutors could argue that by
wiretapping suspected plutonium thieves they were seeking evidence
relating to conspiracies to commit sabotage,78 robbery and
extortion,'79 unlawful use of explosives,'80 or thefts of goods from
interstate commerce,'8 all of which are grounds for wiretaps under
Title III. in some cases, the effect of using these provisions would be
to alter the probable cause requirements for the wiretaps: the
prosecutors would have to demonstrate knowledge not only of how
the suspects intended to obtain plutonium but also of what the
suspects planned to do with the plutonium. The practical reach of
Title III's list of offenses is nevertheless quite broad;'82 at least one
court has held that if a wiretap is validly granted for investigation of
See 18 U.s.c. § 2516(l)(a) (1970), referring to sabotage offenses under Id.
§~ 2151-57. Some, hut not necessarily all, attacks o,o nuclear fuel plants or uses of
private nuclear weapons against governmental property would constitu$e sabotage
within the meaning of these sections. For example, Id. § 2155(a) provides for
imprisonment of not more than ten years for any person who, "with intent to injure,
interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the United States, willfully injures,
destroys, contaminates or infects, or attempts to so injure, destroy, contaminate or
infect any national defense material, national defense premises, or national defense
utilities The statute was sustained against a vagueness attack in United States v.
Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774, 780-8 I (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (indictment charging attempt to
destroy National Guard trucks which were being used or could be used to transport
national defense material).
See 18 U.s.C. § 2516(l)(b) (1970), referring to "any offense which involves
murder, kidnapping, robbery, or extortion, and which is punishable under this title."
Comprehensive federal regulation of explosives was established by the
Organized Crime Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-452, §~ 1101-07, 84 Stat. 952. The Act
made it an offense to transport explosives in interstate commerce with intent to kill or
injure, to transmit in interstate commerce threats to use explosives to kill or injure, to
use maliciously explosives to destroy or damage federal property, to possess without
authorization explosives in federal buildings, to use explosives to commit federal
felonies, and to use maliciously explosives to damage or destroy any property in
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 844(d)-(i) (1970). Section 1103 of the Act amended
tht Omnibus Crime Control Act to allow wiretaps aimed at investigating any of these
offi,mscs. The definition of "explosives," Id. § 844(j), covers dynamite, gunpowder,
Molotov cocktails, and conventional cl~emical explosives but does not expressly refer
to nuclear explosives. The deflnitio~ does, however, include an open-ended term, "all
forms of high explosives," which has not yet received judicial gloss.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1 )(c) (1970), referring to offenses under Id. § 659. Attacks
on interstate shipments of plutonium by truck, train, or aircraft would fairly plainly fit
within this section.
Under the Act, states may enact statutes allowing state prosecutors to obtain
wiretap warrants for investigation of any offense "dangerous to life, limb, or
property" which under the state's laws is punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year. Id. § 2516(2). Suggestive of the broad construction given to this provision is
United State~ v. Tortorcllo, 342 F. Supp. 1029, 1035-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), off d, 480
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one of the offenses enumerated in Title III, other offenses discovered
in the course of the investigation may be prosecuted even though
they were not covered by Title 111.183 Adequate authority for the
wiretapping of potential plutonium thieves may thus already exist in
the Omnibus Crime Control Act despite the absence of any express
mention of nuclear theft offenses.
Assuming that persons intent on stealing plutonium would be
valid subjects of wiretaps under Title III, the question remains
whether the government could meet the statutory probable cause
requirements. There are* four standards which must be met: (a)
"probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit" one of the enumerated offenses;
(b) "probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning the offense will be obtained" through the wiretaps; (c)
failure of other "normal investigative procedures," or reasonable
belief that they are "unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous"; and (d) "probable cause for belier' that the facilities to
be wiretapped are used by or owned by the person suspected of the
offense.'84 These standards purport to meet the constitutional
requirements of probable cause and particularity as established by
the Supreme Court.'85 By insisting on a "specific person, specific
offense, and specific place," tI~ey seek to limit the use of electronic
surveillance to "the most precise and discriminating circumstances,
which fully comply with the requirement of particularity."86
Although a few dissenting views have been heard, both in Congress'87
and in the courts,'88 the constitutionality of Title III's probable cause
F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1974) (criminal fencing activities
are within the scope of the designated offenses).
`"United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 413 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (allowing
prosecution for offenses carrying sentence of less than one year which were uncovered
by wiretaps aimed at investigating offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2) (1970)).
`" 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970).
"See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41(1967).
S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1968).
See Id. at 169 (views of Senator Hart).
III United States v. Whitaker, 343~F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), held 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (1970) unconstitutional on its face, and is the only case that has done so. The
grounds for the decision were the duration of the searches permitted under the section
(30 days, with unlimited extensions), the discretion reserved to the executing officer,
and the failure of the section to require notice of the search to be given to parties not
named in the warrant. The Third Circuit rejected all three arguments and sustained the
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provisions has generally been upheld.'89
Though in theory probable cause is determined by applying an
exacting standard to the facts of each case, in practice only a
perfunctory showing is usually required.'9° Thus, for example, it is
not necessary to first use "normal investigative procedures" as long
as it can be reasonably shown that they are unlikely to succeed or are
likely to be dangerous.'9' This requirement should be easy to meet in
cases of suspected plutonium theft because of the clandestine nature
of such activity and the immediacy of the danger to the public.
Courts are generally reluctant, in national security cases, to disturb
the judgment of law enforcement officers. Not one of the 816
applications for wiretap warrants in 1971 was denied, and only five
out of 860 were denied in 1972.92 Hence there is ample reason to
believe that the government will be able to use freely the Omnibus
Crime Control Act to authorize widespread wiretapping for
plutonium safeguards purposes.
3. Warraniless Wiretapping under the `Foreign Security" Exception
Even if Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act is held not
to permit wiretapping of suspected plutonium thieves, or if a warrant
cannot be obtained on the facts of a particular case, warrantless
wiretapping of such persons may be permissible under the "foreign
security" exception to the warrant requirement.'93
The President's power to engage in warrantless wiretapping for
the purposes of protecting the nation against action by foreign
governments and their agents was expressly left open by the Supreme
Section's constitut!onality. United States v. Whitaker, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cit.), cert.
de,zu't/, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
See. e.g.. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 77 1-75 (2d Cir. 1973~, ceri.
~le,zied, 414 U.S. 886 (1974); cases cited in United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358,
364 n.5 (ED. Pa. 1972).
`"See note 192 infra.
8 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1970). In United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1015-
6 (D.C. (`it. 1974), ceri. denied, 95 S. Cl. 495 (1974), this provision was
read "in a practical and commonsense fashion," the court deciding that "normal"
investigative procedures" would be unlikely to penetrate a tightly organized narcotics
ring. See also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
`"Nesson, Aspects of the Executive's Power over National Security: Secrecy
(`lass /lcalions and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L. J. 399, 415 (1974).
`"See ~enerallv Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the FQurih Amendment,
87 HARV. L. REV. 976 (1974): Developments-National Security, supra note 98, at
1244-70.
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Court in United States v. United States District Court.'94 Prior to that
decision, Congress had acted to remove all statutory barriers to the
President's exercise of such power.'95 Both the Third Circuit'96 and
the Fifth Circuit'97 have held that the President does have power to
use warrantless wiretaps to gather foreign intelligence information.
In United States v. Butenko, a 5-4 decision by the Third Circuit
en banc, the court concluded that the President, exercising his duties
as commander in chief and administrator of the nation's foreign
affairs, must be able to exercise an "informed judgment" and hence
must be "apprised of the intentions, capabilities, and possible
responses of other countries."98 The court held that the fourth
amendment generally, though not the warrant clause, applies to the
President in foreign security surveillance matters.'99 Foreign security
wiretaps must therefore conform to a standard of reasonableness.
However, the rule announced in But enko heavily favors the
government: wiretaps are per se reasonable if the court finds that
they are solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information.2' The government need not show that prior to
undertakii~g the wiretaps it had probable cause to believe that actual
criminal activity would be uncovered.20'
The legality of warrantless wiretaps thus turns on the definition
of "foreign security." In United States v. United States District Court,
the Supreme Court suggested that wiretaps would be excluded from
this category if they were directed at United States citizens having
"no significant connection" with a foreign power.202 Read literally,
this test would prohibit warrantless wiretapping of many domestic
subversive or organized criminal groups. But in Zweibon v.
"~ 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972) (domestic security wiretaps require prior judicial
uuthoriiation).
" Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.90.351, § 802,
82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970)); see United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1971) ("Congress simply left presidential powers
where it found them").
" United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974), crr:. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 147(1974).
" United States v. Brown, 484 F~2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
494 F.2d at 601.
`~ Id. at 603.
~°` Id. at 606.
2,'I Id.
202 407 U.S. at. 309 n.8. In both Buzenko and Brown the appellate courts accepted
the district courts' findings that the wiretaps were for foreign intelligence purposes
without indicating what facts justified those conclusions.
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Mitchell,203 a district court held that warrantless witetapping of the
Jewish Defense League's headquarters in New York City was proper
under the foreign security exception. Although there was no showing
that the JDL had any connection with any foreign government, the
court found that its activities posed "a clear threat to this country's
foreign relations" inasmuch as the Russian government had
threatened harm to American citizens living in Moscow in retaliation
for the JDL's activities in this country.24 Zweibon would apparently
allow warrantless wiretapping of any domestic group if its activities
created a risk of international repercussions. Many if not all
conspiracies to steal and use plutonium would easily fit under this
rubric.205 However, the Zweihon rule is so much broader than the
Supreme Court's dictum that it is doubtful whether it will ultimately
prevail.20o
On the other hand, it is at least questionable whether the
distinction bctwe~n domestic and foreign intelligence gathering itself
will survive. Although the cases do not say so expressly, one major
basis for the distinction may be the difference in power between
foreign and domestic organizations.207 Whereas foreign governments
may he the military equals of the United States, domestic radical
groups are regarded as relatively impotent.200 This argument loses
much of its force when nuclear weapons are available to private
groups.209 If the threat of private nuclear ex~ilosions brings about the
demise of the foreign/domestic distinction, courts may extend the
warrant requirement to all presidential intelligence gathering
activities.20 What appears more likely, however, is that the
expanding recognition of a foreign security exception to the warrant
requirement, coupled with fears of attempted thefts of plutonium,
2 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973).
~` id. at 943. Surprisingly, the court quoted the Supreme Court's "significant
connection" test as a justification for its result.
Foreign governments are likely to be the prime customers in a black market of
stolen plutonium. See Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 119.20.
Set' generally, Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment,
.supra note 193, at 977-78.
~7 It is also said that the distinction stems from a sense that invasions of the rights
of foreigners are less serious than invasions of the rights of Americans. See Id. at 988.
~` See Id. at 984 n.41.
2~0 See note 61 supra.
2 (`j. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 610 (3d Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 95
S. Ct. 147 (1974), (Seitz, J., dissenting) (questioning why the President's commander-
in-chief power is more important than his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed for the purposes of applying fourth amendment standards to his activities).
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will give rise to a new excuse for unsupervised wiretapping by the
executive branch.
4. Summary
The urgent need to prevent thefts of plutonium will lead to a
loosening of standards for government conduct of covert surveil-
lance. The government will probably take full advantage of the broad
powers which the courts have allowed it in the use of informers and
infiltrators. Moreover, the case for using wiretapping to uncover
plots to steal plutonium is very strong. At the same time, the
authority of the government~ to engage in wiretapping against
suspected plutonium thieves, under either the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1968 or the foreign security exception, is less than
perfectly clear. Congress at this point can choose to make explicit the
government's statutory authority in this area, or it can allow the
courts to expand the exceptions to the warrant requirement. There
are several reasons why the former course would be preferable. First,
though all wiretapping is subject to abuse, the government can
engage in wiretapping to suppress dissent or to obtain information
for political rather thati law enforcement ~iurposes more freely if it
acts without judicial supervision than with it. Second, the govern-
ment may be able to keep the existence of warrantless wiretaps
permanently secret,2t' whereas the Omnibus Crime Control *Act
ensures that records will be kept of all judicially authorized
wiretaps.212 Third, allowing the government unlimited discretion to
engage in wiretapping in a broad range of cases may encourage
executive disregard for the judicial process and for individual fourth
amendment rights. The warrant may be a minimal safeguard, but it is
one worth insisting on.
Most importantly, consideration of an amendment to the
Omnibus Crime Control Act will require Congress to confront a
significant civil liberties cost of plutonium recycling. Case by case
balancing by the judicial branch is likely to produce inconsistent and
unsatisfactory results.213 If Congress decides to encourage plutonium
211 But see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969) (records of illegal
surveillance must be turned over to any criminal defenthmt who has standing to object
to the search).
212 18 IJ.s.C.~25l8(8Xa)(l970).
"~ In the aftermath of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (claim that Army
intelligence gathering program chilled exercise of first amendment. rights did not
constitute ajusticiable controversy absent a showing that complainants had sustained
71-074 0- 76 - 20
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recycling, it should also determine, whether wiretapping is necessary
to keep plutonium out of the wrong hands and what types of
procedural safeguards should be required before resorting to such
measures. These decisions should not be left solely to the AEC and
the courts, since once plutonium recycling is implemented it may no
longer be possible to argue that widespread wiretapping is not
justified.
III. RECOVERING STOLEN PLUTONIUM
The public dangers of plutonium increase dramatically follow-
ing a successful theft of the substance.214 Restricting attention to
theft-preventive safeguards would be irresponsible: careful
consideration must also be given to the method that could be used to
recover stolen plutonium before it could be used destructively.215 The
urgency of recovering stolen plutonium will create great pressure on
government officials to compromise civil liberties for the sake of
public protection. Effective recovery might require such drastic
measures as emergency area searches and the imposition of martial
law.
The likelihood that the government will take such measures to
recover stolen plutonium becomes apparent when one considers the
implausibility of doing nothing in response to a nuclear threat. Some
commentators claim to see advantages in having the government
declare, in advance, a policy of absolute refusal to negotiate with or
meet any of the demands of the threatening parties.216 This solution
avoids the choice about whether to accept civil liberties in-
fringements in the face of a nuclear threat, and it has the virtue of
certainty, but it also seems to guarantee that the threat will be carried
out. Not all acts of terrorism have an immediate blackmail purpose;
some, perhaps even a majority, are intended merely to demonstrate
or were immediately in danger ol' sustaining a direct injury as a result of the Army's
activities), ii may he difficult to mount a general challenge in court to any surveillance
program which the AEC, or the FBI acting for it, may adopt. But see Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 95 S. Ct. 425 (1974).
~ See note 65 supra.
~" See generally Wilirich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 152.155.
See IC,. at 1 58. The advantages alleged for a "hardline" policy of
nonnegotiation appear illusory. Such a policy might deter hoaxes, but the central
concern of safeguards is clearly with credible threats. Whether "the American peo-
ple . . . are prepared to suffer the disruption and even the devastation of a nuclear
threat or actual nuclear violence" in order to preserve their political institutions
against terrorist attacks, as the hardline policy implies, is doubtful.
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 413
the terrorists' power and resources and to instill fear and disarray
into society.217 Refusals to negotiate by the government would ring
hollow in the face of nonnegotiable demands by terrorists, and
irresistible political pressure on the government to take action would
surely be mounted. Whether or not the government chose to
negotiate with the terrorists, it would surely use every possible means
to locate and recover the plutonium.
The Atomic Energy Commission is reluctant to disclose its
thinking regarding plans for recovering stolen plutonium.218 It has
said only that it will "participató in efforts to locate plutonium which
for any reason is unaccounted for"2t9 and that it will notify the FBI of
reported thefts or sabotages.22° Under the Interagency Radiological
Assistance Plan, other federal regulatory agencies have agreed to
contribute manpower, equipment, and services in case of "major
accidental release or loss of control of radioactive material which
would seriously endanger the public health or safety."22' As with
preventive safeguards measures,222 however, the AEC concedes that
improved recovery measures are needed and claims to have such
improvements under consideration.223 It is probable that certain
measures which have serious civil liberties implications will be
involved. This section examines emergency searches and seizures and
martial law in terms of both existing legal doctrine and the claims
which might be made for their adoption in the event of a successful
theft of plutonium.
A. Emergency Searches and Seizures
Once a quantity of plutonium had been stolen, the case for
literally turning the country upside down to get it back would be
" Cf. DeNike, supra note 136, at 16 ("Recent violent crimes and terrorist
atrocities suggest very strongly that a few persons will commit the most heinous deeds
within their power").
"See REGULATORY STAFF RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 2. The
drawbacks of alerting potential thieves to the tactics that will be used against them are
fairly evident. See note 78 supra.
3194 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra~note 5, at Y~22.
220 Id. The FBI in turn will notify the CIA, the Customs Services, and the Border
Patrol if necessary.
231 Id. at V-23.
"~ See note 89 supra.
"`4 DRAFT STATEMENT, supranote 5, at V~23.
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overwhelming.224 Regardless of which federal agency is charged with
the recovery operation,225 it would probably seek to use measures
which ordinarily would be regarded as violations of the fourth
amendment. In the few cases in which the local authorities thought
that massive search programs were necessary and justifiable, the
courts have held the line against invasions of the priv~acy of innocent
people.226 But experience with any substance as dangerous as
plutonium is lacking, so existing precedents afford little guidance. In
view of the courts' tendency to "balanc[el the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails,"227 it is doubtful whether much
judicial supervision of plutonium recovery measures could be
expected.22~
See generally Developments-National Security, supra note 98, at 1310-13;
Note, Riot Control and the Fourth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1968).
"` One would expect that the AEC's proposed federal nuclear police force would
assume responsibility for recovery, see Letter from Sen. Walter Mondale andSen.
Phillip Hart to AEC Chairperson Dixy Lee Ray, Sept. 26, 1974, at 5, but the AEC's
public position is that "recovery operations would continue to be the responsibility of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation." REGULATORY STAFF RESPONSE, supra
note 23, at 2.
Feder~.l District Court Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli granted a preliminary
injunction forbidding the detention and questioning of black citizens in the absence of
specific grounds to suspect them, during the hunt by the San Francisco police for the
"Zebra" murderers. Williams v. Alioto, No. C-74-0866-ACW (N.D. Cal. April 25,
1974). The leading precedent for this decision was Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1966). In Lankford, the Baltimore poiice had arrest warrants for two blacks
whom they believed had killed one police officer and wounded another in the course of
robbing a liquor store. The police searched without warrants more than 300 private
residences, most of them occupied by blacks, acting in most cases on unverified
anonymous tips. In enjoining such conduct, the court observed that the searches were
highly unlikey to produce positive results and took explicit notice of the state of
relations between the police and the black community as a factor bearing on the
appropriateness of injunctive relief. cj. Comment, Federal injunctive Relief from
Illegal Search, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104, 110-11.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
~` A case suggesting the likely judicial response to stolen plutonium is United
States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). The day after four major New
York City buildings were struck by explosions, police arrested Melville with dynamite
bombs that they believed were intended for the destruction of Army property. Shortly
before his arrest Melville had left a package in defendant Alpert's apartment. The FBI
agents who arrested Alpert without a warrant searched her entire apartment, allegedly
seeking either other explosives or information indicating the location and time of
detonation of other bombs. The district court held that the search was lawful,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Chitnel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), on grounds that "the consequences feared [by the FBI agents) had to be
considered in the atmosphere of seven terrifying explosions which had recently
occured in the City of New York." Id. at 832.
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1. Methods of Searching for PluEonium
Plutonium is not likely to be significantly easier to locate than
such nonradioactive valuable substances as gold and heroin. The
same characteristics which make it nonhazardous on external
exposure229 also make it difficult to detect if it is kept well enclosed.
Significant efforts have been made in recent years to develop
equipment which is capable of measuring precisely the amount of
plutonium present in a sample already at hand23° and of detecting
small traces of plutonium present in the air and on surfaces.23' But
the problem of recovering stolen plutonium or of locating
clandestine nuclear weapons requires detection of plutonium at a
distance and in buildings and containers rather than in the natural
environment. For these purposes existing devices, such as Geiger
counters, are unlikely to be of much use.232
Consequently, authorities searching for stolen plutonium will
have to use those methods which traditionally have been regarded as
229 See note 66 supra.
See generally Keepin, Bramhlett~, & Higinbotham, Development of Techniques
and Instrwne,itation for Non-Destructive Assay of Fi.~sionable Materials, in 9
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 19, at 413-33. Precise
nondestructive techniques for measuring the amount of plutonium in a given sample
of material are an essential component of any safeguards system which relies on
materials accounting. See notes 79-83 supra.
231 See generally W. Price, NUCLEAR RADIATION DETECTION (1964); J.
Shapiro, RADIATION PROTECTION (1972). Environmental monitoring of
plutonium concentrations is necessary in order to protect workers in nuclear facilities
from overexposure. Since the permissible concentrations of plutonium in the air are
very low, see note 63 supra, the design of devices which will detect the presence of
plutonium before it becomes a danger is a formidable problem,
232 Dr. Oppenheimer has said, "If you hired me to walk through the cellars of
Washington to see whether there were atomic bombs, I think my most important tool
would be a screwdriver to open the crates and look. I think that just walking by,
swinging a little gadget, would not give me the information." Lapp, The Ultimate
Blackmail, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1973, §6 (Magazine), at 12, 33-34. To make the search
still more difficult, a person who stole plutonium would probably know how to
minimize the chance that it would be detected by those searching for it. Willrich &
Taylor, supra note 14, at 153.
"Spiking" the plutonium with some highly radioactive substance would enhance
the possibilities for locating it at a distance using radiation detection equipment. See
note 88 supra. As mentioned, this alternative may be prohibitively expensive. There is
one nuclear reactor fuel, U-233, which, though also usable in nuclear explosives and
hence attractive to thieves, has radiation characteristics which make it fairly easy to
detect at a distance. See Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 46. This isotope is
associated with the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) fuel cycle, which is
not expected to be operational before the 1980s. Id.
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4(6 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
most offensive to the fourth amendment. If the plutonium is located
inside a building, they will have to enter the building and conduct a
thorough search in order to find it. If it is in a car, they will have to
search the interior of the car.233 Put simply, probable cause to
conduct searches for plutonium will have to be sought in the usual
manner; the substance itself does not "radiate" probable cause."6
2. The Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court has taken the position that, apart from a
few clearly delineated exceptions,235 a warrant is essential to the
validity of a search under the fourth amendment."6 By insisting on a
warrant, the Court insures that the decision to conduct the search
will be made in a deliberate and responsible manner by a person who
is at least nominally free from arbitrary, subjective motivation.237
More directly, the requirement decreases the chances for abuse by
policemen by placing formal obstacles in the way of their conducting
searches.23'
"~ Clandestine fabrication of a nuclear explosive small enough and light enough
to he transportable by car is well within the range of possibilities. cf. Willrich &
Taylor, supra note 14, at 10.
~ By contrast, the smell of marijuana has been held to be an element of probable
cause. United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 74 (10th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 410
U.S. 927 (1973): see note 244 infra.
~" United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to arrest);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294(1967)(hotpursuitof fleeing
felon).
"` Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10(1948).
In a much-quoted passage, the Court in Johnson referred to decisions made by
"a neutral and detached magistrate" rather than by "the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 333 U.S. at 14. Similar reasoning has
led to the disqualification of a district attorney from authorizing a search. State ex ret.
Vs'hit~ v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965). See also Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment. 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396-97 (1974).
~" These barriers have been subject to erosion since their erection ten years ago in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). There the Court said that when an officer relies
for probable cause on statements of an informer, the officer must allege "underlying
circumstances from which [hel concluded that the informant. . , was `credible' or his
information `reliable.'" Id. .at 114. See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). Quite possibly some searches for plutonium might appear necessary though
based on tips and hunches that would be insufficient for a warrant under a strict
reading of Ag~'llar. Cf Developments-..Nationol Security. supra note 98, at 1310.
However, the Court has recently found ways to read Aguilar somewhat more loosely
or to ignore it altogether. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 ((972)
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 417
The decision in Camara v. Municipal Court,239 however,
reasserted the view that advance ratification of a search by a neutral
party might be dispensed with if it undermined efforts to protect the
public fron'i serious harm.24° Ihe Court drew authority for this
proposition from North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,24'
which upheld a state's power' to seize and destroy unhealthy poultry
without giving the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard: The
opinion invoked the state's duty to protect the lives and health of its
inhabitants, concluding that summary seizure of the food was
justified because it was "in itself a nuisance. . . of the most dangerous
kind."242
Since Camara, several courts have found that the existence of
emergency situations or special circumstances justified dispensing
with the warrant requirement. The absence of warrants did not
invalidate searches where their purposes were to guarantee the safety
of the President of the United States,243 to locate the source. of a
strong unpleasant odor in a university library,244 or to regulate the
sale and storage of firearms in accordance with a congressionally
enacted gun control program.243 In each of these cases the courts felt
(informant's tip carried "enough indicia of reliability" to justify forcible stop of
suspect). In plutonium search cases, it seems unlikely that the strict reading would be
resurrected.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
~ "Nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even
without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations." Id.
at 539.
`~` 211 U.S. 306(1908).
242 Id. at 315. One could surely say that same about plutonium. Although North
American Cold Storage dealt with seizures rather than searches, the Court by relying
on it in Camara indicated a willingness to adopt its reasoning in search cases.
~ Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967) (dictum), ceii. denied, 389
U.s. 1021 (1967). Plaintiff, a licensed gun dealer, sued Treasury agents for trespass and
interferenöe with his access to his residence. He had admitted to them that he had a
25mm cannon in his house, which was located some 300 yards from'the hotel where
President Johnson was staying during a visit to Chicago. The agents had been assigned
to maintain surveillance of plaintiff's house.
People v. Lanthier, 5 Cal. 3d 751, 488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1971). A
security guard opened each `of forty.two lockers in the vicinity of library study carrels
before finding a briefcase containing marijuana in defendant's locker. The strong odor
from the marijuana justified application of the Camaro emergency e~ceptiun; the court
implicitly assumed that the search was justified as against each of the forty.two
lockers. `
~` United States v. Biswell, 406 U~S. 311(1972). The opinion stated that "(ljarge
interests are at stake" in the regulation of firearms, Id. at 315.
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that there was an identifiable public emergency,246 and they did not
stop to inquire whether or not it was practical under the
circumstances to obtain a warrant. One might urge recognition of a
distinction between circumstances where there is a latent public
danger and the narrower class of cases where the time required to
procure a warrant would unreasonably frustrate the police in their
efforts to avert the danger.247 But most plutonium threat cases will
fall into the latter category. In view of the hazardous nature of
plutonium and the seriousness of the threat, it may be expected that
exigent circumstances will often eliminate the requirement for a
warrant, and even where warrants are sought, they will probably be
issued automatically.
3. The Particularity Requirement
The fourth amendment commands that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."24~ The emphasized passage is commonly
taken to be the historical core of the fourth amendment: it codifies
the framers' uncompromising opposition to the "general warrants"
or "writs of assistance" under which they had suffered as colonists.249
The objection to general warrants parallels the objection to
warrantless searches; both leave the decision whether to invade a
particular person's privacy to the unsupervised discretion of the
police officer.25° One would therefore expect the Supreme Court
always to hold invalid warrants that authorized searches of large
See People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 496 P.2d 1261, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1972)
(actual emergency situation required).
~` The traditional justifications for dispensing with a warrant have all involved
the factor of impracticality. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police
in hot pursuit of suspect); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) ("not
practicable to secure a warrant" to search a vehicle which may be moved out of the
jurisdiction).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
24~See generally J. Landynski, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 19-42 (1966); N. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF TIlE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTiON 13-105 (1937). The common law case usually cited as the
origin of the fourth amendment is Entick v. Carrington, 19 1-low. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
See 10 W. Holdsworth, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 672 (1938).
"° See Amsterdam, .cupra note 37, at 396. James Otis' statement as reported by
John Adams, that general warrants represented "a power that places the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer," is a classic crystallization of this
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areas or classes of people.
Before Camara, the Court held fairly closely to this view. The
particularity requirement was~ interpreted functionally, so that a
warrant was valid if it allowed the officer "with reasonable effort [to]
ascertain and identify the place intended.""' But a warrant could not
lawfully authorize the search of a large area when the affidavit
provided probable cause only with respect to a smaller included
area.2" A similar requirement was imposed regarding the objects to
be seized.2"
However, in Camara and its companion case See v. Seattle,"4 the
Court drew back from its pràvious adherence to the particularity
requirement.2" These cases involved searches of residential and
commercial buildings by municipal officials who were seeking to
enforce fire, health, and building codes. The officials argued that
effective enforcement required a statistical rather than an individual
probable cause standard for conducting the searches. Justice White,
writing for the majority, agreed, concluding that warrants aimed at
securing compliance with municipal building inspection programs
might be justified by "the condition of the entire area, but they will
not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of
the particular building.""' In reaching that conclusion he made three
observations. First, the purpose of the inspection programs was to
prevent the "development of conditions which are hazardous to
public health and safety";"7 second, the only test of the
reasonableness of the search involved "balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails";258 third, applying the
balancing test, the public interest in abatement of dangerous
sentiment. 2 LEGAL. PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 141-42. (L. Wroth & H. Zobel
eds. 1965).
~" Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
~" United States v. 1-linton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955). See also Moore v.
United States, 461 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1960); People v. Coulon~ 273 Cal. App. 2d 148, 78 Cal Rptr. 95 (1969).
I3erger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (New York wiretap statute held
unconstitutional insofar as it allowed general warrants which failed to specify the
particular conversation to be seized); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)
(particularity requirement read with "scrupulous exactitude" when the objects to be
seized are books and the basis for their seizure is their contents).
"~ 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Strangely, neither of the majority, opinions in (`amara and See even mentioned
the particularity clause; both viewed probable cause as the controlling standard.
`~` 387 U.S. at 538.
2311d.at 535.
"` Id. at 537.
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conditions justified the issuance of warrants aimed at entire areas
where "it [wasj doubtful that any other canvassing technique would
achieve acceptable results."259
From such language it appears to follow that Camara authorizes
the search of an entire neighborhood for plutonium in the wake of a
theft.26° It might be said that Camara, despite its language,. does not
totally subvert the purposes of the fourth amendment particularity
clause. By insisting on a prior warrant in municipal search cases, it
commands a degree of neutral supervision of law enforcement
officers' behavior which limits their power to act arbitrarily.26' It is
not clear, however, how much comfort could. be derived from this
rationalization in the face of a citywide search for plutonium in
which unprecedented numbers of people would suffer invasions of
privacy. If the central purpose of the fourth amendment is to set
limits on the discretionary conduct of the police,262 then that
amendment requires a prospective inquiry into whether the licensing
of plutonium use will lead to increased police power. Attempts to
supply fourth amendment legitimacy for plutonium searches after
the decision to allow recycling is made must ultimately fail.
4. The Demise of the Fourth Amendment
To the extent that traditional do .~;inal guarantees of privacy are
2S~ Id.
~` There appear to be two grounds for arguing that Camara's relaxed probable
cause standards do not extend to searches for plutonium. First, the Court in (`amara
distinguished municipal building inspection programs from criminal investigations
aid implied that its holding only applied to the former. 387 U.S. at 535. That
distinction is unpersuasive in the context of searches for stolen plutonium, however,
since the main purpose of such searches is the protection of public safety rather than
the discovery of evidence of a crime. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443
(1973) (warrantless search of policeman's disabled car was justified by need to
"protect the public from the possibility that [his] revolver would fall into untrained or
perhaps malicious hands"). Second, the invasions of privacy occasioned by the
municipal searches in Cwnara were minimal, in contrast to the thorough searches
which would be required to uncover stolen plutonium. See pp. .415-16 supra.
However, the increased privacy invasion in a search for plutonium would be more
than offset by the other side of the balance announced in (`amaru, namely the need to
search. 387 U.S. at 536-37. See Note, Riot Control and the Fourth ,4n:endnient, .cupra
note 224, at 629 (arguing that "the efficacy of individually justified searches may be
doubted" in a riot situation where "the mere existence of such an otherwise innocent
item as gasoline may constitute what is tantamount to a `health hazard' . .
~" This is Professor Amsterdam's view. See Amsterdam, supra note 237, at 417
n.549.
212 See Id. at 368-73, 416.22.
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swept away in the face of a plutonium threat, the decision whether to
accept the risks and burdens of plutonium recycling ought to take
into account, in advance, the strains which it will place on the fourth
amendment. Little in the way of judicial supervision of police
conduct in searching for plutonium appears to be in p~ospect;263 in
particular it does not appear that widespread area search programs
would either be declared unlawful264 or enjoined.263 Although
broad, highly offensive searches for stolen plutonium would be con-
stitutionally "justified" in thà sense that courts would probably
uphold them, there would nonetheless be a sense that important
constitutional interests had been sacrificed. By examining alternative
characterizations of the fourth~ amendment which seek to legitimate
searches for plutonium, one can conclude that the amendment itself
commands a forward-looking review of the effects of plutonium
recycling on individual privacy.
One such alternative would rely on theory of consent,
suggested in part by United States v. Biswell.26' Thert~ the Court held
that a warrantless search of a locked storeroom of a firearms dealer,
as authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968,267 did not violate the
fourth amendment. The Court found that the invasion of the dealer's
privacy was justified since "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this
pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does
so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and
ammunition will be subject to effective inspection."268 The use of the
~" The decision in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (warrant required for domestic security wiretaps) does not indicate otherwise.
There the Court was faced with an executive claim of broad "national security"
authority to conduct wiretaps in the absence of any identifiable emergency. The
Court's conclusion that domestic security surveillance programs were overbroad
relative to the dangers they sought to avert may not extend to cases of clear-cut and
extreme emergency. Id. at 324. See also note 228 supra.
~ See pp. 418-20 supra.
As a matter of legal principle, the Lankford and Alioto cases ought to compel
an injunction against city-wide searches for plutonium. See note 226 supra. In the
Allow case in particular, the reasonable fear on the part of municipal authorities of
further "Zebra" killings did not justify detaining all black citizens. However, the
decisive difference between these cases and a plutonium search case may be one of
expediency. A court might be reluctant to worry about either individual claims to
privacy or police-community relations where even an aimless, overbroad, and
constitutionally questionable search sàemed preferable to complete paralysis in the
face of a threat to detonate a nuclear device or disperse plutonium into the
atmosphere.
204 406 U.S. 311(1973).
2o7 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1968).
406 U.S. at 316.
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term "chooses" suggests that the dealer's decision to enter the
firearms business functions as a substitute for the magistrate's
decision to authorize the search of his premises. In a sense, he
assumes the risk of being searched; because he contributes to an
increased level of general risk in society, it is deemed fair to impose
this burden on him.269
Use of this theory tq justify area searches for plutonium would
quickly dissolve into question-begging, however. The argument
would have to be that society, by engaging in plutonium recycling
and thereby raising the general level of danger, has accepted any
losses of privacy which might become necessary in order to minimize
the risk. But warrantless searches and area searches with or without
warrants are indiscriminate: one would be faced with the problem of
deciding whether the persons who objected to them had or had not
constructively assented to the inconvenience. The only way to break
out of the circle would be to insist that the decision to tolerate the
police practices required for the recovery of plutonium be a
unanimous one by all of the people.
Anol.her alternative, perhaps more in keeping with the view of
the fourth amendment as a regulator of police conduct, would have
search and seizure guidelines for use in plutonium threats laid down
in advance by legislation. Professor Amsterdam has suggested that
the legislature, by prescribing search and seizure rules which are
"reasonably particular in setting forth the nature of the searches and
seizures and the circumstances under which they should be made,"27°
can provide a check on abuses of police discretion while at the same
time relieving the courts of difficult doctrinal problems. While there
may be something to be said for the legislative approach as a means
of dealing with day-to-day police practice in nonemergency
periods,27 such an approach in times of emergency, where drastic
~ Cf. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 FIARV. L. REV. 537
(1972) (strict liability in tort apportioned according to relative risk creation). This
theory could distinguish Camara (which required a warrant) from Bis;t'ell (which did
not) insofar as (`anzara represents a judgment that owning urban real estate does not
involve participation in publicly dangerous activity to the same degree as operating a
gunshop. On the other hand, maintaining an arsenal of weapons in the vicinity of the
President, as in Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 389 U.S. 1021
(1967), creates a signilicant public risk. See note 243, supra. -
~" Amsterdam, supra note 237, at 416.
271 "lIere is a protective procedure which uniquely avoids the Manichean conflict
between efiectiie law enforcement and the safeguarding of individual rights. For the
present withspread state of uncontrolled police discretion is at war with both the
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measures seem to be called for, does not satisfactorily respond to the
complaint that the rules approved by the legislature involve large-
scale privacy invasions. Moreover, the fourth amendment is not
founded solely on notions of how police conduct ought to be
supervised; it also contains substantive judgments about what kinds
of police conduct ought to be permitted at all. Citywide searches
have traditionally been regarded as high on the list of disfavored
practices.272 Therefore the proposal for advance legislative rule-
making for search and seizure programs in plutonium theft cases fails
to legitimate the infringement of civil liberties inherent in the security
requirements of plutonium recycling.273
In the end it appears that ihere is no way to read the fourth
amendment which would not result in its virtual elimination in
plutonium recovery situations. Concern about supervision of police
conduct is ultimately based upon concern for privacy, and there is
very little that either courts or legislatures could do to protect privacy
if a citywide search for a hidden nuclear weapon became neces-
sary.274 If the substantive limits imposed by the fourth amendment on
the process of law enforcement are to be respected, the question of
whether the benefits of using plutonium are worth the costs of getting
it back if it is stolen must be addressed at the outset.275
preservation of individual liberties and efficiency in the performance of the law
enforcement function." Id. at 422.
272 In Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 1966), the court described
such searches as "a series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever to come under
the scrutiny of a federal court."
"` That the proposal for legislation involves a circularity is recognized, by
Professor Amsterdam: "The legislation or rules must, of course, be conformable with
all additional requirements imposed by the fourth amendment upon searches and
seizures of the sorts that they authorize." Amsterdam, supra note 237, at 417.
274 Some of the hardships could perhaps be mitigated by providing for post.search
remedies, howevcr. Thus, one could insist on strict application of the exclusionary rule
to bar from trials evidence uncovered in the course of the search for plutQnium which
was unrelated to the terrorists or their crimes. See Developments-National Security.
.cupra notc 98, at 1311. Of course, exclusion would be useless to the many innocent
victims of the search. A remedy in damages might be available for them under the rule
of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agànts of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), but if a general citywide search were found justified under the
circumstances, they could probably recover only by showing malice or recklessness in
the course of the search of their particular premises.
277 This view of the fourth amendment occasionally emerges from decisions by the
Supreme Court. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held that a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest must be confined to the area within the
immediate reach of the person arrested. Justice White, dissenting, argued that police
offlcers arresting a person in his house ought to be allowed to search the entire house,
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B. Martial Law and t1:~ Restoration of Order
Recovery of stolen plutonium, as has been shown, would be a
matter of the highest priority. It would become even more urgent if
the thief announced that he had constructed a nuclear explosive or
dispersal device and intended to use it.276 Although intensive searches
for the missing plutonium or weapons would no doubt continue, the
government might feel additional compulsion to extend more general
military control over the activities of civilians.277 The agency
conducting the recovery operation would need broad powers to
eliminate any obstacles placed in its path, deliberately or unwittingly,
by citizens. It would want the ability to discourage and punish
interference with its operations, to carry out evacuations if they
became necessary, and to deal with people who might take advantage
of the prevailing disorder to commit other crimes, such as looting. It
might be thought necessary to bypass the civilian law enforcement
system and authorize the military to arrest and try those thought to
stand in the viny of the speedy recovery of plutonium.
Few Americans of the present generation have experienced the
rigors of martial law. Since World War II, when the Hawaiians278 and
since the possibility that relatives or confederates of the arrested person will remove
evidence from other rooms of the house before a search warrant can be obtained
creates exigent circumstances. Id. at 773-75 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart
answered this argument in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), in which the Court
again held unlawful the warrantless search of an entire house following the arrest of
one of its residents on the front steps. Justice Stewart's argument was that, although
the arrest may have created exigent circumstances which the arrcstingofficers should
nave foreseen before making the arrest at the house, they should have obtained a
search warrant at the time they obtained the warrant for the arrest. Id. at 35. It would
appear then that the fourth amendment, in addition to establishing criteria by which
searches may be justified, also requires the government, to avoid if possible tl~e
creation of circumstances in which offensive searches are necessary.
It is quite possible that government authorities would be unaware of a nuclear
threat until a weapon had been constructed. Since reliance on materials accounting
ha:; left uncertainty about whether destructive quantities of plutonium are not already
in illicit hands, ~:ee note 83 supra, credible nuclear threats could come at any time,
unrelated to any known theft.
:~ The AEC is silent ols he matter, but at least two commentators believe that the
imposition of martial law in the face of a nuclear threat is a distinct likelihood. See
P/:i(oniu'n Reeve/c, supra note 11, at 20; Willrich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 157 ("the
hard decisions will involve such issues as . . . [w]hen should evacuation be ordered,
martial Iuw'declared, or other emergency steps taken?").
" See gener:llyJ. Anthony, HAWAII UNDER ARMY RULE (1955).
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the West Coast Japanese-Americans279 were subjected to military
rule, no domestic emergency situation has required a declaration of
martial law.28° The term "martial law" describes the substitution of
military for civilian authority when emergency conditions demand a
more flexible, less procedure-bound exercise of governmental
power.28' Under martial law the military takes over the job of law
enforcement and assumes power to arrest, try, and confine civilians
charged with crimes.282 These activities may or may not be assisted by
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.283 The mere use of troops to
preserve or restore order may fall short of martial law, however.284
This Section will examine the possible consequences of a
decision to invoke martial law in the face of a plutonium threat.285
"` See. e.g.. Exparie Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81(1943).
~` As part of a 1955 Civil Defense exercise testing the federal response to a
simulated nuclear attack, President Eisenhower declared "mock martial law."
Wagner, .supra note 2, at 34-36.
2* See C. Fairman, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 30-38 (2d ed. 1943)
[hereinafter cited as FairmanJ. See also F. Wiener, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF
MARTIAL LAW (1940); Fairman, The L.aw of Martial Rule and the National
Eniergencv, 55 1TIARV. L. REV. 1253 (19~I2). A recent law.review article on the subject
of martial law apparently concluded that~ the topic included searches and seizures and
preventive detention. Comment, Martial Law, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 546 (1969).
However, during World War II even the Supreme Court confessed to its imprecise
understanding of the meaning of the term. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315
(1946). See also D~i'elopinents-National Security. supra note 98, at 1321.
2*2 See Exparie Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 WaIl.) 2, 123-31 (1866).
2*3 See Fairman, supra note 281, at 42-45.
2*4 Id. at 30-38. Questions of military jurisdiction over members of the armed
forces and military power to occupy hostile territory are not issues of martial law. See
Id. at 38-42.
2*5 One factor relevant to an assessment of the prospects for the institution of
martial law is the military attitude on the subject. Traditionally, the military i~as been
unenthusiastic about the prospect of taking over the reins of civilian government. It
argued, first, that its primary mission in the aftermath of a nuclear war would be to
deal with the enemy, and second, that it had neither the trained manpower nor the
organization to perform civilian administrative work. See Rankin & Dallmayr, supra
note 2, at 62-63; see also Menke, supra note 2, at 52-54. But the Army's role in
preventing a nuclear attack by~private terrorists is not really comparable to its role in
the aftermath of a nuclear war. An argument may be made that the military has a
greater duty to prevent the occurrence of disaster than it has to run the country after
the destruction has been completed. A nuclear threat by a private organization would
not be likely to involve more than one or a small number of cities; it would be difficult
then to contend that the Army could not spare the personnel to perform martial law
functions. Indeed, such functions may be a vital and integral part of its recovery
mission. In any case, the military would be compelled to obey an executive order that
it assume martial law duties. Hence, there should be no reliance on announced
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`l'he Supreme Court has been preoccupied with the limits of military
jurisdiction for over a century, and its decisions serve to illuminate
some of the stakes involved. From the individual's standpoint, all
phases of a coordinated military effort to recover stolen plutonium,
from the courtroom to the streets, represent threats to liberty. To a
people grown accustomed to life under civilian rule, martial law will
seem a great price to pay, even to prevent the destruction of a city.
.1. Judicial Review of Declarations of Martial Law
* Most commentators believe that martial law may exist even
without a declaration: "It [is] the emergency which calI[s] it forth,
not the fact of the proclamation, which justifies the extraordinary
measures taken."286 Nevertheless, the imposition of martial law is
ordinarily preceded by a declaration;287 mobilization of the military
must come from the executive by virtue of his authority as
commander in chief. As a practical matter, the enforcement of
martial law will be difficult unless the public is informed of the
decision.
The question whether an executive declaration of martial law is
conclusive upon the courts has had a long and unsettled history in
the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taney, in a case growing out of
Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, thought that the governor
enjoyed unreviewable discretion to call out the militia.288 Two years
later he retreated, concluding that such discretion could not be left
unexamined if exercised in an arbitrary manner.289 By the end of the
Civil War the Court had confirmed the latter view.290 At the outset of
the twentieth century, however, Justice Holmes returned to the
position that an executive declaration of emerger'~y is conclusive,
asserting that "[p]ublic danger warrants the substitution of executive
process for judicial process."29' The decision, which arose out of a
military attitudes in deciding whether to declare martial law in the context of a nuclear
threat.
~ Fairman, mipra note 281, at 167.
"~ !~., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307.08 (1946) (Governor of
Hawaii proclaimed martial law on Dcc. 7, 1941, immediately following the attack on
Pearl Harbor). Authorit~ for military evacuation and detention of Japanese-
Americans was granted by President Roosevelt in Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R.
1092 (1943). See Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214, 216-217 (1944).
2$S Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1(1849)
~ Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115(185!).
~ E.vparie Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909).
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declaration by the governor of Colorado that labor violence had
created a state of insurrection, was subsequently confined to its facts
by Sterling v. Constantin.292 That decision announced the rule that
while the executive enjoys unreviewable discretion to determine
whether an emergency exists, his decisions as to how to use military
force in dealing with it are subject to judicial scrutiny.293 The
standard imposed, that the decisions to use force must be made "in
good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed,"294 is the
prevailing one today. In a case challenging Governor Rhodes' use of
National Guardsmen at Kent State in 1970, the Court, applying
Sterling, held that "a declaration of emergency by the chief executive
of a state is entitled to great weight but it is not conclusive."2"
Judicial review of the imposition of martial law may depend on
the context in which the question is raised. It is highly unlikely that a
court will prospectively enjoin the executive during the early stages of
an emergency.~6 Courts are ordinarily reluctant to put restraints on
the government's ability to restore order, especially where the
executive is acting on information not available to the courts. The
threatened Use of a plutonium bomb or dispersal device is as serious
a danger as any in which a declaration of emergency has been upheld.
Though the suggestion is made that the courts use a "less restrictive
alternative" test,29' it is doubtful that courts will entertain much
confidence in their ability during the early stages of an emergency to
weigh the costs and benefits of alternative responses to the nuclear
threat better than the chief executive. A related proposal, that the
292 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932).
~" Id. at 399-401 ("What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and
whether they have been overstepped in~a particular case, are judicial questions").
~" Id. at 400. See also United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971)
(mayor's determination that emergency conditions existed following racial disturb-
ances was made in good faith). But see Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 353
F. Supp. 1249 (D.D.C. 1973) (decision to use troops to quell civil disorders belongs
exclusively to the executive). Merely putting troops on alert is "preparatory" and not
subject to judicial review. Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963) (per curiam).
~ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 250 (1973). Remanding the case for trial in
district court, the Court held that jhe lower court had incorrectly taken judicial notice
of the existence øf "mob rule" at Kent~State.
Prospective condemnation of presidential use of emergency measures has only
been applied where the President acted without necessary congressional authorization,
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Most
commentators expect that the President will be called upon to respond to a nuclear
threat, even if the threat is conveyed to local authorities. See Willrich & Taylor, supra
note 14, at 157.
See Developments-National Security, supra note 98, at 1297.
71-074 0 - 76 - 21
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428 1 larvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
courts apply strict scrutiny to executive decisions made "quickly,
under severe `pressure, or on the basis of incomplete information,"291
is. also of little help. The argument will surely be made that it is
precisely under those circumstances that the executive ought to be
freed from worry about whether his decision will be, undone by a
court. Finally, the lack of judicial power to enforce an injunction
against the executive declaration of martial law would probably be a
decisive argument against the issuance of such an injunction at the
outset of an emergency.
The prospects for postemergency review of the declaration of
martial law are somewhat better. The question would probably arise
in the context of a suit for damages by an injured civi1ian~9 or a
habeas corpus action by a person held in military custody.30° Once
the emergency had passed, the courts would have the benefit of
hindsight, better information, and their own historical competence to
adjudicate questions' of civil and criminal liability. It may be argued
that postemergency relief is the only available compromise between
individual rights and the demands of public safety in the event of a
nuclear threat; nevertheless, the significant civil liberties costs of
martial law should not be overlooked.
2. Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Throughout most of the nation's history, the federal judiciary
has jealously guarded the right of civilians to be tried for crimes in
civil courts with constitutionally enforced procedural safeguards.
The strongest statement of this protective attitude is found in the
landmark case of Ex parte Mulligan.30' Milligan, a civilian citizen of
Indiana during the Civil War, was arrested, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death by a military commission for conspiracy against
the United States government.302 In considering his petition for
habeas corpus,303 all nine justices of the Supreme Court found that
Congress had not authorized the trial of civilians by military com~
mission. In addition, a majority of five went further and declared
"` Id. at 1299.
"~ See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974).
~°° See Exparie Milligan,7l U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
`~ 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 2 (1866).
`~` hi. at 6.
`` Milligan's petition to the federal courts for his release alleged that a federal
grand jury convened in the same jurisdiction had failed to indict him for the offenses
charged. Id. at 78.
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 429
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to do so. Martial law,
they held, "can never exist whàre the courts are open, and in. the
proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."304 Moreover,
martial law "cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity
must be actual and present; the invasion [must be] real, such as
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.~~3OS
It may be that the Milligan "open courts" doctrisle is an
unnecessary dictum in an otherwise correct decision based on
statutory construction.306 However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the doctrine in the 1946 decision Duncan v. Kahanarnoku.307 The
Court held that Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act30' did not
authorize military trials of civilians in Hawaii when, eight months
after the Pearl Harbor attack,~ the courts had reopened and were
functioning. Justice Black's majority opinion rested squarely on
construction of the Act, but he quoted with approval the Milligan
court's establishment of constitutional limitations on military jur-
isdiction.309 Justice Murphy, concurring, expressly approved the
"open courts" doctrine and would have held the military trials in
Duncan unconstitutional.3'° The rule that emerges from Milligan and
Duncan is that civilians31' residing in peaceful zones where civil courts
are functioning are guaranteed a civil trial.
