PAGENO="0001"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GIJAIW AND NAVIGATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
ON
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
INVESTIGATING THE TOTAL PROBLEM OF VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
AND THE PARTIOULAR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN CERTAIN AREAS
JUNE 26, 1975-WASHINGTON, D.C.
JUNE 27, 1975-NEW YORK, N.Y.
JULY 7, 1975-PHILADELPHIA, PA.
OCTOBER 3, 1975-NEW ORLEANS, LA.
SEPTEMBER 21 AN]) 22, 1976-WASHINGTON, D.C.
COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES IN THE
UPPER GREAT LAKES
OVERSIGHT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COAST GUARD PERTAINING
TO THE FACIL~TIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER GREAT LAKES
JULY 16, 1976-SAULT SAINTE MARIE, MICH.
Serial No~ 94~39
Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78-280 WASHINGTON: 1976
`1 f~
~
PAGENO="0002"
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Ohio
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
THOMAS N. DOWNING, Virginia
PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida
JOHN M. MURPHY, New York
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California
MARIO BIAGGI, New York
GLENN M. ANDERSON, California
B (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas
RALPH H. METCALFE, Illinois
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
FRED B. ROONEY, Pennsylvania
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
BO GINN, Georgia
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi
JOSHUA EILBERG, Pennsylvania
RON DR LUGO, Virgin Islands
CARROLL HUBBARD, Ja., Kentucky
DON BONKER, Washington
LES AuCOIN, Oregon
NORMAN E. D'AMOURS, New Hampshire
JERRY M. PATTERSON, California
LEO C. ZEFERETTI, New York
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan
CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio
PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JIL, California
GENE SNYDER, Kentucky
EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey
PIERRE S. (PETE) nu PONT, Delaware
DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana
JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington
DON YOUNG, Alaska
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland
NORMAN F. LENT, New York
MATTHEW J. RINALDO, New Jersey
DAVID F. EMERY, Maine
JOHN M. MURPHY, New York
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
E (KIKA) DR LA GARZA, Texas
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi
RON DR LUGO, Virgin Islands
CARROLL HUBBARD, Ja., Kentucky
JOSHUA EILBERG, Pennsylvania
PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida
FRED B. ROONEY, Pennsylvania
LES AuCOIN, Oregon
JERRY M. PATTERSON, California
LEONOR K. SULLIVAN, Missouri, en officio
FRANcIs D. HEYWARD, Counsel
Ausriu P. OLNEY, Minority Counsel
1 Resigned December 31, 197~.
2 Appointed April 4, 1976.
LEONOR K. (MRS. JOHN B.) SULLIVAN, Missouri, Chairman
ERNEST J. CORRADO, Chief Counsel
FRANCES STILL, Chief Clerk
RICHARD N. SHAROOD, Chief Minority Counsel 1
W. PATRICK MORRIS, Chief Minority Counsel 2
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION
MARIO BIAGGI, New York, Chairman
PIERRE S. (PETE) flU PONT, Delaware
GENE SNYDER, Kentucky
DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana
DON YOUNG, Alaska
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland
DAVID F. EMERY, Maine
PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan, en officio
(II)
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CONTENTS
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
Hearings held- Page
June 26, 1975, Washington, D.C - 1
June 27, 1975, New York, N.Y 21
July 7, 1975, Philadelphia, Pa 65
October 3, 1975, New Orleans, La 119
September 21, 1976, Washington, D.C 181
September 22, 1976, Washington, D.C~. 233
Statement of-
Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways:
Statement No. 1 241
Statement No. 2 269
Antrainer, Norman, Fer River Towing Co., New Orleans, La 172
Barrow, Rear Adm. Winford W., Commander, 8th Coast Guard
District 122
New Orleans vessel traffic systems 126
Bauman, Capt. Richard A., Chief of Port Safety and Law Enforce-
ment, U.S. Coast Guard 182
Betts, T. R., Cargo Carriers, Inc., Baton Rouge, La 178
Blom, Kenneth 0., general manager, Reinauer Transportation Co~ 55
Boggs, Hon. Lindy, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Louisiana 122
Brite, Dr. Robert L., statistical consultant 241
Bullard, Capt. Jack R., American Commercial Barge Line Co 241
Burnham, George, joint executive committee for the improvement and
development of the Philadelphia port area 114
Carlton, David, vice president, Marine Operations, Federal Barge
Lines, Inc 290
Cleary, William, New York Towboat and Harbor Carriers Association 40
Cobb, James, representing Hon. Lindy Boggs, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Louisiana 122
Conrad, Capt. Ed, Compass Marine Services 241
DiMaggio, Anthony, representing AFL-CIO Marine Engineers Bene-
ficial Association 44
Doucet, Norman K., president, Gulf Coast Towing Association_. -- 145
Eneix, Lloyd, Agri-Trans. Corp 219, 233
Fugaro, Rear Adm., Anthony F., Chief, Office of Marine Environ-
ment and Systems, U.S. Coast Guard 182
Gardner, Robert L., Alter Co., Davenport, Iowa 163, 219, 233
Giallauza, Sam, senior vice president, New Orleans Steamship
Association 157
Goodwin, Capt. Dudiley, C., U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port,
Philadelphia, Pa 68
Gundlach, James, Canal Barge Co., New Orleans, La 171
Hickey, Comdr. Eugene J., Jr., Chief of Vessel Traffic Services, U.S.
Coast Guard 13, 182
Ives, Capt. Paul, Pilots Association for the Bay and River, Delaware~ 103
Jackson, H. Willis, chairman of the joint executive committee for the
improvement and development of the Philadelphia port area 113
Joifray, Capt. Henry G., associate port director, Port of New Orleans 142
Johnson, Lt. Comdr. Carl T., U.S. Coast Guard 21
Kruger, Oliver, General Accounting Office 13
Lambert, Stephen, Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission.__ 174
(~)
PAGENO="0004"
Iv
Statement of-Continued Page
Moser, Capt. Kevin, Port Safety Division, U.S. Coast Guard 13
McNeal, Wiffiam C., Marine Consultant 151
O'Neil, Wiffiam E., counsel for Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and
Waterways 241
Perkins, Capt. David E., Chief of Staff, Third Coast Guard District__ 21
Posner, Paul, New York City Bureau of the Budget 60
Rea, Vice Adm. Wiffiam F., III, Commander, Third Coast Guard
District, Governors Island, N.Y 68
Reinauer, Harold A., president, Reinauer Transportation Cos 55
Rush, Col. Early J., III, district engineer, New Orleans District, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers 139
Rush, Thomas, chief, Marine Division, New York City Fire
Department 49
Sanders, Robert W., Red Star Marine, Inc.; member executive corn-
mittee of New York Harbor Vessel Traffic Advisory System 40
Stegbauer, Frank T., executive vice president, Southern Towing Co.,
representing the American Waterways Operators, Inc 219, 233
Torrens, Capt. Kenneth C., Farrell Lines, Inc 39
Wheat, Capt. David, president, Crescent River Pilots Association_ - - 161
Whittum, Lt. Arthur R., U.S. Coast Guard 21
Additional material supplied by-
Brite, Robert L.: Report to the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and
Waterways: A statistical analysis of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel
Traffic Systems 271
Coast Guard:
A comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
closed circuit television versus radar for VTS use in a River
environment 227
Department of Transportation statement on GAO report 2
Distress calls - 260
Use of channel 13 259
VTS Rulemaking 198
Eilberg, Hon. Joshua:
Article from The Evening Bulletin of May 15, 1975: "Philadelphia
Port Led the World in Tonnage Last Year" 83
Recommendations on proposed vessel traffic safety system for the
Port of Philadelphia and the Delaware River 78
Communications submitted for the record-
Barrow, Rear Adm. W. W.: Letter of November 12, 1975, to Hon.
Mario Biaggi 179
Goodwin, Capt. D. C.: Letter of April 28, 1975, to Charles Duld 88
Kenny, Thomas E.: Letter of September 14, 1976, to Hon. Mario
Biaggi 293
Olney, Pierre: Memorandum of June 25, 1975, to Chairman Biaggi with
background information 11
Siles, Adm. 0. W.: Letter of July 8, 1975, to Hon. Mario BiaggL~_ 19
Tinkey, J. A.: Letter of October 16, 1975, to Hon. Mario Biaggi 179
COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES IN THE UPPER GREAT LAKES
Hearing held-
July 16, 1976, Sault Sainte Marie, Mich 295
Statement of-
Armstrong, Carol, District No. 4, United Steel Workers of America~. -- 355
Bluitt, John, port agent, Seafarers International Union, River Rouge,
Mich -- 349
Bush, Thomas, District No. 33, United Steel Workers of America_ - 355
Chestnut, James L., Chestnut, Brooks & Burkard, Minneapolis, Minn 344
Deck, Comdr. John III, Chief, Ship Design Branch, Office of Mer-
chant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters 301
Edwards, Charles, Johns Hopkins University, Laurel, Md - 335
Gracey, Rear Adm. James S., Commander, 9th Coast Guard Dis-
trict, U.S. Coast Guard, Cleveland, Ohio 301
Mark, `Dr. Herman, NASA, Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio__ 341
Milradt, Capt. Charles, Commander, Group, Sault Ste. Marie 301
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V
Statement of-Continued Page
Nolawski, Stephen, Great Lakes Seamen's Local 5000, United Steel
Workers of America, Cleveland, Ohio 355
O'Brien, Capt. R. W., chairman, Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc 344
Oberstar, Hon. James L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Minnesota 300
Reed, Daniel, Whitefish Bay Township Shoreline Owners Association,
Paradise, i\'Iich 358
Rico, Capt. A. F., president, Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc 344
Ruppe, Hon. Philip E., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan 298
Rutledge, Capt. Thomas H., Chief, Congressional Affairs Staff, U.S.
Coast Guard Headquarters 301
Slaughter, E. L., international vice president, International Long-
shoremen's Association 344
Smith, Daniel L., District No. 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Asso-
ciation-Associated Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO, Toledo, Ohio - - - 352
Trimble, Vice Adm. Paul E., U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), president,
Lake Carriers Association, Cleveland, Ohio - 326
Additional material supplied by-
Coast Guard:
Boat requirements 372
Recent Major SAR Cases 309
Ruppe, Hon. Philip E.:
Article from Inland Seas, summer 1976: "In Retrospect" 365
Man in cold water: Cooling rate in heavy winter clothing and
treatment of accidental hypothermia: An experimental study
of inhalation rewarming 312
Communications submitted for the record-
Gracey, Rear Adm. J. S.: Letter of August 24, 1976, to I-Ion. Philip E.
- Ruppe with answers to questions 372
Hoeft, John E.: Letter of February 16, 1976, to Hon. Philip E. Ruppe~. 364
PAGENO="0006"
PAGENO="0007"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1975
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND
NAVIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m., in room
1334, Longworth Office Building, the Honorable Mario Biaggi (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting will please come to order.
This is a briefing on port safety and port safety navigational
systems.
Captain Heyward?
Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Chairman, before initiating the hearings that
the subcommittee is going to be holding in various port areas, and
the overall hearings later in the fall on the total problem of Vessel
traffic control, minority counsel and I this morning were prepared
to give a short briefing on the background for the information of the
subcommittee, and also for the purpose of including in the record
various documents and material which are applicable to this problem.
I would like to ask unanimous consent from the chairman to pre-
sent for the record a copy of a United States Coast Guard study re-
port on vessel traffic systems analysis of port needs for August 1973,
together with a study report for vessel traffic safety issues study,
volume 1, executive summary, dated March 1973.
Mr. Chairman, in addition, and for the record, I would like to have
unanimous consent to include a report to the Congress by the Comp-
troller General on vessel traffic systems, what is needed to prevent
and reduce vessel accidents; the Coast Guard comments which were
subsequently made on that report dated February 25, 1975, and some
additional comments which were received by the staff from the Coast
Guard yesterday.
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of these documents is to set the stage
for what the subcommittee will be looking at in the various visits to
the port areas.
Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, the material referred to will be
placed in the record.
[The material was placed in the hearing record files of the
committee.
[The Coast Guard comments on the GAO report follows :}
(1)
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2
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STATEMENT ON GAO REPORT
I. TITLE: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS-WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT AND REDUCE VESSEL
ACCIDENTS?
II. GAO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is the conclusion of the GAO Report that the vessel traffic system (VTS)
program should be redirected in order to produce maximum benefit in reducing
loss of life, injuries, and damage to property and the environment caused by
vessel collisions, rammings, and groundings. On the basis of system acquisition
and construction costs, GAO has classfied the various levels of VTS into two
categories: "basic" and "sophisticated." "Basic" systems include regulations,
traffic separation and routing schemes, and vessel movement reporting communi-
cations systems (VMRS). Systems which utilize electronic surveillance or auto-
mated equipment have been termed "sophisticated."
GAO considers that greater incremental benefits can be gained from the devel-
opment of "basic" systems in many ports and waterways than from the addition
of "sophisticated" system elements in the major port areas presently under
development. The GAO Report contends that the Coast Guard should follow a
strict phased approach in all ports and waterways by first operating and evalu-
ating the effectiveness of basic systems before adding increased system capa-
bilities, such as surveillance or automation.
The Report recommends that plans to add surveillance capabilities in Houston!
Galveston, New Orleans, and sections of New York be deferred until "basic"
systems have been developed in several other U.S. ports and waterways. Addi-
tionally, GAO has concluded that expanded efforts in establishing regulations
under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 are required. It is recom-
mended that national emphasis and direction be given to establishing regulations
including vessel speed limits, limiting the size of tows, and regulating the move-
ment of vessels carrying dangerous, combustible and polluting cargoes.
III. DOT COMMENTS ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to assess accurately the direction of the vessel traffic system program,
clarification' of two points which form the basis of the GAO Report is essential.
A misconception of the trend of costs for VTS levels appears in the GAO
Report, inasmuch as only acquisition and construction costs are quoted. For a
more complete analysis of system costs, annual operating expenses, such as
personnel salaries, which comprise a substnatial component of total costs, must
also be taken into account. All Coast Guard decisions concerning the selection of
VTS levels for the areas under development have been based upon an analysis of
total system costs and benefits. Appendix A provides detailed cost information
for both initial construction and annual operating costs by system and level.
Analysis of total costs rather than just initial costs provides more comprehensive
information for decision making purposes.
The second point which deserves expansion and explanation is the GAO Report
classification of VTS levels as "basic" and "sophisticated." While there is merit
in the basic concern for cost effectiveness voiced in the GAO Report, this classifi-
cation fails to address the relevant system cost and complexity considerations
of the specific ports and waterways. For example, the GAO Report categorizes a
VMRS communications system as "basic" and those systems incorporating sur-
veillance capabilities as "sophisticated." In many cases these labels are not
accurate either from an engineering or cost standpoint.
In areas where traffic density and volume are high and traffic patterns com-
plicated, a VMRS may require automated (i.e., "sophisticated") equipment to
provide fast, effective data retrieval for traffic management. Where this need
exists, the only alternative to automated system components is greatly increased
manning level (and cost), accompanied by an increase in the probability of human
error. On the other hand, some surveillance systems may be very "basic" consisting
of only a radar and scope presentation or low light level television (LLLTV) to
monitor vessel movements and to validate the accuracy of VMRS reports.
The GAO Report's classification of VTS levels is also inappropariate on the
basis of total system costs. The following bar graph, from an earlier Coast Guard
Study Report, depicts the general trend of annual costs by VTS level for the
"typical" VTS. The cost figures in the bar graph are based on a hypothetical VTS
in which all levels are employed, with. three to four remote communications sites
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1'
General Trend oi i~anu~l Costs
Versus
VTS Lev~l1
Graph. essence hypcthc~tica1 VTS is rbLch all TIS levels Cr11 be used.
Level of VTS
3Dcfinition of Levels mci Loganci of costs
Vessel Bridge 1:0 Bridge Radiotslcphcsc
Traffic Scpsrac:ioe Scberco . .
*L5- Vessel 1Iovcsrnt fleporti~g SysBeec .
Las is Surveilian cc .
Adve~ced furvccillccnde
L5 Accto::at.od Mvcncod Surveiflercco.
21.ncuel ~a::t Id dcf~ecd is thc cc.:rcctic. cost clivldsd Cif tee
ilLS `hU a. sal orcraciii': ccrLe. (~nts ace hcc:ed ccc asCu:.' ~
for 1cc~ ct: Send I) mel S~.: :~:rcI * .o, sad en en eat ed c~.
for Los icca. C5J `~ ~.tce end ~ca: Osl~r.:: (P'.~~ I)
and two to three remote radar sites. Annual costs were computed by adding
annual operating expenses to the initial implementation costs divided by 15 years.
The figure of 15 years, estimated to be the expected life of each system, may be
subject to argument, but this figure is considered valid since the costs of equipment
replacement are included in annual costs.
As portrayed by the bar graph, the most dramatic increase in annual costs
occurs in moving from a traffic separation scheme to a vessel movement reporting
system (VMRS). The establishment of a VMRS involves the construction and
outfitting of a vessel traffic center, remote communications sites in most cases and
extensive personnel costs for continuous watchstanding and operation. Compara-
tively, the cost increase in adding surveillance capabilities is smaller. The initial
capital outlay for surveillance, relay, and display equipment may seem substan-
tial, but little or no annual operating personnel costs are incurred.
L2 L3 L L
4 5
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After close examination of costs by VTS levels, it is considered that the classi-
fication of VTS levels as "basic" and "sophisticated" is inappropriate. Possibly, a
more meaningful classification, on the basis of system complexity and costs,
would be "manned" and "unmanned" systems.
With these clarifications of the general trend of VTS costs:and of the classifica-
tion of VTS levels, attention is directed to the GAO Report's "Recommendations
to the Secretary of Transportation." Each of the four recommendations is dis-
cussed in detail below.
Recommendation 1: "-redirect its traffic program to emphasize the development
of basic vessel traffic systems in TJ.S. ports and waterways;"
In the implementation of vessel traffic systems, it has been the policy of the
Coast Guard to proceed on the basis of cost/benefit considerations and national
needs. Those ports and waterways with the most pressing marine safety needs and
the most promising returns on investment receive first attention. In every area
where VTS is instituted, the minimum level of VTS required is selected, and the
decision is based on an assessment of total costs and benefits.
The 1973 Coast Guard Study Report, "Vessel Traffic Systems-Analysis of
Port Needs" provided a firm foundation for initial VTS planning decisions. In-
cluded in the outputs of this study was a ranking of major ports and waterways
based on their need for VTS, initial recommendations of the VTS levels justified in
each area, and estimates of the expected number of accident preventions. In cer-
tain instances, the GAO Report has relied exclusively upon the numbers of
accident preventions in evaluating Coast Guard VTS implementation decisions,
while excluding from their analysis other pertinent factors relating to VTS needs
and benefits. These factors are addressed in detail in the discussion in response to
the second recommendation.
In the discussion of the Coast Guard's implementation of VTS the GAO
Report states that systems "are becoming increasingly sophisticated and costly,"
and that, "in some cases, local maritime interests had expressed a preference for
sophisticated systems." Notwithstanding, present funding levels and plans for
system implementation and sophistication are more conservative than early
plans when VTS was first introduced. The studies completed in 1973 were under-
taken to structure VTS plans, and recommendations for system complexity are
very conservative. While the Coast Guard does provide for adequate consulta-
tion, comment, and coordination with local marine interests, as specified by the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, system implementation is. being con-
ducted in accordance with the plan based on national needs, implementation
criteria and cost/benefit considerations. Local marine interests do express their
preference for sophisticated systems and exert pressure on the Coast Guard, but
the final configuration of each system is based on the Coast Guard's judgement of
what level is required.
While the Coast Guard does consider the addition of surveillance capabilities
as planned for certain selected areas more beneficial than communications systems
in lesser ports and waterways, GAO's assessment of the benefits to be derived
from such lower level systems is fully concurred in. The Intracoastal Waterway
(ICW) west of New Orleans has. one of the highest probabilities of accident in
the nation. The GAO Report is accurate in identifying the large scale of vessel
casualty prevention possible with a communications based VTS, and in selecting
the optimal implementation approach in this area.
The waters of the ICW are very similar and lend themselves to simultaneous
treatment through a systems approach. It would be inefficient to address each
specific: 10 or 20 mile section on a piecemeal basis. At the present time, detailed
data collection efforts are underway. on the ICW. It is planned that as soon as an
effective approach is identified the 10W will be the next area addressed in VTS
developments. It is anticipated that a communications system alone will provide
adequate safety; however, surveillance may be incorporated in selected areas if
the need is clearly demonstrated.
The Coast Guard recognizes the benefits to be derived from establishing
relatively simple systems in lesser U.S. ports and waterways. In 1973, a com-
munications system in the vicinity of McAlpine Dam on the Ohio River near
Louisville, Kentucky was instituted. This system is placed in operation at those
times when the flood stage at the McAlpine Dam exceeds 15 feet, a condition
which causes strong outfall currents at the upstream approach to the canal en-
trance to the locks. During such times, it is hazardous for more than one tow to
be in the vicinity of the lock approach at the same time. The VTS coordina.tes the
arrival of the tows at this approach. At the present time, it is a voluntary system
based on a VHF-FM communications network. Personnel who man the system
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intermittently are made available from their regular tasks by the call up of
ready-reservists. Other similar systems may be initiated in response to hazardous
situations in the future.
The Coast Guard agrees that in many areas relatively low level systems will
provide an adequate level of safety at a favorable cost/benefit ratio. However,
a distinct need is recognized to address the major port areas now in planning
with systems which will provide the reliability and effectivness demanded by
local conditions. In order to provide maximum national benefit for marine safety,
it is essential that those areas with the greatest needs and highest returns on
investment be addressed first. In making its implementation decisions, the Coast
Guard has been considering all relevant variables and examining the incremental
costs and benefits involved with each system component implementation. As
systems which achieve acceptable levels of safety are completed in the major
ports and waterways now under development, those lesser areas identified by
GAO will be addressed. It is strongly maintained that within the limited funding
constraints, low level systems in lesser areas should not be undertaken at the
expense of providing surveillance capabilities in the major port areas as pretlyens
planned.
Recommendation 2: "-defer its present plans for further electronic surveillance
in Houston-Galveston, New Orleans, and the East River and Newark Bay
in New York until basic systems have been developed and placed in operation
in these ports and several other major U.S. ports;"
This recommendation applies the concerns voiced in Recommendation 1 to
the specific areas in which Coast Guard VTS planning and implementation are
presently underway. The justification for present Coast Guard plans in each of
these areas is duscussed separately below.
It is true, as the GAO Report points out, tht in some cases more numbers of
vessel casualties could be prevented with communication systems in lesser
areas than with surveillance additions in major areas. However, a simple tahula
tion of the number of vessel casualties may be misleading since there may be a
large variance in the damage caused by an accident. The amount of physical
damage and environmental harm resulting from a vessel casualty is dependent
upon several factors including the vessel's overall size and cargo capacity, the
capacity of the individual cargo tanks, the ability of the hull to withstand shock
without rupturing, and the nature of the cargo.
Typically, the major U.S. ports in which VTS developments are planned or
underway are frequented by vessels whose average damage in accident exceeds
that of vessels engaged in operations on the inland waterways. This is due in
part to the factors enumerated above. Vessels engaged in international commerce
calling at major ports are generally larger in overall size and in cargo capacity.
Furthermore, the size of the individual cargo tanks is an important variable in
determining the threat to public and environment. Although the quantity of
cargo carried by a number of barges making up a tow may be the same as that of
medium sized ocean going tank vessel, the number of individual chambers in the
tow greatly exceeds the number of tanks of the tanker. The risk is quite different
for the same cargo. The quantity of cargo released from a simple hull penetration
of a barge tank would be less than that of a tanker sustaining the same damage.
In fact the quantity of cargo permitted to be contained in a single tank for oil
carrying vessels under IMCO standards is of the order of 30,000 cubic meters, a
quantity that few tank barges are capable of handling.
Another major consideration is the construction and maintenance of hull and
system. Although foreign flag vessels calling in major U.S. ports are built in accord-
ance with internationally recognized classification society standards (the U.S.
Coast Guard plays a supervisory role in development of those of the American
Bureau of Shipping) ocean going tankers vary considerably in reliability depending
on their registry as a result of differences in national marine safety programs. On
the other hand, buyers carrying combustible or hazardous cargo in U.S. inland
waterways must conform to Coast Guard regulations for construction and main-
tenance stipulated in Subchapter D and Subchapter 0 of Title 46 CFR, directed
specifically at reducing the potential for damage resulting from casualty. These
are the most extensive regulations dealing with tank vessels of any nation. The
regulations in Subchapter D deal with vessels which carry flammable or combusti-
ble liquids in bulk. The regulations of Subchapter 0 deal with vessels which carry
certain dangerous bulk cargoes-those which have potential hazard beyond and
including that of flammability, such as explosives, poisons corrosive liquids, etc.
(See 46 CFR 151.01)
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In addition to the factors which govern the amount of physical damage to the
vessel resulting from casualty, other variables must he taken into account for a
complete evaluation of marine safety. Without a doubt, the cargo moving in the
Houston Ship Channel is among the most hazardous in the nation. Likewise, the
waters are very restricted, and have an extremely high probability of accident,
based on past casualty data. Although a valid methodology has not yet been
developed to quantify the potential for disaster, it is evident that vessel casualties
in the Houston Ship Channel have a very high potential for catastrophe due to
the nature of cargo moved and the proximity of industry handling this cargo and
of the civilian population. In that area all the ingredients are present for a vessel
casualty to lead to a major disaster.
Surveillance coverage of selected areas in the Houston/Galveston area will add
important capabilities to Coast Guard supervision. The principal purpose of the
surveillance system is to confirm vessel movement radio reports. Based on experi-
ence gained in operation of the St. Marys River system over a period of many
years, it has been concluded that masters tend to hedge their movement reports
to give them advantage and priority passage at critical points. This is particularly
true when strict speed limits are posted. Furthermore, surveillance will detect
the presence of any vessels which fail to report by radio, a condition which cannot
be tolerated in an area such as the Houston Ship Channel. In the Houston/
Galveston VTS the Coast Guard is also installing automated equipment to process
the vessel traffic movement information. Such equipment will provide for fast,
reliable information retrieval and will reduce overall manning requirements.
In New York Harbor, the GAO Report concurs in the need for surveillance
of two areas, but questions the justification for surveillance in the adjacent East
River and Newark Bay sectors, as planned by the Coast Guard. The same con-
siderations present in the Houston/Galveston area also apply to New York VTS
development. Furthermore, a consideration of broader scope must be taken into
account in addition to the incremental benefits to be derived from surveillance
in each particular section. In developing VTS for the various areas of a complex
port, such as New York Harbor, the areas cannot be treated independently of
each other. A total systems approach is necessary to achieve an effective system.
The fact that the return on investment in surveillance is higher in one area has
led GAO to the conclusion that surveillance is not justified in other parts of New
York Harbor. The large number of intersections and "mixing bowls" with oppos-
ing streams of traffic demand a high degree of reliability and coordination. There-
fore, the plan developed for YTS applications in a complex port must provide
suitable capabilities to support both a feasible and functional system concept for
the port. In addition to defining the concept of operation for the system the plan
must also consider the overall operational and regulatory aspects applicable to
the port.
For instance, the elimination of surveillance capabilities in the Upper and
Lower Bay area would have a far-reaching and detrimental effect on the entire
system, especially on the New York and New Jersey Channels. The Constable
Hook area, where Kill van Kull intersects Upper Bay, is probably the most
hazardous area in New York Harbor and is a prime example of this situation.
Without totally accurate and complete information concerning vessel movements
in Upper Bay, available only through surveillance due to the occasional unrelia-
bility of VMRS reports, the effectiveness of surveillance in Kill van Kull would be
significantly eroded. Surprise meeting situations would continue to occur in that
area due to vessels entering from Upper Bay which had not, or had incorrectly,
reported to the VTS, and the potential for serious casualty would remain.
This consideration applies to each of the areas where selected surveillance
coverage is planned. It should be noted that the surveillance planned for Newark
Bay and the East River will not initially be designed to provide complete coverage.
At the outset, surveillance coverage of both of these areas will be provided rela-
tively inexpensively with a total of only three or four remote LLLTV sites.
In New Orleans, as in New York, the potential for catastrophe cannot be
discounted, as vessel density is high and millions of people are within close range
of the affected waters. Considering all factors, the surveillance planned for selected
areas of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of New Orleans is entirely justified.
It will replace the personnel required to man the traffic lights operated by the
Corps of Engineers and will provide significant benefits in vessel casualty, deaths!
injuries, and pollution incident reductions as well as in vessel, cargo, and property
savings.
In summary, the GAO Report is accurate in pointing out that in some cases
more numbers of vessel casualties could be prevented with communications
systems in lesser areas than with surveillance additions in the major areas. How-
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ever, when all the factors are taken into account, including differences in vessel
construction, cargo, traffic density, and the potential for catastrophic environ-
mental and personnel casualty, it is concluded that the surveillance capabilities
planned will be the most cost beneficial.
Recommendation 3: "-adhere to a strict phased approach by first operating
and evaluating the effectiveness of basic systems before adding more
sophisticated elements;"
The GAO Report correctly states the Coast Guard's policy as set forth in a
1973 Study Report, as follows:
A phased approach will be stressed in the implementation of VTS (vessel
traffic systems) in each port or waterway. This procedure will permit ex-
perience gained while operating the existing system to be used in planning
for a more sophisticated system. It will also provide means to accumulate
a better data base.
The GAO Report justifiably óalls attention to the apparent inconsistency
between that statement and the Coast Guard's plans to establish initially major
systems incorporating surveillance and limited automated capabilities. The
cause of this discrepancy is the Coast Guard's failure to update that policy
statement to reflect the planning advances which have been made in the interim.
Through the development and employment of several analytical tools and tech-
niques, VTS planning has been substantially iniproved and formalized. In the
Coast Guard's Analysis of Port Needs Study completed in late 1973, vessel
casualty, transit and damage data were examined in detail for many major U.S.
ports and waterways. Estimates of the effectiveness of each VTS level in each
of these areas were developed in order to augment the knowledge of VTS require-
ments and the level of VTS necessary and justified in each area. More refined
data collection and analysis techniques are now being employed at particular
ports and waterways planned for VTS. Through the use of both side looking
airborne radar (SLAR) and a mobile radar and communications van, detailed
information is being collected concerning traffic patterns, communications
loading, and vessel congestion. Likewise, simulation models have produced
good projections of communications frequency and transceiver siting require-
ments. In addition to these analytical tools, the Coast Guard's knowledge of
VTS has been expanded by the experience gained in the operation of two major
systems for more than two years, and from planning the major systems in New
York, Houston/Galveston, New Orleans and Valdez.
From the detailed analyses conducted in the major ports and waterways under
development, the Coast Guard has determined that a higher level of VTS (than
the minimum first step) is both required and justified. In such areas, that level
of VTS which is considered necessary with a high degree of certainty is being
established initially. It should be recognized that even in those areas, the initial
implementation may be accomplished in a multi-year approach, but this "phasing"
is due to budgetary constraints rather than uncertainty over system needs. The
operation of all systems will undergo continuing scrutiny and evaluation. Any
modifications or additions which are judged necessary will be undertaken in a
subsequent phase(s).
The Coast Guard recognizes the importance of continuing to add to the knowl-
edge base concerning VTS Systems and Operations. Statutory responsibility to
provide vessel traffic systems and services has existed for a very short time-just
over two years, although the legislation was preceded by the establishment of an
Advisory Radar System at San Francisco. San Francisco thus became the Field
Testing Site for VTS research and development projects. At that location the
operational system uses the High Resolution Radars that were developed on an
R&D basis. Automated features representative of the more sophisticated VTS
levels are maintained there on an experimental basis. Achievement of major
hardware advancements, however, does not mean completion of research and
development efforts, for much remains to be acquired in the way of operational
knowledge before United States Vessel Traffic Systems reach maturity. This is
especially evident in the fact that VTS operations have not yet entered into the
more complex modes under which vessels are provided movement control by the
Coast Guard. Accordingly, developmental emphasis is expected to shift from
hardware to operations. Important areas of investigation and definition include
the formulation of operational control concepts and the generation of port by port
VTS System Functional Requirements based upon traffic analyses, hydrographic
data and the (separately derived) operational control concepts. The Department
of Transportation recognizes existence of certain parallels along with major
differences between Air Traffic Control and Vessel Traffic Control. Without
attempting to detail these, it is clear from the aviation experience that there are
PAGENO="0014"
8
continuing lessons to be learned in arriving at a national set of Vessel Traffic
Systems which operate effectively at lowest system cost. The VTS Research and
Development Program in the Coast Guard builds on existing knowledge to help
achieve this goal.
Recommendation 4: "-give national emphasis and direction to establishing
regulations as authorized by the 1972 Act to control vessel traffic, including
more extensive use of speed limits; greater regulation over the movement of
vessels carrying dangerous, combustible and polluting cargos; and limiting
the size of tows."
The GAO Report stated that the Coast Guard had made limited use of its
authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to issue regulations for the
control of vessel movements, and identified control of vessel speed, control of the
movement of vessels carrying hazardous or polluting cargoes, and control of tow
size as regulatory measures expected to be effective for prevention of accidents.
The GAO Report further detailed inconsistencies between headquarters, dis-
trict and field units in the approach to development of regulations under the Act.
The promulgation of regulations was stated to be the measure least costly to the
government for reducing accidents through control of vessel movement.
The Coast Guard recognizes the essentiality of these constraints and they are
being developed at Headquarters. However, the task of developing meaningful
regulatory guidance at the national level is a good deal more profound than may be
realized. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act empowers the Coast Guard to
regulate the vessel with regard to its route. Such regulations must be merged in a
harmonious way with other regulations by which maritime safety in the United
States has for years been governed by the Coast Guard. Along with the operational
constraints under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the preexisting regulation
of safety and construction of the vessel, qualification of crew, safe handling and
carriage of cargoes, anchorages, and Rules of the Road form a matrix addressing
all elements of the system.
The development of a regulation is an exacting process which requires care in
the identification of the problem to be corrected by means of the regulation,
recognition of varied geographic and operating conditions, and appreciation of the
impact of the regulation on the public affected, including the broad economic
effect of the measure, and finally, definition of the corrective regulation. Presum-
ably in recognition of these factors, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act contains
a provision for consultation and comment by interested parties in preparation of
proposed regulations; this is in addition to the requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act.
Inconsistencies which may appear to exist at the field level could well be due
to local efforts to cater for variations in type of vessel, climatic conditions, and
waterway configuration. Such local solutions with their differences will, as feed-
back, prove beneficial in the preparation of a comprehensive statement from the
headquarters level.
The first significant rulemaking under the Act was accomplished in the Puget
Sound VTS regulations which became effective on 30 September 1974. These
regulations addressed a local problem, identification and solution of which were
more rapidly handled than broad nationwide regulations. Once developed, how-
ever, these regulations contained most of the elements which will be employed in
other systems, and as such will serve as a model for VTS rulemaking in other
areas. Draft regulations now in preparation for San Francisco and Houston VTS
draw extensively on the principles worked out for Puget Sound.
Regulations which address navigation and certain vessel operations have been
promulgated for Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay and Apra Harbor, Guam.
Principles employed in these regulations will be applicable to other areas.
Rulemaking actions appeared in the Federal Register on 1 March 1974 and
28 June 1974. Final rulemaking under the first of these actions is now in draft
and will be published in the near future. This regulation will enable the District
Commander, Captain of the Port, or their authorized representative to direct
or control the movements of vessels under emergency or temporarily hazardous
conditions when necessary for safety. This is the first regulation of nationwide
application under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The second action is
an advance notification of a broad philosophical approach the Coast Guard
intends to follow in regulating the safe movement of vessels by means of operating
controls. The work of drafting principles for proposed rulemaking is in progress
and addresses equipment required to be on board vessels, tests of machinery
and equipment, movement of hazardous and polluting cargoes, and safe operating
procedures. The specific principles will be referred to interested parties for con-
sultation in preparing the proposed rules.
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The GAO Report places emphasis on control of vessel speed as an effective
measure for prevention of accidents. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act gives
the Coast Guard authority to control vessel traffic by means of speed limitations
in areas determined to be especially hazardous. The U. S. Army, Corps of Engi-
neers presently regulates vessel speed under authority of 33 USC 1. Preliminary
arrangements have been made to relieve the Corps of Engineers of this function
in all but certain waters of particular interest to the Army. The GAO Report
indicated a greater incidence of accidents attributed to excessive vessel speed
than Coast Guard analysis of the raw data can support. The Coast Guard is
mindful that speed is often listed as a contributing cause to accidents. However,
vessel speed alone is rarely the sole cause. The effective regulation of vessel speed
is a complex matter related to vessel size and maneuvering characteristics, channel
configuration, harbor congestion, weather and visibility, and involves far-reaching
economic considerations. The Coast Guard will move forward with repromulga-
tion of the Army Corps of Engineers' regulations where appropriate under au-
thority of the Act, and the development on a case by case basis of regulations to
limit vessel speed where necessary in especially hazardous areas.
The GAO Report advised of inconsistency on the part of the Coast Guard in
different ports in applying suitable controls to the movement of vessels carrying
hazardous or polluting cargoes. Current regulations require advance notification
of arrival of any vessel loaded with cargoes of particular hazard. Action taken by
the Coast Guard locally upon receipt of that notification will vary according to the
particular requirements of different ports, so that some inconsistency is inescap-
able. The rulemaking, previously discussed for the operational control of vessel
movements, will provide the regulatory tools necessary for effective action com-
mensurate to the hazard and the particular area. As an adjunct the Coast Guard
is considering an industry proposal to require visual, aerial identificaton of cer-
tain inland barges which carry hazardous or polluting cargoes.
Limitation of tow size and the powering of towing vessels were discussed in the
GAO report, in part related to repeated casualties at two bridges. The Coast
Guard has eliminated this problem at the West Port Arthur Bridge in Texas by
widening the draw under the authority of the Truman Hobbs Act. Since that ac-
tion, there has been no casualty attributable to the obstructive nature of the
bridge, (or conversely those factors of tow size related so towboat power which
could be addressed in regulations). In 1973 and again in 1974 the Coast Guard
issued Special Navigation Orders for the protection of the Southern Pacific Rail-
way Bridge at Berwick Bay, Louisiana. These orders, among other things, limited
the size of tows permitted to pass through this bridge and established arbitrary
horsepower requirements. Work is now in progress to establish a VTS at Berwick
Bay for the protection of this bridge. Regulations will be developed for this VTS
which will draw on the experience gained with the Special Navigation Orders.
Efforts to establish criteria for tow boat power related to the ability to control
barges, as called out by the N.T.S.B. report in 1972, have not thus far met with
success. The Coast Guard is pursuing solution in two ways: research and develop-
ment efforts in progress are addressing vessel maneuverability, of which power
related to tonnage is a significant consideration; and, the problem has been referred
to the Towing Industry Advisory Committee to the Marine Safety Council for
an empirical solution based on industry practice.
Other measures the GAO discussed which may improve vessel safety are the
requirement for drawbridges to be equipped with bridge-to-bridge radio tele-
phone (VHF-FM Channel 13, 156.65 MHz), and the requirement for vessels to
have on board some form of precision navigation equipment. The Coast Guard
has been generally successful in its efforts to have bridge owners voluntarily
equip draw bridges with bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone. Furthermore, in order
to address those bridges which have not been so voluntarily equipped, the Coast
Guard has sought legislation which would require the bridge owner to install this
equipment at the same time bridge protective systems (fendering) are constructed
or altered. Loran "C" may prove to be the suitable form of navigation equipment
suggested in the report. The Coast Guard has no plans at this time to require
Loran "C" to be carried on certain classes of vessels. If the necessary study of this
matter should indicate the installation of Loran "C" equipment should be re-
quired, regulations towards this end may be developed under the Act.
Recognizing the overall scope of the work of drafting regulations which lies ahead,
the Coast Guard is undertaking the development of a comprehensive Ports and
Waterways Safety Act regulation plan towards this end. In order to assure a
uniform understanding of the basis for the development of these regulations and
their equitable enforcement, timely guidance will be circulated to the field.
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10
Several errors and inaccuracies have been found in both the GAO Draft Report
and final Report. The Comptroller General was alerted to these discrepancies in
Appendix C of the DOT Statement on the GAO Draft Report, which was trans-
mitted on January .21, 1975.
IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTION
The Coast Guard intends to implement the vessel traffic system program on
the basis of cost/benefit considerations and national needs. In keeping with these
considerations, and the recommendations of the GAO Report, the next major
VTS start is planned for the ICW. Detailed data collection efforts are now under-
way to identify the marine traffic safety needs more clearly and to help structure
a comprehensive approach which will address the entire area most cost effec-
tively. The VTS needs of Chesapeake Bay, an area which the GAO Report
recommended for VTS implementation, are presently under study at the local
level. By July 1, 1975 the Commander, Fifth Coast Guard District expects this
examination along with system recommendations to be complete.
While the Coast Guard's position concerning implementation through a strict
phased approach has been previously clarified, analyses of operational effective-
ness will be conducted annually for each of the systems. After the selected level(s)
has been established and in operation, such analyses will be used to identify the
need for possible system upgrading and modification.
For the most part, the GAO Report's Recommendation concerning the promul-
gation of regulations under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 is con-
curred in. Efforts are underway to identify those aspects of marine safety which
lend themselves to universal regulatory treatment. As such problem areas are
identified, nationwide direction to field units will be provided by Coast Guard
Headquarters. In other instances, the peculiarity of local conditions will require
ocal regulatory remedies. In any case, greater emphasis is being given to marine
safety regulations, and recent headquarters staff augmentation should expedite
the entire process.
0. W. SILER,
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant.
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF VTS COSTS BY SYSTEM BY LEVEL (COSTS BY LEVELS ARE INCREMENTAL)
Port of waterway System component
A.C. & I. cost
(million)
Annual
operating
expense 1
(thousands)
Present value of
total 15-year
cost (discounted
at 10 percent)
(millions)
San Francisco Present configuration: AC. & I. cost
includes all VTS R. & D.
Puget Sound VMRS
Radar
Total
Houston/Galveston VMRS
LLTV
Radar
Total
New York VMRS
LLTV
Radar
Total
New Orleans and VMRS
Mississippi River to LLTV
Baton Rouge.
Total
Valdez VMRS
Radar
Total
$5.8
$700
$11.1
1.0
1. 0
340
280
3.6
3. 1
2.0
620
6.7
1.2
.8
.7
570
120
100
5.5
1.7
1.5
2.7
790
8.7
1.6
1.7
1.2
800
250
180
7. 7
3.6
2.6
4. 5
1, 230
13. 9
1. 7
. 6
800
100
7.8
1.4
2.3
900
9.2
3. 1
1. 5
700
225
8.4
3. 2
4.6
925
11.6
1 Operating personnel costs are included.
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in each of the areas, the VTS levels indicated and costed are those which are
presently in operation or planned for implementation. Additions or improvements
may be made subsequently after experience is gained from system operations.
The cost estimates provided in this appendix are based on August 1, 1974
engineering cost estimates, and do not in all cases coincide exactly with previous
budgetary requests and documentation.
Mr. HEYWARD. In addition, Mr. Chairman, minority counse',
Pierre Olney, has prepared a brief memorandum which brings the
issues into focus for the subcommittee, and I would like unanimous
consent for him to present that, and to have that memorandum
submitted for the record.
Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, so ordered.
[The document referred to follows :1
U.S. HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
Washington, D.C., June 25, 1975.
MEMORANDUM
To: Chairman Biaggi, Congressman duPont, and members of the Coast Guard
Subcommittee.
From: Pierre Olney, minority counsel.
Subject: Background information for vessel traffic safety oversight hearings.
(1) In response to increasing accidents in harbors and waterways, the Congress
enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. Among other things, the
Act authorizes the Coast Guard to:
Establish, operate and maintain vessel traffic services and systems in
congested waterways;
Require the installation of electronic or other devices necessary for the
implementation of a traffic safety system; and
Control vessel traffic when conditions require it through traffic control
routing schemes and speed limits.
(2) As part of its general review responsibilities, the General Accounting Office
conducted an investigation of the Coast Guard's implementation of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act. The report of the Comptroller General was made available
to the Congress on January 21, 1975. The GAO was critical of the Coast Guard's
activities in two major areas:
(a) The GAO found that the Coast Guard had given too much emphasis to
the development of "sophisticated" systems in the six ports of Houston-
Galveston, New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, Puget Sound and Valdez.
The GAO's conclusion was that before refining the VTS systems in these
ports, some expenditures for basic systems should be made in other ports.
For example, the cost of the basic systems for Houston-Galveston, New
York and New Orleans is expected to cost about $5 million and should
result in preventing 72 casualties annually. The addition of sophisticated
equipment could cost between $9.5 million and $11.5 million and may
prevent about 30 vessel casualties annually.. With a lesser investment of
between $3.5 million and $7 million, the Coast Guard could develop basic
systems which could prevent an estimated 52 vessel casualties annually.
In short, the GAO believes that basic vessel traffic systems across the board
would be more cost-effective than the present Coast Guard plans for com-
pleting basic and sophisticated systems in the six ports named above.
(b) The GAO criticizes the Coast Guard for its limited use of authority
to regulate vessel traffic movements. According to Coast Guard estimates,
about 15% of the accidents considered preventable by VTS can be pre-
vented by regulations if properly implemented. Such regulatory actions
could include vessel speed limits, more stringent control over movement of
dangerous and polluted cargoes, restrictions on movement during poor
visibility, and limitations on size of tows.
(3) This leaves the Coast Guard Subcommittee with four major issues:
Should the Coast Guard redirect its traffic program to emphasize broad
development of basic vessel traffic systems?
Should the Coast Guard defer present plans for sophisticated electronic
surveillance in Houston-Galveston, New Orleans and New York until basic
systems have been developed in other major ports?
78-280-76----2
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12
Should the Coast Guard adhere to a strict phased approach by first evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of basic systems before adding more sophisticated
elements?
Should the Coast Guard give national emphasis to more extensive use of
speed limits, more stringent regulation over movement of hazardous cargoes,
and mandatory limits on the size of tows?
Mr. OLNEY. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Heyward alluded, I have a
memorandum that has been placed in the folders of the members,
which briefly summarizes the issues that were identified by the General
Accounting Office in their report that was submitted to the Congress
in 1975.
I think for the purposes of starting the hearings it is important
not to necessarily accept the conclusions of the General Accounting
Office, but to use them as a means of framing the issues which will
be considered as the Subcommittee begins visiting some of the
ports throughout the country.
As you noticed in the memorandum, one of the first issues that was
identified by the General Accounting Office was that the Coast Guard
had, in effect, decided to go ahead and develop vessel traffic systems
to an advanced, sophisticated stage in six major ports before develop-
ing what is termed basic systems across a broader spectrum of ports.
I think that the committee, when they are looking at these ports, should
keep in mind whether, in fact, these sophisiticated systems must be
added to these major ports first, and whether those sophisticated
systems are essential to reduce accidents in those six before we con-
sider the reduction of accidents in other ports that are not among
the six major ports, through basic methods.
The GAO report concludes that basic systems are more cost-
effective in that initially they can affeèt a greater reduction of accidents,
and that the addition of sophisticated equipment may result in only
incremental reduction in accidents, so this will be one of the areas
the committee should be considering in visiting each port. Should
there be broad based implementation of basic systems, before the
sophisticated systems are implemented in those 6 harbors.
Another major issue which the committee will be discussing is
that involved in the implementation of that section of the Port and
Waterways Safety Act which calls upon the Coast Guard to establish
regulations for control of traffic.
Mr. Chairman, this would include speed limits, traffic separation
schemes, limits on tow size and the like. The General Accounting
Office report is critical of the Coast Guard in that they cite many
accidents are caused by excessive speed, instances where perhaps
Coast Guard imposed speed limits could have made a difference.
When we get a chance to visit the different ports I know we will
be hearing a lot of comments from the various operators, and probably
from the captains of the ports, on how feasible it is to, in fact, impose
speed limits on the traffic in the area.
Bearing in mind that if the Coast Guard is going to impose traffic
regulations on ships, what does this mean in terms of traditional
notions of liability? Could the Coast Guard perhaps become jointly
liable in the event of accidents where the vessel was under Coast
Guard regulation?
We also have to consider the responsibility that the masters and the
pilots have under such regulations.
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13
Mr. Chairman, I think all of these issues involve new areas of the
law, and will merit serious consideration by this committee.
If the members of the subcommittee now have any further ques-
tions we have witnesses here available to answer thse questions from
both the General Accounting Office and from the Coast Guard.
Mr. BIAGGL Thank you.
Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Chairman, this morning, subject to whatever
you wish, it had been my intention that we not go into detail in the
GAO report, of the Coast Guard response to it, in view of the fact
that we are going to be holding field hearings, and that report wifi be
gone into, in depth, when we hold our hearings in the fall.
However, in case there are any questions that the members may
have, I asked Captain Moser, who is at Coast Guard Headquarters,
and Chief of Port Safety, and Mr. Oliver Kruger, from the General
Accounting Office, `who I understand was involved in the preparation
of the report, to be ready to respond if you had anyquestions.
I though it would be better to defer a detailed presentation of the
exact contents of both the report and the response to it until a later
time when the members were more familiar with the exact problems
of the various port area or the various port areas. Whatever you would
like to do Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is line, Captain Heyward.
I would certainly suggest that the points Mr. Olney brought up be
responded to by the Coast Guard in detail, but for myself, I think it
would serve the committee's interest best if we could have a review
of the basic system as contrasted to the sophisticated system, and
then talk about the conflict of opinion between the General Accounting
Office and the Coast Guard.
In other words, how the whole navigational system should be
treated in preparation for our planned meetings.
Mr. HEYwARD. Do you wish to have them come up now, so ques-
tions can be addressed to them?
Mr. BIAGGI. Before they start to testify, we shall have to take a
short recess to answer the quorum call.
[Short recess.]
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is again called to order.
At this time we will recognize Captain Moser and Commander
Hickey of the Coast Guard, and Mr. Kruger from the General
Accounting Office.
Captain Moser, can you give us the GAO's point of view as con-
trasted to the Coast Guard?
STATEMENT OP CAPT. KEVIN L. MOSER, PORT SAFETY DIVISION,
U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY COMDR. EUGENE HICKEY,
U.S. COAST GUARD, AND OLIVER KRUGER, GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE
Captain MosER. Mr. Chairman, first, the terms "basic" and "sophis-
ticated" were not terms devised by the Coast Guard.
This was developed by the General Accounting Office in the course
of their review of our activity in vessel traffic systems.
As I understand it, the GAO definition, they would describe as
basic any kind of a system which does not use a means of surveillance,
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14
such as a TV or a radar, or involve the use of a computer for whatever
purpose, be it merely managing data or solving problems.
Systems which have those features, ability to see the radar, or the
TV, or the ability to process the computer would be described by the
GAO as sophisticated, and all others would be basic.
I think that this is really not useful to the way the Coast Guard
would manage the program.
For one thing, the computer, sir, is a laborsaving device in addition
to some of the other things it might do.
Mr. Chairman, one might have what would be otherwise a basic
system using radio reporting alone, or with some other supportive
things, such as regulations and the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone.
At a certain point, the amount of work that a man must do in
plotting and keeping track of this traffic overwhelms him. He is prone
to error. He must bring in additional people at additional cost, and,
quite frankly, it is more accurate and cheaper to buy a machine to do
the work of the man.
Therefore, we contest the use of a computer for that purpose is
really not sophisticated at all, merely a laborsaving device.
When one couples a computer to a radar, and has the radar prob-
lems solved by computer, again, this is using a machine to do what it
would take many men to do, and doing it more accurately, and
immensely faster.
Mr. Chairman, we could handle problems better, and leave the men
to make the judgments about the information presented by the
computer.
Mr. Chairman, I think that pretty well sums up our thoughts on
the difference between basic and sophisticated.
Mr. BIAGGI. How do you justify the Coast Guard's position of deal-
ing with six major ports with the installation of the sophisticated, if
you will, system, rather than having a basic system in a large number
of ports around the country first?
Captain MOSER. Well, I think we started down this road at vessel
traffic systems, Mr. Chairman, in order to get the problem solved
where it was worse, and frankly, it is worse in the big ports.
There are places, such as ports of the ICW, which have accidents
by and large where the accidents are large in number because there
are large numbers of small barges which may be involved in a single
accident.
But where one has a large busy port, for instance, New York,
which is the second largest port in the world, New Orleans and its
complex and its associate Port of Baton Rouge, is the third largest
port in the world, and the Coast Guard judgment is that a basic
system is not going to do the job there.
We have to have it supplemented, and I use the word "basic"
because I happen to be sitting here talking about basics, not because
it is a Coast Guard term. The Coast Guard would use those tools
necessary to do the things we would so wish to do in keeping track of
traffic, and when we develop the regulations for these particular areas
to operate the system in such a way that the vessels will not try to
occupy the same place at the same time.
Mr. Chairman, that is really what we are trying to do, space control
by a number of stratagems, either by advising the mariner of other
PAGENO="0021"
15
vessels, and concentrations of vessels, or by directing the mariner
not to proceed in such a way which would cause a concentration of
vessels.
Mr. BIAGGI. We understand your concerns, and the mutual con-
cerns for the larger ports.
Just what is the picture in the smaller ports where we do not have
such problems?
Captain MOSER. There are accidents there, but I believe our study,
Mr. Chairman, which was introduced into the record, the analysis
of port needs, would give you a pretty good picture of incidents of
accidents, the frequency of them, and their seriousness, and what kind
of a vessel traffic system could prevent the accidents which have really
taken place in these ports over the previous 4-year period during
this study.
What we did with this study, first, we charted out the ports by
tonnage and transit, to see which were the really important ports in
this country, organized them in descending order, and then investi-
gated them by means of an algorithm, which studied different kinds
of accidents, laid a value alongside of them, and then we examined
each and every accident, almost 4,000 accident reports, perhaps
2,000 accidents, and asked the question, and the question was:
"Would, let us say, bridge-to-bridge radio have prevented this
accident if properly used?"
Would a traffic separation scheme have prevented this accident if
properly used?
Would a VTS involving radar surveillance have prevented the
accident?
The answers were clouded, and quite frankly, I was surprised to
find there were a number of places where my inclination would tell
me that we would need, let us say, a radar, or some surveillance devise
which the answers proved to us were not warranted.
Mr. Chairman, I should go one bit further. We do look at this in a
cost-benefit way. The cost of the installation should certainly prevent
accidents of greater value than the cost, and if it cannot meet that
test, we simply do not go that far.
Mr. BIAGGI. Just for my own information, I see New York has had
in fiscal years 1969-72 320 accidents, and Boston has had 15.
I imagine there is substantially less traffic in Boston, but are there
other factors?
Captain MOSER. Factors for the number of accidents?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Captain MOSER. I think we took the port and said look, you are
having many accidents, and that is what we are trying to attempt.
We did in our early attempt try to get a handle on how difficult
the port was, and what made one port more demanding in skills for
the mariner than another port, but we quickly found we were not
getting very far looking at that and decided that we would look at the
accidents which are taking place, and try to prevent those things from
happening, not the things that did not happen.
Mr. BIAGGI. Do you have any navigational systems in Boston
Harbor?
Captain MOSER. Yes, sir, there are navigational systems in Boston
Harbor, well-buoyed and well-marked, as are in New York, as in
all of our ports.
PAGENO="0022"
16
Mr. BIAGGI. We had some testimony that Philadelphia left some-
thing to be desired, but we will look at that shortly.
Mr. }IEYWARD. In connection with Boston, as contrasted with
New York, other than the traffic volume, would you not say there
are not as many complicating cross channels, and different directions
that people move in Boston?
Captain MOSER. Oh, yes, I would agree with the counsel for point-
ing that out.
New York is a complicated harbor. Staten Island sits smack in the
middle of it.
There are really four entrances into the harbor, streams of traffic
that join and then split away, and go other places.
Yes, it is a very complicated case.
Mr. HEYWARD. I would suppose that perhaps Philadelphia and the
Delaware River are somewhat comparable in connection with ap-
proaches, because there is mainly one channel there.
I am not saying it is the same, but what I am saying is the con-
figurations of the harbor areas would probably influence the number
of accidents if there is very little crossing of traffic, and fewer acci-
dents shold occur. Would you not agree?
Captain MOSER. I would tend to agree, but I think rather than just
agree with you, we would have to go back and check the numbers out.
I really believe that you are on target though, at least the simple
channel is much more receptive to, say, the movement of vessels than
a complicated one.
Mr. HEYWARD. I notice from the casualty record, for instance,
that the Delaware River and Bay had 107 accidents, as constrated
to 320 in New York during this period, even though the volume of
traffic in Delaware Bay, at least in some commodities, is much greathr
than New York.
I am speaking of volume now, and not the number of transits.
Each harbor and port has its own problem area, and each con-
figuration, each usage, each traffic pattern will dictate a different need
and a different result.
Captain MOSER. Absolutely, sir. These ports are quite individ-
ualistic, and we try to look at them and treat their problems according
to what is needed for that particular port.
Early on, Admiral Benkert set this up in our mind, that we were
not going to take a paint brush and paint the traffic system the same
in every place.
We have to meet the need that exists in a particular port.
Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney?
Mr. OLNEY. Captain, you mention that you do not agree with,
rather you do not use the term "basic and sophisticated" to describe
what level of vessel traffic systems you have in a given port, is there a
classification that you would prefer that you think is more consistent
with the way the Coast Guard analysizes different levels of traffic
control systems?
For example, in this letter dated February 25 to the chairman of
the Government Operations Committee, on page 3 of the appendix
you have levels of VTS systems where you define systems starting
from bridge-to-bridge radio telephone through to advanced
surveillance.
PAGENO="0023"
17
Do those five classifications represent separate components that
can be added in a series, or do they have to be added into an inte-
grated system?
Captain MOSER. No, they do not have to be added in a series.
They are discreet things.
For instance, some ports simply could not use a traffic separation
scheme.
I think the Delaware River in ~some places would not fit one in.
It is not wide enough, so that would be one that could not possibly
be used in that area.
We have no plan for such a thing in New Orleans.
However, in Puget Sound they have a separation scheme. These
things are modular, if you wish to think of them in that way, and
they can be placed in place, not necessarily depending on a previous
placement of all the other ones.
Mr. OLNEY. So if we looked at the port and it had, let us say,
bridge-to-bridge, traffic separation, and a basic surveillance, and we
compared that with another port which had advanced surveillance,
we could make some comparison about the sophistication and cost
effectiveness about those particular packages.
Captain MOSER. Yes and no, sir. Because your surveillance is one
device, or a series of devices that give you surveillance, and the price
tag may differ depending on how many remotes you might have,
but I think I could get right to the point here.
If we are talking about dollars and cents, the real split between
costly systems and a less costly system are those which are manned
and those that are unmanned. The things that cost less would be
regulations without an expensive system to support them-traffic
separation schemes, the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone system,
and those things have practically no cost attached.
When one starts to put in things such as radios to make reports,
all of a sudden yo~ have to have a man on the other end of the radio,
and that is where your money starts.
The capital costs are there, but the real continuing cost, the one
that eats you up is the man.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Captain.
Now we will hear from Mr. Kruger from GAO.
Would you care to make some comment and respond to my ques-
tions, Mr. Kruger?
Mr. KRUGER. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I could give a fast rundown
why we got into this job in the first place.
Mr. Chairman, we wanted to take a look at the who'e Ports and
Waterways Act of 1972, and what the Coast Guard was doing in
that respect, and provide some sort of evaluation to the Congress
as we were charged to do.
I think Mr. Olney accurately stated what our function in this
matter is, and that is to bring forth some issues for consideration
by committees like yours.
In this particular case, we have made some recommendations that
we felt are necessary, based primarily on data we have obtained from
the Coast Guard.
Mr. Chairman, none of the data in our report is generated by the
General Accounting Office. It is an evaluation and analysis of the
Coast Guard's existing data.
PAGENO="0024"
18
We try to use simple language in our reports. The terms "basic"
and "sophisticated" to us were something that people on the street
can understand.
The definitions that we use, or the criteria that we use, I think was
accurately stated by the captain here.
Anything that has to do with electronics surveillance, be it radar
or TV, we consider sophisticated systems.
The captain here just mentioned that the manned versus unmanned.
might be a better definition. Unmanned vessel traffic systems in
my point of view, anyway, would consist primarily of just your
regulations.
The system that is currently in existence at Puget Sound, for
example, and I do not know whether you have installed the radar out
there or not, but before the radar we would consider the system out
there to be a basic system. That included the vessel captains reporting
into the traffic control center on their positions, their speeds, the
plot board where the Coast Guard would plot these various ships,
show them in the traffic lanes where they were, who was going to
meet at various turning basins, and so forth.
This, to us, was a basic system, Mr. Chairman.
Now, the plans were to add radar surveillance in various sections
of the Puget Sound area. To us this was getting into the sophisticated
aspects of the vessels system.
The Congress, as we interpreted the intent of the initial Port and
Waterways Safety Act, was to get as much safety as we could for our
dollars.
The Congress in this whole program has been rather stringent in
providing money for this program.
Therefore, in the view of the General Accounting Office, in looking
at this program with the limited resources we felt that we could get
more safety for the same amount of dollars by spreading out the basic
systems in more ports, and then as money becomes available, and as
studies would show the necessity for adding on additional increments
of a system, we can do this.
We have no objection to this, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Mr. Kruger.
Captain MOSER. May I make this statement, Mr. Chairman, con-
cerning in some places the use of electronics surveillance devices I
would take the Port of New York as the most extreme case where the
traffic is complicated, and if one is to use a vessel traffic system in
New York, it is virtually impossible to put one in without a radar.
With a reporting system alone, it would fill the air up with reports,
and challenge the people who are trying to keep track of what is going
on.
There will be so maiy reports you simply must have some book-
keeping device, such as a computer, or some way of using eyes where
they cannot see otherwise, such as a TV, or a radar, in certain other
areas in a heavily trafficked port.
Mr. Chairman, we do not believe it would be possible to put m
successful YTS in many places without this "sophisticated" equipment,
and I would include in that the Houston area, where we are limping
along without a computer, but we will have to have one in order to
keep track of the very heavy traffic in that area, and New Orleans
for the same purpose.
PAGENO="0025"
19
Mr. BIAGGI. As far as the New York area, that is not talking in
terms of the Hudson River, is it?
Captain MOSER. No, sir, unfortunately, just below the Battery
things begin to happen.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much.
You have made it quite clear.
Mr. Olney?
Mr. OLNEY. Captain, I would like to follow up once more. I think I
understand your last statement, and what you are saying is that it is
not necessarily effective to, across the board, have levels 1, 2, and 3 of
the basic system.
What you are saying is in an area like New York, you have to go one
through five. You have to start with bridge-to-bridge, and go all the
way through to levels of automated surveillance. So, in effect, when we
are comparing ports, we should not necessarily look at the degree of
sophisitication in one port and compare it to another, but look at the
port as a whole.
Captain MOSER. Yes. The one thing I am not certain of is whether
there will be devised a way to have separation of traffic in New York,
so it might be inappropriate to suggest that they will have a traffic
separation scheme.
The other elements, though, would be appropriate, even including
the possibility of a basic system if one were to put a TV to monitor
certain restricted areas where the TV could work. That might be ap-
propriate in addition to a radar.
I have with me Commander Hickey, who has just come off leave,
to be present at this briefing, and he keeps nudging me, and wants me
to say it is life cycle cost that we are speaking about when we buy a
piece of capital equipment, a radar, a center, and that is the kind of
cost that we have applied in our thinking of our system when we
measure cost-benefit ratios.
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Captain Moser, Commander
Hickey, and Mr. Kruger.
At the outset, you will recall I asked the Coast Guard to prepare
responses to the points that Mr. Olney raised in his statement, and
we would appreciate it if you would do that as quickly as possible.
Captain MOSER. We will have that in your hands as soon as we
can get it.
[The following was received :~
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
July 8, 1975.
Hon MARIO BIAGGI,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On 25 June 1975, Mr. Pierre Olney, Minority Counsel
to the Coast Guard and Navigation Subcommittee, submitted for the record
a memorandum of background information for Vessel Traffic System oversight
hearings. In this memorandum Mr. Olney summarized, in his own words, the two
basic criticisms made by the GAO with respect to the Coast Guard's activities
in the vessel traffic management area. These were contained, respectively, in
paragraphs (2)(a) and (2)(b) of his memo. You asked that the Coast Guard pro-
vide you with its response to the issues raised in the memorandum.
PAGENO="0026"
20
The Coast Guard feels that Mr. Olney has accurately identified the major
issues of concern to the GAO and to the subcommittee. Whereas Mr. Olney's
memorandum has summarized the GAO's criticism of the Coast Guard, it would
also be appropriate to summarize the Coast Guard's response to those criticisms.
For an accurate assessment of the Coast Guard's vessel traffic system program,
two points which form the basis of the GAO Report must be clarified. First,
GAO's analysis of system costs is distorted and misleading, inasmuch as only
acquisition costs were quoted. A valid cost analysis for any such program requires
that annual recurring costs such as operating expenses and personnel costs be
included. It is the total life cycle costs, not the initial acquisition cost, which
must be examined in making implementation decisions.
The second point which deserves explanation is the GAO Report's classifi-
cation of YTS levels as "basic" and "sophisticated." While GAO's intent to
arrive at terms easily understandable to the layman is appreciated, it is felt that
these terms are oversimplified and tend to cloud rather than clarify the relevant
system cost and complexity considerations. Those ports and waterways with the
most pressing marine safety needs and the most promising returns on investment
are receiving first attention. The decision to implement automated or surveil-
lance system components in any area is made only after careful study of the
total incremental costs and benefits. In assessing vessel traffic system benefits
many factors in addition to the simple number of accident preventions must be
weighed. These include differences in vessel construction, cargo, density, accident
severity, and the potential for catastrophic environmental and personnel casualties.
The Coast Guard agrees that in many areas relatively low level systems wifi
provide an adequate level of safety at a favorable cost/benefit ratio. However,
a distinct need is recognized to address the major port areas now in planning
with systems which will provide the reliability and effectiveness demanded by
local conditions. In order to provide maximum national benefit for marine safety,
it is essential that those areas with the greatest needs and highest returns on
investment be addressed first.
For the most part, the GAO's Report recommendation concerning the pro-
mulgation of regulations under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 is
concurred in. Efforts are underway to identify those aspects of marine safety
which lend themselves to universal regulatory treatment. As such problem areas
are identified, nationwide direction to field units will be provided by Coast Guard
Headquarters. In other instances, the peculiarity of local conditions will require
local regulatory remedies. In any case, greater emphasis is being given to marine
safety regulations, and recent Headquarters staff augmentation should expedite
the entire process.
As a summary of the Coast Guard's position concerning the GAO Report on
vessel traffic systems, this letter should not be considered definitive in that regard.
However, it is hoped that it is responsive to your specific request. For a com-
prehensive review of the issues under consideration, it is suggested that the
GAO Report and the lengthy response prepared by the Coast Guard be relied
upon. For your convenience, a copy of each of these documents is enclosed.
Sincerely,
0. W. SILER,
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant.
Enclosures.
1\'Ir. BIAGGI. The meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.]
PAGENO="0027"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1975
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAviGATioN,
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:07 p.m., in room
2705, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y., the Honorable Mario
Biaggi, subcommittee chairman, presiding.
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.
This is the first of a series of oversight hearings of the Coast Guard
Subcommittee that we will be making throughout the country in
order to deal with the vessel traffic systems and safety plans that
are on the boards.
In order to evaluate them properly and to deal with the general
comments made by GAO, the subcommittee has initiated the hearings
by appearing in New York as its first site.
I have with me the ranking minority member of the subcommittee,
the Congressman from the State of Delaware, my good friend, Mr.
Pierre du Pont; also counsel, Mr. Pierre Olney, and counsel, Mr.
Francis Heyward.
We spent most of the morning making~ an overflight of the New
York waterways, something that I have never been privileged to do
as a resident of this city and an owner of a boat for many years. I
have been all around the island and most of the islands and water-
ways, but seeing it from the top is something else and quite an
experience.
We are privileged to have this afternoon Capt. David Perkins,
chief of staff of the Third Coast Guard District, who will testify.
Captain?
STATEMENT OF CAPT. DAVID E. PERKINS, CHIEF OF STAFF, THIRD
COAST GUARD DISTRICT, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COMDR. CARL T.
JOHNSON AND LT. ARTHUR R. WHITTUM
Captain PERKINS. Con gressinan Biaggi, Congressman du Pont,
and gentlemen, first of all, Vice Admiral Rea, the District Commander
extends his regrets that he could not be here today. I do think that,
he is planning to make the hearings in Philadelphia on the 7th of July.
The VTS problem was first addressed by the Coast Guard approxi-
mately 3 years ago in the New York area. After we had worked on it a
short time, we became aware of the fact that we had to have a signifi-
cant input from people in industry who were a lot more familiar with
the local situation than we were.
(21)
PAGENO="0028"
22
We, therefore, in April of 1973, formsd an advisory committee.
I would like to go down the list and the current associations of the
members of this advisory committee to simply give you an idea of
the spectrum of expertise that we have in this group.
The following are members of our committee: Adm. John Will, U.S.
Navy (retired), currently associated with Arthur Tickle Engineering
Works; Capt. Harry C. Breitenfeld, New York Sandy Hook Pilots;
Capt. William H. Burrill, New Jersey Board of Commissioner of
Pilotage; Mr. Giallorenzi of the Exxon Co.; Col. Thomas C. Hunter,
Jr., New York District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Mr. Alfred
Hammon, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; Capt.
James G. Stillwaggon, Interport Pilots Associates; Capt. Thomas A.
King, Eastern Region Director, Maritime Administration; Mr.
Henry H. Anderson, Jr., North American Yacht Racing Union; Mr.
Robert W. Sanders, Red Star Marine Services, Inc.; Capt. Stephen M.
Seledee, American Institute of Marine Underwriters; Capt. Robert
Donald Sante, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff of the Military Sealift
Command, Atlantic; Mr. Vito J. Fossella, Commissioner of Marine
and Aviation, city of New York; Capt. Kenneth C. Torrens, Farrell
Lines-Captain Torrens is the chairman of the executive committee
of our advisory board; Capt. Thomas J. McGovern, United New
Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots; Mr. Paul Elliot, Environmental Protection
Agency.
With this group we have been working for over 2 years to develop
what we think is going to be a viable traffic system for the Port of
New York.
I am going to ask Lieutenant Commander Johnson in a moment to go
into some of the details of what we see as the problem in New York,
how we developed or identified this problem, and basically what we
propose to do about it.
Lieutenant Commander Johnson.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Representative Biaggi, Repre-
sentative du Pont, Captain Perkins, ladies and gentlemen, my pres-
entation this afternoon is intended to inform you of the purpose,
background, and current status of the New York vessel traffic system.
To fully understand our present position, some brief background
information is desirable.
The American public, through congressional action, has demanded
that more action be taken to reduce the loss of lives, injuries to people,
and damage to property and the environment that result from the
steadily increasing number of serious vessel casualties that occur in
U.S. waters.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 authorized the Secre-
tary of the Department in which the Coast Guard operates to estab-
lish, operate, and maintain vessel traffic services and systems for ports,
harbors, and other waters subject to congested vessel traffic. This
act also authorizes the requiring of vessels to use or comply with the
system, as well as the control of vessel traffic during conditions of
hazardous circumstances.
I would like to digress for a moment and address the subject of
control.
The word "control" has ominous overtones to the maimer. The
association of the word "control" with the word "Govermnent" often
PAGENO="0029"
23
suggests to the mariner the usurpation of responsibility and freedom
to act independently to maneuver his vessel according to his own train-.
ing and judgment. I am sure as long as the word "control" is held in
that context by the mariner, it will continue to be an emotional and
frustrating prospect.
The New York vessel traffic system does not expect to have the
necessary information, the expertise, or even the desire to attempt
maneuvering a vessel from a shore facility. You and I, as motor
vehicle drivers, would tend to be emotional if the traffic patrolman
at the intersection opened the car door and told us to move over so
he could drive the vehicle through the intersection or, worse yet, he
sat in the passenger seat, in heavy traffic, ordered us to disregard all
outside activity and manipulate the steering wheel, brakes, and
accelerator as he directed.
Thankfully, such is not the case. The patrolman stands at the
intersection, holds up his hand for us to stop, because he knows that
we can and directs traffic to cross safely in front of us. Such will be the
role of the Controller in our Vessel Traffic Center.
DEFINITION OF VESSEL TRAFFiC SYSTEM
With the passage of the Bridge-to-Bridge Radio-Telephone Act of
1971, and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, a vessel traffic
system became defined as "an integrated system encompassing the
variety of technologies, equipment and people employed to coordinate
vessel movement in or approaching a port or waterway."
The purpose of the New York vessel, traffic system is to reduce the
incidence of `marine casualties that result from collisions and ground-
ings by identifying and eliminating their causes while facilitating the
orderly movement of vessels within the port.
HEADQUARTERS PLANNING PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION
In March 1973, the Commandant, Office of Environment and
Systems, published the Vessel Traffic System Issue Study. The
objectives of this study were:
1. To identify specific vessel traffic system program goals, antici-
pated benefits and alternatives.
2. To analyze the potential vessel traffic system roles of Federal,
State and local authorities, and private enterprise; and recommend
the most beneficial role for the Coast Guard.
3. To analyze the quantitative and qualitative factors to be con-
sidered in the determination of the needs for various levels of VTS
in U.S. ports.
4. To prepare short and long-range staffing and funding plans.
5. To prepare a management plan to use as a guide in planning,
developing and implementing new systems.
In August of 1973, the Office of Environment and Systems pub-
lished a report titled the "Analysis of Port Needs." This report was a
follow-on to the VTS issue study.
The cost/benefit analysis developed in the issue study was applied
to 22 major ports and waterways in order to establish a relative
ranking of their need for VTS. The ports were selected for analysis on
PAGENO="0030"
24
the basis of tonnage of cargo handled, number of vessel transits, and
number of vessels involved in marine casualties over a 4-year period,
fiscal year 1969 through 1972. The output of this analysis was a
listing of ports and waterways in the order their needs for a vessel
traffic system should be addressed, and the initial recommendations
concerning the level of need for each area.
The Port of New York ranked No. 1 in level of need in terms of
dollars lost in damages to vessels and environmental pollution. It
ranked second, behind New Orleans, in deaths and injuries. New York
also ranked No. 1 in benefits from estimated annual reductions of
damage, deaths and injuries by the implementation of a vessel traffic
system.
The issue study estimates that 52 percent of the casualties in New
York Harbor are preventable by a vessel traffic system.
I would like to add some perspective to this estimate.
New York Harbor has the largest amount of casualties because it
is the largest and most complex harbor in the United States and has
the most traffic. These casualties have resulted from over 2 million
vessel movements in the 4-year time period.
The mariner in New York Harbor is an expert and can be proud of
the overwhelming number of successful harbor transits as opposed to
those involving casualties. It is because there is such a large potential
to do grievous damage of great magnitude with so few casualties that
the public has demanded that these few casualties be reduced even
further.
Some of us overfiew the harbor this morning and have had a first-
hand look at some of the factors which have influenced our system
design. Each port has its own geographic and traffic density problems
and is therefore unique. There is no one system that will solve the
traffic problems of all ports and waterways.
For those who did not make the flight this morning, let me briefly
review the composition of the Port of New York in terms of geography
and traffic.
The Port of New York, according to the compact reached in 1921
between New York and New Jersey, is defined as an area of some
1,500 square miles within a 25-mile radius from the Statue of Liberty
located in upper bay.
As you can see, the actual navigable channel area, shaded in green,
is substantially smaller than the total area, and in the lower bay the
difference is more apparent-see figure 2. So you can see that although
the total area is extremely large, the area available for the navigation
of large vessels amounts to less than 15 percent of the total area. The
port areas has a water frontage of 750 miles of which 460 miles are in
New York and 290 miles in New Jersey.
Geographically, it offers one of the best natural deepwater harbors
in the world today. An ice-free port and seldom hampered by fog,
it has an average tidal range of only 4~ feet.
The upper bay can be considered the center of a huge wheel from
which the port's major navigable channels extend. It contains a large
protected anchorage basin. Deepwater piers along the Staten Island
and Brooklyn waterfronts are only 9 miles from the open sea.
The Port of New York has six major entrances for vessels. Entrances
to lower New York Bay include Ambrose Channel and Sandy Hook
Channel from seaward and Raritan Bay Channel from inland points.
PAGENO="0031"
25
Upper New York Bay is served from seaward by the Narrows, Long
Island Sound, the East River and Kill Van Kull.
Together, these are the basic inner harbor channel systems from which
the major branch and spur channels emanate. The channels range in
bottom width from 150 feet through 2,000 feet, and a controlling mean
low water project depth from 12 through 45 feet.
According to available information, the total channel network of
the port during 1973 served more than 216 million short tons of trade.
The Port of New York and its channel system handles all forms of
vessel traffic, including passenger liners, tour boats, container ships,
break-bulk general cargo vessels, petroleum tankers, dry bulk cargo
carriers, and a large volume of tow boat traffic.
In 1971, some 18,193 of these arriving and departing ocean going
vessels, operated by 185 steamship lines, united the Port of New York
with other ports around the world. These vessels represent 21 percent
of the total volume of ocean-going vessel traffic of the 11 major sea-
ports of the United States during the same year. Particularly signifi-
cant is the fact that the Port of New York accommodated over 8.5
million long tons of containerized cargo in 1971, more than twice
the amount of the next leading U.S. container port.
Serving all marine cargo facilities is a harbor fleet of approximately
250 towboats and almost 1,300 pieces of floating equipment, including
barges, lighters, scows and carfloats, thus adding to the volume of
vessel movements between terminals, shipyards, anchorages, and
similar intraharbor movements.
Particularly appropriate at this point are the remarks of Mr. Alfred
Hammon; the supervisor of development and planning for the Port
of New York Authority to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Coast
and Geodetic Survey and Navigation delivered on August 11, 1970,
on the proposed `Torts and Waterways Safety Act of 1970." I quote:
The Port of New York is and wifi continue to be a complex network of crossing
and joining Federal channels, marked in various degrees by sharp turns, narrow
constrictions, rip currents, narrow or low bridges and heavy concentrations of
ocean traffic. At night or during periods of low visibility, navigational dnagers in
such areas increase considerably. In many instances hazardous conditions are not
physically remediable. Where remediable, they can often be eliminated or modified
only at tremendous cost. Further, as ships, such as tankers and container ships
become longer, wider, deeper and faster, they tend to intensify these hazards,
particularly since the economics upon which their construction and operation are
founded stimulate rapid and undelayed port turnarounds. Traffic, fog, rain and
snow impede rapid port turnarounds and can cost up to $1,000 per hour in vessel
time, not to mention the cost in dollars of injury and loss of time when accidents
occur.
A preliminary vessel traffic system survey was conducted from
November 8 through November 16, 1973, during the hours of 8 a.m.
and 4:30 p.m. The purpose of the survey was to determine the number
of vessels subject to a vessel traffic system underway at any given
time within New York Harbor. The vessels which we intend to make
subject to the vessel traffic system are the same as those subject to
the Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act, namely:
1. Every power-driven vessel of 300 gross tons and upward while navigating.
2. Every vessel of 100 gross tons and upward carrying one or more passengers
for hire while navigating.
3. Every towing vessel, while towing, of 26 feet or over in length while
navigating.
4. Every dredge and floating plant engaged in or near a channel or fairway in
operations likely to restrict or affect navigation of other vessels.
PAGENO="0032"
26
During the survey from 48 to 106 vessels subject to a Vessel Traffic System
were actually observed underway simultaneously. From this traffic survey it
was determined that a maximum of 147 vessels, subject to a Vessel Traffic System,
could currently be underway at any one time. Subsequent traffic data has served
to verify these figures-see Figure 3.
Referring to the Vue-graph, the upper figures within the boxes are the mean
and the lower figures are the maximum hourly traffic densities recorded at the
locations indicated. The locations circled are particularly hazardous for the
navigation of large vessels and tugs with tows because of limited visibility and
narrow channels. The conditions in these areas merit particular attention in
planning a Vessel Traffic System for New York.
With the probable exception of very large oil tankers and dry cargo bulk
carriers, the Port of New York may logically be expected to handle the largest
of the vessels expected to call at any port of the United States in the next three
decades.
The preceding information provides an overview of the type of
general planning and the quality of information available at our
local level to undertake the specific tasks of implementing a vessel
traffic system in the port of New York.
In 1972, concurrent with headquarters planning, Commander,
Third Coast Guard District, asked Captain of the Port New York
to conduct a local Maritime Hazards Study which first dealt in detail
with the complexities of local geography and traffic densities-see
figure 4.
Soon after that study, in response to a headquarters' request, an
acquisition, construction, and improvement proposal for a New York
vessel traffic system was drafted and was made up of the system
elements recommended later by the analysis of port needs.
In 1973, the Captain of the Port New York completed a vessel
traffic system study which used the results of the maritime hazards
study to make the first local effort in the transition from general to
specific planning for the system.
During 1973, the need for advice from the broad spectrum of mari-
time interests and the need for a dedicated Coast Guard Project
Staff were identified. This resulted in the establishment of the Vessel
Traffic System Advisory Committee in April 1973, and the Vessel
Traffic System Staff of Commander, Third Coast Guard District.
Membership in the advisory committee represents a cross-section
of the maritime community made up of shipping, port, maritime,
boating, and environmental interests. This committee is a valuable
associate in assuring that our system not only increases safety but
meets the needs of those who will participate in it without undue
burden.
During the period August 1973 through February 1974, the vessel
traffic system staff identified the local tasks and procedures necessary
to implement our vessel traffic system. The initial planning effort was
estimated at 60 man-years and several millions of dollars distributed
over a 24-month period.
National and Coast Guard priorities have dictated a substantially
reduced planning effort coincident with available personnel and
funds and the acceptance of the attendant risk that system effective-
ness might be reduced. It was therefore necessary to minimize planning
errors and maximize local staff effectiveness to insure that the fore-
shortened planning would not result in an ineffective system.
Far more detailed information on ship characteristics, traffic
behavior, harbor geography, traffic hazards, and existing communica-
tions usage was required for an acceptable functional design.
PAGENO="0033"
27
We found that the most effective way to characterize both harbor
and traffic parameters was through a well-structured data base that
would be accessible in minimum time. A plan to accomplish both data
collection and analysis was developed and resulted in a most efficient
mformation system which has served us well. An expenditure of
approximately $70,000 was required for necessary equipment.
This information system, the harbor image data base, presently
consists of 230 days of vessel traffic density, harbor geography,
communications usage, traffic hazard, and environmental information
that has enabled our staff to progress through a logically structured
approach to the final functional design for the New York Vessel
Traffic System.
This approach is best described as follows:
I refer to the Vue-graph. The harbor area was divided into small
manageable areas, unrelated to actual system sectors because of the
analysis techniques available. Data was collected reflecting the total
environment, the vessel's characteristics, and the traffic density in the
area.
Harbor geography was defined in usable terms. Dimensions of all
channels, descriptions of existing aids to navigation, and prominent
land areas were quantified to form the boundaries of the areas where
the vessels maneuver.
Ship characteristics were analyzed to roughly determine the
maneuvering capabifity of the various classes of vessels which use the
harbor. This analysis has grossly defined vessel relationships to one
another in the channels and has provided an assessment of a channel's
ability to contain traffic.
Weather effects limiting visibifity were considered versus vessel
maneuvering capability to determine optimum safe traffic separation.
The safe traffic capacity of each segment was then estimated. The
segments which represent actual conditions were then assembled to
form a dynamic traffic proffle of the harbor.
See figure 6-the safe capacities of the small segments were used to
define route networks throughout the harbor. It is this point where we
find ourselves now with the remaining blocks in process of final
implementation. An evaluation is being made to determine if traffic
densities exceed the estimated safe capacities and, if so, then methods
to reduce traffic to a safe level will be used, such as limiting traffic
through an area. If the densities are safe, then methods to manage the
flow along the routes will be used to preclude potentially hazardous
encounters in physically restricted maneuvering areas.
Hazards, both physical and operational, are being identified and
listed and then ranked according to degree. Physical hazards, such as
obstructions to visibility or obstructions near channels, are being
evaluated so as to reduce their effect on traffic flow.
For example, some hazards may be eliminated by establishing a new
aid to navigation or by recommending a demolition or a dredging
operation through the Corps of Engineers.
Various rules and regulations will be developed and considered to
minimize a particular hazard's effect on traffic flow. During this phase,
the Vessel Traffic System Advisory Committee will be particularly
involved in recommendations concerning the proposed rules.
78-280-76-3
PAGENO="0034"
28
In cases where conditions fluctuate to the extent that rules and
regulations would be ineffective for all situations, it will be the direct
action of the Vessel Traffic System Controller, through communicating
advisories to the vessels concerned that will minimize the effects of
potentially hazardous encounters in restricted maneuvering areas.
Following this approach, it has become obvious that cost/benefit
analysis and other general indicators of Port VTS requirements have
not addressed the practicalities involved in actual system implementa-
tion. I am sure they were never intended to.
We found this illustrated when we estimated the ability of a partic-
ular system level to manage the high traffic densities found in the
relatively small navigable areas in New York harbor.
We found, and the VTS Advisory Committee agreed, that a com-
munications based VMRS could not effectively manage traffic, nor
could it improve safety in the harbor. In fact, quite the opposite would
have occurred. The mariner would have been burdened with additional
communications loads that would have served to provide the vessel
traffic center with information without any significant benefits
returned to the mariner. The imposition of this system level would
have unnecessarily diverted the mariner's attention from his primary
task which is the safe navigation of his vessel.
The Commandant's Office of Environment and Systems was
notified of this development, and the VTS Staff was subsequently
tasked to generate the specific operational requirements for the
New York System.
With the aid of our data base and the help of the VTS Advisory
Committee, the specific operational requirements were completed
in October 1974, and represents, without regard to cost, the system
functions necessary to provide a safe effective traffic management
system for New York harbor.
It was readily apparent that the funds currently appropriated and
the time necessary to apply existing technology were inadequate to
implement a system containing all the functions specified in the SOR.
Therefore, Commandant, Office of Engineering, responded with
specifications for system hardware procurement which will provide,
within present funding levels, most of the functions required by the
SOR.
The system hardware will be sufficient to allow us to engage in
traffic management methods which will reduce potentially hazardous
encounters, harborwide, with minimum burden on the mariner.
We recognized that some near term action to improve harbor safety
was necessary. Therefore, the current voluntary "Safety Broadcast
System" was implemented-see figure 7. This system formalized
and standardized the local practice of individual vessels broadcasting
their intentions, on the bridge to bridge channel, to transit areas
known to be hazardous if an approaching vessel encounters another
without prior warning.
The points at which broadcasts are made are shown in the num-
bered circles. The direction that the vessels are traveling when they
make the broadcasts are indicated by the arrowheads. The details
of the system are published in Local Notice to Mariners, No. 33,
dated July25, 1974.
PAGENO="0035"
29
Participation has been excellent, and this system is providing a
good evolutionary springboard for transition to an active traffic
management system.
This next Vue-graph, figure 8, is a simplified critical path network,
showing the remaining tasks. It is the most realistic implementation
schedule, considering available staff resources, that we are able to
forecast at this time.
The heading scale represents calendar months from April 1, 1975 to
1 May 1977. Each line, or path, represents a task versus time, and is
drawn to show its dependence on, or relationship to, other tasks.
The most critical path is Coast Guard Headquarters' procurement,
installation and off-line testing of system hardware.
There are several significant tasks that must be completed locally
prior to activating a centralized traffic management system:
First. Rules and regulations governing the system must be formu-
lated with the aid of the VTS Advisory Committee. They must be in
nearly final form before publishing the Operations Manual and
Vessel Traffic Center Manual.
Second. A controller training program must be developed and
approved prior to the arrival of operating personnel. This program
must be carefully prepared because we recognize that, initially, the
controller will have never managed traffic and the local mariners
will have never participated in a management system. We must build
a basis on mutual trust and confidence with each other in order to
have a successful system.
Third. Controller training and on-line testing with the mariner must
be completed prior to activating the system.
I think that this explains most of the line items and our schedule
should lead to system operation by mid-1977.
This concludes my presentation.
If there are any questions, I wifi be happy to answer them if I can.
At the conclusion of the question period, please feel free to examine
our display material which illustrates some of the techniques used in
assembling our data base. My staff and I will be available to answer
further questions.
Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Lieutenant Commander John-
son, for an excellent statement.
Mr. du Pont will, of necessity, be required to leave some time before
the meeting is terminated. In view of that, we are privileged to accord
him the opportunity to question you in this area.
Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to have to leave even a little bit sooner. So, first, I
appreciate Mr. Biaggi's initiative to get these hearings going, and I
look forward a week from Monday to continuation on the Delaware
River hearing where we have a situation that is very different than
the problem that you have in New York. It is less sophisticated at
the moment, the traffic problems are less in terms of volume, but the
rate at which we have been having problems there, I think a hearing
is perhaps overdue.
I appreciated the tour this morning and had an opportunity to see,
as the Chairman pointed out, from the air some of the very difficult
areas that you have surrounding New York, particularly on the New
Jersey side.
PAGENO="0036"
30
Do you anticipate that the vessel traffic system is going to adequately
be able to handle the more difficult blind corner problems?
I can see it on the East River where the corners are not so bad, but
in the New Jersey area there are some very difficult areas.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir, I think we will be able
to handle it adequately.
Of course, radar surveifiance in areas of this sort are traditionally
ineffective because of the geography and sight ability. I think with
the aid of some low light level television for local surveillance and
the communications system which will support the vessel traffic sys-
tem, it will be able to sequence traffic through these areas and reduce
the hazards.
Mr. DU PONT. Would you say that the limiting factor in the develop-
ment of these systems is the technology, is the money, or is the training
time required to get people to use the technology that wifi be available?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I think principally it is at this
juncture the money.
The technology is available that just has not been applied to this
particular application principally, this harbor. There is a lot of plan-
ming and development work that would have been necessary to support
the system that we outlined in our specific operational requirements.
There simply was not the time or the money at that time.
I do not think that the system that is implemented in 1977 wifi be
the final system in New York Harbor. I think that there are some other
techniques that are available that might be marshalled to solve some
of the problems in a little bit easier fashion than we are going to be
able to do at the outset.
Mr. DU PONT. I have never heard anybody testifying before a
congressional committee that did not say money was the bottleneck.
So maybe that is the expected answer.
But, judging from what I have seen today, and from your state-
ment, it sounds to me like you anticipate no technical problems other
than getting the equipment in place, which is a physical and time one.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
The other problem which is attendant to the money problem, of
course, is the personnel that we have available to implement the
system.
The CPM chart that you saw at the end there was a pretty compli-
cated chart. There are a lot of local tasks, but I think, given that
amount of time, I think we can implement the system within the
capability of the hardware that we are being provided.
Mr. DU PONT. I thank you, Commander, and if I stay much longer,
I am going to miss my train. So I am going to depart.
But, at the conclusion of your questioning, my counsel has some
specific questions that he wifi take up.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. Bon voyage. Do not travel m
the harbor.
Dealing with the money factor, Commander, what is the present
level of funding these systems?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. The total funding for New York
Harbor that exists is, I believe, $5.5 million, plus or minus a few
thousand.
PAGENO="0037"
31
Now, this amount covers the system hardware that we wifi be
providing. This is a Coast Guard Headquarters' function. Our func..
tions are the other planning factors, generation of procedures, rules
and regulations, various manuals that will be used, and the procedures
that they cover and, of course, the training program.
Mr. BIAGGI. Wifi there be any additional funds required?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I believe in the future that they
will, and I believe that the Commandant, Office of Environment and
Systems, is addressing this now.
Mr. BIAGGI. You mentioned by 1977.
What will be the time frame of the various phases of development
of the proposal?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Beyond that, you mean, sir?
Mr. BIAGGI. Up and until.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. To that time.
Could I have the Vue-graph back up there? It is probably the
easiest to explain by that. The whole thing.
Next to the bottom line is the headquarters' task of procuring the
hardware, bring it up onto on-line testing and turning it over to the
local people.
Now, also another headquarters' function is authorizing the people
and seeing that they arrive onboard so that we can commence training
at that time.
Now, during-prior to that time, our training program has to be
developed, but we really could not start in any detail in this unit we
knew the capability of the system hardware that was being provided,
and that has only been very recently given to us, sir.
We have done an analysis of the capability now, and we are going
to be able to proceed in here to generate the training program and, at
the same time, a fallout of this will be rules and regulations and our
operations manual. The operations manual is intended to be a
mariner's guide. This will be the booklet that will explain how the
system works to the mariner.
Then, of course, we will have our own internal center operating
procedures, and that will occur sometime after the rules and regula-
tions are nearly in final form.
Mr. BIAGGI. Tell me precisely where you are with that plan as far
as New York Harbor is concerned now.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. We are-let us see. Right about
here [indicating]. We just as a matter of fact, in defining the system
performance requirements, we are just about finished with that now-
OK, you point-we are just about there [indicating]. We have done
some preliminary development in the training program and analyzing
the task that we are required to do in order to implement this program,
what skills are we going to have to give the operators in particular
that come to us; what does he already have; how long is this going to
take?
And it is astonishing the amount of hours that it does take. It takes
about 50 hours of preparation time for every 1 hour of classroom
time.
Mr. BIAGGI. You are talking in terms of three segments, if I recall
correctly?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
PAGENO="0038"
32
Mr. BIAGGL You are talking in terms of radar?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. You are talking in terms of computers?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. And low-level television?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. In what order will they be installed?
Let me put the question this way, can we expect a partial installa-
tion so that we will have the partial benefit of the overall plan?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. No.
I think the system should be installed in total before it is ever
switched on to be used, because most of the other tasks will not have
been completed by that time. It is all geared so that it comes together
at the end, and we test it, and we are sure of what we have got. And
we are sure that we are not going to needlessly burden the mariner in
the harbor before we turn it on. And we must make some kind of
assessment on how good the system operates before we turn it on
officially.
Mr. BIAGGI. What is your reaction to the GAO recommendation
that it delay plans for the electronic surveillance in the East River
and Newark Bay?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, I think New York's
particular case, I think some form of surveillance in these areas are
mandatory in order to efficiently manage traffic. It gives you-
radios alone in these areas, because they are so short and so narrow,
and there is so much traffic, tend to be ineffective because of the
amount of traffic that you have to handle in the area.
You can see and verify that someone is there. Mariners have a
tendency to be not as precise as we would like them to be in reporting
their positions, and this is a natural thing to do. But we require a
little more timely information and a little more frequent information
than the mariner can really provide.
In other words, we would be burdening him needlessly with commu-
nications. We can see him normally. We do not have to talk to him
unless there is going to be a conffict.
Mr. BIAGGI. I think you testified to the eligibility of ships, the re-
quirement of certain ships to participate in this system?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Again for the record, what are they and also will the
ships which do not fall within that area be able to receive information?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, ships not subject to the
system for the most part in New York Harbor are light running tugs,
and they are equipped to receive information and normally would be
listening on the channel, or at least on the bridge-to-bridge channel, on
the party line system that we have now, so they would have the
information.
Pleasure craft, probably not, but in the harbor area there is not that
big an incidence of pleasure craft except down off Sandy Hook or up
around the Throgs Neck area, and that would be dealt with separately.
Now, for the record, the vessels we intend to have subject to the
vessel traffic system are the same as those subject to the bridge-to-
bridge Radiotelephone Act. They are every power-driven vessel over
300 gross tons while navigating towing vessel over 26 feet, while tow-
PAGENO="0039"
33
ing, while navigating, every vessel of 100 gross tons and upward,
carrying one or more passengers for hire while navigating, and every
dredge floating plant engaged in or near a chanel or fairway in opera-
tions liable to restrict navigation of other vessels.
Now, there could possibly be individual exception to this if there are
special cases. But, at this juncture in the planning, none are antici-
pated. But we certainly leave the door open as necessary.
Mr. BIAGGI. But pending the installation of this equipment in the
implementation of the plan, what is the Coast Guard doing and
what has it done in relation to GAO's recommendation for additional
regulatory action dealing with hazardous cargo?
New York is always concerned about liquefied natural gas among
others.
Lieutenant Commander JoHNsoN. Well, we are looking at that
kind of cargo as part of the traffic management problem and, of course,
as I said this morning, some of the facilities are located in not the most
advantageous places for vessel traffic management, located where
they are commercially more feasible. But I think possibly if dangerous
cargo is involved, we have procedures that we use for ammunition
ships, such things as that, I imagine special procedures will be devel-
oped to handle this type traffic when it becomes a reality, where this
is within our plan.
Mr. BIAGGI. What does that mean, Commander?
Right and special procedures will be developed?
Lieutenant Commander JoHNsoN. Such as an escort for the vessel;
such as requiring tugs, or such as establishing a security zone around
the vessel during its transit if it becomes necessary.
Those are some of the ways that type of vessel can be dealt quite
effectively with.
Captain PERKINS. Perhaps I can interject here.
We have LNG movements, the barge Massachusetts made six
trips into the New York Harbor area.
During those trips, basically she was escorted. There was a security
zone around her when she moved. She was permitted only to move
during daylight hours.
That activity has been terminated. The safety provisions that were
provided seemed to be entirely adequate. There were no problems.
When such activity is resumed, if it is, we would visualize similar
types of control over that movement and that control would be ex-
ercised through the VTS system.
Mr. BIAGGI. You are completely satisfied that that is adequate in
provision?
Captain PERKINS. It appears to be completely adequate, yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Generally speaking, when we put out new regulations
or start something new in the Coast Guard or Government, generally
somebody out there in the public gets a little bit of a licking.
What effect will this have on the industry as far as cost to the ship-
ping industry in concerned?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I would hope that the cost of the
shipping industry would be really zero in terms of dollars for addi-
tional equipment or additional people that they might require.
I think the only change the industry will notice will be operation-.
ally. In other words, the way the man on the bridge conducts his
PAGENO="0040"
34
operation. He would have to contact the Vessel Traffic Center in a
minimum amount of times rather than pass movement information
on vessel-on the bridge-to-bridge channel as he does now.
So he would do things differently. It would not be additional things
that he would have to do.
Captain PERKINS. Can I add to that?
Mr. BIAGGI. Sure.
Captain PERKINS. There is one problem area, and that is the matter
of the number of radio frequencies that these vessels have to guard.
We are going to impose an additional-another guard frequency.
We hope to resolve that so that it will not cost them anything by
getting the FCC to agree to let the Coast Guard stand their guard on
the channel 16 while they are in this system.
If this works out, then there will be no increased cost to them be-
cause they will still be guarding the same number of channels.
Mr. BIAGGI. I know you have an advisory committee.
Will counsel of the Coast Guard advise them directly of your plans
through that committee?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
We work very closely with the advisory committee. They worked
as an associate in the development of our specific operational require-
ments before they were submitted to headquarters. We tussled about
this for a number of months, and the requirements that we laid down
were those that the crossection of industry agreed with as being
adequate and meeting the needs of the mariner in the harbor.
Mr. BIAGGI. One more question-well, one of two.
You testified-I am sure I will hear from the industry on that
scOre-you testified that 52 percent of the accidents that occurred
were preventable.
Lieutenant Commander JoHNSoN. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Now, if these plans are implemented, total package,
what effect will that have on those 52 percent?
Lieutenant Commander Johnson. We hope that that 52 percent
would go away.
In other words, we anticipate that much reduction.
Mr. BIAGGI. I asked you this question before, but I will ask you
again for the record.
I think the Indians could invade America, coming down the Hudson
without anybody-without colliding with any ships.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Now, are those plans-will those plans be extended up
the Hudson River and, if so, for what purpose?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. It is possible. We have looked at
this and we have had a Hudson River group that has been a sub-
committee of our advisory committee. And if the traffic density, or if
the conditions warranted it, why, our system could extend this as far
as Albany in the form of vessel movement reporting system.
The reason that we need to go as far as the Yonkers Pilot Station at
this time is to have control over the southbound input and to the
system so that we knew if a vessel's route is around Manhattan or
into the kills. Then we will need some advanced warning of their
coming.
Mr. BIAGGI. Here is an issue not necessarily germane to the purpose
of this oversight hearing, but it relates to the total picture.
PAGENO="0041"
35
Currently, New York City is undergoing a terrible fiscal crisis, and
there is a threat of the elimination of New York City marine fire-
fighting units.
Does the Coast Guard have the capacity to fill that gap?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I would like to defer that to
Captain Perkins if I may, sir.
Captain PERKINS. On a one-for-one basis, no, sir. Their fireboats are
much more sophisticated and much better outfitted than anything we
do have.
We do have in the port area several small harbor tugs that belong
to the Coast Guard, that have minimal firefighting capability. We
have several patrol boats that have portable pumps that can be used
for firefighting capability. We do assist the city whenever we can,
using these facilities, but I would not propose for a second that they
were equal to one of the big city fireboats.
Mr. BIAGGI. So if the fireboats are eliminated, any fire that starts
along the shoreline or on the vessel, the best way to control it is to
permit it to burn out?
Captain PERKiNS. It could prevent a very serious problem if the
fireboats were eliminated, yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. In pursuit of that thinking, as a result of the same fiscal
crisis, there is a threat of eliminating the harbor unit, harbor precinct
of the police department.
If that were eliminated, could the Coast Guard be required to
supplement its forces?
Captain PERKINS. Here, again, we work very closely together with
the harbor police. Many of our activities and patrols are coordinated.
If they were withdrawn, it certainly would leave a void in many
areas that we could not fill.
Mr. BIAGGL And it is safe to say then if the vessels that are ordinarily
calling for help are sinking or distressed in any other fashion, they
would suffer as a result of the elimination of the harbor precinct?
Captain PERKiNS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. You could have a loss of lives as a result of it?
Captain PERKINS. You could conceivably, yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Fine.
Thank you.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with that last question, Captain
Perkins, the Coast Guard has no statutory responsibility for fire-
fighting?
Captain PERKINS. No.
We do it on a cooperative basis.
Mr. HEYWARD. Let us suppose the Coast Guard were given that
responsibility.
How much would it cost to substitute for the firefighting capability
of New York City in the harbor area. Do you have any idea?
Captain PERKINS. I do not have-no, not a figure.
I would feel that it would cost essentially what it is costing the city.
Mr. HEYWARD. Plus, assuming some costs in taking over the boats
themselves?
Captain PERKINS. Right.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the last question the chairman
asked about vessels in distress, the Coast Guard does have the re-
sponsibility in search and rescue?
PAGENO="0042"
36
Captain PERKINS. Yes.
Mr. HETYWARD. That is not left to the New York City forces?
Captain PERKINS. No.
But there are many areas that they work with us.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with enforcement of criminal laws,
there would be a lack of authority to enforce the criminal laws de-
pending on what laws were being violated?
Captain PERKINS. That is correct.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with your statement earlier, Mr.
Johnson, there is-and I think this may have been what Mr. Biaggi
was partially getting to-there is a partial utilization of some sort of
vessel traffic control now in the reporting system, voluntary or
otherwise?
Commander JoHNsoN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. Which would be a part of the new system, too, but
your answer, I take it, was that the electronic equipment which would
ultimately be required should all go online at the same time?
Commander JOHNSoN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. For whatever parts of the system it would operate?
Commander JOHNSON. That is correct.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with incidental or single incidents of
movement .of hazardous cargoes, liquefied natural gas and others, the
captain of the port has the authority, does he not, to take whatever
necessary measures there are to protect the vessel and the surrounding
area as those cargoes move?
Commander JOHNSON. Yes, he does.
Mr. HEYWARD. It then becomes a matter of being informed as to
what he is moving?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney?
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you.
Commander Johnson, on page 16 of the GAO report, which I think
you are familiar with, there is reference to interim traffic regulation
measures to be incorporated until a vessel traffic system is in p1ace~
According to the report, on December 4, 1974, these were still under
consideration by Coast Guard Headquarters. S
Could you tell us the status of those regulations?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I wonder if I might defer this to
Captain Perkins? S
This is with respect to the proposed speed limits--
Mr. OLNEY. That is correct.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. That are outlined here.
I believe Captain Mosher yesterday of Coast Guard Headquarters
made some remarks to the subcommittee regarding vessel speed
limits. It has been studied. Some of the propositions about vessel
speed limits have been discussed with the vessel traffic system's
advisory committee, specifically by the captain of the port, and it is
not generally felt that an arbitrary speed limitation would improve
safety to any great extent because of the difference in vessel size and
maneuvering characteristics. And there are so many factors involved,
it would be very difficult to establish one speed limit that is applicable
to all vessels.
Mr. OLNEY. I understand that.
PAGENO="0043"
1 just wanted to determine the status of the regulations at this time.
A related question on page 18 of the same report; apparently the
Captain of the Port of New York was proposing regulations for
eliminating vessel movement during heavy fog conditions.
What is the status of those regulations?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. As far as I know, it is still under
study and it is also still part of the considerations that we have in
implementing a vessel traffic system because we do recognize that
reduced visibility increases the hazard of a vessel casualty collision in
grounding measurably.
Specifically what to do about it, we have not established yet, but
we would certainly deal with it before any system is implemented.
Mr. OLNEY. Then your intention is, if you are going to introduce
regulations, to bring them on-line as part of an entire package?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
And I am sure if the captain of the port felt it was necessary before-
hand, he would do so.
Mr. OLNEY. Captain Perkins?
Captain PERKINS. In the same general area, we have recently insti-
tuted procedures that require much stricter watch standing on the
vessels that are anchored in the anchorage of the upper bay.
We have had a lot of problems in that area with vessels dragging
one into another because they were not properly manned.
This is the only recent major change that we have made.
Mr. OLNEY. I have another request, and I am not sure if you have
this information available.
On map 2 of the pamphlet you gave us this morning, you cite that
there were 195 reportable accidents during the period fiscal years
1969 through 1975.
The captain of the Port of Philadelphia provided the subcommittee
with a breakdown on each reportable accident occuring on the Dela-
ware during this period. Each summary is about four or fives lines
long.
Do you have similar breakdown or a summary?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. We have a breakdown. This is
in our data base and we access it by query. And it certainly could be
provided. I am not sure if we have one with us.
Mr. OLNEY. If it is not unmanageable, could you send it down?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I am certain we could provide it
for you, yes.
[The information was not received at time of printing.J
Mr. OLNEY. A question relating to figure 8 on your presentation;
the electronics equipment that you are requiring.
Is this first generation equipment or are you purchasing technology
that is already available?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. This is available technology.
This is the so-called off-the-shelf state of the art.
Mr. OLNEY. The reason that I ask is because Congress is a little
bit sensitive about cost overruns, as soon as you get into develop-
ment of new technologies, the estimates can vary widely.
Lieutenant Commander JoHNSoN. Yes.
Mr. OLNEY. And I have one last question in regard to monitoring
the various frequencies.
PAGENO="0044"
38
I have heard complaints from some of the operators that the
master is required to monitor too many channels at the same time,
and this is one of the fears of a VTS system, that this is yet another
distraction from navigational duties.
Could you elaborate on this?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Additional communications are
always an onerous task to any vessel master because of the attention
that he must give to maneuvering the vessel. But we try to recognize
this in implementing the system by recommending, through Admiral
Rea, to the FCC that the system assume the mariner's channel 16
guard and also to minimize any communications within the system
directly related to the center, except in regard to hazardous encounter
or things of this nature. Try to minimize the impact on the man
maneuvering the vessel.
Mr. OLNEY. But you are generally satisfied that there is not a lot
of extraneous conversation on these channels today?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
I think when we first started monitoring the bridge-to-bridge
channel, in particular, there were a lot of extraneous transmissions
on it.
I think in a year and a half that we have been dealing with it, the
extraneous transmissions have dropped off considerably. You still
hear a few, but I think you always will hear some.
But I think, by and large, it is fulfilling the function that it was
intended to these days. It is very heavily used, but I think it is being
used for its intended purpose.
Mr. OLNEY. You do not feel there is a need for an additional
frequency to be dedicated to VTS purposes?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, now, I was talking about
the bridge-to-bridge channel.
Yes, there is definitely a need for additional frequencies to be used
in a vessel traffic system because the character of the communication
system is different.
The bridge-to-bridge communication system, the vessels are only
taling to one another and principally they are talking to those who
are quite near to them, and this takes advantages of favorable charac-
teristics of the FM system.
But, in a centralized system, I think if we try to implement it on a
single channel, it would be a disaster. We just could not service that
many potential users at once. So it must be sectorized and we must
have additional channels for a vessel traffic system.
But the mariner should not have to communicate with us except
on them one at a time.
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you for your presentation, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
One question, and we will move along.
Is it within your contemplation that after the new systems are
installed, you will maintain the same procedure as far as transporting
hazardous cargoes?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. You mean with respect to po-
tential escorts or security zones or things of that nature?
Mr. BIAGUL Yes.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Very possibly so because without
the assistance of automatic radar tracking and acquisition and auto-
PAGENO="0045"
39
matic traffic management routines, I think we are kind of on a manual
system in that regard in that the same kind of escort or security
procedures would be necessary until the traffic management system
is sophisticated enough to negate the need for any special escort.
But this is a long way in the future, I think
Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Perkins?
Captain PERKINS. When the barge Massach'asetts was here, she only
made six trips. She came in once every few days or few weeks-I
have forgotten exactly-but these were very, time-wise, very isolated
incidents.
When this thing gets to be a-if I can use the expression "mass
transit problem," transit of this type going frequently through the
harbor, we undoubtedly will have to have a real hard look at it and
we might do things differently.
Now, what it might be, I do not know.
Mr. BIAGGI. It is my understanding of the response of Commander
Johnson and yourself, that there is no assurance that the same in-
tensive attention will be given to hazardous cargoes once we get the
new systems into effect.
Captain PERKINS. No, I did not mean to convey that.
Mr. BIAGGI. That was my understanding.
Captain PERKINS. The same attention will be given. Whether we
will do it with the same mechanics we did this isolated incident, we
cannot say here.
Mr. BIAGGI. What will be the alternative-I would suggest that-
Captain PERKINS. Well-
Mr. BIAGGI. It is a critical issue as far as the subcommittee is
concerned. You are aware of it and I am aware of it, and the subcom-
mittee is aware of it.
We do not want any unfortunate occurrence to develop as a result
of some omission on anyone's part, and I am sure that applies to every
facet of the industry.
We would suggest that you continue to focus attention on it in
the measure that it deserves. I do not suggest that th~ new systems
should result in a diminution of attention at all.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. No, that was never our intention
at all.
Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you, Captain Perkins, Commander
Johnson, for a wonderful morning, an informative morning. And we
learned more from the sky than riding these waters, and it only
punctuates the need for new systems. Hopefully, they can be imple-
mented to everyone's satisfaction as quickly as possible.
Thank you for your testimony, and we appreciate your cooperation.
Captain PERKINS. We appreciate the opportunity to be here.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.
Capt. Kenneth Torrens, would you care to testify?
STATEMENT OP CAPT. KENNETH C. TORItENS, FARRELL LINES, INC.
Captain TORRENS. As chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Advisory Committee, Admiral Will, chairman of the Full Committee,
is not here. I have no particular comments other than to confirm that
the Advisory Committee has been working very closely with the Coast
Guard, and we do represent a cross section of the industry and of the
users of the harbor; that we hope to be of additional assistance to both
PAGENO="0046"
40
yourself and to the Coast Guard in their formulation of a proposed
system.
We have, in fact, very substantial agreement in everything that
they have said today in their proposals; that if you have any other
questions, I am prepared to answer them.
Mr. BIAGGI. One question.
You heard the answer, and I would like to hear it from you as a
representative of the industry.
I posed the question, what, if any, additional costs would be imposed
on the industry, and you heard their answer.
What would your answer be?
Captain TORRENS. I would substantially agree as long as we can
keep the number of channels that are required to be monitored by the
mariner to a minimum, and the Advisory Committee has gone on record
as feeling that two channels should be the maximum that is required
of a mariner to be monitored while he is trying to safely navigate his
vessel. Above two channels would create two things-probably a more
unsafe condition and, second, it would probably require equipment
which would be a burden.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Torrens.
Mr. William Cleary representing the New York Towboat and
Harbor Carriers Association.
STATEMENT OP WILLIAM CLEARY, NEW YORK TOWBOAT AND
HARBOR CARRIERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. CLEARY. Congressman Biaggi, at this point, I should like to
defer to Mr. Robert W. Sanders, who is the representative of the
towing and transportation industry on New York Harbor vessel
traffic advisory system.
Mr. Sanders.
STATEMENT OP ROBERT W. SANDERS, RED STAR MARINE, INC.;
MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OP NEW YORK HARBOR VES-
SEL TRAFFIC ADVISORY SYSTEM
Mr. SANDERS. Congressman, I do not have much to add, and I am
in substantial agreement with Commander Johnson.
I do have something to say, however, concerning the two aspects of
this problem.
I have to be repetitious. Counsel for Mr. du Pont was mentioning
this factor of number of channels aboard a tug and its radio equipment,
and I think it bears repeating as to what the real concern of the towing
mdustry is.
These tugs, there are probably 200 or 300 tugs in this harbor. A
vast majority of them stay in the harbor 24 hours a day, as opposed to
a ship that would be here for a few days, discharge its cargo and go
back to Europe or wherever it would go.
The men on the-in the pilothouse of these tugs have to listen to
these radios 24 hours a day.
Now, at the present time, we are required by law to monitor channel
16, channel 13, and because of the economics of the harbor, we have to
monitor our own private channels which each towing company
PAGENO="0047"
41
operates. So there are three channels at the present time on the air
that we have to listen to.
It gets to a point where we feel a problem will develop if the man is
required to listen to any more because the pilothouse is confined; the
radio equipment itself is compact; some of the equipment is made with
one speaker so that it is difficult to determine whether you are hearing
the channel 16 or channel 13, or your house channel. It is all coming
from one direction.
Now, there are some sets, and most of us have gone to a system
where you can separate the speakers just for the purpose of assuring
that they understand which channel they are listening to.
A sectorized system in New York Harbor would require us to again
listen to another channel, the vessel traffic system channel. It would
also require, if there were several channels who are vessel traffic sys-
tems, it would require the operator to constantly change from one
channel to another.
Now, there is one man in the pilothouse at the time, and he has to
steer the tug, watch out for the traffic, look out for what is behind him
and so forth, answer these radios.
We feel that it is a definite safety factor involved here and that we
should not progress beyond the need for a man to listen to three
channels.
If the Coast Guard were able to get the-what is it, the Federal
Communications Commission, to allow us to-allow the Coast
Guard to guard channel 16 while the vessel is within the control of
the vessel traffic system, then the tugs would not have to monitor 16
and that channel would be open and free to be used for a vessel traffic
system.
If the tug left the harbor, why again he would have to stand his
own watch on channel 16 in pursuance to the law.
That is all I have to say on that subject.
I think you asked a question, Chairman Biaggi on the economic
impact. I think one of the problems with the economic impact is that
we really do not know.
Now, you just asked about the transportation of liquid gas, lique-
fled gas. And as I understood the answer, the Coast Guard feels, at
some place down the line, once the full hardware is in and the system
implemented, they will be able to monitor traffic and control the
traffic in such a way that they would have provided the same area of
safety as now provided by, let us call it personalized watching of that
particular gas vessel, which is probably true, and I think it probably
could work.
But the minute you say that you are going to control the traffic,
then the industry has to arrive at the next conclusion, which means
that somebody has to wait while all these other things are going on.
Somebody is not going to get to the berth; somebody is not going to
meet the ship, or a ship is not going to come into the harbor. And as
soon as you have the power to control the traffic and to regulate it
for whatever purpose, there has to be some economic impact on the
financial condition of those vessels which must wait for the traffic
to be cleared or whatever is going on.
And so-
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me.
PAGENO="0048"
42
But do you not have that condition now where you have these
big liners waiting outside in the harbor, waiting to come into their
berths because they are coming at a time when we have a lot of
traffic along the river and in the harbor?
Mr. SANDERS. No, I do not think that the-I think that the in-
adequacy of the anchoraging ability for large tankers is the big
problem in New York Harbor.
There are some ships that have to wait outside for that, but I
think most vessels proceed into the harbor without undue delay.
Mr. BIAGGI. Why do not we get a response from Commander
Johnson to that?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, there is, as we discussed
earlier, there is a queue that forms outside of Ambrose waiting to
pick up a pilot, but I do not think it delays commerce excessively in
the same context of what Mr. Sanders was talking about.
I think, by the same token, though, if a regulation was necessary
to restrict the amount of traffic through an area, I do not think it
would affect commerce as much as having a substantial casualty in
the same area. This is disruptive to commerce as well as disruptive
to property and potentially injurious to people.
Mr. SANDERS. It is like being for motherhood and against sin.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, we realize this is the
problem and we realize what control can lead to, and it is our intent
in the planning to minimize any impact on commerce.
Mr. SANDERS. I believe you are. I believe the Coast Guard will,
and their record has been very good.
They have cooperated with us.
But I was trying to point out what our fears are. We were talking
many years ahead, and then we hear you say things like, well, we can
control traffic in such a way that will be just as safe. It makes us
think that somebody is going to have to wait some place.
Mr. BIAGrn. Let me ask you this, and I appreciate your concern, of
course, in talking about it, it brings it out and we will explore it.
What would be their purpose in delay?
The Coast Guard would have no purpose in delaying except if it
had a salutary benefit on the total picture.
Mr. SANDERS. I agree. And it depends on who is defining what the
salutary benefit would be.
If we leave it up to the men on the vessels, I think we can arrive at
the same benefit, just bridge-to-bridge communication.
Let them figure out how they are going to pass.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is why we have an advisory committee that
works together with the Coast Guard. We know the possible problems,
and it is better to deal with them before they are developed.
In the spirit of cooperation, these things can be worked out, be-
cause I get the impression that that is exactly what is occurring here.
There is a spirit of cooperation on the part of industry and the Coast
Guard and Government in order to help the industry, help the whole
shipping industry in this area to make it as safe as possible.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I would like to add something,
if I could, to this.
Your fears about control are the principal reason why we have
developed a traffic simulation capability of our own, of the staff, in
order to try and measure what the effect of a particular rule limiting
PAGENO="0049"
43
traffic through an area would be on the total commerce and if it would
unduly restrict it, then we would look for another method to regulate
traffic flow that was less restrictive.
I think this is the current method that we are using to meet those
kind of needs.
Mr. SANDERS. I agree.
Mr. BIAGGI. I got the impression that these new facets, this new
technology that they will be installing, will be supplementing what
you have, to deal with problems that really cannot be dealt with
with this voluntary broadcasting system.
We have seen these blind spots. We have seen these narrow cor-
ridors of water which are treacherous and which have resulted in
accidents. We have seen a number of these things, and the record
speaks for itself.
And with that purpose in mind, I cannot see any untoward delay
occurring. If there is a delay, it is simply in the name of safety. I am
sure you have some of that now, even bridge to bridge. It will never
be-it will never be utopia, but at least, even if you have a little
delay, you get there in one piece which is more important in the end.
Any questions of Mr. Sanders?
Mr. OLNEY. Mr. Sanders, since you are representing tow operators,
I would just ask the question about a typical tug operator.
If you were required to monitor more frequencies, would you have
to buy new radios for your tugs?
Mr. SANDERS. No. The majority of the tugs that we surveyed had
VHF sets that had more than three channels. There were a few in
the harbor, but I think it was something like 75 percent of all tugs
had the VHF sets.
The new sets that are coming out now have 24 channels, and the
Coast Guard is rapidly filling them all up, I might add.
Mr. OLNEY. Commander Johnson was talking about what, five
sectors where you would have different frequencies?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, there would be three dis-
creet vessel traffic system channels, only one of which would need to
be monitored at a time in addition to channel 13, the bridge to bridge,
if we are able to assume the channel 16 guard for the participants.
Mr. OLNEY. But, for the majority of operators, that does not
require buying new equipment?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. That is correct.
Mr. OLNEY. If you did have to buy a new radio, how much would
that be?
Mr. SANDERS. I think it would cost us in the area of $3,000 for a
modern VHF radio that we would use all the time. The pilots have
another problem. They have to have a set that is a small hand-carried
set, the ones that go aboard the ships. They cannot carry a big box
over their back. They have to have something they can carry up the
ladder.
So they have to know what the limitation is going to be on channels.
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you.
Mr. HEYWARD. I would like to ask one question on this frequency
problem. I do nOt think it has been asked before.
That is in connection with monitoring house frequencies.
Is there a possibility of call up on a monitored frequency, then shift
to the house frequency, or are they-
78-280-76---4
PAGENO="0050"
44
Mr. SANDERS. Yes, it could do that on channel 16 and then-in
other words, initiate a call on 16, and that would go over on house
frequency. It could be done.
But, then, everybody in the harbor would be on 16.
Mr. HEYWARD. Yes.
Mr. BIAGGr. Thank you, Mr. Sanders.
Commander, you might as well sit there and relax, because I am
sure there will be continuing colloquy between all the witnesses and
ourselves and yourself.
Mr. Anthony DiMaggio of AFL-CIO Marine Engineers Beneficial
Association.
STATEMENT OP ANTHONY DiMAGGIO, REERESENTING AFL-CIO
MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION
Mr. DIMAGGI0. How do you do.
~ Congressman Biaggi and the committee, I was caught short today.
I only read about this in the newspaper yesterday. I wish I had known
sooner.
But where I represent the masters and the-
Mr. BIAGGI. We only had a bridge-to-bridge communication.
Mr. DIMAGGIO. We did not have our radio on.
I represent masters, mates and engineers on the Staten Island
ferries, and also the masters and engineers on the New York City
fireboats.
Now, our captains on the ferries are very concerned about this
vessel traffic system, especially on the new supertankers and container
vessels coming out of the Kill Van Kull crossing the ferry slips.
I did submit a letter not too long ago to the Coast Guard hearing
in Washington, and I understand that I was the only one from New
York that was concerned enough to submit anything. It was a surprise
to me.
But we feel that any tug-assisted vessel coming out of the Kifi
Van Kull should maintain the tugs so that they can keep maximum
control at least until the Verrazano Bridge when they are clear of all
the ferry slips and the anchorage.
We also feel that had this been the fact with the Seawitch and the
Esso Brussels, that there may never have been any collision if they
stifi had their tugs.
It is a practice to let go the tugs practically in front of the ferry
slip. Then the vessel is hooking up and heading out to sea.
Mr. BIAGGI. Wifi you hold on?
Commander?
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, this is something that
the-
Mr. BIAGGI. I want you to know that I am completely uninitiated
and I am in the learning process, and I would like to hear it from an
authority.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Thank you.
The captain of the port currently is addressing a problem-I
think there was a meeting yesterday with the captain of the port,
Port Authority, and a couple of the members of my staff, concerning
the same matter.
PAGENO="0051"
43
We are concerned about it. The captain of the port may feel it is
necessary to take some steps to require tug assistance longer or
maybe not.
The question is being discussed right now. We realize it is a problem.
We have heard from the Staten Island ferry people and, of course,
the long term from the vessel traffic system, we are looking at the
problem, because that is a bad corner right there. There is no doubt
about it.
Something that is equitable for everyone is going to have to be done,
I do not think that we can get into a position of arbitrarily requiring
tug assistance throughout the harbor. I think that would be a good
way to shut us down. It would make the tugboat people happy for
awhile.
But, beyond that, we might be doing them more harm than we
will good. But, yes, we see it as a problem and we are trying to do
something equitable about it.
Mr. DIMAGGIO. Another thing, we agree with the towboat outfits
that spoke before-I think it was Mr. Sanders-on the confusion of
monitoring all these radios, especially on the Staten Island ferry.
Now, the route of the Staten Island ferry is the same. It has been
the same for 100 years at least. In fact-
Mr. BIAGGL Did not we lose one in fog once?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. No.
They do run in fog, by the way. They never stop. I think one
hurricane-
Mr. BIAGGI. Do you not have some tugs with the ferries?
Mr. DIMAGGIO. No, never.
Everybody knows-every ship that comes in, most every ship
knows where the Staten Island ferry is going, but the Staten Island
ferry does not know where every ship is going.
Now, if the ships were to report their heading in the Kill Van Kull
or their heading to the North River or their heading to the East
River, then the Staten Island ferry would know where he is going.
But he already knows where the Staten Island ferry is going. He can
only go from St. George to the Battery.
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me.
Is that a fact? All of these liners coming into the harbor know
where the ferry is going?
Are they all familiar with-
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. They are all pretty familiar with
it, but they have a pilot aboard in most cases who is familiar with it.
Mr. DIMAGGI0. He has to be, and most charts show the ferry route
anyway. So our captains feel it is not really necessary for him to
report under that location, radio reports. I think they do now.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I think the participation has been
very good from the Staten Island ferries.
Mr. DIMAGGIO. Well, they are doing it, but some of them-some
of them do not agree, because it is confusing when they report,
especially in the fog. When they are navigating, they never stop, and
it is quite difficult to monitor all the radios they have, the same as
the tugboat.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. If I could respond to that in
particular.
PAGENO="0052"
46
I believe that when an active system is implemented, that require-
ments for these safety broadcasts will be substantially reduced because
of the system, and I would hope that the vessel traffic system would
recognize the ferry routes. And if it looked like there was a perpetual
hazard encountered, they would let both parties know about it, but I
think the fear is for a lot of reporting requirements for the ferries
are-I do not think they are going to be borne out when the system is
finally turned on.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Heyward.
Mr. HEYWARD. I just want to comment that I think that would be
true of any operation which runs a regular schedule on a regular
route.
It might be treated somewhat differently from the other vessels in
the system.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. DIMAGGIO. Now, I would like to speak, since you brought it
up, about the LNG and the fireboats, which is a big concern of ours
also.
There is talk of cutting service, and 20 years ago there were 10
fireboats, and now there is 5. Since the most recent holocaust is the
Seawitch and the Esso Brussels, in the newsclips that I have photo-
stats of-I could not bring my files, of August 1973-it is a fact that
all five fireboats were on the scene of the Esso Brussels and the Sea-
witch and the rest of New York was uncovered, the whole other area of
the waterfront.
There are 578 miles of New York area waterfront, and 5 vessels
were out fighting the Seawitch and the Esso Brussels.
First, the commissioner denied this in his first report in 1973,
August. Then, in December of 1973, Chief August Beekman came out
with a report that they were very much concerned of increasing and
reevaluating the marine division and increasing coverage from five
boats.
Now, the commissioner did an about-face and pointed out himself
the holocaust between the Seawitch, wherein he said that all five of the
department's fireboats were used for this blaze, leaving the rest of the
waterfront unprotected.
The commissioner said that an up-to-date recall system is being
implemented for boats previously retired.
Why, I am not certain that-I think there are members of the fire
department here that will probably speak toward that. If anything,
we have to increase the boats.
I was hopeful that-I think now-I am not up on it, that there was
a Federal assistance program for public safety organizations or units
such as fireboats.
I feel if these vessels, LNG, are coming in from Federal waters into
New York Harbor waters, maybe the Federal Government could
supply some assistance on implementing more fire vessels or imple-
menting further firefighting tactics for an LNG vessel.