`°°ld.at 127.
3°' Id. The "open courts" doctrine has an ancient common law heritage, which is
traced in Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of Military
Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1-18 (1971).
~ See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 281, at 159-63.
~n 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
3°' Act of April 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 153.
3°' 327 U.S. at 322-24.
~`° Id. at 325-26. Languagefrom Justice Murphy's opinion perhaps best illustrates
the constitutional tension. First he stated, "From time immemorial despots have used
real or imagined threats to the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating
human rights. That excuse is no less unworthy of our traditions when used in this day
of atomic warfare or at a future time when some other type of warfare may be
devised." Id. at 33G. He then added: "There must be some overpowering factor that
makes a recognition of those rights incompatible with the public safety before we
should consent to their temporary suspension." Id. Unfortunately, one suspects that a
nuclear tlue.tt would be. such an "overpowering factor" that the assertion that the
conslitutiun survives into the atomic age would be cast aside as mere rhetoric.
The class of people protected by the Milligan rule has been limited. Enemy
saboteurs who infiltrate the country for the purpose of destroying war materials and
facilities are guilty of "offensels) against the laws of war" and are subject to trial
by military commission. Ex pane. Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1942) (expressly
distinguishing Mihigan). Actual members of the armed forces are of course subject to
court~martial jurisdiction. In a series of cases over the last two decades the Supreme
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The question is whether courts will continue to believe that the
strict standards of Milligan are appropriate in the nuclear age.
Professor Fairman has argued forcefully that modern society cannot
affordthe `open courts" doctrine:
When one considers certain characteristics of modern war-
mobility on land, surprise from the air, sabotage, and the
preparation of fifth columns-it must be apparent that the
dictum that "martial rule cannot arise from a threatened
invasion" is not an adequate definition of the extent of the
war power of the United States.312
His view that martial law is justified by "public necessity"313-a more
general test than "open courts"-finds nominal support in the
cases34 and would surely be urged on behalf of military authorities
attempting to deal with a nuclear threat. Implicit in this argument is
a belief that terrorists armed with a nuclear device are far more
dangerous to society than the less well-equipped rebels of the
A'Ii/ligan era. But perhaps the question should be whether our
perception of the threat posed to the social order by twentieth
century terrorists has the same significance as a nineteenth century
person's perception of the threat posed to his social order by
nineteenth century rebels; the fact that Milligan might. not be
regarded as extremely dangerous in today's world does not mean that
he was not so regarded in Indiana during the Civil War.
Court has struck down attempts to expand this category. See United States ex tel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11(1955) (Congress cannot constitutionally authorize court-
martial trial of honorably discharged serviceman who at the time of the arrest was
completely dissociated from the military); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1(1957) (Congress
cannot constitutionally extend court-martial jurisdiction to civilian dependents living
with servicemen on military bases); Kinselki v. United States ex tel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960) (applying Reid to noncapital offenses). In Reid the Court said .that
"The Milligan. Duncan and Tot/i cases recognized and manifested the deeply rooted
and ancient opposition in this country to the extension of military control over
civilians." 354 U.S. at 33. More recently, the Court limited court-martial jurisdiction
even over military personnel to offenses that are "service connected." O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969) (attempted rape committed away from the base in
peacetime was not service connected).
312 Fairman, supra note 281, at 165.
~ Id. at 47.
`4ln Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952
(1903). the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a declaration of "qualified martial
law." There the courts and civil agencies were still open and functioning, but the court
found that the presence of labor strife necessitated vesting the military with certain
powers to restore order.
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 431
Ultimately this argument appears overly refined. To the extent.
that a nuclear threat to an urbancenter risked the destruction of lives
and property and of governmental, economic, and social insti-
tutions,3'~ the government would be acting irresponsibly in failing to
take any measures required to prevent the threat from being carried
out. Thus, despite the fact that martial law may be imposed in
degrees and gradations,316 halfway measures would likely prove
insufficient.317 Citizens subjected to temporary detention3'~ and even
* trial by military commissions319 would be deprived of basic
procedural safeguards provided in the Bill of Rights32° and one of the
nation's most cherished traditions would be overthrown.
~" See notes 59-65 supra.
3b See Fairman, supra note 281, at 45-47.
"~ A suggested alternative to martial law would preserve the jurisdiction of civil
courts but allow the government to change the venue of the trial or obtain conviction
by a less than unanimous jury. Developments-National Security. supra note 98, at
1325. Both proposals address the situation where military jurisdiction would be
justified by the existence of local prejudice in favor of defendants sufficient to prevent
the government from obtaining a fair trial, for instance in the case of urban riots. In
the face of a nuclear threat, however, the military would argue that its need to deal
summarily with those who hinder or oppose its operatiops will not be served short of
abandonment of the civil court system with its delays and uncertainties. Even if courts
arc unwilling to accept this argument, the facts of the situation may operate to put the
military effectively beyond judicial control. Cf. Fairman, supra note 281, at 207.
~" Whether or not they are tried for crimes, citizens detained by the military
would suffer a loss of their fourth amendment right to freedom from unreasonable
seizures. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 43 U.S.L.W. 4230, 4234 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (fourth
amendment requires judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
extended restraint on liberty following arrest).
319 Military commissions are established during periods of martial law to try
civilians and are distinguished from courts-martial which exist at all times to try
servicemen. See Fairman, supra note 281, at 262; note 311, supra. Although military
commissions resemble courts-martial, military commissions are not bound by military
law and need only look to it as a guide. The standards to be applied are those of the
"law of war," Expar:eQuirin, 317 U.S. 1(1943), and the proceedings are not subject
to review by civilian courts, Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). The
subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions includes offenses against the laws
of war, breaches of military regulations and promulgations, and civil crimes which
cannot be tried in the ordinary courts when they have ceased functioning. See
Fairman, supra note 281, at 265-66.
320 Justice Douglas's opinion in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), which
dealt with courts-martial, suggests the dóprivations which a citizen tried by a military
commission would suffer. Most fundamentally, he would lope the benefits of
indictment by a grand jury and trial by a civilian petit jury. Id. at 262. He would be
judged by a military law officer and tried by a panel of officers who could convict him
by a two-thirds vote. Id. at 263. His access to compulsory process for obtaining
evidence and witnesses would depónd "to a significant extent" upon prosecutorial
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One way to mitigate these hardships would be to provide for
review by the civil courts of the detention of civilians by military
commissions after the emergency had ended. By suspending the writ
of habeas corpus during the nuclear emergency,32' the government
could give the military the power to detain persons who were
obstructing the search and recovery operation or who were violating
curfew orders or other regulations promulgated by the military to
ensure civil order. After the emergency had passed, restoration of
habeas corpus would allow federal courts to review convictions
imposed by military commissions.
There is little doubt that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
petitions for habeas corpus from civilians held by military
commissions.322 The scope of that jurisdiction is quite clouded,
however. Since the Supreme Court's decision two decades ago in
Burns v. Wilson,323 it has been unclear whether allegations of denial of
constitutional rights may be heard by federal courts considering
habeas corpus petitions from court-martial convictions.324 At least
approval. id. at 264 n.4. In general he would find himself in a hostile judicial
atmosphere: "A court martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but
remains to a significant degree a ~pecialized part of the overall mechanism by which
military discipline is preserved." Id. at 265.
321 The Constitution provides for the suspension of habeas corpus "when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. 1 §9 cI.
2. In Ex pane Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C. Md. la6l), Chief Justice
Taney, sitting as circuit judge, held that suspension of habeas corpus is the exclusive
responsibility of Congress. However, President Lincoln ignored this decision, and his
suspension of the writ was later ratified by Congress.
3~2 Cf. Lx pane Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) ("[N]either the Proclamation nor the
fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners'
contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally
enacted forbid their trial by military commission"). The statutory power of federal
courts to grant the writ to persons "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States", 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970), has been construed to
apply to court-martial convictions. Burns v. WiLson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953).
Presumably the same section applies to military commjssions although the courts have
not yet had the opportunity to so construe it.
323 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
324 Petitioners in Burns alleged denial of due process in their court-martial
convictions for rape and murder, claiming that the prosecution had used coerced
confessions, denied them effective representation, suppressed evidence favorable to
them, and used perjured testimony against them. A plurality of four justices
announced that "it is the limited function of the civil courts to determine whether the
military have given full consideration to each of these claims." 346 U.S. at 144.
Reviewing the facts of the case, they decided that full and fair consideration had been
given. id.
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 433
some lower courts continue to adhere to the old rule325 that only the
jurisdiction of the court-martial over the petitioner and the offense
charged may be questioned by habeas corpus.32' In the case of
military commissions the scope of habeas corpus review is even less
certain since the few decided cases have involved challenges going
only to the jurisdiction of the military commission over the
petitioner.327 If habeas corpus review of convictions imposed by
military commissions is limited to questions of jurisdiction, then such
review is useless where martial law has been declared since by
definition the military has trial jurisdiction over civilians. However,
such a constricted scope of habeas corpus review is dictated neither
by the constitution nor by' statute.329 Although the courts appear
free to adopt a broader scope of review, if the imposition of martial
law in the event of a nuclear threat is contemplated, a provision that
federal courts can review the merits of convictions imposed by
military commissions as well as~ their jurisdiction should be enacted
* by Congress.329
3. Accompanying Infringements of Civil Liberties
* The responsibility for recovering stolen plutonium will almost
"In Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.s. 103, 111(1950), the Court had said citing In re
Grimley, 137 U.s. 147, 150(1890), that "It is well settled that by habeas corpu.c the civil
courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court
martial . . . . The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." The Burns test broadened
Hiatt and was used by Judge Aldisert to support a holding that a district court can
review a court-martial conviction on grounds that the articles of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice that resulted in the conviction were void due to vagueness and
overbreadth. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 780-83 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 733
(1974). See also Vallecillo v. David, 360 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.N.J. 1973) (petition for
habea.s corpus granted where Army failed to follow its own regulations; dictum that
constitutional claims may also be reviewed).
~b E.g., Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1965), cerl. denied, 382 U.S.
946 (1965); Le Ballister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965). The Supreme
Court has done little to clarify its position since Burns, and difficulties in applying the
"full and fair consideration" test persist. See generally Note, Civilian Court Review of
Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1969); Developments in the
Law: Federal Habeas corpus, 83 HARV. L REV. L03~, 1208-38 (1970).
~ Duncan .v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.s. 304 (1946); Ex porte Quinn, 317. U.S. 1
(1942); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 WalIr.) 2(1.866).
" See Note, Civilian Court Review, of Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUM.
L,REV. 1259, 1273(1969).
"`In particular, the cjvil court should be empowered to hear claims of
misapplication of statutory or regulatory standards of liability, procedural
inadequacies, and unreasonable length Of sentence. *
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certainly be a federal one and will probably devolve on the federal
armed forces.33° The case for using federal troops in such a situation
is a strong one, based on their superiority over local law enforcement
agencies in terms of manpower, equipment, and training."
Presidential authority to order federal troops to perform recovery
operations is well established by constitutional332 and statutory333 law,
and it is difficult to conceive of a successful challenge to the decision
to use troops.334
A large-scale federal military presence in an area, whether or not
it is accompanied by a declaration of martial law, carries with it
possibilities for substantial infringements of liberty. Neither the
existing standards governing the use of deadly force by soldiers
against civilians3" nor the remedies available to injured civil-
~° The AEC takes the position that recovery would not be an AEC responsibility*
See note 225 supra.
Wilirich & Taylor, supra note 14, at 153-54.
132 General constitutional authority is found in the commandment that the
President insure that the laws are faithfully executed, U.S. CONST. art. ii § 3, and in
the obligation of the federal government to guarantee a republican form of
government to the states and to protect them against invasions. U.S. CONST. art. IV
§4. The Coflgress is given power to call out the militia to execute federal law, suppress
insurrectiors, and repel invasions. U.S. (`ONST. art. I § 8 ci. 15.
Congress has given the President power to call out state and federal militia to
suppress "insurrections" against state governments upon request of the state
legislature cr governor. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). The narrow construction given to the
term "insurrection," namely a movement "specifically intended to overthrow the
constitutedgovernmen.t," Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 736 (1st Cir. 1954),
might not cover every nuclear threat. However, courts have not been inclined to
disturb decisions to use troops in ebses of extreme domestic violence. See Note, Riot
Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HARV. L. REV. 638, 644 (1968). See also
Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in
Civil Disordirs, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 62 (1971). The President could also rely, without
waiting for a call from a state government, on 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1970), which gives him
power to use federal troops to enforce federal laws whenever "unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States,
make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in anyState or Territory
by the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings."
"~ See notes 286-297 supra.
`"There is no federal statutory law governing the amount of force that a
commander of troops may order or that the troops themselves may use in domestic
emergencies. Comment, Kill or Be Killed? Use of Deadly Force in the Riot SituatIon, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 829, 840 (1968). The attitude of the military appears to be that the
common law justifications for homicide furnish adequate guidelines for soldiers acting
to enforce domestic law or restore orde!. See Murray, Civil Disturbance, JustifIable
Homicide and Military Law, 54 M1L. L. REV. 129, 14G41 (1971). Law enforcement
officers have traditionally been allowed to use deadly force to prevent the commission
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1975] Plutonium Recycling 435
ians336 would be adequate in the face of a plutonium crisis. Under
the imminent threat of a nuclçar detonation, military forces might
feel compelled to adopt a policy of shooting first in cases where sus-
pected terrorists appeared to be on the verge of large-scale vio-
lence. This attitude might extend to cases where other citizens were
frustrating military attempts to locate the weapon and restore
order. The existence of a~ shoot-first attitude on the part of the
authorities charged with protecting plutonium has already been
reported.337
An effective recovery program might also require formal
prohibitions on certain movements of civilians. Curfews have been
used in the past during urban riots, apparently with success.33~ They
aid law enforcement authoritics in their efforts to end the emergency
by thinning traffic in the str~ets and by reducing the amount of
"ordinary" crime.339 They als9 serve to protect the citizenry from
mob violence.~° While courts have ordinarily upheld curfews despite
the restrictions they impose on freedom of movement and
assembly,~' there might be serious difficulties with curfews in a
nuclear threat situation. Enforcement of a curfew would entail
publicizing the existence of the nuclear threat with the possible result
of encouraging panic.342 People might regard the curfew as an effort
to keep them trapped within the threatened area. Presumably the
government would evacuate the threatened area immediately as part
of its response to the threat, but lingering fears, based on uncertain
of a felony, e.g.. Stinnett v. Virginia, 55 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1932); State v. Fair, 45 N.J.
77, 211 A.2d 359 (1965). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1958). Apparently a federal soldier employed under 10 U.S.C.
§~ 331-32 (1970) would be enforcing fe~era1 constitutional law and hence would have
the status of a law enforcement officer. Murray, supra, at 144. As a practical matter,
prosecutions of servicemen for actions taken during civil disturbances have been quite
rare. Id. at 130.
See generally Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972); Note, Inadequacies of Federal Sovereign
immunity: A New Perspective, 61 GEO.~ L.J. 1535 (1973).
"The Washington Post reported in October 1973 that the AEC issued shoot.to.
kill orders to personnel directing the production, shipment and storage of atomic
weapons at the height of the Yom Kippur War." Plutonium Recycle, supra note 11, at
20.
tmSee generally Comment, The Riot Curfew, 57,CALIF. L. REV. 450 (1969);
Comment, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L. J. 1560 (1968);
Developments-.Naiional Security, .cupra note 98, at 1304-07.
"` Developments..-Nalional Security, supra note 98, at 1304.
~°Id.
~" See, e.g. 1-lirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81(1943).
`~` See Developments--National Security, supra note 98, at 1306; Willrich &
Taylor, supra note 14, at 155 ("on balance" favoring "official candor").
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~l36 1l~irvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
information about the destructive possibilities of the nuclear
explosive and about its location might lead to widespread resistance
to the curfew. The potential for violent social disorder would be
correspondingly enhanced.
Finally, it is necessary to realize that the operating time for
execution of the recovery program may be extremely short. The
discussion heretofore has assumed a period of perhaps several days
during which federal troops, aided by martial law and curfew
restrictions, would carry out the search for the stolen plutonium, the
nuclear explosive, or the dispersal device. But it is entirely possible
that the person or group making the threat may give the government
only a few hours in which to respond. In such a case the government
would be compelled to use every means at its disposal to locate the
source of the threat. Searches based on the scantiest information or
on no information at all as well as brutal interrogations of persons
suspected of having knowledge of the identities and whereabouts of
the threatening parties or the nuclear device would be inevitable.
Such desperate measures would go far beyond the sorts of emergency
powers which have been upheld or even considered in the past, and
would approach the establishment of tyranny.
IV. MANDATORY REVIEW OF THE CIVIL LiBERTIES
IMPACT OF PLUTONIUM RECYCLING
Given the extraordinary impact that plutonium recycling may
have on civil liberties, it is worth inquiring whether the AEC has a
legal duty to consider that impact in making its decision about
recycling, it is at least clear that the Commissicn has a duty to
consider potential environmental effects of using plutonium. Since
ihe enactment in 1969 of the National Environmental Policy Act
(N EPA),343 all federal agencies have been required to assess the
environmental impact of contemplated action and to prepare
statements describing such impact and weighing alternative courses
of action.344 The AEC's draft environmental impact statement on
plutonium recycling was prepared in satisfaction of this require-
ment.345
42 U.S.C. §~ 4321-47 (1970).
Id. § 4332(c).
1 DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 5, Forward. Regulations issued by the
Council on Environmental Quality require the preparation of a draft environmental
impact statement for circulation to interested federal and state agencies and for public
comment. Where required by statute or by agency practice, public hearings are held on
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As this Comment has demonstrated, however, the circulation of
plutonium in private commerce threatens to poison the legal as well
as the natural environment. Once the recycling of plutonium
commences on a large scale, the courts may be committed to
upholding the legality of safeguards that seriously infringe important
constitutional rights. If these rights are to be protected they must be
fully considered in the process of deciding whether to license
plutonium recycling at all. Such an accounting would require the
AEC to structure the regulation of recycling so as to minimize the
need for safeguards that infringe civil liberties and to take the public
position that the economic benefits derived from recycling more than
offset the program's civil liberties costs.
This Section will develop the argument that NEPA requires the
same concern for civil liberties as it requires for the physical
environment: that is, that the AEC's environmental impact statement
must include a detailed discussion of the civil liberties impact of
plutonium safeguards. Since the values protected by the first and
fourth amendments are identical in kind to the values reflected in
federal environmental policy, a construction of NEPA that
compelled respect for the latter but not for the former in federal
* decisionmaking would be anomalous.
The basic command of! NEPA is procedural rather than
substantive; federal agencies are directed "to the fullest extent
possible" to tailor' their policies and regulations to the environmental
policy set forth in the Act.346 That policy is highly anthropocentric:
protection of the earth's air, water, and plant and animal life is
encouraged, not because these natural objects have inherent rights to
remain unspoiled, but rather because their preservation promotes
human values such as physical and psychological well-being.347 The.
statute itself incorporates this view at several points. Its declared
purpose is "to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
the draft statement and the comments received are then incorporated into a final
environmental impact statement. See 38 Fed. Reg. 20550-62 (1973). The AEC
announced in December, 1974, that it intended to hold public hearings on its draft
impact statement on plutonium recycling, the date and place of the hearing to be
established by later order. 39 Fed. Reg. 43 101-02 (1974).
~ 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). But cf Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach
to Substantive Review U,zder NEPA. 88 IIARV. L. REV. 735 (1975) (arguing that
NEPA imposes substantive restraints on agency action).
`~7This view of environmental policy has been . criticized for its inherent~
limitations. See Stone, Should Trees Have Sganding?.__To ward LegalRighl:for Natural
Objects. 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Enviranmenta! Law, 83 YALE U. 1315. (1974).
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damage to the environment or biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of man":'4' it purports to recognize "the critical
importance of restoritig and maintaining environmental quality to
the overall welfare and development of man";'4' and it requires the
preparation of environmental impact statements in the case of
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.""' Perhaps the strongest statement urging a
humanistic construction of NEPA was made by one of its principal
sponsors, Senator Jackson:
An environmenta' policy is a policy for people. Its primary
concern is with man and his future. The basic principle of the
policy is that we must strive, in all that we do, to achieve a
standard of excellence in man's relationships to his physical
surroundings."'
Further evidence of the anthropocentric nature of federal
environmental policy is the fact that NEPA's protection extends to
manmade as well as natural objects. One section of the Act creates a
responsibility in the federal government to "preserve important
historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice.""2 This section has been
applied to restrain federal action that threatened to destroy historical
landmarks3" or alter the aesthetic appearance of their
surroundings.354 Unlike mountains and streams, which arguably
deserve protection whether or not there are people around to
appreciate them,355 historic buildings and other human artifacts are
objects of environmental concern solely because of their value for
people. The inclusion of historical and cultural items as subjects of
`~`42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
~ 1(1. § 4331(a).
"° Id. § 4332(C) (emphasis added).
"`115 CONG. REC. 19009(1969).
42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b) (4) (1970).
Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (ED. Va. 1972) (federal interstate
highway to be built through historic plantation); Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n
v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (0. Mass, 1972) (demolition of historic waterfront
buildings).
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130(4th Cir. 1971), modified on oilier grounds, 497 F.2d
252 (4th Cir. 1974) (penal facility to be constructed near historic houses).
~ See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755-60 (1972) (Blackmtin, J.,
(lissenting) (suggesting that environmental groups be given standing to litigate claims
on behalf of wilderness areas which will be used by few, if any, people).
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19751 Plutonium Recycling 439
environmental concern under NEPA makes sense only if federal
environmental policy is concerned with values that preserve and
improve the quality of human life.
The values embodied in the environmental policy declarations
of NEPA are embodied as well in the Bill of Rights.33' Illustrations of
this point may be found in NEPA itself, in its legislative history, and
in its application to actual.controverSies. For example, the statutory
command that federal agencies seek to "preserve important historic
[and] cultural . . . aspects of our national heritage"3" could be read to
encompass a concern for civil liberties. Most Americans would agree
that their constitutional rights are an important historical and
cultural aspect of their heritage. Another clause of that section,
requiring the government to "maintain, wherever possible, an
environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice,""8 seems particularly addressed to the first amendment."9
One of the environmental evils that Senator Jackson believed would
be attacked under NEPA was "crowding, congestion, and conditions
within our central cities which result in civil unrest and detract from
man's social and psychological, well-being.""0 This remark suggests
The converse of this proposition was argued with vigor during the period just
prior to the enactment of NEPA. Commentators urged that federal courts fashion a
constitutional right to a dçcent environment out of the penumbra of rights protected
by the Bill of Rights, along the lines of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Roberts~ The Right to a Decent Environment; E=Mc'2: Environment Equals Man
Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 674, 688-92 (1970);
Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970).
The argument was not received favorably by the courts, see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971), and was for the most part mooted by the enactment of
NEPA.
"` 42 U.S.C. § 433 l(b)(4) (1970).
Id. Apparently this phrase has not received independent judicial construction;
the cases rely instead on the "historic, cultural" language of the first phrase of the
section. E.g., Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F.Supp. 1120 (E.D. Va. 1972); Boston
Waterfront Residents Ass'n v. Romney, 343 F.Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972),
"` This section was intended by its draftsmen to "emphasize that an important
aspect of national environmental policy is the maintenance of physical surroundings
which provide present and future generations of American people with the widest
possible choice in cultural pursuits, in recreational endeavors, in esthetic appreciation
and in living styles." 115 CONG. REC. 40419 (1969) (appendix to remarks of Sen.
Jackson). Ensuring a wide range of choic~s of cultures and life styles is conventionally
regarded as one of the basic ends served by the first amendment freedoms of speech
and press. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See
generally T. Emerson, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
For a discussion of the effects of security regulations on the first amendment rights of
plutonium workers in the nuclear power industry, see pp. 388-400 supra.
"° 115 CONG. REC. 29067(1969).
PAGENO="0334"
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440 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
that federal environmental policy should be concerned with threats
to personal privacy, a concern that is also reflected in the fourth
amendment.36' The Second Circuit, echoing Senator Jackson, has
held that the construction of a federal detention center and drug
maintenance facility could lead to increased crime in the
neighborhood and expose passersby to drug addicts and drug
pushers, thereby sufficiently affecting the quality of the human
environment so as to require the General Service Administration to
prepare an environmental impact statement under Section 102(C) of
NEPA.362 If NEPA requires the government to try to avoid creating
conditions in which peoples' privacy and dignity would be subject to
assaults from private individuals, it should also require avoidance of
the creation of conditions in which peoples' constitutional rights
would be subject to assaults from the government.363
It would appear, then, that the AEC's draft environmental
impact statement on plutonium recycling, which contains no dis-
cussion at all of the civil liberties effects of plutonium safeguards, is
seriously deficient under NEPA standards. In seeking to remedy this
deficiency, the AEC should keep in mind two provisions of NEPA
particularly relevant to the civil liberties issues raised by plutonium.
First, the Act requires environmental impact statements to discuss
"alternatives to the proposed action."3" If the AEC favors
plutonium recycling, this provision requires the Commission to
justify its belief that plutonium is preferable as an energy source to
other substances whose protection does not require such serious
infringements of individual rights and to consider requiring
safeguard methods, such as "spiked" plutonium and nuclear parks,366
that are more expensive but less threatening to civil liberties. Second,
NEPA requires environmental impact statements to take account of
"any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
~ See, e.g.. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Hanly v. Kleindienst. 471 F.2d 823. 834 (2d Cir. 1972), cerl. denied. 412 U.s.
908 (1973). On remand, the district court decided that the GSA had not abused its
discretion in determining that the proposed facil?tics would not signilicantly affect the
quality of the human environment. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision. Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
~" Thus, NEPA would require AEC review of proposed wiretapping of suspected
plutonium thieves, and of the likelihood that extensive building searches and inarti.al
law would he required i~ the event of a theft of plutonium. See pp. 412-35 supra.
`~ 42 U.S.C.~4332(C)(iii)(197O).
" See note 88 supra.
PAGENO="0335"
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19751 Plutonium Recycling 441
mented."366 Although civil liberties are perhaps not "resources"
* within the meaning of this section, its spirit would seem to require the
* AEC to understand that, once plutonium recycling is authorized, it
may be too late to expect. the courts to protect civil liberties against
the demands of safeguarding the public from the dangers of
plutonium.
* The argument that NEPA requires government agencies to
consider the civil liberties Implications of proposed actions is
admittedly a novel one,367 but its underlying motivation should not
be overlooked. If NEPA does not in fact provide authority for
compelling the AEC to issue a~ "civil liberties impact statement"
regarding plutonium recycling, then Congress should act to prohibit
the licensing of recycling until such a statement is forthcoming.3"
Commitment of this country to a course of action which would leave
constitutional rights forever at the mercy of the need for national
security should not be undertaken without full public exploration of
the interests at stake.
CONCLUSION
To prevent dangerous quantities of plutonium from falling into
the hands of criminals and terrorists arid to insure the safe and
speedy recovery of plutonium if it is stolen would require fun-
damental alteration of the legal~ framework established to protect
individual rights. Virtually everyone in society would be called on to
make sacrifices of personal liberty in order to assure effective
safeguards. Both within and without the nuclear industry, in-
dividüals would be confronted with governmental demands that they
curtail their expectations of privacy and their exercise of
associational and expressive, rights for the greater good of public
safety.
A basic objection to theft-preventive safeguards is that they
would require individuals to distort their assessment of their own
42 U.S.C. §4332(C)(v) (1970).
An objection may be raised that the argument developed here would require
every governmental action to be preceded by a civil, liberties impact statement.
However, NEPA only requires environmental impact statements in the case of"rnajor
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (1970) (emphasis added). This limitation would apply to civil
liberties impact statements; few federal actions can be imagined which have a more
significant impact on the human environment than plutonium recycling.
36S See H.R. 3618, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975; notes 14. 20 .cupra.
PAGENO="0336"
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442 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10
role in society. For example, civilian employees of the nuclear power
industry who would have to comply with stringent new security
regulations369 might come to believe that they were more like soldiers
than civilians in light of the background checks that they would have
to undergo to secure employment and in light of the limitations on
their off-the-job activities that they would have to observe to retain
employment.370 Similarly, people outside the nuclear power industry
would wonder whether they were the subjects of covert government
surveillance.37' The result would be a chill on first amendment rights
and an increase in the general level of suspicion in society.
Post-theft recovery measures would create a situation approach-*
ing civil war, with the government arrayed against the perpetrators of
the nuclear threat and with innocent citizens caught in the middle.
Although emergency measures like widespread ransacking of homes
and buildings,312 detention of resisters and offenders by the
military,373 and restrictions on assembly and movement374 would
hopefully be temporary, they are nonetheless drastic departures from
the rule of law as it has come to be understood by the people of this
country.
Throughout this Comment, reference has been made to the
unpiec~Jented difficulties posed by plutonium in the context of
legislative and judicial decisionmaking. This challenge to the legal
system's competence to adjust social interests in public safety with
individual interests in civil liberties may be the most significant social
cost of plutonium. It is instructive to consider that, while the Anglo-
American legal sy~tem is approximately ten centuries old and the
See pp. 393-400 supra.
Putting the issue this way suggests that there would be nothing objectionable in
using ~he same kinds of personnel security programs in the civilian nuclear power
industry as are' presently used in the military whcn the people who subject themselves
to such programs by seeking employment do so knowingly and voluntarily. There are
two answers to this argument. First, increasing the number of people in society who
must surrende? some of their liberty is itself objectionable even if those people are
volunteers. More importantly, the government twenty years ago made the decision
that supervision of peaceful uses of nuclear power would be entrusted to civilians. To
alter the status of nuclear industry workers from civilian to quasi-military defeats their
expectations and those of prospective workers about the nature of their positions.
Unilateral avtion by the government that defeats legitimate expectations of certain
kinds of governmental benefits is a denial of due process. C~ompare Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 5.64 (1972).
" See pp. 401-Il supra.
~ See pp. 4 14-23 supra.
`"See pp. 424-33 supra.
"~ See pp. 434-35 supra.
PAGENO="0337"
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1975) Plutonium Recycling 443
United States is about two centuries old, the hazardous lifetime of
plutonium is hundreds of centuries.3" With the passage of time and
~ the increase in the quantity of plutonium in existence will come
pressure to eliminate the traditional checks the courts and leg-
islatures place on the activities of the executive and to develop a
powerful central authority better able to enforce strict safeguards.
Alongside the prospects for diminished individual liberties in a
plutonium economy must be placed the possible substitution of an
authoritarian "nuclear priesthood" for the traditional institutions of
law enforcement.376
It is thus virtually impossible to construct a compelling af-
firmative case for plutonium reóycling in the face of the civil liberties
objections to it. Although in the present era one would not lightly
urge rejection of a promising~source of energy, it is instructive to
consider Dr. Weinberg's characterization of the choice involved:
We nuclear people have made a Faustian bargain with
society. On the one hand we offer . . . an inexhaustable
source of energy....
But the price that we demand of society for this
magical energy source is both a vigilance and a longevity of
our social institutions that we are quite unaccustomed to.377
It is surely within reason to demand that all other s6urces of energy
be proven unworkable or unacceptable and to demand significant
long term reduction in the consumption. of energy before im-
plementing an energy program with such dire effects on law and
liberty.
-Russell W. Ayres
" See note 37 supra.
See A. Weinberg, unpublished paper, quoted in Plutonium Recycle, supra note
II, at 20.
" Weinberg, Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy, 177 SCIENCE, July 7, 1972,
at 27.
71-074 0 - 76 - 22
PAGENO="0338"
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Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Graham, we shall give you the chance to give
your full statement.
We will adjourn until 2 o'clock and at that time you will have as
much time as you need.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon-
vene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Paul E. Tsongas
presiding.
Mr. TsoNGAs. Dr. Graham, why do you not proceed.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Graham, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. T50NGA5. We have promoted others, we may as well promote
you.
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TsoxGAS. Before you begin, would you state your professional
background.
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OF PRANK GRAHAM, ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM
Mr. GRAHAM. My name is Frank Graham. I have been with the
Atomic Industrial Forum for about 2 years. Prior to that time I was
with Consolidated Edison Co. in New York. I was also in the U.S.
Navy, having spent 13 years in the Navy's nuclear program and com-
manded three submarines, two of which were nuclear powered.
Shall I proceed with my statement?
Mr. TSOXGAS. Yes.
Mr. GRAHAM. I would like to go through all of it. It is rather
cryptic and short.
Mr. TsoxGAs. That is why I wanted to start early. Go ahead.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportu-
nity to testify on U.S. domestic safeguards and the leadership the
nuclear industry has taken in the physical protection of nuclear
materials. I am the secretary for the Atomic Industrial Forum's Com-
mittee on Safeguards Policy and it is in that capacity that I am
here today. The views I am presenting are my own but coincide with
those that have been expressed by the members of the Forum's Com-
mittee on Safeguards Policy.
The Atomic Industrial Forum is an association of over 600 member
organizations in the United States as well as in 25 other countries
all of which share a common interest in the development of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. The member organizations represent a broad
spectrum of industrial, commercial, and institutional groups includ-
ing electric utilities, reactor and component manufacturers, archi-
tect-engineers, constructors. uranium miners and millers, fuel fabri-
cators and reprocessors, labor unions, insurance companies,
Government agencies. and private consultants.
In the early stages of the nuclear industry, safeguards were con-
sidered to be primarily an accounting problem. Like gold, nuclear
material was expected to receive protection commensurate with its
economic value.
PAGENO="0339"
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However, domestic and foreign political unrest in the late 1960's
and early 1970's with accompanying acts of violence brought about
an increasing concern for industrial security. The trend toward vio-
lence was given worldwide attention with the terrorist attack at the
1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany. And we have heard of it before
in testimony-increased physical security measures were established
by the law enforcement agencies and industry to protect material
and installations against criminal attack. Every air traveler wit-
nesses some of the resulting safeguards.
On the nuclear side, the industry, working with the Atomic
Energy Commission, upgraded and strengthened its industrial secu-
rity. The continuing evaluation of safeguards measures in the
nuclear industry led to a major upgrading in physical security sys-
tems in 1974, and in the spring of 1975 material accounting proce-
dures were tightened and improved.
Congress expressed its concern in the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974 by establishing the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and by request-
ing the NRC to study both nuclear energy sites and a security
agency.
Almost 2 years ago, the Forum's executive committee authorized
the establishment of a committee on safeguards policy. A list of the
committee members has been given to your staff for inclusion in this
record.
[Information referred to follows:]
SAFEGUARDS POLICY COMMITTEE
Chairman: J. Dean Worthington, senior vice president, Pacific Gas and Electric
Co.
Secretary: Frank W. Graham, manager, Special Studies, Atomic Industrial
Forum.
John Barnard, Nuclear Energy
Division, General Electric Co.
Perry Brittain, president, Texas
Utilities Co.
William A. Cameron, nuclear
representative, The Babcock &
Wilcox Co.
Robert V. Curry, executive vice
president, Nuclear Fuel Services.
Raymond Dickeman, president,
Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc.
G. A. Dobelman, senior vice president,
Brown & Root, Inc.
Samuel Edlow, president,
Edlow International.
Jack Gilleland, Assistant Manager for
Power, Tennessee Valley Authority.
William Jack, vice president, Power
Division, C. F. Braun Co.
Hugh Kendrick, manager of
safeguards and nuclear fuels,
Science Applications, Inc.
William J. L. Kennedy, vice president,
Stone and Webster Engineering
Corp.
Geoffery Keyes, director of business
planning, Westinghouse Electric
Corp.
Robert Lowenstein, Esq., Lowenstein,
Newman, Reis, Axelrad.
Leo Mackim, president,
Transnuclear, Inc.
Charles Mayer, nuclear transportation
division, Tn-State Motor
Transit Co.
Gary Molen, manager, nuclear
materials safeguards, Allied
General Nuclear Services.
Lawrence F. O'Donnell, program
development director, General
Atomic Co.
Kenneth R. Osborn, vice president,
Allied Chemical Corp.
Leonard Reichle, vice president,
Ebasco Services, Inc.
William Shelley, director of
regulation and control, Kerr McGee
Corp.
Eugene F. Sturgeon, director of public
relations, Northeast Utilities.
Robert Uhrig, vice president of
nuclear affairs, Florida Power and
Light Co.
Russel P. Wischow, vice president,
E. R. Johnson Associates.
PAGENO="0340"
336
Mr. GRAHAM. It is mainly the work of this Forum committee which
I shall be addressing today.
The nuclear industry as represented by the Forum committee mem-
bers foresaw the need for a continuing review of safeguard's policy
and for providing appropriate physical protection measures to sup-
port resumption of commercial reprocessing of spent fuel when
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It was recognized
that not only must the industry appropriately safeguard plutonium,
but that the public must be assured that adequate safeguards exist.
In support of this position, the Forum committee has reviewed the
existing physical protection measures and formulated for commer-
cial plutonium recycle, a. recommended domestic safeguards policy.
This committee position was transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in response to its request for comments on the congres-
sionally mandated security agency study. A copy of the Forum com-
mittee letter has been provided for your staff for inclusion in the
record.
[Information referred to follows.]
AToMIc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC.,
Washington, D.C., October 24, 1975.
Mr. S. H. SMILEY,
Deputy Director for Policy and Planning,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
U.S. Nv clear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SMILEY: The Federal Register, Volume 40, Number 176, dated Sep-
tember 10, 1975, announced the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Security
Agency Study and requested comments. The Atomic Industrial Forum's Com-
mittee on Safeguards Policy has reviewed the text of the Security Agency
study scope statement. A list of the committee members is attached.
As a result of the committee's review, the following comments are submit-
ted:
1. It is the opinion of committee members that a graded safeguards system
can be structured to provide each step in the nuclear fuel cycle with acceptable
safeguards. In a graded system recognition would be given to inherent differ-
ences between low enriched uranium and plutonium. It is the committee's opin-
ion that more rigorous safeguards functions such as those applicable to pluto-
nium are appropriate for the Government to undertake. These Government
safeguards functions can be developed within current agencies or through the
establishment of a security agency within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
However, a limited organization within NRC to provide information and
advice to established agencies would seem to provide the best course. This
arrangement would avoid adding a new security agency, would utilize systems
and equipment already available, would utilize information and information
gathering capabilities within existing organizations, and would expand the
opportunity for rotation of security forces to avoid stagnation of personnel.
The safeguards functions appropriate to Government include:
(a) The responsibility for the security of materials in transit. Guards may
be Government employees or contract guards under Government orders.
(b) The responsibility for response forces for both fixed site and transit
security. Actual response forces need not be Federal. Private, state and local
forces could also be utilized under Government control.
(c) A national communications system and command center, perhaps includ-
ing regional centers, to support and coordinate response forces in the event of
attempted sabotage or diversion attempts at fixed installations or during trans-
port.
(d) The responsibility to provide a personnel security clearance system for
licensee security personnel and those having access to significant quantities of
special nuclear material.
PAGENO="0341"
337
2. It seems appropriate to the committee members that these Government
safeguards functions, whether or not a Federal Security Agency is established,
be integrated with the current ERDA security/safeguards system.
3. Guard and security forces at fixed installations should be under the
supervision of plant management. The guard and security forces, and physical
security measures at fixed installations should be sufficient to detect, report
and delay attempted sabotage or diversion until response forces arrive. The
delay time required should be determined on a case by case basis.
4. The guard and security forces at fixed installations would be trained in
the use of and authorized to carry hand guns. All escalation of the use of
force would depend upon response forces.
5. In order to provide NRC with alternatives available to solve security
problems with a minimum of operational impact, the committee members rec-
ommend that procedures be established for members of industry and major
security organizations to advise the Commission on proposed safeguards regu-
Iations.
6. The committee also recommends that the NRC consider the establishment
of a Nuclear Security Training School to assist in standardizing guard force
performance and capability. The training could be accomplished in the same
manner as the Department of Defense's training provided for industrial secu-
rity personnel.
The members of the committee also considered the series of six other "vital
elements" of a safeguards regime include in the scope of the NRC Security
Agency study. There was concern on the part of the committee members that
two of the listed elements, i.e., item 1-the need for continuous inspection of
material control and accounting procedures, and item 5-the responsibility for
bearing costs of guard forces were only ancillary to the NRC Security Agency
study and could tend to distract from the central issue of the study. However,
with this concern in mind, the following comments address the six "vital ele-
ments".
1. "The need for expanded NRC involvement in verifying material control
and accounting procedures; e.g., the need for continuous NRC inspections of
such procedures". The members of the committee do not envision an improve-
inent in material control and accounting through continuous NRC inspection of
such procedures. However, with the built-in time delay inherent in material
control and accounting, unannounced NRC inspections appear to be a reasona-
ble method of providing additional assurance to the public that material con-
trol and accounting is being accomplished properly within the time constraints
of the system.
2. "The role of NRC in recovery of stolen special nuclear material". The
recovery of stolen special nuclear material would logically use nationwide
intelligence information and therefore would best be handled within the estab-
lished Government agencies by an FBI operation under the Attorney General.
The role of the NRC as viewed by committee members would be in an advi-
sory and supporting capacity providing technical information and assistance in
the unique properties of radioactive materials.
3. "Coordination and liaison on intelligence matters and contingency plans
between NRC and other agencies". Intelligence information available to the
FBI, Treasury Department, CIA, Department of Defense, ERDA, and State
and local law enforcement agencies has a demonstrated capability for forecast-
ing threats and can be very useful in reducing risks. The committee members
do not know if a good mechanism now exists for the prompt reporting of such
information to a central, responsible authority and, also, for the prompt dis-
semination of such information to law enforcement agencies. If it is not being
done, as the committee members suspect, this should be corrected. The com-
mand center, previously mentioned, could fulfill this function. The contingency
planning of the proposed security agency would, of course, involve the same
Federal agencies with which it coordinated intelligence matters.
4. "The extent to which the establishment of a security agency within NRC
would introduce civil liberties questions not present under existing safeguards
arrangements". The scope of this element is too broad for constructive com-
n'ient within the timeframe of the committee's deliberations. However, based on
the wide experience in the nuclear fuel cycle of the committee members, it is
their opinion that few if any civil liberties' questions not already present
under existing governmental security systems would develop.
PAGENO="0342"
338
5. "The responsibility for bearing costs of guard forces, for example, how
costs should be apportioned among industry and Government". Again, the time
constraints of these comments preclude an indepth analysis of this subject.
However, it is the committee's preliminary opinion that the allocation of costs
should be dependent upon the purpose of the safeguards being considered. In
general, those costs involved in protecting society from incidents arising out of
social or political causes should be borne by the society. Those costs which are
incurred to provide safeguards to protect the employees and property of the
industry should be the responsibility of the industry. In areas where an over-
lap occurs, such as the costs involved in a communications system, they should
be shared by both the industry and government. Certainly, working out an
equitable solution will require study and analysis.
6. "The use of deadly force for purposes other than self-defense in respond-
ing to attempts to gain unauthorized possession of special nuclear materials or
to sabotage nuclear failities". The concept of guards, armed and trained in the
use of handguns, has been accepted by the industry to provide self-protection
while alerting response forces. It seems appropriath to the committee members
that any escalation of force beyond self-defense wotild be the responsibility of
the forces acting under Government orders as conceived in previous committee
comments.
The most effective safeguards appear to be through an industry-Government
partnership with each carrying out its role where it can do the best job. The
members of the committee recognize the importance of protecting nuclear facil-
ities and special nuclear materials at fixed sites and in transit, and believe
that the basic goals of industry and the Government are the same.
We would be pleased to meet with you or members of your staff to discuss
our comments.
Sincerely,
J. DEAN WORTHINGTON,
Chairman, Committee on S'afeguards Policy.
Enclosure.
Mr. GRAHAM. I shall review some of the comments contained in the
letter. The Forum committee feels that a graded system of safeguards
is necessary to provide each step in the nuclear fuel cycle with accepta-
ble protection. Such a graded system would recognize the inherent dif-
ferences between low-enriched uranium and plutonium.
The most effective safeguards in the opinion of the Forum commit-
tee members is through an industry-Government partnership with
each carrying out its role where it can do the best job.
The safeguards functions which the Forum committee believes to
be appropriate to Government include responsibilities for the secu-
rity of special nuclear materials in transit. It is the committee's
opinion that private equipment and guards operating under Govern-
ment orders would provide appropriate security assurance.
The Government should also be responsible for response forces for
both fixed site and transit security. The committee believes that
jurisdictional constraints of law enforcement agencies make the Fed-
eral Government the most effective manager of response forces. Pri-
vate, State, and local forces as well as Federal should be utilized
under Government control.
It follows that the Government responsibilities should include the
operation of a national communications system and command center,
perhaps including regional centers to monitor the status of fixed
sites and material in transit, and support and coordinate response
forces in the event of attempted sabotage or overt diversion. It
seems appropriate to the Forum committee that commercial security
requirements be integrated with the ERDA communications and
PAGENO="0343"
339
control system already in operation. And, in addition, the Govern-
ment should have the responsibility to provide a personnel security
clearance system for licensee security personnel and those having
access to significant quantities of special nuclear material.
The safeguards functions which the Forum committee found to be
appropriate to industry include the guard forces and security sys-
tems at fixed installations. These security forces and physical secu-
rity measures should be sufficient to detect, report and delay
attempted sabotage or diversion until response forces arrive. The
delay time required would be determined on a case basis depending
on the materials being protected and assessments of the threat based
on Government analysis of intelligence information.
Thdustry would also be responsible under the regulatory require-
ments of the NRC for the material accounting.
The committee also recommended that the NRC consider that
establishment of a nuclear security training school to assist in stan-
dardizing guard force personnel, performance and capability. The
training could be accomplished~ in the same manner as the Depart-
ment of Defense's training provided for industrial security person-
nel.
In any assessment of adequate security measures cost-benefit con-
siderations must be included, and they were discussed somewhat this
morning.
Frequently comments have been made that the cost of providing
safeguards would make nuclear power uneconomical as an energy
option. The Forum recognized the need for quantifying the costs of
safeguarding plutonium, and. as part of the AIF's comments to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the General Environmental
Statement for Mixed Oxide Fuel [GESMO], requested E. R. John-
son Associates to prepare a study on safeguards costs.
The study describes a system of safeguards which combines all of
the basic measures which could significantly improve safeguards
including redundancies among the various components of each con-
cept. It was the purpose of the study to describe a safeguards system
which, using currently available techniques would be clearly beyond
any reasonable requirements in protective features and in cost for
the protection of plutonium. The study established the cost of this
severe and extensive series of measures to determine their impact on
the economics of plutonium recycle. A copy of the report, which is
entitled, "An Tipper Estimate of Safeguards for Handling Pluto-
nium," has been given to your staff for inclusion in the record.
[Information referred to follows.]
PAGENO="0344"
340
E. R. JOHNSON ASSOCIATES, INC.
8206 Leesburg Pike
Vienna, Virginia 22180
`AN UPPER ESTIMATE OF SAFEGUARDS FOR HANDLING PLUTONIUM
July 21, 1975
Prepared for
Atomic Industrial Forum
475 Park Avenue South
New York, New York
PAGENO="0345"
341
S NOTICE
This report contains the results of a study
conducted by E. R. Johnson Associates, Inc. for
the Atomic Industrial Forum. The conclusions set
forth herein are those of E. R. Johnson Assocjates,
Inc. and do not necessarily represent those of the
Atomic Industrial Forum or~ any of its member
organizations.
PAGENO="0346"
342
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
1.0 INTRODUCTION 1-1
2.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION~ 2-1
3.0 PROJECTED COST OF SAFEGUARDS IN A MOX FUEL 3-1
FABRICATION FACILITY
3.1 Description of Model Facility 3-1
3.2 Description of the Physical Security System 3-1
3.3 Description of the Nuclear Material Control System
for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 3-10
3.4 Estimates of Safeguards Costs 3-15
4.0 PROJECTED COST OF SAFEGUARDS IN A REPROCESSING FACILITY 4-1
4.1 Description of Model Facjij~y 4-1
4.2 Description of the Physical Security System 4-1
4.3 Description of the Nuclear Material Control System
Tor the Reprocessing Faci]j~y 4-9
4.4 Estimates of Safeguards Costs 4-15
5.0 PROJECTED COST OF SAFEGUARDS DURING TRANSPORTATION
PLUTONIUM 5-1
5.1 Description of Model Transportation System 5-1
5.2 Cormiand Center 5-1
5.3 Description of National Radio Network System 5-2
5.4 Recovery Force 5-3
5.5 Transport Mode forfMP~ and for MOX Assemblies 5-3
5.6 Estimates of Safeguards Costs 5-7
6.0 REGULATORY REVIEW AND INSPECTION 6-1
11
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EXHIBITS
Page No.
EXHIBIT A - COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE PHYSICAL
SECURITY PROGRAM AT A MODEL MOX FUEL FABRICATION
FACILITY A-i
EXHIBIT B - COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
PROGRAM AT A MODEL MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY B-i
EXHIBIT C .~ COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE PHYSICAL SECURITY
PROGRAM AT A MODEL REPROCESSING FACILITY C-i
EXHIBIT D - COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
PROGRAM AT A MODEL REPROCESSING FACILITY D-i
EXHIBIT E - COST CALCULATIONS FOR COMMAND CENTER E-i
EXHIBIT F - COST CALCULATIONS FOR NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK SYSTEM F-i
EXHIBIT G - COST CALCULATIONS FOR RECOVERY FORCE G-i
EXHIBIT H - COST CALCULATIONS FOR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM AS
AND AS MOX FUEL H-i
EXHIBIT I - COST CALCULATIONS FOR REGULATORY REVIEW AND INSPECTION
AT THE MODEL MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY AND AT
THE MODEL REPROCESSING FACILITY I-i
-I *l .1
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AEC - Atomic Energy Commission
AIF - Atomic Industrial Forum
CCIV Closed Circuit Television
CEQ - Council on Environmental Quality
1OCFR7O - Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 70
10CFR73 - Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 73
FEA - Federal Energy Administration
GESMO - Generic Environmental Statement Mixed Oxide Fuel
ICA - Item Control Area
IFCF - Integrated Fuel Cycle Facility
LWR - Light Water Reactor
MBA - Material Balance Area
MOX - Mixed Oxide
MT U+Pu - Metric Ton Uranium plus Plutonium
NDA - Non Destructive Assay
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
SNM - Special Nuclear Material
iv
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1-1
AN UPPER ESTIMATE OF SAFEGUARDS FOR HANDLING PLUTONIUM
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 1975 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a press release
asking for public comment concerning its provisional policy regarding the
matter of a decision on the issue of the use of plutonium in water reactors.
This provisional policy, among other aspects, called for NRC to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis of alternative safeguards programs. This provisional
policy was largely a result of recommendations by the Presidents Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) in its letter of January 20, 1975 that a safe-
guards program cost-benefit analysis precede any final NRC action on the
plutonium recycle question. The CEQ letter, among other suggestions, speci-
fically recommended that NRC take certain actions including the following:
(1) "The NRC should identify alternative safeguard programs which
could protect the public from the unauthorized use of special -
nuclear materials.
(2) "The impacts - envircnmental, economic, social, legal and insti-
tutional - of each alternative safeguards program should be
fully analyzed.
(3) "The NRC should present these alternative safeguard programs, in-
cluding its proposed, preferred alternative, in an addendum to
the draft environmental impact statement (GESMO) which should be
circulated for review and comment according to CEQ guidelines and
existing NRC procedures for draft environmental impact statements.
(4) "After considering the comments received on both the initial draft
environmental impact statement and the addendum, the NRC should
proceed with preparation of the final environmental impact state-
ment.
(5) "Only after these steps have been carried out should a final de-
cision be made on whether to permit the commercial recycling of
plutonium in light water reactors."
The AEC in its Generic Environmental Statement on the use of Recycle
Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in LWR's (GESMO), WASH-l327 (August 1974)
stated that:
`The safeguards program has as Its objective achieving a level of pro-
tection against such acts to insure against significant Increase in the overall
risk of death, injury, or property damage~to the public from other causes be-
yond the control of the individual. It is judged that this objective will not
be fully met for Pu recycle by current safeguards measures; however, present
development programs have been carefully reviewed and other concepts which
could significantly improve safeguards have been identified. These concepts
include:
"1. Minimization or elimination of the transportation of plutoniuia
PAGENO="0350"
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1-2
from reprocessing plants to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities
which is the operation most vulnerable to an attempted act of theft
or sabotage. To the extent that such shipments are minimized or
eliminated, the safeguarding of plutonium would be enhanced. This
objective can be accomplished by locating mixed oxide fuel fabrica-
tion plants in close proximity to or adjacent to reprocessing plants
in Integrated Fuel Cycle Facilities. Although some safeguards
advantages of this concept are apparent, such a plan would require
careful analysis of a number of social, economic, environmental and
political factors. In addition to the elimination of a key trans-
portation step, the Integrated Fuel Cycle Facility would also make
it possible to use onsite physical protection measureu more effic-
iently to prevent a theft of plutonium. An early evaluation of this
concept is necessary (while the industry is in the evolutionary
stage) so that decisions cam be made before large capital invest-
ments are made at separate sites.
`2. Further protection of transportation functions by use of
massive shipping containers, special escort or convoying measures,
vehicle hardening against attack, improved coennumicatioms and res-
ponse capabilities.
"3. Additional hardening of facilities through mew barrier require-
ments, new surveillance instrumentation, new delaying capabilities
(e.g., incapacitating gases).
`4. Upgrading of operating and guard functions through the use of
personnel security clearance procedures, a Federally operated
nuclear security system, more advanced systems for monitoring
and searching of personnel, and closer liaison with law enforcement
authorities.
`5. Improving the timeliness and sensitivity of the system of in-
ternal control and accountability of plutonium.
"6. Use of "spiked' plutonium* which would be less susceptible to
theft and would be more difficult to manufacture into a nuclear ex-
plosive because of the required elaborate handling procedures."
~" `Spiked' plutonium is plutonium which is combined with radioactive material
emitting high levels of penetrating radiation."
The AEC went on to say that it had a high degree of confidence that im-
plementation of some combination of the above-listed concepts would
result in the safeguards objectives being met--and that the safeguards
problem is manageable.
PAGENO="0351"
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1-3
The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) in its letter to NRC of January
24, 1975 shared the view of the AEC and further stated that
"We believe such safeguards are within the reach of existing technology,
and the cost of implementing them~wil1 be small relative to the gain
which is achievable by the use of~p1utonium recycling."
Considerable safeguards research and development has been, is being and will
continue to be conducted by both government and industrial organizations.
Much of the work conducted to date has not been applied to the actual safe-
guarding of special nuclear material (SNM) in commercial nuclear fuel cycle
facilities. Much of the work yet to be done consists of applying developed
and available safeguards methods to con~niercial activities in a meaningful and
economic fashion.
In its letter, CEQ emphasized its belief that NRC should identify alterna-
tive safeguards programs which could protect the public from the unauthorized
uses of plutonium and, among other things, should analyze the economic impact
of these alternative programs. As a result of the Atomic Industrial Forum's
earlier review of GESMO, and from the extensive knowledge of the U. S. safe-
guards programs on the part of the AIF member organizations, it was judged
that the safeguards program that would afford a maximum in protection against
the prospect of plutonium diversion would be a program which would combine
all of the basic "...concepts which could significantly improve safeguards...",
except those concepts of collocation and spiking. Therefore, a study was
undertaken for the Atomic Industrial Forum by E. R. Johnson Associates, Inc.
to describe a system of safeguards which contained all of the elements of
these concepts (except collocation and spiking) including significant re-
dundancies among the various components of each concept. It was the purpose
of the study to describe a safeguards system which, using currently available
techniques, would be clearly beyond (in protective features and in cost) any
reasonable requirements for the protection of plutonium--and to cost this
severe and extensive program to determine its impact on the econothics of
plutonium recycle. In conducting this study the four basic activities in-
volved in plutonium recycle were considered; i.e., the reprocessing of spent
fuel for recovery of contained uranium and plutonium, the shipment of recovered
plutonium oxide to a MOX fuel fabrication facility, the fabrication of MOX
fuel and recovery of scrap generated in connection therewith, and the shipment
PAGENO="0352"
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1-4
of fabricated MOX fuel to a nuclear power plant.
No consideration was given to the cost of additional safeguards measures
at nuclear power plants as a result of plutonium recycle, since it would be
expected that the safeguards measures employed by such plants for the preven-
tion of sabotage would provide adequate protection to MOX fuel during its
receipt and storage.
Included in the safeguards system which was described for costing pur-
poses, in addition to all requirements of 1OCFR7O and 1OCFR73 as they existed
as of July 1, 1975, were the following concepts:
(1) Further protection of transportation functions by
(a) use of massive shipping containers
(b armoring trailers and tractors used in shipping
(c top-loading of trailers; bolting on trailer lid; no doors
(d) securing of shipping containers to trailer
(e) use of disabling mechanisms for trailer and tractor
(f) creation of a national radio network for coninunicating
with shipments, and maintaining a record of the location
of all such shipments
(g) creation of a special support and response force to respond
irrnediately to any attempted theft of SNM
(h) creation of a coninand center to coordinate safeguards and
response activities with military and law enforcement
authorities
(2) Additional hardening of facilities by
(a) use of multiple perimeter fences and concertina barbed wire
(b) use of multiple intrusion sensor systems--outside the perim-
eter barrier, on the barrier and inside the barrier
(c) use of quick-acting, positive barriers across vehicle access
roadways
(d) use of closed circuit television (CCIV) to monitor barrier
(e) use of cable network to prevent helicopter landing inside
protected area
(f) increased use of CCIV to monitor activity in material access
areas
(g) increasing the size of the security guard force, improving
their armament and equipment, and providing a trained emer-
gency support unit from other plant employees
(3) Upgrading of operating and guard functions by
(a) upgrading of training and responsibility of guard force and
of the security programs
(b) use of Q-clearances for all plant personnel
PAGENO="0353"
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1-5
(c) search and monitoring of all (including Q-cleared) personnel
entering or leaving both protected areas and material access
areas
Cd) use of metal detectors, SNM detectors and explosive detectors
on every entry or exit from protected area or material access
area
(e) monitoring every package entering or leaving protected area
and material access area by X-ray, SNM detectors and explosive
detectors
(f) elimination of all commercial vehicles from protected area
(g) reducing the number of persons authorized to have access to,
and the number of access points to the protected area and
material access area
(h) use of generally increased guard and CCIV surveillance of
activities on site
(i) institution of regular coordination meetings with local law
enforcement authorities and the upgrading of equipment of
local law enforcement organizations as necessary to improve
their response capabilities
(4) Improving the timeliness and sensitivity of accountability of
plutonium by
(a) use of advanced non-destructive assay (NDA) measuring
equipmentforSNM to provide fasteranalytical results
(b) use of computer terminals in or near each Material Balance
Area (MBA) and the immediate recording of each transfer of
SNM into or out of each MBA into the terminal
(c) establishing a real-time computer system and program for the
accountability of SNM
All of the foregoing could be readily accomplished using equipment and
systems which are available today, and could be further upgraded, as desirable,
as new equipment becomes available.
Ihe implications of collocation of the fuel cycle facilities were not
considered for two reasons:
(1) Integrated Fuel Cycle Facility~ (IFCF) or collocation of fuel
cycle facilities would not alter significantly the economics
of the safeguards system as described herein (in fact there
would probably be a reduction in the cost of the systems as
estimated herein in that the transportation requirements may
be eliminated, or at least significantly reduced) and,
(2) IFCF is the subject of a separate and broader study being con-
ducted currently by the NRC; this study covers, in addition to
71-074 0 - 76 - 23
PAGENO="0354"
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1-6
the safeguards considerations, the technical and economic feasi-
bility of the IFCF concept, as well as the societal and insti-
tutional implications of concentrating fuel cycle activities in
a single location.
The proposed "spiking" of plutonium was regarded unworthy of detailed
consideration as a safeguards procedure for several reasons:
(1) It would afford only a small increment of safety over that
achievable by other means;
(2) It would result in an increased risk of radiation exposure to
persons legitimately handling the "spiked" plutonium;
(3) It would possibly interfere with legitimate uses of plutonium
if it proved necessary to separate the spiking agent prior to
subsequent use.
This report contains a summary of the study which was conducted and the
results which were derived therefrom. The study was based on the following:
(1) The total cost of safeguards (physical security and accountability)
under existing regulations has been included in the costs set forth
herein as well as the costs of the added safeguards described.
(2) The cost involved in the described safeguards program includes all
costs normally experienced in commercial operations--including all
direct and indirect costs, depreciation of facilities, amortization
of startup expenses and an annual 25% pre-tax return on fixed assets
employed. If any of the safeguards efforts described were conducted
by the Federal Government, return on investment would not be appli-
cable to such activities.
(3) The cost involved for military or law enforcement activities in
connection with the response to a theft or attempted theft of
plutonium has not been included in the costs set forth herein. It
was assumed that these activities would be maintained for national
security and law enforcement purposes in any event and, as such,
would not represent an incremental cost to the public.
PAGENO="0355"
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1-7
(4) The safeguards systems described are not descriptive of any
specific existing or p1anned~ facilities (or transportation system);
they are, however, based on the application of existing technology,
construction.practices, measurement state-of-the-art, and equipment
to the development of a very high level of protection for plutonium
used in model facilities and transportation systems, and to the pro-,
vision of an adequate response to limited assaults on plutonium
or facilities in which it is handled.
The safeguards systems described jn this report were selected for the
purposes of establishing costs for an extensive, redundant and in some
instances excessive safeguards system for plutonium recycle activities. The
systems described are not recoimiended For adoption by the nuclear industry
or by NIkC; they are intended purely for costing purposes. In the opinion of
E. R. Johnson Associates, Inc. these systems represent a higher degree of
safeguards than Is required for obtaining a satisfactory level of protection
for plutonium when the latter Is in wide scale use.
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2-1
2.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From a general review of the conditions which prevail in the U. S.
today with respect to the safeguarding of nuclear materials in the
comercial nuclear fuel cycle, and from the study conducted regarding the
prospective costs of extensive added safeguards to plutonium processing
and shipping operations, the following conclusions have been developed:
(1) The existing safeguards, including physical security and the
control of SNM, as prescribed by~ existing regulations as set
forth in 1OCFR7O and 1OCFR73, are adequate for the protection of
the quantity levels of plutonium which exist in the commercial
fuel cycle now and that which will be generated during the next
several years, assuming that there will be no delays involved
in licensing the construction and operation of spent fuel
reprocessing plants and MOX fuel fabrication facilities.
(2) The results of this study show that the current technology is
adequate to improve the safeguards systems established under
existing regulations as such improvements become necessary.
This study confirms the Federal Energy Administration statement
that "(improved) safeguards are within the reach of existing
technology, and the cost of implementing them will be small
relative to the gain which is achievable by the use of plutonium
recycling." Economic considerations as well as the desire for
continuing improvements in reliability and sensitivity of
instrumental measuring and detection equipment will provide the
motivation for a continuing research and development program
in both government and industry in coming years. This continuing
improvement in technology can be expected to provide continuing
improvements in both cost and the margins of safety provided by
the safeguards system as the quantities of plutonium in use
increase during the 1980's and beyond.
PAGENO="0357"
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2-2
(3) The total cost of safeguarding plutonium, using the extensive
measures outlined in this study, during the course of reprocessing
of spent fuel, transporting recovered plutonium to a M0X fuel
fabrication facility, fabrication of MOX fuel, and transporting
the MOX fuel to the nuclear power station would amount to $1,350/kg
fissile Pu--as set forth by the following:
Total Annual Cost/kg Pu (Fissile)
Cost ($000) Processed ($)
MOX Fuel Fabrication*
Physical Security 2909 211
Accountability 2203 160
+
Reprocessing
Physical Security 4182 443
Accountability 2686 284
Transport
From Reprocessing 936 99
From MOX Fuel
Fabrication 1136 82
Regulatory
MOX Fuel Fabrication 4Ô0 29
Reprocessing 400 42
TOTAL $1,350
*600 metric tons U+Pu/yearfabrication capacity
(13,800 kg fissile Pu)
+1500 metric tons U+Pu/year~reprocessing capacity
(9,450 kg fissile Pu)
In addition to these costs, an annual cost of a command center
of $1.1-million, a national radio network system of $4.3-million
and of a recovery force for responding to thefts and attempted
thefts of $5.6-million would be incurred which would have to be
prorated over all strategic SNM utilized in the commercial fuel
cycle during a given year and any other strategic materials the
transport of which might be monitored by such a system. While
it would be expected that such a system would also monitor ship-
ments of strategic military items, government-owned SNM, as well
PAGENO="0358"
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2-3
as coniiiercial SNM--particularly if the system were operated by
the Federal Government--for the purposes of this study the entire
cost of the system was assumed to be charged against the coniiiercial
plutonium traffic projected for the period 1980-1990.
Since the radio/recovery/conTnand system would have a capability for
easily handling shipments amounting to over 100,000 kg fissile
plutonium annually, and since the average projected traffic in
fissile plutonium would be 10,000 kg/year in 1980, increasing to
40,000 kg/year in 1990 and 200,000 kg/year in 2000, the average
annual cost of the system would amount to an additional safeguards
cost of $1100/kg Pu (fissile) in 1980 decreasing to. $275/kg Pu
(fissile) in 1990.
Thus the total cost for safeguarding plutonium by the extensive,
currently available methods described in this study would be about
$2,450/kg Pu dropping to $1,625/kg Pu toward 1990--and even lower
thereafter (1975 dollars). It would be expected that the results
of current and future research and development in the safeguards
field would result in a significant reduction in these costs.
(4) The cost estimates developed in this study show that the penalty
imposed on nuclear fuel costs by incorporation of the severe safe-
guards procedures described herein is small in relation to the
dollar benefits and the resource conservation benefits of plutonium
recycle as demonstrated by the following:
(a) The total plutonium safeguards costs of $2,450/kg Pu
(fissile), when related to the cost of electrical
power, is equivalent to about a 0.6% increase in the
cost of nuclear power, assuming a total power cost of
12 mills/kwh.
(b) The safeguards costs associated with the operation of
a reprocessing facility, including regulatory costs
connected therewith, amounts to about 3.2% of the
cost of reprocessing and waste management. The
safeguards cost associated with the operation of
a MOX fuel fabrication, including the regulatory
costs connected therewith, amounts to about 3.7%
of the cost of fuel fabrication.
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2-4
(c) The total cost of safeguards (in 1975 dollars)
connected with plutonium recycle amounts to a
maximum of 7-9% of the value of uranium and
plutonium in the spent fuel in 1980, and this
can be expected to decrease~to a maximum of
5% of the value of uranium and plutonium in the
spent fuel in 1990.
(The current value of U and~Pu in spent fuel
assuming current prices of $22.00/lb U308 for
yellow cake, $1.50/lb U for~conversion, $53.35/kg
SWU for enrichment, and $150/kg fabrication penalty
for plutonium is about $174,000/MT U+Pu. However,
the enrichment price set forth above represents the
Government's price announced to be effective in
August 1975. It is currently projected that enrich-
ment services from commercial facilities now in the
planning stage and expected to be in operation in
the early 1980's will be priced at $85/kg SWU (1975
dollars). Such a price would have the effect of
increasing the value of U and Pu in the spent fuel
to about $209,000/MT U+Pu.)
(d) The recovery of U and Pu from spent fuel will have
the additional benefit of conserving uranium resources
and reducing requirements for uranium enrichment.
According to our calculations the U and Pu recovered
and recycled annually from the spent fuel of a typical
1000 MWe PWR at equilibrium operation would represent
an annual reduction in uranium raw material require-
ments by nearly 40% and an annual reduction in
enrichment requirements by 30% for that reactor.
PAGENO="0360"
356
3-1
3.0 PROJECTED COST OF SAFEGUARDS IN A MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
3.1 Description of Model Facility
A model MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility was developed which had a
capability of producing MOX fuel assemblies at a rate of 2 MT Ui-Pu/day
(a capability for processing 13,800 kg Pu (fissile) annually assuming
a 300 day operating year). This facility would receive nuclear feed
materials in the form of natural UF6 and Pu02 and would have a
capability for
(1) conversion of UF6 to U02
(2) blending U02 and Pu02 to produce MOX
(3) pelletizing and sintering of MOX
(4) grinding sintered MOX pellets
(5) encapsulation of MOX pellets in Zircaloy tubing
(6) assembly of fuel rods into finished nuclear fuel assemblies
(7) recovery of Pu from scrap material, and
(8) waste processing.
In addition the facility would have all of the quality assurance, health
physics, analytical laboratory and support services normally attendant
to a completely integrated fuel manufacturing operation.
A general layout of the model facility is set forth in Figure 3-1.
It should be pointed out that the layout is not intended to be optimum
for operating purposes, but rather is intended to identify the numbers
and types of process areas and access points which could be expected to
be included in such facility--as well as to define the overall envelope
of the facility. The overall dimensions of the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility were established at 300 ft. long x 305 ft. wide x 55 ft. high
(at penthouse top).
3.2 Description of the Physical Security System
3.2.1 Protected Area Perimeter Barriers (See Figure 3-2)
The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is protected by a physical
barrier consisting of three fences. The inner perimeter fence (A)
is located at a distance of 145-150 ft. from all sides of the
facility and consists of an 8 ft. high cyclone fence topped with
3 strands of barbed wire. The outer perimeter fence (B) is located
PAGENO="0361"
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FIG. 3-!
LAi-oir Or Moo~i MOX Vo~. FA8R!C~r'ON Fi,LIrY
PAGENO="0362"
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LA! T
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/i[N~t/&~E' PERlMETi~R
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PAGENO="0363"
359
3-4
20 ft. outside of the first fence and is similarly constructed.
Concertina-type barbed wire (C) is placed in the space between
these two fences. A third fence (D) is located 30 ft. outside of the
outer perimeter fence and consists of a 4 ft. high cyclone fence.
Three intrusion detection systems were used in connection
with the fence system:
(1) An infra-red intrusion detection system (E) is located
10 ft. inside the inner perimeter fence, in the isolation
area between that fence and the facility itself. A total
of 8 separate and overlapping circuits of infra-red units
is used, which provide total perimeter coverage except
for the main gate area~and the guard house.
(2) A fence motion detection system is located on the
outer perimeter fence. A total of 80 separate sensors
is included in this perimeter alarm system.
(3) A microwave intrusion detection system (G) is located 15 ft.
outside the outer perimeter fence. A total of 8 separate
and overlapping circuits is used which provide total
perimeter coverage except for the main gate area and the
guard house.
There are two gates located~in each of the perimeter fences
such that they form an isolation lock between the fences. The main
gate (H) is 20 ft. wide and consists of two remotely operated gates
which can be opened and closed from the guard house and which will
normally be set for one gate to lock out while the other is in the
open position--although provisions would be made for bypassing this
lock out in the event a longer truck had to enter the premises.
The space between the gates contains a steel barrier (I) which is
normally positioned in the ground but which can be lifted up quickly
by two hydraulic pistons to block entry through the gates, in the
event that an attempt is made by a heavy vehicle to crash through
the gates. The rear gate (J) is~6 ft. wide and is.for personnel
exit only in the event of an emergency, is equipped with a remotely
operated lock system and intrusion alarms, and is viewed at all times
by CCTV. The space between the two gates contains steel posts
imbedded in concrete to prevent the passage of vehicles.
A series of 25 two-fixture light poles (K), 30 ft. high, are
PAGENO="0364"
360
3-5
located inside of the inner perimeter fence, which provide
illumination of the isolation zone as well as the fence system
to a level ofnot less than 0.25 foot candles.
CCIV units are located on each of the corner lamp posts and
on the guard house, directed down the inside of the inner perimeter
fence line. CCTV units are also located on the rear of the facility
viewing the rear gate and on the guard house viewing the main gate.
For the prevention of an unauthorized helicopter landing inside
the protected area, a 30 ft. steel tower is located on the center
of the roof of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility with 1/4' diameter
steel cables strung from the top of the tower to the lamp posts in-
side the inner perimeter fence with connecting cables in such a
configuration that there is no access hole in the cable system more
than 40 ft. in diameter.
3.2.2 Access Control
All personnel and vehicle access (except under emergency con-
ditions) is through the main gate.
Entering personnel sign in at the guard house and exchange a
photo-identification card for a photo-identification badge. They
surrender any packages to the guard who passes them through an X-
ray unit. In the event there is an object which is opaque to X-ray
in the package, the package is opened and searched. In addition,
the package is sniffed with an explosive detector. Entering per-
sonnel then pass through a metal detector and an explosive detector
prior to being admitted to the protected area. Exiting personnel
surrender packages to the guard who passes them through an X-ray
unit and a SNM detector. Exiting personnel then pass through both
a SNM and metal detector and exchange their photo-identification
`badge fOr their photo-identification card, sign out and are per-
mitted to leave the premises. A CCTV unit is located in the guard
house to view these inspection activities.
personnel access is limited only to employees and visitors
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3-6
with a specific need and a specific authorization to be inside the
protected area. In addition the administration building is located
outside of the protected area and houses offices of persons who
have no need to go into the protected area, or only an occasional
need therefor, in order to reduée the numbers of individuals who
have access to the protected area.
No vehicles are permitted in the protected area except the
special transfer vehicles which are used to move materials from
the receiving/shipping warehouse outside the perimeter fence into
the protected area, the armored carriers delivering shipments of
plutonium oxide and picking up shipments of MOX fuel, and the
patrol vehicles. These vehicles would be designed in such a
fashion as to facilitate inspection for the presence of explosives
or unauthorized SNM. Loading or unloading of vehicles for receipts
or shipments of SNM is conducted under the direct surveillance of
an armed guard and a CCTV unit.
3.2.3 Material Access Area Protection
It is assumed that the entire MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
will be located in a single structure containing a minimum of
doorways and penetrations. It is assumed that all doorways will
be equipped with intrusion alarms and all penetrations will be
either gridded with metal crossbars or will be sealed.
Access control to the material access area will be through two
locations. Each location will consist of a room equipped with a
CCTV unit and two controlled doors. A person entering the material
access area will pass through an explosive detector, a metal detector
and a SNM detector. In the event any of these should detect the
presence of SNM, explosive, or amounts of metal, the door to the
material access area will be automatically locked. Otherwise, the
entering person could open it with a specifically authorized key
card by inserting the key card into the key card reader. in exiting
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from the material access area the employee will insert a key card
into the key card reader on the other side of the door then pass
through the SNM detector, metal detector and explosive detector
prior to exiting into the protected area. In the event any of these
detectors should detect the presence of SNM, metal or explosives
the door to the protected area will be automatically locked.
One of these access stations will be equipped with an X-ray
unit, a SNM detector, and an explosive detector for use in monitor-
ing packages specifically authorized to enter or leave the material
access area--and only this entrance will be used for package move-
ment. Monitoring of packages will be conducted by a guard dispatched
to the station for this purpose.
S CCIV units will be used to monitor all activities.in the
material access area. It is assumed that a total of 34 TV units
will be included in the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility as follows:
Area No. of TV Units
UF6 Conversion Area 2
Blending and Pelleting Area 3
Rod Loading and Assembly Area 3
Rod Inspection Area 2
Assembly Shipping Area
Assembly Inspection Areas 2
Miscellaneous Chemical Storage Area
Hardware and Components Storage Areas 2
Empty Drums and Equipment Storage Area 1
Plutonium Storage Vault
UF6 Storage Area
Fuel Assembly Storage
Fuel Assembly Manufacturing 2
QC Area
Health Physics Area
Metallurgical Laboratories
Spectroscopy Laboratories 2
Chemistry Laboratories
Radiochemical Laboratories
Scrap Recovery Area 3
Filter Rooms 2
Total 34
3.2.4 Control Systems
There are two central control stations in the plant--one in a
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30 ft. x 30 ft. annex to the main guard house and the other within
the material access area. Each of these control stations contain a
Honeywell Alpha-3000 unit which has a capability for automatic logging
of all alarms in the entire facility; the control stations also contain
TV monitors for all CCTV units and have telephone communication and
transceiver communication with local law enforcement authorities, as
well as walkie-talkie communications with all members of the guard
force on the site at any given time. Both of these control stations
are hardened facilities with limited and controlled access only by
* specifically authorized persons.
3.2.5 Security Force
The security force for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility con-
sists of a total of 74 people which includes 1 shift supervisor, 2
`central control room guards, 2 auxiliary control room guards, 2
main gate guards, and 6 patrol and escort guards--all on duty on
each 4 shifts (assuming a 7 day/week, 24 hour/day operation).
A fifth shift of these personnel has also been provided for, for
use in event of sickness, vacation, holidays, shift-breaking, etc.
In addition, there is a chief of security, an instrument engineer
and an instrument technician, 3 secretaries and 3 clerks on duty
during the day shift.
All guards are equipped with .38 caliber pistols and automatic
rifles. In addition to this armament the main guard house is also
equipped with automatic shotguns, tear gas guns, bullet proof vests,
riot helmets and tear gas masks, for use in emergency conditions.
A support force of other employees located within the protected
area, amounting to ten men per shift, is maintained in the event of
an emergency so that a minimum of 23 armed men would be available
to meet an attempted penetration of the protected area. This support
force will be given an initial 30-day intensive training course in
the plant security system and objectives, the use of firearms, the
use of tear gas, organization and direction of support activities,
* tactics to be used in event of emergency situations, and local en-
forcement support arrangements. They will be given a quarterly one-
day refresher training course. It is assumed that this support
force would receive supplemental pay for standby services and would
be primarily used to relieve the regular guards from their regular
duty stations to. resist the attack force. *
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3-9
3.2.6 General
All employees of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, including
personnel working outside the protected area in the administrative
offices and receiving/shipping warehouses, will be Q-cleared. It
is estimated that about a 15% turnover in personnel will be ex-
perienced in connection with the operation of the facility. All
employees will be subject to search upon each entry or departure
from the protected area and the material access area.
All employees of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility will be
given psychological profile tests on an annual basis.
Emergency power, either from powef~ packs within individual
pieces of security equipment or from a 100 kw diesel generator,
will be available in the event of failure of normal electrical
supplies such that the entire security system could function with-
out loss of efficiency.
A quarterly audit of the physical security system of the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility will be conducted by an outside consulting
organization experienced in the field.
A program will be established for coordination of local law
enforcement support which will include:
(1) Conducting monthly meetings with local law enforcement
authorities to discuss the tactics to be used in connec-
tion with the support activities.
(2) Establishing a single coordinator at each local law en-
forcement center for communicating additional information
relative to the physical security of the MOX Fuel Fabri-
cation Facility.
(3) Furnishing special equipment to local law enforcement
facilities as required to upgrade their support effective-
ness when such equipment is not otherwise normally avail-
able.
The physical security system of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facil-
ity otherwise meets all requirements of 1OCFR73, as such exists
today, with respect to training, records, reports, testing and
maintenance of security equipment, and security of SNM storage
vaults and areas.
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3-10
3.3 Description of the Nuclear Material Control System for the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility
The control and accounting for nuclear materials at the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility is accomplished by several methods including:
(1) Item Control - Control of discrete items the integrity of
whose packaging can be maintained and can be visually verified;
the SNM content is not redetermined.
(2) Measurement - Determination of weight, concentration, isotopic
assay, number of pieces, density or other chemical or physical
characteristic to assign the measured value of SNM therein.
(3) Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) - Use of methods by which the
fissile content can be determined without destruction of the
material or any sample thereof.
(4) Surveillance - Performance of all operations and transfers by
at least two authorized individuals working together. No
transfer of material can be made by a single individual.
3.3.1 Organization
The accountability organization comprises a professional,
technician, and clerical staff which is independent of management
control by the production organization. This staff is experienced
in measurement (both destructive and non-destructive assay) and
control of SNM. A variety ofprofessional skills are included such
as chemists, physicists, statisticians, accountants, computer pro-
grammers, analytical technicians, and instrumental specialists.
Background and training in uranium and plutonium handling is manda-
tory for employment. All members of the staff are Q-cleared.
3.3.2 Item Control and Material Balance Areas
The facility comprises Item Control Areas (ICA) and Material
Balance Areas (MBA). The MOX~Fuel Fabrication Facility contains
three ICA's as follows:
ICA-l UF6 Storage
ICA-2 Plutonium Storage Vault
ICA-3 Fuel Rod Inspeátion and Bundle Assembly
In all of these ICA's, the SNM is contained in discrete packages for
each of which the amount of SNM has been previously determined and
certified. The individual package is either welded (such as fuel rods)
71-074 0 - 76 - 24
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3-11
or otherwise sealed with an approved security, tamper-indicating
seal. If the seal has been tampered with or otherwise damaged,
a redetermination of the contained SNM is made within a prescribed
period.
MBA's are those where some of the SNM may be contained in
discrete packages but most of the SNM is contained in process
equipment. The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility contains six MBA's
as follows:
MBA-l Conversion of UF~ to U02 powder
MBA-2 Blending of U02 ~nd Pu09 powder, pelleting and sintering
MBA-3 Loading of MOX pellets 1~nto fuel tubes and welding
MBA-4 Scrap recovery and conversion to Pu02, U02/Pu02 or U02
as applicable
MBA-5 Miscellaneous scrap and waste processing
MBA-6 Chemical and physical laboratories
3.3.3 Real-Time Accounting System
A real-time accounting system is used to identify the location
of any item within an ICA and the location of any item or quantity
of SNM within a given MBA. This system utilizes computer terminals
in each ICA and MBA, linked to a central station which in turn is
linked to a time-share computer or a computer at the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility. All lines from the computer terminal to the
central station are enclosed in tamper indicating cables. Access
to the time-share or in-plant computer is restricted to specifically
authorized, Q-cleared individuals, and may be accomplished only
through a terminal located at the plant. All terminals require
positive identification of the operator by means of a magnetic key
card which is issued daily by the security guard. Such magnetic
key cards are never permitted to leave the facility. Identity of
operator and location of source terminal is recorded by the computer
for each input.
This real-time system permits the printout on a daily basis, or
at any time upon demand, of all transactions involved for each MBA
and ICA and for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. The system
accepts input of items by pre-identified cards, direct input of
balances and also of non-destructive assay equipment; these input
data cannot be altered by an individual without the computer system
PAGENO="0371"
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3-12
registering such an event. The system can be called upon at any
time to point out the container identification, quantity of
contained SNM and location of each controlled item, and the
quantity of SNM in process in each MBA so that these inventory
values can be physically verified promptly on a spot check basis.
3.3.4 Materials Measurement and Accountability
The control of nuclear materials in the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility is set forth in Figure 3-3. the facility input is
identified by an 11*11 and the output by~ a "+` in Figure 3-3.
The uranium and plutonium content and the isotopic ratios of
all nuclear materials are identified, measured or otherwise deter-
mined upon entering or leaving the facility and at each receipt,
transfer or identifiable process point during the conversion of UF6
and Pu02 starting materials into the final product of mixed (Pu02/U02)
oxide fuel materials encased in fuel tubes. All material entering
or leaving an ICA must be verified by serial number and piece count;
all material entering or leaving a MBA~must be measured, analyzed,
weighed or otherwise determined to establish the fissile content and
nuclear material composition. These values are immediately entered
into the computer terminal or data register. All containers of
material, the contents of which have not been measured, analyzed or
determined are quarantined until such measurements have been made and
accepted. The material balance comprises the algebraic sum of all of
the transactions within the facility for a given period. Techniques
for which the accuracy and precision are known and are acceptable are
used to determine the composition (elemental and isotopic) of the
starting materials, intermediate and finished products as well as
scrap and waste materials produced by the fabrication process.
Chemical analyses include gravimetric, volumetric and instru-
mental methods for determining the uranium and plutonium content.
Mass spectrometric techniques measure the isotopic ratios of the
* nuclear materials. In addition to these techniques, the total
fissile content (Pu-239, Pu-241, U-235) of materials is determined
PAGENO="0372"
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3-14
using a variety of non-destructive assay devices. These include:
(1) Automated Sample Assay
Pellets or powder samples containing ~0.3 gm fissile
isotope are non-destructively assayed with a precision
of ± 5% relative.
(2) Bulk Fuel and Scrap Assay System
The fissile content of bulk fuel (powder, pellets,
solution) or scrap materials containing nuclear and non-
nuclear materials is measured to a precision of + 0.5%
with a sensitivity of one gram fissile isotope. Con-
tainer sizes can be varied up to five gallons. Another
type of bulk material assay machine which also accepts
containers up to 5 gallons has a sensitivity of 0.05
gram fissile uranium and 0.03 gram fissile plutonium.
These machines are versatile devices to measure speci-
fically fissile scrap materials intermixed with non-
nuclear materials.
(3) Fuel Rod Scanner
The fissile content of completed fuel rods is determined
using an active scanning device; at a speed of one rod
per minute the total fissile content (Pu and U) can be
measured to better than + 1%.
(4) Plutonium Passive Assay System
Storage containers of plutonium nitrate or oxide are
measured with a passive assaysystem. Using calThrated
standards, the sensitivity is about 60 mg Pu-240.
(5) Portable Gamma Scanner
Uranium material dispersed among hydrogenous materials
and even contained in paper or wooden containers is assayed
with the LASL "elephant gun" type of device with the
amount of uranium determined to within + 20%.
All of these instruments are interfaced with data input or
computer terminals to provide a direct readout or data input to the
material balance data bank. Use of these instruments avoids the
long delay usually required between sampling and destructive chemi-
cal or physical analysis as well as minimizes the sampling error
involved in measuring heterogenous materials which have a non-uniform
dispersion of the plutonium.
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3-15
Use of these non-destructive assay devices, the chemical
analytical techniques, and the mass spectrometric system, all with
direct or manual input into the computer system provides a real-
time inventory and up-to-date material balance. Use of serial
numbered and sealed containers, defined ICA's and MBA's, measured
materials on each transfer, and prompt reporting of data coupled
with the electronic data processing permits the material balance
and inventory listings to be audited and verified frequently
without excessive interruption of production activities.
Records, journals, transfers of materials, fissile contents,
location of items, and ICA/MBA inventories are maintained elec-
tronically with individual journals or tabulations as required
printed on an up to date basis. Manually maintained records are
minimized to facilitate fissile control as well as to conserve
personnel resources.
3.4 Estimates of Safeguards Costs
Calculations were made of the costs involved in establishing and
maintaining at a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, the extensive physical
security system described in Section 3.2 and the comprehensive account-
ability system described in Section 3.3 (in 1975 dollars). A sumary
of these calculations are set forth in Exhibit A and Exhibit B.
In making the cost calculations several principles were observed
which indicate the conservative nature of calculations:
(1) The cost of fixed assets required were depreciated over a
period of 10 years on a straight-line basis.
(2) The operator of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility made a 25%
pre-tax return on his investment in fixed assets.
(3) The facility guards received salaries significantly higher than
the current market-- to cover the possibility that these guards
might be members of a Federal guard force.
(4) Many of the costs for individual capital items contain a size-
able contingency over price quotations received from the manu-
facturer.
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3-16
The cost calculations contained in Exhibit A show that the total
annual cost for the extensive physical security system would amount.to
$2.9-million. The cost calculations contained in Exhibit B show that
the total annual cost for the comprehensive accountability system would
amount to $2.2-million. On a combined basis the total cost of the
improved safeguards at theMOX Fuel Fabrication Facility would amount
to $8,520/MT U+Pu in the fabricated fuel--or about 3.4% of the cost of
the fuel fabrication operation at a price of $250/kg U+Pu. This total
cost would amount to $371/kg fissile Pu.
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_____________________________________________________ 4-1
4.0 PROJECTED COST OF SAFEGUARDS IN A REPROCESSING FACILITY
4.1 Description of Model Facility
A model spent fuel Reprocessing Facility was developed which has an
assumed capability of processing 1500 MT U+Pu/year (a capability for recovery
of about 9,450 kg Pu (fissile) annually). This facility would receive spent
fuel and would have a capability for
(1) storage of spent fuel
(2) shearing of spent fuel
(3) dissolution.
(4) separation of U and Pu from fission products
(5) separation of U and Pu and purification of each separated product
(6) conversion of recovered U to UF6
(7) conversion of recovered Pu to Pu02
(8) storage of recovered U and Pu
(9) concentration, solidification and vitrification of high level
radioactive liquid waste
(10) inbitumening of intermediate level radioactive liquid waste
(11) packaging of other wastes.
In addition the facility would have all of the quality assurance, health
physics, analytical laboratory and support services normally attendant
to a completely integrated spent fuel reprocessing operation.
A general layout of the model facility is set forth in Figure 4-1.
It should be pointed out that the layout is not intended to be optimum
for operating purposes, but rather is intended to identify the numbers
and types of process areas and access points which could be expected to
be included in such facility--as well as to define the overall envelope
of the facility, particularly that part of the plant involved in 3he pro-
cessing and handling of plutonium (and uranium). Site layout is shown in
Figure 4-2.
4.2 Description of the Physical Security System
4.2.1 Protected Area Perimeter Barriers (See Figure 4-2)
The Reprocessing Facility is protected by a physical barrier
consisting of three fences. The inner perimeter fence (A) consists
of an 8 ft. high cyclone fence topped with 3 strands of barbed wire.
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The outer perimeter fence (B) is located 20 ft. outside of the inner
perimeter fence and is similarly constructed. Concertina-type barbed
wire (C) is placed in the annulus between these two fences. A third
fence (0) is located 30 ft. outside of the outer perimeter fence and
consists of a 4 ft. high cyclone fence.
Three intrusion detection systems were used in connection with
the fence system:
(1) An infra-red intrusion detection system (E) is located 10
ft. inside the inner perimeter fence, in the isolation
area between that fence and the facility itself. A total
of 12 separate and overlapping circuits of infra-red units
is used, which provide total perimeter coverage except
for the main gate area, the rail/truck gate area and their
respective guard houses.
(2) A fence motion detection system is located on the outer
perimeter fence. A total of 138 separate sensors is
included in this perimeter alarm system.
(3) A microwave intrusion detection system (G) is located 15 ft.
outside the outer perimeter fence. A total of 12 separate
and overlapping circuits is used which provide total peri-
meter coverage except for the main gate area, the rail/truck
gate area and their respective guard houses.
There are three gates located in each of the perimeter fences
such that they form an isolation lock between the fences. The main
gate and the rail/truck gate (H) are ?0 ft. wide and each consists
of two remotely operated gates which can be opened and closed from
the respective guard house and which will normally be set for one
gate to lock out while the other is in the open position--although
provisions would be made for bypassing this lock out in the event a
longer truck or rail car had to enter the premises. The space be-
tween the gates contains a steel barrier (I) which is normally positioned
in the ground but which can be lifted up by two hydraulic pistons to
block entry through the gates, in the event that an attempt is made by
a heavy vehicle to crash through the gates. The gate in the opposite
end of the protected area (F) is 6 ft. wide and is for personnel exit
only in the event of an emergency, is equipped with a remotely operated
lock system and intrusion alarms, and is viewed at all times by CCIV.
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4-5
The space between the two gates contains steel posts imbedded in
concrete to prevent the passage of vehicles.
A series of 60 two-fixture light poles (K), 30 ft. high, are
located inside of the inner perimeter fence, which provide illumina-
tion of the isolation zone as well as the fence system to a level of
not less than 0.25 foot candles.
CCTV units are located on each of the corner lamp posts and on
the guard houses, directed down the inside of the inner perimeter
fence line. CCTV units are also located on the rear of the facility
viewing the emergency exit gate and on the guard houses viewing the
main gate and the rail/truck gate.
For the prevention of an unauthorized helicopter landing inside
`the protected area, a 150 ft. steel tower is located at the center
of the protected area of the Reprocessing Facility with 1/4 diameter
steel cables strung from the top of the tower to the lamp posts in-
side the inner perimeter fence with connecting cables in such a con-
figuration that there is no access hole in the cable system more
than 40 ft. in diameter.
4.2.2 Access Control
All personnel and vehicle access (except under emergency con-
ditions) is through the main gate and the rail/truck gate.
Entering personnel sign in at the respective guard house assigned
to them and exchange a photo-identification card for a photo-identifi-
cation badge. They surrender any packages to the guard who passes
them through an X-ray unit. In the event there is an object which
is opaque to X-ray in the package, the package is opened and searched.
In addition, the package is sniffed with an explosive detector. En-
tering personnel then pass through a metal detector and an explosive
detector prior to being admitted to the protected area. Exiting per-
sonnel surrender packages to the guard who passes them through an X-ray
unit and a SNM detector. Exiting personnel then pass through both a
SNM and metal detector and exchange their photo-identification badge
for their photo-identification card, sign out and are permitted to
leave the premises. CCTV units are located in the guard houses
PAGENO="0381"
377
4-6
to view these inspection activities.
Personnel access is limited only to employees and visitors
with a specific need and a specific authorization to be inside the
protected area. In addition the administration building is located
outside of the protected area and houses offices of persons who
have no need to go into the protected area, or only an occasional
need therefor, in order to reduce the numbers of individuals who
have access to the protected area.
No vehicles are permitted in the protected area except the
special transfer vehicles which are used to move materials from
the receiving/shipping warehouse outside the perimeter fence into
the protected area, the spent fuel shipping cask conveyances and
the armored carriers picking up shipments of plutonium, and the
patrol vehicles. Loading and unloading of vehicles for shipments of
SNM is conducted under the direct surveillance of an armed guard and
a CCTV unit.
4.2.3 Material Access Area Protectiàn
It is assumed that the entire portion of the Reprocessing
Facility which is involved with the handling or processing of SNM
will be located in a single structure containing a minimum of door-
ways and penetrations. It is assumed that all doorways will be
equipped with intrusion alarms and all penetrations will be either
gridded with metal crossbars or will be sealed.
Access control to the material access area will be through
three locations. Each location will consist of a room equipped with
a CCTV unit and two controlled doors. A person entering the material
access area will pass through an explosive detector, a metal detector
and a SNM detector. In exiting, the employee will pass through the
SNM detector, metal detector and explosive detector prior to exiting
into the protected area.
All three of these access stations will be equipped with an
X-ray unit, a SNM detector, and an explosive detector for use in
moni~oring packages specifically authorized to enter or leave the
material access area. Monitoring of packages will be conducted by
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4-7
the guard on duty at each station supervising all access activities.
CCTV units will be used to monitor all activities in the
material access area. It is assumed that a total of 40 TV units
will be included in the Reprocessing Facility as follows:
Area No. of TV Units
Fuel Receiving and Storage Area 2
Uranium Product Handling and Storage Area 2
Plutonium Purification and In-Process
Storage Areas 4
Plutonium Conversion, Packaging and
Storage Areas 4
Plutonium Analysis Laboratory 2
Analytical Laboratory
Spectroscopy Laboratory
Analytical Aisle 2
Scrap Loadout Area
Operating and Viewing Aisles 6
Health Physics Laboratories 2
Physics Laboratory
Emergency Utility Services 2
Waste Solidification Facilities 4
Other Selected Locations
Total 40
4.2.4 Security Alarm Control Systems
There are two central security alarm control stations in the
plant--one in a 30 ft. x 30 ft. annex to the main guard house and
the other within the material access area. Each of these control
stations contains a Honeywell Alpha-3000 unit which has a capability
for automatic logging of all alarms in the entire facility; the
control station also contains TV monitors for all CCIV units and
has telephone coninunication and transceiver coninunication with local
law enforcement authorities, as well as walkie-talkie communications
with all members of the guard force on the site at any given time.
Both of these control stations are hardened facilities with limited
and controlled access only by specifically authorized persons.
4.2.5 Security Force
The security force for the Reprocessing Facility consists of a
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4-8
total of 97 people which includes 1 shift supervisor, 2 central
control room guards, 2 auxiliary control room guards, 2 main gate
guards, 1 rail/truck gate guard ,3 material access area guards and
6 patrol and escort guards-- all on duty on each of 4 shifts (assuming
a 7 day/week, 24 hour/day operation). A fifth shift of these per-
sonnel has also been provided for use in the event of sickeness,
vacation, holidays, shift-breaking, etc. In addition, there is a
chief of security, and instrument engineer and two instrument techni-
cians, 4 secretaries and 4 clerks on duty during the day shift.
All guards are equipped with .38 caliber pistols and automatic
rifles. In addition to this armament the main guard house is also
equipped with automatic shotguns,tear gas guns, bullet proof vests,
riot helmets and tear gas masks, for use in emergency conditions.
A support force of other employees located within the protected
area, amounting to ten men per shift, is maintained in the event of
an emergency so that a minimum of 27 armed men would be available
to meet an attempted pentration of the protected area. This support
force will be given an initial 30-day intensive training course in
the plant security system and objectives, the use of firearms, the
use of tear gas, organization and direction of support activities,
tactics to be used in event of emergency situations, and local en-
forcement support arrangements. They will be given a quarterly one- -
day refresher training course. It is assumed that this support
force would receive supplemental pay for standby services and would
be primarily used to relieve the regular guards from their regular
duty stations to resist the attack forces.
4.2.6 General
All employees of the Reprocessing Facility, including personnel
working outside the protected area in the administrative offices
and receiving/shipping warehouse, will be Q-cleared. It is esti-
mated that about a 15% turnover in personnel will be experienced in
connection with the operation of the facility. All employees will
be subject to search upon each entry or departure from the protected
area and the material access area.
All employees of the Reprocessing Facility will be given psy-
chological profile tests on an annual basis.
Emergency power, either from power packs within individual
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4-9
pieces of security equipment or from two-lOO kw diesel generators,
will be available in the event of failure of normal electrical
supplies such that the entire security system could function with-
out loss of efficiency.
A quarterly audit of the physical security system of the Re-
processing Facility will be conducted by an outside consulting
organization experienced in the field.
A program will be established for coordination of local law
enforcement support which will include:
(1) Conducting monthly meetings with local law enforcement
authorities to discuss the tactics to be used in connec-
tion with the support activities.
(2) Establishing a single coordinator at each local law en-
forcement center for communicating additional information
relative to the physical security of the Reprocessing
Facility.
(3) Furnishing special equipment to local law enforcement
facilities as required to upgrade their support effective-
ness when such equipment is not otherwise normally avail-
able.
The physical security system of the Reprocessing Facility
otherwise meets all requirements of 1OCFR73, as such exists today,
with respect to training, records, reports, testing and maintenance
of security equipment, and security of SNM storage vaults and areas.
4.3 Description of the Nuclear Material Control System for the
~processing Facility
The control and accounting for nuclear materials at the Reproces-
sing Facility is accomplished by several methods including:
(1) Item Control - Control of discrete items the integrity of whose
packaging can be maintained and can be visually verified; the SNM
content is not redetermined unless there is evidence of tampering.
(2) Measurement - Determination of weight, concentration, isotopic
assay, number of pieces, density or other chemical or physical
characteristic to assign the measured value of SNM therein.
(3) Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) - Use of methods by which the
fissile content can be determined without destruction of the
material, package or any sample thereof.
(4) Surveillance - Performance of all operations and transfers by
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4-10
at least two authorized individuals working together. No
transfer of material can be made by a single individual.
4.3.1 Organization
The accountability organization comprises a professional,
technician, and clerical staff which~is independent of management
control by the production organization. This staff is experienced
in measurement (both destructive and non-destructive assay) and
control of SNM. A variety of professional skills are included such
as chemists, physicists, statisticians, accountants, computer pro-
grammers, analytical technicians, and instrumental specialists.
Background and training in uranium and plutonium handling and remote
processing of highly radio-active materials is mandatory for employ-
ment. All personnel are Q-cleared.
4.3.2 Item Control and Material Balance Areas
The facility comprises Item Control Areas (ICA) and Material
Balance Areas (MBA). The Reprocessing Facility contains three
ICA's as follows:
ICA-l Spent Fuel Receiving and~ Storage
ICA-2 Plutonium Storage Vault
ICA-3 UF6 Storage
In all of these ICA's, the SNM is contained either in spent fuel
assemblies or in discrete packages for which the amount of SNM has
been previously determined and certified. The spent fuel assemblies
are identified by a unique serial number. Because of the high radia-
tion level, measurements of the fissile content are not made but
rather the calculated fissile content~is used for inventory purposes.
The individual packages of purified plutonium materials are sealed with
approved security, tamper-indicating seals. If any seal has been
tampered with or otherwise damaged, are-determination of the con-
tained SNM must be made within a prescribed period.
MBA's are those areas in which SlIM may not be contained in
discrete packages; generally in the MBA the nuclear materials are
being processed whereby the physical ~nd/or chemical forms are being
changed.
71-074 0 - 76 - 25
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4-il
4.3.3 Real-Time Accounting System
A real-time accounting system is used to identify the location
of any item within an ICA and the location of any item or quantity
of SNM within a given MBA. This system utilizes computer terminals
in each ICA and MBA, linked to a central station which in turn is
linked to a time-share computer or a computer at the Reprocessing
Facility. All lines from the computer terminal to the central sta-
tion are enclosed in tamper indicating cables. Access to the time-
share or in-plant computer is restricted to specifically authorized,
Q-cleared individuals and may be accomplished only through a terminal
located at the plant. All terminals require positive identification
of the operator by means of a magnetic key card which is issued
daily by the security guard. Such magnetic key cards are never per-
mitted to leave the facility. Identity of operator and location of
source terminal is recorded by the computer for each input.