Now, I disagree with the Coast Guard on-that they say there was
protection offered on a barge that is coming in and out, the barge
Massachusetts. And I state that when the fireboat, Firefighter, was
escorting this barge around the kills and around Staten Island, it
was window dressing. It was just window dressing for the people of
Sta ten Island to believe that they are well protected.
PAGENO="0053"
47
Here comes this LNG vessel in. We do not have to worry because
look at this big red fireboat, he will protect us.
That fireboat can't do one thing. If that barge leaked, there is no
protection that is known right now that can put out an LNG fire or
explosion or anything.
The fire department itself only recently came out with a contingency
plan, and what is it?-Spray water at the base of the leak and try to
force it out to sea.
I would not want to be the guys on the fireboat that are spraying
the water on the leak of the LNG vessel.
Now, MEBA has even implemented a course in their school in
Baltimore because the Coast Guard is going to require that any
engineer that works on an LNG ship that is coming out-very shortly,
I do not know, maybe a month or two away-is going to be required
to have a certificate of completion of an educational course. And I think
it is a 144-hour course. It is a very lengthy and difficult course for the
engineers on the ship.
I am going to propose, and I have in negotiations, that they should
train the engineers and the pilots, the masters on the fireboats besides
the firemen.
I am talking about the men that are operating the vessel.
When you tell the master just shoot the hose at the base of the vapor
and force that vapor out to sea, and if his hull goes into that vapor, it
will crack like an egg. The hull will crack and explode or hit the engine
room or flame up.
And also when they do have this safety area, it is not enough. There
have been many hearings. Councilman Gaeta has been holding them.
The danger area is about 5 miles off when they go up the East River.
Half of Queens could be wiped out.
So there is not really a good plan. Plus the ferry service and every-
thing in the harbor shuts down. If the ferry is just about to leave the
slip, and this LNG ship is coming in, and the safety area is such and
such, half a mile or a mile, that ferry just stays there for an hour. He
cannot move. And all the people from Staten Island just sit on it if
they are already on it.
But there is probably a warning that such and such a time, we are
going to shut down the harbor.
So there is no service for an hour. So there are a lot of problems.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, you can see why they do that. They want to
rid the waters of any possible difficulty with some ships. Somebody
might be inconvenienced. It is equivalent to Mr. Sanders' concern
about delay.
Mr. DIMAGGI0. There is no doubt in my mind that LNG is coming
to New York even though there are organizations trying to stop it
and oppose it.
I feel certain that it is coming.
The ships are being built, and they are going to enter this harbor.
But, instead of eliminating fireboat service, we certainly should have
more fireboats because the boats are the ones that are going to be
concerned with anything that will happen to the LNG vessels, not
the land companies.
Mr. BIAGGI. We share your view on that, Mr. DiMaggio. You
know that. And I posed the question earlier on to Captain Perkins,
who responded, and I will pose it again to you.
PAGENO="0054"
48
What do you foresee as a possible consequence of diminution or
the elimination of the fire units?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. Just look at the Seawitch and the Esso Brussels.
What could happen?
In the fire department's own statement, on that night, or a very
few days later, there was a fire at pier 90, 50th Street, in the Hudson
River, which went to four alarms.
The same night, a short time later, a pier at Hudson Street in the
Hudson River went afire.
Both places required the services of all but one fireboat in the fleet.
Later that night, a pier at 200 Seventh Street in the Harlem River
burned, and the services of a fireboat were urgently requested. The
only boat available was Marine 9 on Staten Island, and the estimated
time of arrival would be 90 minutes.
We lost a boat in Whitestone not too long ago. It was a fireboat.
They replaced it with a tender called the Smoke. There was a lot of
screaming because there was a lot of marinas up there. It is opposite
your side of the river in the Bronx.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is the mainland.
Mr. DIMAGGI0. Yes, the mainland on the-citizens came and spoke
against eliminating their uireboats. It was a fireboat.
* They put the tender Smoke there, no engineers, no masters. So the
people saw a red boat and they said, well, we are still protected.
They do not know that that boat did not have any pipes.
Now, it has been converted but, in those days, it didn't. They just
keep eliminating boats, and, like you say, if a blaze comes, you let
it burn to the waterline.
Mr. BIAGGI. Reduction of fire units could result in loss of lives
and property?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. And how! Yes.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney.
Mr. OLNEY. Mr. DiMaggio, at the beginning of your statement,
you talked about the need for increasing tug assistance on tankers.
What size in terms of DWT were the Esso Brussels and the Seawitch,
just approximately?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. I do not have it. I do not think I have it, no.
They were large, I can say that.
Mr. OLNEY. As a general matter, when a tanker like this-
Mr. DnWAGGI0. Well, the tanker was anchored, the Esso Brussels.
Mr. OLNEY. So the Seawitch was moving?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. Right.
Mr. OLNEY. Presumably at some point as the vessel increases
speed, the tug is no longer effective.
At what speed approximately do you think that occurs?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. Well, in the harbor, he cannot really hook it up
full speed anyway. But you mean to control steerage?
Mr. OLNEY. Yes.
Mr. DIMAGGI0. I am not an expert. That would vary, to maintain
the steerage way. How many revolutions and all that, I could not
answer.
Mr. OLNEY. What I am getting at is whether the collision caused
by the Seawitch was caused by excessive speed or whether it was
caused by inability to maneuver.
PAGENO="0055"
49
Mr. DIMAGGI0. Well, there was talk that-I think the final investi-
gation has not been completed, but it was a defect in the steering
motor mechanism.
So, just to have tugs, when that steering motor mechanism went out
if he still had tugs, he would not have hit the Esso Brussels, because
they would have discovered the defect in the steering motor, and the
tugs would have been able to maneuver him away.
As it was, they say that the steering motor hydraulic system rod
was broken or something, defective.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Could I express another point of
view?
1 think in a system that suffers a mechanical failure, such as hap-
pened in the Seawitch, would cause you a hard over and the steering
mechanism, you could very potentially have lost the tugboat, because
if she was gaining way, why I do not think a tug would have had time
to maneuver out of the way if she was alongside on the turning side
of the vessel.
Mr. DIMAGGI0. But she would not have been gaining way with
the tugs. She would have been maintaining the same speed with the
tug alongside.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, this presupposes that the
tug would have accompanied her at least to the narrows-
Mr. DIMAGGIO. That is what I am saying, yes.
Well, to the Verrazona Bridge where it would have been safe tO let
her off.
We say, in any event, they should not let go in front of the ferry
slips.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is a question that is obviously being looked into.
Mr. DIMAGGI0. That is really our concern because of the captains
on the ferry coming out or going in. Fortunately, it was not a ferry
boat that they hit.
Mr. OLNEY. In the vicinity that you are talking about, near the
ferry boats, the tankers are moving at a speed where a tug could
safely assist them in maneuvering?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. As soon as they come out of the Kill Van-yes, I
would say yes.
Mr. OLNEY. Now, the practice is to leave the tug as they exit them
out of that channel and then to pick up speed?
Mr. DIMAGGIO. Yes.
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Mr. DiMaggio.
Chief Thomas Rush, marine division of New York City Fire De-
partment, representing Commissioner 0 `Hagan.
Chief.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS RUSH, CHIEF, MARINE DIVISION, NEW
YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
Mr. RUSH. Congressman, first I would like to read a prepared
statement that was the feelings of the Fire Commissioner in this
regard.
The New York City Fire Department maintains within its struc-
ture a line division which is officially termed the marine division.
PAGENO="0056"
50
Its primary mission is to provide fire protection and to conduct a
fire prevention program throughout the waterfront areas and the
waterfront and the waters of the city of New York.
It has also rendered assistance throughout the years to adjoining
communities, particularly the many small communities in the State
of New Jersey whose resources are somewhat limited and whose water..
front protection can best be described as nil.
The area served by the marine division is in excess of 500 miles.
The marine division is composed, at present, of five marine corn-.
panies, strategically located throughout the harbor.
As recently as 1964, there were nine marine companies.
The facilities of the Port of New York are unexcelled for the move-
ment of cargo, passenger accommodations and service for ships
needing repair. Its shorelines are also abundant with oil storage
facilities, commercial and defense facilities, heliports, airports, tun-
nels, bridges, powerplants, and so many other ventures that find
access to the water advantageous.
The waters of the city of New York have been the site of numerous
disasters. Two of the most recent being the Alva Cape/Texaco Massa-
chusetts collision in 1966, and the Seawitch/Esso Brussels collision in
1973.
Many lives were lost at both. But the fact that many more casual-
ties did not occur was due, in large part, to the fireboats of the New
York City Fire Department's marine division.
While the division has suffered from cuts due to budget problems
previously, the most recent mandated adjustments will further ad-
versely affect the services rendered by this unit.
The five fireboats now in service represent the bare minimum for
effective protection. To maintain this level, and yet meet the fiscal
mandates, it wifi be necessary to reduce the maiming on four of these
vessels, and to place a smaller vessel in service with an even more
reduced manning schedule.
The fireboats have been an effective ifre extinguishing weapon
because of their ability to deliver large volumes of water to the scene
of a fire, which is only possible with the manpower available at present.
The reduced manning will necessitate the engaging of additional fire-
boats with the result that areas of the harbor will go unprotected.
The alternative of employing land units aboard fireboats will also be
employed, but this has a disadvantage of depleting already overtaxed
land forces and a delay in the response of the fireboats.
As to the use of a smaller boat, where a situation previously could
be controlled with one boat will now require two, reducing the avail-
ability of vessels in an already marginally protected harbor.
Beyond the threat that a major disaster could bring to its citizenry,
the importance of New York Harbor and its continuity of service to
the city, State, and Nation cannot be overemphasized.
An adequately manned fleet of fireboats is a worthwhile investment
in one of our most important commodities, the Port of New York.
I may add that, for the past 3 years, we have operated at fires and
communities in New Jersey for a total of 153 hours and 30 minutes at a
cost to the city of $23,147.50.
Now, that concludes my statement, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is the commissioner's statement?
Mr. RUSH. That is the commissioner's statement.
PAGENO="0057"
51
Mr. BIAGGI. What would happen if New York marine unit did
not respond to the Jersey fires?
Mr. RUSH. I would say, Mr. Biaggi, they would continue to burn.
In 1971, the Trade Deering, that was a tanker that was tied up at
one of the terminals in New Jersey. It took fire, they called for assist-
ance, and the commissioner sent the fireboat down there.
Usually, when this happens, we send a fireboat, and they supply
the forces.
When the fireboat arrived, the tanker that was involved had been
cut from its moorings and let adrift. When the fireboat officer asked
for assistance from the Jersey community he was refused, and he
was told that since it was not tied up at our pier, it is not our problem,
it is yours, with the result that I had to ask the commissioner for
further-another fireboat and additionally take on land forces to
go down, and with the assistance of the Coast Guard we were able
to control the fire, but not with the assistance of the community that
asked for our mutual aid assistance.
So I think this would give you an idea what happens in the waters
of New York were it not for the New York City fireboats.
Mr. BIAGGI. You testified-Commissioner O'Hagan testified through
you-that you have five fireboats and they represent a bare minimum?
Mr. RUSH. Yes.
Mr. BIAGGI. To be candid, it is less than a minimum required to
provide the kind of service, because I recall when we had nine-
Mr. RUSH. 1964.
Mr. BIAGGI. I heard the same testimony.
Nine was a bare minimum. I would suggest it is an administrative
nicety to deal with the harsh reality of life, and that five boats are
hardly adequate to deal with the total picture in the waters insofar
as your responsibility is concerned.
Mr. RUSH. I would agree.
Mr. BIAGGI. Now, in light of that, I would like your comment.
I realize that it might be somewhat embarrassing; if you choose
not to answer it, please do not, but I have every confidence in your
professional integrity.
Mr. RUSH. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. The contemplated cuts, reduction in force in the
marine units, will obviously have to affect your effectiveness.
Mr. RUSH. That is correct.
Mr. BIAGGI. Would that result in a loss of property that might
otherwise be saved?
Mr. RUSH. Yes, sir, it could.
Mr. BIAGGI. Could that result in a loss of lives that might other-
wise be saved?
Mr. RUSH. By delayed response, it could, yes.
Mr. BIAGGI. What would your reaction be to the Coast Guard's
assuming some of this responsibility?
Mr. RUSH. Well, I have every confidence in the Coast Guard, and
I want to say that we work as a team wonderfully. We have almost
a day-to-day liaison with the Coast Guard.
I think we have to be frank, and I think that they would be the
first to admit that they do not have the resources to deal with a
major fire in the city of New York's waters.
Mr. BIAGGI. I think they testified to that already.
Mr. RUSH. Yes.
PAGENO="0058"
52
A major fire, I would say, would be one similar to the Esso Brussels
and the Seawitch, which we keep repeating.
It is true there were five marine units there. Fortunately, we have
two reserve boats, and they were pressed into service to cover the
balance of the harbor. This took several hours, because we had to
call people from home to man the boats.
I also think it is true that perhaps one of the fire vessels at the
Seawitch~Brussels might have been released. But the chief of the
department at the time, now Commissioner O'Hagan, felt it was a
good safety measure.
We had a terrible catastrophe on our hands. We faced the loss of
the Verrazano Bridge.
Fortunately, the tide was on the way out. If it had been the other
way, the vessels that were locked together would have drifted into
the center of the harbor, and it might have threatened some land
areas.
I think this is the Commissioner's, and it is certainly my greatest
fear, that if we do not have the fireboats sufficiently manned to
handle a situation like this, we are going to run into a situation
where the land areas are going to be threatened by a collision in the
Port of New York.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to concur. I know it is the commissioner's
view.
Mr. RUSH. Yes.
Mr. BIAGGI. I chatted with him on a number of occasions, and he
is a first-rate fire officer and administrator, and his prime concern
is doing his job properly. But he has to be reinforced with equipment,
and the fiscal crisis is working and that brings a hardship on his
administration.
One last question as it relates to vessel traffic systems.
You have been on the water long enough. Are you familiar with
the proposed vessel traffic system?
Mr. RUSH. I have heard there is one proposed, yes; proposed, yes.
* Mr. BIAGGI. Do you have any personal familiarity with it sufficient
to testify?
Mr. RUSH. I would say this, that any vessel traffic system that
we can institute in the Port of New York that will aid us in the
control of traffic and avoid collisions, such as we have seen in our
harbor, would be well worthwhile.
I know now we have bridge-to-bridge, which is the channel 13. We
have it on our fireboats, and I know that this has been a great aid in
the control of traffic in that we know what other vessels are moving.
But I believe, if I understand it correctly, a traffic system, such
as is proposed, would even further support the channel 13.
I, as a marine division chief, would certainly be in favor of it.
May I make a comment, sir, about the proposed LNG?
I recently testified before the Federal Power Commission concerning
Distrigas application to bring LNG into the harbor.
While the Distrigas plant in Staten Island has been mothballed, I
believe for several years, I think we all have to face the reality some
day that it will come.
The commissioner took the position against the movement of the
barge Massachusetts throughout the harbor. He felt that it was
PAGENO="0059"
53
running too big a risk to have 32,000 barrels of LNG moving through
the harbor, a product about which we know at this moment very little.
This was his biggest concern.
I hope the committee will not take too lightly what Mr. DiMaggio
said about the proposed plans for the fire department to combat LN G.
What we know-from what we know at the moment, fog, spray
nozzles is probably the most effective weapon we have at the moment,
and that is the reason we went for a contingency plan which called for
the use of fog nozzles. This is the only known weapon at the present
time.
But when six barges were brought into the Newtown Creek area
to the Brooklyn Union Gas, it was the commissioner's policy to
escort them. They came in via the Long Island Sound, down into
Newtown Creek. We escorted each one of them in and each one of
them out.
Now, if the barge is permitted to come into the harbor-and I am
sure the tankers will come into Rossvffle-I believe it will be the
policy of the commissioner to escort each one of these.
Now, each escort in and out is going to take in the area of 3 or 4
hours. And we stood by at the plant of Brooklyn Union Gas until we
thought everything was running normally before we left the area there.
So, here, if this happens, this will be a further regular depletion of our
forces, as each tanker is brought into the port, and if it happens as
each barge is brought from Rossville to Newtown Creek or the Astoria
area to the Con Edison plant, by the barge accompanied by a fireboat,
this will take this boat out of service and will not be able to be used for
any other fires which leaves four vessels in service.
And in niceties of Commissioner O'Hagan.'s statement-again, of
course, this again is very marginal, if not below marginal-I think we
plan our resources to combat two simultaneous fires.
Obviously, with five fireboats at work at a collision, the two remain-
ing could not handle a similar collision.
If LNG does not come in, there is a proposal to bring LPG, which
is an equally dangerous substance. In fact, they had an explosion over
in Tokyo here recently, and the resources there, while their fireboats
have maybe one-fifth the capacity of some of ours, they were not equal
to the task, and the vessel was finally towed out and bombed and sunk.
We had a fire in Marcus Hook, Pa., recently, and I believe that
while the Coast Guard took the position that it was better to let the
vessel burn out rather than risk water pollution, we in the city, .New
York City Fire Department, we choose not to do that. We choose
to combat the fires and put them out and avoid any possible danger
to any other areas or vessels in the harbor.
So we have vessels that run in capacity from 5,000 to 20,000 gallons
a minute. We feel that anything below 5,000 gallons a minute should
not be classed as a fireboat.
Mr. BrAGGI. Thank you, chief.
Mr. HEYWARD. I want to ask you, in connection with the LNG
problem, do you know at what temperature LNG vaporizes?
Do you happen to know?
Mr. RUSH. I did know, and I went to Washington, but I am sorry,
I forget. I am sure there may be some experts in the Coast Guard-
Mr. HEYWARD. I want to ask you, chief, about the New Jersey
side.
PAGENO="0060"
54
Do I understand that the New Jersey communities do not have
any fireboats of any kind in the New York Harbor area?
Mr. RUSH. Newark had one at one time. It was called the Kennedy.
Whether it is still in operation, I am not sure.
Mr. HEYWARD. Where is the dividing line between the State of
New York and the State of New Jersey; Is it in the center of the
Hudson, or is it on the New Jersey shore, or where?
Mr. RUSH. I believe it is over closer to the Jersey shore, but I
am not sure. It runs down about the center of the Kill Van Kull, if
you are familiar with that.
Mr. HEYWARD. Yes, in the Hudson.
Is it in the center of the Hudson?
Mr. RUSH. I am not sure at this point.
Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you.
Mr. OLNEY. No questions.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, chief, and be sure to give my
best to Commissioner O'Hagan.
Mr. RUSH. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. BIAGGI. As Mr. Heyward stated at the outset, while I was
not here, any person who feels he might like to make contribution to
the hearing is perfectly free to come and testify and make a comment.
All he has to do is rise and sound off.
Captain Torrens?
Mr. TORRENS. This is just a slight addition to my former testimony
that occurred to me while Mr. Sanders was speaking.
You asked what impact, financial impact, additional equipment
would be, and I answered it would probably be none. That was based
on two channel monitoring as I had already mentioned, because
most equipment is built to only monitor the single channel that it
happens to be working.
All vessels which are presently required to have bridge to bridge
do have two channel capability because they have to monitor channels
13 and 16 and, therefore, it would follow that if the Coast Guard were
able to take over the watch on channel 16, it would leave that channel
free for a vessel traffic system.
So I wan ted to clarify my testimony to that extent, that additional
monitoring, and the word is "the monitoring" aspect is most burden-
some. Most sets today do have capability, of 12 to 86 channels of
sending.
Portable units, which the pilots have had difficulty procuring,
may go up to five or seven channels sending, but they are only able
to monitor one channel at a time.
So, therefore, the addition channel monitoring would be the burden.
Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. May I add just a little bit of
clarification about the economic impact of the monitoring and avail-
able channels, that there is two things about VHF, FM radio that
are affected.
The first thing is the number of channels that have to be monitored
simultaneously. That is the equivalent-if you must monitor three
channels simultaneously-that is the equivalent of three receivers.
Now, the amount of channels available per transmission, one at a
time, they vary from 1, 3 or up to 8 or 16. This proposition is, No. 1,
if you have to monitor three, that costs more because you have
PAGENO="0061"
55
effectively three receivers. If you have to be able to shift to a number
of channels, then this also adds to the cost of the unit in that more
transmitting channels are required. So there is two things that affect
the economics, the simultaneous monitoring of the channels, and the
number of channels that are available to select to transmit on.
Mr. BAIGGI. We are mindful of that. We would be mindful of
that, too.
Any questions?
Sir?
Will you identify yourself, please?
STATEMENT OP KENNETH O~ BLOM, GENERAL MANAGER, REI-
NAUER TRANSPORTATION COS., ACCOMPANIED BY HAROLD A.
REINAUER, PRESIDE~TT, REINAUER TRANSPORTATION COS.
Mr. BL0M. I am Ken Blom from Reinauer Transportation Cos.,
in New York.
Mr. BIAGGI. You can come forward and sit here if you like.
Mr. BLOM. All right.
When you measure things in terms of the economic impact, one of
the concerns that I have is that we have a fleet of tugs and barges in
New York Harbor, and we run the whole gamut of sizes of tugboats.
Now, we run from 800 horsepower to 3,200 horsepower. It is very
nice for these fellows to sit down and plot charts, and say, hey, you
know you are an underpowered tow, you are this or that. They might
not be saying this right now, but, sooner or later down the line,
the Coast Guard is going to say, well, you are a low-powered vessel so,
therefore, you are assigned to this lane, and further put that vessel in
an uneconomic position.
We also have a 3,200 horsepower tugboat so, therefore, we would
qualify to go into a high-powered lane as you traverse this habor.
Now, it seems to me if this system is going to come into effect-I
do not know where they are at right now, because I have heard so
much talk about it-
Mr. BIAGGI. We will sort of get a response to your question in a
minute.
Mr. BLOM. All right.
Well, there was a hearing one time, or I was at one of these meetings,
and the guy was saying, well, look, you have got to stay to the right.
Well, I have bucked a lot of tides out of the Kifi Van Kull. And I
did them with junky crappy little boats, and we were making a living.
And, you know, we did not mind that a catamaran came by us and
drove us under with their weight. We did not care about ships. We did
the job. But we also had the advantage that, well, if it was a Sunday
morning, I could go duck under the Bayonne shore and do 2 knots
there.
You did your work for the boss, and that is what it was.
Now, they are throwing out all these terms, such as the systems
approach and hardware.
Well, I can be just as dumb as anybody else on the boat, and I look
at the makeup of the crews. Now, the average crew you have today,
they are all high school dropouts. OK. So am I. It does not bother me
one bit.
PAGENO="0062"
56
However, these guys-
Mr. BIAGGI. How many vessels do you own?
Mr. BLOM. My company has-I think it is 6 tugs and 10 barges.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is not bad for a high school dropout.
Mr. BLOM. I do not own this thing. I just work there.
But the point I am trying to make is, you know, just like you
cannot legislate love, you cannot legislate brains, and when you start
talking about hardware, if you are talking about it to some of my
guys, they think you are talking about hardware stores. They do
not know about this system business.
I get Scientific American and I follow some of the advances in
computer technology and all these fancy terms.
What I want to know is the leadtime. How long is it going to take
to indoctrinate these fellows into the system?
They are talking about, I think, next year of starting these things.
You know, bureaucracy is bureaucracy. It is like a disease. It gets
bigger and bigger and more cumbersome.
What are you going to do with the poor fellow that gets caught
in the squeeze?
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, why do not we get some answers to some of
your questions?
Mr. BLOM. OK.
Commander JOHNSON. Mr. Blom, I appreciate your fears about
being relegated to a slow speed channel, or something like that. It
would be nice if we had enough space in the channel system in
New York Harbor to do something like that.
The reality of the thing is that there is not enough space, and there
will not be in the foreseeable future. So everybody that now is in
the harbor area is going to be there probably 10 years from now and
they will be operating in probably the same manner.
We do not anticipate any special lanes for low-powered vessels
or things of that nature. Everybody is going to have to learn to live
together in the channel system under a centralized traffic management
system.
And I think to answer about how the operators are going to absorb
the new technology, I think the answer to that is that they are not
going to have to. They are not going to be doing things much different
than they are right now. Part of this, we recognize. We talk in terms
of technology, and that is fine as far as it goes, but there is another
half of this proposition that jumps up and grabs you, and that is the
relationship to people and the application of commonsense, and the
appreciation of exactly what the individual operator's problems in
the harbor are. There are many of them.
We recognize this, and we have to do more to acquaint ourselves
with what your problems are. That is one of the reasons why, in our
training problem, we are addressing the possibility of our potential
controllers getting out there and actually riding on the harbor craft
and finding out first hand what the operator's problems are so that
he really appreciates it when he gets back in his vessel traffic center
and is faced with the task of actually managing the traffic.
So if we apply commonsense this way, if we apply people-to-people
approach, so to speak, I think you will have a system that you will be
able to use, and I think it will help you as well as any other users in
the harbor.
PAGENO="0063"
57
Mr. BLOM. That is the first I have heard of it in terms of help.
Commander JOHNSON. That is what it is for.
Mr. BLOM. I am for avoiding collisions but not to the point that it is
going to change the system as we have it. We have a workable system
right now.
Commander JOHNSON. That is correct, and I addressed that in my
presentation.
Mr. BLOM. But one more fact-
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me.
Mr. Blom, you say we have a workable system.
The record shows that we have a number of accidents that can he
prevented by the implementation of some new technology, new
systems, and there are spots out there that continue to remain very
perilous even to the uneducated eye. It becomes quite apparent. The
idea is to improve the safety of the harbor without causing any hard-
ship to the industry. We are always mindful of the industry. At least
I am, because I have a friend of mine out there who has been com-
plaining to me about the Coast Guard ever since I have known him,
my friend, Frank Barry of the Circle Line.
If we asked him for an opinion, I am sure he would give us a dozen.
I chatted with him yesterday, and he runs a first-rate operation.
I have never lost sight of that fact, and I am sure the Coast Guard
knows of my concern in that area.
But we do not-we do not compromise to the extent of endangering
the prime objective.
Mr. BLOM. Well, sir, there is one other aspect here.
Is this system going to be an advisory system, because, you know
these things grow, too?
This bit of control is-it is a little bit hairy. I have watched first-
hand the collision between the Alva Cape and the Texaco and Massa-
chusetts in which 39 guys died. And I spoke very strongly on behalf of
bridge-to-bridge VHF radio, and I see it works. It clearly does.
It was a dumb stupid case of misunderstanding between people.
But, now, where is it going to go 5 years from now?
When they go to implement the system, are there going to be things
built in there so it remains an advisory system?
Piloting is an art. It is a subjective thing, you know, to the degree--
Mr. BIAGGI. Why do we not get a response from that query?
Commander JOHNSON. Yes, I would like to clarify what you mean
by advisory.
Mr. BLOM. For instance, if I am on a boat now, OK, and I am
coming up the Bay, are you going to tell me where to go?
Commander JOHNSON. I might tell you to slow down if you are
going to meet somebody in a hazardous area where two vessels of
your size and type should not meet, but I am not going to attempt
to maneuver your vessel from my vessel traffic center. That is up to
you.
Mr. BLOM. Well, I have not read this document, but is that built in
there?
Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLOM. You do not anticipate a change in it?
Commander JOHNS ON. No, sir.
They would have to have a lot more information than is going to
be available to us initially in the system when we turn on, to be able
to maneuver a vessel from a shore facility. That is not our intention.
PAGENO="0064"
58
During my presentation, I made the analogy of the patrolman on
the corner. You would get upset if he hopped in on the passenger side
and told us what to do with the accelerator, brakes and steering wheel.
And I think that is what makes the mariner nervous.
No, we are not prepared to do that at this time because we simply
do not have the information to do it.
I do not know that there is any need to do it.
Mr. BLOM. One of my other concerns-I wifi try to shut up in a
minute-but one of my other concerns is we have a situation now in
some god-awful place down in Louisiana called Berwick Bay, or
something, where the Coast Guard is seeking to impose horsepower to
length of tow, to tonnage ratios and so forth, what you can do and
cannot do.
Now, this Nation was built on free trade and free navigation, and
you get a regulatory body like yourselves come in here. Now, this is
the first step. OK?
Pretty soon-what I am concerned about is we do not have Coast
Guard inspection on our tugboats. Thank God.
Well, listen, we have a very good safety record with tugboats insofar
as keeping them going.
Now, if we get to the point where you are going to start saying to
me, hey, look, you cannot take this 20,000-barrel barge with that
800-horsepower tugboat. Where is this thing going to begin and end
with their control?
That is the thing that makes me nervous.
Commander JOHNSON. Well, I do not know that I could even begin
to give you any guarantees of a bottom line on control and regulation.
That is certainly not within my power to do so.
But I think that in the majority of instances, when a rule or a
particular regulation is instituted, there is a reason behind it, and
usually the reason behind it, as far as the Coast Guard is concerned,
at any rate, is damage to property, loss of life, environmental pollu-
tion. These are our three chief reasons for regulating anything.
And if that becomes necessary, now, I am sure we wifi do it, but if
it is not necessary, I think our record is pretty clear that we sought to
avoid it.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with that, I would just like to com-
ment that whatever rules and regulations are proposed, there has to be
a public hearing. And where the specific rules are objected to and
objected to on reasonable grounds, at least theoretically they should
not go into effect.
As far as Berwick Bay is concerned, they did issue regulations.
The fact of the matter is that there were a tremendous number
of collisions with that bridge, putting the bridge out of operation,
stopping traffic in the area, besides the loss of property and lives.
Mr. BLOM. Well, sir, I respectfully submit that that was overcome
then by the installation of a traffic light, a go/no-go basis.
But, then, there was further consideration concerning horsepower
to tonnage ratios or the amount of tow ratio-
Mr. HEYWARD. I am not too sure, but I think the Berwick Bay
regulations also address low-powered tows, at least as to the number
ofjbarges that they are allowed to carry through that system.
PAGENO="0065"
59
Commandor JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLOM. One last shot.
I live in Staten Island. It is the world's biggest garbage dump.
Mr. BIAGGI. Do not let the paper hear you say that.
Mr. BLOM. What is that?
Mr. B1AGGI. The Staten Island Advance would not be happy about
that.
Mr. BLOM. I do not read it anyway.
They wanted the bridge, too.
The point I am trying to make is a little bit more serious. It is the
stinking LNG.
Who is going to protect us?
Even with this system here, you know, I am sure that the air
traffic controller that was out at Kennedy last week when the 727
went in, you know he had active control. Everybody had control,
and there are a lot of dead bodies there just the same.
Mr. BIAGGI. I am not so sure that that is true.
The pilot apparently that flew that 727 was aware of the conditions
and exercised his discretion. Perhaps if he had listened-well, I
would not say, at that point-perhaps if he had taken the controller's
advice or followed the course of conduct that his preceding flight had
taken, he might have avoided that. But who is to say?
That was obviously an unfortunate development.
Mr. BLOM. My last shot.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is what y~u said two shots ago.
Mr. BLOM. I know. I cannot talk at home so I get away with it here.
You know, this whole thing really hangs on one thing. I was thinking
of it. It is a little glass cylinder with a metal tip on each end called a
fuse.
And what is there-you know, what is not spelled out is what is
inherent in this thing.
Now, a guy gets in the system and everybody is talking about
systems, but his radios crap out. What is going to happen to this? Is
this vessel now manifestly unseaworthy under the law?
What provision have you got for this and what protection is there
to the company for liability?
If we are in your system now and you are controlling this, what
amount of the liability are you taking?
Are you going to take liability?
Commander JOHNSON. Radio failure?
Mr. BL0M. For anything.
Commander JOHNSON. I would hope that we would have procedures
built into the system to follow in case of equipment failures. That is a
necessary part of every system.
By that, I do not mean we intend to shut down the whole port
because somebody has a radio failure. That is part of the common sense
about the system that I was talking about.
Mr. BLOM. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Mr. Blom.
You were a refreshing contribution. You raised some interesting
questions.
Did you raise your hand a moment ago?
Mr. REINAUER. I would just like the record to show, Mr. Biaggi,
I am Mr. Harold Reinauer.
r8-280-76-5
PAGENO="0066"
60
But I am here today as the vice chairman of region 5, American
Waterway Operators, and I would just like the record to show that I
support Mr. Robert Sanders.
Mr. BIAGGI. Fine.
If anyone else wants to be here recorded, please feel you are free to
tell the reporter.
No other witnesses?
Sir?
STATEMENT OF PAUL POSNER, NEW YORK CITY BUREAU OP THE
BUDGET
Mr. POSNER. My name is Paul Posner with the New York City
Bureau of the Budget.
I would like to address that one issue about the city's fireboats and
the Coast Guard's responsibility.
Mr. BIAGGI. Sure.
Mr. POSNER. Some weeks ago, a letter was sent by the city, to
the Secretary of Transportation, requesting that the Coast Guard
assume a greater share of responsibility for fire protection in the
port of New York. It certainly is the policy of the mayor and the
budget bureau that we do not want to diminish the protection avail-
able to the port of New York for marine fires. Rather it is a question
of the appropriate level of government that should deal with this
problem.
The city presently has, as you know, an intense budgetary crisis,
and as long as we are required to provide 100 percent of the funding
for this service, I am afraid to say that the service will suffer as are most
city services at the present time.
At the present time, the city is in the position where it cannot do
everything that it wants to do. It caimot do everything that people
want it to do.
So when you have a shrinking pie, so to speak, a shrinking base of
resources, the question is you have to choose your priorities. And while
we would like to satisfy everything and respond to all needs, as you
know, the Mayor has been forced to make some rather painful choices.
The city's primary firefighting responsibility is to protect its resi-
dents and property from fires on land and, to the extent that they are
threatened, on water as well.
Our recent budget crisis has forced us to cutback on personnel in
both land-based and marine fire units. In view of these recent reduc-
tions in the level of fire protection available to our own citizens, we
should now be relieved of the costs of providing fire protection for
interstate commerce and for other cities and States-responsibilities
which more properly rest with the Federal Government.
Federal reimbursement or takeover of the city's marine fire service
for the port could save approximately $5 million-money which we
could allocate to rehire laid-off firemen and help restore fire protection
to the city's own residents. I might note that $5 million is the equiva-
lent to the costs of 200 city firemen.
The problem of delivering fire protection to the port of New York
is clearly an interstate problem for which the city, through an histori-
cal series of events, has assumed the sole responsibility.
PAGENO="0067"
61
And I think, at this point, the shrinking financial resources of the
city have pointed out how unfair this division of responsibility is.
The city currently provides marine fire protection to the New
Jersey waterfront without reimbursement. This is an issue that other
cities have handled differently. For example, the city of Seattle is in
the process of entering into a series of agreements with neighboring
cities and with shipping companies doing business within their port,
requiring reimbursement for their marine fire services.
Our city has been, for a long time, generously providing this service
without charge to anyone except the taxpayers of the city of New
York. Due to this fiscal inequity, the city has reviewed the issue and
has promulgated some alternative approaches to seeking external
financing.
One alternative would be to charge neighboring communities in the
State of New Jersey. However, this would pose problems of coordinat-
ing fire protection and billing with each separate New Jersey town on
the waterfront. Furthermore, the determination of fees is a sensitive
and technically complex problem.
The other more logical solution for the entire port would be to
secure Federal participation in providing marine fire protection.
Among the primary duties of the Coast Guard is the general legal
responsibility to protect the safety of life and property on the waters
subject to U.S. jurisdiction. We would argue that this responsibility
extends to fire protection within our port.
Elsewhere throughout the country, the Coast Guard exercises
exclusive responsibility for fire protection in the ports of Norfolk,
Charleston, and Miami. This is according to our own research. Thus,
we believe that the Coast Guard would be the most appropriate
agency of Government to offer marine flre services in our port, due to
its legal authority and interstate jurisdiction.
There is no reason why the level of protection should necessarily be
diminished if the service is transferred to the Coast Guard. It is
quite possible that arrangements could he worked out whereby the
city's boats and equipment could be leased to the Coast Guard for
this purpose.
But, really, once again, it is a question of not wanting to diminish
the service but rather wanting to have the most appropriate level of
government deliver the service.
Mr. BIAGGI. You said at the outset that you had made application
to the Secretary of Transportation.
My understanding is that entreaty was rejected.
Mr. POSNER. I have not seen a letter of reply yet.
Mr. BIAGGI. Because I made some inquiry after I learned about it.
Mr. POSNER. Right.
Mr. BIAGGI. I think the same reasoning was offered by the Secre-
tary there that the President offered when he rejected Mayor Beame's
plea that New York City could not be distinguished by singular treat-
ment. Most cities have problems.
However, I think this is a little bit different, a little bit of a problem.
If you were here, you would note that throughout the testimony
and the questioning, there was a string of questions to develop a
logical, perhaps possible jurisdiction of the Coast Guard in this area,
at least some Federal Govermnent responsibility. Whether it be the
Coast Guard or not remains to be seen.
PAGENO="0068"
62
But there is a bistate or tristate responsibility-at least the bistate
area responsibility where New York City has been providing the pro-
tection, inadequate protection at best. Although the people who work
there are performing a yeoman's job, it is inadequate, simply because
they have limited resources and equipment.
It is my judgment that the request is sound, the approach is logical,
and there should be some relief forthcoming.
The Merchant Marine Committee has a bill, not yet subjected to the
hearing process which calls for evaluation of the various needs of the
ports throughout the country, and it might well be that we could work
this concern of yours, this firefighting facet into those hearings, and
perhaps arrive at a conclusion that might help the mayor's fiscal
problems, and not diminish the firefighting units, and perhaps not
even encroach upon current Coast Guard jurisdiction.
Captain, did you want to say something?
Captain PERKINS. Yes; I would just like to correct one statement.
The Coast Guard does not provide fire protection for any port in
the United States. Just like in the Port of New York, we have many
facilities, as I mentioned earlier, that has some firefighting capabilities.
This is installed primarily for search and rescue operations wherever
it is available.
We certainly wish to cooperate wherever there is a place for us to
do something. The Coast Guard does not budget for, and does not
build, or provide firefighting facilities in any port in this country.
Mr. POSNER. This was just-the information we got was from the
fire chiefs of these various cities who reported that they do not budget
for fire protection for their ports, but rather that they depend solely
on the Coast Guard.
So the question is, the only agency that really has the legal re-
sponsibility in any-even if you say in a vague sense-is the Coast
Guard. Just as with the Port of New York, the city of New York
does not have the legal responsibility for fire safety throughout the
Port of New York, certainly not in New Jersey.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would say in the light of history and tradition the
city of New York now has assumed that responsibility. I think the
courts will decree that. That is my judgment, but it is not a moot
question. I think it is a vital question very much alive.
Just off the top of my head I do not know that the Coast Guard
would be the avenue through which we approach it, but certainly
there is responsibility of the Federal Govermnent to participate. I
think that is a logical conclusion.
There is a moral responsibility as well as a real responsibility to
provide some fiscal assistance. I am sure if that were provided the
Mayor would be happier unloading, if you will, that particular
responsibility.
Mr. Heyward?
Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was just going to comment in connection with two of the three
cities that were mentioned, it is obvious that there are large Naval
installations. In Charleston and Norfolk, much of the activity
in those harbors is Navy, and perhaps those localities depend upon
the very fact that the Navy has its own protective equipment, and
therefore neither has an adequate marine fire fighting budget, hoping
to be assisted, just as other communities are assisted by New York.
PAGENO="0069"
63
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. DiMaggio?
Mr. DIMAGGI0. Just one comment in response to that.
I cannot see where you could take a fireboat and just say to the
Coast Guard, here, operate this piece of sophisticated equipment.
The pilots and engineers are firefighters first, then they promote to
an engineer or pilot who are licensed by the Coast Guard.
I would like to see the city say here, operate this boat and go and
fight the ALVA CAPE fire. It is outlandish to consider it.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, if you understand the problem, you understand
the city is desperately groping for alternatives, but the underlying
issue is muddy. I come back to my original conclusion. I think the
logical course to pursue is to pursue the Federal Government, and
try to convince them that they do in fact have a fiscal obligation to
assist in this area.
And you might report this. We do have proposed legislation that will
be subjected to the hearing process which will evaluate the needs of
the various ports throughout the country. I repeat that.
I am sure that firefighting will be one of those needs, and then the
question becomes how much money can we get into it, and how will it
trickle down to you. But at least there is an avenue.
Mr. POSNER. I would say that that would be the preferable approach,
to be reimbursed for the service, to keep it within the city.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I am sure you are familiar with Government.
It will not be next week, it will be a long, tedious process.
First we must get a notion accepted, and develop that whole concept,
and pursue that hopefully to enactment. Until then I do not know that
we will alleviate the city's problem in time to withdraw some of those
pink slips. But in any event we are sympathetic, and we are aware, and
we agree that there should be some monies coming in to support a
service which is really bistate.
I would like to thank you for your contribution, and Commander
Johnson, Captain Perkins, gentlemen, we appreciate your participa-
tion here today, and if you have any further contributions, we would
appreciate it that you send it to us in Washington.
Any comments as we go on with the implementation of the process,
as I am sure there will be some variance of opinion and differences,
and it is our purpose, as I said at the outset, to develop a plan that is
satisfactory to all, without imperiling the prime objective.
That being all, the meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.]
PAGENO="0070"
PAGENO="0071"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
NONDAY, JULY 7, 1975
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION OF
THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
Philadelphia, Pa.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 1:05 p.m., in Con-
ference room B, 11th floor, 1421 Cherry Street, Federal Building,
Philadelphia, Pa., Hon. Mario Biaggi, chairman, presiding.
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting will be called to order.
This morning we had an overflight of the Delaware River and the
Port of Philadelphia, on which I was accompanied by Congressman
Josh Eilberg and Congressman Pierre du Pont. After many confer-
ences and consultations in Washington in relation to the conditions
in this area, we are pleased to be here to receive testimony from the
Coast Guard and from any member of the marine industry or the
public that desires to make a statement. All they have to do is indicate
to the chair that they wish to speak to the committee and it will be
done.
Before we get into the statement which I will read in a moment,
I would like the people of this community to understand that the
hearings today were the result of special and vigorous effort on the
part of Congressman Josh Eilberg and Congressman Pierre du Pont,
who have maintained sustained interest in the vessel safety features
of the Delaware River, climaxed by the Queeny-Corinthos incident.
The results of their efforts and their concern for the people and
property of the area is the prime reason why we are having hearings
in Philadelphia today.
I am sure the people of Delaware and the people of Philadelphia
will be mindful of their interest and contribution.
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is meeting tins
afternoon in Philadelphia for the second of a series of field visits and
discussions related to the general problem of vessel safety in the
various port areas and navigable waters of the United States.
At the beginning of the present Congress, it became apparent that
the Subcommittee, in order to carry out its oversight responsibilities,
should inspect in some detail as many aspects of Coast Guard opera-
tions as it could find possible to do.
One of the significant areas of operation involves Coast Guard
responsibilities in the promotion of the safe movement of vessels in
our navigable waters. The increasing volume of waterborne traffic
in the United States, as well as the expanding numbers of hazardous
cargoes which move in waterborne commerce, make it particularly
important that vessel traffic movements should be so organized and
(65)
PAGENO="0072"
66
supervised as to guarantee as accident free a traffic system as it is
reasonably possible to accomplish.
In early 1975, the Comptroller General submitted a report to the
Congress which had been developed pursuant to the general auditing
responsibilities of his office. That report was entitled "Vessel Traffic
Systems-What Is Needed To Prevent and Reduce Vessel Accidents?"
In view of the subcommittee's interest in this general subject matter,
that report was particularly timely and its recommendations, together
with the Department of Transportation comments on the report,
serve to focus attention on the `issue to "be considered in evaluating
the general problem area.
The subcommittee, therefore, decided to address the subject in a
series of hearings which hopefully can be concluded before consid-
ering Coast Guard authorization hearings for the fiscal year 1977
budget.
On June 27, the first of the field visits was held in the New York
Harbor area, and the problems peculiar to that area' were discussed
with the Coast Guard and various public witnesses.
This morning, the subcommittee members made a helicopter ffight
for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the general outlay of
the Delaware River and Philadelphia Port area.
This afternoon, we are meeting to receive a report from the Coast
Guard and its local captain of the port, outlining specific problems
of vessel traffic in this area, together with a discussion of existing and
potential Coast Guard plans for solving those problems and improving
safety in Delaware Bay, the Delaware River, and the inland port
areas. `
Following the Coast Guard presentation, the subcommittee will
be happy to receive comments from any members of the audience who
may be interested in furnishing any information or in expressing their
views on the general subject of vessel traffic safety.
It would be particularly helpful if comments could be addressed
to specific problem areas, such as the adequacy of aids to navigation,
vessel movement reports, channel depths and configurations, means
of communications, speed and size of vessels, vessel speeds and
maneuverability controls, and the monitoring of vessel movements.
With that brief introduction, I recognize the Commander, Third
Coast Guard District, Vice Adm. William F. Rea III for any
comments that he may care to make, after which we will hear from
Capt. Dudley C. Goodwin, U.S. Coast Guard, captain of the port,
Philadelphia, but before I do that I would like to give my colleague,
the ranking minority member of the committee, Congressman Pierre
du Pont, of Delaware, an opportunity to make any remarks.
Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for
scheduling these hearings in the Delaware River region'. We had a
great many problems, especially along the Delaware River, all the
way from Big Stone Beach where the tankers lighter off their view
approximately from Delaware all the way to the city of Philadelphia
where some of those lighter tankers arrive to discharge the rest of
their cargo.
Mr. Eilberg has been concerned, as I have, with the safety prob-
lems in the river getting the best sort of a vessel traffic control system
that we can establish for the Delaware River and I think our tour
this morning and these hearings will be very helpful in doing that.
PAGENO="0073"
67
Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions for the Coast Guard
witnesses and I think that I will save those until they have completed
their testimony.
Mr. BIAiGI. Congressman Josh Eilberg.
Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first thank the Coast Guard for their hospitality this
morning, providing the helicopter trip over the lower Delaware
and Delaware Bay.
I might say that visibility was very poor this morning so that we
were not able to see as much as we would have lilced. We had some
difficulty with the intercom in the plane. I just wish that conditions
had been better, although I must confess that the Coast Guard
certainly did everything it could to make the morning profitable.
Also their courtesy down at Gloucester City was very much appre-
ciated where they briefed our staffs and provided us with some lunch
and now we are ready to go.
Mr. Chairman, the problem of vessel traffic safety on the DeiaWar~
River has become a very serious matter. I might say, Mr. Chairman,
some of my remarks may be very strong, but the reasons therefor
will appear.
The problem of vessel traffic safety on the Delaware River has
become a very serious matter because of the apparent lack of concern
for this problem on the part of the Coast Guard and the Federal
Department of Transportation.
Recently, the General Accounting Office-and I say "recently"-
the report was submitted in January of this year-made a study of
the Coast Guard's implementation of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act, which was passed by Congress in 1972.
in its report, the GAO criticized the Coast Guard for its failure
to provide better control of the movement of vessels carrying danger-
ous cargoes and it listed the Delaware River in the area of the Port
of Philadelphia as one place which needed an improved vessel traffic
system. Regretfully, the Coast Guard has not seen fit since 1972,
subject to the last remarks which I suppose we will hear about this
afternoon, to make any changes by the GAO which report is in my
possession.
However, the Coast Guard has reported that Philadelphia is
12th in line for the establishment of such a system and that this
means nothing will be done until the 1980's.
Because of this situation, I recently met with Secretary of Trans-
portation Wffliam Coleman and the Commandant of the Coast Guard
who were kind enought to come to my office, but that discussion
proved to be very frustrating at best.
The Secretary told me that although the suggestions I had made
for improving safety in the port were under study and that some may
be implemented, nothing would be done if it was going to cost too
much money. I must say that I find this attitude intolerable.
I have spoken with the men who work on the river every day,
including members of the Seafarers' Union, Docking Masters and
River Pilots. All had suggestions for safer operation of the vessels
which use our port. Somehow, the Coast Guard officials in that area
do not seem to hear our suggestions.
It is vital that at the very least, planning begin immediately for
an improved VTS with an early implementation date rather than some
nebulous time in the future.
PAGENO="0074"
68
A recent report in the Philadelphia Bulletin listed Philadelphia
as one of the Nation's largest ports. Somehow the figures of the
Coast Guard, however, are quite different. With the coming devel-
opment of the huge oil and natural gas deposits on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf off the east coast, we must expect that traffic on the
Delaware will be substantially increased.
Most of this increase will be in the form of tankers carrying oil
and gas and so the chances of fatal accidents wifi also increase. Unless
something is done now, I do not see how the Coast Guard wifi be
able to assure the people who work on the river or use it for recreation
as well as the people of Philadelphia and the surrounding communi-
ties, that every possible action had been taken to guarantee their
physical safety and the protection of the environment.
It is my hope that during this hearing, we will receive the assurances
that adequate steps are being taken so that we will not have to
order them through the legislative process.
I would say, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, then, it may very well
be that legislative steps will have to be taken because nothing has
happened as far as I know with minor exceptions since this matter
was raised by us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Eilberg.
It is my pleasure to welcome Admiral Rea of the Third District.
STATEMENT OP VICE ADM. WILLIAM P. REA III, COMMANDER,
THIRD COAST GUARD DISTRICT, GOVERNORS ISLAND, N.Y., AC-
COMPANIED BY CAPT. DUDLEY C. GOODWIN, U.S. COAST GUARD,
CAPTALN OP THE PORT, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Admiral REA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Vice Adm. William F. Rea III, Commander of the Third
Coast Guard District and my headquarters is Governors Island,
N.Y.
I am very pleased to be here with you and the members of your
committee, with Congressman Eilberg and Congressman du Pont,
to have our captain give you an overview and some of the efforts
that we are making in the Philadelphia area.
This is your second visit, as you have indicated in your opening
statement, to the Third Coast Guard District, you having held
similar hearings in the Port of New York.
As you will see today, although in New York we are fairly well
along with some vessel traffic system planning, the Delaware River in
the Port of Philadelphia is in a somewhat different category and this
will be touched on and dealt with in the statement; and I can deal
with that later in the questions if necessary.
I think it would be sufficient to say that I am pleased to be here.
I am very much available for questions and cooperation with your
committee and particularly, Mr. Eilberg, to resolve the problems that
apparently are unresolved in the Philadelphia-Delaware area.
At this time I would turn the mike over to Capt. Dudley C. Good-
win, the Captain of the Port of Philadelphia, who has a statement to
make to your committee, sir.
PAGENO="0075"
69
Captain GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman du Pont, Con-
gressman Eilberg, there has been considerable interest demonstrated
in the Philadelphia area in recent months with regard to safety prob-
lems in the port and as concerns our plans for improved traffic safety-
especially with respect to the vessel traffic system program. Of course,
these are the very things the committee is here to review.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss those subjects with you, and
suspect that we will all benefit from constructive discussion of their
various facets.
Since you recently conducted a similar review in the area comprising
the Port of New York, perhaps it would be worthwhile to underscore
some notable contrasts between our port and that of New York.
For example;
(a) The area available for navigation of large vessels amounts to
less than 15 percent of the total water area in New York. I would guess
that ours is even less, certainly no greater;
(b) The Port of New York incorporates a large protected anchorage
basin. Our port has six rather widely dispersed federally maintained
anchorages, each of limited capacity, adjacent to the roughly 80 miles
of federally maintained channel. Enclosure (1) depicts the locations
of our anchorages; Enclosure (2) contains a summary of the anchorage
characteristics;
(c) Whereas the Port of New York has deepwater piers only 9
miles from the open sea, our first facilities of consequence in this
regard are located at Wilmington, 62 miles from the open sea. These
piers continue, in varying densities, over an additional 47 or so miles;
(d) While there are six major entrances to the Port of New York, we
have two; namely via Delaware Bay and Chesapeake Bay C. & D.
Canal;
(e) Channel dimensions in the Port of New York range from 150
feet to 2,000 feet in bottom width while ours vary from 200 feet at
Trenton to 1,000 feet at the lower end of the bay;
(f) Controlling depths in the Port of New York range from 12 feet
through 45 feet, whereas ours vary from 12 feet to 40 feet;
(g) The network of channels serving the Port of New York accom-
modated 216 million short tons in 1973; our single, somewhat restricted
channel handled 80 million tons.
Enclosure (3) contains a summary of vessel accidents investigated
by our Marine Inspection personnel during the period January 1, 1967
through 1974.
Enclosure (4) recapitulates causes, location, and other factors, by
year.
Enclosure (5) summarizes type casualties by location with regard
to its channel characteristics.
Enclosure (6) outlines my position on "whether or not the intro-
duction of additional vessel traffic system measures would improve
safety associated with navigation of the Delaware River." Copies of
that position were previously mailed to you. I hope you received them.
In the interest of brevity, I will only quote in part and in essence
from that paper. For record purposes, I have annotated enclosure (6)
to indicate the portions I will draw from; using a checkmark to desig-
nate the appropriate paragraphs.
I have no doubts that additional vessel traffic system measures
would improve safety associated with navigation of the Delaware
PAGENO="0076"
76
Admiral REA. Captain Smith.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is the captain here?
Is he prepared to testify before this committee at this point as to
the basis of his charges as to what they are?
Admiral REA. Mr. Chairman, Captain Smith did not come
prepared for that. He really, in order to testify, ought to have the
records before him.
I think, if you would permit, we would get these records and the
accurate information into the record as quickly as possible as to the
status.
Mr. BIAGGI. Let me pursue that, Admiral.
I would like to ask Captain Smith, where are the records?
Captain SMITH. They are in my office.
Mr. BIAGGL How far is your office from here?
Captain SMITH. Second and Chestnut Streets.
Mr. BIAGGI. Timewise?
Captain SMITH. Probably half an hour.
Mr. BIAGGI. I think we will be underway for more than half an
hour.
Admiral Rea, may I suggest that the captain be permitted to go
fetch the records?
Admiral REA. Yes.
Mr. DU PONT. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Mr. DUPONT. Before you go charging off to get the records, Cap-
tain, let me raise a question of due process about the advisability at
a public hearing, when airing charges against an individual, making
them public before the individual has been served and I am concerned
with that both from the point of view of the individual but also. from
the point of view that if you do that, it may be that whatever prosecu-
tion or legal action you take may ultimately be voided because his
rights will be violated right in this hearing this afternoon and I would
think we ought to have an opinion from someone more competent
than I whether that is an advisable step.
Admiral REA. I am without counsel at the moment but I
think our counsel-or counsel, minority counsel, may support this.
My intention was to furnish and what I was proposing and perhaps it
was in terms, just for the record, just a status and if the charges have
not been preferred, I think it would be premature because the man
himself has not been advised what the charges are.
Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, a few minutes ago you said that you
had arrived at no conclusions with regard to the accident and that is
the thrust of my question.
I am not-certainly not interested in violating the rights of anyone,
but apparently you have arrived at certain thoughts as to how this
accident occurred and this is the thrust of my question.
I would like to know what evidence, what kinds of evidence were
involved.
Admiral REA. Mr. Eilberg, first I was not on the board of
investigation. I am not up to date on it but the action or the pro-
posed action proceeding against a person's license is based on when
this occurred, it's based on evidence of either negligence, misconduct
or incompetence on the part of the person. This does not necessarily
say then-dictate the conclusion that this is the cause of the casualty.
PAGENO="0077"
71
And I run down, Mr. Chairman, through 20 cases there that I
could go into if you would like me to, but for time purposes, you
may want to study that later.
Mr. BIAGG1. They all seem to have something in common, that
VTS might have or would have-
Captain GooDwiN. Might or should have.
Mr. B1AGG1. Or should have?
Captain GOODWIN. Yes, sir.
And I concluded that-there, by saying that of the foregoing 20
cases under consideration, in order to justify VTS, I feel in only 11
cases could VTS have been considered necessary with regard to pre-
venting or possibly preventing the particular casualty. I have marked
those with an asterisk. The remainder should have been prevented
through adherence to existing regulations or rules of prudent
seamanship.
Finally, if we consider the 20 cases by themselves, without discount-
ing the nine which presumably would have occurred even with VTS,
it becomes evident, that we averaged 2.5 accidents per year from
January 1, 1967 through 1974, or call it 3.
It is interesting to note that the GAO, inferring that we do not
presently have a basic VTS, estimates that such a system would
result in three fewer accidents annually.
In reviewing the information contained in that paper, I have come
to one conclusion: that regulations by themselves are of little use
without a means of surveillance for purposes of enforcement, par-
ticularly during periods of reduced visibility when they are most
sorely needed. Radar in particular is an essential adjunct to any
effective vessel traffic system.
Consequently, I cannot as far as the Bay and River Delaware is
concerned, consider the GAO report on vessel traffic systems, which
calls for basic systems consisting of regulations, traffic separation
schemes, or a communications network, including vessel movement
reporting procedures, to have validity.
We have the basic system here already, in the form of regulations,
traffic separation, and the Maritime Exchange's vessel movement
reporting system. If we want to improve our safety record, a means
to conduct surveillance will be required. Based on the Port of Phila-
delphia's safety, I do not feel* that the necessary electronic system;
namely, radar, is justified at this time.
The priority established by the commandant for installation in
this port is not inconsistent with the priority implied in the GAO
report, wherein the Delaware River and Bay is ranked after San
Francisco, Puget Sound, Houston-Galveston, New York, New
Orleans, five separate and distinct segments of the intercoastal
waterway through Louisiana and Texas, and the Chesapeake Bay.
While the foregoing position is derived by considering specific
casualties, I have noted some general figures that are also noteworthy
that I have received from the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, and
they indicate the vessel traffic in terms of numbers at the end of
December, from 1967 through 1974, have varied from 6,393 in 1967 to
4,815 in 1974.
While they move up and down a little bit, there has been a consistent
decline.
PAGENO="0078"
72
The net registered tonnage is not available for 1967 and 1968, but
from 1969 through 1974, it increased from about 42~ million tons to
53 million tons.
And from the Coast Guard records, our accident rate from 1967 to
1974 has varied from 19 in 1967 to 16 in 1974, and that again has
moved up and down a bit.
I suppose an individual can interpret the foregoing figures any way
he pleases. My interpretation is that since 1967 there has been a grad-
ual decline in both numbers of vessels entering the port area and the
number of casualties, while at the same time, there has been a gradual
increase in vessel tonnage. Consequently, I suspect larger vessels are
using the port.
The Coast Guard has determined that the United States-that the
U.S. ships of more than 30,000 deadweight tons have 66 percent more
casualties than smaller ships. If this is valid, then we can reasonably
expect an increase in accidents in our port with the arrival of increasing
numbers of vessels such as the Notre Dame Victory at 37,785 tons, the
Athos at 48,000 tons, the Spectra J at 34,000 tons, and the Gorinthos
at 30,700 tons, unless we take effective steps to provide for a modern
deepwater port in an effort to keep larger vessels out of the immediate
and somewhat restricted port area.
Elaborating on my comments relative to the increased chance of
casualties with vessels over 30,000 tons, it is pertinent to note that
in the Port of Philadelphia the trend in this regard, of late, has been-
in March 1975, we had 54 vessels enter the port over 30,000 tons;
April, 58, May, 93, and June, 85.
Once having established the need for a vessel traffic safety system,
it becomes a matter of determining what we want, need and can
afford. We have two working groups in the Port of Philadelphia that
will undoubtedly provide valuable inputs in this regard.
First, under the auspices of the Joint Executive Committee for the
improvement and development of the Philadelphia Port area, we have
a VTS working group, chaired by Capt. Paul Ives, and secretary of the
American Pilots Association.
The function of this group, generally stated, is to evaluate and make
recommendations to improve safety associated with navigation in the
Delaware Bay and River. Beyond noting that I am an ex officio mem-
ber of that group, I will defer to Captain Ives for further comment
concerning the subject and related matters.
Second, we have the Mariners' Advisory Committee for the Bay
and River Delaware, chaired by Capt. Sam Schellenger, again of
the Pilots' Association for the Bay and River Delaware. Once more,
beyond noting that I am an ex officio member of that group, I will
defer to Captain Schellenger for further comment concerning its
functions and effectiveness.
At such time as the Coast Guard finds it expedient to establish a
Delaware River and Bay Traffic System Advisory Committee, I
suspect that committee will be guided to a large extent by the find-
ings, opinions, and recommendations of those two bodies. In further-
ance of that purpose, I intend to furnish to them copies of the annual
report from the New York Harbor Vessel Traffic System Advisory
Committee, to be used as a guide in approaching the general subject.
PAGENO="0079"
73
With respect to "when will a vessel traffic system for the Port of
Philadelphia be operational," I can only note that in 1973, the Coast
Guard completed a study of 22 ports and waterways to determine
the needs of those areas for vessel traffic systems.
This study included a case-by-case review of all collisions, rammings,
and groundings for a 4-year period to determine the estimated per-
centage reduction in these types of casualties that would result by
having had various levels of vessel traffic systems.
Analyses of casualties in Delaware River and Bay revealed that a
vessel traffic system would not have had a significant effect in pre-
venting these casualties. There appeared no need to go beyond the
increased use of bridge-to-bridge telephone, a concept which has
been employed in the Delaware since the early 1960's. This long
successful experience in the Delaware contributed to the national
adoption of bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone and may help explain
why the area did not rank higher in need of a system.
Using newly developed techniques, data collection efforts resumed
in the Delaware River and Bay area in October 1974. Side looking
airborne radar, SLAR, was used to determine vessel traffic densities
and flow patterns.
In March of this year, a data collection radar van was used to
collect radio communication data and additional information on
vessel traffic densities and flow patterns.
Analysis of these data and other currently known factors will
identify whether or not a vessel traffic system is needed, and if one
is needed, the degree of complexity of such a system.
New factors, such as the projected start-up of facilities handling
cargoes of particular hazard, will be introduced into the data bank
at such time as their implementation becomes reasonably firm.
It should be recognized that Delaware River and Bay has been
included inthe Coast Guard's long-range budget outlook. If the need
for a system is identified, it is anticipated that moneys will be re-
quested in the 1980 budget, which means an operational system might
be a reality in 1981-82, depending on the system's complexity.
In conclusion, and I did not include it in this particular statement,
I would like to also note as I tried to point out this morning that the
subject of port safety is a broad one. It includes not only requirements
for traffic regulations and maintenance of an aids-to-navigation
system of a base and navigation but also it requires consideration
of how cargoes, particular by dangerous cargoes are handled aboard
ship and at the facilities.
It includes a review of how the facilities are maintained and how
ships are constructed and maintained; how well crews are trained.
To emphasize any one of these aspects at the expense of another
would likely not serve to effectively improve our overal mission,
accomplishment in port safety.
Increased performance can only come about with increased personnel
resources and equipment. If you are willing to concede that, by and
large our personnel are fully and effectively employed at the present,
not only here in Philadelphia but generally throughout the Coast
Guard-and I feel they are-I feel it would be-I feel on our part
it would be the height of complacency to say that we are presently
doing all that needs to be done; we are not. But given adequate
resources, I believe we can.
PAGENO="0080"
74
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy
to attempt to answer any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you very much, Captain Goodwin,
Admiral Rea, for your complete cooperation in these hearings in
providing the data and also your hospitality.
At this point, I will defer my questioning and relinquish my time
to Congressman Eilberg.
Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Rea
and Captain Goodwin.
Captain Goodwin, I have no doubt of your sincerity and your
seeing the job as you see it, but we seem to have differences of opinion.
That is the purpose of this hearing and hopefully to take some steps
to provide more safety for the Delaware and the people who live
in the Delaware and work on the Delaware and to provide you with
what additional facilities, if any, you may need.
Now, you went to great length, Captain Goodwin, to analyze
figures of accidents and I am not going to comment on those except
to say that figures can be used any way you want to use them and
in contradiction to the thrust of that statement, I would like to say that
I have been told by members of the Seafarers Union that there is
every day an accident on the Delaware River or Delaware Bay.
By that I mean a ramming or grounding or collision and this infor-
mation is given to me, so I suppose it is a matter of definition as to
what is an accident.
Nevertheless, the union people involved who work on the river in
the bay tell us that there is an accident every day.
Now a principal point that concerns me is the Queeny and Gorinthos
incident of January 31 of this year. You niight say that I am a new
member on this committee because I have felt the necessity of having
a port watcher from Philadelphia, looking at the Delaware and the
safety and development of the Delaware and no sooner do I become
a member o this committee then this very serious acciden t occurs
with the loss of a great many lives. That accident was on January 31,
1975, as I understand it.
Can you tell me what conclusions, if any, you have arrived at as to
the causes of that accident?
Vice Admiral REA. Would it be all right, Mr. Eilberg, if I answer
that one?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Yes, sir.
Vice Admiral REA. The data, that was subject to an investigation
by the Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation and eventually
and overview by the National Transportation Safety Board. The
report has not been completed.
It would be premature to say what conclusions, because the report
has not been completed. When the report becomes public, certainly
we will be sure that you and the committee becomes well aware of it.
But it is an incomplete investigation.
Mr. EILBERG. It is 5 months later, Admiral Rea, and you have
no comment to make as to the causes of that accident?
Vice Admiral REA. The Board of Investigation has not completed
their work and it just would be premature, Mr. Eilberg, until it
goes down approved by the Commandant and then the National
Transportation Safety Board makes the final determin ation as to the
PAGENO="0081"
75
cause of the casualty. I regret that they are not out sooner. The
history of these boards, this procedure has been very time consuming.
Mr. EILBERG. Since the accident, is it true that you have required
locally that tugs of company vessels into the channel or out of the
channel into docks?
Captain GOODWIN. It is true that I gave it considerable thought.
I put it out as a proposed regulation and quite frankly, based in
large part on prodding from your office.
I later changed it from a proposed regulation to an advisory,
because of the economic impact that such a requirement would have
on this port if it was not a general requirement in other ports of the
country.
Mr. EILBERG. What does advisory mean now?
Captain GOODWIN. It is a recommendation.
Mr. EILBERG. You mean vessels are free or companies are free to
use a tug or not, is that what you are saying?
Captain GooDwIN.Yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. So that YOU have withdrawn that temporary
regulation which you have ordered?
Captain GOODWIN. I have withdrawn it as a regulation and
reissued it as an advisory, yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. Now, do you contemplate any time within the near
future bringing any charges against any individuals for their con-
duct in connection with the accident?
Captain GooDwIN. I would like to pass this to Admiral Rea
because that is not in my bailiwick. This is bureaucracy in action, I
suppose, but there is an interface between my office and Marine
Inspection and that is in the Marine Inspection's area of responsibility.
Mr. BIAGGI. I might suggest that you feel free to move that
microphone to each other and-whoever is desirous of answering the
question please feel free to do so.
Admiral REA. Excuse me. My apologies. Behind me is Capt.
Wayne Smith, the officer in charge of Marine Inspection.
When you're reached a stage in investigation that there is evidence
of negligence or misconduct or incompetence, when these are turned
over to his office for handling and I just consult with him to just
determine where they stood and charges have been preferred; I shou~1d
say they are being drawn up but have not been preferred as yet.
These will be charges probably made of negligence or incompetence.
We can furnish you exactly for the record what the status of this is,
but that action does not have to await the approval of the Board of
Investigation.
Mr. EILBEEG. When there is evidence, then we should proceed
with it. An investigation under article 4450 looking into action
against a person's license or whether he should return his license or
not should be gone into.
Can you give us the basis of those charges? Are they in the stage of
being prepared?
Admiral REA. I do not have them. I can have the captain testify.
I think the simplest thing is we can produce them as quickly as we
possibly can for the record.
Mr. BIAGGI. If the gentleman would yield and if I understood the
response correctly, the charges are in fact prepared but have not been
served. What was the captain's name again?
78-280-76----6
PAGENO="0082"
77
The cause of the casualty is the total picture and it may or may not
have been in the alleged evidence of misconduct or negligence on the
part of some individual.
In a board of investigation, there are procedures when the board is
proceeding, when they reach a point in their deliberations in gathering
information and the facts, and they reach a conclusion that there is
evidence of negligence on the part of one or more persons then that
action is initiated looking toward further investigation against their
license or document. It is a separate procedure, a separate operation
and one does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that that man's
negligence was the cause of the casualty per se, it might have been some
other cause but even so you might proceed against his license.
Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, I would like to suggest to you the legal
possibility under the Freedom Information Act, we may very well
have the right, the public may have the right to see the document that
I have referred to.
Do I understand you take the position now that you will not allow
these to be explained or brought forward at this hearing, is that your
position, Admiral?
Admiral REA. My position now would be to seek advice from
our counsel as to the propriety of releasing, prior to the person being
charged being served and I would like to do that.
Mr. EILBERG. How soon do you expect that the charges will be
preferred, Admiral Rea?
Admiral REA. I do not know whether Captain Smith is going
to answer that. I would defer to him if he could answer it. I do not
know whether he can.
Mr. EILBERG. Captain Smith?
Captain SMITH. I would estimate within a month.
Mr. EILBERG. All right, thank you.
Admiral, or Captain Goodwin, since my submission of proposed-a
proposed VTS-
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me, would you yield?
In light of the question raised by Congressman du Pont, after
consultation at the table with Mr. Heyward, the need for Captain
Smith to go get his records has been obviated. Rather than air the
whole question of due process, we will wait and have you submit the
information on the changes later.
Mr. EILBERG. Since my submission of a number of suggestions for
proposed vessel traffic system in the Delaware River Bay, have any of
these been adopted?
Captain Goodwin, you have been supplied with a list of regulations,
proposed regulations which you have very carefully read. They were
delivered by my district office administrator and you replied at
length, highly critical of most of them.
I would like to hear from you now as to whether you have adopted
or looked with favor on any of the suggestions? Certainly you have
your letter, document in front of you.
Captain GooDwiN. Yes, I do.
I am trying to pick out some areas that I can comment on.
Of course you recommended a basic, as our vessel traffic system and
I believe in quoting from my letter here, I indicated that the basic
VTS is defined by GAO, as one that includes regulations, traffic
PAGENO="0083"
78,
separation schemes or communications network including YTS
reporting procedures.
I note that we have all these elements to the degree which I feel is
required in the Delaware area. We have them as to the entrance of
the bay, we have regulations in terms of rules of the road, regulations
governing the handling, of hazardous matrials, regulations governing
anchorage-we have the VTS managed by the Federal Maritime Ex-
change, with a cooperation of the Pilots Association.
Finally, we have a bridge-to-bridge communications network using
10 or 13 to facilitate the coordination of vessels in transit to and from
facilities.
I would think that quite honestly the only recommendation that
you made, Mr. Congressman, that I felt might be worth a try at this
time, in addition to what we already have is the proposal for tugs
and I was convinced in my own mind that that would be economically
unfair to the port and also giving it further consideration, the mere
presence of tugs is not going to in my mind really preclude accidents.
We had the Spectra J., one of our large ships, moving from an anchor-
age assisted by three tugs here not too long ago, and he hit two ships
trying to get into Arco. I suppose to answer your question, I am going
to have to say that no, I have not implemented any regulations.
Mr. EILBERG. And you do not believe that any of them have any
merit in terms of alleviating any potential vessel accidents?
Captain GoODwIN. I think the vessel traffic system in the port as I
mentioned earlier, no doubt would serve to prevent some accidents.
But again our requirements have to be put in perspective by the
commandant as he gets a lump sum of money from the Congress and
how he wants to divide it up. He has a bigger picture certainly than I
do and I think that our requirements here in the Port of Philadelphia
apparently are on down the line a ways.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission at this point to
place in the record a list of my recommendations for the record and
for the consideration of all of the members of the subcommittee.
Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection.
[Document above-referred to follows:]
RECOMMENDATIONS OF lox. JOSHUA EILBERG ON PROPOSED VESSEL TRAFFIC
SAFETY SYSTEM FOR THE PORT OF PHILADELPHIA AND THE DELAWARE RIVER
PREFACE
There is a pressing need for the adoption of regulations pertaining to vessel
traffic throughout the ports of the Nation, and the time for action is now. However,
I have a primary concern with the port of Philadelphia and the safety of my
constituents and their property.
The General Accounting Office report on vessel traffic safety reveals that there
have been recommendations by the Coast Guard for a two-plan vessel traffic
system:
1. A basic vessel traffic system.
2. A sophisticated vessel traffic system.
The basic traffic system appears to be the ideal system in that it is effective
through the enforcement of existing regulations and the implementing of updated
regulations, coupled with the use of present equipment; that is, radio and tele-
phone communications (cost factor being held at a minimum).
The sophisticated system appears to be inadequate in that the end results are
not sufficiently effective considering the cost factor. The system involves the use
of closed circuit TV and radar. We must consider the cost of the equipment,
installation, maintenance, and operating personnel. The limited effectiveness will
not compensate for the high cost to the taxpayer.
PAGENO="0084"
79
Through personal observation, as well as interviews with knowledgeable in-
dividuals that have navigated the Delaware River waterways, it is my conclusion
that a basic traffic system could be adopted at a minimal cost which would result
in a marked decrease in merchant vessel traffic accidents.
Radar and communications center
The installation of a radar and radio communications center within the Dela-
ware Bay area to observe and regulate vessel traffic preparing to enter the river
channel. This will also control the flow of outgoing traffic. It will be manned by
Coast Guard personnel, so material procurement and maintenance costs will be
the only new major expenses.
Visual towers
The installation of a network of visual towers to operate in conjunction with the
radar and communications center, to be manned by existing Coast Guard per-
sonnel, along the route of the river at suitable sites on the Pennsylvania and New
Jersey shores, with facilities for tower-to-tower telephone communications and
tower-to-ship radio communications. Every outward bound or inward bound ship
would come under the control of each tower as it progresses along the river route.
The towers could relay to the ships messages of hazardous conditions and other
ship traffic information, such as orders to lay to, where to pick up tug assistance,
and anchorage information in event of emergencies.
Speed limitations
Require all vessels to maintain a safe operating speed of between 6 and 10 knots,
depending on existing traffic conditions and maneuverability of the vessel. Vessel
speeds can also be controlled by tower personnel. If a ship is unmaneuverable at
low speeds, tug assistance would be required.
Speed limits should be set and enforced for vessels transiting restricted naviga-
tional waters. Transit speeds during hours of darkness should be slower than day-
time speeds. Enforcing speed limits could present a difficult problem; but unless it
is accomplished, the posting of speed limits will be of no value.
Special details
Require all vessels entering and leaving the Port of Philadelphia to maintain a
special anchor detail, as well as additional engineering personnel on throttle watch
and boiler room watch in the event that this is not now the practice.
Tug control-In
Require all merchant vessels, oilers, tankers, cargo ships, and so forth, to
obtain tug control prior to leaving channel for a docking area.
Tug control-Out
Require all merchant vessels to obtain tug control prior to departing from
dock. The tug will be responsible for bringing ship to midchannel and placing
ship on its proper heading prior to release.
Escorts
It will be the responsibility of the Coast Guard to supply escort craft to all
ships carrying dangerous cargo. These escort craft would use visual and audio
signals, as necessary, in the escorting of these ships up and down the river.
Ship movement
The Coast Guard will assume the responsibility for restricting the movement
of all ships-inbound and outbound of the port of Philadelphia-when poor
visibility and other hazardous conditions exist.
Inspections
Upon completion of the docking of a ship bearing dangerous cargo, it will be
the responsibility of the Coast Guard to inspect the mooring lines for proper
mooring techniques, as well as requiring the command officer of the vessel to
secure proper electrical grounding of said ship, if necessary.
Vessel identification
When approaching congested harbor/river entrances where numerous ships
are entering, departing, embarking, and debarking pilots, it is extremely difficult
to identify vessels which may meet or cross your track. Listening to the bridge-
to-bridge conversations among ships and harbor pilots provides a wealth of
Information regarding these ships' immediate and intended movements. Un-
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fortunately, unless the specific ships can be visually/electronically identified, the
movement information is useless and, in fact, confusing. There is a definite need
for providing an unmistakable means for identification.
Verbal description given by each master/pilot of his ship's significant identi-
fication characteristics. This is to be provided during the "call up" and "acknowl-
edgment" while conversing with each other or with the pilot.
Anchorages
It is necessary for the expansion of existing anchorages such as Marcus Hook
and Mantua Creek and the establishment of additional anchorages along the
river route, especially in the upper regions.
Improvement in navigation aids
a. Targets for visual bearings.-The use of visual bearings to fixed beacons,
towers, et cetera, is extremely valuable in fixing the ship's position in those areas
where there are no easily identifiable topographic characteristics. The effectiveness
of these navigational aids is diminished by the difficulty in locating them and
their similarity in construction hindering positive identification. Examples of
these aids in the lower reaches of the Delaware Bay are the towers at:
(1) Egg Island-New Jersey side of Miah Maull Range.
(2) Ben Davis Point, Dunks Point, and Arnold Point-New Jersey side
of Liston Range.
(3) Similar towers installed on the Delaware side of the channel.
b. Lighted ranges which are difficult to use.-There are several lighted ranges
which are extremely difficult to identify or use. They are (commencing with the
area in the vicinity of Artificial Island, proceeding toward Philadelphia):
(1) Liston Range-extremely difficult to pick up visually while proceeding
in an outbound direction prior to entering the Range. This condition makes
an accurate turn on to Liston Range very difficult. The Range lights and
light towers are not easily distinguishable until actually on the Range (which
is astern).
(2) Bulkhead Range (in the vicinity of Pea Patch Island)-is difficult
to see while proceeding in either direction.
c. Navigational aids in the lower reaches of the Bay.-In general, difficulty is
experienced in accurately fixing the ship's position in the area of Brandywine/
Crossledge Ranges and south. Visual bearings on topographical features are
almost nonexistent and there are too few stationary charted objects to provide a
sufficient number of visual and/or radar bearings. Though the bay is quite wide
at this point, the width of safe water in several locations is limited. Traffic en-
countered in this area is usually moderate; hence, accurate navigation is a must.
d. The increasing of the amount of channel markers the entire length of the
Delaware River, where needed, especially at the lower end in the bay area.
e. Installation of range markers for headings in the areas where only astern
readings are available.
Channel changes
Suggest that mid-channel at Billingsport range and where Cherry Island and
Belivue ranges intersect be relocated. At present, ships must run too close to
fuel piers at Billingsport Range. In the event of a human error or a mechanical
failure, this could cause an extremely dangerous and hazardous situation.
The intersection of the Bellvue and the Cherry Island ranges (south of Chester,
Pa.) is extremely close to the western shore of the river. It presents extreme
difficulty to ships transiting through the intersection in either direction. It de-
mands precise judgment and timeliness to turn onto either range while proceeding
at any speed.
SUMMARY
At the present time, it appears that the only communications system available
to relay any ship movement information is in the very capable hands of the
Pilots Association in conjunction with the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange.
It must be noted that these dedicated people are performing an outstanding
service.
This is accomplished through the service of a pilots boat, supplied by the
Pilots Association, which remains on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Since the Coast Guard has jurisdiction in enforcing the regulations of their
respective ports, I feel that it is the Coast Guards' responsibility to assume the
duties of vessel communications with the ships entering and leaving the port of
Philadelphia.
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However, since pilot-to-pilot, via bridge-to-bridge communication is invaluable
in nature, therefore, the radar and communications center should have personnel
from the Pilots Association assigned to work in conjunction with the Coast
Guard. If this system were to be established, it woud not necessitate the presence
of the pilots boat. Transfer boats for the pilots could be tied up at the radar and
communications center.
Strict discipline should be exercised in using the bridge-to-bridge circuit.
Unnecessary conversations clutter the circuit and could prevent the transmission
of vital navigational information. It is advisable that the Coast Guard monitor
these communications to enforce discipline.
In addition to the proposals regulating vessel movement, "no passing" zones
should be considered at various locations along the channel. Typical areas to be
designated as "no passing" zones, as an example, could be:
1. Channel legs where the distance between turning points is limited-
possibly 6,000 yards or less.
2. Intersections where two or more channels meet.
3. Areas of the channel adjacent to "busy waterfronts" such as: refinery
piers, cargo loading/off loading piers, ferry crossings, and so forth.
Questions arise regarding a speed limit, since our deep draft ships must pass
the upper regions of the Marcus Hook Range during high tide. Dangerous rock
formation reduces the channel depth during low tide. This would cause undue
delay in that deep draft ships would be required to wait approximately 12 hours
for the next high tide.
It is therefore, recommended that dredging operations continue at this point
to alleviate this situation.
By no means should these proposals be considered as exclusive to the port of
Philadelphia; but to the contrary, should be evaluated for their adoption and
implementation at other ports, depending on that local area's needs.
Sound judgment should be exercised in recommending and establishing vessel
traffic systems. Basic vessel traffic systems, minimal in cost, should be established
as opposed to any high-cost sophisticated system when it is indicated that this
system would operate just as efficiently.
Mr. BIAGGI. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Rea?
Admiral REA. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Eilberg, for the record I would
like to say that at the district level, third district level, we will take
another look at these and see if there is any possibility that we should
have different viewpoints on this.
In other words, I would just like to say we will give further
consideration.
Mr. EILBERG. I really appreciate that, Admiral, very much, be-
cause it seems to me Captain Goodwin has indicated a fixed mind
about the subject and the recommendations that we have made, none
of them were presented as my conclusions, my creation, or the creation
of my district office assistants, but rather were the consensus of the
views of many, many people who work for the Seafarers Union, work
with the members of the Seafarers Union-men who operate tugs,
masters on tugs, people who are active members of the United States
Navy, this is a consensus of views presented by any number of people
which Captain Goodwin casually discards and I therefore welcome
your suggestion very much.
Mr. Chairman, since the accident involving the Queeny and the
Corinthos, has the Coast Guard adopted any regulations pertaining
VTS that would prevent a recurrence or tend to prevent a re-
currence of that type of accident?
Admiral REA. Mr. Eilberg, Captain Goodwin may want to respond
to this a little more, but the circumstances as I know the casualty
you are talking about where the vessel was coming across the river,
and my information is primarily from the news media because I
PAGENO="0087"
82
was not on that board of investigation, but I am not aware of any
steps that we could take to prevent that. It certainly does not fall in
the pattern that the vessel traffic system would cope with. A vessel
proceeding from one side of the river to the other and would not quite
turn-would not quite turn the vessel in the dock-
Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, if I may interrupt.
It has been advanced to me by members of the seafaring com-
munity, that if the tug had been attached to the Gorinthos into the
center of the channel, the accident would not have occurred. Would
you care to comment on that?
Admiral REA. No, sir, I do not, because this again is in the very
facts of the Board investigation trying to turn up and again it would
be premature, even if I had the information to speculate, but I do
not have it at hand.
Mr. EILBERG. Would you care to comment on the suggestion that
has been made that if there had been someone on anchor watch on the
Corinthos when an order was given to release the anchor, if there had
been an anchor watch, that that accident may not have occurred?
Would you care to comment on that?
Admiral REA. I do not think I could at this time, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. I do not think you could. All right. Now, Admiral,
this is probably related to you.
Thursday, May 15, an article appeared in the Philadelphia Eve-
fling Bulletin that indicated that the Philadelphia Port led in tonnage
last year.
I might say, Mr. Chairman, that this appears in a newspaper article,
copy of which I have, dated Thursday, May 15, 1975, in the Phila-
delphia Evening Bulletin.
The Philadelphia Port led the world in tonnage last year. Reading
a small part of this article by Rem Rieder: "The 1974 total for inter-
national shipping in Philadelphia was 80,842,875 tons, a record high.
Included were 73,871,950 tons in imports and 6,970,925 tons in ex-
ports. New York City finished second with 71,827,951 tons, trailed
by Hampton Roads, Virginia, with 56,697,133 tons, and Baltimore
with 41,808,443 tons."
Do you agree or disagree with that article?
Vice Admiral REA. I have no comment. Each port, as you go around
the country, makes different claims, uses a different basis. Some ports
say we are first with vohime or international trade or other things. I
am in no position to challenge that one way or the other, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. The article also goes on to say-and perhaps I should
say that the reporter got the information from the Delaware River
Port Authority.
Would that change your reaction in any way?
Vice Admiral REA. No; I would say I have no comment. I would
accept the figures but as far as-I have no reason to question them,
but I do not have any basis to say they are good, bad or otherwise.
Mr. BtAGGI. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Mr. BIAGGI. Just to clarify in my mind, for the record, what that
article seems to indicate is that the Port of Philadelphia exceeded
tonnage, the traffic in the Port of New York in toto. I think-at least
that is the impression I get.
PAGENO="0088"
83
Mr. EILBERG. Do you want to see the article? I will make it a part
of the record.
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes, you can do that, without objection.
[The document referred to follows:]
[From The Evening Bulletin, May 15, 1975]
PHILADELPHIA PORT LED THE WORLD IN TONNAGE LAST YEAR
(By Rem Riéder of The Bulletin staff)
The Flyers were not Philadelphia's only champions last year.
* The Port of Philadelphia also earned a No. 1 ranking.
Final statistics released by the Delaware River Port Authority show that in
1974, Philadelphia was the nation's most active international port, judged by
total tonnage of exports and imports.
FIRST SINCE `64
It was the first time since 1964 that the local port had surpassed New York
City in international trade.
However, like Roger Mans' home-run record, Philadelphia's ranking includes
an asterisk.
When domestic trade is included, New York is still No. 1.
In addition, Philadelphia continues to lag far behind New York in the most
lucrative type of shipping-general cargo. General cargo includes goods which
must be loaded and unloaded by human labor and generates about $26 a ton for
the local economy.
Philadelphia's supremacy is based on bulk cargoes-commodities like oil, iron,
ore and grain-which generate between $6 and $8 a ton.
Much of the recent effort to upgrade the local port, which stretches from Tren-
ton to `Wilmington on both sides of the Delaware River and is called Ameriport,
has centered on increasing general cargo shipments.
But last year, local general cargo dropped by about 500,000 tons. At the same
time, bulk shipping in Philadelphia rose by two million tons.
The dollar loss in the general cargo category was roughly equal to the gain in
bulk cargo, meaning the port's financial impact on the Philadelphia area was
about the same as in 1973.
With the economy in a general state of decline, port officials were pleased by
the port's performance.
"GOOD SHOWING"
"Considering the state of the economy, it's a very good showing," said pQrt
authority spokesman William Lynch.
The 1974 total for international shipping in Philadelphia was 80,842,875 tons,
a record high. Included .were 73,871,950 tons in imports and 6,970,925 tons in
exports.
New York City finished second with 71,827,951 tons, trailed by Hampton
Roads, Va., with 56,697,133'tons and Baltimore with 41,808,443 tons.
SLIGHT RISE
Philadelphia's share of the four-port pie rose slightly over 1973, while New
York City dropped 5 percent, Hampton Roads gained 4 percent and Baltimore
3 percent.
Port officials said increases in imports of petroleum products, iron ore and iron
and steel products helped Philadelphia earn its top ranking.
Both imports and exports of machinery were up sharply.
The sag in general cargo was due largely due to a drop in lumber imports,
reflecting stagnation in the housing industry, port officials said.
Exports of iron and steel scrap products also declined.
Mr. BIAGGI. What I think it says is that Philadelphia did have
more international tonnage than New York.
Mr. EILBERG. That is what I said, Mr. Chairman. 1-1974 total
for international shipping in Philadelphia. You are quite right in
your statement.
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Mr. BIAGGI. Because I think the Port of New York must have
three or four times as much total tonnage.
Mr. EILBERG. If I did not read the word "international" shipping,
I certainly meant to and that is part of it now.
Mr. BIAGGI. Would the gentleman yield for another question?
It is a question that I wanted to put to the Admiral before when
we were talking about the Queeny-Corinthos.
You testified that even if we had a VTS system in this port, it would
not have prevented that accident.
Vice Admiral REA. As I know it, Mr. Chairman, from newspaper
accounts. I have tried to conceive afterwards what kind of traffic
system would you conceive to prevent that. But it does not come out.
But I think probably my remarks need to be qualified that we need
to wait to see what the Board comes up with. Rather than accept-
so I have to qualify my response in that regard.
Mr. BIAGGI. Because of the unique nature of that accident?
Vice Admiral REA. Well, the vessel traffic systems that we are
designing or trying to develop the flow of traffic, in meeting and
passing situations, low visibility, I do not know of any that play-
the particular vessel turnaround with no other traffic in sight and not
quite make much of a turn-
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter received
from the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commandant Admiral
Siler, dated March 24, 1975.
He says that for the year 1974, the total vessel tonnage in Phil-
adelphia was 52,193,000, whereas the figure on the Delaware River
Port Authority is 80,842,000.
Now, do you have any explanation of the disparity between those
figures?
Vice Admiral REA. Mr. Eilberg, I do not. Perhaps Captain Goodwin
might. I do not. It is a matter that I will look into if there seems to be
a disparity.
Captain GOODWIN. I had a copy, but unfortunately I did not bring
it with me, of that same letter. I read it over pretty carefully. I cannot
explain the disparity, no, sir; but I certainly do not see anything in
the Commandant's letter that I would disagree with.
Mr. EILBERG. Well, the Commandant uses the figures 52,193,000
tons as tonnage. If the fact that it is greater than that-would that
alter your opinion as to the necessity of the vessel traffic system?
Captain GOODWIN. Here again, Congressman, we get all screwed
up on these tonnage figures. It depends on what you are talking
about or what the Commandant was talking about. We are the
number two port in the country in terms of importation of petroleum
products. I understand we are number one in terms of international
trade, and number four overall. When you juggle these figures around,
I would have to take a look at it a little more in depth before I could
comment any further on it.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman,' I would like to make the newspaper
article a part of the record if I might.
Mr. BIAGGI. All right.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, on page 21 of the GAO report, under
the conclusions, the first paragraph and the second paragraph, recon-i-~
mendation to the Secretary of Transportation.
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85
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation require the Coast Guard
to give national emphasis and direction to establishing regulations as authorized
by the 1972 Act to control vessel traffic.
These actions should include more extensive use of speed limits; greater regula-
tion over the movement of vessels carrying dangerous, combustible, and polluting
cargoes; and limitations on the size of tows. The Department advised us that it
was undertaking a high-level review of the vessel traffic program because of the
issues raised by our review.
Now, have you heard anything about this review or the conclusions
of the review, Admiral Rea?
Admiral REA. I think the review is made but I would like to sug-
gest, sir, that in response to that, any comments you may want
to get on that, the Commandant's Coast Guard Headquarters had
made the review and I would not be conversant with them at all as
far as being able to testify or explain what they might be.
I think when you develop your record at the Washington level, this
would be very appropriate to get into the record at that time.
Mr. EILBERG. As it is you have received no direction from the
Secretary of Transportation as to any such review; is that correct?
Admiral REA. We have not, sir, because I assume-or I am rather
sure that the review was made in Washington; so we have not.
Captain GoODwIN. If I could refer back, Mr. Chairman, I have the
answer to the Congressman Eilberg's question. I believe, concerning
the tonnage figures, you will note that those are contained on page 5
of the Commandant's letter. They are the identical tonnages that I
had on page 12 of my statement and those figures were obtained from
the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange. They are net registered tonnage
excluding barges.
Mr. EILBERG. Recent information that I have is that the Penndel
Corp. has been commissioned to conduct a study for deep-water
ports in the Delaware Bay area. Obviously, if a port such as this were
to be established, would a vessel transportation system be established
in the Port of Philadelphia?
* We have a deep-water port system; do you see any need for a vessel
traffic system?
Admiral REA. I cannot make a direct response to that, Mr. Eilberg.
It says the national level is made sort of priority where there was
a need. I think Philadelphia is on the list; it is just not on a. very high
priority. So there has been a determination made that some point in
time they would be here; but there are other ports which are of a higher
priority and more necessity to get on with it.
Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, do you have an explanation as to why
in the GAO report they keep putting Delaware River and the Bay in
a relatively high priority?
Look at the GAO report, page 10-that they refer to necessity
of Delaware River Bay? And there are also various references to the
viability of the Delaware River Bay?
You just disagreed with the GAO report, I take it. Is that what
you are saying?
Admiral REA. It is not .a matter of me or Captain Goodwin.
This is a national decision. This was not done at the local level. Again,
I think this would be a matter that you would take up with Admiral
Siler's staff.
Mr. EILBERG. This report says that it is the function of the captain
to make recommend ations.
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86
Captain Goodwin, have . you made any recommendations re-
garding-that might lead to a vessel traffic system?
Captain GooDwIN. No, sir. Not as of this date.
Mr. EILBERG. The report also says that sophisticated traffic, vessel
traffic systems, should be abandoned. and that the basic system should
be installed first in the ports indicated in the report.
Do you agree or disagree with that proposition?
Admiral REA. I think Captain Goodwin spoke to that as far
as here in New York. It was clear when we had the record over there.
Our own view is that that would not be sufficient in the Port of New
York. The Commandant again I think has addressed himself to this,
and may I suggest that this would be his view; but certainly in the
Port of New York, clearly the Advisory Committee support is that
you cannot stop with the basic system that GAO talked about; the
basic system just being a vessel movement reporting system and no
surveillance and that in New York they did not think this was neces-
sary in a couple of areas and it was the New York advisers and our
New York staff and ourselves that would agree with that proposition.
But again I think the Commandant of the Coast Guard and his
staff that could give you insight as far as his comments on the national
level when you take it up down there, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. Admiral, I think it would serve the committee's
interest if you would make the distinction between the basic system
and sophisticated system, and also note that one of the important
components of the basic system is bridge-to-bridge, which is manda-
tory throughout the Nation.
Admiral REA. For the GAO maintenance distinction, that a
basic system was a-is the better reporting movement system; that
is, you just get on the radio and you say, I am at point A, B or C.
There would be no surveillance with low-light TV; no surveillance with
radar and to quote the sophisticated system would be any system
which uses this extra equipment. This is the distinction we made.
We do not think you could sort it out that way, certainly as far as
New York; you could stop at the basic system. In fact, our industry
people there would not support that particular viewpoint.
If they were going to get into it, they needed surveillance to get in
with it. So you not only had radio communications but you needed the
radar-now, the bridge-to-bridge radio, which was pioneered right
here in the Delaware River, they have the bridge-to-bridge radio
for some years on a voluntary basis, has been and is a very, very
effective arrangement and it is being used by all vessels, basic vessels,
foreign and domestic over a certain size coming in the port.
I believe the passing we saw this morning probably, if we could have
heard the vessels talking, we would have heard them talking about it.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, following the Queeny-Uorinthos,
incident and statements that this Member made in Washington,
there was a regular van established at the end of the bay, Tsubic
Bay to make a survey as to the needs for vessel traffic systems.
Admiral Rea, do you know the date that that van was there?
Admiral RAE. No; but-unless Mr. Whittum has it. But we
can produce it for the record. We are moving ahead and trying to
collect data, so when Philadelphia-
Mr. EILBERG. Approximately how long was the van there?
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Admiral REA. Lieutenant Whittum?
Lieutenant WHITTUM. Each site was 1 week long.
Admiral REA. Lieutenant Whittum's response was 1 week. That
is 24 hours a day.
Mr. EILBERG. The van was there 7 days?
Lieutenant WHITTUM. Yes, sir.
Admiral REA. Yes. The answer is "Yes."
Mr. EILBERG. What were the dates?
Admiral REA. I could furnish them. I do not have them at hand,
but I could furnish them.
Mr. EILBERG. Have you studied the results of what you have
found?
Admiral REA. I have not. I have not gotten a report from our
staff yet.
Captain Goodwin tells me that the information is at headquarters
and they are being looked over down there. I have no direct informa-
tion on them. This is one of the steps as you go along, the elementary
steps that once has been made, to accumulate as much data about the
traffic patterns so then you can make the decision of what kind of
equipment you need, eventually whether you want a fancy radar or
TV; just what you need.
But in order to reach those determinations, you have to start
collecting data. We have done that in the other ports and moved the
van over here and started to do some of that over here.
Mr. EILBERG. That was back in March, approximately, that
you had the van there?
Lieutenant WHITTUM. Yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. And that is about 4 months and you have no con-
clusions or no impression of what that van discovered?
Admiral REA. I have none myself; no.
Mr. EILBERG. Do you, Captain Goodwin, have any idea what the
van's findings were?
Captain GooDwIN. No, sir; none whatsoever.
We called headquarters and they are analyzing it. Again, I do not
think-I think this takes some study.
Mr. EILBERG. Do you have any idea when the study may be con-
cluded?
Captain GoODWIN. I am under the impression, if I recall correctly,
it will be along about October.
Mr. EILBERG. You are aware that the Waterway Safety Act was
enacted in 1972; are you not?
Captain GOODWIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. Now, Captain Goodwin, among other recommenda-
tions that I made was the need for additional channel markers and
other additional aids such as range lights and so forth.
Have you considered these at all and has there been anything done
to place additional markers?
Captain GooDWIN. No, sir.
Of course, as you are aware, we responded to this in a letter to Mr.
Duld. I can run through my comments relative to the proposed aid
system if you would like me to.
Mr. E1LBERG. Would you summarize it at this point?
Captain GOoDWIN. I will try.
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They wanted, as I recall, he wanted an improvement for the existing
system of age navigation in the immediate area of Cape Henlopen and
I noticed there was a radio beacon down there with a light on the
south end of the Harbor of Refuge breakwater of such candlepower
as to be visible 23 miles in the white sector and 20 in the red.
Additionally, I noted that the sea lanes approaching the entrance are
well marked, and that the bottom contours lend themselves well to
assisting a navigator through prudent use of a fathometer, and that
the adequacy of the existing system in that area probably explained
why there had only been two significant vessel casualties in the area
over the period January 1, 1967, through December of 1974.
I noted that both those casualties were collisions. One in 300-yard
visibility and close to an aid to navigation; and the other was in clear
weather with both vessels having a pilot aboard.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a moment,
please?
I do not think that the committee is getting much sense out of that
statement. I wonder if we could make that letter a part of the record?
Mr. B1AGGI. Without objection, it is submitted for the record.
[The material follows:]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
U.S. COAST GUARD,
Philadelphia UISCG Base, Gloucester City, N.J., April 28, 1975.
Mr. CHARLES DULD,
216 1931 Cottman Avenue,
Philadelphia, Pa.
DEAR MR. DULD: I am writing with reference to the Proposed Vessel Traffic
Safety System for the Port of Philadelphia and the Delaware River, as published
by Representative Eilberg, and the charts annotated to indicate proposed changes
in the aids to navigation system as established in the Delaware Bay and River.
Both the charts and the VTS proposal were left in my office by you after our
meeting last month; you desired my comments relative to each.
Starting with the charts, and proceeding from the entrance to the bay on up
stream, the following comments are noted:
a. There has heretofore been no need indicated for improvement of the existing
System of aids in the immediate area of Cape Henlopen. I note there is a radio
beacon at Cape Henlopen itself, with a light on the south end of the Harbor of
Refuge Breakwater of such candlepower as to be visible 23 miles in the white
sector and 20 miles in the red sectors; accompanied by a fog signal. Additionally,
the sea lanes approaching the entrance are well marked, and bottom contours
lend themselves well to assisting the navigator through prudent use of the
fathometer. The adequacy of the existing system probably explains why there
have only been two significant vessel casualties in that area over the period 1
January 1967 through December 1974. Both of those casualties were collisions,
one in 300 yard visibility and close to an aid to navigation; the other was in clear
weather, both vessels having pilots on board. The presence of a Vessel Traffic
System (VTS) might have prevented either of them; similarly, so might prudent
seamanship. I doubt that additional aids to navigation would have helped.
b. As you are aware, the Coast Guard has plans to establish a VTS for Delaware
Bay and River. The Cape Henlopen/Cape May areas are being evaluated in
that respect.
c. I have found no record of vessel casualties during the period 1 January1967
through December 1974 in the four mile stretch between South Shoal Lump
Buoy 6 and Delaware Bay Main Channel Lighted Bell Buoy 9; therefore, I fail
to see the need for additional buoys in that area. Also, it is noteworthy that there
has been no need for additional aids indicated at our meetings of the Mariner's
Advisory Committee for the Bay and River Delaware. Either I or one of my
officers regularly attend those meetings. The committee is comprised of members
of the Pilots Association, Norton, Lilly & Co., Inc., National Bulk Carriers, Inc.,
Mobil Oil Co., and Swann Oil Co. Additionally, representation is usually pro-
vided by the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, the Joint Executive Committee
PAGENO="0094"
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for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port Area, the Corps
of Engineers, and the Burlington Bristol Bridge Commission.
d. I realize we have in excess of two miles between markers on the Delaware
side of the Brandywine Range segment of the main channel. However, I fail to
see where there is an indicated need for additional aids. Since January 1967
there have been two groundings on that side of that portion of the channel-
both in the immediate vicinity of Delaware Bay Main Channel Lighted Bell
Buoy 9. There have been two groundings on the east side-one well out of the
channel.
e. Although we have a record of three groundings in 8 years on Miah Maull and
Cross Ledge Ranges (one within a mile of Elbow of Cross Ledge Light, on the
east side, and two in the immediate area of Delaware Bay Main Channel Lighted
Bell Buoy 32), I can find no record of casualties on Liston Range. Consequently
in the absence of justification to the contrary, I again fail to see where there is
an indicated need for additional aids on that stretch of the channel.
f. You note that we have only one set of ranges marking the approximately
1.6 mile leg of Baker Range, and suggest a possible location for a complementary
range for down bound vessels. In eight years we have had one recorded grounding
in this area, and that was in the immediate vicinity of Reedy Island Range
Lighted Bell Buoy 2R. The grounding involved an up-bound vessel in good
visibility. It does not appear that an additional set of ranges is required.
g. We are presently considering the Reedy Point area (entrance to the C and
D Canal) as a possible site for a VTS installation.
h. In a period of 8 years we have had 6 groundings on the New Castle Range
segment of the channel. One occurred in the immediate vicinity of New Castle
Range Lighted Bell Buoy iN/Buoy 2N-on the New Jersey side of the channel;
two occurred between Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Junction Lighted Bell
Buoy, and New Castle Range Lighted Bell Buoy 5N on the Delaware side;
another in the immediate vicinity of Bulkhead Bar Range Lighted Bell Buoy 2B;
and the final two in the proximate area of the intersection of New Castle Range
with Bulkhead Bar Range, on the outside of the bend. Consequently, I see little to
indicate a need for a lower range supplementing the upper range.
i. In reviewing Coast Guard records over the 8 year period 1 January 1967
through 1974, I find no record of collisions (vessel vs vessel), groundings or ram-
mings (vessel vs fixed object/moored vessel) in the area adjacent to Pea Patch
Island; thus I see no need to sacrifice a portion of Anchorage 5, even if the Corps
of Engineers had funds available to relocate the channel, for a questionable
purpose.
j. There have been no groundings and only two collisions, in the 8 year period of
my survey, on Deepwater Point Range. The two collisions (1968 and 1970)
occurred between Deepwater Point Range Lighted Buoys 1D and 2D. I fail to see
ççrher~ an additional set of range structures (at the lower end of the range) are
justified.
k. A range light may be weak due to a dirty lense or faulty power supply; how-
ever, because it appears weak occasionally, (you mentioned one complaint appar-
ently entaffing one incident) we should not automatically assume increased candle-
power is needed. I have had no complaints other than yours to the effect that Deep-
water Point Range Rear Light is inadequate. If it becomes apparent that there is a
demonstrated need for increased candlepower, I will make an appropriate recom-
mendation to our aids to navigation people at Governors Island.
1. I do not understand your notation with respect to Cherry Island Range Front
and Rear Lights, and Bellevue Range Front and Rear Lights. Specifically, I do
not understand how their location makes it difficult for ships to make the turn.
We have an unlighted buoy (Cherry Island Range Buoy 9C) guarding the shoal
on the Delaware side, on the outside of the turn, and there is Bellevue Range
Lighted Buoy 2B just opposite the intersection of the ranges and guarding Cherry
Island Flats. Additionally, the pilot/master can depart either range early due to
the fact that the area to the New Jersey side of their intersection has been widened
beyond the general 800 foot project width; there is no need to run to the inter-
section of the ranges. Of course any movement of the ranges would necessarily
mean they would no longer mark the channel center line-a customary function
of most ranges.
m. As a side light, I note you have designated the "Scene of Fatal Collision"
at the wrong site.
n. I can find no record of any groundings on the Little Tinicum Range segment
of the channel-over the period 1 January 1967 through 1974. We have had two
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collisions and two rammings on that stretch in that period. One collision occurred
in fog, near Little Tinicum Island Range Buoy 4T with both ships communicat-
ing with each other and near or at mid-channel; the second collision occurred
when a vessel had a steering casualty and hit (rammed) a vessel at the Mobil
Oil facility. The two rammings occurred when vessels were docking; one was
blown onto a pier, the other suffered a power loss and struck a pier. I do not see
where there is a demonstrated need for your proposed second set of range struc-
tures.
o. Your suggestion that the channel be widened and/or relocated to "mid
stream" is noted. Along Billingsport Range we have experienced one collision
and two rammings in 8 years. The one coffision occurred when a vessel hit a
barge at the Mobil Oil facility, having experienced engine failure while undocking.
Of the two rammings, one ship hit the Esso Paulsboro pier while maneuvering to
get underway; the second rammed the BP Paulsboro pier while mooring. Whether
or not the Corps of Engineers would feel widening and/or relocating the channel
is justified is a subject best left to them.
p. The statement that "Additional range markers should be placed in areas
where vessels must take a heading from a stern view" is too general to comment
upon.
Proceeding on to a review of the congressman's Proposed Vessel Traffic Safety
System for the Port of Philadelphia and the Delaware River, the following com-
ments are offered:
a. Page I.-The "basic traffic system" which is viewed as ideal would be of
limited usefulness, particularly during periods of reduced visibility, without the
use of radar for surveillance to assure compliance. The addition of radar of course
leads to the designation" sophisticated system" which in turn is termed "in-
adequate in that the end results are not sufficiently effective considering the cost
factor." I do not agree. Just as radar is used for enforcement on our highways,
most likely to reduce the number of law enforcement officers needed for surveil-
lance, so do we need radar as a part of our VTS, for surveillance.
b. Page 11.-The basic vessel traffic system is defined by the GAO as one that
includes regulations, traffic separation schemes, or a communications network-
including vessel movement reporting procedures. We have all these elements, to
the degree which I feel is required, in the Delaware Valley area. We have a vessel
traffic separation scheme at the entrance to the bay. We have regulations, in
terms of: The Rules of the Road, regulations governing the handling of hazardous
materials (and enforced by my men), regulations governing the anchorages, and
orders stipulating vessel separation in periods of fog-to name several. Further,
we have a vessel reporting system, very ably managed by the Philadelphia
Maritime Exchange with the cooperation of the Pilots Association. Finally, we
have a bridge to bridge communications net work using Channel 13 (FM), to
facilitate the coordination of efforts as vessels transit the channel and maneuver
to and from facilities.
c. Page 1.-While the proposal seemed to initially rule out radar (since it
would then escalate cost-wise to a "sophisticated system"), the discussion im-
mediately visualizes the presence of radar. I am pleased to see this but fail to
understand where the personnel will come from, since no additional personnel
resources are apparently contemplated in the comment "-so material procure-
ment and maintenance costs will be the only new major expenses." This is short-
sighted and reflects no appreciation of our manning problems at today's level of
mission implementation/accomplishment.
Likewise, I am totally at a loss to understand how, given no increase in per-
sonnel, we will carry out existing mission responsibilities and at the same time
man an installed network of visual towers operated in conjunction with the pro-
posed radar and communications center.
Tower and equipment maintenance, in addition to the manning, wifi have to be
accomplished, somehow. I need a more detailed statement as to exactly how the
congressman sees his proposal being implemented before I can comment objec-
tively.
d. Page 2.-I can appreciate what the congressman is striving for by prescrib-
ing speed limits and the use of tugs. Of course it would have an economic impact
on the port. I would be interested in hearing what those organizations pro-
moting the port (such as the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange and the Phila-
delphia Port Corporation), and those whose livelihood is dependent upon and
contributes to the economic viability of the port have to say about such a broad
proposal. I am sure the 10 knot limit in the lower bay would be of particular
PAGENO="0096"
91
interest to the pilots; it might well have some implication with respect to the
need for increased anchorage dimensions.
I am particularly gratified to note the apparent awareness that regulations
without a means for surveillance are of little value.
e. Page 3.-46 CFR Parts 146 and 147 contain a list of explosives and other
dangerous cargos. The regulations governing the cargos covered therein are
enforced by the Coast Guard. You have undoubtedly noted that a good number
of the 914 pages of regulations are devoted to merely listing the products and
stipulating stowage requirements. I am not of the opinion that a Coast Guard
escort of all ships carrying dangerous cargo is necessary, desireable, or, in the
absence of additional resources, possible.
f. Page 4.-No comment except to note that we are essentially doing all that is
discussed at the present time-on a random basis. Our safety record does not
indicate a need for stepped up activity.
g. Page 5.-The need for the expansion of existing anchorages was not sub.-
stantiated in a recent study contracted for by the Corps of Engineers-except for
improving Marcus Hook anchorage in the absence of a modern deepwater port.
The study, the results of which is titled "Engineering and Economic Analysis
of Delaware River Anchorages", was conducted in 1973 and 1974 by Tippetts-
Abbett-McCarthy and Stratton, Engineers and Architects, of New York.
h. Page 6.-The difficulty noted with locating and identifying the aids at Egg
Island, Ben Davis Point, Dunks Point and Arnold Point, as well as similar towers
on the Delaware side of the channel, is not understood, except perhaps as it per-
tains to small craft. However, if we are primarily concerned with shipping in the
usual sense, and I would expect that to be the case in a discussion of the need for
VTS, we have adequate aids marking the shipping channel. The aids inshore in
the bay are primarily for the benefit of smaller craft, and most especially at night.
The characteristics of the shoreline, coupled with identifying marks on other aids
in the immediate area assist in identifying those towers during daylight; the light
characteristic provides identification at night.
We are presently installing new dayboards on a number of ranges on the Upper
Delaware River, to improve visibility. Similar changes can be made elsewhere if
the users indicate there is such a need.
More specific comments were made earlier in this letter with regard to specific
segments of the channel and the aids to navigation system.
i. Page 10.-The Coast Guard periodically monitors Channel 13 (bridge to
bridge circuit). The enforcement of circuit discipline is a matter for the FCC.
The Coast Guard, namely my office (in the Port of Philadelphia), does, on a
continuing basis, consider "No Passing" zones at various locations along the
channel. We presently have one in effect on Muffin Range. On occasion, we have
closed the channel completely.
j. Page 11.-The proposal concludes by again promoting a basic vessel traffic
system; however, between Page 1 and Page 11 I am under the distinct impression
that we are discussing our needs in terms of a sophisticated vessel traffic system.
I am enclosing a summarization of my findings at the conclusion of a study I
undertook with respect to vessel casualties during the period 1 January 1967
through 1974. You may have obtained a copy earlier, but I feel it is pertinent to
our present discussion.
I trust the foregoing is responsive to your desires. The subject of port safety is a
broad one; it includes not only requirements for traffic regulations and mainten-
ance of an adequate system of aids to navigation, but also it requires consideration
of how cargoes (particularly dangerous cargoes) are handled, both aboard ship and
at the facifities; it includes a review of how facilities are maintained and how ships
are constructed and maintained-how well crews are trained. To emphasize any
one of these aspects at the expense of another would likely not serve to effectively
improve our overall mission accomplishment in port safety. Increased perform-
ance can only come about with increased personnel resources and equipment-if
you are willing to concede that, by and large, our personnel are fully and effectively
employed at present, not only here in Philadelphia but generally throughout the
Coast Guard. I feel they are. I also feel it would be the height of complacency to
say we are presently doing all that needs to be done. We aren't. Given adequare
resources, we can.
Very truly yours,
D. C. GOODWIN,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Captain of the Port, Philadelphia.
78-280-76-----7
PAGENO="0097"
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Mr. EILBERG. Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not know exactly what
procedure you would follow, but I would like to make a statement
that we were given kindly by the Coast Guard, a statement of charts
of the Delaware River and Delaware Bay which showed through 1974
all the collisions, groundings and rammings, their locations, their
precise locations.
We took those charts and superimposed upon them in very brief
language, comments or suggestions as to improvements that might be
made.
I would like the chairman's permission to bring those charts up at
this point and, with the assistance of my assistants, review those for
the benefit of the committee so that you might understand and the
committee might better understand the kinds of things that we are
looking for.
* Mr. BIAGGI. I have no objection to that, but I would ask Mr.
Eilberg to defer until Mr. du Pont has completed with his questions.
Mr. EILBERG. By all means.
Mr. DU PONT. Do you want to continue on another subject?
Mr. EILBERG. Excuse me, Congressman du Pont, I do not want to
cOntinue on another subject; I wish to present the Coast Guard charts
given to me and the comments. You can see from the charts, which are
marked "Collisions, Groundings, Rammings," when they occurred, and
what our recommendations are to minimize accidents from occurring.
Mr. Dli PONT. Mr. Chairman, I would do it either way if that is the
final question or area that Mr. Eilberg has.
Mr. EILBERG. At this point.
Mr. Dli PONT. Well, why do you not go ahead and do that?
Mr. EILBERG. I know that you are in a bit of a rush.
Mr. Dli PONT. Well, I have another hour.
Mr. BIAGGI. Why do you not go ahead?
Mr. Dli PONT.. You want me to go ahead? All right, I will go ahead
in case time runs out.
Captain Goodwin, I am at this point a little bit confused as to just~
what kind of vessel traffic system we have. I listened with interest to
Mr. Eilberg's questions and it must be me that is confused.
I thought that you said that we did not have, at one point, that we
did not have the basic system and yet in your testimony you say that
you already have the basic system, which is on page 11, in the form of
regulations, traffic separation of the Maritime Exchange Reporting
System.
So would you say today that we have a basic vessel traffic system in
iii the Delaware River?
Captain GOODWIN.. Yes, sir, if I said we did not, I am sorry. I must
have slipped up.
I feel we do have the basic system and Admiral Rea commented on
New York. I feel that any system of regulation requires the surveil-
lance capability just as our police officers use radar and so forth and I
would certainly wa.nt some form of radar in the por.t area of
Philadelphia.
Mr. DUPONT. Well, now, is that vessel traffic system, in some form
that we could put it at this point in the record, listing exactly what it is
and what its components are? Is there a public document?
Captain GOODWIN. No, sir, it is an-pretty much of an informal
thing and comprised of the regulations that the captain of the port
PAGENO="0098"
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put out for the anchorage down in Big Stone Anchorage, the regula-
tions we have prescribing vessel separation during periods of reducect
visability of 1,000 yards, of course the rules of the road and that nature.
That is the regulatory part of it. The communications are under the
auspices of the Maritime Exchange with their reporting stations at
Henlopen and in the Marcus Hook area and the vessel traffic separa-
tion that is referred to, I feel we have where we need it, and that is
at the entrance to the bay.
Mr. DU PONT. So if we have the basic system, the real issue is,.
should we go to the more sophisticated system and I gather that is
your conclusion that that would not be particularly helpful, but I
would ask two questions-three questions.
Surely it would not be harmful and, second, what would it cost if we
went ahead and put in a sophisticated system appropriate to the
Delaw are River that is in ballpark figures; and, third, would not it
be particularly helpful in two of the pressure points, looking at your
chart of accidents on the river, at the entrance to the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal, where there have been a large number of accidents at
one time or another and slightly north of there at the Goose Island
Passage where you turn around the wildlife refuge. Those are the two
places that show as the most susceptible to accidents and would not
the system, more sophisticated just be more helpful at those two points?
Captain GoODwIN. Yes, sir. I am in favor of a sophisticated system.
It is the only system that I want.
But I think that the priority that the Commandant has assigned to
it, based on our safety record in the port, is realistic.
When I made the study, if that is what you want to call it, I started
off and I was a little bit worried for fear that maybe we had gotten so
wound up in the day-to-day operations that there were things occur-
ring that I was not aware of, maybe the situation was worse than I
thought and I was not sure where it was going to come out. I was quite
surprised, quite frankly, when I found that we averaged two and a
half per year vessel accidents.
Now, while we have those areas, and certainly they are areas that
they are looking at, and that is why we had our radar van in those
areas. We again have to look at the severity, or grounding or ramming,
I don't think there is any man who had been a skipper of a vessel
whose vessel has not touched a pier a little harder than he intended
and you call it a ramming. That is a matter of dollar value that
attaches to it, I believe.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. du Pont, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. DU PONT. Yes.
Mr. EILBERG. In your questioning concerning the vessel traffic
systems referred to a sophisticated one. I wonder if you have a copy
of the GAO report in front of you.
Mr. nu PONT. Yes, with the table on page 6~
Mr. EILBERG. Would the gentleman be kind enough to look at the.
paragraph at the bottom of page 7. It reads:
With a total estimated investment of from $3.5 million to $7 million, the
Coast Guard could develop basic systems in other ports and waterways that
should prevent about 52 vessel casualties a year. The ports and waterways where
a basic vessel traffic system should be more cost-effective in reducing vessel
casualties include Chesapeake Bay, Baltimore, Norfolk, Hampton Roads and
Newport News, Delaware River and Bay, Philadelphia, Trenton, and Camden~
and five sections of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, et cetera.
PAGENO="0099"
94
So obviously there is some disagreement as to what is a basic
vessel traffic system between the GAO and-
Mr. du PONT. Well, that is a good observation and that is why I
asked the initial question. But if you turn back to page 6 of the GAO
report and look at the four elements that they list in the basic system,
it appears that all four of those already are in existence here according
to the Captain's testimony. The radio, the bridge-to-bridge telephone,
the traffic separation scheme are in these parts of the river and the
only remaining question is the regulations, which is why I asked the
question.
Mr. EILBERG. May I respond?
I think we can secure agreement on the fact that all of these kinds
of traffic systems, radar systems, you can have TV observations,
there are a whole range which goes from very simple ones to compli-
cated ones.
I would suggest that the use of the language, "basic system" or
"sophisticated system" really is an arbitrary one and really does not
have a great deal of meaning.
Mr. DU PONT. Well, the point of my question here is to find out
what the cost would be and whether it would be effective to put
these other three items in that they list, which they call sophisticated
systems, and see whether they would be helpful, particularly at the
two pressure points I mentioned and to see whether they would be a
substantial financial cost.
Captain GOoDwIN. Well, I am not prepared to talk about the cost
because I am not familiar with it. I can certainly say from an opera-
tional standpoint it would be helpful.
I would like at this point to mention, too, that while there were a
few comments in your report as concerns the Delaware Bay and River,
it is, as I recall, this was one of the ports the GAO Committee person-
nel did not visit.
Mr. DII PONT. Just looking again at the GAO report, they estimate
somewhere between $9 million and $11 million for the cost of the
system in New York Harbor, which is many times more sophisticated
in its problems than we have in the Delaware River.
Would it be fair to say, or-let us say, at the outside, for $5 million
we could develop a sophisticated data controlled system here? I am
just looking for a ballpark figure, $5 million, plus or minus $1 million?
That it is close enough for Government work.
Captain GooDWIN. Yes, sir. That is a lot of money for the Coast
Guard. Yes, I would say we could put one in for $5 million, would
you not say, Admiral? I'm sorry.
Vice Admiral REA. 1 would certainly say the starting point, Mr.
du Pont, the radar certainly would certainly help, some surveillance
would help, and reduce the possibility of an accident.
Mr. DU PONT. So it would be your-as I said at the beginning, it
certainly would not be harmful.
Vice Admiral REA. No.
Mr. DU PONT. If someone were to present you with the $5 million,
things would get better.
Vice Admiral REA. I think it is possible.
Mr. DII PONT. Well now,-
Vice Admiral REA. Also, our city of New York, and we also could
use it better over there and I would not want to indulge in that
argument with this committee here today.
PAGENO="0100"
95
Mr. BIAGGI. Would the gentleman yield?
I would like the committee to know that for the record, New York
with all of its traffic, which is many times that of the port of Phil-
adelphia or Delaware Bay, we are No. 7 in the priority list. It is a
question of money and this area is scheduled No. 12.
The fact is, no one disagrees that the "sophisticated"-which took
on that characterization as a result of the GAO report-vessel traffic
system would benefit the maritime industry. Again, it is the question
of priorities and we sympathize with the representatives of Delaware
and Philadelphia, but happily New York is five up on you.
Mr. EILBERG. Would the Chairman yield for a moment?
I think the application of terms and ballpark figures are really not
very helpful in trying to find a solution to whatever problems there
are. We have taken the trouble to provide suggestions. Many of these
require the use of no money at all.
The people we have consulted feel that many of these suggestions
are valid ones. I do not take the position that we need a "sophisticated
system."
I say that some or all of these suggestions should be considered and
that the figure would be nowhere near $5 million.
Mr. BIAGGI. In response, I call attention to the reply from Admiral
Rea stating that the third district staff will review your recom-
mendations and perhaps have another point of view, but certainly
give it additional consideration.
Mr. DII PONT. Well, again, the point to be made is to try to get
in my mind, somekind of idea of what we are really talking about here.
I recognize that the admiral has a conflict of interest between the
Delaware River and New York Harbor but we can settle those con-
flicts with a few words in the appropriation bill as to where the money
ends up and take that burden off your shoulders for you.
We are talking only about $5 million to get the most sophisticated
system and maybe that is not necessary. But the important thing was
your statement that you thought, particularly at those two places in
the river that I mentioned, that it would be helpful and I think that
that is the primary response to come out. How it is funded is part of
your problem, but it is also part of our problem.
Captain GooDwIN. Mr. Congressman, could I just make one com-
ment there?
If you do give us the money to build it, I do hope that you will get
us the men to man it because as Congressman Eilberg states here, on
his proposed radar center, it would be manned by Coast Guard per-
sonnel, some material, procurement, and maintenance cost would be
the only major expenses, and it ain't true.
Mr. Dii PONT. We would certainly do that and-as you recall, I
had as a result of a meeting that you and I had in January, I had a
conversation with Admiral Suer at the appropriations hearings about
the assignment of additional men to Philadelphia in your harbor
safety unit which you seem to feel is necessary. He did reply that
he did not need any more money in his authorization bill, that he had
plenty of money to supply the men if he thought the men were justified.
So we would certainly look at the financial aspect of it.
Mr. EILBERG. If I may interrupt for a minute.
Do I understand that the money is there for manpower if the
admiral decides that the system is necessary?
PAGENO="0101"
96
Mr. DU PONT. We were referring in that authorization hearing to
beefing up the port safety group and I was particularly concerned
with inspecting hazardous cargo vessels and we were not talking about
the vessel traffic system.
But the point that I was making in this case was that if we had to
have additional personnel, I would certainly put them in that appro-
priation at the same time.
Mr. HEYWARD. Mr du Pont, in that regard, I would like to state
that the committee in its authorization legislation sets the level of
personnel for the Coast Guard. If and when additional personnel are
moved to Philadelphia or Delaware Bay it has to come from some-
where else, unless the committee is going to authorize additional
personnel to meet the needs.
Mr. DIJ PONT. Probably they could come from New York City with
no trouble at all.
All right, let me move to another question. It seems to me, even
though you have some regulations regarding vessel traffic in the river,
that you could do more in that area. For example, when the tankers
lighter off at Big Stone Beach and start up the river, it is my impres-
sion that they do so with very little to spare in the way of draft
clearance. They do not lighter off any more than they have to because
it costs them money to do that. So sometimes they come up with just
a few inches under the keels. They tie up on the high side of the tide
and they pump fast enough so they do not go aground as the tide
goes out.
Would not it be appropriate for the Coast Guard to put in effect a
regulation that says how much you have to lighter off and get a few
more feet of clearance there so there would not be as many groundings
there?
Captain GOoDwIN. I think that could be a possibility, yes, sir.
Mr. DU PONT. I do not know how many of your accidents that you
tabulate here were groundings and I do not know how many of those
involve tankers that have lightered off oil, but it seems to me that is
a relatively simple way and easily monitored way to cut down on
problems of that kind.
Captain GooDwIN. I would want to take a look at the causes of the
groundings and again it is easy to regulate and we have the authority
and can do it very easily but we try to work closely with the maritime
exchange.
We try to consider the economic impact what we do, this cost-benefit
ratio, perhaps thing. In 2 years, we have had one grounding that I am
aware of that is-that has resulted in significant pollution in the port
area and that was with the Mellon.
But, we could prescribe that they lighter off to a lesser depth.
Mr. BIAGGI. On that point, Captain, in pursuit of Congressman
du Pont's question, how many groundings have you had as a result
of insufficient lightering?
Captain GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the figures on
that, but I could work them up and get them with probably not too
much trouble. All I would do is review those charts and the recapitu-
lation here.
[The information was not received at time of printing.]
PAGENO="0102"
97
Mr. BIAGGI. For the record, I would appreciate if you do that, but
for my own immediate information, does it happen with any degree
of frequency?
Captain GooDwIN. I would say no, sir, it does not.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.
Mr. m PONT. Captain, one question about the regulation and the
procedures you used to issue them. Referring again to the GAO
report, there are several paragraphs about how the captain of the
Coast Guard, capatin of the ports in New York recommended various
regulations on speed limits and vessel movements in fog, and so forth.
When you propose a regulation, I am using that word as a term of
art, does that regulation take on the effect of law or does it have to
be-after you propose it, does it have to be further processed in some
way before it gains the total affect of law?
Vice Admiral REA. May I try to respond to that, Congressman
du Pont?
The authority and procedures available, if you need to get a regula-
tion out right now because of some immediate situation, emergency
situation, the captain of the port can promulgate that right now. It is
not used very often because those situations did not cover authorities
there. But in the more orderly manner and when you put a regulation
out which is not quite that emergent, you had to follow the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, have public notice, put it in the Federal
Register, have a public hearing, promulgation of the regulations.
Mr. DU PONT. Now in the case of the Port of New York, this has
from time to time been done. The proposed regulation has been issued
and the procedures gone through. Has that happened here in the
Delaware River?
Vice Admiral REA. I will refer to Captain Goodwin. It certainly
has happened in New York. It could have.
Captain GOODWIN. I have right now three proposed report orders
or regulations. They have not gone down to Washington yet and they
are being observed by the Maritime Committee in the port, but they
have not been finalized or registered in the Register.
Mr. DU PONT. But you intend to pursue that?
Captain GooDwIN. Yes, sir.
* Mr. m~ PONT. Is, for example, the traffic separation scheme
that exist at the mouth of the bay a proposed regulation or actual
regulation?
Captain GOODWIN. That is published on the charts.
Vice ADMIRAL REA. The traffic separation scheme as you approach
the Chesapeake Bay-in New York, are an international scheme
which had been adopted by ENCO.
Mr. DU PONT. But they have not-so they are not a regulation?
Vice ADMIRAL REA. No, they are in the form of a regulation and
IMCO has asked that all countries take action to-I cannot think of
the word they have, but that the countries take action.
Mr. DU PONT. Ratification?
Vice Admiral REA. No, it is not a ratification. But IMCO is and
has specialized, has recommended that the nation take steps to
penalize or take actions against their mates who do not follow those
separation schemes. If there was a port, master or mate failed to
abide by those, when we would pursue against his license under
RS 4450.
PAGENO="0103"
98
Mr. DU PONT. What about the vessel traffic separation scheme up
in the Delaware keeping greater distance in the fog, for example, is
that a regulation?