This real-time system permits the printout on a daily basis,
or at any time upon demand, of all transactions involved for each MBA
and ICA and for the Reprocessing Facility. The system accepts input
of items by pre-identified cards, direct input of weights from balances
or scales, and also of calculated quantities from non-destructive
assay equipment; these input data cannot be altered by an individual
without the computer system registering such an event. The system
can be called upon at any time to point out the container identification,
quantity of contained SNM and location for each controlled item, and
the quantity of SNM in process in each MBA so that these inventory
values can be physically verified promptly on a spot check basis.
4.3.4 Materials Measurement and Accountability
The spent fuel assemblies are received with the values of
contained uranium and plutonium assigned by the reactor operators;
the measured values of the contained materials are obtained after
the assemblies are chopped into short pieces and the nuclear fuel
is dissolved. A series of chemical separations carried out behind
thick shielding walls separates the dissolved nuclear materials into
the purified uranium and plutonium products. The final products of
these separations are UF6 in large shipping cylinders and Pu02
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4-12
powder in 5-10 kg lots in cans or other containers. Wastes (spent
fuel hulls, equipment, or contaminated materials) are measured and
disposed of in an approved repository.
Control of the nuclear material ~ through a coordinated pro-
gram which involves remote instrumentation, use of calibrated
equipment, chemical analyses, and non-destructive methods of assay
with the operations performed by highly trained personnel.
The control of nuclear materials in the Reprocessing Facility
is set forth in Figure 4-3; the asterisk (*) identifies input of
nuclear materials to the facility and the (+) identifies all output
materials. All materials entering or leaving the facility and at
each identifiable receipt, transfer or process point are sampled,
analyzed, weighed, measured or non-destructively assayed to deter-
mine the nuclear material and/or the fissile content thereof.
All material entering or leaving an ICA must be verified by
serial number and piece count; all matérial entering or leaving a
MBA must be measured, analyzed, weighed or otherwise evaluated to
establish the fissile content and nuclear material composition.
These values and information are entered immediately into the com-
puter terminal or data register. All containers of material, the con-
tents of which have not been measured, analyzed, or otherwise evaluated,
are quarantined until such determinations have been made and accepted.
These measurement techniques and their accuracies and precisions are
known and acceptable. These determinatjons establish the composition
(elemental and isotopic) of the materials being processed, the inter-
mediate products, and the UF5 and Pu02 products as well as the scrap
and waste materials produced by the reprocessing operations.
Chemical analyses include gravimetric , volumetric and instru-
mental methods for determining the uranium and plutonium content.
Mass spectrometric techniques measure the isotopic ratios of the
nuclear materials. These primary measurements depend also upon the
use of precisely calibrated accountability vessels wherein the
volume can be determined to a precision within ±0.3% relative to
the value measured. Replicative measurements of successive volumes
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ACC~ZJfl1.BILl1Y SYSTIM ~* ~P~CLSSIp~ YACIUTY
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4-14
decreases the overall error by the~factor l/4iiwhere "n' is the
number of measurements. Precision of the weight measurements is
within +0.1% of the scale reading.
In addition to these techniques, the total fissile content
(Pu-239, Pu-241, U-235) of materials is determined using a variety
of non-destructive assay devices. These include:
(a)
Bulk Scran Ascav Svst~m
The uranium enrichment or plutonium content of scrap
materials (spent fuel hulls; process solid wastes)
containing nuclear and non-nuclear materials are measured for
the fissile content to +5% with a sensitivity of one
gram contained fissile isotope. Container sizes can be
varied up to five gallons. This machine is a versatile
device to measure fissile scrap materials intermixed with
non-nuclear materials and is used for assaying spent fuel
hulls and other scrap materials prior to shipment to the
desi gnated repository.
(b) Bulk Fuel Assay System
The fissile content of Pu02 product containers is measured
using a bulk fuel assay machine. The sensitivity is 0.05
gm fissile uranium and 0.03 gm fissile Pu.
(c) Plutonium Passive Assay System
Storage containers of plutonium nitrate or oxide are
measured with a passive assay system. Using calibrated
standards, the typical sensitivity is about 60 mg Pu-240.
This measurement, when compared to the isotopic ratio
obtained mass spectrometrically yields the total fissile
content of the plutonium product containers.
(d) Portable Gamma Scanner
Uranium material dispersed among hydrogenous materials
even in paper or wooden containers is assayed with the
LASL `elephant gun" type of device with the amount of
uranium determined to within +20%.
All of these instruments can be interfaced with computer ter-
minals to provide a direct readout or data input to the material
balance data bank. `Use of these instruments avoids the long delay
usually required between sampling and destructive analysis as well
as minimizes the sampling error involved in heterogenous materials
having non-uniform dispersion.
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4-15
Use of these non-destructive assay devices, the chemical
analytical techniques, and the mass spectrometric system, all with
direct or manual input into the computer system provides a real-
time inventory and an up-to-date material balance. Use of serial
numbered and sealed sample and product containers, defined ICAs
and MBA's, measured materials on each transfer, and prompt reporting
of data coupled with the electronic data processing permits the
material balance and inventory listings to be audited and verified
frequently without the extensive interruption of production
activities.
Records, journals, transfers of materials, fissile contents,
location of item, and ICA/MBA inventories are maintained electroni-
cally with individual journals or tabulations as required printed
on an up-to-date basis. Manually maintained records are minimized
to facilitate fissile control as well as to conserve personnel
resources.
4.4 Estimates of Safeguards Costs
Calculations were made of the costs involved in establishing and
maintaining at a Reprocessing Facility, the extensive physical security
system described in Section 4.2 and the comprehensive accountability
system described in Section 4.3 (in 1975 dollars). A summary of these
calculations are set forth in Exhibit C and Exhibit 0.
In making the cost calculations several principles were observed
which indicate the conservative nature of the calculations:
(1) The cost of fixed assets required were depreciated over a
period of 10 years on a straight-line basis.
(2) The operator of the Reprocessing Facility made a 25% pre-tax
return on his investment in fixed assets.
(3) The facility guards received salaries significantly higher than
the current market--to cover the possibility that these guards
might be members of a Federal guard force.
(4) Many of the costs for individual capital items contain a size-
able contingency over price quotations received from the manu-
facturer.
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4-16
The cost calculations contained in Exhibit C show that.the total
annual cost for the extensive physical security system would amount
to $4.2-million.. The cost calculations contained in Exhibit D show
that the total annual cost for the comprehensive accountability
system would amount to $2.7-million. On a combined basis the total
cost of the improved safeguards at the Reprocessing Facility would
amount to $4,578/MT U+Pu in the spent fuel--or about 3.1% of the
cost of the spent fuel reprocessing and waste management operation
based on $150,000/MT U+Pu for such operations. This total cost
would amount to $727/kg fissile Pu.
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5-1
5.0 PROJECTED COST OF SAFEGUARDS DURING TRANSPORTATION OF PLUTONIUM
5.1 Description of Model Transportation System
A model fuel transportation system for the safeguarding of
plutonium shipments was developed which contained the following
elements:
(1) A national radio network system would be established for
providing two way communication with all vehicles trans-
porting SNM at any time and any place in the United States.
(2) A recovery force would be established for the purposes of
immediately responding to any attempted theft of plutonium
during shipment.
(3) A comand center would be established at one of the radio
network system stations which would exercise control over
both the radio network and the recovery force and would be
responsible for coordinating support from the military,
the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.
(4) A single type of container would be used for the shipment
of recovered PuO2 from the Reprocessing Facility to the
MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility.
(5) A single type of container would be used for the shipment
of MOX fuel assemblies from the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility to the nuclear power plant.
(6) Special trucks specifically designed for the shipment of
PuO~ and for the shipment of MOX fuel assemblies, would be
dedicated only for use in such shipments.
(7) All shipments would be accompanied by armed guards in two
escort vehicles.
5.2 Command Center
A command center would be established at the location of one of the
stations in the national radio network system and would exercise control
over both the radio network described in Section 5.3.and the recovery force
described in Section 5.4, and would be responsible for coordinating
support from the military, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies
in the event of a theft or attempted theft of plutonium. This command
center would probably be comprised of Federal employees in order to
facilitate authoritative coordination with such law enforcement authori-
ties.
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5-2
A total of three people would be on duty on a 24 hour/day, 7 day/
week basis. A superintendent would be on duty during the day shift
and would be subject to call-in at any time in the event of an emer-
gency. In addition, a separate shift of three men would also be
available for use in the event of sickness, vacations, holidays,
shift breaking, etc. A total of l6~persons would be involved in the
coniiiand center--in addition to those personnel operating the radio
equipment located at the center and as otherwise included in Section
5.3.
The Federal agency responsible for the operation of the command
center would be responsible for consummating agreements with local and
state police, the National Guard and Federal armed forces for pr~ovision
of reinforcements in the event of attempted theft or diversion~ Such
agreements may involve state governors in the case of state police and
the National Guard, and the President or the Attorney General in the
case of Federal armed forces.
5.3 Description of National Radio Network System
A national radio network system would be set up which would
consist of five separate radio statIons each equipped with a 10,000
watt transmitter. Broadcasts would~be on an HF band with dedicated
channels set aside for this specific purpose. A small computer
would be located at the central station. Each station would have two
men on duty on a 24 hour/day, 7 day/week basis with an additional
shift of two men at each location for use in event of sickness,
vacations, holidays, shift-breaking, etc. A total of 50 persons would
be involved in the radio network system.
Each station would be equipped with a 10,000 watt transmitter, a
receiver and an antenna set. It would be located in a 4,000 sq. ft.
building on a 10 acre plot of ground. The facility would be a
hardened facility with access limited only to specifically authorized
individuals.
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5-3
5.4 Recovery Force
A recovery force comprising 82 men divided between two centralized
locations in the United States would constitute the special recovery
force to be used for the investigation of any attempted thefts and for
the recovery of stolen material. This recovery force would also provide
field coordination of the recovery and investigating activities with all
other law enforcement authorities that might be brought bear in the event
of such action. The purpose of the recovery force is to have personnel
in reserve at all times who are dedicated solely to the prospect of safe-
guarding nuclear material, and who are specifically trained in recovery
strategies and techniques.
The recovery force would be located at an airport. This recovery
force would have the capability to reach any location within its zone
of control within no longer than six hours from notification of a theft
or attempted theft. A total of eight men would be on duty at each of
the two stations on a 24 hour/day, 7 day basis with an additional shift
of eight men available at each location for use in event of sickness,
vacations, holidays, shift-breaking, etc. Duty personnel would be
available for imediate dispatch to a needed area with off-duty personnel
being suninoned shortly thereafter.
The support force would be equipped with .38 caliber pistols, auto-
matic rifles, bullet proof vests, riot helmets, tear gas masks, walkie-
talkies, and signal detection equipment and SNM detection equipment to
assist in the location of any stolen material.
5.5 Transport Mode for Pu09 and for MOX Assemblies
The vehicles used for transporting Pu02 product from the reprocessing
facility to the MDX Fuel Fabrication Facility and for transporting the
new MOX fuel assemblies from the MOX facility to the reactor site satisfy
the regulatory requirements set forth in the Commission's regulations
1OCFR73 and the associated regulatory guides.
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.5-4
The basic design criteria apply to both the shipment of Pu02
containers and the completed MOX assemblies; differences between the
two types of vehicles are in the type of load carried and the loading
arrangements. These basic design criteria are as follows:
Type of Vehicle
Diesel tractor with dual drive wheels
Trailer (8 ft. x 9 ft. x 40 ft.) with tandem dual axles
Maximum loaded weight for tractor and trailer (73,280 lb.)
Armored to Level 4 intrusion resistance
Cargo Compartment Design
No doors at trailer bed level
Top loading only with armored top moved into position
by crane
Wall thickness about 3 inches
Armor Requirements
Trailer
Laminated sandwich of glass, plastic or ceramic backed
with armor plate. Total weight of armor equivalent to 1/4"
steel on all six sides of 8 x 9 x 40 ft. trailer body or about
31 cu. ft. of steel which weighs about 16,000 lbs. This armor
is rated to Level 4 intrusion resistance.
Total trailer weight including armor is about 26,000 lbs.
Tractor
Armor to Level 4 added to tractor cab yields a total
weight of about 22,000 lbs.~
Summary of Armored Vehicle Weight
Trailer (lb) 26,000
Tractor (lb) 22,000
TOTAL (lb) 48,000
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5..5
Shipping Weight Capacity of Tractors and Trailers with Armor
Maximum Legal Road Weight (ib) 73,280
Armored Tractor and Trailer (lb) 48,000
Gross Cargo Weight Permitted (lb) 24,280
Vehicles which have generally satisfied these criteria have been
designed. Modifications of comerci ally-available vehicles by addition
of armor plate, immobilizing devices, and communications equipment are
presently being performed commercially and vehicles armored to this
extent (Level 4 which is the highest protection currently in use for
armored commercial vehicles) are currently in use by commercial organi-
zations and governmental agencies.
For purposes of estimating the size, weight, decay heat removal,
and economics associated with an acceptable Pu02 shipping container,
the reference design utilized for the Pu02 container for the Liquid
Metal Fast Breeder Reactor was used. It was recognized that changes
in this design may be required to meet future regulatory requirements;
however, there is no reason to believe that an adequate Pu02 container
cannot be constructed and licensed using the current state-of-the-art
technology.
The Pu02 container is essentially a 55-gallon drum with two
containment barriers by which the package could survive categories
1 through 4 accidents. A non-flammable, hydrogenous insulation
material would provide neutron shielding and fire protection. A thin
sheet of shielding material would provide shielding for gamma radiation.
The total weight of the shielded container and the contained 4.5 kg
Pu as Pu02 is estimated to be about 400 lbs.
The basic concept for this MOX cargo trailer is a "top loading only"
design; there are no cargo doors opening directly at the trailer bed
level. All cargo is loaded with a crane through the open trailer top.
A total of 39 Pu02 shipping containers is arranged on the trailer
on a single level (no double stacking). Thirteen rows of three containers
per row are used for a gross weight of 15,600 lbs. The group of containers
is further immobilized by enclosing each group of three shipping containers
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5-6
within a steel box which is fitted with a bolted top, the bolts of
which require a specially designed wrench for removal. This vault*
type of containment adds an additional 6,500 lbs. for the thirteen
1/8" thick steel boxes--for a total cargo loading including PuO,
containers of about 22,000 lbs,; the gross cargo load limit is 24,000
lbs. This design would be subsequently refined to provide sufficient
flexibility and prevent overloading.~
To load the Pu02 containers, each group of three Pu02 shipping
containers is placed inside the vault-type container and the top of
the vault is bolted on with special fasteners. The vault is loaded
by the crane into the armored trailer and retaining devices on the
vault are engaged thereby locking the vault into the trailer bed.
Each vault is loaded in turn until the thirteen vaults are loaded
and retained. The armored top of the trailer is added by means of
the crane and is fastened with sealed bolts around the top perimeter
of the cargo trailer.
The MOX fuel shipping container is a cylindrical steel, clamshell
arrangement wherein two MOX fuel PWRissemblies can be fastened, closed
and shipped in accordance with the regulatory requirements. A typical
container for pressurized water reactors weighs 7,300 lbs. loaded with
a tare (empty) weight of 4,200 lbs. The shipping container for boiling
water reactor fuel would be similar in design but would accomodate
four assemblies.
Three such containers are loaded by means of a crane through the
opened top of the armored trailer and fastened to the bed of the truck
with restraining devices (bolts, chains or welded rods) to prevent un-
authorized movement or removal of the assemblies. Upon completion of
loading and tie-down operations, the crane lowers the armored top onto
the armored trailer; bolts are fastened around the perimeter of the top
of the trailer and seals are attached~ thereto.
The trailer is hooked to the tractor using a semi-permanent link-
age such that the tractor cannot be removed from the trailer without
special tools; these tools do not accompany the vehicle. The landing
*A "box" constructed of steel rods could also be used where heat
dissipation was required.
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5-7
gear is locked in the `up' position preventing the trailer from being
removed and hooked up to another tractor without the use of a crane for
lifting the front of the trailer. Disabling equipment for the vehicle
will be includedas standard equipment.
Cormiunication equipment (short wave and CB radio) is provided in
the tractor for communication between the tractor and the escort cars;
the tractor also has radio equipment capable of direct contact with any
of the five permanent stations. (See Section 5.3).
The two tractor operators are armed with pistols and protected with
bullet proof vests and gas masks; the guards in the escort vehicles are
armed with pistols, automatic rifles, automatic shotguns, tear gas
grenades, and protected with bullet proof vests and gas masks.
Although the current designs for Pu02 shipping containers do not
incorporate air conditioning or cooling of packages, such additional
cooling may be desirable though not mandatory. Recognizing the present
regulatory position that such cooling may not be approved for maintain-
ing the primary containment, nevertheless, for operational purposes,
the cargo area is air conditioned with a dual system for redundancy.
5.6 Estimates of Safeguards Costs
Calculations were made of the costs involved in establishing and
maintaining the extensive safeguards system for the transportation of Pu as
discussed in Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 hereof (in 1975 dollars). A
summary of these calculations is set forth in Exhibits E, F, G and H.
The cost calculations in Exhibit E show that the annual cost of a
command center would amount to $1.1-million. The cost calculations in
Exhibit F show that the annual cost of operating a national radio network
system would amount to $4.3-million. The cost calculations in Exhibit G
show that the annual cost of maintaining a recovery force would amount to
~5.6-mi11ion. The cost calculations in Exhibit H show that the annual cost
of transporting plutonium under stringent safeguards from the Reprocessing
Facility to the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and from the MOX Fuel Fabri-
cation Facility to the Reactor would amount to $181/kg Pu (fissile)
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6-1
6.0 REGULATORY REVIEW AND INSPECTION
The level of physical protection required by the conceptual safeguards
plan set forth herein and the improved nuclear materialsaccountability
system described would entail substantial review and inspection effort by
NRC. This regulatory effort has been assumed for the purposes of this
study to include the following principal activities:
(1) The initial regulatory reviews and approvals of the physical
security program and of the nuclear material control program, and
(2) The routine periodic reviews and inspections of these programs at
the respective facilities.
Costs were estimated for each of these activities; a summary of the
calculations is presented in Exhibit I. For purposes of assigning unit
costs attributable to these regulatory functions, the costs estimated for
the initial review and approval of the programs (for both the MDX Fuel
Fabrication Facility and the Reprocessing Facility) were amortized over a
three year period. The calculations presented in Exhibit I show an annual
cost for the periodic reviews and inspections of either type of facility to
be $300,000, and the total cost of the initial reviews and approval of
both programs at either type of facil~ity to be $300,000. Total annual cost
for the regulatory function is, then, $400,000 for either the MDX Fuel
Fabrication Facility or the Reprocessing Facility, with unit costs being
as follows:
MDX Fuel,
Fabrication Facili~y Reprocessing Facility
$/MT U+Pu 667 267
$/kg Pu (fissile) 29 42
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EXHIBIT A
COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM
AT A
MODEL MDX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
PAGENO="0401"
TABLE A-i
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
ANNUAL COST OF PHYSICAL SECURITY
($OOO)
EXPENSES (See Table A-2)
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table A-5)
(10 yr. ,S/L)
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS (25% pre-tax)
AMORTIZATION OF SUPPORT TRAINING (See Table A-6)
(3 yr.,S/L)
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES (3 yr.,S/L)
Production Capacity
Pu Content
Total Wt Pu
Cost/MT U4-Pu
Cost/Kg Pu (fissile)
600 MT U+Pu
3.3% (70% fissile)
13,800 kg. fissile
$4,848
$ 211
397
A-i
$2,166
165
413
55
110
TOTAL $2,909
Cost Per Unit of Production
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A-2
TABLE A-2
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
ANNUAL PHYSICAL SECURITY EXPENSE
($000)
SECURITY FORCE SALARIES, including burden-- $1,356
(See Table A-3)
OVERHEAD ALLOTED TO SECURITY FORCE (25% of 375
General Management Expense)
SUPPORT FORCE EXPENSE (See Table A-4) 131
Q CLEARANCES FOR EMPLOYEES* 50
(424 employees @ 15%/yr.= 64 @ $780)
TELEPHONE/TELEX 2
SUPPLIES 50
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT & COORDINATION 50
AUDIT OF SECURITY SYSTEM (Quarterly) 20
MAINTENANCE 75
UTILITIES 15
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCREENING (Annually) 42
(424 employees @ $100/person) ______
TOTAL $2,166
*Cost of initial clearances - $330,720
(424 employees @ $780)
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ANNUAL
SALARY (II TOTAL i_$1
20,000 20,000
18,000 90,000
15,000 150,000
15,000 150,000
15,000 150,000
15,000 225,000
15,000 225,000
15,000 15,000
12,000 12,000
9,000 27,000
7,000 21,000
$1 ,O85,000
BURDEN(@ 25%) 271,250
TOTAL $1,356,250
399
TABLE A-3
A-3
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
SALARIES OF SECURITY FORCE
NO. __________
CHIEF OF SECURITY 1
SHIFT SUPERVISORS 5
CENTRAL CONTROL GUARDS 10
AUXILIARY CONTROL GUARDS 10
MAIN GATE GUARDS 10
PATROL GUARDS 15
ESCORT GUARDS 15
INSTRUMENT ENGINEER 1
INSTRUMENT TECHNICIAN 1
SECRETARIES
CLERKS ______
7~4
PAGENO="0404"
400
A-4
TABLE A-4
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
ANNUAL COST OF SUPPORT FORCE
SALARY PREMIUM (assume average annual salary $100,000
premium of $2000 for 50 men)
QUARTERLY REFRESHER TRAINING 30,772
MANPOWER (4 days/yr. @ average monthly salary 10,909
or wage of $1200/mo. - 50 men)
BURDEN (@25%) 2,727
OVERHEAD (@100% of manpower and burden) 13,636
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES 1 ,000
PROFESSIONAL FEES 2,500 ________
TOTAL $130,772
PAGENO="0405"
401
PERIMETER PROTECTION
Perimeter Barriers
Outside Fence 2900 ft. @ $4.50/ft. $13,050
Outer Perimeter Fence 2580 ft. @ $12/ft. 30,960
Securing Outer Perimeter Fence Base 10,000
Inner Perimeter Fence 2380 ft. @ $12/ft. 28,560
Concertina Barbed Wire Between 2460 ft.
@ $20/ft. 49,200
Vapor Barrier + Gravel Surface 50' width 25,000
Microwave Intrusion System 80,000
Infra-Red Intrusion System 90,000
Fence Alarm System 25,000
Remote Gates-2O ft. 2 @ $2,500 5,000
Remote Gates- 6 ft. 2 @ $1,500 3,000
Vehicle Barrier 10,000
Outside Lighting (25 poles, 50 light units) 25,000
Gridding of Culverts 25,000
Steel Posts in Emergency Exit 1,000
Anti-Helicopter Cable Tower & Cable System 25,000
T.V. Units 6 @ $2,500 15,000
T.V. Monitors 6 @ $300 1,800
Access Control
Guard House 1600 sq.ft. @ $5O/sq.ft.
Metal Detector (Arbor)
Metal Detector (Portable)
Explosive Detector (Arbor)
Explosive Detector (Portable)
SNM Detector
TABLE A-5
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
CAPITAL COST OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES
A-5
$ 462,570
203,350
80,000
5,000
250
10,000
6,000
13,000
PAGENO="0406"
402
A-6
TABLE A-5 (Continued)
Access Control (Cont.)
X-Ray Unit $ 40,000
Photo-Badge Unit 2,500
Patrol & Response Vehicles 2 @ $6,000 12,000
Special Transfer Vehicles 2 @ $15,000 30,000
T.V. Units 2 @ $2,000 4,000
T.V. Monitors 2 @ $300 600
Physical Barriet~ $ 35,000
Gridding or Sealing of Penetrations 25,000
Intrusion Alarms 10 units @ $1,000 10,000
Access Control 137,100
Metal Detectors (Arbor) 2 @ $5,000 10,000
Metal Detector (Portable) 2 @ $250 500
Explosive Detectors 2 @ $10,000 20,000
Explosive Detector (Portable) 6,000
SNM Detectors 2 @ $13,000 26,000
SNM Detector (Portable) 10,000
X-Ray Unit 40,000
Key-Card ÷ Door Units 2 @ $10,000 20,000
.T.V. Units 2 @ $2,000 4,000
T.V. Monitors 2 @ $300 600
MM Surveillance 78,200
T.V. Units 34 @ $2,000 68,000
T.V. Monitors 34 @ $300 10,200
Control Systems 350,000
Honeywell 3000 Unit 2 @ $125,000 250,000
Space 2-1000 sq.ft. rooms secured
@ $50/sq.ft.
100,000
PAGENO="0407"
403
Pistols + Holsters 68 @ $150 $10,200
Automatic Rifles 30 @ $500 15,000
Automatic Shotguns 6 @ $400 2,400
Tear Gas Guns 6 @ $150 900
Bullet Proof Vests 30 @ $500 15,000
Riot Helmets 30 @ $50 1 ,500
Tear Gas Masks 30 @ $200 6,000
Communications
Walkie Talkies 12 @ $800 9,600
Base Station for Walkie Talkies 4,000
Citizens Band Transceiver~ 2 @ $2,500 5,000
Construction Penalty for Locating Administrative
Offices Outside Perimeter Barrier
Receiving Warehouse Outside Perimeter Barrier
Emergency Power Diesel Generator, Switchgear +
System Installation
Office Equipment
OTHER
TABLE A-S (Continued)
Arms
A-7
$ 51,000
18,600
100,000
55,000
30,000
100,000
10,000
$1,630,820
$1 ,650,000
Installation (Other than that included in individual items)
TOTAL
SAY
PAGENO="0408"
404
A-8
TABLE A-6
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
INITIAL SUPPORT FORCE TRAINING EXPENSES
TRAINING TIME - 1 month
TRAINING COURSE OUTLINE
Plant Security System & Objectives
Use of Firearms
Use of Tear Gas
Tactics
Organization & Direction of Support Activities
Local Law Enforcement Support
NUMBER OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL - 10/Shift, Total of 50
SUMMARY OF INITIAL COSTS
Manpower (assume average monthly salary $ 60,000
or wage is $1200)
Burden (@25% of manpower) 15,000
Overhead (@100% of manpower & burden) 75,000
Materials & Supplies 5,000
Professional Fees 10,000
TOTAL $165,000
PAGENO="0409"
405
EXHIBIT B
COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM
AT A
MODEL MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
PAGENO="0410"
406
TABLE B-i
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
ANNUAL COST OF ACCOUNTABILITY
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table B-2) $1 ,633
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table B-4)
(10 yr.,S/L) 88
AMORTIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT (AND INSTALLATION)
OF COMPUTER SYSTEM (10 yr. ,S/L) 75
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
COMPUTER SYSTEM (25% pre-tax) 407
TOTAL . . . .~$2,2O3
Cost Per Unit of Production
B-i
Production Capacity
Pu Content
Total Wt Pu
Cost/MT U+Pu
Cost/Kg Pu (fissile)
600 MT U+Pu
3.3% (70% fissile)
13,800 kg. fissile
$3,672
$ 160
PAGENO="0411"
407
B-2
TABLE B-2
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
ANNUAL ACCOUNTABILITY EXPENSE
($000)
ACCOUNTABILITY FORCE SALARIES (including burden) $ 831
OVERHEAD ALLOTED TO ACCOUNTABILITY FORCE 375
(25% of General Management Expense)
TELEPHONE/TELEX 5
COMPUTER RENTAL & SERVICES 300
SUPPLIES 60
MAINTENANCE 30
UTILITIES 12
AUDIT OF ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM (Annual) 20
TOTAL.... $1,633
PAGENO="0412"
408
TABLE B-3
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
SALARIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY STAFF
ACCOUNTABILITY & SAFEGUARDS MANAGER 1
ASSISTANT MANAGER 1
STATISTICIAN 1
PROGRAMMER 1
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIANS 2
TECHNICIANS/SCANNER OPERATORS 16
CLERKS 2
SECRETARIES 2
MBA WATCHMEN/CUSTODIANS 24
Subtotal 50
HALF TIME ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIVITY
B-3
FULL TIME ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIVITY
NO. ANNUAL SALARY ($) TOTAL ($)
$25,000 $ 25,000
20,000 20,000
20,000 20,000
12,000 12,000
10,000 20,000
10,000 160,000
7,500 15,000
7,500 15,000
8,000 192,000
$479,000
1 25,000 25,000
1 20,000 20,000
4 18,000 72,000
18,000 18,000
4 12,000 48,000
16 9,000 144,000
4 7,500 30,000
2 7,500 15,000
33 372,000
16.5 186,000
66.5 $665,000
166,250
TOTAL $831,250
LABORATORY MANAGER
ASSISTANT MANAGER
SHIFT SUPERVISORS
MASS SPECTROMETER SUPERVISOR
MASS SPECTROMETER OPERATORS
ANALYSTS
CLERKS
SECRETARIES
Full-Time Subtotal
Half-Time Subtotal
TOTAL
BURDEN (@25%)
PAGENO="0413"
409
TABLE B-4
MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
MASS SPECTROMETER
COULOMETER
AMPEROMETRIC ANALYZER
BALANCE
FURNACE 2 @ $750
UF6 TRANSFER MANIFOLD AND HOOD
SAMPLE CYLINDERS 20 @ $100
Pu SAMPLE PREPARATION HOOD/DRY BOX
PLUTONIUM ACCOUNTABILITY LAB WARE & MISC. EQUIPMENT
BULK DRUM SCANNERS (Barrel & Can)
1 @ $40,000 (40 gallon drum)
1 @ $35,000 (5 gallon can)
BULK POWDER SCANNER 3 @ $37,000
FUEL ROD SCANNER (Fissile Only) 2 @ $100,000
PROPORTIONAL COUNTER
MBA COMPUTER TERMINALS 6 @ $15,000
COMPUTER NETWORK FOR TIME SHARE
OFFICE EQUIPMENT
LABORATORIES 4000 sq. ft. @ $5O~sq.ft.
*Half of cost assigned to accountability
activities. Remaining half assigned to
quality control.
TOTAL COST OF DEVELOPMENT AND INSTALLATION
OF COMPUTER ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM $750,000
B-4
CAPITAL COST OF ACCOUNTABILITY EQUIPMENT
$ 75,000*
2,500*
500*
1 ,OOO~
750*
10,000
2,000
15,000
35,000
75,000
111,000
200,000
3,000
90,000
40,000
15,000
200,000
TOTAL $875,750
PAGENO="0414"
410
EXHIBIT C
COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM
AT A
MODEL REPROCESSING FACILITY
PAGENO="0415"
411
EXPENSES (See Table C-2)
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table C-5)
(10 yr. ,S/L)
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS (25% pre-tax)
AMORTIZATION OF SUPPORT TRAINING (See Table C-6)
(3 yr. ,S/L)
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES (3 yr.,S/L)
Cost Per Unit of Production
Production Capacity
Pu Content
Total Wt Pu
Cost/MT U+Pu
Cost/Kg Pu (fissile)
1500 MT U-I-Pu/yr.
0.9% (70% fissile)
9,450 kg. fissile
$2,788
$ 443
C-l
TABLE C-l
REPROCESSING FACILITY
ANNUAL COST OF PHYSICAL SECURITY
($000)
$3,022
272
680
55
153
TOTAL... $4,182
PAGENO="0416"
412
C-2
TABLE C-2
REPROCESSING FACILITY
ANNUAL PHYSICAL SECURITY EXPENSE
($000)
SECURITY FORCE SALARIES, including burden-- $1,766
(See Table C-3)
OVERHEAD ALLOTED TO SECURITY FORCE (20% of 700
General Management Expense)
SUPPORT FORCE EXPENSE (See Table C-4) 131
Q CLEARANCES FOR EMPLOYEES* 69
(587 employees @ 15%/yr.= 88 @ $780)
TELEPHONE/TELEX 2
SUPPLIES 75
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT & COORDINATION 50
AUDIT OF SECURITY SYSTEM (Quarterly) 20
MAINTENANCE 125
UTILITIES 25
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCREENING (Annually)
(587 employees @ $100/person) 59
TOTAL $3,022
*Cost of initial clearances - $457,860
(587 employees @ $780)
PAGENO="0417"
CHIEF OF SECURITY
SHIFT SUPERVISORS
CENTRAL CONTROL GUARDS
AUXILIARY CONTROL GUARDS
MAIN GATE GUARDS
TRUCK-RAIL GATE GUARDS
MM GUARDS
PATROL GUARDS
ESCORT GUARDS
INSTRUMENT ENGINEER
INSTRUMENT TECHNICIANS
SECRETARIES
CLERKS
TABLE C-3
REPROCESSING FACILITY
SALARIES OF~SECURITY FORCE
NO. __________
5~
10
10
10
5~
15
15
15
2
4
4
97
BURDEN (@25%)
TOTAL
TOTAL ($)
20,000
90,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
75,000
225,000
225 ,000
225 ,000
15,000
24,000
36,000
28,000
$1 ,413,000
353,250
$1 ,766,25O
413
C-3
ANNUAL
SALARY ($)
20,000
18,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
12,000
9,000
7,000
71-074 0 - 76 - 27
PAGENO="0418"
414
C-4
TABLE C-4
REPROCESSING FACILI1I
ANNUAL COST OF SUPPORT FORCE
SALARY PREMIUM (assume average annual salary
premium of $2000 for 50 men)
QUARTERLY REFRESHER TRAINING
MANPOWER (4 days/yr. @ average monthly salary
or wage of $1200/mo. - 50 men)
BURDEN (@25%)
OVERHEAD (@100% of manpower and burden)
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES
PROFESSIONAL FEES
$100,000
30,772
$10,909
2,727
13,636
1 ,000
2,500 ________
TOTAL ~i~Q~ZZL
PAGENO="0419"
415
Microwave Intrusion System
Infra-Red Intrusion System
Fence Alarm System
Remote Gates-20 ft. 4 @ $2,500
Remote Gates- 6 ft. 2 @ $1 ,500
Vehicle Barrier 2 @ $10,000
Outside Lighting (60 poles, 120
Gridding of Culverts
Steel Posts in Emergency Exit
Anti-Helicopter Cable Tower
T.V. Units 9 @ $2,500
T.V. Monitors 9 @ $300
$ 22,500
50,472
20,000
47,448
80,680
50,000
150,000
150,000
50,000
10,000
3,000
20,000
light Units) 60,000
35,000
1,000
100,000
22,500
2,700
160,000
10,000
500
20,000
12,000
26,000
TABLE C-5
REPROCESSING FACILITY
CAPITAL COST OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES
PERIMETER PROTECTION
Perimeter Barriers
Outside Fence 5000 ft. @ $4.50/ft.
Outer Perimeter Fence 4206 ft. @ $12/ft.
Securing Outer Perimeter Fence Base
Inner Perimeter Fence 3954 ft. @ $12/ft.
Concertina Barbed Wire Between 4034 ft.
@ $20/ft.
Vapor Barrier + Gravel Surface 50' width
C-S
$ 875,300
380,900
& Cable System
Access Control
Guard Houses 2-1600 sq.ft. @ $SO/sq.ft.
Metal Detector (Arbor) 2 @ $5000
Metal Detector (Portable) 2 @$250
Explosive Detector (Arbor) 2 @ $10,000
Explosive Detector (Portable)2 @ $6,000
SNM Detector 2 @ $13,000
PAGENO="0420"
416
C-6
TABLE C-5 (Continued)
Access Control (Cont.)
X-Ray Unit 2 @ $40,000 $ 80,000
Photo-Badge Unit 2,500
Patrol & Response Vehicles 3 @ $6,000 18,000
Special Transfer Vehicles 3 .@ $15,000 45,000
T.V. Units 3 @ $2,000 6,000
T.V. Monitors 3 @ $300 900
Physical Barrier $ 70,000
Gridding or Sealing of Penetrations 50,000
Intrusion Alarms 20 units @ $1,000 20,000
Access Control 289,650
Metal Detectors (Arbor) 3 @ $5,000 15,000
Metal Detectors (Portable) 3 @ $250 750
Explosive Detectors 3 @ $10,000 30,000
Explosive Detectors (Portable) 3 @ $6,000 18,000
SNM Detectors 3 @ $13,000 39,000
SNM Detectors (Portable) 3 @ $10,000 30,000
X-Ray Units 3 @ $40,000 120,000
Key-Card + Door Units 3 @ $10,000 30,000
T.V. Units 3 @ $2,000 6,000
T.V. Monitors 3 @ $300 900
MAA Surveillance 92,000
T.V. Units 40 @ $2,000 80,000
T.V. Monitors 40 @ $300 12,000
Control Systems 450,000
Honeywell 3000 Units 2 @ $175,000 350,000
Space 2-1000 sq.ft. rooms secured
@ $50/sq.ft.
100,000
PAGENO="0421"
OTHER
417
TABLE C-5 (Continued)
C-7
Pistols + Holsters 86 @ $150
Automatic Rifles 30 @ $500
Automatic Shotguns 8 @ $400
Tear Gas Guns 8 @ $150
Bullet Proof Vests 30 @ $500
Riot Helmets 30 @ $50
Tear Gas Masks 30 @ $200
Comunications
Walkie Talkies 20 @ $800
Base Station for Walkie Talkies
Citizens Band Transceiver 2@ $2,500
$12,900
15,000
3,200
1 ,200
15,000
1 ,500
6,000
~~~rgency Power Diesel Generator, Switchgear +
system Installation 2 @ $30,000
Installation (Other than that included in
individual items)
Arms
$ 54,800
25,000
150,000
55,000
60,000
16,000
4,000
5,000
Construction Penalty for Locating Administrative
Offices Outside Perimeter Barrier
Receiving Warehouse Outside Perimeter Barrier
Office Equipment
200,000
15,000
TOTAL $2,717,650
SAY $2,720,000
PAGENO="0422"
418
C-8
TABLE C-6
REPROCESSING FACILITY
INITIAL SUPPORT FORCE TRAINING EXPENSES
TRAINING TIME - 1 month
TRAINING COURSE OUTLINE
Plant Security System & Objectives
Use of Firearms
Use of Tear Gas
Tactics
Organization & Direction of Support Activities
Local Law Enforcement Support
NUMBER OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL - 10/Shift, Total of 50
SUMMARY OF INITIAL COSTS
Manpower (assume average monthly
salary or wage is $1200.) $ 60,000
Burden @ 25% of manpower) 15,000
Overhead(@ 100% of manpower & burden) 75,000
Materials & Supplies 5,000
Professional Fees 10,000
TOTAL $165,000
PAGENO="0423"
419
EXHIBIT D
COST CALCULATIONS FOR AN EXTENSIVE ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMS
ATA
MODEL REPROCESSING FACILITY
PAGENO="0424"
420
0-1
TABLE D-l
REPROCESSING FACILITY
ANNUAL COST OF ACCOUNTABILITY
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table D-2) $2,160
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table 0-4)
(10 yr.,S/L) 75
AMORTIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT (AND INSTALLATION)
OF COMPUTER SYSTEM (10 yr. ,S/L) 75
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
COMPUTER SYSTEM (25% pre-tax) 376
TOTAL... .$2,686
Cost Per Unit of Production
Production Capacity : 1500 MT U+Pu
Pu Content : 0.9% (70% fissile)
Total Wt Pu 9,450 kg. fissile
Cost/MT U+Pu : $1,790
Cost/Kg Pu (fissile) : $ 284
PAGENO="0425"
421
0-2
TABLE D-2
REPROCESSING FACILITY
ANNUAL ACCOUNTABILITY EXPENSE
($000)
ACCOUNTABILITY FORCE SALARIES, including $ 909
burden (See Table 0-3)
OVERHEAD ALLOTED TO ACCOUNTABILITY FORCE 700
(20% of General Management Expense)
TELEPHONE/TELEX 6
COMPUTER RENTAL & SERVICES 300
SUPPLIES 100
MAINTENANCE 100
UTILITIES 25
AUDIT OF ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM (Annual) 20
TOTAL.... $2,160
PAGENO="0426"
422
TABLE D-3
REPROCESSING FACILITY
SALARIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY STAFF
FULL TIME ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIVITY
D-3
NO. ANNUAL SALARY ($) TOTAL ($)
LABORATORY MANAGER
ASSISTANT MANAGERS
SHIFT SUPERVISORS
MASS SPECTROMETER SUPERVISOR
MASS SPECTROMETER OPERATORS
ANALYSTS
SAMPLER TECHNICIANS
CLERKS
SECRETARIES
Full-Time Subtotal
Hal f-Time Subtotal
TOTAL
BURDEN (@
25,000
2 20,000
4 18,000
18,000
4 12,000
16 9,000
16 7,000
4 7,500
2 7,500
50
25
72
25%)
25,000
40,000
72,000
18,000
48,000
144,000
112,000
30,000
15,000
504,000
252,000
727,000
181 ,75O
TOTAL.... $908,750
ACCOUNTABILITY & SAFEGUARDS MANAGER
1
$25,000
$ 25,000
ASSISTANT MANAGER
1
20,000
20,000
STATISTICIAN
1
20,000
20,000
PROGRAMMER
1
12,000
12,000
ELECTRONICS SUPERVISOR
1
20,000
20,000
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIANS
2
10,000
20,000
TECHNICIANS/SCANNER OPERATORS
20
10,000
200,000
CLERKS
2
7,500
15,000
SECRETARIES
2
7,500
15,000
MBA WATCHMEN/CUSTODIANS
16
8,000
128,000
47
475,000
Subtotal
HALF TIME ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIVITY
PAGENO="0427"
TABLED-4
REPROCESSING FACILITY
CAPITAL COST OF ACCOUNTABILITY EQUIPMENT
MASS SPECTROMETER
COULOMETER
AMPEROMETRIC ANALYZER
BALANCE
FURNACE 2 @ $750
UF6 SAMPLE TRANSFER MANIFOLD AND HOOD
SAMPLE CYLINDERS 20 @ $100
Pu SAMPLE PREPARATION HOOD/DRY BOX
PLUTONIUM ACCOUNTABILITY LAB WARE & MISC. EQUIPMENT
BULK DRUM SCANNERS (Barrel & Can) FOR SCRAP ASSAY
1 @ $40,000 (40-60 gallon drum)
2 @ $35,000 (5 gallon can)
BULK POWDER SCANNER
Pu PASSIVE ASSAY SYSTEM (Pu STORAGE~ CONTAINERS)
PROPORTIONAL COUNTER
MBA COMPUTER TERMINALS 9 @ $15,000
COMPUTER NETWORK FOR TIME SHARE
OFFICE EQUIPMENT
LABORATORIES 4000 sq.ft. @ $5O/sq.ft. ________
*Half of cost assigned to accountability
activities. Remaining half assigned to
quality control.
TOTAL COST OF DEVELOPMENT AND INSTALLATION
OF COMPUTER ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM $750,000
423
D-4
$ 75,000*
2,500*
500*
1 ,0O0~
750*
10,000
2,000
15,000
35,000
110,000
37,000
35,000
3,000
135,000
75,000
15,000
200,000
TOTAL $751,750
PAGENO="0428"
424
EXHIBIT E
COST CALCULATIONS
FOR
COMMAND CENTER
PAGENO="0429"
425
E-l
TABLE E-l
COMMAND CENTER
ANNUAL COST
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table E-2) $1 ,074
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table E-4)
(10 yr.,S/L) 20
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS (25% pre-tax) 50
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES
(3 yr.,S/L) 4
TOTAL.... $1,148
PAGENO="0430"
426
E-2
TABLE E-2
COMMAND CENTER
ANNUAL EXPENSES
($000)
OPERATING SALARIES, including burden $ 501
(See Table E-3)
OVERHEAD (100% of salaries and burden) 501
TELEPHONE/TELEX 50
UTILITIES 5
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES 15
Q CLEARANCE FOR EMPLOYEES*
(16 employees @ 15%/yr. @ $780) 2
TOTAL $1,074
*Cost of initial clearances - $12,480
(16 employees @ $780)
PAGENO="0431"
427
E-3
TABLE E-3
COMMAND CENTER
OPERATING SALARIES
ANNUAL
NO. SALARY ($) TOTAL ($)
SUPERINTENDENT 1 36,000 36,000
WATCH COMMANDERS 5 33,000 165,000
ASSISTANTS 5 25,000 125,000
GUARD/CLERK 5 15,000 75,000
16 $401,000
BURDEN (@ 25%) 100,250
TOTAL $501 ,25O
PAGENO="0432"
428
E-4
TABLE E-4
COMMAND CENTER
CAPITAL COST OF FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT
($000)
RADIO EQUIPMENT
Center to becollocated with radio station
w/computer equipment. Such equipment
included in Exhibit F.
BUILDINGS $100
1000 sq.ft. @ $100/sq.ft.
SECURITY EQUIPMENT 100
Guard Arms
CCTV
Intrusion Alarms
Key Card Readers
TOTAL.... $200
PAGENO="0433"
429
EXHIBIT F
COST CALCULATIONS
FOR
NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK SYSTEM
71-074 0 - 76 - 28
PAGENO="0434"
430
F-i
TABLE F-i
RADIO NETWORK SYSTEM
ANNUAL COSTS OF SYSTEM
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table F-2) $2,409
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table F-4)
(10 yr.,S/L) 536
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS (25% pre-tax) 1,340
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES
(3 yr.,S/L) 13
TOTAL $4,298
PAGENO="0435"
431
F-2
TABLE F-2
RADIO NETWORK SYSTEM
ANNUAL EXPE~~~
($000)
OPERATING SALARIES, including burden $1,019
(See Table F-3)
OVERHEAD (100% of salaries and burden) 1,019
TELEPHONE/TELEX 25
UTILITIES 60
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES 30
MAINTENANCE 250
Q CLEARANCES FOR EMPLOYEES*
(50 employees @ 15%/yr. @ $780) 6
TOTAL.... $2,409
*Cost of initial clearances - $39,000
(50 employees @ $780)
PAGENO="0436"
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TABLE F-3
RADIO NETWORK SYSTEj~L
OPERATING SALARIES
F-3
STATION MANAGERS
STATION ASSISTANT MANAGERS
RADIO OPERATORS
__________ TOTAL ($)
110,000
255,000
450,000
$ 815,000
BURDEN (@ 25%) 203,750
TOTAL $1,018,750
ANNUAL
~i~L SALARY ($)
5 22,000
15 17,000
15,000
50
PAGENO="0437"
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F-4
TABLE F-4
RADIO NETWORK SYSTEM
CAPITAL COST OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
($000)
RADIO EQUIPMENT $4,000
5 Transmitters (10,000 Watt)
5 Receivers
5 Antenna Sets
Computer
BUILDINGS 1,000
5 @ 4000 sq.ft.
20,000 sq.ft. @ $5O/sq.ft.