Captain GooDwIN. Right now that is an interim regulation. It has
not been formalized and it is being on a cooperative basis, being
adhered to. It is an interim regulation.
Mr. DII PONT. That is one of the ones that you intend to pass on to
Washington for final action?
Captain GOODWIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. DII PONT. Do you have any speed limit, regulations in effect
now in the river?
Captain GOODWIN. No, no, sir, no specific speed limit. Again to
answer that, and to discuss the subject of speed, would be a little bit
messy. I have some comments on speed that I would like to make if
you feel we have the time.
Mr. DII PONT. Well, my point at the moment is to make sure, just
to see if there were any regulations.
Captain GOODWIN. No, sir. I would not want to put a specific
figure, not in the river. I understand the port in New York tried it
and decided that it was not practical there.
Mr. DU PONT. All right, I think that that would conclude my
questioning, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we can go to Mr. Eilberg's chart
and work on that problem.
If I have any more, I will come back to them in a second.
Mr. BIAGGI. All right.
Mr. Eilberg?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes, if I could have Mr. Duld from my staff come
up to the maps.
Mr. BIAGGI. May I have your attention, please? While the charts
are being arranged, Congressman Eilberg has stated that he was in-
formed by various labor groups involved with the marine industry
that they have an accident every day. Would you respond to that?
Vice Admiral REA. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Do your records reflect that?
Vice Admiral REA. Not to my knowledge. I will respectfully re-
quest that Mr. Eilberg pass the union's report to us because our
records do not reflect any kind of data. Our files do not reflect any
data like that. If there are accidents every day, then they should be
reported to us and we will certainly investigate them and I would
just urge that the unions be encouraged to make those reports to us
so we can look into them.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, this information comes from the local
Seafarers' representative John Fay and perhaps he might want to
write to Mr. Fay and I am sure he would respond.
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes, we will. If Mr. Fay would take initiative and just
respond, make a statement of fact to this committee we would ap-
preciate it.
Let me raise a question. I have the advantage of the overflight this
morning.
How do you view hazardous cargoes now and how do you plan to
deal with them in the future, in light of the proposed developments
and in light of the nuclear plants being operational?
Captain GOODWIN. Well, of course Mr. Chairman, our people board
the vessels that are handling cargoes of particular hazards.
PAGENO="0104"
99
I referred several times to the importation of liquefied natural gas
this morning. We have come up with our proposed guidelines for this.
In that particular case, we propose to escort the vessels. We strictly
limit their movement in the port. We will require closer supervision of
their hookups and when they unhook, things of this nature. I do not
know whether that answers your question or not.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is what you are doing now.
What will you do, if anything, when the nuclear plant becomes
operational?
Captain GooDwIN. In that particular case, sir, we propose to pick
up our escort a little further south than we initially intended. We
have moved our intercept point from 6 miles below the C. & D. Canal
to 18 miles below the canal to provide a Coast Guard escort and we
also will require the provision of a commercial tug to accompany the
ship as it is coming up the channel, in the event that he loses his
propulsion or steerage. Things of this nature. But in the LNG tanker
construction, they have built in redundancy to a degree that would
probably preclude some of the accidents that we have had with
conventional construction and there again we point out that we have
double hull construction on our LNG carriers.
At a hearing we held locally, some people I think looked-question-
ably the testimony that entered that had the Queeny hit an LNG
carrier down in that position rather than the Gorinthos, there probably
would have been no explosion. As near as I can make out from what
little I know of the occurrence, I think this is probably true because
of the double hull construction on the LNG tankers.
Mr. BIAGGI. Do they clear the waters of any other vessels when
you have transportation of hazardous cargoes?
Captain GOODWIN. No, sir, not-with the LNG; we have problems
in this port that you do not have in other ports. The long transit time
coming up the channel. The fact that you have just one channel
serving the port.
We could not prescribe just one-way traffic for instance. We would
have to have a passing situation and we had to prescribe regulations
that, if the local communities decide they want LNG in their area,
we will have to prescribe the best regulations we can to minimize the
chances of an accident.
Mr. BIAGGI. One further question before we go to the charts.
I recognize you have acknowledged the contribution of Capt. Paul
Ives and Capt. Sam Schellenger and their respective organizations.
Is it the committee's understanding of this contribution correct
when they conclude that the Coast Guard works together with these
various groups, bearing in mind the various considerations?
Captain GooDWIN. I think we work closely together. I have no-
I look to them for a lot of advice and I think we have a very close and
harmonious working relationship.
Mr. BIAGGI. And you regard their input?
Captain GOODWIN. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, it was partly-
well, yes, sir, no doubt about it.
Mr. EILBERG. On that point, may I ask a question of Captain
Goodwin?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Mr. EILBERG. Until recently, I understood that the Pilots Associa-
tion had an opening at the bay from which the pilot would board ships
for entering the bay. Also they had radar system on the ship.
PAGENO="0105"
100
According to newspaper reports, that ship was taken out of action
because of the expense involved. Is that correct, Captain Goodwin?
Captain GooDwIN. I am not sure what the reason was, Mr. Con-
gressman.
I think that Captain Schellenger from the Pilots Association is
here, and I think he would probably be better equipped to respond
to that question than I.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record
a photograph from the Philadelphia Inquirer which indicates this
ship from Philadelphia being tied up and the Inquirer stating that
the former Coast Guard icebreaker is being laid up because of the
expense of maintaining it, officials representing the Pilots said.
Mr. BIAGca. Without objection.
Mr. EILBERG. Now, Captain Goodwin, I understand then that they
gave the ship up and went ashore. What did you do for radar control
at the entrance of the bay during that period?
Captain GOODWIN. What did I do for it?
Mr. EILBERG. What did the Coast Guard do, if anything?
Captain GoornvlN. We have noticed no difference in the operation
down there. We have done nothing other than to monitor the situation.
I do not-there has been no indication that the services have been
reduced.
Mr. EILBERG. So you do not consider that their contribution insofar
asradar was any significance as far as the Coast Guard was concerned?
Captain GOODWIN. Their installation of radar?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Captain GOODWIN. I think after it has had a chance to be proven,
it is quite new, that we may find that-that they are making consider-
able contributions. It may have an impact on what the Coast Guard
would decide to do down there.
Mr. EILBERG. Now they have reinstalled the radar on shore now,
permanent quarters on shore and you take the position that you do
not know that that radar has any value, at all as far as ship safety is
concerned, is that your position, Captain Goodwin?
Captain GOODWiN. No, sir, it is not. I am sure it has value.
Just for the relative merits of the installation, they will have to hold
off and see what materializes, until we get a chance to gain some ex-
perience or they get a chance to gain some experience.
Mr. EILBERG. And you do not feel that there is anything unusual or
anything questionable about having this as part of the government
process if the prior installation became radar, you see no problem with
that?
Captain GooDwIN. No, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. We may disagree on that, Captain.
What happens if we decide that the radar is essential and the radar
goes out. Does it become a matter of concern to them?
Captain GoODwIN. It might and then I think it is incumbent upon
the Coast Guard to find the funds and put their own radar in.
Mr. EILBERG. But you have not sought to do so so far, have you?
Captain GooDwiN. No, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. All right, Mr. Chairman, we have these sketches
which I would like to show to you if I may. This is a rather difficult
place. Can we move this around somehow?
Mr. BIAGGI. Let us go to it.
[Pause.]
PAGENO="0106"
101
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Duld.
Mr. DULD. To start off with Mr. Eilberg's proposal was at point one
and two here for an establishment of a radar system that would have
control over the Delaware Bay area insofar as vessel traffic control and
its movement is concerned.
At the present time the only traffic control that you have there is
that which is established by the Pilots Association of the Maritime
Exchange.
Mr. Eilberg has also proposed additional channel markers in the
particular area and we have stretches that go for as far as 2 miles and
some places 1,800 yards apart without markers on one side of the chan-
nel.
In comparison with the chart that was supplied by the Coast Guard,
it indicates in the particular areas that Mr. Eilberg. has made his
suggestions that there have been some incidents which have taken
place. Whether or not the establishment of what Mr. Eilberg has pro-
posed will alleviate the present problem remains to be seen.
If we go on to the next chart. In this particular area, we have also
indicated the possible location for range markers. We have ships that
are traveling south but must look over their shoulder to take a bearing
on range markers that are behind them or astern of them.
There are actually no range markers to line their ship up directly
ahead of them. We have indicated this in various places along the
river and this information by the way has not come from Mr. Eilberg
or myself directly. We do not navigate these waters every single
day but have been introduced as proposals and suggestions by the
people that Mr. Eilberg has indicated in previous statements.
We have also indicated that there is a possible widening of channels
or a moving of channels, the midchannel because it runs too close to
fueling piers and docking areas that cause a hazardous condition.
These are contained on the charts.
Especially now for the Delaware Canal, the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal, Mr. Eilberg has indicated the need for a vessel
traffic control spot. Now in comparison, if they will just look at this
one particular area, the Coast Guard charts indicate a high degree of
accidents or incidents within this particular area. However, I do
find that Captain Goodwin, since we have come out with this, has
indicated the need for a vessel traffic control at this particular point.
We may, Captain Goodwin, have shown on this particular chart
a wrong location by maybe an inch or two insofar as the scene of the
fatal collision. In this particular area, we have asked for a relocation
of the channel because we have found from ship masters, captains of
naval ships that have navigated these waters on a weekly basis,
have indicated that right in that area in the lower left-hand side that
it is quite difficult in making the channel where the two ranges cross
each other.
However, I understand Captain Goodwin has indicated that they
can make an early turn but it is not indicated on that particular chart
and I am not sure about the foreign ships that are coming in, whether
they would have that information unless the pilot says that we can
make an early turn. However, if this was established, it would be
a potential for alleviating the accidents or a potential hazard at the
present time.
PAGENO="0107"
102
Right here at Billings Port range, if ships making their turn at
that point, and I understand from the Coast Guard charts, if you look
at it, there have been incidents right over there, quite a few and that
is a feuling pier. Quite a hazardous area.
They may have been lucky up until this time, but who knows
about tomorrow or next week? We have not gone any further up the
river. We have stopped at this point.
However, there are other charts insofar as all the way up to Morris-
yule and Trenton is concerned, showing some accidents in regard to
what the Coast Guard has logged.
Mr. EILBERG. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral?
Vice Admintal REA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think probably these are suggestions already made to Captain
Goodwin, but rather than cut that off there, and have him give a reply,
what I would like to do is perhaps suggest that perhaps your committee
would refer these to me, Third Coast Guard District, and also I
think you need to refer them to the Corps of Engineers because he is
talking about matters in there about widening the channels, which
is more appropriate to the Corps of Engineers.
But I would welcome the opportunity to comment on these pro-
posals and give you a possible response rather than to attempt to go
over them now.
Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, I think that you only need to turn
to Captain Goodwin to get those materials. We have presented all of
this to Captain Goodwin.
Vice Admiral REA. Well, Mr. Eilberg, Mr. Chairman, are these the
same identical proposals to which Captain Goodwin has already
responded?
Mr. EILBERG. They are, Admiral.
Vice Admiral REA. All right. We will look those over again, sir.
The answers may not be any different but we will look them over
again and try to give you another overview of them.
Mr. EILBERG. And/or keep pressing until we get some action out
of the Coast Guard.
Vice Admiral REA. But I do think it is a matter for the corps. I do
not know whether you want to refer them to the corps or not, but
some of these matters are beyond us.
Mr. EILBERG. You can make recommendations to the corps too,
just as well as we can, can you not?
Vice Admiral REA. Well-
Mr. EILBERG. Do you not?
Vice Admiral REA. We can. We can when we get matters of those
that are referred to us, but I thought maybe the committee would
like to. Either way. We can do it either way.
Mr. EILBERG. We may do this, but you may also, if you think any
change is correct.
Vice Admiral REA. Oh, we can.
Mr. BIAGGI. All right, no further questions, Admiral. Captain,
thank you for your contributions. I suggest, if you will, stay where
you are because I am sure there is going to be some interchange.
It is our experience that interchange is full and wholesome.
Vice Admiral REA. We will.
PAGENO="0108"
103
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like Capt. Paul Ives.
I believe you have expressed a desire to address us.
Capt. Paul Ives represents the Pilots Association for the Bay and
the iRiver Delaware. He is also the secretary of the American Pilots
Association, and we welcome you.
STATEMENT OP CAPT. PAUL IVES, PILOTS ASSOCIATION FOR THE
BAY AND RIVER, DELAWARE
Captain IvEs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome
you and the other members of the committee to Philadelphia and by
word of further introduction if I may, I would like to say that I am
chairman of the American Pilots Association Electronics Aid Com-
mittee and participate in numerous committees in Washington on
planning of this sort. I am presently chairman of the Radio Technical
Commission for Marine Services Special Committee. Sixty-seven,
Vessel Traffic Systems. In addition to that, I am chairman of the
Port of Philadelphia vessel traffic study group under the auspices of
the Joint Executive Committee and in this capacity I wear two hats.
I am a working pilot on the Delaware River and just as recently as
yesterday morning I conducted one of those ships you were talking
about from Big Stone Beach anchorage to the Port of Philadelphia.
In the course of my activities on the national level, I have had an
opportunity to visit the Port of San Francisco, I think at least four
times in the planning stages of the VTS systems. I have been there as
recently as a year ago. I have visited and observed the Seattle Puget
Sound vessel traffic system. I was in the Houston control center and
have been in touch with the New York group on their deliberations.
Last January I was a guest of the Norwegian Government making
some observations of the proposed electronic surveillance system for
Oshofjord. I have a number of opinions and observations about
vessel traffic systems; and, getting right down to the local level, which
is what we are here to address today, I would like to give you some
of my observations about the affectiveness of what we are presently
doing here in the Delaware River.
First of all I think we have to define what we are talking about in
the vessel traffic system. I think the port was unjustly criticized
recently, and I think the public was given the idea that we do nothing
here to regulate traffic; that ships run willy-nilly up and down the river,
careening off anything that might happen to get in their paths, at
exorbitant rates of speed. I think that a little observation would show
that that is not the truth. In fact, I think the opposite is more the case,
in that I think we have a very highly defined vessel traffic system
in the Delaware River. It is not federally sponsored, but it is industry
supported and it is voluntary and enjoys almost 100-percent coopera-
tion from the people who use it.
By way of a little history, after the mission San Francisco casualty
in 1958, the Port of Philadelphia, under the Joint Executive Com-
mittee, which is a collection of all the maritime interest in the port, got
together, and I wifi not burden you with a long history of the bridge-to-
bridge radio telephone deliberations, but we were able to get a specific
radio frequency in the VHF maritime mobile band to be used by pilots
and shipmasters, specifically for the prevention of vessel casualties.
PAGENO="0109"
110
Mr. ETLBERG. You had no others.
Captain IvEs. Well, we have the backup system, the pilot boat,
which is lying at a pier just inside Cape Hentopen and her equipment
is ready to go, and in the event that we have a radar failure at Cape
Henlopen, we can operate the radar on the pilot boat at a slightly
reduced range.
Mr. EILBERG. Do you think it would be useful to have an installa-
tion anywhere else on the Delaware or Delaware Bay?
Captain urns. Well, I think you run into a cost-benefit ratio, how
much better is it going to provide for the amount of good that it can
do. Some years a.go, the port sponsored a study and I do not have the
exact facts at my fingertips now but it was suggested that we should
have a chain of radar systems up the Delaware River.
I am afraid I must disagree, again, with my friends and Mr. du Pont
who said if New York's radar cost $10 million we should be able to
get by for $5 million. I think if New York's cost $10 million, I think
ours would probably be $50 million. Because, whereas New York can
cover their harbor from 2 or 3 locations, I think the study that we
had showed that we would need at least 10 to 12 radar sites to effec..
tively cover the long and winding Delaware River.
I would say that complete radar survefflance would be very costly
for the Delaware River.
Mr. EILBERG. And you do not care for visual towers, either, I
take it?
Captain IvEs. Well, I think it is good only on clear days and a system
which can only be used part of the time, I do not think is effective.
Mr. EILBERG. Would you tell me something again about the Master
Mariners Advisory Committee? What is their composition?
Captain IvEs. This is a group of shipmasters who are now presently
working as port captains, and marine superintendents, and in various
executive positions in the tanker companies and dry cargo operators in
the port, and it also has members, the representatives of the OCMI
and the captain of the port, and the Corps of Engineers. This is an
informal group that meets regularly several times a year, and more
often if necessary. The president is Capt. Sam Schellenger, the presi-
dent of the Pilot's Association, and the secretary is Capt. James
Wallace, both of whom are here today.
This group addresses problems on a professional basis.
Mr. EILBEEG. This includes a number of shipowners?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. How many would you say?
Captain IVE5. Every major tanker company. These are the larger
draft tankers.
The small freighters do not seem to present the type of problems
that we address in this Mariners Advisory Group. This group is mainly
to address the problems of the deep draft vessels, the hazardous cargo
vessels, and the vessels that could present potential problems in thô
port.
Mr. EILBEEG. Captain Ives, I have absolutely nothing against this
organization and I would assume from your words that they do agood
job. But I think the obvious concerns that any outsider might have,
if I may call myself that, is that an advisory committee that consists
of all the major owners of vessels is going to be one that may be
PAGENO="0110"
105
Now, as to the notoriety that we gained here from the most recent
ship accident at Marcus Hook. I would like to support Captain
Goodwin's contention that when we talk about improvements that
can be derived from YTS, you have to address yourself to specific
problems that you are trying to cure and I certainly have to agree as a
working pilot, that I cannot see any information which could be gained
from a VTS that could have prevented that accident. I am not pre-
pared to comment on what the causes of the accident were except to
say that it is possible that it was simple human error and a mistake
in judgment. If that is what the Board of Investigation determines,
I cannot see how any vessel traffic system would have improved that
situation. I do not see how it would have prevented the tanker Elias
from exploding at the pier, and I do not see how it would have pre-
vented a plant casualty, an engineering casualty, on the Notre Dame
Victory and the subsequent collision with the Athos. I think the port
interests here have demonstrated, on a voluntary basis their concern
f or safety in the Delaware River.
I cannot think of any more people who are more concerned with
safety; because, after all we are the direct beneficiaries of a safe port.
We also have a long river. We are in direct competition with
neighboring ports who are close to the sea. The action we take in
promoting safety also has to be consistent with efficiency and we are
striving to keep the port open and keep it moving efficiently so that it
is an attractive place for vessel owners to send their vessels and for
shippers to send their cargo.
In line with this, we have numerous other systems working in the
port which enhance the safety of operations. One of them is the Master
Mariners Advisory Committee. This is a committee of representatives
from the tankers and the large cargo carriers, their owners and opera-
tors. The members of the committee are actually licensed master
mariners, pilots, or ship masters who are working as port captains
in supervisory positions for their companies.
We also have, ex-officio, members of the committee, representatives
from the Coast Guard and the Corps of Army Engineers.
Now this committee, on a voluntary basis, has prepared recom-
mendations for the maximum safe draft for vessels transiting the
river. The maximum draft that a vessel can carry up the Delaware
River is variable. So in cases of extremely high tides,, the vessel can
safely come with more drafts than it can with less tide. I cannot think
of anyone who is in a better position to decide what the safe draft of the
vessel should be than the ship master or pilots who are actually going
to be responsible for conducting that vessel.
This system, incidentally, has worked very well. Our incident of in-
channel groundings due to insufficient water has been almost negligible.
I also credit the use of the tide gages to warn us of adverse tide con-
ditions in this regard.
We also review and prepare recommendations for channel dredging,
channel maintenance, and anchorage improvement. We prepare
recommendations for improvements to the aids to navigation and we
address ourselves to specific problems that come up in the port that
require answers from a navigational standpoint.
In addition to this, the pilots and the masters and the operators
cooperate in scheduling the transit of these deep vessels on the rising
PAGENO="0111"
106
tide to prevent traffic congestion and confusion. That is to say, vessels
are anchored at the IDelaware Capes awaiting favorable conditions for
transit in the river.
When the conditions are favorable as determined through our
communications network, it is decided among the pilots and masters
which vessels should go first, and the others follow in an orderly fashion
with the spacing of several miles in between.
So that the vessel that has the farthest to go up the river will go first
and this prevents a lot of unnecessary overtaking and potentially
hazardous navigation.
The industry has also voluntarily scheduled vessel transits through
the Taconic Palmyra Bridge during peak traffic rush hour openings.
This has been at a considerable sacrifice to the industry in time and
money but it has resulted in a marked decrease in rush hour congestion
on the bridge and I am sure it has been appreciated by the monitoring
public.
The point of this is, in spite of the fact that we do not have a federally
sponsored vessel traffic program, I feel that the Port of Philadelphia
through its various agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, has
voluntarily instituted those elements of a VTS which it feels are
necessary for the operation of a safe port. The cooperation in the
maritime industry here has been excellent. I think the question was
raised about our relationship with the Coast Guard, and I can only say
that I do not know of any other ports where industry and Government
work more in concert than they do here in Philadelphia.
I think if Federal money is to be spent in the Philadelphia area to
solve problems, I think it might most effectively be spent in the area
of channel improvement, deepening the channels, improving the
anchorages so that ships will have a safe channel to operate in and
they will have adequate anchorages to anchor in, in the event of bad
weather or engineering problems. In this regard I would enlist the
assistance of the committee in helping us obtain the funds which are
necessary to maintain our project depths.
This is the end of my formal presentation. I would appreciate
responding to any questions that you might like to ask that I would
be capable of answering.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you very much, Captain Ives, for a
very lucid statement and very informative one.
I have one question. Do you have a copy of Congressman Eilberg's
prqposal?
Captain IvEs. I do not have it with me, but I have seen it, yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGL Congressman Eilberg.
Mr. EILBERG. Captain Ives, you are aware that I have talked to
other pilots in preparation today?
Captain IvEs. I had heard you were, sir, but I was not able to
identify the pilots specifically. Members of my association?
Mr. EILBERG. I do not know. I did not ask whether they were
members of your assOciation because I unfortunately did not know
you before you stepped up to the table here.
Captain IvEs. Yes sir; I understand that you had talked to various
members of the industry.
PAGENO="0112"
107
Mr. EILBERG. You know that these are things not j ust out of my
head but conversations with other pilots and a great many other
people as well.
Captain TIrES. Yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. You ended up with some recommendations or possible
recommendations.
Do you have any recommendations? You said you would like cer-
tain things done if money was spent.
In your comments prepared to the chairman, would you be good
enough to add specifically what you think ought to be done, what
anchorages ought to be developed, what portions of the channel
ought to be widened and the other things?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. I do not mean to give the impression that
we should be complacent. I do not mean to say that we have a wonder-
ful system here and we do not need any help and that nothing needs
to be done, because if you have one accident, you should always
strive to eliminate that.
I do think the records show that the Delaware River is one of the
safest rivers in the United States and I was trying to develop the idea
that this is through-this is not accidental, this is through concerted
industry action.
Mr. EILBERG. Captain, I will respond by saying that if we were to
have another tragic accident today or tomorrow or next week or next
month, I will be horrified and that is why I am doing what I am doing.
Captain IvE~. Yes sir; I understand.
Mr. EILBERG. One accident, no matter how many lives, is not too
much to prevent and when we have made a number of recommenda-
tions from professional sources, many of which cost no money, I find
it very difficult and have not received satisfactory answers as to why
some of these ideas cannot be examined more carefully and adopted.
Now you mentioned the use of bridge-to-bridge communication and
the VHF channel. In my conversations with people in your profession,
they indicate that frequently these channels are cluttered or there is
a great deal of chatter going on in these channels. Is that true or not
true in your experience?
Captain IvEs. I would say that there is more congestion and possibly
misuse of the bridge-to-bridge navigation channel than we would like
to see. I am not of the opinion in this port that it had rendered it
ineffective. I think it may have rendered it somewhat less effective
than it could be and we have been taking steps voluntarily in the
industry to single out the offenders, in the absence of FCC monitoring.
Of course, FCC, the Federal Communications Commission, is
charged with monitoring these frequencies and enforcing its laws and
regulations.
The FCC, for various reasons, has not had the manpower to do the
job on these frequencies that we would like them to do. So we have
taken up a system of self-policing. The towboat industry who are
the major users of the river and these radio channels that we are
speaking of, and the pilots, have been in complete cooperation. I
neglected to mention that before and they have helped by circularizing
their masters and asked them to use the channels properly and we
asked our people to please observe the rules and regulations and it is an
ongoing self-policing.
78-280-76-8
PAGENO="0113"
108
Mr. EILBERG. Captain, have you complained to the FCC at anytime
about these conditions that you talked about?
Captain IvEs. I have not filed a formal complaint in letter form but
I am on numerous committees in Washington which deal with these
problems and I have access to the FCC through other channels and
these type of problems have been brought up. It is a nationwide
problem, not only in the maritime service but in other radio services
and I was led to believe that the FCC was looking into the matter.
Mr. EILBERG. Could I ask Admiral Rea or Captain Goodwin
whether they had made any complaints with regard to the use of these
channels?
Vice Admiral REX. To my knowledge, we have not, Mr. Eilberg,
but I would like to comment that I think the discipline and the use
of channel 13 is improving all along as the people get accustomed to it.
In the Port of New York, we have put out, through a. notice, some
recommended points for which vessels could call in when they are
passing. It is not a mandatory requirement. Just voluntary require-
ment.
Just so when you pass certain points. That also resulted in approved
discipline because our Coast Guard vessels use it and they are all for
that. So the situation is getting better on 13. To my knowledge, we
have not filed a formal complaint. We have heard and are aware of the
overuse of it in certain of the areas and made known to the FCC
informally.
Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Admiral.
Captain, I was of the view of that condition, and of course we do
not know what the cost would be and perhaps this would be some-
thing for the Coast Guard to study, perhaps, but if there are-were
a number of shore installations involving visual communication, would
this not be a better system than the bridge-to-bridge communication
that you have talked about?
Captain IvEs. I am not certain that I understand you, Mr. Congress-
man. Visual observation of vessels?
Mr. EILBERG. That is right.
Captain IvEs. Well, the bridge-to-bridge visual system provides
information to the navigators of each ship, specifically in a meeting
situation. Presumably, they are in visual contact with each other,
either physically or through radar, and shore visibility and on the
basis of the information from their navigational instruments and
their conversations on the bridge-to-bridge radio, they arrange to
make a satisfactory meeting or passing situation.
I would say that of all the services which lends itself least to shore-
side assistance, perhaps the bridge-to-bridge radio does not. It is
strictly a self-contained operation aboard the two ships that are
directly involved.
Mr. EILBERG. I am saying if the channel is cluttered and the con-
ditions prevent adequate communication, would it not be an effective
safety device to have visual communication from the shore, with some
towers scattered over the most congested areas. Perhaps the entrance
to the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, for example.
Captain IvEs. Well, a strictly visual system would be good only
perhaps in the hours of daylight. No, sir, I could not-I could not
really agree that that would be-that that would solve any specific
problems that I know of.
PAGENO="0114"
109
I do not know of any situation where a pilot has been unable to get
through to another pilot due to channel congestion when he wanted to.
Mr. ErLBERG. On the question of speed, you say that you are self-
controlled. Yet the GAO reports indicate that over one-third of the
accidents that have occurred and been reported, serious accidents,
speed was irrelevant.
Do you not think we should give some consideration to control of
speed? I do not mean necessarily in the Delaware Bay but in the more
congested areas north of the bay.
Captain IvEs. Again, I would please ask your forgiveness for being
somewhat opinionated on the idea, but 1 do work on board vessels
and I am a working pilot and I think I have observed some of these
problems firsthand and perhaps see them in a slightly different light
than people who sit shoreside and analyze the accident after it has
happened.
I think that speed on the water is a highly relative thing. Whereas,
on the land, people can appreciate a speed limit sign, an automobile is
safe at a certain speed in a given area. On the water this does not
follow. The speed for a tugboat in an area wotild not be the same safe
speed for a supertanker. The problem is self-regulating, that the large
vessels cannot make any appreciable speed.
Because of their size and proximity to the bottom, they can not
speed. Most vessels adjust themselves to the conditions and they seek
a proper speed for the conditions that they are operating in.
I do not think that speed limits have much applicability on the
water.
Mr. EILBERG. So you have had no complaints then about vessels
speeding; do you go as far as to say that?
Captain IvEs. Well, I think we fell into a statistical trap and I read
the GAO report very closely. When accidents are being investigated,
the boards of investigation analyze every facet of the problem. Quite
frequently and I ask forgiveness of my friends in the Coast Guard,
quite frequently it is fashionable for the Coast Guard to assess as part
of a problem the speed as a contributing factor. More obviously, if a
ship did get stopped in time from hitting something else, obviously
he was going too fast.
I think that this sort of statistic which has been creeping more and
more into accident reports has finally caught up to us, to the point
where we have taken a lot of bad information and made an observa-
tion on it.
Mr. EILBERG. So you disagree with one of the main points of the
GAO report as far as speed is concerned, I take it.
Captain IVES. Yes, sir. I do not believe that speed is a major fac-
tor in most accidents.
Mr. EILBERG. Now you mentioned radar, and until your reference
to it, I was not aware that the entire area is covered by radar. Would
you-
Captain IvEs. Not the entire area, sir, just the Delaware Capes area
at the present time, including the Big Stone Beach Anchorage and I
would say 20 miles up the bay and 20 miles to sea. It is a 40-mile
radar, but weather conditions being what they are, 20 miles would be
a dependable average.
Mr. EILBERG. You had one installation at Cape ilenlopen?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir.
PAGENO="0115"
111
slightly biased in favor of shortcuts as far as the shipowners are
concerned.
Now, how do you respond to that?
Captain IvEs. Well, I think that is certainly a possible conclusion.
However, I feel that the master on the bridge and the owner of a vessel
is going to do what is best for his vessel and he is not going to endanger
the multi-million-dollar investment that he has, and I think the interest
of the shipowner in preserving his investment, certainly coincides with
the interest of the Port of Philadelphia and we do not want any
problems either.
Mr. EILBERG. What is your reaction to the-having a tug accom-
pany, one of these large vessels from the channel to the dock, or from
the dock to the channel?
Captain IvEs. You are speaking specifically of using tugs for docking
operations?
Mr. EILBERG. That is right.
Captain TirEs. Very well, I think you have to understand as a State
pilot, my responsibility is discharged when I bring the vessel off the
pier or to a safe anchorage. It is not among my duties, except in cases
of extreme emergency, to dock a vessel.
I do not feel completely qualified to pass on whether a vessel should
have a tug or not have a tug. I have seen very safe docking maneuvers
with no tugboats and I have seen some catastrophes with four tugs
alongside.
Mr. EILBERG. With all things being equal, do you think the tug
attached is not likely to reduce accidents if the ship has actually got
into the channel, the center of the channel?
Captain IvEs. I think a tugboat is a great assistance to a ship
maneuvering, yes, sir.
Mr. EILBERG. What do you think of the proposal to have the Coast
Guard inspect the wiring of ships as they dock?
Captain TirEs. Inspect their wiring?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes, at the dock site.
Captain TirEs. Well, I. am not qualified in that phase of ship en-
gineering. I was not aware that the wirings-you are speaking of the
construction of the vessel, the lighting system?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Captain TirEs. Well, I think that the Coast Guard, especially on
American flag vessels, has very stringent inspections of the ship's
engineering plan, including their wiring.
I would like to pass that on to Admiral Rca, if I may,
Vice Admiral REA. Your question-I am not clear of your
question-American flag vessels are fully inspected by the Coast
Guard; the integrity of the electrical system is a very basic part of the
inspection as far as crew inspection and maintenance of vessels. As far
as foreign flag vessels which are signatory to IMCO, they have safety
certificates and they get safe construction of those. So I am not sure
of what wiring we are really speaking of, Mr. Eilberg.
Mr. EILBERG. Well, any wiring that would be involved when a ship
docks.
One of our suggestions was that wiring should be inspected by the
Coast Guard when a ship docks.
PAGENO="0116"
112
Admiral REA. I do not know how to respond to you too much
because I do not quite understand the question. Maybe they are
talking about the ground wires that you hook up before you start
the discharge of the cargo. I am not really clear on how extensive an
inspection we are speaking of. We do make inspection of vessels.
Mr. EILBERG. We are talking about grounding regulations.
Admiral REA. Yes.
Mr. EILBERG. Now, you do make an inspection in each case, did
you say?
Admiral REA. No, we are not down there every case. But there is
a regulation that requires that, and when our men are down to the
dock they check to see if they are grounded, yes.
Mr. EILBERG. Did you say if they are on the dock or when they are
on the dock?
Vice Admiral REA. When a vessel moors, and before it hooks up its
cargo wire, it is good practice and our regulation requires that a ground
wire be hooked up before you start discharging your cargo and loading
your ca.rgo.
Mr. EILBERG. Captain ives, I think a minute ago, said that this
was done in every case by the Coast Guard. I am just testing to see
whether this is so or not.
Vice Admiral REA. I think Captain Goodwin responded to what is
going on in Philadelphia. But as our people in the port get around us,
that is one of the things they check, to see whether it is safe to load
or unload. We are not necessarily there the moment they hook up, nor
are we there when they disconnect. But there is a burden on the
master and personnel to carry out this regulation like many others.
Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Admiral.
Captain Ives, we appreciate your testimony and we hope you will
follow through, if you will, with a written statement on our suggestions.
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir, this is the-I will at the~ very earliest
opportunity convene the Vessel Traffic Subcommittee that I am
chairman of, and if it is all right with you we will review these and
give you written answers specifically.
Mr. EILBERG. Which association now would you be submitting that
to?
Captain IvEs. This is the Vessel Traffic Systems Subcommittee of
the Joint Executive Committee for the Improvement and Devel-
opment of the Philadelphia Port Area.
Mr. EILBERG. Now, I am not sifre of the composition of that. Would
you repeat that again?
Captain IvEs. Well, the chairman of the Joint Executive Com-
mittee is here today and I would like to, if possible I would like to,
defer to him. It is an industry committee. It represents nearly every
user, including tow boats.
Mr. EILBERG. Is this the Masters Advisory Committee?
Captain IvEs. No, sir; this is not. This is a larger and more all-
encompassing committee. This committee encompasses all of the Port
of Philadelphia.
Mr. EILBERG. Would you get a report back here as soon as you can
on that?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir.
[No report was received at time of printmg.]
Mr. EILBERG. Thank you very much, Captain.
PAGENO="0117"
113
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry, counsel wished to ask you a
few questions.
Mr. HEYWARD. Captain Ives, in connection with the vessel re-
porting system, how does it operate and who uses it?
Captain IvEs. The system is informal, sir, by standards at other
places, I would presume, and certain by Federal vessel traffic system
standards but we feel it is adequate. It provides the amount of in-
formation that is necessary.
A list is prepared every day of vessel arrivals and departures, the
approximate times of departures. This list is disseminated through the
Maritime Exchange to the pilots and the operators of vessels on the
river and the information is available through the VHF port operations
radios, so that in case of poor visibility, they should become a matter
of concern to a ship, they can radio in and ask how many ships they
expect to be meeting or where they might possibly be encountered
and when the ships get close enough, then of course they can maintain
the contact by bridge-to-bridge radio.
Mr. HEYWARD. Do they do it by monitoring radio transmissions?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir, every ship is monitoring channel 13, bridge-
to-bridge radio channel, and by doing nothing more than listening.
After you have been on the bridge for a short time, you can get a
very accurate picture of what is moving around.
Mr. HEYWARD. I assume it is updated by both ends of the river?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. How about the radar, what is the purpose of the
radar and how is that used?
Captain IvEs. The purpose of the radar at Cape Henlopen at the
present time is to identify inbound ships and outbound ships so that
the watch officer, who at this particular moment is the captain of
the pilot boat, can dispatch pilots and provide a certain amount of
information to the ships about what is moving in the area, should the
visibility be poor.
Mr. HEYWARD. So that it is used for safety purposes even though it
is a privately operated organization?
Captain IvEs. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Captain.
Anyone else care to testify?
STATEMENT OF H. WILLIS JACKSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OP THE PHILADELPHIA PORT AREA
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, my name is H. Willis Jackson and I
am chairman of the Joint Executive Committee that was just men-
tioned a few minutes ago.
I have no prepared statement. I have no prepared statement as
such except that I did want to back up what Captain Ives said about,
if there is money to be spent in the Port of Philadelphia, we could use
some help from you.
I am going to submit to you copies here of our testimony before the
civil-before the Public Works Subcommittee on Appropriations in the
Senate and House of Representatives, asking for appropriations in
PAGENO="0118"
114
connection with widening and deepening of the channel and approving
our anchorages. This is a battle that we have had; this organization
incidentally has been in existence since 1888 and included in the
membership are labor unions, as you can see on the bottom-I will not
list them all-we represent the industry, we represent labor unions
and others and our purpose is to coordinate the activities for the port
and we work very close to the Pilots Association and all the other
organizations are with us.
But I would like to place on the record our testimony which was
made by our vice chairman in Washington on April 29th as to the
battle that we are having to try to get this money and I am sure that
you know what trouble they have in New York of trying to get it,
but frankly if there is anything that can be done to help us with ap-
propriations for channel maintenance and for anchorages, this would
be money well spent and I would be very glad to answer any questions
if anybody has any, but I will put this in the record.
Mr. BIAGGI. We will have that for the record.
[The document follows :J
STATEMENT OF GEORGE BURNHAM, JOINT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE
IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILADELPHIA PORT AREA
Summary of testimony by George Burnham, vice chairman, Joint Executive
Committee for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port
Area, before the Subcommittees on Public Works Appropriations of the United
States Senate and House of Representatives on April 29, 1975; and calling for
increased funding, as well as the institution of funds for which no provisions has
been made, in the President's Fiscal Year 1976 Budget covering those federally
authorized navigation projects under the administration of the Philadelphia
District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO THE SEA
1. The President's FY `76 Budget contains no funds whatsoever for either
Marcus Hook or Mantua Creek Anchorages; both are considered essential for
safe navigation of the larger ships transiting on the Delaware River. We request
that the following funds be added:
a. Marcus Hook Anchorage: Add $6.5 million of which $2.5 million will be
needed for the 40-foot depth presently maintained by the Corps over a 1400-foot
width; with the $4 million balance used in restoring this anchorage to its fully
authorized width dimension of 2300 feet.
b. Mantua Creek Anchorage: Add $1.4 million in order to allow for continued
maintenance of the existing dimensions of this anchorage. (See recommendation
for additional monies as shown under CONSTRUCTION)
2. Add $1.5 million for maintenance of the Delaware River Channel, Phila-
delphia to the Sea. In June 1975, Phase III of the rock removal contract for
Marcus Hook Range will be completed improving the minimum depth of rock
in that range from 35.6 feet to 41 feet. The employment of these additional
funds for use in normal channel maintenance will serve to complement the achieve-
ments made in rock removal insuring that we finally have the 40-foot channel
authorized by the Congress in 1938.
DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO TRENTON
Add $1,759,000 in maintenance funds in order to bring this funding to the
minimum level considered necessary to sustain the more than 21 million tons of
commerce which will have been carried over this portion of the Delaware River.
PAGENO="0119"
115
SCHUYKILL RIVER
The $539,000 budgeted for the T Quarter and the Fiscal Year will permit the
Philadelphia District to perform maintenance dredging only in the 26-foot
channel. We request that $711,000 in additional funds be made available so
that normal maintenance can be performed in the 33-foot section as well. The
more than 18 million tons of waterborne commerce carried on this waterway
annually comes principally from the 33-foot section.
WILMINGTON HARBOR
Less than half the normal amount of funding for maintenance of Wilmington
Harbor channel and turning basin appears in the Fiscal Year 1976 Budget. To
sustain the 4 million tons of waterborne commerce transiting via these facilities
annually, we urge that the additional amount of $257,000 be added for this
project.
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO THE SEA
In 1958 Congress authorized the construction of Mantua Creek Anchorage,
40-feet deep, 2300 feet wide and 11,500 feet long. This has never been constructed
and is presently being maintained at a 37-foot depth, 1400 feet wide over its
authorized length. In the interest of safety this anchorage is badly needed to its
full dimensions and as a first step only, we urge that it be deepened to 40-feet over
its existing dimensions, so that this portion will at least be compatible with our
40-foot Delaware River ship channel. To accomplish this will require $2 million.
We urge that this be approved.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
My name is George Burnham. I am Vice-Chairman of the Joint Executive
Committee for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port
Area.
The Joint Executive Committee, founded in 1888, serves as port-affairs spokes-
man for twenty-two separate organizations in the Delaware Valley Region,
whose common interest is a viable port. Members' names appear on the letter-
head page of this testimony and to save time I do not propose to name these
other than to say that this membership includes Chambers of Commerce, Civic
and Trade Associations, Quasi-Governmental Bodies, and an International Labor
Union. The members pay no dues aside from nominal amounts needed to cover
the Committee's administrative expenses, and the Officers serve without
compensation.
TESTIMONY
I have been asked by the members of the Joint Executive Committee to appear
today on their behalf and to express to you the concern which they share upon
noting the inadequate amounts which have been allocated in the President's 1976
Fiscal Year Budget for those federally authorized navigation projects which are
administered by the Philadelphia District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These
projects sustain ports located adjacent to the Delaware River in Delaware, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, commonly called the Ports of Philadelphia. This com-
plex is ranked as the leading United States port in terms of international water-
borne commerce handled and ranks second in the Nation in total waterborne
commerce.
Comparing the amounts in this Budget versus the needs we have to both main-
tain our port standing and to assure that the vessels which carry this huge volume
of commerce can arrive and depart in reasonable safety, we find that if we are to
meet these objectives that we must have $14,127,000 added to this Budget.
Allow me if you will to refer now to the specific projects which require addi-
tional funding:
DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO THE SEA
We are distressed to find that the President's FY 1976 Budget contains no
funding for the Marcus Hook or Mantua Creek Anchorages. Both were authorized
under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1958, principally for the safety which they
PAGENO="0120"
116
would provide to vessels transiting the Delaware River. Marcus Hook Anchorage
was constructed to its authorized dimensions but was allowed to shoal and pres-
ently is being maintained to its authorized depth and length over a width of 1400
feet instead of at its 2300-foot authorized width.
Mantua Creek Anchorage has never been constructed to its authorized dimen-
sions and is presently being maintained over its length to a width of only 1400
feet, instead of its project width of 2300 feet, and at a depth of 37 feet instead of its
project depth of 40 feet.
If anything, there is far more need today for these fully constructed anchorages
than there was when the projects were approved. Vessels using the Delaware
River today are longer and beamier and many find it necessary to schedule their
transit on a rising tide because of draft limitations.
These vessels cause us great concern because of the inadequacies of the two
anchorages. Many are carrying energy related and hazardous cargoes in greater
quantities than ever before. Most of the deep draft vessels can not use Mantua
Creek Anchorage because it is being maintained at a depth which is incompatible
with the greater depth of the channel. Because of width limitations at both Mantua
Creek and Marcus Hook, the large vessels that do anchor swing through the
channel on a change of tide or during a high wind, creating conditions of risk both
to themselves and to vessels transiting in the ship channel.
Following the explosion of the ill-fated tanker ELIAS and the recent ramming of
the docked tanker CORINTHOS by the EDGAR M. QUEENY in the Delaware
River, both incidents resulting in a heavy loss of life, much has been said in the
press and elsewhere suggesting a need for the establishment of speed limits for
vessels on the Delaware River as well as suggestions aimed at increasing Coast
Guard control over vessel movements. It has been determined that neither of
these accidents could have been avoided by such measures. Knowledgeable ship
people however are far more concerned about the threat to safety posed by the
inadequacies of our Delaware River anchorages. We therefore urge that the follow-
ing amounts be added to the President's Budget to prevent needless loss of lives,
property and damage to the environment:
MARCUS HOOK ANCHORAGE-OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
We request that an additional $6.5 million be approved for use in restoring this
anchorage to its full project dimensions. It is our understanding that $2.5 million
of this amount would be needed to maintain the existing 1400-foot width to
authorized depth of 40 feet while the remaining 900-foot width in the shoaled area
would require maintenance funds in the amount of $4 million to deepen this to
40-foot project depth over its authorized length.
MANTUA CREEK ANCHORAGE-OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
We request that $1.4 million be added to the President's Budget for use in
providing maintenance for the existing 1400-foot width at a depth of 37 feet over
its authorized length.
CONSTRUCTION
Aware that its existing depth of 37 feet is inadequate for many of the deep
draft vessels using the Delaware River, and aware that this depth does not
provide compatibility with the 40-foot channel depth, as intended when the
project was authorized, we ask that the Corps be directed to construct this
anchorage to its authorized dimensions. As a first step, in Fiscal Year 1976, we
ask the Congress to add $2 million in construction funds needed to deepen the
existing dimensions from 37 feet to 40 feet.
Aside from the lack of funding for anchorages in the Delaware River-Phila-
delphia to the Sea, we note that insufficient funds have been allocated to cover
normal maintenance in the ship channel.
In June 1975, Phase III of the Delaware River rock removal program will have
been completed, improving the minimum depth of rock found in Marcus Hook
Range from 35.6 feet when this program began to 41 feet. For the first time since
our 40-foot channel project was authorized in 1938 we indeed have the potential
use of a fully maintained channel at its project depth. To not provide the Corps
with sufficient funds to maintain the improved depth appears to be self-defeating,
particularly in view of the many millions of dollars spent in the rock removal
program in order to attain this objective.
Accordingly, we urge the Congress to upgrade funding for channel maintenance
in the Delaware River-Philadelphia to the Sea, to full Corps' capability. To
achieve this, we have been advised that $1.5 million in 0. & M. funding is
necessary.
PAGENO="0121"
117
DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO TRENTON
* More than 21 million tons of waterborne commerce are carried over this portion
of our waterway annually. It is important to the port to be able to sustain such a
high volume of commerce and Which cannot be done without funding the project
to the full Corps' capability. To accomplish this we ask that Congress add $1,759,-
000 to the 0. & M. portion of the President's budget in the interest of protecting
this valued commerce.
SCHUYLKILL RIVER
The $539,000 which appears in the President's Budget is intended principally
for use in maintaining the 26-foot portion of the Schuylkill River channel. Accord-
ing to the Philadelphia District Office, sufficient funds will remain only to initiate
a contract for maintenance in the 33-foot channel. Inasmuch as the majority of
the 18 million tons of annual waterborne commerce relates to the 33-foot section
of the waterway, we consider it important that this section not be allowed to
shoal up and accordingly we ask that $711,000 in additional 0. & M. funds be
made available for this particular use.
~TILMINGTON HARBOR
Over 4 million tons of waterborne commerce is handled annually at the port of
Wilmington. The normal expenditure to maintain Wilmington Harbor and its
turning basin to sustain this volume of revenue is in the range of $500,000 annually.
The Budget provides a figure which is less than half this amount and in view of
this we urge that $257,000 be added in 0. & M. funds for this project.
Concluding our remarks, we should mention our interest in the Channel Dimen-
sions Study, Delaware River, Philadelphia to Trenton. A Resolution adopted
3 May 1962 by the Senate Committee on Public Works, has produced information
which indicates the desirability of the Federal Government assuming maintenance
of the vessel maneuvering area in front of Tioga Marine Terminal. Based on
these findings, the Philadelphia District Engineer and the New York Division
Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have recommended that the Federal
Government assume maintenance to a depth of 36 feet of the maneuvering area
in front of the terminal including a turning basin of 1300 feet in diameter. The
necessary local guarantees are being developed. We would urge that when this
project is submitted to Congress that approval be granted so that the necessary
work can proceed promptly.
Thank you very much.
Mr. HEYWARD. May I?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the Corps of Engineers problem,
does the Division Engineer take any position or are they limited by
what they get from Washington?
Mr. JACKSON. They are limited by the money they get from
Washington.
Mr. HEYWARD. I do not mean money; I mean policy decisions.
Mr. JACKSON. Oh, you mean priorities and this sort of thing?
Mr. HEYWARD. Yes; as far as improving the anchorages are con-
cerned. Have the local engineers supported-
Mr. JACKSON. [interrupting]. They are very, very helpful. In fact,
the testimony that is in here, we had a meeting with them and asked
them what was their capability and what can we ask for within the
range of their capabilities.
Mr. HEYWARD. How about the Chief of Engineers in Washington?
Has he supported these particular projects and the Delaware River?
Mr. JACKSON. Yes; but we do not-
Mr. HEYWARD. [interrupting]. So it is a matter of money being
authorized?
Mr. JACKsoN. It is a matter of money being authorized and we
have one project in particular that we have in common with Baltimore
and that is the C. & D. Canal where we have an excellent benefit/cost
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118
ratio and the completion of that is about 13 years behind time and now
we are having trouble getting the dredging of the Chesapeake Bay so
that we can both use it.
So this is something that we, if you can help us-
Mr. BIAGGI [interrupting]. May I see your testimony--
[Document handed to Mr. Biaggi.]
Mr. HEYWARD. This is all operations and maintenance?
Mr. JACKSON. That is right. This is broken down by operations and
maintenance and it was within the budget figures.
Mr. HEYWARD. But it is generally authorized already under the law?
All they need is to appropriate the funds.
Mr. JACKSON. That is right, to appropriate it.
Mr. BIAGGI. You made your point. Thank you, very much.
Anyone else desirous of testifying?
[No response.]
Mr. BIAGGI. There being none, we will adjourn the meeting and
thank you very much, admiral, captain, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Navigation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was
adjourned.]
PAGENO="0123"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1975
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND
NAVIGATION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
New Orleans, La.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in room 10,
Rivergate Convention Center, Hon. Mario Biaggi, presiding:
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is meeting
here in New Orleans to deal with the Vessel traffic system or service
as it will be known in the future. I am delighted to be here and I am
grateful for the hospitality that has been displayed, especially to
Admiral Barrow and to the different gentlemen that have made our
stay so pleasant so far. We have many demands for committee
appearances throughout the country, but at the insistence of Congress-
man Treen and the gentlelady from New Orleans, Congresswoman
Boggs, New Orleans was made first priority.
I would like to give Congressman David Treen the opportunity
to make any remarks he would care to make.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Chairman Biaggi. They are not all my
constituents here, but a lot of them are. I would like to claim them
all. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for selecting New Orleans
as one of the places to have, and one of the priority places to have
the hearing on this most important subject of vessel traffic. There is
a lot that I need to learn about it and I hope not to display too much
of my ignorance in the questioning today, but it is extremely important
for this area, for the Port of New Orleans. The Intracoastal Waterway
comes in here and leaves from here and, of course, this is a major
port. We have had some problems in the recent years, especially
during high water times with casualties and accidents. When we get
siltation in the mouth of the river and get the high water, it makes it
tough to control barges.
My office has had tremendous cooperation from Admiral Barrow
and Colonel Rush, from the Corps of Engineers, and from others
to try to alleviate the problem. I do think the vessel traffic system
holds forth a great deal of promise for relieving some to the difficul-
ties, but we want, as Members of Congress, to hear not only from
government people who are involved, but from industry members
today.
Just one last comment, Mr. Chairman. Some people may wonder
why we have only two members of the committee here today. The
reason-and I know that some of you are familiar with this-is that
(119)
PAGENO="0124"
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there are so many demands and most Members of Congress are on
a number of subcommittees. I am on six of them, three of them on
the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and three others,
and this is true of all of the members. Many of the committees are
meeting in Washington, some for the purpose of reporting legislation,
and that has kept a lot of the other Coast Guard Subcommittee
members away. rrhey will, of course, see the record and our staff is
here so they can brief the other members of the subcommittee who
are not here. But I did want to explain why we are a little bit short of
membership today. It is because we are in session in Congress today.
Sometimes we aren't on Friday, but we are today. That will also
explain why I will miss a lot of votes today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Congressman Treen.
Before we commence, we will provide as much opportunity as
possible for witnesses who are desirous of providing testimony. We
have some scheduled, and I understand there have been some requests
from others not on the schedule to have the opportunity to testify.
If time permits, we will do that. However, in the absence of avail-
able time, we will leave the record open, and with that I ask if there
is any dissent that the record be left open for future submissions.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is meeting this
afternoon in this beautiful city of New Orleans as the third of a series
of field visits and discussions with local officials and interested citizens
related to the general problem of vessel safety in the various port
areas and navigable waters of the United States.
At the beginning of the present Congress, one of the subjects which
the subcommittee felt should be addressed, in carrying out its over-
sight responsibilities, is the promotion of the safe movement of vessels
in our navigable waters. The increasing volume of waterborne traffic
in the United States, as well as the expanding number of hazardous
cargoes which move in waterborne commerce, make it particularly
important that vessel traffic movements should be so undertaken
as to guarantee as accident free a traffic system as it is reasonably
possible to accomplish.
At the same time, I, individually, and I am sure, other members
of the subcommittee are concerned that whatever systems of traffic
supervision and control are developed, there should be the minimum
amount of Federal interference to this vital segment of our national
economy, and that in developing any type of control system, we
should take care that we do not, in effect, sanction an overkill.
In early 1975 the Comptroller General submitted a report to the
Congress which had been developed pursuant to the general auditing
responsibilities of his office. That report was entitled, "Vessel Traffic
Systems-What is Needed To Prevent and Reduce Vessel Accidents?"
That report was particularly timely and although its recommendations
may not result in total agreement, it has served to focus attention on
the issues to be considered in evaluating this general problem. The
subcommittee, therefore, decided to address the subject by making a
series of field visits and acquiring personal familiarization with some
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local problems and to hold a series of hearings which hopefully can
shed some light on the proper course to take in the consideration of
Coast Guard authorization for appropriations for future fiscal year
budgets.
During the summer, the subcommittee visited the New York and
Delaware River areas and received information on the problems
peculiar to those areas. We found that those two visits were informa-
tive and helpful for our purposes.
This morning the members in ade a helicopter flight for the purpose
of obtaining an overall impression of the Greater New Orleans Port
Area. This afternoon we are meeting to receive a report from the
Coast Guard outlining its views of the specific problems of vessel
traffic in this area, together with a discussion of existing and potential
Coast Guard plans for solving those problems and improving safety
in vessel movements in the lower Mississippi River.
Following the Coast Guard presentation, the subcommittee will be
happy to receive comments from local representatives who may be
interested in expressing their views on the subject of traffic safety.
As to the witnesses, I would request that at the time they testify,
they identify themselves and any organization which they represent,
and I further request them to make sure that the reporter is informed
of their proper mailing address so that their testimony may be for-
warded to them for review before being printed as a part of the
permanent record.
I will further ask the speaking witnesses to submit their prepared
statements for inclusion in the record, and to address their remarks
to the summary highlights of their statements. It would be helpful
if they could speak on specific problem areas, such as the adequacy of
the channel and aids to navigation, vessel movement reports, means of
communications, speed and size of vessels, vessel speeds and maneuver-
ability controls, and the monitoring of vessel movements.
Before proceeding to hear the first witness, I would like to state
that the relatively small membership here today is not an indication
of lack of interest by our subcommittee either in the overall problem
or in the traffic problems of the New Orleans area. Unfortunately,
several changes in the House schedule in the middle of the week shifted
bills for floor consideration with which several other Members who
had planned to attend today were directly involved. Those of us here
also had difficulty in not being present in Washington today.
However, because the plans had been made and the witnesses in
this area had taken the time to prepare their views for presentation,
to us, and because we consider this subject one of major importance,
not only to our subcommittee and our committee, but to the Congress
and the Nation as a whole, we resolved not to cancel the hearing if we
could possibly avoid doing so.
The first witness scheduled to appear was Rear Adm. Winford W.
Barrow, but before we ask the admiral to testify, we would like to
recognize a representative of the gentlelady from New Orleans, Con-
gresswoman Boggs, who has a statement she would like to read in the
record.
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STATEMENT OP FAMES COBB, REPRESENTING HON. LINDY BOGGS,
A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS PROM THE STATE OP
LOUISIANA
Mr. COBB. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen, members of the
committee staff, in Mrs. Boggs' absence, she has asked me to read this
statement to you all this morning.
I welcome the committee to the Second Congressional District and regret
exceedingly that a markup session on an important committee bill preculdes my
ability to welcome you in person.
I am also sorry that I am unable to personally express my gratitude to the
United States Coast Guard and its splendid officers and personnel who provide
safe passage for the enormous amount of trade and commerce which is the life
blood of our region's economic health. In addition, they are the beacon of help in
the time of storms and floods which sometimes plague our area.
I should like to commend the Coast Guard sepecially for their prompt action
and sustained vigilance to solve the problems of barges breaking from their
moorings.
We are very proud to have the United States Coast Guard Eight District,
commanded so ably by Rear Admiral W. W. Barrow, headquartered in New
Orleans.
My thanks to the members of the committee and to all of the persons who have
made the arrangements for the hearing and to all who will be testifying today.
Signed, Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs, Representative, Second District, Louisiana.
Mr. Chairman, may your stay here today be informative and
pleasant.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. We will now hear from Rear
Adm. W. W. Barrow, Commander, 8th Coast Guard District.
Admiral BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen
and members of the committee staff. I would like to ask the committee
if they would like me to present the statement which I had prepared
covering the 1E[ouston-Galveston vessel traffic service? I can enter that
into the record without comment or comment very briefly on it,
either one.
Mr. BIAGGI. We can enter the written statement into the record as
it is and we suggest that you make whatever comments you might
make about the highlights.
STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. WINFORD W. BARROW, COMMANDER,
8TH COAST GUARD DISTRICT
Admiral BARROW. I will not read the statement. I am Rear Adm.
Winford W. Barrow, Commander, 8th Coast Guard District.
I have a prepared statement on the Houston-Galveston vessel
traffic system which, as you know, is a working system commenced
by the Coast Guard in the Houston-Galveston area in February of
this year.
Mr. TREEN. Would you move the microphone a little closer? I
think some people in the back are having trouble hearing you.
Admiral BARROW. It is a pleasure for me to be able to make this
presentation on the vessel traffic system in the Houston-Galveston
area on behalf of the U.S. Coast Guard.
PAGENO="0127"
123
HOUSTON-GALVESTON VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM
On a per mile basis, few other waterways in the world can compare
with the Houston-Galveston area in its potential for danger. Over 10
percent of the U.S. petroleum refining capacity and 20 percent of our
petrochemical capacity are located here, with a resultant capital
investment of over $5 billion. Of the cargo shipped here (some 117
million short tons plus 20 million tons passing through on the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway in 1973), 70 percent falls into the category of
"dangerous". Although we do not feel we can make a firm statistical
projection, the risks present in this area indicate that a vessel casualty
could be catastrophic to both population and industry.
In the Houston-Galveston watershed there are 533 square miles of
water area, but less than 2 percent of this area is navigable by deep
draft vessels with an additional 5 percent navigable by barge traffic.
While most large port complexes have 1,000-foot-wide deep-draft
channels, the channels width in this system are-
800 feet at entrance for 8 miles;
400 feet into Texas City for 6 miles;
300 feet into Texas City Inner Harbor for 1.5 miles;
400 feet into lower Port Houston for 35 miles;
300 feet into the new Bayport complex for 3.5 miles;
300 feet through Port Houston for 10 miles; and
250 feet to Port Houston Turning Basin for 1 mile.
Where shore facilities are located, there is another 100-200 feet of
additional width available. There are five turning basins plus another
seven locations where vessels can be turned. At each of these the entire
channel is blocked during the maneuver. Most barge marshalling is in
the channel or on the channel edges.
More than 7,000 ships and 15,000 tows entered these very restrictive
channels plus more than 10,000 tows crossed through on the Gulf
Intracoastal WaLerway in 1973. To add a little more complexity to this
situation, there are 70,000 crossings by ferries at 2 locations every year.
When the Port of Houston was christened from the deck of the Rev-
enue Cutter T4'imdom in 1914, no one could have imagined the tre-
mendous growth in this area. But with the same channels as in the
1930's, vessel sizes have steadily increased. In 1960, the Houston Pilots
Association set up special rules, including mostly daytime passage
only, for handling ships over 20,000 gross tons. They further stated
"No vessel above 30,000 tons has called on the Port of Houston and
any vessel above that tonnage would require special consideration."
Vessels up to 40,000 gross tons now call routinely in Houston, day and
night, with two way traffic in the channel. We have ships almost 900
feet long and 125 feet wide routinely traversing these channels. We
have tows over 1,200 feet long and 100 feet wide routinely using the
area.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM (VTs)
In 1971, Coast Guard Headquarters began preliminary planning
for the Houston-Galveston VTS, predicated on the probability that
Congress would require greater navigational safety in our waters. With
passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, the mandate
was clear and planning proceeded in earnest on all levels, headquarters,
district and local. A group of local representatives of the maritime
78-280-76-9
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community was appointed in June of 1972 to advise the Coast Guard
on first, whether or not a VTS was desireable for this area, and second,
if so, what equipment, operating procedures and personnel training
would be required. This advisory group continues to monitor the VTS
and advise for the future.
Throughout 1972 and 1973, radar communications, and closed
circuit television surveys were taken, while planning got more specific.
Construction was started early in 1974 and the system became oper-
ational on February 1, 1975.
Unfortunately the communications surveys which had shown that
channel 13 VHF-FM could support both bridge-to-bridge and VTS
communications soon proved to be faulty. Because of this difficulty,
in March 1975 we changed operations to use another frequency for
VTS. For those vessels with channel 12 capability, we now call on
channel 13 and shift to channel 12 for working messages. Additionally,
our efforts to "clean up" channel 13 have continued and produced
noticeable results. Virtually everyone acknowledges that channel 13
is used more properly now than was the case before VTS came along.
It is, therefore, much more available for what Congress intended its
use to be.
Relatively early in the development of VTS it was decided that
electronic surveillance coverage of the VTS area would be necessary,
principally to confirm vessel movement reports. For instance, in other
areas the Coast Guard has found that vessel masters often hedge
their ETA's at critical points so that they can get through first. In
channels as narrow as those as the Houston Ship Channel, there are
many such critical points. Of even greater concern to the users or
operator of the system is the non-participator, whether he be an
exempt vessel or one with inoperative radios. Surprises are definitely
not welcome in the VTS area.
Houston-Galveston VTS now has total communications coverage
through three VHF-FM sites. There are 17 miles of low level light
closed-circuit television coverage through some of the hazardous parts
of' the upper Houston Ship Chennel.
There are three significant developments in the immediate future
of this VTS. First, is the installation of a computerized tracking sys-
tem to replace our locally designed and constructed board. This new
system will be far more accurate and timely, and will have additional
capabilities, such as determination of time and place of all meetings,
overtakings, etc. These capabilities must be available before we could
incorporate proposed limitations on vessel sizes in all the various
reaches of the channel. This system is due to be installed by next
summer.
Next will be a radar at Galveston. This will give positive surveil-
lance over all of Galveston Bay, including Galveston and Texas City
harbors, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Bolivar Roads
mixing area, plus the approach from sea. Installation is scheduled for
the end of 1976, and is eagerly awaited by all components of the
maritime community.
Finally, there will be a mandatory VTS, probably with some limi-
tations on vessel sizes and operating conditions imposed. This sounds
terribly controversial, but in fact is not. The advisory group has
already recommended specific limitations on the conditions under
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which both large ships and large tows can navigate without prior
arrangement. Everyone here agrees that limitations are necessary;
the only real controversy is over the specific break-off points.
VTS OPERATIONS
Present VTS operations consist of gathering information about
vessel transits, channel conditions, aids to navigation discrepancies,
and weather and then passing that information back to the navigator
to help him best plan his own trip.
If we see unusual congestion building or are aware of channel
blockage, we may make specific recommendations to slow, stop,
or remain moored until the situation improves. Under no circum-
stances do we, or will we in the future, attempt to navigate vessels
from shoreside.
In our first 6 months of operation we logged more than 6,500
large vessels and 32,000 tows transiting the system. As indicated by
the percentage of vessels participating, acceptance by the marine
industry seems to be nothing short of phenomenal.
In addition to operation of the Vessel Traffic Center, we look at
associated problems. For example, we have gotten a private hazard.
to navigation properly marked. Before this, about two tows per month
hit bottom; since, no one has hit bottom at that location. We in-
vestigate every proposed new facility with an eye toward the impact
on navigational safety. We have successfully campaigned to make
lightering operations less hazardous. We are into many other problems
and will continue to pursue them to an acceptable conclusion.
We can verify a few cases where VTS has prevented a specific
accident from happening. Statistics indicate that there are other, less
provable, cases. As an example, this September VTS routed traffic
in the Houston Ship Channel when a major fire at the Space Age
Plastics plant forced the shutdown of the channel, followed by its
opening to one way traffic before its reopening to normal traffic.
Overall, shipping is up slightly, accidents are down somewhat.
SUMMARY
It is the opinion of the VTS personnel and the expressed opinion of
the users of the Houston-Galveston VTS that we are performing a.
useful function and that we are meeting the need for a reasonable and
cost-effective means towards reducing the probability of a major
catastrophe in the Houston-Galveston area, thus fulifihing the require-
ments of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act.
Mr. BIAGGI. In the comparable period before the new system became
operational, what was the relationship in accidents in Houston and
Galveston?
Admiral BARROW. I think it is probably a little early to tell with
regard to statistics how well we are doing. We can verify several cases
where the vessel traffic service system has prevented a specific accident
from happening. As an example, in September the vessel traffic system
routed traffic in the Houston Ship Channel when a major fire at the
Space Age Plastic Plant forced a shutdown of the channel, followed
by its opening to one-way traffic before its reopening to normal traffic.
This is an example of the use of the system over there.
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Overall shipping is up slightly and accidents are down somewhat.
I can't give you the precise details of this at this time. I think it is a
little bit early.
Mr. BIAGGI. When did you say it was operational?
Admiral BARROW. In February of this year.
Mr. BIAGGI. How far along are you on installing that system in the
New Orleans area?
Admiral BARROW. The New Orleans vessel traffic system is supposed
to be initiated in early 1977. We were originally scheduled to start it
in the fall of 1976, but we are behind in some respects.
Mr. BIAGGI. When will that voluntary system in Houston become
mandatory?
Admiral BARROW. The regulations for the system in Houston-
Galveston are about fourth in the priority of producing in notice
form. I would say it probably is perhaps 9 months to 1 year away.
Mr. BIAGGI. Dave, do you have any questions on Houston?
Mr. TREEN. On Houston, no.
Mr. BIAGGI. Would you like to talk to New Orleans now?
Admiral BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission,
I will proceed to the New Orleans vessel traffic system.
STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. W. W. BARROW ON NEW ORLEANS
VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS
Admiral BARROW. The purpose of my presentation today is
primarily to acquaint you with the proposed New Orleans vessel
traffic system; its background, current status, and expected opera-
tional features and capabilities.
BACKGROUND
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 gave the Department
of Transportation the authority for the development, administration,
and operation of vessel traffic systems in U.S. ports, harbors, and other
waters subject to congested vessel traffic, and designated the U.S.
Coast Guard as the agency responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the act.
Prior to the passage of the act, but in anticipation of its passage,
the Coast Guard launched an intensive study of vessel traffic system
needs. Based on the issues to be resolved the major objectives of this
study as noted in volume 1-Executive Summary (final report)
were to:
(1) Identify specific VTS goals, anticipated benefits, and
alternatives.
(2) Analyze the potential VTS roles of Federal, State,
local authorities, and private enterprise; and recommend the
most beneficial role for the Coast Guard.
(3) Analyze the quantitative and qualitative factors to be
considered in the determination of the needs for various levels
of VTS in the U.S. ports.
(4) Prepare short and long staffing and funding plans.
(5) Prepare a management plan to use as a guide in planning,
development, and implementing new systems.
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The results of the study were published in March 1973 in four
rather lengthy volumes, and was followed in August 1973 by a report
entitled, "Vessel Traffic Systems-Analysis of Port Needs." This
latter report is the summation of an analysis of port needs for vessel
traffic systems throughout the United States. The output of this
analysis is a listing of ports and waterways in the order in which their
needs should be addressed, and contains initial recommendations
concerning the level of need in each area. The date used in this analysis
was from years 1969 to 1972. Based on this analysis, New Orleans
ranked No. 1 in deaths and injuries caused by collisions, rammings,
and groundings, and ranked No. 2 in dollars damage and pollution.
Baton Rouge ranked No. 14 in death and injuries, and ranked No. 11
and No. 9 in damages and pollution respectively. These standings
are relative to the 22 top ranking U.S. ports. More recently in June
of this year, Operations Research, Inc.,-ORI-under a contract
awarded by the U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Research and Develop-
ment completed its study on vessel traffic and communications in
and around the Port of New Orleans. This study attempted to deter-
mine the average as well as peak density of vessel movement as well
as communications on channel 13 at five selected sites on the river
from Venice to Port Allen. This publication will be of value in attempt-
ing to determine traffic and communications load that may be
encountered in the different sectors.
INTRODUCTION
Before going into details on the proposed New Orleans Vessel
Traffic System, there are certain features about the lower Mississippi
River including the Ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge which
make it unique from other ports or inland waters and I will touch
briefly on some of these:
(1) The Port of New Orleans, which is the first major port on the
Mississippi River from seaward, lies approximately 120 miles upriver
from the entrance. This entails a long river run for all vessels with a
very definite transition from high seas piloting to river piloting and
vice versa. Additionally, it is impossible for a vessel to duck in or
duck out of port during short periods of clearing under foggy condi-
tions. Thus either an upbound or a downbound vessel may encounter
fog or reduced visibility at any location in the river and be forced to
reduce speed, stop, or anchor at a most inopportune time.
(2) The lower Mississippi River, which is the outfall for one of the
largest river complexes in the world, is subject so severe silting and
shoaling condition which may change almost from day to day. Addi-
tionally, the lower Mississippi River is subject to a yearly high water
condition which contributes greatly to these silting and shoaling con-
ditions. This makes transits of certain portions of the river extremely
hazardous under certain conditions and these hazards may be aggra-
vated by chance vessel meeting situations encountered under less than
ideal situations.
(3) The lower Mississippi River is not a nice straight run but
rather has numerous sharp twists and bends as well as a considerable
current at all times. This combination of factors does not lend itself to
easy piloting, nor is it conducive to an orderly flow of upbound and
downbound traffic with all vessels keeping to the right in compliance
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with the Inland Rules of the Road which are applicable as far up as
the Huey P. Long Bridge just north of New Orleans. The point and
bend system of necessity has been adopted through common usage, all
the way to the river entrance. This creates the problem that the cross-
over point is different under different conditions of the river as well as
for each type of vessel. With the numerous bends that exist in the
lower Mississippi River, the definite potential exists for upbound and
downbound vessels to suddenly meet in an embarrassing situation with
both vessels attempting to crossover in the same area at the same time
with no clear-cut port-to-port or starboard-to-starboard passing
indicated.
(4) The most notable feature of the traffic on the lower Mississippi
River is the great variety and mix in size and type of vessels. These
include deep draft general cargo, bulk cargo, and tankers engaged in
foreign and coastal trade; medium draft vessels of the same type en-
gaged in river trade; an enormous amount of river as well as ocean-
going barges carrying everything from general cargo to dangerous
and hazardous cargos; towboats and tugboats of every size, horse-
power, and description; ferryboats which cross in numerous locations;
excursion boats in the New Orleans area; crew boats, supply boats,
and mudluggers which service the offshore oil facilities; a fleet of fishing
boats engaged in numerous types of fishing; public vessels of various
types; and last but not least a small but increasing number of rec-
reational boats. This vast mix of vessels with their equally vast
diversity of interests produces a complex problem in maintaining an
orderly flow of traffic in the river.
(5) The lower Mississippi River south of Baton Rouge has
numerous arteries in the form of locks and canals connecting with the
ICW as well as other waterways, thus adding to the complexity of
maintaining an orderly flow of traffic in the river.
(6) The lower Mississippi River is subject to a seasonal fog condi-.
tion. The spring fog generally comes at the same time as high water
which is caused by the spring thaw and runoff. The mixing of the
cold river water with the warm air from the Gulf of Mexico produces
a convection type of ground fog primarily at the entrance to the
Mississippi River in the area of the Head of Passes. This shutout
fog can be very persistent, due to the static nature of these two
influences, and has lasted as long as a week during which time no
vessels could transit the river entrance in either direction. When this fog
exists for any duration of time, vessels tend to stack up on both sides
of the fog awaiting passage, resulting in a heavy congestion of an-
chored vessels. When the fog does lift, all vessels attempt to move at
once in both directions, resulting in a potentially dangerous situation.
(7) The last factor I should make mention of is the large volume of
traffic on the lower Mississippi River. The Port of New Orleans
boasts of being the second largest port in the United States after
New York. The Port of Baton Rouge ranks seventh.
As can be readily imagined any one or a combination of the above
factors can produce a potentially hazardous situation of the Lower
Mississippi River.
STATISTICS
The New Orleans Vessel Traffic System (VTS) area consists of
approximately 243 miles of river which is mostly continuous curves
and blind bends, as well as the Mississippi River gulf outlet (MR GO).
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There are 15 maj or entry points into the system such as locks and
canals from the TOW and other waterways. Traffic counts indicate
approximately 270,000 annual transits of the system or an average of
almost 750 a day, with peak loads far exceeding the average. Ap-.
proximately one-third of the traffic consists of tanker and tank barges
transporting 140 million tons of petroleum and chemical products. In
addition to the over 76,000 towboats, and between 6,000 and 7,000
deep draft ships entering and departing the area aunually, the fol-
lowing classes of vessels greatly contribute to the complexity of a
potential vessel traffic system:
(1) Approximately 500 crewboats operating in and around the
area primarily engaged in carrying personnel to the over 1000 off-
shore oil structures in the area.
(2) Approximately 25 mudluggers operating in and around the area
primarily in support of the offshore oil industry.
(3) Approximately .35 supply boats operating in and around the
area also in support of the off shore oil industry.
(4) Thirteen scheduled ferry crossings which make several hundred
thousand river crossings per year.
(5) Seven major excursion boats in the New Orleans area which
carry hundreds of sightseers daily through New Orleans Harbor.
(6) A variety of public vessels including the U.S. Navy, the Corps of
Engineers, and police and fire boats.
It is interesting to note that most of the above classes of vessels are
not subject to the Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act.
DESCRIPTION OF THE NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM
The purpose of the New Orleans Vessel Traffic System is to enhance
maritime safety and facilitate vessel movement by acting as a central
maritime information collection and dissemination agency through use
of a VHF-FM communications network, aided by a computerized
realtime automated data system that will provide the VTS watch-
stander with predicted vessel movement, position, and navigational
information. In addition to the regulations, the New Orleans. system
will consist of a vessel traffic center, a communications network, and
limited surveillance in selected areas.
The Geographical System will be divided into four operational
sectors as follows:
(a) Sector I-From the entrance to South Pass and Southwest
Pass north along the Mississippi River to mile 75 Above Head of
Passes (AHP). Also the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet . (MR GO)
from the entrance (approx. 29-25.4N, 88-59.5W) to the Inner-
Harbor Navigational Canal lock where it joins the Mississippi River.
(b) Sector IT-Mississippi River from mile 75 AHP to the Huey P.
Long Bridge.
(c) Sector ITT-Mississippi River from the Huey P. Long Bridge
to mile 159 AHP. . .
(d) Sector TV-Mississippi River from mile 159 AHP to mile 243
AHP. .
Each operational sector will have a designated sector frequency
upon which all VTS communications within that sector will be passed
between the VTC . and the vessel. VHF-FM channels 11, 12, and 14
have been designated as VTS frequencies, but channels 12 and 14
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will be shared with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for lock opera-
tions as well as bridge and canal communications.
There will be sufficient transmitter/receiver sites located throughout
the system to provide individual sector communications coverage
within the sectors with minimum interference with any communica-
tions in adjoining sectors or other sectors having the same working
frequency. The VTS will utilize directional antennae to minimize
interference between different sectors operating on the same channel.
The New Orleans vessel traffic system, when operational, will
control the traffic lights now maintained by the Corps of Engineers.
The traffic lights will be in operation year round and will be manned
by Coast Guard personnel. Initially the area covered by the traffic
lights will be the only area within the New Orleans system with
surveillance. After the installation of low level light closed circuit
television in the vicinity of Algiers Point, the manned watch at the
traffic lights will be discontinued after a period of familiarization.
HOW THE SYSTEM WILL OPERATE
Theoretically, the ideal vessel traffic system would be one in which
every vessel would be protected against marine casualties resulting
from collisions, rammings and groundings at all times and yet would
be permitted complete freedom in the use of the waterways. Further,
from the user's standpoint, the ideal vessel traffic system would permit
a vessel to depart when desired and move to its destination without
delay or interference from other vessels. The user's equipment would
be only that which reflects his own individual needs.
In reality, absolutely free transit of the waters within the New
Orleans vessel traffic system will not be possible at all times due to the
conflicting demands of the many users who travel within extremely
small navigable areas compared to vessel size and maneuverability.
Under these restricted conditions, the incidence of more than one
vessel needing and attempting to use a given portion of the waterway
at the same time is much higher than in areas, such as the open sea,
where space is not a limitation.
In phase one, the New Orleans VTS will function basically as a
navigation data gathering and disseminating system through the
use of a communications network utilizing VHF-FM channels 11, 12,
and 14. In order for the system to serve its intended purpose, it must
be a mandatory participation system. If not, those vessels not par-
ticipating can and will become hazards because of the false sense of
security assumed by those vessels that are participating. A mandatory
participation system will require a listening watch on the sector
frequency in addition to those now being guarded. Under existing
regulations and the proposed draft regulations for VTS New Orleans,
most vessels would be required to guard -when not transmitting-
three channels: 13, 16, and VTS sector frequency. This mandatory
sector guard is necessary in order to insure to the greatest extent
possible a clear frequency for the VTC to pass navigational informa-
tion to the user and to advise him of potential dangers or hazards
ahead of which he might not otherwise be aware. This procedure
allows the operator of the vessel to exercise his own discretion and
coordinate his passing with other vessels on channel 13. When a
hazardous situation is developing, all vessels destined for that area
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will be advised. The prudent operator will take the information of a
developing hazardous situation, evaluate it and take timely action to
avoid it, such as slow down, stop in a safe area, or depending on the
potential situation he may wish to anchor. If everything worked in
the desired manner, there would be no need for a vessel traffic system.
Statistics show, however, that this is not the real situation. Therefore,
in extreme cases, it may become necessary for the vessel traffic
center to direct a vessel to take positive action to avoid a potentially
hazardous situation in which the presence of his vessel would only
add to the hazard on congestion.
This direction by the VTC may take the form of advising the vessel
to slow, remain moored or anchored, or possibly to anchor as soon as
conditions permit. Again, this would only be done in extreme cases
when there is no alternative, and then only when the. vessel does not
take appropriate action on his own initiative in a timely manner. It
must be clearly understood that the responsibility for the safety of
any vessel and its crew remains with the captain or master and cannot
and will not be assumed by the VTC. The proposed draft regulations
for the vessel traffic system New Orleans as well as the published
regulations for . the mandatory compliance system presently es-
tablished in Puget Sound do, however, contain authority to deviate
from any direction in an emergency, to the extent necessary to avoid
endangering persons, property, or the, environment. Obviously any
deviation from a direction issued by the VTC that resulted in a casu-
alty would have to be strdngly justified and the burden of proof would
have to be borne by the vessel. In a similar manner, any direction
issued by the vessel traffic center that resulted in a casualty or other
mishap would have to be strongly justified and the burden of proof
would be borne by the Coast Guard.
Under normal conditions a properly functioning VTS would prevent
hazardous conditions from occurring by recognizing them in advance.
However, certain situations will occur which no human effort could
avoid. To mention a few, unpredicted localized fog conditions, vessel
loss of control or power, breakaway barges, localized squalls or heavy
weather, or possibly an explosion or burning vessel caused, by some-,
thing other than a collision, ramming or grounding. Under unusual
circumstances such as these the VTC would obviously have to~ take a
direct control of the situation to minimize present damage. as well as
to prevent additional damage. A VTC in a situation such as those
cited above would be exercising an authority much the same as the
COTP now exercises under the Magnuson Act.
ELEMENTS OF VTS NEW ORLEANS
Having thus described the proposed operation of the vessel traffic
system in New Orleans in very general terms, allow me to address
specific areas in which the vessel traffic system may improve the
overall safety of shipping relative to the unique features of the lower
Mississippi River which I previously enumerated:
(1) Long river transit.-As noted previously the Port of New Orleans
is a considerable distance up river from the mouth and vessels are
subject to encounter fog in any section of the river. Initial reports of
fog from en route ships would be reported to the VTC which in turn
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would pass such information to other vessels approaching the area
and allow them to better determine an appropriate* course of action.
Additionally the VTC would queue vessels so that they might meet
in the more favorable areas .of the river, or would impose one way
traffic in restricted areas. Lacking surveillance or continuous reports
from all along the river, this would be about the extent of the vessel
traffic system's participation during periods of short duration fog in
isolated sections of the river.
(2) Shoaling and silting.-Changes in the bottom contour resulting
from shoaling and silting are continously taking place but are aggra-
vated during the spring high water. Chance meetings obviously can
be eliminated by a vessel traffic system. When due to conditions of
high water and increased current navigation in certain shoal areas
becomes hazardous, vessels will again be queued and one way traffic
imposed if necessary. A maximum draft limitation based upon the
most current information available could also be imposed to meet
temporary shoaling conditions.
(3) Navigating the bends.-If the Lower. Mississippi River were a
relatively straight run, it would be possible to establish a traffic
separation scheme with all traffic remaining to the right of a separation
zone similar to the system in Puget Sound. Such is not the case, how-
ever, and a potential hazard exists as vessels cross over in seeking the
point or bend as appropriate. Again the vessel traffic system by queuing
vessels to meet either above or below the ambiguous area for crossing
over, where a port to port or starboard to starboard passing is more
clearly indicated, will help to alleviate this hazardous condition. The
situation at Algiers Point in New Orleans Harbor is so potentially
dangerous that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has seen fit to
enforce one-way traffic around this point during periods of high water.
through the use of traffic lights. These traffic lights have been in
operation for over 20 years and are well liked by the maritime users.
Additionally, local efforts have pushed to have these traffic lights
operated year round. A vessel traffic system exercising positive control
in the form of the continued operation of these traffic lights is obviously
indicated and is included in the Coa.st Guard's proposal. Examination.
of certain other areas in which imposed one-way traffic may he appro-
priate as recommended in "Vessel Traffic Systems-Analysis of Port
Needs," is still under evaluation. By queuing vessels and imposing
one-way traffic regulations where necessary, the hazards associated
with the sharp twists and bends in the river ca.n be greatly reduced.
(4) Variety of river traffic.-The vast mix of river traffic with its
varied interests is an area of great concern in attempting to maintain
an orderly flow of traffic. On the one hand, mandatory participation of
all vessels in certain areas is impractical and would cause a communica-
tions saturation. Discussions with local marine interests are still
underway in an effort to determine the optimum level of mandatory
participation in areas of high traffic density. One problem area exists
at the entrance to the river with the literally hundreds of crew boats,
supply boats, and mudluggers operating in support of the offshore oil
industry. Another problem area exists with boats engaged in fleeting
operations which may or may not pose a potential hazard t.o other
i~raffic while engaged in fleeting operations. These two areas as related
to the vessel traffic system in New Orleans are not yet totally resolved
but will receive the Coast Guard's most careful consideration.
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(5) River junctioms.-As noted above there are no less than 15
arteries in the form of locks and canals which join the Lower Missis-
sippi River with other inland waterways. Delays of 24-36 hours at
the Inner Harbor Industrial Canal are sometimes experienced result-
ing in traffic backing up. A vessel traffic system could advise all vessels
upon their entry into the system of what the expected delay at any
given lock would be at any time based upon the computer output.
Based upon this estimate a vessel might find it advantageous to alter
its original intended plan. Increases or decreases in speed of vessels
might also be recommended so as to provide a more even flow of
traffic when approaching the canals and locks. Some form of landline.
communication between the VTC and each of the locks is also being
investigated, as a means of reducing the radio communications load
on channels 12, 13, and 14. A direct coordination between the Corps of.
Engineers lock operators and the VTC could result in a queuing of
vessels into a more desirable sequence so that a combination of vessels
could more efficiently utilize the lock space. The overall congestion
caused by vessels entering and leaving the main flow of traffic in the
river can thus be reduced to some degree by the vessel traffic system.
(6) Extended periods of fog.-The potential role of the Vessel
Traffic System is perhaps as great in dealing with this situation as
with any other. Even lacking radar surveillance the vessel traffic
system will be able to receive reports of fog from vessels anywhere
in the system and advise other vessels who will enter that sector of
the, reported condition, in a manner similar to the reports made by
aircraft pilots (PIREPS). This advance information will probably
cause a small percentage of vessels to alter their proposed plans and
reduce some congestion. During the enroute stage of piloting in fog,
while a vessel still has sufficient visibility to comply with article 16
of the inland rules (speed in fog), the vessel traffic system will once
again be able to queue traffic so that vessels may meet and pass in
the most favorable areas, or impose one-way traffic in restricted areas.
During extended periods of "shut-out" fog at the entrance to the
river, as delayed traffic builds up and the anchorage becomes crowded,
the VTC may prohibit additional vessels from getting underway
enroute this area when additional suitable anchorage is no longer
available. In this way the congestion in the anchorage may be limited
so that when the fog lifts the hazards of vessels attempting to get
underway up and down the river will be reduced. The VTC will also
be able to direct the order in which vessels weigh anchor and get under-
way to prevent a "free-for-all" situation. This same procedure is also
applicable to extended periods of fog encountered elsewhere in the
river.
(7) Large volume of traffic.-'The large volume of traffic transiting
the Lower Mississippi River is one of the basic factors which mandate
the establishment of the vessel . traffic system in New Orleans. With
only one vessel present in an area, the potential for a collision or a
ramming to occur is zero. With the addition of each subsequent vessel
the potential for collisions or rammings increases in some mathematical
progression. It is to the problem of attempting to organize and
coordinate vessel movements that the vessel traffic system addresses
itself. The groundings of a vessel except as a result of being crowded
by another vessel, is considered to be generally unavoidable by a
vessel traffic system and there should be little impact on the number
of grounding incidents.
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SUMMARY
The New Orleans vessel traffic system will be an operational system
with built-in elements of regulatoins, communications and surveillance
that will funètion as an aid to the mariner by gathering and dissemi-
nating navigational information vital to his need. The greater portion
of the time, appropriate action will be taken by the operator upon
receipt of advisory information from the VTC pertaining to future
situations which he may expect to encounter. Only in unusual cases
will the VTC authority to direct a vessel to take a particular course of
action be exercised and then only to the extent that the course of
action itself will not create a dangerous or hazardous situation. This
directed action will be limited to stop (when and where conditions
permit), slow, anchor, remain at anchor or berth, or specifying times
when a vessel may enter the system. Never will rudder commands,
courses or actual maneuvering commands be given. The responsibility
for the safety of any vessel remains with the master or captain,
regardless of any VTC direction.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have with me
several people in the room who with me will attempt to answer any
questions which you might have for us. Commander Oberholtzer who
is the project officer in the district staff and Commander Boyce who
is the CO of the vessel traffic center.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Admiral. There are a number
of questions. In the light of numerous accidents we have had in the
New Orleans port area, how do you account for not having the system
installed at an earlier date?
Admiral BARROW. The emphasis on vessel traffic systems throughout
this country commenced somewhere around the 1970-71 timeframe.
In fact, this system was one of the first ones studied during that time
period, before the Ports and Waterways Safety Act which specifically
authorized the establishment of vessel traffic systems. We had in this
country some very minor systems in effect, but the Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act was the first positive direction to create vessel traffic
systems, and this system was initiated at that time, at least the plan-
ning for it.
Mr. BIAGGI. I had the advantage of the overflight this morning and
looking at the maps and viewing the condition myself. It became
apparent there are quite a number of potentially serious trouble spots
along the river, the very winding nature of it, and I am sure that in
some of those areas ship captains are operating almost blindly, but
one of the outstanding potentials for the difficulties was the arteries
coming into the river. What devices or precautions or procedures do
you have for their safe entry into the river?
Admiral BARROW. In each of those arteries which come into the
system, the entry point, or before you arrive at the entry point, a
reporting point will be established for the vessels to report into the
system and they will be able to proceed only after getting a rundown
on the traffic which will be in that specific sector which would affect
their particular operation.
Mr. BIAGGI. You say, "will be established." What do you have
there now?
Admiral BARROW. We have no system at all now covering this.
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Mr. BIAGGI. During the same flight I observed barge fleeting at the
same point in the river on both sides that seemed to narrow the free
water as far as the ships are concerned. Do you have restrictions as to
whether or not-don't you think you should have restrictions or some
regulations that would eliminate that practice?
Admiral BARROW. I think the point that you are referring to proba-
bly was at the Mississippi River-gulf outlet. I don't believe those are
fleeting areas, but there are barges which do tie up on both sides. It
is an area that we could look at. So far as I have been able to deter-
mine, we have had no complaints about the traffic flow in that par-
ticular area or the barges building up on either side of the waterway
causing any difficulty, but I will agree that on very narrow waterways
where you do have ships on either side plus in some cases fueling
operations going on outboard of that, there is a potential problem.
Mr. BIAGGI. We were in a position to witness the anchorage where
dangerous cargo ships were moored. Would you tell this committee
what special procedure or precaution is taken in connection with any
dangerous cargo vessel?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. One of the elements in the reporting
process into the vessel traffic system is to indentify any hazardous
cargo which is aboard. This information will be entered into the com-
puter and will be available for use of the operator to pass onto other
users of the waterways. We will know at all times within the system
what vessels have hazardous cargoes on board.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I asked you this question earlier and in my own
judgment I don't think that the potential that the dangerous cargo
bears is sufficiently met by simply passing along information. In the
New York area we have some transportation of liquefied natural gas
and, obviously it is a very potentially dangerous situation and the
community is upset about it because of the potential danger. The
admiral in that area has established a special procedure to deal with
that. Now, sometimes a ship gets out of control for one reason or
another and there could be a collision, an accident, explosion, and I
don't think that the simple procedure of information passing or trans-
mission would be adequate for that eventuality.
Admiral BARROW. Excuse me, sir. There are other things, of course,
that through the vessel traffic system are possible and not specifically
tied to the hazardous cargo, although many many of the ships that pass
through this area will be ships that carry hazardous cargo of one nature
or the other. I think inherent in the system of knowing what you have
is the capability to do other things with regard to having ships not
meet at specific points which are going to cause you problems.
I think you have indicated quite correctly the number of blind curves
in the river where it is possible, knowing the ships, to be able to recom-
mend to a vessel that they take such action as necessary so they will
not meet at dangerous points in the river, and this is something that
we can do.
Mr. BIAGGI. Congressman Treen.
Mr. TREEN. Admiral, what mechanisms have you used, either you or
your predecessor, for getting industry input into the development of
the vessel traffic system in this area?
Admiral BARROW. In this specific area we have not had established a
vessel traffic system advisory group; advisory committee. In the Hous-
ton-Galveston area in 1971 or 1972, an ad hoc advisory group was set
up. That was not done here.
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Mr. TREEN. Was it helpful in Houston to have that group?
Admiral BARROW. I think very much so.
~\`Ir. TREEN. Can you tell me why that wasn't done here?
Admiral BARROW. I don't believe I can answer your question on the
initial stages, the 1971 or 1972 time frame. An advisory committee
was asked for in late 1973 or early 1974, as my memory serves me. That
coincided with a period in which there was a concern in the Govern-
ment over the proliferation of advisory committees, and the judgment
of Coast Guard Headquarters at that time, and this was early 1974,
was that a formal advisory group was not necessary to the develop-
ment of this specific system.
I can't speak for that particular judgment. The judgment was made
and this is not to say that there was no consultation. I think there has
been since this system was first started, consultation individually and
collectively with the people in the industry in this area. There was at
the outset of the study process for vessel traffic systems as a whole a
symposium to which people from New Orleans came. There has been
published in the Federal Register a draft of environmental impact
statement covering the system as well as a final environmental impact
statement covering the system with very little comment.
So I think there has been some consultation. Personally I think that
we would have fared better to have had an earlier input in a more
formal way.
Mr. TREEN. Are you saying then quite frankly that you disagree
with the policy established at the headquarters?
Admiral BARROW. I think that a committee would have been useful.
Mr. TREEN. I don't have a copy of the act, I have sent for a copy
of the act and maybe counsel can help me on this.
If I can't find it right away, I will come back to this point. Of
course, the establishment of regulations is subject to the Administra-
tive Practices Act, which calls for publication in the Federal Register,
and so forth, but the feeling I get from the act is that there should be
a mechanism for input by industry. I would just think-and I am not
an expert at all in this area-that that is the most important thing.
The act provides:
In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this title, to promote the
safe and efficient conduct of maritime commerce, the Secretary shall consider
fully a wide variety of interests which may be affected by the exercising of his
authority hereunder.
Is there anything in here specifically about a committee?
Mr. OLNEY. No.
Mr. TREEN. Well, it appears to be the flavor or the tone of the
legislation, that we must get input from all of the interests involved
and I would hope that (I realize that you are bound by policy made
elsewhere), but I hope that we would have a regular means of input.
I assume your consultation has been on a random basis, Admiral?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. I would not want to leave the impression
that this has been minimal, I don't think it has been minimal, I think
it has been substantial consultation. The difference is in the format
of the advice, whereas the system that was used in Houston-Galveston
was a more formal process with the group sitting around the table
and discussing the system and its operational requirements, as op-
posed to this one.
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Mr. TREEN. You did feel that was helpful?
Admiral BARROW. Oh, I don't think there is any question.
Mr. TREEN. And you would agree it would be helpful in this area?
Admiral BARROW. Well, I go on from this point to say that the
package that has been developed was given by me to the Port Safety
Advisory Committee in New Orleans and they have been reviewing
the package that we have and are due to come up with comments on
it to me at some time, I believe, during this month.
Mr. TREEN. We have a representative of the Port Safety Advisory
Committee here?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. What costs will be incurred by the industry, that is,
the owners of vessels, in implementing your final program? I know
under, of course, the previous acts, such as the Bridge-to-Bridge
Communication Act, this required industry to install this equipment.
Now, what, just generally what other equipment now will be required
of vessel owners when your program is fully implemented?
Admiral BARROW. A full answer to this is going to have to wait
until a decision is taken on the question of channel 16 guard, but
perhaps I can ask Commander Boyce if he has any figures on the costs
involved at this time. I know we are working on development of
that aspect of the economic costs on the participants and I don't
know whether it has been completed at this time, but perhaps I
can ask him.
Mr. TREEN. Yes.
Commander BoYCE. I have nothing on it, sir.
Mr. TREEN. The reason I asked is that Congress, this committee
and the Congress, is interested in what it costs the taxpayers generally
for new rules and regulations and systems, but we are also interested
m what the impact is going to be on the industry involved. This is
a fortunate feeling of sensitivity that has been growing in Congress.
We require a committee to report what a new bill or new law is
going to cost in the terms of revenues and we are getting around
now to where we are requiring the committee to report on what it is
going to cost the industry or the affected people. So that is something
that we will be interested in; I would, at least.
How many people are you going to have assigned to this program
when it is fully implemented?
Commander BOYCE. Thirty-nine.
Admiral BARROw.Thirty-nine altogether.
Mr. TREEN. Of course, you will have some people on around the
clock, won't you?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. That would mean a total of 39 people given the around-
the-clock operation?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir. The 39 people is the total manning
requirement for the center itself including the commanding officer
and supervisory personnel and watch standers within the system.
Mr. TREEN. At any one time it would be 39 people?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir, that is the total requirement for the
center. I don't know whether that includes the personnel to man the
lights at Algiers Point.
Commander BOYCE. It does not.
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Admiral BARROW. It does not. There will be some additional person-
nel required to initially man the lights at Algiers Point which are now
being operated by the Corps of Engineers. We are not unmindful of
the economic cost of this.
I might point out that we are not at the point of a notice of pro-
proposed rulemaking, we are still in the consultative point at this
time. We have not forwarded any of the regulations on the system to
Coast Guard headquarters, so the process of developing an eèonomic
impact on the industry is still to be accomplished, as well as necessary
leadtime for the users of the system to secure the equipment and
get it into place.
Mr. TREEN. The economic impact would include not only the addi-
tional equipment that industry might have to acquire, but additional
manning requirement that industry might be subjected to. Your
system is going to control access or entry into the system from the
Gulf Intracoastal Waterways. If that begins at the point where the
Intracoastal enters the Mississippi or the inner harbor navigational
canal, it is a little bit too late then, isn't it, to tell a tow that they
can't enter? It would seem to me that if you are going to deny or
delay entry at the access point, that it would be better to cover a little
larger area. I would suspect that some of these tows would find it
easier to lay back a few miles away than to get stacked up at the
locks. If I am all wet, say so.
Admiral BARROW. I don't think you are all wet, Congressman. On
this specific point, one of the committees, the subgroups of the Port
Safety Advisory Committee that is looking at the package which was
developed as a proposal is an area subgroup, subcommittee, and
presumably this would be something perhaps they could recommend
to us. If indeed you need to go 1 mile or 2 miles or a certain distance
in the canal in order to lead into it, I would think that this is something
that they could come up and make a recommendation to us on.
I agree that it is not always best to wait until you get right into the
area in order to plug into the system, but this is something that they
could give their recommendations on.
Mr. TREEN. I hope that I will hear from industry members on that
subject. One last question, Mr. Chairman, I was under the impression
thatthe harbor traffic light system was in use all of the time. Is it just
in periodic use, just in high water times?
Admiral BARROW. High water times.
Mr. TREEN. Only?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. There have been recommendations over
the years to continue this on a year-around scheme.
Mr. TREEN. What is involved? Assuming that there is some benefit,
what is the cost of going from just seasonal or intermittent use to
full-time use?
Admiral BARROW. I think I would defer to the Corps of Engineers.
Mr. TREEN. That's right; it is under the Corps of Engineers jurisdic-
tion. You haven't taken that over yet?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir. In fact, we have not formed an agreement
with the Corps of Engineers on this subject; we still have to negotiate
an agreement.
Mr. TREEN. You want some of their budget along with some of
their responsibilities.
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10
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Admiral. We have 10 witnesses and in
order to provide each one, as I said at the outset, with an oppor-
tunity to speak, I will ask respective counsel to hold their questions
and submit them in writing to you, Admiral, and you can respond
and serve them in the record. Without objection, so ordered.
Thank you for your contribution.
Col. Early J. Rush III, district engineer, New Orleans.
STATEMENT OP COL. EARLY ~1. RUSH III, DISTRICT ENGINEER,
NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OP ENGINEERS
Colonel Rusn. Mr. Chairman, I am Col. Early J. Rush III,
district engineer, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers. I appreciate the fact that the subcommittee recognizes the
role that the Corps of Engineers plays in the development, operation,
and maintenance of our Nation's waterways. I also appreciate your
invitation to appear before this subcommittee today in its evaluation
of local vessel traffic safety problems and the Coast Guard's plans for
a vessel traffic system on the Mississippi River.
I believe you should know that I assumed my current position as
district engineer on August 25, 1975. Additionally, I have with me
Mr. Henry Schorr of my operations division. My statement is
brief and, therefore, I would like to give it in its entirety.
Since 1933, the Corps of Engineers has operated a visual system of
traffic control lights in the New Orleans Harbor. This system is
essentially designed to limit traffic to one way around Algiers Point
during periods of high water only. The system consists of three lights:
One located below Algiers Point on the east bank of the river atop
the Governor Nicholls Wharf; a second light on a tower on the west
bank levee at Gretna, La.; and a third light on a tower on the west
bank levee at Westwego, La.
The Governor Nicholls light controls upbound vessel movements
while the Gretna and Westwego lights control downbound traffic.
Vessels proceed or hold up, depending upon whether the light is green
or red. The Governor Nicholls and Gretna towers are manned by
professional pilots who are temporary hire employees of the New
Orleans District. These locations have radio communications with
vessels using the river. The Westwego light is remote controlled from
the Gretna tower.
Historically, the operation of the system has been governed by the
river stages as read on the Carrollton Gage located at River Mile 102.8
above Head of Passes.
Originally this system went into operation at a reading of 12 feet
on the Carrollton Gage when the river was rising and went out of
operation at 15 feet when the river was falling. In 1955, regulations
were revised, and the lights were turned on at a 10-foot gage reading
on a rising river and discontinued at 12 feet on a falling river.
Since 1968, because of the increase in number and size of vessels
using the river, the lights are operated between an 8-foot gage reading
on a rising river and a 9-foot gage reading on a falling river. During
the last three high water seasons, the lights were operated an average
of about 6 months a year.
78-280-76-10
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While we feel there is a definite need for a vessel traffic system,
particularly in the New Orleans Harbor, we do not feel we can properly
address the scope or manner in which the system would operate with-
out the advantage of extensive studies with the Coast Guard and
maritime interests.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today, and I or Mr.
Schorr will be happy to answer any questions that you, Mr. Treen, or
your counsels may have.
Mr. BIAGGI. I have one question. The problem of shoaling and
silting seems to be perpetual. What can be done besides dredging?
Colonel RUSH. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Mississippi
River drains approximately 41 percent of the United States, that is,
the continental United States. As water is generated in the watershed
area, it does erode soil and that soil is carried with the Mississippi as
the sediment load.
The area here, of course, was built by this type of action as far as
the river and its sediment load are concerned. Therefore, we have to
expect that we will continue to have sediment deposited in this area
and that we will have to continue dredging in order to maintain
shipping channels for our navigation potential and also for the com-
merce of the Nation.
I guess the real question is the quantity of dredging that is required
in any given year. During periods of extreme high water, such as we
have experienced in the past 3 years, the need and quantity of dredging
increase dramatically. At those times we have to pull together as
much of the dredging capability that we can in order to cope with the
problem. We have done this in the past, not without some impacts
elsewhere and not without a significant increase in the funds required
for it.
Mr. BIAGGI. Are there any efforts or any studies or research being
undertaken in connection with finding alternative methods of dis-
posing of the silt?
Colonel RUSH. We do have a study underway at the present time
which is an effort to identify ways which will permit more consistent
maintenance of channel dimensions, particularly in the Southwest
Pass area, which is where we do the most significant amount of our
dredging. We hope that these structures would tend to control the
river and reduce the rates of siltation in the navigation channel.
In our deposition of materials we are, of course, at the present time
utilizing two methods; one, a corps-owned hopper dredge which works
for New Orleans district most of the time when it is not in mainte-
nance, and two, contract cutter-head dredges, which work the other
areas that are most suitable for that type of equipment. The hopper
dredge actually uses two disposal methods. When river velocities are
strong enough to carry resuspended materials out to sea, the hopper
dredge simply agitates the bottom material into suspension. This
method moves more material out in a given amount of time. However,
as river velocities decrease, the dredge must load its hoppers and haul
the material to disposal sites in deep waters of the gulf. The cutter-head
dredges utilize pipelines and water to deposit that material into
disposal sites adjacent to the river banks.
Mr. BIAGGI. How does the existing visual system relate to the vessel
traffic system once that is put into effect?
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Colonel RUSH. Well, as Admiral Barrow indicated, the system would
be turned over to the Coast Guard for its operation. I don't know
specifically how that integration will take place, but that would be the
concept, we would no longer operate it in the corps.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, will that visual system be continued or dis-
continued or incorporated into the whole system?
Admiral BARROW. The visual system would be continued in opera-
tion by the Coast Guard until the low light level TV surveillance
system was placed into effect and then some period beyond that time
to insure that the needs of navigation could be taken care of through
the television system as compared with the actual onsite people.
After that approved period and once we were satisfied that the
system could be controlled from VTC, we would discontinue the
people who were actually operating the lights on scene.
Mr. BIAGGI. Congressman Treen.
Mr. TREEN. Colonel Rush, I appreciate you being here very much.
The Atchafalaya takes part of that 41-percent drainage-
Colonel RUSH. It certainly does, Mr. Treen.
Mr. TREEN. I want to note for the record that goes through my
district, too, the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya. We have lots of
problems over there in that area, too.
How many people are involved in manning the traffic light system?
Colonal RUSH. There are nine people involved.
Mr. TREEN. Nine when you have it in operation?
Colonel RUSH. That is correct.
Mr. TREEN. That is about 6 months out of the year for that?
Colonel RUSH. For the last 3 years. Under a normal year, when we
don't have extensive high water, our operation has averaged about 2
months per year.
Mr. TREEN. You just hire pilots for that time, and then they are off
your payroll?
Colonel RUSH. Yes, sir. We have a list of people who are available
and interested in that type of work and in our judgment qualified to
perform that function. We then hire them on that temporary basis
during either the 2-or up to 6-month timeframe when we are in the
high water period. I might add-
Mr. TREEN. That is just for control around Algiers Point?
Colonel RUSH. That is correct, Mr. Treen. I might add that the
cost which was questioned before is approximately $14,000 per month
in order to employ the nine individuals to provide around-the-clock
operations. So the annual cost would depend upon the degree of time
that we actually operated the system.
Mr. TREEN. What else under your jurisdiction are you going to
surrender to the Coast Guard when this VTS is fully implemented?
How about permitting of fleeting operations, will you retain that?
Colonel RUSH. We will retain permitting of fleeting operations.
Mr. TREEN. And of the locks?
Colonel RUSH. And the locks remain under our control as well.
Mr. TREEN. I would presume under the vessel traffic system ac-
cess would become the Coast Guard's responsibility then, wouldn't it,
under the system? If they scheduled the ships through the access into
the system, then they are going to be necessarily telling you-well, I
guess they will be telling the vessels.
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Colonel RUSH. I don't know the exact details that will be worked
out in that regard, however, I am sure there will have to be close
coordination between the corps and the Coast Guard.
Mr. TREEN. Do you have any or do you see any problems?
Colonel RUSH. I don't believe so.
Mr. TREEN. I am sure there won't be any problems between you
two gentlemen-
Colonel RUSH. I don't believe so.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Counsel has some questions and they will submit those
to you in writing. I would appreciate it if you would respond through
them to the committee.
Colonel RUSH. We will be pleased to answer those for the record,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. I imagine when the day of surrender comes of jurisdic-
tion, the meeting will have to take place in Geneva.
STATEMENT OP CAPT. HENRY U. JOPPRAY, ASSOCIATE PORT
DIRECTOR, PORT OP NEW ORLEANS
Capt. Henry G. Joifray, associate port director, Port of New
Orleans.
Mr. JOFFRAY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Treen, gentlemen of the staff, I
am Henry G. Joffray, associate port director for the Board of Com-
missioners for the Port of New Orleans.
I have rendered a statement on the Board's position relative to the
vessel traffic system, but I would like to highlight certain facets of
the statement.
[The statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF HENRY G. JOFFRAY
I am Henry G. Joifray, associate port director of the Port of New Orleans.
In the calendar year 1974, 144,000,000 tons of waterborne commerce transited
the Port of New Orleans area. During this period, 125,000 barges passed through
our port area. On any given day, 10 percent of all the barges on U.S. inland
waterways are in the Port of New Orleans. In addition, there were 15,181 cargo
vessel movements thrqugh the Port of New Orleans. Also, there were 1,921 tankers
moving through our port. Safety statistics indicate that most of the accidents in
the Port of New Orleans involved collisions between inland barges and tugs and
oceangoing vessels.
If barge traffic continues to increase and ships continue to get larger and less
maneuverable, accidents will be more frequent and more costly in terms of lives,
property damage, and damage to the environment.
There are certain adverse conditions that recur each year to test the navi-
gational skills of both the small and large vessel operators. During the period
from December through February, heavy fog reduces visibility as a result of cool
air from the north meeting warmer moist air from the Gulf of Mexico. According
to NOOA statistics, New Orleans has 31 days of heavy fog per year. This is not
any higher than other post areas on the Gulf, Atlantic, or Pacific Coasts, however,
the heavy traffic and type of traffic in this port area makes navigation particularly
hazardous during this period of reduced visibility. Also, the heavy traffic in the
restricted passes at the mouth of the river presents additional navigational
hazards. The hazardous situation on the river is compounded by other problems
during this same period of time (December through February) because in addition
to the fog, the current velocity on the river is at its highest. With increasing stages
of the river, we can expect swift and unpredictable eddy currents and a changing
channel bottom.
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River elevations reached flood stages in 1973 and in 1974. In 1973, we were
plagued with barge breakaways resulting from swift currents, inadequate barge
fleeting areas, and questionable fleeting practices. In 1974, as a result of safety
measures initiated by the U.S. Coast Guard and traffic controls which were made
mandatory, the Port of New Orleans did not experience the barge breakaway
problem to the extent as in 1973, even though the fog and river currents were
comparable. This attests to the fact that safety measures and traffic controls are
effective.
A safe port is a healthy port. By considering current trends in commerce, vessel
traffic, known geographic and logistical factors, known weather and river condi-
tions, and considering the opinions of persons knowledgeable in navigation
through the port area, we can make some progress on safety and environmental
conditions. We believe the following procedures and programs will contribute to
an effective safety program for our port:
A vessel traffic system acceptable to Government and industry.
Additional barge fleeting areas which comply with appropriate safety
standards.
Maintenance of Mississippi River authorized project channel depth of 40
feet and provision of a deeper navigation channel for the longer term.
A new ship/barge lock downstream of the general anchorage area to more
safely accommodate barge traffic and to provide an alternate route to the
Gulf of Mexico for deep draft vessels.
Mr. JOFFRAY. We naturally have a great concern for the safety of
our port area. As Admiral Barrow indicated, we are the second
largest port in the United States in total waterborne commerce. Last
year we handled over 144 million tons of cargo through our port area.
The vessels that accommodate this cargo represent a tremendous
amount of traffic. In fact, within our port reaches, this is the most
dense traffic area on the inland waterways system in America.
On any given day, 10 percent of all of the barges of the United
States are located in the Port of New Orleans. We have 2,000 to 3,000
barges in our port region, for instance, today. We have anywhere
from 50 to 100 vessels per day.
As I mentioned before, compounding this traffic, we have some
physical restraints in our geographical layout. As you know, the city
is in a crescent and one of the areas that presents a tremendous hazard
and a difficult problem for navigation is the Algiers Point. In excess
of 180,000 bottoms rounded that point last year. This is a 90-degree
bend where you have limited visibility at best and you compound
that with about 30 days of fog during the navigational year and any-
where from the 4- to 6-knot current during high water, you can see
you have the ingredients for some serious holocausts that could occur.
We are very concerned in that respect, also.
Another factor that is entering in, we see more and more in our
deep draft vessels an increase in size. It used to be that a 500-foot
vessel with maybe 12,000 tons was a considerable-sized vessel in the
normal day-to-day port operation. Just in the first month of this
year we handled more large vessels of the OBO type, 600 feet and
over, than we handled all of last year. So we see tremendous growth
factors in the size and dead weight of the vessels that come upon us
very rapidly.
Naturally your larger ships are confronted with the restraints that
I just mentioned, the currents and fog and reduced speed because of
congested situations within your harbor area, the maneuverability is
essened to the extent that is is more difficult for them to safely op -
erate within the restraints of the port's physical layout.
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In 1973, we had here within the port during this high water inci-
dent and during our fog season a situation where we had 130 runaway
barges* that got loose in the port area. Fortunately, the extent of the
damage was minimal considering what could have happened in that
instance. Well, immediately after, and particularly more so in 1974,
the Coast Guard initiated safety measures and operations that I
think attest to the effectiveness of the traffic system or the initia-
tion of such measures as to the safety of the port and its cargo ac-
tivities because on 1974, the incidence of runaway barges was prac-
tically nil, mainly because of the industry cooperating with the Coast
Guard that we were able to have a very good track record for that
year.
I heard an economist mention the other day in another panel dis-
cussion that I attended that maritime commerce, if you generate $100
in revenue, you net out about $5, but for every $100 that you save in
preventive measures on accidents will increase your cash flow by $50.
I think it is of vital interest to the industry, anything to enhance
safety improves their profit picture in the overall financial return of
their operations.
So in conclusion and consideration of these facts that has led our
Board to very definitely support the initiation and operation of a
vessel traffic system within our area, and I would be glad at this time
to answer any questions.
Mr. BIAGGI. I don't think I have any questions, Mr. Joifray, hut
I would like to first thank you for your contribution and your testi-
mony. I think it should be said that the Coast Guard and the indus-
try, by working together, ought to be congratulated because from my
observations this morning, it confounds me that you . don't have more
serious accidents on this river, and it is a tribute to the industry and
the men who pilot those boats and, of course, the Coast Guard.
Hopefully, the installation of the vessel traffic system will reduce that
incidence of accidents even more. I like the perspective you put on it.
You make more money by not spending it on accidents. Of course, the.
economics are very compelling and industry, I am sure, will cooperate.
Thank you very much for yor contribution.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Joifray, for coming. What kind of
economic impact do you see to the port from the full implementation
of this system? I realize that we don't know all of the details of the
system yet. We talked about the industry already. Is it going to have
any impact one way or the other on the port itself or the revenues of
the port?
Mr. J0FFRAY. I would think that if the system is advisory in nature
and if it is not too rigidly structured that there are encumbrances*
placed upon the industry that could hamper or delay their operations,
I think it would be a positve measure in the port. If it is, say, an over-
kill type situation where it is too rigid and too structured and you
entail delays, I can't speak too well for inland waterways costs, but
on the deep sea you are going anywhere from $5,000 to $30,000 per
day per vessel. As I say, if you delay these ships for any period of time
because trying to adhere to certain provisions of the system that are
compelling or mandatory, it could have a detrimental effect in that
regard, but, otherwise, other than the financial outlays of the industry,
and I think most of them have the necessary radio equipment and
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some have radar. I don't know what the encumbrances would be on
industry as far as financial outlay, but I think in the long run if these
safety measures were initiated, it would enhance not oniy the revenues
of the port, but those of the industry.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. One question. You mentioned that the size of the ships
were increasing. What is the width of the largest ship that can pass
through these locks?
Mr. JOFFRAY. Well, the present lock is 75 feet wide; there is a new
lock proposed, construction of a new lock, which I think in conjunction
with the vessel traffic should help the overall safety situation of the
port, and the width of that lock will be 150 feet. Presently we are re-
strained because we have got a lot of ships 90-foot in beam that can't
get through the existing locks because that is the controlling width
within the lock.
Mr. BIAGGI. That seems to be a trend, the increasing size of ships.
I was down in Panama and they are just about skimming through.
Mr. JOFFRAY. It certainly is.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much.
Mr. Norman K. Doucet, president, Gulf Coast Towing Association.
STATEMENT OP NORMAN K. DOUCET, PRESIDENT, GULP COAST
TOWING ASSOCIATION
Mr. D OUCET. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen, members of the
committee staff, 1 have a prepared statement. First of all, I should say
my name is Norman Doucet. My address is 2614 South Bayou Drive
in Golden Meadow, La. I am president of the Gulf Coast Towing
Association.
I have a prepared statement here which I will make and a time or
two I may stray from it. The Gulf Coast Towing Association is a
3-year-old trade organization which represents approximately* 59
towing companies operating throughout the gulf coast. Originally
formed to respond to the towing vessel operators licensing regulations,
the Gulf Coast Towing Assothation gives a voice to the smaller firms
that operate on the Mississippi River and the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway.
Our members are committed to safety on the waterways. When
your livelihood depends upon a vessel that you own and operate, it is
easy to become personally involved in waterways safety. We are sin-
cerely interested in the Coast Guard's proposed vessel traffic system
regulations and we appreciate having this opportunity to express our
views on the general subject of vessel traffic controls.
The members of the Gulf Coast Towing Association believe that
radio telephone communications are the singlernost important factor
in vessel traffic safety. We note that a Coast Guard vessel traffic sys-
tems issue study completed in 1973 concluded that the bridge-to-bridge
radio telephone requirements would result in an 80 percent reduction
in collisions between moving* vessels. If that projected improvement
has not been realized, it is because there has been a lack of enforce-
ment of proper radio procedure on the channel 13, the bridge-to-bridge
frequency.
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Mr. BIAGGI. Would you be a little more detailed as far as that last
statement is concerned?
Mr. DOUCET. Yes, sir, I will come back to that a little later, if you
don't mind. I have got something that I want to come back to on this
certain thing here.
Improved bridge-to-bridge communications will contribute the most
to vessel traffic safety at the least expense. We feel that the Coast
Guard should not give up on the present system without a concerted
effort to realize its full safety potential. The Gulf Coast Towing
Association is currently conducting an education program in proper
radio telephone procedures for its members. We urge the Federal
Communications Commission and Coast Guard meet their respon-
sibilities for enforcing circuit discipline on the bridge-to-bridge
frequency.
A review of the Coast Guard's draft regulations indicates that the
proposed communications system may be unworkable. Existing
regulations require a vessel operator to monitor channels 13 and 16
in addition to the company frequencies he may be using. The proposed
regulations would require the addition of three more radio channels
to the vessel's communications equipment and the continuous moni-
toring of at least three separate frequencies. Aside from the additional
expense this requirement would entail, we feel that the proposed
system would not be practical because it will burden the already busy
operator with the requirement to listen to and sift through three
continuous sources of radio communications.
In short, we feel that a system already exists which will improve
vessel traffic safety in the New Oreleans area; a more effective utiliza-
tion of channel 13. We recommend that the Coast Guard, FCC, and
industry try to make the present system work before implementing
a multimillion dollar system that may create more problems than
exist now.
We recommend that the Coast Guard, FCC, and the industry try
to make the present system work. Now, this is where I will answer
your question. We also have FCC, Federal Communications Commis-
sion. The FCC is, I believe, the Federal agency, regulatory agency, for
any kind of radio communications. I have been to meetings throughout
the State of Louisiana and throughout other States and I have talked
a lot about the traffic system, but up until today I have never seen
an agent of FCC in any of our meetings, and yet they are the people
that are going to regulate us.
I believe-and this is my only thought-
Mr. BIAGGI. Have you invited them?
Mr. DOUCET. I think they have been invited to some of our Port
Safety Council meetings.
Mr. BIAGGI. They should be there.
Mr. DOUCET. I know they have been invited to our association
meetings, but it seems like they are too busy monitoring stations in
Allegan, Mich., and Kingsville, Tex., and issuing out citations for
not using call letters and not waiting for 2-minute intervals, they are
too busy doing that and they can't come to New Orleans.
Mr. BIAGGI. New Orleans is part of the United States and it is part
of their responsibility.
Mr. DOTJCET. Well, I believe-and this is my belief only-but I
believe if FCC would have gotten involved in this and would have
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taken the local people that cause these traffic jams off of the air, and
I think it is very simple to do that, I don't believe we would have to
even talk about a vessel traffic system around here today. However,
we are in favor of a vessel traffic system for the city of New Orleans
because the way it is operating now, we need it. I think I have gotten
my point across about the FCC.
Mr. BIAGGI. Before you go further, Mr. Doucet, I would like to stay
with that point because that was the question I was going to raise. I
think the admiral touched on it when he mentioned the three fre-
quencies and he thought there might be some difficulty.
If I recollect correctly, Admiral, you testified that you were dealing
with some alternatives in connection with the three frequencies?
Admiral BARROW. One of the recommendations that has been made
here, as well as in New York, is that once vessels report in to vessel
traffic systems, the requirement for monitoring channel 16 be dispensed
with. So, in fact, if that were the case, and this, of course, has not been
agreed to by FCC or anybody else, but if this were the case, a vessel
in the system would be required to monitor the sector frequently and
channel 13.
Mr. BIAGGI. Has the Coast Guard been in touch with FCC in
connection with this problem?
Admiral BARROW. This is a matter which is going to be taken care of
between Coast Guard headquarters and FCC. It is a matter under
active consideration and active interplay right now; yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. How does that proposal set with your industry?
Mr. DOUCET. Well, sir, I am speaking as a man that has put in 28
years of actually running up and down this river in this part of the
country. I just got off the boats in the month of February and I think
I know the ropes. I still say that the way this VTS program is set up
now, that it will not work on that one condition, that there will be too
many radio frequencies for a man to listen to all day long. You have
got channel 13, which you do have to stand by on the river now for
ships traffic; you have got channel 16, the emergency frequency for the
Coast Guard, and it is also an emergency frequency put out by FCC.
You also have a company frequency that you have got to keep in
contact with your company. That gives you three frequencies and
then if you add one or two more frequencies that you have got to
operate for VTS, you will have just too many people talking at one
time.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is your point of view reflected on the advisory council?
Mr. DOUCET. On the VTS advisory council?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Mr. DOUCET. I am on the steering committee here in New Orleans
on the YTS group.
Mr. BIAGGI. You should make your point emphatic in that area.
Apparently there is an effort to conciliate that situation. I think it
has been acknowledged that there is some confusion.
Mr. DOUCET. Well, to tell you truthfully, I would like to see a good
.VTS program, but something that will work. This is the only drawback
that I can see, too many frequencies involved to monitor around the
city of New Orleans at one time and that is the only drawback that we
have got on it.
Now, to keep on with my statement-
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Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, in connection with this discussion, how would
you resolve this so that there is mutual agreement, consistent with the
safety of the vessel in the vessel traffic system?
Admiral BARROW. I don't believe I understand the question, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. The witness testified very strongly that there is an
extra burden and obviously some diminution of effectiveness of a three-
frequency process. I think you and I chatted about this, and I think
you testified that there might be some confusion and something should
be done. Just how far can you go and be consistent with your ultimate
objective?
Admiral BARROW. At this level, Mr. Chairman, I think nothing other
than to make recommendations to the Commandant for pursuing
through FCC. I would agree, and I'm sure that the people in our Coast
Guard contingent here would be that for a towboat to try to monitor
channel 16, channel 13, and a sector frequency would be awfully diffi-.
cult, if not impossible, in connection with running a good vessel traffic
system. I think there has to be some relief on this in order to have a
viable system.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.
Mr. TREEN. Can I ask a question?
Mr. BIAGGI. Certainly.
Mr. TREEN. Norman, you have got three frequencies that you are
monitoring now, 13, 16, and your company frequency?
Mr. DOUcET. Right.
Mr. TREEN. Under the VTS system it would be one additional,
rather than three additional. I mean, there are three frequencies used
in the system, but you have only been monitoring one of those; is
that correct Admiral Barrow?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. I think what the .witness was trying to
say was the additional channels that he would have to add to his radio
in order to accommodate-
Mr. TREEN. Right, but as far as monitoring, you have got one more?
Mr. DOUcET. Right.
Mr. TREEN. Now, one of the frequencies that you monitor now is
channel 16, the emergency frequency?
Mr. DoucET. Right.
Mr. TREEN. That is used by the Coast Guard for emergency
messages. When you get into the VTS system, Admiral Barrow, why
couldn't the requirement for monitoring 16 be expended and emer-
gency messages then given over the VTS system? In a sense it is going
to be run by the Coast Guard. Why should operators have to monitor
two Coast Guard frequencies?
Admiral BARROW. The channel 16 guard is an FCC requirement
purely and simply. Vessels would in addition have to guard the VTS
sector frequency and channel 13, the bridge-to-bridge frequency.
Mr. TREEN. I mean, from your point of view, do you see any
problems?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir, although the monitoring of channel 16
for ships in the system would probably require additional equipment
and personnel in VTC.
Mr. TREEN. What do you think of that, Mr. Doucet?
Mr. DOUcET. Well, that still falls under FCC, the regulatory
agency, and still we don't hear from them people.
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Mr. TREEN. I understand, but assuming that this can be accom-
plished, do you have any problem with that? In other words, as you
move into the YTS system, then you are monitoring-I realize you
still have got to have all of these channels on your equipment-but
as far as monitoring these frequencies, if you have only the one fre-
quency, the YTS frequency for the sector that you are in over which
you would also get any emergency messages that you would get on
your channel 16, is there anything wrong with that?
Mr. DOUCET. No; if FCC will comply with it.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you.
Mr. DOUCET. If a VTS is implemented in the New Orleans area,
we recommend that it not extend above the Huey P. Long Bridge.
A review of the proposed VTS rules by the ad hoc steering committee
indicated that there is some question of justification of a vessel traffic
system above the bridge. In light of that question, we feel that a
logical step-by-step approach should be used to implement the VTS.
In fact, this form of phased approach was recommended by a General
Accounting Office study of vessel traffic systems. We ask that the
Coast Guard follow the GAO recommendation by using a phased
approach in the New Orleans area. Ouly after experience is gained in
limited area and a need is identified in an additional area should the
program be expanded.
Discussions by the ad hoc steering committee also indicated that
this vessel traffic system may be the forerunner of more extensive
forms of vessel traffic control. The members of the Gulf Coast Towing
Association do not feel that there is identifiable need at the present
time for the implementation of other forms of vessel control such as
tonnage, horsepower limitations, or speed limits. President Ford has
asked the executive agencies to seek ways to reduce the administrative
and regulatory burden they place on the private sector. We hope that
the Members of Congress will help the Chief Executive hold the
regulatory agencies to his orders.
In conclusion, we feel that the goal of improved navigational safety
can best be achieved by using and improving the present system of
bridge-to-bridge communications. We feel that we should try to make
the present system work before spending millions of dollars on an
untried and possibly impractical form of vessel traffic control.
If a vessel traffic system is to be implemented, we ask that it extend
above the Huey P. Long Bridge only if the need exists and only when
the system is tested in a smaller area. We further ask the Members of
Congress to do what they can to check the growing power of Federal
bureaucracy.
Thank you again for giving the members of the Gulf Coast Towing
Association this opportunity to express their views. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Doucet. I have no questions. I think
we, in our colloquy, established a very important point and one that
I'm sure will be given proper attention by the Coast Guard and FCC
as well as this committee. It recognizes a problem and the question is
how to resolve it. As far as the Coast Guard is concerned, apparently
there seems to be no objection to the suggestion of Congressman
Treen, that it is a question of dealing with FCC. I don't know the
flexibility of that agency as far as this particular regulation is con-
cerned. I see smiling faces and that means the executive will continue
to remain the executive and intransigent.
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Mr. TREEN. Not altogether.
Mr. BIAGGI. I hope this is the exception that proves the rule. I
don't simply mean this administration. Now we agree.
Mr. DOUCET. I must say this, that around the city of New Orleans
there is very good harmony between the U.S. Coast Guard, between
the industry, the ship pilots, the pilot's association and, as far as I am
concerned, the only people that we haven't been able to get too much
out of or associate with us is the Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. TREEN. Could I ask one question; Do you see any problems with
regard to entry into the vessel traffic system area from the Intra-
coastal Canal? If you get to the point of entry and you have got to get
stacked up there, what sort of problems---
Mr. DOUCET. Well, my understanding, as far as the inharbor
navigational canal is concerned, my understanding is that the YTS
program will extend to the, well, I know it will extend to MRGO-
Mr. TREEN. Extend to what?
Mr. DOUCET. Extend to the Mississippi River-gulf outlet. (MRGO)
That is where most of these tows that are coming from the east, they
have got to come through the system, so they will be through the
system at the intersection before they ever come through the locks.
Am I right, Admiral?
Admiral BARROW. Yes.
Mr. TREEN. Within a section of the-
Mr. DOUCET. Of the Industrial Canal and the Mississippi River-
gulf outlet.
Mr. TREEN. There is not a lot of distance there, is there, from that
intersection----
Mr. DOUCET. That may not be a lot of distance, but by God, there's
a lot of waiting.
Admiral BARROW. One of the things that we are going to investigate
and, in fact, are investigating are improved communications between
the vessel traffic center and each of the locks in order to determine
what the status would be at the locks. One of the things we can do
with that would be to pass this information to tows that are ap-
proaching the reporting-in point to give them what the waiting time is
going to be at that specific area, and hopefully to decrease some of the
problem in getting to a lock and having to stay there and wait. We are
investigating teletype communications, and things of that sort, with
the lock.
Mr. TREEN. How about coming in from the west?
Mr. DOUCET. I don't know where the traffic system will start from
the west. I would like to see it start anywhere west of the Algiers
Lock or Harvey Locks. If we do wait until the boats come into the
river itself to enter them into the system, then it's a little late.
Mr. TREEN. How far, in your judgment, would you have to go in
distance from the locks back to accommodate periods of heavy traffic?
Mr. DOUCET. I think that if the locks themselves would be put into
the system, when a man calls in for lockage from the canal side, it
gives them plenty of time to be prepared for what he is going to meet.
Mr. TREEN. How far away is a tow when it calls to the lock?
Mr. DOUCET. Usually around the Harvey Locks, usually about a
mile away from the Harvey Locks and at the Algiers Locks, he is
usually about three-quarters of a mile when he gets to the Algiers
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Highway Bridge, and that should give them sufficient time to be
prepared for what is out on the river when he gets out.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. William C. McNeal, marine consultant.
STATEMENT OP WILLIAM C. McNEAL, MARINE CONSULTANT
Mr. MCNEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you
said that this record would be open for people to submit contributions,
would that be for as long a period as 30 days?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Mr. MCNEAL. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak here today. I
am William C. McNeal of 2519 Bristol Place, New Orleans, and I
appear on behalf of Mid-South Towing Co. and Gulf Coast Transit
Co., both of 4251 Henderson Boulevard in Tampa, and I personally
subscribe to this statement.
We know that vessel traffic safety in this area, with respect to
avoiding collisions, has improved in the past few years despite major
floods in 1973 and 1974. The primary reason was congressional action
in 1971 in passing the Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Act.
This made it mandatory that all large commercial vessels have a
common radio with an ability for pilot-to-pilot communication. It
was effective January 1, 1973.
Other safety improvements have come from the law licensing most
towing vessel operators and the increased on-the-river presence of
Coast Guard vessels and personnel.
We do not believe that the wide-ranging and costly vessel traffic
system now being imposed on the area will substantially improve
safety. We do believe that full time, instead of seasonal, use of the
New Orleans Harbor traffic lights would contribute to increased vessel
traffic safety. We urge this full-time operation.
The lights have been run by the Corps of Engineers since 1952, and
we think that a vessel movement reporting system in the immediate
New Orleans Harbor area would improve collision avoidance to a
degree that warrants establishment of such a system. This should be
done between the Huey P. Long Bridge and Belle Chasse.
We also suggest that you closely review the actions of the Federal
Communications Commission in establishing rules that require listen-
ing to more than one marine radio channel simultaneously and in
failing to enforce their rules about misuse of vessel radio telephones.
These are general views; let me explain them.
The New Orleans Vessel Traffic System, as now being built by the
Coast Guard, covers about 330 miles of Louisiana's rivers and canals.
This plan was devised without any consultation with industry despite
the fact that in 1971 the then Commandant of the Coast Guard
assured your subcommittee that such would be done prior to the
imposition of a traffic system.
In 1969 discussions, the Coast Guard's local officer in charge of
marine inspection and captain of the Port of New Orleans both agreed
that a vessel traffic system was needed in New Orleans Harbor, but
only from Algiers Point downriver to Meraux. Now the Coast Guard
has a new, much-expanded view. We recognize difficulties inherent in
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the formation of formal advisory committees caused primarily by over-
regulation, but they have been used to formulate vessel traffic systems
in New York, Houston, and Louisville.
We think the use of such a group here would have precluded the
planning errors now apparently built into the monster system. We
urge the Coast Guard be instructed not to repeat this mistake in
other areas in the future.
With full Coast Guard cooperation, I have been able to review the
casualty data that is given as the jurisdiction for the giant vessel
traffic system. My analysis of the data indicates a need for the sys-
tem from the Huey P. Long Bridge to Belle Chasse, a possible need
for a system downriver from Belle Chasse to the sea buoy, no need
whatsoever in the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet where commercial
vessel traffic is rare, and no need upriver from the Huey P. Long Bridge.
The Coast Guard data includes the period from 1968 to 1973, and
includes only 6 months of operation under the Bridge-to-Bridge
Radio Telephone Act and none under the Towboat Operator Licensing
Act.
The data does include such unrelated items as groundings, barge
breakaways, and rammings of docks and other fixed objects in water-
ways as well as vessel collisions. We do not think a vessel traffic
system will be of much help except in preventing vessel collisions.
I am certain both my analysis and the Coast Guard analysis can
be questioned since the data is suspect. Maybe the Coast Guard
phrased it best when they stated:
The total benefit of a particular vessel traffic system cannot be determined from
available data. . . . These benefits are either difficult to convert to dollars or
dollar benefits are difficult to obtain; however, they must be evaluated before a
conclusive cost/benefit analysis . . . can be made.
We urge you obtain such analysis for the Louisiana vessel traffic
system. We also feel that the Coast Guard should comply with the
spirit of Executive Order 11821 and submit a study of the inflationary
impact of the vessel traffic system plan as it affects both the industry
being regulated and the high cost to the American taxpayer.
We also need your help in dealing with the radio communications
problem in our business. The Coast Guard planned rules under the
Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Act that made it possible and
necessary for nearly all vessels underway to have and use a radio to
talk with others in the immediate area. This was a simple, common-
sense, and good sense idea. Then the Federal Communications Com-
mission stepped in and said that a pilot had to listen simultaneously
to a second radio channel. You can imagine how this works.
Now the Coast Guard plans to have us monitor simultaneously a
third channel while in the vessel traffic system here. The primary
reason for this is simply the failure of the Federal Communications
Commission to police misuse of the original bridge-to-bridge channel so
it is overcrowded and cannot be relied on for vessel traffic. Obviously a
pilot cannot listen effectively to three radio channels at once. If any
of you have ever tried to take simultaneous orders from your mother-
in-law, your wife, and your daughter, I think you will understand the
problems. As a result, safety suffers.
In summary, we recommend that the Algiers traffic light be put into
full-time service; that a vessel movement reporting system be insti-
tuted from the Huey P. Long Bridge to Bell Chasse; that the formal
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advisory committee be organized to consider vessel traffic system
plans; that the New Orleans-Louisiana system be properly analyzed
for economic benefits; that an inflation impact statement be drawn
up for the system; that the marine radio telephone rules be both
corrected and enforced.
I thank you for your time.
Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you for a very precise statement.
Apparently you have touched a number of very critical and sensitive
areas. I know you were in the room while we were talking in terms of
the three-channel business and obviously the FCC will have to be
dealt with on that basis, so I think there is a unanimity of opinion
as far as the burdening of the pilot in receiving messages from three
people at the same time.
Mr. MCNEAL. What happens, sir, is that obviously one of them is
going to be received and the other two are going to be tuned out.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is obvious and we are aware of that. The admiral
has testified to that fact and the Coast Guard will talk to the FCC, as
stated by Admiral Barrow earlier in connection with this particular
relation. It causes a problem and it has been recognized.
I was under the impression, correct me if I am wrong, but I was
under the impression that we had a form of advisory committee in
this area.
Admiral BARROW. We do not have an advisory committee estab-
lished in accordance with the formal process whereby the people's
names are submitted, with their background, and they are agreed to
formally with the agenda published in the Federal Register, no, sir,
we do not.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is there any particular reason why we don't?
Admiral BARROW. I think that the record will show that I stated
previously that in early 1974 a request was made for a formal advisory
committee with a charter forwarded and it was Headquarters' con-
clusion at that time that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act require-
ments for consultation did not have to be by that process. That was
during a period of time when formal advisory groups were being looked
on as a proliferation of committees and Headquarters decided not to
go through that process.
They encouraged, as this thing progressed, full consultation with
those affected by the requirements, and that the product that was
worked up be submitted to various groups of local people who were
interested in the system for their advice on the application, and that
has been done. We submitted in May or June the proposals to the
port safety advisory council which has formed up subcommittees to
deal with the proposal and to come back to me with a report.
Mr. TREEN. Will you yield to me for a moment, Mr. Chairman?
Would you explain the port safety advisory committee. How is that
made up and who serves on it?
Admiral BARROW. It is a very broad-based group of people in
New Orleans consisting of agents, port authority people, dock board,
and towing-barge people.
Mr. TREEN. Is the Coast Gouard represented on it?
Admiral BARROW. The Coast Guard does attend the meetings.
Mr. TREEN. You serve on it informally?
Admiral BARROW. The package which we referred to them is being
considered by a group formed up out of the port safety advisory
committee and Mr. David Wheat is the chairman of that group.
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Mr. TREEN. You serve on that, Mr. McNeal, or you did at one time?
Mr. MCNEAL. Yes.
Mr. TREEN. You serve on it now?
Mr. MCNEAL. Right.
Mr. TREEN. I want to get back to that in a moment, but I don't
want to interrupt you.
Mr. BIAGGI. The testimony of several of these witnesses, Admiral,
seems to be consistent with one another as some of the points of con-
tention are concerned. Has the Coast Guard been advised of these
points of contention, and have they been taken up for discussion by
this advisory committee that you have?
Admiral BARROW. Which point?
Mr. B1AGG1. Well, the three-channel thing which we all agree may
cause some problems and confusion. I would like to know whether
or not as a matter of procedure it was discussed generally by the
industry?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. It has been and that particular item has
been forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters within the last month
as a particular trouble spot in the establishment of the system. That
has gone forward. The report from the ad hoc committee that Captain
Wheat has will be coming to me sometime in the middle of this month
and we will then consider their comments that have been made to us
by that group, modify the proposal that we have now, and send it
forward to the Commandant.
Mr. BIAGGI. Earlier you said that your request for a charter of the
advisory committee was turned down by the headquarters. Was it,
in fact, turned down by headquarters or someone higher up, to your
knowledge?
Admiral BARROW. Well, sir, it was not my recommendation. This
would have gone back to a previous district commander. The proposal
for a formal vessel traffic committee was turned down by headquarters.
The chief counsel of the Coast Guard had been requested to deter-
mine if a formal advisory committee was mandatory to satisfy the
requirements of section 104 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act,
and the chief counsel of the Coast Guard answered this question in
the negative, and the establishment of the formal committee was not
determined to be in the best interests at that time.
Now we are talking about a formal committee; we are not talking
about the consultative process that has been going on and is going on
right now. We are not at the point of putting out a notice of proposed
rulemaking, so we are in the consulting phase right now.
I have agreed all along with Mr. McNeal and others that I think
that the consultative process going back to 1971 probably would have
been a better way to have gone about it, but notwithstanding that, I
don't think we are completely lost. We are in that process right now.
Mr. BIAGG1. I am not so sure that I got a concise response to my
question. Let me rephrase it. Was this decision made at a departmental
level?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir. The response which we got came from the
Commandant, Coast Guard Headquarters.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, that may well be. When I said, "to your knowl-
edge," do you know whether it was made at the departmental level?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir, I know of no decision taken on that
particular subject at departmental level.
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Mr. MCNEAL. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on the advisory
committee that may help clear up some of the problems? I proposed
here that a formal advisory committee would have been an excellent
idea at the time that the planning was done, was underway. This
was what was envisioned in the questioning. I'm sure that was made
by Mr. Corrado of the Commandant in 1971, and that is what gen-
erally we felt in the industry. The formal advisory committees have
been used in every other vessel traffic system that I am aware of
and, as a matter of fact, as recently as last May in Huntington,
W. Va., the Commandant of the Coast Guard praised this industry
committee with respect to a VTS system at Louisville, and this is
in the Coast Guard's proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council.
The point here is that until this spring and until within the last
5 months, the individuals have not been brought in on any sort of a
formal, informal, organized or however you would like to call it,
basis to talk about the system. Now, the only thing individuals have
been asked to comment on in this board safety advisory committee
and/or ad hoc steering committee are the regulations. We have not
been asked to address ourselves as to whether or not the system is
necessary, as to whether or not the areas are correct, as to whether
or not the entire system might or might not be needed and/or the
costs involved. It is these basic things that I believe are questionable
about the New Orleans vessel traffic system as now proposed.
Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask one question and put this business to rest.
1 get the notion that we do have a formal advisory committee in other
ports. Is that what you testified to, Mr. McNeal?
Mr. MCNEAL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. To your knowledge, is that a fact, Admiral?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir, this is true in some ports.
Mr. BIAGGI. New Orleans is treated somewhat differently?
Admiral BARROW. New York does have a formal vessel traffic
system advisory committee.
Mr. BIAGGI. That was also my notion. Can you explain why New
Orleans is treated in a different fashion?
Admiral BARROW. No, sir, other than the fact that a charter was
requested and turned down, I can't tell you whether the facts and
figures upon which the initial system was predicated were considered
to be of such overpowering nature that at that stage one was just
not considered necessary, I have no idea.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to say in connection with the last state-
ment you made that there have been no formal meetings. Admiral
Barrow did testify that he has been meeting with the members of the
industry. Is that a fact, Admiral, informally?
Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir, we have people who have been meeting
with the ad hoc group on a regular basis.
Mr. TREEN. You stated, Mr. McNeal, in your statement on page
2: "This plan was devised without any consultation . . ." Do you
stand by that up to this point "without any consultation"?
Mr. MONEAL. Yes, sir, I stand by it. To my knowledge, nobody in
the business has been in consultation with the people who drafted,
who devised and drafted the plan. To the best of my knowledge,
this plan was drafted and devised in Washington in Coast Guard
Headquarters.
78-280-76---------1 1
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Mr. TREEN. You are talking about the plan for New Orleans?
Mr. McNEAL. I am, sir, and I think it was devised in 1.971 and
1972, and the first time I think that any individual-and there are
many people in the marine business in this room-knew the extent
of what was being proposed in any detail was when the draft of the
environmental impact statement was issued on August 6, 1974.
At that time I, for the first time, saw it and I do try to follow things
of this type. There may be others here who are better acquainted
than I. I have not been able to find a person who was in that early
consultation. So I will stand by the statement, sir, even though I
may be proved wrong.
Mr. TREEN. I would like at this point in the record to read in a.
section of the operative statutes that I had in mind earlier, and that
is this part of section 104. Section 104 states: "The Secretary may
issue reasonable rules and regulations and standards necessary to
implement this title. In the exercise of his rule making authority the
Secretary is subject to the provisions of Chapters Five and Seven of
Title Fifteen, United States Code." That is the Administrative
Procedure Act, which, of course, requires him to publish the proposed
regulations in the Federal Register.
Now, the iiext sentence, I think, is apropos to our discussion here,
and that is as follows: "In preparing proposed rules"-and note the
words "proposed rules' `-"In preparing proposed rules, regulations
and standards, the Secretary shall provide an adequate opportunity
for consultation and comment to state and local governments, repre-
sentatives of the marine industry, port and harbor authorities, en-
vironmental groups, and other interested parties."
That is the end of the section 104. I am not quarreling with you,
Admiral Barrow. I think you are following orders from your head-
quarters; It would seem to me that if the Secretary is mandated by
the law passed by Congress in 1972 to provide an adequate oppor-
tunity for consultation and comment, that means some sort of mecha-
nism to provide it. I think there is a mandate there, not necessarily
to set up an advisory committee under the appropriate statutes that
deal with advisory committees, but to set up some sort of mechanism.
It doesn't direct the district Coast Guard commander but rather
it calls for the Secretary to provide an opportunity. That means to
me that the Secretary is bound to l)ut out some sort of regulation or
statement ii he is mandated to 1)rOvide some opportunity for the
consultation. 1 don't want to beat this thing to death, but I think
both the Coast Guard and industry are in agreement that a more
formalized consultation mechanism would have been helpful.
I would add this to my good friend, Bill McNeal. I'm sure that the
Coast Guard will be pleased to receive all of your comments on the
VTS system, including the basic question of whether it is needed at all.
You are certainly not going to be restrained in the kind of comments
that you make in response to the requests for comments.
Mr. McNEAL. May I say, Congressman Treen, that restraint is not
one of those things that I exercise too often. I will say, too, and I
believe it should be noted here that Admiral Barrow has been most
receptive to any type of comment that has happened. Most of the
uncommunicativeness that I have talked about here certainly didn't
occur on his watch in the Coast Guard.
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Mr. TREEN. I know he appreciates that and I do, too.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to address myself to the point that was
just made, how you justify the distinction between New York and
New Orleans. Obviously, on its face it is not equitable. I have been
advised by counsel, however, that the Federal Advisory Committee
Act of January 1, 1974, in order to deal with the proliferation of com-
mittees throughout the Federal structure established certain criteria
that made it more difficult to establish these advisory committees
as contrasted to the situation that existed prior to the enactment of
the law.
For the record I have to get it down so that we didn't make New
Orleans look so bad.
Admiral BARROW. May I make one other comment on that. I think
despite the fact that perhaps a political mista.ke was made in not
establishing a full advisory committee with a charter and publishing
in the Federal Register, I think that the consultative process by
which we come forward with a notice of proposed rulemaking is
going on now. I have noted no reticence on the part of Mr. McNeal
or anybody else to tell me what they think about the system, and I'm
sure that the notice of proposed rulemaking that goes forward will
reflect, at least at this stage, a lot of the comments which are made.
I think the system, its extent, is going to have to stand on the record
and on the facts and on what is needed. This advisory committee,
whether or not it be a formally constituted one under the system,
I think doesn't matter to that process.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. McNeal.
Mr. MONEAL. Thank you, sir. I would only comment, if I may,
that if the Coast Guard feels that we should obey the law, I have the
feeling sometimes that they ought to obey the Federal Committee
Act, too.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. TREEN. He had to get that last punch in.
Mr. BIAGGI. We will take a short recess.
[A short recess was taken.]
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.
Mr. Sam Giallauza, vice president, New Orleans Steamship
Association.
STATEMENT OP SAM GIALLANZA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION
* Mr. GIALLANZA. Thank you. I am Sam Giallanza, senior vice
president, New Orleans Steamship Association. I am delighted that
you came down to visit our port city and I express my thanks to
Congressman Treen for all the help he has been to us, especially in
the past 2 years when we experienced silting in Southwest Pass. He
has been a big help. Thank you.
* I appreciate the opportunity of appearing here today in behalf of
the New Orleans Steamship Association, a trade association which
has been in existence since 1912. Our association represents the steam-
ship owners, the steamship operators, agents and stevedores that
operate in the port area from the mouth of the river up to the port
limits of Baton Rouge.
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During the last year, 1974 calendar year, the members of our as-
sociation handled more than 6,000 deep draft vessels that called at
the public and private facilities along the Mississippi River from the
Passes to the Port of Baton Rouge.
I will cite some statistics so that you will have a better understand-
ing of our statement and our position. Our statement is not too
lengthy.
This port area, as late as 1960, was served by only one grain eleva-
tor; today, eight elevators deliver grain to vessels with still another
elevator presently under construction just above Reserve, Louisiana,
and expected for completion by 1976.
The growth in number and the increase in capacity of these elevators
attribute to making New Orleans the leading grain exporting port
in the world. Annually, more than 1,400 vessels load millions of tons
of grain at these elevators with most loadings into the larger bulk
carriers and tanker class vessels, many of which are in excess of 100,000
deadweight tons. I think a question was asked earlier about the size
of vessels. Well, just yesterday a vessel sailed from the reaches of the
river, and this was above the Huey P. Long Bridge. This vessel had a
deadweight tonnage of 118,167 and was 856 feet in length.
This morning, and you may have seen this when you flew over the
port area, there was a vessel, the Canadian Bridge, of 117,613 dead-
weight tons and 858 feet in length. There is another vessel, still in the
same reaches of the river just above the port area of the IE[uey P.
Long Bridge, of 103,225 deadweight tons and 841 feet long. So, we
do have large vessels now calling at the port.
Just as with the grain elevators, this area has seen other growth of
new industries settling in Louisiana along the river from Baton
Rouge to New Orleans, such as the new Energy Corporation of
Louisiana's tanker facility now being constructed. Within the past
decade new industries, including petrochemicals have moved into
this reach of the river which the Louisiana Department of Commerce
estimates as more than a $10 billion investment. Industrial growth
along these banks continues and all of these complexes are and will be
serviced by both deep draft ocean carriers and shallow draft vessels.
This port is also recognized as the Lash/Seabee capital of the world
due to its location as a natural port for this newest concept in ocean
commerce. In 1969 the first barge-carrying vessels went into service at
the Port of New Orleans, and since then there has been a continuous
increase in the number of barge-carrying vessels calling at this port.
At this time 16 vessels of the Lash/Seabee class are calling
regularly. These barge-carrying vessels have in themselves added con-
siderably to the barge traffic in the port.
The construction of additional elevators within the past 10 years
has caused an increase in the number of barges that transit the reaches
of the river in the port area. The rapid growth of petrochemical
complexes, many of which are served by barges, reflect a definite
increase in river traffic as it relates to barges and large inland tows.
As far back as 1964, our association, in the interest of safe naviga-
tion on the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge to the Gulf, in
cooperation with the local pilot associations, instituted a bridge-to-
bridge voice communications system. This system, financed by our
members, provided each pilot with a portable radio which has since
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159
become an integral part of pilotage and provided bridge4o-bridge
voice communications, at least between deep draft vessels.
Following the inception of this system, the Corps of Engineers and
the State department of highways added similar equipment on all
bridges crossing navigable channels. It must be noted that this was
initiated by the deep draft vessel interests prior to the bridge-to-
bridge law, which was only implemented on January 1, 1973.
The Corps of Engineers' regulations require that at certain stages
of the river, the traffic lights controlling vessel movement around
Algiers Point are put into effect and we have proposed the continuous
use of these lights the year round due to the ever-increasing traffic in
this most strategic area.
After study of the proposed Vessel Traffic Service by our Technical
Committee of Captains, we are of the opinion that in view of the
continuing increase in river traffic, such a service could effectively
contribute to safe navigation. However, for it to be effective, the
following objectives are essential:
The service should cover South and Southwest Passes and the
Mississippi River up to and through the port area of Baton Rouge
and the Mississippi River-gulf outlet from the sea buoy to ~the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal;
All vessels should participate in the service;
Each vessel should report in to the service at designated check-
points in order that the vessel traffic center will be able to track the
movements of all vessels, and;
It is important that the capabilities of the Vessel Traffic Center be
such that the participation by all traffic would not overload the service
and result in a detriment to safe navigation.
It is our position that under normal conditions a properly function-
ing vessel traffic service would prevent hazardous situations from
occurring by recognizing them in advance. However, certain situations
will occur which no human effort could avoid. To mention a few,
unpredicted localized fog conditions, vessel loss of control or power,
breakaway barges, localized squalls or heavy weather, or possibly an
explosion or burning vessel caused by other than a collision, ramming
or grounding. Under unusual circumstances, such as these, the vessel
traffic center will obviously have to take a direct control of the
situation and issue directives.
Such directives by the vessel traffic center should take the form of
advising the vessel to slow, remain moored or anchored, or possibly to
anchor as soon as conditions permit. This should only be done in
extreme cases when there is no alternative, and then only when the
vessel does not take appropriate action on his own initiative in a
timely manner.
In view of the above, it is anticipated that in cases of such emergen-
cies, directions from the vessel traffic center must be adhered to.
Only the senior watch officer, who is an experienced mariner with
sufficient experience and knowledge of the Mississippi River to enable
him to render proper judgment in such situations will be authorized to
issue such directives to a vessel.
I would like to say thank you for giving me the opportunity to
present our position on this all-important service.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Giallanza. I would also like to con-
gratulate you and your organization for having the foresight to
PAGENO="0164"
160
implement the bridge-to-bridge communications system long before
it was mandated by law.
I would like your reaction to Mr. McNea.l's and Mr. Doucet's
statements that the vessel movement reporting system be instituted
from the Huey P. Long Bridge to Belle Ohasse.
Mr. GIALLANZA. As I mentioned earlier in my statement., we handle
more than 1,400 vessels in the area of the river above the lluey P. Long
Bridge to Baton Rouge; additional complexes are being built; and in
recent years, the capacities of the existing elevators have been in-
creased, all of which create more shallow draft traffic. For instance,
I don't think you could put a traffic light on Canal and Bourbon
Streets and only have Chevrolets obey it. I think if we have a traffic
system, it has to encompass all craft to be effective.
Mr. BIAGGI. I agree on that point, but I think the contention or the
premise is you don't put a cop in the middle of the desert as an analogy.
You might like to have a. cop every place, hut you can't afford it. As
to the area that is excluded from the suggestion made by Mr. Doucet
and Mr. McNeal, in youi' judgment, should that be included?
Mr. GIALLANZA. We feel it should. I think we were extremely for-
tunate during the past 2 years of unprecedented silting in Southwest
Pass. that mo~re serious accidents did not occur. Silting, with its related
problems, is not limited to Southwest Pass only; it is also experienced
at about 11 crossings of the Mississippi River above the Huey P.
Long Bridge where there a.re changes in the configuration at the bot-
tom of the river, the natural relocation of the channel, which I under-
stand is not an uncommon occurrence over a 24-hour period.
In that area of the river, there are fleeting areas that service most of
the facilities, and certainly fleeting areas tha.t serve the elevators in
the upper reaches of the river. So, we do have increased traffic.
Mr. BIAGGI. It is also recommended t.hat the Algiers traffic light be
put in full-time opera.tion.
Mr. GIALLANZA. We have proposed that and we urge it. We cer-
tainly feel that a.ny delay experienced by any of the vessels we handle
is greatly offset by the safety factor.
Mr. TREEN. On that particular point, you are the second person
that has recommended that they be operated all-year-round. Now,
apparently it is discontinued when you don't have the high-water
problem?
Mr. GIALLANZA. That is right.
Mr. TREEN. Is it really needed the other times? I mean, have you
had collisions at other times that t.his particular traffic signal would
have prevented?
Mr. GIALLANZA. I can't answer that; I am just a layman, not a pilot
nc~r a mariner, but I have occasion quite often to be in the ITM Build-
ing and, when I look out the window and view the traffic, involving
large vessels and large tows, it is assuring t.o have the lights in opera-
tion. The problem we have had, as we do in all of these programs, a.re
finances and the Corps of Engineers has not been able to continue
their operation due to lack of funds.
Mr. TREEN. Well, that is the point. As the chairman points out, we
don't want to put cops in the middle of a desert. But if this thing
would really have some value commensurate with the cost, then I for
one am prepared to push the Corps of Engineers, as long as it remains
PAGENO="0165"
161
under the jurisdiction of the corps, to do this. Can you give me some-
thing a little bit beyond your statement that as you see the traffic you
think it would be good? Has the Steamship Association made a study
of this and made a definite decision that they would like to have it?
Mr. GIALLANZA. I think our records will reflect that we had re-
quested the Corps of Engineers a number of times in the past years
that the time be extended which they did.
Mr. TREEN. Extended up to 6 months the last 3 years?
Mr. GIALLANZA. Well, this is right, and due to the-
Mr. TREEN. You want it all year round is what I am saying?
Mr. GIALLANZA. This is correct. I think that the pilots who are here
in this room could perhaps answer that question better than I can,
but we certainly feel that it is a good safety precaution.
Mr. TREEN. I think we are going to have a pilots' representative.
Thank you, Mr. Giallanza.
I did have one more question. Do the shipowners represented by
your association, have they ever indicated any problems with the
barge fleets that extend out into the river a pretty good distance? I
saw one fleet of barges that looked to me like it occupied about
30 percent of the width of the river, which I had never seen before.
Mr. GIALLANZA. Yes, we do have problems. If you had occasion to
fly over the inner harbor navigation canal, you would wonder how they
could put a skiff through it, much less a vessel, and this is not a
barge fleeting area, but just an accumulation-perhaps a barge is
being repaired.
Mr. TREEN. I am referring to the fleeting in the river. This was
upriver, probably at Jefferson Parish.
Mr. GIALLANZA. We have not had any great problems, with the
extension of the fleeting area channel wide as far as the deep draft
vessels go. Before a fleeting area goes in we, of course, receive a
notice from the Corps of Engineers that a request for permit has
been received from an applicant. This is reviewed by our technical
committee of captains, all of whom hold master licenses, and a deter-
mination is made as to whether or not they feel that it would create
any navigational hazards.
Mr. TREEN. To fleet at that point?
Mr. GIALLANZA. To fleet at that point.
Mr. TREEN. I am talking about the stacking of barges alongside
each other way out into the river. Do I understand that you haven't
had any complaints by your shipowners?
Mr. GIALLANZA. This is right.
Mr. TREEN. OK. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Capt. David Wheat, the president of the Crescent River
Pilots Association. Captain, before you make your comments, you
were in the room when we were questioning Mr. Giallanza regarding
the area above the Huey P. Long Bridge. In your judgment, do you
feel the vessel traffic system could be justified and installed upriver?
STATEMENT OP CAPT. DAVID WHEAT, PRESIDENT, CRESCENT
RIVER PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Captain WHEAT. Mr. Chairman, the area north of the Baton
Rouge-the Huey P. Long Bridge is out of my piloting territory, so
I would rather not comment on that, b~ t I would comment on the
PAGENO="0166"
162
lower part of the river. If you have any questions pertaining to that,
I would be glad to answer them.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen, and members of the staff, my
name is David Wheat
We are river port pilots for the lower Mississippi River and the
Port of New Orleans. I would like to speak in behalf of the ad hoc
steering committee that I happen to be the chairman of. This com-
mittee was formed some 3 months ago through our port safety council,
in other words, an informal committee.
It was made up of some 60 members, roughly, of all sections,
shallow draft, deep draft vessels, and a cross section of the industry
and the port and river and canal areas.
Out of the steering committee we formed small working committees,
we formed five subcommittees. One committee is in feasibility, one
in areas, one in communications, one in operations, one in mandatory
volunteering. These subcommittees were chaired by outstanding
professional men. They submitted reports to the steering committee
and we have this process in motion to go back to the district com-
mander with the final report sometime prior to the 15th of October.
As I mentioned earlier, with permission of the district commander,
he would like to submit a copy of this report to your committee, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. I~ would be delighted to receive it.
Captain WHEAT. That is the end of my statement. I would answer
any questions on the lower Mississippi River pertaining to the VTS
system.
Mr. BIAGG1. I noticed you were sitting here throughout the hearing,
Captain, and I think we have come down to several points that seem
to be in contention. I would like your reaction to the extra channels
in the radio communications.
Captain WHEAT. It would be, in my opinion, impossible to monitor
three channels. I think it is not practical to have to do it anyway. I
believe it was well covered that if channel 16 can be eliminated, then
we can operate very efficiently on channel 13 and the sector channel.
Mr. BIAGGI. As to the Algiers traffic light, that is recommended for
full-time operation.
Captain WHEAT. The Algiers traffic light, if we put it on tomorrow,
we would be 1 day too late.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is succinct and informative.
Congressman Treen.
Mr. TREEN. That was my question, about the traffic light system.
Have you had any casualties in the last several years involving
Algiers Point during the time that the signal system was not operative?
Captain WHEAT. Mr. Treen, we had a casualty in 1969, that I
have always believed-that was on Easter Sunday 1969, with the
Union Faith, and I have always believed that had the traffic light
been in operation, the casualty would have never occurred. Several
people lost their lives, including one of our pilots and a ship was
lost and the expense-which I am not familiar with, I'm not sure
what the expense of operating a traffic light would be within the
system the corps has, but it is a very effective system and I think
if you could prevent one casualty, that it would be well worth it.
PAGENO="0167"
163
Mr. TREEN. You think it would be a very beneficial factor to have
it all year round?
Captain WHEAT. I do. I think it would be not only a safety factor,
I think it would more or less expedite our work a lot because we have
a lot of ships in that area that have to turn and turn downriver
to proceed to sea or to other berths and by having that light in effect
in that particular area of the river, it's a great aid to pilots and to
the mariners.
Mr. TREEN. All right. Thank you, Captain.
Mr. BIAGGI. You couldn't testify to the value of the traffic system
upriver. I-low about the lower river?
Captain WHEAT. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we need a system
in the Port of New Orleans and at the Pilottown and Southwest
Pass area. If you have a system, I'm a firm believer that you should
have a system and remain in it. I don't believe it would be feasible
to get into a system and out of a system, into a system, out of a system.
I would prefer to have it all the way on the Lower Mississippi River
from the Gulf of Mexico to the 1-luey P. Long Bridge.
Mr. TREEN. Where do you take over, from Pilottown to the 1-Iuey
P. Long Bridge?
Captain WHEAT. That's right.
Mr. BIAGGI. All I know, Captain, is that I have been listening to
some stories at lunch being told by river people and people in the
industry and I marvel at the way the pilots perform almost magical
maneuvers coming upriver and downriver with these vessels. We are
grateful to you for your testimony today and for your very incisive
response to pertinent questions. Thank you very much.
Captain WHEAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Robert L. Gardner, Alter Co., Davenport, Iowa~
STATEMENT OP ROBERT L. GARDNER, ALTER CO., DAVENPORT,
IOWA
Mr. GARDNER. I must at the onset apologize for the quality of the
copy. I opened my briefcase in St. Louis yesterday and realized I
had left it at home, so this came over the wire this morning.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Counsel, Congressman Treen.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My
testimony is rather lengthy, as you can see, and I have been asked by
Congressman Treen to paraphrase or summarize whenever possible.
My name is Robert L. Gardner and I represent Alter Co., 2333
Rockingham Road, Davenport, Iowa. We are a leading scrap mer-
chandiser and commercial barge line officed in Davenport, Iowa.
We have terminals along the Mississippi River from St. Paul,
Minn., to and including the Port of New Orleans, La. The latter
installation operates under a subsidiary name of Alter Fleet, Inc. and
is engaged in commercial fleeting and switching in and around the
New Orleans Harbor.
My capacity with Alter Co. is port captain, which carries the
responsibility of operations of all its 212 barges and 7 towboats. I
furthermore am responsible for operations of remote locations such as
the local one here as Alter fleet. I am a graduate of Western Kentucky
University and currently hold a U.S. Coast Guard first class pilot
PAGENO="0168"
164
license, any gross tons, for portions of the lower Mississippi River
with endorsements for operator on western rivers and waterways. I
have been employed in the river trade since 1955, and have served in
many and varied functions.
The next portion of my testimony deals primarily with the area
that Alter Co. serves and the intent of this piece of testimony is to
indicate to the committee that this is not just a local issue, but rather
an issue that has national implications. Any delays that occur to our
vessels in the movement of phosphate rock coming out of Tampa,
Fla., which we move a great deal of; in the movement of grain into
the area simply causes the barge freight rates to increase and thus
pass it on to the consumers. This would affect farm produce originating
in Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and points north of New Oreleans.
If delays, as a result of mandatory vessel traffic controls, are incurred
and cost of transporting fuels for generation stations in Iowa and
Wisconsin will he substantially increased, resulting in higher electric
power cost to citizens in these communities.
As a first class licensed pilot and with the operational knowledge of
Alter Fleet, Inc~ in the area, my company must take the stand of
being opposed to the implementation of a vessel traffic control system
in the New Orleans Harbor as proposed. rfhe system itself is non-
workable due to many technical reasons and highly unnecessary.
Furthermore, I would like to charge the U.S. Coast Guard with
misuse of powers granted to them by the Ports and Harbor Safety
Act of 1972. The misuse pertains directly to the procedures and
reasoning behind the proposed VTS for the New Orleans area on the
Mississippi River.
On August 4, 1975, 1 received in my office a. Department of Trans-
portation Coast Guard local, notice to mariners issued by the *2d
Coast Guard District dated July 29, 1975. In this notice, the U.S.
Coa~t Guard informed the i~ub1ic that they were in the process of
developing regulations under which a vessel traffic system would
operate in the Port of New Orleans from the sea buoys at South Pass
to mile 243 above head of passes.
The notice indicated an ad hoc steering committee had been chosen
from a wide cross section of the marineS industry to review and make
written comment to the U.S. Coast Guard concerning a draft proposal
for the VTS regulations. On August 19, 1975, the ad hoc steering
committee, to which I was added as a member, held its first meeting
to discuss and review the proposed regulations and discuss problem
areas that had been outlined by Comdr. Ransom K. Boyce, com-
manding officer, U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans vessel traffic system.
It was decided at this meeting that the system needed a broader base
for the discussion, that there were too many members, and as Captain
Wheat testified, the committee was broken into five subcommittees
and the subcommittees then were to go off and meet prior to another
meeting of the ad hoc steering committee, which was held on Sep-
tember 23, 1975.
During our initial meeting, several questions were put to the
officers in attendance. I believe the highest ranking officer in that
meeting was a lieutenant commander, and to my knowledge, the
industry has not had the opportunity to discuss with an officer of the
Coast Guard of any high rank the problems involved in this system.
PAGENO="0169"
165
One question was was there to be an economic impact statement
done for the proposed VTS regulations. The answer was that Wash-
ington had been questioned in this matter and they decided that
none was necessary.
A second question posed to the U.S. Coast Guard was could the ad
hoc steering committee have a 90-day extension on submitting com-
ments for the draft proposal. The committee was answered, with a
comment that more than likely no such extension would be, granted
sinèe the computers and hardwa.res needed for the VTS in New Orleans
more than likely had already been placed on order.
I have since learned-I don't know how factual it is-that this
equipment has been placed on order, bids have been out for many
months.
At this point it became obvious to me and many others on this
committee that we had been invited to New Orleans, a great distance
from our homes,: to participate in an ad hoc committee that wa~
supposed to advise the U.S. Coast Guard on the draft proposal and
operational problems with the vessel traffic control system, only to
have had these questions already answered prior to us ever leaving
home. . . . .
The shape of things continued to become clear after receiving Adin.
Owen W. Siler's' letter to GAQ answering to the Coast Guard's po-
sition to the ComptrQller General's recommendations. Also contained
in the letter were GAO's recommendations. In this letter the ad hoc
steering committee was given the first `black and white information as
to what was the basis for the need of the' vessel traffic control system
other than the one that presently exists in the New Orleans area.
The basis is said to be a 1973 Coast Guard study report entitled
"Vessel Traffic Systems Analysis of Port Needs." There have been no
copies of this report made to members of the ad hoc steering committee.
as of this writing~ I was fortunate, however, to obtain a Xerox copy:
froiñ another source and found that this report began two years prior
to the passage of the Ports a.nd Harbor Safety Act in anticipation of
its passage. The information contained therein is inaccurate, mis-
leading, and not current.
The date of Admiral Siler's report to GAO is unknown to me.
However, I must conclude it was composed many many months prior
to the establishing of an ad hoc steering committee. In the writings
found on page 5 of this report, Admiral Suer indicates that "The
Coast Guard does provide adequate consultation, comment, and
coordination with local marine interests as specified by the, Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972." It is obvious to me-.
Mr. TREEN. Are you referring to the report by Admiral Suer on the
GAO findings and recommendations?
Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. The fifth page of that?
Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, 1 am.
Mr. TREEN. For your information, the date is February 1975-it
looks like February 25, 1975-if that helps you.
Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, sir. I don't know if it does or not.
Mr. TREEN. You were reading from page 5?
Mr. GARDNER. I was reading from page 5, yes, sir.
\[r. r1i1~EEN. `\~\bat part of page 5?
PAGENO="0170"
166
Mr. GARDNER. I don't have that. The quote is taken from there-
Mr. TREEN. I see it now.
Mr. GARDNER. Okay, sir. That does confirm that it was written-
my opinion that it was several months prior to the ad hoc committee
being formed, if it was written on February 25.
Recommendation No. 4, and this recommendation is a GAO
recommendation, found on page 10 of Admiral Suer's letter, is:
Give national emphasis and direction to establishing regulations as authorized
by the 1972 act to control vessel traffic, including more extensive use of speed
limits; greater regulation over the movement of vessels carrying dangerous,
combustible and polluting cargoes; and limiting the size of tows.
Admiral Suer says:
The GAO report stated that the Coast Guard had made limited use of its
authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to issue regulations for the
control of vessel movements, and identified control of vessel speed, control of the
movement of vessels carrying hazardous or polluting cargoes, and control of tow
size as regulatory measures expected to be effective for prevention of accidents.
The promulgation of regulations was stated to be the measure least costly to the
government for reducing accidents through control of vessel movement.
It becomes clear that we have a battle between GAO and the
Coast Guard over funds for hardware to be used for VTS in New
Orleans. The people being caught in the middle of this battle are
the waterway user and eventually the American public. GAO is
saying, "Cut your spending and start regulating."
On page 11 of Admiral Siler's report, he says:
The development of a regulation is an exacting process which requires care
in the identification of the problem to be corrected by means of the regulation,
recognition of varied geographic and operating conditions, and appreciation of
the impact of the regulation on the public affected, including the broad economic
effect of the measure, and, finally, definition of the corrective regulation. Pre-
sumably in recognition of these factors, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
contains a provision for consultation and comment by interested parties in
preparation of proposed regulations; this is in addition to the requirements of
the Administrative Procedures Act.
I charge once again that the U.S. Coast Guard, by the use of such
verbage, is trying to convince GAO and others that they have com-
plied with the terms of the development of regulations as outlined
in the Ports and Harbors Safety Act when, in fact, they have not.
Statements such as the above are numerous and were written long
before any such action was ever begun.
What we have here before us is a whitewash. A number of years
ago a vessel traffic control system was conceived and a study begun
to establish data for its basis. I would like to charge the U.S. Coast
Guard with the misuse of power in its endeavor to establish a vessel
traffic control system in the New Orleans area. The charges are
numbered as follows:
Gathering of information to be used as a basis for VTS prior to
the enactment of the law which would give the Coast Guard authority
to act.
No. 2, failure to study economic impact and effects as prescribed
by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Public Law 92-34086,
statute 426C5.
No. 3, failure to comply with the Ports and Harbors Safety Act,
statute 426C in carrying out his duties and responsibilities under this
PAGENO="0171"
167
title to promote the safe and efficient conduct of maritime commerce,
the Secretary shall consider fully the wide variety of interests which
may be affected by the exercise of his authority hereunder. The
interests referred to in this law have only very recently been con-
tacted for consultation and the works of the committee established
for that purpose have only begun.
No. 4, the U.S. Coast Guard has placed on order and spent Federal
moneys for equipment to be used under regulations yet to be estab-
lished. The $4.4 million involved in this equipment was spent prior
to a realistic need being shown for the system or consideration as to
its design as required by law.
No. 5, the forming of an ad hoc steering committee is being used as a
whitewash to cover up for statements earlier made by Admiral Siler
and referred to in this writing that the Ports and Harbors Safety Act
required consultation and input from a variety of interests which may
be affected by the exercise of his authority. The workings of this com-
mittee are designed to be powerless and to be used to satisfy a legal
requirement.
In summary, a vessel traffic control system, as proposed for the New
Orleans Harbor, is not needed. There is no basis for the needs of such a
system, as the one currently in operation is working extremely satis-
factorily to all shipping interests. If the U.S. Coast Guard wishes to
spend money and time to prevent damage to, or the destruction or loss
of vessels, bridges, or other structures on or in the navigable waterways
of the United States, it should concentrate on doing the jobs it has
currently undertaken well, prior to moving into newer and more
sophisticated endeavors.
The $4.4 million to be spent for a vessel traffic control system in the
New Orleans Harbor with an annual operational budget of $900,000 is
ridiculous. These funds could be put to use in areas with far greater
benefit to the waterway community and the nation than in a VTS as
proposed.
If efforts were to be channeled towards using the existing vessel
traffic control systems in the New Orleans Harbor and promoting the
proper use of vessel bridge-to-bridge radio telephone, then a safety
factor would result from a minimum of expenditure and effort on the
part of the U.S. Coast Guard.
I would like to make one other comment, if I could, Mr. Chairman.
In regard to the subject of the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone that
has been discussed quite a bit, it has been said in several of our meet-
ings involving the communications aspects of VTS, when we asked
them the question, asked the Coast Guard: "How do you propose to
clear these channels that you have elected to use in the VTS, because
it is obvious that these channels have to be clear for vessel traffic
control communication and can't be used for other port needs at the
same time?" The Coast Guard's answer to this question, sir, was that
"The mere presence of the Coast Guard," that they have found, like in
Houston, that "The mere presence of the Coast Guard in a monitoring
function serves this purpose and does, indeed, police those frequencies
for the use that they are intended." My question is why, why cannot
these moneys and the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard be put into effect
in that area to police our existing vessel traffic system, the Radio Tele-
phone Act, why can't these efforts be channeled in that direction which
is far less costly than the proposed system?
PAGENO="0172"
168
They have a radio network capable of doing this. If their findings are
that, why is there such an impellin.g need to spend all of this money?
As Admiral Barrow indicated, the proposed regulations say that the
pilot is not admonished from any responsibility that he might have for
the safe navigation of his vessel, regardless of what the VTS tells him
or may direct him to do, it is his final responsibility.
Mr. TREEN. "Absolved" or "admonished"? You said, "adinon-
ished."
Mr. GARDNER. Absolved, I'm sorry. The final responsibility rests
with this pilot and it is only through the eyes and ears of this pilot
that the person giving the orders in the YTS will obtain the informa-
tion necessary to direct traffic except through the localized use of low
level television, et cetera. rfhe computer is not an exacting process
whereby there is going to be transponders placed aboard these vessels,
and this type thing. It is still dependent upon the information coming
from the bridge of that vessel.
Mr. BIAGGL That is it?
Mr. GARDNER. rrhat is it. Do you have any questions?
Mr. BIAGGI. Your summary is quite extensive and you make any
number of charges. I would appreciate it if you would give Admiral
Barrow a copy of the statement, so that he can provide this commit-
tee with responses and explanations to them. You have been in the
room while the people have been testifying. A number of them have
testified as to the desirability of the system and they apparently have
expertise and have indepth experience in safety. How do you account
for the wide variance in opinions and the conflicting positions?
Mr. GARDNER. I can't really speak for their opinions. You have
severa.l interests involved here. You have deep water interests and
you have shallow water interests and I think from the testimony that
I have heard today that the deep water interests favor a vessel traffic
control system and the shallow water interest~s do not, as proposed,
sir. I am not saying, and I would like to go on record as saying that
I am not outright opposed to some form of vessel traffic control, but
not as proposed.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, how do you feel about deep water control?
Mr. GARDNER. I beg your pardon?
Mr. BIAGGI. Deep water vessels, VTS for deep water vessels.
Mr. GARDNER. How do I feel about them?
Mr. BIAGGI. Does your position change or do you just oppose it
on the shallow------
Mr. GARDNER. No, sir. What I am opposed to primarily, and from
my statement I did not address myself to the things that you asked
us to address ourselves to at the beginning, sir, but I didn't know
that is what you wanted me to address. The details of the system and
how things work, you know, like for example, Admiral Barrow touched
on the points and bends system. I don't think he accurately described
that system. That is a safety system, that is not a system that was
designed or used to speed up vessels by catching slack water. Actually
you give UJ) a lot of slack water in using the points amid bends system.
But this is a system that has been locally worked out between deep
water interests, basicallv-well, both, deep water and shallow draft
interests-and works rather well, and it is a safety measure. It is not
designed to speed things.
PAGENO="0173"
169
So I feel as though that we are in a position, the barge line carriers,
to have our tows cut and drafts limited much easier, sir, than a deep
draft vessel is because you can't cut a deep draft vessel in half, but
we can be required to drop barges. Our barges are small units, as you
understand.
I think that leaves us wide open to someone making that decision
and critically curtailing operations at a great expense to the consumer.
Mr. BIAGGI. Are you suggesting that you have no limit on the
number of barges that you should be towing?
Mr. GARDNER. I am suggesting that that is-yes, sir, that there
be no limit on the number of barges that a vessel may carry. This
industry has been existing for maiiy, many years with an excellent
safety record, and we, I think, are the experts in that area as to how
many barges a vessel can safely handle. You see, the one thing that
people very seldom indicate is what dictates this to us. What dictates
this to us is profit or loss, and we can't make money having accidents.
Mr. BIAGGI. That is true, but you don't function under the theory
that you are going to have accidents. You function under the theory
that you will not have accidents and nfl things being equal, we let
the carriers carry as ina~ iy barges down or upriver as possible.
Mr. GARDNER. Safely.
Mr. BIAGGI. Of course. But the fact is there have been a number
of accidents.
Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, I realize that. rfhe1~e have always been
accidents on the river. r1iheI~e are accidents on the highways. Mr.
Nader~
Mr. BIAGGI. We put up lights, we install safety-
Mr. GARDNER. The point I am making is there is always going to
be an element of risk, sir, and the car, I think, is a good example.
Mr. Nader thought the American public wanted to buy that, but
people didn't and they are willing to risk their lives by not wearing
a crash helmet inside their automobile because it is inconvenient.
There is always going to be that element of risk, but we think that
this job is being done rather well, and if there were a basis for this,
sir-I am charging that this is not a good basis for such an expensive,
elahoi~ate system. If there were a reason for it, then I would have to
go along with it.
Mr. BIAGGI. All right, you certainly raised some interesting points
and the committee will certainly look into it and give it very serious
consideration.
Congressman Treen.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, There was one charge
that I am not going to comment on, although I think you must know
that I am concerned about the consultation provisions. I think we
are going to try to get some explanation on that from the Coin-
mandant, or from the Secretary of Transportation, actually.
But your charge No. 1 of "Gathering of information to be used as
a basis for VTS prior to the enactment of the law which would give
the Coast Guard authority to act." I don't see that this is any abuse
or anything, gathering information before--
Mr. GARDNER. Let me apologize once again, and I guess you put
me under fire for my words there, and I would do this, but the intent
behind that was to show how old it was and when the information
PAGENO="0174"
170
was gathered and that the thinking for a VTS has been around an
awfully long time.
Mr. TREEN. In other words, you are charging that they are not
using up-to-date data?
Mr. GARDNER. That's correct, that's absolutely correct.
Mr. TREEN. You said, Mr. Gardner, that you approved the system
that is in operation now. You don't approve the proposed system.
Now, what do we have now in the system that you approve of specifi-
cally and what are the items in the proposal that you don't approve of?
Mr. GARDNER. OK, sir. The system at present that has been
discussed is the control light at Algiers Point. I am told-
Mr. TREEN. That has been there since 1952.
Mr. GARDNER. It has been there a long time and I approve of that
system.
Mr. TREEN. Don't we have some low level television there?
Admiral BARROW. Not yet. Some bridges have them.
Mr. GARDNER. When I refer to a system, sir, you mentioned
earlier-one of you mentioned earlier-that you noticed that there
were a lot of arteries flowing into the river and you asked Admiral
Barrow, you know, there's no system. Yes, sir, there is a system and
the system I am referring to are the laws and regulations that apply
to the piotage of a vessel, including the Radio Telephone Act. When
one of you made the comment that when approaching a sharp bend
you have virtually-you don't really know what is coming around
that bend, if the act was being followed, you would. This is the system
that I am referring to, sir.
Mr. TREEN. The bridge-to-bridge radio was enacted in the law
several years before this, in 1971. I don't consider that part of the
VTS system-
Mr. GARDNER. That is what I am describing as a vessel traffic
control system in connection with the rules of the road. You under-
stand you have rights-of-way and it becomes-one vessel is under the
law required to hold and stay clear of other vessels under certain
circumstances and this is all very clearly defined by the rules of the
road.
This is the system to which I am referring. That is a vessel traffic
control system in my mind that is adequate.
Mr. TREEN. What you don't want is all of this team of people, this
computer and the monitoring system. You just feel that that would
be a waste of money?
Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, as proposed.
Mr. TREEN. Do you think it would impose an economic burden on
industry?
Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. TREEN. But I think the size of the tows can be controlled by
regulation without respect to vessel traffic systems, if that is one of
your complaints.
Mr. GARDNER. No, that is correct. The act-well, the act gives
the Coast Guard broad authority to do that.
Mr. TREEN. We don't have to set up a vessel traffic system to adopt
a regulation about the size of tows, and I think that apparently is one
of your complaints, isn't it?
Mr. GARDNER. it is my complaint that that would be done, sir,
as testified to, under extreme conditions, and what worries me is who
PAGENO="0175"
171
is going to be making that decision and the quality and the caliber
of the individual that will make that decision at the time. It has to
be a spot basis. The captain of the port, for example, can halt every
bit of traffic in that harbor. They stopped traffic at Vicksburg Bridge
and I didn't even know their district went up to the Vicksburg Bridge
until they stopped it, and he has that power, but the captain of the
port is not going to be sitting behind that vessel traffic control system
monitor, as proposed. That is going to be a duty officer of some sort
and his information that he receives is coming in from various means
and I question whether or not this person would have the ability to
make such a judgment and then limit the size of my tow, tell me to
tie up, stop, or what have you.
Mr. TREEN. Well, your company, is a big operator and there may be
some smaller operators willing to gamble on this a little bit more. I
would like to think that, being a free market advocate, the economic
consideration of individual companies will force the safety. Your
insurance rates are going to have an affect on you. On the other hand,
the Southern Pacific railroad bridge crossing the Atchafalaya River
between Morgan City and Berwick has been hit how many times?
Over 100 times?
Admiral BARROW. Over 500 times.
Mr. TREEN. Over 500 times by tows and the economic impact of
that has got to be pretty bad on these companies.
Mr. GARDNER. I would agree with you 100 percent.
Mr. TREEN. I get calls from constituents every time that bridge
gets knocked out or a chlorine barge gets lodged up against it.
That illustrates to me that the economic impact isn't always sufficient
to regulate. A small VTS system there apparently has helped a
great deal.
Mr. GARDNER. I am not that familiar with it, but I understand
it has.
Mr. TREEN. Do you operate on the Atchafalaya?
Mr. GARDNER. No, sir, we do not. It is my understanding that the
system there and at Houston is a good system.
Mr. TREEN. It is a small VTS system, and I think Admiral Barrow
will confirm, and the record shows it has been very effective. I have
often wondered why, with all of those losses, the towing industry
itself didn't do something about it. Now you can't answer that
because you don't operate on the Atchafalaya.
Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OP IAMES GUNDLACH, CANAL BARGE Co.,
NEW ORLEANS, LA.
Mr. GUNDLACH. I just wanted to make one statement about that
last statement-
Mr. TREEN. Just one moment, I don't think you have been identi-
fied for the record.
Mr. GUNDLACH. I am James Gundlach with Canal Barge Co. of
New Orleans.
Members of the towing industry that do operate down the Atcha-
faiaya River for years have been proposing to the Coast Guard to put
in some vessel traffic advisory in Morgan City. It was finally adopted
78-280-76--------12
PAGENO="0176"
172
just recently after many months and years of our insistence that this
would help.
Mr. TREEN. rfha.nk you for adding that.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Norman Autrainer with the Fer River.Towing Co.,
New Orleans, La.
STATEMENT OP NORMAN ANTRAINER, PER RIVER TOWING Co.,
NEW ORLEANS, LA.
Mr. ANTRAINER. Gentlemen, my name is Norman L. Antra.iner,
port captain with the Fer River Towing Co., New Orleans, La.
Our company operates 175 dry cargo barges and six river towboats
ranging from 800 to 5,600 horsepower. We navigate from mile 60
ahead of Pass below New Orleans north to all points on the Mississippi
River system, hauling millions of tons yearly in grain products to
export elevators. This is done in 38,000 cargo ton units, 1,100 feet long
and 175 feet wide, dea.d weight 44,515 tons.
As operators in the New Orleans and Baton Rouge area, we are
opposed to any additional vessel traffic system, reasons forthwith.
The marine industry, the U.S. Coast Guard and the FCC have
ample regulations at present to improve safety and promote good
seamanship. Additional regulations will confuse all interests. Economic
losses due to unwarranted vessel lost time would be disastrous to
companies such as ours.
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me for interrupting, but that is the second time
that has come up and I didn't propose any questions to have it eluci-
dated. The implication of that statement, or you might say almost a
direct statement, charges that this vessel traffic system would cause
delays.
Mr. ANTRAINER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Would you please tell us how?
Mr. ANTRAINER. For example, if a northbound ship was proceeding
to Baton Rouge and the VTS told one of my tows to hold up, it would
take us-we are moving 13 miles an hour, it would take us probably
close to an hour to get that thing settled down and backed into a bank
somewhere to where that ship could get up around the point, and then
we have to pull back out in the river and drop down and probably have
to swank, that's a maneuver that big tows use, floating with the cur-
rent, take additional time. So many times of this and it just adds up to
excessive lost time.
Mr. BIAGGI. Why would VTS order you to do that?
Mr. ANTRAINER. If they felt the ship had the right-of-way and
needed to navigate the bend before we got there, even though we might
have right-of-way because we are southbound vessel.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to ask Admiral Barrow. Now we require
the expertise and I don't possess it, but why would YTS stop a tow
as described by Mr. Antrainer?
Admiral BARROW. I think he is really reaching for an excuse. I
can't see this thing at all. The only possible reason to slow anybody
down would be that if you have two vessels trying to occupy the same
space at the same time. If, indeed, we don't facilitate traffic on the
river as a result of this VTS, we will not be doing our job. I can't see
slowing traffic down.
PAGENO="0177"
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Commander BoYcE. One comment. It is our proposal that all
passing situations will be originated by the two vessels involved. We
do not concern ourself with the lateral position of the vessels, in other
words, left or right of the river. We do not anticipate ever having any
consideration for that and the situation stated here would be the
responsibility of the two vessels on channel 13 to originate their own
passing signals and if it came to the point where it is obvious they
could not reconcile, in other words, we would be monitoring 13 and
if they could not satisfactorily reconcile it, hopefully we might be able
to take action and direct one of them to hold up and, again, the
extreme case and not the normal course of action contemplated.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is it your contention, Admiral, that the system
would expedite rather than delay?
Admiral BARROW. I am certainly-that is one-half of the purpose
of the VTS, and that is to facilitate, to make it move smoother, to
prevent pileups of traffic in specific situations.
Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Wheat, are you in a p.osition to make an
observation on that point?
Captain WHEAT. Well, he mentioned the fact that he was south-
bound with a heavy tow and a northbound ship-I think he has got
his story backward. I think the northbound vessel would be the one
to hold up. That is the way we work on the lower river, maybe he is
up above Baton Rouge.
Mr. ANTRAINER. Correct, that is the way it does work, but under
this VTS, unless you have someone in that office that actually knows
what the rules of the road are for the western rivers, and so forth, what
do you know what is going to happen?
Mr. BIAGGI. I don't think it is expecting too much to expect that
somebody in the office will know the rules of the road.
Mr. ANTRAINER. I hope so.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is there any possibility that-
Mr. ANTRAINER. I don't think these gentlemen understand the
Algiers traffic light, if what they are saying they are not going to
regulate the vertical movement or the passing of the vessels. The
Algiers traffic light does just that, it holds traffic at one side of the
Algiers Point so other traffic can pass around the point. They do it on
a regular rotation basis, northbound moves, stopping southbound
traffic, and southbound moves after northbound traffic has moved.
Mr. BIAGGI. You are not the first witness, you are the second,
perhaps the third, that may have raised it. Admiral, 1 think that is an
important point that bears some extra i~ttention. For the record, we
would appreciate your providing the committee with the information
clearing up that point and stating your position as contrasted to the
assertion here, that is, whether or not this system would expedite
rather than delay.
Captain Wheat, we would appreciate a comment for the record
on this point from you and your association, a'so, whether or not the
proposed system would delay or expedite because obviously we have
an economic factor in delays.
Captain WHEAT. Sir, I really-it is hard to answer a question like
that because it is new. We have never had a system like this before.
The system has been a system that we have made of our own to a
certain, extent, however, the Algiers traffic light which is operated
PAGENO="0178"
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at certain periods of the year, and I don't really think we could
consider that a delay because basing it against the safety side, I
wouldn't consider it a delay.
Mr. DOUCET. Sir, may I say something to this point here? We have
been talking today about the safety of navigation and everybody
in this room considers Algiers Point traffic light the biggest safety
factor we have got here in the New Orleans Harbor, and we would
like to see it 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, yet you do have lost
time at the Algiers traffic light, but it is one of the biggest safety-
any time you deal in safety, you have got to deal in lost time. But
your lost time-your safety is a heck of a lot better than lost time.
Commander OBERHOLTZER. I think one of the factors is that the
lost time in the event of a catastrophic accident or in the event of
any accident has to be taken into account. The amount of lost time
and economic impact of any type of accident is going to far outweigh
the losses that might be delayed by such as the Algiers traffic light.
Mr. BIAGGL That may appear to be on its face, but if you have a
sustained run of continued losses, the accumulative effect could
almost equal perhaps a catastrophic loss.
Mr. ANTRAINER. The personnel in the U.S. Coast Guard of the
VTS would need extensive training in river navigation at the taxpayer's
expense. River navigation versus ship navigation are different in many
respects and I feel that whatever-if the system does come into
effect, we need these people in the VTS to understand what is involved
in river navigation. Deep sea navigation or shipping is-there is
quite a difference.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I think there is no question about that, and I am
sure that is one of the reasons why all portions of the industry should
have constant communication with the Coast Guard and Admiral
Barrow, on a formal basis if necessary. At least, the input is essential
if we are to come up with a final product that is compatible with all
interests. Thank you very much.
Mr. Stephen Lambert, Greater New Orleans Expressway
Commission.
STATEMENT OP STEPHEN LAMBERT, GREATER NEW ORLEANS
EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION
Mr. LAMBERT. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Trene and staff, thank
you for the privilege of being heard by you all.
I think any study about marine safety, Mr. Chairman, you might
not be familiar with the Lake Ponchartrain, but I think any discussion
of marine safety should include the problems we are having out there.
Before I get a poisonous dart in the back of my neck, I want to say
that the commission wants to be a good neighbor to the marine
industry, but with our lake, I think they will agree, is capable of
being quite treacherous under certain conditions. Let me go into my
introduction-
Mr. TREEN. Explain to the chairman that you operate the bridge
across the lake.
Mr. LAMBERT. Right. I live at 100 Green Acres Road, Metairie,
and I am in Congressman Treen's district, and I am a member of the
Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission which is also known
PAGENO="0179"
175
as the Causeway Commission. It is the legal authority which admin-
isters the operations of the 24-mile-long causeway toll bridge across
Lake Ponchartrain. It is the longest bridge over water in the world.
I have been a member of this commission only about 2 months,
having been appointed after the accidental death of my father, who
was chairman, on July 27. He had been chairman for 12 years.
Although I am a newly-appointed member of the Commission, all
of my family has been living with the trials and tribulations of the
causeway, nearly since its inception. Furthermore, all of us are proud
of the fact that under my father's leadership the toll bridge has
become one of the most successful type operations in the country.
At this point, if you don't mind, I would like to show you, Mr.
Chairman, so you may familiarize yourself with these copies of press
clippings on barge rammings and you all can look through them
during my talk.
My purpose for appearing here today is to urge you to include the
Lake Ponchartrain area in the Port of New Orleans Vessel Traffic
System. If it is not practical to include the lake area as an integral
part of the Port VTS, then a separate subunit VTS should be set up
for Lake Ponchartrain, all under the jurisdiction of the Commander
of the 8th Coast Guard District.
Gentlemen, I fully understand that the criteria used to establish
the priorities for the installation of the vessel traffic system include:
1, tonnage of cargo; 2, number of vessel transits; 3, number of vessels
involved in collisions, ranimings and groundings. These criteria were
stated in an August 1973 report entitled, "Vessel Traffic Systems,
Analysis of Port Needs."
I submit that not only have these criteria never been applied in a
serious analysis of the Lake Ponchartrain marine traffic by Federal
agencies, but also as Congressmen you should take an overall view, per-
haps from the standpoint of the Department of Transportation itself,
which is over both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Highway
Administration.
If anyone had bothered to look into the marine problem, they would
have found that there are over 15,000 barge tows a year crossing
through the marine openings in the causeway, each of which has the
potential to knock the bridge out of service, and kill people in auto-
mobiles who are using the bridge.
I know that Congressman Treen is very familiar with the series of
tragic accidents which have occurred over the past 15 years or so, all of
which have been a direct result of irresponsible and unregulated marine
traffic in Lake Ponchartrain. However, for those of you who may be
unfamiliar with these occurrences, I would like to go over a few high-
lights of news stories covering these tragic events. You all have them
and you can see it is a pretty ghastly sight from those pictures. I
repeat, these have not been responsible marine operators. We have had
problems with men sleeping, nobody awake on the tow, just heading
for the causeway until they finally hit it. I must comment, at this
point, that it has been sort of proven out that the equipment and man-
power operating on the river tends to be of a much better grade than
that operating in the lake.
Now, only last week, in the dark at 5 in the morning, a barge tow
was attempting to cross through one of the marine openings in the
PAGENO="0180"
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causeway in high seas which were a result of weather systems in
advance of Hurricane Eloise, when a cable securing the barges to-
gether broke and the fender systems and navigation lights were
damaged. In other words, these tows-barges--were apparently out
in front of the tug and one of the cables broke, allowing it to jacknife
into the fender system. If the seas were that bad and it had happened a
half-mile out away from the bridge and turned all of the barges loose,
we might have killed no telling how many people.
As a matter of fact, the causeway commission-and this is how
we found out, the causeway commission received notification of this
from a ham radio operator who happened to be monitoring the marine
band and called the causeway office when another tug captain reported
the navigation lights out.
Fortunately, there was no structural damage to the bridge itself,
but the real point is that this barge tow should never have been at-
tempting to cross through the causeway in weather like that and cer-
tainly not at night. Gentlemen, this is a very common occurrence.
Another incident which might hit home with Mr. Tréen, knowing
*the problems we have had with hurricanes, on the Sunday morning
before the Monday that Eloise could have possibly hit, we had a
tugboat out in these same rough seas beginning to have trouble. He
lost power and eventually rolled over and sunk, almost taking dOwn
two other vessels that were trying to assist him. rrhat vessel stayed
there and as of Monday at 5 o'clock when we were forced to close the
bridge and~ build a levee across the entrance to protect the levee
system from the high water, that tug was stilT out tl.iere and buoys
out in the gulf-
Mr. TREEN. Where was it with relation to the causeway?
Mr. LAMBERT. 500 yards off the east side of the bridge, just about
6 or 7 miles out. The wave action of Eloise recorded by the U.S.
Weather Bureau, which, thank God, didn't hit here, caused some
seas in its path some 40 feet high. In a lake that averages 15 feet
deep, you can appreciate that it would have slammed this tugboat
right through the bridge. It had no business beinginthat water under
those conditions.
I fear that the continuing lack of regulated marine traffic may result
in a far worse tragedy than has occurred thus far. In the last accident
on August 1, 1974, the causeway police officer hurrying to the scene-
and all he had received was a sketchy report that there had been an
accident on the bridge, and further I would like to say this officer
happens to be my brother-he was rushing out there to find it and the
tow that struck the bridge struck and knocked out the downside of a
high-level hump, which means as you approach the hump, it looks
like a normal approach until you get on the top and then there is
nothing there.
In other words, he skidded to a stop sideways less than 50 feet from
the edge-two vehicles containing three people having gone in before
he got there. He was able to stop and if he had gone in, not yet having
verified the accident, it's possible that other vehicles could have
followed him in.
I think if you will notice in that thing-book of clippings-one of
the most serious occurrences was when a bus went in out there.
Another major point that should be considered by you as U.S. Con-
PAGENO="0181"
177
gressrnan is that the causeway provides a vital link between two maj or
east-west interstate highways, 1-10 and 1-12, and is the only such
link for 40 miles in the Greater New Or'eans area. When the bonds
are paid off, the causeway will become part of the State and probably
the Federal highway system.
Admiral Barrow pointed out in a letter dated March 4, 1975, to
the Lake Ponchartrain `Safety `Committee that "The major threat to
the causeway is `from tugs and barges operating under State leases,"
and, therefore, he felt that the State bears a special responsibility for
anticollision measures. What the admiral is referring to is the fact
that the shells dred'ged from the western end of Lake Ponchartrain
come from State-controlled leases, and it should be made clear that
the tugs and barges themselves are licensed by the TLS. Coast Guard.
The State is really not in,' the business u! regulating marine traffic-
nor should it be.
Furthermore, it seems `totally irrelevant whether or not the `shell
leases are State Or' privately controlled. The important fact, however,
is that the shell deposits in Lake Ponchartrain provide the' only
economical aggregate source in southeast Louisiana. rfl~ese clamshells
are used in place of gravel, which is scarce and expensive, primarily
in highway construction, `and primarily on Federal highways. The
existence o'f this clamsl'iell deposit is extremely important to the
Louisiana Department of Highways and the Federal Highway. Admin-
istration. Therefore, it seems quite apparent that the problem con-
cerns both the U.S., Coast Guard and the Federal Highway Admin-
istratiOn, which are both agencies of the Department of Transportation.
Last year the commission hired safety engineers to make `an'
indepth detailed study of the causeway. One of the major recommend a-
tions was the installation of a VTS consisting of a manned radar
tracking station, with provisions for radio operated `alarm sys-
tems installed on each: tug' operating in the lake. If the radar
operators were unable to cause the course of an errant barge tow to
be altered after calling on the marine radio, the alarm system could
be set off by radio. This `would ring on every tug on the lake and would
not only tend to wake up the sleeping crew of the tug in question, hut
also' alert' all other tugs on the lake so that they could assist in any
way possible.
Gentlemen, the Congress has the authority to provide funding for
the installation and operation of such a system for Lake Ponchartrain
under `the provisions of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
It makes no difference to us whether this YTS is an integral part
of the Port 0 New Orleans VTS or a separate one. You are here to
consider the safety of operations involving commerce in the Port of
New Orleans. We beg you to consider the lives of the passengers
in the 2i~ million vehicles which cross the causeway each year.
Thank you very much for allowing us to present this desperate
problem. `
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Lambert. The presentation was
revealing,' so were the pictures and the statement in connection with
the many accidents that have occurred. Obviously, the general subject
of boat safety comes within the purview of this committee and the
Coast Guard. I don't know that it comes within the precise thrust
of what we are discussing today, but it certainly merits further
consideration.
PAGENO="0182"
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Mr. LAMBERT. I would not be dramatic, but I close with this
thought: Suppose it was a bad-weather night and suppose, say, a
cavalcade of students had gone to a game across the lake and they
were returning late tonight and a tow went through that bridge, we
would all feel a little funny tonight when we found out about it.
Mr. B1AGGI. Your position is sound.
Mr. LAMBERT. We are having trouble getting help on this; we really
are. This has been going on for a long time and we really need help
bad and we want to cooperate.
Mr. BIAGGI. All I can tell you is you have two very esteemed and
vigorous Congressmen in the persons of Congressman Treen and the
gentlelady from New Orleans, Congresswoman Lindy Boggs, who I
am sure will do all they can.
Mr. LAMBERT. They have been trying to help us, but we need all
the help we can get.
Mr. TREEN. We have got Mr. Biaggi now.
Mr. BIAGGI. The gentleman from Baton Rouge is the last witness.
Would you please identify yourself.
STATEMENT OP T. R. BETTS, CARGO CARRIERS, INC.,
BATON ROUGE~ LA.
Mr. BETTS. Yes. I am T. R. Betts, Cargo Carriers, Inc., Baton
Rouge, La.
I think one of the reasons that you have difficulty in finding whether
or not the VTS is needed above New Orleans is that the committee
and hearings have all been slanted to New Orleans. Certainly Baton
Rouge is the seventh largest port in the United States and we think
that if we are going to be regulated, that there should be more
consideration given to the needs and the operations within the Port of
Baton Rouge, and not be tied in with the operations of the second
largest port, Port of New Orleans.
Mr. BIAGrn. Nobody quarrels with you, except we have a series of
ports that we have to survey and we will try to make as many of
them as possible.
Mr. BETTS. What I am saying is we are being tied in with New
Orleans right now. All of the regulations being discussed will not
only apply to New Orleans, but apply to Baton Rouge.
Mr. BIAGGL That is true, and to New York as well. We try to get
as much input as possible. Our only regret is that we don't have as
much time as possible to travel to each of these places when we would
like to. The hearings will continue for many months to come, I'm
sure.
Mr. BETTS. We appreciate it.
Mr. BIAGGI. Hopefully, we will be able to hold hearings at Baton
Rouge.
Mr. BETTS. Thank you very much. I appreciate you coming.
Mr. TREEN. I want to say that just because the VTS will en~
compass the Ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge doesn't mean
that the regulations applying to Baton Rouge won't be consistent
with its needs.
Mr. BETTS. This may be true; however, the regulations that we
have seen have been consistent for all four sectors, at least regulations
PAGENO="0183"
179
we have seen drawn have applied throughout the sector of the Mile
Zero to 243, which we are talking about Baton Rouge.
Mr. TREEN. I'm sure your industry representatives will be sure to
offer your comments on the proposed regulations.
Mr. BETTS. I don't understand.
Mr. BIAGGI. In that connection, this record is open; it will be open
for a month. You can make any contributions from any source in
Baton Rouge, from any sources in the area. We are extremely anxious
to get as much input as possible.
Mr. BETTS. Thank you very much.
Mr. BIAGGL The meeting will adjourn.
[The following was submitted for inclusion in the record:]
MID-AMERICA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
St. Louis, Mo., October 16, 1975.
Hon. MARIO BIAGGI,
Chairman U.S. Coast Guard Subcommittee, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN: I would like to officially go on record on behalf of Mid-
America Transportation Company as being opposed to the V.T.S. as presently
proposed. We feel the vessel traffic control system from the sea buoy to mile 243
A.H.P. is not needed. Properly managed and manned the present traffic system
(the stop and go lights at Algier's Point) coupled with the monitoring require-
ments of channels 13 and 16 currently in effect should and would provide a viable
and safe system of vessel traffic management in the New Orleans area at a fraction
of the cost of the proposed V.T.S.
The monies that have been earmarked for this system 4.4 million dollars for
the initial investment could be spent in countless other areas to promote safe
and economical transportation of goods by water.
The vessel traffic control system as presently proposed was developed without
the proper input of industry in the form of a formal advisory committee.
We feel that had there been a proper advisory committee working in coopera-
tion with the Coast Guard on this, the proposed regulations would have been
contested at the onset.
Yours truly,
J. A. TINKEY,
Vice President,
Manager Traffic and Personnel.
[Enclosure 5]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
U.S. COAST GUARD,
New Orleans, La., November 12, 1975.
Hon. MARIO BIAGGI,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Rouse Subcommittee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Rouse of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. BIAGGI: During the field hearing on Vessel Traffic Safety on 3 October
1975, you asked me to provide, for the record, comments on two aspects of the
proposed New Orleans project. The first aspect was the statement made by Mr.
Robert L. Gardner of Alter Company, Davenport, Iowa, which contained charges
concerning the Coast Guard's actions in attempting to implement the New Orleans
Vessel Traffic System.
After reviewing Mr. Gardner's letter and the preliminary transcript of the
hearing, I have come to the conclusion that his charges encompass a policy area
which is in excess of my authority. I have therefore requested the cognizant staff
within Coast Guard Headquarters to respond to these allegations. You will
receive a response from the Commandant for inclusion in the record.
The second aspect of the hearings which you asked me to address is the question
of whether the New One ans Vessel Traffic System will expedite rather than delay
traffic.
PAGENO="0184"
180
Delay of traffic in the Coast Guard's existing Vessel Traffic Systems has not
been a factor which has been raised as an industry objection, nor can I statistically
prove that these systems have expedited traffic. The major area of comment in
both the presently operational Houston-Galveston and Berwick Bay Vessel Traffic
Systems in my District has been the vessel operators' opinions that these systems
provide a feeling of confidence enabling transit of these hazardous areas with a
greater degree of safety. The New Orleans Vessel Traffic System's operational
area is so geographically different from our existing systems that our experience
may not be directly comparable; but I believe this same increased confidence on
the mariner's part will occur in the New Orleans System.
As I stated in my testimony, one of the basic purposes of the Vessel Traffic
Services is to facilitate vessel movement by acting as a central maritime informa-
tion collection and dissemination agency. My requirements for the New Orleans
system were also stated in the record; in essence, there will be times that vessels
will be required to slow down, stop or not be able get underway within the system
at the precise time that the operator desires. Obviously this could be termed as
delaying or slowing traffic but such a procedure would only occur when a situation
existed whereby a prudent operator would take the same action (delay departing,
slow down, stop, etc.) if he were aware that an unsafe situation existed or was
developing in his intended transit route. By making full use of the vessel movement
reporting system, aided by a computerized real-time automated data system, the
Vessel Traffic Center will be aware of a potential hazardous situation developing
Directed action by the VTC to an operator in the form of advice to stop, slow,
remain moored, etc. to avoid an unsafe condition from occurring, would only be
given when an operator is not aware of a potential unsafe condition or was aware
of and ignored his responsibility to act in a pludent manner. To slow down
traffic for any reason other than for safety would be in direct conflict with one of
the basic purposes of a VTS previously mentioned (i.e. to facilitate traffic move-
ment) and will not be practiced or tolerated.
If there are any aspects of this or any other subject on which I can he of assist-
ance, my staff and I will be pleased to respond at your request.
Sincerely,
W. W. BARROW,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard,
Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, sine die.I
PAGENO="0185"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1976
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FisHERiEs,
SUBCOMMiTTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAViGATION,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth
House Office Building, Hon. Mario Biaggi, chairman of the subcom-
mittee, presiding.
Mr. B1AGGI. The meeting is called to order.
This morning, the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is
continuing its hearings begun last year in connection with its oversight
responsibilities for Coast Guard programs.
Early in the Congress, the subcommittee decided that it would be
advantageous to take a detailed look at the Coast Guard program
involving vessel traffic services, a program formally initiated subse-
quent to the passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
Since that time, plans for the development of vessel traffic systems in
various port areas have been undertaken.
The relative soplustication of the services contemplated varies
significantly, depending upon the port area involved and its peculiar
needs, but some kind of system has been initiated for the Ports of San
Francisco, Houston, Sault Sainte Marie, Puget Sound, New York,
New Orleans, and Valdez, Alaska. It is understoodl that consideration
is now being given for such a system in the Chesapeake Bay and pos-
sibly in the Delaware River. Other port areas should receive atten-
tion as future needs direct.
As a part of its review of the program, the subcommittee held hear-
ings on the subject in New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and
Sault Sainte Marie. Unfortunately, it was unable to make scheduled
visits to other port areas, but expects to do so when visits to those ports
can be scheduled during the next Congress.
The hearings today and tomorrow are scheduled for the purpose of
bringing the subcommittee up to date on the overall program and to
permit testimony from several interested witnesses who have requested
the opportunity to appear and express their views, particularly on the
plans for the vessel traffic services in New Orleans and the lower
Mississippi River.
I have requested the Coast Guard to review the current status of
vessel traffic services in each port area where such services are either
in place or being developed, to furnish the subcommittee with a
summarized history of the appropriations and expenditures for each
(181)
PAGENO="0186"
182
port area, together with anticipated future needs, to inform the sub-
committee of the exact status of the development of the program in
each port area, and to advise us of any plans for areas where the
program is not yet underway.
In conducting these oversight hearings, I wish to comment that the
subcommittee is, in no way, desirous of substituting its judgment for
that of the Coast Guard in the details of these various port programs.
We do, however, wish to assure ourselves that the manner of satisfy-
ing the needs of each port area is rational and reflective of the overall
needs, and we wish to be sure that funding which we authorize will
be utilized effectively, consistent with those needs.
Our first witness today is Rear Adm. Anthony F. Fugaro, who has
recently assumed duties as Chief of the Office of Marine Environ-
ment and Systems at Coast Guard Headquarters.
As the officer responsible for the overall vessel traffic service pro-
gram, Admiral Fugaro will review for us the overall program and
will discuss future plans for its expansion into new areas.
Admiral FUGARO.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ANTHONY F. FUGARO, CHIEF, OFFICE
OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SYSTEMS, U.S. COAST GUARD,
ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. RICHARD A. BAUMAN, CHIEF OF PORT
SAFETY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND COMDR. EUGENE L
HICKEY, 1R., CHIEF OP VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES
Admiral FUGARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today to testify concerning the Coast Guard's
vessel traffic services program.
I am Rear Adm. Anthony Fugaro, Chief of the Office of Marine
Environment and Systems, Coast Guard Headquarters.
With me on my right is Capt. Richard Bauman, Chief of Port
Safety and Law Enforcement, and on my left is Comdr. Eugene
Hickey, Chief of Vessel Traffic Services.
My statement is lengthy, and if there are no objections, I will read
it at this time.
This morning I would like to summarize the historical back-
ground-
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, excuse me.
I note the extent of your statement. I do not know if it is possible-'
if it would be possible for you to summarize your statement, or would
it be necessary to go into complete detail?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I am ready to-I would be more
than willing to summarize it.
I assume, of course, that the entire statement will go in the record,
and I recognize that we are a little late, sir.
I would be more than very happy to summarize.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows :1
PAGENO="0187"
183
STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. ANTHONY F.. FtTGARO, U.S. COAST GUARD,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is a pleasure to appear before
you today to testify concerning the Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Service program.
I am Rear Admiral Anthony Fugaro, Chief of the Office of Marine Environment
and Systems, Coast Guard Headquarters. With me, on my right, is Captain
Richard Bauman, Chief of Port Safety and Law Enforcement; and on my left is
Commander Eugene Hickey, Chief of Vessel Traffic Services. My statement is
lengthy, and if there are no objections, I will read it at this time.
This morning I would like to summarize the historical background of vessel
traffic management in the United States; discuss the justification and rationale
behind the Coast Guard's VTS program; and identify the essential considerations
taken into account in arriving at the current stage of VTS development. The
concluding part of this testimony will address the specifics of each VTS currently
operational or under construction, and will touch on current planning for future
systems.
While some foreign ports, namely, Liverpool, Hamburg and Rotterdam, have
had some form of VTS since 1964, the United States, despite the large number of
ports and high volume of waterborne commerce, has been slower in the establish-
ment of systems intended to provide some form of marine traffic control.
Table 1 is a list of some rather basic traffic services that were being operated
in United States ports and waterways prior to 1972. The only Coast Guard opera-
tion was in the St. Marys River. Legislation for this dates back to 1896.
TABLE 1
Port or waterway Type Operator
St. Marys River VMRS,1 TV U.S. Coast Guard.
New Orleans Traffic lights Corps of Engineers.
Cape Cod Canal Traffic lights, VMRS, radar, and TV_ Do.
Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Traffic lights, VMRS, and TV Do.
St. Lawrence Seaway VMRS St. Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation.
Honolulu Signal tower Harbor master.
Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor radar, teletype net LA/LB pilots.
Baltimore VHF-FM communications Private.
Portland, Dreg do Do.
Boston VMRS Do.
1 Vessel movement reporting system.
It has taken the United States some twenty years to achieve general acceptance
of systems intended to provide some form of marine traffic control. A shore
based harbor radar service was established in 1949 by Jacobsen Pilot Service,
Inc. in Long Beach, California, and has been operated continuously by them
ever since. This was just one year after the first harbor radar installation in the
port of Liverpool, England. The pilots employed by the city of Los Angeles
followed with their own harbor radar in 1951. The radars in Long Beach and
Los Angeles were installed in the pilot dispatch offices and used by the pilots
for their own purposes. They have not been continuously manned and do not
provide for overall traffic mangement in these ports.
In 1951 a harbor radar demonstration, patterned after the systems in Liverpool
and Long Beach, was conducted in New York Harbor. This was initiated and
funded by the New York Port Authority. The potential of harbor radar was
demonstrated, but funding and management problems for a permanent system
were not resolved. The demonstration was terminated in 1952.
From 1962 to 1965 a second demonstration project was conducted in New
York, this time by the U.S. Coast Guard. This project was known as Ratan,
Radio Television Aid to Navigation. Technical problems led to a termination of
this demonstration, although the concept may possibly have future application.
In November 1968, the Coast Guard forumlated plans for a Harbor Advisory
Radar Project. This experimental project was developed in San Francisco Harbor
in 1969. Later the same year, a Coast Guard position paper concluded that there
was a definite need for harbor advisory systems in congested U.S. ports and that
the Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation, should provide
national leadership in this field.
PAGENO="0188"
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In January 1970, the Coast Guard began operating the San Francisco Harbor
Advisory Radar Project on an experimental basis. On 5 February 1970, Congress-
man Downing of Virginia introduced the first bill which included specific provi-
sions for vessel traffic control. In May 1970, the President, in his oil pollution
message to Congress, urged enactment, among other things, of legislation directed
at vessel traffic control. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Transportation
submitted its own Ports and Waterways Safety proposal, which was introduced
as H.R. 17830.
Testimony on H.R. 17830 favored the marine safety and environmental
purposes of the Bill, but was almost unanimous in opposition to many provisions
of the Bill. The general tenor was that it was too loosely drawn and too broad in
scope. On 18 January 1971, while an improved version of the Bill was being
drafted, the Oregon Standard collided with the Arizona Standard in San Francisco
Bay, with the resultant discharge of 800,000 gallons of oil into the Bay. This
casualty emphasized the possible need for vessel traffic control in our ports.
On 10 July 1972, a more compact version of the Ports and Waterways Safety
legislation was signed into law by the President. This authorized the Secretary
of the Deparment in which the Coast Guard operates to establish, operate and
maintain vessel traffic services and systems for ports, harbors and other waters
subject to congested vessel traffic.
The American public through congressional action had thus demanded that
mere action be taken to reduce the loss of lives, injuries to people and damage
to property and the environment as a result of the steadily increasing number of
vessel casualities occurring in U.S. waters.
Prior to the passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, the Coast
Guard Office of Marine Environment and Systems was established in July 1971.
One function of this office was to prepare and implement a national plan for vessel
traffic services. The numerous ports and waterways of the United States are
visited by almost every size and type of vessel currently in use in the world. These
vessels transport thousands of different types of cargo. Many of these cargoes
when spilled are hazardous or polluting. The size of vessels and the volume of
shipping continue to increase. The potential for major marine disasters exists.
According to U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty statistics, the number of
collisions and grQundings in U.S. waters rose from 1,185 cases in fiscal year 1965
to 1,918 in fiscal year 1975. The reported losses to vessels, cargo and property
from these casualties was $33 million in fiscal year 1965; in fiscal year 1975 these
losses were $103 million. A recent study of the Coast Guard marine casualty
reports suggests that due to unreported casulaties and underestimates of the
dollar losses for those casualties that are reported, the actual annual dollar losses
are probably several times that amount. The annual loss of lives and number of
serious injuries during this same period was 50 and 39 respectively. These figures
do not include the substantial damages to property ashore, such as the costs of
spilled oilcleanup.
During calendar years 1971 through 1975, the years for which complete data
on pollution are available, there was an annual average of 170 polluting incidents
caused by collisions and groundings which spilled an annual average of 5.2 million
gallons of pollutants into U.S. waters.
Statistics indicate that waterborne commerce in the U.S. will increase substan-
tially and the carriage of hazardous and potentially polluting cargo will be a
significant part of this growth. Thus, the forecast for the future shows increased
waterway congestion and greater potential risk of traffic accidents. Historical
casualty data and the future outlook for waterborne commerce indicate a need
for improved marine traffic safety in U.S. ports and waterways. Vessel traffic
services can make significant contributions to this effort.
This, then, is the situation that confronts the Coast Guard today. The Con-
gressional mandate is clear. What follows is a description of the Coast Guard's
activities to date in establishing vessel traffic services.
First, to establish the terms of reference, the concept of vessel traffic manage-
ment should be examined, as it is vessel traffic management that is practiced
by a vessel traffic service. Vessel traffic management seeks to establish two
principles: good order and predictability; and can take many forms. Essentially,
vessel traffic management encompasses every measure applied to affect (and
improve) the relationship of vessels with respect to each other. The Rules of the
Road are statutory and regulatory measures that must be practiced by vessels,
in order to prevent collisions. Another form of traffic management is routing,
one element of which may be a traffic separation scheme, which is a network of
one-way traffic lanes, and separation lines or separation zones, designed to
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physically separate vessel traffic proceeding in opposite or nearly opposite direc-
tions. Additionally, depending upon the individual configuration of a port or
waterway and the complexity of its vessel traffic patterns, other regulations may
be established to further affect vessel movements, such as speed limits, limita.-
tions on vessel size, and restricting vessel operation to vessels that have particular
operating characteristics and capabilities. Each of these forms of traffic manage-
ment can be very cost effective in reducing vessel casualties, in that government
equipment and personnel are not required except in the administration and
enforcement of the laws and regulations.
For the sake of convenience, all of the foregoing forms of vessel traffic manage-
ment can be categorized as passive. It is when people external to a vessel become
involved in its operation, either directly or indirectly, that vessel traffic manage-
ment becomes active. Such is the case when a Vessel Traffic Service is established.
It has been recognized throughout the world, through detailed vessel casualty
analysis, that passive vessel traffic management is not sufficient to prevent some
serious vessel casualties. At the most recent international symposium on marine
traffic systems, conducted at The Hague,. April 11-14 1976, representatives of
25 nations submitted some 40 technical papers on the subject, and I quote from
one:
"Is a captain still capable to navigate his ship safely, taking into account the
increased traffic flows and the greater risk level of cargoes? Is a captain still
able to anticipate the oncoming dangers without proper knowledge of what
happens beyond the limits .of visibility? Is it necessary to provide a captain with
traffic information to facilitate the process of taking decisions?
"Evidently, a great public interest is at stake. The tragic marine accidents of
the past decade demonstrate the fatal consequences of strandings and collisions
in terms of loss of human lives, pollution of the environment and the loss of
capital."
These observations, made by His Excellency, Dr. M. H. M. va.n Hulten, Secre-
tary of State of the Netherlands Ministry for Transport and Public Works,
reflect the general consensus of the international marine safety community. It
is gratifying to note that the United States is now considered to be at the fore-
front in the development of vessel traffic services. The Coast Guard developed
harbor surveillance radar, being installed in New York, Galveston and Valdez,
Alaska, has established a new international standard in its accuracy, effectiveness
and reliability; the extensive use of low light level television, as a primary method
of surveillance ,was pioneered in VTS Houston-Galveston; and, the Coast Guard's
procurement of traffic analysis and display computers is being closely followed by
authorities in several major foreign port areas.
An active role in vessel traffic management presupposes the operation of equip-
ment and people that have sufficient capability to fulfill that role. In the United
States, we view the situation from the perspective of providing user services;
p~. that is, providing services to the master of a vessel-generally, furnishing him
with information, critical to the safe navigation of his vessel, that he would not
normally be able to obta.in readily on his own. It remains, as in the past, the
ultimate responsibility of the master to control the movements of the vessel,
after correlating all available information, to ensure its safe passage.
Each component of a vessel traffic service is designed to derive this information
that is critical to safe navigation, and to enable its communication to a vessel
master well in advance of its need. The management approach to designing a
vessel traffic service is a logical progression: first, identify the needs, cost, benefits,
and vessel traffic options of a port or waterway (in the form of user services);
second, identify the capability necessary to meet these needs (in the form of system
components); and third, identify the specific engineering requirements necessary
to provide the capability desired (in the form of specific electronic equipments).
Thus, system operations management precedes system engineering management.
In order to accomplish the first step in traffic management systems design-
establishing need-the Coast Guard examines four broad areas: (1) historic
casualty experience, (2) potential for future serious casualties, (3) port or waterway
configuration and traffic patterns, (4) future port or waterway growth. This step
must be conducted on a port-by-port basis. In 1973, the Coast Guard conducted
an analysis of port needs for vessel traffic services. The output of this analysis
was a listing of ports and waterways in the order in which their needs should be
addressed, and initial recommendations concerning the system components
necessary to meet these needs. This study (Vessel Traffic Systems, Analysis of
Port Needs, August 1973) indicated that seven U.S. ports or waterways were
experiencing the number and type of vessel casualties that would require a vessel
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traffic service to prevent. These ports and waterways were identified as: New York,
Houston-Galveston, the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico to Baton
Rouge, Chesapeake Bay, San Francisco, Puget Sound, and several sections of
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (JCW). The study also found that in eleven
other U.S. ports and waterways vessel casualty experience warranted a future
detailed examination with respect to what passive vessel traffic management
measures could be applied. In most cases, it was felt that compliance with the
then recently promulgated Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act and
regulations would be sufficient to significantly reduce the incidence of vessel
casualties in those waters.
With respect to the second step in system design-required capability (compo-
nents)-a number of essential considerations are made. In order for any vessel
traffic management system to be effective, the traffic manager must be provided
with four basic components: (1) the ability to communicate, (2) the ability to
analyze and display information, (3) surveillance, (4) qualified personnel.
The ability to communicate with Participating Vessels.-A Vessel Movement
Reporting System (VMRS) is the keystone of any vessel traffic service. It consists
of a VHF-FM communications network that permits direct radio contact with
the master of every participating vessel in the VTS area. While participation by
vessels is currently voluntary in all VTS areas other than Puget Sound and Berwick
Bay, the Coast Guard is considering issuing Federal regulations to require parti-
cipation by vessels in every VTS. In a VMRS vessels provide information to the
Vessel Traffic Center (VTC) as to their location, intended movements, size, cargo,
and conditions that may adversely affect their safe navigation or the safe naviga-
tion of other vessels, such as observed discrepancies in aids to navigation, con-
centrations of fishing or recreational vessels, and obstructions to navigation.
Vessels must maintain a continuous listening watch on the VTS frequency desig-
nated for the geographic area within which the vessel is operating.
In those ports and waterways where the number of vessels participating at
one time exceeds the number that can be accommodated on a single radio fre-
quency, as in New York and the Mississippi River, the VTS area will be sectorized,
and vessels will change frequencies when crossing sector boundaries. As each vessel
is also required to maintain a continuous listening watch on VHF-FM Channel 13,
the vessel bridge-to-bridge radio-telephone frequency, a common radio frequency
is available to vessels in proximity of each other, but in different VTS sectors.
Channel 13 is also listened to by each VTC sector operator; consequently, this
frequency serves as a backup for immediate communication between the VTC
and vessels, in the event of congestion on the sector frequency. Additionally, a
continuous listening watch on the VTS sector frequency establishes a "party line"
concept, wherein masters are able to discern substantial valuable information
concerning the movements of other vessels in the vicinity by listening to com-
munications with the VTC.
The ability to analyze and display information.-In order to provide the user
services necessary to avoid the hazardous conditions that lead to vessel casualites,
the traffic manager must be provided with the component that will analyze and
display all relevant information obtained through the VMRS and other sources.
Generally, this can be accomplished by automatic data processing and computer
generated displays. The Coast Guard is looking at computers as an aid to the
traffic manager in his decisionmaking process, by performing accurately and
rapidly those time consuming functions otherwise required to be accomplished
manually. Additionally, computers can perform complex tasks, such as auto-
maticaffly accepting and displaying vessel location and movement data from
surveilance devices. And, most important, computers can forecast the develop-
ment of vessel congestion-the primary cause of vessel collisions-so that the
traffic manager can alert vessels in time to develop remedial courses of action.
It should be emphasized that the Coast Guard does not put decision making in
the hands of a computer-that is the role of qualified humans. We do, however,
wish to take advantage of this superior resource for freeing the traffic manager
of the manual functions that needlessly detract from his time available to com-
municate and to think.
Surveillance.-The need for a surveillance component in a vessel traffic service
is directly proportional to the level of accuracy of information necessary to provide
user services. In areas where vessel traffic density is high and traffic patterns com-
plex, and in areas where the waterway configuration presents natural constrictions
to traffic, it is generally advantageous to allow the traffic manager to "see" and
exactly measure the situation on a real-time basis. The accuracy of vessel location
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and movement reports is limited by numerous governing factors, including errone-
ous information input by participating vessels.
Currently, surveillance is provided by three means: visual observation; closed
circuit, low light level television; and radar. Other surveillance devices, such as
magnetic or acoustic detectors may have application in U.S. systems, and are
now under study in the VTS Research and Development program.
In selecting the type of surveillance to cover any section of a VTS area, two
primary criteria govern: 1) the geographical configuration of the waterway, 2)
the purpose of the surveillance. Experience in the operation of Houston-Galveston
VTS has shown that closed circuit, low light level television (CCTV), augmented
with infrared illumination equipment, is one of the best means of electronic surveil-
lance, in that it most closely duplicates the capability of the human eye-the
ideal method of surveillance. CCTV's application is limited to the river environ-
ment, however, and is not as well suited to coverage of large harbors and bays as
is radar. High resolution, harbor surveillance radar can detect and track vessels
up to 24 miles from the antenna site. By using microwave links, any number of
remote radars can bring surveillance coverage to the traffic manager. Radar,
while lacking CCTV's ability to positively identify all vessels within range,
has the advantage of being effective during periods of extremely limited visibility.
Thus, it is possible to assist vessels in fixing their location during reduced visibility,
when they may have lost the ability to do so independently. Additionally, radar
video data can be digitized for automatic entry into computer processors. We are
currently developing a capability for automatic radar tracking of vessels by com-
puter, thus introducing further speed and accuracy into the system, and further
freeing human operators of time consuming manual functions.
Qualified Personnel.-The most important component of any vessel traffic service
is the complement of personnel tasked with operating it. In the initial planning
stages of VTS development the Coast Guard has manned its vessel traffic centers
with military personnel. The Coast Guard recognizes that, in general, its personnel
do not possess the specialized qualifications of the pilots that navigate the vessels
sailing the waters of the VTS area. Nevertheless, as a seagoing agency of long
standing, the Coast Guard does possess highly competent mariners. The Coast
Guard does intend to assign these men to its vessel traffic services, and feels that
they will be both fully trained and fully qualified to perform the specific functions
required. Keep in mind, we recognize the role of the master and pilot as the sole
authority in the maneuvering of the vessel-the traffic manager ashore cannot
supplant that role. The criteria that the Coast Guard has developed in manning
vessel traffic centers are based on complex factors relating to the amount of
necessary communications; vessel traffic density and complexity; and electronics
equipment configuration. Each VTC is manned on a 24 hour day basis. A Coast
Guard officer in the grade of lieutenant is continuously on duty in the capacity
of watch supervisor. He is in direct supervision of several enlisted sector operators,
who do the actual communications with vessels and perform the data management
functions of the center. It is the watch supervisor who is solely responsible for
decisionmaking and who exercises the authority of implementing Federal regula-
tions. On a longer term basis, alternate manning arrangements, considering the
use of local personnel, including pilots, are being studied.
The expressed intent of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 is the
prevention of damage, destruction or loss to vessels or bridges or structures and
the protection of the navigable waters from resultant environmental harm. There-
fore, a basic principle in the operation of any vessel traffic service established under
this Act is that necessary action be taken to prevent collisions and groundings,
within the capability of the system. Should a watch supervisor perceive a certain
set of circumstances to constitute a situation that may result in a vessel casualty,
he is authorized and required to take whatever action that he feels is necessary to
prevent that casualty. Generally, his actions will involve a timely exchange of
advice and information with the master, pilot or other person in charge of the
navigation of the vessels. Nevertheless, if in his opinion it is necessary, the watch
supervisor will issue orders directing the movement of the vessel or vessels in-
volved. Even then, this does not lessen the responsibility of the master or pilot for
safe navigation and prudent maneuvering of his vessel. The master or pilot may
choose to disregard this order under the provisions of Section 161.111, 33 CFR,
which reads:
"In an emergency, any person may deviate from any section in this subpart to
the extent necessary to avoid endangering persons, property, or the environment."
He must then report his actions to the VTC, in accordance with Section 161.134,
which reads:
78-280-70-13
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"Whenever the master of a vessel deviates from any section in this subpart
because of an emergency or radio failure, he shall report, or cause to be reported,
the deviation to the VTC as soon as possible."
A recent marine casualty in the Houston Ship Channel involved the accidental
grounding of an 893 foot lash ship (in the 400 foot-wide channel) after it collided
with a tug pushing barges. The tug experienced a steering casualty while being
overtaken by the larger vessel. During the period from the time the collision
occurred, at 7:50 p.m., to the time that the ship was again under way, at 2:40 a.m.
the next morning, the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Center in Houston actively
managed traffic to prevent further casualties as a result of the extreme congestion
that resulted. The summary of events, which I would like to submit separately for
the record, graphically ifiustrates the capability of a VTS, wherein the components
of communications, surveillance, and competent people functioned ideally to avert
potential disaster. No one can say what would have happened had the downbound,
585 foot liquified petroleum gas (LPG) ship not been advised of the several other
deep draft vessels anchored in the narrow channel. The fact that the Houston Ship
Channel is in the heart of a heavily populated area containing dense chemical and
petroleum storage facilities greatly exacerbated the already hazardous situation.
It is possible that most, if not all, of the costs of establishing VTS Houston-
Galveston were recovered that night, in the form of loss of life and property that
was prevented.
Having first identified the needs of a port or waterway, and then the system
components necessary to provide the user services to meet those needs, the final
step in the management approach is to identify the specific engineering require-
ments to provide the capability desired. An evolutionary process has taken place
in this regard since initial vessel traffic services were procured in 1972 and 1973.
Originally, specific electronics equipment and services were selected by the Coast
Guard and procured through the applicable GSA Federal Supply Schedule Con-
tract. A review of this procedure by the General Accounting Office resulted in the
recommendation that the Coast Guard procure future systems using a detailed
work statement and competitive procurement. In writing a detailed work state-
ment, electronics equipment operating and design requirements are specified; but,
the specific equipments are left to the prospective bidder. Thus, the Coast Guard
seeks to define its electronics engineering needs in the form of specific operating
requirements.
In all candor, it should be noted that the Coast Guard has not meet with general
acceptance of its plans by the marine industry, which has been understandably
skeptical to date. Such is not the case in those areas that have actually been pro-
vided the user services of a VTS. The Port of Houston, in particular, has signifi-
cantly benefited from the Houston-Galveston Vessel Traffic Service, both in
hazards reduced and faciliation of marine commerce. In my opinion, there would
be substantial marine industry opposition to any proposal to withdraw those
services. I am just as confident that general industry acceptance will be gained
by each new VTS as each is given the opportunity to demonstrate its worth.
Thus far I have briefly described the history of VTS in the U.S. I have also
described the methodology we have used in selecting and designing systems for
specific ports. I have attached to my statement a brief chronological history and
description of existing or planned VTS in the following areas: San Francisco,
Puget Sound, Houston-Galveston, New York, New Orleans, and Prince William
Sound.
In the seven areas identified in the 1973 "Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report
as having a potential requirement for active vessel traffic management, five vessel
traffic services are currently operational or under construction. The remaining two
areas-Chesapeake Bay and the Gulf ICW-are stifi undergoing study by Coast
Guard planners in the Fifth and Eighth Coast Guard Districts respectively. Our
preliminary analysis of Chesapeake Bay indicates that a VTS for the entire bay
area may not be cost beneficial. We are looking at sectors of the bay area to
determine if VTS in these areas would be justified. In any event, we intend to hold
public hearings in both Maryland and Virginia to ensure that all interested parties
have an opportunity to comment on needs in the bay area. This will ensure that
the broadest based information will be considered by the Coast Guard before
any final decision on VTS in the Chesapeake Bay area is made. With respect to
the Gulf ICW, we expect to complete our detailed studies of costs versus benefits
during calendar year 1977.
At the present time, no other U.S. port or waterway is being actively considered
for establishment of a manned vessel traffic service. Nevertheless, the Coast
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Guard is pursuing a program of data collection and analysis for each area where
marine commerce is significant, so that we will be prepared to identify any future
needs as they develop. Further, we will be monitoring existing operations to assure
that they are, in fact, cost effective and are producing desired objectives. We will
also update these systems as necessary. Already we have developed a long-range
R&D plan looking towards improvements in future systems.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. I or my staff will be
happy to answer any questions that the Committee may have.
ATTACHMENT 1
SAN FRANCISCO VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
The first formal involvement of the Coast Guard in vessel traffic management
occurred in 1968, as planning began for an experimental harbor advisory radar
system in San Francisco, CA. San Francisco was selected as the site for this
initial research and development effort for several reasons:
(a) The bay had an established voluntary vessel movement reporting system
(VMRS) and an existing, well developed, communications system.
(b) The relatively high occurrence of fog allowed a more complete evaluation
of system benefits in facilitating vessel movement during low visibility.
(c) Traffic density was not high enough to require complex data collection
and analysis methods during the experiment.
(d) The bay presented several complex traffic patterns; the experience gained
could therefore be applied to similar areas in other ports. The Coast Guard
began operating the San Francisco Harbor Advisory Radar (HAR) Project on
an experimental basis in January 1970. Our original concept was to proceed
rather deliberately with the HAR experiment before trying to develop any fully
operational systems. The collision between two tankers beneath the Golden
Gate Bridge on 18 January 1971, with the resultant discharge of 800,000 gallons
of oil into San Francisco Bay, greatly accelerated our plans. On 22 August 1972
the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service assumed operational status. During
1973 a traffic separation scheme was instituted, the traffic center was expanded
and moved to Yerba Buena Island, and improved communications equipment was
placed in operation. Also, communications coverage was extended to the delta
region, and a vessel movement reporting system was instituted between Point
San Pablo and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. One radio frequency
has proven sufficient in San Francisco to handle all VTS communications.
VHF-FM channel 13 is now being used, but plans call for a shift to channel 12
as the primary VTS frequency in the near future. At present San Francisco VTS
is voluntary, but user participation and acceptance are excellent. Regulations to
require participation of certain classes of vessels are presently under review
within Coast Guard Headquarters, and will be the subject of public hearings
prior to implementation.
San Francisco VTS is manned by seven officers and 21 enlisted personnel.
Including all research and development work, the system cost $5.8 million to
establish; annual operating expenses are $780 thousand.
White statistically valid conclusions on the operational effectiveness of the
system cannot be drawn due to limited data, merchant vessel casualty statistics
for the first three years of operation are most encouraging. Although vessel
transits have been steadily increasing, the annual number of collisions has fallen
from 12.4 in the pre VTS period to 2.3 since San Francisco VTS was commissioned.
During the three year period of VTS operations there have been no deaths/injuries
or pollution incidents caused by vessel casualties, and the annual damages caused
by vessel casualties have dropped from $2.3 to $1.7 million.
No system changes or improvements are planned.
ATTAChMENT 2
PUGET SOUND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
In September 1972 the second U.S. vessel traffic service was established in
Puget Sound, WA. This area is made up of long, narrow, deep waterways, and is
subject to visibility of less than two miles more than 12% of the time. Large
numbers of commercial fishermen and recreational boating enthusiasts take
maximum advantage of the area's pristine environment.
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A fiscal year 72 appropriation of $1.0 million provided funds for the initial
system establishment. The vessel traffic center was constructed in Seattle and
a buoyed traffic separation scheme implemented in Puget Sound and adjacent
waters. Regulations requiring vessel participation went into effect in September
1974. Puget Sound VTS operated solely as a communications based vessel move-
ment reporting system until October 1975, when limited radar surveillance of
congested areas was added. This system augmentation was funded by a fiscal year
74 appropriation of $1.0 million. Puget Sound VTS operates on a single VHF-FM
communications channel. VHF-FM Channel 13 is presently being used, but a
shift to Channel 14 is planned within a year.
As the United States and Canada share common traffic management problems
in the boundary areas, close coordination has been maintained. In March 1975
a voluntary traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Juan de Fuca was jointly
implemented. In February 1976 technical agreement was reached on provisions
of a United States/Canada joint vessel traffic management agreement for boundary
waters.
The personnel complement for Puget Sound VTS is seven officers and 23 en-
listed men. The total establishment cost is $2.0 million, with annual operating
expenses of $830 thousand.
As with San Francisco, the casualty statistics have been favorable, if not con-
clusive, since the system assumed operations. The annual number of collisions
dropped from 3.5 to 1.0, and annual monetary damages from vessel casualties
have decreased from $800 thousand to $400 thousand. In the three years of
operations there have been no pollution incidents or deaths/injuries caused by
vessel casualties.
Two system modifications are under consideration for Puget Sound VTS. First,
the addition of radar coverage of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Rosario Strait is
needed to provide positive surveillance capabilities for effective implementation
of joint U.S./Canadian vessel traffic management in those waters. Secondly, the
present manual means of maintaining vessel position and status is proving in-
adequate in handling the more than 240 daily vessel transits which are actively
being managed by Puget Sound VTS. The addition of a computer based informa-
tion and display system is being studied.
ATTACHMENT 3
HOUSTON-GALVESTON VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
The Coast Guard's third VTS was established in the Houston-Galveston,
Texas, area in February 1975. The area includes Galveston Bay and entrance, a
section of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, Bolivar Roads, and the entire 1-louston
Ship Channel. The Houston Ship Channel is a narrow man-made channel with
many sharp bends and extends about 40 miles from Galveston Bay to the turning
basin in Houston. Annually, there are over 80,000 vessel transits carrying 82
miffion tons of cargo, over 60 percent of which is petroleum and chemical products.
The 1973 Coast Guard "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report ranked
Houston-Galveston third, behind only New York and New Orleans. An average
of 36 collisions, rammings, and groundings occur annually, causing an average
of three pollution incidents and $4.3 million in direct damage to vessels, cargo, and
property. It is estimated that the operation of the VTS will prevent 38 percent of
the collisions and 25 percent of all casualties and will produce direct monetary
benefits of over $1.0 million. Presently, this system incorporates a communications
based vessel movement reporting system, with surveillance of the four most critical
sections of the Houston Ship Channel provided by low light level, closed circuit
television. VHF-FM channel 12 is the single VTS operating frequency. Regula-
tions are now being drafted to make participation of certain categories of vessels
mandatory.
The manning complement of Houston-Galveston VTS is seven officers and 24
enlisted personnel. System additions for which contracts have been awarded
include radar surveillance of Galveston Bay and computer based information
and display system. The total system establishment cost of $2.8 million has been
funded by appropriations of $2.0 million in FY 73 and $800 thousand in FY 76.
Annual operating expenses are $890 thousand.
No further modifications or major system changes are planned.
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ATTACHMENT 4
NEW YORK VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
New York Harbor represents the greatest vessel traffic management challenge
in the United States. It is the country's largest port, handling the largest amount
of commerce, and has very high vessel density and complex traffic patterns. About
one half million vessel transits take place annually in greater New York Harbor.
In the 1973 Coast Guard "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report,
New York ranked No. 1 in priority for improved vessel traffic management serv-
ices. About 80 collisions, rammings, and groundings occur annually, causing
an average of six pollution incidents and $9.0 million in direct damages to vessels,
cargo and property. It is estimated that the operation of New York VTS will
prevent one half the collisions, about one third of all casualties and produce direct
monetary benefits of $2.4 million annually.
New York VTS is scheduled to start operations in July 1978. It will maintain
radar surveillance of the Upper and Lower Bays and television surveillance of six
critical areas in Arthur Kill, Kill van Kull and the East River. Computer based
automated techniques wifi be used to store, process and display vessel information
for traffic management functions. Due to the geographical size of the area and the
large number of vessels, New York VTS will be divided into five sectors, using
VHF-FM channels 11, 12 and 14 as operating frequencies.
The $7.3 million cost of system establishment has been funded by appropriations
of $4.2 million in FY 74 and $3.1 million in FY 77. Annual operating expenses are
estimated to be $1.21 million. The manning complement will be seven officers and
45 enlisted personnel.
ATTACHMENT 5
NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
New Orleans VTS will cover the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge to 15
miles seaward of the entrance, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and portions of
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, Harvey Canal, Algiers Canal, and the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal. Annually the Mississippi River in the vicinity of New
Orleans carries over 1.5 million tons of cargo, half of which is petroleum and
chemical products. Annual vessel transits exceed 150,000.
The 1973 Coast Guard "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report ranked
New Orleans second nationally in its need for improved vessel traffic management
services. In the last three years an annual average of 165 collisions, rammings, and
groundings has occurred, causing an average of $7.8 million in direct damage to
vessels, cargo and property. It is estimated that the operation of New Orleans VTS
will prevent over half of these casualties and produce $2.6M in direct monetary
benefits annually.
New Orleans VTS is being developed in phases, with initial operations sched-
uled to commence in July 1977. A vessel movement reporting system will utilize
three VHF-FM communications frequencies: Channels 11, 12, and 14. The oper-
ation of existing Corps of Engineers traffic lights at Governor Nicholls Wharf,
Gretna, and Westwego will also be incorporated in the VTS. We intend to operate
the system initially with voluntary participation. When we may issue regulations
requiring mandatory participation will depend upon our experience under volun-
tary operation.
In the second phase, tentatively scheduled for completion in mid 1979, low
light level, closed circuit television surveillance coverage of the Mississippi River
from mile 89 AHP to mile 112 AHP will be added. In a subsequent phase, radar
surveillance of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of the Head of Passes could
be added.
The total initial system cost of $3.9 million has been funded by appropriations
of $1.7 million in fiscal year 74 and $2.2 million in fiscal year 76. Annual oper-
ating expenses are estimated to be $1.04 million. New Orleans VTS will be manned
by seven officers and 40 enlisted personnel.
ATTACHMENT 6
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (P.L. 93-153) requires the Coast
Guard to establish a VTS for Prince William Sound and Valdez, AK. It is expected
that of the 17 daily transits of vessels subject to VTS, four will be tankers in the
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80,000 to 125,000 DWT range. Geographically, the area is comprised of deep,
open waterways surrounded by mountainous terrain. The only constrictions to
navigation are at Cape Hinchinbrook, the primary entrance to Prince Wffliam
Sound and at Valdez Narrows, the entrance to Port Valdez.
Annually, the area is subject to restricted visibility of less than two miles about
half the time, due to rain, fog, and snow.
Prince William Sound VTS, which is scheduled to assume operations in October
1977, will provide reliable communications coverage of Port Valdez, Prince
William Sound and 90 miles seaward of Cape Hinchinbrook, as well as high
resolution radar surveillance of Valdez Arm, Narrows, and Port Valdez. In addi-
tion, traffic separation schemes are being established in Prince William Sound
and its approaches.
Offshore tanker routing between Prince William Sound and West Coast ports
is under development. Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN-C) coverage of
such routes will provide accurate means for position determination for vessels to
maintain the charted tracks.
The $7.1 mfflion cost of establishing the system has been funded by appro-
priations of $2.36 mffiion in fiscal year 1975 and $4.74 million in fiscal year 1976.
Annual operating expenses are estimated to be $1.24 million.
The vessel traffic center will be located in Valdez, AK, as part of a Marine
Safety Office. Facilities will include a 65' tug, family quarters, and barracks
space. The total complement is 6 commissioned officers, 3 warrant officers, and
40 enlisted personnel.
No additional changes or modifications are anticipated.
ATTACHMENT 7
OTHER VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES
In addition to the six major vessel traffic services, the Coast Guard has estab-
lished two less extensive systems since passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act. Each of these systems was undertaken to remedy a particular hazardous
situation.
In 1973 a communications system was instituted in the vicinity of McAlpine
Dam on the Ohio River near Louisville, Ky. Louisville VTS is placed in operation
at those times when the flood stage at McAlpine Dam exceeds 13 feet, a condition
which causes strong outfall currents at the upstream approach to the canal en-
trance to the locks. During such times, it is hazardous for more than one tow to be
in the vicinity of the lock at the same time. The VTS coordinates the arrival of
tows at this approach, and maintains communications with the nearby railroad
drawbridge. Personnel who man the system intermittently are made available from
their regular tasks by the call up of reservists. Louisville VTS cost approximately
$12,000 to establish and $20,000 per year to operate.
Berwick Bay VTS was established in 1974 on the Atchafalaya River and Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway, in the vicinity of Morgan City, LA. Two bridges over the
Atchafalaya River at Berwick Bay make vessel navigation difficult, especially
during periods of high water and fast currents. Berwick Bay VTS is a communica-
tions based system. It operates full time to coordinate traffic flow to ensure that
vessels do not meet in proximity to the bridges. During periods of high water
additional limitations apply to vessel operation restricting the size and makeup of
tows. Berwick Bay YTS is manned by one officer and nine enlisted personnel.
System establishment cost was $24,000, and annual operating costs are $152,000.
ATTACHMENT 8
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
Collision of M/V Delta Norte and Tug Mississippian and subsequent grounding
of M/V Delta Norte on 10 July 1976, in the Houston Ship Channel, vicinity of
LT-51A
All vessels and tows underway during this incident were VTS participants. All
communications with the two vessels ~Delta Norte and Mississippian) other than
initial call were on Channel 12 and Channel 6.
Traffic summary at time of collision: Three inbound tows between HSC 25 and
26 and Redfish Bar and no inbound ships. Next expected arrival was M/V Hellenic
Sun (522' x 76' x 23') at 2300. There were six outbound ships at time of collision,
five more eventually came off dock. Four outbound tows below Morgan's Point.
All ships anchored between HSC LT-84 and Redfish, all tows pushed into the bank
on Redftsh Bar.
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ALL TIMES CDST
1950
VTC overheard that a collision occurred between the Lash Ship Delta Norte
(outbound from Barbours Cut to Sea) and the Tug Mississippian (outbound from
Ideal Cement to Bolivar, pushing 2 loaded, sand barges). The display showed the
Delta Norte in an overtaking situation with the Mississippian in the vicinity of
HSC LT-51A.
Informed COTP Galveston that a collision had occurred.
~952
The pilot aboard the Delta Norte informed VTC that he had collided and subse-
quently grounded the vessel. The channel was blocked by the ship and the pilot
indicated he was unable to maneuver. VTC inquired about casualties, and damage
to the vessel. The pilot indicated that there were no casualties, the Delta Norte
had suffered little damage during the collision but that the Tug Mississippian had
been holed. The watch inquired if tug assistance was requested. The pilot indicated
that no tug assistance was requested and that as soon as the tanks had been
sounded aboard the vessel that he would attempt to back off. This information was
passed to COTP Galveston. The watch was directed to inform all outbound traffic
below Morgan's Point and all inbound traffic above 1150 LB's 25 and 26.
1954
VTC alerted the Harbor Tug dispatcher in Galveston and Houston and told
them Harbor Tugs might be needed because of the size of the Delta Norte (893'
long, 101' wide and 32'8" draft).
1955
VTC finally succeeded in contacting the Tug Mississippian. The skipper said
he had been holed aft (barges were intact) and that none of his crew was hurt. He
had power and was proceeding to Bolivar. The watch asked if he needed pumps or
other assistance. The Mississippian said that he had pumps aboard and did not
require assistance.
1959
Delta Norte pilot advised VTC that the ship could not back off and that two
tugs had been ordered. COTP Galveston was notified. The pilot office and pilot
boat were notified.
2000
The outbound crude carrier Essi Flora (516' x 66' x 30') anchored two miles
above the Delta Norte.
2005
VTC notified COTP Galveston that VTC had closed the channel between
Redfish Bar and LB's 25 and 26. The watch commenced notifying traffic.
2009
The channel was closed. COTP Houston was notified and informed of traffic.
2031
Pilot of the Delta Norte and tows in area recommend one-way traffic. COTP
Galveston was notified and the channel was opened to one-way traffic. The
Delta Norte was informed by the watch that two harbor tugs had just left Baytown
(approximately 15 miles upchannel to assist the Delta Norte). COTP Galveston
directed (through the Center) that the Mississippian wait at Government
Moorings in Bolivar to be boarded by MIO personnel and that the Delta Norte
wait in Bolivar anchorage for boarding by MIO personnel.
2036
Commanding Officer VTS briefed on the incident, the action taken, and the
proposed course of action. He was subsequently informed of all major changes
in status.
2045
Pilot of the Delta Norte indicates that vessel is grounded in pipeline area. VTC
slide of area shows pipeline crossing above the position of the Delta Norte. The
watch requested to know if there were any visible signs of discharge from a pipe-
line. The Delta Norte replied that there were no apparent leaks. COTP Galveston
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was notified and the vessel was requested to cease attempting to back off until
the contents of the pipeline could be ascertained.
2048
Closed channel due to the jostling effect of passing vessels.
2104
COTP Galveston indicated that the Delta Norte could continue to back off,
if, in VTC opinion, the traffic situation required it.
Note.-Among the outbound traffic was the Trina Multina (LPG) (585' x 71'
x 23), the Essi Flora (516' x 6' x 30') (crude), the Multitank Westfalia (298' x 45'
x 21') (crude) and the Tuliahoma (585' x 80' x 34') (crude). The Esso Bahamas
(569' x 85' x 25') had just come off dock in Baytown loaded and two other Exxon
ships were scheduled to sail prior to midnight.
The Master of the Delta Norte had shifted cargo aft and pumped his forward
(water) peak tank raising the bow three feet. VTC advised the pilot he could
continue his attempts to back off and notified COTP Galveston of the action
taken.
Note.-A total of eleven outbound ships from Houston had been advised of
the traffic situation and requested to slow until the Delta Norte cleared. All even-
tually anchored in the channel between LT-84 and Redfish Bar.
2139
Delta Norte position and draft were finally obtained (bearings and ranges) and
passed to MIO Galveston.
2225
Pilots on-scene recommended one-way ship traffic in area due to lack of move-
ment on Delta Norte. COTP Galveston notified and one-way traffic outbound for
ships approved.
2234
Delta Norte backs off. Pilot indicates it will take him ten minutes or so tO get
straightened out in channel. Channel re-opened by COTP Galveston.
All ships notified of situation.
2247
Delta Norte is in irons and is unable to get straightened out. More tugs are
ordered. COTP Galveston notified and the channel is re-closed.
2305
Notified Exxon Baytown and recommended that their two large crude carriers
remain at berth until the Delta Norte clears. Exxon concurs.
VTC watch relieved.
2325
Relieved the watch with 13 ships anchored above M/V Delta Norte. Five tows
pushed in at Redfihs Reef and 14 twos in the vicinity of Galveston Freeport
cutoff Buoy #2 and HSC 25 and 26. Delta Norte hard aground with two tugs made
up alongside one tug enroute. Delta Norte reports no success with two tugs and is
waiting for the third and asked if we can round up more. Called G&H Towing
and put two tugs at Exxon Baytown on standby.
0226
M/V Delta Norte underway with tugs assisting.
0240
Delta Norte reports all systems functioning properly, opened channel to all
traffic. VTC coordinating participants, user cooperation excellent all passed
without further incident.
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, in here it has been, as I have
indicated in my statement in the historical background, we have been
about 20 years since we first initiated some form of vessel traffic
services. At least it has taken that length of time to gain acceptance
within the United States.
Other nations have had systems such as Liverpool and Rotterdam,
but we have come a long way, I feel, within the vessel traffic services
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in development, and we have come to the point now where I think
we are one of the leaders in the world in the development of hardware
and in the development of systems and management in vessel traffic
services.
iPart of my statement I listed the existing systems in the world,
including the one existing mandatory service in St. Mary's River
near Sault Sainte Marie. And in my statement I also indicated the
Coast Guard's history with the development of vessel traffic service
and, in particular, the analysis and methodology that we used in
developing the systems that we have today.
I have indicated the primary steps, Mr. Chairman, that were taken
to insure that we get an adequate system, and on what we base our
system.
First, for example, in determining whether or not there should be a
system, we try to identify the needs, the cost, the benefits and the
vessel traffic options of a port or waterway in the form of user services.
Second, we have identified the capability necessary to meet these
needs in the form of system components.
And, third, identify the specific engineering requirement necessary
to provide the capabilities required in the form of specific electronic
equipment.
I also indicated what points we considered in establishing criteria
and I also indicated what the steps we followed in insuring that we
meet these needs. And, finally, Mr. Chairman, at the summary of my
statement, I have included a fact sheet on each of the currently oper-
ating and planned VTS, vessel traffic services, within the United
States along with some budgetary data on each one.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one.brief summary statement.
In all candor, it should be noted that the Coast Guard has not met
with general acceptance of its plans by the marine industry, which
has been understandably skeptical to date. Such is not the case in
those areas that have actually been provided the user services of a
VTS. The Port of Houston, in particular, has significantly benefitted
from the Houston-Galveston vessel traffic service, both in hazards
reduced and facilitation of marine commerce.
In my opinion, there would be substantial marine industry opposi-
tion to any proposal to withdraw those services. I am just as confident
that general industry acceptance will be gained by each new VTS as
each is given the opportunity to demonstrate its worth.
Mr. Chairman, that, in a sense, is a brief summary of the statement,
and I and members of my staff will be pleased to answer any questions
at this time.
Mr. BIAGGI. I asked you to summarize briefly. I did not expect you
to do such an excellent job of such extensive material. We appreciate
that, but it leaves us up in the air to an extent.
My experience with vessel traffic service in the short time that I
have been involved with it is that in certain areas some people-in the
New York area specifically-are not so sure that the traffic up there
warrants such an extensive system.
Then we go to New Orleans where I have spoken to many operators
who indicate-and I am sure the gentleman from New Orleans, Mr.
Treen, will make more specific observation in reference to it-that
there is some conflict and an absence of cooperation, a lack of input
from the operators, insofar as vessel traffic service is concerned.
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As a matter of fact, to be very specific, they came there "raising
hell." We had hearings, and we were left with the impression that
there was a lack of cooperation. Apparently that is not exactly the
fact.
I have been all over New York Harbor. That is where I come from.
And I did not see any extreme traffic problems in those areas.
I know that the industry gets along quite well with the Coast Guard,
and with Admiral Rea, but some of them were quite candid with me,
and I get the notion that vessel traffic service should be reserved for
traffic conditions in congested areas. In Philadelphia we had an over-
sight flight there, and we must have hit the quietest time of the day,
because there was literally no traffic at that point.
What occurs to me is that this is a system that was conjured up as
an ideal objective just for the sake of having a perfect situation,
whether it is justified or not.
Are we getting a dollar returned for a dollar spent?
You put a traffic cop where there is traffic, not in an intersection
where there is none. That, I think, is the crux of it.
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I think what we have based all
of our vessel traffic systems upon, is an analysis of each of the ports
wherein we have put a system.
First, we did do a rather extensive analysis, and the study which
we call the Vessel Traffic Services and Analysis of Port Needs, which
I believe the committee has already seen.
In this we have studied the needs of each port, we have studied the
casualty data of each port, and it was based upon these factors, among
others, in which we determine whether or not there was a need for a
system in each of these ports.
In the process of doing this analysis, one of the factors is to insure
that we are getting a favorable cost benefit for any moneys which we
expend in these systems, and I believe in each instance wherein we
have put a system that we have established that there is a clear cost
benefit for these systems.
With respect to the point you make, Mr. Chairman, concerning an
ideal system, or a need for a system with respect to traffic control,
the type of systems which we envision are not positive, all encompass-
ing systems, similar to, say what the FAA has within their air traffic
control systems, where they are positively controlling the actual course,
speed, height of a plane.
We have no such similar thoughts that these will be applicable to
the marine mode.
Essentially what our system will be, and essentially what our sys-
tems are really, is where we are providing advice to mariners in these
areas, so that the mariner is aware of the possible and potential haz-
ards which he faces as he navigates along the waterway.
We will not be a positive control system. We will essentially be an
advisory system, telling the mariner what is ahead of him.
Mr. BIAGGI. I got the notion that you do advise him, but he is also
required to react to the advice in a manner conforming with your
concept of proper response.