SECURITY EQUIPMENT 110
5 Entrance/Identification Stations 60
@ $12,000
Arms 10
Intrusion Alarms 40
LAND 125
5 - 10 Acre Plots
50 Acres @ $2500
IMPROVEMENTS 125
TOTAL $5,360
PAGENO="0438"
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EXHIBIT G
COST CALCULATIONS
FOR
RECOVERY FORCE
PAGENO="0439"
:435
G-l
TABLE G-l
RECOVERY FORCE
ANNUAL COST OF RECOVERY FORCE
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table G-2) $5,383
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table G-4)
(3 yr.,S/L) 133
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS (25% pre-tax) 100
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES
(3 yr.,S/L) 21
TOTAL.... $5,637
PAGENO="0440"
436
G-2
TABLE G-2
RECOVERY FORCE
ANNUAL EXPENSE
SUPPORT FORCE SALARIES, including burden $2,630
(See Table G-3)
OVERHEAD (100% of salaries and burden) 2,630
TELEPHONE/TELEX 25
UTILITIES 8
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES 40
Q CLEARANCES* 10
(82 employees @ 15%/yr. @ $780)
HOUSING 40
5000 sq. ft. @ $8.OO/sq.ft./yr
TOTAL $5,383
*Cost of initial clearances - $63,960
(82 employees @ $780)
PAGENO="0441"
437 4
G-3
TABLE G-3
RECOVERY FORCE SALARIES
NO. ANNUAL SALARY ($~) ____________
2 36,000
2 9,000
8 33,000
70 25,000 _________
82
STATION COMMANDERS
SECRETARY
STATION CAPTAINS
INSPECTORS
TOTAL ($)
$ 72,000
18,000
264,000
1 ,750,000
$2,104,000
BURDEN (@25%) 526,000
TOTAL.. . .$2,63O,000
PAGENO="0442"
438
G-4
TABLE G-4
RECOVERY FORCE EQUIPMENT
($000)
PISTOLS + HOLSTERS 80 @ $150 $12
AUTOMATIC RIFLES 80 @ $500 40
BULLET PROOF VESTS 80 @ $500 40
RIOT HELMETS 80 @ $50 4
TEAR GAS MASKS 80 @ $200 16
WALKIE TALKIES 80 @ $800 64
BASE STATION FOR WALKIE TALKIES 2 @ $4,000 8
TRANSPORT VAN 2 @ $25,000 50
SIGNAL DETECTORS 6 @ $5,000 30
SNM DETECTION EQUIPMENT 100
OFFICE EQUIPMENT 20
TOTAL.... $384
SAY $400
PAGENO="0443"
439
EXHIBIT H
COST CALCULATIONS
FOR
TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM AS PuO2
AND AS MOX FUEL
PAGENO="0444"
440
H-i
TABLE H-i
SNM TRANSPORT
ANNUAL COST OF TRANSPORTING PLUTONIUM
FROM 1500 MT U+Pu REPROCESSING FACILITY
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table H-3) $700
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table 1-6)
(2 Truck + Escort Units; 3 yr.,S/L) 133
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS (25% pre-tax) 100
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES
(3 yr.,S/L) 3
TOTAL $936
Cost Per Unit of Production
Production Capacity : 1500 MT U+Pu/year
Pu Content : 0.9% (70% fissile)
Total Wt Pu : 9,450 kg. fissile
No. of Trips : 85/year
Cost/MT U+Pu $624
Cost/kg Pu (fissile) $ 99
Cost/trip $11,012
PAGENO="0445"
441
TABLE H-2
SNM TRANSPORT
ANNUAL COST OF TRANSPORTING PLUTONIUM
FROM 600 MT U+Pu MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table H-4)
DEPRECIATION OF FIXED ASSETS (See Table H-6)
(2 Truck + Escort Units; 3 yr.,S/L)
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL CLEARANCES
(3 yr. ,S/L)
TOTAL.... $1,136
H-2
Cost Per Unit of Production
Production Capacity
Pu Content
Total Wt Pu
No. of Trips
Cost/MT U+Pu
Cost/kg Pu (fissile)
Cost/trip
600 MT UI-Pu/year
3.3% (70% fissile)
13,800 kg. fissile
225/year
$1 ,893
82
$5,049
RETURN ON FIXED ASSETS
(25% pre-tax)
$ 900
133
100
3
PAGENO="0446"
442
TABLE H-3
SNM TRANSPORT
ANNUAL Pu TRANSPORT EXPENSE FOR REPROCESSING FACILITY
DRIVER & GUARD SALARIES, including burden $250,000
(See Table H-5) --2 units @ $125,000
OVERHEAD (100% of direct salaries and burden) 250,000
Q CLEARANCES FOR GUARDS & DRIVERS* 1,560
(12 15% yr. = 2 @ $780)
TELEPHONE/TELEX/RADIOTELEPHONE
SUPPLIES
MAINTENANCE
OPERATING EXPENSES
(85 trips)
10,000
145,000
TOTAL $676 ~56O
SAY $700,000
H-3
10,000
10,000
* Cost of initial clearances - $9,360
(12 employees @ $780)
PAGENO="0447"
443
TABLE H-4
SNM TRANSPORT
ANNUAL MOX FUEL TRANSPORT EXPENSE FOR MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
DRIVER & GUARD SALARIES, including burden $250,000
(See Table H.-5) -- 2 units @ $125,000
OVERHEAD (100% of direct salaries and burden) 250,000
Q CLEARANCES FOR GUARDS & DRIVERS* 1,560
(12 @ 15%/yr.= 2 @ $780)
TELEPHONE/TELEX/RADIOTELEPHONE 10,000
SUPPLIES 20,000
MAINTENANCE 30,000
OPERATING EXPENSES 300,000
(225 trips)
TOTAL $861,560
SAY $900,000
*Cost of initial clearances - $9,360
(12 employees @ $780)
PAGENO="0448"
444
H-5
TABLE H-5
SNM TRANSPORT
SALARIES OF CONVEYANCE PERSONNEL
NO. ANNUAL SALARY ($) TOTAL ($)
GUARDS 4 15,000 60,000
DRIVERS 2 20,000 40,000
6 $100,000
BURDEN (@ 25%) 25,000
TOTAL $125,000
(for each unit of tractor,
trailer and two escort vehicles)
PAGENO="0449"
445
H-6
TABLE H-6
SNM TRANSPORT
CAPITAL COST OF CONVEYANCE EQUIPMENT
SHIPPING VEHICLE (Equipped) $165,000
Armored Tractor $ 60,000
Armored Trailer. 60,000
(40 ft., enclosed, top-load
dual tandem axle)
Imobilization Vaults for PuO2 Containers. 15,000
Disabling Mechanism 10,000
Cooling System 7,500
Radio HF 12,000
Citizens Band Radio 500
ESCORT VEHICLES (Equipped) 26,600
Basic Vehicle 2 @ $8000 16,000
Automatic Rifles 4 @ $500 2,000
Automatic Shotguns 4 @ 400 1,600
Bullet Proof Vests 6 @ $500 . 3,000
Pistols + Holsters 6 @ $150 900
Tear Gas Guns 4 @ $150 600
Tear Gas Masks 6 @ $200 1,200
Citizens Band Radio 2 @ $500 1,000
Riot Helmets 6 @ $50 300
TOTAL $191,600
SAY $200,000
for each unit required
71-074 0 - 76 - 29
PAGENO="0450"
446
EXHIBIT I
COST CALCULATIONS FOR REGULATORY REVIEW AND INSPECTION
AT THE
MODEL MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
AND AT THE
MODEL REPROCESSING FACILITY
PAGENO="0451"
447
I-i
TABLE I-i
ANNUAL COST FOR REGULATORY REVIEW AND
INSPECTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL
PROGRAMS OF EITHER MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
OR REPROCESSING FACILITY
($000)
EXPENSES (See Table 1-3) $300
AMORTIZATION OF INITIAL REGULATORY REVIEW
(See Table 1-2) (3 yr. ,S/L) 100
TOTAL.... $400
Cost Per Unit of Production
MOX Reprocessing
Annual Production Capacity 600 1,500
(MT U+Pu)
Pu Content (%) 3.3% (70% fissile) 0.9% (70% fissile)
Total Wt Pu (kg)--fissile 13,800 9,450
Cost/MT U+Pu $667 $267
Cost/kg Pu (fissile) $ 29 $ 42
PAGENO="0452"
448
1-2
TABLE 1-2
INITIAL COST OF REGULATORY REVIEW AND APPROVAL
OF PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM OR NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL PROGRAM
($000)
SALARIES $36
(assumed 1 man year @ $36,000)
BURDEN (@ 25%) 9
OVERHEAD (@ 100% of salaries + burden) 45
TRAVEL & SUBSISTENCE 10
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES 20
TOTAL.... $120
SAY $150
TOTAL INITIAL COST FOR BOTH PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
PROGRAM REVIEW AND APPROVAL AT EITHER MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
OR REPROCESSING FACILITY - $300,000
PAGENO="0453"
449
1-i
TABLE 1-3
ANNUAL EXPENSES FOR REGULATORY REVIEW AND
INSPECTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY~ AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL PROGRAMS
OF EITHER THE MOX FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY
OR REPROCESSING FACILITY
($000)
MANPOWER
3 men @ $36,000/year
BURDEN (@ 25%)
OVERHEAD (100% of salaries +
TRAVEL & SUBSISTENCE
3 men @ $10,000/year
burden)
$108
27
135
30
TOTAL.... $300
PAGENO="0454"
450
Mr. GRAHAM. Included in the extensive safeguards system which
was described in the study for costing purposes, in addition to all of
the regulatory requirements, were many redundant and unique fea-
tures such as:
Use of mutual perimeter fences and barbed wire;
Use of multiple intrusion sensor system-outside the perime-
ter barrier, on the barrier and inside the barrier;
Use of quick-acting, position barriers across vehicle access
roadways;
Increasing the size of security guard forces, improving their
training and ~quipment, and providing a trained emergency
support unit comprised of other plant employees;
Use of detectors for metal, special nuclear material, and
explosives;
Use of massive shipping containers;
Armoring tranportation trailers and tractors;
Top loading of trailers-bolting on the trailer lid to eliminate
doors;
Use of disabling mechanisms for tractors and trailers;
Creation of a national radio network for safeguards commu-
nications with a command center to coordinate safeguards pro-
cedures and response activities with law enforcement authori-
ties; and
Reducing the response time and improving the sensitivity of
special nuclear material accountability by establishing computer
systems and programs for accountability.
The conclusions of the study indicate that currently available
safeguards concepts and measures are adequate to improve the
security systems already established under existing regulations as
such improvements become necessary. The cost estimates developed
in the study show that the penalty imposed on nuclear fuel costs by
incorporation of these severe safeguards procedures is small in re-
lation to the dollar benefits and the resource conservation advantages
of plutonium recycle. When the costs are related to the cost of gener-
ating electricity it amounts to about a 0.6-percent increase in the cost
of nuclear power, assuming a total power cost of 12 mills per kilowatt
hour.
The Forum's work in domestic safeguards did not end with the
study on costs. In looking to the future for alternative methods to
improve further and/or to reduce the costs of plutonium safeguards,
the Forum organized a special study group for this purpose. The
study group examined technical options for reducing the risk in plu-
tonium transport and determined the operational and economic
impact of these options on the fuel cycle. A copy of the study
group's report has been given to your staff, Mr. Chairman, for inclu-
sion in the record.
[Information referred to follows:]
PAGENO="0455"
451
TECHNICAL OPTIONS
FOR PLUTONIUM
SAFEG UARDS
A REPORT
OF A FORUM
STUDY GROUP
ON FUEL
CYCLE
SAFEG UARDS
688
PAGENO="0456"
452
Index
Page
Introduction 1
Scope of Study
Study Group Condusions 2
Study Group Recommendations 2
Study Group Findings 3
No Reprocessing 3
Reprocessing 3
Denaturing or Spiking 3
Residual radioactivity 3
Added radioactivity 4
Mixing/blending 6
Dilute blend 7
Master blend 7
Custom blend 7
Transportation 7
Co-location 9
Appendix A - List of Study Group Members
Figure 1 - Decision Tree - Fuel Cycle Options
Working Papers
Effect of Denaturing on Reprocessing
An Evaluation of Spiking
Shipment Costs
The Impact of Spiking on the Utilities
Mixed Oxide Shipping
Co-location
PAGENO="0457"
453
Introduction
The Atomic Industrial Forum, in recognition of the nuclear induttry's concern
for adequate safeguards, determined that it would sponsor a survey of technical
options, including co-location, for reducing the risks in the transportation of
plutonium from the reprocessing facilities to fabrication plants,
Mr. Robert V. Curry, Executive Vice President of Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.,
was invited to chair a study group on fuel cycle safeguards. Appendix A consists
of a list of the study, group members. The study group was asked to examine
technical options for reducing the risk in plutonium transport and for the opera-
tional and economic impact of these options on the fuel cycle.
This report is composed of (1) the study's principal findings, conclusions and
recommendations, and (2) a series of working papers, developed by individual
members of the study group, which contributed to the findings, conclusions
and recommendations.
In most cases, a quantitative assessment of costs and safeguard risks in the imple-
mentation of the various technical options considered by the study group could
not be made within the time scope of the study group's deliberations. However,
the wide experience in the nuclear fuel cycle of the study group members was
employed to indicate, where appropriate, relative costs and safeguard effec-
tiveness,
Scope of Study The Technical options, which have been suggested for reducing or eliminating
the risk for criminal diversion in the transportation of plutoniumi, and which
were considered by the study group, using the decision tree shown in figure 1,
are:
A. No Plutonium Recycle
1. Storage
2. Disposal (throwaway fuel cycle)
B, Plutonium Recycle
1. Denaturing or Spiking
a. Residual radioactivity
b. Added radioactivity
2. Mixing/blending
a. Dilute blend (as proposed by Dr. Karl H. Puechi)
b. Master blend (20% - 30% plutonium oxide)
c. Custom blend
3. Transportation
a. Safe-secure transport
b. Reduce number of shipments
c. Helicopter transport
4. Co-location
PAGENO="0458"
454
Study Group Conclusions The conclusions reached by the study group are a result of careful analysis and
review of the technical options discussed in this report. The group's conclusions
are:
1. That a number of technical options are available to reduce further the risk of
criminal diversion in the shipment of plutonium.
2. That each of the technical options has in varying degrees, as should be ex-
pected, an adverse effect on the operation of the nuclear fuel cycle: in cost,
in radiation exposure, and/or in complexity of operations. A weighing of each
of these effects on a case basis should dictate which of the technical options
are selected to provide adequate safeguards.
3. That currently available options for protecting shipments of plutonium oxide
can provide adequate safeguards at an acceptable cost.
4. That process options such as blending plutonium and uranium oxides can
reduce the utility of the material for criminal purposes.
5. That denaturing or spiking are not viable technical options for reducing the
risk in plutonium shipments.
6. That co-location of reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants can reduce
further the risks of criminal diversion of plutonium shipments, but in doing
so imposes institutional problems. In practice co.location may be expected to
evolve based on economic incentives.
Study Group
Recommendations As indicated in the report's findings on various technical options, most would
reduce the risk of criminal diversion in plutonium recycle. However, as can be
expected, each option has certain advantages and disadvantages in the operation
of reprocessing, fabrication and reactor facilities. The study group carefully
weighed the advantages and disadvantages of each of the technical options to
determine its relative benefits in reducing risks and in effective operation of plu-
tonium recycle. The following recommendations constitute the results of this
analysis:
1. Developments in transportation safeguards, including safe-secure vans and
special tactical escort vehicles, whether designed and/or operated by ERDA
or by the commercial sector of the industry, should be used for transporta-
tion of plutonium oxide.
2. Industry shipments of plutonium oxide should be integrated with the ERDA
high frequency communications network and response system.
3. The shipment of plutonium between fuel reprocessing and fabrication plants,
and co-location of such plants as an economic alternative to safeguarded
transportation, should remain as options.
4. The following alternative may be considered, when and as practicable, to re-
duce the costs and/or increase the effectiveness of safeguards for plutonium
shipments:
a. Reduce the number of plutonium oxide shipments to each fuel fabrication
facility.
b. Institute blending of 20% to 30% plutonium oxide in uranium oxide at
reprocessing plants.
2
PAGENO="0459"
455
c. Use helicopter transport for direct delivery within flight range of the
equipment.
The recommendation for the use of helicopter transport is based on the assump-
tions that the helicopter will be provided adequate protection, i.e. an escort heli-
copter, and that an economic payload including the containers is achievable.
Study Group Findings A. No reprocessing
There are a number of comprehensive studies underway in industry to examine
the fuel cycle alternatives, which would be possible if plutonium were not
recycled in light water reactors. Since, as discussed in the report, the study group
concurs with the GESMO conclusion that adequate safeguards can be provided
by various technical options which have been identified, the industry studies
will serve to delineate the cost benefits of these options as compared to the alter-
native of not recycling plutonium. These industry studies, now in progress, are
expected to be published before the end of the calendar year.
B. Reprocessing
The findings which follow all involve measures in a fuel cycle which includes the
reprocessing of spentfuel.
1. Denaturing or Spiking
Two concepts for denaturing or spiking to improve safeguards were considered
by the study group. The first concept is the denaturing or spiking of the pluton-
ium to increase the ease with which it can be detected by doorway monitors or
survey instruments. Although this concept is feasible, in the opinion of the study
group, little would be gained by its use. Currently, instrument sensitivity can
detect very low levels of plutonium oxide or mixed oxides without adding
material only for detection purposes.
The second concept of denaturing or spiking to make plutonium hazardous for
criminal diversion was carefully reviewed by the study group. It appeared that
massive dose rates in excess of i05 R/hour would be required in order to inca-
pacitate or kill within one to two hours, assuming two inches of lead shielding
were employed.
Two procedures for increasing radioactivity were considered:
a. Residual radioactivity
Allowing a portion of the fission products to accompany the plutonium
throughout the recovery process.
To be effective as a deterrent, materials present in discharged fuel should provide
adequate doss rates and have a half life of at least two years to insure that fuel
coming out of temporary storage maintains its deterrent capability. The study
group's analysis indicated that only cesium-i 37 meets these criteria. Cesium,
however, was found tà have two associated problems that prevent it from being
a practical source. The chemistry of cesium would make it difficult to co-extract
with the plutonium, using present commercial reprocessing technology. Further,
in subsequent oxide processing steps a major separation of cesium and pluton-
ium oxide would take place leaving a much reduced gamma source. Ruthenium
and zirconium were considered the next most likely candidate although both fall
far short of being an ideal denaturant. Zirconium 95, which is abundant in dis-
charged fuel, has a half life of 65 days and would, therefore, remain effective for
a maximum of about two years after reactor discharge. Ruthenium 103 is like-
wise limited by its 40 day half life. Ruthenium 106, however, does have a mar-
3
PAGENO="0460"
456
ginally acceptable half life of one year and occurs in amounts sufficient to be an
effective deterrent, It does have the complicating factor that its chemistry is one
of the most difficult of all elements. Maintaining conditions that leave the ruth-
enium and plutonium together throughout the fabrication cycle would be diffi-
cult. In such steps as mixed oxide sintering, significant separation would likely
occur or at best the ruthenium behavior would be very unpredictable.
The disadvantages and limitations may be summarized as follows:
1. There is no known available isotope in discharged fuel that meets all the cri-
teria of an ideal denaturant.
2. It is difficult to ensure that the denaturant would remain with the plutonium
through all the fuel cycle processing steps.
3. Carry-over of stable fission products, along with other impurities, could have
a significant impact on mixed oxide fuel performance and mechanical in-
tegrity.
4. Increased radiation exposures would occur to plant operating personnel and a
serious conflict with the As Low As Practicable IALAP) philosophy would be
created.
5. Substantial increases would occur in the areas of both capital and operating
costs.
6. The effectiveness of plutonium accounting methods would be markedly re-
duced and there is probability that the requirements for accountability, as
now spelled out in regulations, would be impossible to meet.
b. Added radioactivity
Intimately mixing a high strength gamma source with the plutonium product
after reprocessing but prior to further transport, which would remain with the
plutonium product throughout the remaining steps of the fuel cycle.
Such a source may be a recovered fission product or a manufactured product.
Cobalt-60, a manufactured product, appeared to the study group to be the most
viable material because of its appropriate half life, 5.25 years, and high energy
gamma rays, 1.17 and 1.33 Mev. The amount of total cobalt (cobalt-60 plus
stable cobalt) required for spiking is estimated to be about 10 weight percent
based on contained plutonium.
The advantages of this method of spiking are:
1. Current reprocessing flowsheets remain unchanged.
2. Source strength in the plutonium product would be more predictable and
could be better controlled.
The disadvantages are:
1. Fractionation of high-level waste to obtain an acceptable fission product
spike would be costly and complicated.
2. Use of a manufactured spike such as cobalt-60 would present a major prob-
lem because of cost and amount required. An estimate of the cobalt-60 that
would be required in the mid 1980's is on the order of 50x106 ci/year. This
compares with the current total U.S. production of about 106 ci/year.
4
PAGENO="0461"
457
3. Operational problems and substantial increases in both capital and operating
costs would result from the heavy shielding requirements. Further, there
would be the risk of a much higher incidence of worker radiation exposure.
4. Plutonium accounting methods would be markedly reduced in effectiveness,
with a distinct possibility that current regulatory requirements could not be
met.
Placing a tamper-resistant, self-contained gamma source in the plutonium
product that could only be removed at the receiving facility. This method would
require massive shielding and remote handling for the source loading and unload.
ing operations and would provide an increased deterrent during transportation.
The advantages of a tamper-resistant source are:
1. The added protection would be available during the period of highest risk.
2. Total additional cost to the fuel cycle would be substantially less than other
schemes.
3. Spiking sources, such as cobalt.60, would be reusable and the quantity
needed, therefore, greatly reduced.
The disadvantages include:
1. The degree of protection is reduced, because the spike is not intimately
mixed with the plutonium product.
2. Some reliance on administrative control is required to ensure that the meth-
ods of disarming the transport packages are not compromised.
Inducing activity in the plutonium prior to shipment using irradiation tech.
niques.
The advantages of using irradiation techniques are:
1. Spike is intimately mixed during transit.
2. Reprocessing steps would not be affected.
The disadvantages of this method are:
1. Irradiation has not been shown to be technically practical. Adequate dose
rates may not be achievable.
2. Decay times may be either too short for protection or too long not to affect
adversely downstream operations.
3. Again, as in all spiking and denaturing concepts, there would be an increased
risk of radiation exposures to plant operating personnel creating a conflict
with ALAP philosophy.
The study group, in considering the denaturing or spiking concept developed
economic parameters comparing relative transportation costs for shipping un-
spiked versus spiked plutonium oxide powder and mixed oxide fuel assemblies.
The cost increment indicated for spiked plutonium oxide shipment is 60% to
70% more than conventional plutonium oxide shipment costs. The transporta-
tion cost increment of a highly spiked mixed oxide fuel assembly is approximate-
ly four times the cost per assembly for conventional fuel.
PAGENO="0462"
458
The handling of spiked new mixed oxide fuel elements at the reactor site would
also require substantial modification in the design of present fuel handling facili~
ties and procedures. Shipping casks for the new fuel assemblies would require
heavy shielding resulting in redesign and substantial increase in weight. Of more
significance is the requirement for remote handling of the shipping containers
and the fuel assemblies with the potential for increased worker exposures.
Present plant designs do not accommodate receipt, unpacking, inspection and
storage of spiked new fuel assemblies. While a new plant could be designed and
built to provide for remote handling of spiked fuel, existing plants would require
a substantial portion of present facilities to be torn down and rebuilt, requiring
a prolonged shutdown which would be a very expensive modification.
The perceived advantage of denaturing or spiking plutonium is the potential for
reducing the risk of criminal or terrorist diversion. A problem exists, however, in
making a quantitative assessment of the degree of incremental benefit which
could actually be achieved. If it is assumed that the postulated thief has the
desire, technical resources and financing to produce a nuclear device, then the
difficulty of handling denatured plutonium presents only one more obstacle in
an already long, involved sequence, albeit an important one. If the object of the
theft is only for reasons of extortion, then denatured plutonium could present
an even greater hazard to the public than purified plutonium.
The effects of denaturing or spiking methods, which include intimate mixing of
the spiking material with the plutonium product, would significantly change the
design and capital cost of reprocessing, fabrication and reactor plants. Because of
the spike-created radiation, the entire plutonium process would have to be com
pletely remote using heavily shielded facilities and remote operation and mainte-
nance techniques. In addition, laboratory requirements would increase by an
order of magnitude. Both hot cells and the contained equipment would require
substantial development effort. Since all sampling and analysis would have to be
performed remotely on the spiked material, the complications would be large
and costly.
Although all four spiking concepts appear to have severe limitations, the third
listed method of using a tamper-resistant self-contained spike during transit ap-
pears to the study group to offer the best balance between increased protection
and added fuel cycle cost. However, neither this nor any of the other spiking
methods have been demonstrated to be commercially feasible. Therefore, it is
not possible to conclude that any of the spiking methods can be used on a com-
mercial scale until after such a demonstration has been made.
2. Mixing/blending
One proposal to reduce the risk of transporting plutonium between the repro.
cessor and the fabricator is to ship a plutonium-uranium oxide. The study group
considered several options:
a. Dilute blend (Puechl) which postulates blending of all plutonium and urani-
um to a mixed oxide of very low plutonium content.
b. Master blend (20% to 30% plutonium oxide) which involves blending to a
percentage of plutonium which makes it very difficult to construct a nuclear
device without chemical separation of the plutonium from the uranium.
c. Custom blending of plutonium and uranium oxides at the reprocessing site
to fabrication specifications.
All three options substantially increase the mass required to be diverted to ob~
tam a critical amount of plutonium, and complicate the process and extend the
PAGENO="0463"
459
time to convert the material to a quality suitable to construct a nuclear device.
Thus, mixing/blending constitutes a real reduction in the combined success
probability of diverting material andmanufacturing a nuclear device compared
to the alternative of shipping plutonium oxide.
a. Dilute blend (Puechl)
The dilute blend proposal of using a O.2%-0.4% plutonium enriched mixture in
all reactor fuel achieves an improved economy in light water reactors since the
plutonium is spread out more uniformly in the fuel resulting in less self-shielding.
The study group concluded that the Puechi mode could save an additional
20% in enrichment services and an additional 5% in uranium feed over the con-
ventional plutonium recycle mode, However, the introduction of a universal
plutonium "contaminated fuel" in the light water reactor fuel cycle would
sharply increase fuel fabrication and handling costs, Existing uranium fabrica-
tion plants would require expensive (and perhaps impossible) backfitxing and
new plants would involve more costly design and construction to meet: (1)
more stringent accounting and security requirements for plutonium )2) regula-
tory requirements for hardening against natural phenomena, and (3) greater
contamination control and shielding requirements. Every light water reactor
fuel fabrication facility would become a mixed oxide plant with lowered effi-
ciency and higher manufacturing costs, Transportation costs would also increase
since all fuel material would require safeguards. In addition, many workers in
these steps of the fuel cycle would have higher exposures to radiation in contra-
diction to the ALAP philosophy.
b. Master blend )20%-30% plutonium oxide)
A mixed oxide blend composition in the range of 20% to 30% plutonium oxide,
in the opinion of the study group, could provide increased safeguards without
unduly penalizing the fabrication process, although it would require additional
facilities at the reprocessing plant. A mixed oxide in the range of 20% to 30%
plutonium would be very difficult to use in constructing a nuclear device. The
mixed oxide fuel fabricators indicate that they can work satsifactorily with such
a mix, However, additional specifications and means for verifying master blend
acceptability would be required.
c. Custom blending
The concept of custom blending the plutonium oxide and uranium oxide at the
reprocessing facility to 2% to 4% plutonium oxide by specification would reduce
the risks in transportation and concentrate the blending process at the reproces-
sing facility, However, special processes developed by the fuel fabricators in pre-
paring uranium oxide for pellet manufacture require unique procedures and
quality control tests to meet the individual specifications of each of the fuel
fabricators. These features are not available at reprocessing plants on a custom
basis.
In the view of the study group, the master blend process of blending 20% to 30%
plutonium oxide with uranium oxide at the reprocessing plant is the most ac-
ceptable of the mixing/blending options available, It provides the best balance
between risk reduction and economics in these steps of the fuel cycle.
3. Transportation
Transportation is generally considered to be the most difficult safeguards prob-
lem. However, industry has a successful model in the nationwide ERDA safe-
secure system for highway shipments ofgovernment-owned plutonium.
PAGENO="0464"
460
a. Safe-secure transport
The ERDA system incorporates special penetration-resistant and self-immobi-
lizing vehicles, special tactical escort vehicles, and a nationwide dedicated com-
munications system for monitoring the status of all shipments. The system is
designed so that diversion of the cargo by unauthorized persons could be de-
layed until response and recovery forces could arrive and regain control of the
shipment. ERDA safe-secure trailers have been in operational use since October,
1972 and have accumulated nearly 900,000 miles of service. ERDA is develop-
ing a van-body truck to provide a smaller vehicle which will also incorporate
penetration deterrence, mobilization access control, driver protection and com-
munications. This prototype vehicle will be used by ERDA to demonstrate to
the nuclear industry an example of transportation safeguards. The commercial
sector of the industry also has the capability to design and develop safe secure
transport, which would be equivalent to an ERDA vehicle. The industry should
retain the option to develop such a vehicle allowing economics to be the deter-
mining factor of design selection.
ERDA's nationwide voice communications system, which has been operational
since 1972, is being modified by adding a digital system to expand communica-
tions capacity, to increase reliability, and to decrease vulnerability. The system
which will begin operations late this summer will have added capacity for moni-
toring industry-wide shipments of industry-owned as well as government-owned
plutonium.
b. Reduced number of shipments
Although it is impossible to complstely eliminate all transportation risks, it is
possible in the opinion of the study group, to minimize the number of pluton-
ium shipments by providing appropriate storage capacity at the reprocessing
and mixed oxide fabrication facilities, and economically feasible to provide safe-
guard systems for those shipments, which will essentially deter or prevent crimi-
nal diversion. Fortunately there is asufficient technical base to continue improv-
ing transportation safeguards and to provide exceptionally high levels of security.
c. Helicopter transport
In recent years, helicopters operating in regularly scheduled service have experi-
enced a high degree of reliability and safety sufficient to permit the commercial
carrying of passengers. Newer designs are expected to exceed this safety level by
a wide margin.
Helicopters with recent improvements in safety and reliability appear to offer
advantages for the shipment of plutonium oxide within the operations range of
the equipment. Various fixed wing aircrafts would also provide similar advan-
tages. The following is a listing of some of the advantages apparent to the study
group:
1. Minimal ground support facilities required.
2. Loading and off-loading of material inside controlled parameters.
3. Control over crew training and expertise.
4. High degree of route control
5. Security in flight-radar followed, short transit times, existing rapid communi-
cations system.
8
PAGENO="0465"
.461
6. Not dependent on varying conditions of route (e.g. road repair, traffic, flood-
ing, snow, reduced speed tracks(.
7. Relatively insensitive to labor disturbances.
8. Flights can be limited to daylight in good weather conditions.
9. Design concepts for helicopter shipping containers are under development.
The disadvantages are:
1. Higher equipment and operating costs.
2. Limited range (about 400 miles).
3. If high-jacked the helicopter provides great flexibility in evading pursuit.
4. Accident consequences more severe.
5. Weather limitations.
4. Co-location
Locating mixed oxide fabrication plants in close proximity or adjacent to repro-
cessing plants in integrated fuel cycle facilities was examined by the study group
since shipment of plutonium in its pure form between reprocessing and fabrica-
tion facilities is considered to involve the greatest risk for criminal diversion. To
the extent such shipments would be minimized or eliminated the safeguarding
of plutonium would be ehhanced by co-location. Co-location might also make it
possible to use physical protection measures more effectively to prevent criminal
diversion. However, there are a number of institutional and legal factors which
make the concept of co-location difficult to realize in practice.
The diverse geographical location of existing reprocessing and fabrication facili-
ties essentially precludes co-location during the development stage of the mixed
oxide fuel industry. Thus, fuel cycle facilities' integration is considered to have a
long-range potential rather than being a viable near-term alternative. Such inte-
gration or co-location has possible long-term merit only if a number of problems
such as the following can be satisfactorily resolved:
1, Maintenance of competition among suppliers.
2. Freedom of fuel service purchasers to select specific suppliers for each phase.
~3. Fungibility of reprocessor output from the standpoint of economic value.
4. Availability of a sufficient labor pool.
5. Disruption of an entire site by difficulties with materials, labor, services or
other factors.
6. Overlapping jurisdictional interests of Federal (Corps of Engineers, NRC, EPA,
001, etc.) state and local agencies.
There are currently a relatively large number of fuel vendors, each of which has
tentative commitments to supply mixed oxide fuel. The present size of the
reprocessing and recycle industry does not allow the needed capacity match be-
tween the reprocessing facility and the particular fuel fabricator at present or in
the near future. Without a precise match, some movement of plutonium to or
from the site is inevitable. As stated in the study's conclusions, adequate safe-
9
71-074 0 - 76 - 30
PAGENO="0466"
462
guards can be provided for the transportation aspects of the fuel cycle, commen-
surate with the type, form and amount of the nuclear materials involved. Appli-
cation of such safeguards to the limited transportation required in the early
years of plutonium recycle should allow for continuation of the presently
planned facilities as well as an orderly evaluation of the necessity and means for
co-location. That is, co-location would not be necessitated by safeguards consid-
erations, but by the relative economic merits of co-location and the cost of
transportation. A course of action which would allow both co-location and
safe guarded shipment of plutonium as dictated by operational and economic
considerations would avoid the logistical and institutional problems identified
above.
Accordingly, the study group found that the most advisable course of action
would be to retain co-location as an option and alternative to the costs in-
volved in transportation. As such, co-location may be expected to evolve natural-
ly from economic considerations.
10
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463
Appendix A - List of Study Oroup Members
Chairman: Robert V. Curry
Executive Vice President
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
Secretary: Frank W. Graham
Manager, Special Studies
Atomic Industrial Forum
Fuel Cycle Services Committee Robert B. Atwater
Executive Director of Fuel Supply
Consumers Power Company
Fred W. Kramer
Engineering Manager
Westinghouse Nuclear Fuel Division
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
R. W. Lambert
Manager, Technical Planning
Fuel Recovery Operation
General Electric Company
Roy Nilson
Manager, Ouality Assurance &
Licensing
Exxon Nuclear Company
Walter J. Price
Executive Vice President
Allied General Nuclear Services
Hugh Stewart
Vice President, Manufacturing
General Atomic Company
Safeguards Policy Committee William A. Cameron
Nuclear Representative
The Babcock & Wilcox Company
Robert Lowenstein
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad
Charles W. Mayer
Vice President, Nuclear
Transportation
Tn-State Motor Transit Company
Norton Shapiro
Manager, Plutonium Recycle
Combustion Engineering
William Shelley
Director of Regulation & Control
Kerr-McGee Corporation
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FIGURE I
BACK END CYCLE OPTIONS
Pool
Geologic
Spent Fuel
Store-away Path
Puechl
/~u~ /~er M~\Blenc~ng Path
_____ ~us~om /~ 4
Blend~ -~
Ship (1)
Nitrate
Oxide
(1) Regulation prohibits after 1978
(2) Option follows same path as
the convert to oxide chain
Ship Pellets
Unlimited
) Transportation
/ Path
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465
Effect of Denaturing on Reprocessing
Introduction Denaturing (or spiking) Pu has been proposed to meet a wide variety of possible
objectives, with the main goal of greatly reducing the possibility of theft or di-
version of Pu. This would be accomplished by physically incapacitating the thief
or alternately making the material extremely difficult to work with should a
theft occur. Other potential benefits such as facilitating location of the Pu in the
event of theft, improving the ability to locate Pu in-plant, improving monitoring
ability at site exits, etc., have in general been found to fall short of their adver-
tised goals. Analysis of the effects that denaturing would have on the reproces-
sing step will therefore assume that the objective of denaturing is primarily to
reduce the threat of diversion by criminal or terrorists groups.
The discussion will be structured as follows:
1. Techniques and technology of denaturing
2. Effects on plant design and plant capital costs
3. Effects on plant operation and operating costs
4. Summarized advantages, disadvantages, and limitations.
The conclusion reached by examining the above four topics, is that, for the
reprocessor, denaturing Pu is neither a simple nor straightforward concept and,
in fact, creates substantial technical and economic problems. The need exists to
perform an in-depth, cost-benefit analysis in order to give proper perspective to
the entire concept. Such an analysi~ may benefit from studies that are currently
being sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) that are aimed
at defining the mechanics and technical aspects of various denaturing concepts.
Techniques and Technology The denaturing or spiking concept can be achieved in a variety of ways. Four of
of Denaturing the ways often considered are summarized below:
1. Allowing a portion of the fission products to accompany the Pu throughout
the recovery process
2. Intimately mixing a high-strength gamma source with the Pu product after
reprocessing but prior to further transport or processing. The gamma source
`could be in the form of previously separated fission products or a manufac-
tured spike such as cobalt-60.
3. Placing a tamper-resistant, self-contained gamma source in the Pu product and
MO2 fuel that could only be removed at the receiving facility.
4. Inducing activity in the Pu prior to shipment using irradiation techniques.
Fc~r the scope of this report, only the method listed first will be addressed. This
a~proach seems reasonable by the fact that it not only is the technique most fre-
qt.~ntly proposed, but also the one having the greatest impact on the reproces-
sing operation, It also offers the greatest degree of safeguards protection.
TI~e first problem that arises in a denaturing concept is obtaining a concensus
that defines the criteria for the material to be used as the denaturing substance.
Two of the prime considerations are establishing the minimum acceptable half
lives for the isotopes to be used and defining the dose rate that needs to be
achieved. To cover the variety of circumstances that will be encountered in repro-
cessing, the gamma source should have a half life of at least 2 years to ensure
that fuel that has been in long-termstorage, or Pu that has been in storage,
PAGENO="0470"
466
would maintain an effective deterrent capability. In this category, only Cs-137 is
present in discharged fuel in sufficient quantity to be an effective gamma source.
Cesium, however, has two associated problems that prevent it from being a prac-
tical source material. The first limitation is that the chemistry of cesium would
make it difficult to co-extract with the plutonium using conventional reproces-
sing technology. The second problem is that in the subsequent oxide processing
steps, a major separation of cesium and Pu02 would take place leaving a much
reduced gamma source.
Falling back to the next best source material that would have sufficient gamma
strength, ruthenium and zirconium emerge as the most likely candidates. These
isotopes, however, also fall short of meeting the criteria of an ideal denaturant.
Zirconium 95, which is abundant in discharged fuel, only has a half life of 65
days and would, therefore, remain effective for a maximum of about 2 years
after initial reactor discharge. Ru-103 is likewise limited by its 40-day half life.
Ru-106, however, does have a marginally acceptable half life of one year and
does occur in amounts (-500,000 Cute at 160 day cooled) sufficient to be an
effective denaturant. Ruthenium has an additional complicating factor, however,
in that its chemistry is one of the most complicated of all elements and main-
taining conditions that leave the Ru and Pu together throughout the entire fuel
fabrication cycle is somewhat of an optimistic assumption. In such steps as MO2
sintering, significant separation will likely occur or at best the Ru behavior will
be very unpredictable.
In spite of these drawbacks, which may in themselves be prohibitive, it will be
assumed that Ru is the chosen denaturant and the effects on a reprocessing plant
considered. Using established technology, it does appear possible that by making
significant modifications a flowsheet could be devised that would leave sufficient
Ru with the Pu to be an effective denaturant. It is estimated that about one-third
of all the ruthenium present in the discharged fuel could be forced to remain
with the Pu. If this function can be achieved, then the resultant dose rates
should approach those required to act as a deterrent.
It should be pointed out that the type flowsheet that would allow co-extraction
of Ru and Pu would also carry along Zr. The presence of both Ru and Zr would
represent a significant chemical impurity to the Pu since only about 5% of the Ru
and 0.5% of the Zr are radioactive, while the total amount of the elements would
be carried along with the Pu. This level of chemical contaminant (up to 20% of
total Pu) could offer significant fuel performance uncertainties either because of
failure mechanisms or neutron effects.
An additional problem would arise for the uranium portion of a reprocessing
plant by the fact that the type of flowuheets that would allow Ru, Zr, and Pu to
be co-extracted also would allow increased quantitites of neptunium and other
contaminants to follow the uranium stream. These contaminants would have to
be subsequently removed which would add to the complexity of the reproces-
sing operation.
Effects on Plant Design and Because the majority of reprocessing is already required to be carried out on a
Plant Capital Costs remote basis, the impact on plant design and capital cost would not be as big a
factor for reprocessors as in the case of an MO2 fabricator. These costs, however,
would still be significant and can be assigned to four basic areas:
1. The final plutonium processing portions of a reprocessing plant are currently
operated on a contact-maintained basis. Because of the denaturant created
radiation fields, the entire Pu process would have to be completely remote
using heavily shielded facilities and remote operation and maintenance tech-
niques. This increased cost could be partially offset by a decrease in the
number of steps required to reach the final Pu product stage.
PAGENO="0471"
467
2. Regardless of plant siting philosophy (with or without co-location(, tonne
quantities of Pu will have to be stored as a buffer between reprocessors and
MO2 fabricators. Such storage if designed for totally remote operation would
require new designs and new concepts as well as being very expensive.
3. Laboratory requirements would increase by an order of magnitude. Both
hot cells and the contained equipment would require substantial develop.
ment effort. Should all sampling and analysis be required to be performed
on a denatured basis, the complications could be overpowering.
4. Additional facilities and equipment would be required for uranium cleanup.
This most likely would take the form of another cycle of solvent extraction.
The total cost impact of the above-listed requirements has not been detailed, but
it could have the effect of increasing plant construction costs in the order of
10% to 15%. It should be pointed out that this relatively low level of impact is
applicable only because of the assumption that the reprocessor is not also in the
business of converting plutonium nitrate to oxide.
Effects on Plant Operation Three major areasof negative impact on plant operations would be created by
and Operating Costs adoption of a denaturing concept:
1. The potential for achieving meaningful accountability data would be dramat-
ically reduced. There already exists the problem that measurement methods do
not currently meet the level of accuracy required to meet the desired limit-of.
error limits. Given the case where purified Pu is not acceptable in the labora.
tory, these goals become nearly impossible. It is hard to visualize successfully
designing and operating a mass spectrograph on a remote basis. On the other
hand, if purified Pu is allowed in the laboratory, a new scenario can be cre-
ated that shows that major flaws exist in the denaturing concept. The require.
ment of achieving adequate accountability in a remotely operated and re-
motely maintained plutonium nitrate storage facility also presents what
appears to be near insurmountable accountability problems. In short, it may
well be that any incremental benefit in reducing the risk of overt theft may
be more than offset in reduced accountability effectiveness.
2. The use of a denaturing concept would present a dilemma to the reprocessor
in terms of meeting the still-evolving, as-low-as-practicable (ALAP) regulatory
guidelines. Without question, the exposure incurred by plant workers would
be significantly increased. Such tasks as inspecting fixed poisons in Pu proces-
sing equipment or storage vessels and disposing or repairing hot failed equip-
ment would result in increased exposures. The laboratory would also present
a real challenge in keeping workers within acceptable exposure limits.
3. While denaturing may offer some potential for reducing risk of terrorist diver-
sion, there would be a whole new family of safeguard problems created if de-
naturing should be relied upon as a deterrent. For example, a new set of
scenarios and corresponding countermeasures would have to be analyzed to
ensure that the denaturing process could not be circumvented and the unde-
natured Pu could not be obtained in the reprocessing plant. A simple proces-
sing cell sump could be used as a batch contactor to effect Pu purification or
a laboratory hot cell could be easily used for Pu cleanup. Taken to an ex-
treme, it would be that accountability systems to keep track of all TBP might
be suggested as a way to guard against unauthorized Pu purification.
The overall impact on reprocessing plant operating costs has not been detailed
but it can be assumed to be substantial in the areas of manpower levels and
equipment replacement and maintenance costs, If viewed against a backdrop of
increasingly stringent ALAP requirements, the penalty could grow to become a sig-
nificant factor in the overall nuclear fuel cycle costs.
PAGENO="0472"
468
Summarized Advantages, The perceived advantage of denaturing Pu is the potential for reducing the risk
Disadvantages, and of criminal or terrorist diversion. A problem exists, however, in making a quanti.
Limitations fied assessment of whatdegree of incremental benefit could actually be achieved.
If it is assumed that the postulated thief has the desire, technical resources, and
financing to actually produce a nuclear weapon, then the difficulty of handling
denatured Pu presents only one more obstacle in an already long, involved se-
quence. If the object of the theft is only for reasons of extortion, then dena.
tured Pu could present even a greaser hazard to the public than purified Pu. It is
possible that an extortionist could effectively claim Pu possession by simply
parading a spiked inert material.
The disadvantages and limitations may be summarized as follows:
1. There are no known available isotopes in discharged fuel that meet all
the criteria of an ideal denaturant.
2. It is difficult to ensure that the denaturant would remain predictably with
the Pu through all the fuel cycle processing steps.
3. Carry.over of stable fission products, along with other impurities, could have
a significant impact on MO2 fuel performance and mechanical integrity,
4. Increased radiation exposures would occur to plant operating personnel and a
serious conflict with the ALAP philosophy would be created,
5. Substantial, increases would occur in the areas of both capital antI operating
costs.
6. Accountability effectiveness for Pu would be markedly reduced and there is
a probability that the requirements for accountability, as now spelled out in
regulations, would be impossible to meet.
7. In the process of achieving the intended goal of denaturing, a new family of
problems would be discovered and new requirements would have to be im-
posed to ensure that the denaturing process was not circumvented,
While the above items represent individual factors that impact on the denaturing
concept, an accurate overall assessment cannot be made without performing a
thorough cost-benefit analysis. While such a study is outside the scope of this
writeup, there are strong indications that the increased degree of safeguard pro.
tection will be found to be relatively small and that the costs, particularly when
taken across the whole fuel cycle, will be found to be near prohibitive. Such an
analysis, we feel, will also show that in the transportation areas, where safe.
guards risks are the greatest, that alternate solutions such as co-location and ship.
ping MO2 in cask-like containers, offer essentially the same degree of protection
on a more practical basis and with much less cost impact on the fuel cycle.
It should also be pointed out that even should projections and estimates of de-
naturing costs prove not to be absolutely prohibitive, the added uncertainties
and technical risks that are created would, in fact, prove to be a hurdle that
private industry could not overcome. In essence, adoption of a denaturing con-
cept would, for all practical purposes, foreclose the development of a privately
owned and operated back end of the fuel cycle based on the concept of Pu
recycle.
PAGENO="0473"
469
Alternate Denaturing Technique
As compared to the primary denaturing scheme previously discussed, the advan-
tages and disadvantages of alternate denaturing concepts (listed as items 2, 3 and
4 on page 1 of my May 9 draft) are summarized as follows:
2. Back mixing of a gamma source following product purification step at repro-
cessor
Advantages
* Current reprocessing flowsheets remain usable
* Chemical purity of Pu improved significantly over that of scheme 1
* Source strength in product would be predictable and could be more close-
ly controlled.
Disadvantages
* There would be a limited time when purified Pu would be vulnerable to
theft
* Fractionation of high-level waste to obtain an acceptable fission product
spike would be very costly and complicated
* Use of a manufactured spike, such as Co-60, would present a major prob-
lem because of the cost and amount required. An estimate of the Co-60
that would be required in mid 1980s is in the order of ---50 x 106 ci/year.
This compares with the current total U.S. production of ---1 x 106 cl/year.
3. Placing a tamper-resistant, self-áontained gamma source in the Pu and MO2
products during the transportation step
Advantages
* The protection afforded by spiking would be available during the period of
highest risk, but the operating and cost penalties associated with MO2 fab
and reactor handling would be avoided
* Total cost to the fuel cycle would be significantly less than other schemes
* Spiking sources, such as Co.60, would be reusable and the quantity needed,
therefore, greatly reduced.
Disadvantages
* Because the spike is not intimately mixed with the product, the degree of
protection may be slightly re~uced
* Some reliance on administrative control is required to insure that the
methods of disarming the transport package are not compromised.
* Reprocessing and MO2 sites must rely more heavily on physical protection
to achieve an acceptable level of safeguards.
4. Activation of Pu Prior to shipment
PAGENO="0474"
470
Advantages
* Reprocessing and possibly MO2 processing not penalized as severely
* Spike is intimately mixed during transit
Disadvantages
* The concept has not been shown to be technically practical. Adequate
dose rates may not be achievable.
* Decay times may be either too short for protection or too long to not ad.
verwly affect down stream operations
* Cost to perform irradiation would be extremely high
Conclusion While all four spiking concepts appear to have severe limitations, while offering
only marginal benefits, the third listed method of using a tamper-resistant, self.
contained spike during transit appears to offer the best balance between in-
creased protection and added fuel cycle cost. It also is the one scheme that
might offer a low enough technical risk such that members in the private sector
of the industry might still be willing to remain a participant in the fuel cycle.
PAGENO="0475"
471
An Evaluation of Spiking
Introduction At the April meeting of the AIF Fuel Cycle Committee, Westinghouse was
assigned the taskof reviewing "spiking" and to establish a position relative to
this safeguards option.
This paper presents this review and recommendations relevant to adaptation of
this method of increasing Pu safeguards.
Background In the NRC GESMO, recycle of plutonium was adjudged to reduce the adverse
environmental impacts of the LWR fuel cycle, including reactors, relative to the
already small effects of the U02 fuel cycle. The NRC, however, further, stated
that current (mid.1974) safeguards measures to deter, prevent or respond to
theft or diversion and/or sabotage of Pu and its process plants are not fully met.
By assessment of~areas wherein safeguards can be increased, the NRC concluded
that combinations of various elements would make the safeguards problem man~
ageable. Of the key six concepts of increased safeguards, the use of "spiked" Pu
represented the last concept.
The GESMO defines "spiking" as follows: (from page V.44)
"Intimate mixing of plutonium with other difficult to handle or easily detected
substances. . . to improve the following safeguards aspects:
1. Making the plutonium more difficult or hazardous to steal and process.
2. Requiring additional processing before the plutonium is suitable for weapons
manufacture (thus providing more time for discovery and recovery).
3. Increasing the ease with which plutonium can be detected by doorway moni-
tors or survey instruments."
Diacusaion From the above GESMO definition including objectives, spiking can serve a
number of objectives in two broad classifications.
A. Detection
B. Deterrent to Diversion
A. Detection
The first item "Detection was reviewed by T. J. Connally in his paper "Spiking
Plutonium as a Safeguards Measure".2 His conclusions were that aerial search for
and detection of material diverted during shipment would be of doubtful effec-
tiveness. A mobile ground system, which could collect counts for periods of
minutes to days, appears feasible but its area of coverage would be limited. Thus,
location of a diverted shipment through visual means by law enforcement off i-
cers (current regulations) would be more effective.
Detection of material in a reprocessing or fuels fabrication plant would not be
materially improved by spiking since the current state of the art of instrument
sensitivity can detect very low levels of Pu02 or mixed oxides.
Based upon the above observations, there appears to be little gained by spiking
plutonium only for detection purposes. If it were spiked, depending upon the
1See GESMO Vol. 1, pg. S.7
2Reference
PAGENO="0476"
472
mode, detection may be enhanced in a plant, at the cost of greatly increased
capital and operating costs and with the increased probability of personnel expo-
sures during shipping and processing.
B. Deterrent to Diversion
The current detection level for plutonium by portal type monitors is on the
order of grams. A spiking level of approximately .1 ppm60 Co or 5 ppm13 7Cs
would improve the detectability by an order of magnitude. Similarly, such
spiking would improve the detectability of diverted plutonium. However, such
diverted plutonium would probably be shielded so any improvement in detecta-
bility is dependent upon the scenario which has been postulated. For example, it
could be in a shielded container, in the basement of a massive building, or in an
underground mine or cave.
In order to provide an effective deterrent to a dedicated terrorist bomb builder
by spiking, the dose rates would have to be high enough to kill or incapacitate
him before a bomb could be assembled, It is also likely that some shielding
would be used by the thief without significantly increasing the necessary work-
ing time which is considered to be several hours. If he chose to protect his
health, expensive remote operations would be required which would greatly in-
crease the time required to build a bomb, thus decreasing the probability of
success.
Spiking Materials Potential spiking materials include 60Co 13 7Cs and fission products or actinide
left in the plutonium at the reprocessing step. In each case, evaluations would be
required to assure that the selected material and quantity would not adversely
affect LWR fuel performance and reactor operation. 60Co appears to be the
most viable material because of its appropriate half-life (5.3 years) and high
energy gamma rays (1.17 and 1.33 Mev). The amount of cobalt required for high
level spiking would be on the order of 1 to 4 weight percent 60~ in the pluto-
nium. For comparable unshielded dose rates with a `37Cs spike, approximately
equal or even greater quantities of 37 than plutonium would be required.
Furthermore, the 13 7Cs is much more easily shielded than 60Co; the half value
layer for 13 7Cs is 0.6cm compared to 1.2 cm for 60Co. The other alternatives
would be less effective than 60Co.
Levels of Spiking With an objective to prevent a diverter from building a bomb without massive
shielded facilities for remote operations and assuming that he must be incapa-
citated or killed within an hour or two requires massive dose rates and high levels
of spiking. It must be assumed that the would-be bomb builder would also be
knowledgeable in radiation protection and would take precautions to limit his
exposure including the use of lead shielding. Under these assumptions, dose rates
in excess of 10~ R/hr would be required to assure that a bomb could not be built
in a short time. This would require approximately 100,000 Ci of 65~ Assum-
ing a 10 Kg quantity, the level of spiking would be about 1% 60~ in the plu-
tonium.
Impact of Low Level Spiking Increased levels of spiking would provide some improvement in detectability
depending upon the scenarios hypothesized. The advantages and disadvantages
of low level spiking (approximately 5 ppm `37Cs or equivalent) to improve
detectability of diverted plutonium is as follows:
Advantages
1. Improve the detection sensitivity of unshielded plutonium by approximately
an order of magnitude.