Admiral FUGARO. If the particular watch supervisor at a vessel
traffic service determines that a specific action is necessary, for ex-
ample, that a vessel should not proceed beyond a certain point, that
a vessel should slow down before reaching a certain bend, in order to
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avoid meeting a certain vessel at the bend, that sort of service by the
watch supervisor will then be transmitted to the participant in vessel
traffic service.
If the system is mandatory, and if the marine operator feels that
he cannot, for some reason, obey the particular control advice that
was given to him, he under the regulations has the privilege and
option to take any action that he deems necessary for the safety of
his vessel.
Initially, Mr. Chairman, such as in Houston, and such as is con-
templated in New Orleans, these systems are voluntary systems,
there is no mandatory requirement in these systems. Nor is there
any mandatory requirement that the watch supervisor will control
these vessels, as we were talking about a minute ago, to steer this way,
or to steer that way. That is not contemplated in the system.
Mr. BIAGGI. There is one question, one area that I think we should
get cleared away.
My experience has been that no matter what I say, after each one
of the conferences that I have had with the representatives of the Coast
Guard, nothing changes.
Recently the Coast Guard published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking concerning New Orleans vessel traffic service.
Can you tell the committee exactly where we are with regard to
that advance notice, and when the proposed rules are expected?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, we issued that advance notice of
proposed rulemaking, I believe on the 9th of June. We extended the
deadline for comment once until-extended through to the third
of September this year, and we have received quite a few comments
concerning those proposed-advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.
Our present thinking at this time, Mr. Chairman, is that until
such time as we make the system mandatory, there is a question as
to whether or not we will have to come out with the proposed regu-
lations, stemming from that advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.
If the system becomes voluntary, as we currently anticipate,
we will not need to put out proposed rule makinguntil such time that
we decide that there is a need to go mandatory under the system.
So at this time I cannot give a prognosis for when we intend to go
out with proposed rulemaking.
In my statement, in attachment No. 5, concerning the New Orleans
system, you will note in there, sir, at the bottom of that first page,
I do refer to the fact that the system will be voluntary, and when
we may issue the regulations concerning mandatory operation will
depend upon our experience under a voluntary operation system.
Mr. BIAGGI. For the record, to refresh my memory, can you give me
the detailed process, from the very beginning to the conclusion of
the whole rulemaking and who participates?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I think I would prefer, if it is
agreeable with you, to submit this for the record. I think that would be
a rather lengthy response, and I would have to check quite a few
records to determine-as you mentioned earlier in your statement,
I did take over in June in this office, and in order to adequately answer
this question, I feel I would have to do a little research to answer
that question.
Mr. BIAGGI. You may submit that for the record, but let me give
you my thinking.
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[The following was received for the record:]
VTS RULEMAKING
The Administrative Procedure Act, as it relates to VTS rulemaking, affords
interested parties opportunity to review proposed actions and to submit recom-
mendations, pro and con, during the development process. Section 104 of the
PWSA requires that in preparing proposed regulations "adequate opportunity
for consultation and comment to State and local governments, representatives of
the marine industry, port and harbor authorities, environmental groups and
other interested parties" be provided. While there is no specific requirement to
hold public hearings on proposed rulemaking, it is the Coast Guard's policy to
be as open as possible in the development of any regulatory package relating to
vessel traffic services. We value the views of any interested party.
Consultation is accomplished by one or more of several means: through in-
formal meetings with interested individuals or groups; through a formal industry
advisory committee; and, through the process of an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM), as was done in the case of VTS New Orleans.
Upon completion of the initial consultation process, the proposed regulations
are published in the Federal Register as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The
Coast Guard customarily holds public hearings in connection with all proposed
VTS regulations. We also allow at least a 45-day comment period.
All documents received by the Coast Guard are available for public examina-
tion in Coast Guard Headquarters. At the end of the comment period, the Coast
Guard evaluates all responses and may revise the regulations in light of the
comments received. If there are recommendations in the comments that the
Coast Guard feels have merit, but need further consideration and additional
input from the public, the Coast Guard may issue a Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking to solicit comments on the proposals not included in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Again, the Coast Guard allows a 45-day com-
ment period and all documents received are available for public examination in
Coast Guard I-Ieadquarters. Another period of review, consideration and evalua-
tion follows the comment deadline. The regulations are then published in the
Federal Register as final rules.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. These thoughts are shared by many people in the
industry.
The Coast Guard gets a notion that an area requires attention,
rightly or wrongly, and then it proceeds to promulgate some rules, and
the input from the industry is either limited or invited late so that in
fact nothing really changes, and even when it is introduced, the
contention is it is done more for appearance than effect.
I would like to believe that if we are going to have a process it
must be meaningful, and there must be substantial participation, and
participation that is to be recognized.
Now, that is not intended to mean that if industry submits some-
thing, the Coast Guard must submit itself to the industry's judgment.
What we are asking the Coast Guard to do is to give serious con-
sideration to it, so that there can be accommodation where possible.
I have had any number of complaints from industry in various areas
that the rulemaking process is perfunctory, and unilateral, and I
would like you to know that the Chair does not think that is a valid
process.
Of course, I would expect the Coast Guard to respond and say that
it is not the fact-but obviously there is something awry in the
process.
I am not satisfied as to a full democratic process in the sense that
we intend it to be. That is why I asked for detailed record of the
process.
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As you do it, be aware where the industry comes in, at what stage of
the game, has the regulation been that far developed, so that any
input will have little or no effect?
Have the minds been set so that there will be resistance to any
suggestion?
This is a matter of human frailty, if you will, to be sufficiently
conversant with agencies, and institutional conduct, to know that it is
a potential danger in consideration of rules and regulations.
Admiral FIIGARO. Mr. Chairman, as 1 said, I would like to submit
a reply for the record.
I would, however, at this time like to support you in the fact, that I
agree that if the process is to be meaningful, that there must be two-
way communication, and then the Coast Guard cannot operate
unilaterally and hope to be meeting the needs of this two-way com-
munication.
I would also indicate to you at this time that I have discussed the
vessel traffic service, and the proposed rules which we are contemplat-
ing here today, in great detail, with both the commandant and vice
commandant of the Coast Guard. Without any doubt, I can support
that any process which we go through must be meaningful, and that
we must consider the needs of the industry which we are regulating.
I would, without equivocation, assure you that this is the intention
of the commandant, and certainly which I will follow, too.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you for your response.
To get back to the advance notice, can you tell me what the main
substance of the comments on the advance notice were?
Admiral FUGARO. Essentially, Mr. Chairman, I think the main
thrust of the comments received were that many people did not feel
that the system was necessary. They were actually questioning some
of the elements and components of the system as opposed to com-
menting upon the individual regulations which were indicated in that
advance notice.
There were some very pertinent comments which were made by
people concerning items such as the distance going down, I believe it
was the Southwest Pass, where there should be clearance before
another vessel enters the pass. There was some question about we
had indicated, where a vessel must have sufficient horsepower when
towing. These, of course, were rather general statements and needed
to be clarified. And I would agree we do need to look at them. They
were not simply specific enough.
I do have some-in my papers here some other comments which
were made, and if I could just have about 30 seconds to look through
them, maybe I could give you a better response to that question.
One of the complaints, Mr. Chairman, was the fact that we had
based our system on old statistics and we did not consider bridge-to-
bridge and operator-license requirements.
Actually, while the initial study I referred to earlier was based upon
statistics back at the time of the study, analysis which was done
subsequent to the bridge-to-bridge regulations indicated that there is
even more favorable cost-to-benefit ratio in proceeding with the
system, particularly in the New Orleans area.
As I mentioned before, there was some complaint about the com-
ponents of the system. People felt that they should get into the
actual planning for the hardware of the systems.
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200
I submit that this would be rather difficult to do through a corn-
mittee, and that the Coast Guard, through this analysis process, had
done the best work we could in determining what specific equipment
would be needed to perform the type of system which we envisioned.
Again going back to this advisory type system with surveillance
being a key factor to the system, as well as communication being a
key factor to the system, I think we have responded to these and will
respond if and when we do put out a proposed rulemaking.
Mr. BIAGGI. Do you believe that the communications system, as
proposed for the New Orleans area, is adequate, particularly in con-
nection with the available channels for use in different sectors?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do, and with your per-
mission, sir, I have got a chart up here on the left, and I would like
Commander Hickey, who is the project officer on vessel traffic serv-
ices, to give you a very, very brief description, particularly at this
point, of what is entailed in the system and what we envision with
the communication work, with your permission, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Certainly.
Commander HICKEY. Mr. Chairman (referring to a display of the
geographic area) in order to get the entire area of coverage on one
display, we had to break the chart down. So these dashed lines will
show where they connect and where it ends here. And it again starts
here.
The system itself will start at the Gulf of Mexico, and the equip-
ment that we have purchased, that we have awarded the contract for,
will be delivered in June, gives us the capability to operate all the
way up to mile 243 in Baton Rouge.
The communications are broken into four sectors. We will use three
VHF-FM freQuencies. That is channels 11, 12 and 14.
The first sector, which comes all the way up through the Passes
to just before you get into the downtown New Orleans area, will be
on one sector frequency.
When you get into the downtown New Orleans area, there is a
change to another VHF-FM sector frequency. There will be another
operator at the traffic center who will be coordinating vessel move-
ments in that particular sector.
When you leave that area, you are in sector 3, and there is a third
sector frequency there. When you get up into sector 4, we repeat
the sector frequency we had in sector 2.
We designed the system from an engineering standpoint to physi-
cally separate our transceiver sites, our antennas, so that we feel that
we will not have mutual interference from communications that are
sent out from the antenna down in New Orleans and the area up
in the vicinity of Baton Rouge.
There is sufficient geographical distance between the two so that
there will not be mutual mterference.
Also, in VHF-FM communications there is a "capture effect."
Technically that just means that when an antenna receives a signal
more than twice as powerful as another signal, the receiver will be
captured.
So the only thing the receiver will hear is the strongest signal.
During a silent period we may get communication from the Corps of
Engineers lock up in the Algiers area, but as soon as a vessel in the
vicinity of our antenna transmits to us, his signal will capture our
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receiver so we will only hear him. The converse is true when we trans-
mit from this local site down here, which will capture the receivers
of all the vessels in its vicinity.
We have taken action through the Federal Communications Com-
mission to reserve these sector frequencies for Coast Guard use in
the vessel traffic service sectors. The licenses of the limited stations
that are licensed to be on these frequencies at the present time will
not be renewed. So there will be no new users on these frequencies.
At the most, at the end of 5 years, there will be nothing except the
Coast Guard and vessels participating with the Coast Guard in these
sectors. Thus, we feel that we do have dedicated frequencies, and
that we can adjust the "loading"-or the number of vessels that
have to communicate with us-by changing the regulations or the
operating manual to determine what size vessels we require to par-
ticipate. We can narrow the scope of the regulations down to where
we have sufficient time available in a 60-minute period to handle all
the communications that we feel are necessary to get the information
from the vessels to us, and to be able to turn around and take this
information, convert it into something useful, and give it back out
to the user. That is really the objective of the service. It cannot be a
one-way system.
In addition to the four sectors, we also have surveillance of sector
2-basically the whole area from mile 89 to mile 112.
We estimate it will take about four locations, four separate camera
sites to give the sector 2 operator in the traffic center the ability to
actually see what is happening on the river.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is sector 2 the most highly congested area?
Commander HICKEY. Yes, sir; that is the most highly congested
area. The cameras will be low-light level, which means they will
have nighttime availability, and infrared illumination capability, so
that they can illuminate the vessel close to them without hindering
the night vision of the pilot. He will not be able to see the light.
We have a system that will be the optimum surveillance system
for about 97 percent of the time. The only time it will not be effective
is during periods of low visibility. When it is low visibility the traffic
tends not to move.
We feel that we have designed a surveillance system that is the
optimum for the area. Later we would hope to add radar surveillance
to encompass the Piottown area, including the general anchorage
here. They experience a higher frequency of reduced visibility in this
area, and we feel radar would be more applicable there.
That encompasses our plans for the present time.
We have no budgetary request for radar in at the present time.
Mr. BIAGGI. What happens to the radar?
Commander HICKEY. We have specified in our requirement to the
contractor that we have 99.9 percent reliability; 99.9 percent reliability
is provided with redundant equipment. In all sites we have redundant
transceivers; we have diverse communication paths, so that if a micro-
wave link is interrupted we have an alternate path.
We do not feel that communications or radio failure will be a failure
on our part. It is possible on the vessel's part, in which case we go to
dead reckoning the vessel to where he can contact us.
Mr. BIAGGI. How would you contemplate the use of radar?
Commander HICKEY. We would contemplate the use of radar in
the Head of Passes, in the Pilot Town area, possibly as far north as
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Venice. It would give us a 24-mile coverage from the site, both up and
down river.
Mr. BIAGGI. Is all the information you get out of the systems run
through a computer?
Commander HICKEY. Yes, sir, the computer is just simply a method
for the operator to keep track of the information that he has.
He takes the information from the vessels on the radio, and enters
it into the computer. The computer will keep track of the information
for him. He will have a synthetic display upon which he can call up
information that he needs for the various sectors of his operation.
The computer will also generate a look ahead capability. It will be
able to take the information as to the location and speed of the vessel,
and predict the encounters that the vessel will have during its transit,
Of course, that is the real service that we are attempting to provide,
to tell the user who he may expect to encounter over the next period of
time, say 15 minutes or half an hour; at what interval he will en-
counter them; and who they are, so that he can then arrange for safe
passage on channel 13, which is the vessel bridge-to-bridge radio tele-
phone frequency.
It is to enable the vessel operator to contact other vessels.
Mr. BIAGGI. You have radar in one area and you do not have it in
other areas. How accurate would the information you receive from
other areas be, as contrasted to that where you have radar?
Commander HICKEY. Well, in the television area, the information
will be just about as accurate, because the operator will be able to
observe what is happening, and he will have geographic reference
points on the shoreline to correlate with the position of the vessel.
In the areas where we have no surveillance at all, our confidence
level is lower. It is directly proportional to the information that we get
from the mariner.
If he says he is at mile 73, then we enter that he is at mile 73. If he
says that he is making 5 miles an hour, then we enter into the computer
5 miles an hour, until the information is verified or updated.
At any time we can call the vessel and ask him where he is.
If he now, in 15 minutes, says he is at mile 82, we enter that into the
computer and we can calculate how fast he is actually moving.
Mr. BIAGGI. I get the impression that where you have television
and radar, they would be more critical areas?
Commander HIcKEY. That is correct. Our casualty analysis shows
that it is the Pilot Town area, and the downtown New Orleans area
where we feel we cannot operate without some form of surveillance.
However, we do not feel that it is that critical in the other areas
that we can justify surveillance. Surveillance over long distances such
as we have here is very expensive.
The microwave relay of the information is very expensive.
Mr. BIAGGI. In light of the disparity, the difference in the critical
nature of the different sectors, have you contemplated the possibility
of phasing in the system sector by sector?
Commander HICKEY. In effect, sir, that is what we have done. We
have phased in the surveillance. We did not intend to phase in the
surveillance in the sector of operations in Algiers in section 2.
The original project that we considered included surveillance. How-
ever, surveillance was separated for administrative purposes, and the
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item was because we were not ready to operate the system as originally
scheduled.
As far as implementing the entire system, we feel that surveillance
gives us an incremental benefit, but we do have some benefit on our
ability to communicate with the vessels and keep track of them on
the computer.
Therefore, we have not phased in the communications part of it.
We felt that we could start operations from the Gulf of Mexico to
mile 243, based solely on the information that we get from the radio,
and still prevent enough casualties to make it cost effective.
Mr. BIAGrn. One last question.
Does the Coast Guard contemplate engaging any new employees
or advisors to inform them of the local peculiarities of an operation in
these various areas?
Admiral FIJGARO. Mr. Chairman, we are considering the hiring of
local advisors. We are definitely considering the use of pilots for the
traffic lights within the sector 2 zone at Algiers point, which the com-
mander is pointing to now, and as we have done in other areas, we do
intend to train our people before we put them as a sector watch.
And in this regard, yes, sir, we do anticipate that there will be local
training and by locally qualified people.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much.
Mr. Treen.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have not had a chance to read your full statement, Admiral, which
I would like to have done prior to getting into this questioning. That
would have helped me be a little more orderly in my questions, so I
will probably be all over the subject because I have not had the time
to correlate my questions with your statement.
You made reference to the system being voluntary. In your state-
ment, on page 10, you say "While participation by vessels is currently
voluntary in all VTS areas other than Fuget Sound and Berwick Bay,
the Coast Guard is considering issuing Federal regulations to require
participation by vessels in every VTS."
When do you expect to move from a voluntary to a mandatory
participation?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Treen, that will depend on each system.
Mr. TREEN. Let us talk about New Orleans.
I will base my questions on New Orleans.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Thank you.
I would anticipate that we would have at least a 6-month period of
voluntary operation and, in all probability, a lot longer than a 6-month
period of operation of the systems before we considered going into a
mandatory system.
We would use experience that would have a port such as Houston,
which is perhaps similar to New Orleans, as opposed to San Francisco
or the Puget Sound system, where we would try to achieve a high
level of voluntary participation before we went into or considered
going into a mandatory system.
At the current time, in Houston, we are achieving something like a
99-percent participation rate, and we are considering that once having
achieved that high level that we should perhaps take the final step
and make the system mandatory so that everybody participates in
the system since, obviously the majority of operators are participating.
7S-280-76----14
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This is what we anticipate in New Orleans. There is no plan right
now to require that this, a 3-month or 6-month period, that we will
go mandatory in the New Orleans system, but rather wait and gain
the experience and determine when we should progress further.
Mr. TREEN. Would you compare Houston and New Orleans in the
types of vessels?
I am not that familiar with it, but is Houston a port that has much
larger proportion of deep draft vessels, oceangoing vessels as opposed
to tugs and tows?
Admiral FUGARO. I think Houston has more. I say that in the sense
that while the percentage may vary, but I believe the two ports are
very comparable. They both have deep draft vessels plus quite a bit
of barge operations, plus quite a bit of petroleum products being
shipped. I think Houston is more analogous to New Orleans than any
other system we operate around the country.
Mr. TREEN. And you had 99-percent participation under voluntary
participation?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. And you expect that you will get 99-percent participa-
tion in New Orleans as well?
Admiral FUGARO. We would hope so, yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Well, assuming you do, and you have 1 percent that
do not cooperate. How do you manage this with 1 percent of the vessels
not participating, not reporting, and you presumably then are unable
to communicate?
What do you do when, as you indicate in your statement, you have
to take over management of the traffic and issue directives and you
have even the 1 percent not participating?
Admiral FUGARO. Where we do not have full participation, we
would hope that when we got the surveillance system going, that we
would be able to communicate this information by looking through
the surveillance system and finding out what else is on the river system.
Mr. TREEN. What kind of system are you talking about, radar or
television?
Admiral FUGARO. I am talking about television, which is primarily
the system in Houston, and which we would use in sector 2 of the
New Orleans system. This would provide us visual, whether or not
they are voluntarily participating in the system.
We would also hope that through the communications system that
we would be getting feedback from other participator vessels on those
vessels nonparticipating.
Mr. TREEN. Well, I do not believe I know enough about the tech-
nology-I am certain I do not know enough about the technology.
But I wonder how a vessel that is participating will be able to
visually determine that another vessel out there is not participating?
Admiral FUGARO. We would already advise the vessels based upon
the system input, and based upon the automated vessel reporting
system, by computer, which Commander Hickey referred to, what
that vessel could anticipate.
We would assume that if the vessel ran into unanticipated traffic
that was not participating in the system, which was not in the com-
puter, that they would advise us of the fact that they passed or came
upon a different vessel.
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Mr. TREEN. In your proposed regulations, only when a vessel
expects its estimated time of arrival at the reporting point to be more
than 10 minutes off, must it then report back in.
That leaves a pretty wide margin, it seems to me, considering
that you have estimated some 740 transits through the system per
day.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. In a congested area that would be appreciably higher.
If you got variations of 5, 6, or 7, 8 to 9 minutes which did not have to
be reported, it seems to me that in that period of time, you are talking
about a lot of vessel confrontations.
For a vessel that is participating to be able to identify vessels that
are not participating, given that degree of unreported variation,
presents a question to me as to the effectiveness of the system.
I am not now arguing for mandatory participation-I am just
raising a question as to how you can have it voluntary, which would
mean partial participation and partial nonparticipation, given some
of these variables in reporting that you now have in your system.
In other words, a vessel arrives at a reporting point 9 minutes off
frOm what it estimated before, and it has not reported back in to you
because it is not a 10-minute variation. So that vessel is going to be
confronting traffic that you did not anticipate, because that vessel
arrived there 9 minutes off.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; I follow your question.
The requirements which were put forth in the rules, of rulemaking,
were just that, proposed rules. We would hope that before we develop
a final operator's manual for this system that we will have gotten
sufficient input and feedback from the operators to be assured that
they will come forward with a more realistic and effective system.
I appreciate what you are saying, the fact that someone who is 9
minutes late, he will be encountering traffic, or 9 minutes earlier that
he will be encountering traffic that the computer might not have
already given him.
We would hope that nothing would preclude operators from re-
porting into the system at any time. Depending upon the usefulness
of the information, we would hope that the mariners would call upon
the system as their positions change. There are several checkpoints
which are required to check in.
Mr. TREEN. Well, I hope they can get through if they desire to
participate more than required by the regulations. I am concerned
about that.
One of the other persons who will be testifying before us has
furnished us certain data, and we also have had counsel of this com-
mittee prepare some data which raises some questions about the
amount of radio traffic one might have.
I think you have assumed, as I mentioned before, 740 daily vessel
transits through the entire system, and you are going to have three
VTS frequencies, and there are about 9 to 10 routine reports per
vessel, so that the average vessel will have about 6 minutes to es-
tablish contact and will probably have a maximum of 36 in each
port. And it seems to me a very short period of time.
We are probably going to have more transits than you anticipate
here.
PAGENO="0210"
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This is based upon a study of a couple of years ago, is it not? I
am not certain. Then you have a spacing problem. This assumes
that all of these reports are going to come into the VTC, spaced out
in an idealistic way. The ideal of the point of management will
probably not happen.
Then, of course, as you mentioned you have the competition by
Corps of Engineers and other licensed users.
I understand what you are saying, Commander, about FCC
agreeing not to issue licenses over 5 years. But, of course, you do
have that problem in the meantime, and you do have the problem
of the Corps of Engineers. And I will ask you to respond in a minute,
but I will add one other concern, and that is that-the concern that
in the pilothouse of a small vessel, where you have got the monitoring
now of house channel, and then channels 16 and 13, and then they
have to add one of these three channels, depending upon which of the
three, four sectors they are in.
You have to four channels in a pilothouse, pretty noisy situation,
I would imagine. They, with the requirement they report in, as I
say, 9 or 10 times, the transit and maybe more if the ETA-well,
no, I do not think-I do not think that increases the number if the
ETA is off 10 minutes. But 9 or 10 reports by the mariner who is
monitoring 4 channels raises lots of questions.
I have been all over the map on that, I would appreciate your
response, particularly to the question of how we are going to manage
all of these reports going into the vessel traffic centers.
Do we have enough time, considering the number of transits?
Admiral FUGARO. The placement of the communications system
in the sector was based upon these various transits. As we have in-
dicated, we will have four sectors and we will have four sector op-
erators taking each of these messages.
You indicate that there will only be 30 seconds per report. Hope-
fully, 30 seconds would be an extremely long report.
We anticipate that most of the information will be transmitted
in a very quick fashion. That it will not be necessary to make that
long report each time that they are reporting in.
We have has this experience, as I mentioned, in other traffic services
that were run. They do not have to feed in the entire information each
time they are reporting in. Sometimes they just have to give their
name and the fact that they are passing a certain checkpoint which
could be just a matter of a couple of seconds.
Mr. TREEN. The minimum under your regulations would be named
the vessel, position, type of passing, next reporting point, and ETA
reporting point. Those are the five things required?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; I would anticipate that as long as the
vessel is making that report, it can come across very quickly in just a
matter of a few seconds.
Mr. TREEN. How about the spacing problem?
If the particular channel is in use in one of your sectors by a vessel
reporting in from VTC, that precludes any other user at that particular
time from using it, does it not?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. You can only get one report in a given period of time?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
PAGENO="0211"
207
Mr. TREEN. In your most crowded sector, adjacent to New Orleans,
I am concerned about the operator getting through in time when he
passes his reported point.
Has there been a study of the kind of traffic flow study to determine
whether it is realistic to expect that with 740 transits that the fre-
quency channels will be open enough for these reports to get in reason-
ably on time?
Admiral FUGARO. The preliminary analysis, we do believe that there
will be sufficient time to make these reports.
Again the initial operation of the system is to help us gain further
experience within the particular area. In the case, again referring
back to Houston, we seem to have enough time to make the communi-
cations and receive and transmit the communications if necessary.
I would anticipate that if the demand upon communication system
became too great, particularly within the sector 2 of the New Orleans
area, we would have to review that and determine whether we need to
further split up that system or to eliminate the need for certain vessels
reporting into the system.
Mr. TREEN. Well, I hope the other witnesses will address themselves
to this. I think this is one of the major problem areas, as I see it.
Could you give us, on a fiscal year basis, what the costs are in par-
ticipating in a program, in implementing your program as you further
anticipate it?
Admiral FUGARO. Within the New Orleans system, sir?
Mr. TREEN. Yes, within the New Orleans system, sir.
Admiral FUGARO. In phase-
Mr. TREEN. Capital costs and operating costs if you have it broken
down.
Admiral FUGARO. We have indicated the total initial in attachment
5, the last paragraph refers to the total initial system cost is $3.9
million, which has been funded by appropriations of $1.7 million in
fiscal year 1974 and $2.2 million in fiscal year 1976.
It anticipates that the annual operating expenses for New Orleans
will be $1.04 million.
Mr. TREEN. That is for what kind of system, including what kind
of mechanisms?
Admira' FUGARO. That will be for the automated movement
vessel system. The computerized systems with communication links
that we referred to.
It will not include the television.
Mr. TREEN. It will include some radar?
Admiral FUGARO. NO, sir, not at that point.
Mr. TREEN. No radar and no television?
Admiral FUGARO. That is right.
Mr. TREEN. Would radar be the next step?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir.
The first step would be the computerized movement reports system
with the communication link.
Mr. TREEN. These figures would be the same, all mandatory?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
The second step will then be the installation of the low light level
closed-circuit television within sector 2, within the New Orleans
system.
PAGENO="0212"
208
Mr. TREEN. That is in three locations?
Admiral FUGARO. Well, we anticipate it will probably cover four
locations within sector 2. However, we will not be putting out an end
requirement for a specific number of televisions.
What we will be putting out is a bid with operating requirements.
That is, we will determine what area we want of visual determination,
visual detection of vessels, and then let the bidders come in and
determine how they can best meet the operating requirement.
Mr. TREEN. Can you give me an estimate of that cost?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
We are estimating that we will have about $1 million-$1 million
for cost for the closed-circuit television.
Mr. TREEN. That is the outlay?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
We are anticipating that that will be within the 1978 budget.
Mr. TREEN. All right.
Now, the radar addition?
Admiral FUGARO. The radar, currently we are planning this for
fiscal year 1979, and we are anticipating that this will cost $1.5
million. That will be, as Commander Hickey mentioned, down in the
Pilot-town area.
I would also like to make one qualification.
These, of course, are all Coast Guard present plans, and all of these
figures will be subject to other budgetary considerations throughout
future budgetary cycles.
Mr. TREEN. Now, how about additions to personnel required as
you move in these new phases?
Admiral FUGARO. I do not think we will have much additional
personnel requirements.
Based upon our experience in Houston, this will just be an adjunct
and aid to the existing personnel in the system.
The one system operator will also have the television. Once we in-
stall the television, that will be a visual presentation that will be an
adjunct and aid rather than requiring a separate operator.
Now, with the radar, of course, we will have the feedback again
back to the centralized vessel traffic center, which will be up in the
New Orleans area.
Mr. TREEN. And for $1 million in equipment, you expect to have
television surveillance of that entire congested area in downtown
New Orleans?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. In terms of the length of the river, what are we talking
about, sir?
Admiral FUGARO. We are talking about mile 89 to mile 112, sir.
So it is 23 miles.
Mr. TREEN. With four television locations?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, that is our present estimate, that we
will need four television sets.
Mr. TREEN. IDo these receivers rotate so that they are sweeping?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, they sweep. Also you can change the
lenses on these, to get a zoom effect, to narrow in. It will also have
infrared, so that even at nighttime we will be able to see and actually
pick out the names of the vessels.
PAGENO="0213"
209
Mr. TREEN. And those camera or receivers are operated from the
VTC?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, with a switch the operator can move the
television camera around to see wherever he wants to see.
Mr. TREEN. I have to say, aside from the question of the effective-
ness of that, I am a little amazed that we can, for $1 million, get 23
miles of television surveillance.
I will be interested in seeing how that develops.
Admiral FUGARO. A lot of these estimates, Mr. Treen, are based
upon the experience that we have had in other places, in installing
them.
Mr. TREEN. I understand. I do not know a great deal about the
technology, but I am surprised at that.
.111 your statement on page three, Admiral, you referred to demon-
stration projects in New York. You talk about a Coast Guard system
known as ratan-Radio Television Aid to Navigation-and you say,
"Technical problems led to a termination of this demonstration,
although the concept may possibly have future application."
Just briefly, what was that? Radio television aid to navigation?
Admiral FUGARO. This was a system in which a radar transmitter
was installed which showed a radar picture of the harbor. Then a
television camera took a picture of this scope, and transmitted this
picture over a television frequency. With the installation of a television
aboard a vessel, an operator would see a centralized radarscope from
the vessel traffic center.
Mr. TREEN. Now, that is not what you are talking about doing
here?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. We are talking about visual surveillance
by television, and the radar we are talking about will be centralized
radar in the area where we indicated, Pilottown, which will have a
range of approximately 24 miles, both up and down the river.
Mr. TREEN. Let me ask you a question about this training that
you propose for your personnel.
How do you propose to do that, and for how long a tour of duty do
you expect for personnel, once they have been trained, to remain in a
vessel traffic system in a given area?
Admiral FUGARO. Well-
Mr. TREEN. Would the regular rotation apply?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, initially we anticipate that that will
be military people, and rotated in the normal tours of duty.
We would anticipate a 3-year tour for these people, and we will of
course, be rotating them.
In other words, they will not all be coming on the scene 1 day, or
1 month, or year. So there will be a movement through these operators
to insure that we have qualified operators at all times, and a cadre at
all times that will assist in the training.
As to initial training, as I mentioned before, we will have set up
training programs in the area. Also we will call upon local, knowledge-
able personnel, including pilots, to assist us in this training.
Mr. TREEN. Do you expect the personnel to actually gain firsthand
experience by going on vessels, all the various types that will be-
Admiral FUGARO. That will be part of our training. We already
indicated, I think, we anticipate that it is part of the ongoing training
PAGENO="0214"
210
that the people should have. Even though they are in the system, and
already operating, that it will help them to go out and take a look at
the other side. We intend to get them aboard vessels that are using the
system, so they get a better feel of what it looks like from the other
side.
Mr. TREEN. You do anticipate being on the vessels that will be
using the system?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Getting them trained?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Let me get to a kind of basic question here.
What are we trying to do basically with this vessel traffic service.
Again, let us relate it to New Orleans. We are trying to avoid
collisions, pollution from accidents, and things of that nature, is this
correct?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Well, again I am a little concerned, given the variance
that is permitted under this system, in reporting on estimated times of
arrival at different points prior to you getting into your television
surveillance. That presumably would aid in the location of vessels,
although there is some dispute, I think, about that.
But prior to getting to that, with having a requirement for report-
ing changes in ETA, reporting positions only if the variance is 10
minutes or more, that that is going to have significant effect on colli-
sions. In my law practice I was not a maritime lawyer, but I have had
enough exposure to know that collisions, especially on the river, occur
as a result of events that are set in motion within a minute or 2
minutes.
So if you have got a variation here of 10 minutes, I fail to see how
that is really going to help us avoid collisions, which is one of the pri-
mary purposes of this.
Could you address yourself to that?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Just coming around a bend.
Admiral FUGARO. Hopefully, the type of system we are envisioning
will be to advise that mariner what he can expect, on what he cannot
see around a point, and give him a description of all the traffic that
is coming toward him. For example, if he is proceeding up river,
hopefully through this type of advice to him, will enable him to better
plan how he is going to navigate around a particular bend. This will
give him some insight as to what is coming down the river, and what
he will be meeting at approximate time intervals.
We recognize that there will not be a fully-as I mentioned before,
a positive control system, but rather provide advice, with which we
hope that we will be able to better navigate.
The whole premise of our system is that the individual operator is
still completely responsible for his vessel. We are not taking over the
control of his vessel. We are trying to give him better advice than he
has now, which in some cases is approaching a particular bend,
without knowing what is coming down.
Mr. TREEN. Again, I do not know, but it seems to me most people
transiting that river know that there is liable to be vessels around
any bend, every bend.
PAGENO="0215"
211
Well, I hope other witnesses will address themselves to that par-
ticular point.
In that same area, do we have any studies of prior commissions, of
accidents, that we feel the system, as we now envision it, would have
prevented?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, we did in determining the need for a
system. We reviewed the casualties, and on a case-by-case basis, we
tried to make the determinations, within each of these casualties,
which were preventable casualties, and which were not preventable
casualties, and which casualties, which were preventable, by more
passive means.
That is which could have been prevented by, say specific regulation
requirements.
So this was the basis for the entire need for a system, and what we
predicated the benefits on. We do not anticipate that we will prevent
all the collisions that will occur in any one port area as a result of
any massive traffic system. But we are hoping to achieve, that we
will achieve a significant reduction in these collisions.
I think in the statement you will see what percentage we are
estimating in various categories of casualties that occur.
Mr. TREEN. All right, I will study that when I get an opportunity.
Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Heyward?
Mr. HEYWARD. Admiral, in connection with a few of the points
that have been raised, does the Coast Guard have any statistics
which would indicate conclusions as to effective use of the bridge-to-
bridge radiotelephone in casualty prevention?
Admiral FUGARO. I do not believe we have the specific study,
based upon solely the bridge-to-bridge usage.
Mr. HEYWARD. Have you made any tentative conclusions as to
whether that act has reduced accidents, or improved safety?
Admiral FUGARO. Our tentative conclusion is yes, that it has had
a favorable effect. But to quantify that, we are not able to do that at
this time.
Mr. HEYWARD. How would the coverage of participants in this
system differ from the requirements now in bridge-to-bridge radio-
telephone?
Admiral FUGARO. This would be an adjunct to the bridge-to-
bridge.
After we have advised the mariner, he will still arrange for passage
with individual vessels, hopefully having been warned ahead of time
what is coming down, through the bridge-to-bridge. That is, through
channel 13.
Mr. HEYWARD. You use channel 13 in the bridge-to-bridge
communications?
Admlral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. That is required to be initiated when a vessel is in
sight?
Admiral FUGARO. Well, yes, sir. But they can do it at any time.
Once they are advised about it.
Mr. HEYWARD. Once they know that another vessel is there, they
can initiate?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. What kind of requirement on radio equipment
would this new system put on the users that are in the system?
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212
Admiral FUGARO. I am not quite sure.
Of course, again, initially the system will be voluntary. There
will be no requirement placed upon anybody to put the equipment
aboard.
Mr. HEYWARD. Change requirements to need. What will they need?
Admiral FUGARO. They will need the capacity to communicate on
all four; 11, 12, 13, and 14. I believe most of the existing equipment
already have this capability of switching from channel to channel.
Mr. HEYWARD. How about 16?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; and also 16.
Mr. HEYWARD. Are all these vessels required to maintain a watch
on channel 16 now?
Admiral FUGARO. Thirteen.
Mr. HEYWARD. Thirteen?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes.
Commander HICKEY. Captain Heyward, the present FCC regula-.
tions exempt foreign-flag vessels from a channel 16 watch at the
present time. The FCC has also exempted towing vessels under
1,600 gross tons from the channel 16 watch requirement while they
are participating in a VTS, and in effect have a continuous listening
watch on the VTS frequency.
Mr. HEYWARD. The VTS may take over some of their responsi-
bilities on other channels?
Commander HICKEY. We are not taking over their responsi-
bilities. It is just that they are being relieved of the responsibility.
We already have the responsibifity, from a safety and distress
standpoint. But we do not want to get in the public correspondence
part.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the sector channels that you
refer to, you mention the fact that, in the future, licenses would not
be renewed for some of the recent users of those channels.
How much congestion would there be until the time came when
the present users were phased out, so to speak?
Admiral FUGARO. We are not sure of the amount of congestion.
We would hope that as the Vessel Traffic Service utilizes the service
there will be less and less confusion and conflict with our utilization
of these channels. But it is hard to tell you exactly how much we
anticipate will be interfered with our system.
Mr. HEYWARD. It is my understanding that, for instance, channel
12 will also be used in connection with lockage of vessels.
Admiral FUGARO. That is correct, by the corps.
Mr. HEYWARD. That will continue?
Admiral FUGARO. That will continue.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the mandatory versus voluntary
aspects, you say that the initial phase at~ least will be voluntary, and
I understood that you do nOt therefore believe that it would be neces-
sary to go forward with the proposed rules. Did I hear you correctly?
Admiral FUGARO. As long as we are only contemplating a volun-
tary system, the actual imposition of the rules will not be necessary.
One of the purposes of the advanced notice was to try to get some
information, additional information, in respect to how we should
proceed.
PAGENO="0217"
213
Mr. HEYWARD. Then how would you propose to publicize what-
ever you finally arrived at-through notices to mariners, or some
other system outside-
Admiral FUGARO. The first step we are going to have to go through
is the development and eventual promulgation of an operator's
manual, which all voluntary participants will be required to have.
We will give this to them once we have the manual, and this will
provide the instructions of how the individual operator will par-
ticipate in the system.
Mr. HEYWARD. To be initiated next summer: Is that correct?
Admiral FUGARO. The system will be initiated next summer. We
are already at work, and will be working in the development of the
manual in the next coming months.
Mr. HEYWARD. When do you anticipate that the first television
components will be in place, assuming that your present plans go
forward, to get the funds?
Admiral FUGARO. We do not anticipate the television in the near
future. It is in the 1978 budget. But by the time we put out contracts,
once we get the budgetary authority, we are anticipating to be fiscal
1980 before we get to television surveillance.
Mr. HEYWARD. In effect, what you propose to do is to be operating a
movement reporting system for about 3 years before you start
surveillance?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the personnel, you said "7
officers and 40 personnel." I assume these are divided into watches.
What kind of watch system does this cover?
Admiral FUGARO. Well, we will have one watch supervisor, who
will be an officer. Usually a lieutenant. Then we will have at least one
sector operator for each of the sectors, and there will have to be some
redundancy to provide for some break.
Mr. HEYWARD. The sector people are purely communications people,
or do they make some sort of judgment as to what kind of critical
conditions are developing?
Admiral FUGARO. To a degree they will have to be making the
initial determination of hazardous conditions.
However, whether or not any control will have to be exercised, will
have to be by the lieutenant on watch. These people will be trained
within the automated system. They will be trained in the use of the
automated system, and also trying to detect when hazardous condi-
tions are occurring. So that they may advise the traffic supervisor.
Mr. HEYWARD. Is it fair to conclude that if local knowledge becomes
critical, that it is perhaps critical only in the status of the individual
who is making judgment as to what directive should be issued?
Admiral FUGARO. Local knowledge for making the decision, or any
advice that he is going to give to the traffic supervisor, or to the vessel
that is participating.
Mr. HEYWARD. I understand, but I was trying to find out whether
you thought that that should be limited to him-whether the people
simply handling the communications facilities need to know anything
about local conditions, other than the fact that the river is there, and
how it is convoluted.
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214
Admiral FUGARO. No, we feel that each of the sector operators
needs to have the information, too.
Mr. HEYWARD. So it would be the sector operators plus the duty
officer himself?
Admiral FUGARO. It would be all the people involved in the watch,
both the sector watch as well as the Vessel Traffic Center watch super.-
visor.
Mr. REYWARD. In connection with your statement, you had at
least considered the utilization of local knowledgeable people.
Would these be people standing watch?
Would these be hired by the Coast Guard as a watch stander, or
what do you envision?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir.
Initially, we are still anticipating the actual sector operators will
be Coast Guard personnel.
What I was referring to was the utilization of these other people for
training purposes.
Mr. HEYWARD. Well, they could still be Coast Guard personnel if
you hired them as civilians, could they not?
What is so critical about whether they have on a uniform?
Admiral FUGARO. We are trying again to gain experience within
the system to determine what should be our permanent needs.
Mr. HEYWARD. You do have civilian personnel who are expert in
individual fields throughout the Coast Guard that are not rotated
as are uniformed personnel.
I am just asking whether you consider that maybe one or two of
those people at the vessel traffic center, might be an aid to the duty
officer in performing his functions.
Admiral FTJGARO. We consider these people as a training super-
visor who would perhaps on a permanent basis provide for the training
of the people involved in the system.
Mr. HEYWARD. You have not considered separate billets then?
Admiral FUGARO. We have not, not within the sector watch, no,
sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Treen asked you about RATAN.
Is RATAN rejected now?
Does this television setup that you contemplate, is it better, or is
there still a possibility that RATAN might be used sometime in the
system?
Admiral FUGARO. It could be used but, at the present time, we
have no plans to reinstitute the system anywhere.
Mr. HEYWARD. Is that a cost factor for the participant?
I am just wondering, for instance, since you have a setup for the
television surveillance, whether the television surveillance could be
retransmitted to a television receiver onboard a vessel, if the in-
dividual wanted to buy it and put it on there?
Admiral FUGARO. Certainly it is a possibility, but we have to do an
analysis to determine what the cost factors are in transmitting this
information.
Another thing, of course, is the fact that these-the television sys-
tem essentially, the cameras are set up from the viewpoint of sector
operator, and he will be scanning with these televisions, and it might
not be the type of information or usable to the particular vessel
unless he knows exactly in which angle the camera is pointed.
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215
Mr. HEYWARD. It would differ from the RATAN?
Admiral FUGARO. The RATAN was fixed.
Admiral FUGARO. The ratan was fixed.
Mr. HEYWARD. Stationary and the receivers are looking at a central
radar picture?
Admiral FUGARO. That is right.
Every operator within the RATAN system was getting the same
picture within the sector where he was. This would not be the case
if we tried to retransmit the television pictures that we are talking
about here.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to go back to one area, engaging local
people who are familiar with the areas.
In pursuit of that, I do not think it has been sufficiently nailed
down.
If I understand the Admiral, in response to a question of Captain
Heyward, it is your contemplation to engage local people for super-
visory training?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Now, what that means to me is that you will have
some rotating watch people who will always be in a position of being
trained by the supervisory local person.
It occurs to me then that if you need supervisory local people 24
hours a day, or on all watches-
Admiral FTJGARO. No, sir, we are anticipating that initially the
training officer or training supervisor will be utilized to train all of
the sector operators. He will not necessarily be on watch at all times.
This will be for training personnel as they come on the scene to insure
that they are capable of handling the system. They will not necessarily
be on watch. That is not what we are initially contemplating.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, handling the system is one thing, but handling
the system in relation to local conditions is precisely our concern at
this point. And that would be the need for the local talent.
Admiral FUGARO. We are hoping, through training, to provide the
people with that necessary level of local knowledge and local training
which would permit them to operate within the system as we have
defined it.
We do not anticipate that they will have the level of local knowledge
that the pilot will have nor is it required that they are required to
have that degree of knowledge that the pilot would have.
I would make an analogy to FAA traffic systems which perhaps
you are more familiar with. Here again the particular operator is not
necessarily a fully qualified pilot who runs the systems. He is merely
someone trained within the capabilities of that particular control
system. He is not a fully qualified pilot nor do we anticipate that
our operators would be fully qualified nor is there a need for them to
be fully qualified as a pilot.
Mr. BIAGGI. You raise an interesting point.
Would it not be better if you are a full qualified pilot?
Admiral FUGARO. I think that would be overqualification.
I do not think the man needs to have that degree of expertise.
Mr. Chairman, I have had personal experience with the vessel
traffic service. I was the commanding officer of the Sault Sainte Marie
base in 1971-72, and I found some benefit in the fact that these
people were rotated through the vessel traffic service. These become a
PAGENO="0220"
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rather routine function and, in a sense, if you get a highly qualified
person for these jobs, you perhaps-it is not necessarily that the
longer the man is on the job the better he becomes.
After awhile, the job becomes a routine function. And to avoid
this, we keep rotating the men on the watch.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney.
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have two questions.
Admiral Fugaro, there has been a lot of discussion about crowding
of the frequencies that are going to be used in the vessel traffic service,
bridge-to-bridge, and for emergency and distress.
Why are we so limited in the number of frequencies?
Why does the vessel traffic service system have to use frequencies
that are already crowded or already being used by other licensed users?
Admiral FUGARO. Well, we are going to have a minimum of two
dedicated channels that will be channel 11 and channel 14. Channel
12, which is the one currently used by the Corps of Engineers, I think,
that is the one you are referring to.
Mr. OLNEY. That is right. That is used by the Corps.
But 11 and 14 are currently used by individuals holding 5-year
licenses?
Admiral FUGARO. But essentially they will be totally dedicated to
the vessel traffic service.
Mr. OLNEY. Why are you not able to get a frequency that is exclu-
sively dedicated to vessel traffic service at this time?
Admiral FUGARO. That is because of channel frequency allocation.
Mr. OLNEY. That is the obstacle?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. OLNEY. Does the FCC plan to dedicate more frequencies to-
for marine use in the future?
Admiral FUGARO. Not at the present time.
I think these are the ones they have allocated to us. In order to
achieve this, they will have to drop out or not renew the permits.
Mr. OLNEY. At some point the FCC is going to have to reallocate
the frequency uses that exist today, is that correct?
Commander HICKEY. In a sense they have reallocated them to us,
by not reissuing the licenses of some of the people using the channels.
Mr. OLNEY. They are not providing them with alternatives?
Commander HICKEY. Yes; they are.
Mr. OLNEY. On which frequencies?
Commander HICKEY. I do not know, sir, but they have stated that
they are providing alternate frequencies.
Our primary concern is for a vessel going from one port to the next.
He only has to be crystalized for channels 11, 12; and 14 in order
to participate in any U.S. vessel traffic service.
Mr. OLNEY. As you may know, the FCC has come under some criti-
cism for not giving the maritime interest enough frequencies to work
on. That is the reason I raised the question.
Admiral Fugaro, I am confused as to what the policy of the Coast
Guard is in relation to the role of the master when he is participating
in the system.~
In your statement on page 14, you state, and I am quoting:
"Keep in mind, we recognize the role of the master and pilot as the
sole authority"-
PAGENO="0221"
217
In your advanced proposed notice of rulemaking in section 11,
entitled "Vessel Traffic Service Directions," you have three paragraphs
where you provide the vessel traffic service with authority to issue
directives, specific times when vessels may enter or move in the
system, and provide the VTC with authority to impose one-way
traffic, and authority to establish vessel size limitations in any VT~
area.
Finally, you state that the master or person in charge of the vessel
participating in VTS area shall comply with each direction issued to
him under the section.
I do not see how you can square that type of authority with your
enunciated policy in your statement that the master and pilot are
still the sole authority.
Admiral FirnAno. If you will notice on page 15 of my statement-
Mr. Olney, we do at this point, and that is that while we are giving
them this advice and direction, the ultimate control is still vested with
the pilot, and I refer to the part of section 161.111, 33 CFR, which
says, "in an emergency, any person may deviate from any section in
this subpart to the extent necessary to avoid endangering persons,
property, or the environment."
The idea being that the ultimate responsibility is still vested in the
master.
Mr. OLNEY. I am glad you raised that point, because I think that
on its face, the vessel traffic service regulations would appear to be in
vesting more authority in vessel traffic service, than perhaps you
intended with the other provisions, and perhaps in your next rule-
making that would be made clear.
Admiral FTJGARO. I would hope so, too.
Mr. OLNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TREEN. On that same line, this is an issue raised by one of the
other witnesses we are probably going to hear from tomorrow,
Admiral.
Take a situation in the absence of radar when we have a radio
failure onboard a vessel, and when at the same time the vessel traffic
service has taken control of the traffic. Let us say there are some large
vessels that have radio failures. You are going to be directing only
the vessels that you do have communications with in the system,
which seems to me could present peril to both the vessels in communi-
cation, and those that are not, because of this blindness.
Have you decided how that particular problem is going to be
resolved?
Is it a problem?
Admiral FUGARO. I would agree with you, under the circumstances
which you have stated, that there could be a problem.
In response to your particular problem, this would hopefully be a
part of the operator's manual, and how we will operate the system.
Again, I would not say that we have specifically addressed the point
that you are talking about, because in order to completely be re-
sponsive to these situations, we would almost have to go into some
sort of positive control system, which I do not feel we could justify.
Mr. TREEN. Radio failure is going to occur. I think we have to face
that fact.
I will be interested in how you address yourself to that particular
problem.
PAGENO="0222"
218
In other words, perhaps it gets back to something that I am harping
on too much again, that is partial control, without having full control,
perhaps making greater hazards.
This worries me a great deal.
Is there any problem with respect to communications if you are
transmitting on a 50-watt output, and I think that is what you an-
ticipate, is it not?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. From your tracking center in New Orleans, what effect
would this have on the bridge-to-bridge communication channel
within, let us say, 20 or 30 miles from the VTC?
Admiral FUGARO. While transmitting on channel 13?
Mr. TREEN. Yes, sir.
Admiral FUGARO. We would assume that there would be, if the
Coast Guard was transmitting on 13; yes, sir, there could very well
be interference with other transmissions on 13.
We would hope, through the utilization, the other dedicated
channels, that communications by the Coast Guard on 13 would be
at an absolute minimum, except we will be monitoring, listening on
that channel.
Mr. TREEN. A couple of other questions.
I recognize you have not been involved with the VTS system very
long. How long have you been involved with the New Orleans system,
Admiral?
Admiral FUGARO. I assumed the particular office June 10.
Mr. TREEN. Did the studies initially support radar as far as the
New Orleans vessel traffic service system?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. I do believe that the studies indicated
the need for surveillance, but I do not think there was any initial
justification for radar.
Our general policy with respect to radar versus television is, we
feel that the positive identification aspects of television outweigh the
benefits of radar, with the one benefit being that the radar can give
you a more positive and exact location on an upriver, downriver basis.
At the same time, they also operate during the small percentage of
the time while we are experiencing low visibility.
What we feel capability with television provides us with a more
positive control than radar would.
Mr. TREEN. You are saying that there has not been any change in
the position of the Coast Guard with respect to radar?
Admiral FUGARO. The initial studies did include radar, but again
it was the surveillance that was the indicated factor, and not neces-
sarily radar or television was the determination on the initial.
Mr. TREEN. Your change in position was not dictated by budgetary
considerations?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. As a matter of fact, in reviewing the cost
for both television and radar, the cost is comparable. It is not a ques-
tion that we are trying to save money by putting in television.
Mr. TREEN. Who made the decision to use the computer without
radar?
Use the system without radar?
Who is responsible for that decision?
PAGENO="0223"
219
Admiral FUGARO. That was part of the initial study of the system
requirement, and I think, as Commander Hickey mentioned earlier,
this system alone provides the greatest benefit of any of the com-
ponents we are talking about, and that is to provide some automated
system by which we can be giving out advice to the mariner in each
location what the traffic situation in his particular area is.
To try to do this through mechanical means would be too
cumbersome.
So we feel the greatest benefit would come through the computer
system initially.
Mr. TREEN. Have you had discussions with the shallow draft
interests about the deletion of radar from the system?
Admiral FUGARO~ I know that Admiral Barrow in the Eighth District
has had meetings and has discussed these systems with the interests
down there, yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Is anybody here from the New Orleans Coast Guard
District?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir, not today.
Mr. TREEN. Do you expect to have anybody here today or
tomorrow?
Admiral FUGARO. We did not anticipate to have somebody, Mr.
Treen.
Mr. TREEN. Is there any particular reason why we do not have
anybody?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir, there is no reason why we do not have
somebody.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused.
The next witness is representing the American Waterways Op-
erators, Inc., Mr. Frank T. Stegbauer, executive vice president,
Southern Towing Co., accompanied by Mr. Robert Gardner, Alter
Co., and Mr. Lloyd Eneix, Agri-Trans. Corp.
STATEMENT OP PRANK T. STEGBAUER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESI-
DENT, SOUTHERN TOWING CO., REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN
WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT
GARDNER, ALTER CO., AND LLOYD ENEIX, AGRI-TRANS. CORP.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Good morning, gentlemen.
My name is Frank T. Stegbauer. I am executive vice president of
Southern Towing Co., Memphis, Term. I appear here today on behalf
of the American Waterways Operators, Inc., as do Mr. Gardner on
my left and Mr. Eneix on my right.
I believe, following Admiral Fugaro's testimony, we could probably
dispense with the formal statement. I believe you all have copies of
it, and I do not see anything to be gained by reading it.
[The following was received for the record.]
STATEMENT OF FRANK T. STEGBAUER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, SOUTHERN
TOWING Co., FOR THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC.
Mr. Chairman: My name is Frank T. Stegbauer. I am Executive Vice President
of Southern Towing Company, 1814 First National Bank Building, Memphis,
Tennessee 38101.
78-280--76------15
PAGENO="0224"
220
I am speaking for The American Waterways Operators, Inc., the national trade
association of the inland and coastal barge and towing industry. The industry is
composed of approximately 1,800 companies operating 4,100 towboats and tugs,
and 25,400 barges. The industry operates on 25,000 miles of the inland waterways
system of the United States and is regarded as the safest, most fuel-efficient and
lowest cost mode of transport available. A large majority of the towing and barge
operators on the Lower Mississippi River in the area of New Orleans are members
of The American Waterways Operators, Inc.
The members of our association are in favor of a service that would increase the
safety of operations on the Lower Mississippi River and in the New Orleans
Harbor area in particular. We believe that a properly designed and properly
operated vessel traffic service would serve to improve safety in any port or harbor
where restricted waters and high density traffic combine to create potentially
unsafe conditions. A vessel traffic service will work not only to improve safety
but, if it is properly designed and operated, it will assist the movement of water-
borne commerce during periods of reduced visibility. This is being accomplished
in European ports. Rotterdam is an excellent example.
In designing a vessel traffic service (VTS), it is incumbent upon the architects
to develop data based on experience. This can only be done correctly by going to
the individuals and organizations who possess that all-important experience.
This certainly must have been in the minds of the Congress when the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 was enacted. The need for this type of investigative
research is borne out by the wording in Sections 102 and 104 of the Act.
The U.S. Coast Guard has chosen to interpret Sections 102 and 104 in an ex-
tremely restricted manner. The members of the towing industry have expressed
their dissatisfaction with the Coast Guard's reluctance to consult within the
spirit and intent of the Act. However, the complaints have fallen upon unreceptive
ears. The Coast Guard evidently feels that our industry has been given an adequate
opportunity for input into the development of the VTS and they cannot be con-
vinced otherwise by our association collectively, or by any of its individual
members. Our association firmly believes that they have not carried out the man-
dates of the Act.
Our need for consultation centers on the basics of a vessel traffic service,
namely, communications, surveillance, cooperation, and the absolute necessity
for experienced vessel traffic control center operators. We are sure in our mind
that the proposed system for the Lower Mississippi River falls far short in every
one of the fore-mentioned categories.
Communications is recognized by all concerned as a vital part of the service.
This requires little elaboration. Failure to communicate rapidly and clearly can
endanger the vessel attempting to establish communications as well as other
vessels in the vicinity. We know this to be true. The Coast Guard knows this to he
true. Yet, the Coast Guard has refused to sit down with us and discuss this
crucial problem to see what the safe communications minimums might be.
Radar survefflance is the real heart of a vessel traffic service. In the absence of
radar surveillance, the VTS control center personnel must rely on voice com-
munications to pinpoint locations of the large number of vessels within the confines
of the vessel traffic service boundaries. Since all vessels are subject to variances in
their predicted positions, constant position updating will be required. This will
further burden the badly congested communications channels. Moreover, the
accuracy of vessel positions at any given time will not be validated. This will lead
to serious system errors in times of poor visibility and compound vessel movement
reporting problems in the control center. In such cases, no information might well
be better than misinformation.
We wish to quote the following observation made in respect to the proposed
vessel traffic service for the Lower Mississippi River:
There are too many areas where accident rates are high to attempt getting
by with minimum radar/radio coverage. Full radar and communications must be
provided if the high maritime accident rate in the New Orleans area is to be re-
duced".
Strange as it may seem, this observation was made by the Commander, Eighth
Coast Guard District, New Orleans, Louisiana, in his Draft Environmental
Impact Statement on. the proposed Vessel Traffic Control System for the Lower
Mississippi River area, on August 6, 1974.
Yet, in spite of the .Coast Guard's apparent reversal from a position which
coincided with that of our industry, they will not respond to our request for con-
sultation on these fundamental issues.
PAGENO="0225"
221
The pilot or master of a vessel must not be subjected to a situation wherein lie
cannot place the utmost confidence in the information and guidance he receives
from a vessel traffic control center. He is called upon to exercise his own experi-
enced judgment time and time again in piloting his vessel in restricted waters.
Any conflict between the plans and intentions of the pilot/master and the guidance
or directions emanating from the control center will create a chaotic situation..
The pilot/master must place complete trust in the control center. It is unreasonable
to expect him to do so if the VTS has no radar surveillance, and the personnel
manning the control center have no piloting experience. The maneuvering of tows
and ocean-going ships in the Lower Mississippi River cannot he safely controlled
by inexperienced personnel.
Another vital need then, is the employment of experienced and qualified per-
sonnel to man the vessel traffic control center. Again, we would appreciate ai~
opportunity to discuss this with the U.S. Coast Guard.
The only reasonable and proper way to commence the much-needed two-way
dialogue between the Coast Guard and the affected users of the VTS is through
the formation of a joint industry/Coast Guard Committee. Without such a corn-
mittee, we will see a continuation of the Coast Guard listening to, but not heeding
the constructive comments and views of the waterways industry.
In short, Mr. Chairman, we only ask that they sit down and talk with us about
the fundamentals which contribute to a good vessel traffic service. They must be
made aware of the full reasoning behind our suggestions and we should be en-
titled to be apprised of the reasoning behind their differing views.
At a Board of Directors meeting on September 15, 1976, The American Water-
ways Operators, Inc. adopted the following resolution on the proposed Vessel
Traffic Service for the Lower Mississippi River: Resolved:
Recognizing the necessity for the protection of life, property and the environ-
ment, and the necessity to provide for the expeditious movement of water-borne
commerce, especially during periods of reduced visibility, The American Water-
ways Operators, Inc. will fully support the establishment of a fully implemented
Vessel Traffic Service for those portions of the Lower Mississippi River, where it
has been adequately determined there is a need, by measures in compliance with
Sections 102(e) and 104 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
AWO's definition of a fully implemented Vessel Traffic Service is as follows:
1. The VTS will open for service with constant radar surveillance of the areas
encompassed by the VTS.
2. The VTS will open for service with adequate radio communications frequencies
assigned to the VTS, solely for the use of vessels in the VTS and the Vessel Traffic
Control Center.
3. The VTS will open for service with fully trained and qualified vessel traffic
controllers.
4. The VTS will open for service with a permanent Coast Guard/Industry
VTS Advisory Committee established so that a conduit is provided for the
exchange of information between Coast Guard and Industry.
AWO recommends that only the following portions of the Lower Mississippi
River be considered for installation of VTS:
1. From 5 miles seaward from Southwest Pass entrance buoy, and Southeast
Pass entrance buoy, to mile 15 AHP-(This would control the restricted area of
the Passes and the Pilottown Anchorage which becomes severely congested during
periods of reduced visibility.)
2. From mile 75.0 AHP to mile 140.0-(This area encompasses the lower
approaches to New Orleans Harbor, the general anchorage, and northward to
include the barge fleeting areas and petro-chemical complexes above NORCO,
LA.)
There appears to be little justification for such service outside these designated
areas at this time, but AWO will support an expansion of the system if experience
and increased shipping activity should dictate. Of paramount importance is the
inclusion of the above-noted four necessary elements in the system.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my presentation. I would be most pleased to
answer any questions you or members of the Committee may have.
Thank you.
Mr. STEGBATJER. I would like to read to you a resolution that was
passed last week, September the 15th, to a Board meeting in Chicago.
It starts on page 4 of my statement:
PAGENO="0226"
222
Resolved: Recognizing the necessity for the protection of life, property and the
environment, and the necessity to provide for the expeditious movement of water-
borne commerce, especially during periods of reduced visibility, The American
Waterways Operators, Inc. will fully support the establishment of a fully imple-
mented Vessel Traffic Service for those portions of the Lower Mississippi River,
where it has been adequately determined there is a need, by measures in compliance
with Sections 102(e) and 104 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
AWO's definition of a fully implemented Vessel Traffic Service is as follows:
1. The VTS will open for service with constant radar surveillance of the areas
encompassed by the VTS.
2. The VTS will open for service with adequate radio communications frequen-
cies assigned to the VTS, solely for the use of vessels in the VTS and the Vessel
Traffic Control Center.
3. The VTS will open for service with fully trained and qualified vessel traffic
controllers.
4. The VTS will open for service with a permanent Coast Guard/Industry VTS
Advisory Committee established so that a conduit is provided for the exchange of
information between Coast Guard and industry.
AWO recommends that only the following portions of the Lower Missippi River
be considered for installation of VTS:
1. From 5 miles seaward from Southwest Pass entrance buoy, and Southeast
Pass entrance buoy, to mile 15 AHP-(This would control the restricted area of the
Passes and the Pilottown Anchorage which becomes severely congested during
periods of reduced visibility.)
2. From mile 75.0 AHP to mile 140.0-(This area encompasses the lower ap-
proaches to New Orleans Harbor, the general anchorage, and northward to include
the barge fleeting areas and petro-chemical complexes above NORCO, LA.)
There appears to be little justification for such service outside these designated
areas at this time, but AWO will support an expansion of the system if experience
and increased shipping activity should dictate. Of paramount importance is the
inclusion of the above-noted four necessary elements in the system.
Now, I believe that in some respects I personally feel like Alice in
Wonderland wandering through the maze, trying to get out through
the garden wall. Some of the things that we have gone through in
New Orleans, we had a group of us-had a conversation with the Coast
Guard yesterday in which we were informed that the system would be
voluntary. It was my impression that it would be for some time.
Today we are hearing 3 to 6 months.
Now, New Orleans vessel traffic service people had made a statement
to us before that it would be voluntary for a 6-month period just merely
for a shakedown. That was our understanding.
But, yesterday, we thought we had understood that it would be
voluntary for some time. We do not call 6 months some time.
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me, Mr. Stegbauer.
I think with that the admiral responded-left me with the impres-
sion that it could be much longer; that the Coast Guard had not fixed a
time.
What I will say is that, once the course of events has started,
mandatory is almost inevitable. The question is, When?
Mr. STEGBAUER. I think we recognize this, Mr. Chairman.
What we do not give into is the way the system is being proposed.
We recognize this
It would be difficult for the system to function on a voluntary basis
because there would be too many people that would supposedly say,
well, I am not going to check into it, and then the system becomes
invalid.
But I did hear the 3 to 6 months somewhere this morning.
Mr. BIAGGI. You heard the 3 to 6 months, but you did not hear that
as an absolute timeframe.
PAGENO="0227"
223
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, voluntary versus mandatory is a big factor
for us, because if it is voluntary, you can take it or leave it, but when
it becomes mandatory it has to be fully equipped.
Now, Houston is voluntary, and the reports from our pilots, and
from many other company pilots say that the information from the
vessel traffic service at Houston is better than nothing. But it is not,
because it does not have the surveillance, except for the television in
certain strategic areas.
I understand radar surveillance is proposed sometime next year in
the Galveston area, at which it is supposed to become mandatory.
The reason that the industry wanted some input into the com-
ponents of the system, was because we did want to see that we get
the best system that we can, one that will work, and one that will
enable the controllers to pass on reliable information to the captains
and pilots.
Now, I think one of the bases of success for the vessel traffic system
is for the captains and the pilots to be able to put complete reliance
on the system. If they cannot put complete reliance on the system,
then it is not going to work.
Mr. BIAGGI. Let me interject at this point.
I imagine that the Coast Guard has the same concern.
By raising the question inferrentially, you are saying that the
components that are being installed fail to measure up if they in
fact-
Mr. STEGBAUER. I am saying that the computer, that the Coast
Guard has been talking to us over a year, is nothing magical. It is a
computer that does computations of time and motion, that is impos-
sible to do by hand because of the volume of traffic. It does nothing
more than that, and it is on a visual display.
But the age-old saying is garbage in and garbage out. If you do not
have accurate information going in, then you do not have accurate
information coming out.
Mr. BIAGGI. What do you propose as an alternative?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Surveillance.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, the computer is not an alternative, from my
understanding, if it is correct, it is an addition. They have not pro-
posed surveillance yet.
They have radar, television, sonar.
Mr. STEGBAnER. We were told that there was no radar planned. I
was told a matter of months ago by the eighth district that they were
going to try to install one low light level television in the area of
Algiers Point, period. That was the surveillance.
Mr. BIAGGI. You heard the admiral testify this morning that there
is radar in this very section?
Mr. STEGBATJER. I did. That is why I feel like Alice in Wonderland.
What we heard this morning is not what we heard for the last year.
Mr. TREEN. What he said is that television is planned for the
fiscal year 1978 request, and radar for 1980.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, we were told no later than yesterday that
there was no radar planned.
Mr. TREEN. Well, the money has not been appropriated for it yet.
Mr. STEGBAUER. I understand funding, but it was not planned.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, if that is what you were told, then there is a
communication problem somewhere.
PAGENO="0228"
224
Mr. STEGBAIJER. This is part of the whole problem.
What I heard today, we have had the most monumental com-
munication breakdown between the industry and the Coast Guard
that was ever involved.
Mr. BIAGGI. You were here when we opened this meeting, and I
am sure you heard the remarks that were made. That is a very critical
situation as far as I am concerned, with relation to the Coast Guard
and industry, and we must have input and communication.
* I mean total input, not just in symbolic communication. I am talking
about meaningful relations, and I keep hearing about it, but I also
keep getting criticisms from industry that this is not taking place in
a proper and meansingful fashion.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, Mr. Chairman, most of the men in this
room today attended a meeting after me in the eighth district in New
Orleans, and I am sure in the letter that you received from Captain
Woods, from the Coast Guard, he listed all the participating com-
panics. In fact, he was short some companies. There were more com-
panics than he listed.
But the meeting had been meaningless. The first meeting we ever
had was in August of 1975, with a pseudoadvisory group, because it
had been decided not to have a formal advisory group. It went under
the guise of an ad hoc committee to the New Orleans Port Safety
Committee.
We walked into a room of 150-some-odd people, and were given a
set of regulations that said this is it, fellows. There is no change to be
made. That is not what we call dialog, and this has been going on all
the time, and we cannot have any input, we did make some input,
none of it materially changed the first set of draft regulations that I
believe were drafted sometime in the early part of 1975. They were
a rough draft by the eighth district, not Washington, and they have
basically changed since then.
Mr. BIAGGI. We have a quorum call. We will have a 10-minute
recess, and then we will resume upon our return.
{Short recess.]
Mr. BIAGGI. The committee is called to order.
* Before we start, I will state we will be required to leave the room
at 1 :30. There is another hearing scheduled at that time. We will
continue with these hearings tomorrow morning.
Mr. Stegbauer.
Mr. STEGBAIJER. Mr. Chairman, I believe we were talking about
the reasons that the industry wanted some input into systems
components.
* One of the big differences we have with the Coast Guard is the lack
of radar surveillance. We have, I think, a basic philosophic difference
in the use of radar versus television.
* Now, a number of us have experimented with low-light television
and found that it had some definite limitations. It can be made to
function according to light intensity that is available by the addition
of infrared equipment.
Some of the drawbacks are it has no perspective, no depth percep-
tion at all to it. It does not have the ability to track vessels. It can
only see what the eye can see or what the use of magnifying lenses,
what the eye plus binoculars can see.
PAGENO="0229"
225
Therefore, you are limited to the field of vision of the lens just as
you are limited to the field of vision of the eyeball. Radar does not
have this drawback. It can see more area than the eyeball, and it
can also allow VTC to track vessels and use it as a check against
their projected or computer projected track of vessels in the VTC.
As stated before, there is some margin of error. As a matter of fact,
there is quite a bit of margin of error on the computer projections.
We feel that radar is essential to check against the computer readout
on the visual display.
Now, we understand and propose that television will be approxi-
mately 97 percent effective, which brings-you say, well, what about
the other 3 percent, the other 3 percent cannot see in fog?
Radar can see in fog. Television cannot see in fog because your
eye cannot see in fog either.
A number of us, most modern vessels are equipped with radar and
other types of navigating equipment that will allow our vessels to
navigate in nightfall, and we feel that the television will be of no
assistance to the VTC in these periods.
I believe that New Orleans, contrary to some numbers kicked
around, like 29 days out of the year, I believe that fog is rather prev-
alent in New Orleans, especially in the early morning hours. -
Getting a little into this radar thing, the Coast Guard in their
initial environmental impact statement which was out by the 8th
District Coast Guard, under date of August 6, 1974, stated that
radar and television would be both employed.
I quote from the diafted environmental impact statement, and by
the way, we do not know whether this is the final impact statement
or not-I do not believe any of our group have seen one, if there is
one, so we do not know whether this has been changed or not, but
this is the drafted environmental impact statement:
The leasing of a sufficient number of radar and communications installations is
planned to provide complete communications coverage of the system and radar
surveillance of selected hazardous areas. Wherever possible, these installations will
be constructed on existing structures on Federally owned or leased property.
The purpose of the radar coverage is to provide an electronic presentation of all
vessels in the Port of New Orleans to the Vessel Traffic Center. The purpose of the
VHF-FM communications will be to provide direct communications between
vessels within the geographic boundaries of the system and the Vessel Traffic
Center. Television coverage of selected areas wifi allow the Vessel Traffic Center to
visually monitor and identify vessel traffic.
The way we read this, really television was planned in addition to
radar.
Going over a little further in the drafted environmental impact
statement, where they discuss possible alternatives to the proposed
VTS, one alternative is:
Partial communications net only.
Their comment is:
In view of the number of vessels on the river at any given moment, this was
deemed unacceptable. The amount of traffic on a given radio frequency, each
minute, would render the net useless. Many masters would be unable to forewarn
others of their presence due to inability to "breakthrough." A fully implemented
VTS would eliminate this danger.
Partial radar and communications only. There are too many areas where
accident rates are high to attempt getting by with minimum radar/radio coverage.
Full radar and communications must be provided if the high maritime accident rate
in the New Orleans area is to be reduced.
PAGENO="0230"
226
I believe that this document would show that the Coast Guard did
consider quite in depth radar and the VTS system in New Orleans'
VTS in January.
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me, Mr. Stegbauer. Let us talk about the 97-
percent effectiveness, when TV can be operative. Would TV be
superior during that period to radar, in the light of the congestion in
the harbor?
Mr. STEGBAUER. This is where I think our basic difference is on the
use of TV and radar.
Our group does not think it would, because TV cannot see around
corners. Radar can see around corners. You could put a radar at one
of the bends up there, and the radar will give you a picture around the
bend. The TV will not-not any TV that we are familiar with.
Now, we have-a number of us have viewed the TV, and used the
VTS at Morgan Point, which is the entrance to the old Buffalo Port,
or what is now the Houston Ship Canal, as you come west on the
Galveston Bay. It is fine-I mean, you look out there and as far as
the TV camera can see, by swinging the camera, you can see just as
if a man would be there, and sitting and looking both ways, but when
it comes to a bend, you cannot see.
Also, when you are asking the TV, I think one of the sectors were
given to be some 20 miles-23 miles, covered by four TV cameras. I
think that figure is 4.6 miles per camera, which would be the camera
in the middle, 2.3 miles each way, 4.6 each way, and I know of no
equipment, and perhaps the Coast Guard could provide us with that,
but we know of no equipment that will perform this satisfactorily.
Mr. BIAGGI. What you are talking about really is that there would
be-it would be necessary to have strategic positioning of the different
cameras so that if we do have a bend we should be able to see both
sides of that bend.
Mr. STEGBAUBR. Well, if you wanted to do that, yes. I would
check that, and in order to gain proper perspective, because TV has
no perspective, whereas radar does.
A number of .us visited the Puget Sound VTS, where there was
the radar coverage. It is very effective, you stand there and watch
the blips of the ships moving down in the la.ne separation.
Mr. BrAGGI. Let us stay with that, because in my own experience
in this area, I can see a congested harbor, where the blips may not
be as distinguishable as the actual visual image of the scene, where
you get that on television, and radar would not be fully reflective of
the picture, so that it would be of benefit to the controller.
That is my own immediate reaction to this point.
I would say that, in other areas, other than congested areas, then
radar would suffice, but in congested areas it is like being in Times
Square, looking at Times Square through a camera, you know where
all the cars are, and now if you look through radar, radar will tell you
the number of cars there, but it would be difficult to distinguish and
handle this.
That is my own immediate reaction.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, I think one thing that radar does that TV
does not view, and I am sure, Mr. Chairman, you probably have
seen radar pictures, the radar, even though this is confined to an
area, we use it on all our boats, shows you, for instance, which side
PAGENO="0231"
227
a vessel is favored on the banks of the river, which TV-the TV that
I have seen, will not do this, because it has no depth perception at
all, and to me, to a controller, if he were able to see which side of the
river side the vessel was favoring, he could be more abreast of the
conditions existing of two vessels approaching each other.
Mr. BIAGGI. I am sure the Coast Guard has taken that into
consideration, and I see where we have a difference of opinion.
I would appreciate it if the Coast Guard would submit to the
committee their comments on this particular issue.
Admiral FUGARO. Be glad to, Mr. Chairman.
[The following was received for the record:]
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CLOSED
CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV) VERSUS RADAR FOR VTS USE IN A RIVER
ENVIRONMENT, BASED ON EXPERIENCE IN THE OPERATION OF CCTV IN THE
HOUSTON-GALVESTON VTS SINCE FEBRUARY 1975
ADVANTAGES OP CCTV
1. The primary advantages of CCTV are in actually being able to see:
(a) What the mariner sees or is trying to describe to the VTS.
(5) What a tow looks like (make up; number of barges; type of barges; how it's
loaded; the size of the tow boat in relation to its tow; whether it has a bow steering
unit or a tail boat; company marking, name and the barge numbers; load line
and lights.)
(c) Whether a tug is aground or just pushed in for a crew change.
(d) When a two boat loses its coupling or is broken up by a passing ship, incle-
ment weather, current, collision or grounding.
(e) Man overboard and recovery.
(f) Oil in the water, debris, a loose barge, a navigational hazard or channel
obstruction.
(g) Tows swapping barges and when they've completed.
(h) A missed turn.
(i) Position of dredges and pipelines.
(j) Docking and undocking ships; heavy lifts; bunkering operations; special
loadout operations; men working over the side; and, tow boats with long tows
backing out into the channel.
2. Since commissioning the Houston-Galveston Vessel Traffic Service, in
February 1975, there have been seven major fires on the Houston Ship Channel;
three of the seven were within CCTV camera-range and the VTC was the first
to report the fire to the proper agencies.
3. The CCTV requires very little operator training. The controls are few and
simple and, as a result, have a low fatigue factor. The CCTV serves as a window
that presents a changing scene. This helps the operator to identify with the mari-
ner, see his environment and appreciate his problems.
ADVANTAGES OF RADAR
1. Radar Provides:
(a) Low visibility and heavy weather penetration ability; however, the tor-
rential rains characteristic of the Houston-Galveston area can affect even radar.
(5) Surveillance of a large area.
(c) Bearing, range, course, speed, range-rate and movement of contacts.
(d) Position surveillance on aids to navigation.
(e) Capability of tracking weather fronts.
(f) Ability to effect intercepts, either vessel to vessel or vessel to terrestial
points.
(g) Ability to compute the set and drift of a disabled tow or ship and determine
the probable point of grounding.
DISADVANTAGES OP TELEVISION IN VTS
(a) Cannot see effectively long distances.
(b) Reduced capability during darkness, even using infrared illumination.
(c) During periods of fog or heavy rain, a total loss of capability is experienced.
(d) Very directional in nature.
(e) Low accuracy in vessel speed/direction detemination.
PAGENO="0232"
228
DISADVANTAGES OF RADAR IN VTS
(a) Radar is a time study and requires a series of marks to develop a surface
picture.
(b) Radar is physically demanding on the operator, requiring manipulation to
obtain the desired picture. Resultant fatigue and error factor is considerable.
(c) With every scale shift the time slot development procedure must start again.
(d) Small boats with radar reflectors can appear as large contacts; tows with
hull-down barges can appear as boats.
(e) It is impossible to accurately determine size, type, owner markings or other
characteristics important in traffic management.
(1) It takes many hours to train an effective operator.
(g) The geographic limitation of the area makes the radar useless for the higher
scales. For example, the intracoastal waterway would appear as ~2 of an inch on
the sixteen mile scale. This can, however, be overcome with an offset feature on a
lower scale, but then disadvantage (c) becomes the problem.
CONCLUSION
From a VTS point of view, considering that vessel traffic will be confined to
the limits of a narrow channel, CCTV is preferable to radar because:
(a) Target (type) identification is immediate with COTY.
(b) No target interpretation is required.
(c) Operator fatigue is less.
(d) Operator functions are significantly reduced.
(e) Operator interpretation error is greatly reduced with CCTV.
(f) Background clutter and adjacent land masses have no significant effect.
(g) Other factors affecting channel traffic such as fires on landside; oil spills;
fog; overhanging booms on ships; vessels docking or undocking; and vessels
bunkering or conducting heavy lifts are all visible on CCTV and not on radar.
(h) Most any visible problem can be detected on CCTV including flag and dis-
tress signals.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Also, one cannot help but wonder where you have
limited surveillance, and this is one of the reasons why AWO was
selected to remedy that, possibly, two sections of the proposed area
be implemented, at this time.
Now, we could have the finest vessel traffic control system, rather
than spending money for areas, so-called noncritical areas, we just
have a communication network.
One then begins to wonder if maybe we have not got the cart
before the horse, maybe we should have-if these areas are agreed
to be critical, and we certainly agree with the Coast Guard on those
two areas, that the radar should not be down, and certainly, in our
opinion, the system should never be mandatory without full imple-
mentation, radar and the whole bit.
Now, in regard to the other critical areas, one must ask what is so
much better with a communication network than rigid, enforced
compliance with the bridge-to-bridge communication act which is
not being done.
We have been to the Coast Guard and FCC for years, and asked
for a cleanup of chit-chat, if you may, on channel 13, and confine it
to what it is designated for, the exchange of navigation information,
and we have gotten no relief from either agency.
This is one of the problems with 13, so crowded, particularly in
the New Orleans area, that its usefulness is seriously hampered. We
need cleanup on this area, and if we got cleanup plus rigid enforce-
ment of the use of 13, we say, why even have the communication
network in the noncritical areas, what is better about the commtini-
cation center than normal bridge-to-bridge communication.
PAGENO="0233"
229
The statement was made by the Coast Guard that the industry
was relieved from channel 16. This is what we had hoped for, but
there was a catch in the FTC order. The catch was you are only
relieved from channel 16 if you monitor a so-called house frequency.
So this will force you to have a minimum of three radios on your
boat, whereas most people only carry two now.
So in order to comply with these regulations, and engage in VTS,
we see everyone will have to add a new radio to his vessel.
Now, we are still talking with the FCC. We have gone back to ask
them to reconsider their order and withdraw this release from chan-
nel 16 and the house frequency, and we feel that if a man wants to
stand on a house frequency, that is his business, but it should not
be mandatory.
That would enable people to navigate with two radios, one for 13,
and one for VTS, separately.
Hopefully we will get some relief.
However, in dealing with FCC, our efforts have not been too
successful in the past.
We also feel that the Coast Guard should request from FCC
frequencies that would be dedicated to VTS, without taking them
away from the public sector, which is what is being done. We are
already short of a frequency area. Channel 11 is presently being used
by a number of people in the New Orleans area. They will have to
get off the channel within 5 years.
The FCC simply says they will phase them out, they will not
renew their radio license to operate on this channel, so there will be
a phaseout period of these people when they renew their licenses.
Channel 12 and channel 14, whereas the scheduled use of these
frequencies over the various sectors is probably what I would say
probably is the best visible traffic system you would probably have,
but it still does have the propagation of some radio waves over the
possibility of some interference.
We feel that these frequencies should be totally dedicated to VTS.
There should not be extraneous conversations on them, and that the
Coast Guard would be the center, and would be better off in this
area, as would our vessels, but we feel the Coast Guard should stand
up to FCC and insist on these channels.
Now, channel 14 and channel 12-
Mr. TREEN. May I ask a question on that point?
Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.
Mr. TREEN. You have expressed some concern for the public that
use these channels having to give up their license. You are also
saying the Coast Guard should stand up to the FCC, and demand
they have clear channels.
What are the other channels that would be available? I mean, we
cannot serve both of these purposes, or can we?
Do you have a proposal for solving that particular problem?
Mr. STEGBAUER. We have some channels-I am not an expert
in this area, and probably some more witnesses will brief you a little
bit better, but there are some channels that are dedicated to inter-
national use by treaty, but there is a provision in the treaty that you
may use these frequencies on a condition they do not cause inter-~
ference with international use of these channels.
PAGENO="0234"
230
The FCC has been extremely reluctant to allow these frequencies
to be used by U.S. maritime interests. We feel that they could be
used, and that they should be used, as long as we do not interfere
with any international treaties.
This is an area where some additional frequencies are available;
12 and 14 were not dedicated solely to the engineers. They are listed
in the JFCC usage chart as port operation frequencies. They are
available to the general public also, not just the Corps of Engineers.
So the general public, in effect, is losing three frequencies to this
VTS in the New Orleans area, and as strapped as we are for fre-
quencies now, because of the increasing use of VHF, and the increase
in the growth of traffic, it does present a problem to us.
I believe this is about all I have.
Bob, would you have some-
Mr. GARDNER. I will just make myself available for questions,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Lloyd?
Mr. ENEIX. I have nothing.
Mr. BIAGGI. Will you gentlemen be in town tomorrow?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. We have heard so much on this committee about
lack of communication, and so forth. You have indicated that your
attempts to communicate with the Coast Guard have fallen on deaf
ears.
Could you be specific? What have they refused to consider? I am
not talking about what they may have refused to do, but when have
they failed to listen, in what respect?
Mr. STEGBAUER. In one respect they have failed to listen to our
pleas to, "let us implement the system to a graduated basis."
Now, yesterday, for the first time-
Mr. TREEN. Have you been able to communicate your thoughts
as to why, such as you have done in your statement here?
The four points that you mentioned on page 5 are an excellent sum-
mary, I think, of your position. Essentially your position is you should
not put this system in operation until you have all the things you
need: trained personnel, good communications, and the radar sur-
veillance that you want.
Have you not been able to make these points to the Coast Guard?
Is that the problem, they have not sat down and listened to you?
Or is the problem that they do not agree with you?
Mr. STEGBAUER. The problem is they do not agree with us. We
have sat down with their project officers in New Orleans. We have a
small group of us that do sit down in the District Commander's
office, and they just do not change at all.
Mr. TREEN. Then the next question would be, how would the
formal adoption of an advisory committee change that? The idea of a
committee is not to dictate policy, but to communicate.
Mr. STEGBAUER. May I be very honest?
Mr. TREEN. Yes, sir.
Mr. STEGBAUER. I think some of you gentlemen have been snowed
by the Coast Guard, by the amount of conversations that have been
going on with industry, because there are no minutes, there are very
little records of the conversations, so particularly in the letter from
PAGENO="0235"
231
Captain Woods, for instance, where he gives this broad view of all
these people they have talked to.
Sure, we have been called in.
Mr. TREEN. In view of the transcript of the hearings we had in
New Orleans, I was pretty vocal about the establishing of better
communications at that time.
I agree with you, but I was trying to get to the point of whether
or not the problem is really that they have not listened to your
arguments, and to the points that you make. Or is it that they have
listened, but they simply have not been responsive in the fashion
that you would wish them to be?
I think you have more or less answered, but if you have got some-
thing else to say-
Mr. STEGBATJER. Well, Congressman Treen, I believe you are
addressing this situation in the hearings in New Orleans probably
had about the same results as our endeavors.
They will talk to us, but we make no headway whatsoever, now.
I do not think-I should say, we do not think-our whole group does
not think it is uureasonable to ask that this thing be implemented on
a smaller size basis, and let us all get in and get our feet wet.
Now, 243 miles, one crack right out of the box, will go 243 miles,
has a) lot of area to cover. I am not familiar with how many-how the
worldwide VTS system, how big they are, but I venture to say that is
probably the biggest one in the world.
Mr. TREEN. Essentially what you are saying is, let us narrow the
geographical scope of what we are trying to do, and implement that
with radar and trained personnel-there is no quarrel about whether
you are supposed to have trained personnel.
We agree with that. You may have quarrel as to what is going to be
necessary to train them, but essentially what you are saying is, Let us
narrow the scope to the two sectors you mention in your statement as
a possible narrowing of geographical scope, and not open until you
have four things that you outlined in your statement. That is essen-
tially your position?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. And that has been communicated to the Coast Guard,
certainly if not before, it has been communicated today. I think from
my knowledge of it, it has been communicated to the Coast Guard
prior to this time.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask you-you have no quarrel with the whole
system, implementation of the system, and its objectives, if I under-
stand correctly, but it is a question of-
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, I would have to be very candid with you.
There are a number of us who have some reservation about how
many benefits would derive to the industry or the general public from
the expenditure of this money, and a number of us think the Bridge-
to-Bridge Communication Act with the cleaned up channel, and rigid
enforcement, would contribute in large measure to helping avoid
accidents.
Of course, it would not have the radar, just the communication
network, but the bridge-to-bridge communication requirement, when
they became law, they did not even affect most of the people running
PAGENO="0236"
232
the upper river, because they had been doing it for years on their own
volition, but they recognized how much of an assist it was to them.
The question is, When you talk about money, talk about cost
benefits, one has to wonder whether they are really going to be this
many cost benefits derived from a YTS.
I think most of us are reconciled we are going to get YTS, and in
the end we are going to get it mandatory, but there are some reserva-
tions about the cost benefits that we as taxpayers have.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, that is always a concern of ours, too, Mr.
Stegbauer.
With relation to the question you raised on the sector-to-sector
application, it has been touched on several times, and rather than an
overall application in this particular area, I think it was the testimony
of the admiral that there has been substantial reduction in accidents,
or virtual improvement in safety records in the areas where the system
has already been installed, and it would seem to me that that would
be the basis for their installation over this extended area.
Mr. STEGBAIJER. We would be very interested in seeing this type of
numbers.
We have never seen this, to our knowledge.
Mr. BIAGGI. I am sure that can be made available to you. They
were made available to me.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, the reason we do not know is we do not
have the figures.
Mr. BIAGGI. We will make them available to you.
Mr. STEGBAUER. If we could have the figures, we could look at it, too.
We are not in this thing with closed minds. We are interested in
safety as much as anybody else. After all, if you want to look at it
just from a cold, hard money standpoint, we are the ones that pay
for the bills after these coffisions.
Mr. BIAGGI. We are aware of that, Mr. Stegbauer.
Mr. STEGBAUER. We are interested also if the thing will materiali-
ally decrease casualties, both in property and in lives.
Now, nobody could fail to support that.
Mr. BIAGGI. It is now 1:32, beyond our tenancy, and we will be
dispossessed, if you like. You will appear tomorrow if you have further
comments to make, and we would appreciate them.
Thank you very much.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Thank you.
iWhereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon-
vene at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, September 22, 1976.]
PAGENO="0237"
VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1976
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth
House Office Building, Hon. Mario Biaggi, chairman of the sub-
committee, presiding.
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.
When we recessed yesterday, Mr. Stegbauer, Mr. Eneix and Mr.
Gardner were at the witness table. Will you please come forward?
CONTINUING TESTIMONY OP PRANK T. STEGBAUER, EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT, SOUTHERN TOWING CO., REPRESENTING THE
AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY
ROBERT GARDNER, ALTER CO., AND LLOYD ENEIX, AGRI-TRANS.
CORP.
Mr. BIAGGI. Do you have a statement, Mr. Eneix?
Mr. ENEIX. I do have a statement, but in the essence of time, I
will more or less reiterate our concern, and we would just like to
basically highlight the statement that I have.
Our prime concern is, of course, the communication of the VTS.
And, of course, the incorporation of radar into the system, and I
think the basic functional thing dictates that they be incorporated,
and it is the concern of our industry, a number of systems without
incorporation of clear-cut communication and radar, and I think I
would like to leave it at that, in the essence of time.
Mr. TREEN. I just want to ask one question.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Treen.
Mr. TREEN. On page 2 you state, "the use of YTS systems is
grossly misrepresented."
Please briefly say who did the misrepresentation, and misrepre-
senting, and what specifics are you referring to?
Mr. ENEIX. We specifically refer to the type of research, which
in our opinion has been gleaned from the Coast Guard form 2692.
Mr. TREEN. I am still having trouble hearing you. Can you bring
the mike a little closer, please?
I do not know if the volume is up.
Mr. ENEIX. The Coast Guard form 2692, having been presented
to us, was the vehicle which the information was gleaned from to
justify a YTS system, accident reporting.
(233)
PAGENO="0238"
234
A form 2692, for example, has to be produced for each barge of a
tow, even though one barge may be the only piece of equipment that
is involved. That also includes a 2692 for the towboat itself.
The only information, of course, that is available has been Coast
Guard records, and we in the industry have not kept records, although
we have been the producers of the 2692's, and it was explained to us
that this was the method of justifying a VTS system.
Basically, accident prevention, and the number of accidents were
gleaned from the 2692's, was an astronomical number, but not valid.
Mr. TItEEN. Well, what you are saying is that the Coast Guard has
misrepresented the numbers, or misinterpreted, or deliberately-
Mr. ENEIX. I would suggest-
Mr. TREEN. Or falsified records, or what?
Mr. ENEIX. I would suggest to you that that is probably a combina-
tion. Determinations were made from 2692's as to what type of acci-
dent could have been prevented with a VTS system.
Now, we have no way of knowing who made this determination.
Mr. TREEN. All right. Sir, if you would care to submit something in
addition for the record as to where you think the misrepresentation
specifically has occurred, I would be most interested.
I have nothing further to ask at this time.
Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Stegbauer, I want to go back again to your
proposal for a sector implementation rather than an overall imple-
mentation. I believe that you are suggesting in your testimony that
the Coast Guard, rather than covering the entire sector, should initiate
the program, if any, only in two sectors in the beginning, and from
experience determine what to do in the two other sectors. Is that
correct?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. HEYWARD. Would it not create a problem if you are going to
have a gap in the system for vessels that are moving in the river
system, or going into the blind areas, so to speak?
What is the problem, or difficulty for the industry in participating
in that blind sector, in between sectors one and three-whatever the
proper numbers are?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, there are two. One, we do no think it is
needed from a navigational standpoint. Our groups do not feel it
would be any problem at all.
Mr. HEYWARD. I beg your pardon, without any-
Mr. STEGBAUER. Without any problem at all, from going to a non-
controlled sector to a controlled sector. In large measure we do it
quite often, even when you go into a lock, in a sense this is a con-
trolled sector, because you come under the control of the lockmaster.
So it is no problem as far as the navigational problems. We do not
believe that the money spent in the other systems would have good
cost-benefit ratio.
Also, the Coast Guard has told us they are constrained by lack of
funds, and we would like to see the funds spent in the most productive
area, since they are limited funds.
We certainly understand that, and these are the areas we feel would
be most productive.
Mr. HEYWARD. But initially, the expenditure, as I understand it, is
for the computer and the vessel traffic center. If it is there, and has
PAGENO="0239"
235
the capability of receiving and analyzing your reports from that
midsector, what is the problem of funding?
Mr. STEGBAUER. This goes to the heart of our argument. The in-
formation received by the VTS has no validity without the ability
to cross-check the computer with radar surveillance.
Mr. ETEYWARD. I can understand that, but there is a report by GAO
on this matter, criticizing the Coast Guard for going too sophisticated
in the system, and proposing that they have basics, that is, com-
munication systems only in all the ports, before they go into the
surveillance aspect.
They are getting advice and recommendations from more than one
direction.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, I am familiar with the GAO's report, but I
have not known GAO to be experienced in the maritime navigation
field.
Mr. HEYWARD. I do not know that that is a particularly critical
answer.
We are talking about the expenditure of Government funds, and
GAO should be an expert on that aspect.
Now, the real question is-what burden is `placed on industry to
make vessel reports in this middle sector, if the other two sectors are
going to be put into effect?
Mr. STEGBAIJER. I do not see the necessity for it. The information
that goes into the nonsurveillance sectors, in our opinion, will not be
valid information, and could seriously-
Mr. HEYWARD. I guess what you are really saying, you do not think
one or two or three ought to be into effect without the radar surveil-
lance in the beginning. That is really the answer; is it not?
Mr. STEGBATJER. Absolutely.
Mr. HEYWARD. But if they are going to put it on a voluntary basis
for vessel movement reporting systems despite your argument that it
should be an overall surveillance, then the midsector is equally war-
ranted as the two sectors surrounding it; would that not be correct?
This is not a separate objection on your part, as I understand it.
You are saying that there should be radar surveillance, and it should
be radar surveillance in the two critical sectors, leaving the other two
alone, because there is not really a problem demonstrated there. Is
that fair to state?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. But despite your position, if they go ahead and put
in a vessel movement reporting system on a voluntary, not mandatory
basis whether you can consider it cost beneficial or otherwise, the
same objection would exist with the midsector as those other two. Is
that not right?
Mr. STEGBAUER. The objection to the nonradar sector is the fact
the information is not valid, and we feel that our captains and pilots
will not be able to place reliability on it.
Now, in light of that, I guess, you all perfectly figured out we spent
a lot of time yesterday afternoon, I believe the word is caucusing up
here, and we have come forth with a little statement from AWO, and
and if I may read it to you:
After listening to the Coast Guard's comments yesterday, and
studying their prepared statement, the members of AWO who are
78-280--76-16
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236
concerned with New Orleans' VTS will recommend, with great re-
luctance, to the board of directors of AWO that due to the following
facts:
1. The Coast Guard's refusal to consider the installation of radar
surveillance in the New Orleans' VTS.
2. The Coast Guard's unwillingness to provide clean VHF channels
for VTS communication that will not interfere and/or deprive the
maritime industry of presently used VHF frequencies.
3. The Coast Guard's failure to provide industry with a compre-
hensive plan for the proper training of VTC personnel.
4. The Coast Guard's failure to provide a vehicle for ongoing
dialog between the Coast Guard and industry.
The New Orleans VTS as presently proposed, will have the potential
to provide mariners in the system with unrealiable and erroneous
information, that will make the system unsafe, and will be a con-
tributing factor to the possibility of accidents to those mariners using
and relying on the system.
Therefore, the AWO board of directors should advise our member-
ship not to use the New Orleans VTS as presently proposed on a
voluntary basis, and that AWO work against the mandatory imposi-
tion of New Orleans VTS in its present form, with al] measures avail-
able to AWO.
Now, most of the people that are members of AWO, who are here
today are not administrative people. These are all operational people,
and we feel this very, very strongly.
Mr. HEYWARD. You do not want a voluntary system. You do not
want a mandatory system unless it has radar, and you do not want a
mandatory system except in two sectors, and that is what it boils
down to.
Mr. STEGBAUER. We did not accept mandatory systems, but if you
have got radar surveillance for the full length of the system, and the
Coast Guard sees fit to spend the money, and the Congress-
Mr. HEYWARD. So you do not want a voluntary system. You want
it mandatory. Is that correct?
Mr. STEGBAUER. We do not want a voluntary system that is not
radar surveilled.
Mr. HEYWARD. Suppose they had radar, would you be in favor of
voluntary or a mandatory system?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, we are on record either way would be fine
with us.
Mr. HEYWARD. You do not care?
Mr. STEGBAUER. No, as long as you have the radar system and
proper communication. That is what we are working for.
We realize that it will go mandatory, and we are not sticking our
head in the sand. We realize this and only want the best for the
system.
Mr. HEYWARD. There is another question in connection with input,
and I can understand the problem which you have had in connection
with your dealings with the 8th District Coast Guard.
As you recall, there was a meeting in the chairman's office and the
commandant of the Coast Guard and your group, AWO of which
you were a member-
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir.
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237
Mr. HEYWARD. At that time the complaint was made that the
Coast Guard was not keeping the industry advised of their proposal.
And as I recall, the basic thrust was that you wanted to know exactly
where the Coast Guard was at that point in their planning, if any. Is
this a fair statement?
Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. And as a result of that the Commandant agreed to
issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking-not proposed rules,
but an advance notice-so that everybody would have notice, not
only the industry, but any other interested people, including the public
who were not involved in transportation by water.
He did that shortly thereafter, and now we hear that, presumably,
the Coast Guard has now changed its mind on going forward with
proposed rules and wants to put this thing in on a step-by-step basis
beginning with a voluntary system. And yet you say you have no input.
I think the result indicates that somebody has a hell of a lot of input.
Mr. STEGBAIJER. I have to agree with you there. The Coast Guard
also told us they intended to put this system in on a voluntary basis
all the time.
Now, this is the Coast Guard in Washington, but the Coast Guard
in the 8th District in New Orleans has told us this is not so.
I have a letter here from the project officer that says it will go in
on a 2-month voluntary basis at which time he will train his VTC
people on using our vessels as a guinea pig, and at the end of the
3-month period they will go mandatory.
Mr. HEYWARD. That is not what we were told yesterday, and
apparently there are no present plans to go mandatory in 3 months.
Mr. STEGBAUER. This is reading a letter of February 13, 1976,
from the 8th District.
Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me.
I notice Admiral Fugaro is in the room, and it appears he is listening
as we are. There seems to be some discrepancy here.
Mr. Stegbauer has a letter indicating 3 months and then mandatory,
and your testimony is at variance with that letter.
We would appreciate a firm position and a clear one.
Admiral FUGARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I can only reaffirm what I said yesterday, that our
intentions are not to go mandatory, and there was no fixed period of
any 3 months or 6 months. I believe I testified yesterday that our
intention was to go for a reasonable period of time, and I believe I
did indicate that I would estimate a minimum of, say, a 6-month
period before we would even consider, and probably longer than that.
While Captain Stegbauer has some letter from the project officer
down there, the ultimate control of the project is still here in head-
quarters. And I can assure you that what I told you yesterday what
will come about, that is that initially it will be a voluntary system.
There is no fixed voluntary period that we are imposing now.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.
Admiral FUGARO. While I am here, I would like to make perhaps
one clarification to other testimony that was given this morning with
respect to the Coast Guard form 2692, which is now our accident
reporting form for reportable marine casualties.
What Captain Eneix said was correct with respect to the fact when
there was a casualty, each barge involved in the casualty has to be
PAGENO="0242"
238
reported on a separate 2692 form inasmuch as each of the vessels
is a registered vessel. But when we consider casualties, we only con-
sider the casualty as a whole, whether there is 1 or more than 1, or
10 barges, is 1 accident.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TREEN. May I just ask for clarity, do you mean that if there
are eight barges and one tow, a 2692 is filed on each of the eight barges?
Admiral FTJGARO. Yes.
Mr. TREEN. But in your computation you are saying that you
would count that as one casualty if that tow is involved in a collision?
Admiral FTJGARO. That is right, sir.
Mr. TREEN. OK. Thank you.
Mr. STEGBAUER. Mr. Chairman, this is a problem that we have had
over and over and over again. New Orleans tell us one thing, and we
have conducted our dealings with New Orleans up until the time of
the advanced proposed rulemaking.
We base our replies to the advanced proposed rulemaking on what
we have been told in the 8th District. We have had no knowledge of
these items until the day before yesterday.
If I remember correctly, and you can correct me, Mr. Heyward,
Admiral Price said the same thing in the meeting with Mr. Biaggi's
office that we had with the Commandant.
Mr. HEYWARD. I think there was an agreement in Mr. Biaggi's
office that there had been a lack of communication which was un-
fortunate. But it seems to me that you have taken a position that
anything the project officer said was something that had been estab-
lished, and that is simply not so.
The only way under the law that the Coast Guard can establish
this system and require rules to be followed by the maritime industry
is by publishing rules which apply.
Now, the Administrative Procedures Act requires them to go
through a certain format to do that.
Each time any form of paper has come out, you have said, in effect,
at least this is my impression, that they have put this in concrete
and we have not had a chance to do anything with it.
I think the result has demonstrated that nothing has been in con-
crete, and then you criticize them because there has been a change
which, in many cases, I am sure, has been caused by the comments
that you have made which, to me, demonstrates that you have had
input, whether or not what you have recommended is exactly what
comes out or not. I think if right now we were to address ourselves
to what the future role should be of this vessel traffic system, and
what the proposed rules are going to contain, this is the way that all
of us should see that it goes.
Now, in the proposed rules, Admiral Fugaro said yesterday it was
a voluntary system, that they would not issue proposed rules because
it would not be mandatory. They are not required. They would do
it by a manual which would be issued.
If they decided at the time they deemed it required to go manda-.
tory, they cannot go mandatory without issuing a proposed rule,
giving the public the opportunity to comment.
PAGENO="0243"
239
So they are not going to be able to one day say, Mr. Stegbauer,
tomorrow morning this is mandatory. They cannot do that, whether
they want to or not.
Mr. BIAGGI. Before you respond, if you will forgive us, we are
subservient to those bells. There will be a 10-minute recess.
[Short recess.]
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.
Mr. Stegbauer, you were about to respond.
Mr. STEGBATJER. Could I have the question again, please?
Mr. BIAGGI. It was not a question. You were responding to a
comment made by Mr. lEleyward.
Mr. STEGBATJER. Well, the basis of our problem has been the
difference in what we are told in the 8th District and what we have
now been told since Sunday night by Washington.
Evidently there is some breakdown in communication between
Washington and the 8th District. But in our prior dealings we have
been confined to dealing with the 8th District, and we had no way
of knowing what the Washington area was speaking about.
Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I am inclined to agree with you. There seems to
be some confusion, and I think the result of the testimony today on
both your part and all the hearings on the part of Admiral Fugaro of
the Coast Guard, will possibly clear that up. Communication obvi-
ously is a problem, and has always been a problem with a large insti-
tution. And I guess that is one of the reasons we have hearings, to
resolve them.
But one question I would like to put to you is do you believe an
advisory committee would help resolve our problems?
Mr. STEGBAUER. If we could get an advisory committee where we
could have an exchange of information and not a briefing by the
Coast Guard is really what we have been going to when we to the
meetings in the 8th District, we get a briefing.
I believe we could make some progress, and both parties go into
it with an open mind. And we certainly stand ready to. I believe
progress can be made.
Now, whether it is a formal advisory committee, I realize this is a
rather ponderous mode of operation, and I do not think we have any
objection to an informal advisory committee, which I am not sure
whether that is in compliance with the law or not as regards advisory
committees. There has been some condemnation of these about
anything we can have in a group and meet and make records of the
dialog that goes on in the meetings. We would welcome the opportunity
to try it.
Mr. BIAGGI. Why could you not use those records or recordings of
informal meetings?
Mr. STEGBATJER. That would be perfectly all right with us. That
is no problem at all. We have got into this thing really and did not
realize what we were getting into, and we did not make arrangements
to keep recordings. And we learned rather slowly, but we have learned
in the future that we will do so.
Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to think that, when you sit down with the
Coast Guard, all parties concerned, in good faith, will have an honest
PAGENO="0244"
240
exchange with one purpose in mind, and that is to resolve the im-
mediate or anticipated problems. Whether it is formal or informal is
another question.
Certainly there should be these meetings. I could not contemplate
the Coast Guard operating in a vacuum and, conversely, I could not
expect that industry would be functioning within its own parameters
without having some input into the Coast Guard and in its
deliberations.
Mr. STEGBAUER. We have always been able to do it before on many
other bills that affected our industry, the writing of the subchapter on
hazardous cargo regulations, all pollution prevention regulations,
many other regulations, we have had input, and we have worked with
the Coast Guard and got something they could live with, the Con-
gress could live with, and we could live with.
We see no reason why we could not work this out, talk and be
listened to.
Mr. BIAGGI. I think we are in the process of doing that and have
been doing that for the past number of months. I think the con-
clusions may not always be compatible with your thinking, but some-
where along the line you have to fish or cut bait, and the decisions are
made, and some you like and some you do not like. But I always
believe that the decisions are made for the benefit of the total picture.
As far as this committee is concerned, it is our policy to have an
honest exchange and prolific exchange because we are as much in-
terested in the industry as we are in the policing of it by the Coast
Guard. And I know that reflects the views of Chairman Sullivan.
It is important that all components work together. We like to help
rather than impede. We have enough problems under our roof created
through the bureaucracy.
Mr. STEGBAUER. We appreciate this attitude, and that is why we
are here to ask your help.
Mr. BIAGGr. Madam Chairman.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. I have no questions at this time. I am sorry I was
not able to come over here and hear the testimony, because I am ex-
tremely interested in some kind of a system that can work. And I feel
as Chairman Biaggi feels, that there needs to be, and we hope there
will be, a communication and general discussion, so you can give the
benefit of your experience. You know the river, you know it well,
you know your tugboats and the vessels that you operate, and pos-
sibly in that connection better than the people who are going to be
responsible for administering any rules or regulations that are set up.
If there is not a free exchange, so that we understand each other,
it is just that much more difficult, So I hope that the Coast Guard
will adhere to this and work with the men on the river.
I have no questions at this time.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Stegbauer, Mr. Eneix, and Mr. Gardner.
Mr. BIAGGI. Representing the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and
Waterways, Capt. Ed Conrad, Compass Marine Services; Capt. Jack
R. Bullard, American Commercial Barge Line Co.; and Dr. Robert L.
Brite, statistical consultant, accompanied by William E. O'Neil,
counsel.
PAGENO="0245"
241
STATEMENT OP CAPT. ED CONRAD, COMPASS MARINE SERVICES;
CAPT. JACIC R. BULLARD, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BARGE LINE
CO.; AND DR. ROBERT L. BRITE, STATISTICAL CONSULTANT, AC-
COMPANIED BY WILLIAM E. O'NEIL, COUNSEL
Mr. O'NEIL. Thank you.
We have consumed a great deal of time yesterday and today talking
about communications and vessel traffic systems. It is the objective
of this committee, which was formed on the 15th of July primarily
to evaluate the problems that have existed in the past between the
Coast Guard and the barge-towing industry, to look at it from a legal
point of view, and from a statistical point of view, and from a practical
pomt of view to find out exactly where their problems are, to point
them out and hope for some sort of relief.
We have filed with the Coast Guard our comments-19 pages of
which relate to what has gone by the boards. I do not see any point
in reiterating anything that has been said in the past 2 days about
communications. I think that this committee recognizes that there is
a problem. I would hope that at the end of the testimony of Dr. Brite,
Captain Conrad and Captain Bullard both, that I would be allowed
again to make some comments and some constructive thoughts-set
forth some constructive thoughts on how perhaps we can proceed
and get off center in this matter.
We have two statements-one which will be given by Captain
Conrad, which specifically relates to the communications part of the
planned vessel traffic system. This is the nerve center of the New
Orleans vessel traffic system.
The statement by Captain Bullard will relate to management prob-
lems in that system; and I hope that we can now address ourselves to
the problems that we have so diligently tried to convey to the Coast
Guard and show you why we are so concerned about what is going on
in New Orleans from a tower's point of view, and the river operators'
point of view; and I would like to turn this now to Captain Conrad,
and if permissible, Mr. Chairman, and other members, I would like
to not have his comments read into the record, but rather just go
right to the heart of the problem and have him summarize basically
what he is going to say, and this will be done in his presentation.
Mr. BIAGGI. We will accept his entire statement to be included in
the record, and he can summarize.
[The statement referred to follows :J
STATEMENT No. 1 OF AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR PORTS AND WATERWAYS
On behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways, we submit
herewith our comments which will be presented by Captain Ed Conrad on the
communications problems in the proposed Lower Mississippi River YTS system.
I am here on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways to
testify in connection with the Coast Guard's proposed regulations dealing with a
VTS system on the Lower Mississippi River. Specifically, I would like to address
my comments to what we feel are the weaknesses of the system's communication
net and what we think is required for its proper functioning.
Briefly, the proposed regulations provide that each vessel participating in the
system must make an initial report 30 minutes or more before entering the system,
a movement report upon actually entering the system and each time the vessel
passes a reporting point, and a final report whenever the vessel anchors, moors,
or leaves the system. The initial report must give the following information:
name of vessel, position of vessel, estimated entry time, point of entry, destination
PAGENO="0246"
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and route, ETA, draft, number of barges, length of tow, dangerous cargoes, and
notice of any handling defects.
The movement report must provide the vessel name, position, time of passing
reporting point, next reporting point and ETA at next reporting point. The final
report will consist of the time and place of mooring, anchoring or leaving the
system. Additionally, a vessel must make supplementary reports whenever any
of the information it has furnished to the Vessel Control Center changes. This
will include ETA changes of more than 10 minutes.
Three VHF channels have been assigned to the VTS system: 11, 12 and 14.
Communications in each of the geographical sectors of the VTS system will be
assigned to one of these channels as specified in an operations manual which has
not yet been developed by the Coast Guard.
Our reservations about the communications aspect of the VTS system center
around the problems of an insufficient number of frequencies, ineffective policing
of the frequencies, the monitoring of three frequencies, the effect of equipment
failures, and the accuracy of reported information.
At present, the frequencies assigned to the VTS seem totally inadequate for
the job. The Coast Guard in the preamble to its proposed regulations estimates
a total of 270,000 vessel transits yearly in the VTS area. It is noteworthy that
this figure is taken from data which is over three years old. Since that time,
cargo tonnage has increased so presumably vessel transits have likewise increased.
However, for the sake of argument, we will use the Coast Guard's old figures for
a simple example illustrating the likelihood of overloading the VTS communication
network:
Assuming there are 270,000 vessel transits of the area yearly, there will be an
average of 740 daily vessel transits of the area. The three channels assigned to
the VTS will provide 72 hours of air time each day during which communication
may take place. Thus, the average vessel in the system will have approximately
six minutes each day in which it must establish contact with the vessel Control
Center, give its required reports, and receive whatever information or instructions
which the Center wishes to transmit. Experienced vessel operators have, after hav-
ing reviewed the reporting requirements, conservatively estimated that they will
have to make 9 or 10 routine reports per transit. This works out to a maximum
of about 30 seconds for each routine report, during which time the vessel operator
must confirm contact with the Vessel Traffic Center, give his report, and receive
acknowledgment of his report along with any communication the Vessel Traffic
Center wishes to relay to him. This time limit may be possible to meet under the
best of circumstances, but the Coast Guard has not shown this to be the case,
and our simple example has not taken into consideration several other important
factors.
First of all, channels 11 and 12 are not dedicated to the exclusive use of the
VTS system. Channel 11 is presently still being used for commercial marine
operations. While the F.C.C. has promised to grant no new commercial licenses
on this channel, it will be several years before all the presently outstanding
licenses expire and the channel becomes fully usable by the VTS.
Until that future date, an unknown quantity of air time will continue to be
used for non-VTS purposes. More importantly, channel 12 is shared with the
Corps of Engineers for communications at their locks within the VTS area. At the
present time, there are no plans to change this situation which obviously reduces
VTS utilization of channel 12. Both of these facts will, for the foreseeable future,
significantly cut down on the maximum of 30 seconds which the average vessel
will have to complete a routine report.
In addition, all of this has assumed that vessel reports will be evenly scattered
throughout the day. What will happen if there is a peak of vessel traffic during the
day? This will obviously bunch the routine reports into a shorter time span and
could easily prevent many vessels from making contact with the VTC at all.
What are these vessels to do then? If they proceed anyway and report later, will
this be a statutory fault making them liable in case of an accident? Or are they to
wait until they can make contact with the VTC and be forced to suffer the eco-
nomic consequences of delay? As far as we know, the Coast Guard has not even
considered these possibilities in assessing the economic impact of its regulations.
Interestingly enough, under the regulations proposed by the Coast Guard, such
a communication tie-up could, and probably will be, considered a hazardous
circumstance sufficient to authorize the VTC to take direct control of vessel
movements. This control will undoubtedly consist of making the vessels wait for
instructions from the VTC.
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The Coast Guard has yet to make any determination whether such foul-ups
are possible during times of peak radio traffic, nor has it given any indication
of how it will meet such a crisis~ We in the industry feel that the most likely
result of the inadequate communication facilities of the VTS will be to make the
vessel traffic slow down and wait for the government to catch up, regardless of
what actual traffic conditions are.
There are 300 frequencies available for aircraft communications and additional
private channels are available to airlines. The marine industry must rely on a
tenth of that number of channels for all of its communications. We cannot under-
stand why the Coast Guard has not attempted to get clear channels for its VTS
system rather than taking over channels already in heavy use. We can only
surmise that the Coast Guard feels it is more expedient to impose on the maritime
industry than to work with the F.C.C. in getting additional channels.
The Coast Guard has also not considered the problem resulting from the
significant override of the VTS channels by improperly adjusted signals. from
taxicabs, paging companies, and security guards' walkie-talkies in the New
Orleans area.
This problem, which is well documented by the industry's complaints to the
F.C.C., has caused great. difficulty in the communications on channels 13 and 16
mandated by the Bridge to Bridge Radio Communications Act and the F.C.C.
Whatever attempts have been made to police channels 13 and 16 have been
totally unsuccessful from the industry's viewpoint, and we see no reason why the
situation will be any different on the VTS channels. This kind of interference
will hamper VTS communications in some of the most heavily traveled areas in
the VTS. As far as we know, this problem has not even been recognized by the
Coast Guard.
Another area of our concern is in the fact that vessel operators will be required
to maintain a 24 hour radio watch on channels 13, 16 and a VTS or in-house
channel. The first is required by the Bridge to Bridge Radio Communications
Act and the second by the F.C.C. for distress, safety and calling. The third will
also be required if these regulations are adopted. Beyond the fact that monitoring
the additional channel will require the industry to~ incur the cost of additional
equipment, we will now have the situation where a vessel operator must try to
listen to three radios at the same time he is trying to run his boat. This is ob-
viously nearly impossible and is bound to result in confusion. It is hard to see
how such a requirement is consistent with the safety which the VTS system is
supposed to promote.
Equipment failure is another area of considerable concern on our part. The
Coast Guard informs us that radio failures should not prevent vessels from
entering the system. In the normal situation, this may create no greater difficulties
to shipping than are presently encountered under the Bridge to Bridge Radio
Communications Act. What worries us is what will happen during times when the
Vessel Traffic Center has taken control of traffic and there are large vessels with
radio failures navigating the system. The VTS system, in the absence of radar,
will be completely blind to these vessels and may inadvertently put participating
vessels in positions of extreme peril as a result of this blindness. We are informed
that the Coast Guard is undecided as to how this will be resolved, and we submit
that this is just the sort of thing which must be resolved prior to implementation
of the VTS system.
Other questions concerning the accuracy of the picture perceived by the Vessel
Traffic Center arise. From what we have been given to understand, the information
received from participating vessels will be fed into a computer which will generate
an artificial display representing the projected positions of vessels in the VTS
area. Certainly, the reliability of this picture is very suspect. There are possible,
indeed probable, inaccuracies every step of the way.
In addition to the fact that vessels with radio failures will not be tracked by the
computer, there are numerous other vessels which will be invisible in a practical
sense. Vessels working in barge fleets will not be pictured nor will non-towing
vessels under 65 feet. It is readily apparent that vessels falling within both of these
classifications are capable of inflicting serious damage in a collision, but the com-
puter will not know where they are.
Furthermore, there is a serious question of how errors will be found which are
introduced by the traffic controllers into otherwise accurate vessel reports. Given
the speed at which these controllers will have to work, the possibility of human
error seems significant. In a system with radar surveillance of traffic this problem
is done away with, but in the Coast Guard's proposed system such errors are bound
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to occur, and it is simply a matter of time before some unnoticed error becomes the
basis of a serious miscalculation during hazardous conditions. It may well be that
there is no way to eliminate such errors, but in that case, it would seem wise to
reevaluate the benefits which are claimed for this proposed VTS system.
Finally, there is the problem of the accuracy of the vessel's reports themeselves.
Even assuming the best efforts on the part of our vessel operators, we feel that the
Coast Guard is imposing an impossible burden upon them to produce accurate
reports. A couple of examples will illustrate this.
The VTS sectors will be approximately 20 miles long and a vessel transiting a
sector will, upon entry, be required to estimate his ETA at the end of the sector.
After this report, he will be required to give a supplemental report whenever his
ETA changes by more than 10 minutes. Presumably, this means that reported
ETA's are to be within an accuracy of 10 minutes. For a vessel travelling 4 mph. a
change in speed of less than 0.1 mph. will result in an ETA change of more than 10
minutes. There is absolutely no way that the present level of technology on most
vessels can measure such slight increments of speed. To do so would require an
enormous investment in radar-operated speedometers. Furthermore, the use of
such equipment would not solve the problem because the vessels are constantly
encountering current variations of more than 0.1 mph. and the vessels must of
necessity change speed in negotiating bends in the river and upon encountering
other vessels. As a result, the captain of a vessel will have to make an estimate of
his ETA based upon these variables. Since there is no way he can reliably estimate
his ETA within 10 minutes, it is a foregone conclusion that he will be forced by the
regulations to make amended reports whenever he can make a better estimate.
As it is a foregone conclusion that such supplemental reports will be necessary, he
will not be able to simply proceed in the customary manner, but will have to
continually revise his ETA due to constant variations from his estimate. We
understand that accurate reporting is necessary in order for the computer to
plot an accurate picture, but we are afraid that an on-board computer will be
necessary to provide information of the precision demanded by the Coast Guard.
Let us assume for the sake of argument, however, that the captains of the
vessels in the VTS system are paragons of navigational ability, and that they are
able to reliably estimate their ETA at a point 20 miles distant based upon their
knowledge of river currents and the various speeds that they will make on bends,
etc. When this information is given to the VTS computer, unless it can read the
captain's mind, it will project on its display a dot moving at the constant speed
necessary to arrive at the next reporting point on the captain's ETA. The com-
puter will accurately show this vessel's position at the time it enters the sector and
at the time it leaves. Whether the vessel is where the computer thinks it is in the
meantime is simply a matter of chance. This is because the captain in estimating
his ETA took into account such things as slowing down for bends and speeding
up in between. Suppose the vessel loses 10 minutes at each of 3 bends, intending to
make up the time on a straighter stretch of river. The vessel will be 3~i mile behind
the position the computer has plotted for it but its ETA will not necessarily have
changed. How such inaccurate information can be used in a VTS system is beyond
us, but this is what will be used unless radar surveillance is incorporated to show
the true positions of all vessels.
Such inaccuracies in the computer picture could cause serious safety and
economic detriment to the industry, especially during hazardous conditions when
traffic control has been taken over by the VTC. In fog or rain or other conditions
of low visibility for example, any traffic information which the VTC can give will
be more than useless if it contains such large errors. This has been the case in the
Houston VTS system where vessel operators unanimously report that VTS sup-
plied information is of no assistance to them. Vessels will have to proceed as they
do now, relying on their radar and bridge to bridge communications. The VTS will
be of no help whatever, and the VTC will more than likely simply shut down
traffic in the VTS area rather than allow it to continue on its own devices.
In summary, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends that the proposed VTS
regulations not he implemented until the Coast Guard satisfactorily resolves the
problems of overloading the communication channels due to insufficient available
airtime, sharing of frequencies with other interests and land-based radio inter-
ference. Also to be resolved are the problems of equipment failure, the numerous
channels which must be monitored simultaneously, and the inaccuracies inherent
in the computer's visual display. It may well be that these problems cannot be
resolved, or that the incorporation of radar surveillance into the system will be
necessary for satisfactory results. In any case, the existing problems in the com-
munications area are so great as to require a satisfactory solution prior to putting
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the VTS into operation. To do otherwise will be counter-productive to achieving
the desired results from the VTS.
Mr. O'NEIL. And therefore I would like to submit his entire record
to be studied as well as Captain Bullard's statement; and Captain
Conrad can now be allowed to go ahead and make his statement.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Sullivan, gentlemen, my name.
is Edward Conrad. I am a towboat operator in the New Orleans area.
I would like to limit my remarks to the communications portion of the
YTS.
Let me explain the problems as we see it, being the heart of the
VTS-communications.
I would like to take a look at the sector channels one by one and
we would like to say what the Coast Guard did not say. I would like
to give a brief explanation if I may on the channels, and the uses of
those specific channels.
The first thing I would like to address myself to is the channel 11,,
which is-
Mr. BIAGGI. Captain, if you would for a minute, we had a chart up
there yesterday, which the Coast Guard put up. Reference was made
to the sectors; and I wonder if we could have that so that I can see it.
Mr. O'NmL. Mr. Chairman, the other chart was super-imposed on
the Coast Guard chart because the Coast Guard chart deleted what
we considered to be a very significant portion of the waterways of
New Orleans and which have a direct bearing on communications.
That is why we put it on top.
Mr. CONRAD. When I need that chart I will ask them to turn it
over.
Mr. BIAGGI. Continue, please.
IVIr. CONRAD. Channel 11, from what I was able to understand
from yesterday's comments, is the channel to be used for VTS in the
sector of the New Orleans Metropolitan Area.
Channel 11 is classified as a commercial channel, operates on 156.550.
It functions, as specified, by the FCC's Intership, meaning vessel-to-
vessel, and ship-to-ship; meaning a commercial, duly licensed FCC
holder may use this channel to speak to his vessels.
There are only eight channels of that classification available to our
industry, which we all must have and live with.
Commercial channels are used for the purpose of exchanging pay-
rolls, taking orders for groceries, supplies, and so forth. It is the activity
of operating a business of a land-based station, trying to communicate
with the vessel which is always mobile.
If we lose One of these eight channels, which are already desperately
crowded in our New Orleans area, it would put a tremendous burden
on our industry.
Remember, now, that I specified it is only one of eight available
channels and I submit to you an exhibit showing the breakdown of
the channels, that you may refer to.
If the Coast Guard gets on that channel and uses it for VTS, there
is no such thing as sharing the channel. The Coast Guard will monopo-
lize it. We will be moved off. The license-holder will have to find
anOther place. The FCC will give him, assumingly, one of the existing
seven channels.
Channels 12 and 14 I would like to approach next. The other two
VTS channels that the Coast Guard is going to use in their sector
operations is 156.60146.700.
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24~6
These channels are classified as port operations. Thes e are the
channels that we must use in communicating with our vessels.
Their change of orders, their tow makeup instructions, fleeting
operations, and the entire operation of a tremendously busy harbor
are all communications done on VHF channels designated as port
operations.
These port operation channels seem to have led one to believe one
had an exclusion or an exclusive right of the Corps of Engineers. This
is not so. The Corps of Engineers by local custom in the New Orleans
area uses channel 12 or 14 as a switchover channel to communicate
to the vessels their intentions of locking, and their position of locking;
and their position of locking; and it is a tremendously busy channel;
and the reason for the use of these channels is because these are two
of the most popular channels aboard all vessels for port operation.
The removal of these two channels from our sector would greatly-
greatly hurt port operations. These two channels would be removed
from a total of only seven port operation channels issued to this
industry; and I am not referring only to the towing industry; I am
referring to the Maritime industry; I am talking about dredging; I
am talking about pipe-laying; I am talking about marine construction
and contractors; and I am talking about vessels that are licensed to
have these channels.
We have a tremendous amount of people that are demanding the
use of these channels. People have a lot of money invested in antenna
and radio equipment for communication. These people, it is true, they
will move elsewhere and they will get off the 12 and off the 14 and
they will be run off, but what will they have left? They will have only
five port operation channels to use for the entire area. I find that this
would be an impossibility for us to live with.
I wonder if the Coast Guard has also considered the licenseholders
of these channels, both 11, 12, and 14, that are not directly in the
New Orleans area, but are in places like Morgan City, Homer, Dulac,
all of the Bayou country. There are many, many licensed people in
these areas that have these channels that use them also for port
operations.
There will definitely be a bleeding through a communication. You
need clear channels; you need perfectly clear channels to dispatch
information as VTS presumes they are going to dispatch to us.
I would like to now approach channel 13, which seems to be a
channel with quite a bit of niisunderstanding.
Channel 13 is 156.650. Its classification is navigational. It is the
only navigational channel for the use of all vessels on the waterways
of the United States. Every bridge-to-bridge communication is to
take place on this channel. Every vessel seeing an approaching vessel
planning to make a passing, a landing or relay, whatever his intentions
are to the vessels in his immediate area must by law be communicated
on channel 13.
The Coast Guard has informed us that they will use channel 13 in
emergencies to communicate with vessels in the VTS. I cannot see
that. I would like to get onto that a little further on in my discussion;
but we do have the communication from the Coast Guard that they
will be able to operate on 13.
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247
Channel 16 is 156.800. This is a channel that we are told we do not
have to monitor any more if all this goes into effect. I find that hard
to believe. The classification is to stress safety in calling. They say if
we do not monitor 16, we can monitor the house channel. It is still
another channel that you have to monitor.
We do not have any such thing as a house channel. No one has an
exclusive channel. When you monitor a house channel, you are
monitoring all of the dispatching of commercial activities of numerous
vessels, not just a house. It does not stay blank until somebody wants
you. It is in constant and continuous use.
I would like to explain the FCC's procedure on the use of 16.
A licensee on a channel of land-based channel is obligated by law to
monitor 16, and any other frequency that he has as a working fre-
quency simultaneously. He is supposed to make all communication
contacts, the initial contact, on channel 16. If you tell the vessels
where you do not have to monitor 16 any more because you know we
are going to relieve you of that burden that that means the port
operation must try to make contact some other way.
The relief of 16 may sound like it is a monitoring and may seem like
it gives us some relief of our burden; but the only thing it does is add
to the confusion of, where do you find the vessel when you want him?
Where is he heading? What frequency is he on?
We cannot transmit on a VTS frequency, which he must be on. We
cannot transmit on 13; so you cannot find him there. He is relieved
of the obligation of watching 16. You may have a lot of difficulty in
making changes of orders on emergency-all kinds of things that
happen on the bank that must be relayed to the vessels.
So I find this is not any relief of our obligation. It is also necessary
to monitor channel 16 so that you can make use of the public cor-
respondence channels that the telephone company operates because
they also make their initial contact on channel 16, if you change
from one of their sectors to another.
So the relief of monitoring channel 16 to me sounds like it is just
another way of making us have a little bit more difficulty in our
communications on a day-to-day basis.
So I think the Coast Guard again is somewhat a little bit misled
on this because of the September 3 regulation of the FCC, telling
the base station they must monitor 16, must use 16 to make the
initial contact.
So the relief of that obligation does not seem like it is going to help
us too much.
I would like to refer to this chart that I brought along today, and
you gentlemen have a copy up there; because I think the geography
of the area is very important to fully understand.
The chart supplied by the Coast Guard is showing the implemen-
tation of the vessel traffic system with the Mississippi River in the
appearance like it is indicates it exists in its own world. This is not
the case. We live in an area that is completely covered by havigable
waterways. They are actively and completely surrounding us on all
sides. VTS may-and I say "may"-help control traffic on the
Mississippi River, but what it would do in outlying areas may cause
complete and total disaster to the commerce in these areas.
PAGENO="0252"
248~
If I may, I would like to refer to the map.
The red line that I have indicated on the map shows the paralleling
and corresponding waterways of the Gulf Intercoastal Canal. I have
outlined it as far as Morgan City, which is only about 80-some air-
plane miles from New Orleans.
The route running north and south is a portal route. The Mis-
sissippi River is shown right along there, running almost totally
parallel to these two waterways.
The commerce-the traffic on these waterways is literally bumper-
to-bumper. The intersection is the intersection of Harvey Canal
and Algiers Canal, with one tremendous amount of traffic. People are
making decisions to go from one canal to another, to locks out in the
Mississippi River. It is an area of total congestion.
The red lines on the east side of the Mississippi River indicate the
Gulf Intercoastal Canal, to the east, across the Mississippi Sound,
Mobile, and so forth.
The red line running south and parallel to the Missis~ip~i River
indicates the ship channel known as Moregood.
There is also a tremendous amount of marine commerce in Lake
Pontchartrain, shell dredging, yachts, pleasure boats; all of these
are licensed and operating on our frequency.
There is also a tremendous amount of oilfields and connecting
waterways that we did not even bother to try to outline all through
the south of there-sulfur mining, the oil industry, drilling platform
contractors, and so forth, all relying on VHFradio as their means of
communication.
Transmitting on VHF on the sectors, as I have indicated, will
only cause problems to a tremendous amount of people in an
awfully large area.
The type of transmitter-and just as we were told yesterday by
the Coast Guard, which is absolutely fact-the most powerful trans-
mitter takes over; the rest of them just blank out. They do not even
exist. So when you have a communication going on an area, and the
Coast Guard keys one of these transmitters, everyone else is wiped
out; everyone else having any commerce or communication on any
of the channels that they expected to work on will be eliminated off
the air; but the people monitoring will be monitoring not only the
Coast Guard's conversations, but they will be monitoring people
in these areas who are still duly licensed to operate on these
channels.
I would also like to explain what I feel is a tremendous hazard to
our industry, with the Coast Guard having the permission or au-
thority to transmit on channel 13. I think it is horrendous that they
could even consider it. If a vessel were approaching the Harvey-
Algiers intersection and he met a boat with a tow coming out of each
of those canals, and he was just about in the situation in which he was
exchanging information, getting an agreement with these two vessels
as to how they would meet and pass, if the key was pressed-if a
button was touched by the Coast Guard on channel 13, these people
would not even exist. They would be blasted off the map. They are
limited to 1 watt of power-i watt of power on an antenna mon-
itored on the top of a boat; and the Coast Guard will have an an-
tenna-I do not know where or how large or what-but I am sure
PAGENO="0253"
249
it would be of sufficient size to completely and totally eliminate any
communication on channel 13.
This I make as an example of only one vessel, but what could happen
is, there could be at the same time, simultaneously, some 15-some
innumerable number of vessels meeting each other in this broad area,
all sharing one channel and not conflicting with each other because
of the 1-watt power requirement; and the Coast Guard could eliminate
these people from getting an understanding and putting themselves in
a position that could really be disastrous.
What, therefore, could be the solution of the VTS problem?
I suggest that the first channels, 11, 14, and 12, should remain in
the control and used exclusively by commercial marine interests. Al-
ternatively, the Coast Guard could and should procure from the FCC
the necessary frequencies for their VTS and they still could do this.
We are limited to what channels are available to us. There are many
channels that are available, that fit into this band spectrum that could
be used for this purpose; but that consideration apparently was not
even given.
May I also refer to the chart that I gave to you gentlemen showing
VHF channel selections.
There are channels that are classified as noncommercial, which we
have no ability to use-channels 9, 68, 69, 70, 71, and 78, for instance.
The Coast Guard has at their disposal channel 21, 23, 81, 82, and 83.
We do not know what these channels are used for; but possibly they
could be used for this purpose.
There are also numerous other channels that are excluded by inter-
national agreement. These channels are available or could be made
available for this purpose but these channels are not available for our
use. This is a copy of the card that I am referring to and, as you can
see, the things that are colored in blue are the ones limited from our
use by international agreement.
It far surpasses the ones lined off in green that are available for
commercial interests.
Second, I would like to summarize channel 13.
Channel 13 should remain exclusively for bridge-to-bridge with
1-watt transmission power, as specified by the FCC requirement.
Utilization of that channel for purposes other than direct, bridge-to-
bridge vessel communication should be considered a potential hazard
of such magnitude that even the consideration of a shore-based station,
especially one operated by people whose object is to protect life, proper-
ty, and environment, astounds and frightens me. The Coast Guard
could even consider that they should have the capacity to contact some-
one and to ask them to switch over to VTS and to press a button on 13
with a shore-based station is criminal, and the consideration of such
astounds. me, that the Coast Guard would even think they should
have the ability to do this.
I was told, "Well, this will only be done in case of an emergency."
Who determines what is an emergency? Is an emergency a vessel that
has the audacity to pass through the system without reporting? He
knows he can be contacted on 13, so the radio operator switches on 13
and says, "Come on over to 11. I want to talk to you." I cannot visual-
ize this as an emergency; and I think .the capacity to even be able to
transmit on 13 should be left-I state these things not with just theory;
I say this might happen or it could happen.
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250
I am saying this, that with personal knowledge that it is happening.
It is happening in the Morgan City area. There is the Morgan City
YTS that has not been brought up. It is a control and it is a control
that was needed. I cannot argue with that, of vessels in a one-way
traffic situation through a very hazardous situation in which what is
known as the Burwick Bay Ring and highway bridge, and this control
is necessary but, again, transmissions are taking place on channel 13
from a shore-based operation.
When that key is pressed-and I am certain this station on that
bridge does not have the power output nor the antenna that is proposed
for the VTS system-when that button is pressed, it wipes out all
bridge-to-bridge communication in an area of approximately 30 miles
around the Morgan City area.
So we feel that-we know that this is something that is being done
and we know that it could be done again if it were implemented in the
New Orleans area.
I would like to quote yesterday from the record by Mr. Heyward
to the admiral on bridge-to-bridge communication.
Mr. lEleyward asked the admiral, "Does the Coast Guard have any
statistics which would indicate conclusions as to effective use of
bridge-to-bridge radio telephone in casualty prevention?"
And the admiral's reply was, "I do not believe we have a specific
study, based upon solely the bridge-to-bridge; no."
This has been an act that has been in force since 1973. If there are
no studies based on whether bridge-to-bridge has helped the industry,
a direct communication from vessel-to-vessel; if we do not know
whether there is any good or isn't any good, then what basis are we
using to implement a VTS?
YTS as proposed is nothing more than another bridge-to-bridge
with somebody standing in the middle and telling you where the
people are supposed to be. We have YTS right now; bridge-to-bridge
is VTS.
When we meet a boat, if the channel is available and clear to us,
that vessel tells us who is behind him; he tells us everything that is
in the immediate area that he has just recently passed.
This is passed on to the captain of boats for him to evaluate. We
are not interested in what is going on at the head of the path or 20
miles or 30 miles or 50 miles down the way. It only adds confusion to
the situation.
Our interest in making our decisions in navigation are based strictly
on what is immediate; what is immediate. You do not want to know
what is happening 15 or 20 miles down the highway when you are
driving a car. You are interested in what is in your view, who is going
to come out from a side street, who is approaching you.
You cannot make a decision 15 or 20 miles away or even need that
knowledge to safely operate your vehicle nor do you need it to operate
a vessel.
In closing I would like to make an example as to how we visualize
the time consumption at VTS.
What we did is try to make as honest an evaluation as possible in
making a contact and hypothetical situation in which a vessel wants
to leave a dock; and we made it simple because the vessel was leaving
the dock within one VTS zone. He is not crossing into or coming from
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251
anotherone and we would like to try to show the amount of time that
is consumed just for one vessel merely to report in, just to report in,
and then he has to be given back all the information VTS can make
available to him.
At 0100, the vessel is tied to the clock and he is preparing himself
to leave; I mean 1 minute after midnight, he calls the Coast Guard.
He is in sector 3, which is the New Orleans sector, which starts out
about mile 129 as the chart indicates.
He is at dock mile 122: the vessel calls as prescribed. "This is the
tow vessel, Big Tow WXZ-5729, calling Coast Guard vessel traffic
control sector 3. Come in, please.
The Coast Guard answers, "This is sector 3, Coast Guard, New
Orleans, come in."
"This is tow vessel Big Tow WXZ-5729. Our position is mile 122-
at the ABC chemical dock. We presume we will be able to get under-
way within 30 minutes. That would be 03100, please. Our destination
is southbound in the Mississippi River to our chemical dock down on
Venice mile 10. Our ETA of our destination is approximately 12 noon
tomorrow. Our deep draft is 9 feet. The number of barges that we have
in tow, sir, are four. Our dimensions are 175 feet long by 104 feet wide.
Yes, sir, we do have Danish cargo on board, ethyldichlorene. No;
there was no phone available here. We could not call in. That is why
we had to come in on channel 11. We will be getting underway in
approximately 20 to 30 minutes. We will call you at that time."
Then before you can leave the dock, he must make his contact
again. Of course, he does not have to give all this information, but
still another contact is made.
At this time, the Coast Guard would relay to him all of the vessels
that should or could affect him in the YTS area. That means not only
vessels approaching him from the south because he will be southbound,
hut he has to know of the vessel that are coming from the next sector
so he will have to talk to sector 4 as well as sector 3, because sector 3
could not give him the southbound information coming from Baton
Rouge, so sector 3 would fill him in on what is northbound. Sector 4
would have to fill him in on what is southbound, and by this time, the
guy is already behind 10-minutes on his schedule, so he will ha.ve to
update his thing because it was a quarter to 11-a quarter to 2 before
he finally got away from the dock.
If this would end, that would not be so bad; but if as the Coast
Guard proposes every 10 or 15 minutes, and I am quoting from the
record of yesterday. "This man would be updated." This sounds
really fine, if this guy was the only person on the river in this sector
coming down, but he is having to listen to everyone else update every-
one else's traffic.
I cannot visualize how this channel could have a minute of free
time in sector 3 area.
I think it would just have to be total dialog to relay all this infor-
mation and for the VTS to relay this information back.
The only thing that I can see here that would help, you know, is
what we would put in before. We feel the bridge to bridge should be
limited to vessel traffic only. I am in strong favor and feel that if a
bridge-to-bridge investigation had been made to evaluate the use of
bridge to bridge, we would have a system now that could be maybe
78-2S0---76-----17
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252
in operation but, if not, at least prOpQsed and which we would have
sector bridge-to-bridge.
This, gentlemen, is what I feel is the answer to our communications
problem in the New Orleans area, the area in which the traffic situa-
tion is the greatest, and everyone is having to share one channel for
all contacts. You must listen to vessels on Lake Pontchartrain, listen
to vessels on the Gulf Intercoastal Canal; you must listen to vessels
negotiating the locks. All of this traffic takes place on channel 13.
If there is a sector bridge-to-bridge service available to us in which
the operator would know that he would change his bridge-to-bridge
channel at certain locations so that there would not be an intermixing
or a crossing of bridge-to-bridge communications; that the only
traffic that you would hear would be traffic that interests you in your
immediate area, and I think we would have the best VTS that could
be offered to us.
And with that type of a bridge-to-bridge communication there is no
reason that I can see-that I speak again for my industry-that they
can see there is any necessity to go through a third party to get the
information that we have readily at hand from oncoming vessels,
from vessels behind us, vessels we approach, and the information that
we relay to our fellow people in the industry.
Going through a third party can do nothing but confuse the issue,
because we are having to try to decipher that which pertains to us
and weed this out through a tremendous amount of other stuff.
If you would try to visualize the root that you are probably best
familiar with from your home to your office that you take each morn-
ing and each evening, you know that route like the back of your hand.
You know without even thinking where you are going to turn, where
the top signs are, et cetera. If someone were to ask you at what time
do you cross Main and 7th, could you tell us? Even though you do it
each day? It is just one-third or two-thirds of the way down from your
office to your house. You do not time that. You do not try to predict
an ETA in the middle of a voyage. It is not necessary, just as it is not
necessary in an automobile.
I find that this would be a perfect example of trying to drive to
work with two citizen band radios going in your car at one time, and
your wife and your mother-in-law shouting orders at you, trying to
concentrate on the job at hand of trying to prevent someone from
getting run over by some damned fool coming out of an intersection;
and this is how we evaluate what bridge-to-bridge would do to our
industry, based strictly on a voice communication as set up at the
present time.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Captain Conrad. Yours was a
very vivid description of the conditions. You pose some very interest-
ing questions, the answers to which we certainly will obtain; and I
suggest the Coast Guard be in a position to respond to them.
As I see it, there are some very real problems here. I do not know
that everything you say is accurate or is as critical and crucial as you
make it appear; but until we get a response from the Coast Guard,
that is the picture that is in my mind.
We have always had a question, frankly, of whether or not we have
sufficient channels, and I have heard witness after witness, in hearing
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253
after hearing, make reference to the same problem. What we contern-
plate doing is bringing representatives of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to provide some answers; and we will inquire of
them in connection with the problems of communication.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for just a moment?
I do not want to upset your hearing schedule, but I just wonder if
there are any Coast Guard officials here now who might briefly
explain to us why these changes are made in the channels, as the
captain has explained it.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Fugaro, could you answer briefly, so that
those who were not here yesterday-
Admiral FUGARO. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman.
With respect to the channel which we have selected, these are the
channels for VTS all over the country, 11, 12, and 14. So part of our
thinking in assigning these channels to the various port areas is to
assume or achieve some degree of standardization, not only for river
traffic, but for all vessels which are using YTS.
So this is why these channels have been allocated for just VTS.
Going back to the point the captain was making-Captain Conrad
was making with respect to channel 13, the law does authorize the
use of channel 13 for navigation, taking information, and also, as he
stated, with respect to locks and bridges; it is authorized for the
passage of navigation and safety information.
One thing, though, I think needs to be clarified. The Coast Guard
transmitter on channel 13 will be a 1-watt transmitter, which is the
maximum allowed by law so that we will not be blocking out other
people as he indicated. I think again perhaps he had misinformation
on that point.
rfhe blockage that he was talking about or the frequency capture
that he was talking about was really for the YTS channels that we
are talking about, 11, 12, and 14, and the various sectors.
Mr. TREEN. That would be the 50 watt?
Admiral FUGARO. Maximum is 50 watt. We do not intend to go
up that high.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. May I just comment on that.
I can see the reasoning of designating certain channels for certain
uses; but would that channel be used in the same manner in other
areas as it would be where these towboats are running in a particular
part of the river?
Admiral FUGARO. Again, we have got experience in this area,
Mrs. Sullivan, which indicates that we are able to work within the
channels under the system as we contemplate for New Orleans.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Now, your men, captain, your men who use these
channels, what is your answer to this? Do you think that could be
worked out, that others using that channel only use it for the same
thing you would, or is it going to be too crowded for everyone to use
that channel for that same information?
Captain CONRAD. There is no guarantee that channels 11 and 14
and 12 would be aboard any vessel that would come into the New
Orleans area. Probably our biggest vessels to control are tankers and
large grain ships that come through the area. There is no guarantee
these vessels would be equipped with these channels.
I feel that the harm of taking these channels away from our indus-
try, leaving us nowhere to go except to be pushed over and be further
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crowded in trying to dispatch and operate our industry provides a
burden on us far greater than a specific additional channel that would
be specifically for VTS use, and I think with New Orleans, you know,
I am in agreement that it is nice to have everything uniform; but the
kind of vessels that we are interested in, kinds of vessels we have are
limited by design and style and so forth, to the inland waterway,
which is known as the Western River and goes up the Mississippi;
and these vessels are not going to he going to Seattle or some place
like that; and I just feel the taking of these channels away from us
will really cause us a lot of grief.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Admiral, is it your idea to unify all vessels that
come up and down in these areas to use, regardless of whether it is a
ship, towboat, or whatever else, runs-
Admiral FUGARO. Mrs. Sullivan, if and when a VTS system does
become a mandatory system, then, yes, there would be complete
standardization within communications. The vessels which would
come into the port would be required to have these channels to
communicate with the YTS.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. How would you make it mandatory, by law or
regulation?
Admiral FUGARO. By regulation. The law providing for the estab-
lishment of YTS has already been passed, of course, as you know,
~through the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The regulation which
would then have to be promulgated under this a.ct could then require
these particular channels under the regulations be required in order
to participate in the system
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Is it possible to limit what can come over these
particular channels within an area, or would there be a jumbling
of various orders and instl uctions coming through at the same time
to really mystify the person who is receiving it?
Admiral FUGARO. We do anticipate dedicating the channels for
just YTS, as Captain Conrad just stated; and, in effect, they have to
go-leave the 11, 12 and 14 channels. We will be facing that; and
there is approximately a five-year period during which already-
existing permits will. not be reissued on these channels. So we do
expect some problems during this phaseout period, hopefully less
and less, to the point where we would have a totally dedicated channel
for VTS.
Captain CONRAD. I can confirm that my channel 11 was taken
away from me.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. That is why I wanted it answered now, not when
we read it some time later, because you are the people who are in-
volved and, you know a lot more than we will ever pretend to know.
We cannot just decide who is right and what is right without a good
discussion among all those who are involved; and it just seems to me
that there has to be a meeting of the minds; because when you need
information you need it now; and they cannot wait 10 or 20 minutes,
if the channel is cluttered up with other messages.
So these are the things that I think we are all trying to accomplish
to try to help work this out and get a system; but I would like to see
you argue this out in the open so that you can come to some kind
of a satisfactory solution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PAGENO="0259"
255
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Captain Conrad contended that when the Coast Guard, with its
antenna power got involved, everything else would be blocked out
because they are limited to 1 watt.
Admiral, to respond, they could only have 1 watt, and that would
be a fact that that would not happen on 13?
Admiral FIJGARO. On 13?
Captain CONRAD. Sir, if he had, as he first stated, I find it hard
to believe that Morgan City blankets the area with 1 watt, but we
will leave that up for discussion; but if this is so, if the Coast Guard
has Only the capacity to transmit on 1 watt on channel 13, sir, they
have no reason to transmit. They cannot cover their VTS area. They
could only cover a vessel that was in sight of the antenna, so there
is no reason for them to transmit.
The reasoning that I was giving today and yesterday for having
the capacity to transmit on channel 13 was that they could blanket
the industry with necessary information if it became an emergency,
or they could communicate with a vessel that did not have the capac-
ity to communicate in VTS and give them instructions, pass on
messages on something that was necessary; but if they have the
capacity to transmit on only I watt, that means they can only talk
to vessels that are in sight of their antenna.
Admiral FTJGARO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman; but as I think:
we pointed out yesterday, we will have multiple transmission sites
which are planned to cover the entire area. I believe that on our chart
we point out the four transmission sites, one down river, one in each
sector; but Captain Conrad is correct that these will cover the entire
area. The 1 watt will be with the channel 13 only. The other channels
will be on a higher wattage.
Mr. BIAGGI. I want to stay with his response that it would be ~
1 watt.
When you a.re on a 1-watt transmission-
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; on channel 13; right, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Conrad contends that it would be limited.
He could only transmit to ships that are in sight.
Now, I think you responded, if I understood you correctly, that
you have four transmission sites.
Are they 1 wattage, or~
Admiral FUGARO. Let me verify this, Mr. Chairman, if I may.
Mr. Chairman, that is correct. There are five, not four, transmission
sites, represented by the red triangles shown on that chart there~
and these will be the transmission sites for all of the channels which
will be transmitting within any one sector.
The operator at the VTC will control which channel and in which
area he will be transmitting.
Mr. BIAGGI. All right.
Now, let us go back to 13.
Thirteen, I assume, is one of those channels which the operator
will be functioning.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. Now, we get on 13, they are all 1-watters.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, wherever the 13 will be a 1-watt
transmission.
Mr. TREEN. Where will they be?
PAGENO="0260"
256
Admiral FUGARO. There will be five different sites.
The CHAIRMAN. How many miles away? How far is one watt?
Captain CONRAD. Theoretically, just strictly at a line of sight.
Mr. BIAGGI. Will those five transmission sites and the 1-watt
power, will that be adequate to deal with the problem?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. They will cover the entire VTS area
with the channel 13.
Mr. BIAGGI. Only on the 1 watt?
Admiral FUGARO. On the 1 watt; yes, sir.
Captain CONRAD. Sir, I beg to differ. If you have a transmission
of 1 watt coming out of this antenna and sector 1, looking at the
Gulf of Mexico, 15 miles out into the sea buoy, you are looking above
mile 10 Venice, mile 15, VHF at 50-watt transmission will cover this
area nicely. One watt from this transmission site may have a trans-
mitting power if no one else is using the facility or the chnanel as
far as possibly the head of the passes, certainly not down these passes.
There is no way that 1-watt transmitters from these sector sites
could cover a sector. You would have to switch over to more wattage
or you have nothing really to transmit; but even a 1-watt transmission
from this sector site would interfere greatly with innumerable vessels
trying to negotiate locks, bridges, meetings, crossings, and in a
highly congested area right here because their antenna which is an
important factor will be higher than anybody else's antenna, so it
will blanket an area far greater than a lower antenna; but with one
watt, it probably could cover the metropolitan area; but that would
probably be all.
But certainly no 1-watt sector antenna from this area here could
cover this sector and especially these bigger sectors.
Mr. TREEN. May I ask a question?
Captain Conrad, a minute ago you said 1-watt power would
only permit you to communicate on a line of sight.
Captain CONRAD. Theoretically; that is, supposedly; but the higher
the antenna, sir, the longer the line of sight. If you are standing on
the ground on a flat surface you can see less; with your eyes 6 feet off
the ground, you might see about 10 or 14 miles; but if you put your-
self up on a mast of a ship, your vision increases, generally speaking,
you know; and a line of sight is pased on the height of the two
antennas; and so if you have one antenna that is more greatly raised
than the other, naturally, his line of sight will increase.
Mr. TREEN. The question I specifically had was that transmitter
located, it is about at the Algiers point, is it?
Captain CONRAD. On top of Governor Nichols Street, I assume.
Mr. TREEN. Would you be able to communicate down river there,
past that large crossing there; in other words, toward the end of the
sector?
Captain CONRAD. To the end of the sector.
Mr. TREEN. Your response is, if that antenna were high enough,
yes, it probably could?
Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you.
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Treen, these antennas will
be approximately 100 feet high; so they will be fairly high antennas
for these purposes, as Captain Conrad stated. They will extend a line
of sight by this height.
PAGENO="0261"
257
Mr. BIAGGI. So what Captain Conrad has said, as a matter of fact,
as far as the limitation on 1-watt power transmitters is not accurate?
Admiral FUGARO. We believe with the antenna height, we will be
covering this area.
Mr. BIAGGI. You have certainly taken that into consideration, the
distance?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIAGGI. The committee will be going to vote now. It is 11:45.
We will stand in recess until 1:30, and then we will return, and hope-
fully complete the testimony of the various witnesses.
Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that Mr. Treen
may not be able to be back, may I just make one statement which
I think-
Mr. TREEN. I just will not be here at 1 :30. I have got another meet-
ing at 1:30 and I have got to take 15 or 20 minutes.
Mr. O'NEIL. If I may say one thing that I think will focus the
problem that this industry has had with the Coast Guard from the
inception of this project, it is apparent right here at this moment,
based on what has happened in the last 5 or 10 minutes.
Yesterday, upon questioning from Mr. Treen about the 50-watt
antenna, the question I have in front of me was put to Admiral Fugaro
in this fashion:
Is there any problem with respect to communications if you are transmitting
on a 50-watt output; and I think that is what you anticipate; is it not?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. From your tracking center in New Orleans, what affect would this
have on the bridge-to-bridge communication channel within, let us say, 20 or 30
miles from the VTC?
Admiral FUGARO. While transmitting on channel 13?
Mr. TREEN. Yes, sir.
Admiral FUGARO. We would assume that there would be, if the Coast Guard
was transmitting on 13, yes, sir, there could very well be interference with other
transmissions on 13.
Now, we go from'~50 watt back to 1 watt to a tower, and this is
where the frustration that this group has where the Coast Guard
comes into play. There is no firm footing on what is going on, and I do
not wish to fault Admiral Fugaro-I know he has just gotten into
this-but this has been the cause of some of the frustration that this
industry has encountered in the past year.
Thank you.
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, could I suggest they have a friendly
discussion before they go out and eat and see if we can come to some
agreement here?
Mr. BIAGGI. I think it is more friendly after they eat.
We will recess now.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene
at 1:30 p.m. this same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, would you come and sit at the witness table,
please, so we can continue this dialog?
Admiral FUGARO. Surely.
Mr. BIAGGI. I believe when we left off, Mr. O'Neil was making a
comment.
PAGENO="0262"
258
Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, the comment I was making was in
reference to highlighting what we feel has happened before about
switchjng of positions and communication and I just used that as an
example of what this industry has been confronted with for some period
of time.
This is the sort of thing that makes it so frustrating at times to deal
with the people who want to put the system in because sometimes we
think the Eighth District Coast Guard says one thing and then we are
confronted and faced off with Washington; and when Washington is
confronted, they have no knowledge of what is going on in the Eighth
Coast Guard District; and I used that as a reference point. That was
all.
Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Conrad, let us get back to 1-watt power
transmitter.
Are you satisfied with Admiral Fugaro's response?
Captain CONRAD. I am satisfied with, you know, with the under-
standing that the wattage will not be in excess of 1 watt; but I am
not satisfied in the response that it will be used without really making
that clarification as to how and when, because even if 1 watt of power
in the line of sight and antenna, as we explained, on a high tower,
as they envision, would still knock out a tremendous amount of bridge-
to-bridge communication in New Orleans Harbor, by utilizing 13.
I think that should be of the utmost discretion, whenever that
would ever be implemented.
Mr. BIAGGI. If I understood you correctly, you say initially about
the 50-watt now we have reduced it to 1 watt because you have a
high antenna of saying we transmit with a high antenna 1 watt and
it will still have the same effect?
Captain CONRAD. No, sir, it will not have the same effect-will not
have broad coverage, hut in the New Orleans area, with the convert-
ing of the canals coming from the west and the east, ship channel
running parallel, and so forth, it is a tremendous amount of vessels
that are, even outside of the system, not counting the ones that are
in the system that would be affected by transmission even of the 1
watt on channel 13, and channel 13 is designated to be specifically
a bridge-to-bridge voice communication in making and understanding
of passing and meeting and so forth.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Fugaro.
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I think both of these points are
the points that Mr. O'Neil made and Captain Conrad made and are
tied together.
Yesterday in my testimony, when I referred to the fact that we
anticipated there would be some level of interference for channel 13,
it was the fact that Captain Conrad is saying when we do come on
other frequencies, somebody else will be working on that, that is
when the Coast Guard will provide a level of interference.
But getting back to his point about the utilization of this channel
and the control of the Coast Guard's utilization of this channel, we
would have specific instructions certainly within the operating manual
that will be developed so that there will be strict limitations placed
upon the Coast Guard VTC when it is actually utilizing the channel.
It is not a blanket taking or utilizing any time you have any trouble
with anybody else. That is not the intention of our use of channel 13.
Mr. BIAGGI. What is the intention?
PAGENO="0263"
259
Admiral FUGARO. It is our intention with the use of channel 13 as
an emergency backup in the event there is some reason for us to get
some particular information of a rather emergency nature to a vessel.
Perhaps if we see a couple of vessels together and have only been able
to communicate with one; that is the sort of thing where we feel it is
imperative that we do communicate something to vessels within the
system.
Mr. BIAGGI. If you could estimate on the basis of your experience,
how frequently do you estimate that would occur?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I really do not have any personal
information on the utilization of this; but, say, within the Houston
area, however, I will be happy to get this estimate from Houston and
submit it for the record.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, sir.
[The following was received:]
UsE OF CHANNEL 13
It cannot be determined from experience in the operation of existing vessel
traffic services how often we may expect to resort to the use of the vessel bridge-
to-bridge radiotelephone frequency, channel 13, to contact a vessel that cannot
be reached immediately on the VTS sector frequency. The Coast Guard does
not yet operate a VTS wherein vessels are required to maintain a continuous
listening watch on a frequency other than channel 13. It is estimated that when
all participating vessels are maintaining a continuous listening watch on the
VTS sector frequencies in the New Orleans VTS, the vessel traffic center's use of
channel 13 will be minimal (i.e., less than one transmission per hour).
Experience in the operation of YTS Houston- Galveston has shown that, because
of Coast Guard presence on channel 13, the efficiency of usage of that frequency
has risen from 56.2 percent, in the pre-VTS month of June 1974, to 97.0 percent
during August-September 1976. Channel efficiency is the ratio of valid messages
(i.e., conforming to the intended purpose of the Act) to total messages on that
frequency. It is expected that the establishment of VTS New Orleans will have a
similar beneficial effect.
Captain CONRAD. The designation by the FCC for safety, Mayday
calls and distress is channel 16, not channel 13. Everyone is supposed
to be monitoring 16. That channel should be adequate with 50 watts
of output to get across any message necessary.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral?
Admiral FTJGARO. I think though we want to save channel 16 for
the very intended purpose that Captain Conrad said, as a distress
frequency; and I do not think necessarily we are talking about distress
in high frequency when we are talking about passing navigation safety
information. I think we would be better to leave channel 16 clear for
its intended purpose and utilize channel 13 for this purpose, of course,
within the limited utilizations and controls as I mentioned before.
Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask you this question.
What experience do you have on the frequency of the distress calls,
Mayday calls?
Admiral FUGARO. I know in all distress frequencies, part of the
problem has been unauthorized utilization sometimes, interfering with
distress situations. For this reason, I would advocate that the utiliza~
tion of any distress frequency should be kept completely clear of any
extraneous communication.
Mr. BIAGGI. I can appreciate if you do not have the answer to my
question; but notwithstanding that, I would appreciate if you could
submit for the record the experience you have had with distress calls.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes; be glad to, Mr. Chairman.
PAGENO="0264"
260
[The following was received:]
DISTRESS CALLS
During fiscal year 1975, the Coast Guard received 14,446 distress calls from
vessels on VHF-FM frequency 156.800 MHz (channel 16).
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you.
Mr. Heyward.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the channel 13 usage, this is no
change from the present use of the channel; is that correct, the
proposed change?
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir.
The utilization we are contemplating is within-in accordance with
the law.
Mr. BIEYWARD. And if the Coast Guard transmissions are at the
same level of power as the transmissions from the ships, it would
really mean one more "ship" on the channel. Is that not so?
Admiral FUGARO. That is right; and that is the level of interference
I am referring to, the fact that one more-
iVir. HEYWARD. And also I would assume that any rules you have
in the use of that channel would restrict its use, at least, except in
a dire emergency, to a situation where you would not interfere with
information being exchanged by two passing vessels at the time you
wanted to send transmissions?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. Frankly, I think that while it is entirely proper to
keep the channel restricted, that the use by the Coast Guard, in
special situations, would not create a tremendous impact on the use
of the channel.
Is not that channel used by more than two ships in the same area
at times?
Admiral FUGARO. This is channel 13 you are referring to?
Mr. HEYWARD. Yes; I mean, there are passing situations between
ships now that are potential interferers with other conversations going
on?
Admiral FTJGARO. Definitely; yes. It is being used by more than
one ship.
Mr. HEYWARD. Improperly used? And one should not be using it
to interfere with somebody else's use of it at that time?
Admiral FUGARO. That's right.
Mr. IE[ETY-WARD. Is it not really a question of monitoring the system
to see that it is properly utilized and not being used for purposes
other than it was designed to be used for?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. HEYWARD. Does the Coast Guard have any responsibility
in that regard?
Admiral FUGARO. With respect to channel 13, and the bridge-to-
bridge, these are promulgated under Coast Guard regulations which
require the equipment to be aboard and which require or state the
situation under which the equipment would be utilized.
Our experience in the Houston area with channel 13 is the fact
that the Coast Guard is on the system and has helped to clear up
extraneous communication on the system.
PAGENO="0265"
261
With respect to monitoring the system, the Coast Guard has
promulgated regulations, as I mentioned, with respect to the equip-
ment and the utilization of the equipment; but the actual monitoring
of a particular frequency usage I believe is a province of the FCC.
We have occasion when we have heard unauthorized transmissions
on channel 13; have been able to identify the particular unauthorized
user and have communicated to this user and found this somewhat
of a beneficial effect, even though it is not strictly an enforcement
procedure. It is sort of an acknowledgement to that user that he
should not have been using the system at that particular time.
Mr. HEYWARD. Does the FCC have adequate monitoring of that
system, in your opinion?
Admiral FIJGARO. I would defer to the FCC to comment on that.
it is apparent, though, that channel 13 is not serving its purpose in
the sense of there is more communication on there than there should be.
Mr. HEYWARD. How about the wattage, Captain Conrad; in
connection with the wattage, are the vessels and their equipment
limited to the use of 1 watt, or do they have the possibility of using
higher power on their equipment?
Captain CONRAD. Sir, they are limited legally but, of course, YOU
have equipment that could be in service that would have been built
prior to the enactment in 1973; and it seems it is just general policy
to let the stuff wear out before you have to replace it, and we alsQ
have the condition of many foreign vessels coming into our system~
These foreign vessels, when they are clipped with the use of VHF
channels in the area, pilots tend to use them when they are not using:
their hand-held sets; so the strength of the signal coming from a.
channel 13 user could vary tremendously.
In theory, the signal should be the strongest signal that is being
put out from the closest vessel, but that is not always the case.
Mr. HEYWARD. Is one of the problems presently on 13 that, perhaps
on occasion, the people who are using it are using more power and
therefore interfering?
Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir, that is right; definitely so.
Mr. HEYWARD. Do you know whether the FCC has done anything
about correcting that or attempting to correct it?
Captain CONRAD. Do I personally know?
Mr. HEYWARD. Yes; I wonder whether you were familiar with any
complaints that had been made to the FCC.
Captain CONRAD. No. Personally, I don't think there that FCC
is ~monitoring as such. They do on channel 16 and issue citations. I
think the reason for this is because of the very limited scope of the
channel that they do not pick up as much citations about.
They have listening posts, we know of, down in Texas, near the
border, near Mexico; and most of the citations orginated in our area
come from there; so unless there is some kind of an alarm they would
not be able to receive a channel 13 communication.
Mr. HEYWARD. Well, in your opinion, is channel 13 being abused
now, without regard to this VTC?
Captain CONRAD. Channel 13 is being abused, sir, only because
it is being overworked. I think overwork is a form of abuse. It is not
serving our purposes because there are too many people having to
share too little space.
PAGENO="0266"
262
Mr. HEYWARD. When you say "sharing," are they restricting their
lransmissions to the legitimate use of the channel?
Captain CONRAD. Well, I do not think that you could say that with
a blanket "Yes." I think the average boat operator follows the law.
He makes his initial contact; if he has nothing more, makes a passing-.
on agreement; and they generally do it right on 13.
If the conversation is going to be extended past that they are
supposed to agree on a mutual channel that they can both switch
over to if they have more to discuss than just the normal passing or
meeting situation, and the agreement.
Of course, it is abused. I think everything is abused; and policing
would definitely help; but we have too much overriding characteristics
of the channel because of the close proximity of too many waterways
in one area, all running parallel, nothing stopping.
This is not mountainous area. Ther is nothing going to stop a
transmission from coming across the flat on the land down there;
and so 3TOU can receive a strong channel signal, you might be receiving
out of the middle of the Mississippi Sound, maybe a ship coming up
the Mississippi River down at Pilottown, which is defmitely no
distress; and we have experienced that, continuously.
Mr. HEYWARD. Now, as to 11, 12, and 14, and the fact that these
will be dedicated to VTC use, during the overlap period, obviously
there is going to be a tremendous problem on this same type of thing.
Ultimately, in terminating present uses on those channels over a
period of time and forcing those people, including you, to shift to some
other channel, has the FCC indicated any plans at all for alternative
channels for usage to replace these channels?
Captain CONRAD. No, sii~, they have not. They have not. We have
not been able to get any assurance whatsoever that anything else
will be made available.
At the expiration of my license, I was just to pick out another
channel. I selected the channel that was overcrowded 10 years ago.
Mr. HEYWARD. That is an existing channel for the same type of
~isage?
Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir. I had to select a channel that I passed
lip when I got my initial license on this 5 years ago.
Mr. HEYWARD. How were these choices made originally? Why did
you pick one of these three, because the others were saturated?
Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir. You can only, depending on your
business and the situation you are in, you are normally licensed only
on two channels, 16, which everyone must have a license on, and a
working channel.
The working channel could be either a port operation channel or
It could be a commercial channel. They will not issue two commercial
channel licenses simultaneously.
Mr. HEYWARD. You have to make a choice?
Captain CONRAD. You have to make a choice. If you can prove
need, you can go back to the FCC with this application and get one
port operation channel and one commercial channel, so that we had
an alternate; but normally they will not give you that alternate.
Mr. HEYWARD. How about the port operation channels; are they
being saturated with nonessential usage? Is that one of the problems?
Captain CONRAD. I think you have so much business being con-
ducted on so few channels that I cannot say that, you know, you could
PAGENO="0267"
263
clean it up just by removing the nonsense; because with the Corps of
Engineers using those channels 12 and 14, it is both 12 and 14, the
Corps of Engineers switches over to make their agreement with you
and giving you your position at the locks-
Mr. BIAGGI. When the Corps of Engineers injects itself onto the
channel, do they block out everybody else?
Captain CONRAD. No, sir. The Corps of Engineers has transmitting
capacity on those particular channels about equal to that of the ves-
sels; because on those channels everyone is allowed to have either 25
or some stations have up to 50-watt sets; but the corps has no more
power than ABC; and so they are just sharing those channels. They
have no control over them with all kinds of other port operations that
are going on, blasting ships loading, just the whole gamut-the whole
facet of operating the port and surrounding area, dispatching grain
barges to elevators, et cetera.
Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with your statement on page 3 of
your statement-and it was the basis for one of Mr. Treen's ques-
tions-you referred to 270,000 vessels transiting earlier.
Is that the total vessels transiting?
Is that including-
Captain CONRAD. Sir, the admiral is in a better position to answer
that. We said we got this information from them.
Mr. HEYWARD. I would assume that that would include, for in-
stance, all the barges in tow, rather than those that are reporting.
Admiral FUGARO. That is correct. The number that is cited there,
270,000, represents total vessel transit; so it includes the figures of
barges.
I think within that figure, the 270,000, we are really talking about
70,000 communicating vessels. The rest would be the other 200,000,
which would represent barges which, of course, are not manned.
Mr. HEYWARD. 70,000.
What does that work out to, approximately 200 daily?
Admiral FUGARO. About one-quarter of the total.
Captain CONRAD. On a daily basis.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes; on a daily basis.
Captain CONRAD. But you see you are only counting vessels in the
system. You have to count the vessels that are in the adjacent system.
This is the crux of my situation, and I am trying to put us into-you
cannot look at the Mississippi as an entity in itself. It is only the main-
stream of so many branches coming off and, after all, having to share
the same communications network, and so even if there were 70,000
vessels in the system and the YTS system, that still does not answer
the question of all of the vessels, port operations, land-based stations,
et cetera, that are sharing this net of communictions; because you
must take into consideration the whole picture; and not just the
VTS system.
Mr. HEYWARD. At such times as these channels became dedicated
to VTC, these other transmissions in the area outside of the VTC are
not going to be conducted; is that not correct? So that aside from your
other problem of getting adequate channels for your own use, this
interference problem you are talking about is in the overlap period.
Captain CONRAD. And how far is the control that the FCC has
placed on not renewing licenses? The FCC gets a license renewal from
PAGENO="0268"
264
a station, a shell operator on Lake Pontchartra~n with a very high an-
tenna, using channel 14 for a number of years.
Is the FCC clear enough to be able to determine that this would
interfere with the VTS net, or do they just eliminate people who have
an address of New Orleans?
Mr. HEYWARD. It is my understanding that this would be dedicated
to vessel traffic control, not only in New Orleans, but elsewhere; is
that correct, Captain?
Admiral FUGARO. I believe that is correct, Mr. Heyward. And I
believe certainly within the New Orleans area, when and if the sys-
tem comes into existence, utilization of 11, 12, and 14, that the issuance
of permits will be ceased in the surrounding areas also, and exactly
what the geographical limits of ceasing these issues, I am not sure.
As I say, I think it is the intention to dedicate these frequencies to
ITTS.
Mr. HEYWARD. Well, I think Captain Conrad has done the com-
mittee a great service in bringing his viewpoint here, and I think a~ lot
of the problems are problems that are beyond this committee's pur-
view, but nevertheless, as the chairman indicated, we are going to have
the FCC come up here and we will discuss with them these problem
~areas and see what kind of assistance we can get from them in resolv-
ing some of these issues.
Captain CONRAD. Does he give latitude and longitudes of what he
~an serve, the area that would be served?
Mr. TREEN. Before we go to vote, I just want to have Captain
Conrad touch on this question of the regulation requiring that the
communication be in the English language. I represent a lot of people
who only speak French down there.
What is it going to do to these people? And is this a significant
problem or not?
Captain CONRAD. I think that that is the-kind of an oversimpli-
fication, sir. I think that it would not be necessary, however, for a
real "Cajun" to stand by the radio, but I think what this situation
does call for is to have the person who is capable of understanding the
local knowledge and customs.
We look at this thing as if we were running a railroad track or an
interstate that is conveniently marked along the side of the road
every mile is a little number which comes up and shows you
practically where you are. This is not the case.
These people have engrained in their own minds local names, and
some of these names are in French and some versions of French; but
they have called these areas for years and years and these people that
operate in this system are not capable and exceptions were made,
realizing these capacities in the licensing.
These people are not capable of reading a mile chart that would
designate that such and such a place is exactly so many miles.
Mr. TREEN. All right.
That part of the proposed regulation which requires communication
in the English language is not a problem then?
Captain CONRAD. I think that most of the people can get by on the
English. I would not say they would be non-English speaking, but I
would say they are-there are many that their English is very, very
limited.
PAGENO="0269"
265
Mr. TREEN. Has there been any problem under the Bridge-to-
Bridge Act with respect to local color and local language?
Captain CONRAD. I think people who are in a better position would
be some of your Yankee friends that come through the area.
Mr. BIAGGI. The Civil War is stifi on.
I think we will recess for 10 minutes.
[Short recess.]
Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.
Mr. O'Neil.
Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one comment on the
French language, to put that to rest.
The only point we had in raising that is the fact that some of the
transmissions in the New Orleans area, particularly the Morgan City
area and the canal, are not in French, but they are not in English,
either. They are in something between; and our own purpose was
perhaps some consideration to be given to having someone on watch
in case you get a critical situation where the transmission back an&
forth between the vessels cannot be understood because of that prob-
lem, which does in fact occur.
But it is not to be misunderstood as a requirement that transmis-
sion be made in French. That is not what we pointed out as the local
custom that has given rise to potential companies.
Mr. BIAGGI. It comes back to the question of whether we engage
local people-employees.
Mr. O'NEIL. Precisely.
Mr. BIAGGI. I am sure the Coast Guard will take that into considera-
tion. And that is an important factor. Mr. Treen.
Mr. TREEN. One other question. In your statement on page 4,
Captain Conrad, you talk about training. You said:
* * * it is uncontestible, we believe, that there is no position in the Coast
Guard where a person may gain practical knowledge concerning the day-to-day
operation of a large seagoing vessel and river tows navigating the proposed VTS
area.
As I understand from Admiral Fugaro, there will be on-the-job
training, so to speak, on the various types of vessels which will be
transiting this area.
Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Treen, that was Captain Bullard's statement,
which we will get into, that you read into this proceeding in that
direction, and perhaps you can address that directly.
Mr. TREEN. Maybe you can answer that now.
One of the issues you have raised here is that you do not think
the people in the VTC will have the knowledge necessary to under-
stand what is going on in the river. What kind of training do you
think is going to be required? I would like to have that answered while
the Coast Guard representative is here and perhaps can respond to
your response.
Captain BULLARD. Congressman Treen, the Coast Guard insists
that we have a minimum of 3 years' service in on-the-job training
before we can set a pilot license under the new license program and
operators license; even after we have obtained this license, that does
not necessarily prove that we are capable pilots.
It is up to the individual companies to review and see if you are
capable by putting you on the job and seeing if you are capable.
PAGENO="0270"
266
My group contends that the Coast Guard should not let a yeoman
or a seasoned lieutenant, as they so refer, direct traffic over this
243~mile stretch of river.
Mr. TREEN. Does one who would be operating in the vessel traffic
center have to have the same knowledge as one who would have
to have to actually be operating a vessel?
There are many things you have to learn as a pilot or as a seaman
that do not really apply to the movement of the vessels.
Captain BTJLLARD. We contend that the vessel traffic center officer
should be familiar with the river, should be familiar with boats,
barges, river stages, currents at different stages.
We run from 0 to 54-15 feet, and you are well aware of the condi-
tions that are created during these stages of the river, and you cannot
take a 3-foot stage in New Orleans and pilot the boat the same way
you do when you are 55 feet; and we have been, and I am sure we
have a consensus of opinion, it is going to be somebody with more of
a qualification than a man who rotates from one job to another every
3 years, spends 3 or 4 months training himself under the previous
VTC officer to do his job.
We will have to have enough confidence in this officer to tell us what
to do in case of emergency or how to meet a vessel or where to hold
up or where to turn the tow around or what to do.
Mr. TREEN. Does the Coast Guard want to respond?
Admiral FTJGARO. Yes, Mr. Treen.
We have established within the existing VTC's very strict quali-
fications, training requirements before we certify a man as capable
of taking the watch.
* I go back to the point I made, too, sir, that the qualifications that
this man needs is not the full qualification of a pilot. He is at entirely
different purposes; and we are going back to the very basic philos-
ophy, the essentials of the VTS.
The essentials of the VTS is not to literally guide an individual
vessel through this maze of other vessels which it will meet. The
purpose of the VTS is to provide the maximum amount of safety infor-
mation to that operator to enable that master or that pilot to safely
guide the vessel through whatever hazard he may be meeting.
In other words, our operator must be capable of operating this
particular equipment, the TV or radar in other areas, or the com-
munications equipment.
He must be familiar with the operation of the computer system;
how to get in and get out; how that works, as well as the procedures
on passing this information.
Mr. TREEN. In other words, you are talking about this man just
locating the vessels. You are not going to be telling him how to
maneuver it?
Admiral FUGARO. Exactly.
Mr. TREEN. What to do if he encounters-
Admiral FUGARO. No, sir, that is not the essentials. If we expect
a man to be able to do that; I would agree with Captain Bullard
that we do need to have fully qualified pilots. When you direct a vessel
with a pilot he should have the same qualifications; but this is not what
we are intending to do.
Mr. TREEN. Mr. O'Neil, you wanted to comment?
PAGENO="0271"
267
Mr. O'NEIL. Congressman Treen, I think you have posed what is
a very serious problem and a very difficult one to answer.
I think that any pilot or the admiral and myself certainly cannot
tell you how long a man must be trained to learn the river, its bends,
its currents, its bars, and how to navigate it, although-
Mr. TREEN. Let me stop you there.
Does the fellow in the traffic center have to know where the bars
are?
Mr. O'NEIL. I do not think he needs to know and have the exact
knowledge as the pilot has in the pilothouse.
I do have one area of concern, and that is the Vessel Traffic Center
operator has, under rule 11, the power to determine what is a hazardous
situation and stop traffic.
Now, I do not know under those circumstances what the degree of
knowledge is that one must have to make that determination.
For example, let us assume we have a situation where we have a
setout fog, and we have vessels jammed up in the area of the head of
pass on the lower Mississippi River. I do not know how someone in the
Vessel Traffic Center, perhaps, can make the determination on who
should go first or what vessel should move where, this sort of thing.
Obviously, if all the employee of the Vessel Traffic Center has to do
is to accumulate statistical knowledge and put that into a device and
then record it back, you do not need anything more than a techniicna.
a computer technician.
I do not think that is the minimum and that certainly is not enough
for what we are talking about.
Somewhere between that point and a master is a neutral ground
that is going to be necessary for training. I do not know how and to
what degree that training will be necessary. I do not know what the
Coast Guard's training manual is, but I think this entire industry
would like to see how they have trained their VTC people in other
areas, particularly Houston, so we could make some sort of comparison
of what is necessary.
Mr. TREEN. I think then we are narrowing it down. Except in those
cases where some control would be issued directly by the Vessel
Traffic Center, all that is is a reporting system. Individual decisions
with respect to management of the vessel are made by the people in
charge of these vessels. So it gets down to what kind of directives and
controls.
Admiral FUGARO. Precisely.
Mr. TREEN. Is everybody shut out and to stay put and may be
that does not-Admiral Fugaro, you do not want to get into the
position where you have a technician holding up the river and making
decisions something like that.
Captain CONRAD. Mr. Treen, I think, too, what troubles us, though,
in this ability of being a pilot and being the computer operator is that
what we have a fear of is the lack of local-not piloting ability, but the
local knowledge of the local terminology which is going back to the
same thing about the same thing about the language problem in that
it probably could be worked out; but we have a feeling of a little bit
of unease about this.
If you are familar with a route and the other guy is familiar with a
route and y'all talk to each other and say, "I just passed farmer
78-280-70------18
PAGENO="0272"
268
Brown's house," you will have a mental picture where you are; but
if you pass the same thing on to another guy who has got a road map,
and he looks at the map and he says, "Well, farmer Brown's house is
not on this map, where are you?"
The guy says, "I am about halfway between here and there, and
I just do not know farmer Brown's house and I am lost. I do not
know where I am."
J\'Ir. TREEN. I guess we will have a glossary of terms.
Captain CONRAD. That is correct.
But what has happened, sir, is that these terms that are in everyday
use in piloting, which is a part of piloting, are not on charts and they
are not on maps. They are just common knowledge of an area. It is
something that is called local custom, local situation, that you cannot
exactly put down on a piece of paper and say, this point is this place,
and this mile 103 has got maybe a half dozen different names that are
known locally; and some of these things have not existed for 10, 15,
20 years, but they are still called by the name of what may have been
there years ago, a farm or a plantation or a dock.
It does not exist; but we are not lost. We know where we are. It
is-you just cannot put a finger on it and put it in exact mile points,
what that is, all the time.
Mr. TREEN. Do you want to comment?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes.
Mr. TREEN. In commenting, would you cover the question of the
reporting points? I understand you have a number of reporting points
in the system.
Admiral FUGARO. I believe we have indicated those on the chart,
have we not? Those are the red diamonds. We will point them out.
Commander HICKEY. Red are down and green are up.
Mr. TREEN. Red are the reporting points. You have to agree upon
what you are going to call them.
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Whether you number them or call them Farmer
Brown's house, or whatever, you must agree on the names. You've
got no more than 20 or maybe 30 reporting points in all.
Admiral FUGARO. Approximately about 20.
So I would agree that the names~
Mr. TREEN. You expect they will be reporting in between the
specific points?
Admiral FUGARO. Some degree of reporting in between them, I
would believe would be occurring between some of these points. If
there is a bend between two points and I am looking, say, just below
Belle Chasse, where there is a bend, we would possibly be reporting
to the vessel that he can expect to be meeting a vessel coming around
that bend; that would be part of the VTC information for that vessel.
With respect to the local knowledge, that these people should have,
we recognize that there is a requirement for local knowledge in any-
body who is going to be a section operator, much less the watch
supervisor.
We definitely intend to include knowledge and training through
the utilization of local knowledge instructors, perhaps pilots them-
selves, to instruct these people. In addition to that, a requirement will
be these people take trips to these sectors in which they will be operat-
ing and not oniy before they take over a section of operation. After
PAGENO="0273"
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they become a sector operator they will still he required to periodically
to go tour these areas to see what problems there are and to continue
familiarization with that area.
I think we are looking for a minimum level of local knowledge before
we qualify the sector operator. We cannot hope to make him a fully
qualified pilot, but then again we do not feel that that is necessary.
We recognize, however, as it has been stated, there is a need for some
level of local knowledge in these sector operators.
Mr. TREEN. Thank you.
I know there is more that could be said. I guess we have to move on.
Mr. BIAGGI. Any other statements to be made?
I might caution you we will continue until 3 p.m. We do have time
~constraints.
Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, I think we have covered many of the
points in Captain Bullard's statement and I do not see any reason
to pursue as Congressman Treen has centered on those particular
~problems.
We would like to make Captain Bullard's statement a part of the
record, however.
Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, all of these statements will be in
their entirety made a part of the record.
[The statements referred to follow:]
STATEMENT No. 2 OF AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR PORTS AND WATERWAYS
On behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways, we submit
:herewith our comments which will be presented by Captain Jack R. Bullard on
the manning problems which we foresee in the proposed New Orleans VTS system.
I am appearing on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways,
an association of numerous companies operating on the inland waterways who
are concerned with the Coast Guard's proposed Vessel Traffic System on the
Lower Mississippi River.
The Ad Hoc Conimittee objects to numerous aspects of the proposed Vessel
Traffic Service (VTS), hut we shall confine our comments to the lack of a respon-
sible plan for the manning of the System.
The Vessel Traffic Center has been delegated enormous power in the proposed
regulations. It will be the nerve center of the entire system. All of the information
given and received by the Service will pass through this Center and the Coast
Guard's computer will be located there. Presumably, all the orders that the
regulations authorize the Coast Guard to give to vessels in the VTS will emanate
from this Center and from the persons operating the Center. These orders may
include speed limits, vessel size, limitations, one way traffic requirements, and
control of the movement of nearly every vessel on 259 miles of the Mississippi
River. In fact, the Vessel Traffic Center could conceivably completely shut down
the 2nd and 8th largest ports in the country without exceeding the power delegated
to it under the proposed regulations.
Incredibly, however, there are absolutely no provisions in the regulations
establishing the qualifications or ability of those who wifi man the Vessel Traffic
Center and who will exercise these broad powers. The only reference at all to
personnel is contained in Proposal Rule 2 which indicates that the Vessel Traffic
* Center wifi be manned by the Coast Guard. In connection with questions posed
to them by the Ad Hoc Committee, the Coast Guard has indicated that its
* intention is to place the Vessel Traffic Center under the supervision of a "seasoned
duty officer" with communications and the monitoring of computer visual displays
to be performed by personnel of lower grades. They have not indicated, however,
the criteria by which an officer is considered "seasoned" nor have they shown
what qualifications the lower grade personnel will have or how they will be trained.
Considering that the proposed VTS is simply an adaptation of existing Federal
Aviation Authority systems minus the radar, we cannot understand why the
Coast Guard persists in ignoring the maritime community's plea for the establish-
:~ment of some minimum standards of competence similar to those promulgated by
PAGENO="0274"
270
the FAA for the certification of air traffic controllers. Among other things, the'
FAA regulations require that its traffic controllers pass a written test demon-
strating knowledge of flight rules, traffic control procedures, communications
procedures, air navigation, and weather. In addition, these traffic controllers must
pass a practical test to demonstrate proficiency with control tower equipment and
knowledge of the geographical area in which he will work. In particular, he must
demonstrate knowledge of the physical features of the airport and the control
zone, traffic patterns and holding procedures, and search and rescue. Even after
passing these tests, the air traffic controller must work as a trainee for 6 months
under the supervision of a senior controller before he is allowed to work on his own.
Obviously, all of the areas in which an air traffic controller must demonstrate
expertise are directly analogous to inland water transportation within a VTS
system. Such a system is, by definition, heavily traveled and governed by rules
and procedures concerning navigation and communication. Nowhere in the pro--
posed regulations, however, do we find any assurance that the Coast Guard.
personnel operating the YTS will have the knowledge necessary to promote safety
and expedite the movement of traffic in the affected area.
Within the 259 mile length of proposed YTS system, there are two different sets.
of navigational rules including the inland rules and the western rivers rules. There
are a multitude of buoys, lights and other navigational aids in this area, not to~
mention submerged wrecks, pipelines, cable crossings and constantly shifting sand.
bars. As everyone involved with water transportation well knows, a detailed
knoweidge of all of these things is required for successful navigation of large~
vessels but the proposed regulations do not require the slightest familiarity with.
them on the part of the Coast Guard personnel who will operate the system.
Other countries give credence to our insistence on experienced and qualified
controllers. Of the 12 VTS systems operating in 1973, including Liverpool, three~
systems in London, Southhampton, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Montreal, two systems
in Japan, and the Elbe and Weser River system, all are manned or supervised by
Master Pilots familiar with the areas under control and and who, in addition, have
the benefit of radar surveillance. Since the proposed VTS system does not in-~
corporate radar surveillance, and to our knowledge, the Coast Guard has no
river pilots in uniform, it is difficult to see how the system could be anything but
inferior in operation to every foreign system on which information is available.
This is not to say that the Coast Guard does not possess intelligent and corn-
petent personnel. They are undoubtedly well qualified for the traditional duties
undertaken by the Coast Guard, but it is uncontestible, we believe, that there is
no position in the Coast Guard where a person may gain practical knowledge~
concerning the day-to-day operation of the large seagoing vessels and river tows.
navigating the proposed VTS area. Such knowledge and expertise will obvisouly
be necessary to avoid confusion and disruption of traffic under any type of VTS
operation. It may well be that given sufficient time and on the job training, the
Coast Guard could develop a corps of operators trained for this VTS area, but thern
point is that the Coast Guard presently has no such trained operators and has
established no qualifications whatever for the persons they intend to use. Further-
more. it is well known that the Coast Guard rotates its personnel every 2 or 3
years, often to positions completely unrelated to the past positions held. While
this may encourage versatility among the Coast Guard's people, it seems to us that
this practice will insure that the VTS system will be regularly deprived of its most
experienced operators and that the industry will be continually subjected to untried
and unfamiliar VTS operators. The Coast Guard cannot, moreover, simply transfer~
operations from other YTS systems to the proposed sytem. There are several
reasons for this. First, the Mississippi River and the connecting waterways in
this proposed system are totally different from a physical standpoint from every~
other VTS system opera.ting in the U.S. None of these include a major river of the~
Mississippi's dimensions. Secondly, no other system uses the variety of navigating.
rules found in the proposed system. Lastly, probably no other port in the country
except New York has anywhere near the traffic found in this system and none~
whatsoever have a similar mixture of vessels, including oceangoing ships, tugs,
ferries, large river towboats and tows, canal towboats and their tows, fishing
vessels, water taxis, floating oil rigs, pleasure craft, and old fashioned river steam-
boats. There is simply no YTS area in the country where experience in dealing with.
this melange of vessels can be obtained other than in the proposed VTS area itself.
There is also no provision in the regulations for communication capabilities
in the French language. Such capability is absolutely essential in Southern Loui-
siana with its large population of persons of French descent, many of whom still
depend upon their native tongue, a situation which is officially encouraged by
PAGENO="0275"
271
-the State of Louisiana, and who depend upon maritime pursuits for their liveli-
hood. Their maritime heritage goes back generatiOns and as a group, they have
:achieved worldwide recognition of their masterful and intrepid seamanship. This
:15 demonstrated by the fact that when oil companies exploring the North Sea
needed seamen to insure the regular operation of their supply vessels under some
-~f the worst weather conditions in the world, they brought these French-Americans
to Europe to run the boats and to re-train English sailors and captains for this
hazardous duty.
Unfortunately, the proposed regulations require that each vessel under control
of the VTS have a person proficient in English to stand radio watch at all times.
This will impose an impossible burden on the shipping and fishing industries in
South Louisiana who depend upon these French speaking personnel for a signifi-
cant portion of their manpower. Many vessels are run as small family operations
which will now have to hire additional crew members to meet the requirement
-of the proposed regulation. This may seem simple enough, but for many the costs
involved will mean the difference between earning a living and going out of
business. Similarly, many of the larger companies hire these French speaking
people in all positions from deckhand on up and are glad to have them. The
*proposed regulation will end this practice since these people will not be able to
meet the language requirement which the Coast Guard wishes to add to their
jobs, and their employers will not wish to break the law by hiring them. This
creates a double burden on the public. First, the people will lose their jobs and
be forced to look for employment which does not take them through VTS areas.
This will not be so easy to do. Second, their employers will suddenly be faced
with a drastic reduction in the number of qualified personnel to man their vessels.
They will have to rely on less qualified applicants because in this hotly competi-
tive industry, it is not possible to just increase crew size to insure that a person
proficient in English is on the radio at all times. The additional crewmen are
-not available, and the increased labor cost would be prohibitive.
These problem areas which I have just discussed are so basic to the safety of
this system and can be so easily rectified that it is hard to understand how the
Coast Guard can continue to ignore them. If the problems are not solved now, it
is likely they will be solved later on a collision by collision basis after unjustified
damage to the economic position of the industry has been done.
The Coast Guard should staff its control center with Master Pilots working on
rotation basis from area pilot associations and transportation companies. The
-savings which the Coast Guard can make in training expenses by hiring ex-
perienced civilians will offset the increased labor costs, and the safety benefits are
obvious. Failing this, Coast Guard supplied VTS operators should work under the
24 hour supervision of Master Pilots from the area and the Coast Guard should
establish by regulation the qualifications and training necessary for its personnel
to become operators of the system. Otherwise, the Coast Guard's job rotation
- system will result in regularly staffing the VTS system with cooks and quarter-
masters. If the Coast Guard refuses to accept the experience and ability of civilian
pilots, and if they are able to justify this position, which they have not yet done,
-then it will be absolutely necessary that their personnel who are assigned to the
SITS system be exempted by regulation from the present job rotation system
undertaken by the Coast Guard. This will be needed in addition to regulations
-establishing their training and qualifications. These regulations will preferably
*require service as observers on commercial vessels in the area. Otherwise, there is
no way that the VTS system will he staffed with persons with the level of ability
necessary to promote the system's objectives of safety and facilitation of
- commerce.
Finally, the regulations should provide for French language communication
capability at the Vessel Control Center. This would require little effort on the
Coast Guard's part and would be much cheaper to the taxpayer and consumer
than requiring all the vessels passing through the system to have English language
* communication capability. Such a simple step would prevent the confusion and
dislocation in the maritime industry which will otherwise result.
REPORT TO THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR PORTS AND WATERWAYS: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM
My name is Robert L. Brite and I have been asked to testify on behalf of the
Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways concerning the statistical validity
of studies which have been performed by the United States Coast Guard and the
conclusions relative to the presently proposed Vessel Traffic System.
PAGENO="0276"
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past three to five years, the United States Coast Guard has con-
ducted a number of studies on the establishment of a Vessel Traffic System (YTS)
for various ports in the United States, including the Mississippi and the port of
New Orleans. These studies have involved a minimum of 9,300 man hours and
have been performed for the purpose of:
1. determining the need for a vessel traffic system in the various ports, and
2. determining the level of vessel traffic system needed.
Essentially, these systems are divided into basic (non-surveillance) systems andl
sophisticated (surveillance including radar and/or television) systems.
During the course of the Coast Guard study, a great deal of data analysis was.
performed with the intent of computing the probability of an accident of a given
type occurring to a particular type ship in a certain port. This probability was
then used to compute expected damages from such accidents. These accidents.
were individually analyzed in order to determine the level of VTS necessary to
prevent such an accident. A revised probability was then computed and an ex-
pected damage reduction was calculated.
There are many problems with the data and with the procedure used. Although.
the result of this analysis is the presently proposed Vessel Traffic System, New
Orleans data were not included in the development of the initial algorithm upon.
which the calculation of the probabilities is based. The United States Coast
Guard Study Report "Vessel Traffic Systems: Issue Study," Volume 3, written
by Computer Science Corporation, March, 1973 (hereafter referred to as Issue
Study) concludes that tlìe algorithm must determine the expected casualty losses
as a result of the accidents and determine the effect that a proposed VTS will
have on the probability of accidents and recalculate the expected casualty loss.
They note that "an accident-by-accident analysis, as indicated in the algorithm,
should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of various levels of Vessel Traffic
Systems." (Issue Study, p. 2-15.) The report also notes the expected effect of
VTS:
"The data suggests that a VTS may also reduce the expected damage either
through prevention of some of the more serious accidents or thorugh reduction
to the severity of those that do occur. However, we were not able to quantify
this reduction sufficiently to justify a revision in the expected damage per acci-
dent." (Issue Study, pp. 6-8.)
Based on these statements from the Issue Study, I would have to conclude that.
the New Orleans area is sufficiently different from those ports studied and suffi-
ciently unique in its geographic configuration to require its inclusion in the~
development of the algorithm. It is very difficult to take into account the unique~
characteristics and requirements of an individual port unless the algorithm is~
specifically designed for that port.
Based on my statistical analysis of the Issue Study and the United States.
Coast Guard Study Report "Vessel Traffic Systems: Analysis of Port Needs"
(August, 1973) and other related publications including the background data.
supporting these studies, I have come to the following conclusions:
1. The data base used in the analysis is very poor and requires a great
deal of judgment in drawing any conclusions;
2. There are a number of problems with the statistical techniques used.
in the algorithm and its application to studies of individual ports; and
3. Nothing I have seen in the data, the statistical analysis, or the studies
of the Coast Guard in any way supports the presently proposed Vessel Traffic
System based solely on a voice communication network.
I would now like to elaborate on these points.
II. PROBLEMS WITH DATA BASE
There are a number of problems with the data which lead me to believe that it.
is virtually impossible to draw reliable conclusions from this data. In the Issue
Study, it is noted that:
"The method chosen uses recent empirical data to estimate the expected casualty
losses in a port which are caused by the types of accidents that may be prevented
by a vessel traffic system and then uses a combination of empirical data and
judgment to determine the expected reduction in casualty losses if a vessel traffic
system is implemented or improved." (Issue Study, p. 6-2.)
"This evaluation must quantify the effect of VTS on the probability of an
accident. Present experience with VTS is so limited that a rigorous mathematical
PAGENO="0277"
273
formulation cannot he developed from existing data with sufficient reliability to
justify its use." (Issue Study, p. 6-7.)
Data deficiencies were noted to be a significant problem in the Issue Study.
They include problems with correlation of accident locations to port areas covered.
by VTS. The statistics on vessel transits available from the Department of the
Army, Corps of Engineers "Waterborne Commerce of the United States," 1969-
1974, are difficult to correlate with information available from the Coast Guard.
concerning the location of accidents. The Issue Study also concludes that it is.
difficult to correlate the effect of a specific Vessel Traffic System to casualty cause.
Thus, the data is difficult to use in the support of any conclusion according to
their own statements.
Another significant problem is the reporting of accidents. It is clear that a
large number of accidents go unreported for a variety of reasons. It also appears
that the percentage of accidents actually reported varies over the period 1969-
1972 (the Coast Guard study period). This would of course lead to erroneous
conclusions concerning the accident probabilities in given port areas. The four-year
time period used was very brief. This problem could not have been overcome at
the time of the study; however, data are now available through 1974 and show
some significantly different patterns from those of the 1969-1972 period.
Other data problems include errors in the Marine Vessel Casualty Reports
(MVCR CG-2692). "The information called for in the `Report of Vessel Casualty
or Accident' Form 2692 . . . lacks adequate detail in several areas, especially
on factors related to the cause of the accident, vessel movement and specific
location." (Issue Study, p. 6-61.)
"The data which is transcribed to punch cards . . . omit some valuable data
on the report form. The associated coding instructions leave too much room for
judgment in assigning codes to the data in the reports with a resulting lack of
consistency." (Issue Study, p. 6-61.)
The Issue Study would thus lead us to believe that the information available
concerning the number of accidents, the cause of accidents, and the coding of~
information reported is totally unreliable. It is difficult to see how any conclusions
ba.sed on such data could be given much weight. It is therefore quite apparent
that the data base is very inadequate for decision making purposes. The con-
clusion that a particular level of VTS should be installed in the New Orleans~
area must therefore be based on something other than statistically factual
information.
This conclusion is probably best supported by the Issue Study:
"The information contained in the Vessel Casualty Report Form CG-2692
provides very little to establish the cause of the accident and even less to deter-
mine what might have prevented it. This is presumably left up to the Marine
Inspector, since to require such information from the vessel master or the owner
might involve self-incrimination in some cases." (Issue Study, p. 6-68.)
This is the data set upon which the decision for the presently proposed system
is supposedly based.
III. PROBLEMS WITH STATISPICAL TECHNIQUES USED
The development of the algorithm is fairly straightforward but does include a.
number of assumptions which may or may not be applicable to the New Orleans
area. My major reservation, however, is not with the logic of the algorithm but
with the application of the algorithm to the New Orleans port area. Since the
original Issue Study did not include any New Orleans data, it is impossible to
determine whether or not such information would have affected the construction
of the algorithm. It is not difficult, however, to see that the algorithm must use a.
combination of empirical data and judgment to determine the effect through the
expected reduction in casualty losses. The method used in the Issue Study was
analysis on a case-by-case basis of each reported accident.
"The method presented here is based on estimating separately the effects of
various VTS levels in reducing each type of casualty . . . It has the disad-
vantage, however, of requiring a considerable amount of judgment when esti-
mating VTS effects." (Issue Study, p. 6-109.)
Thus, we see that the method used was to analyze each accident case chosen
for analysis in order to determine the level of VTS necessary to prevent the*
accident. Because of problems with the data base noted earlier, such a decision
would require a great deal of judgment and could of course be influenced by any
biases of the reviewer. The general guidelines used were: "any collision, ram-
ming, or grounding involving a participating vessel is potentially preventable,.
PAGENO="0278"
274
but only if the VTS would actually affect the vessel's movement or its location
given the same circumstances causing the accident . . . The estimated accident
prevention rate for any level of VTS at a specific port should properly take into
-account the causes of different types of accidents in that port in determining the
degree to which they would be affected by the proposed VTS." (Issue Study,
pp. 111-112.)
The classification of a given accident into preventable or not preventable is
-obviously extremely subjective and requires knowledge of the individual port
conditions.
"Application of the case-by-case analysis method requires not only a consid-
eration of the factors cited for the previously discussed method, but also a detailed
examination of the causes and circumstances of each casualty for contributing
factors such as qualifications of person(s) in charge, currents, location in the
port, traffic congestion, etc. For this reason, this method can best be applied by
personnel at the port who are familiar with conditions there and have access to
the original casualty reports." (Issue Study, pp. 113-114.)
~jT~ again see that conclusions must, for the most part, be based on subjective
*judgment rather than on hard statistical facts. Recall that the Issue Study
points out that the MVCR Form 2692 "provides very little to establish the cause
of the accident and even less to determine what might have prevented it."
In the application of the algorithm to the New Orleans area, a great deal of
such subjectivity entered the analysis. The United States Coast Guard Study
Report "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs," August, 1973, (hereafter referred to as
Coast Guard Study Report) concludes that: "at present, it is estimated that
~accident reports are filed on only 30 % of the reportable casualties . . . For
purposes of this analysis, it was estimated that casualty reports were completed
on accidents accounting for approximately 50% of the total cargo and vessel
damage;" (P. 5.) Amazingly, the analyst chose to adjust for this factor arbitrarily.
"Therefore, the total, annual vessel and cargo loss values calculated using the
algorithm were multiplied by a factor of 2." (P. 5.)
Statistically, such a procedure cannot be justified. To further complicate the
problem, they concluded that the damage reported on the casualty reports were
only about half of the actual damage and "therefore, to compensate for inaccurate
loss estimates, a second factor of 2 was applied to the vessel and cargo figures
calculated by the algorithm . . . In summary, the vessel and cargo loss values
were multiplied by a factor of 4 to compensate for unreported accidents and
inaccurate vessel and cargo damage estimates." (Coast Guard Study Report,
p. 6.) Again, such a procedure is statistically totally unjustifiable. There is little
more justification for multiplying the data by a factor of 4 than for multiplying
by 3, 5, or 2.6. Such a procedure would allow the analyst to come to any con-
elusion by simply deciding what the conclusion should be and choosing the data
adjustment factor accordingly.
Other problems with the statistical analysis were apparent. The size of a ship
was not considered as a separate factor in the analysis. This may or may not be
justifiable. Only analysis of accurate data could determine this factor. Un-
fortunately, in the development of the algorithm in the original form, the re-
searchers found that "the appropriate level of VTS for any given port can only
be properly determined from a cost-effectiveness analysis of the various VTS
options available to the given port, and this is beyond the scope of the current
study." (Issue Study, pp. 6-39, 40.)
The damage reduction figures for the New Orleans port were therefore based
upon the analysis in the Coast Guard Study Report of August, 1973. This is the
* same data base which has been described as being unreliable for determining
necessary VTS levels for accident prevention.
Although ports comparable to -the New Orleans area with radar-based vessel
traffic systems are available, no analysis of such ports has been performed, to my
knowledge. I am specifically referring to the port of Rotterdam, which has for a
number of years had a Vessel Traffic System including surveillance. A thorough
- analysis of such a system should be deemed essential prior to the implementation
of a working system in the New Orleans-Mississippi River area. It would seem to
me to be much more cost-effective to analyze an existing situation rather to install
a Vessel Traffic System such as the one which has been proposed and which existing
data does not support. I have begun to collect information concerning the port of
Rotterdam. However, the collection and analysis of this information will be very
- time consuming.
PAGENO="0279"
.275
IV. PRESENTLY PROPOSED VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM
The Coast Guard has proposed a Vessel Traffic System which would include
only a voice communication network and would not include surveillance in the
form of radar or television cameras. It is my feeling that statistically this proposal
is without any support. This view was shared in the original Coast Guard Study
Report recommendations: "Algorithm results indicate some form of surveillance
is necessary from Mile 75 to Mile 109." (P. B-5). Thus, the original Coast Guard
Study Report concluded that New Orleans ranked very high in need for a VTS.
The report shows that New Orleans was divided into three sectors.L3 was recom-
mended for two of these sectors and L3 for one of the sectors. Thus they concluded.
that the statistics available indicated that L3 (radar and/or television surveillance)
was desirable in the most heavily trafficked area of the New Orleans port. It is
easy to see how this conclusion came about. Chart I shows that level L2 reduces
Type 1 accidents by approximately 52 percent while L3 reduces it by approximately
72 percent. Total accidents with L2 are reduced by about 19 percent while L3.
reduces total accidents by about 29 percent. In dollar terms, the reduction in
damage by L2 is about $520,000 as estimated while level L3 reduces dollar damage
by about $800,000. The Coa.st Guard Study Report on pages B-8--10 therefore
presents a very strong argument for some form of radar and/or television surveil-
lance in this particular sector of the Mississippi River.
This follows the conclusion in the Issue Study that "in most ports different levels
of VTS would be indicated for different sectors of the port." (P. 6-109.) This
Issue Study also concluded that the preventable accidents indicate the expected
savings that would result from a Vessel Traffic System a.nd thus are very useful
in a cost-benefit analysis of various levels of Vessel Traffic Systems.
The Coast Guard Study Report ran into a number of problems in analyzing
the New Orleans port area. The problems with the data and the manipulation of
data have already been noted. They found it difficult to determine the effect of
various levels of VTS.
"Tue basic surveillance mode does not include sufficient features for positive~
control, but does considerably improve the shore-based center's knowledge of the
presence and movement of vessels in the area.
"In a case-by-case study, it was difficult to determine whether surveillance
would have been necessary to prevent any particular accident." (Coast Guard
Study Report, p. 14.)
Thus, the Coast Guard Study Report concluded that it was difficult to deter-
mine the level of Vessel Traffic System necessary to prevent the accident on a
case-by-case basis, but that surveillance in some form does improve knowledge of
ship movement. This would be particularly true of the New Orleans area. The
Coast Guard Study Report also concludes that: "it was difficult to determine
whether this level would be required to prevent any particular casualty. It was
evident from plotting accidents on charts and from reviewing transit data, that
some port areas were extremely congested and dangerous. Collision avoidance
radar and computer-interfaced equipment was considered to be necessary to pre-
vent many of the casualties which occurred in relatively open water where traffic
density was high, and traffic patterns diverse and complicated." (P. 15.)
While their conclusions do support implementation of a Vessel Traffic System
with surveillance, they note:
"It must be kept in mind that the estimated reduction in accidents based on
this lengthy analysis is subjective. The actual effectiveness will be determined by
evaluating the results obtained from operating systems." (Coast Guard Study
Report, p. 23.)
Although the Coast Guard recommends that the actual effectiveness should be
determined by evaluating an operating system, it is my understanding that the
computer configuration currently on order does not include data collection capa-
bilities and will not be able to provide any information concerning the amount of
use of the system, the effectiveness of the system, or any basis upon which to
decide whether the system is in fact desirable or not. I find it incredible that the~
Coast Guard would install a system which is unable to supply such statistical
information for future analysis.
Various other reports were also enlightening on this issue. The United States
Coast Guard, Department of Transportation, "Vessel Traffic System-What Is
Needed to Prevent and Reduce Vessel Accidents," by the Comptroller General
of the United States, noted that the sophisticated systems were installed in San.
Francisco and Puget Sound because ". . . in some cases, maritime interests had.
PAGENO="0280"
276
~expressed preference for the more sophisticated systems." (P. iii.) Thus local
views were instrumental in the types of systems installed. This is not true of the
New Orleans experience. The study further concludes that "the instrumental
benefits of using sophisticated systems are not really known and that the actual
~effectiveness would have to be determined by evaluating operating systems."
(P. 5.) Again, such a system is operational in the port of Rotterdam. The concern
that many have with the presently proposed system is the voice communication
effectiveness and as noted in the United States CoastGuard Study "VTS IssuesStudy,
Final Report," Volume I, Executive Summary, March, 1973, "the effectiveness of
the system can be no better than the weakest component." (P. 6.) The weakest
component of said system is the communication network.
Other data indicate that the need for a system above New Orleans (between the
Hiiey P. Long Bridge and Baton Rouge) is actually not great. The problems in
this area certainly could be handled without surveillance.
The report by the Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard
Draft, "Vessel Traffic System New Orleans," Environmental Impact Statement,
August, 1974, concluded that there were too many vessels for a partial com-
munication network.
"The amount of traffic on a given radio frequency each minute would render
the net useless. Many masters would be unable to forewarn others of their pres-
ence due to their inability to break through. A fully implemented VTS would
eliminate this danger." (Vessel Traffic System New Orleans, p. 7.)
Of a partial radar and communication only, they conclude that: "there are too
many areas where accident rates are high to attempt to get by with minimum
radar and radio coverage. Full radar and communications must be provided if the
high maritime accident rate in the New Orleans area is to be reduced." (Vessel
Traffic System New Orleans, p. 7.)
They further state that: "consideration to using other combinations was con-
sidered, and on a partial implementation basis, was deemed unacceptable and
unreasonable. A VTS does, in fact, have all the combinations of the above. How-
ever, it is the use of all combinations at maximum efficiency that makes the VTS
useful and effective." (Vessel Traffic System New Orleans, p. 7.)
Thus conclusions of studies commissioned by the Coast Guard and performed
by the Coast Guard indicate that a full radar surveillance system is essential for
the safe operation of the port of New Orleans. No factual information supports
the presently proposed system.
TABLES 1-Vill
Tables I-VT represent the number of accidents, the number of vessel transits,
and the calculated probability of an accident occurring for the fiscal years 1969
through 1974, respctively. These data are divided into ship type (k) and accident
type (j). We are therefore able to determine the probability of ship type k having
accident type j in year t. A ~, k represents the number of vessels in accidents by
ship type k and accident type j. N k represents the number of vessel transits by
ship type Ic and P(A) ~ indicates the probability of ship type Ic having accident
type j. The probability of an accident by each ship type for all accident types is
also computed and shown as a total within each of the ship type cells. At the bottom
of each table are probabilities of accidents by accident type; thus, P(A) repre-
sents the probability of accident type j for all ship types. The figure at the bottom
of the probability column represents the probability of an accident of any type
occurring to any ship type. In 1969, this figure was 31.83 x 1O_~. In scanning the
tables, we see that the probability of an accident occurring has increased signifi-
cantly between 1969 and 1974 based on the number of accident reports filed.
Table VII shows the total accidents ,vessel transits, and probability of accident
by ship type for the years 1969 through 1974. The total for all ship types for the
1969-1974 preiod is represented by a probability of 92.46 x 1O~.
Table VIII shows the number of accidents, vessel transits, and probability of an
accident by accident type for the period 1969-1974.
Following is a description of the accident types by number as they appear in
~the tables:
1. Collisions in meeting, crossing, or overtaking situations;
2. Collisions in docking, mooring, or anchoring situations;
3. Rammings of fixed objects;
4. Rammings of non-fixed objects;
5. Groundings.
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277
ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS AND PROBABiLITY OF ACCIDENT, NEW ORLEANS, FISCAL YEAR 1969-74
TABLE 1.-FISCAL YEAR 1969
Number of
vessels in Total number Probability of
Accident accidents, of transits, accident X
Ship typek type] A~,k N k ~ P(A)~,k
Tanker 1 0 0
2 1 20.73
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 2 41.45
3 4,825 62.18
Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 11 33. 15
2 5 15.07
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 2 6.03
18 33,180 54.25
10 13.02
6 7.81
0 0
O 0
2 2.60
Total 18 76, 790 23. 44
barge 1 6 6.24
2 13 13.52
3 2 2.08
4 0 0
5 0 0
Total 21 996, 158 21.84
1 15 26.73
2 6 10.69
3 3 5.35
4 0 0
1 1.78
25 56,111 44.55
j A~ N
1 42 15.73
2 31 11.61
3 5 1.78
4 0 0
5 7 2.62
85 267,064 31.83
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278
TABLE IL-FISCAL YEAR 1970
Number of
vessels in Total number Probability of
Accident accidents, of transits, accident X
Ship type k typej A ~, Nj, 104 P(A)3, j,
Tanker 1 2 36.25
2 9 163. 13
3 2 36.25
3 54.38
90.63
Total 21 5, 517 380. 64
Cargo ships and passenger vessels 18 52. 11
2 19 55. 01
3 2___ - 5.79
4 2 ____ :
5 17 49. 22
Total 58 34, 540 167. 92
Tank barge 1 18 23 68
a 15 19.73
3 2 2.63
5.26
2 2.63
Total 41 76, 023 ~
Cargo barge 12 11.56
10 9.63
6.74
1 .96
___________ 3.85
34 103,807 32.75
Tow, tug 1 30 55. 15
2 18 33.09
3 10 18.38
4 7.35
5.12
Total 65 54,393 119.50
_________ N
1 80 29. 17
2 71 25.89
3 23 8.39
4 14 5.10
5 31 11.30
Total 219 274, 28~ 79 84
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279
TABLE 111.-FISCAL YEAR 1971
Number of
vessels in Total number Probability of
Accident accidents, of transits, accident X
Ship typek typej A~,k N k 10~~ P(A)j,k
1 3 53.70
2 1 17.90
3 2 35.80
4 0 0
5 5 89.49
11 5,587 196.89
18 63.92
12 42.62
I 8 28. 41
1 5 17.76
13 46.17
56 28, 159 198.87
1 10 12.60
2 12 15. 11
3 2 2.52
4 4 5.04
5 3 3.78
79,395 39.05
8 7.30
38 34.70
9 8.22
0 0
5 4.57
60 139,524 54.78
Tanker
Total -
Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1
Total...._..
Tank barge~___
Total
Cargo barge
Total
Tow,tug
2
3
4
5
1 19 34.26
2 27 48.68
3 11 19.83
4 2 3.61
5 10 18.03
69 55,465
j
Aj N
1
2
3
4
5
.
58
90
32
11
36
20.85
32.36
11.51
3.95
12.94
Total
227 278,130 81.62
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280
TABLE IV.-FISCAL YEAR 1972
Number of
vessels in Total number Probability of'
Accident accidents, of transits, acc~dent X
Ship typek typej A, j,k N k 10_aP(A)~,
1 5 95.82
2 3 5749
3 1 19.16
4 0 0
5 8 153.32
Total 17 5,218 325.80
Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 15
16 5355,
22 73.64
1 2 6.69
9 30.12
Total 64 29, 876 214. 22
Tank barge 1 15 17.62
2 7 8.22
3 4 4.70
4 1 1.17
4 4.70
Total 31 85, 108 36. 42
1 20 14.99
2 15 11.24
3 8 6.00
4 0 0
5 0 0
Total 43 133, 440 32. 22
Tow, tug 1 22 35.23
2 16 25.62
3 12 19.22
4 1 1.60
5 2 3.20
53 62,451
84.87
I
A3 N
P(A)j
-
1
2
3
4
5
77
57
47
4
23
24.36
18.03
14.87
1.27
7.28
208 316,093
65.80
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281
TABLE V-FISCAL YEAR 1973
Number of
vessels in Total number Probability of
Accident accidents, of transits, accident X
Ship typek typej Aj,k N k 10-~P(A)~,k
Tanker 1 1 17.89
2 4 71.61
3 4 71.61
4 0 0
5 10 179.02
Total 19 5, 586 340. 14
Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 18 61. 05
2 54 183.15
3 15 50.88
4 4 13.57
5 19 64.44
Total 110 29,484 373.03
Tank barge 1 14 16. 15
2 32 36.92
3 3 3.46
4 1 1.15
5 1 1.15
Total 51 86, 672 58. 84
Cargo barge 1 12 9. 24
1 60 46.21
1 27 20.79
0 0 0
5 4 3.08
luLal 103 129, 847 79.32
Tnw tue 1 26 42.11
45 72.88
25 40.49
2 3.24
5 8.113
103 61,743
166.82
j
A1 N
P(A)1
1
2
3
4
5
71
195
74
7
39
386 313,332
22.66
62.23
23.62
2.23
12.45
132.19
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282
TABLE \`I.-FISCAL YEAR 1974 NEW ORLEANS ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS AND PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT
Number of
vessels in Total number Probability of
Accident accidents, of transits, occident X
Ship type k type j A k N k 10 -~, P(A)~,
1 2 29.27
2 9 131.71
3 0 0
4 2 29.27
5 32 468.32
45 6, 833 658. 57
17 58.25
150. 76
10 34.26
1 343
154. 18
__________ 117 29,186 400.88
19 22.86
34 40.92
6.02
6.02
6 7.22
69 83, 098 83.03
17 12.20
110 78. 95
5.02
2.87
15 10. 77
153 139,334 109.81
70.79
42 67. 57
14 22.52
14.48
18 28.96
127
62.154
204.33
A~
N
1 30.88
2 239 7455
3 36 11.23
4 21 6.55
5 116 36.18
511 320,605 159.3
TABLE VII.-ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS, AND PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT BY SHIP TYPE-NEW ORLEANS,
FISCAL YEAR 1969-74
Number of Probability of
vessels in Total number accidentX1O-~
Ship type k accidents Ak of transits N~
Tanker 116 33, 566 3115 59
Carlo ships and passenger vessels 423 184, 425 229. 36
Tank barge 241 487, 091 49.48
Cargo barge 414 712, 110 58. 14
Tow,tug 442
125.46
Total 1, 636 1, 769, 509 92.46
Tanker
Total
Cargo ships and passenger vessels
Tank barge
Total
TrthI
Csrgo barge
Total
Two, tug
Total
Total
PAGENO="0287"
283
TABLE Vlll.-ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS, AND PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT BY ACCIDENT TYPE-NEW ORLEANS,
FISCAL YEARS 1969-74
Accident type J
Number of
vessels in
accidents A~
Total number
of transits NJ
Probability of
accidentXl0-5
P(A)j
1
2
3 -
4
5
427
683
217
57
252
24.13
38.60
12.26
3.22
14.24
Total
1, 636
1,769, 509
92.46
Mr. O'NEIL. I would, if the committee would allow me a few minutes,
like to perhaps try to put this in perspective and make some suggestion
on where we could go from here.
I think I speak for everybody who is a member of the Ad Hoc
Committee for Ports and Waterways and AWO, and in saying we
are gratified that this committee presented itself and listened to what
we have had to say today.
We hope we have impressed the committee on our concerns, particu-
larly with what is going on in New Orleans.
Most of the people whom I represent have been on the river for
at least 50 years. They know every bend, every turn, every sand bar
and other bars, I am sure.
They have been in the wheelhouses of the boats. Theyare realists,
not obstructionists, and I hope we have not conveyed to anybody
that we are trying to obstruct the implementation of this system.
They foresee very real problems in what has been developed so
far, and only want the opportunity to give the Coast Guard what
they feel is safe methods of operation.
They are very concerned with the hazardous materials regulation
and the pollution statute. If a system is put out on the Lower
Mississippi River which is in the least bit unsafe or unworkable or
unfeasible, many of these people could well go out of business with
the penalties under those statutes.
They carry a great deal of chlorine; they carry dangerous cargo,
hazardous cargo in great quantities, and for those reasons they are so
vitally concerned.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act in section 122(e) sets forth
the criteria that must be followed in implementing that and I think
we have illustrated today many of these have not been met.
There is said much as to the scope and the degree of hazardous
material, and I am sure that is appreciated. I do not know of any
study-and Dr. Brite will make just a few comments on that-on
whether or not the intercoastal waterway overlapping areas were ever
considered.
78-280-76-19
PAGENO="0288"
284
`~he econoi~ic impact au~l `ef~ect `on these people ~rom their point
of view of licensing-and their -radios, 140 not believe that it has been
given serious considera~iom
Th~ local pl'actice, knowledge, and custom, to which Cotrgressm'an
-T-reen referred -to~ ~gain is anotber -area that `all `o~f `t'h~e ~st forth as
criterion must be -considered by -a wide variety of interests. Perhaps
this will be considered in the ñitüré. It èeñainly tb our knowledge
has not been considered in the past, although we haire had a soundmg
board and-there has been no response.
We wou'd suggest therefore that perhaps the following piocedure
should be followed in this matter; and that is that, subject to, again,
Dr. Brite's comments, I think I preempted him~ but I myself might
as well go ahead and finish, `fur the cothmit'tee whom I represent
discussed this last night and we would like Tto suggest these procedures
and perhaps have them endorsed b~r this `committee.
We think that it is absolutely essential that advance notice of
proposed regulation be withdrawn. These regulations in their present
form are unworkable and they do not represent the cOmments cer-
tainly which this industry has made.
* Mr. TREEN. Are you going to file, or do you have one filed now
under the procedure, under the advance notice, or are you going to
file comments in the i~~cord?
Mr. O'NEIL. Congressman, we have filed as of September 3 over
30 comments to those and we are cut 6ff procedurally from doing
anything else, and it sits with the Coast Guard to determine what
they will do. That has been done.
The `second point is, I do net see personall~r any need for a formal
*.~advisory committee at this time., aIthongh I do hot ~aht to waive
that right if in fact that exists. I would hope `that ~ah `informal com-
mittee could be established composed of eight people from the barge
towing industry, representing a cross-section of their interests to
`deal with the Coast Guard.
Now, this committee must deal both with Washington and New
Orleans because the reason we have to put a stop on the 8th Coast
Guard District blaming Washington and Washington blaming the
8th Coast Guard District, we cannot e.fford to have `this any more
and we are not responsible and we do not know what is happening.
We submit `that all `of the meetings that this committee to treat
the problems which have arisen today be recorded with testimony,
with a court reporter so that there will be no misunderstanding what
*has been said and what has transpired.
We suggest that these meetings take place in New Orleans and
that, `subsequent to these meetings, perhaps on April `1, 1977, if that
:time span is adequate, that `that jbiht committee report be resub-
mitted to this committee, resubmitted to this committee On what
progress has been made.
This will, I think, give us an opportunity to insure this committee
that the system which will be put into New Orleans will be rational
and reflective of our needs and that the funding that you have author-
ized will be utilized effectively.
We are not sure that that will happen right now.
We think that no system could go in on a volunatry basis at all
until these critical questions are resolved, and that is the position
I think that we take.
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285
Dr. Brite `has done `a thorough analysis of the statistics which the
Coast Guard `initially used to `design this `system for New `Orleans;
and Ii would like now to defer to him `for one moment so that he can
summarize those things because there are sOme `pro1biems that have
been raised and we have done `our homework.
We have "lodked at the statistics. We have tried to ~flnd out `how
wo got to where we are `and we are `not sure `how we got to where `we
`are; and `we are afraid-we `hope this is not `the case., `that `we may
have been puthed `into an ~entbarrassing `situ'ation `that we may have
a system that perha~ps is not the, right one for New Orleans, and if
`that is the case, we ought to know `right `now `before we `~o `one `step
f'urther'; `and ~[ `think Dr. Bri:te could `make some comments.
Mr. B'IAGGI. Yes, `bii~f comments.
Mr. BR!TE. Mr. `Chairman, Mr. Treen, gen~lernen':
I `have ~been asl~ed to testify `for the `ad hoc committee and my
complete report will be `available for `the record, ~but `for `time con-
sid'era'tions, I `will just `make some `very `quidk `comments.
The `analysis that I did was `for the purpose of determining what
`statisticai procedure was us'ed by the Coast Gurad in proposing the
present system. `Baaically, what I found `was that `there `were `a number
`of prohiems with the data, a number `of problems `with `the statistical
analysis; that `is, the statistical techniques `used, `and `a `number of
problems with "the presently `proposed ~ystem.
`The first `problem `was `that in the `devdlopm'ent `of "the methodology
or analyzing the various `ports `in `determining `What''type of `syatem
was necessary, New Orleans was not included in the development
of what we call algorithm; that `is, the New ~Oileans `area, ~whieh is a
~artic'ularly `unique-unlike Houston, Puget `~Sound, `and various
"other `areas, was not included in the `development `df this algorithm.
The "cbncluaion `that `I have come to ~f'ter looking over `these reports
and studying them in great detail is `that the "data base `use,d is very
poor; that is, the `data deals `with reported ac~idents w'hich varies
`considerably from one time ,period to the `next.
One statement of the Coast `Guard `report was "that ~only ~bout `30
percent of actual accidents are in fact reported. The statistical tech-
niques `they used were questionable in one particular case.
The data concerning th'e number of `accidents `was doubled in order
to `adjust for t'his `lack of `rep'ort"ing, and `then in ord~' to estimate th~
damage that was done,, the data was .again doubled; therefore, !%~J~
have a multiple of 4 used in `determining `the "outcome.
Mr. TREEN. How do you know that that is inaccurate?
Mr. BmT'E. T'h'e multiple of `4?
Mr. TREEN. Yes.
Mr. BRITE. I `have no `way of `knowing `that it is `not accurate, `but
`there was nothing to justify it, `either. What I am `saying is one could
choose any multiple and come to any conclusion that anyone `conid
wish. Statistically it is j'ust `not justified with'out more justification
than I have seen.
The analysis of the data `was `based on a `case.~by-case analysis of
the 2,692 forms. The result is that a great deal of judgment is neces-
sary in `determining whether or not an accident can in fact be pre-
vented; and I will not go `in'to the quotes, but they are available in
the report-quotes `from the `Coast Guard report'; and I am specifi-
cally referring to t.he issue study that was completed in March of
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286
1973, indicating that in fact someone familiar with that particular
port, someone knowledgeable at that port should be available when
analyzing the 2,692 forms to determine whether or not the accident
could have been prevented.
So there is a great deal of judgment involved in the analysis.
The present proposed change, which is based on the Coast Guard's
analysis of these reports, however, does recommend that, and I quote,
"Results indicate some form of surveillance is necessary for mile 75
to mile 109. That is the most heavy congestion of the New Orleans
Port."
The conclusion of the Coast Guard report and the conclusion of the
report that I have seen is that there must be some form of surveillance
in order for the system to be workable, particularly in the section
which is designed sector 3; and I did have some charts to verify this
but I do not think I have time to go into those conclusions but again,
my conclusion was that the reduction in accidents was approximately
52 percent, using the voice communication, network only, and approx..
imately 72 percent using the more sophisticated radar system.
Now, I do not know that these figures are accurate. I have no way
of knowing because, as I said, whether or not a particular accident
could have been prevented is based to a great extent on judgment.
In any case, the conclusions based on the statistics that the Coast
Guard has was that there needed to be some form of surveillance, and
I have seen no statistics, no data at all to indicate that the presently
proposed system, not including surveillance, would be the appropriate
one.
So in conclusion, available data-
Mr. TREEN. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, we are getting into
the horrible question thing as far as I am concerned, and what I
raised yesterday, and that is applying this system to the accidents
that we have had using that as the basis on which we proceed with
these things that are proposed to be implemented in the first phase,
second phase, will they prevent the things that have happened on
the river. That is the big issue as far as I am concerned.
Mr. BRITE. No, sir.
Congressman Treen, I have not seen in any of the statistical studies
indicated that the presently proposed system of voice communication
only will prevent a significant portion of accidents. There has been
no study.
Mr. TREEN. How about with radar added?
How about with the full radar net?
Mr. BmTE. The estimates of the Coast Guard are m their reports,
are available in their reports; as I said, they are based on a very poor
data base, and some questionable statistical techniques.
Various studies have shown that in one case, 72 percent of the ac-.
cidents could have-
Mr. TREEN. I understood that; but what I want is your opinion as a
statistician.
Mr. BRITE. Statistically, I would have to go back to the original
reports, the 2,692 forms and analyze them with the knowledge of the
neople in the industry; that is, I would develop an algorithm specif-
ically based on the New Orleans port and determine whether [or not
their conclusions* were verifiable based on present data.
PAGENO="0291"
287
Mr. TREEN. You are not able to say here that their conclusion is
incorrect? You are just saying you do not believe scientifically that-
Mr. BRITE. Statistically, it is not.
Mr. TREEN. And they contend that it is correct.
Mr. BRITE. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Statistically, it has not been verified.
Mr. TREEN. From your point of view, we do not know the answer
to that basic question of how much-
Mr. BRITE. That is true.
Mr. TREEN [continuingi. Reduction in accidents we could receive
from the proposed system in any of its stages, and you are not saying
we do not have the answer to that?
Mr. BRITE. Yes; that is correct.
However, the Coast Guard does conclude that the New Orleans
radar surveillance and TV is essential for the safe operation of this
system; and that is-I have the quotes in the report; what I was
going to suggest is the logical next step would be to actually look into
the effect of the presently proposed system; that is, does a study based
on the presently proposed system in order to try to determine what
effect would there be because all other studies have come to the
conclusion that this is not the correct system.
Mr. TREEN. What other studies?
Mr. BRITE. Studies of-all of the studies of the Coast Guard that
I am including there, the issue study, which is a four-volume study
done by the Coast Guard that came out in March of 1973, the analysis
for the Fort Meade study, which is the basic document for, I assume,
this recommendation.
There was an environmental impact study in 1974; again, a con-
clusion of all of these was that a full VTS system was essential for the
safe operation of the New Orleans port.
Mr. TREEN. Well, then, your contention is not the full system will
not work. Your contention is that the initial phases of it would not
work; is that correct?
Mr. BRITE. What I am speaking to is the general proposed system
is the one, including radio communication only; that is correct.
Mr. TREEN. OK~
Go ahead.
Mr. BRITE. Well, as a final statement, I just want to indicate, or to
reiterate, I suppose, that the projection is based on the data from
1969 through 1974; indicate that there will be a tremendous increase
in traffic, as we all suspect, through 1980; and I have projected through
1980 and we would also expect that accidents would increase at least
as rapidly, with no VTS.
There is nothing which I have seen which statistically supports the
presently-proposed system and therefore I suggest that we need some
justification of that system, statistical analysis, which does speak to
the presently-proposed system and reduction that we could expect
from it. V
Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Fugaro?
Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a couple of
points.
PAGENO="0292"
288
I am, not familiar with the points that Dr. Brite was making, with
respect to New Orleans not being included in the algorithm and `I'
would have to check that. But I believe the algorithm was developed
to try and permit us to make a relative rating between the individual
ports to give them a priority rating as to which ports should we go
to first.
I am not sure exactly which points Dr. Brite is referring to in that
case, but as I think we have indicated, New Orleans came out as one
of the prime priority ports, which should be addressed if and when
we put VTS into existence.
I believe the point he is making with respect to the case-by-case
analysis of accidents is correct. We did this on an individual, case-by-
case basis, and if anything, we were extremely conservative in the
subjective judgment which we made on each of these cases. That is,
if there was any doubt as to whether or not this was in effect or in fact
a preventable accident, we did not include that in the category of
preventable accidents.
We were just looking for accidents which there was no question
about, that if a VTS had been in existence, there was a possibility
that the information provided through the YTS might have assisted
in preventing that casualty.
Again, in no case have we made the statement or indicated that all
accidents are going to be prevented. That is not, I think, what the
situation would be.
What we are hoping to do is to reduce the number of accidents and,
again, going back to existing systems, I think we have shown that
these have provided a benefit and reduced the number of accidents
that have occurred in ports where the VTS's are in existence. Within
this category we also do feel that while we think surveillance is neces-
sary, and we definitely want it, especially in the congested areas, as
we have referred to, that while we consider surveillance necessary to
complete the system,, communication is really the heart of the system.
The communication and the passing of the advisory information, as I
mentioned before, is going to be really the meat of the system and
hopefully will achieve the maximum benefit of any part of the system.
The most cost beneficial part of any VTS is the communications
aspect.
So while we love to have the complete system in all at once, and
turn a switch, we~ still do feel that it is essential that we take this
phase in operation, the first step of communication which is very
vital, and will be very beneficial-
Mr. TREEN. Was your analysis of your judgment as to which acci-
dents were avoidable based solely upon your review of the 2692 form?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes. We' took it case by case.
Mr. TREEN. It is a matter of record which ones you judged could
be prevented and which ones could not be?
Admiral FTJGARO. Yes, sir.
Mr. TREEN. Is there any reason that information could not be made
available to those who wish to look at it?
Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. It can be made available.
Mr. TREEN. Well, it seems to me you ought to look at the 2692's
and see how the Coast Guard analyzed them and-
PAGENO="0293"
289
Mr. Q1Ni~i,i~ I. tried tp get tjiat information, congressman,.. We
did not meet with any success m New Orleans Dr Brite went out to
the vessel traffic center and got some statistics but by no means
complete.
One thing I think that should be emphasized is that the statement
by Admiral, Fug~ro leads, me. to believe when they made the judg-.
m~ent-my question is when, they made the judgmeht on. preventable.
accidents under a VTS, were they talking about a fully-implemented
VTS or the system with, which, we. must live, until 1980?
Mr. TREEN. I understood thee was, one figure Qf~2 pe~'cent reductiop.
during the early part of this and a 72 percent in the fulJ, irnplelp.9ntation;
so you had two judgments, on each accident.
Mr O'NEIL But that included some sort of surveillance that we
would be operating, at least,, to 1980 without any-~
Mr T~EEN All I am saying is the Coast Guard has offered to
make that information, available.
Since you contest, Dr Brite, on a statistical basis, the justification
for a system on which we are going t~. spend millions of dollars to
taxpayer money, I think that if the Coast Guard is willing to let you
into this, this committee would be interested in your analysis
Mr. BRITE. Mr. Treen.,, quoting from, the report of the, Coast. Guard's
Issue Study, ~orm 2692, lacks adequate detail, in, several areas, es-.
pecially on factors relatip.g, to the cause of accidents, vessel move-
ments, and specific locations That is, by admission of the Coast
Guard studies, these forms lack a great deal of information And in
fact it is very, very difficult to determine the cause of an accident and
whether or not it could have been prevented.
Somehow, this needs to be statistically justifiable, that is, we need
to-one thing i~ would', suggest, is that we need some local input, on
determining whether or not an accident could have been prevented,
someone who is thoroughly faxnthar with the local area
Mr. TREEN. I understand the Coast Guard is now saying these
records on which they based. their judgment would be made ayailable
to representatives of your group.,I do dot want to push yeu, Admiral,
but-if it is not against your regulation or your authority, but i'f'you are
agreeable to. do soinethiug: about this- ` `
Admiral FTIGARO. Yes, sir:.
Mr. TREEN [contin,uing}., Then, you have a chance tQ look at them,
and you can conclude that there is not sufficient infor~ati~u to make,
a determination, and so forth.
Mr. BIAc~GI. I have onc question, Captain Conrad.
I think it was estimated. ~0Q vessels. in, the main stream-yop.,
responded there were many others and other channels in, other areas.
How would you estimate that?'
Captain C0NR'AD.. I would say probably' within the area, general
area of New Orleans, there are many ves~els in the adj acent water-
ways that would be. in the main streams ~f the Mississi.ppi; probably
more, because generally speaking, vessels that negotiate the Missis-
sippi River hav'e many, many barges in larges groupings handled by,
one boat but those same barges., when they are broken down for
distribution, throughout the canal network; whereas, arriving in New~
Orleans `under the power of I vessel with, 30 barges are now under
PAGENO="0294"
29O~
a number of vessels which from 1 to 4 barges, in each tow, there is a
multiplication that happens in New Orleans.
Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, captain.
Once again the bells are ringing. We have two other witnesses and,
in deference to their patience and convenience, we will return to listen
to their testimony, but first, I would like to assure Mr. O'Neil and his
group that the testimony collectively was more than informative.
I am sure by this time you gather the intention of the committee is to
obtain the best possible resolution to what seems to be a very complex
problem in an area that has multiple problems.
Once again, I address myself to the Coast Guard.
I think that a very sincere, cooperative effort should be mani-
fested. I do not mean just a facade, not just a token effort, but a very
sincere, cooperative effort. I do not intend to substitute our judgment
for your professional judgment, but on the other side of that coin, we
have professionals who have been in the business for a lot longer,
in most cases, than the members of the Coast Guard, and who have
intimate knowledge of many of the problems.
I am sure you have a common interest, at least in defining and
providing safety, and let us assure ourselves that the Coast Guard
and the industry are on "all fours" in seeking the optimum system,
to follow. In the end, we would like to be satisfied that there has been
substantial input and very serious consideration-very serious con-
sideration to the total picture.
Any doctrinaire position adopted by one side or the other should
be given short shift. This committee feels very strongly about that.
So, at this point, we will recess again for 10 minutes-
Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, the final two witnesses have indicated
that we have touched all of the bases and that they have waived their
right to oral comment; and we thank you very much for your indul-
gence; and we would like to have their statements made a part of the
record.
Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, is ordered.
[The statements referred to follow:]
STATEMENT OF DAVID CARLTON, VICE PRESIDENT, MARINE OPERATIONS, FEDERAL
BARGE LINES, INC.
Mr. Chairman-members of the committee-my name is David Canton. I am
vice-president of marine operations of Federal Barge Lines, Inc. The company I
represent was founded by the U.S. Government as the Inland Waterways Corp.
during World War I, to pioneer barge line service on this Nation's waterways.
The corporation was operated and expanded by public demand until 1953, when
in its wisdom, Congress decided that a sufficient number of privately funded barge
lines were in operation to serve the needs of the shipping public. At that time, the
Government divested itself of the Inland Waterways Corp. and all of the equip-
ment was purchased by the present owner, Pott Industries, Inc.
As a private concern, Federal Barge Lines has continued as a leader in the
inland waterways transportation field, serving the shipping public throughout the
entire Mississippi River system. Federal Barge Lines is one of many barge lines
serving this Nation, providing the service that transports 16 percent of this
Nation's freight. A great portion of that freight is farm products, produced in the
bread basket of the Nation-the Midwest.
As you are well aware, it is farm products and farm products alone, that keeps
this Nation's balance of payments in proportion in the world market.
The Port of New Orleans exports more farm products to world markets than
any other port in the country, and the major part of that grain is brought to
New Orleans by barge. Those barges are towed by towboats owned by companies
PAGENO="0295"
291
who employ men of great expertise in the towing industry-expertise that has
been gained by many years of practical experience. Many of the top operating
personnel of all barge lines are men who came up through the ranks from an
assignment as deckhand-mate-pilot-captain and on into management
positions. Men who know every facet of barge line operations.
The barge line industry has, without a doubt, the finest safety record of any
mode of transportation. This record has been accomplished and is maintained
today by the facts I just stated. Men of great expertise are responsible for day-to-
day operations of the towing industry and they are constantly striving to improve
their safety record. That is one of the reasons you will always find barge line
industry representatives willing to discuss any plan that will enhance their opera-
tions to a greater degree of safety and efficiency.
On August 6, 1975, a notice to mariners from the 8th Coast Guard District in
New Orleans, dated July 29, 1975, was received in the St. Louis office of Federal
Barge Lines. The contents of that notice was to notify all interested parties that a
committee had been appointed to advise the Coast Guard of the industries'
viewpoints on a proposed vessel traffic system, from the sea buoy to mile 243,
Lower Mississippi River. The rationale behind the selection of this committee has
never been fully understood. The notice indicated that the industry committee
would be chaired by the president of the Crescent River Port Pilot's Association,
who, at that time, was Captain David C. Wheat, Jr. The committee list I received
was composed of many ship pilots belonging to various associations, several deep-
draft shipping companies, and only a token amount of shallow draft operators,
who were local in nature. There were no barge line representatives on the
committee.
After a hurried meeting among a number of barge line operating personnel, I
contacted our American waterways operators representative in New Orleans,
Captain Merle Harbourt. I expressed to him our grave concern that the segment
of the industry that would be most affected, was not represented on this committee.
Through his efforts, we were successful in having 12 major barge lines added to
the list-Federal Barge Lines being included. It appeared to all of the barge
line representatives that we had been purposly deleted. However, we were assured
by the Coast Guard that this was not their intention.
The revised advisory committee first met in New Orleans on August 19, 1975
at Coast Guard headquarters.
We were under the impression that this would be the first step of industry
input to the Coast Guard, to determine what type of system, if any, was needed
in the New Orleans area. That illusion was soon shattered when a draft proposal
was passed out to the members of the committee, outlining in detail the system
proposed by the Coast Guard. We were informed by the commanding officer of
New Orleans vessel traffic system that 18 days prior to this time, he had no
knowledge of VTS systems whatsoever. He was, however, now the commanding
officer of this proposed new system. Numerous Coast Guard officers advised the
committee repeatedly that it was imperative we make a fast decision and recom-
mendation because there was a contract on the street for the purchase of a $4.2
million computer.
This astounded the entire committee, barge line operators, deep draft interests,
and pilot associations alike! There was no question in industry representatives'
mind that the dye had been cast for a computerized system and in fact, all items
in the draft proposal were, in essence, really not negotiable. There was no ques-
tion that all of this had been decided before any conversation had taken place
with the affected parties. We did, however, agree that the industry should form
several subcommittees to study different aspects of the Coast Guard's proposal.
The subcommittees were broken down as follows:
(1) A feasibility committee.
(2) An "area to be covered" committee.
(3) A mandatory voluntary participation committee.
(4) A communications committee.
(5) An operations committee.
I was selected to chair the "area" committee. Members of my committee
represented barge lines, ship pilot associations and Coast Guard. My committee
met on September 17, 1975 and all of the affected parties, i.e., industry and pilots
associations, agreed that the area the Coast Guard desired to implement a VTS
over, was entirely without merit. Our recommendations were that an area cover-
*ing New Orleans Harbor proper, a distance of approximately 30 miles, be used
PAGENO="0296"
~%S ~ starting base with radar surveillance, which could be instituted much mOre
ecOnomically and more effectively than the elaborate computerized system, as
jtoposed by the Coast GuarcL During that COmmittee fneeting, Captain Henry
Durham, president of the NOw Orleans-Baton Rouge Pilot Association, furnished
data covering the prior 10-year period, which illustrated that his association had
been involved in 55,622 ship movements and there had been, during that time,
24 collisions that could have conceivably been prevented by some type of vessel
traffic control system; however, as he pointed out, there was no guarantee that
the collisions would not have occurred had there been a system. He pointed out
that percentage-wise, this amolinted to Only .0004 of 1 percent accident ratio.
A figure so minute that there was certainly no justification of any expenditures
of the taxpayers money to institute a VTS system.
The other committees also reported back to the Coast Guard, as we did in
the "area committee," that the system as proposed by the Coast Guard, was
not justified or workable for many reasons. Two of the outstanding reasons were:
laCk of radar surveillance and a totally unacceptable radiO communications sys-
tem. Other testimony will be given at this hearing in greater detail of specific
problem areas, that I will not endeavor to go into in my testimony.
After all reports of the subcommittee had been turned in to the Coast Guard
at a meeting held September 24, no further meetings were held until April of 1976.
However, communications were received from Commander Boyce in February,
flJ76, saying in effect, that he thanked us for our time and efforts as subcommittee
chairmen and for all of the input we had contributed. He said, however, that he was
recommending the Coast Guard implement the system in its entirety-, as originally
proposed in the draft proposal we received on August 19, 1975.
The maritime industry represebtatives that have attended meetings conducted
by the 8th Coast Guard DistriCt cOncerning this matter, feel unanimously, that
their attempted input into the development of the proposed system has been
conipletely and totClly ignored. It seems apparent to all concerned that the course
of events had been predetermined by the Coast Guard. Also, the high-handed
and dictatorial manner in which the meetings were conducted, was certainly not
conducive to a meaningful cooperative effort by the two parties to arrive at a
constructive conclusion, or to correct aily problems in navigation, if indeed, such
pi-oblems do exist.
Without open-minded dialogue between the maritime indtistry and the U.S.
Coast Guard, in this and in future matters, we will be left with no other choice
but to believe that the proposed vessel traffic system, and other programs, are
nothing more than a scheme of empire building on the part of the Coast Guard,
at the expense of the maritime industry and the American public.
There is grave concE~rn that the lack of expertise, knowledge and understanding
of the shallow draft towing industry, by the U.S. Coast Guard, no matter how
noble their intentions, could lead to a serious impairment of this Nation's inland
waterways.
The Coast Guard does not have among its ranks, to my knowledge, one man
who has the practical experience or capabilties of operating a towboat and barges
of the type used on the Lower Mississippi River. It is apparent that they have
chosen to ignore the real experts of this industry ahd would like for the industry
to conform to their manner of thinking, regardless of the Cost. As I was told at one
meeting in New Orleans, "We (the U.S. Coast Guard) have been mandated by
Congress through the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 to embark on a
vessel management program." I tind it hard to believe tlìat the Congress ever
intended to place in the hands of the military the po'~ver to resttict, interfere with
and dictate programs and policies to private industry, as they so choose.
I would like to assure the members of this committee that the barge line industry
will always be willing to work with Government agencies in order to promote the
safety and efficiency of our operations that are so vital to the economic well-being
and defense of this Nation. We do, however, feel that it is imperative that officers
of the Coast Guard be directed to heed the advice of the experts before attempting
to implement regulations that have such a far-reaching effect.
In closing, I would like to state that throughout this industry, after our experi-
ence in this matter, we are cognizant of the meaning of the statement of Justice
Brandeis, and I quote: "Experience should teach us to be on guard, to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. The greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding."
This concludes my testimony. I will be more than happy to answer any ques-
tions on what I have stated or on technical matters that will be discussed.
PAGENO="0297"
293
WIsCoNsIN BARGE LINE, INC.
Hartford, Iii., September 14, 1976.
Hon. MARIO BIAGGI,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Room .1334, Longworth
House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515
DEAR CONGRESSMAN BIAGGI: I am in receipt of your letter of September 10,
1976, wherein you invite me to appear before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Navigation in regards to the Proposed Vessel Traffic Service to be instituted
by the U.S. Coast Guard as proposed in Volume 41 of the Federal Register,
No. 18 (Thursday, June 17, 1976), at Pages 24604 to 24670.
I am opposed to the institution of the Vessel Traffic Service by the U.S. Coast
Guard on the Lower Mississippi River embracing the Mississippi River from its
gulf outlet to Mile 243, AHP, Lower Mississippi River. In the following paragraphs
I list some of my objections.
My first objection to the proposal that have been given in this Advance Notice
is the fact that the system as proposed is not a complete system that would
bring about the reduction of accidents in what is commonly known as the
New Orleans-Baton Rouge port area. A system such as proposed in the Advance
Notice wherein you have a radio or audio system use in conjunction with a
computer is not practical in being able to determine at any given time where
a vessel and its tow would be situated in this area. I feel that any vessel traffic
system along with the rzdio communication set up within it, and along with
the computer into which the radio communications set up within it, and along
with the computer into which the vessels within the area would contribute input;
must also have a radar surveillance incorporated in the system. With a radar
surveillance component in the system you would not only have the audial informa-
tIon to which the computer could produce projections on traffic, but you would
also have a visual check that would verify and show any discrepancy that the
computer might make with the information that had been supplied it. In my
estimation, you cannot have one without the other, to have the system that is
needed .to produce the results that are projected.
Originally as I had understood it and according to comments made by the
Coast Guard in explaining to us the proposed vessel traffic control system, the
Coast Guard had taken a position at that time that a system would not be satisfac-
tory without radar surveillance. Now I find that in an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that a system will be installed that does not have radar surveillance
and in my opinion I concur with the Coast Guard's previous statement that it
would not be sufficient or practical.
Looking through the different sections of the Advance Notice I see nowhere
in the Advance Notice where there will be employment of civilian professional
pilot personnel to help in the operation of the VTS. I am aware that the Coast
Guard is a military organization and that one of the doctrines within this military
organization is the transferring of its personnel throughout its military locations
anywhere from two to four years. Therefore, if this VTS system as proposed is
put into operation, we could have personnel directing the movement of towboats
and ships within the VTS area, individuals who have never seen the Mississippi
River and who do not have any degree of expertise in the art of piloting tows in the
VTS area.
At this point, I would also like to bring out that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, another military organization, does have operations on the Mississippi
River and its tributaries. They differ in their methods of operation in comparison
with the Coast Guard, in the fact that they employ civilians who do have expertise
in regards to the river and who have the ability to develop themselves and their
career in the Corps of Engineers due to the fact that they are not transferred from
one location within the Army Corps of Engineers operation to .another. I am aware
that in some of the districts the gentlemen who are civilians in the Army. Corps
of Engineers have been employed for ten to 20 years and have become experts
over the specialized area in which they have contributed their time and talents.
This is not true of the Coast Guard and their method of operating within the
Inland Waterways in the United States. It seems just about the time that we have
an officer of the Coast Guard who is in charge of some particular function pertain-
ing to navigation on the Mississippi River and its tributaries; and who has devel-
oped a knowledge and expertise over a period of three years, that at that time
he is transferred our of the district into another district of the Coast Guard. The
man who replaces him comes in as a man who is not aware of the problems that he
is assuming in regards to river navigation.
PAGENO="0298"
294
I feel that professional licensed pilots who have been engaged in piloting ships
and towboats in the VTS area should be employed on a permanent basis with the
incentive to make a career of employment in the VTS. These men have been em-
ployed in the movement of towboats or ships in the VTS area. This would remove
the objection that so many of the members of the towing industries have in re-
gards to the Coast Guard personnel that would be operating this VTS. I feel that
we should have Coast Guard officers in charge of the VTS but the actual operation
of the system should be in the hands of professional licensed pilots.
I also find in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that the requirements
that we will have to comply with in the operation of the VTS system; in that we
must monitor three channels; will lead to confusion to the master and pilot on
watch on board the towboat or ship. In some cases I doubt where we are going to
be sharing a channel with another government agency in regards to one of the
VTS sectors, that the volume of transmission that would be made on that channel
will be such that we will have nothing but a garble of noise and interference. My
thoughts in regards to using the VHF channels for each individual sector should
be that there would be a clear VHF channel for each VTS sector. Even with a
clear channel to each VTS sector, depending on the density of ships and towboats
in that individual sector, a pilot might find great difficulty in breaking through
the traffic that would already be transmitting on that clear channel assigned to
that VTS sector.
Another point that I wish to bring up at this time is that I feel the total area
covered in the VTS is too big. Some months previous when the Coast Guard was
conferring with an Ad Hoc Committee of better than 50 members in the towing
industry; the Ad Hoc Committee had brought up the point that they felt it would
be more advisable to have a selected area possibly from Mile 85, AHP, Lower
Mississippi River, to Mile 120, AHP, Lower Mississippi River. The Ad Hoc Com-
mittee pointed out as a specific instance that a VTS in the area of Algiers Point
would be a good practical installation to try the system. This would enable the
experience gained in operating such a VTS system and would provide an area
where there are many ships and towboats going through such an area. At that
time the Coast Guard took this information that had been offered by the Ad Hoc
Committee and said.they would take it under advisement.
In a subsequent letter the commanding officer of the VTS system politely
thanked the Ad Hoc Committee members for their suggestion, but that he had
decided that they would install the complete VTS system from the sea buoy at
the mouth of the Lower Mississippi River to Mile 243, AHP, Lower Mississippi
River. As I expressed to the gentlemen in a letter I felt that our participation in
that Ad Hoc Committee was purely for the mechanics of complying with the re-
quirement that the towing industry be consulted. I still feel that a good area to
use as the initial area in which a VTS system would be installed and operated
therein; would be an area which would encompass 15 miles south of Algiers Point
and 15 miles north of Algiers Point. This would give one of the best opportunities
to observe and determine the efficiency of a VTS system in the New Orleans port
area.
There are many other points that raise questions in regards to the proposed
VTS for New Orleans. I am in complete agreement with all comments that are
being submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee for ports and waterways, to the Coast
Guard in regards to this Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Yours truly,
THOMAS E. KENNY,
Vice-President, Administrative.
Mr. BIAGGI. I want to tell Capt. David Canton, vice president of
marine operations of the Federal Barge Lines, and Mr. Thomas E.
Kenny, vice president, administrative, of the Wisconsin Barge Line,
Inc.-let me extend on behalf of the entire committee and myself
our sincere thanks.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
at the call of the Chair.]
PAGENO="0299"
U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES IN UPPER GREAT
LAKES
FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1976
HOUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,
Sault Sainte Marie, Mich
The subcommittee met at the Cisler College Center, Lake Superior
State College, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., Hon. Eligio de la
Garza, acting chairman, presiding.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. The subcommittee will be in order.
I bid all of you good morning.
This subcommittee is the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Navigation, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries and we are meeting this morning here as part
of the general responsibility of this subcommittee for the oversight
responsibility over the operations of the U.S. Coast Guard.
For some time the subcommittee has been trying to get up here
at the insistence of Congressman Ruppe. Unfortunately, there is
always a problem with one member or another of the committee and
we have finally managed to select a date at which at least three of the
members of the committee are here.
Unfortunately, our subcommittee chairman and colleague, the
Honorable Mario Biaggi of New York has been engaged this week
in the activities of the Democratic Convention in New York City
and he found it impossible to be here.
I might add he was one of the leaders in having our colleague, Mr.
Rodino, made the Vice Presidential nominee and he wasn't too
successful in that endeavor.
He has asked me to serve as chairman in his absence and he, along
with all the other members of the committee, look forward to hearing
and receiving our personal impressions and information derived from
this hearing.
I might add that I represent a district-if you went south from here,
and you hit the other border, that is where I live.
We also have a bridge that crosses into Mexico and we cross the
Rio Grande River, so I represent a very similar area, but at the op~.
posite extreme of our country. Brownsville is probably the southern~
most part of the continental United States. Hawaii is lower, but
Brownsville is the southernmost part. Well, sometimes the people
from Key West argue. [Laughter.]
But at this time this morning I might mention to you that we are
trying to listen to you and have all the information that we can and
still we would like to get to the locks on one of the boats on the lake,
(295)
PAGENO="0300"
296
and so on, so we are going to ask your indulgence that you limit your
testimony as brief as possible without cutting anyone off, but you
have the availability, as I'm sure all of you know, of inserting into
the record any information you would like. It doesn't necessarily
have to be mentioned here. For that purpose, the record will remain
open until August 2, 1976, foi any inclusions or enclosures or addi-
tional views that anyone here might wish to submit.
Our primary purpose in coming to the Soo, of course, is to review
the vessel traffic movement in the area and any associated problems,
including navigational equipment and applications for improving
traffic movements generally and for promoting marine safety. In the
latter connection, of course, we are also interested in the adequacy
of Coast Guard search and rescue facilities in this area and in the
upper Great Lakes generally.
As I said before, if you would address yourselves to the pertinent
parts of your testimony and if you would cooperate with us, it would
help us to be able to conclude the hearings as early as possible, we
are hoping by 1 p.m., in order that we might have an opportunity
to visit and see as much as we can see that we can coordinate your
testimony with our actual perusal of the geography here.
With that, I would like to inform you that we have to my right our
colleague, Mr. Jim Oberstar, who, while not a member of this par-
ticular subcommittee, is a member of the full committee and he is
your neighbor-what are you, west?-to the west, and of course,
Congressman Ruppe, who is not only a ranking minority member of
the full committee, but represents you here in this area.
Before we start with the witnesses, Mr. Ruppe, do you have a
statement or would you like to say something?
Mr. RUPPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
statement. However, I would like to paraphrase a portion of it at
this particular time.
I also would like to extend greetings to you and Congress man
Oberstar on behalf of the people in Sault Ste. Marie, and all those
present in this room.
I realize between your official duties in Washington, Texas and
Minnesota and your necessary and I am sure enthusiastic interest
in the convention that it is difficult for you to take time to come here
to northern Michigan, so I am very pleased that you would see fit
to do so.
I would like to make a few further comments concerning these
hearings here today.
Long before the sinking of the steamer Edmund Fitzgerald, in 1975,
I had indicated an interest in a public hearing into the adequacy of
Coast Guard search-and-rescue facilities on the Great Lakes. That
interest has expanded into concern for vessel traffic control systems,
for associated and improved navigational systems as well as for vessel
znd crew safety.
The Fitzgerald incident seems to highlight deficiencies in rescue
forces. These deficiencies are in no way the fault of the selfless and
heroic individual Coast Guardsmen who are as dedicated today to
the saving of life as were their predecessors of the old days. They
reflect rather upon those of us in a position to see that there are
enough of these dedicated individuals and that they are adequately
supported by the lifesaving technology available to us today.
PAGENO="0301"
297
Changes at one time may have bQen j~stifie4. They ~,ay ~ve.justi-
fled closing of statiQn~ an4 the reduetipu of rescue ~u~t~rs. Oirçum-
stances today, however, warrant a reappraisal of needs,
More winter sailing, for instance, is taking place than in the past.
Even if this traffic is not into ice-clogged channels, the traditional
November and December weath~ron the lakes subjects men and their
vessels to the curelest of taskmasters: The vagaries of nature in a
northern winter. I submit that these vagaries demand innovation from
the safety point of view which perhaps surpass what a rescue station
alone can provide; they sugge~t, rather a need for a greater rescue
cutter presence.
A further need becomes evident for a preventative vessel traffic
control system including winter advisory services that will lessen the
need for on-scene assistance. Innovative navigational aids such as
LORAN might lessen a dependence on other manned aids. An auto~
mated vessel reporting system will trigger assistance when needed.
This is a system that was not available to the Bradley, the Morrell,
or the Fitzgerald, but which would be feasible once LORAN is fully
implemented in the lakes.