2. Improve capability of finding diverted plutonium by airplane, car, etc.
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Disadvantages
1. Require additional shielding and mechanization of fabrication and fuel handl-
ing facilities.
2. Increase exposures to personnel handling mixed oxide fuel.
3. Increased fabrication plant personnel exposure and downtime for mainte-
nance operations.
Safeguarding of shipments would not be enhanced by this level of spiking. The
improved detectability for monitoring nuclear facilities is of marginal value since
current monitoring instrumentation will detect 1 gram of plutonium. Thus, the
increased personnel exposures and fuel costs are not justified.
Impact of High Level Spiking The advantages and disadvantages of high level spiking (1-4% 60Co) are:
Advantages
1. Massive shipping container would be required to divert a strategic quantity of
plutonium.
2. Remote handling and shielding requirements would significantly increase the
necessary facility capabilities and the time required to build a bomb.
3. Increased detectability of the material could aid in locating it depending upon
the postulated scenario.
4. The diverter would have to accept probable death to attempt to accomplish
his objectives,
Disadvantages
1. Massive shielding and total remote operation of all fuel processing functions.
2. Increased exposures to personnel handling mixed oxide fuel.
3. Massive spent fuel type shippping containers requiring increased numbers
of shipments and greater population exposures.
4, Require spent fuel type handling and inspection at reactor facility.
5. Increased fabrication plant downtime for totally remote operations with
totally remotemaintenance.
6. Would require total reevaluations of planned safeguards and accountability
systems.
7. Increased risk and consequences of accidental exposures.
8. Would not alleviate safeguards requirements for shipments or facilities,
9, Increased environmental impact and population exposures.
10. Feasibility of totally remote powder handling and fuel fabrication opera-
tions and quality assurance have not been demonstrated.
11. Mixed oxide fuel rod and assembly examinations for quality control and
assurance would become remote operations.
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The increased fuel costs of this system were examined in light of current Westing-
house experience with the Recycle Fuels Plant design. It appears that a fuel cost
addition of $250-$800/kg of mixed oxide would result depending upon the
choice of spiking material and level of the spike. For the lower additional cost,
assumptions were made that permitted the spikant to be removed in a hot cell
by chemical separation operations, powder was then made and fuel fabrication
proceeded through rod loading testing and examination. A second hot cell would
then affix a tamper proof spike to the rods or assembly prior to shipping off-site.
Added laboratory costs and generation and disposal of high level wastes were
included in the added cost.
For the higher level fuel costs addition, the assumption was made that the spik-
ant remained in the Pu02 and a totally remote fuel fabrication and rod loading,
assembly operation was required. Here again laboratory analyses and disposal of
high level wastes added considerably to costs. The feasibility of totally remote
powder processing would have to be established by additional development test
programs.
C. Alternatives to Spiking Fuel
An alternate spiking method to provide a deterrent during transportation is to
locate a highly radioactive source in the fuel container or attached to the fuel
assembly. To assure that the shipping container could not be opened without
special shielding and remote handling would also require unshielded dose rates
in the range of 100,000 R/hr at 1 meter. This method requires massive shielding
and remote handling for the source loading and unloading operations and ship-
ping containers. It would provide additional safeguard deterrents during the
transportation phase; however, the impact on fuel costs and the environment
would still be significant. This additional hazard increases normal personnel and
population exposures and adds the possibility of accidental expossres from the
sources.
Another alternative is to irradiate the fuel before shipping. In order to provide
an effective deterrent over a period of several months, significant exposure levels
would be required. This is not feasible for fuel in forms other than fuel assem-
blies. This method has limited benefits and requires associating special reactor
facilities with the fuel fabrication plant, and handling and inspection of the new
fuel at the reactor site in a manner similar to spent fuel. This would increase
personnel and population exposures.
Recommendations 1, The use of "spiking" as a detection tool is not warranted for two basic rea-
sons. First, since gamma radiation from small amounts of plutonium (~ 1
gram) is readily detectable (unshielded) in portal monitors, an attempt to
remove the material would be thwarted. In the event of the use of `y-ray
shielding metal, detection equipment would also result in an aborted at-
tempt. Second, in the case of large-quantity highjacking, radiation detection
serves as a poor recovery device since shielding may be easily provided.
Aerial or ground detection would be better served by the placement of radio
transmission equipment within a shipment container. In both cases, then
increased levels or radiation would not likely enhance detectability.
2. Spiking to serve as a deterrent to diversion imposes severe penalties on
mixed oxide fuel costs that are not warranted since other additional safe-
guards have been and are now being considered to be imposed on Pu recycle
such as:
- Added shipping safeguards
- Added plant security
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Shipment Costs
I. Plutonium Oxide Powder A. Conventional:
Shipments
Container
3500 lb. container having a capacity of 32 kg of Pu and a shield equivalent to 1"
of lead. (2700 lb. corrtainer plus 800 lb. lead). Cost would be about $12,000!
container and would charge out at $30/day.
Transport
A 500 mile (one way) trip was assumed as typical with round trip time (includ.
ing turnarounds) being 3 days. Transportation costs using a standard vehicle
(42,000 lb. load of 12 containers) and a separate armed escort would be $2870!
trip. (current tariff) Multiple trips were assumed so special dead heading charges
were not added (also such charges should roughly balance out on a differential
comparison basis).
Cost
Cask - $30/day X 3 days + 32 kg = $2.81/kg.
Transportation $2870 ÷ 12 containers
+32 kg. = 7.47 kg.
TOTAL $10.28/kg.
B. Spiked:
Container
6000 lb. container having a capacity of 32 kg of Pu and a shield equivalent to 4"
of lead (2800 lb. containers plus 3200 lb. lead). Spiked source would be approxi.
mately 1000 R. Container cost would be about $16,000 and would charge out
for $40/day.
Transport
Same trip and assumptions as under 1A above. Vehicle carrying capacity would
be reduced to 7 containers due to increased weight. Facility costs at mixed oxide
plant for unloading spiked material within the same time frame as 1A was not
included.
Cost
Cask-40X3+32 = $ 3.75/kg.
Transportation $2870 ÷ 7 +32 = $12.84/kg.
TOTAL $16.69/kg.
C. Cost increment of spiked plutonium oxide transport cost over conventional
oxide is $6 to 7/kg.
II. Mixed Oxide Fuel A. Conventional:
Assembly Shipments
Container
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476
Similar to that used for normal U02 fuel assemblies (FA), plus a small amount
of additional shielding. Container and contained assembly would weigh approxi-
mately 3500 lbs. Container cost was assumed as $12,000 with a daily use charge
of $30 day.
Transport
Transport distance and cost would be the same as 1A for a load of 12 fuel assem-
blies. Total turnaround time was assumed as 4 days (rather than the 3 used in 1A)
due to increased fuel assembly handling and storage problems.
Cost
Cask - $30/day X 4 days ÷ 1 F/A $1 20/FA
Transportation $2870~ 12 FA = $240/FA
TOTAL $360/FA
B. Spiked:
Container
A 40,000 lb. (loaded) container having a shield thickness of 21/2" of lead was
assumed with a capacity of 6 fuel assemblies. Cost would be approximately
$120,000 and it would have a daily use charge of $300/day.
Transport
Same as IA except transport capacity is reduced to one container holding six
fuel assemblies.
Cost
Cask-$300/dayX4days~6FA = $200/FA
Transportation $2870 6 FA = $478/FA
TOTAL $678/FA
C. Cost increment of spiked mixed oxide fuel assembly transport over conven-
tional oxide is S300~$400/fuel assembly.
D. Highly spiked mixed oxide fuel assembly shipments
Container
A 44,000 lb. (loaded) container with an equivalent lead thickness of 51/2 inches
would be required. This would have a carrying capacity of three PWR fuel assem-
blies. Since the container weight is approximately the same as that used previ-
ously; cost would similarly be equal at $120,000 (A $300/day use charge).
Transport
Same as I(A (of previous submittal) except that the transport capacity is reduced
to one container holding three fuel assemblies and an additional three day
demurrage charge would be required by the transporter.
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Cost
Cask - $300/day X 7 days ÷ 3 fuel assemblies = $700/Fuel Assembly
Transportation - $2870/trip + 3 X $250/day ÷ 3 fuel assemblies = $1210
TOTAL $1910/FA
E. The transportation cost increment of a highly spiked mixed oxide fuel assem~
bly over conventional oxide would be approximately $1500 per assembly.
71-074 0 - 7e - 31
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The Impact of Spiking on the Utilities
Introduction `Spiking" has been suggested as one of several alternatives to improve safeguard
measures to deter or prevent theft or diversion of plutonium. Papers presenting a
general evaluation of the impact of "spiking" on fabrication and reprocessing
plant operations and costs and on transportation costs have been submitted by
members of the Fuel Cycle Safeguards Study Group. Those papers discussed
various concepts for spiking, evaluated several possible isotopes and reviewed as-
sociated advantages and disadvantages.
The impact on the utility of "spiking" plutonium contained in new fuel assem-
blies will be primarily felt in the areas of:
1. Physical plant
2. Plant operations
3. Personnel exposure
4. Fuel cycle cost
In discussing the impact on utilities, it is assumed that the spiking level, irrespec-
tive of method, is intended to incapacitate or kill a would-be divertor.
Discussion On-site receipt of spiked fuel assemblies can be accommodated only through
substantial modification of present fuel handling facilities and procedures.
Shipping casks for new fuel assemblies must be shielded contributing to substan-
tial increased weight. Of more significance, however, is the requirement for re-
mote handling and its impact on shipping cask design. The present new fuel ship-
ping container designs do not contemplate remote handling. The many bolts and
fasteners on shipping containers which require contact work must be replaced by
locking devices which lend themselves to remote operation. A shipping cont&ner
designed for remote opening and removal of fuel assemblies also reduces the
difficulty and time that unauthorized individuals would have in opening such a
container,
If a self-contained gamma source is placed in the shipping container, facilities
must be provided at the plant site to remotely remove and temporarily store the
source. Conceivably, the new fuel, following the opening of the shipping con-
tainer and source removal, could be handled using existing receipt, inspection
and storage procedures.
If the spiking concept includes fission product retention, intimately mixed
gamma source or induced activity, complete remote handling of new fuel on site
will be required, Existing nuclear plants are not equipped for remote handling of
new fuel assemblies.
The major factors to be considered in remote handling of new fuel are:
1. Location of facilities for opening shipping container. The spent fuel pool of
existing plants could be utilized after substantial modification. As an alter-
nate, a new shielded room with remote handling equipment could be con-
structed.
2. Receipt inspection for transportation damage. Present inspection devices and
procedures do not lend themselves to remote operation. New devices to
measure overall fuel assembly dimensions, envelop, rod spacing, etc and to
provide visual inspection must be designed and built.
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3. New fuel storage facilities. Present new fuel storage facilities will not ac-
commodate spiked new fuel. Spent fuel pools could be utilized. Modification
of new fuel storage areas to include substantial shielding may be possible in
some instances. Construction of a new facility to accommodate spiked fuel
storage is possible.
Location for container opening, receipt inspection and new fuel storage could
conceivably all be accommodated in the spent fuel storage pool after substantial
modification. However, a very real possibility exists that the capacity of the
present spent fuel storage pools will be inadequate to store the quantities of
spent fuel if continued delays in licensing and operation of reprocessing plants
occur. Two alternatives then appear most probable for existing plants. The first
alternative involves substantial plant modification to provide new facilities to
receive, unpack, inspect and store spiked fuel utilizing remote handling. This
alternative will require major capital expenditures and a period of one to three
years to complete. Possibly, an extended plant outage will be required to inter-
connect electrical and mechanical systems. The second alternative is to forego
the use of spiked mixed oxide fuel.
Conclusion Present nuclear plant designs do not accommodate receipt, unpacking, inspec-
tion and storage of spiked new fuel. While a new plant could be designed and
built to provide for remote handling of new fuel, existing plants would require
substantial modification of present facilities, An estimate of the cost for new
plants and for modification of existing plants is not available to the writer.
Procedures for receiving new fuel will be greatly complicated if remote handling
is required; and, personnel exposure could be expected to increase.
In the final analysis, it is the electric customer who will ultimately bear the addi-
tional cost of improved safeguards irrespective of whether such additional costs
stem from changes affecting reprocessing, fabrication, transportation or the
nuclear plant.
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Mixed Oxide Shipping
Introduction One proposal to reduce the risk of transporting plutonium between the repro-
cessor and the fabricator is to ship from the reprocessor a plutonium-enriched
uranium oxide, Several options can be envisioned; the one recently proposed by
Karl Puechl postulates liquid blending of Pu and U as plutonium nitrate and
uranyl fluoride solutions, coprecipitating and then reducing the coprecipitates to
a mixed oxide of very low plutonium content. The recovered U would have been
previously converted to UFe, shipped offsite for enrichment, and then returned
to the reprocessor for blending.
This is likely the most economical case; other blending possibilities include:
1. Converting PWR recovered U to UF6 for enrichment and converting BWR
U to U02 without enrichment; then coprecipitating or blending U and Pu.
2. Separating fission products from the U-Pu and without partitioning the U-Pu,
coprecipitating the mixture. The U enrichment needed would be supplied by
blending in higher enriched U enriched from natural U. This alternate elimi-
nates the need to convert the reprocessed U to UF6.
3. Producing Pu02 at the reprocessor, converting enriched UF6 to U02 and
blending the powders.
The intent of the Puechl proposal would be to produce a "universal" mixed
oxide fuel mix containing very small amounts of plutonium in enriched uranium
which has purported safeguards advantages discussed later,
The suggested plutonium enrichment level is 0.2% to 0.4%. However, based on
projections of LWR fuel fabrication and plutonium availability through 1990,
the average Pu concentration (if Pu were spread uniformly among all operating
LWR's) would exceed 0,4% by 1985. It does not therefore appear feasible to
limit the plutonium composition to only 0.2-0.4% and still utilize all the avail-
able Pu. For the purposes of evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the
dilute blend concept, a 0.6% uniform plutonium composition is assumed.
Risk Comparison The dilute blend concept is proposed as a means to substantially reduce the risk
of diversion in the reprocessor-fabricator transportation leg of the fuel cycle
compared to the previously-assumed and previously-accepted modes of shipping
Pu02 - Its risk can also be compared with other proposals such as co-location,
armored shipments, spiking, etc.
An absolute assessment of the risk is not possible without extensive study (e.g.,
similar to the Rasmussen study on reactor safety). However, the fact that the
dilute blend concept substantially increases the mass required to be diverted to
obtain a needed amount of Pu and complicates and extends the time to convert
the material to weapons quality material constitute real reductions in the com-
bined success probability of diverting and manufacturing a nuclear device com-
pared to the alternative of shipping Pu02 - Compared to co-location of reproces-
sor and fabricator, the risk is higher. Compared to armored transportation of
Pu02, the risk is probably lower, since it is not obvious that shipping of the
dilute blend material would not also require armored protection.
Whereas, the concept can indeed result in a real risk reduction compared to
other alternatives, the value of this reduction may not be apparent to the public,
who will well be the final judge in the use of plutonium. Plutonium is plutonium
to the average layman, and to convince him that a long convoy of armored
trucks containing massive amounts of U02 Pu02 is safer than a smaller armored
convoy containing more concentrated Pu02 will be difficult. Likewise, the
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increased time and complexity in converting the material to a weapon by the use
of the dilute blend concept will also not be given much weight by the public,
again for the reasons cited.
Thus, one can conclude that, although the concept does provide a real reduction
in the success of illicit use of plutonium, this reduction will not be sufficiently
understood or creditedby the public to be a useful alternate in achieving an
acceptable plutonium safeguards program. This conclusion is subjective, and to
be fair it is necessary to look at the other cited advantages of the concept.
Economics The proposed plutonium recycle mode using the 0.2-0.4% plutonium enriched
mixed oxide does achieve a better neutron economy in the reactor since the plu-
tonium is spread out more uniformly in the fuel resulting in less self-shielding.
The February 20, 1975, Nucleonics Week article, which described the Puechl
approach, quotes a savings of 40% (vs. 15% for conventional plutonium recycle)
in enrichment requirements and a savings of 16% (vs. 12%) in uranium require-
ments. This quotation is in error. What Mr. Puechl claims is that the SWU value
of the plutonium is increased by 25% and the ore value is increased by 6%. These
savings appear to be reasonable. Calculations for a BWR give the results shown in
the table below:
ORE and SWU Savings
No Recycle Conventional Dilute Blend
____________ Recycle Recycle
3 w/o U02 1h HM at 3.15 0.6 w/o Pu02'2.4
w/oMO w/oUO2
% HM at 3.00 (No enrichment
w/o U02 penalty)
SWU/Kg U 4.306 3.23 3.018
Kg Feed/kg U 5.479 4.359 4.305
SWU Savings
vs.No
Recycle - 1.076 (25%) 1.288 (29.9%)
Kg Feed
Savings vs.
No Recycle - 1.12 (20.4%) 1.174 (21.4%)
The table shows that the SWU value of plutonium recycle is 30% by the use of
dilute plutonium (0.6%)~compared to 25% for conventional recycle, which is a
relative increase of 20% (compared to the 25% quoted above). The uranium feed
savings increase is 5% relative (compared to the 6% quoted above). Redoing these
calculations at 0.2 or 0.4% Pu would yield slightly higher savings.
Assuming that SWUs equilibrate at about $100/unit, the enrichment savings
resulting from the dilute blend fuel could amount to as much as $25/kg mixed
oxide fuel. Likewise, savings in uranium could amount to another $2'$4/kg
mixed oxide fuel assuming yellowcake in the $15-$30/ pound range.
These pure economic savings are substantial if recycle of plutonium is carried
out in the U.S. Five years ago, these savings could be assumed to be fully ob-
tainable. However, in today's regulatory climate, the introduction of a universal
plutonium "contaminated" fuel to the entire LWR fuel fabrication and trans-
portation process augments the cost of manufacturing LWR fuel in several
ways and all or most of these savings will be eroded.
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First, the fact that plutonium must now be processed in fuel plants which other-
wise were designed for U02 fuel fabrication alone will require expensive (and
perhaps impossiblel backfitting of existing plants and more costly design and
construction of new plants to meet 11 the more stringent accounting and securi-
ty requirements for strategic SNM, 2) the hardening requirements for natural
phenomena, and 31 greater contamination control (glove box) and shielding re-
quirements. Every LWR fuel manufacturing plant becomes a mixed-oxide plant
with lowered efficiency and higher manufacturing costs. The savings afforded by
the improved neutron economy will be offset to a major degree.
Second, the transportation costs will also increase since it is not prudent to
assume that the postulated reduced risks in transportation would eliminate the
need for guarded and armored convoys. In contrast to the case wherein only
Pu02 shipments to the fabricator require armor protection, now all shipments
(U and Pu) to the fabricator would require such protection. Although the mass
of oxide in the shipments increases by 150-500 times (0.2-0.6% Pu), the increase
in shipment mass or volume may not be as great due to the reduced shielding
requirements in the dilute form. Nevertheless, the penalty will be large and
causes further erosion of the SWU and ore savings discussed earlier.
Third, additional facilities will be required at the reprocessing plant. A hydrolysis
plant is needed to convert the enriched UF6 to a liquid form amenable for copre-
cipitation with plutonium. Estimated size is 3000 MT/year per reprocessing
plant. A U-Pu coprecipitation plant to produce the dilute mixed oxide is
required at each reprocessing plant also sized at 3000 MT/year. On the other
hand, the plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide conversion plant would be elimi-
nated. The net cost of these changes will be positive, and again act to erode the
SWU and ore savings.
Other Factors The major economic advantage resulting from decreased SWU and uranium re-
quirements will be offset by the cost penalties discussed. The safeguards im-
provements, while real, are not judged to be important when viewed by the
public. There are other factors which also need discussion.
1. The concept requires an all-or-nothing approach. The entire LWR industry
must adopt it. The concept could be initiated prior to 1980-85 and would
require a substantial reorientation in the LWR fuel cycle industry.
2. The radiotoxicity of the material handled in the mixed oxide fuel fabrication
process is reduced by virtue of the uranium dilution, but overall the radio-
toxicity risk is substantially increased since now there will be no low toxicity
U02 processing.
3. The shielding requirements are reduced by about 35% over that required for
conventional mixed oxide processing. However, this reduction is not large
enough to eliminate shielding in view of ALAP, and, furthermore, shielding
requirements will be extended into the entire LWR fuel line.
4. The "hot particle" controversy is softened in that the radiation from a fuel
particle is substantially reduced by virtue of the uranium dilution. However,
the issue of the "hot particle" can be refuted technically, and although the
controversy still rages, emissions from existing mixed oxide plants are low
enough to offset entirely any MPC reductions required to negate any "hot
particle "effect on the public.
Preferred Alternate A mixed oxide blend composition in the range of 30% PuO2 may provide safe-
guards advantages without penalizing the fabrication process. Although not
known from unclassified information, there should be some level of uranium
concentration in Pu02 which effectively makes it impossible to make a nuclear
weapon without chemical separation of the U and Pu. Thus, part of the safe-
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483
guards advantage credited to the dilute blend concept is preserved. Such a mix
may well serve as an ideal input to the mixed oxide fabricator for it can result
in easier fabrication particularly, with respect to Pu particle size. Additionally,
it ameliorates the "hot particle" problem and is fully dissolvable in the reproces-
sor's head end, One potential disadvantage to the fabricator is that now the
activity of mixed oxide powder with respect to making good pellets is more de-
pendent on the MO pdwder than in the case of blending Pu02 and U02 at the
fabricator, If industry must accept a blend concept as a solution to the safe
transporting of plutonium, this concept would be by far the preferred route.
Summary and Conclusions In view of the discussion above, the dilute blend concept is not considered a
viable alternate to improve the overall safeguards in that part of the transporta-
tion leg between reprocessor and fabricator, Other options of higher assurance
and public acceptance exist, Further, the economic advantages resulting from
improved neutron economy in the use of mixed oxide fuel will be offset by real
cost penalties in transportation, fuel fabrication and preparation of the dilute
blend, "universal" mixed oxide form. An alternate concept employing a higher
plutonium content mixed oxide product from the reprocessor (30% Pu02, for
example) offers some of the safeguards advantages of the dilute blend approach
and is vastly more practical from a fuel fabrication standpoint, If blending is
found to be a necessary alternate, industry would be much more receptive to
the latter approach.
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Co-location
Locating mixed-oxide fabrication plants in close proximity or adjacent to repro-
cessing plants in integrated fuel cycle facilities (co-location) has been suggested
as a means for improving the safeguarding of plutonium. Shipment of plutonium
in its pure form between reprocessing and fabrication facilities is thought to be
particularly vulnerable to attempted acts of theft or sabotage, and, to the extent
that such shipments would be minimized or eliminated, the safeguarding of plu-
tonium would be enhanced by co-location. Co-located facilities might also make
it possible to use physical protection measures more efficiently to prevent theft
of plutonium.
While the concept of co-location appears to have significant merit, there are a
number of social, economic, environmental and political factors which require
careful analysis and which might make the concept of co-location difficult to
realize in practice. Several of these factors are discussed below with the intent
of illustrating several potential difficulties with co-location, rather than of pro-
viding an in-depth analysis of the many factors involved. While these difficul-
ties do not necessarily preclude co-location, they do serve to illustrate that care-
ful evaluation of the relative benefits and costs of co-location with respect to
alternate methods of improving safeguards should be performed before recom-
mendations to proceed with co-location are made. Some of the more obvious
concerns with co-location are discussed below:
1. Existing Facilities
The current domestic mixed-oxide fabrication capacity for light-water reactors is
approximately 50-75 MT per year. This capacity is largely comprised of five fa-
cilities diversely located in the states of Washington, California, Oklahoma and
Pennsylvania. There is currently no domestic reprocessing facility in operation.
The AGNS plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, however, is well advanced in con-
struction and should be operational in 1976. The NFS plant at West Valley, New
York may also be operational with an expanded capacity by approximately
1979. Although construction of additional fabrication facilities is anticipated to
begin within the next few years, the mixed-oxide fuels industry will have to rely
on these existing facilities and possibly upon non-domestic sources of fabrication
until the early 1980's.
The diverse geographic locations of these existing reprocessing and fabrication
facilities preclude co-location during the early and essential development stage
of the mixed-oxide fuel industry. Consequently, the issue of safeguarding plu-
tonium during transport must be satisfactorily resolved in the near-term, inde-
pendent of the question of co-location. Assuming that procedures and/or equip-
ment are developed which would allow plutonium to be shipped with adequate
safeguards, as indeed they must if the mixed-oxide fuel industry is to evolve to
the stage where co-location could be implemented, would imply that the deci-
sion on co-location becomes not one of safeguards, but rather one of economics.
That is, once these procedures for the safe shipment are developed, co-location is
not necessitated by safeguards considerations, and the decision to develop inte-
grated facilities would then be based on the relative economic merits of the cost
of co-location and the cost of plutonium transportation.
2. Evolution of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Industry
In the Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxides (GESMO), the
demand for mixed-oxide fuel fabrication capacity was assumed to be met by the
periodic introduction of 300 MT/yr model commercial scale facilities, with
approximately five such facilities required by 1990. While such an assumption is
adequate for evaluating the environmental impact of fabrication facilities, the
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485
actual evolution of domestic fabrication capacity is expected to deviate mark-
edly from this scenario. There are currently a relatively large number of fuel
vendors, each of which has tentative commitments to supply mixed-oxide fuel
at such time as the NRC would allow plutonium recycle and commercial repro-
cessing capability becomes available. As a result, it is anticipated that construc-
tion of a number of fabrication plants would be initiated between now and the
early 80's. The initial capacity of each of these plants is likely to be 50-100
MT/yr, with the capability of eventual expansion to 300-400 MT/yr. The evolu-
tion of the fabrication industry thus is expected to be characterized by the early
introduction of a relatively large number of facilities capable of eventual expan-
sion to the 300 MT/yr capacity of the GESMO standard plant. The early intro-
duction of a number of small capacity facilities is necessary to meet individual
vendor commitments, while the capability to expand to the 300 MT/yr through-
put is necessary for economic reasons,
GESMO identifies the need for about five reprocessing plants of 1500 MT/yr
capacity by 1990. Since reprocessing plants smaller than 1500 MT/year do not
appear economically attractive, reprocessing plant additions are expected
to follow the sequence identified in GESMO, i,e,, the periodic addition of
1500 MT/year units, rather than the introduction and subsequent expansion
of a number of small-capacity facilities as in the case of fabrication
plants.
Through the early 1980's, the AGNS facility at Barnwell and, after 1979, the
NFS facility at West Valley, New York are expected to be the sole source
of domestic capability. According to the GESMO timetable, the next addi-
tion to reprocessing capacity should come on line in 1983, but unless the
questions of safeguards and recycle are rapidly resolved and commitments
made relatively shortly for this plant, expansion of domestic reproces-
sing capacity will undoubtedly be delayed beyond 1983. If co-location of
fabrication facilities were a requirement, it would become necessary for
many of the fuel fabricators to begin construction of fabrication facili-
ties adjacent to one of the two reprocessing plants currently under con-
struction or expansion. During the early 80's, an integrated facility
might then consist of a single reprocessing plant and a number of fabrica-
tion facilities.
At the larger of the two reprocessing plants, the AGNS facility at Barnwell
with a 15,000 MT/year throughput, one might anticipate the construction of
possibly three or more fabrication plants. The AGNS facility can support ap-
proximately 300 MT/year of mixed-oxide fabrication capacity, and consequently
the reprocessing plant capacity and the fabrication plant capacities will be
well matched during the early years when the fabrication plants are operating
at 50-100 MT/year throughputs.
However, as the quantities of plutonium in the fuel cycle increase, additional
reprocessing and fabrication capacity will be required. Additional fabrica-
tion capacity could most efficiently be obtained by expanding fabrication
facilities adjacent to the reprocessing plant. If shipment of plutonium were
to be avoided at this time, the required additional reprocessing capacity
would have to be constructed at these original sites. Co-location, conse-
quently, is likely to result in a mature industry in which reprocessing and
fabrication facilities are concentrated at a very few sites, with possibly
two or three 15,000 MT/year reprocessing plants and two or three 300 MT/year
fabrication plants located at each site. While such complexes may prove feasi-
ble, a number of issues require careful evaluation before implementation of
such a policy is considered: namely, the local environmental impact of these
large complexes, public and political acceptance of such large plutonium facil-
PAGENO="0490"
486
ities, and the possible increase in hazards and safeguards risks associated
with shipping spent fuel and fresh mixed-oxide fuel long distances to these
localized complexes.
Of course, the development of these multi-reprocessing plant complexes could
be avoided if fabrication plant sizes were limited to 50-100 MT/yr capacities,
so that each fuel manufacturer would have to construct fabrication facilities
at several reprocessing plants at various geographical locations, If the indus-
try were to move in that direction, the fabrication plants of vendors would be
so fragmented and the throughput per plant so small that fabrication prices
would consequently be very high. In order to avoid this problem, one would
have to make arrangements to consolidate fabrication facilities at each repro-
cessing plant into one facility that would service all fuel vendors; the legal
problems with this concept and the impact on competitive pricing are obvious.
Even if one assumes that the industry could somehow satisfactorily reach the
mature 1990 situation without the necessity of large multi-unit reprocessing
complexes or fragmented fabrication facilities, co-location would still not
be without serious difficulties. In the mature 1990 industry, five 1,500
MT/yr reprocessing plants and a like number of 300 MT/yr fabrication plants
would be required. Presumably, there would be five complexes, each containing
a reprocessing and a fabrication facility located at various geographic
locations throughout the country. It is, first of all, difficult to see how
such complexes could, in practice, develop. Would a reprocessor risk the
large capital investment required when his market was tied to the success of
the single fabricator located in the complex, or would the fabricator invest
in a facility until the reprocessing plant is built and proven? The success
of such a complex would be so inter-dependent on the success of the two facili-
ties that it is difficult to envision such complexes except under single own-
ership. Whilesuch single ownership is a possibility, it would mean the inte-
gration of concerns with the respective technologies, which may well raise
legal questions, and also few single concerns could provide the necessary
capital investment; there is the possibility that government subsidy or own-
ership may be required if such facilities are actually to be constructed. Even
if constructed by private isdustry, such complexes would likely adversely
affect the competitive marketplace, since a utility would have to contract
for the combination of reprocessing and fabrication prices, rather than the
best price for each service as would be possible if shipment of plutonium
were allowed.
In summary, while co-location might appear as a straightforward method for im-
proving the safeguarding of plutonium, it cannot serve as the sole solution to
this problem in the early stages of the industry, and would lead to an unac-
ceptable situation as the industry matures if complete co-location were re
quired. The most advisable course of action would be to retain co-location as
an option and as an alternative to the costly shipment of plutonium. As such,
co-location might be expected to evolve naturally from economic considerations
to the extent feasible, and problems identified above could be largely
avoided.
PAGENO="0491"
487
Mr. GRAHAM. The conclusions the study group reached, which I
think are relevant to this hearing are:
That a number of technical options are available to reduce
further the risk of criminal diversion in the transport of pluto-
nium;
That these currently available technical options for protecting
shipments of plutonium can provide increased safeguards at an
acceptable cost;
That process options such as blending plutonium and uranium
oxides can reduce the utility of the material for criminal pur-
poses; and
That colocation of future reprocessing and fuel fabrication
plants could reduce further the risks of criminal diversion of
plutonium shipments, but at the expense of imposing institu-
tional problems. Economic incentives may warrant colocations
at some future time.
From these conclusions the study group carefully weighed the
advantages and disadvantages of the various technical options in-
cluding denaturing or spiking, mixing or blending, modes of trans-
portation, and colocation of reprocessing plants and mixed oxide fuel
fabrication facilities. The results of the analysis are summarized in
the recommendations made in the report.
These recommendations include various alternatives to improve
and/or to reduce the cost of plutonium safeguards. The report's rec-
ommendations include:
Transporting plutonium oxide in safe, secure vans with special
escort vehicles;
Integration of industry shipments with the ERDA high fre-
quency communications network and response system; and
Retaining the option to transport plutonium oxide between
fuel reprocessing and fabrication plants, and as the industry
grows, to colocate such plants as an economic alternative.
Other alternatives considered in the report which are available to
improve safeguards and/or to reduce costs include reducing the num-
ber of shipments, blending of 20-30 percent plutonium oxide in
uranium oxide at the reprocessing plants to decrease the utility of the
material for criminal diversion, and the use of helicopter transport
for direct delivery within the flight range of the equipment.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony reviews some of the nuclear indus-
try's activities and foresight in providing adequate domestic safe-
guards, and indicates that leadership exercised by members of the
industry in developing safeguards measures for the licensing of plu-
tonium recycle.
In closing I would like to summarize by stating two broad conclu-
sions reached as a result of the Forum committee's studies and
assessment of domestic nuclear safeguards:
The first is that safeguards measures must have the flexibility
to respond to changes in threat assessment and to changes in the
quantities and types of material being utilized in the commercial
fuel cycle.
The second conclusion is that current concepts and equip-
ment are available to provide flexibility in safeguards systems.
PAGENO="0492"
488
These concepts and equipment can provide increased protection
in response to changes in threat assessment, and can support the
commercial licensing of plutonium recycle at a cost which is
small relative to the gain which is achievable by the use of plu-
tonium in the fuel cycle.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today, Mr. Chairman,
and would be pleased to answer any questions you or the committee
members may have.
Mr. T50NGA5. We have a copy of your inserts, I believe, do we
not?
Mr. GRAHAM. Which inserts, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. T50NGA5. You indicated that there were addenda that you
had submitted to the staff for inclusion in the record.
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, that is correct. I sent to the staff two copies of
the cost study of the technical options study and of the committee
recommendations to the NCR.. Also a list of the members of the
Forum committee.
Mr. TsoNGAs. That material has been inserted at a previous point
in the record.
Dr. Taylor, your approach was quite philosophical in looking at
the immediate problem of security. I could ask you a great broad
range of questions about level of risk, what is acceptable, and who is
to decide and so forth.
For the sake of argument can we assume that we shall have
nuclear energy, and assume that we want to do what we can to make
it as safe as possible within reasonable limits. How would you go
about defining risk and determining who should make that definition
and at what point we begin to accept those risks?
Dr. TAYLOR. It is because I cannot answer that question thoroughly
and with conviction that I made the statement that I was having
difficulty in identifying a specific set of recommendations for what
we ought to do.
As to who should define what risks are acceptable, I have given
that a lot of thought and it seems to me that in the United States
the best body of people to do that is probably the Congress. I know
of no way to get some sense of what the general public believes is
acceptable nationally other than through the Congress, since the
public is represented by Members of Congress.
Mr. TsoNGAs. Let me interrupt if I can. Is it not true that histori-
cally in terms of new technologies that society does undertake new
risks that generally what you have is not a determination by a Con-
gress or a Chief Executive but rather no determination, for example,
automobiles.
Fifty thousand people die each year in automobiles. No one has
said that that is acceptable. Yet no one has said it is not acceptable
and by no one doing anything, the simple state of inertia implies we
do accept that risk. The same is true of commercial aircraft and so
forth.
Dr. TAYLOR. That is correct. And I think that if nuclear energy
had the property that the kinds of risks that it involves were sub-
ject to statistical analysis-for example, if one could say how~many
events of the kind one is concerned about, like automobile accidents,
PAGENO="0493"
489
have actually occurred each year-I think it would then not be nec-
essary to take a consensus.
The difficulty with nuclear energy is that we are talking about
risks of future events, none of which have yet happened. That puts
it in a very different category of risk assessment, and makes the
decisions as to whether or not to proceed with it, and in what form
and on what scale and with what safeguards, so extremely difficult
to deal with.
We have no statistics yet-to first order we can say there is no
risk because nothing has happened yet. It is for that reason that the
public in general has no way of judging at all how likely it is that a
threat to use nuclear explosives for terroristic purposes or whatever
develop, whereas, it does have some basis for at least having a rough
idea of the chances of being killed if someone decides to drive from
New York to Los Angeles.
Lacking that, let me say a negative thing or two about the risk
business. That is to say, that I have believed for many years that an
assessment of what the risks are and what risks should be acceptable
or accepted or inherent in the nuclear industry should not be made
outside of public view by a combination of the nuclear industry and
the executive branch of the Government. I feel that very strongly.
That is not just because there is a real or apparent conflict of
interest. It is because I can see no way that the sense of what people
really want is likely to be represented by those people. That is why
I keep coming back to the Congress. Now I see huge difficulties in
actually implementing that.
I can visualize, I suppose, a situation where the NRC, for exam-
ple, makes its determination of what it thinks the risks are and
helps us to deal with them and presents them in detail to Congress.
I would go so far as to suggest: that the first proposals for how to
handle a full blown industry with plutonium recycle should be sub-
ject to a vote of both Houses of Congress. This sounds perhaps out-
landish but I really do believe, along with Senator Symington and a
number of other people, that what we are talking about is the most
serious risk in the whole world-the world's most serious problem-
and I think we have to deal with it as such.
I realize this is not a clear proposal, fraught with great difficul-
ties, but it is what comes to mind at the moment as a way of decid-
ing whether what is being proposed by the executive branch is
acceptable.
Mr. TSONGAS. In that contention, the first session I have had on
nuclear energy, someone had shown some figures on the number of
people who would die because of:: respiratory diseases from the burn-
ing of coal to generate electricity, so it was suggested that at least as
to that process, there is a quantified number of deaths per kilo-
watt-hour or however you want to: calibrate it.
Would it not also have to be part of the equation, that if you do
not go in this direction you go in this direction and this is what we
know would be the consequences of that approach?
Dr. TAYLOR. I agree with that completely and I should have said
in the answer that I started to give to your question that part of the
decision, whether or not a certain: residual level of risk is acceptable,
PAGENO="0494"
490
will require an understanding of what the risks are in connection
with other alternatives, such greater use of coal for example; or
with the likely delays in substituting on a big scale another alterna-
tive that may carry fewer risks like solar energy.
I flatly state that the technical knowledge necessary to make an
assessment that will compare nuclear energy with other forms of
energy in such a way as to tell one whether safeguards are adequate
or not does not exist and one of my concerns about the present situa-
tion is that I have no clear evidence that EIRDA is setting about to
narrow the uncertainties in these questions about alternatives on all
fronts sufficiently so that we can say here are the kinds of worse
things that are likely to happen associated with nuclear power
development, with fusion, with gasification of coal and so on and so
on, to allow anybody-whether it is the Congress or anybody else-
to make a rationally defensible statement to the public about why a
decision to count more on nuclear power, count as we are on it, or to
try to wind it down.
It is for that reason I find that I cannot come out on either side
of the question, are you strongly in favor of nuclear power?
I do not know. I do not know what the risks inherent in the alter-
natives really are. Some of them are huge.
Mr. TSONGAS. But you would agree that if we go to the next gen-
eration which is the plutonium cycle, that the order of magnitude of
risk is so much greater than it would warrant the kind of study that
you are suggesting?
Dr. TAYLOR. Yes, I would have to say that I would be strongly
opposed to starting plutonium recycle until effective safeguards sys-
tems have been demonstrated. That is a conviction based on a sense,
a feeling about the relative advantages of going to plutonium recy-
cle as compared with not. It is not the result of a careful assessment
of other alternatives in some quantitative sense, but it is a gut feel-
ing, however a strong one.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver.
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Graham, you said on page 10 of your testimony
that:
When the costs are related to the cost of generating electricity it amounts to
about a 0.6 percent increase in the cost of nuclear power, assuming a total
power cost of 12 mills per kilowatt-hour.
Do you have the gross dollar figure on that that you used?
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, in the study on page 2-3 it states that the
total plutonium safeguards cost is $2,450 per kilogram of plutonium-
and that number is worked out in detail in the study, Mr Weaver.
Mr. WEAVER. Now, this 0.6 percent represents the cost of safe-
guarding the recycling process alone; is that it?
Mr. GRAHAM. That is correct, sir. Just the reprocessing plants,
transportation linkages, fuel fabrication plants. Wherever the plu-
tonium would be handled in a~
Mr. WEAVER. Not the plant itself?
Mr. GRAHAM. Not the nuclear reactor generating plant, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. How much does that add? You say a kilogram of
plutonium-
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
PAGENO="0495"
491
Mr. WEAVER. How many dollars?
Mr. GRAHAM. $2,450 per kilogram is for safeguarding the pluton-
ium in the fuel cycle where it is in a form which can be used for
criminal purposes.
Mr. WEAVER. Per kilogram.
How much of this plutonium is thrown off or will have to be recy-
cled by a 1,000-megawatt plant?
Mr. GRAHAM. I think the number is about 250 kilograms, 200 to
250 kilograms per year.
Mr. MTEAVER. Per year?
Dr. Taylor, you say you do not want to come down for or against
power, nuclear, that is, because of the unanswerable questions. Do
you have a feeling of uneasiness with nuclear power? You know
with public works you must have a cost-benefit ratio of greater than
1. Do you believe the costs are greater than the benefits in nuclear
power?
Dr. TAYLOR. Well, I do have that uneasy feeling. The costs of any
energy production system that are important are just not the dollar
costs of capital and operating costs associated with the system.
There are also whatever costs there may be to society of side effects.
Those costs in some cases can be higher than the cost of the systems.
I think-
Mr. WEAVER. That is what I meant to imply.
Dr. TAYLOR. And I am very uneasy about our ability to state what
those costs are in connection with any very large-scale development.
I think I should say, however, that from all knowledge that I have
of the character of respective energy sources, the one that by far
carries with it the lowest external or side-effect costs-this is now
independently of the internal costs-is application of solar energy.
Solar energy is fundamentally weak in the sense that it is difficult to
collect but that in my mind is one of its greatest virtues. It is
difficult to use solar energy destructively on a large scale. I think
that may turn out to be its biggest virtue.
Whatever is done in terms of nuclear energy development I have
no doubt that in my mind that safeguards need to be improved sub-
stantially over what they are now.
I would say though that the efforts to develop solar energy appli-
cation on a very big scale I think should have the highest priority
of any energy development in the United States and I would say
incidentally worldwide. That is ilot now the case.
Mr. WEAVER. We are going to have a hearing on next Wednesday
in the afternoon here in this room with Dr. Seamans to go over the
ERDA budget and that is the point I would try to make at that
hearing.
Something that has not been said much about solar energy, and in
talking to the building trades Officials now is that of course solar
energy would produce many more jobs than nuclear and I am trying
to get them to shift away from nuclear to solar because it would, of
course, enhance the job situation for their unions.
If you want jobs in this Nation, then you should want to go to
solar. Nuclear is just a capital intensive industry and hinders the
expanded employment we so badly need. Back on the safeguards, I
PAGENO="0496"
492
read Mr. Graham's list of redundant and unique features and it
sounds to me like a concentration camp, "use of multiple perimeter
barb wire systems," "multiple intrusion sensor systems," and we
tried that sort of thing in Vietnam, the McNamara wall.
"Increasing the size of security guard forces," "use of detectors
for metal, special nuclear material and explosives," et cetera, et
cetera. Are we creating a society that we will not want to live in for
the sake of another air conditioner? These are the questions that I
think have to be asked.
Dr. TAYLOR. My answer to that is no. I do not think it follows at
all that the kinds of security measures th'at the atomic industrial
forum, for example, is calling for or recommending, or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in its look at what it may consider recom-
mending in the future, I do not believe that those will lead to any-
thing that would necessarily lead to anything we would call a garri-
son sta.te. The reason for that is I think well explored in a number
of papers on this.
I believe this is in the Atomic Industrial Forum statement. That
is the number of guards, the number ~f facilities, and employees
subjected to security clearance is really quite small compared to the
numbers of people in that state for other reasons today.
I must say-
Mr. WEAVER. This includes transportation.
Dr. TAYLOR. Yes. In fact transportation calls for more security
people if it is applied in a heavy way to the transportation of fuel,
which I certainly strongly advocate, more than any other part of the
fuel cycle. But nevertheless, the numbers are still small in the sense
that by the midnineties, in the projections that NRC and the indus-
try are making these days for nuclear power, the total number of
guards that would be involved for a very heavily guarded system is
somewhat less than 10,000. Now that alone sounds like a very big
number but to put that in. perspective there are something like
500,000 local, State, and military police officers now in the United
States. So that number is small compared to what we are used to.
I should say that it is quite possible that any security system, par-
ticularly the investigative arm if there should be some incidents, as
we have seen in this country in the recent past, can be heavily
abused. We have to look out for that very carefully. But I think it
is wrong to argue that there will be-that there will have to be psy-
chological profiles taken or polygraphs taken of employees every so
often and then say how bad that would be because as far as I know
that is not under serious consideration now by the NRC. In other
words, it is a kind of a strawman self-shot down. I think we have to
be very alert to abuses of civil liberties, particularly if events begin
to take place. I am more concerned about that than before an event
takes place.
If there is-one can imagine a situation in which a real theft takes
place and then a great massive abrogation of civil liberties takes
place. I think we should avoid that.
Mr. WEAVER. You are saying then that-
Dr. TAYLOR. It does not necessarily hold.
Mr. WEAVER. The majority of these nuclear plants will not create
an armed camp in this Nation. It would be limited to-your concern
PAGENO="0497"
493
is about nuclear in any event from another point of view that we are
probably taking the most dangerous substance we have ever created
and spreading it around?
Dr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I am also concerned that about my own feel-
ings of what is adequate in terms of security does not call for zero
risk at all would be quite different from your own or someone else's
and it is for that reason that I am very troubled about the lack of a
clear mechanism for getting a consensus of what risks should be
acceptable. I feel from experience that I am probably more prone to
be willing to state at least that I would accept a much higher level
of risk than most people. I found that as a matter of experience.
Mr. WEAVER. Dr. Tamplin, do you agree with this idea of the
armed camp, the need for guards and whatnot?
Dr. TAMPLIN. Well, I guess I would have to say with respect to
the civil liberties implications and so forth, with, respect to the
investigative arms that are or would be part of this system, that my
level of tolerance is certainly much lower than Dr. Taylor would
indicate that his is. I just have a feeling as we have watched the
events in the last couple of years relative to abuses of our police
powers that this might be a fairly general opinion that is held
within the United States. This idea of armed camps is somewhat
scary particularly when you get involved in the transportation
phase.
You cannot just go out and give anybody an automatic weapon
and send him out to guard your: material. You have to be careful of
the qualifications of these people because they are going to run into
situations. We look at Kent State as an example of improper actions
in this type of thing.
This whole idea of risk in nuclear power debate-automobile acci-
dents always come up in some measure, 50 thousand people killed
upon our highways every year. Somehow or other we get the impres-
sion that the American people accept that. I doubt if that is true at
all.
You know we have the Green Cross that is continually trying to
reduce the accident rate.
Most people drive their automobiles, I would say this is a great
majority of them, much more safely than this 50,000 death rate
would indicate.
People do not have the same risk assessment that the picture of
society looks like. As I understand, half of the fatal accidents are a
result of drunk driving and somehow or another I do not think 100
percent of the U.S. population drives while drunk.
Mr. WEAVER. Dr. Tamplin, I would mention one thing that has
surprised me in my naiveté in these 2 days of hearings, that is how
much this information is either classified or restrained from speak-
ing openly and this bothers me a :great deal when we have a bureauc-
racy that manages an industry and yet Members of Congress are not
allowed the information they need just simply to figure out whether
it is being done properly.
So you ~sk a question, How :much nuclear fuel has been lost?
"Well, we cannot tell you." That is the answer. You ask all these
questions and they are all secret areas and the more we would build
71-074 0 - 76 - 32
PAGENO="0498"
494
up secrecy in this Nation, certainly the more areas of potential abuse
of security systems exists, I would think.
Dr. TAMPLIN. Yes, I would think within the NRC today and
within ERDA there are individuals who besides being somewhat
concerned about their job, if they do speak out, that is, relative to
the hazards or the conditions associated with nuclear power, that a
number of these people are somewhat intimidated by the fact that
they have security clearances and that their security clearance itself
may be put in jeopardy.
I know from my own experience-and, of course, this has come
out-there are a lot of materials that have been classified secret that
are only sensitive, sensitive to the agency, not because they contain
any classified information in them but because the agency would just
prefer not to hive them put out publicly.
Mr. WEAVER. I understand. I just want to ask one more question.
Yesterday we were told by eminent witnesses that it was next to
impossible to sabotage a nuclear plant.
Is this your understanding?
Dr. TAMPLIN. Well, that certainly has never been my understand-
ing.
Mr. T5ONGA5. Let me interject. I think the question was to the
point of melt down.
Mr. WEAVER. Right, he did say that.
Dr. TAMPLIN. I see no reason- why they should make that state-
ment. There was a GAO report that looked into the security of
nuclear powerplants, and Dr. Ray was still Chairman of the AEC
and the letter was to Dr. Ray indicating that under present security
at the nuclear reactor two to three people could easily take over the
reactor and that this was also a conclusion of the people in the AEC
who had responsibility for reactor security.
Now, once you get into a reactor with all of the knowledge today
that people have about shaped charges, with the kind of equipment
that has been stolen from national armories and so forth, for some-
one to say that a nuclear powerplant could not be easily sabotaged
all the way to melt down seems to me to be an incredibly naive
statement.
Mr. WEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TSOXGAS. It is my intent that, Mr. Seiberling, we go to 3
o'clock. I have further questions which I will submit in writing to
you so that the later panel can be reasonably on time.
Mr. Seiberling.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I do not think I will have to go to 3 o'clock, Mr.
Chairman. I just have a couple of questions.
Mr. Graham, in your study you referred to in your statement
which outlined various factors to be included in a plan for adequate
safeguards, one of them was that the committee believed that the
Federal Government could be the most effective manager of response
forces and that private, State and local forces as well as Federal
should be utilized but under Government control.
That would imply that for purposes of nuclear safety and security
we would have in effect a Federal police force, which is something
we have never had in this country. I am wondering if you could
elaborate on that?
PAGENO="0499"
495
Mr. GRAhAM. No, sir; I do not see it in the same way that you
have described it.
The same forces that exist today would be utilized, but with gov-
ernment coordination. Of course; one of the difficulties in use of the
forces is jurisdictional problems. For example the National Guard,
if it were necessary, and in some cases with State, county, and local
forces, there are jurisdictional boundaries that need to be worked
out ahead of time it is a problem for the organization that has coor-
dination over all of them or at least management control, to be able
to organize and make sure that :they could meet the responsibilities
that would be necessary in response forces.
But it would not be a-it would not be a standing force of Fed-
feral-
Mr. SEIBERLING. In other words the Federal Government would
try to coordinate all of these forces.
Mr. GRAHAM. That is correct.
Dr. TAYLOR. Could I make a brief comment on this point?
Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes, go ahead.
Dr. TAYLOR. There is experience with a Federal transport service
which in fact used armed guards under direct Federal authority,
that was the old post office. That was a government department and
post office guards in the old post office were charged with armed pro-
tection of registered mail for example. There was a great deal of
this. I strongly endorse the Atomic Industrial Forum proposal that
transport of these materials be, under Federal authority. And I
would go a little further and say we have had experience with that
and it is that kind of a Federal system that I would strongly advo-
cate be instituted to transport all nuclear materials.
Dr. TAMPLIN. The forum has indicated, Mr. Chairman, setting up
these communication centers.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I was going to get into that.
Dr. TAMPLIN. This is in the report. And the FBI specifically
decided not to do that because it would become a national police
force.
Mr. SEIBERLING. That was my next question. The committee report
also suggests a national communications system and command center
perhaps including regional centers to monitor the status of fixed
sites and materials in transit and support and coordinated response
forces in the event of attempted sabotage or overt diversion.
What are the implications of that in terms of the numbers of
people and the extent of Federal overseeing of this whole system?
Mr. GRAHAM. It appears very~ small. It would be just a small
group that would monitor communications and have good communi-
cation links, with the various organizations for response.
Perhaps I should go back just a bit. The response forces as such
are not those that are on the site or that make up the normal protec-
tion. They are those forces which can be called into action when a
diversion or an attack takes place.
Mr. SEIBERLING. That can be anywhere.
Mr. GRAHAM. That could be anywhere.
Mr. SEIBERLING. So in effect this means that Federal coordination-
at least for purposes of protection against atomic sabotage and so
forth-all the police forces of the country would be involved.
PAGENO="0500"
496
Mr. GRAHAM. Well, do they not have that responsibility now?
Mr. SEIBERLING. They certainly do not.
Mr. GRAHAM. To have some kind of a response-"if we call upon
you will you provide us help ?"
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well-
Mr. GRAHAM. That is all it is saying.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, I suppose they have that but they do not
coordinate police forces all over the country. They may exchange
information about crimes and that sort of thing.
Mr. GRAHAM. Do they not whenever there is a crime committed,
don't the various law enforcement organizations work together to
help solve it?
Mr. SEIBERLING. They do but there is no national communications
system and command center or regional center?
Mr. GRAHAM. That just tells you that a crime has happened. It
would be small, a small center that had good communications. It
exists today I believe, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. SEIBERLING. There is certainly no national command center
for law enforcement.
Mr. GRAHAM. No, but there is a-I believe this is correct, and I
think the next testimony that you have will describe the system that
ERDA uses today which does have a communications center-
Mr. SEIBERLING. But they do not coordinate the police forces all
over the country.
Mr. GRAHAM. They have response forces and I am certain there
must be coordination with law enforcement agencies in case there is
a problem.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, I will be very interested in hearing about
that because maybe ERDA has already set up something we have
been trying to avoid for decades and if they have then they have
gone a lot further than Congress ever thought they were going to
go. I do not think we intended ERDA to set up a new law enforce-
ment system.
Mr. GRAHAM. Then perhaps I misunderstood you.
It is not meant that the command center is going to tell the police
what to do. It is going to alert them that a crime has taken place
and that they need to execute the normal functions that they have
within their jurisdictional boundaries. It would not tell the sheriff's
people to go here and do this or carry various kinds of weapons.
Their response is all within their own organizations responsibil-
ities. It just is a coordination function to provide the resources that
we have.
Mr. SEIBERLING. The word command has a distinct meaning to me.
I was in the Army 4 years and a command center is a place where
the orders are given.
Mr. GRAHAM. That is an unfortunate use of the term. It is not
meant to command at all.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Perhaps a Freudian slip. When would you en-
vision this to be complete, by 1984?
Mr. GRAHAM. It is Freudian perhaps because I was in the military,
not Freudian from the industry's point of view.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I certainly know that raises implications that-
PAGENO="0501"
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Mr. GRAHAM. It was not thought of at all, that there would be any
command function over the law enforcement agencies by the sug-
gested communications center.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, even if~ there is no enforcement, you know
we have quite a problem with the FBI just running checks for local
police agencies and maintaining: records which they pass on. This is
a major subject of debate in law enforcement circles and in legisla-
tive circles and in the Judiciary Committee, which I am on, as to
how far the FBI should go in coordinating local police activity even
to the extent of merely providing an information bank from which
they can draw. We do not want a national data bank for example on
people that might be criminals or, potential criminals and-
Mr. GRAHAM. There is nothing in a coordination center that would
even lead to that.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, how do you know?
Mr. GRAHAM. Perhaps I am not seeing it the same way you do. I
do not see any of those institutiOnal structures changed at all. It is
just to provide them with the necessary information that they need
to exercise the functions that they have.
If the purpose of law enforcement is to catch criminals, or if it's
to prevent an attack, you can provide them with intelligence and
with information ~rn whatever is happening. They then exercise their
normal responsibilities. That is all that it was meant to do. There is
no data base kept. There is no list of undesirables if that is the case
you are talking about, not at all, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, I am glad to hear that, but I must say
when I see ~in that statement that it is proposed that the Federal
Government be the most effective manager of response forces, when
you talk about a national communications system and command
center, then I think we are raising some implications here that are
very sinister and need to be explored, and yet I will also say that if
we are going to go all out for nuclear power I do not see any other
way to do it and still have security. So we have to face up to the
fact that maybe that is the implication of it all.
Mr. GRAHAM. No, sir, that is not the impression that was intended.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, whatever is intended I was saying that
maybe that is what is necessary and maybe what you are intending
is really not that.
Mr. GRAHAM. Perhaps I could ask a question then. If we arrive at
that point it seems to me that you are talking about a breakdown in
all of our institutional systems and if that happens then this com-
munications center has absolutely no use at all.
Mr. SETBERLING. Well, that is really the basic question that this
whole thing involves. I would like to ask Dr. Taylor a question. We
are confronted here with what I consider to be a possibility of put-
ting some heretofore unacceptable restrictions on our free society in
order to get energy through nuclear power. Now I question whether
that is the price we ought to pay jf there is any other alternative.
I would like to ask you-since you have thought rather basically
on this-what are the implications for our society. if we do not do
this either in terms of, (a) our energy supply; and if we cannot get
the energy supply, (b) in terms of whether that in itself will cause a
breakdown in our society?
PAGENO="0502"
498
Do you follow that?
Dr. TAYLOR. Yes, I guess I hear two questions. One has to do with
what energy we need, and I think that how much energy this coun-
try will require by the time these projected nuclear powerplants will
be really full blown, say 15 years from now, I think is open to seri-
ous debate in terms of the added reserves of energy for the United
States, 15 years from now that are represented by using nuclear
fission. I think that it is rather clear that more efficient use of
energy can be implemented-techniques for which can be imple-
mented across the next 15 years can account for a larger total
amount of energy than this difference between what we would have
if we took the projections plus nuclear energy and left nuclear
energy out. Now that is in the fairly short term, about the next 15
years.
So I am strongly attracted by the idea of energy conservation not
in the form that requires radically changing our life styles. I do not
mean turning thermostats down to
Mr. SEIBERLING. Sweden has a per capita standard of living
higher than the United States and they consume about half as much
energy per capita.
Dr. TAYLOR. And when you look at reasons for that, the character
of their toilets for example which use a very small amount of water,
this is true in most central European countries, the character of the
home heating systems and so on. Having lived in Europe for a
couple of years, in Austria, I found the quality of life that we had
living in an Austrian suburb in an Austrian home was arguable
whether it was greater or smaller than in the United States. So con-
servation I think is an alternative to increasing our tofal consump-
tion by large amounts.
As far as substituting other sources of energy for nuclear fission, I
think the only-at least in the long run-the only alternatives are
coal, solar energy in various forms, wind and ocean thermal currents
and so on; and fusion.
Fusion is not yet with us in a controlled way and I am not all
that sure that the problems with respect to nuclear bombs that will
come when fusion becomes possible will not also be very much a sub-
ject of concern.
As far as solar energy is concerned, it is known how to collect it
and how to convert it to all forms of energy to be used. The ques-
tion is what is the cost? That is what slowed it up.
I want to make one statement about solar energy which I think is
not fully appreciated and which I think is very important and that
is that it is possible to visualize solar energy systems on a scale quite
a bit bigger than the single household but a lot smaller than neces-
sary to supply the necessary energy for a large city at which the
economy is of scale for solar collectors and storage systems and heat
transmission systems have been achieved but at a scale at which one
does not have to talk about many square miles of covered area and
then transmission lines or high temperature steamlines going great
distances from the center.
That scale of solar energy collection and use, on what you might
call a neighborhood or community scale, not a single house, not a
PAGENO="0503"
499
big city, is not getting any significant attention that I know of in a
national solar energy program. 1 think that is a big gap. It is that
particular form of solar energy in which all of the forms of it that
are processed by the collection system are in fact used that I think is
the best bet. I am not at all sure that within 15 years a substantial
fraction of the energy consumed, at least by residential and commer-
cial areas in the United States, could not be supplied by such sys-
tems.
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Taylor, are you aware of the fact that in the
last month or so there has been a very intense struggle between
ERDA and 0MB over the solar energy research assistance?
Dr. TAYLOR. I have heard about that but I have no knowledge of
the real facts of the situation.
Mr. TSONGAS. I think we do have a time limit here, but I would
like to have Dr. Cochran comment just briefly on the testimony. Did
you hear the testimony by the NRC officials?
Dr. COCHRAN. Yes, I did.
Mr. TSONGAS. Do you have any comments about the direction they
are going and whether they do perceive the threat as seriously as
you would like?
Dr. COCHRAN. I think the threat that-I cannot imagine they seri-
ously consider the existing threat today to a facility as two people
armed with small arms. I think the only reasonable conclusion you
could draw is that they are trying to cover for past mistakes that
they have made just as the old AEC did in its history; the present
policy is simply one of covering the previous steps taken. They are
unwilling to come out and say, yes, the safeguards today are inade-
quate; because that would imply they have done a bad job in the
past or it would imply they have to quickly beef up these facilities
or shut them down.
So I think they are simply protecting the industry and protecting
themselves for their past mistakes.
Mr. TSONGAS. Well, what I would like is that when staff develops
the questions for the NRC in the subsequent session that you might
work with them and develop the questions in terms of gleening the
specifics of what NRC is going to do in the future.
Dr. COCHRAN. We have a petition to the NRC outstanding now
which we are waiting for them to, act on. Our efforts are to get them
to upgrade the existing facilities and perhaps when we find out
what the commission itself decides to do it will provide some useful
information.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I ask one more question-
Dr. TAMPLIN. I was going to say that when you ask your next
questions I hope one of the things you will not have to ask the NRC
is "Why did you let it happen?" because .1 think that may be the
case if they do not move quickly to upgrade their safeguards.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Dr. Taylor, dO you think that the adjustments
and contortions that we would have to go through to avoid having
to expand our nuclear capacity in the next 15 years would be as
great, as difficult for us as the one we are going to go through if we
do expand it?
Dr. TAYLOR. I have asked myself just that question more persis-
tently than any other questions across the last 6 months or so and I
PAGENO="0504"
500
find I do not know. I certainly am not convinced that we would
have to go through more contortions if we stopped further develop-
ment of nuclear power than if we didn't, but I must say I cannot
with any strong conviction say that the opposite might not be true.
The difficulty is that if we have to meet a demand for power that
is even on the lower side of what is now projected-and I do not
think that is given from the facts, I think that is given from the
way our society is gearing up to proceed-if we have to meet those
demands the alternative to nuclear power 15 years from now has got
to be coal or solar energy. If I could sit here-if I could describe to
you in detail with cost estimates, a specific set of solar energy alter-
natives that I think are very likely to be possible, if I could do that
today I would do that and say that is the best safeguards measure,
and probably come down unequivocally for a complete halt on
nuclear power development. I cannot do that.
Therefore, I have to ask myself suppose we have to move in the
direction of much more coal to meet this self-imposed statement
about what our demands will be?
I find large-scale development of coal is fraught with terrible
risks, none of which are understood in any detail. The risks associ-
ated with coal have to do with ice ages or flooding of coastal cities
and general massive disruption of large areas of the West in ways
that may or may not cause major difficulties. We do not know what
we are doing when we talk about coal development on a scale three
or four times what it is today. So that I am not sure.
I would expect that within a couple of years, if the solar energy
program is really intensively pursued across the next 2 years, that
then it may be possible to answer that question in terms of a clear
statement regarding how do you use solar energy to fill that gap?
I cannot do that today.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you.
Dr. COCHRAN. Could I respond to tl1at?
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, the chairman is in control.
Mr. Ts0NGA5. You came a long way to say very little, so please go
ahead now.
Dr. COCHRAN. I think the only contortions necessary are by Mem-
bers of the Congress. The reason I say that is based on looking at
the budget figures for the moneys we are spending in the nuclear
area compared to the moneys we are spending in some of the other
areas. In the fiscal year 1977 budget we have $991 million for fission
power development, and for solar energy something like $116 mil-
lion and for simply the solar photovoltaic portion we will be spend-
ing $32.8 million. That compares to $27 million we will spend solely
on safeguards. We are spending the same amount of money on safe-
guards as we are spending on solar photovoltaic.
The energy end-use conservation budget this year is something
like $53 million, 17 times less than the total amount we are spending
on fission energy development; 17 times less on end use energy con-
servation than on the entire fission budget.
PAGENO="0505"
501
You can go down the list. The entire end-use energy conservation
budget is 5.8 times less than this year's increase in the fission budget,
just the annual increase.
Eleven times less than the L FBR program budget. Two-and-a-
half times less than this year's increase in the LMFBR program
budget.
You could go on and on like this-four times less than the cost
overruns this year in the Clinch River reactor. That is how much
money we are spending on end-use energy conservation.
Mr. TSONGAS. I might say, DOctor, that you are talking about this
to the already-convinced.
Dr. COCHRAN. At least it should go in the record.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Just to show you what we are up against here,
last year on the floor in connection with the ERDA authorization an
amendment was introduced by Congressman Ottinger to increase the
solar energy budget authorizatiOn from $45 to $90 million and Con-
gressman Mike McCormack, who was managing the bill got up and
said "We cannot spend that money even if you authorize it because
we cannot use money that fast."
Now, if it is true that this whole medium range of solar facilities
are not even being researched in any significant way, according to
Dr. Taylor, then I have difficulty seeing why we cannot use more
money in the solar field.
Mr. WEAVER. I would like to point out to my colleague that they
are unable to fund more than 10 percent of the qualified applications
now.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I am sure that is true but that is what we are up
against when the so-called experts get up and make statements on
the floor.
Mr. TSONGAS. I would just correct the gentleman to point out that
that amendment was introduced, by Messrs. Weaver, Tsongas, Miller,
and Richmond.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Oh, I request unanimous consent to revise my
remark.
Mr. WEAVER. I object. [Laughter.]
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you very much.
If we could have Mr. Lyon, Mr. Jones and Mr. Edlow to appear
together on the panel we could speed things up.
Apparently, it is White House policy that ERDA and ERDA-
related personnel shall not sit at the same table with itidustry. I
think a comment to that is obviOus and we will not engage in that.
Mr. Edlow, did I hear you say you have a time constraint ~
Mr. EDLOW. I would like to: be in temple tonight by 5 :45 for
Friday evening services which means I have to be out of here by 5
o'clock at the latest.
Mr. TSONGAS. That can be arranged.
Mr. LYON. Mr. Chairman, it is perfectly all right if you would
like to have Mr. Edlow appear first. We have no objections.
Mr. TSONGAS. I think that would be reasonable because he is the
victim of a policy over which he has no control. Maybe you can get
to your earlier service. Why do you not come ahead.
PAGENO="0506"
502
STATEMENT OF SAMUEL EDLOW, PRESIDENT, EDLOW INTERNA-
TIONAL CO., ACCOMPANIED BY JACK EDLOW, VICE PRESIDENT,
EDLOW INTERNATIONAL CO., AND DAVID RUDOLPH, SHIPMENT
SECURITY MANAGER, EDLOW INTERNATIONAL CO.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do
appreciate it.
[Biography of Samuel Edlow follows:]
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SAMUEL EDLOW
Mr. Edlow is founder and president of Edlow International Company which
he built around the concept of integrated management of global nuclear fuel
pipeline operations. This concept embodies scheduling transport flows to opti-
mize inventories and transport costs; from uranium concentrates on through to
spent nuclear fuel. Adjunct activities include brokering of uranium concentrate
sales and sales of nuclear material chemical conversion services.
Mr. Edlow's involvement in the nuclear program began in the late 1950's
when his Edlow Lead Co., of Columbus, Ohio, was asked to design and pro-
duce spent nuclear fuel shipping containers. He subsequently began, and still
continues, to serve as consultant to the major governmental, institutional, and
commercial organizations in the nuclear field in areas involving transport secu-
rity and international commerce in nuclear materials.
Mr. Edlow attended the University of Cincinnati until he entered the ILS.
merchant marine during World War II. He serves on the Atomic Industrial
Forum's Subcommittee on Safeguards and has presented transportation and
safeguards topics in seminars, workshops, and speeches worldwide.
Mr. TSONGAS. Your statement is of reasonable length, why do you
not read it in full?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Do I understand you want me to read it in
full? It takes 17 minutes. I am prepared to summarize it.
Mr. TSONGAS. Are we talking about the same seven-page state-
ment?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Yes. Do you want me to read it?
Mr. TSONGAS. I would suspect it would go a little faster than 17
minutes. Could you identify your colleagues, too.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Yes, on my right is Jack Edlow, my son, vice
president for international operations; on my left is Mr. David
Rudolph, our manager of security.
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, thank you very much for your invi-
tation to present testimony today, and we are most pleased for the
opportunity to give our views of safeguards applied to transporta-
tion of special nuclear material (SNM).
My name is Samuel Edlow, and I am president of Edlow Interna-
tional Co., a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia.
Since 1963 our company has acted as agent for a number of over-
seas nuclear interests, among other functions which we perform for
our principals, we arrange the movement of the several kinds of
nuclear materials which are in their supply lines to and from the
United States. We arrange for the transportation of large quantities
of source materials and special nuclear materials, and we are well
known as shippers by trucking companies, rail lines, airlines, and
steamship companies.
We obtain export and import licenses on behalf of our principals,
and we are very well known by staff of the international programs,
PAGENO="0507"
503
security, and safeguard groups within ERDA; and by licensing staff
and most of the Commissioners at NRC; by staff in the Bureau of
Oceans, International, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs at the
State Department; and by personnel at ACDA. We believe that all
of these people will tell you that our record is one of constructive
* effort, forthrightness, integrity; and true professionalism in traffic
management of nuclear fuels.
Our views can best be expressed as follows:
First. Because of the very special nature of nuclear materials, it is
of the utmost importance to maintain a real time capability to moni-
tor location and custody of such materials at all times, while they
are in the transportation environment. We applaud the revisions to
10 CRR part 73 which were made effective in March 1974, which for
the first time required shippers to provide such a capability.
Second. We believe that a realistic and reasonable amount of
physical security should be afforded such materials while they are in
the transportation cycle, over and above that security which would
be normally afforded by transportation companies. We applaud
those requirements made effective in March 1974, and we imple-
mented them by engaging armored car companies to transport our
materials in surface transport.
We do believe, however, that a physical security hysteria has
arisen fed by a new priesthood Of physical security cultists, and that
the Government is about to engage in overkill by going far beyond
reason in requirements for physical security during transport.
Third. We deplore and protest the ERDA plan under which at
this very moment a Government transportation network has already
replaced private industry as a carrier of nuclear materials, and
which now threatens to expand to that point where all of us are
driven out of business in favor of a Government owned and oper-
ated transporation monopoly. And, Mr. Chairman, I tell you that
Mr. Chapman advised us this morning-although we did not expect
the news until next Monday, Mr. Chapman testified today that he
knows ERDA is going to do this-to cover all transportation of
these materials-referring to Government-owned materials-by the
first of October of this year.
Mr. TSONGA5. Is he one of the priesthood that you referred to?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. No, not Mr. Chapman, no sir.
So, briefly stated these are our views. If you find them unorthodox
and contrary to popular trends, so be it. Or as Archie Bunker might
say, "Whatever."
These are our views, and we thank the good Lord that our society
still affords us an opportunity to obtain a fair and just hearing for
them.
Let us amplify a little.
Our company specializes in the international movement of nuclear
materials. An international movement consists of three segments-a
domestic one on the U.S. side, an international segment by air or
water, and a domestic one on the foreign side. Accordingly, it was
necessary for us to become thoroughly expert in all aspects of sur-
face and air transport within the United States.
As we began to move materials in 1963, we quickly learned that
the inefficiencies of carriers in all modes of U.S. transport were of
PAGENO="0508"
504
such magnitude that, left to their own devices, the carriers could not
be relied on to deliver goods on a timely basis or even to the proper
destination or without substantial risk of loss of or damage to the
shipment. Because of the special nature of our materials, and espe-
cially because of their high values, we instituted our own monitoring
techniques whereunder we followed our movements regularly by tele-
phone, through every terminal, change of carriers, change of. equip-
ment from beginning to end of the transports, around the clock day
and night. By this means we literally forced the carriers to handle
our shipments on a timely basis, and we were able without fail to
establish the whereabouts of every movement within 1 hour.
At the same time, we were aware that others were not having the
same good luck, and that, from time to time, nuclear shipments were
temporarily "dropping out of the cycle." In May of 1969, in an
address before the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, we
made our first public appeal to the AEC to establish a set of regula-
tions requiring each shipper to effectively monitor the location and
custody of material in transit on a real time basis.
The AEC began to pay heed to our comments and, in 1971, con-
tracted with us for a study in detail of all shipments of SNM
within the United States in fiscal year 1970. This study produced
definitive data on shipping methods in use at that time by most
shippers, which demonstrated a lack of care for, attention to, and
efficiency in, operations for the movement of SNM which could be
deemed scandalous.
Finally, in 1974, revised part 73 modified our recommendations
and, at least, shippers of SNM began to monitor location and cus-
tody of their materials within the transportation cycle. And let us
note, gentlemen, this sytem was first used by us in the middle 1960's
in concert with the existing private commercial transport system in
this country, and the counterpart international system. It has been
working since then, and continues to work successfully now. Govern-
ment did not invent it private industry did. Government required
that private industry implement such a system-private industry did
so. Let us bear this in mind as we proceed.
The revision of part 73, which became effective March 1974,
required the addition of what we deem to be a reasonable level of
physical security to the transport of strategic quantities of SNM.
Effectively, shippers were given a choice of two options:
First. Material could be shipped in an armored vehicle, in which
the crew carries weapons, or
Second. Material could be shipped in a normal transport vehicle
provided it is accompanied by an escort vehicle carrying guards
armed with weapons.
We consider this a reasonable approach. Edlow determined it
would use the armored vehicle option, and assembled a group of
independent armored vehicle companies with whom it contracted for
the carriage of SNM shipments for which Edlow had the responsi-
bility.
Some 150 shipments have been made by Edlow, since early 1974,
using private commercial armored car companies, successfully, on
time, without penalties for violation of any regulations, with a
safety and safeguard record of 100 percent.
PAGENO="0509"
505
But now there appears a group of "specialists," both in and out of
government, who are generating a climate of hysteria on this subject
which in our view is inversely proportional to their knowledge of
the subject.
Example-an NRC staff member proposes the use of armed
guards to accompany SNM on the high seas. When queried by us, he
admitted that he was not aware that general cargo ships had been
replaced by containerships on most trade routes. Further, he had
never visited a container port or~ boarded a containership.
Example-according to NRDC, Dr. Ted Taylor testified in his
December 10, 1975 statement before the Committee on Energy and
Diminishing Materials of the California State Assembly as to the
resources and motivation of the Brinks gang, suggesting that this
gang attacked goods in transit. We agree that Dr. Taylor may well
be the world's greatest expert on the manufacture of efficient nuclear
explosives. We deny that he knows beans from applebutter when it
comes to transportation, or the practical problems incidental to the
application of physical security to the several components of the
transport modes. His ignorance and blatant lack of expertise is evi-
denced by the fact that no Brinks gang has carried out a successful
attack against an armored vehicle since the late 1920's. In fact, gen-
tlemen, the Brink's gang is strictly another figment of Ted Taylor's
imagination, dreamed up to fuel the hysteria so necessary to public
acceptance of Taylor's narrow arid suspect views.
Example-The Mitre report authored by Rosenbaum and Associ-
ates, contracted by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and deliv-
ered as Report No. MTR-7022, on page 159, makes the following
conclusion:
Within the last year, armored car service companies have sustained serious
losses during armed robberies. In one case $4 million was stolen. In another
almost a half-million dollars was stolen. Therefore [ergo, it must be so], the
continued use of armored car services companies by agents of licensees to
transport SNM should receive careful scrutiny.
Does not this lead you to believe that the robberies were per-
formed against armored cars in transit? Using elementary logic, the
sentence beginning "therefore" can only be interpreted that way.
Yet, the Mitre people knew that the robberies were directed
against fixed site installations, against funds and securities in vaults
in storage facilities, and were, hi ~act, not directed against armored
vehicles in transit.
Mitre, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the hysteria with
an illogical conclusion drawn from faulty facts. And mind you, not
one man of the Mitre team was drawn from the transportation
industry. They were all of security or military background, already
dedicated priests sacrificing befOre the altar of force, security and
cops and robbers. Gentlemen, I repeat, since the 1920's not one suc-
cessful attack has been launched against an armored vehicle in
transit. Private armored car companies must be doing something
right.
We can only conclude that there are uninformed forces in Govern-
ment and outside, who, for reasons best known to themselves, and
with little or no knowledge of transportation or the practical appli-
PAGENO="0510"
506
cation of physical security, who are urging the adoption of measures
which are unnecessary, which can only lead to the strengthening of
a new security establishment, which will find the means to self per-
petuation and aggrandizement by continuing to mislead the Con-
gress, the executive, and the public. And the end result will be a new
security bureau acting in the interest of national defense and secu-
rity, which will lead mostly to new erosions of our own civil
liberties. You asked for our views-here they are, and we are pre-
pared to amplify and defend them.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we who pioneered the use of monitoring
systems, who were among the first to successfully implement the use
of armored vehicles and armed guards under the requirements 10
CF1R Part 73, who steadfastly pursued the very best in professional
efforts as a member of private industry to fulfill the governmental
requirements placed on us, were appalled to receive a letter from
ERDA telling us flatly that ERDA proposed to begin, about Janu-
ary 1976, to carry an increasing number of the movement heretofore
carried by Edlow and its contractors, by means of a Federal trans-
portation system, using federally owned and operated equipment,
with Federal marshals as escorts and Federal employees as drivers.
Mr. Chairman, do you think I am out of my mind? I could not
believe my own eyes. 1n the United States of America, in the year
of our Lord 1975, a bureaucrat dared to tell a private company,
engaged in an activity under the free enterprise system, that the
Government would take over that activity. Yes, it happened, and we
attach a copy of this letter to this statement.
[Letter referred to follows.]
U.S. A~o~iic ENERGY CoMMIssIoN,
Washington, D.C., December 30, 1974.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW, President,
Edlow International Co.,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. EDLOW: As you know, the Atomic Energy Commission has issued
proposed new regulations to strengthen AEC requirements for protecting quail-
titles of special nuclear material (SNM) which is transported by licensees. A
copy of the press release and Federal Register notice is enclosed for your con-
venience. These measures would provide for three alternatives for safeguard-
ing SNM shipments. The alternative which we consider the most effective from
a safeguard's viewpoint is the use of a specially designed truck or trailer in
conjunction with communications coverage and armed guards.
AEC has been sponsoring work at Sandia Laboratories for the design and
fabrication of a vehicle that will meet AEC standards. Although the detailed
design criteria are not yet available, the work at Sandia is almost completed.
We expect to have a preliminary report from Sandia soon.
We understand that you have a safeguards plan which was approved by the
AEC. The plan, however, does not provide the degree of protection which
would be afforded by the use of specially designed vehicles.
Because of your high degree of involvement in the transport of special
nuclear material, I want to let you know something of our plans which may
affect your transportation operations in the future. You are no doubt already
aware that many AEC And AEC-contractor shipments of strategic Govern-
ment-owned special nuclear material are being handled by the Government, in
Government-owned specially designed vehicles. In order to provide strength-
ened protection for its shipments, the Commission has decided that the Gov-
ernment will transport all shipments of strategic Government-owned special
nuclear material. The timing is primarily contingent on the acquisition of a
sufficient number of specially designed vehicles.
PAGENO="0511"
507
If you would like to discuss this matter further, I would be happy to
arrange a meeting for you with appropriate AEC staff members here in Wash-
ington.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM A. BROB5T,
Chief, Transportation Branch,
Division of Waste Management and Transportation.
Enclosures.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. We began to protest, and pointed out our
rights. We engaged counsel to assist us, and began the long, hard
road through the bureaucracy, maintaining the position that Gov-
ernment has no monopoly on excellence-that private industry could
provide any security measures or equipment required. That it is the
function of Government to develop the standards for performance
and it is the function of private industry to implement the stand-
ards. The security people, the safeguards professionals maintained
that only they knew the secret road to physical security. But a few
noncultists listened and s'owly but surely the monolithic advance
was slowed. Dr. Seamans, administrator of ERDA heard of our
battle and listened to u~. The security and safeguard people were
asked to reexamine their views. We are even now waiting for their
response. And, Mr. Chairman, we were told by Dr. Starbird we
would get .their answer on Monday. He also told us not to be very
optimistic about that answer and once again I remind you that Dr.
Chapman already knows the answer. They are going to try to put us
out of business.
Let me make it abundantly clear, Mr. Chairman, that we believe
that the Congress and the executive have, wittingly or unwittingly,
violated the very spirit of the free enterprise system by sponsoring
and supporting the replacement of the private enterprise system by
a Government-owned-and-operated monopoly.
Mr. Chairman, these are our views, others may disagree with us.
We find ourselves quite alone. We are satisfied we are right and we
will continue to stress our views and to defend them. And if we get
the wrong response from the executive we may very well turn to the
judiciary for relief.
To recap, we say:
One: monitoring of the place and custody of nuclear materials on
a real time basis is a must and is required under 10 CFR Part 73 as
now published.
Two: A realistic and practical system of physical security is a
must and is required under 10 CFR Part 73 as now published.
Three: The very thought that, the Government functions better
than private industry as a security organization is wrong, and is not
based on facts. The attempt on the part of Government namely
ERDA, to usurp the security function of private industry must be
stopped. The rights of small business enterprises must be protected,
and we believe they will be.
Mr. Chairman, if I may add about three more sentences, counsel
has pointed out to me that I should add one more belief that we
have to this.
Edlow is not going to get involved in any arguments with anyone
as to whether there should be 3 guards or 18 guards or 2 trucks or 5
PAGENO="0512"
508
trucks or 3 chase cars or 1 chase car or we should use .22 caliber pis-
tols or submachine guns.
We look to Government to provide the function of developing the
standards. It is the function of Government to develop the standards
for safeguards. What we are saying is we and our armed guard con-
tractors will implement whatever safeguard levels are established.
Now that is our function. It is the function of Government to
develop the standards. It is the function of private industry to carry
them out.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared to discuss this with
Mr. Seiberling, finally, if an attack is made on a vehicle, if by some
chance some goods are taken, it then becomes a function of the Gov-
ernment to recover the goods. That is not the function of private
industry. That now is a law enforcement function. So there is a fine
line between what the Government should do and what the GOvern-
ment should not do.
Thank you for the opportunity of presenting our views.
Mr. TSONGAS. I enjoyed the change of pace of your testimoney, I
must say.
During parts of it I could hear the ghost of Mr. Steiger and
Symms and Bauman, cheering you on. [Laughter.]
Mr. TSONGAS. Are you satisfied-apparently you are not-that
standards by the old AEC and now NRC are sufficient to safeguard
materials?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. It is our corporate view that we are very
happy with the security provided material during transportation
now. Now, there are some differences of opinion. If the Government
decides we should have more guards and thicker walled vehicles, we
will implement it. For example, you are about to hear testimony
about a new vehicle being prepared by ERDA, one they are already
using in their own Federal Transportation System which will over-
take ours, which will supersede ours. Now it is our view that that is
just another armored vehicle. It is; it is nothing more that just
another armored vehicle. It is a more complex armored vehicle, you
see.
I do not want to go into some of the things we know about it but
it is just another armored vehicle.
Oddly enough, Mr. Chairman, just as ERDA would not-this is
not a nice thing to say, I know it is Government policy you cannot
sit with private industry, you see they won't sit here at this table
and you know, Mr. Chairman, *ERDA never came to the first
armored car operator even to discuss the concept of their armored
vehicle. When the invitation to see the armored car came, it was
only because we pointed out they had invited representatives of
every foreign government around the world to come see it but they
had not let us see it. It is very, very interesting.
What we are saying is that we will lease the vehicle from them,
we will buy vehicles, we will operate the vehicle, let us discuss with
them whether their basic concept is credible. But we think that we
as private industry are prepared to implement whatever the Govern-
ment wants us to do.
Mr. TSONGAS. I have to suppress the comment that things will be
better with a Republican administration. Since we already have
that, one wonders what-
PAGENO="0513"
509
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Well, I have always voted the straight Demo-
cratic ticket; the answer is obvious, because my father did.
Mr. TSONGAS. That may have clinched your future right there.
Mr. Weaver?
Mr. WEAVER. You say-I know nothing about your business, I
confess right at the start so we do not have any-
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Thank you.
Mr. WEAVER. I am not a priest or anything else.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver is a candle cultist. [Laughter.]
Mr~ WEAVER. The Brink's robbery was not robbery of an armored
truck then?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. It was not robbery of an armored truck in
transit, sir. There has been no-
Mr. WEAVER. Excuse me?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. There have been no successful attacks against
an armored vehicle in transit since the 1930's.
Mr. WEAVER. Well, the Brink's robbery, the one that occurred,
occurred in the 1950's, did it not?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. There is a description in the Mitre Corp.
study.
Mr. WEAVER. The Brink's robbery occurred in the 1950's, right?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I do not know.
Mr. SEIBERLING. That was a robbery of the Brink's office, not of
the truck.
Mr. WEAVER. I see.
Mr. Edlow, have you ever shipped nuclear materials by airplane?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Yes, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Do you still do so now?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Well, are you-that is a tough one.
Mr. WEAVER. Why? Is that classified?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. No, no, let me answer the question this way.
`We will only ship materials in accordance with Federal regulations.
If Federal regulations permit the use of aircraft for shipping
nuclear materials, we will do so. It is our belief that if it is incorrect
to ship it by air then the regulations should be changed.
Mr. WEAVER. You are the unthinking instruments of the Govern-
ment, in other words?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Please, Mr., Weaver. [Laughter.]
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I do not deserve that. I do think-remember
I am a citizen, I am 61 years old and I think.
Mr. WEAVER. I think you think a lot, and I am very impressed by
your testimony.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Thank you. No, we are not unthinking
people. And in our career we have been very fortunate to have had
the opportunity of working with~ government in establishing many
of these regulations.
My answer to you is that we will talk with anybody about the
wisdom or lack of wisdom in a Federal regulation but we are just
one voice.
Mr. WEAVER. All right, may I have your voice now. Do you think
it is wise to ship nuclear materials by air?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I see nothing wrong with it by air.
Mr. WEAVER. How about plutonium?
71-074 0 - 76 - 33
PAGENO="0514"
510
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I see no objection whatever. As a matter of
fact we are only prepared to ship plutonium by air because the pack-
age which we use to ship plutonium by air has been demonstrated to
be crash-proof. It can-these packages have actually been dropped
out of aircraft on to concrete pads. We have submitted movies of
this incidentally to ERDA and NRC, they are familiar with it. So
it is because we are satisfied, we are satisfied, Mr. Weaver, that it is
not unsafe to ship it by air. Therefore, we would ship by air.
Mr. WEAVER. The Air Force also, I think, ships nuclear material
by air.
But you mentioned something about Mitre or Dr. Taylor, was it-
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Both of them.
Mr. WEAVER. Somebody anyway who did not know of these con-
tainer ships and you found that to be appalling.
What is the difference, you know, the nuclear materials traveling
whether it is in a container in a ship or not in terms of need for
armed guards?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. It does make a difference, Mr. Weaver. When
you ship by container ship there simply is no way in the world that a
crew member or anybody else can get access to your cargo if it is in
a container at a level below the top level of the ship. Now it is a
technical thing. Our point is that if a regulator-this happened to
be NRC that made this regulation-if a regulator knew anything
about a container ship he would realize it is an utter waste of money
to put two armed guards on a ship to take a free ride across the
ocean.
Mr. WEAVER. So you do not see any need for armed guards on a
containership?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. No, sir, none.
Mr. WEAVER. Never since the 1930's has there been a successful
robbery of an armored car in transit. Has there ever been a successful
taking of a ship in transit?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I cannot answer that question because I am
accidently party to classified information.
Mr. WEAVER. You do not need classified information. It is a
famous one and there have been-
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I hate to use the words but it happens that is
the case.
Mr. WEAVER. Particularly in private free enterprise, too. Classified
information. I have no further questions.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Seiberling.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, thank you. I am going to have to leave in
about 5 minutes. I just would like to note one thing and then, Mr.
Edlow, you said you wanted to say something to me. I do notice in
reading Mr. Jones' prepared statement that he says that there is a
nationwide ERDA voice communications system which allows con-
tinuous contact with ERDA shipments and escorts in the contiguous
United States in operation since 1972.
And I gather that is where they are doing their own transporting.
You indicated that you have had-you could monitor shipments
within 1 hour which is somewhat less than this-than instantaneous.
I just wonder what your comment would be on that?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I would like to comment, Mr. Seiberling.
First let me say that I wish I lived in your congressional district so
PAGENO="0515"
511
I could vote for you. You ask some very, very good questions of Mr.
Graham and I am glad-
Mr. SEIBERLING. Any time you want to move there, I will take
you. [Laughter.]
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I lived in Columbus, Ohio, I never liked
Northern Ohio.
Let me answer; the reason I say you ask very good questions is
that-
Mr. T50NGA5. Mr. Weaver and I take that personally, but go
ahead. [Laughter.]
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. You see, before I get to your specific ques-
tion, we think that there is a real danger of a government security
force. I do not know whether-I do not care whether you call them
government marshals, to ride trucks, but the one thing we do not
need in this country is another government police force. The execu-
tive police force is bad enough already. We do not need another one.
We think there is a very subtle difference between qualified armed
guards paid by private industry, and government guards. There is a
very subtle difference between the two. We think that the word
"government marshal" carries a connotation against civil liberties
that a privately employed guard does not.
We think that a government marshal might even try to take
authority which it should not have.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Are you prepared to set up the same kind of
communications system, could you possibly do what ERDA has?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Let me come to that now. There is one link
in the communications system which is bad. It is a fact that there
are certain areas where it is blacked out. We do know that the AEC
and now ERDA has established a real good high-class communica-
tions system and we think it is necessary to have timely information
and timely contact with the material in transit and also with recov-
ery forces.
But this does not mean private industry should be put out of busi-
ness because of that. What we have suggested to ERDA-and we
have made the suggestion to ERDA is-that there is a method
where private industry could interface with that system. Now, we
support the concept of a Federal-of a national, do not call it Fed-
eral-of a national communications system which will improve on
some of the defects in the system we now use. But there is no reason
in the world, no reason, why private industry cannot interface with
that system.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, I think just to shorten this up. I would
agree with you, I do not know why it has to be Federal. If you look
at the Post Office, it is not exactly clear that the Federal Govern-
ment can do any better job than industry in handling transporta-
tion-related problems. In fact, if industry could not do a better job
than the Post Office, they ought to go bankrupt and that is just
what the Post Office is doing.
So-well, go ahead.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. That is my answer to your question.
Mr. SEIBERLING. OK.
I do think there are some very serious problems with going
beyond the question of who should do it, though, and they are
namely; well, what are the risks on whether anyone is capable of
PAGENO="0516"
512
giving proper protection? But it seems to me if the market is there
and the requirements are laid down by ERDA or NRC, private
industry ought to be just as able to meet them in terms of the equip-
ment and the staff and everything as Government.
I do think this though, and I do notice that in the Mitre reportS on
page 89 and 90 it is pointed out that cargo thefts-now we are talk-
ing about the problems in dealing with people whether Government
or private-cargo thefts are essentially collusive acts that require
employee assistance to achieve success. The following instances are
cited. The Justice Department study, a police department analyzing
a series of thefts from loaded and unattended trucks concluded that
60 percent involved collusion of the driver.
Going on it says a recent statistic presented by Greater New
York's Airport Security Council showed that airline employees
accounted for 38 percent of those arrested for crimes against air
cargo during 1970 and 1971 at airports in the New York metropoli-
tan area. So there is a general problem of security where you are
transporting critical materials, and it seems to me that NRC and
ERDA and everybody else who is interested in this will have to
address themselves to the problem of how, where you have materials
that have such a very serious security aspect-not just a monetary
aspect-you can guard against that type of collusion which is going
to be prevalent and you simply have to take steps to combat it.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Mr. Seiberling, no one can argue with what
the Mitre report said because of their facts. No question about it.
That is why a very special system, a system. different from the
system used for airline cargo, other types of cargo is established. We
are talking about armored vehicles, armored cars. Now whether it is
a complex fancy vehicle such as designed in Sandia or the special
vehicle that-
Mr. SEIBERLING. But we are also talking about the people who are
in the armored cars, the guards and drivers.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. We have already cleared our drivers, you
obtain a Q-clearance to carry Navy materials; armored car compa-
nies clear their drivers with defense clearances and Federal Reserve
bank clearances. I mean~
Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you have multiple checks so that one guard is
checking on another and so forth so that one fellow goes off it is
going to be easy for him to be checked by the others?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Do we have that specific thing?
Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I am not sure but I will tell you what I am
sure of. I am sure that every security officer assigned to a movement
of nuclear materials has been checked by normal security clearance
patterns used by private security guard companies, and if it is
required that they be further cleared by the ERDA, NRC, Armed
Forces, anybody else, the companies are prepared to get such clear-
ances.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you rotate people so you do not have the same
crew every time on jobs?
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. No, sir. In some instances, yes, in many
instances, no. We are looking for reliability of crews is what we are
looking for.
PAGENO="0517"
513
The very best people are assigned by our companies to these runs.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, thank you.
I have no further questions.
Mr. TSONGAS. I would just like to-I find your comments on
Mitre to be interesting since they are constituents of mine.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I am sorry,, I could not hear you.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mitre Corp. happens to be located within my dis-
trict.
Mr. SEIBERLING. Incidentally, your reference to the quotes of
Mitre Corp., that statement should be page 159 and not page 59.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Oh, I am sorry. It is a typo. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I finally found it.
Mr. TSONGAS. I might add, in conclusion, that I share Mr. Seiber-
ling's view that the issue is not who is to perform it. I have no
problem with that, with private enterprise. The question is the level
of security.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. You have no problem with the Government
performing this function?
Mr. TSONGAS. I said I have no problem with free enterprise.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. But our problem is that free enterprise is
doing it and the Government is proposing to take it over. You have
no problem with that? We think that is a disgrace. I mean, a small
businessman goes into a business, makes an investment in personnel
and training and armored vehicles and all of a sudden Bill Brobst
at the AEC writes us a letter and says "drop dead." You have no
problem with that? I cannot understand it. I thought we had a free
enterprise system in this country. I thought the small businessmen
were supposed to stay in business. You are telling me that my
family and I should move to Tahiti or someplace else to get little
business freedom.
Mr. TSONGAS. I agree with you up to the Tahiti, but after that-
[Laughter.]
Mr. SEIBERLING. I will say this, I think the Government, if they
allowed you to get into this business and decided for policy reasons
to take over that business, ought to feel some obligation to at least
pay you for the equipment, the money you have invested in. your
equipment and so forth.
I think that-at least morally-they do not have any right to just
walk away from it.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. As a matter of fact, A-76 whach is an
official document of the Office of Management and Budget, whatever
they call it, flatly states, and EIRDA knows this and this is the big
argument we have had with them and this is why Dr. Seamans told
these people to reexamine. A-76 says that Government may not go
into a business that private industry is already in and the fact that
the activity is classified is no excuse for going into the business.
So again, Mr. Seiberling, you trouble me. It seems to me they
have to justify putting us out of business.
Mr. WEAVER. You are losing his vote, John.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I would not go so far as to say they have no
right. After all, the atomic business is a monopoly right now. As far
as the materials are concerned. They make all of it.
71-074 0 - 76 - 34
PAGENO="0518"
514
And so if they choose to transport their own materials I think
that the Government has a right to do that. Now whether they
ought to is a question of policy. I do not know the answer to that
question.
Mr. SAMUEL EDL0W. Mr. Seiberling, we are prepared to go to
Federal court because we do not believe this is true. We do not
believe that just because a government wants to go into a business it
can say, "Edlow family, you are out of the business." We think
there are laws in the United States to prevent this and Edlow Inter-
national Co. with its counsel is going to test it and I am amazed to
hear a group of Congressmen tell me that lip service only is paid to
the free enterprise system.
Mr. SEIBERLING. This committee is not a court that can decide this
question, of course. I am simply saying that if the government
decides for reasons of its own to transport its own material-
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Not if we are already transporting it, Con-
gressman.
Mr. SEIBERLING [continuing]. Then I think morally and I do not
know whether legally, morally they should have an obligation to at
least make you whole.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Thank you.
Mr. SEIBERLING. I am not prepared to say the Government cannot
do it if they want to do it; and I am not prepared to say what the
law is. I simply express a personal thought on the subject.
Mr. WEAVER. You can move into-
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. I deny they have the right to put us out of
business.
Mr. WEAVER. You can move into my district.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. OK. [Laughter.]
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you very much.
Mr. SAMUEL EDLOW. Thank you. And thank you for your cour-
tesy.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Edlow's comments have set a tone that I find
intriguing. I would like to see how we foll'owthrough with it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Lyon, are you addressed as Mr. Lyon, Dr.
Lyon, or Admiral Lyon?
Mr. LYON. Plain Mr. Lyon is fine, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Jones, too.
STATEMENTS OF HARVEY E. LYON, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF SAFE-
GUARDS AND SECURITY, ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
MENT ADMINISTRATION, AND ORVAL E. FONES, DIRECTOR OF
THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEMS ORGANIZATION, SANDIA
LABORATORIES, ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.
Mr. TSONGAS. Your testimony is set up, we have no time con-
straints if you do not, you can summarize or read it.
Mr. LYON. Mr. Chairman, I have a short statement and if it
please the committee, I would read it into the record. First, I would
like to say, Mr. Chairman, I am most pleased to have the opportu-
nity to appear before this subcommittee on such an important sub-
PAGENO="0519"
515
ject as nuclear materials safeguards. Staff members of the subcom-
mittee have advised me that the subcommittee is specifically
interested in ERDA's development efforts in safeguards applicable
to the transportation of special nuclear materials. Therefore, the con-
tent of my statement will be largely devoted to this special area of
safeguards.
In addressing the subject of safeguards, I will use the word in its
broadest sense as it applies to a total system design. That is a safe-
guards system in depth. This is a system utilized to deter and/or
prevent any deliberate illicit acts involving special nuclear materials
or facilities, including transportation, that could endanger the gen-
eral public. The basic elements of such a safeguards system are a
physical protection subsystem, an `accounting and control subsystem-
if you like, a counting of the atoms-and an internal control
system for access to, and handling of, special nuclear materials. The
specific design and application of these three elements must be tai-
lored to the individual nuclear facilities as located in their specific
environments, such as a vehicle on the road. To be most cost effective
they must also consider the attractiveness to terrorists of the various
forms in which the special nuclear material may exist.
For example, most of the material being transported in the private
sector is low-enriched uranium. `It is not attractive to a terrorist
because it cannot readily be made into a bomb or used as toxic dis-
persal. Thus, the number of guards, types of of alarms, material
assay equipment, and access controls will vary in degree for differ-
ent classes of facilities, including transportation, and in specifics for
different types of material.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there are two organizations in our
Government which have responsibilities for nuclear material safe-
guards activities. One, of course, is the Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration [ERDA], dealing in Government-owned
material, which has the responsibility for implementing safeguards
in Government-owned facilities transporting Government-owned spe-
cial nuclear material and to conduct safeguards research and devel-
opment in support of ERDA and U.S. private sector safeguards. In
addition, ERDA supports international safeguards policy, technol-
ogy and development. The other organization is the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission [NRC] which has responsibility for issuing safe-
guards regulations for domestic commercial activities and for
enforcing these regulations through onsite inspections. It is the
policy of both organizations to assure that safeguards are compara-
bly effective between equivalent government and private sector facil-
ities. 1
That is so that there is no weak link.
There has been an extensive amount of research and development
work that provides a factual technological data base in support of
development of cost effective safeguards systems needed to satisfy
specified requirements. ERDA has developed a computer modeling
program that will allow assessment of the capabilities of a safe-
guards system to counter any designated level of threat. Concepts
for integrated systems can be compared in this model before devel-
opment or hardware procurement decisions are made. Selected con-
cepts of actual safeguards systems ~, for common classes of facilities
PAGENO="0520"
516
are actually installed for testing and evaluation. Data from these
installed systems are used to validate the performance of the model.
This computer model, in conjunction with onsite assessment, allows
ERDA to identify necessary adjustments to its safeguards systems
at critical ERDA facilities.
The model is continually improved and further validated by
application to other ERDA facilities and to concepts of systems
planned for development and testing in support of the light water
reactor fuel cycle. That is the plutonium recycle fuel cycle if that is
arrived at. ERDA has long had a safeguard transport system. This
goes back to the Manhattan project. The development of this system
was necessary to comply with the provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act in protecting classified nuclear weapons and weapon components
in transit. The system did, in the past, utilize special designed, cov-
ered, enclosed rail cars and trucks convoyed by armed escorts.
Periodic communication with a control station and report of safe
arrival of the shipments were a requirement. Personnel were
required to satisfy a personnel reliability screening and to achieve
specified standards in physical conditioning and use of weapons.
As a result of increased terrorism being experienced worldwide,
ERDA in 1970 commenced development of an improved system.
This improved system is designed to counter the threats of a terror-
ist group equipped with power tools and other special equipment
from penetrating the shipments for a sufficient period of time to
allow a reaction force to arrive on the scene.
Additionally, special communication equipment was developed to
allow a continuous communication capability between escort vehicles
and the transporter as well as the control point. The response time
provided by the security of the trailer allows security forces pro-
vided by State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as the
accompanying escorts, to arrive on the scene before access to the spe-
cial nuclear material can be attained. After exhaustive testing this
system was placed in operation for the various ERDA facilities and
is performing satisfactorily. I would hasten to add that no terrorist
attacks have occurred. The fact that such a system exists and is, in
fact, being used is a strong deterrent against such attacks.