While acting upon shoreside innovations, however, attention in my
opinion must also be focused on ship and crew safety, and these must
be especially tailored for Great Lakes vessels. Crewmen on these lakes
are keenly aware that November is the crueliest month and Lake
Superior the most treacherous of all the lakes.
Out of adversity often comes accomplishment or, as some would say,
even with failure there can be achievement, Already since the Fitz-
gerald tragedy, Admiral Gracey has redeployed a modern 44-foot
motor lifeboat to Marquette. I have also secured funding for the
construction of a similar craft for Grand Marais, Mich. The Coast
Guard, through Admiral Gracey's persistdnce, has established and is
perfecting a Mini-LORAN system for the St. Mary's River and has
published proposed safety equipment regulations for Great Lakes
vessels. These regulations are similar to what the industry has pro-
posed for itself.
There is one need that we may be unable to explore today but which
we must consider in the near future. This is the need for better over-
water weather forecasting for the Great Lakes. The Fitzgerald sinking
and Dr. Wolff's subsequent article in the summer 1976 issue of Inland
Seas establish that there was nothing to indicate that Lake Superior
skippers had any inkling that a November 9 storm warning would
involve "hurricane" winds such as developed on November 10. In
that same fateful November, I asked the National Advisory Com-
mittee on Oceans and Atmosphere to consider the use of weather
buoys on the lakes to improve forecasting. This may not be the answer
to the weather advisory problem, but some solution seems to be
imperative.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity this hearing
affords to air many pent-up feelings perhaps of frustration, and for
this singular attention to the perils and needs of the Nation's fourth
seacoast. These needs are not merely those of a region. We must never
forget, in this space age, that all of us in these 50 United States in our
third century are still ultimately dependent in large measure on the
men who-as did those who first discovered and settled our magnifi-
cent land-go to the sea in ships, even if these "seas" are five great
inland "ponds."
PAGENO="0302"
298
Mr. Chairman, I again want to thank you and my colleague from
Minnesota for being here this morning and participating and leading
these hearings.
[The statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP E. RUPPE, A. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Chairman: I appreciate your consideration and the Committee's indulgence
in taking the time at the heels of one busy convention and just before another to
visit what many seem to consider the hinterland of the United States.
In reality, however, this is one of the great manufacturing regions of our
country, containing some 14 percent of its population. This area produces the
goods and raw materials involved in the more than 100 billion ton-miles of water~.
borne commerce that move over the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway system
each year. The misconception in the minds of much of our nation of our region as a
hinterland reminds me of a distorted chart I have seen that pictures a Bostonian's
Idea of the United States. By that view, we of the Midwest live beside ponds in the
western prairies. A footnote to that chart warns that it should "Not be used for
navigational purposes".
Perhaps it is because of such misconceptions, in addition to our concern for
maritime safety that we meet here today, a first for the Subcommittee. We are
also motivated by an important concern for "Government in the sunshine,"
and by a need to get a feel for things, to feel the pulse of concern that throbs in
this community for the safety of its mariners and vessels. As long as men have gone
to sea, the communities who have sent them out have watched the horison,
anxiously awaiting their safe return. These great "ponds," especially with their
ferocious northern winters, have claimed more than their share of seafarers in
spite of an historical concern with maritime safety. There was once a time when
all major lights were manned and when a host of Lifesaving Stations ringed the
shores of the Great Lakes. I am reminded of the search-and-rescue stations that
served the Lake Superior mariner from Whitefish Point, Vermilion Point, Crisp
Point, Big Two Hearted River of Hemingway fame, Deer Park or Muskalonge
Lake, Munising, Ship Canal or Portage, Eagle Harbor, and Grand Marais (Min-
nesota). All that remains now are the Grand Marais (Michigan), Marquette,
Bayfield, and Duluth Stations. Additionally, a Coast Guard cutter was once
stationed at Two Harbors as well as at Duluth. Now only the Cutter Woodrush
remains at Duluth. Sault Ste. Marie at one time had additional cutter resources
than those which presently exist, including a 180-foot buoy tender.
Leafing of the pages of history would reflect similar reductions but to a. far lesser
degree in the lower lakes. The northern reaches of Lake Huron would seem to
warrant attention where no station exists between Tawas and St. Ignace-at one
time the Hammond Bay and Walker's Point Stations filled this gap.
I realize that changing traffic patterns, automation, mechanically propelled
ships of higher horsepower and related innovations have mandated that changes
occur. It is well, however, to sit back at this point and reevaluate trends, to ap-
praise the degree of essential statutory services being provided the mariner in
this vast Great Lakes region. There is no way to do so without input from the
affected segments of the community. I have long felt that, with the shutdown of
community field services of the kind referred to, an administering but remote
agency runs the danger of losing touch with the public it was established to serve.
Government must, therefore, meet the public as we are doing today to provide
some balance and avoid becoming a detached administration.
Long before the sinking of the Steamer Edmund Fitzgerald in 1975, I had in-
dicated an interest in a public hearing into the adequacy of Coast Guard search-
and-rescue facilities on the Great Lakes. That interest has expanded into concern
for vessel traffic control systems, for associated and improved navigational systems
as well as for vessel and crew safety.
The Fitzgerald incident seems to highlight deficiencies in rescue forces. These
deficiencies are in no way the fault of the selfless and heroic individual Coast
Guardsmen who are as dedicated today to the saving of life as were their predeces-
sors of the old days. They reflect rather upon those of us in a position to see that
there are enough of these dedicated individuals and that they are adequately
supported by the lifesaving technology available to us today.
PAGENO="0303"
299
Changes at one time may have been justified. They may have justified closing
of stations and the reduction of rescue cutters. Circumstances today, however,
warrant a reappraisal of needs. More winter sailing, for instance, is talking place
than in the past. Even if this traffic is not into ice-clogged channels, the traditional
November and December weather on the Lakes subjects men and their vessels
to the cruelest of taskmasters: The vagaries of nature in a northern winter. I
submit that these vagaries demand innovation from the safety point of view
which perhaps surpass what a rescue station alone can provide; they suggest,
rather a need for a greater rescue cutter presence.
A further need becomes evident for a preventative vessel traffic control system
including winter advisory services that will lessen the need for on-scene assistance.
Innovative navigational aids such as Loran might lessen a dependence on other
manned aids. An automated vessel reporting system will trigger assistance when
needed. This is a system that was not available to the Bradley, the Morrell, or
the Fitzgerald, but which would be feasible once Loran is fully implemented in
the Lakes.
While acting upon shoreside innovations, however, attention in my opinion
must also be focused on ship and crew safety, and these must be especially tailored
for Great Lakes vessels. Crewmen on these Lakes are keenly aware that November
is the cruelest month and Lake Superior the most treacherous of all the Lakes.
Out of adversity often comes accomplishment or, as some would say, even
with failure there can be achievement. Already since the Fitzgerald tragedy,
Admiral Gracey has redeployed a modern 44-foot motor lifeboat to Marquette.
I have also secured funding for the construction of a similar craft for Grand
Marais, Michigan. The Coast Guard, through Admiral Gracey's persistence, has
established and is perfecting a Mini-Loran system for the St. Mary's River and
has published proposed safety equipment regulations for Great Lakes vessels.
These regulations are similar to what the industry has proposed for itself.
There is one need that we may be unable to explore today but which we must
consider in the near future. This is the need for better overwater weather fore-
casting for the Great Lakes. The Fitzgerald sinking and Dr. Wolff's subsequent
article in the Summer 1976 issue of Inland Seas establish that there was nothing
to indicate that Lake Superior skippers had any inkling that a November 9th
storm warning would involve "hurricane" winds such as developed on Novem-
ber 10th. In that same fateful November, I asked the National Advisory Com-
mittee on Oceans and Atmosphere to consider the use of weather buoys on the
Lakes to improve forecasting. This may not be the answer to the weather advisory
problem, but some solution seems to be imperative.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity this hearing affords to air
many pent-up feelings perhaps of frustration, and for this singular attention to
the perils and needs of the Nation's Fourth Seacosat. These needs are not merely
those of a region. We must never forget, in this space age, that all of us in these
50 United States in our third century are still ultimately dependent in large
measure on the men who-as did those who first discovered and settled our
magnificent land-go to the sea in ships, even if these "seas" are 5 great inland
"ponds."
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much.
Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement which I will submit for the record. I merely want
to summarize by saying that my area is Lake Superior, but the Great
Lakes are really not divisible. They must be considered as a unit and
that the problems of one are the problems of the others and your
problems are our problems here in the Soo, around Lake Michigan or
`farther down in the lower I akes, and I believe that together we must
work for lasting solutions for the problems that affect all of the lakes
as I said as a unit, so we must work together on our common interests
and that is why we are very pleased to be here this morning to join
with you in looking at the needs of the extended season and the
problems that all the men who go down to the sea in ships face as
they brave these enormous bodies of water.
78-280-76----20
PAGENO="0304"
300
[The statement follows:]
* STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAB, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all those who risk their lives on Lake Superior and
the other Great Lakes, and on behalf of the Lake Carriers and other Carriers who
send their vessels out on these vast waters, I thank you for making these hearings
possible.
The sinking of the S.S. Fitzgerald last November brought to the surface of our
consciousness what we all acknowledge, constantly and subconsciously: that these
waters are treacherous, dangerous; and that the men who sail them lead very
precarious lives at the mercy of nature.
These hearings are designed to touch all aspects of safety: on-board equipment
for the men; the Coast Guard's Search and Rescue capability; new communica-
tions and aids to navigation; and other features of water safety.
We want to know what precautions are needed to protect the Longshoremen
and others who brave the elements on icy docks to service ships while they are
in harbor.
We also want to know specifically what caused the Fitzgerald disaster: why did
the vessel break up; why did it sink as fast as it did; why were no rescue efforts
possible.
In addition, I hope we can focus in, for at least part of the time, on safety
aspects of late season sailing.
For five years now the Coast Guard, the Corps, 8 other Federal agencies, labor
and private industry have been investigating the feasibility of extending the
winter navigation season.
But all economic benefit studies are in vain, if we cannot assure the safety of
the men involved, during the worst part of the year.
Until doubts about safety during winter sailing are answered, we cannot, I feel,
proceed with further Federal involvement in the program.
I would point out, for the record, that this Subcommittee, under the distin-
guished leadership of its chairman, Mr. Biaggi of New York, and with the strong
and necessary support of today's chairman, Mr. de la Garza of Texas, authorized
the reopening of the Coast Guard SAR station at Grand Marais, Minnesota, and
strengthening of the SAR mission of the Coast Guard station at Grand Marais,
Michigan.
This Committee also authorized the procurement of 7 new icebreakers for the
lakes. These vessels, in addition to keeping the lanes open during winter will be
able to serve SAR missions during the ice-free months of the year.
Both the authorizing and funding legislation are awaiting final action by the
Congress and, I hope, prompt signature by the President. And while the author-
ization does not provide all the icebreaking capability we need, I believe we have
established the record of need, and can build on this year's progress in the years
ahead.
In conclusion, I hope that these hearings can help resolve the doubts we now
have regarding safety at sea; that they will pinpoint where safety is still lacking;
and establish what can be done in the short term as well as what should be done
in the long term to make year-round sailing safe and, particularly, to prevent in
the future disasters of the magnitude of the Fitzgerald.
Thank you.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. The first witness this morning is Rear Adm.
James S. Gracey, commander of the 9th Coast Guard District, U.S.
Coast Guard, Cleveland, Ohio.
Admiral, I will be very happy to hear from you at this time.
You might identify for the record those that accompany you.
PAGENO="0305"
301
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES S. GRACEY, COMMANDER, 9TH
COAST GUARD DISTRICT, U.S. COAST GUARD, CLEVELAND, OHIO,
ACCOMPANIED BY COMDR. JOHN DECK III, CHIEF, SHIP DESIGN
BRANCH, OFFICE OF MERCHANT MARINE SAFETY, U.S. COAST
GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.; CAPT. THOMAS H.
RUTLEDGE, CHIEF, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS STAFF, U.S. COAST
GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND CAPT.
CHARLES MILRADT, COMMANDER, GROUP, SAULT STE. MARIE
Admiral GRACEY. Yes. Good morning. I have with me Capt. Thomas
Rutledge, who is from headquarters in the congressional liaison staff,
whom you all know very well, and Comdr. John Deck from the Head-
quarters Merchant Marine Technical Division, Ship Design Branch,
who has done a great deal of work on lifesaving improvement; and
also with me is Capt. Charles Milradt, who is commander of the group
here at the Soo.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this
opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues to talk about
Coast Guard activities on the Great Lakes. I have been in command
of the 9th Coast Guard District-the Great Lakes District-for
almost 2 years. In that time I have come to realize as never before
what a vast, beautiful, and challenging part of our country this is,
with its extremes of weather, its richness of natural resources, its
great public interest in the waters and water quality and the extensive
use of those waters for recreation, its colorful marine traditions, rife
with dramatic tales of heroism and skill, its impressive record of
contributions in all aspects of marine transportation, and its great
significance to the economic well-being of the United States.
The Coast Guard and its predecessor agencies have long been a
part of this vibrant and challenging Great Lakes history-this year
marks the 100th anniversary of lifesaving stations here, for example.
And we continue to have a major role, its aspects expanding in scope
and volume of activity. I would like to give you a broad overview
this morning of what we are doing to meet the challenges facing us.
There is not time to speak in detail of all our missions, so I will con-
centrate on safety, which is your primary interest here today.
Coast Guard efforts to enhance the safe use of the waters of the
Great Lakes really fall under two broad headings-rescue and
prevention. The term "rescue" incorporates such activities as search,
location, self-survival, and communications. "Prevention" includes
such activities as education, communications, enforcement of laws and
regulations, aids to navigation, and insuring personnel qualifications.
Some of these fail into specific Coast Guard program categories and
some cross several programs. To stay consistent with the subject of
this hearing I will speak in terms of the broad hearings of rescue and
prevention instead of specific programs.
PAGENO="0306"
302
RESCUE
In fiscal year 1975 Coast Guard forces on the Great Lakes and
the St. Lawrence River responded to over 8,000 calls for assistance.
Of those 278 were in Lake Superior and 352 were in the area for which
Coast Guard Group, Sault Ste. Marie is responsible, viz, extreme
northern Lake Michigan, the Straits of Mackinac, northern Lake
Huron, the St. Mary's River, and eastern Lake Superior. Please note
that there is some overlap where I speak of group Soo statistics versus
Lake Superior. I will try to clarify it, if it is confusing. We saved 450
lives and $10 million worth of property throughout the district.
Some 19 persons and $92,000 in property were saved in Lake Superior
while in group Soo we saved 22 persons and $1,203,000 in property.
We do not yet have detailed figures for this year, but our total
district response figure should be about 9,200, with 520 lives saved
and $10,200,000 worth of property saved.
By far our heaviest workload is in the area of western Lake Erie,
Lake St. Clair, and the connecting rivers-part of our group Detroit,
which has about 53 percent of the cases in the district. By comparison,
all of Lake Superior plus the rest of group Soo combined have about
6 percent of our cases.
Our primary SAR response comes from 3 air stations and 46 sta-
tions, 9 of which are seasonal. Of the seasonal stations, 3 are manned
primarily by Reservists and 6 are manned during peak boating periods
by Auxiliarists. In the Lake Superior/group Soo area we have 9 sta-
tions, 3 of which are Auxiliary operated.
To permit our regular personnel some relief during the heavy work-
load season and to increase our ability to respond when needed, we
rely on the special help of about 1,000 Reservists, who assist at many
of our stations, especially on weekends. We also rely heavily through-
out the district on our 5,500 Auxiliarists, with their privately owned
facilities-some 1,713 vessels, 40 aircraft and 105 radio stations.
In 1975 they provided 2,222 SAR responses, saving 163 lives and
$1,323,000 worth of property.
Our five 180-foot buoy tenders, five 110-foot harbor tugs, two major
icebreakers, and one 82-foot patrol boat also provide some SAR
capability to add to the boats of the stations and the aging HH-52A
helicopters and the venerable HU16E fixed wing aircraft.
To improve our response capability from stations we have started to
replace our 40-foot utility boat-the workhorse of SAR in recent
years-with the new 41-foot boat, which has greater speed, range,
crew endurance, and electronic navigation and search capability.
Three of the nine we have so far are in the Lake Superior/group Soo
area. As these boats arrive we are rearranging our fleet to upgrade
capability in as many areas as possible. We have also relocated the
44-foot motor surf boats to areas having the greatest need for heavy
weather capability. Of the 22 we have, 4 are in the Lake Superior/
group Soo area. One more is in the fiscal year 1977 budget and it will
go to Grand Marais, Mich. to replace our last 36-foot lifeboat.
We also make extensive use of other resources such as our own
C-130's from North Carolina and 11-3 helos from New York, the
Air Force, CAP, Army, National Guard, State, county and local
police, park rangers, and a cooperative agreement with Canada, not
PAGENO="0307"
3;Q3
to mention vessels of opportunity when in the vicinity of a case, and
this is a very real benefit.
We now have VHF-FM communications coverage for the entire
U.S. portion of the Great Lakes except for a few "shadow areas"
we have discovered. I expect those minor voids to be covered this year.
In addition to the things I've mentioned above and the rather
extensive prevention effort that I am going to discuss in a moment,
there are some other things the Coast Guard is doing to improve our
rescue capability. One major contribution will be the replacement of
our 110-foot icebreaking tugs. Not only will these vessels greatly
enhance our efforts to assist winter navigation, but they will have a
year-round utility the 110 footers do not have. The 110 footers were
built as harbor tugs, and consequently are subject to severe operating
limitations in heavy weather. They are very sensitive to high winds
and become unstable and unsafe in winds above 45 to 55 knots, depend-
ing on loading and vessel class. They take on water very readily and
their freeing ports are not adequate to permit it to run off.
In cold weather they also ice up badly in a storm and become un-
stable. Obviously these characteristics severely impede their useful-
ness in the vicious sea and wind conditions that occur so often on the
Great Lakes. The new vessels have been designed with this in mind
and thus should greatly enhance our heavy weather capability. One
will be located at Sault Ste. Marie, the first one.
We are encouraging boaters to make out a "float plan" and leave it
with their marina operator, family or friends so we can get prompt
notification when they do not return as planned and so we will know
where to start looking for them.~ Following the loss of their son in a
boating accident a family recently erected a memorial at Grand
Marais, Mich., city dock. It includes a booth much like a phone booth
with a float plan notebook in it that boaters can fill out when they
depart. There is also space for boaters to log in when they return, so
interested or concerned people who check the book, can readily detect
a potential problem and advise the Coast Guard-before the situation
becomes a 2 a.m. emergency.
A similar type of effort consists of sunset patrols, primarily by
Auxiliary surface and aircraft. The purpose, of course, is to locate
boaters who may be in trouble and thus preclude difficult, often futile,
night searches-or any search at all for that matter-or at the least
save the boater the anguish of a helpless night on the lake. This has
paid considerable dividends in some areas.
An FM emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) is
being developed as are detection devices such as a special forward-
looking radar for fixed-wing aircraft, application of our oil-detection
side-looking radar, an infra-red system for helicopters, and an improved
illuminating system for helicopters. -
People caught in an emergency must have ways to take care of
themselves-to survive-until we or some other rescuer can reach
them. They also need to have ways to help us find them. Efforts to
improve survivability must per force include the means to deal with a
wide range of situations-and so they do, ranging from simple flotation
devices for water skiers to self-launching survival craft for ore boats.
They include such things as exposure suits, positive flotation for
recreational boats, radar transponders to aid detection, a "mayday
PAGENO="0308"
3k04
streamer", radios, cold water survival techniques, strobe lights, et
cetera. This spring a team of Coast Guard personnel, ships, boats and
aircraft conducted some in-water tests of several of these items. The
results ranged from successful to promising to surprisingly disappoint-
ing. The work continues.
Meanwhile, commercial operators and the water-sport industry are
also working on developing ideas and equipment to meet the various
needs. And we have published advance notice of proposed new regula-
tions which would provide for more extensive and improved equipment
aboard lakes vessels. They include lifeboat exposure protection, life-
boat maneuverability, survival craft availability, launching of survival
craft, ability of lifeboats to float free automatically, personnel exposure
protection, communications equipment on survival craft, lights and
refiectorized materials, and standards for substitute equipment.
Of course the best way to solve a problem is preventing it from
coming up in the first place-the old saw about "an ounce of preven-
tion being worth a pound of cure." `That is what most of the rest
of our safety effort is all `about. You are `aware of the basics of our
commercial vessel safety, , port safety and security, short-range aids to
navigation, and radio navigational aids programs, which `are the heart
of our preventive effort, so I will discuss only new developments and
specifics that affect the Great Lakes.
Efforts to help the recreational boater enjoy his chosen sport more
but with less risk are particularly significant on the waters of the
Great Lakes region because 35 percent of the boats in the entire coun-
try are in use here-that's more than 2,550,000 `boats.
To help the boater understand how to use his boat safely we are pur-
suing an aggressive public education program. Last year we provided
lectures for 36,000 people. We ha~d over 1,500,000 people visit our
exhibits at `boat shows, et cetera. We `had 13,000 radio and `TV spots,
and we gave over 2,000 boating safety courses to 120,000 people. We
also gave over 41,800 courtesy exams to check boat equipment, pa-
trolled almost 400 regattas, and we made 5,000 safety patrols. These
activities were done, primarily, by our 5,500 Auxiliarists and our seven
Boating Safety Detachments (BOSDET). BOSDET personnel also
conducted extensive training programs for `State, county and local
marine law enforcement personnel.
I might add that it is a point of great pride that two of the `States
in `my district have had all the marine law enforcement personnel in
the State trained now by Coast Guard Boating Safety Team Person-
nel and we are expecting the third State to make it this year. The
fourth State that has been primarily in our responsibility has been
two-thirds trained.
I should no,te that we also have an `aggressive enforcement effort in
areas where Our statistics showed the greatest need.
To illustrate how effective this overall program can be I should like
to tell you about one particular case. In the early months of the 1974
season we were horrified by an appalling rate of carnage in the Fox
Chain of Lakes in Illinois. By August, 20 people had died in this `area
alone. Our BOSDET moved in and `started an aggressive enforcement
program. They also worked with local and State officials, providing
training and setting a positive example. The results began to show in
PAGENO="0309"
305
the latter months of 1974, but were really evident in 1975, when not a
single life was lost in that area.
To help the navigator, particularly on large commercial vessels, two
developments in aids to navigation are significant. First is extension of
LORAN C coverage to the Great Lakes. The first station will be built
in Seneca, N.Y., and should be on the air in 1979. The second, which
will complete coverage, will be built in upper Minnesota and is planned
to be on the air in 1980.
The other major development in aids to navigation, we call Mini
LORAN C. It is a `ow-power, specifically configured LORAN-C
chain we've built for the St. Mary's River. It is now on the air in a
dQmonstration phase, and we are developing special user equipment.
When done, we expect it will provide accuracies as fine as 25 feet. In
some areas we have already had demonstrated accuracies down to
10 feet and in some cases even better, like zero, but that is special.
Even more exciting ate some features of the user equipment being
developed. These will provide, on a continuous read-out, such infor-
matioiI as speed Ovet the ground, time and distance to next turn,
course to next turn, vessel position and attitude with relation to the
desired track, et cetera. We hope to demonstrate this second generation.
user equipment this August. Later we expect to install a set on a com-
mercial vessel for a trial.
In other actions to improve safety of Great Lakes commercial oper-
atiOn, we are continuing Our long standing vessel traffic service on the
St. Mary's River, but we are now monitoring meeting situations at
the critical turn at the lower end of Soo Harbor and asking vessels to
adjust speed to avoid arriving simultaneously at that turn. We are
also providing more complete information on rates of flow through
the Soo control gates ~o masters can better control their vessels.
We have developed, with Canada, a joint contingency plan for
traffic control in case of emergency in the critical Detroit and St.
Clair Rivets, a.hd we have installed a "hot line" between the District
a~d Sarnia control centers to insure immediate positive communi-
cations.
New regulations last year provide increased authority for Coast
Guard captain~ of the port to take prompt affirmative action to deal
with a ratige of possible hazards. Finally, on a grim note, this report
to you really would not be complete if I didn't talk a little bit about
the tragedy last November which shocked and saddened the entire
Great Lakes maritime community. The investigation of the Fitzgerald
sinking continues, with the 19 hours of TV tape and 1,000 pictures
taken during this spring's underwater survey still being analyzed~
That survey, you may recall, was made by the Coast Guard from the
Coast Guard cutter Woôdrush. In selecting a method for conducting
the survey the Board considered many different possibilities. Since
the depth of water precluded divers, the Board ultimately chose to
contract with the Navy for use of its CURV, a sophisticated, remote-
cOntrolled underwater vehicle. CTJRV and its associated people and
equipment were flown from the west coast in Coast Guard C-130 air-
craft. Like all who sail in or otherwise care about Great Lakes shipping,
I certainly hope the Board will be able to find, in the meager informa-
tion available, enough to permit them to reach some conclusion about
what happened that fateful night.
PAGENO="0310"
306
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you this morning
and to talk about two topics which are very much in my mind and
heart-the Great Lakes and the U.S. Coast Guard.
I will be glad to answer any questions that you have.
Mr. lYE LA GARZA .Thank you very much, Admiral.
Any questions?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief be-
cause we have so many witnesses.
The portion of your testimony that refers to the-
[Microphone noise.]
Admiral GRACEY. I must be radiating personal magnetism or some-
thing.
Mr. OBERSTAR. With all that sophisticated LORAN C and all the
rest we have on the lakes, the microphone doesn't work. Where you
talked about the safety aids, I was interested in the exposure suits;
are those being especially developed for winter navigation and avail-
able for seamen that serve on those vessels?
Admiral GRACEY. There are a number of suits that are being de-
veloped by different people, and we tested two types this spring.
Commander Deck put on one suit and Commander Mason from my
staff put on another one and went into the 42 degree water this spring
to see how the suits work. One of them was relatively successful and
the other was surprisingly disappointing. Those are one of the things
I referred to in my statement. I don't know it we approved the suit,
but there is considerable work going on.
There were suits recommended before, but our tests indicated they
didn't do the job and perhaps would create some false sense of security.
To answer you briefly, yes, the work is going on.
Mr. OBERSTAR. This is something of concern to me. It. has been
expressed by longshoremen, and seamen as well, who are exposed to
the elements in these increasingly longer voyages in the winter
months. I strongly encourage the Coast Guard to intensify its efforts
in providing the kind of research necessary for the personal protec-
tion of individuals, and we would be glad to have any recommenda-
tions and reports in more depth as the Congress and certainly the
House Public Works Committee later this summer will consider
cxtensions to the demonstration programs for the winter navigation
season, and we would like to be able to focus more on measures to
protect the individual. One last question about the Fitzgerald.
Do you have any information beyond what is stated in your state-
ment that you could provide for the committee, any indications now
of what might have happened? What does the vessel look like down
there at the bottom of the lake and is it possible for the subcommittee
later on to look at some photographs that the Coast Guard might
have had as a result of those deep water investigations?
Admiral GRACEY. I think, Mr. Oberstar, it would be-I'm sure
there are a lot of opinions as to what happened and I am sure that
the Board has probably started to form some. I don't know what
they are. I very carefully avoided trying to find out what they are
because I think it would be inappropriate to discuss until the Board
ha~s reached its final conclusions.
I am not hiding anything, I just don't know. I can tell you what
they found essentially on the bottom was the vessel in two pieces
PAGENO="0311"
307
with one of the two pieces badly broken. They were hoping to be able
to get a good total look at the hull with a view to trying to get some
idea of what might have caused the wreck or the sinking.
What we found was that the stern section was upside down and
separated from the forward section, the forward section broken, and
with the bow buried in 27 feet of mud. It was a very soft bottom so
that as the curve device went down, it tended to stir up the bottom.
We didn't get the same quality pictures we were hoping to get. Of
course we were most hoping to get some evidence from near the
bottom and that is buried in the mud. So whether they will be able to
interpret the pictures, whether they get it or not, I don't know, but
it is going to be a very difficult job.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Your statement made a very commendable out-
line for the extensive SAR, prevention and protection. What puzzles
was there was a Coast Guard station relatively near, and yet the
Coast Guard either couldn't or for some reason did not send a rescue
vessel out and there are some who say, even if the weather had been
such that a vessel could have been ordered out, they didn't have one
capable of providing the rescue mission that would have been
necessary.
Could you respond to that?
Admiral GRACEY. Let me see, where do I start.
1 think if you look at the chart of where the Fitzgerald sank-John,
would you point out on the chart where that is, please?
Mr. BRUCE. Just this point, just over the international line.
* Admiral GRACEY. And would you run to Sault Ste. Marie and
Grand Marais?
Mr. BRUCE. ~Indicating.1
Admiral GRACEY. If it were possible to predict where a sinking
would take place and where you would put a station to be reasonably
available to handle it, the only place that would be better so far as
the location is concerned, would be on White Fish Point. You have
to select your sites in places where you have support and some
community capability for your people unless you have some particular
reason to believe that the investment ought to be out there. That is
an isolated event.
We did not have capability for vessels-the vessels we had were
not capable of going out in that weather.
Mr. OBERSTAR. That is the thing that concerns people.
Admiral GRACEY. As I said, the 144-foot tug which will replace
Naugatuck will have this heavy weather capability. When we get
the five 110's replaced with the 140's, we will have reasonably heavy
weather capability.
I did an analysis of where the major disasters have occurred on the
Great Lakes since 1958 and if the committee would be interested, I
can show you a chart to show you how that is configured. I was
rather interested to see how they spread out. Would you be interested
in such a thing?
Mr. OBERSTAR. I don't know whether we have the time now,
Mr. Chairman.
Admiral GRACEY. I can do it very quickly. See the red circles?
[Indicating chart.]
PAGENO="0312"
O DISTRICT OFFICE
*~ MULTI-PURPOSE BAUD
o BIN STATION
o STATION-SAN
o AIDS TO NAVIGATION TEAM
0 LIGHT ATTENDUNT STATION
GROUP BOUNDARY
RVIVB INTERNATIONAL BOUNSA~y
STATE BOUNDARY
Ii'
U. S. COAST GUARD
NINTH C.G. DIS1RICT
PRINCIPAL. U:NITS
ON THE
GREAT LAKES
PAGENO="0313"
309
[The following was submitted:]
RECENT MAJOR SAR CASES
These are cases which. involved, large vessels and/or considerable- damage, loss
of life or public concern-. Medevacs, cases occurring in restricted- waters where
tugs would normally not. present- an improvement in- SAR response, and cases
where Coast Guard' assistance was not required nor used have not been included.
There are innumerable groundings and collisions in the lakes, most of which are
minor and most of which occur in harbors, rivers, bays,. etc.
1. 18 November 1958-Bradley san-k south of Beaver Island, Lake Michigan.
Thirty-one loss of life. Cause, material failure and, weather., Major search effort
by several Coast Guard units.
2. November 19.66-Ivioreel sank off Alpena, Lake Michigan- with. approximately
~0 loss of life. Cause,, material failure and weather. Major search. effort, by several
-Coast Guard units.
3. 30 April 1970-Fitzgerald and Hochelaga collided just south of Detroit River
light causing considerable damage to both. Cause, suction from passing, close while
overtaking. No loss- of life. No Coast Guard assistance required, both vessels
-proceeded to port.
4. 14 July 1970-Eästcliffe Hall grounded and sank in St. Lawrence River at.
Chrysler Shoal. Nine lives lost. Cause, poor navigation and weather. Maple
responded.
5. 12 August 1971-Ethel Marie, Patriciar and Mein Kapitan' all experienced
heavy storm damage during severe weather in the Straits of Mackinac. No loss of
life. No Coast Guard assistance required.
6. 4 October 1971-Maplecliffe Hall and Wieldrecht collided near Detroit River
light causing consi'derable damage to both. No lives lost. Cause, steering failure
on Maplecliffe Hall. No Coast Guard assistance required.
7. 13 April 1972, Nicolet sustained heavy ice damage in position 45-50N/85--50W,
Lake Michigan when caught between shifting ice fields. No loss of life. Mesquite
escorted vessel to port.
8'. 27 November 1972, Stolt Falcon sustained heavy damage from fire 15 miles
north of Manitou Island, Lake Michigan. No loss of life. A helicopter from air
station Traverse City evacuated- four injured crewmen, the vessel proceeded to.
port.
9. 10 June 1973, barge Oil Queen capsized and sank in position 45-35N/85-20W;
Lake Michigan when her cargo shifted in heavy weather. No loss of life. No
Coast Guard assistance required, barge was unmanned.
10. 26- September 1973, fishing- boat Viking II exploded and. sank 7 miles. north--
west of Big Bay Point in Lake Superior. No loss of life. Cause, explosive vapors.,
Survivors picked up another fishing boat. Operator claimed he radioed for help,
but transmission was not received.
11. 2 October 1973, ROLTV I and Marathonian collided in fog in position 45-46N/
85-SaW, Lake Michigan. No loss of life. Cause, poor navigation and weather.
Extensive damage to both. No Coast Guard assistance required, both vessels
proceeded to port.
12. 30 March 1974, tug Castel started to flood while towing the Crapo. Position
45-43N/85-57W, Lake Michigan. Two men lost overboard. Cause, material
failure and weather. Helicopters from air station Traverse City and Sundew
responded.
13. 23 May 1974, Ste'inbrenner and Cardinal collided in Lake Erie, position
41-51/82-34. Extensive damage to both. No loss of life. Cause, poor seamanship.
Injured were evacuated by air station Detroit helicopters and Bramble escorted
the Cardinal in. Steinbrenner required no assistance.
14. 12 September 1974, tug Killarney sank in Lake Erie, position 42-06N/
81-11W. No loss of life. Cause, material failure. Another tug picked up survivors.
15. 20 November 1974, Jodrey grounded and sank in St. Lawrence River at
Alexandria Bay. No loss of life. Cause, poor navigation. Station Alexandria Bay
removed crew before sinking.
16. December 1974, Jennifer sank in Lake Michigan, position 43-32N/87~-08W.
No loss of life. Cause, material failure and weather. Two merchant vessels and
several Coast Guard units responded.4 Crew taken-off by air station helicopters.
Rest picked up by Fortuna (UK).
17. 23 February 1975, Hannah Barge l~91 grounded on Milwaukee breakwall
causing major oil spill. No loss of life. Cause, material failure and weather. Station
Milwaukee saved barge from sinking, no persons on board. Major cleanup.
PAGENO="0314"
310
18. 26 July 1975, tug Sachern and barge collided with a cabin cruiser 1~ miles
north of Marblehead. Four lives lost. Cause, poor seamanship. Station Marblehead,
station Sandusky and air station Detroit responded, two survivors.
19. 10 November 1975, Fitzgerald sank in Lake Superior 15 miles north of White-.
fish Point. Twenty-nine loss of life. Cause, weather and material failure. Massive
search effort by Coast Guard, Canadian, Air Force, Navy and civilian forces.
20. 10 December 1975, Thayer grounded hard in Lake Erie position 41-51N1
82-35W. No loss of life. Cause, apparently poor seamanship. Kaw stood by until
refloating.
21. 19 May 1976, Gaelic Barge 117 grounded on Cleveland breakwall after
towing tug became disabled. No loss of life. Major oil spill resulted. Cause,
weather and material failure. Kaw and station Cleveland Harbor responded. Major
cleanup.
22. 22 June 1976, Nepco Barge 140 grounded in St. Lawrence River near Alexan-
dria Bay. Major oil spill resulted. No loss of life. Cause, poor seamanship. No SAR
assistance necessary. Major cleanup.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes.
Admiral GRACEY. They group here in the Straits of Mackinac and
down here in the west end of Lake Erie. We have one here in Lake
Huron which was Morrell, and you have the Fitzgerald, of course,
here and you have one over here by Whitefish Point -Keweenaw.
You have a couple in Lake Michigan, but they are near rescue
stations and near heavy weather capability. The Jennifer occurred
off the port where we have the Westwind and the Westwind was
underway in less than 2 hours. We got two survivors off with heli-
copters and the vessel sank before we could get anybody else out.
Fortunately the British vessel, the Fortuna, was nearby. The master
of the abandoned ship 4 minutes before she went down* and the
Fortunately the British vessel, the Fortuna, was nearby. The master
of the Jennifer abandoned ship 4 minutes before she went down and
the Fortuna picked up the rest of the survivors. That is what I mean
by ships of "opportunity." We could not have been better located,
but we just didn't have time.
I really believe the statistics show that we are properly located.
We do have plans to improve our heavy weather capability with the
140-footers and any statistical analysis that I am able to make and a
review indicates we are in the right place and we will have the right
equipment.
Mr. OBERSTAR. The location I have no quarrel with. The equip-.
ment capability, I am glad that is being upgraded.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr.. Ruppe?
Mr. RUPPE. Thank you.
First of all, does the Coast Guard maintain any facility plan based
on some kind of established time and distance criteria?
Admiral GRACEY. Well, we do have facility plans that are of rel-.
atively recent origin, meaning within the last 4 or 5 years, and part
of the criteria on which the needs are determined is time and distance
from high workload areas. I cannot tell you what the standards are
offhand.
Mr. RUPPE. Could you supply whatever plan or plans you have
for the record here?
Admiral GRACEY. That portion that is pertinent, yes, sir.
[See p. 372 for information.]
Mr. RUPPE. Admiral, is there any particular or specialized de-
tection equipment that is carried aboard Guard search aircraft
assigned to the Great Lakes region?
PAGENO="0315"
311
Admiral GRACEY. No. Just the standard radar and so forth. No,
there is no particular detection.
Mr. RUPPE. I had reference to night-sun illumination equipment.
Admiral GRACEY. Yes; we do have night-sun, but not on all our
helicopers.
Mr. RUPPE. Is it the intent of the Coast Guard through the ap-
propriation process to equip all your aircraft in that regard?
Admiral GRACEY. I might note that while the night-sun is not on
all helicopters, they all have mounts and it is relatively easy to shift
the equipment from one to another. It is about a 5-minute job. In
theory, any aircraft that is in the air at night would have the capa-
bility. If there were two or three helos aloft as on the night of the
Fitzgerald, we would not have enough.
Mr. Ruppn. I understand the Coast Guard has a detection package
ready to go aboard its proposed new medium surveillance craft.
Could you give us a description of the equipment and possibly its
expected effectiveness and, of course, its availability?
Admiral GRACEY. I can give you a general rundown from some
notes I might have, but it might be more helpful to provide it for the
record. I think it would give you a better rundown on the specifics.
[See p. 372 for information.}
Mr. Ruppn. Does the Coast Guard have some pretty specific
plans for replacing the 111152's presently assigned to your district?
Admiral GRACEY. All the 111152s we have will be replaced when
the new short-range recovery aircraft that the Coast Guard hopes
to buy one day are bought. We are not in the buying phase; there has
been no money appropriated for that helicopter as yet.
When it is, all the ones in this district will be replaced in the same
numbers that we have now.
Mr. Ruiin. All right, a couple of questions on the survival factor:
Could you tell me what the status is of studies relating, and I under-
stand there are studies underway or studies have been completed,
relating to survival of vessel crews? I was referring to exposure
protection, man-overboard alarms, et cetera.
Admiral GRACEY. I will ask Commander Deck to answer. He is
the man who is working with that, Mr. Ruppe.
Commander DECK. Through the extended season program, we
got our start in the cold water survival problem. We developed a
program very early in the game, had some initial studies that were
* done by Battell which indicated that in order to improve our survival
capability, we had to make improvements on a number of fronts,
We couldn't just optimize one particular facet. We couldn't come up
with a super lifeboat and expect that was going to solve all our prob-
lems, so we had to work on activities which looked at personal pro-
tection, group protection, early distress alert, distress detection
enhancement, as well as man-overboard, which, surprisingly man-
overboard statistics account for half of the lives that are lost off of
commercial vessels.
We have made, I think, a considerable amount of progress. We have
underway now an engineering study based on a feasibility study
looking at a physical system for a man-overboard alarm. This en-
gineering development should be completed sometime by the end of
this year.
PAGENO="0316"
312
We ~had :ma~d~ improvements of cold water capability of inflatable
life rafts. We have looked at a number of, different types of personnel
exposure equipment, survival `suits, different kinds of jackets-some
rof `it is Rube Goldberg type of activity, `but I think we have looked
at a considerable number of pieces of equipment. We have actively
*m~der test and evaluation by Underwriters Laboratory two different
types of exposure equipment to be qualified., certified and approved
by the Coast ~Gnard as personnel flotation `devices.
These `tests and evaluation are underway `now. It probably will
`b.e 6 weeks or better ~bOfore the ~fin'al results and approval of those
particular pieces of equipment are out. We have been working in `the
training `and education phase. We have had `a number Of studies :on
personnel survival. We have a survival pamphlet that speaks to
cold `water survival, survival techniques an'd'clothing protection.
that has `been published.
A limited ~mmb'er of `copies have been distributed. We are in our
second printing `in which a very significant number, somewhere "in
the neighborhood `of about 50,000 copies `will be printed and there
will `be a very `large distribution made this Tall prior `to this yeai'~s
winter ,season.
Mr. RUPPE. Congressman Oberstar and I have Introduced legis-
lation to `extend `the studi'es and the demonstration program involving
the winter `navigation season for an additional 2 years. Do you think
that legislation, `if indeed it passes, will be of some help in giving `you
the, direction and possibly the financial wherewithal to carry on
additional studies of the nature you have suggested, `to completion?
Commander DECK. Yes, sir, we do.
Mr. RuPPE. Commander, were you i'n~olved in `the develpoment
of cold water and heavy winter clothing?
`Commander DECK. Yes, Ii was. I essentially `developed the contract
wi'th Dr. Hayward from the University `of Victoria.
Mr. RuppE. With unanimous consent, perhaps `I could place this
in the record. It would be an interesting `observation.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Is it a statement or graph?
`Mr., `RUP.PE. A study, `really.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Very well.
`[The `document follows':]
MAN `IN COLD WATER: `COOLING RATE IN HEAVY WINTER CLOTHING AND TREAT-
MENT OF ACCIDENTAL HYPOTHERMIA: AN ~XPERIMENTA'L STUDY OF INHALATION
REWAR'M'ING
uNIVERSITr OF VICTORIA
These two reports are the results of a study funded by the U.S.
`Coast Guard, Ninth Coast Guard District, 1240 East Ninth Street,
Cleveland, Ohio, 44199. Contract r~ference No. `O9~702'5-~75.
DISCUSSION
These results show that `the `survival time `of `average men in cold water can be
significantly increased by a combination of two factors: 1) wearing "heavy
winter clothing"; and 2) adopting a behaviour in the water which reduces heat
loss (H.E.'L.P.). The `68% increase in predicted survival time over that predicted
for lightly-clothed subjects who did not adopt the thermally-protective behaviour
(7) is a consequence `of both the above factors. The relative importance of each
can be estimated as follows. `Data available in two previous studies (6, 7) permit
the calculation that adoption of the H.E.L.P. behaviour would increase survival
time approximately 35%. The remaining 33% increase would be attributable to
PAGENO="0317"
~31~3
the heavier clothing. Therefore, the generalization seems warranted that survival
time in typical heavy clothing is ~about `cine-4hird -greater thafl' that of lightly-
clothed man in cold water.
Previous data on the effect of heavy clothing on cooling rate of man in cold
`water `was available `from a study `by Kea'tinge (2). He compared `the oooling
rates `Of `5 `men, wearing eithe~ bathing "tninks o1~ heavy clothing, While holding
still in 5°C water. The mean falls in rectal temperature during the 20 minutes of
immersion were 1.23 and 0.29°C for the unclothed and clothed situations respec-
tively. The rate of cooling with heavy clothing is only 24% of that of the unclothed
subjects. The difference seems much larger than might be expected. Also, the
cooling rate of the heavily clothed subjects in Keatinge s study would equal
0 87° C/hr a vilue which is less than one half the 1 85° C/hr cooling r'tte foi
similerly-ckithed subjects in Our study. The -difference of `only 2°C in watOr
~temperature `could not account for this large discrepancy. The reason, we reel, is
That eooling `rates of the body core which are based on `only 20 minutes of immersion
in cold water are invalid. This is because unifOrm cooling rates of rectal and
~yInpanic temperatures are not established until after 20 minutes of immersion.
Including temperatures before this `time underestimates cooling rate and -cannot
be used to predict survival time
`The survival and toleranOe time predictions of this study seem as valid as it is
possible to obtain experimentally. If `this is so, `then on `the basis Of Fig. 4, the
following generalizations can be made regarding the situation on the Great Lakes.
At the average temperature of the surface water in November (7.8°C), a heavily-
clothed seaman, who adopts the H. E.L.P. behaviour, can -be expected to reach
a degree of hypothermia at which -unconsciousness is -likely and death impends, in
about 4 -hours. He -may be almost incapacitated with regard to assisting with his
own rescue -in about 2~ hours. Withou't the -H.'E.L.P. behaviour, `survival time
would decrese by about 25%, and by another 25'% if the victim was swimming
or `treading water. Similar generalizations can be made for other water tempera-
4ures from Inspection of -Fig. 4.
;It -seems worthwhile to mention, `that from -our ~experience, significant curtail-
ment of -peripheral neuromuscular function occurs within the first 15-30 minutes
of -immersion, even before significant core ~hypotherm-ia results. However, this
does not mean the person is incapacitated for we find that `useful activity"
-of the limbs, although-slowed, is still possible -for much -longer -periods. This early
-loss of dexterity, -onset of -stiffness, and `decrease in skin sensitivity, may be one
-reason for the tendency of many survivors of -brief immersions in cold water to
overestimate their degree of hypothermia, and to spread the "lore" of hopeless-
-ness regardin'g `attempts to improve survival time in cold water.
It must be emphasized that the predictions in Fig. 4 are for the "average"
`individual. From the variation in cooling rates -among `individuals in -this study, it
`-is to be expected `that approximately -two-thirds of accidental immersees would
have survival times within the range -of 25% -more or less than the predictions of
-Fig. 4. Regarding the example given for 7.8° C water temperature, -this would
5mean that two-thirds `of the immersees would have survival times between 3 and
5 hours. If the water temperature was approaching freezing, survival times would
be 2-3.5 hours for two-thirds of the immersees. This duration may seem longer
than is conventionally assumed, but-it must be remembered that it applies to the
victim who is heavily-clothed, and who does adopt a thermally-protective behavior.
This study has shown that `even for immersees t'hat `have `the therm-al `benefit
*of heavy clothing and the H.'E~L.P. behavior, a further doubling `of predicted
`survival time can `be achieved by -wearing a UVic `Thermofloat Jacket. This con-
cePt of a work `or `casual jacket `which also provides bouyancy and significant
thermal~ protection -deserves consideration as a compromise between the -insignifi-
cant thermal protection of most standard flotation devices (5), and the more
insulative, but less wearable, survival suits.i
In summary, it iS hoped that the experimental data and predictions of this
~tudy `will assi'st in educational programs on cold water safety, and will be useful
in providing a time base `for rescue services concerned with man in cold water.
~ An estimate from our findings of the survival `time of an average seaman, who was
wearing an Imperial Survival Suit in the Great Lakes In November (mean temperature of
7.8'C), would -be 15-16 hours.
PAGENO="0318"
314
PART 2
TREATMENT OF ACCIDENTAL HYPOTHERMIA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF
INHALATION REWARMING
By John S. Hayward and Alan M. Steinman, Department of Biology, University
of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, and U.S. Coast Guard Air Station,
Port Angeles, Washington 98362
ABSTRACT
Ten men were immersed in the sea at a temperature of 70 C to determine the
effect of heavy winter clothing on body cooling rate and predicted survival time.
Mean body cooling rate in heavy clothing was 1.85° C/hr. This cooling rate cor-
responds to predicted survival times at different water temperatures which are
one-third greater than for lightly-clothed subjects. When subjects wearing heavy
clothing adopted a thermally-protective behavior in the water (H.E.L.P.), a
68% increase in predicted survival time over lightly clothed subjects was observed.
* When the subjects also wore a thermally-protective flotation device (UVic Thermo-
float Jacket) their predicted survival time was doubled, to a duration 3.5 times
that of lightly-clothed persons. The relevance of these findings to the situation
of seamen on the Great Lakes is discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Survival time of man accidently immersed in cold water is determined by a
variety of factors: body size and fatness; activity and posture in the water; indi-
vidual variations in control of shivering and circulation; and the thermal pro-
tection capabilities of the clothing and flotation device being worn (3, 6, 7).
Recent findings (7) have provided a prediction equation for the survival time of
an average adult in cold water of various temperatures, which is based upon cooling
rate in light clothing, such as that often worn by recreational boaters. The question
arises: to what extent would "heavy clothing", such as that worn by seamen during
winter, slow cooling rate and extend survival time? This question has obvious
relevance to many occupational groups who must work on water at the colder
times of the year. The situation for seamen on the Great Lakes is typical of this
concern. The average temperature of the surface waters of the Great Lakes
exceeds 15°C (59°F) for only 3 months (July-Sept.) of the year and is lower than
10°C (50°F) for 8 months of the year (8). For example, in Novembei~ which is
typically a month with bad storms that have resulted in ship casualties (8),
the average surface temperature of the Lakes is down to 7.8°C (46°F). With such
a prevalence of cold water, it is essential that those responsible for regulating
the safety of seamen on the Great Lakes, those charged with rescue operations,
and the seamen themselves, should all have the maximum information available
that is relevant to their fate, if mishap should put a man or men in such cold water.
It was the object of this study to increase the knowledge of cooling rate incold
water of man wearing heavy winter clothing, and to use this to improve predic-
tions of survival time in cold waters such as those of the Great Lakes.
METHODS
Immersions were conducted in the sea (7°C, 45°F) near Victoria, B.C., from on
board a research ship. Ten adult male subjects were studied whose characteristics
were: age, 29 + 9.0 years; weight, 83 ± 10.8 kg (188 lbs); height, 184 cm (6'O");
body fat, 16.1% (by skinfold thickness method of determination). Subjects
passed medical screening according to procedures outlined elsewhere (7).
Clothing variables
The definition of "typical seaman's winter clothing" is extremely difficult,
even if one delimits to a region such as the Great Lakes. In an attempt to aid such
a definition, Dr. Eckerson, of this research team, spent two days on an ore carrier,
the "Stanley" which travelled across Lake Superior early in April, 1975. This
was a time when "winter clothing" was still necessary for those exposed to the
10-20°F air temperature which prevailed. His conclusion regarding clothing worn
by the men on board was that it was impossible to generalize on any particular
style of typical winter clothing. In fact, most of the 26 men, including the officers
and engineers, had little direct exposure to the environment and wore light
clothing similar to that of "indoor" workers anywhere. The "deck crew" consisting
PAGENO="0319"
31.5
of about ii seamen, were most exposed, especially during loading and unloading
procedures at dockside. There was no uniformity in their particular clothing.
Some wore long, woolen underwear. Both denim and wool pants were evident.
A great variety of jackets and sweaters were worn. Gloves and head-coverings
were consistently present. Occasional "snowmobile" suits were seen.
It was necessary to come to some decision as to one or two forms of "typical
seaman's winter clothing". The clothing should adequately represent that being
used by the seamen of the Great Lakes, and at the same time, be relevant to
professional seamen, offshore oil-rig workers, and coastal fishermen, wherever
cold water occurs.
The array of clothing which was chosen is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In Fig. 1,
two styles of "heavy clothing" are shown which vary only in the nature of the
outer coat or jacket being worn. In Fig. 1, the layers of clothing are:
(a) "Long-john" woolen underwear, and woolen socks
(b) cotton shirt, heavy wool pants, and ankle height, work boots
(c) down jacket, wool cap, and waterproof gloves
(d) standard foam flotation device (lifejacket) of the vest type
(e) down vest (no sleeves) and wool jacket (alternative to the down jacket of
illustration c)
(f) standard foam flotation device with clothing alternative (e).
Therefore, the two "heavy clothing" styles which were worn in the water are
shown in Fig. id and if. Five individuals were tested in each of these two clothing
variations. These two variations were not chosen with the a priori expectation
that they would cause significant differences in cooling rate, but to avoid being
too narrow in the definition of heavy winter clothing. Obviously, many further
variations of heavy clothing could be tested, but with the likelihood of being
insignificantly different from the forms chosen here.
One other format of heavy winter clothing was considered to be worthy of
study for its effect on cooling rate of seamen in cold water. A wearable windbreaker-
type jacket (the 1] Vie Thermofloat jacket'), which provides significant thermal
protection (5) in addition to flotation and visibility, has been developed in our
laboratory. It replaced the wool jacket and standard flotation vest of Fig. if,
and is shown in Fig. 2a. When the "convertible shorts", which are attached
inside the back, are deployed, this flotation device appears as in Fig. 2b and
2c (the fluorescent red hood with retroreflective tape is also deployed). This
jacket provides more than 15.5 lbs of buoyancy with good flotation position, so
that an extra "lifejacket" is not required. Each ot the ten subjects was immersed
a second time wearing the iJVic Thermofloat Jacket as is shown in Fig. 2b and c.
Single immersions of one subject (J.H.) were also conducted with two forms
of "survival suits". Fig. 2d illustrates the Mustang Survival Suit (Mustang
Sportswear, Vancouver, B.C.) which is a nylon coverall with buoyant and
thermally protective, closed-cell foam (W') between the layers. It was worn
over the clothing in Fig. ie without the wool jacket. The other survival suit
(Imperial Industries, Bremerton, Washington) consists of u-inch, closed cell
foam that can be tightened over the clothing by closure of zippers on arms, legs,
and trunk (Fig. 2e). It was worn over the same clothing as the TJVic Thermofloat
and Mustang Survival Suit. These single tests on the thermal protection capa-
bility of the two survival suits were considered a worthy comparison within this
study, since both models are currently used for cold water safety, despite lack of
experimental data on their effectiveness in reducing body cooling rate.
Temperature measurements
Core body temperatures were measured at the tympanic and rectal sites.
Tympanic temperature was monitored with a small, padded thermocouple placed
gently against the tympanum. The ear canal was then sealed with a wax plug.
Rectal temperature was recorded with a thermistor inserted 15 cm beyond the
anus. Temperatures were monitored continuously throughout pre-immersion,
cooling, and rewarming phases.
Immersion precedure
Body temperatures were monitored for 10 minutes prior to immersion, during
which time the subject sat in an air temperature of 8-10°C. The subject then
walked a few meters to a ladder which he descended into the sea (7°C). The sub-
ject was instructed not to swim or make gross movements since these have been
1 Manufactured by Mustang Sportswear, 540 Beatty Street, Vancouver, B.C.
78-280 O-76----21
PAGENO="0320"
316
shown to increase cooling rate (7). Instead, he remained still and adopted a
thermally-protective behaviour, H.E.L.P. (Heat Escape Lessening Posture)
which reduces cooling rate (6). The posture entails curling up in a "foetal-like"
position, which results in decreased rate of heat loss from critical areas of the
body surface (6). Therefore, the behaviour in the water was designed to minimize
cooling rate, and thereby complement the potential of the heavy clothing to ex-
tend predicted survival time. The results would then represent the situation of a
heavily clothed man attempting to take best advantage of all his insulative
capacity.
Immersions were terminated when the deep body temperature reached 35°C
(95°F), or when sufficient hypothermia hadoccurred to yield a uniform cooling
rate. Immersion time varied from 45-120 mm depending on clothing variables
and individuals differences in cooling rate. Subjects were rewarmed by either
hot bath or inhalation techniques as described elsewhere (see Part II).
RESULTS
Cooling curves
Fig. 3 presents cooling curves of tympanic and rectal temperature of an indi-
vidual who showed typical responses. It is important to note that a fairly uniform
cooling rate of the body core was no testablished until approximately 20 minutes
of immersion. Therefore, cooling rate determinations were based upon temperature
decreases from 20 minutes onward (mean immersion time was 85 mm).
Analysis of cooling rates
Table 1 summarizes the cooling rate findings for the different clothing variables.
There were no significant differences between the cooling rates of the tympanic
and rectal temperatures. Hence, the cooling rates of these two sites can be aver-
aged to provide a single measure of cooling rate of the body core. Using this
measure, no significant difference occurred between the cooling rates with the
two forms of heavy clothing while wearing the standard flotation device (1.78 and
1.92°C/hr). Therefore, these two values can be combined to yield a single, mean
value for cooling rate of 1.85°C/hr for subjects wearing heavy clothing and a
standard flotation device. In comparison to this value, the UVic Thermofloat
Jacket caused a highly significant (p<0.01) reduction of mean cooling rate to
0.89°C/hr.
Analysis of the cooling rates in Table 1 shows the degree of variation between
individuals in this study. The standard deviations of the cooling rates were often
about 25% of the means.
ABSTRACT
Inhalation rewarming of hypothermic humans with heated, humidified oxygen
was compared to rewarming by immersion in a hot bath. In ten subjects cooled to
approximately 35°C core temperature, there was no significant difference in the
amount of temperature "afterdrop" with the two rewarming procedures. Inhala-
tion rewarming provided rapid commencement of increase in tympanic and eso-
phageal temperatures, indicating effective rewarming of critical core regions,
especially heart and brain. This method of core rewarming avoids the physiological
hazards associated with the peripheral vasodilation which accompanies external
rewarming. Moreover, the simplicity of application of this method suggests its
greater use in both first-aid or hospital treatment of accidental hypothermia.
INTRODUCTION
Accidental hypothermia in man is a common, but serious problem in cold air
and water environments. The rapid rate of cooling which occurs in cold water
immersion (12) and in mountain accidents (10, 23) can readily progress to a
medical emergency. Hence immediate recognition and therapy of this condition
are necessary to overcome its high mortality (6, 22).
Many current articles (9, 10, 16), medical texts (2) and military survival pub-
lications (8, 32) recommend rapid peripheral rewarming as the treatment of first
choice for hypothermia. Indeed, this has been shown to be effective even in the
profoundly hypothermic victim (1). Many modalities are used to accomplish
this, including immersion in hot water baths, wrapping in electric blankets, appli-
cation of heated objects to the skin surface (3), and recently, circulation of warm
water through special garments fitted to the victim (33).
These methods are all effective in treatment of rapid-onset hypothermia, but
certain physiological problems may arise with active, peripheral rewarming of the
PAGENO="0321"
317
slow-onset, unconscious, profoundly-hypothermic victim. The well-described "after-
drop" of the core body temperature following removal of the cold stress can be
increased in magnitude by peripheral rewarming. This occurs through vasodila-
tion in the cold periphery and subsequent return of cooled blood to the body core,
further chilling the myocardium (33) and potentiating the possibility of ventricular
fibrillation (1, 17, 33). Furthermore, in hypothermia of long duration, in which
intravascular volume is decreased secondary to fluid shifts, rapid rewarming may
precipitate hypovolemic shock as peripheral vasodilation further diminishes
central blood volume (17, 33). To obviate these problems, some authorities (17,
31) recommend rapid rewarming for rapid-onset hypothermia, and slow rewarm-
ing for slow-onset hypothermia. The difficulty in many accident situations of
ascertaining the degree of hypothermia and its duration, complicates the decision
of which type of therapy to apply, at a time when delay decreases the chance of
successful resuscitation.
Theoretically, core rewarming of the hypothermic victim avoids the physio-
logical hazards mentioned above, through delivery of heat directly to the central
circulation and tissues, leaving the limbs and peripheral tissues to warm more
slowly. Several core rewarming methods have been used including extracorporeal
circulation (7, 30); warm, peritoneal dialysis (18); direct warming of the heart
after thoracotomy (19); endotracheal administration of warm air alone (28) and
in combination with heated, intravenous fluids (27). Although all of these tech-
niques have proven successful in many instances, they are clearly limited to the
hospital environment.
Recently, Lloyd (20) has described a means of core rewarming through the
airway using warmed oxygen. He presents case histories showing its effectiveness
in the hospital treatment of hypothermic patients, and in addition, describes a
portable apparatus based on this principle (21). Inhalation rewarming is also
receiving the interest of mountain rescue organizations (26) and of physicians as-
sociated with mountaineering medicine (15, 29). Therefore, inhalation of heated,
water-saturated gas (such as oxygen) by the hypothermia victim may best combine
the merits of core rewarming and first-aid applicability at the accident site.
The purpose of this experiment was to compare the effectiveness of inhalation
rewarming (using heated, humidified oxygen) to peripheral rewarming in a hot
whirlpool bath. In other that the results be most relevant to accidental situations,
immersions were conducted in the sea using persons of average build, who wore
standardized clothing and lifejackets. In addition, the rewarming apparatus was
selected so as to be compatible with rescue aircraft and vessels, such as those of
the U.S. Coast Guard.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Immersions were conducted in the sea near Victoria, British Columbia, from on
board a research ship which provided laboratory space for recordings and re-
warming procedures. Sea temperatures were between 7 and 8°C and a slight cur-
rent and small waves prevailed for the 4 days of immersions.
Ten healthy male subjects (all athletically active) volunteered for the study
and satisfied rigid medical selection criteria described elsewhere (12). Their
characteristics (means and ranges) were: age 29 (20-48); weight 83 kg (75-105);
height 1.84 m (177-191); and percent body fat 15.4 (9.3-25.7) based on standard
measures of skinfold thickness.
Core temperature was measured as follows. A fine, padded thermocouple was
placed gently against the tympanum, and the auditory meatus sealed with a wax
plug. Rectal temperature was monitored with a thermistor inserted 15 cm beyond
the anus. In one subject only, esophageal temperature was obtained using a
thermistor inserted nasally and positioned to lie at about the level of the cardiac
atria.
Production of hypothermia.-Each subject wore an outfit of typical seaman's
clothing and a personal flotation device. With tympanic and rectal temperature
being continuously monitored, 10-minutes of pre-immersion values were recorded.
The subject then entered the cold sea water and remained motionless beside the
ship while clinging to a life-ring. Constant visual surveillance of the subject was
maintained. The immersion was terminated when the core temperature declined
to 35°C or when the subject became too uncomfortable to continue. The range of
immersion times was 45-120 mm. The subject then climbed out of the water up a
3 meter ladder to the deck, removed his wet garments with assistance, and walked
20 meters to the rewarming site in the laboratory of the ship. The time interval
from leaving the water to initiation of rewarming was 3-4 mill.
PAGENO="0322"
318
Rewarming procedures.-Each subject was cooled twice (on separate days) and
rewarmed once by each of the two procedures. The order of use of the two re-
warming procedures was randomized for the different subjects.
Fig. 1 shows the inhalation rewarming apparatus. Oxygen from the cylinder
was passed at a variable rate through the heating and humidifying apparatus. It
was a standard Bennett model heater and vaporizer commonly used on hospital
respirators. It consisted of a 1-liter water bath with a thermostatically-controlled,
electric, immersion-heater element. The oxygen was bubbled through the water
and delivered to the subject via a loosely-fitted, ventilation mask. The mask was
fitted with a rebreathing bag to act as a reservoir which helped conform the
variable ventilation flow rate of the subject to the uniform flow of the oxygen.
The water was heated to about 700 C such that the water-saturated oxygen flowed
from the Bennett heater at about 550 C and arrived at the subject's mask at
40-45° C. This was the maximum temperature of inhaled oxygen that the subjects
found to be comfortable. The flow rate of oxygen was regulated to maintain the
40-45° C temperature of the inhaled gas. This required high flow rates for the first
5-10 minutes, because the subjects had high ventilation rates associated with
vigorous shivering thermogenesis. As shivering subsided, oxygen flow rates were
reduced to 10-12 liters/mm for the remainder of the rewarming. Inhalation re-
warming was discontinued when the subjects had rewarmed about 1.5° C by
tympanic recordings, involving a total period of about 45 mm from initiation of
the treatment. During the inhalation rewarming, the subjects lay prone on a
foam mattress. Room temperatures wa 24-26° C. The subjects were exposed to
the air until their skin temperatures in the trunk region reached air temperature,
requiring 7-10 minutes. They were then covered with an unwarmed blanket for
the remainder of the rewarming period.
Bath rewarming was accomplished using a 5 ft long, whirlpool bath. The subject
reclined in the bath so that the water was at neck level. Initial water temperature
was about 26° C and was then raised steadily to 42° C over the first 7-8 mm.
Vigorous stirring continued at this temperature for the remainder of the rewarm-
ing. The lower initial water temperature was required due to the severe discomfort
to conscious, hypothermic subjects if suddenly immersed at the higher temperature.
RESULTS
A typical recording of core temperature changes during cooling and inhalation
rewarming of one individual is shown in Fig. 2. A fairly uniform cooling rate was
established by approximately 20 mm of immersion and the subject exited the cold
water when the core temperatures were near 35 °C. Temperatures continued to
decline during the period before inhalation rewarming began, and this "afterdrop"
continued for another 0.3° C over the first 10 mm of rewarming before being
arrested. Temperature increase of the tympanic site proceeded at a faster rate
than the rectal site.
For the ten subjects, comparison of the effectiveness of the inhalation and bath
rewarming techniques is presented for the tympanic and rectal sites in Figs. 3
and 4 respectively Change in temperature before and after the onset of rewarming
is shown. Tympanic temperature exhibited marked acceleration of cooling during
the interval of physical activity that was associated with movement from the cold
water to the rewarming laboratory. In this 3-4 minute period, tympanic tempera-
ture declined an average of 0.4° C. For the tympanic site, there was no significant
difference in the amount of continued cooling with the two rewarming methods.
Inhalation rewarming had a mean afterdrop from commencement of rewarming
of 0.38° C compared to 0.48° C for bath rewarming. The inhalation technique
appeared to provide a slightly more rapid onset of increase in tympanic tempera-
ture. By 15 mm of rewarming with each method, uniform rates of temperature
increase were established, such that by 30 mm of rewarming a temperature rise
of 1.3°C above the minimum was achieved. Rectal temperature (Fig. 4) showed
less response to the physical activity during the transition from the cold water to
the rewarming site (only a 0.1°C drop). Again, no significant difference occurred in
the amount of afterdrop between the two rewarming methods. With inhalation
rewarming, there was a further mean afterdrop of 0.40°C compared to 0.33°C
with bath rewarming. At the rectal site, inhalation rewarming appeared to
provide a slightly slower rate of temperature increase than bath rewarming.
Approximately 20 mm was required to establish a steady rate of temperature in-
crease, such that at 30 mm of rewarming, temperature rises above minimum of
about 0.6° C and 0.4C occurred for the bath and inhalation techniques respectively.
In comparing the rate of temperature increase of the tympanic and rectal
sites during inhalation rewarming (Figs. 3 and 4), rectal temperature increase
was significantly lower than tympanic from 15 mm of rewarming onward.
PAGENO="0323"
319
Fig. 5 presents the temperature change curves for the one subject who had
esophageal temperature recording in addition to tympanic and rectal measure-
ments. Esophageal temperature showed essentially no afterdrop once inhalation
rewarming began. Furthermore, this site showed a rapid rate of increase ia temper-
ature, gaining 2.1°C in the first 5 mi Tympanic temperature showed a small
afterdrop of 0.3°C and onset of temperature increase in less than 10 minutes
(similar to the pattern in Fig. 3). Again, rectal temperature had a greater afterdrop
and slower onset of increase than tympanic when treated with the inhalation
technique.
0
0
cr
I-
0
a-
0
F-
TIME (mm)
FIGURE 2.-Typical recording of core body temperatures during cooling in 7°C
water and subsequent inhalation rewarming.
PAGENO="0324"
320
1.2
1.0
0.0
~0.6
w
I - ______________________
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
TIME (mm)
FIGURE 3.-Comparison of tympanic temperature changes occurring with in-
halation and bath rewarming. Changes were calculated from the temperature
at the beginning of rewarming (time 0). The mean tympanic temperature at
time 0 was 34.5° C. The difference in cooling curves from 15 to 5 minutes before
rewarming was due to clothing differences (being studied separately), and had
no bearing on the afterdrop findings. Vertical lines denote standard errors of
the means.
[~~ANIC
cx,,
cold
wc'/er
/
beg',,
rewarm
PAGENO="0325"
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FIGURE 4.-Comparison of rectal temperature changes occurring with inhalation
and bath rewarming. The mean rectal temperature at time 0 was 35.3° C.
Other conditions as in Fig. 3.
DISCUSSION
These experimental results confirm the theoretical expectation that inhalation
rewarming can be an effective treatment for hypothermia in humans. The lack
of difference in core temperature afterdrop and rewarming rate between inhalation
and bath rewarming allows the inhalation technique to be considered an "active"
or "aggressive" therapy. Although cardiovascular variables were not measured,
the lower rectal and skin temperatures, and the more persistent shivering with the
inhalation method testify to less warming and consequently less vasodilation of
the peripheral regions. Hence, the further advantage results that rewarming
shock and induction of ventricular fibrillation by cold and acidotic venous return
are minimized, despite rapid rewarming of the "critical core". With the inhalation
method, direct warming of the grain would occur by conduction from the naso-
pharynx, and by circulation of warmed vertebral and carotid arterial blood. The
more rapid rewarming of the brain would both reverse cold-induced depression of
the respiratory centers and more rapidly stimulate regaining of consciousness of
the severely hypothermic victim.
PAGENO="0326"
322
FIGURE 5.-Changes in esophageal temperature in comparison to tympanic and
rectal temperatures in an individual being rewarmed by the inhalation method.
The mean temperature of the three sites at time 0 was 34.1° C
With regard to the need to stop further cooling of the hea~t and begin its re-
warming, the extremely rapid response of the esophageal temperature to inhala-
tion rewarming deserves emphasis. Previous studies have shown that a close
parallel exists between esophageal temperature and the temperature of the heart
and great vessels (5). The esophageal recording would therefore indicate that
inhalation rewarming facilitates rapid myocardial rewarming. Transfer of heat
from warm, humidified gases to the airways is rapid (34); and heat may then flow
from the airways to other structures of the mediastinum. The heart would be
warmed from the pericardium inward. Probably of greater significance, however,
is the return to the heart of warmed blood from the lungs, leading to myocardial
warming both through direct heating of the endocardium and through coronary
perfusion. Rapid rewarming of the heart in this manner would minimize the
possibility of ventricular fibrillation and would potentiate increased cardiac
output (24, 25).
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5
10
PAGENO="0327"
323
A further advantage of inhalation rewarming with heated, humidified oxygen
can be anticipated. Since the oxygen supply to the myocardium is decreased in
hypothermia, both from decreased coronary vascular flow (13) and decreased
oxyhemoglobin dissociation (4), the possibility of ventricular fibrillation from a
limitation of myocardial energetics is enhanced (14). The inhalation of heated
oxygen in the treatment of hypothermia would not only be therapeutic in terms of
warming of the myocardium, but also from a concurrent increase in coronary
arterial oxygenation. Nevertheless, one report (31) recommends against the use of
100% oxygen for respiratory support of severely hypothermic subjects, on the
assumption that oxyhemoglobin is not dissociated, CO2 transport is consequently
impaired, and CO2 narcosis results. However, this assumption needs verification
and most authorities (10, 16, 20, 21, 22) recommend oxygen therapy to counteract
hypoxia in severe hypothermia. In fact, the use of heated oxygen has been used
successfully in actual case histories of hypothermia (20, 21). Finally, a practical
reason for use of oxygen for rewarming is its easy availability through widespread
use in emergency medicine.
In the context of minimizing the amount of afterdrop of core temperature and
maximizing its rate of increase, some combination of inhalation rewarming and
peripheral rewarming may be optimal. Peripheral rewarming should omit the
limbs and concentrate on transfer of heat into the trunk. The most effective surface
areas for application of heat to the trunk, while avoiding peripheral vasodilation,
would be the neck, lateral thorax, and groin regions. These have been shown
thermographically (11) to have high heat transfer with the "core".
Another aspect of the results of this study deserves note. Tympanic and esopha-
geal temperatures showed sharp temperature declines during the period of physical
activity involved in climbing out of the cold water, removing outer clothing, and
walking to ths ship's laboratory. The significance of these findings for those
involved in rescue operations is clear: hypothermia victims should be recovered
with as little physical exertion on their part as possible, so as to minimize the
post-rescue afterdrop in core temperature (32).
In conclusion, the simplicity, effectiveness, and safety of the inhalation rewarm-
ing technique warrants its adoption on a larger scale for both rescue and hospital
treatment of all levels of hypothermia.
Mr. RUPPE. I understand the American Bureau of Shipping in-
creased draft marks for lake vessels in 1973 with a reduction in
freeboard. Do you feel that there are any. adverse effects that may
have come about on vessel structural integrity because of these
changes in draught?
Admiral GRACEY. I am going to ask Commander Deck to respond
in a little more detail, sir, but I have looked at that question, and my
understanding is that it was done under the auspices of a. joint
Canadian-U.S. Coast Guard Committee. It was not a carte blanch
approval to increase draft. It was done only on certain vessels under
certain conditions. The people that I have talked to have not indicated
to me that there is any increased safety hazard to this, but I will ask
Commander Deck to give you some more details.
Commander DECK. I probably should point out, I think, one slight
inaccuracy. The American Bureau of Shipping didn't bring this
about themselves. They are acting as agent for the Coast Guard and
they essentially do the physical work in making the calculations and
the inspections and placement of the Plimson marks on the vessels.
The change in 1973 to the Great Lakes load lines was only for a
very limited particular class of vessels. These were vessels which were
of fairly recent vintage that had a number of safety features, such
things as watertight hatch covers, certain kinds of enclosures over
portholes, watertight doors on house fronts, different kinds of closures
for their vent syste~ns. So far as the structural adequacy of these
vessels, each was analyzed in depth prior to giving this deeper load
line draft.
PAGENO="0328"
324
One of the, I guess, anomalies of naval architecture is that the
deeper the draft in its deeper loading, the vessels in the loading
condition did not really increase the stress of the vessel to any signifi-
cant degree. As a matter of fact, in the analysis, it is shown that,
the vessel suffers greater stress when she is in the ballast condition
than in the loaded condition. As an example, we use a figure of four
tons per square inch being the limit.
Deeply loaded vessels, that is the summer load line vessels, their
stress may be somewhere in the neighborhood of one and a quarter
tons per square inch, whereas the vessel in the ballast condition may
be two and a half to three, perhaps three and a half tons per square
inch. So the deeper loading really did not have a significant impact
as far as the stress loadings were concerned and, therefore, did not
have a significant impact as far as the structural capability of the
vessel was concerned.
Admiral GRACEY. Of the three major lake vessel casualties we
talked about, two of them were in ballast at the time they broke up.
Mr. RUPPE. In your opinion, has the Mini-LORAN-C been an
effective navigation tool and, if so, do you foresee the possibility or
likelihood of extending its use to other areas of the Great Lakes?
Admiral GRACEY. We cannot say it has been an effective tool yet,
Mr. Ruppe, because we really haven't had a chance to put it into
operational practice. I think it has great promise. The success we
have seen is with a very primitive piece of user equipment. And if the
designer who I think is here will forgive me for those words, we have
got great hopes for the future for equipment that is being developed
now. But even that will show great promise.
Mr. RUPPE. You indicated in your statement-you referred to
my persistence on this and I have been persistent, and of course
the Coast Guard itself is very interested and excited about this
because we think it has great prospects.
Admiral GRACEY. One of the reasons that we think it has prospects,
we figure if it will work in the St. Mary's River, it will work anyplace.
We thought it was a marvelous opportunity to have a go at it. As far
as the Great Lakes are concerned, I think there might be some other
areas, for example the Detroit-St. Clair area, but the expense there
probably isn't warranted. I know the St. Lawrence Seaway people
are watching our development very interestedly.
There are some parts of the country where we have some thoughts
of using this-for example, in some of the lower regions of the Missis-
sippi.
Mr. RUPPE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Admiral, you mentioned that we have a co-
operative agreement with Canada. Does Canada~ have a cooperative
part of our Coast Guard in the lakes?
Admiral GRACEY. No, they really don't. There is a Canadian
Coast Guard and it does do a lot of the things that we do, but law
enforcement is handled by the Canadian police and search and rescue
is handled by another group, so no, there is no country in the world
that has an agency that does all the things that your Coast Guard
does.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Do you limit your activities solely to our
jurisdiction, or do you go across the line?
PAGENO="0329"
325
Admiral GRACEY. We have cooperative agreements with Canada
on icebreaking, SAR and pollution surveillance. The pollution sur-
veillance agreement was worked out and has since been approved by
the State Department. It was worked out on the basis of efficiency.
Instead of our flying down one side of the border and their flying over
the other, we said, "Why don't you fly over Erie and Ontario and we
fly over Superior and Huron and we can exchange information on
what we see." That is being done. There is a law that permitted us
to join in icebreaking with foreign countries.
That was subject to agreement. There is an agreement being worked
out now. However, for years and years icebreaking has been shared
on the Lakes and that has been continuing. The Canadians helped
on the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. The icebreaking is normally limited to geo-
graphic limitations of the two countries?
Admiral GRACEY. No, as you go across the lakes, you go in and
out of Canada all the time. The natural tracks of vessels do not follow
the border at all. In fact, the Fitzgerald is just barely in U.S. waters.
It is just about on the Canadian border and had been coming down
from Canadian waters.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. So if someone is in distress in Canadian waters,
you nonetheless go out and assist him?
Admiral GRACEY. Only if we have a request for help from Canada
and vice versa, but it is a very frequent event. Of course, usually
with the rescue case, if you hear it, you don't wait for a lot of for-
malities, you go.
Basically, we are so busy responding to our calls, we only respond
to Canada on request of the Canada Rescue Agent.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. You mentioned about 1,000 auxiliary service
assists on weekends. Do you pay those? Are they doing volunteer
service, or how is that, Admiral?
Admiral GRAcEY. I think I have kind of confused things a little
with my statement. The 1,000 figure referred to Reservists. We don't
have 1,000 who are on duty every weekend. We draw from a pool of
1,000 to derive the number who come in on weekends.
Yes, they are paid. The volunteers are the Auxiliarists. Some are
paid for fuel and damage to their boat when they are on the job.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. You provide them fuel for the boat?
Admiral GRAcEY. If they are under orders. A large portion of what
they do, they do on their own time.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. On their own?
Admiral GRAcEY. On their own time. Marvelous organization.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Yes, I know, I have been hauled in by one of
them.
[Laughter.]
Admiral, thank you very much.
We appreciate your testimony and your cooperation, and we look
forward to working with you and having continued oversight.
I might mention that many times people associate congressional
oversight responsibility with trouble, but that is not the case. Over-
sight means that we work with you and we oversee the good and the
bad, so when we say oversight, it doesn't mean we are only having
oversight hearings where there are problems or trouble, but there are
PAGENO="0330"
326
many oversight hearings in which everything worked right and is fine
and we just want to come out in the field and take a look at it and
look at the people who have done the work.
In this case we have a little of both. We appreciate your cooperation
and your testimony.
Admiral GRACEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Now, I might add mostly for the benefit of
my colleagues, if my two colleagues would bear with me, I would
like to follow the procedure of having the testimony of each witness
and then deferring any question and then inviting all the witnesses
together at the end for questions, if that would be agreeable.
The next witness is Vice Admiral Paul E. Trimble, USCG (retired,)
president, Lake Carriers' Association, Cleveland, Ohio. And we will
be very happy to hear from you, Admiral.
STATEMENT OP VICE ADM. PAUL E. TRIMBLE, U.S. COAST GUARD
(RETIRED), PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION, CLEVE-
LAND, OHIO
Admiral TRIMBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee and welcome to the Fourth Seacoast. We are very
pleased that you have chosen this locale for your look at the facilities
in the Great Lakes area.
At the outset, as far as lake shipping is concerned, the Coast Guard
here on the lakes does a fine job of carrying out its public responsibili-
ties and managing its available resources. Its personnel, headed by an
outstandingly capable District Commander, by and large are com-
pletely dedicated to their tasks round the clock, round the calendar,
and without regard to weather conditions. To the extent that there is a
weakness or a problem it is in available resources which I will touch on
subsequently.
Mr. Chairman, in the interests of time, I would like to introduce my
statement for the record and then just touch on parts of it.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Without objection, your full statement will
appear in the record as if delivered and you may quote from it as
seen fit.
[The statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. PAUL E. TRIMBLE, PRESIDENT, LAKE
CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, welcome to the Fourth
Seacoast! We in the lake shipping industry are pleased that you are holding
hearings at the Soo on the adequancy of Coast Guard facilities in this area.
We do have more important ports in terms of tonnage but this is really the hub
of the Great Lakes navigation system. This locale presents more marine problems
than any other section, such as aids to navigation, ice obstruction, vessel traffic
control, and variable weather. Consequently, Coast Guard operations here are
correspondingly more extensive.
I represent the domestic bulk vessel fleets on the lakes so my comments on Coast
Guard facilities will reflect that point of view. As this Committee is particularly
aware Coast Guard activities and capabilities impact heavily on the shipping
industry. Coast Guard responsibilities start with approval of plans for construc-
tion or modification of merchant vessels, approval of safety equipment, licensing
of personnel, and annual inspection of the vessel and safety equipment. The
Coast Guard is responsible for aids to navigation, including electronic, such as
Loran-C and vessel traffic control. Its multi-purpose vessels perform search and
PAGENO="0331"
327
rescue missions, break ice to meet the reasonable needs of commerce, and are
available for marine law enforcement work, including enforcement of marine
pollution regulations. In addition to vessels, both fixed and rotary wing aircraft
are used in support of its missions, especially search and rescue, law enforcement
and ice surveillance. The Coast Guard is also responsible for research and devel-
opment in support and furtherance of its activities.
At the outset I will state for the record that the Coast Guard here on the lakes
does a fine job of carrying out its public responsibilities and managing its available
resources. Its personnel, headed by an outstandingly capable District Commander,
by and large are completely dedicated to their tasks round-the-clock, round-the-
calendar, and without regard to weather conditions. To the extent that there is a
weakness or a problem, it is in available resources which I will touch on
subsequently.
Since your committee, Mr. Chairman, is responsible for Coast Guard legislation
and authorization, as well as oversight, your activities and performance are also
important to shipping and the Great Lakes. The authorization process for Coast
Guard capital improvement items was instituted by your Committee during the
early sixties. It is a fact that Coast Guard facilities during the intervening period
have become steadily more adequate for the statutory tasks assigned. At the same
time some of those tasks have been broadened in the area of fisheries surveillance,
pollution abatement, and Loran-C coverage under the national navigation plan.
Recent extension of our fisheries zone to 200 miles will further tax Coast Guard
resources, perhaps even coming ahead of those needed in the Great Lakes.
Before looking at the adequacy of Coast Guard facilities here, please bear with
me very briefly on the what and why of domestic bulk lake shipping, its importance
to the national economy, and effect on the Coast Guard. As has been well publi-
cized, water transportation takes pride in being the lowest cost mode of trans-
portation, the lowest energy consumer per ton-mile of cargo moved and in having
the least environmental impact.
We are down to 137 vessels compared to 240 in 1970 when the average age of
the bulk fleet was over 45 years. Extension of benefits to the lakes that was pro-
vided for in the Merchant Marine Act Amendments of 1970 has given considerable
impetus to replacement of the smaller and older vessels with larger, safer and more
productive vessels that the improved navigation system and the Poe Lock will
now accommodate.
Why is lake shipping important to the Great Lakes and the nation?
Improvement in vessel productivity is helping to keep shipping costs down,
which in turn affect utility costs to the consumer; what the farmer gets for his
grain; and what the consumer pays for products containing steel. It also helps
to keep domestic steel production costs competitive with foreign supplies, and this
impacts on employment, our economy, and the balance of payments.
In 1974, imports of foreign steel exceeded our exports by $3.4 billion. In 1975
the world-wide slump reduced steel demand and the deficit to less than $3.0 billion,
still a significant figure when we think of lost business and employment in our
own country. This is especially important to the Great Lakes area, the industrial
heartland of the Nation. /
Looking ahead from the slump we are emerging from, economists are f ore-
casting steel expansion requirements of 25 to 30 million tons by 1980-81, with
increased employment from the mines to the mills of 90,000. Planning towards
that goal is well under way with specific expansions announced by most of the
major steel companies.
On the raw material side to meet that demand, and that is where lake shipping
is directly involved, construction is already under way to increase domestic
taconite pellet production from 55 million tons annually to 85 million tons by
1980, over a 50 percent increase. Dockside ore handling facilities are being
modernized or replaced at the head of the lakes to handle the expanded raw
material movement.
An ultra-modern dockside facility has just been completed at Superior, Wiscon-
sin to handle up to 20 million tons annually of western coal for Great Lakes
utility plants. S
With the bulk cargoes projected, over a dozen new vessels are under construction
or contract through 1982, and others are in the design stage, each with winter
navigation capability. Still others are being lengthened or modernized as yard
capacity permits. Under the Congressional authorized and funded season extension
program during the past five years we have successfully demonstrated that
appropriately designed or modified vessels can safely and economically operate
on the lakes from 10 to 12 months, instead of the normal 8~ months' season.
PAGENO="0332"
328
This substantial improvement in lake shipping productivity, along with newer,
larger and self-unloading vessels, has been accomplished with our existing Great
Lakes waterway, and has involved little additional public investment.
Forecasted stockpiling savings can only occur if stockpiling is reduced and
land use planned accordingly, Vessel use for the year must also be planned ahead
for optimum productivity. Carefully coordinated long-range planning in connec-
tion with expanded steel production, the supporting pellet production and loading
facilities, western coal movement and handling facilities, and shipping is necessary
to achieve those savings. Huge capital outlays are involved, so the planning is not
something that can be turned off and on each year.
A good example of the situation and problem is the expanded pellet production
in Upper Michigan that has been going on during the past few years, with a
further substantial increase just announced this past month that will create an
additional 1,000 jobs in this depressed area. The capacity of the rail systems to
Escanaba and Marquette are limited, as well as the dock loading facilities, so
the only way, without building new facilities at added capital costs and construc-
tion time, to move this added capacity is by operating during the winter. This
certainly makes sense as a flexible step that should be taken before going to the
expense of new construction. It should be noted that it has even been necessary
to operate ships into the winter the past two years to move needed pellets. That
situation is expected to continue this coming winter.
The expanded bulk shipping under way and other changes described have a
significant effect on the Coast Guard in the Soo area, especially the following
programs:
Aids to navigation.
Vessel assistance, both search and rescue, and ice breaking.
Vessel traffic control.
R. & D. in support of Coast Guard responsibilities, especially marine
safety.
In the aids to navigation field, the Coast Guard has under way two important
improvements in facilities. Loran-C coverage, as recently announced under the
national navigation plan, is being extended to the Great Lakes with completion
by 1980. This will provide a much more accurate position keeping capability for
vessels equipped to use the system. It will be especially helpful in Lake Superior,
but will also enhance safety in other lakes.
A mini Loran-C system, affording an accuracy of 25 feet in critical locations in
the St. Marys River, should be ready for testing on a commercial vessel later this
year. This system will minimize lost time resulting from poor visibility, will
improve navigation safety and should minimize groundings. I credit Rear Admiral
Gracey, the Great Lakes Commander of the Coast Guard for recognizing this
requirement and pushing the development to the stage of success currently in
sight. It has other interesting potential uses that the Coast Guard is exploring
separately.
The picture is not nearly so rosy when it comes to the Coast Guard's general
purpose vessel fleet available for Great Lakes service. None of these vessels were
designed specifically for Fourth Seacoast duties. In fact, no vessel has been built
for Great Lakes service since the World War II era. The duties, the operating
environment and the available technology have changed considerably since then.
As might be expected, the Coast Guard vessel fleet has grown exceedingly tired in
the intervening years and is increasingly difficult to provide parts-support for,
and assure the traditional Coast Guard reliability.
I refer primarily to the five harbor vessels, such as the Naugatuck here at the
Soo, the winter-time work horses of the fleet. These vessels are not only assigned
for rescue and law enforcement, but also for ice breaking. If replacements were
so designed, they could also tend aids to navigation. Today these vessels are of
marginal value for rescue services in severe weather.
While in service these vessels have performed yeoman duty helping to keep the
St. Marys River channels open during the winter. Such ice breaking responsibili-
ties of the Coast Guard stem from 14 U.S.C. 2 and also Executive Order 7521
issued December 21, 1936 that provides in substance that:
"The Coast Guard is directed to assist in keeping open to navigation by means
of ice breaking operations, insofar as practicable and as the exigencies may require,
channels and harbors, in accordance with the reasonable demands of commerce."
Through the dedicated maximum efforts of its crews using World War II vin-
tage vessels with varying ice breaking effectiveness, ice breaking has kept up with
the limited level of winter demonstration effort, the proving period, so to speak.
Except for the MACKINAW, the vessels were not designed for extended season
PAGENO="0333"
329
operations nor for the super-size carriers that have already started to make up
the fleet. With more vessels and more ports involved in winter operations, super-
imposed on normal Coast Guard winter operations, the needed ice breaking
capability is just not there.
Lead time for authorization, design and funding for vessel procurement is 3 to
6 years, depending upon whether a satisfactory, already designed and operationally
tested vessel is available. I am not proposing additional vessels nor personnel for
the lakes, just faster replacement of present overage multi-function vessels than
is included in current Administration planning to be ready for increased cargo
movements by 1980 . . . so as not to be a drag on this phase of the economy and
employment. Without such action, the Coast Guard is not going to be ready, ice
breaking-wise, for lake shipping of 1980, and probably not even that of 1977, 1978
and 1979.
Your committee is aware of this deficiency, Mr. Chairman, and its action on the
Coast Guard Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1977 speaks for itself. On the House
side, Congressmen Ruppe and Oberstar were especially aggressive in developing
and presenting the facts, and supporting a more adequate program, as reflected
in H.R. 11670 passed by the House earlier this year.
With respect to vessel traffic control in the Soo area, the Coast Guard has been
exercising its authority since the turn of the century. We in industry feel that the
program has been successful in the interest of safety and minimum traffic delays.
To minimize shore erosion and property damage, speed control zones have also
been established. We agree with the objective but have had difficulty complying
to the gnat's eyebrow. The problem is the varying current through the speed
zones resulting from changes in the number of Soo compensating gates in operation,
weather conditions and water level changes. I see improvment ahead for two rea-
sons: First is the furnishing tomasters of current change data by the Coast Guard
here at the Soo as the vessel passes, a procedure instituted this season. Secondly,
the mini Loran-C vessel equipment is expected to provide an accurate speed meas-
uring capability as a dividend to its other benefits.
As to Research and Development in support of its Great Lakes responsibilities,
I feel the Coast Guard has not been sufficiently aggressive, especially in marine
safety. That service does have regulatory responsibility and has to approve
each item of safety equipment used on a merchant vessel. Safety regulations and
equipment required is largely evolutionary and for the most part stems from
casualty experience rather than a systematic approach, technological develop-
ments or development of equipment to meet a specified marine safety objective.
Since Coast Guard approval is required before safety equipment can be used,
there is not much incentive for nongovernment research unless the Coast Guard
is involved or shows interest. Incidentally, the Coast Guard has recently pub-
lished proposed regulations in the Federal Register of June 7, 1976 to facilitate
the development and use of more effective lifesaving safety equipment on Great
Lakes vessels.
The Coast Guard's Research and Development program is of such national
importance that I urge oversight by your committee. I recommend that it be
added to the programs requiring authorization, as well as to having an annual
progress report filed with the committee, or such a report included in scheduled
oversight hearings. This action will permit review as to the adequacy of the annual
program and also long-range objectives.
The Coast Guard investigation into the tragic sinking of the Edmund Fitz-
gerald last November in nearby Lake Superior waters, with the loss of all hands,
has not been completed * * * and Admiral Gracey has commented on it.
Because of the safety implications the shipping industry is very interested in
the results. According to a statement attributed to the Chairman of the Board
of Inquiry appointed to investigate this casualty, something happened to the
Fitzgerald between three and three-thirty in the afternoon of November 10 north
of Caribou Island. At that time the ship started taking on water and taking a
list, and her master reported that, by radio. And subsequently the hull suffered
a rather sudden failure * * *. However, it appears that the master was unaware
that his vessel was in jeopardy until it was too late. * * * Consequently, no
S.O.S. was broadcasted nor was Coast Guard assistance requested. Result:
Loss of the entire crew, 29 valued and experienced men; a fine vessel; and her
cargo of pellets.
Tragedies such as this are most infrequent on the lakes . . . and with the
technology available today in our great country, we should not have any more.
PAGENO="0334"
330
Here are some steps, all within the current state of the art, that are being under-
taken and others that need to be undertaken to accomplish that result. I think
our lake fleet is the safest in the world, and construction and design reflects that
objective, but these additional steps, with Coast Guard or appropriate federal
agency taking the lead with industry cooperation, will be a quantum step forward.
(1) Develop a computerized hull monitoring system with an appropriate
pilothouse readout to interpret hull actions in all wealher situations and to alert
the master that trouble is developing.
(2) Develop an all-weather capsule that will float free in the event the vessel
sinks. Capsule should carry a portable VHF radio or other appropriate electronic
signalling equipment capable of being received by search aircraft and vessels.
It should be of distinctive color; have radar reflecting qualities. At least two would
be carried on each vessel. Such development should not be much of a challenge
to space age technology. It would not be dissimilar to the presently available
Brucker capsule in general use in the Gulf on oil rigs; the cumbersome launching
system would be eliminated.
(3) National Weather Service should expedite planning and development of
a marine weather and ice forecast center for the lakes. Lake shipping has been
making this recommendation to NOAA and the National Weather Service for
a number of years. While the Weather Service personnel on the lakes are ex-
tremely cooperative, the fact remains that there is no marine forecast capability
for the Great Lakes system, and the marine aspect is inadequately funded.
Having full-time marine forecasters here would permit monitoring the progress
of a lake storm full-time by experts and making appropriate marine broadcasts.
Weather reporting equipment is not effectively located. To some extent this
stems from the station automation program of the Coast Guard. At manned
stations Coast Guardsmen were available to record and report selected weather
data. The Weather Service now has to rely on automatic reporting equipment in
isolated areas and often not located for best results.
(4) NOAA should deploy or develop weather buoys for use on the lakes to fill
in these critical gaps in data reporting:
(a) Eastern end of Lake Superior
(b) Lake Michigan to replace the automated Lansing shoals Coast Guard
station
(c) Lake Huron to replace reporting from the former Coast Guard Light-
ship.
I note with interest Congressman Ruppe's comments about weather buoys
and I heartily concur.
I understand that Canada is also interested in weather buoys for reporting
Lake Superior data. Perhaps the weather services of our two countries should
mount a joint program.
(5) Develop a weather manual for deck officer training and use that is oriented
specifically towards Great Lakes weather and wave conditions. Note: This has
been initiated.
(6) Lake vessels should be permitted to carry an effective "utility" boat, such
as a Boston Whaler, for man-overboard rescue and other purposes in lieu of
lifeboats, which are largely obsolescent in my opinion. The availability of rescue
capsules will hasten the phasing out of lifeboats on the lakes.
(7) Loran-C coverage and related charts should be expedited for the lakes.
Reliability and accuracy in position keeping will be in the interest of safety. * * *
(8) United States and Canadian Coast Guard have now completed VHF
radio coverage of the lakes for emergency and distress. Reliable communications
are available.
(9) A replacement ptogram for the obsolescent 110-foot harbor vessel is about
to be commenced by the Coast Guard. The new multi-purpose vessels will be
capable of responding to distress calls in all-weather conditions. I have made
recommendations to this Committee at earlier hearings what the operational
characteristics should be so I won't repeat at this time.
(10) Replacement of the aged 36-foot lifeboat at the nearby Grand Marait
Coast Guard Station with a modern self-righting 44-foot lifeboat will permit
all-weather response from that station. We appreciate Congressman Ruppe's
successful efforts this year for that accomplishment.
(11) The deck officer training provided by our own Great Lakes Maritime
Academy at Traverse City is already and should continue to produce officers for
tomorrow's sailing who will be equal to the challenge and advances in
technology. * * *
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be heard today, Mr. Chairman.
PAGENO="0335"
331
Admiral TRIMBLE. Before looking at the adequacy of the Coast
Guard facilities, please bear with me on the when and why of bulk
shipping. As you have been told I am sure a number of times, water
transportation is the lowest cost mode of transportation, it is the
lowest energy consumer per ton-mile of cargo moved and we feel it
has the least environmental impact.
Why is it important to the Great Lakes and the Nation? We are
talking about domestic lake shipping, hauling of coal; it means wheat,
limestone, petroleum products, sand, and so forth.
Improvement in vessel productivity is helping in keeping shipping
costs down which in turn affect utility costs to the consumer;
what the farmer gets for his grain. And we are talking about the auto
industry, the pipeline industry, the oil rig industry, agricultural
implements that the farmer uses, the heavy construction equipment,
and so forth, so this touches a wide swath through the economy. It
also helps to keep domestic steel production costs competitive with
foreign supplies, and this impacts on employment, our economy, and
the balance of payments.
In 1974, imports of foreign steel exceeded our exports by $3.4
billion. In 1975, the worldwide slump reduced steel demand and the
deficit to less than $3 billion, still a significant figure when we think of
lost business and employment in our own country. This is especially
important to the Great Lakes area, the industrial heartland of the
Nation.
Looking ahead from th~ slump we are emerging from, economists
are forecasting steel expansion requirements of 25 to 30 million tons
by 1980-81, with increased employment from the mines to the mills
of 90,000. Planning toward that goal is well underway with specific
expansions announced by most of the major steel companies.
On the raw material side, to meet that demand, and that is where
lake shipping is directly involved, construction is already underway
to increase domestic taconite pellet production from 55 million tons
annually to 85 million tons by 1980, over a 50-percent increase.
Dockside ore handling facilities are being modernized or replaced at
the head of the lakes to handle the expanded raw material movement.
An ultramodern dockside facility has just been completed at
Superior, Wis., to handle up to 20 million tons annually of Western
coal for Great Lakes utility plants. This is one of the most modern
coal-handling facilities in the world, including the dust handling and
other environmental precautions.
With the bulk cargoes projected over a dozen new vessels are under
construction or contract through 1982, and others are in the design
stage, each with winter navigation capability. Still others are being
lengthened or modernized as yard capacity permits.
Under the congressionally authorized and funded season extension
program during the past 5 years we have successfully demonstrated
that appropriately designed or modified vessels can safely and econom-
ically operate on the lakes from 10 to 12 months, instead of the normal
834 months' season. This substantial improvement in lake shipping
productivity, along with newer, larger, and self-unloading vessels, has
been accomplished with our existing Great Lakes Waterway, and has
involed little additional public investment.
78-280 0-76-22
PAGENO="0336"
332
There is a tabulation showing gradual extension from 1968 up to the
entire winter in 1974-75 and 1975-76 when we operated around the
calendar. In fact, in the last few years we operated up to February.
Forecasted stockpiling savings can only occur if stockpiling is
reduced and land use planned accordingly. Vessels use for the year
must also be planned ahead for optimum productivity. Carefully
coordinated long-range planning in connection with expanded steel
production, the supporting pellet production and loading facilities,
Western coal movement and handling facilities, and shipping is
necessary to achieve those savings.
Huge capital outlays are involved, so the planning is not something
that can be turned off and on each year.
A good example of the situation and problem is the expanded pellet
production in upper Michigan that has been going on during the past
few years, with a further substantial increase just announced this
past month that will create an additional 1,000 jobs in this depressed
area. The capacity of the rail systems to Escanaba and Marquette
are limited, as well as the dock-loading facilities, so the only way,
without building new facilities at added capital costs and construction
time, to move this added capacity is by operating during the winter.
This certainly makes sense as a flexible step that should be taken before
going to the expense of new construction. It should be noted that it
has even been necessary to operate ships into the winter the last 2
years to move needed pellets. Tha situation is expected to continue
this coming winter.
The expanded bulk shipping underway and other changes described
have a significant effect on the Coast Guard in the Soo area, especially
the following programs: Aids to navigation; vessel assistance, both
search and rescue, and icebreaking; vessel traffic control; and R. & D.
in support of Coast Guard responsibilities, especially marine safety.
Admiral Gracey has discussed what is being done in the aids to
navigation field and I respectfully concur.
On LORAN-C, I admire Admiral Gracey for pursuing this solution
for a matter that has been bothering us. I'm optimistic about its use.
The picture is not nearly so rosy when it comes to the Coast Guard's
general purpose vessel fleet available for Great Lakes service. None of
these vessels were designed specifically for fourth seacoast duties.
In fact, no vessel has been built for Great Lakes service since the
World War II era.
The duties, the operating environment and the available technology
have changed considerably since then. As might be expected, the Coast
Guard vessel fleet has grown exceedingly tired in the intervening
years and is increasingly difficult to provide parts-support for, and
assure the traditional Coast Guard reliability.
I refer primarily to the five harbor vessels, such as the Naugatiick
here at the Soo, the wintertime work horses of the fleet. These vessels
are not only assigned for the rescue and law enforcement, but also for
icebreaking. If replacements were so designed, they could also tend
aids to navigation. Today these vessels are of marginal value for
rescue services in severe weather.
With respect to vessel traffic control in the Soo area, the Coast
Guard has been exercising its authority since the turn of the century.
PAGENO="0337"
333
We in industry feel that the program has been successful in the interest
of safety and minimum* traffic delays. To minimize shore erosion and
property damage, speed control zones have also been established.
We agree with the objective but have had difficulty complying to the
gnat's eyebrow. The problem is the varying current through the
speed zones resulting from changes in the number of Soo compensating
gates in operation, weather conditions, and water level changes. I
see improvement ahead for two reasons: Fisrt is the furnishing to
masters of current change data by the Coast Guard here at the Soo
as the vessel passes, a procedure instituted this season. Second, the
mini loran-C vessel equipment is expected to provide an accurate
speed-measuring capability as a dividend to its other benetfis.
As to R. & D. in support of its Great Lakes responsibilities, I feel
the Coast Guard has not been sufficiently aggressive, especially in
marine safety. That service does have regulatory responsibility and
has to approve each item of safety equipment required on a merchant
vessel. Safety regulations and equipment required is largely
evolutionary and for the most part stems from casualty experience
rather than a systematic approach, technological developments or
development of equipment to meet a specified marine safety objective.
Since Coast Guard approval is required before safety equipment
can be used, there is not much incentive for non-Government re-
search unless the Coast Guard is involved or shows interest. Inciden-
tally, the Coast Guard has recently published proposed regulations
in the Federal Register of June 7, 1976, to facilitate the development
and use of more effective lifesaving safety equipment on Great Lakes
vessels. The Coast Guard's R. & D. program is of such national im-
portance that I urge oversight by your committee. I recommend that
it be added to the program requiring authorization, as well as to having
an annual progress report filed with the committee, or such a report
included in scheduled oversight hearings. This action will permit
review as to the adequacy of the annual program and also long-range
objectives.
The Coast Guard investigation into the tragic sinking of the Ed-
mui~d Fitzgerald last November in nearby Lake Superior waters, with
the loss of all hands, has not been completed, and Admiral Gracey
has commented on it.
Because of the safety implications the shipping industry is very
interested in the results. According to a statement attributed to the
chairman of the Board of Inquiry appointed to investigate this
casualty, something happened to the Fitzgerald between 3 p.m. and
3:30 p.m. of November 10, north of Caribou Island. At that time the
ship started taking on water and taking a list, and her master reported
that, by radio. And subsequently the hull suffered a rather sudden
failure. Now this was a statement that the chairman of the inquiry
made and it was quoted in the Michigan papers.
However, it appears that the master was unaware that his vessel
was in jeopardy until it was too late. So it wouldn't have made too
much difference what sort of external facilities are available if the ves-
sel itself does not know it is in trouble.
Consequently, no SOS was broadcast nor was Cost Guard assistance
requested. Result: Loss of the entire crew, 29 valued and experienced
men, a fine vessel, and her cargo of pellets.
PAGENO="0338"
334
Tragedies such as this are most infrequent on the Lakes, and with
the technology available today in our great country, we should not
have any more. Here are some steps, all within the current state of
the art, that are being undertaken and others that need to be under-
taken to accomplish that result.
I think our lake fleet is the safest in the world, and construction
and design reflects that objective, but these additional steps, with
Coast Guard or appropriate Federal agency taking the lead with
industry cooperation, will be a quantum step forward.
(1) Develop a computerized hull monitoring system with an ap-
propriate pilothouse readout to interpret hull actions in all weather
situations and to alert the master that trouble is developing.
(2) Develop an all-weather capsule that will float free in the event
the vessel sinks. Capsule should carry a portable VHF radio or other
appropriate electronic signaling equipment capable of being received
by search aircraft and vessels. It should be of distinctive color and have
radar reflecting qualities. At least two would be carried on each vessel.
Such developm~ent should not be much of a challenge to space-age
technology. It would not be dissimilar to the presently available
Brucker capsule in general use in the gulf on oil rigs; the cumbersome
launching system would be eliminated.
(3) National Weather Service should expedite planning and develop-
ment of a marine weather and ice forecast center for the lakes. Lake
shipping has been making this recommendation to NOAA and the
National Weather Service for a number of years. While the Weather
Service personnel on the lakes are extremely cooperative, the fact
remains that there is no marine forecast capability for the Great Lakes
system, and the marine aspect is inadequately funded. Having full-
time marine forecasters here would permit monitoring the progress of
a lake storm full time by experts and making appropriate marine
broadcasts.
Weather reporting equipment is not effectively located. To some
extent this stems from the station automation program of the Coast
Guard. At manned stations Coast Guardsmen were available to record
and report selected weather data. The Weather Service now has to
rely on automatic reporting equipment in isolated areas and often
not located for best results.
(4) NOAA should deploy or develop weather buoys for use on the
lakes to fill in these critical gaps in data repoting:
(a) Eastern end of Lake Superior.
(b) Lake Michigan to replace the automated Lansing Shoals Coast
Guard Station.
(c) Lake Huron to replace reporting from the former Coast Guard
lightship. I note with interest Congressman Ruppe's comments about
weather buoys and I heartily concur.
I understand that Canada is also interested in weather buoys for
reporting Lake Superior data. Perhaps the weather services of our
two countries should mount a joint program. .
(5) Develop a weather manual for deck officer training and use
that is oriented specifically toward Great Lakes weather and wave
conditions. Note: This has been initiated. . .
(6) Lake vessels should be permitted to carry an effective utility
boat, such as a Boston whaler, for man-overboard rescue and other
PAGENO="0339"
335
purposes in lieu of lifeboats, which are largely obsolescent in my
opinion. The availability of rescue capsules will hasten the phasing
out of lifeboats on the Lakes.
(7) LORAN-C coverage and related charts should be expedited for
the lakes. Reliability and accuracy in position keeping will be in the
interest of safety.
If the charts are available, we can start using LORAN-C equip-
ment before 1980 when the last station is completed. There is fair
coverage even at present so expediting availability of charts will be
helpful.
(8) United States and Canadian Coast Guard have now completed
VHF radio coverage of the lakes for emergency and distress. Reliable
communications are available.
(9) A replacement program for the obsolescent 110-foot harbor
vessels is about to be commenced by the Coast Guard. The new
multipurpose vessels will be capable of responding to distress calls
in all weather conditions. I have made recommendations to this
committee at earlier hearings what the operational characteristics
should be so I won't repeat at this time.
(10) Replacement of the aged 36-foot lifeboat at the nearby Grand
Marais Coast Guard Station with a modern self-righting 44-foot
lifeboat will permit all-weather response from that station. We
appreciate Congressman Ruppe's successful efforts this year for
that accomplishment.
(11) The deck officer training provided by our own Great Lakes
Maritime Academy at Traverse City is all ready and should continue
to produce officers for tomorrow's sailing who will be equal to the
challenge and advances in technology.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be heard today,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We appreciate your testimony and we invite you to stay for the
rest of the hearing and be available for questions at the conclusion.
The next witness is Mr. Charles Edwards, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity. We offer you the same advantage, Mr. Edwards, of inserting
your full statement in the record and then quoting from it if you
would like to utilize shorter time.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES EDWARDS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
LAUREL, MD.
Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
The St. Marys River forms part of the United States and Canadian
border and links Lake Superior and Lake Huron. Throughout much
of the 65 miles of the river, large vessels-up to 1,000 feet in length
and 105 feet in beam-are confined to dredged channels no more than
300 feet in width. To facilitate the large volume of traffic, the Coast
Guard maintains an extensive array of buoys, day beacons and visual
ranges, as well as a radio vessel reporting system. However, during
the winter months, additional aids to navigation are needed to
compensate for (1) frequent poor visibility, (2) buoys removed or
pushed under the ice, and (3) confusing radar returns because of ice
ridges. Prior to the installation of the LORAN-C mini-chain, other
PAGENO="0340"
336
techniques, such as a laser reflector system and a high resolution radar
system, were tried.
The St. Marys River mini-chain is functionally identical to a
conventional LORAN-C chain except that it has shorter baselines-
that is, the transmitters are closer together-and uses lower power
transmitters. Four transmitters are used, two in Michigan and two in
Canada. Using short baselines assures good time difference geometry
and signal strength within the coverage area. The design goal stated
by the Coast Guard wa~s to determine a boat's cross track position-
that is, left or right of channel-with an accuracy of plus or minus 25
feet for 95 percent of the time. Beyond the design coverage area, the
accuracy degrades rapidly because of poor geometry. Thus, the mini-
chain should be used only in the immediate vicinity of the St. Marys
River.
COGLAD NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT
In 1967 the Applied Physics Laboratory developed a LORAN
Assist Device (LAD) for a classified military operation requiring
precision aircraft guidance. Since that time, APL has developed a
number- of newer and more sophisticated versions of the original
LAD. In 1970 the Coast Guard funded APL to develop a civilian
version of LAD which became known as CO GLAD (Coast Guard
Loran Assist Device). Two CO GLAD systems were eventually built
for the Coast Guard and have been used experimentally for positioning
buoys in Lake Huron, ice patrol in the North Atlantic and oceano-
graphic research in the Gulf Stream. CO GLAD was patented by APL
in 1974 and the patent signed over to the Government to insure that
the technology would remain available to all. One of these CO GLAD
systems now forms the nucleus of the equipment currently being used
for test purposes aboard Coast Guard vessels in the St. Marys River.
Utilizing LORAN-C for precision guidance is basically a two-step
process, data measurement and data transformation. Three or more
LORAN transmitters and a suitable receiver provide the raw data for
determining a position fix. Navigation with the raw data is awkward
because the lines of position are hyperbolic curves and the units are
microseconds of time difference of arrival. Manually reducing this
data to a position fix-when LORAN charts are available-negates
much of the true potential of LORAN-C, especially in speed and
accuracy. The second step consists of using some form of processor to
mathematically transform the raw data into a form usable for navi-
gation and piloting.
In the art of piloting, the typo of position information most mean-
ingful is position relative to a known point, an intermediate way point,
or a final destination. The entire St. Marys River from Whitefish Bay
to Do Tour Passage can be described as a series of 25 to 28 straight
line segments where each segment is the center line of its respective
channel. Where the center line of two adjacent channels intersect has
been defined as an intermediate way point. Each of these way points
for the entire river has been numbered and the LORAN coordinates
surveyed. By storing these LORAN coordinates in the extended mem-
ory of the CO GLAD system, continuous navigation guidance can be
provided throughout the entire St. Marys River relative to known
points.
A special display unit mounted on the bridge provides Along Track
Distance to the way point in statute miles, Cross Track Distance rela-
PAGENO="0341"
337
tive to the center line of the channel in feet, Along Track Speed in
miles per hour, Cross Track Speed in feet per second, bearing angle to
the next way point, time to the next way point in minutes, as well as
the number of the way point. For evaluation purposes, an X-Y plotter
and a digital printer are also part of the system. Figure 1 is a picture
of the CO GLAD navigation system and figure 2 is a system block
diagram.
While the Coast Guard normally refers to CO GLAD as User I
equipment, it was designed as a research tool and not intended to be a
prototype for commercial production.
[The figures mentioned follow:]
FIGURE 1.-COGLAD NAVIGATION SYSTEM
PAGENO="0342"
338
It is APL's opinion that the analysis of the test data indicates, with
an 80 to 90 percent confidence, that the mini-chain concept is a viable
approach for piloting boats in confined waters. To improve the confi-
dence level, more long-term stability data is needed. It must be es-
tablished that the required accuracy can be maintained throughout all
seasons and all forms of precipitation. Distortions in the LORAN grid
have been observed in some parts of the river. These distortions must
be compensated for in the data processing.
Beyond this, additional effort will be required, both on the trans-
mitting equipment and the user equipment, to make the St. Marys
River mini-chain an operational navigational system.
It was found that the most precise LORAN measurements of the
way points could be performed in the winter when the river was com-
pletely frozen over. When the boat was stopped in the ice, neither
current nor wind would move the boat off station while LORAN
coordinates were being measured.
Prior to the start of field testing, it was anticipated that the large
ore carriers would produce local distortions in the LORAN grid, and
degrade the accuracy during a passing situation. Numerous tests have
been conducted and to date, no such distortion has been observed.
Distortions observed while passing through the Soo locks were also
much less than expected. Only when passing under the International
Bridge were the signals observed to be significantly distorted.
FIGURE 2.-COGLAD NAVIGATION SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
FIELD TEST CONCLUSIONS
PAGENO="0343"
33~
Figure 3 is a comparison of CO GLAD (User I) position data versus
autotape. Autotape is a line-of-sight radio ranging device which was
used as a reference. This track plot was made with the CGC Naugatuck
downbound just south of Six Mile Point and steering on a visual range.
The difference in cross track distance measured by the two systems is
typically less than 15 feet. Again, I must stress that the LORAN mini-
chain must be tested in all seasons and all types of weather. A final
report will soon be released to the Coast Guard covering all of APL's
participation in this program.
The CGC Naugatucic has been assigned to the mini-chain program
throughout most of the field testing. The exclusive availability of
this boat has been a distinct asset to the program, and the cooperation
from the crew has been outstanding.
Before commerical boats can begin using the St. Marys River
LORAN mini-chain, assuming the all-weather accuracy requirements
are met, the transmitters must be upgraded to operational status and
commercial user equipment made available. Upgrading the trans-
mitters would consist mainly of adding redundant equipment and
emergency generators at the transmitter sites. The Coast Guard has
funded private industry for the development of User II equipment,
which may prove to be the prototype of the first commercial user
equipment. Testing of this system on the St. Marys River is expected
to begin soon.
[The figure mentioned follows :}
ALONG TRACK DISTANCE TO GO EMILLS)
o ~AIJ1OTRPE DATA
~USER I DATA
LA 42.5
L DATE 4/~7/76
TIME PM
DIR. DCLhJEGUND
+
+
+
150
h~e!i~
iog
+
+
+
+ +
0
Li
Li
U-
Li
Li
z
b
U
0
U
+
-SO
+ + +
1.50 .1.25 1.00
+ + +
.75 .50 .25
c~. oD
FIGURE 3.-Track Plot of COGLAD and Autotape Position Data
PAGENO="0344"
340
FUTURE APPLICATIONS
APL feels that the technology was ready for the development of the
mini-chain navigation system. The main challenge has been to assem-
ble the right combination of components and fine tune them into a
precision navigation system. We feel that the technology is also avail-
able for more sophisticated applications, such as vessel reporting and
traffic control, search and rescue, and port-to-port navigation.
Assume, for example, that all commercial vessels on the St. Marys
River are equipped with mini-chain navigation systems. Each vessel's
position could be reported to Soo traffic control in LORAN co-
ordinates. Upon receiving an interrogate code from Soo control, the
shipboard navigation system would transmit its LORAN coordinates
on a time-shared marine UHF channel. A computer at Soo control
would then display a composite picture of the river and vessel locations
on a television screen. An operator could expand any portion of the
picture for greater detail.
As an added refinement, the composite picture could be transmitted
on a UHF-TV channel. Each vessel could view the entire river or any
portion of it. Another possible refinement would be to interface the
boat's radar to the LORAN navigation system.
Search and rescue would be greatly enhanced by shipboard LORAN
navigation equipment. A boat in distress could automatically or
manually transmit its LORAN coordinates. Other boats would enter
these cooidinates as a destination and be guided directly to the boat
in distress. If the LORAN coordinates are not known and an area is to
be searched, a series of way points can be entered to guide the search
boat in a precise search pattern unaffected by set and drift. Additional
Coast Guard applications for LORAN navigation systems include
patrolling oil slicks, offshore dumping, and the new 200-mile fishing
limit.
U~e of LORAN navigation systems need not be confined to the St.
Marys River. The expanded east coast LORAN chain will provide
coverage throughout all of the Great Lakes, the east coast and the
gulf coast. Expanding the memory of the shipboard equipment would
allow continuous navigation information from port to port. Accuracy
would be less than the mini-chain but ± 100 feet or better seems
reasonable.
Other rivers and harbors with critical navigation requirements
could be equipped with LORAN mini-chains and benefit from the
development work here on the St. Marys River. The St. Marys River
is uniquely qualified as a test area for developing future vessel con-
trol systems. It has the only Coast Guard mini-chain in operation.
The river is larger than most harbors and has a full range of weather
conditions including liberal amounts of ice, snow and fog. There is
a large volume of big boats with severe channel requirements. De-
veloping user equipment is greatly facilitated by the regular flow
of boats through the river. Unlike ocean-going vessels that visit a
given harbor infrequently, most of the commercial boats pass through
the St. Marys River every 3 or 4 days.
Potential aircraft applications for LORAN-C navigation systems
are very similar to the shipboard applications. Even with allowance
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341
for the greater speed and mobility of aircraft, most of the shipboard
technology is directly applicable. Experimental navigation systems
have been successfully flown by APL on Coast Guard aircraft as
early as 1970, and aboard Navy aircraft still earlier. Use of LORAN-C
for air traffic control has also been studied by APL.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on results to-date, APL would like to make the following
recommendations: (1) Work should continue toward developing the
St. Marys River LORAN-C mini-chain into an operational system;
(2) Program management and expenditures should be directed
towards a more expedient development of this system; (3) Additional
personnel for field test support are needed. Technically qualified
Coast Guard personnel available for shipboard evaluation are spread
too thin with other job assignments; (4) To encourage and accom-
modate commercial development of navigation systems for the St.
Marys River, a data package should be prepared containing: results
of the St. Marys River tests, suggested systems configurations, and
any expected Government performance requirements. Documentation
on hardware, software, and transformation algorithms for systems
previously developed by APL and others should be referenced in this
data package; (5) A study should be conducted to determine the
projected requirements for navigation systems on the St. Marys
River and to plan an orderly evolution of the necessary equipment.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, sir, and we invite you
to remain for the rest of the hearing and be available for questions.
Dr. Herman Mark, NASA, Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF Bit. HERMAN MARK, NASA, LEWIS RESEARCH
CENTER, CLEVELAND, OHIO
Dr. MARK. Good morning.
I am Herman Mark, Chief of the Aerospace Applications Branch
of the NASA Lewis Research Center located in Cleveland, Ohio.
The duties of my position include the development of advanced
technology that can be applied to civilian needs especially if the
capability can be deployed with the use of satellites in a cost/beneficial
way. This effort is part of the ongoing program in the NASA Office
of Applications which has already successfully demonstrated many
such applications with its series of developments of weather satellites,
communications satellites, earth resources survey satellites, and
other similar space developments.
The purpose of my appearance is to discuss existing capabilities
for all-weather observations of the Lakes by means of side-looking
airborne radar, and recent applications of these capabilities by the
Coast Guard as an aid to vessel traffic. This capability was deployed
during the multifederal agency effort to determine the feasibility of
extending the shipping season on the Great Lakes to include the four
extending the shipping season on the Great Lakes to include the 4
winter months. I will also describe a cooperative Coast Guard/
NASA/NOAA/Navy effort to deploy the same equipment to aid
PAGENO="0346"
342
Arctic shipping along the west and north coasts of Alaska during the
period when military and civilian shipping attempts are made to
resupply critical locations in that icebound part of our country. Perhaps
the most relevant effort I will discuss is the cooperative Coast Guard!
NASA effort which has been under way for the last 2 years to de-
termine the utility of this equipment for detecting icebergs and ships
in the North Atlantic during the international ice patrol.
For the past 3 years as part of the Federal program called for by
the Congress, including Public Law 91-6 11, to extent the Great Lakes
shipping season, the Coast Guard, NASA, and NOAA have been
working cooperatively to provide timely aliweather images and
interpretive charts of the ice cover in all areas where such information
is critical to shipping. The plan for providing this ice information is
as follows: When the Coast Guard Ice Navigation Center, located
at the 9th District Headquarters in the Federal Office Building in
downtown Cleveland, determines there is a need for ice information on
the Lakes, the Officer in Charge of the Center signals the Commander
of a Coast Guard HC-130B stationed in the area and the aircraft
sets out directly to fly over these critical areas at an altitude of about
41,000 feet. From this altitude when passing over the areas of interest,
the SLAR equipment on board can make an image of the Earth below
right through cloud cover since clouds are transparent in this
wavelength.
The swath width of the image collected aboard the aircraft is 100
kilometers (approximately 62 miles). This image is digitized and
scanned at a convenient rate for transmission (6,250 bits per second)
from the aircraft via a UHF radio link to the NOAA/GOES-1 satel-
lite in orbit at Easth synchronous altitude 22,000 miles above the
Equator. From the GOES-i the signal is relayed to NOAA's com-
mand and date acquisition station at Wallops Island, Va., thence
via an ordinary telephone line back to the Ice Navigation Center.
Thus as the aircraft flies the area of interest, an image approxi-
mately 62 miles wide appears in real time in the Ice Navigation
Center for the length of duration of the aircraft flight line. `When a
satisfactory area of 100- to 200-miles long was been collected, per-
sonnel in the. Ice Navigation Center who are experienced in ice inter-
pretation make an annotated chart at the same scale as the received
image. Ice thickness measurements are also made remotely by a
sounding radar as well as by drilling measurements added when
available to the chart. This image/chart ice information product
is then transmitted via a MARAD-sponsored VHF-FM radio system
with transmitters at various locations around the lakes, directly to
the vessel wheelhouse where they. are received on telefax equipment
installed for that purpose by winter shippers. This system has been
in operation during the last two winters and has provided over 300
such ice information products to vessels shipping during the winter.
As a demonstration the program has been quite successful and has
been a definite assistance to shipping which continued for the first
time for 24 consecutive months (1974-1976).
The agencies involved have been sufficiently encouraged to plan a
deployment of this very system to aid shipping in the Alaskan Arctic
this summer. Since the shipping which resupplies Arctic military sites
PAGENO="0347"
343
and the shipping which supplies the North Slope civilian efforts to
bring oil from this extremely hard-to-reach location is essentially
coastal, the format required for ice information by those vessels is
similar to that for the open Great Lakes winter shipping. The Arctic
demonstration is to begin next month in the middle of August.
For over 50 years the International Ice Patrol has been collecting
information on the icebergs that may drift down from the higher
latitudes into the North Atlantic shipping lanes and cause a hazard
to vessels operating in that area. For the last 2 years NASA has been
cooperating with the International Ice Patrol in evaluation of methods
involving this same SLAB for improving the efficiency of the patrol.
Since the North Atlantic in the Grand Banks area is very often
covered by fog and by a low overcast for most of the rest of the time,
covering the area employing human observers involves a great deal
of low-altitude flying and is often too dangerous or even impossible
to accomplish. The very same SLAR equipment described above, to
which fog and clouds are transparent, is being used to evaluate the
advantage of such a system to perform the surveillance required by
the International Ice Patrol. In this evaluation the following results
have been determined:
(1) SLAB greatly increased the effectiveness of the patrol.
(2) There were no misses. All bergs seen by the chase plane had
been detected by the SLAB.
(3) Small bergs are consistently detected.
(4) Large bergs are detected in sea ice.
(5) All vessels in the area were also detected.
Although all targets are detected by this system, one cannot yet
reliably distinguish between icebergs and ships and this problem is
continuing to receive attention.
From my own personal experience in working with the Coast
Guard in cooperative interagency efforts, such as those I have de-
scribed above, I have found the Coast Guard to be cautiously deter-
mined to develop and to assist in the development of the capabilities
it requires in performing its mission.
I believe the Coast Guard is going down the right path in providing
themselves with the advantages of the technological advances that
have been made in recent years. If a role or requirement develops for
very large area surveillance responsibility, or for the application of
SLAB to vessel traffic assistance or for search and rescue, it seems to
me the Coast Guard will be in a position to deploy the appropriate
system toward this need. It is my personal hope that in the not-too-
distant future when appropriate systems are shown to be effective
and cost beneficial from satellites, the Coast Guard and the Depart-
ment of Transportation will be able to deploy a system of Coast
Guard satellites.
I would like to add that in my experiences with the Coast Guard,
I have found the 9th District, the Elizabeth City Air Station, the
Office of Ocean Operations, and the International Ice Patrol are
especially interested in modernizing, upgrading, and improving the
cost effectiveness of the methods by which they perform their func-
tions. I would like to recognize, with pleasure, the assistance the
programs I described above have received from the Commander of
the 9th Coast Guard District, Bear Adm. J. S. Gracey; from the
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344
Chief of Ocean Operations, Capt. Richard J. Knapp; from Comdr.
A. D. Super of the International Ice Patrol, and from Lt. Comdr.
Leon Thomas, Elizabeth City Air Station.
Thank you very much.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Doctor, and we invite
you to remain for the rest of the hearings and be available.
I understand the next two witnesses, Mr. Reed and Mr. Hutton,
would prefer to appear at the end of the other witnesses and that
Mr. E. L. Slaughter from the ILA has some scheduling problems
and would like to appear now and that you would be accompanied by
Captain Rico, is that correct?
Mr. SLAUGHTER. Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OP E. L. SLAUGHTER, INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESI-
DENT, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AC-
COMPANIED BY CAPT. A. P. RICO, PRESIDENT, UPPER GREAT
LAKES PILOTS, INC.; JAMES L. CHESTNUT, CHESTNUT, BROOKS &
BURKARD, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.; AND CAPT. R. W. O'BRIEN,
CHAIRMAN
Mr. CHESTNUT. Mr. Chairman, I am Jack L. Chestnut, counsel for
Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc.
We have coordinated the positions of several interested parties
in the statement of Mr. Slaughter. Mr. Slaughter is immediately on
my left. To his left is Capt. A. F. Rico who is president of Upper Great
Lakes Pilots and to my right is Capt. R. W. O'Brien, who is chairman.
In addition, a number of employees are here in the audience as well as
other interested parties involved in the maritime industry in Duluth
and Lake Superior.
Mr. Slaughter has a short statement from which he will read
excerpts and very general comments. At this time I offer the statement
of E. L. Slaughter for the record.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Without objection, the full statement will appear
in the record and then we will be very happy to hear from you at this
time, Mr. Slaughter.
[The statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF E. L. SLAUGHTER ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION
I am E. L. Slaughter, appearing on behalf of the International Longshoremen's
Association of which I am Internationa.l Vice President. I reside in Duluth,
Minn. Also in attendance with me at this hearing is Captain A. F. Rico, President
of Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc., who also subscribes to the positions set forth
in this statement.
There are a number of matters that are of major concern to the organizations
we represent, with respect to navigation and the handling of maritime commerce
in the Great Lakes, particularly during winter seasons. The U.S. Coast Guard,
the Corps of Engineers, industry and labor must all be prepared to improve our
current operating system if we are to insure safety.