Development of a commercial version of the safe secure trailer has
been partially completed. Thus, technology is available for use by
the commercial nuclear industry as future requirements may necessi-
tate. I know of no decision arrived at by either the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission or ERDA at the present time for transporting pri-
vately owned material.
In this regard it is important to note that ERDA shipments
involve not only weapons and weapon components, but also strategic
amounts of special nuclear materials needed for weapons. Current
plans are to utilize this system to transport plutonium fuel to be uti-
lized in the liquid metal fast breeder reactor test and demonstration
program under ERDA and the highly enriched uranium provided
for the naval nuclear ship programs. In these latter two cases this
decision has not yet been made but we are planning to have the
capability to do that. This is prudent, Mr. Chairman, because our
weapons transportation requirements vary as national defense needs
vary. And to use the system most effectively we need to have some
base from which to grow or to draw back from.
PAGENO="0521"
517
In the case of rail shipments, the developed safeguards technology
is being applied to rail cars so that sufficient delay. time there is also
provided. Such cars when loaded are under continuous surveillance
by armed escorts who have continuous communication capability
with base headquarters. Preplanned routing and notification of
departure and arrival are required. If national security requirements
make necessary air transportation, dedicated ERDA aircraft are
used along with the other provisions and procedures.
Technology exists today for improving the effectiveness of safe-
guarding strategic nuclear materials and facilities as amounts of
such materials and the numbers of facilities using them increase
with the expected growth in the, use of nuclear power. Research and
development work by ERDA, NRC, and private industry is directed
toward meeting these identified safeguards needs of the future.
Mr. Edlow has certainly spoken very strongly as to the ability of
private industry. Dr. Orval Jones, director, nuclear security systems
directorate, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque operations office, is
with me today. He has had the responsibility for development of
ERDA's safe secure trailer and the supporting systems. I believe he
also has a short statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask on that same page,
you say light water-do you mean liquid metal fast breeder reactor?
Mr. LYON. Yes, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. I did not think you had developed otherwise so fast.
Thank you.
Dr. Jones, would you proceed.
[Statement and biography referred to follow:]
ORVALE. JONES
Dr. Orval E. Jones is director of the nuclear security systems organization
at Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N. Mex. In this position he is responsible
for planning, directing, and managing Sandia Laboratories' physical protection
safeguards programs which are sponsored by the division of safeguards and
security and the division of military application of the ERDA, by the base and
installation security systems project office of the Air Force, and by the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. These programs are generally concerned
with various aspects of the development of improved security systems for the
physical protection of facilities and transportation.
Dr. Jones received his Ph. D. in mechanical engineering and physics in 1961
from the California Institute of Technology where he was a National Science
Foundation fellow. Following graduation he joined the staff of Sandia Labora-
tories to conduct research in the area of shock wave physics and explosives.
Following several promotions and prior to assuming his present position, he
was director of the solid state sciences research organization at Sandia, and
was responsible for leadership of applied physics research in radiation effects
in semiconductors and solids, stress wave phenomena, surface physics, mathe-
matics, and solid state physics.
STATEMENT OF DR. ORVAL E. JONES, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEMs, SANDIA
LABORATORIES, ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX., AND LIvERMORE, CALIF.
SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN TRANSIT
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Orval E. Jones,
director of the nuclear security systems organization of Sandia Laboratories. I
welcome the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee on the subject of
transportation safeguards.
Sandia Laboratories has a major role in assisting ERDA in the implementa-
tion of safe and secure transportation systems which will prevent theft, diver-
PAGENO="0522"
518
sion, or sabotage of nuclear materials in transit. Our long-term experience in
this area leads me to believe that practical and effective transportation safe-
guards systems can be implemented at reasonable cost.
Although there have been no malevolent acts directed at special nuclear
materials in transit, it is prudent that transportation safeguards systems be
upgraded in order to counter the increased threat of terrorist activity which
has arisen during the past few years.
Safeguards is not a new area in which little or no experience exists. In fact,
substantial experience exists as a result of solving problems of protecting U.S.
weapons. This protection technology which was developed long before the cur-
rent fuel-cycle safeguards concerns arose is now being adapted by ERDA to
greatly increase the protection being given to special nuclear materials. The
ERDA will have a nationwide safe-secure transportation system fully opera-
tional in 1976 for protecting I1ighWay shipments of all significant quantities of
Government-owned special nuclear materials. Such technology is transferable
to both the domestic and international nuclear power industries.
Our goal is to protect against an overt attack by a well-organized, armed
group with sufficient strength to overpower conventional security guards and
security hardware. Such a group might be in collusion with a security system
employee or employees. Exhibit A is a decision diagram which illustrates how
physical protection elements interact to counter such threats. Detection, assess-
ment, communications, access denial, and response forces all serve to prevent
loss of material control. If SNM is lost, then recovery capability enables
timely recovery. Use denial techniques for de~poiling the material make it dif-
ficult for a malefactor to use the material and increase the time available for
recovery. All of these elements are being assembled in balanced protection sys-
tems of assured effectiveness. Appropriate publicity regarding the existence of
such systems can result in psychological deterrence of malefactor actions.
Thus, as shown in exhibit A, there are five levels at which a malefactor action
may be thwarted. i~lalefactors are forced to successfully complete an entire
sequence of actions while the safeguards system to be effective needs only to
interrupt one of the many steps in the sequence. This "protection-in-depth"
approach, w-hich underlies all safeguards development, means that single ele-
ments of an effective safeguards system need not be perfect. With regard to
insiders who might attempt to circumvent the system, the protection-in-depth
approach incorporates operational procedures and access-enabling interlocks
which require a "sequence of independent actions" by several individuals to
defeat the system. No one person can either defeat the system or be placed in
a duress situation w-here he might be forced to contribute significantly to its
defeat.
Protection of SNM from an incident during transport is generally considered
more difficult than at any other time. An example of a current transportation
safeguards system is the nationwide ERDA safe-secure transportation system,
referred to earlier, for highway shipments of Government-owned SNM. This
system incorporates special penetration-resistant and self-immobilizing vehicles,
specially trained couriers in armored escort vehicles, a nationwide dedicated
communications system for monitoring the status of all shipments, and prear-
ranged response and recovery capabilities. The development of special vehicles
which would greatly improve the security and safety of materials during sur-
face transportation was begun over six years ago. The objective has been to
prevent access to the cargo in order to allow law-enforcement response forces
to arrive and assist in neutralizing an attack.
Exhibit B is a photograph of a safe-secure trailer (SST) of the type which
has been in operational use by ERDA since October 1972. Although it is simi-
lar in appearance to a standard semitrailer, the walls, celling, and floor a re-
constructed of materials which will resist penetration for an extended period
of time. In the event of an incident, an immobilization system precludes move-
ment of the trailer and internal deterrents are activated which will thwart
penetration attempts. Since becoming operational, the present SST fleet has
accumulated in excess of 1-million miles of service without incident. A second-
generation SST which incorporates major protection improvements has been
developed and is currently being procured to expand the system. The towing
tractors are armored for both crew and equipment protection. To provide
increased security for SNM in transit, the SST transporters always travel in
convoy with escort vehicles. Improved escort vehicles, as shown in exhibit B,
PAGENO="0523"
519
will soon be introduced into operational service. These new escort vehicles are
specially modified recreational vehicles which provide additional protection for
escort couriers and vital equipment, and afford courier comfort to assure alert-
ness during extended trips.
A nationwide ERDA voice communication system called SECOM which
allows continuous contact with ERDA, shipments and escorts in the contiguous
United States has been operational since 1972. The main elements of system
are shown schematically in exhibit D. The operations control center is shown
in exhibit E. In order to expand communications capacity, to increase reliabil-
ity, and to decrease vulnerability, the system is being modified for digital oper-
ation with voice communication retained as an emergency option. The new
system is now being installed. It has the capability for simultaneously moni-
toring more than 100 convoys with present reporting procedures. Looking
ahead, this new digital system will be the key to enhancing courier effective-
ness and minimizing any potential for duress. For example, the current com-
munication system relies on the couriers to report convoy location and to pin-
point any potential incident. Under development is an add-on system which
utilizes the existing Omega worldwide navigation network to automoatically
and continuously report actual convoy locations. Accuracies of 1 nautical mile
have been demonstrated in actual road testing.
In the event of an attack on an SST convoy, the escort courier force has
primary responsibility for preventing unauthorized convoy control. However,
should the convoy security force be severely challenged by a large, heavily
armed attack, State law enforcement authorities would be requested to provide
support. In order to assure that adequate backup protection is available along
all shipment routes, a national assessment of U.S. State police capabilities has
recently been completed. These data have been computerized and will be an
integral part of routing and control operations.
Although a singular amount of systems planning and testing has gone into
the development and operation of this transportation system, the ERDA is still
not complacent. An emergency operation plan has been established and
resources have been assembled to search for and to identify any radioactive
material which might be lost, stolen, or associated with either bomb or radio-
active-dispersal threats. The agencies involved are: (1) the FBI which
assumes overall responsibility, (2) the ERDA I-Ieadquarters Emergency Action
Coordination Team (EACT) which has threat assessment responsibility, (3)
ERDA laboratories' personnel who act as scientific advisors, and (4) ERDA
laboratories and contractor personnel who have been organized into a Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST) which maintains a state of readiness for
worldwide deployment. Immediately available NESTearn resources include
deployment aircraft and a wide variety of special ERDA-developed radiation
detection equipment for helicopter, highway, or walking use.
A program is also underway to develop use denial methods for despoiling
special nuclear materials automatically or on command in the event other pro-
tection System elements have been compromised. Such methods will render the
materials very difficult to use for malevolent purposes. Highly enriched ura-
nium can be effectively despoiled by adding natural uranium. Chemical dilu-
tion which makes plutonium separation extremely difficult and time consuming
has already been demonstrated. Feasibility of incroporating these use-denial
methods into practical shipping and storage containers has been demonstrated
and prototype containers are now being developed.
It is essential that there be an independent method of evaluating protection
systems and ensuring that they cannot be defeated before arrival of an ade-
quate response. During the past dozen years, we have developed and systemati-
cally used the technique of adversary simulation to insure that system design-
ers do not overlook weaknesses in a protection system. Adversary teams with
a broad range of skills and technical backgrounds are used to ferret out weak-
nesses in either systems or hardware. Such a team, typically made up of secu-
rity-cleared individuals, is given information which it might be able to collect
after extensively studying and observation of the particular protection system.
Some teams are given insider information. They are then asked to develop
attack or diversion scenarios and to assess both by analysis and laboratory
experimentation their likelihood of defeating either the total protection system
or given elements. The scenarios and experimental results are then examined
by the system designers and corrective measures are taken where required. In
PAGENO="0524"
520
addition, the results provide input data and validation for computer models
which are also used to evaluate the effectiveness of protection systems.
For example, in an early adversary simulation experiment conducted in 1969,
a military explosive ordnance disposal team was briefed and challenged to pen-
etrate, in minimum time, a 14-foot thickness of lightweight foam material
which had steel springs and sticky materials embedded in it. Any tools, equip-
ment, and materials desired by the team were made ava~iab1e to it. Penetra-
tion was accomplished only after a total elapsed time of nearly 14 hours.
During the past year, more than a dozen such tests have been performed to
evaluate advanced denial concepts.
Effective utilization of technology developments in both government and pri-
vate SN1~I transportation systems requires not only adaptation or modification
of the technology to meet specific needs, but also systems analyses directed at
defining balanced protection systems which provide protection-in-depth and are
cost-effective. Computer models to optimize transportation modes and routes in
terms of effectiveness and cost tradeoffs have been developed. Sensitivity analy-
ses of alternative siting schemes, shipping schedules, and escort and response
capabilities have provided insight into many of the important considerations
affecting SNM transportation in the United States. Such studies of the nuclear
power industry have shown that if extensive plutonium recycle is implemented,
total transportation safeguards costs in 1985 would add about one-tenth of a
percent to the consumers' electric bill. The total number of security guards
and support personnel associated with such a system would be much less than
one-tenth of 1 percent of the 1975 total of half a million officers involved in
State and local law enforcement.
Studies have also been conducted to compare different modes of SNM trans-
portation. Airborne shipments are very difficult to hijack without employee col-
lusion. Also, accident frequencies are far lower for air transport than for any
other mode; however, accidents are usually severe if they do occur and could
result in dispersal of radioactive material. Accident-resistant shipping contain-
ers have been developed and tested which will preclude any dispersal of radio-
active material in either a fixed-wing aircraft or a helicopter crash. Exhibit F
shows such a container which has survived an impact equivalent to that
resulting from a jet cargo plane crashing into a mountainside. The container
can also withstand the subsequent aircraft fuel fire.
In summary, Sandia's efforts related to ERDA's mission to develop safe-
guards systems for SNM intransit are directed at (1) increasing the time
required for the malefactor to achieve his goal, (2) improving detection and
communication capabilities, and (3) increasing the capability of couriers and
secondary response personnel to defeat any attack. The cost to the electrical
power consumer of improved transportation safeguards systems will be insig-
nificant. I believe it is both possible and economically feasible to implement
protection systems which will continue to deter or prevent malefactors from
using ~nuc1ear materials in transit to endanger society.
STATEMENT OP ORVAL B. ~TONES, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SECURITY
SYSTEMS, SANDIA LABORATORIES, ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.
Dr. JoNEs. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
welcome the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on the
subject of transportation safeguards.
Sandia Laboratories has a major role in assisting ERDA in the
implementation of safe and secure transportation systems which will
prevent theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials in transit.
Our long-term experience in this area leads me to believe that prac-
tical and effective transportation safeguards systems can be imple-
mented at reasonable cost.
Although there have been no malevolent acts directed at special
nuclear materials in transit, it is prudent that transportation safe-
guards systems be upgraded in order to counter the increased threat
of terrorist activity which has arisen during the past few years.
PAGENO="0525"
521
Safeguards is not a new area in which little or no experience
exists. In fact, substantial experience exists as a result of solving
problems of protecting U.S. weapons. This protection technology
which was developed long before the current fuel-cycle safeguards
concerns arose is now being adapted by EIRDA to greatly increase
the protection being given to special nuclear materials. The ERDA
will have a nationwide safe-secure transportation system fully opera-
tional in 1976 for protecting highway shipments of all significant
quantities of government-owned special nuclear materials. Such tech-
nology is transferable to both the domestic and international nuclear
power industries.
Our goal is to protect against an overt attack by a well-organized,
armed group with sufficient strength to overpower conventional secu-
rity guards and security hardware. Such a group might be in collu-
sion with a security system employee or employees.
The first exhibit in the back of the text, exhibit A, which is
displayed on the screen, is a decision diagram which illustrates how
physical protection elements interact to counter such threats. Detec-
tion, assessment, communications,, access denial, and response forces
all serve to prevent loss of material control. If SNM is lost, then
recovery capability enables timely recovery. Use-denial techniques
for despoiling the material make it difficult for a malefactor to use
the material and increase the time available for recovery. All of
these elements are being assembled in balanced protection systems of
assured effectiveness. Appropriate publicity regarding the existence
of such systems can result in psychological deterrence of malefactor
actions. Thus, as shown in exhibit A, there are five levels at which a
malefactor action may be thwarted. I will indicate those for you:
Psychological deterrence, protection systems, response, recovery, and
use-denial.
Malefactors are forced to successfully complete an entire sequence
of actions while the safeguards system to be effective needs only to
interrupt one of the many steps in the sequence. This protection-in-
depth approach, which underlies all safeguards development, means
that single elements of an effective safeguards system need not be
perfect. With regard to insiders who might attempt to circumvent
the system, the protection-in-depth approach incorporates opera-
tional procedures and access-enabling interlocks which require a
sequence of independent actions by several individuals to defeat the
system. No one person can either defeat the system or be placed in a
duress situation where he might be forced to contribute significantly
to its defeat.
Protection of SNM from an incident during transport is generally
considered more difficult than at any other time. An example of a
current transportation safeguards system is the nationwide ERDA
safe-secure transportation system, referred to earlier, for highway
shipments of government-owned SNM. This system incorporates spe-
cial penetration-resistant and self-immobilizing vehicles, specially
trained couriers in armored escort vehicles, a nationwide dedicated
communications system for monitoring the status of all shipments,
and prearranged response and recovery capabilities. The develop-
ment of special vehicles which would greatly improve the security
PAGENO="0526"
522
and safety of materials during surface transportation was begun
over 6 years ago. The objective has been to prevent access to the
cargo in order to allow law-enforcement response forces to arrive
and assist in neutralizing an attack.
Exhibit B is a photograph of a safe-secure trailer of the type
which has been in operational use by ERDA since October 1972.
[Exhibits A and B follow:]
PAGENO="0527"
COMMUNICATIONS
EXHIBIT A - Interaction O~ Physical Protection Elesients
PAGENO="0528"
H.
V
T
XXII I BIT B - SaIn-Sacure Trailer arid TrucLor
3'
TT7 ~
CJ'
PAGENO="0529"
525
Although it is similar in appearance to a standard semitrailer, the
walls, ceiling, and floor are cOnstructed of materials which will
resist penetration for an extended period of time. In the event of an
incident, an immobilization system precludes movement of the
trailer and internal deterrents are activated which will thwart pene-
tration attempts. Since becoming operational, the present SST fleet
has accumulated in excess of 1 million miles of service without inci-
dent. A second-generation SST which incorporates major protection
improvements has been developed and is currently being procured to
expand the system. The towing tractors are armored for both crew
and equipment protection. To provide increased security for SNM in
transit, the SST transporters always travel in convoy with escort
vehicles. Improved escort vehicles, as shown in exhibit C, will soon
be introduced into operational service. These new escort vehicles are
specially modified recreational vehicles which provide additional
protection for escort couriers and vital equipment, and afford courier
comfort to assure alertness during extended trips.
A nationwide ERDA voice communication system, called
SECOM, which allows continuOus contact with ERDA shipments
and escorts in the contiguous United States has been operational
since 1972. The main elements of the system are shown schematically
in exhibit D. The operations control center is shown in exhibit E.
[Exhibits C, D, and E follow:]
PAGENO="0530"
C)
C)'
I PTT C - I c'nrj. `J~Th c
PAGENO="0531"
CONVOY
HF RECEIVING
REMOTE STATIONS
~LAND LINES ~
EXHIBIT D - ERDA Nationwide SECOM Communications System for SNM Transportation
PAGENO="0532"
f
- -
I
N
L L.
00
EXHIBIT S - Operations Control Canter f or the ERDA/SECOM Communications System
PAGENO="0533"
529
In order to expand communications capacity, to increase reliabil-
ity, and to decrease vulnerability, the system is being modified for
digital operation with voice communication retained as an emer-
gency option. This new system is now being installed. It has the
capability for simultaneously monitoring more than 100 convoys
with present reporting procedures. Capability has been built into it
so that private industry can tap into it via dispatching offices. Look-
ing ahead, this new digital system will be the key to enhancing cou-
rier effectiveness and minimizing any potential for duress. For
example, the current communication system relies on the couriers to
report convoy location and to pinpoint any potential incident. Under
development is an add-on system which utilizes the existing Omega
worldwide navigation network to automatically and continuously
report actual convoy locations. Accuracies of 1 nautical mile have
been demonstrated in actual road testing.
In the event of an attack on an SST convoy, the escort courier
force has primary responsibility~ for preventing unauthorized convoy
control. However, should the cohvoy security force be severely chal-
lenged by a large, heavily armed attack, State law enforcement
authorities would be requested to provide support. In order to assure
that adequate backup protection is available along all shipment
routes, a national assessment of U.S. state police capabilities has
recently been completed. These data have been computerized and
will be an integral part of routing and control operations. To give
you an example, if a bridge is washed out and it is necessary to
change the route of a truck in progress, we can ask the computer
whether there is adequate backup capability along that new route. If
additional security precautions are indicated we can specify them at
that time.
Although a singular amount of systems planning and testing has
gone into the development and operation of this transportation
system, the ERDA is still not complacent. An emergency operation
plan has been established and recources have been assembled to
search for and to identify and radioactive material which might be
lost, stolen, or associated with either bomb or radioactive-dispersal
threats. The agencies involved are: (1) The FBI which assumes
overall responsibility, (2) the ERDA headquarters emergency action
coordination team [EACT] which has threat assessment responsibil-
ity, (3) ERDA laboratories' personnel who act as scientific advisers,
and (4) ERDA laboratories and contractor personnel who have been
organized into a nuclear emergency search team [NEST] which
maintains a state of readiness for worldwide deployment. Immedi-
ately available nuclear emergency search team resources include
deployment aircraft and a wide variety of special ERDA-developed
radiation detection equipment for helicopter, highway, or walking
use.
A program is also underway to develop use denial methods for
despoiling special nuclear materials automatically or on command in
the event other protection system elements have been compromised.
Such methods will render the materials very difficult to use for
malevolent purposes. Highly enriched uranium can be effectively
despoiled by adding natural uranium. Chemical dilution which
71-074 0 - 76 - 35
PAGENO="0534"
530
makes plutonium separation extremely difficult and time consuming
has already been demonstrated. Feasibility of incorporating these
use-denial methods into practical shipping and storage containers
has been demonstrated and prototype containers are now being
developed.
It is essential that there be an independent method of evaluating
protection systems and insuring that they cannot be defeated before
arrival of an adequate response. During the past dozen years, we
have developed and systematically used the technique of "adversary
simulation" to insure that system designers do not overlook weak-
nesses in a protection system.
Adversary teams with a broad range of skills and technical back-
grounds are used to ferret out weaknesses in either systems or hard-
ware. Such a team, typically made up of security-cleared
individuals, is given information which it might be able to collect
after extensively studying and observing the particular protection
system. Some teams are given insider information. They are then
asked to develop attack or diversion scenarios and to assess both by
analysis and laboratory experimentation their likelihood of defeat-
ing either the total protection system or given elements. The scena-
rios and experimental results are then examined by the system
designers and corrective measures are taken where required. In addi-
tion, the results provide input data and validation for the computer
models mentioned by Mr. Lyon, which are used to evaluate the
effectiveness of protection systems.
For example, in an early adversary simulation experiment con-
ducted in 1969, a military explosive ordnance disposal [EOD] team
was briefed and challenged to penetrate, in minimum time, a 14-foot
thickness of lightweight foam material which had steel springs and
sticky materials embedded in it. Any tools, equipment, and materials
desired by the team were made available to it. Penetration was
accomplished only after a total elapsed time of nearly 14 hours.
I would like to show a severely edited movie of those 14 hours
which takes about 4 minutes that will give you a feeling for the
kind of testing I am talking about. We have about a 14-foot thick
plug of lightweight 2-pound-per-cubic-foot foam in the entrance of
a storage vault. The plug face that is presented to the explosive ord-
nance team is 7 feet by 7 feet. The team was told that there was
nothing in the material that would hurt them, but that it did con-
tain different kinds of deterrents.
[Movie presented.]
They started rather cautiously, probing the face of the foam mate-
rial just to learn what was actually in it. This was a skilled explo-
sive ordnance demolition team.
Now I think as you will see here, this foam is not very hard to
break up. But it takes time and that is our objective, to provide
delay time until a response can arrive.
They thought they could use a chainsaw to cut on it but they
didn't reckon with the hardened steel wires that were embedded in
it. There is sticky material in it, and you can see the foam sticking
to their shovels.
PAGENO="0535"
531
Here they are grappling with one of those hardened steel wires. I
might add that they were on a learning curve as they went along,
and you can see they are going at the penetration task much more
forcefully now.
They thought perhaps the wire was continuous and if they hooked
it in a fishhook way they could pull the whole mass out at one fell
swoop. We had thought of that and the wires were cut short.
We had challenged this team by telling them if they could beat a
certain penetration time we would give them a case of champagne.
If they didn't they got beer.
They thought perhaps they could get a fire going and they used a
torch. This is a foam that had been specially formulated so that it
won't support combustion, but it burns when under the torch. It
puts out massive amounts of smoke which provides protection in
itself. They decided to use explosives. Remember we let them pick
their tools.
That was a relatively small charge. You can see they are moving
through the material now. And here you see they use a little more
explosive. [Laughter.]
These explosive attacks are serious threats and ones that we worry
about. They actually test us hardest. Notice they had to go to pro-
tective face masks. [Laughter.]
There you see the next charge. And let's do away with hand shov-
els-here is a front end loader. [Laughter.]
We are now seeing them just as they are beginning to break
through the rear-you can turn the film off now--through the rear
of the foam. This is the kind of testing that we are using to be cer-
tain the designer sitting in his office has not overlooked a serious
weakness.
Effective utilization of technology developments in both Govern-
ment and private SNM transportation systems requires not only
adaptation or modification of the~ technology to meet specific needs,
but also systems analyses directed at defining balanced protection
systems which provide "protection-in-depth" and are cost-effective.
Computer models to optimize transportation modes and routes in
terms of effectiveness and cost tradeoffs have been developed. Sensi-
tivity analyses of alternative siting schemes, shipping schedules, and
escort and response capabilities have provided insight into many of
the important considerations affecting SNM transportation in the
United States. Such studies of the nuclear power industry, and I
might note that these have been done for NRC, have shown that if
extensive plutonium recycle is implemented, total transportation
safeguards costs in 1985 would add, whether by Government or pri-
vate industry, about one-tenth of 1 percent to the consumers' electric
bill. The total number of security guards and support personnel
associated with such a system would be much less than one-tenth of
1 percent of the 1975 total of half a million officers involved in State
and local law enforcement. The latter number was also mentioned by
Dr. Taylor.
Studies have also been conducted to compare different modes of
SNM transportation. Airborne shipments are very difficult to hij ac1~
PAGENO="0536"
532
without employee collusion. Also, accident frequencies are far lower
for air transport than for any other mode; however, accidents are
usually severe if they do occur and could result in disperal of radio-
active material. Accident-resistant shipping containers have been
developed and tested which will preclude any dispersal of radioac-
tive material in either a fixed-wing aircraft or a helicopter crash.
Exhibit F shows such a container which has survived an impact
equivalent to that resulting from a jet cargo plane crashing into a
mountainside.
[Exhibit F follows:]
PAGENO="0537"
XHIBIT T ;cc~ annt ~ Cu~t
PAGENO="0538"
534
The container can also withstand the subsequent aircraft fuel fire.
Although it's badly dented, it won't leak.
In summary, Sandia's efforts related to EIRDA's mission to
develop safeguards systems for SNM in transit are directed at: (1)
Increasing the time required for the malefactor to achieve his goal;
(2) improving detection and communication capabilities; and (3)
increasing the capability of couriers and secondary response person-
nel to defeat any attack.
The cost to the electrical power consumer of improved transporta-
tion safeguards systems will be insignificant. I believe it is both pos-
sible and economically feasible to implement protection systems
which will continue to deter or prevent malefactors from using
nuclear materials in transit to endanger society.
Thank you.
Mr. TSONGAS. Dr. Jones, the film was interesting but I don't
understand its relevance. You had a 14-foot thickness of material.
Dr. JONES. Yes.
Mr. T50NGA5. In transit obviously the material is not encased with
14 feet of material. However you put th~ material into the truck it
would obviously be the easiest way of getting it out. If you had
your attackers who would try to get through the siding, they proba-
bly wouldn't have the capability intellectually to even stop the truck
in the first place.
Dr. JONES. Let me first comment that the relevance of the film
was not to apply it to the transportation mode per Se, but simply to
illustrate that this is the tool that we are using for testing transpor-
tation elements. So I use it as an example.
We have run many such tests. This is an early one in the develop-
ment of active denial schemes.
Your second question was how might something of this sort be
applied in an actual situation. I would point out that this foam can
in fact be sprayed out and it sets up in a matter of minutes.
Thus you might fill an igloo or a vault or whatever you have with
something like this, on command.
We are looking at classes and families of materials which can be
used to greatly enhance the delay that an attacker would incur, but
yet would not interfere with normal operations and safety of ship-
ping personnel.
Mr. TSONGAS. Well that is quite different from the impression that
its going to take 14 hours for an advanced demolitions team to get
through the safety net.
Dr. JONES. No, I didn't say that about the vehicle. I just wanted
to illustrate the method of testing.
Mr. TSONGAS. Also, you never discussed the possibility that they
preferred beer to champagne.
Dr. JONES. They lost, They got beer and I also forgot to tell you
its a good thing we didn't make the movie in sound.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Weaver.
Mr. WEAVER. Those semitrailers we saw, particularly the one you
have there; what is carried in those? They are in operation now;
isn't that right?
Dr. JONES. Yes.
PAGENO="0539"
535
Mr. LYON. Yes, Mr. Weaver, initially they were used to carry and
are now being used to carry weapons that have been manufactured
and assembled by ERDA for transfer-
Mr. WEAVER. Those are weapons carriers?
Mr. LYON. Yes, they carry weapons.
Mr. WEAVER. Do they carry plutonium, too?
Mr. LYON. They also carry special material manufactured to be
used in various EIRDA development projects.
Mr. WEAVER. This isn't classified?
Mr. LYON. No.
Mr. WEAVER. But in other words, those will carry just about any
nuqlear material you can think of, right?
Mr. LYON. They are designed to be an all-purpose carrier. As Dr.
Jones pointed out we also develop special containers for the material
that is being carried. Oviously~ in any type; of a transportation
system you must be prepared for various types of natural accidents
that can occur.
For that reason the containers are designed to protect whatever
material they are carrying. Contents are protected against shock dis-
persal around the countryside and so forth.
Mr. WEAVER. I just wanted to know what they are carrying; they
carry anything, right?
Mr. LYON. Yes.
Mr. WEAVER. Do they carry plutonium?
Mr. LYON. Yes.
Mr. WEAVER. Did you see any James Bond movies?
Mr. LYON. I am a great fan of James Bond.
Mr. WEAVER. Don't they hijack that kind of truck all the time in
James Bond?
Mr. LYON. I don't remember that Dr. Jones talked about this, but
that type of trailer can be motivated to lock itself. To carry it off
you would have to have a tank carrier, something that could lift up
several tons.
Mr. WEAVER. The trailer motivates itself?
Mr. LYON. Immobilizes itself.
Dr. JONES. On command.
Mr. WEAVER. Well, as I say, you know, I always thought James
Bond was a charming picture until I started reading CIA materials,
then I began to wonder. So, I do think-
Mr. LYON. Dr. Jones has an additional comment.
Dr. JONES. I would like to add a comment to that. The reason I
wanted to show you the kind of testing we do is because we worry
that a designer working in an office won't think of all the possible
scenarios. We have run about a dozen similar kinds of attacks. To
answer an earlier question, we run that kind of attack on the actual
truck itself to-
Mr. WEAVER. Have you tried candles? [Laughter.]
Dr. JONES. We have tried a lot of things but not candles.
Mr. WEAVER. I yield to the distinguished chairman.
Mr. LYON. I think it is important, Mr. Weaver, to note that in
this particular case we are dealing with a terrorist threat that does
exist in the IJnited States.
PAGENO="0540"
536
There is not a threat to nuclear weapons that we know of, but
who is to know when whatever group is involved may decide to
make them their objective?
What we are trying to do is to provide a good technological base
for systems offering a wide range of use options. Right now this
technology is being selectively applied to shipments involving weap-
ons and special nuclear materials.
Mr. TSONGAS. I guess there are those who would say when Daniel
Schoor and his group want to take over, we have to be prepared to-
well, two questions.
I must admit that I was very impressed with your presentation.
But two thoughts occur to me. One is that I see this vehicle and I
see a 14-hour time to penetrate a particular situation. Yet, I remem-
ber Mr. Edlow, who I see has left his son and colleague here, if you
had the same team and tried to penetrate existing armored vehicles,
what would your guesstimate be as to how long it would take to do
that?
Mr. LYON. The estimate at the present time to penetrate a normal
armored vehicle is something in the order of a few minutes with a
team that is properly equipped. They would have to have some type
of power tools, shape charges or high explosives.
Mr. TSONGAS. Motivation would be either financial or ideological,
something a lot more than would drive him than champagne.
Mr. LYON. That is right. I might point out that the Domestic
Transportation System of Nuclear Materials, as I mentioned in my
statement, is largely involved with materials that are not attractive
targets. They are unattractive on two counts. First, they lack great
monetary value; second, they do not involve the kinds of material
terrorists might try to use to effect their measure on society.
Mr. TSONGAS. I suspect that may be true, but I can easily see a
situation where a terrorist group would attack such an armored
vehicle and that the niceties of whether the nuclear material was or
was not useful in terms of making a weapon or in terms of dispersal
would really be lost on the population; the shock impact, the psy-
chological impact would be there irrespective of the technical
details.
The second thing that comes to mind is that if indeed this truck
that you have described is as good as it is-and I would like to see
it sometime-I contrast that with current NRC regulations which
state that all that is necessary to safeguard nuclear powerplants are
two armed guards with pistols.
We are almost in a schizophrenic situation where we are almost,
we have almost Orwellian security in effect in one case and in
another link of the chain you seem to be vulnerable.
Mr. LYON. I think, again, Mr. Chairman, that it is important to
understand what needs to be protected in the powerplant and what
needs to be protected in transit.
The powerplant has low enriched nuclear fuel, which, in itself, is
not hazardous. It is encased in fuel elements which are themselves
protected, installed in a core which is even more protected, and put
in a heavy container which is more protected and encased in a large
cement, tornado-proof building which is even more protected.
PAGENO="0541"
537
Guards, you might say, are the first visible line of defense, but there
are many, many reinforcing protective systems at work.
It would require a large effort. Penetration of the total system
would require a large amount of specially designed equipment and
materials. Studies show the vulnerability of stealing material from a
reactor to be essentially nonexistent.
The reactor's vulnerability to sabotage, whereby you lose electrical
power, is about the same as it is to any powerplant that we have
around the country.
Dr. JONES. Could I have an additional crack at that?
As Mr. Lyon said, we use these multipurpose vehicles; we do
carry weapons in them to which we give an extra level of protection.
Mr. WEAVER. What kind of weapons?
Dr. JONES. Nuclear weapons that have been built-
Mr. WEAVER. I thought you meant carried by the people.
Dr. JONES. Weapons are carried to DOD receiving points in these
trailers and we have always given weapons a very special level of
attention.
I would like to come back to~ the 14 hour test, because I didn't
introduce it to make a direct connection to the transporter itself. I
used it to show you, in a pictorial way the idea of our testing.
Mr. TSONGAS. I understand.
Dr. JONES. But to be more specific, we are striving, in the trans-
porters, for delays of several hours. Our assessment of State police
capabilities suggests that such delays will give us a very comfortable
measure of time for the State police to arrive on the scene. So, I
didn't want to leave you with the feeling that the movie applied
directly to our trucks.
Mr. TSONGAS. It is my-
Dr. JONES. But we use those techniques and tests to see if our
designs are correct.
Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. Pollard, who has gained repute in the last
month or so, Mr. Lyon, testified yesterday that there is in this coun-
try a nuclear powerplant which can be brought to melt down by
simply detonating an explosive in one room.
So, even though theoretically the safeguards which you enumer-
ated exist, there are situations where-and Brown's Ferry is a case
in point-where there are much greater dangers than perhaps would
appear on the surface.
Mr. LYON. Mr. Pollard is welcOme to his own opinion, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. But Brown's Ferry was not Mr. Pollard's opinion,
Brown's Ferry did indeed take place.
Mr. LYON. There was a fire there, yes, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. And in Erwin, Tenn. we have the security incident
which took place.
Mr. LYON. There is a town by the name of Erwin, Tenn., yes, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. TSONGAS. Yes.
Mr. WEAVER. In conducting the program of safeguarding trans-
port of nuclear materials, you said you did a study, a national
assessment of the State police capability. That is right is it not?
Dr. JONES. Yes.
PAGENO="0542"
538
Mr. WTEAVER. In other words, in effect-was this study made just
to determine the use of State police for shipment of nuclear mate-
rials?
Dr. JONES. Basically, it was to tell us that if there was an alarm
in the nuclear sector, how do State police establish response priori-
ties, what response capability might arrive at a scene anywhere
along a highway as a function of time. This information, then, lets
us understand how good a transporter we have to build and how
much delay time to build into it. In the event of a large attack we
can be certain that adequate State police and local police backup
forces arrive, on the scene.
Mr. WEAVER. Do you know how much that study cost?
Dr. JONES. Well, I can only give you a guess. Let's see, it was a
combination of letters and actually going out and talking to key
State police representatives. I would say probably around-and I
could be wrong by 50 percent-but I would say around $200,000
because I know how many people were involved in it.
Mr. WEAVER. On page 7 of your testimony, Mr. Jones, you read a
sentence, "Highly enriched uranium can be effectively despoiled by
adding natural uranium." You then omitted the next sentence, "An
enrichment pla.nt would be required to reconstitute the fissile mate-
rial."
Did you mean to omit that sentence?
Dr. JONES. No, I didn't.
Mr. WEAVER. Did you inadvertently omit that?
Dr. JONES. I tried to pick a few places in my testimony that I
thought were clearly obvious to save time. So, to speed up I just left
that one out. All the sentence meant is that if you were to design a
container for 93 percent enriched uranium which might be used in
an HTGR, then if you have a means of mixing the enriched ura-
nium with natural uranium there will be no possible way to make a
weapon out of it.
So, such a container is a use-denial device.
Mr. WEAVER. But, then, you say an enrichment plant would be
required to reconstitute the fissile material. Meaning by that, the
expenses would be considerably greater if you used that technique;
correct?
Dr. JONES. No. All I am saying is that if a malefactor got hold of
that despoiled material he would have to-
Mr. WEAVER. I see, he would have to do that.
Dr. JONES. Exactly.
Mr. WEAVER. And this despoilation would take place only if you
were under attack; is that right?
Dr. JONES. Yes.
Mr. WEAVER. A number of people told this committee that they
would do this automatically, mix these fuels in order to keep them
from use and reconstitute later on.
Dr. JONES. Perhaps, but that is not what I described here.
Mr. WEAVER. But you don't think that would be necessary. You
would have a device, you carry along a little ordinary uranium and
if somebody starts shooting at you, you mix it with the enriched
uranium.
PAGENO="0543"
539
Dr. JONES. If we felt we were in imminent danger, we would do
that. We feel this is a way to handle this problem without destroying
the efficiency of normal operations.
Mr. WEAVER. That wouldn't be any problem, taking on-always
carrying a cannister of that kind of thing, you press a button and
mix them.
How would you safeguard the nuclear material in the permanent
waste disposal sites, permanent, I mean now, really permanent waste
disposal sites?
Dr. JONES. I am not your expert there, but I can-
Mr. WEAVER. I don't mean the temporary ones, I mean the perma-
nent ones. How would you handle that?
Dr. JONES. I can only give you my opinion.
Mr. LYON. First, let me say that the protection of high-level solid
waste is not really a safeguards matter in the sense that it somewhat
protects itself because it is highly irradiated and, therefore,
extremely dangerous. It is normally stored in shielded casks, or put
it underground where it is protected. As you know, we have waste
management studies underway to provide a long-term permanent
storage in the solid form perhaps deep within the Earth.
Mr. WEAVER. Do you know what form it will be in now when we
have permanent waste disposal? Do you know the form of this?
Mr. LYON. It can be in several forms. The particular form has not
yet been determined.
Mr. WEAVER. We don't know what form it is going to be in yet;
isn't that correct?
Mr. LYON. It can be cast into cement blocks, it can be-
Mr. WEAVER. But we don't know~the solution to that.
Mr. LYON. We don't know the cost effective solution. We have
not-
Mr. WEAVER. But we don't know.
Mr. LYON. We have not built the system, no.
Mr. WEAVER. So, we don't know how to safeguard-
Mr. LYON. Yes, sir, we know that-
Mr. WEAVER. You don't know. By syntax you are-
Mr. LYON. The technology is available. It can be applied to the
solution of that problem. We are working with the people who are
designing waste-management systems. The problem is coming up
with the most cost-effective waste-management system, not the safe-
guards, sir.
Dr. JONES. As far as form goes, there are a number of methods a
glassing, calcining process is the leading contender.
Mr. WEAVER. Say that again, please?
Dr. JONES. Putting high-level waste into a glassy-type matrix is
the maj or contender; and there are different variations on that.
However, all of these processes, whatever the most cost-effective
approach is, will put the waste in the form of a solid brick. As Mr.
Lyon said, and this is my personal opinion now, I think the most
effective safeguard will be that these bricks are installed in saltbeds
or deep granitic formations.
Mr. WEAVER. You say we have the right method now, but we have
just not selected it; right?
Dr. JONES. Safeguards is not the governing issue.
PAGENO="0544"
540
Mr. LYON. That is correct.
Mr. WEAVER. And we could go on with this, but I think that both
of our positions have been made clear, so I thank you very much.
Mr. TSONGAS. Two final questions. Isn't, in the long term, your
greatest test to be to make the objective less desirable from the ter-
rorist point of view, either by the spiking principle or the mixing
principle or simply make the material less desirable for any use
whatever?
Mr. LYON. Well, the answer to that, I would say directly, is yes.
If the material is not a desirable theft target, then, obviously, no
one is going to steal it. Unless as Mr. Weaver suggested, or perhaps
it was you, Mr. Chairman, this action is attempted for political
headlines.
There are cost-effective considerations in this. One of our national
goals is to continue the availability of cheap energy that this coun-
try has been blessed with in the past. Anything that requires one to
go through an unnecessary costly process to recover it for its natural
use is undesirable.
And as Dr. Jones pointed out here, we are looking at the types of
systems that allow us to make it unattractive when necessary, but
not before it is necessary.
Mr. TSONGAS. When you do cost-effectiveness, doesn't that presume
that one has a pretty good handle on the probabilities and Dr. Ras-
mussen probably has the most definitive statement on nuclear
energy, and he has stated himself that a number of the things you
have to deal with are not capable of being quantified.
Mr. Lyox. This is true in part, however, as Dr. Rasmussen prob-
ably pointed out to you-and I didn't hear his testimony-he did
through modeling, a great extensive amount of modeling, prove that
a power reactor under most strenuous casualty conditions, is essen-
tially safe. We have that same capability in safeguards. We are
using those same techniques and reinforcing them, as Dr. Jones has
said, by what we call black-hatting operations. The result is situa-
tions where we actually take especially trained and equipped people
and put them to the task of defeating the designer's work. We use
this information to validate our models and to assure that they are
producing factual answers, ones that can be backed up.
So that as we go into developing concepts for our systems, we can
select and test systems offering the greatest opportunities for reli-
ability and cost-effectiveness.
Mr. TSONGAS. Much of the Builder memorandum suggests a 1-3
split in terms of the threat, one person inside, three people from the
outside. One person possibly in collusion from the inside, that is.
You dismiss Mr. Pollard's concern, his opinion; at least I got the
impression you didn't put much stock in it. What do you think of
Mr. Builder's memorandum?
Mr. LYoN. I believe that it is possible to have one person inside
and three people outside. If you go back through this industry, and
certainly in, bank robberies as well, there is conclusive evidence that
an inside man has the ability to open the door or disengage the
alarm and let his friends in. This is precisely the kind of situation
that you would like not to have.
These factors must be and are considered in designing the safe-
guards system.
PAGENO="0545"
:541
You can look at a specific threat. Our belief is that you should
address a range of threats. Then you should model that range of
threats against the various concepts and configurations of safeguard
systems. Evaluation of these results can then be expressed as risks of
a successful adversary action. These data also tell us the conse-
quences likely to result from successful adversary action.
On the basis of this information, one then decides whether it is
worthwhile to add the extra guard, put up an additional perIiiieter
alarm, put all material in the vault, go to the expensive-well, they
are not expensive-transportation system we have discussed here
today.
Mr. TSONGAS. Isn't that what i\r. Builder did in arriving at the
conclusion that current safety standards are not adequate?
Mr. LYON. I am not aware that Mr. Builder has accomplished
such studies on the facilities. I believe that what his statement said
is that we should take these possible threats and see if our systems
will stand up against them.
Mr. TSONGAS. Well, stripped of the verbiage, the clear impression
that we have gotten from all sectors of this testimony has been that
nuclear energy is with us. That is a generalization. I am talking
now not about plutonium recycle, but just what exists now.
I didn't recall anyone who said that he felt that the. existing safe-
guards promulgated by NRC are adequate. In fact, the people who
were here this morning, you may have heard, people from NRC,
have stated to the contrary, that they are in the process of promul-
gating new regulations to bring up the adequacy of safeguards.
That suggests to me that-
Mr. LYON. I think that is a question, Mr. Chairman, that people
from the Regulatory Commission can better address than I.
We have assessed our facilities in the models and we do know what
their capabilities are. We have a request for moneys before you-be-
fore the Congress-this year. It identifies where we think strength-
ening of safeguards is desirable.
We did have, last year, an amendment, approved by Congress,
which provided us additional mOneys to strengthen those areas in
ERDA that have the largest amount of strategic nuclear materials
in a form that is attractive to someone who desires to break the law.
I think it is important to note hat anyone who desires to do that
has to be placed in the category of a terroriest. Theft of special
nuclear materials is an illegal act-a Federal crime. It immediately
brings in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One attempting this
crime at an ERDA facility, certainly risks being caught; if detected,
he risks being detained and queried; and if he tries to use a weapon,
he risks being shot.
Our safeguards system tends to, deter an individual, or a group of
individuals from such an act. It is always possible to believe what is
available is, to his mind or to their minds, worth the effort. That is
what we guard against.
Mr. TSONGAS. The behaviorists from the first session, one of them
enumerated the scenario that would to a certain mind make the
activity all the more enticing.
If you look at the Texas tower situation, all of those things apply.
He knew exactly what he was doing, what the threat to him was,
and it was still acted out.
PAGENO="0546"
542
So, in terms of the-I think it was described as the legitimate
lunatic, a lot of what we postulate is based on that theory.
Mr. Weaver?
Mr. WEAVER. I apologize. I asked the people from the NRC earlier
today this question, and I apologize for not asking you, so I will
now.
Thank you.
The question is, have you in the main ever lost any nuclear mate-
rial? The word became unaccounted for and we tried to define the
difference between "lost" and "unaccounted for", but couldn't. But
either one, lost or unaccounted for?
Mr. LYON. We have lost material, yes, sir.
Mr. WEAVER. You have lost material?
Mr. LYON. Yes, sir. All industrial processes sustain normal operat-
ing losses. As an example of what a normal operating loss might be,
Mr. Weaver, when you unwrap a bar of butter or the other spread,
some of that material sticks on the paper.
Mr. WEAVER. No plutonium sticks on it?
Mr. LYON. Some of that material sticks on the paper. It is not
economic to try and recover it.
When you use your knife, some more material sticks on the knife.
Unless you are going to sit there and lick your knife in front of
everybody, it is not retrieved.
We do attempt to account for, as I said earlier, "to count the
atoms." Our ability to measure fractions of atoms of material of this
type by instrumentation is not yet complete. We do try to measure
by weight or by any other means the material that goes through a
plant and anything that exceeds what is expected as a normal oper-
ating loss for that particular design of plant is fully investigated as
to cause.
We have experienced normal operating losses. To the best of our-
Mr. WEAVER. You have experienced-
Mr. LYON. Normal operating losses, yes. Oil leaks out of cars, that
is a normal operating loss.
Mr. WEAVER. But how much are we talking about in a normal
operating loss? Is that a lot? If it is a classified question, I don't
want to expose Government secrets, so I hope you don't do that.
Mr. LYON. The normal operating loss will be fixed by the design
of the plant and the instrumentation that is put into the plant to
detect these losses. It can be as low as one-tenth or two-tenths per-
cent of the throughput of that plant.
If the plant is in the 1-ton-a-day-of-material capacity, the operat-
ing loss might be two-tenths or-
Mr. WEAVER. You don't know where it is, it is on the knife or on
the butter wrapper somewhere. You don't-you never found out, you
never said you know it has gone there.
Mr. LYON. We do know. We determine where it is. We identify
what it is so that we know we have had no theft and no diversion of
material from the facility.
Mr. WEAVER. Then it is not unaccounted for. It is accounted for.
Mr. LYON. It is unaccounted for until you determine where it has
gone.
Mr. WEAVER. Then we don't have any unaccounted for nuclear
material.
PAGENO="0547"
543
Mr. LYON. Not in the sense that it has disappeared by theft, no,
sir.
Mr. WEAVER. Where does it go? I mean, is it lost?
Mr. LYON. No, it goes into such things as you talked about, the
high-level waste in very small amounts. But over a period of many
years, it is distributed throughout the processing system and it
becomes some number of grams or maybe a kilogram. But it is dis-
tributed over such a wide area that it is not economical to recover it.
Nor can it be used by anyone. It is a matter of economics, Mr.
Weaver.
Mr. WEAVER. When I was in the Navy, I was a very low-class
seaman and they made me clean the bilges. I had to go pick up the
stuff-unless they had somebody like me, it wasn't worth getting
down in the oil and water down there.
Mr. LYON. Well, I can use that as an example. In the Navy, you
almost always ended up with oil: in the bilges-oil that came out of
the turbines or the diesels.
Mr. WEAVER. It sure did, and it came from other places, too.
Mr. LYON. You retained that : material and you put it in the oil
waste tank.
Mr. WEAVER. So, we have plutonium bilges. Are there any pluto-
nium Naval ships?
Mr. LYON. No, sir, we have no plutonium Naval ships.
Mr. WEAVER. I mean nuclear ships.
Mr. LYON. No, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. You realize this is Mr. Weaver's first chance to
speak back to an admiral. [Laughter.]
Mr. LYON. That is a very good question.
Mr. WEAVER. I think that is all I have. I appreciate very much
your testimony, your very pleasant testimony.
Mr. TSONGAS. The only thought I would raise is in Hanford,
where they lost about 110,000 gallons of nuclear material that seeped
out before they realized that it was gone, I think that illustrates it
much better to solve a problem before it happens than to wonder
after it happens what the new processes should be. I think that is
what all these hearings are about.
Mr. LYON. Yes, sir, and that is the extent of our goal here, to be
prepared and to keep the problem from happening.
Mr. TSONGAS. I must admit I have very little confidence in the
history of the AEC, but the new NRC and ERDA structure seems
to be addressing the problem. I think the issue that remains is how
well it has addressed and what recommendations will be forthcom-
ing.
Thank you.
Mr. LYON. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, we are working very
hard on it.
Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you.
Mr. LYON. Thank you, sir.
Mr. TSONGAS. We will leave the record open at this point for
inserts by any member for the next 10 days.
[Whereupon, at 5 :08 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to
the call of the Chair.]
a
PAGENO="0548"