It has come to our attention that in recent years the Coast Guard has main-
tained a practice of removing navigational aids in November. Oftentimes this is
45 to 50 days before the closing of the navigational season for those vessels en-
gaged in foreign commerce and many days before the closing of the system for
those ships in interstate commerce. There have also been delays of as high as
30 days or more in properly installing navigational aids at the beginning of the
PAGENO="0349"
345
season. These aids are absolutely essential for operating the system in a safe and
efficient manner. The Coast Guard must find methods by which to maintain these
navigational aids during the entire season, regardless of the winter weather condi-
tions. They are more important during these periods of potentially hazardous
weather conditions than in periods of "blue bird" weather during the middle of
the season.
Private industry has engaged in the hazardous practice of handling its lines by
use of ship's crew. This is a dangerous and inefficient procedure during good
weather. Private industry utilizing the Great Lakes navigational systems during
winter navigation conditions must be required to use adequate shoreside personnel
to handle the vessel's lines and to insure that docks, piers, and all maritime facili-
ties are maintained in such a maner as to protect the ship's crew and dockside
personnel. Line handling by ship's crew should not be permitted during the winter
navigational season. It is dangerous to the life and limb of those involved.
In respect to those vessels engaged in foreign commerce which may be using
the Great Lakes system during periods of winter navigation, the entire system
should be "designated" within the meaning of the Pilotage Act of 1960.
In the area known as District No. 3, where necessary three pilots should be
required to be on each ship in all areas. It is essential to have three pilots due to
the inability to service these vessels with pilot boats during winter navigation
conditions. It is imperative that a watch-standing pilot be on the bridge 24 hours
a day to preserve the safety of these ships and the system. Designation of the
entire system should commence on December 15 and end on April 15 of the fol-
lowing year.
Present search and rescue equipment maintained by the Coast Guard on the
Great Lakes and in the Soo region is antiquated. New and substantially larger
Coast Guard cutters are essential, not only to normal operations on the Great
Lakes but would become critical to any attempts for an extended winter navigation
season. In addition, communication service should be such that it would facilitate
immediate search and rescue by helicopter. Facilities should he established at
sufficient locations throughout the Great Lakes area to provide for 15 to 20
minute contact in the event of a disaster endangering human life. Additional
attention should be paid to the area of lifesaving equipment and proper training of
Coast Guard personnel to insure their paramedical ability to meet emergencies
that will occur.
It is essential that both the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers be prepared
to maintain all systems throughout the entire Great Lakes navigational area on a
24-hour basis. Currently we believe that a number of these operations are sub-
stantially reduced in the winter season. They cannot be reduced. They must be
increased as the weather hazards increase.
Obviously the Coast Guard must have sufficient year round equipment and
personnel available to maintain regular channels year round. However, we do not
believe that these channels extend to the private slips or dock facilities maintained
by industry. The ice free conditions of these facilities should be maintained to a
safe standard established by the Coast Guard but at the expense and maintenance
of industry.
We are concerned, obviously, with the economics of an extended winter naviga-
tion season and the possibility of new jobs that might he created. We are not in a
position to comment at this time about the costs which must be borne by the
Government in respect to maintaining the system during an extended winter
period. We do understand that these costs will be explored at later hearings. There
is one cost which we are discussing. The system cannot, should not, and will not
be maintained at the cost of human life and limb, of ships' crews or shoreside
personnel. That expense is too great.
Mr. OBERSTAR. If I may just extend a word of welcome to Mr.
Slaughter and Captain Rico who are constitutents of mine. And Jack
Chestnut is an old freind of all the pilots I know. It is a pleasure to
have you, Buster, on the opposite side of the table, although we have
always been on the same side of the issues that affect the people of
our area.
Mr. SLAUGHTER. Thanks, Jim.
Gentlemen, I am E. L. Slaughter, appearing on behalf of the
International Longshoremen's Association of which I am international
vice president. I reside in Duluth, Minn.
PAGENO="0350"
346
There are a number of matters that are of major concern to the
organizations we represent, with respect to navigation and the han-
dling of maritime commerce in the Great Lakes, particularly during
winter seasons. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Corps of Engineers,
industry and labor must all be prepared to improve our current
operating system if we are to insure safety.
It has come to our attention that in recent years the Coast Guard
has maintained a practice of removing navigational aids in November.
Oftentimes this is 45 to 50 days before the closing of the navigational
season for those vessels engaged in foreign commerce and many days
before the closing of the system for those ships in interstate commerce.
There have also been delays of as high as 30 days or more in properly
installing navigational aids at the beginning of the season. These
aids are absolutely essential for operating the system in a safe and
efficient manner. The Coast Guard must find methods by which to
maintain these navigational aids during the entire season, regardless
of the winter weather conditions. They are more important during
these periods of potentially hazardous weather conditions than in
periods of "blue bird" weather during the middle of the season.
Private industry has engaged in the hazardous practice of handling
its lines by use of ship's crew. This is a dangerous and inefficient
procedure during good weather. Private industry utilizing the Great
Lakes navigational systems during winter navigation conditions must
be required to use adequate shoreside personnel to handle the vessel's
*lines and to insure that docks, piers, and all maritime facilities are
maintained in such a manner as to protect the ship's crew and dockside
personnel. Line handling by ship's crew should not be permitted during
the winter navigational season. It is dangerous to the life and
limb of those involved.
In respect to those vessels engaged in foreign commerce which may
be using the Great Lakes system during periods of winter navigation,
the entire system should be "designated" within the meaning of
Pilotage Act of 1960.
In the area known as district No. 3, where necessary three pilots
should be required to be on each ship in all areas. It is essential to
have three pilots due to the inability to service these vessels with pilot
boats during winter navigation conditions. It is imperative that a
watch-standing pilot be on the bridge 24 hours a day to preserve the
safety of these ships and the system. Designation of the entire system
should commence on December 15 and end on April 15 of the follow-
ing year.
Present search and rescue equipment maintained by the Coast
Guard on the Great Lakes and in the Soo region is antiquated. New
and substantially larger Coast Guard cutters are essential, not only
to normal operations on the Great Lakes but would become critical
to any attempts for an extended winter navigation season.
In addition, communication service should be such that it would
facilitate immediate search and rescue by helicopter. Facilities should
be established at sufficient locations throughout the Great Lakes
area to provide for 15- to 20-minute contact in the event of a disaster
endangering human life. Additional attention should be paid to the
area of lifesaving equipment and proper training of CoastS Guard
personnel to insure their paramedical ability to meet emergencies that
will occur.
PAGENO="0351"
347
It is essential that both the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers
be prepared to maintain all systems throughout the entire Great
Lakes navigational area on a 24-hour basis. Currently we believe that
a number of these operations are substantially reduced in the winter
seaon. They cannot be reduced. They must be increased as the weather
hazards increase.
Obviously the Coast Guard must have sufficient year-round equip-
ment and personnel available to maintain regular channels year
round. However, we do not believe that these channels extend to the
private slips or dock facilities maintained to a safe standard estab-
lished by the Coast Guard but at the expense and maintenance of
industry.
We are concerned, obviously, with the economics of an extended
winter navigation season and the possibility of new jobs that might
be created.
We are not in a position to comment at this time about the costs
which must be borne by the Government in respect to maintaining
the system during an extended winter period. We do understand that
these costs will be explored at later hearings. There is one cost which
we are discussing. The system cannot, should not, and will not be
maintained at the cost of human life and limb, of ships' crews or
shoreside personnel. That expense is too great.
Thank you.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Slaughter.
Mr. SLAUGHTER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add
a couple of comments that I think might be interesting.
I have been asked about year-round navigation. Actually, I look at
safety aspects of the additional jobs. And I want to point out that we
just have opened up a brand new facility at the head of the lakes.
It is located over in Superior and it is known as Oretron. It is a new
highly automated million dollar facility. When it is in full operation,
the trains will shuttle from the west with 100-car trains carrying
100 tons per car, and that will be an around-the-clock operation. They
claim, they think that this year, and it is not in full operation yet,
that they are going to have between 8 and 9 million or 15 million tons
of coal. Of that coal, 90 percent is going to be used by Detroit Edison.
We are shipping coal out of there now. There are surveys being
made where there are other industries that are interested and they
claim there will be at least two or three more of these facilities built
and a lot depends upon the coal being shipped the year round, and
year-round navigation.
One point I wanted to bring out, they also ask how can you load
ships during the winter time? Well, there is nothing difficult doing
that. We have loaded grain. We have unloaded grain. We have devised
a system where we used to have to cut the ice with saws, 25 to 30
inches of blue ice. In our own way we devised a way where we can cut
a ship out in a matter of hours, so these things can be done, and, of
course, keeping the safety in mind all the time. I just wanted to bring
this part out, that one little area up there alone could mean jobs, it
could mean several hundred jobs alone just loading and handling coal
from dock to ship, and I think that this is a forerunner and maybe
we won't be around, some of us, to realize it, but I think they are
going to pop up like topsy all over because they found something
out there that they never had before.
78-280-76----23
PAGENO="0352"
348
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you.
Mr. CHESTNUT. If we could beg the committee's indulgence, we
have meetings that the pilots are conducting so we will not be able
to stay for the remainder of the hearing.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. I will ask my colleagues if there are any questions;
if not, we might excuse you because of your other commitments.
Mr. CHESTNUT. Thank you.
Mr. RIJPPE. Just one question. Mr. Slaughter, you bring up that
you desire as a part of any winter navigation program to have a Coast
Guard capability of getting on scene in 15 or 20 minutes. I think that
is important and it behooves all of us to follow up to determine once
contact is made, if it is by fixed-wing aircraft, how rapidly a subse-
quent followup by helicopter can be accomplished, whether that
helicopter is in a position to drop lifesaving equipment or to actually
undertake the rescue mission itself, how quickly a surface vessel can
get on station and what is the likelihood of survival of any individuals
in the open water prior to the arrival on scene of a Coast Guard vessel.
I think there are a number of questions to .be answered, both in terms
of how quickly can the Coast Guard get to the scene and what then
can be the followup to any contact that might be developed within
the very short time frame that you suggested here this morning.
As an example, there was a good question about the helicopters-------
Mr. SLAUGHTER. I had an experience one time where we were trapped
in an airplane and something happened where we could not put the
gear down and it wasn't a very nice feeling, and they wired ahead or
they called ahead, and we were met by helicopter from the Army and
they couldn't get the gear down and it was supposed to land way off
in left field someplace and they met us and we were no sooner on the
ground and they were over us with ladders and asbestos suits and
everything else.. It was just absolutely amazing what they can do if it
is planned out. It would depend on where they were calling from and
how far they would have to travel. If they were spaced out where they
could service us-
Mr. RUPPE. Yes, because in the case of the Fitzgerald, there is
really a very good question whether if a helicopter had indeed gotten
to the scene and there were crewmen alive, whether they could have
effected a rescue mission because of the tremendous winds and the
high seas at the point of the accident. I question the usefulness at
least or the capability of available helicopters effecting a rescue, at
the point and time of the sinking of the Fitzgerald.
Mr. SLAUGHTER. Well, I cannot talk too much on the Fitzgerald.
People at the table were in the immediate scene.
You are right. I have often wondered. If they can do it in Vietnam
and they went in and hauled out a lot of people in worse conditions
than the Fitzgerald, and they did it and with safety, that should tell
somebody something, that they have had that much experience. I
don't know, this is up to the experts. A lot of people are talking this
way.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Oberstar?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any ques-
tions. I do want to commend Mr. Slaughter and his panel on the excel-
lent statement that focuses in on people needs of this winter navigation
season. I think you have rendered a great service to your constituents
and to ours and to this cause of the winter navigation program by
PAGENO="0353"
349
focusing as perceptively as you have done on the needs which should
be-additional technology that should be put in place by the Coast
Guard and the responsibilities of industry as well as the Government.
I think it is a great service and we appreciate having you here this
morning.
Mr. SLAUGHTER. I would say this, Congressman Oberstar, that if
there is any information that the committee desires, they can com-
municate with us and we will give them anything and everything we
possibly can because we are very interested in this. When you put
something together, it has to be put together in the right way. It cannot
be haphazard. We have got a lot of bodies, but we have none to spare.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Slaughter, Mr.
O'Brien, Captain Rico and Mr. Chestnut.
Our next witness.
You may proceed.
STATEMENT 01' IOHN BLUITT, PORT AGENT, SEAFARERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, RIVER ROUGE, MICH.
Mr. BLUITT. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my
name is Jack Bluitt. I am the port agent for the Seafarers International
Union in Detroit, Mich. The Seafarers International Union repre-
sents merchant seamen employed on American-flag vessels of all types
engaged in our Nation's foreign and domestic trade, including approxi-
mately 2,500 seamen on vessels operating on the Great Lakes. As
such, we are especially pleased to have this opportunity to present our
views to the House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard on the opera-
tions and activities of the Coast Guard in this area, the Nation's
fourth seacoast.
As you know, the U.S. Coast Guard has been given the congressional
mandate to protect life and property at sea. In this regard, the Sea-
farers International Union supports the realistic development and
expansion of such aids-to-navigation as LORAN-C and Vessel Traffic
Systems. Both have proven successful in other regions and, through
consultation between the Coast Guard and all segments of the mari-
time industry on the Great Lakes, they should prove equally helpful
and successful in our region.
rfhere is, however, one extremely important point which must be
made, especially in light of past and present Coast Guard policies
and practices. We firmly believe that the development and expansion
of any aid-to-navigation system-LORAN-C, Vessel Traffic System,
or any other-should not be considered as a substitute for trained and
qualified shipboard personnel. Such systems should instead be de-
veloped to complement the experience and expertise of merchant
seamen.
Mr. Chairman, the prime concern of the Seafarers International
Union is and has always been the occupational safety and health of
the merchant seamen working on board U.S. flag vessels. We strongly
believe that the shipboard worker is not only the most important
component of any successful shipping operation, but also the most
valuable. Replacing a highly trained, skilled and experienced mer-
chant seaman who is injured or killed in the course of his employment
is far more costly in the long run than insuring that each worker is
provided with a safe and healthful place of employment.
PAGENO="0354"
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Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Coast
Guard, in the administration of its congressional mandate relative to
merchant vessels and their personnel, is indifferent to occupational
safety and health considerations on the Great Lakes as well as in
other port areas.
All too often the Coast Guard acts unilaterally to eliminate job
ratings and to reduce the number of crewmembers necessary for the
safe and efficient operation and maintenance of vessels without first
determining the impact of such decisions on the working conditions
of the remaining crewmembers.
We have on numerous occasions, Mr. Chairman, expressed our
willingness and desire to work with the Coast Guard to develop and
implement regulations which protect worker safety and health. As
the representative of workers directly exposed to the hazards inherent
in shipping operations on the Great Lakes as well as on the inland
waters and deep sea, we believe we can contribute the experience and
expertise needed to promulgate meaningful and effective regulations.
Regrettably, the Coast Guard persists in its refusal to develop
formal, regular, and objective procedures for consultation with the
representatives of merchant seamen. Similarly, and of equal import-
ance, the Coast Guard refuses to develop minimum manning standards
applicable on a uniform basis to similar type vessels. Instead, the
Coast Guard grants each of its districts autonomy to determine man-
ning on a vessel-by-vessel basis within each port.
In other words, each Coast Guard district, on its own, without
consultation with maritime labor, without review by Coast Guard
headquarters in Washington, D.C., without consideration for occu-
pational safety and health, sets a vessel's manning. As a result, we are
confronted with instances in which similar class ships have crews
which vary significantly in number and ratings, and with vessels
with such reduced manning that crewmembers work overtime in
excess of 100 percent.
One example which clearly demonstrates the Coast Guard's dis-
regard for life and property is its decision to significantly reduce
engineroom manning aboard three vessels owned by American Steam-
ship Co. These vessels-MV Sam Loud, MV 0. E. Wilson, and MV
Roger M. Kyes-were originally granted manning certificates requir-
ing four licensed and three unlicensed men in the engineroom. How-
ever, after only one full season of operation with this manning, the
Coast Guard arbitrarily reduced the engineroom manning by elimi-
nating entirely the three unlicensed oilers.
In the above-mentioned instance, Mr. Chairman, we believe the
Coast Guard once again failed to consider vessel maintenance as well
as vessel operation when it issued the new manning certificates. In
fact, the Coast Guard's own Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
No. 1-69, dated January 8, 1969, dealing with engine room manning,
states that:
Sufficient qualified personnel will be required to: (1) Operate and monitor the
plant in event of control failure; (2) make emergency repairs in event of machinery
casualties; and (3) perform daily or periodic operations, inspections, and mainte-
nance to insure the continued quality of plant performance.
We believe the guidelines set forth in this circular requiring that
sufficient personnel be on board to operate and maintain the plant
are valid and absolutely essential to safe shipping operations. Simply
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put, a vessel cannot be operated safely if the onboard equipment is
not properly maintained. And, a reduced number of personnel,
sufficient to operate a vessel under optimum conditions, will not be
able to respond adequately to emergency situations or to normal
shipboard maintenance requirements.
Mr. Ohairman, the Seafarers International Union has a collective
bargaining agreement with American Steamship Co. which requires
three oilers on board these vessels. The action by the Coast Guard to
arbitrarily reduce the manning certificates with no consultation with
maritime labor representatives illustrates that agency's disregard for
congressionally mandated Federal labor policy which declares it to
be the policy of the United States to encourage collective bargaining.
By rewriting and eliminating ratings at will; by failing to develop
uniform, objective manning standards; and by failing to work with
maritime labor representatives, the Coast Guard thwarts national
policy in the name of automation.
Finally, with respect to search and rescue operations, the incident
involving the Fitzgerald, a 729-foot ore carrier, serves as an example of
the need for new, stringent regulations. The Fitzgerald sank suddenly
on November 10, 1975, on Lake Superior during a storm. No distress
call was given; no bodies or survivors were found.
Mr. Chairman, Coast Guard search and rescue operations proved
meaningless in this situation because an ore ship such as the Fitzgerald
will sink in approximately 5 minutes or less once it is broken up or
ruptured in some way. This happens because ore ships are little more
than one large shell-they have no watertight compartments and the
self-unloaders have one continuous conveyor belt underneath the cargo
holds. They are completely hollow with no watertight compartments.
We believe that these vessels should no longer be allowed to be
built in this manner, posing an enormous risk to the lives of the
crewmembers.
These, Mr. Chairman, are only a few of the areas indicative of the
Coast Guard's failure to execute its responsibility to advance the
occupational safety and health of merchant seamen on the Great
Lakes and throughout the Nation.
The Seafarers International Union believes, Mr. Chairman, that
this subcommittee should undertake an extensive investigation of
these and other Coast Guard policies and practices as they affect the
privately owned merchant marine so as to eliminate the threats to
the health and safety of merchant seamen.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to express our views on this
important area of mutual concern.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Bluitt, and we
invite you to remain through the rest of the hearing and be available
for questions.
I might interject, though, that this subcommittee has a program
for hearings in September in Washington with the areas in which you
address yourselves to and we invite you or your union to participate
and it will be a public hearing with witnesses from the public sector.
Mr. BLUITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WE LA GARZA. I understand our next witness, Mr. Melvin
Pelfrey, has been detained because of flight problems, but that Mr.
Daniel L. Smith will appear in his behalf.
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STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. SMITH, DISTRICT NO. 2, MARINE ENGI-
NEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION-ASSOCIATED MARITIME OF-
FICERS, AFL-CIO, TOLEDO, OHIO
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the subcommit-
tee, honored guests: My name is Daniel L. Smith. I am a representative
of District No. 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association-Associated
Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO, 967 Summit Street, Toledo, Ohio, 43604.
District 6, MEBA-AMO is a labor organization that represents li-
censed officers employed aboard American-flag vessels.
I'd like to thank the Chairman and the members of the subcommit-
tee for inviting me here to offer my views on the U.S. Coast Guard's
operations on the Great Lakes. I will confine my remarks today to
the topic of crew safety, which we believe is the Coast Guard's most
important jurisdictional area. Crew safety has become Great Lakes
maritime labor's major concern in the wake of the sinking last
November 10 of the ore carrier Edmuv~d Fitzgerald.
We who represent Great Lakes maritime officers felt, like everyone
else, a deep shock when the Fitzgerald went down in the steel-blue
waters of Lake Superior. We felt as though the impossible had hap-
pened; the Fitzgerald, after all, had been considered by those who
sailed her to be one of the finest and safest vessels in service on the
lakes. By lakes standards, she was a new ship, a grand lady, the flag-
ship of the Columbia Transportation Fleet. Yet 29 men were lost-
29 good men, who had loved their work and who had performed it well.
And we are reminded of the 1958 sinking of the SS Garl B. Bradley
in Lake Michigan and the 1966 sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell in
Lake Huron. Both ships went down under circumstances similar to
those that brought the Fitzgerald to her violent end.
The parallels between the three disasters are shocking: Each vessel
went down in the open waters of the Great Lakes; each vessel sank
within minutes of being stricken; and the hull of each vessel was found
broken. Of the total complement of crewmen, only three survived,
and. under circumstances that can only be called "miraculous."
The Coast Guard's investigation of the Bradley sinking droned on
interminably but failed to . answer many questions to our satisfaction.
The investigation of the Jl/Iorrell disaster concluded that the vessel
broke in half because. of a structural failure in the hull girder
amidships.
But nothing was done to improve the overall structural integrity of
Great Lakes vessels following the Bradley a.nd Morrell sinkings, and
there is a feeling in the industry that we are heading down the same
inconclusive, uninformative, bang-your-head-against-the-wall path
with the inquiry.
The frightening thing about the loss of the Fitzgerald and her crew
is the great speed with which the vessel went under. The n~en aboard
apparently had no time to don lifejackets or launch lifeboats. We know
the Fitzgerald was taking on water; the cargo holds must have flooded
almost immediately beca.use the Fitzgerald-no exception to the Great
La.kes rule-was not equipped with watertight bulkheads between
cargo compartments. The ship was lost within minutes a.fter she was
stricken.
PAGENO="0357"
353
Contrast this with the story of the SS Maumee, an ocean-going
tanker that struck an iceberg at the South Pole recently. The collision
tore a hole in the ship's bow large enough to drive a truck through,
yet the Maumee was able to travel halfway around the world to the
repair yard, without difficulty, because she was fitted with watertight
bulkheads.
It's amazing-a stricken ocean tanker, with her bow nearly torn
off, can travel halfway `around the world for repairs, and one of our
best Great Lakes freighters taking on water could not make it 55
miles to the safety of Whitefish Point.
It is my opinion that watertightbulkheads, which are required on
all ocean-going vessels, have never been required on Great Lakes
vessels because most of the people in Washington who write the laws
are under the mistaken impression that the Great Lakes are really not
much more than knee-deep ponds. Gentlemen, here is a 769-foot ship
lying in the mud under 600 feet of water in the "knee-deep pond"
we call Lake Superior.
Watertight bulkheads should be required on all Great Lakes vessel~.
Great Lakes shippers claim that such bulkheads would cut down on
loading and unloading times, cut into valuable cargo space, and curtail
the efficiency of their operations. But it's time we decided that men
will come before cargo. Human life must take precedence over ma-
chinery. If shipping must be slowed down s~iewhat, then so be it.
Let's stop saving money to make more money. Let's stop cutting
corners at the expense of the men who move these ships. And it's
time for you, the Congress, to pay as much attention to human over-
head as you have to economic efficiency.
And the Coast Guard must revise its existing safety regulations to
take into account the proven fact that stricken Great Lakes vessels
have the demonstrated capability of sinking rapidly. The agency
must require that each man aboard each vessel be issued a quick-
donning, cold-resistant survival suit of the type that I have argued
for for at least 5 years.
The dramatic ~ords of Great Lakes historian William Ratigan
writing about the Bradley sinking, speak forcefully for surviva1 suits
Could anything live, unprotected, out there in that berserk water? It seemed
incredible that men might be clinging to life out there tossed and tumbled in the
crashing blackness, struggling in a 36-degree water with the air temperature
fallen to the twenties, feeling the ice form in their hair, fighting sleep and night-
mare thoughts, praying for strength to keep their heads above the suffocating
seas, steeling themselves with the will to live for just one hour, and then another,
until dawn
Assuming the 29 men aboard the Fitzgerald might've had time to
escape the doomed vessel, I doubt they would have survived without
such suits. The waves and the wind were strong enough to. capsize
any liferaft. or boat that might have been launched, and the. water
itself was at a temperature that surely would have brought on hypo-
thermia and death within minutes.
As I've said, district 2, MEBA-AMO has continually urged the
Coast Guard to require these suits aboard .Great Lakes ships, par-
ticula.rly since the idea of. extending the navigation season on the
lakes grew beyond the drawingboard stage. But 5 years into the winter
navigation demonstration program, the suits still do not exist on these
ships. . .
PAGENO="0358"
354
We want to go on record here as being supportive of extending the
navigation season through the winter, because continued season
extension would be a portent of continued prosperity in the industries
providing maritime jobs on the Great Lakes. But we are opposed to
i~xtending the season at great risk to human life.
And a storm situation on the Great Lakes can make launching a
Jifeboat impossible. Accordingly, the Coast Guard must require that
Great Lakes vessels be equipped with self-launching Brucker-type
survival capsules, which offer warmth and protection from icy sprays,
waves, and high winds.
Another area we are concerned with is the Coast Guard's cargo
load limitations for Great Lakes vessels. In 1969, the Coast Guard
gave a number of Great Lakes ships additional feet of draft. Draft
refers to the distance a loaded vessel drops into the water, measured
from the keel of the boat to the water line. Further draft increases
have been made since then. Vessels are sitting deeper and deeper in
the water.
Additional draft allows freighters to carry tons of extra cargo-
more cargo than the vessel was originally designed to haul. This in-
creased cargo must surely put tons of additional stress on the vessel's
hull. It also results in considerably less freeboard for each affected
vessel.
We question the Coast Guard's wisdom in permitting the changing
load-line limitations. How do the new limits affect a vessel's stability?
Do they lessen a ship's ability to withstand stress and survive a
storm? Do they make it more difficult to navigate and maneuver in a
storm? We want an independent agency to review the Coast Guard's
altered load limits. We want that agency to answer our questions and
the questions of our membership.
And we cannot forget the families of those seamen who are lost in
disasters like the ones we've experienced on the Great Lakes. It is of
the utmost urgency that Federal legislations setting company lia-
bility limits be amended or repealed because it encourages the industry
to ignore the safety of vessel crew members.
The law permits the owner of a sunken vessel to limit its economic
responsibility to the survivors of the crew to an amount that is sadly
below any humanitarian or civilized standard.
It is the vessel owner, not the crew, that determines the seaworthi-
ness of a vessel. It is the vessel owner who is responsible for the ship's
movements. And we deeply resent present Federal legislation which
shifts the awful economic burden of a seagoing catastrophe to those
persons least able to afford it-the seamen and their families.
The companies can afford this economic burden; they can distribute
the expense throughout the industry as a cost of doing business.
The present liability limits do nothing to encourage vessel owners
to seek higher safety standards for their ships. Insofar as it affects
the crew of the vessel, the law of liability must be repealed or, at the
very least, the limit of $60 per deadweight ton-established in 1936-
must be increased to a figure commensurate with 1976.
There are other recommendations that we have made of the Coast
Guard, and which we will make to you, the people with the power to
change existing laws and rules and regulations.
(1) Stress meters should be installed on all Great Lakes ships that
do not have them, so that the man in the pilothouse can monitor
stress at critical hull points;
PAGENO="0359"
355
(2) Depth and King gages should be installed on those vessels that
do not have them, so that officers can know how deep their vessel
sits in the water and if the ship is taking on water;
(3) Existing navigational aids should be improved upon;
(4) Methods of keeping ice from forming on deck and topside
equipment should be developed;
(5) A "large craft" advisory system should be instituted;
(6) Navigation during the treacherous month of November, which
presents unusual hazards because of the weather changes that occur
during that month, should be regulated by the Coast Guard; and
(7) All officers and seamen should be carefully educated in abandon
ship techniques.
Let's not let the memory of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald and the 29
men abroad her fade into history, as did the memories of the Bradley
and the Morrell, without some positive action taken to prevent dis-
asters and minimize human loss in the future.
There's no question that shipwrecks will continue to happen. But
the great loss of life that accompanies shipwrecks on the lakes need
not take place.
It's time for you and the Coast Guard to stop bowing to company
pressure that the safety measures we've called for would cut down on
the efficiency of a vessel and its cargo-handling capabilities.
The real issue here is money. The vessel operators naturally will
not spend the money to implement real safety measures unless they
are forced by law to do so.
Economic scare tactics must not cloud our judgment when it comes
to protecting the lives and well-being of the men who give their best
to keep the American merchant fleet moving on the Great Lakes.
After the Fitzgerald went down, everyone joined in praising the
bravery of the lakes sailor. But bravery is not enough to keep a man
alive and in one piece.
We've had enough of these frustrating investigations. Now it's time
for action.
I thank you for your attention.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Our next
witness is Mr. Lucci. Mr. Stephen Nolawski, and Mr. Bush will
accompany you, and Mr. Armstrong, too.
STATEMENT OP STEPHEN NOLAWSKI, GREAT LAKES SEAMEN'S
LOCAL 5000, UNITED STEEL WORKERS OP AMERICA, CLEVELAND,
OHIO, ACCOMPANIED BY CAROL ARMSTRONG, DISTRICT NO. 4,
AND THOIV[AS BUSH, DISTRICT NO. 33
Mr. NOLAWSKI. We are staff people with the United Steel Workers
of America. Mr. Armstrong and myself out of District 4, Mr. Bush
out of District 33.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Will you kindly identify them by first name?
Mr. N0LAw5KI. Mr. Carol Armstrong, staff, U.S. Steel Workers of
America, District 4, myself, Stephen Nolawski, staff, District No. 4,
Mr. Tom Bush, District 33.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much. We will be happy to
hear from you.
PAGENO="0360"
356
Mr. NOLAWSKI. Well, I have a short presentation. I sat here and
listened and I agreed with a lot of papers prior to my coming here.
Mine is short.
I issue this statement on behalf of the Steel `Workers of America
and on behalf of the Great Lakes Seamen, Local 5000, who lost
two vessels within the last 2 years, namely, the iViorrell and just
lately, the Fitzgerald.
As a union speaking for unlicensed seamen employed in transporta-
tion of raw materials on the Great Lakes, the United Steelworkers of
America recognizes the realities of this industry. Like all others
within our economic system, it is a profit-making venture. Rightly
so, its continued profitable operation means employment producing a
decent living for our members and their families.
That the different operators compete with each other for the profits
to be realized is likewise a basic rule of the system.
With all of this we have no quarrel, nor should we. Our members
are among those who benefit from the workings of this industry.
That the master of a vessel has full authority and final discretion
in the navigation of vessels has been accepted by consensus as neces-
sary as long as humans have traveled over the water. This we accept.
But when the operation of vessels and the judgment of their masters
are influenced by considerations of profit, prestige and competitive
advantage to the point of endangering and even sacrificing the very
lives of our people, we object. We protest in the strongest possible
terms. We demand constructive measures to end this roulette game
with seamen's lives. To get down to concrete terms, what do we
mean by endangering crew members' lives in pursuit of profits? This
is what we mean.
In shipowners' accounting offices, as in shipowners' dispatching
offices, the watch word is "Time is Mloney." The faster the load, the
faster the transit, the quicker the turnaround, the greater the profit.
Delays for whatever reason, are translated into red figures in ledgers.
The master who runs his vessel through a heavy storm to arrive on
schedule generates profits. The master who goes to anchor in lea of
land does nOt.
Masters competing within a fleet for the more desirable vessel as-
signments have reason to believe that their chances are enhanced
by a reputation as "a real money maker, not .afraid to go out in any-
thing." The results of this mental set are vividly shown by separate
episodes on November 10, 1975, as gathered from union shipboard
reports.
November 10, 1975, the Str. Armco arrived Silver Bay approximately 10 am.
Coming up Lake Superior the ship was so battered in rough seas that the couch
in the Chief Engineer's room broke loose. Oil barrels tore loose and rolled around
in the Engine Room. The Armco loaded and departed safe waters going back out
into the Lake Superior Gale for more battering.
November 10, the Strs. Cort and Beeghly left Taconite Harbor approximately
9 p.m., going out into the same Lake Superior storm which claimed the Str.
Fitzgerald less than two hours earlier.
On the night of November 10, the Str. Midletown was in the St. Mary's River
downbound. Instead of anchoring in safe waters, the master took this ship out
into the battering waves of a Lake Huron Gale. Everything on deck was washed
off-the deck lights, deck safety blocks, even the aluminum ladder had the
squares that hold the rungs torn loose.
PAGENO="0361"
357
November 10-Lake Erie. Per the crew the Str. G. A. Tomlinson was at the
dock in Fairport. After unloading it took approximately 1~ hours to wend around.
The By-pass on the engine had tobe opened up to get enough power to make the
turn in the face of the wind. Tremendous seas were pouring over the breakwall.
Instead of tying up and laying alongside the dock in sheltered waters, the Captain
took the ship out into the Lake Erie Storm. Out on the lake he could not head
the vessel for Detroit. Turning in battering seas, he finally got the ship to shelter
behind an island. With the anchor down the ship would not hold due to the wind
and seas. So the engine had to be run at full speed to maintain position. At the
height of the storm, some of the crew members put on their life jackets. Upon
seeing this, one of the mates informed them if he were the Skipper, he would
fire every goddamn one of them-excuse the English.
It should be obvious that the judgment of these masters was un-
duly influenced by a compulsion to competitive performance beyond
prudence and ordinary good sense, thereby damaging equipment and
placing vessels and crews, themselves included, in extraordinary
peril.
We will never know whether the decisions of the late master of the
Fitzgerald were influenced by his awareness that the Str. Anderson, a
comparable vessel of a competing operator, was making headway
through the disastrous storm of November 10, 1975. The records and
testimony introduced in the investigation of that disaster raise an
inescapable surmise that such a consideration did enter into the
event, with tragic results.
The urge to excel and the urge to compete, which can be assets in
normal conditions, can, in other circumstances, imperil life itself.
To eliminate this kind of hazard in future operations, the United
Steelworkers of America recommends, as it has on prior occasions,
what it has tentatively named an "All Craft Warning"-the issuance
by the Coast Guard in collaboration with the National Weather
Service of a general warning for all craft and vessels of whatever size,
to seek or remain in shelter, or safe harbor.
We will not at this time attempt to recommend specific levels of
gales or seas, or exact weather patterns which should activate such a
warning. We would only urge that the specifications be realistically
set with reference to what they should accomplish.
Such a warning would in effect declare "a whole new ball game,"
officially~ sanctioned and recognized by the entire industry, when
such is warranted by dangerous weather.
It would have the effect of saying to the masters of all vessels in
the waters involved, "Now your first and only concern is the lives of
your men and the safety of your vessels. Your usual concerns over
profitable operation and competitive position must be temporarily
suspended."
Clear guidelines would thus be set for the exercise of the master's
discretion..
Adoption and use of an "All Craft Warning" would benefit the
steelworkers sailing members first and foremost by saving their lives.
By reducing the hazards to vessels and equipment, it would benefit
the entire industry in which they earn their living.
We urge that the Coast Guard* and other appropriate agencies
devise and implement such a warning policy prior to the next fall
storm season. This will be one appreciable step toward making the
Fitzgerald disaster the last of its kind on the lakes.
Mr. DE LA GARzA. We thank you very much, Mr. Nolawski, we
appreciate your being here.
PAGENO="0362"
358
We invite you to stay for the remainder of the witnesses.
Mr. N0LAwsKI. I might add one more comment before I leave.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Yes, sir.
Mr. NOLAWSKI. I notice that there are some people, due to their
lack of experience here on the lakes, that cannot realize some of the
statements that were made around here. I have sailed for the 35 or
40 years, both salt water and on the Great Lakes, both in wartime and
in peacetime, and the difference only is because of the smallness of
the lakes. Our seamen are as good, our officers are as good, I think
our vessels are as good, but where a master in a storm at sea can alter
his course to ride out a storm and possibly alter his course for 2 or 3
days, outside of losing a little time he didn't do anything. Here if
you alter your course in order to weather the storm, you are either
beaching it in Canada or the United States. It is a terrific situation
and this is why we believe the conditions of the sea being in the right
condition, all vessels have to be asked to get off the lake.
Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, sir.
The next witness is Mr. Peter J. Benzoni.
Mr. BUSH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Benzoni is unable to be here today.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. All right, sir, we will inform Mr. Lucci and Mr.
Benzoni of the availability of the record, Counsel, in order that their
statements might be incorporated.
Mr. AMATUZIO. Likewise with him.
Mr. DANIEL REED. Is Mr. Reed here?
STATEMENT OP DANIEL REED, WHITEFISH BAY TOWNSHIP
SHORELINE OWNERS ASSOCIATION, PARADISE, MICH.
Mr. REED. Yes.
Mr. DID LA GARZA. We have come down to you now, sir. Are you
and Mr. Hutton together?
Mr. REED. Mr. Hutton would be with me if he were here. He was
unable to come. He notified me last night. He concurs in the statement
that I will make and also would have added a few comments of his
own because of his personal knowledge. He has sailed on the lakes,
himself. He now has two sons sailing and he would have concurred in
some of the remarks made by the last speaker in regard to ship usage
during severe weather.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Well, you might inform him, sir, that the
committee will welcome in writing any recommendations he might
like to make.
Mr. REED. I will be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. And we will be very happy to hear from you now.
Mr. REED. I received the invitation to appear only Tuesday, and
my home is in Paradise and Paradise does not have a duplicating ma-
chine available, so I have only two copies to leave with you. You have
more equipment in Washington than we have in Paradise. That is
partly what makes it "paradise." {Laughter.]
Mr. DE LA GARZA. We apologize for the delay in getting the in-
vitation to you and we can understand your problems with making
copies. We will take care of that, sir.
Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PAGENO="0363"
359
I am Daniel Reed, a resident of Paradise, Mich. My home is on the
shore of Whitefish Bay of Lake Superior, about 10 miles south of the
Whitefish Point light which has been referred to several times. It is
the oldest active light on Lake Superior and actually what I will submit
to you in writing is more or less a summary of what I would say. I
hope the points are clear in the statement.
The Whitefish Point light and foghorn with radio beacon are
important to commercial navigation, but also to the fishing fleet and
to an increasing number of small craft which are operating in Lake
Superior.
The light marks a course change in navigation and the area is one of
the true "graveyards" of ships on the Great Lakes. This goes back
many years, but it is still a hazardous area. A harbor of refuge is
located about a mile south of the Point and the light on Whitefish Bay.
The station is presently operated by remote control from Sault Ste.
Marie which is a road distance of approximately 75 miles. Servicing of
that station depends on the Sault Ste. Marie area.
In this whole situation, apparently dependability is the name of the
game and there is a need for manning the station for dependable
operation, to render service also which is not now available such as
observation of accidents, disasters and potential disasters and render-
ing such service as possible and calling for appropriate assistance.
No residences are located within miles of the Whitefish Point light
on the Lake Superior shore.
Just within the past 2 weeks two of our men, one of whom is a
fisherman up there, Gustafson Brothers did observe a sailboat tipped
over on the lake, it was drifting away from the shore, three people
involved. They were the only ones apparently that observed it. They
finally were able to launch their boat because of a problem at the
launching site, but they got out and saved the people and then went
back out and brought in the boat. This is a potential minor disaster in
terms of the number of people involved, perhaps, but it is the sort of
thing that is increasingly happening as we are encouraging additional
small boat travel in the area.
On November 10 of 1975, which has been referred to as the date of
the Fitzgerald sinking, both the light and the foghorn were not oper-
ating. As far as I know, the radio beacon was dead.
Whether or not this had anything to do with the Fitzgerald's
problems is certainly questionable, but it is significant that the master
of the Fitzgerald asked a ship that was lying in Whitefish Bay whether
of not the light was working. It was not. It did not work the rest of the
night. It did not come on automatically as it should and the next
morning our telephone serviceman in the area, in checking the lines
to see what was wrong, to see if it was anything connected with the
telephone lines, found that the machinery was not operating and at
the request of somebody here in the Soo station jiggled the relay, I
suppose, and set it in operation, but regardless of the sophistication
of some of the equipment that has been discussed and described here
this morning, there still is not real substitute in the final analysis for
the human touch.
The unmanned automatic equipment failed at the very time when it
could have been useful. All the rest of the year it operates.
Right when you needed it, it didn't.
PAGENO="0364"
360
There is also the need in this area, by the way, for the physical
lresence for someone in authority, both for the protection of the
Government property in that area, and also for the protection of
people who are far from any police protection and yet that is an area
which attracts many people because it is a very significant agate
hunting area and thousands of people a year are up there, and yet
there is nobody up there of any authority to be of any assistance to
people who may be there.
However, there are two good houses there, now closed and boarded
up, which are attached to or very closely adjacent to the light. These
homes, we believe, should be housing two families, probably under
contract, with housing, utilities and a modest sum as an annual sti-
pend furnished, to provide the dependable servicing that these in-
stallation require.
This would also provide the official presence that I mentioned in
the area and would give other service in terms of health problems
that might occur where many people gather and some kind of contact
with the outside world. Telephone, electricity, snow-plowed roads and
schoolbus service are available to service families that might be placed
there. Manning this operation would permit the elimination of a
disturbing nuisance in the area. At present, the light and foghorn
operate year around, night and day.
The foghorn blasts every 30 seconds and the decibel count is very
high. I realize that a foghorn would not have been much help to the
Fitzgerald, but it is kind of an odd thing, isn't it, that that blast,
every 30 seconds, was not working during the storm. We had a dedica-
tion ceremony for a historical marker 2 years ago there. Captain
Bloxsorn, who headed the Coast Guard at the Soo at that time was
very embarrassed. He was very embarrassed that he had to stop
every 30 seconds until the foghorn ceased. It is kind of an odd thing,
too. I serve on the Michigan Environmental Review Board which
reviews the environmental impact statements covering highways,
structures for housing elderly people-many things, and one of the
items we constantly concern ourselves with is the decibel level of noise
that may be around. Believe me, the decibel level of noise interfer-
ence, noise pollution at Whitefish Point is very high and it makes no
sense. It puts government in a ridiculous light to be operating that
sort of situation year round every 30 seconds, when at other points
we make a big effort to try to reduce and suppress noise pollution.
The light and the total installation at Whitefish Point needs pro-
tection from the severe erosion which is now being caused by the con-
tinued high water levels which results from the storing of extra
water on Lake Superior in order to reduce the levels on the lower
lakes.
Last fall in the same storm that sank the Fitzgerald, primarily in
that storm, although some other storms may have contributed,
approximately one-half of the distance between the water and the
lighthouse installation was destroyed, leaving now only about 150
feet separating that installation from the sea. Groins which were put
in there many years ago and which were footed back into the shore
only last summer, now are standing out in the lake, the inner end
some 75 to 100 feet in the water and, as you know, a groin, when it has
been undercut at the back end, is more damaging than it is good.
PAGENO="0365"
361
Something ought to be done at that point soon, or the installation
will be lost.
I had occasion to talk with a U.S. Steel captain about 3 or 4 weeks
ago and I won't divulge his name because I did not tell him I was
interested in knowing what he thought about it for reasons other than
just curiosity, but after some discussion, he said that the foghorn at
Whitefish Point isn't really very much of a factor to us now, but he
said, "Don't let them take the light away." That was his observation.
I am president of the Whitefish Bay Shore Erosion Association,
an organization of about 150 families who own shore properties,
homes, and cottages along the shore and who are suffering and have
suffered considerable damage from the artificially high water levels.
We have as yet received little recognition and no relief from what we
believe to be an unfair situation foisted upon us and the Government
now is facing that same situation in connection with this installation.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, it is very good to be able to
present this to you and I will stay for questions.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
cooperation, and we invite you to remain right there. Is there any
person that is not on the scheduled list of witnesses that might wish to
appear with any testimony?
Our official reporter has been working hard and we will allow her
about 5 minutes.
The committee will stand recessed for 5 minutes, and then we will
invite everyone who has testified with the exception of the admiral
who has already been questioned, to come forward and be available
for questions.
We will take a 5-minute recess.
{Reeess.J
Mr. DE LA GARZA. The subcommittee will be in order.
We will invite all the witnesses to be at the witness table. You may
bring enough chairs if there are not enough.
Thank you very much. We appreciate your cooperation, those of
you that have stayed to be available for questions which we hope that
we might expedite here in order that we might continue with our
oversight of the area.
Mr. Oberstar?
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to set an
example of being brief.
Admiral Trimble, in your judgment, will the new equipment for
heavy weather capability which Admiral Gracey cited be adequate to
respond to the emergency situations that we have heard described this
morning?
Admiral TRIMBLE. I am satisfied that they will, Mr. Oberstar..
Mr. OBERSTAR. Is this something that ought to be more heavily
focused upon during the future winter navigation demonstration
program?
Admiral TRIMBLE. No, sir, I don't believe that that is indicated.
I think that the oversight that this committee is giving to it in the
authorization hearings of the Coast Guard and hearings such as this
will be adequate in the situation because I think this is a Coast Guard
PAGENO="0366"
362
responsibility rather than a winter navigational board general
responsibility.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Edwards, how far off, in your judgment, is the
mini-loran system from being an operational system and how much
more of an investment would we need in this winter navigation demon-
stration program to further that purpose?
Mr. EDWARDS. That is a difficult one for me to handle. The equip-
ment-I specialize in shipboard equipment and that is going on in
parallel with verifying the ability of the change to meet the year-
round requirements.
I would speculate that in the order of a year or so depending upon
the definition of operational-how many boats will they have? As
far as the cost, I'm afraid I cannot address myself to that. That is
being handled by the Coast Guard.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.
Mr. Smith, you had a very comprehensive statement that I greatly
appreciate having. It will be very helpful to the committee and for the
Public Works and Transportation Committee on which I also serve
and which has authorized the winter navigation demonstration pro-
gram, and I will make your testimony available to my colleagues on
that committee as well.
Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that, sir.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. That is Mr. Peifry's statement.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. You suggested having watertight bulkheads
and also pointed out that the industry felt that these would cut down
on their loading and offloading time. But don't we have experience
with the same type of thing on ocean vessels? Are they that different
from lakers?
Mr. SMITH. They are, in the basic type of cargo they carry, yes.
The Great Lakes vessels are mostly bulk carriers.
Mr. OBERSTAR. We see them leaving every day from the port of
Duluth.
Mr. SMITH. That is right, if you are talking about grain vessel
converted to tanker use, carrying liquid to bulk-in light of that, yes,
there are comparable types of cargo being carried.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Are there no bulkheads at all on the taconite and
other ore carriers?
Mr. SMITH. There are bulkheads, but they are not watertight. A
Great Lakes vessel does not possess any watertight integrity in its
cargo spaces which is the major portion of the vessel.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Have you studied the problem enough to know
whether that could be done by Coast Guard regulation or whether
new Federal legislation is needed?
Mr. SMITH. Well, we view the Coast Guard as the enforcers of the
Federal legislation. We would assume that it would have come down
from a Federal level to provide for the construction of watertight
bulkheads in the Great Lakes vessel.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, that is something that we will have to deter-
mine, whether it needs new legislation or whether it can be done by
Coast Guard regulation. I will address that question to the Coast
Guard later.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
PAGENO="0367"
363
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Nolawski, again a very helpful statement. It
is obviously based on extensive experience that you have gained both
on salt water and fresh water. You suggested that there ought to be a
system by which all vessels could be ordered off the lakes at the time
of severe water. How could you reconcile that statement with the.
almost. unchallenged authority of the .ship captain to command his
vessel, and can that be done by regulation of the Coast Guard or is
legislation needed to do that? . , ...
Mr. NOLAWSKI. Well, I haven't'investigated that thoroughly, but
I am informed that the Coast Guard does have that authority now,
but this industry such as it is, there ~re many, many pressures and
they always use an excuse that we are..'infringing on the judgment of'
the master. We don't want to infringe on the judgment of the master.
We say. the industry itself infringes on his `good judgment because he
has got to .compete for his job, he has got to compete. for his wages to~
actually stay out on the lakes and we are asking for a door to be opened:.
for him, that he c~n use his good judgment and not get into trouble.
T.o give, an example, the Fitzgerald was the. second vessel we lost
in 10 years. The Morrell was the one we lost 8 years prior to that.
The Morrell was in anchor in the Huron River. It wasn't going out.
Here comes the steamer Townsend, same: company, but there is a
gung ho skipper on it,' he is going out. This is a bad reflection on, the
man on :the hook. He picks up and. follows; `Yes, the Townsend got'
~battered,. yes, it had to be' scrapped after that, but who lost the crew.
and vessel? The Morrell. This is what. we are trying to get away from.'
We've ;got to give some of these masters~the'.right to use their judg-
ment without getting themselves . in trouble .with their employers.
This is what we are looking for. I :do believe the Weather Bureau
can and did predict to the Fitzgerald: with plenty hours to spare, the
severity, of it, `but the `industry, such as it is, is gung ho-go. Time is
money and this is what is involved.
Mr. OBERsTAR.. Is there any information or will we ever be able
`to tthtain information indicating whether the captain, the skipper of
`the Fitzgerald, actually knew the severity, of the conditions at the
`time he sailed right into it?
Mr. N0LAwsKI.' I think he~ knew. because Captain Cooper, the
`skipper of the Anderson, which was just a couple of hours behind'
him, and he testified in the hearings in Cleveland that he plotted
the whole storm and he predicted 80-mile-an-hour winds and when
Fitzgerald lost its radar equipment and a lot of other things, he w.as
giving them instructions `from his vessel, `so I knew they knew the
severity of that storm. " . `
Mr. :OBERSTAR. So you are saying ~fl addition to the modern
`technOlogical devices that have been developed as aids to navigation,
plotting the weather, determining .its~ .`intensity and charting its
course, in addition to that, there is a judgment factor that in some
way must be subject to Federal regulation?
Mr. NOLAWSKI. I don't quite-
Mr. OBERSTAR. What I am saying, your testimony indicates that
even if we give the skipper all the information he needs with radar
and satellites, weather and navigation~. he still has to make a judg-
.ment. He has to get that cargo through. You are saying somewhere
there ought to be a check on rash judgment?
78-280-76------24
PAGENO="0368"
364
Mr. NOLAWSKI. Due to the makeup of the lakes, like I mentioned
before in my testimony, we have storms just as severe and more
severe out in the ocean, but because of the size of the ocean, you
cannot alter your course. I have been on vessels where you altered
your course for practically a week to ride out a storm and maybe we
lost a couple of days from where you are supposed to be. Here, you
cannot do that, so if you use your judgment and you are wrong, you
are in trouble, and if your judgment is influenced by the people you
work for and the competition around you, against your better judg-
ment, you do things-what I am trying to stress, maybe I am using
bad language, is that we have got to get these skippers off the hook
because there are many, many good skippers, there are. Some are
more gung-ho than others. I say that our people out there are just
as capable as anyone anywhere else, but the competition they are
involved with and seeing another man in your own fleet go out and
he stays there, he has got to follow because a black eye is developing.
I am looking for something that the weather conditions are so severe
that the Coast Guard issues an all-craft warning, that .you shouldn't
be out there, then at least the man who stays on the hook cannot be
ostracized too badly because he was told he shouldn't be out there.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Nolawski, talking to the Coast Guard,
what you would like to have is the Coast Guard formulate a plan
similar to what they now have for small craft warning that at a
designated wind velocity or turbulence intensity of such a nature,
they issue a general warning unsafe for craft?
Mr. N0LAwsKI. And direction, because the direction of the wind
and the direction of the sea-if it is lengthwise of the lake, it doesn't
hurt anything, but if it is at such an angle that you are going to have
to buck the storm and buck the wind, you should not be out there.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. And once issuing that, then of course it is still
up to the individual master.
Mr. NoLAwsKr. Yes, it would be up to the master, but at least the
one who used his judgment couldn't be ostracized because the Coast
Guard said it wasn't weather to be out in. He used his good judgment
and stayed in. He could use his vessel a little different to the other
fellow, but it gives him something more than just the competition;
I have to go out because he is going out, which affects his good
judgment.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppe?
Mr. RUPPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a letter from Mr.
John Hoeft of the Waldorf Corp. of my district. May I have unani-
mous consent to make this letter, which is in effect a statement, part
of the record?
Mr. DR LA GARZA. Without objection, it will be incorporated.
[The letter follows:]
HOERNER WALDORF CORP.,
Ontonagon, Mich., February 16, 1976.
Hon. PHILIP E. RUPPE,
House of Representatives,
509 Cannon Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR PHIL: Thanks very much for sending me the 1976 calendar. I appreciate
this as well as your note soliciting further ideas.
PAGENO="0369"
365
I have neen following with interest your current inquiry into the adequacies
of the Coast Guard, especially with reference to the sinking of the Fitzgerald.
While this is showing up certain deficiencies regarding the search and rescue
capabilities for commercial vessels, I believe if you would look into it further,
you would find greater discrepancies as regards pleasure boaters. The Coast
Guard's current dependency on the volunteer efforts of Coast Guard auxiliary
amounts to almost complete abdication of their responsibilities for search and
rescue on pleasure boaters. At present instead of the Auxiliary helping the Coast
Guard, it has approached the point of the Coast Guard helping the Auxiliary.
The Coast Guard, in order to fulfil its obligations certainly needs more staffing
and equipment.
I have also been watching their activities regarding all winter shipping. It
seems that a tremendous amount of energy, attention, and money is being cx-.
pended to promote all weather shipping. As you have pointed out, this is at
considerable discomfort and inconvenience to others, such as those on Sugar
Island. This is an expenditure of taxpayer money for the benefit of a few shipping
cempanies and the money could be better spent for the benefit of the Coast
Guard in their traditional search and rescue efforts.
Sincerely,
JOHN E. HOrm'T.
Mr. RUPPE. Mr. Chairman, I also have one additional article
entitled "Inland Seas." It is an article in retrospect by Dr. Wolf
addressing the Fitzgerald sinking and perhaps with unanimous con~
sent, I could make that a part of the record as well.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. Without objection, it will be incorporated in
the record.
[The article follows :}
[From the Inland Seas, Quarterly Journal of the Great Lakes Historical Society,, Summer,
1976)
IN RETROSPECT
(By Dr. Julius F. Wolff, Jr.)
"Regarding your interesting story of Lake Superior shipwrecks, in the Spring
1976 issue of INLAND SEAS, may I question your statement that the Fitzgerald
and several other major ships unsuspectingly sailed into the weather monster.
Unheedingly, very likely, but not unsuspectingly.
"Gale warnings were posted for Lake Superior at 9 P.M., e.s.t., November 9th,
and these were upgraded to storm warnings at 4 A.M., November 10th. At the
latter time I would place the Edmund Fitzgerald very near Keweenaw Point,
affording good shelter from N. and NW. winds. The frequency and diversity of
weather warning broadcasts make it incredible that the Fitzgerald and others
would be unaware of what lay ahead of them, weatherwise.
"This seeming disregard of severe weather warnings shows up in other fields
of transportation also. As I write this, the radio tells us of the Eastern Airlines
Kennedy Airport disaster report, in which it is clearly established that said
aircraft and others were attempting to land through a violent thunderstorm. It
is interesting to note that the next succeeding storm, to the one on November
10, found at least one large ore carrier in Marquette Harbor, waiting it out."
Since receiving the above letter and after checking and reviewing a large
number of newspaper reports on the Fitzgerald case, I'm afraid I have to stand
by my terminology, "unsuspectingly." There is nothing to indicate that Lake
Superior skippers had any inkling that this particular storm warning would
involve "hurricanic" winds, such as developed during the late afternoon and
early evening of November 10. The writer's chronology of the weather warnings
differs from those reported in Lake Superior circles, but not by many hours.
Gale warnings in western Lake Superior were correctly posted in the early
evening of November 9, some seven hours after the Fitzgerald had sailed, and
winds from 39-54 miles per hour apparently did materialize, with same snow,
beginning at Duluth a little after 7 p.m. The Fitzgerald was hit by this weather,
reporting to the Cleveland office at 1 am., November 10, that she was beset by-
winds up to 52 knots with 10-foot waves. She encountered no troubi; though
she was off Keweenaw Point at this time. Six hours later, when perhaps 40-50
miles east of Keweenaw, she again reported that the wind had dropped to 36
knots per hour, seemingly indicating that the worst was over.
PAGENO="0370"
This report out of Cleveland (in Duluth Herald, November 20, 1975, p. 15)
coincided with the information furnished to the chief vessel agent of another
large fleet of ore carriers operating on Lake Superior. His company received
the gale warning on November 9 (winds 34-47 knots), which was taken down
some hours later, to be replaced a few hours thereafter by storm warnings (winds
in excess of 48 knots)-the hurricane warning is not used on the Great Lakes.
Later a ranking meteorologist of the Weather Service informed him that the
original low-pressure system had been moving north on the afternoon and night
of November 9 and was expected to pass northward over central Lake Superior
with a center near Marquette on the morning of November 10. Instead, the
storm center veered sharply to the east, resulting in the near hurricane conditions
locally in the extreme eastern lake that afternoon, and evening. Numerous reports
of winds gusting to 70, 80, and even 90 kno.ts were received for late November 10
by the Coast Guard Board of Inquiry. The Weather Service had no data antic-
ipating this type of situation which might previously have occurred in November.
1872, November 1908, November 1913, and December 1927, and possible in
other instances over the last 100 years.
It was obvious that four professionals skippering four of the largest and most
powerful ships (Fitzgerald, Anderson, Blough, and Fort William) felt that the'
forecast of rough weather held no terrors for their respective vessels. For that
matter, neither did the skippers of several vessels which had headed west in the
hours before the Fitzgerald was sunk. Very rarely do the modern high-powered
carriers anchor for protection under Keweenaw Point. My vessel agent contact
could recall only one instance in the last ten years in his fleet. If a carrier was,
waiting in Marquette harbor during a following storm, I would suspect that ship'
~~as probably loaded there, as Marquette is over 70 miles south of the down-'
bound vessel lane, and a skipper would not move that far for shelter.
The loss of the giant Fitzgerald and her 29 men was most regrettable, but
can find no suggestion that her skipper and the other captains disregarded orni-.
nous meteorological forecasts. Our present methods of weather forecasting still
remain, inprecise in that formidable 75 miles of eastern Lake. Superior ~which
historically is known `as the "Graveyard of the Lake." `
Dr. Julius F. Wolff, Jr., in his two-part article, "One Hundred Years of Rescues:
The Coast Guard on Lake Superior," included reference to the Edmund Fitzgerald
and her tragic sinking, in the Spring issue of Inland Seas, referred to above.
A resident of Duluth, Minnesota, Dr. Wolff is Professor of Political Science at
the lJniversity of Minnesota. For many years he has had an absorbing interest in
research concerning Lake Superior shipwrecks, about which he `has written
several earlier articles for our Journal.
Mr. RUPPE. It is interesting' to' note how the whole question of our'
knowledge of the ,weather and our ability to forecast weather is so.
much in doubt. I am not questioning what you say in any way, but I
am pointing out how good men and different minds can come to vari-
ous conclusions because he states, and this is Dr. Julius Wolf saying
that, "I can find no suggestion that her skipper and the other cap,tains
disregarded ominous meteorological forecasts." Our present methods
of weather forecasting still remain imprecise in that formidable 75
miles of eastern Lake Superior which historically is known as the
"Graveyard' of the Lake."
I only bring that up because I. agreeto a large measure with what.
you say beyond that. I think we are woefully short of the weather,
information and the weather reporting facilities and techniques that
we really ought to have not only to run a normal shipping season,
but particularly an extended winter navigation season.
Mi~. NOLAWSKI. I believe in generality what you say is true, our
weather forecasting can be improved and refined. However, in this,
case, when. these vessels left their loading docks, the storm warnmgs
and the intensity of the storm was known, but they still left. So the
warnings were there.
Mr. RUPPE. Admiral Trimble, I understand that you have given a,
lot of very serious and thoughtful time to the whole question of the
PAGENO="0371"
367
Fitzgerald and the sinking of it; do you have any particular ideas of
your own as to what very likely caused the sinking and the loss of the
Fitzgerald?
Admiral TRIMBLE. As you know, the board has not finished it~
deliberations yet, but nevertheless quite a bit of the information has
been made available through the testimony that was in a public
posture. It is my conclusion, based on that information, and I think
this is the general feeling of the industry, that the Fitzgerald did
damage herself by grounding on the shoal in the vicinity of Caribou
Island. That started the train of events that led to her sudden break-.
ing up and going down.
It apparently happened without the knowledge of the master, I
have to assume that because he did not issue a broadcast SOS or ask
for help in any way. He did not have the crew alerted, it would seem.
It sounds like by the time the vessel did break in two, he did not know
before that. Now, if we follow this reasoning and I think that this
theory will be proved largely when the results of the Canadian hydro-
graphic soundings are completed later this year. The board did ask
Canada to recheck the soundings and Canada apparently agreed and
they will do it before this year is out. I think it is quite likely that we
will find that the shoal area is larger than shown on the charts.
Keep in mind that the present soundings date back to the early part
of the century. There has been no recheck. If we find the shoal area
extends further toward the island, eastward, it was established that
the vessel was in that vicinity, Captain Cooper of the Anderson did
testify that he plotted the vessel in that area. The chart shows only a
small shoal area so the masters would have no way of knowing that it
was inaccurate. I think this theory will be proven or disproven when
the Canadian hydrographic work is in.
Mr. RUPPE. Mr. Reed indicated a few minutes ago very possibly
in addition to the light and foghorn not operating, the radio beacon
could well have been out of commission. Would this in your opinion
cause the vessel to navigate less accurately than might otherwise be
the case?
Admiral TRIMBLE. It certainly could. On the other hand, if the shoal
extent is not shown on the chart, even if the vessel knew where he
was in relation to the plotted shoal, he could still be in trouble. But
any time your navigation equipment is not working, that is a problem.
This is one of the reasons we are looking forward to the LORAN-C
coverage of the lakes. I'm sure you are aware it is not a new device. It
has been tested in the 1950s in connection with the missile program
as well as being used in Vietnam. So its accuracy has been proven.
Here, in addition to the other navigational aids, it should certainly
improve the situation for navigation in the Great Lakes and especially
Lake Superior.
Mr. RUPPE. Since you have a good measure of contact with the
shipping companies, several of these gentlemen have indicated that
operators apply directly or indirectly efficiency ratings for their
vessels in terms of turn-around time and in terms of the ability of the
master to make the trip in the shortest possible number of days. If
that is the case, would not that really have the effect of forcing a
master to drive his vessel in the face of adverse and unsafe weather
possibly of the type that beset the Fitzgerald?
PAGENO="0372"
368
Admiral TRIMBLE. I think this is a bone of contention, Mr. Ruppe.
If a master does go out in adverse conditions and sustains damage,
I think he is going to get a worse rating whether it is a written rating
or whether it is in someone's mind. Either way, he is going to get a
worse rating because of his bad judgment in that respect. I don't
think any of the companies have a policy that says "You go through
tinless weather is so adverse that you can't move." I don't think any
of them have. I have heard them instruct their masters with their
crews at their annual meeting before the season starts, that the master
is expected to exercise judgment as far as going out in adverse weather.
Of course, this is one of the reasons why we have been pushing strenu-
ously for improved weather forecasting on the Great Lakes as a
navigation system.
Mr. RUPPE. There are two things that several of the gentlemen have
taised previously and obviously will be brought out in greater detail
in the hearings that the chairman has referred to later in this year;
but in any event, several of the witnesses in the latter stages of the
hearings have indicated that the vessels should have watertight
compartmentation and also one or more of these gentlemen indicated
that the liability limits should be increased to offer better protection
to the families of those that suffer from these accidents. Are you in a
position at this point to comment on either suggestion?
Admiral TuMBLE. I am not in a position to comment on the second
point, particularly, Mr. Ruppe. I would comment on the first, just
generally.
When you talk about watertight integrity, that they did specify in
the cargo hold area, sometimes there have been statements made that
there are no watertight bulkheads. There are on most on the bow and
the stern area on either side of the cargo department, so that it has
been referred to as primarily in that broad expanse in the cargo hold
area. This has been brought up numerous times and of course when
~ou look at the situation, if the Fitzgerald did drown on the shoal off
Caribou Island, then we have a physical condition that caused the
accident and not a matter of a structural defect or something that
would be materially improved by changing the watertight compart-.
mentation.
We are all very interested in the safety of the crews, vessel, and the
cargo-~crews, by all means, first. This is something that would have
to be weighed. I think the testimony of naval architects would be
~very helpful, people who are specialists in the field, would then look
at actual experience. I think it has been brought out by Admiral
Gracey and Commander Deck that the Morrell and the Bradley were
in ballast rather than loaded. The Fitzgerald is the first vessel in recent
or modern times that has sunk in a loaded condition. So it does not
appear that we have a problem. I think we have to look at the ex-
perience, to some extent, as well as the theoretical possibility.
Mr. RUPPE. If the loads are increased and the load line is reduced-
Mr. NOLAWSKI. Increased.
Mr. RUPPE. It has been several years since I put in my time in the
Navy. A witness has indicated it would not put stress on the lower
hull. Does the increased load at any time put stress on the so-called
upper hull or so-called superstructure?
PAGENO="0373"
369
Mr. N0LAwsKI. I thought the testimony was it did not increase the
stress in the loaded condition; it was primarily in the ballast condition
that the problems have occurred in the past. So increasing the loading
would not seem to be part of the problem. The newer ones, the larger
ones will carry more. They have been designed on that basis, so
their strength on the various skeletons and their framework has been
strengthened to meet the loading requirements that are planned as
far as the cargo carrying mood of that vessel.
Mr. RuPrE. One last question. I thought that one of the witnesses
indicated along the way, perhaps as early as 3 or 3:30 that perhaps
something happened along the way to the vessel, that it had listed a
bit or it had taken on water. I don't know if that is fact or conjecture. I
would ask any one of you if that happened, wouldn't the captain have
sent out some kind of SOS or distress signal or told the crew to be on
the alert, that they might have some trouble lying ahead? I have a
difficult time following the possibility of something happening at
3 o'clock or 3:30 and the vessel going down without any distress signal
coming from it a number of hours later.
Mr. NOLAWSKI. Mr. Ruppe, I included a statement attributed to
the chairman of the board of inquiry along that line. He did not expand
on it and say what happened. The testimony in the board of inquiry
did indicate that they had lost a vent or vent cover, this is to one of the
ballast tanks, and that they did have some water in a ballast tank.
However, the pumps in accordance with the captain's conversation
with the Anderson, were handling the water and he did not seem to be
too concerned about it, so it must be-if he damaged himself on the
shoal, it is possible with the sea pounding that he didn't realize that he
did violence. I have been in vessels pounding in heavy seas in salt
water and I sure thought we hit bottom and I knew we couldn't have
hit bottom though it felt like it. The problem could be such that he
really bottomed without knowing about it and if he cracked the hull
in such manner the wave motion caused the vessel to break in two
suddenly, that is what must have happened, or he would certainly
have gotten off an SOS. He was standing on the bridge with a radio
in front of him. It would only have taken seconds for him to say some-
thing over the radio. He didn't have time for that, apparently. He
must not have, from his conversation with the Anderson, considered
the water threatening that was coming in through the vent. This is
the vent on deck. The water coming in there compared to the capacity
of his pumps did not excite him, apparently.
Mr. RTJPPE. I have one question for Admiral Gracey. But before I do,
I want to congratulate my very fine constituent Dan Reed for his
statement. On one point, Dan, I think you bring up a very important
point to consider and that is that Coast Guard surveillance and equip-
ment attendant on the Great Lakes has to necessarily involve the small
boater who in terms of numbers is the greatest user of the Great Lakes.
It is certainly true that an accident of this type, the accident to the
Fitzgerald, triggers inquiries and studies of this nature, and hearings,
and I think we should never lose sight in deploying Coast Guard forces
and achieving better information of the small boater. He is a very
important and very numerous individual. One thing I am glad you
bring out is that the winter navigation board considered transportation
problems and environmental problems related to the winter navigation
season.
PAGENO="0374"
370
The legislation that Congressman Oberstar and I have introduced to
extend the demonstration period for an additional 2 years would give
the winter navigation board new authority to look at transportation
problems and environmental damages. I hope that the winter navi-
gational board will look further at environmental damage and deter-~
mine how much of the shoreline loss is caused by natural conditions,
how much by extended winter navigation, and how much is caused by
the higher water levels that the International Joint Commission has
unilaterally maintained on the Great Lakes, especially on Lake
Superior, in the past few years.
The last question, if I might, Admiral Gracey, I understand that
the Ports and Waterway Safety Act of 1972 would authorize the Coast
Guard to "control vessel traffic in areas especially hazardous or
under conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather," et cetera.
Has the Coast Guard ever considered applying this authority to situa-
tions such as beset the Fitzgerald some months ago?
Admiral GRACEY. I can't speak in terms of broad policy for the
entire Coast Guard. I assume you are alluding to the sailing when
there were some storm conditions predicted?
Mr. RUPPE. Yes.
Admiral GRAcEY. Is that the kind of situation you mean when you
said beset the Fitzgerald?
Mr. RUPPE. Yes; the sort of typical November weather which is
the most hazardous period.
Admiral GRACEY. I don't know what the whole Coast Guard has
done, but I will tell you I have given it serious thought on the lakes
as to whether it would be feasible or not and I have not given up
looking at it. In fact, I am very seriously considering taking a look
at whether or not the conditions of the lakes and the kind of marine
traffic we have here would warrant our instituting a large craft warn-
ing system, if you will on the lakes.
It would be a warning system. I have not really seriously considered
a program which would deny a large vessel the right to decide whether
it sailed or not. Even on a small craft, we do not tell the men "Don't
go out." We warn them. We tell them it is unsafe; we do everything
we can to try to convince them not to go in terms of providing them
information and education, but the small boater still goes out and we
still wind up going out and trying to find him.
Mr. RUPPE. Weather information is a difficult thing to predict.
I know in the copper country we may have a storm warning when only
a fool there will go out and again, maybe because of some local peculi-
arity of the weather, it is really not all that unsafe although the per-
son considering going out ought to take a little extra thought and
precaution about putting his boat out in face of the Coast Guard
warning.
Admiral GRACEY. There has been a good deal of concern about
the weather service no longer asking us to fly the storm warning
flags. A lot of people have voiced concern about that, and we have
tried to explain that action on the basis that the flag is good only
for those who can see it and once you have left the place where the
flag is and it is hoisted after you get out, it doesn't do any good be-
cause you can't see it. What we are trying to do is to have the peopl&
buy a small $12 radio, whatever it costs, and they have constant
PAGENO="0375"
371
weather broadcasts and you carry it in your pocket or on the boat
and listen to it before you sail and listen to the weather~
But, I have been doing a lot of reading about shipwrecks on the
Great Lakes, not just in preparation for the hearing, by the way.~
As I mentioned in the beginning, I am rather entranced with this
part of the world for some strange reason these days and I have done
a lot of reading about shipwrecks over the years, and it just comes
through time and time again about the weather and the patterns and
the peculiar patterns, and even in the face of what seems to. be very
fine capability to predict, when the weather gets out over the lakes,
strange and wonderful things happen to it. Wind and weather con-
ditions change. The big storm in November of 1913 was the case of
three violent hurricane force storms all coming together at once, but
none of them were predicted to do that. Very much the same kind
of thing happened in the storm last year. The only thing we didn't
have was the third storm coming from the South, but we had two other
ones that came together, but they weren't predicted to do that. It is
a very tricky part of the world as far as weather is concerned. Short
of having some buoys or something out there to give some data or
using the satellite information, there is no way to determine what
the weather is going to do.
Mr. RUPPE. Would it not be the duty of your organization and the
maritime agencies to develop a system of large vessel warning?
Admiral GEACEY. I wouldn't consider instituting such a thing
without consulting with the industry and weather service and all
kinds of other people.
iVir. RUPPE. Mr. Nolawski?
Mr. NOLAWSKI. I think the Secretary did give the Coast Guard
the right to control the vessel traffic. It is there now, but somehow
or another the people are dodging a responsibility that should be
exercised by somebody. Let's hope the Weather Bureau could accept
it. Let us hopethat somebody with some authority accepts it, because
they are sweeping something under a big rug which endangers the
vessels and the people's lives on the vessel and endangers the profits.
It does not follow. I don't know why they even write it, if this is
what they are doing.
Mr. RUPPE. You bring up two questions. The first one is, should
we have a large vessel warning system, and second, what materializes
after such a warning is issued? Do you let the master go on his own
risk or do you actually tell him to seek refuge?
Mr. NOLAWSKI. We are using a lot with the master's discretion at
sea and the master's discretion in navigable waters. When the Coast
Guard and regulations are in force, he doesn't use his discretion. He
can only use his discretion when he is at sea. Here is the discretion of
man going out-whoever is in authority, that Coast Guard or whoever
says it is dangerous-they cannot control it. Why doesn't anyone
exercise authority? Everyone seems to think they are infringing on
the master. He is the master at sea. But here he is not. The Coast
Guard has regulations which they think can regulate them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DE LA GARZA. We appreciate all of you being here. Your testi-
mony has been most helpful.
I would like to thank Lake Superior State College and the staff of.
Congressman Ruppe and the staff of the committee that made the
arrangements for the hearing; and pending the statements that will
PAGENO="0376"
372
be submitted later, questions that may be submitted to witnesses, the
committee will stand adjourned.
[The following was submitted for inclusion in the record:]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
U.S. COAST GUARD,
Cleveland, Ohio, August ~4, 197G.
Hon. PHILIP E. RUPPE,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. RUPPE: Enclosed are my personal answers to the questions sent with
your letter of July 22 re: the Soo hearings. I have tried to write them to sound as
they would have had I answered them during the hearing. They are numbered
according to the subject matter, using the following code: SAR-Search and
Rescue; HS-Human Survival; SS-Ship Safety; SLAR-Side-Looking Air-.
borne Radar; LC-Loran C; ML-Mini--Loran; and VT-Vessel Traffic Control.
You asked two questions about weather forecasting which I have not tried to
answer. I think a more meaningful answer would come from the National Weather
Service, who, I understand, maintain rather extensive data on the accuracy of
their forecasts.
You also asked for an assessment of the Whitefish Point erosion problem which
was discussed at the hearing by Mr. Dan Reed. Unfortunately, the copy of the
transcript I received did not include Mr. Reed's testimony, so I cannot provide
a pertinent answer now. I have asked for a copy of that part of the transcript.
When it arrives, I will promptly provide the assessment you asked for plus an
answer to your later letter on Whitefish Point. I hope to be able to get that out
later this week.
I have sent a copy of the answers to Coast Guard Headquarters, but I have
not coordinated the answers with them.
Your consideration during the hearing and your kind words since are much
appreciated. The same is true of Mr. Oberstar and Mr. de la Garza.
Sincerely,
J. S. GRACEY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard,
Commander, Ninth Coast Guard District.
Enclosures.
Question. Does the Coast Guard maintain a facility plan applicable to ships,
aircraft and rescue stations, based upon some kind of established time and distance
criteria?
Answer. The Coast Guard has a facility plan which consists of 3 parts: Cutter
Plan, Aviation Plan, and Shore Facilities Plan.
The ultimate facility requirements development in each part are based on a
wide range of critieria which are determined by the mandates of our many missions.
Since Coast Guard facilities derive their special record of effectiveness in part
from their multi-mission capability, their selection and numbers must per force
be based on critieria of many sorts. "Time" and "distance" are factors used in
part in the Cutter Aviation Plans. They are not used, per se, in the Shore Facilities
Plan because of the wide variety of geographic locations, climatic conditions,
population densities, "clientele" characteristics, caseloads and case severity and
assigned missions in which our shore units are placed and with which they must
cope.
Question. Would you furnish such plan or plans as they relate to all of the Great
Lakes?
Answer. Each of the three Plans I discussed in answering the previous question
consists of a rather large volume. Except in sections which provide tables of
projected facility needs the texts are not divided by specific geographical areas
nor are discussions so oriented. 1 have excerpts, which I will provide for the record
to give a feel for the thought process upon which decisions are made for the Search
and Rescue Program.
III. BOAT REQUIREMENTS
A. ANALYTICAL PROBLEM
The requirements for Coast Guard boats have been determined in the past by
program managers using a variety of analytical and non-analytical techniques.
A major task for the first update of the Boat Plan in 1975 will be the development
of a standard methodology for determining boat requirements which can be
applied to all programs.
PAGENO="0377"
373
In many cases, especially for those newer stations with primary responsibility
for the Search and Rescue (SAR) program, a computer simulated queueing model
has been exercised to determine optimal SAR boat standby requirements. In
most cases, however, the results of many years of trial and error has established
the stations' needs. It can be argued that this approach could result in over-
capacity at many units if the true needs were unconstrained. The tendency would
be to overequip for the most demanding missions expected. In fact, personnel
and financial constraints have been imposed throughout the Service. The limited
availability of personnel and operating expense funding induces program managers,
as well as operational commanders, to minimize the number of boats which will
consume these constrained resources.
Despite this acknowledgement, the study has identified a major need for future
in-depth analysis of actual station requirements. The short time period allowed
for this first year's plan was insufficient to carry out that analyses. However, some
time was available to frame out the methodological approach to be used during
1975 for the first updating of the Plan.
B. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The boat requirements may be developed by describing a~series of~potential
operational constraints which are imposed on boats carrying out the wide variety
of mission tasks. Tasks that boats will be required to perform for each Coast
Guard program are first listed. Operational constraints are then determined from
environmental conditions as well as from human, social, and institutional factors
that affect boat operations. Historical workload data is then grouped into these
categories and future demand expectations are estimated. The resultant projected
workload within each category should provide a descriptive statistical basis for
determining future demand for boat services.
BOAT TASK DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS
Search and Rescue (SAR)
Search for vessel
Search for person in water
\Tector another unit to scene
Provide communications assistance
Provide direction finding assistance
Provide navigational assistance
Provide engineering assistance
Provide medical assistance (advice)
Rescue personnel from water
Rescue personnel from sinking
burning vessel
Rescue personnel from land
Remove property from sinking
burning vessel
Remove property from land
Refuel
Deliver medical supplies
Deliver pump
Dc-water
Fight fire
Refloat
Make repairs
Stand-by
Provide escort
Tow
Fight fire and tow
Dc-water and tow
Fight fire, dc-water, and tow
Refloat and tow
Refloat, repair and tow
Refloat, repair, dc-water, and tow
Fight fire and escort
Dc-water and escort
Fight fire, dc-water, and escort
Relieve tow
Provide diving platform
Recreational boating safety (RBS)
Board boat
Pursue boat
Patrol regatta
Visit marina
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (EL T)
Board fishing vessel
Patrol Security Zone
Interdict drug traffic
or Interdict alien traffic
Aids to Navigation (A/N)
or Inspect day beacon
Inspect minor shore light
Inspect unlighted buoy
Inspect lighted buoy
Inspect bridge light
Check signal
Check buoys mooring
Recharge buoy
Hot pack buoy
Repair buoys visual equipment
Repair buoys audio equipment
Clean buoy
Paint buoy
Relieve buoy
Land on breakwater
Recharge fixed aid
Hot pack fixed aid
Clean fixed aid
Repair structure
Replace structure
Paint fixed aid
Renew Reflective tape
Establish temporary aid
Load batteries
Load buoys
PAGENO="0378"
374
Tow buoy
Replace lamps
Replace lanterns
Replace flasher
Replace wiring
Replace lampchanger
Replace dayboard
Supply lightship
Supply light station
Replace engine-generator
Operate in exposed location
Operate in semi-exposed location
Operate in protected location
Service aid located on sea coast
Service aid in bay, harbor, or inlet
Service aid in river or canal
Service aid on breakwater
Service aid on shore
Remove ice from buoy
Remove ice from fixed aid
Drag for buoy remains
Provide, diving platform
Reserve Training (RT~
Train coxswain
Train engineman
Port Safety and Security (P58)
Supervise hazardous cargo transfer
Supervise radioactive material transfer
Board merchant vessel
Board barge
Visit pier
Patrol security zone
Patrol safety zone
Patrol harbor
Patrol remote harbor area
Patrol off-shore structure
1. Boat Tasks
Inspect waterfront
Control vessel movement
Escort vessel movement
Observe special interest vessel
Investigate accidents on vessel
Investigate accidents on bridge
Investigate accidents at port facility
Provide communications for traffic
control
Marine Environmental Protection (MEP)
Monitor liquid bulk transfer
Monitor removal of discharged material
Remove discharged motor oil
Investigate discharge
Monitor ocean dumping activity
Deliver oil containment boom
Deliver oil absorbing material
Deliver pump and hose
Deploy oil boom
Deploy hose
Distribute absorbent material
Operate skimming pump
Collect water samples
Collect contaminated wildlife
Board vessels for sanitation systems
inspection
Provide communications for on-Scene
Commander
Bridge Administration (BA)
Inspect bridge lights
Inspect bridge for signals
Inspect bridge material condition
Observe drawbridge operations
Observe waterway traffic
Each program can be described by listing all tasks that are accomplished in
carrying out that program's work. These are tentatively listed and are shown for
each program in Table Ill-i.
~. Operational Constraints
Operational constraints are factors that determine how program tasks are
performed with boats. They can be grouped as either environmental conditions
of as human, social, and institutional factors.
Environmental conditions.-T hose external elements that arc part of the environ-
ment surrounding the boat are classified and assigned numerical values where
appropriate. These include climate, weather and sea conditions, visibility, location
in reference to land, etc. A proposed classification scheme is shown in Table
IJI-2.
A preliminary analysis attempted to correlate climatological data of selected
coastal regions with environmental conditions reported during SAR assistance
cases. A rough analysis indicated that the two data sources generally conform.
The next step will be to relate the potential climatic severity of each region with
explicit levels of operational capabilities and crew protection afforded by each
class of Coast Guard boats. Severity thresholds may be useful to determine
miaimum boat capabilities required for each geographical area. The work to date
suggests that this approach will provide the environmental constraint descrip-
tions which are necessary for the task analysis.
PAGENO="0379"
375
TABLE 111-2.-ENvIRoNMENTAL CONDITIONS
Sea state (feet high): Visibility (miles): Distance from shore
o to 2 0 to one-fourth (miles):
3 to 4 one-fourth to one-half 0 to 3
5 to 9 one-half to 1 4 to 10
lOtol9 ltoS 11to25
20 plus 6 to 10 26 plus
Water depth (feet): 11 plus Breaking waves on:
0 to 2 Relationship to land: Bar
3 to 4 High seas Beach
5 to 6 Coastal Shoal
7 plus Inlet Condition:
Wind speed (knots): Bay Daylight
0 to 10 Sound Dusk
11 to 21 Harbor Night
22 to 33 Marsh Fog
34 to 47 River Rain
48 plus Lake Snow
Sleet
Haze
Human, social, and institutional factors.-These factors should describe existing
and anticipated conditions such as human physical capabilities, organizational
responsibilities and boundaries, laws, public expectations, planning rules-of-
thumb, policies, and other factors both inside and outside the Coast Guard which
affect how boats can be used to perform various tasks. For example: lives are to
be saved before property, communications are to be maintained between operating
units and higher commands, district and group boundaries, legal implications of
an improperly positioned aid to navigation, etc.
3. Demand for Boat Services
Historical demand.-Existing program data should be used to develop tables
showing historical utilization of boats in fulfilling program tasks. Data would be
broken into groups that parallel the environmental categories and human, social,
and institutional factors. For example: number of searches for vessels between 10
and 50 miles off-shore in the 12th Coast Guard District, number of trips to
manned lights within bays in the 5th Coast Guard District, etc.
Future demand parameters.-Future demand parameters are those factors that
have been identified for use in transforming historical data to projected data.
There are three types of changes in the marine environment and concepts of
Coast Guard operations that can have an impact on the future demand for boat
services. The first step is to identify and measure those factors which can be
quantified (e.g., extrapolations of the SAR data base). The second step is to
identify and estimate those other factors which cannot be quantified exactly, but
can be roughly estimated to describethe range of possible future conditions (e.g.,
locator beacons to be required by law on all pleasure boats. The third step is to
list other imaginable but not predictable future events (e.g., fuel rationing im-
posed on maritime users).
Future demand estimation.--Future demand is estimated by applying the three
types of parameters to the historical demand. First, the parameters which can
be quantified exactly are applied to the historical demand to project future de-
mand. These projections are spread through the range of secondary parameters.
Lastly, note is made of the speculated effects of the unpredictable future events
upon future demand for Coast Guard boat services.
C. USING REQUIREMENTS TO SELECT RESOURCES
1. Model Development
After the requirements are developed, a methodology is needed to select boats
to carry out the programs. The selection process should result in the most cost-
effective fleet possible. There are, however, a wide choice of boat classes that can
be used to satisfy program objectives. The problem then becomes how to find
the least expensive resources to carry out well defined tasks at explicit levels of
service.
The resource allocation process has two stages in its solution. The preliminary
decision concerns what boats classes should be pre-positioned by assignment to
which shore facilities. The operational decision is what boat should be ~disp~atched
PAGENO="0380"
376
by the officer-in-charge to carry out each task requirement. The model to be devel-
oped cannot resolve the on-the-scene question. This is done by the dispatching
officer applying his judgment based on experience to his knowledge of all factors
affecting the decision, including the preconstrained choice of boats at his station.
Other models, such as Computerized Assisted Search Planning (CASP), are
available to assist in that decision.
Clear definitions of tasks are necessary but they are not always easily described.
For example, multiple tasks can often be carried out simultaneously. Some of
these multiple usages may support the same program while others will support
Tmore than one program. In many other cases, one task requirement precludes use
of the boat for other assignments. There is also an interrupting mode of operation,
where the task is of a routine or scheduled nature, and the other task is an emcrg-
ency or is unscheduled. Provision for interrupting the routine use of the boat can
be made through proper design, outfitting, communications, and training of
~personnel.
In a few instances, the boat may provide an immediate life or property-saving
~elief while waiting for the arrival of a Coast Guard resource better-suited for the
mission. In another case, additional resources or personnel may be delivered to
the boat which is on the scene.
Given that provision can be made for describing these forms of boat task
applications, complete listings of each program's tasks will define the effective-
ness side of the cost-effectiveness equation. The cost side will be determined with
life cycle costing of all existing and proposed boat classes. This is also a method-
ological problem area, but additional analysis will probably result in useful
estimates of costs.
2. Resource Capability Matrix
The Resource Capability Matrix may be the key to the resource allocation
problem as a cost-effectiveness mechanism. It uses a broad list of factors which
describe boat tasks. These capability factors are determined as environmental
conditions, human limitations, and operational capabilities of the boats. The
matrix is shown in Table 111-3. It was originally developed for use in the Search
and Rescue Simulation Model (SARSIM).
The matrix is a binary coded table which indicates the capability of each boat
class to carry out the tasks described with the capability factors listed. The
number "1" is assigned in the body of the table only when a resource can satisfy
the demand attribute. When a boat cannot satisfy the description, the number
"0" is assigned. The task is described by selecting those capability factors needed
for the task. Only those resources that produce a product of "1", when all appli-
cable factors in a vertical boat vector are multiplied, can be assigned to the task
described by that list of attributes. Relative boat costs are to be indicated and
the least expensive boat among those capable of providing the service is assigned.
Sufficient time was not available during this initial study to complete the
development of the matrix as a usable decision making tool. The original proposed
matrix was expanded, however, to include all boat classes discussed in the Plan.
Expert advice was then sought to determine the capability factors applicable
to each boat class.
3. Additional Methodological Problems
Some of the undeveloped aspects of this methodology require additional study.
One concern is how to deal with the geographical and time distribution of demand
for boat services. Another problem area is how to combine demands for scheduled
patrols and response actuated sorties. One possible solution may be in establish-
ing specific minimum levels of response availability based on various thresholds
of expected demand. For example, if expected operations will take place in sea
states over 10 feet during 5% of SAR cases, one 44' MLB must be assigned. Similar
rules could be established concerning availability of suitable resources within
specific distances or response times. Development work will continue in order
to improve the model for use in subsequent boat plans.
Relief boat allowances must then be determined to provide suitable backup
for boats placed out of service due to scheduled overhauls and major casualties.
Relief boats should be assigned to centrally located units to minimize delivery
time. Determination of the ideal numbers, types, classes, and geographical dis-
tributions is to be developed. At present, provision is made for relief boat pro-
curements in the Boat Plan for 44' MLB, 41' UTB, and 30' UTM replacements
where allowances already exist in OPFAC. No reliefs are programmed in the
MRB and PWB procurements since they will be backed up with excess
PAGENO="0381"
377
MSB(SU)'s and relief UTB's in the early years of their introduction to the boat
fleet.
TABLE 111-3.-Resource capability matrix.
CUTTER PLAN
In recent years, the tremendous expansion of recreational boating, the increas-
ing use of small powered vessels for commercial fishing, and the acceptance by
the United States of providing a higher level of assistance to the mariner on the
high seas has created new problems in the Search and Rescue field. The Coast
Guard has responded to these changing maritime patterns by relocating SAR
stations to inlets and bays, by establishing different capacity cutters to assist in
the variety of offshore waters, and by establishing a series of safety oriented
programs such as Merchant Marine Safety, Boating Safety, Port Safety, and
Automated Merchant Vessels Reporting System. Modern managerial methods
are now available to assist in determining the SAR resource mix needed to keep
pace with these changing demands.
C. ECONOMIC
Tangible economic benefits that form a basis for the SAR program are normally
measured in terms of prevention of death and property loss. Less tangible economic
gains for the nation are accomplished by the program's encouragement of recrea-
tional boating and maritime commerce. Practically any maritime activity profits
directly or indirectly from the Coast Guard's SAR program.
III. Resource Capability Required
The specific SAR resource capability required varies from performance of
vessels in direct location and quick recovery to use of rescue craft specially
equipped for long searches. Resource performance is also dependent on environ-
mental factors such as visibility, sea state, temperature, nearness to shoals or
other hazards. In general, High Endurance Cutters and Medium Endurance
Cutters have the endurance and seakeeping capacities to provide SAR at ranges
C'45~LfTY FACTORS
BOAT CLASSES
44'
52'
1,f
L
B
16'
26' 25' 41' 45' 30' 25'
M U U U U U
R S T T T 1'
B B S B M L
32'
w
B
31'
S
B
63' 46' 21'
55' A B T
A 45' N U A
N B B S N
B U0,tOO)L
lB
T
C 16
W SSSAE
A KKKRRT
N BMLCVB
E~!NC~1ENTAL
bet h~5h)
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111
~2
1 0 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 100111
1 0 1
0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 000111
31
319
1 1 1
0 1 1
0 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 006000
006100
*Eo:
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111
E::nh
0 0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111
S'n~
1 1 1
0 0
Vs~' 3npth feet)
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111
32
0 5 1
0 0
0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 111111
:3
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 111111
3:
1 0 0
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111
5r~'
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 11.0111
1 1 1
1 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 000110
0 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 000000
f47
1 0 0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000
45+
1 1 0
0
~:
0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111001
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 000110
3
0 0 0
1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 o00000
4
1 0 0
0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B 600000
5
0 1 0
0 6
Conr+"a~r+ Pc,t:oo
0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 111111
Seat
1 1 0
0
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 000110
3:ndehe)d
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 600110
Ce4Cted
1 1 0
0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 B 0 000110
En~oced
0 1 0
0
NOTE: 1h)s sloe u tease p)annin5 too) and not asa d)recs.e ,B operat:one) commanders,
PAGENO="0382"
378
up to 1000 and up to 300 miles respectively. These cutters provide coverage while
engaged in other missions or while in homeport. Patrol Boat Cutters have endur-
ance and seakeeping characteristics to effectively handle SAR cases up to 100
miles from the coast.
IV. Performance (Mission) /Response Criteria
CRITERIA
1. Program criteria
a. The philosophy of' basing SAR response on "worst case"; i.e. ability to
handle the heaviest workload situation previously encountered or envisioned
could render the use of cutter and personnel resources dysfunctional. A philosphy
of basing SAR response on maximum allowable risk permits planning for resources
within a frame work of acceptable tolerances. The currently accepted value is a
risk not to exceed 3 % failure to respond to serious cases. In some areas 3 % is
considered too high for planning purposes and 1 % has been used.
b. Tolerance time is the waiting time involved upon initial notification of the
Coast Guard to when first Coast Guard resource arrives on scene. Longer tol-
erances result in higher over-all utilization of resources since slower less expensive
resources may be selected. A distress client should be served within a given toler-
ance time which varies with five levels of distress severity. Tolerance time is
established within specific geographical areas based on conditions of survivability
of that area and the guidelines of B-09, B-b of the SAR Report Manual CG-397.
All resources which are capable of serving the needs of the client, under existing
environmental conditions, within the tolerance time are considered equally satis-
factory. It should also be noted that the tolerance time as defined is Coast Guard
criteria and does not fully consider client tolerance. In the eyes of the client, his
tolerance time is a function of when the distress occurred, not when the CG was
notified. The time of occurence is a critical factor in client survival and consequently
has a definite impact on the probability of successfully responding to a given
distress incident. A ranking based on cost is made to select the preferred resources
among those that can meet the tolerance (Ref Tab A).
2. Response criteria
a. A SAR cutter shall be capable of reaching the scene of distress within the
100 to 300 mile zone of the U.S. coast within 36 hours, search for seven days at
15 knots, and return to port with ~a tow. A second cutter of same capability shall
be able to reach the scene within 48 hdurs.
b. A SAR cutter shall be capable of reaching the scene of distress within the
10 to 100 mile zone of the U.S. coast within 12 hours, search for two days at 12
knots and return to port with a tow. A second cutter of same capability shall be
able to reach the scene within 18 hours.
c. No response criteria is specified for distances beyond 300 miles from the
U.S. coast.
3. Demand criteria
a. The density plot of SAR cases illustrates that the major portion of distress
cases, which are responded to by cutters, occurs within the 10 to 100 mile zone
of the U.S. coast.
b. A SAR cutter shall be capable of reaching the scene of 75% of the cases
occurring within 100 miles of the U.S. coat within 12 hours and 90% of the
cases within 18 hours.
c~ A SAR cutter shall be capagle of reaching the scene of 75% of the cases
occuring with 100 to 300 miles of the U.S. coast within 36 hours and 90% of the
cases within 48 hours.
V. Trade-off possibilities
Trade-offs exist among small boats, patrol boat cutters, and helicopters in
many mission areas. The Cutter Issue Study resource selection matrix outlines
the considerations involved when choosing an appropriate resource. It is antici-
pated that the SAR Simulation Model now in use will enable analysts and man-
agers to better evaluate the significance antnd exte of these trade-offs.
VI. Benefit and Effectiveness Rationale
The benefits of the SAR program are the prevention of death and loss of property.
To develop the number of deaths prevented from reported statistics five factors
are combined: (1) the number of lives saved, (2) a percentage of the number of
PAGENO="0383"
379
persons assisted who were reported in severe danger, (3) a lesser percentage of
the number of persons assisted who were in moderate danger, (4) an even smaller
percentage of persons who were in little or no danger, and (5) a percentage of
persons assisted by the Auxiliary. The percentages developed depend on the
probability of loss by assistance that hss not been rendered in the 45 categories
of distress listed in the SAR Reports Manual CG-397.
The value of property loss prevented is considered a percentage of property
which was assisted. Estimated percentages of probable loss, had assistance not
been provided, are assigned to each of the 45 distress categories. The dollar
value of property assisted within each distress category and degree of severity
is obtained from assistance reports.
EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness reflects the degree of success of the SAR program in rendering
aid to persons and property in distress. Effectiveness can be improved by de-
creasing time delays in providing assistance by such methods as (a) earlier de-
tection of distress by better communication systems and search resources, (b)
faster response by increased speed of recovery resources, (c) increased density
of resource facilities. Effectiveness is decreased by increasing clientele without a
proportionate increase in men and facilities. Effectiveness must be examined
with each proposed change in resource assignment or method alteration.
AvIATIoN PLAN
The Maritime Region has been divided into three zones:
1. Long-Range-the areas beyond 300 miles from the coast.
2. Medium Range-the band between 150 and 300 miles from the coast.
3. Coastal and Harbor-this zone includes rivers, bays, and inlets, and ex-
tends 150 miles to seaward.
From the standpoint of where SAR operations are conducted, Assistance Report
Data files provide detailed information as to the specifics of each SAR. case,
including position. Analysis of assistance report files reveals that over 90% of all
assistance calls to which aircraft have responded are located within the Coastal
and Harbor Zone.2
* * * * *
In an effort to determine the validity of the criteria established by the 1967
Aviation Issue Paper in this area, the 1971 Aviation Resources Study examined the
historical performance of aircraft as to compliance with the desired criteria. For
FY 1970, statistics reveal that of all incidents responded to in the Coastal and
Harbor Zone by Coast Guard air facilities, 70.5 per cent could have been reached
by a recovery aircraft in one-half hour and 86.7 per cent could have been reached
in one hour. Appendix A-8 presents a tabular illustration of this analysis.
Coverage factor-The Coast Guard's re~ponsibility for providing aid to persons
and property and distress over vast ocean areas was previously discussed and is
illustrated in Figure SAR-1. To meet this offshore responsibility, there exists a
requirement for the Coast Guard to operate long and medium range SAR
aircraft capable of reaching distress incidents anywhere within the prescribed
areas.
As a result of the foregoing considerations, the following SAR mission criteria
have been established.
1. Each SAR aviation unit shall be provided one aircraft system capable of
immediate response to a distress incident. A second alert system shall be provided
for those units at which the queue demand is such that two systems are required'
outside of normal working hours nine or more times per year.
2. SAR aviator units shall, within the Harbor and Coastal Zone, be capable
of flying to the scene of 75 per cent of the assistance cases within one-half hour
and 90 per cent within one hour and be capable of recovering (rescuing) persons
in distress.
3. The SAR aviation forces shall provide aircraft capable of reaching any point
within the maritime areas of SAR responsbility and rendering some form of aid
to persons in distress.
1 Aviation Issue Paper, September 1961, Volume I, pg. 5, USCG Headquarters, Office of
Operations.
2 Ibid., pg. 7.
`Ibid., pg. IV-63 tliru 65.
`78-2S0-76----25
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Those areas which appeared to he inadequately serviced in accordance with the
preceding coverage and response criteria were subjected to further scrutiny.
Where indicated, the Search and Rescue Simulation Model (SARSIM) was exer-
cised on a selective basis to provide information as to the potential utilization of
aircraft in areas showing an apparent need. The model is able to present a "before
and after" evaluation which compares responses of a theoretical air station with
those of existing adjacent resources, both surface and air. When the results of this
comparison showed that aircraft could be utilized to provide an improved SAR
response capability, those areas were subjectively evaluated from the standpoint
of potential response to other program requirements. When the results of these
multiprogram considerations indicated that it would be advantageous to do so,
new units were included in implementation plans.
For ease of analysis and to ensure that consideration was given to the complex
interrelationships resulting from aircraft procurement, aircraft relocation and
establishment of new units, all air stations were considered on an annual basis.
Accordingly, the following paragraphs described the development of requirements
on a year-by-year basis, starting with FY 1974.
Question. In 1974 Coast Guard Authorization Hearings Admiral Bender
furnished this Committee with a table showing "times necessary to provide
surface, fixed wing, and/or helicopter response to the furthest point in the
Beaver Island, Munising, Portage, and Isle Royale areas." I have a copy for your
perusal-can the Coast Guard still meet those response times?
TIMES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE SURFACE, FIXED WING, AND/OR HELICOPTER RESPONSE TO THE "FURTHEST"
POINT IN THE BEAVER ISLAND, MUNISING, PORTAGE, AND ISLE ROYALE AREAS
Craft Beaver Island Musising Portage 1 Portage 2 Isle Royale
Surface 2h 1h 51 mm 2h 50 mis 5h 18 mm 5h 32 mis.
Fixed wing 33 mm lh lh 18 mis lh 29 mm lh 41 mis.
Helicopter 57 mis lh 53 mis 2h 31 mis 2h 54 mis 3h 18 mis.
1 Keweesaw Bay.
2 Offshore of western end of Keweesaw Waterway.
Answer. Our ability to respond within a given time to a call within a specified
area depends on weather conditions enroute and whether or not the available
rescue unit is involved in another case when the call is received. If a unit is already
underway in an area closer to the case than the home base and/or if it is blessed
with favorable winds, the response can be quicker than planned. The opposite
conditions would cause a slower response. The times shown in the table Admiral
Bender provided are based on normal cutter, boat and aircraft speeds and they
assume departure from homeport or air station. Given conditions which permit
realizing those speeds and departure from the same points, we can meet those times
today.
Question. Do you consider the single Coast Guard vessel for Lake Superior at
Duluth, Minnesota, capable of meeting established criteria and response times?
Answer. The 180-ft buoy tender whose homeport is Duluth, the cutter WOOD-
RUSH, is not capable of reaching cases in the eastern part of Lake Superior in
a timely fashion unless she is underway in the Lake when a call is received. How-
ever, we do not rely solely on WOODRUSH for Lake Superior surface coverage.
We have several other units capable of responding in all but the most extremely
severe weather. We have 44-foot motor lifeboats in Duluth and Marquette and
another is in the FY 77 budget to replace the 36-foot boat at Grand Marais,
Michigan. We have 41-foot rescue boats at Bayfield, Wisconsin and the Soo.
And we have a 40-foot boat at Duluth and a 30-foot boat at the Soo. We also
have the 110-foot tug NAUGATUCK at the Soo. When it is replaced by the first
of the new 140-foot tugs that have been authorized, we will have heavy weather
capability at both ends of the Lake.
Question. Would you not consider the assignment of another vessel to a more
central location warranted today?
Answer. To increase our heavy weather capability in mid-Lake Superior we
have recently moved a 44-foot lifeboat to Marquette, Michigan. Last year we also
considered proposing that an even larger vessel be added. It would not be feasible
to move WOODRUSH because her primary mission is aids to navigation and she
needs the logistics support available in Duluth. There is now no other vessel we
could move that would be more capable than the 44-footer, which, I might add,
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381
is a~ very capable boat. We are presently giving serious thought to suggesting that
one of the new 140-footers be homeported in a port like Marquette or Munising.
Question. Is not the northern reaches of Lake Huron in need of additional
attention-in view of the gap between the stations at Tawas and St. Ignace
that was once covered by two former Lifeboat Stations?
Answer. The two stations have been closed for more than 25 years, so it is
difficult to draw any parallels between operational need when they were open
and now. Analysis of 1974 and 1975 cases in the area between lines 15 miles north
of East Tawas Station and 15 miles east of St. Ignace Station shows the following
experieflce
1974.-32 cases (at least 5 of which were false alarms) 7 were "severe" (4 others
that were treated as "severe" turned out to be false alarms) 12 were handled by
air, 3 were medical evacuations, 13 were disabled small craft, and 5 were "overdues."
1975.-29 cases (at least 3 of which were false alarms) 7 were "severe" (1 other
that was treated as "severe" turned out to be a false alarm), 11 were handled
by air, 7 were medical evacuations, 3 were disabled small craft, and 9 were
"overdues."
Most of the cases were within 30 miles of East Tawas. There is an Auxiliary
flotilla at Alpena but it has not been necessary to call on them for emergency
assistance.
This case experience does not warrant the large expense of establishing a station
between St. Ignace and East Tawas.
Question. What, if any, special detection equipment is carried aboard Coast
Guard search aircraft assigned to the Great Lakes region?
Answer. Aircraft regularly assigned to the Great Lakes area have no specialized
detection equipment. We do have NIGHT-SUN illumination on helicopters
and radar on the HU-16E aircraft.
Question. How does NIGHT-SUN illuminating equipment work?
Answer. The NIGHT-SUN is an illumination device manufactured by the
Spectrolab Division of Textron, Inc. which consists of a high intensity xenon
light of 3.8 million candlepower. It is mounted on the port side of Coast Guard
helicopters only when needed as its weight of 65 lbs. would be a burden during
daylight flights or when it cannot be used. It can be installed on the helicopter
in 3 to 7 minutes when needed. The light is trainable ahead, astern, to the left,
and to some degree beneath the helicopter to its right side. Either the crewman
in the cabin controls the light with a portable toggle switch or the co-pilot controls
it with a fixed toggle switch. The beam diameter on the surface of the water
(or land) when the helicopter is at 500 feet is a maximum of 166 feet 8 inches.
From a 1000 foot helicopter altitude its beam diameter is 333 feet 4 inches.
Question. Are all search aircraft so equipped?
Answer. No. We have equipment for one HH52-A helicopter at each Air Station.
The device can be readily transferred from one helicopter to another, so we always
have NIGHT-SUN capability with the ready helicopter.
Question. In two recent drowning cases in Green Bay and off Eagle 1-larbor
in Lake Superior, lives were lost that might have been averted if sophisticated
electronic detection equipment was available. The Commandant has indicated to
me that this was an on-going Reserch and Development effort. Can you advise
of the status of this development project?
Answer. Research and Development of the following equipment has progressed
as shown for each:
Forward looking radar for the new Medium Range Search (MRS) aircraft
in the final operational test phase.
Active gated television (AGTV) . . . under development.
Wide area illumination system (WAILS) for the HI1-3F helicopter . . . under
development.
Forward looking infra-red (FLIR) for helicopters . . . specification ready for
prototype to be contracted for in Fiscal Year 1977.
Infrared/ultra violet line scanner . . . being developed.
Question. I have heard that the Coast Guard has a detection package ready to
go aboard its proposed new medium surveillance aircraft. Can you describe this
equipment, its expected effectiveness and its availability?
Answer. Detection capability planned for the new medium range search (MRS)
aircraft is as follows:
All aircraft will have a new forward looking radar for weather and collision
avoidance and search. It will be a quantum improi~ement over present equipment,
which has very limited surface detection capability. The new unit is designed to
provide search capability as well as flight safety functions.
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Selected aircraft will also have a sensor package called Aireye installed. I believe.
this is the package your question alludes to.
Aireye is a remote, all weather, day/night, wide area, airborne surveillance.
system with the capability to detect, map and identify and document targets.
The system consists of the following:
Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR),
SLAR provides long range, day/night, all-weather detection of oil, ship/boat,
ice and aids to navigation targets. SLAR will also be capable of recording the
radar picture to provide hard copy for further operational review and/or for
documentation.
infrared/ultraviolet line scanner (IR/ UV-L5),
IR/TJV-LS confirms the presence of oil and maps the real entent of oil pollutants
and when combined with some ground measurement reference~ provides an abso-
lute surface thermal temperature map. It also can be used to discriminate between
various targets (i.e., the ability to distinguish icebergs from ships or oil from
kelp beds).
Aerial Reconnaissance Camera (ARC),
The ARC, during day time only, provides hard copy photographic evidence
which can be used to identify targets of interest.
Active gated television (AGTV),
The AGTV provides a recordable day/night target identification; classification,
and activity determination capability.
Airborne Data Annotation System (ADAS),
ADAS annotates SLAR, IR/TJV-LS, ARC and AGTY with aircraft position
and other enforcement data.
Control, Display and Record Console (CDRC),
The CDRC acts as the nerve center for the system. It controls, displays and
records all sensor generated data. The individual sensors which comprise AIRE YE
each satisfy a portion of the total system performance requirements. Each sensor
has limitations of weather penetration or day/night or target type detection
capability. The integrated combination of the sensor provides complimentary
performance to meet desired requirements.
Question. What are the plans for replacement of the Traverse City HU-lo.
search aircraft?
Answer. The HU-16E aircraft at Traverse City will be replaced with an equal
number of fixed wing aircraft as part of the Coast Guard program to acquire a new
medium range .search (MRS) plane. The planned date of replacement depends on
progress in the overall program.
Question. What are the plans for replacement of the aging 1111-52 helicopters
assigned to the Ninth Coast Guard District?
Answer. The HH-52A helicopters at our three Air Stations will be replaced by
an equal number of short range recovery (SRR) aircraft as part of the Coast
Guard program to acquire replacements for all its HH-52A helicopters. The actual'
date of replacement depends on when the overall Coast Guard program starts.
Question. What is the extent of Coast Guard Auxiliary coverage of the Great
Lakes Search-and Rescue region? Of Coast Guard Reserve contribution to this
effort?
Answer. On the Great Lakes we have one of the most extensive, active and
dedicated group of Auxiliarists in the entire Coast Guard. There are 5,500 of them
and they provide over 1,700 vessels, 40 aircraft and 105 radio stations. Last yearS
they responded to 2,222 SAR cases, saving 163 lives and over $1,300,000 worth of
property. Auxiliarists man seasonal stations during peak boating periods at Sodus
Point, NY, Sackets Harbor, NY, Munising, MI, Portage, MI, South Haven, MI,
and North Superior, MN.
We also have three seasonal stations manned full-time by Coast Guard Reserv-
ists. But that is only part of what our Reservists contribute. Reservists in my
District are also among the most dedicated and active in the Coast Guard. In
addition to manning the three stations they also augment regular personnel at
stations and in boats during peak periods and for special needs.
Question. Should Auxiliary strength decline, as I understand may be the caseS
in a few locations such as Munising, what regular Coast Guard forces are avail- -
able to fill the void?
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Answer. Our Auxiliary forces in most areas are pretty stable. We do experience
`èhanges, of course, as individual members come and go. When strength declines
in a relatively isolated area like Munising, we do not have any regular forces that
can fill the void at the site itself. We rely on the nearest regular stations for boats
to handle the surface portion of searches and long range cases, and we count on
`the local police or sheriff or volunteers to help with localcases. As a long range
solution, however, we try to restore the Auxiliary Flotilla to its needed strength
through local recruiting and training.
Question. Do all rescue stations have the* modern 44-foot motor lifeboats at-
tached?
Answer. 22 of our 40 year-round stations have 44-foot MLB's assigned. An-
other-Grand Marais, MI has an older version, a 36-footer. It will be replaced by
the 44-footer which is in the FY77 budget.
Question. If not, why not?
Answer. The extra expense of providing the special capability of the 44-footer
to work in heavy seas is not warranted in all our areas. Some of our busiest sta-
tions are in relatively protected waters. They need the greater speed and fiexi-
`bility of our 30, 40 and 41 ft boats more. Examples of these stations are Belle
`Isle on the Detroit River; Alexandria Bay on the St. Lawrence River and St.
~C1air Flats on the St. Clair River.
There are other stations in more exposed areas that don't have 44-footers he-
cause they are near stations that do. By alternating we can provide the benefits
of both types of boats in a general area and still have but one boat at a station
when that is all the workload warrants. An example of this is Grand Haven, MI,
which is between Muskegon and Holland, each of which has a 44-footer.
Question. How effective are the helicopter services provided by other military
agencies as an adjunct to youi State and Rescue mission? I recall that an Air
Force helicopter dispatched to the recent Eagle Harbor drowning incident was
unable to remain on scene due to high winds and that it did not appear to have
searchlight equipment?
Answer. The effectiveness of helicopter services provided by other military
agencies is somewhat limited by their design and intended mission. The heli-
copters at K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base and those assigned to the 316th Army
Air Detachment in Cleveland are quite small. Their primary missions are search
and rescue over land in moderate weather and medical evacuation. They are not
designed or intended for lengthy searches over water and are not equipped with
suitable illumination equipment for over water searches at night.
Question. Are all Coast Guard-manned units provided with a boat or some kind
`for emergency use-even if by the public-including Light Stations such as
Eagle Harbor?
Answer. All operational Coast Guard-manned units are provided with a boat
of some kind except Auxiliary operated stations. Recruiting offices, and other
primarily administrative units are not equipped with boats. We do not allow the
`public to operate Coast Guard boats.
Question. If not, why not?
Answer. Units that do not have boats assigned are those whose missions do
not require waterborne activities-either for direct operations or logistics. Units
`that do have boats assigned have boats of types that are compatible with their
need.
We do not allow anyone, public or Coast Guard, to operate a Coast Guard
boat unless he or she is trained and qualified in the use of that boat and the mission
`for which it is to be used. If there is a Coast Guard boat at a unit, there are people
there to use it, so there would be no need to call upon a member of the public to
operate one of our boats for us.
Question. In an earlier exchange of communications from the Coast Guard I was
`advised that one of the new 140-foot icebreaking tugs would he stationed at the
Soo instead of in Lake Superior. Is this advisable from a SAR standpoint in the
light of transit time through the Locks and Upper St. Marys River to a likely point
of distress?
Answer. In selecting a homeport for a vessel the size of the 140-footers we must
`use sites that are in reasonable proximity to primary operating areas and which
can provide adequate logistics for the ship, residences for families of the crew and
morale and recreation for the crew. Unfortunately, in the eastern end of Lake
Superior and Whitefish Bay, the areas of greatest SAR concern for Soo-based
`ships, there is no community except the Soo that can provide adequate homeport
facilities. We are looking very closely at the possibility of also putting a 140-footer
in Lake Superior-probably in Marquette. This would complement the ship at
~the Soo.
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Question. A communication from Kewaunee, Wisconsin, made a comparison
between war time days and today when the number of pleasure-bound fishing
vessels has mushroomed with no available rescue boat. Can you comment on
this scene?
Answer. Recreational boating and pleasure fishing are burgeoning all over the
Great Lakes-in many areas at an even greater rate than Kewaunee, WI.
Fortunately most of the areas of greatest activity have Coast Guard stations well
situated to provide coverage. While we do not have a station withrescue capability
in Kewaunee, we do have one at Two Rivers, about 24 miles to the south, and
another at Sturgeon Bay Canal, about 30 miles to the north. Neither has had a
particularly heavy caseload.
Question. What is the status of studies relating to survival of vessel crews?
(Consider exposure protection, distress alert; detection, man overboard alarms,
protective clothing, evacuation techniques.)
Answer. The below listed studies are completed and are available to the public:
a. Climatological and Environmental Factors that Influence Surivval on the
Great Lakes-C G-D-1 1-74
b. Evaluation of Survival Suits for the Use of the Crews of the Great Lakes
Carriers-CG-D-14-73
c. Assessment of the Requirement for Survival on the Great Lakes-CG-D--
55-74
d. Man Overboard Feasibility Study-C G-D-75-75
e. Man in Cold Water: Cooling Rate in Heavy Winter Clothing-University
of Victoria
f. Treatment of Accidental Hypothermia: An Experimental Study of Inhala-
tion Rewarming-University of Victoria
The below listed studies are in progress:
a. Test and Evaluation of Three Escape System
b. Development, Test and Evaluation of A Self-Encapsulating liferaft.
c. Testing and Evaluation of Portable Hand Held Radar Transponders to
Enhance the Aerial Detection of Small Survival Craft.
d. Investigation of Concepts to Define an Inclined Plane Launch System that
can be Used to Deploy, Fully Loaded, A Recovery Boat or Survived Craft
directly from the Deck of a Merchant Vessel.
e. A study to Address the Viability of Designing Survival Systems that will
Reliably Float Free from a Vessel as it Sinks.
f. Testing of VHF-FM EPIRB's in The Winter Environment to Determine
Effectiveness and Limitations in Performance.
g. A Sociological Examination to Investigate added Stress Factors to which
Personnel Participating in Winter Navigation are Subjected.
Question. What crew safety and survival activities have been tested and studied
under the auspices of the navigation season extension demonstration program?
(See Page 61, 62 of Demonstration Report.)
Answer. The work program continues to bear heavily on the four most needed
areas of survival-individual exposure protection, group exposure protection,
distress alert and detection enhancement, and man overboard alarm.
Activities in individual exposure protection saw the prototype constant-wear
exposure jacket developed by the Naval Air Development Center delivered for
evaluation with the enhanced survival module tested in summer. Determination
of survival times in cold water while wearing typical seaman's winter clothing
was conducted by the University of Victoria under the direction of the noted
physiologist, Dr. John Hayward. Further, pamphlets describing the latest in-
formation and techniques for survival in cold water will be distributed to the
crews this next winter season.
Activities in the early alert and detection enhancement area included an
exercise held last December 1974 with four Coast Guard personnel set adrift in
a raft in Lake Huron to test the effectiveness of a radar transponder and other
equipment. That test was highly successful. A follow on to that is the distribution
of a new radar transponder to several ships in the fleet for evaluation. Further
testing was conducted in Lake Erie in April 1976.
Efforts in group exposure protection continue to track with the Coast Guards
own major work. A contract has been let with the U.S. Naval Academy to deter-
mine the feasibility of the concepts of launching a survival or rescue vehicle down
a ramp or inclined plane to the water and float-off survival craft capability where
the ship abandons the survival craft. The results of these initial studies will be
available in the fall of 1976.
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385
In the previous fiscal year program, a feasibility study to determine the viability
of a man overboard alarm system was made and concluded that two different
techniques were viable. Accordingly, a contract has been let this year which will
settle on a particular design.
Lastly, while not directly related to the above work, but within the charter of
the subcommittee, a contract was let to complete the study of the psychological
and sociological impact of the extended season on the personnel working in the
extended season. This study was initiated last fiscal year.
Question. Have any special studies been conducted with regard to survival time
in cold water and the contribution that special winter clothing would have in
prolonging life?
Answer. Yes. "Man in Cold Water: Cooling rate in Heavy Winter Clothing", a
study and report done by J. S. Hayward, J. D. Eckerson and M. L. Collis of the
Departments of Biology and Physical Education, University of Victoria, Victoria,
Canada.
Studies are continuing in cooperation with Canadian Defense Forces and the
Australian Air Force.
Question. Describe any other techniques or procedures that such studies may
have disclosed for prolonging life?
Answer. Life in cold water may be prolonged by: (a) Reducing activity, (b)
Bringing the body into a tight position to cover the high heat loss areas of the
crotch, arm pits, neck; and (c) Tightening and gathering clothing to cover the
above mentioned areas.
These items are fully explained in the Cold Water Survival Pamphlet which is
to be printed and distributed to all the Great Lakes Merchant Seamen.
Question. Is accidental hypothermia a problem in cold weather and water
environment?
Answer. Yes, it is a common and serious problem which has been the subject of
considerable study in recent years. It results from the rapid rate of cooling which
occurs when the human body is immersed in cold water or is exposed to extremes
of cold air in accidents ashore.
Question. What studies have been made and what procedures developed to cope
with this.
Answer. "Treatment of Accidental Hypothermia: An Experimental Study of
Inhalation Rewarming." A study and report done by Professor J. S. Hayward,
A. M. Steinman, of the Department of Biology, University of Victoria under
Coast Guard Contract and completed in June 1975. The methods and techniques.
developed in that study are now being tested and refined by the Canadian Armed
Services and the Australian Air Force.
Question. I understand that the American Bureau of Shipping increased draft.
marks for Lake vessels in 1973-with a reduction in freeboard. What adverse
effect might this have had on vessel structural integrity?
Answer. To be allowed an increased draft under the 1973 amendments to the
Load Line Regulations a vessel had to meet the Federal Strength Standard at the
new draft, the Standard being 10% or more greater than the A.B.S. standard for
vessels over 710 feet in length.
In that the strength standard is a factor of both length and depth, a greater
requirement was imposed at a greater draft. This prohibited some vessels from
obtaining a deeper draft and required other vessels to add strength members to
obtain approval for the new drafts.
Additionally vessels approved for the new drafts had to remove any square
hatch corners, have single piece hatch covers, update all structures to meet the
1973 scantling requirements, and provide for the use of the master and mates an
approved loading manual.
The total effect actually improved the overall structural integrity of the vessels
affected.
Question. Are any regulations or plans under consideration for critical stress
points of a vessel's hull?
Answer. This problem is still under study through Coast Guard and ABS.
sponsorship in the Society of Naval Architects and panels hull strength-i and hull
strength-2 and through the studies sponsored by the Ship's Structure Committee..
No regulations are presently contemplated.
Question. What lifesaving equipment regulations, if any, does the Coast Guard
contemplate issuing for Great Lakes vessels? (See Federal Register for June 7,.
1976).
Answer. The Coast Guard is considering proposing amendments to the regula-
tions governing lifesaving equipment on vessels operating on the Great Lakes.
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386
The proposals under consideration include requirements concerning the following
subjects:
a. Lifeboat exposure protection.
b. Lifeboat maneuverability.
c. Survival craft availability.
d. Launching of survival craft from stowed positions.
e. Lifeboat capability to float free automatically from a sinking vessel.
f. Personal exposure protection.
g. Communications equipment on survival craft.
h. Lights and reflectorized materials.
i. Standards for equipment substituted for required equipment.
Use of equipment proposed in this notice should improve chances for survival
following a casualty requiring vessel abandonment.
Question. What plans does the Coast Guard have for placing Emergency
Position Indicating Radio Beacons aboard Great Lakes vessels?
Answer. The Coast Guard is presently developing a portable battery operated
EPIRB which will be suitable for storage and use in cold environments. The
Coast Guard is also actively engaged with the FCC relating to frequency designa..
i~ions for those devices.
Question. Is it feasible for all new Great Lakes ship designs to have crew
quarters above the waterline? Above the main deck? I have been advised that
when loaded some living spaces are below the waterline.
Answer. Current construction regulations for Great Lakes vessels require the
deck of the crews quarters to be above the deep load water line. This has been a
specific point of review prior to allowing any increase in draft under the 1973
Load Line amendments.
Since the period on new construction began with the designs of the Cort and
the Blough in 1968, all new Great Lakes vessels have been designed with all the
crews quarters above the weather deck.
Question. Do all automated Light Stations have an emergency generator and/or
battery-powered system as a backup?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What consideration has been given to additional watertight subdivi-
sions for bulk Great Lakes freighters? (See Morreii Marine Board of Investigation.)
Answer. The status of recommendation 9 made by the Marine Board of In-
vestigation involving the Daniel J. Morrell regarding watertight integrity and
subdivision is as follows:
The development of subdivision requirements for cargo vessels, both dry cargo
ships and tankships, was given consideration by the Coast Guard following the
loss of the Morrell. Draft regulations were prepared for cargo vessels in 1970 and
1971. These draft regulations were carefully evaluated within the Coast Guard
and discussed in relations to international application with the appropriate
United States SOLAS Working Groups. On the basis of their evaluation and
discussions and in light of the preparatory work being done for the 1973 Pollution
Convention relative to subdivision further development work on these draft
regulations was suspended.
Emphasis was then placed on presenting the topic of subdivision requirements
to the Joint U.S./Canadian Technical Committee for Great Lakes Load Lines.
This committee was considering revisions for the updating of the 1935 Great
Lakes Load Line Regulations. This portion of their work extended from 1969 to
1973. After careful evaluation of what little agreement could be obtained within
this Committee, the Coast Guard felt that the partial requirements which could
be imposed would not only be inadequate but would create a false sense of safety.
Therefore, further efforts along this avenue of approach were suspended.
Subdivision regulations for new tankships have been placed into effect by recent
regulatory action. The regulations affect both ocean and Great Lakes tankships
and tank barges.
At the present time, the matter of subdivision for dry cargo ships is an item on
the agenda of the IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision, Stability and Load Lines.
No specific studies have been conducted into the possibility of altering existing
Great Lakes vessels to provide subdivision.
Question. What action has been taken to require mechanical disengaging ap..
paratus for lifeboats suspended from Great Lakes vessel davits? (See Bradley
Marine Board of Investigation)
Answer. 46 CFR 94.10-5(a)(4)(i), 46 CFR 33.lO-l5(a) and 46 CFR 75.10-5
(a)(6)(i) have been modified to require that each lifeboat on all Great Lakes
vessels of over 3000 gross tons be fitted with mechanical disengaging apparatus.
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387
In accordance with 44 CFR 75.10-90 and 46 CFR 94.10-90 existing common hook
installations may be continued in service so long as they are maintained in good
condition for vessels contracted prior to May 26, 1965. However, all new installa-
tions or major replacements shall meet the requirements of an approved mechanical
disengaging apparatus constructed in accordance with Subpart 160.033 of Sub-
chapter Q.
Question.. Have you reviewed the five (5) principal recommendations of the
1959 Marine Board of Investigation into the foundering of the Steamer Bradle~j
and, if so, can you advise to what extent they have been accomplished?
Answer. Recommendation l.-The recommendation that all life preservers be
provided with crotch straps to hold the jacket down on the body and with a
collar to support the head out of the water was not concurred with by the Com-
mandant of the Coast Guard. Leg or crotch straps are not considered desirable
on approved life preservers because of the added complications and time element
involved in donning and adjusting.
Recommendation 2.-46 CFR 94.10-40(a) and 46 CFR 94.15-10(c)(3) have
been modified to require two approved inflatable liferafts for every Great Lakes
vessel of 300 gross tons and over, when crew, berthing, and/or working spaces are
widely separated. The capacity and location of the liferafts shall be to the satis-
faction of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.
Recommendation 3.-Please refer to my answer to the previous question.
Recommendation 4.-46 CFR 94.20-15(a), 46 CFR 94.20-10(a), 46 CFR
33.15-10(a), and 46 CFR 75.20-15(a) have been modified to require two painters
on all Great Lakes vessels.
Recommendation 5.-46 CFR 94.20-10(a), 46 CFR 94.20-20(a), 46 CFR
94.20-15(hh), 46 CFR 94.20-25(n), 46 CFR 33.15-5(a), 46 CFR 33.15-15(a),
46 CFR 75.20-10(a) and 46 CFR 75.20-20(a) have been modified to require at
least six red parachute type flare distress signals and the means to project them on
each lifeboat and liferaft on Great Lakes vessels.
Question. Have you reviewed the eleven (11) principal recommendations of the
1967 Marine Board of Investigation into the sinking of the Steamer Morreli,
the Commandant's Action, and additional recommendations of the National
Transportation Safety Board and, if so, can you advise to what extent they have
been implemented?
Answer. The status of actions on the principal recommendations of the Morreil
Board and the Commandant's Action is as follows:
* Recommendations 1 and 2.-46 CFR 94.10-40(a) and 46 CFR 33.05-20(c)
have been modified to require the forward and aft liferafts to be of the inflatable
type and to provide for 100 percent capacity for Great Lakes cargo and tank
vessels of 300 gross tons and over.
Recommendation 3a.-Regulations as recommended have been implemented
and a separate source of power close to the radio telephone and well above the
water line is required for Great Lakes vessels.
Recommendation 3b.-Requirement for an emergency radio with self-contained
source of power was incorporated in the Great Lakes Radio Telephone Agree-
ment between Canada and the United States.
Recommendation 3c.-The U.S. Coast Guard promulgated rules and regulations
on 18 March 1974 which required certain inspected vessels in ocean and coastwise
service to carry an emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB). The
Coast Guard has supported the use of EPIRB's for many years. However, it was
* not until several major marine casualties occurred that opposition to the carriage
of EPIRB equipment, principally from the U.S. Air Force who feared that the
radio beacon might disrupt the use of 243 MKz as a military emergency channel,
could be overcome. As a compromise measure it was necessary to limit the number
of vessels which would be required to carry the radio beacon. It was determined
that the device would be most beneficial to those vessels operating beyond the
range of VHF radio distress coverage. Consequently the regulations did not extend
to vessels transmitting the Great Lakes where VHF radio distress coverage is
considered adequate.
Recommendation 4.-A structural examination was made of all Great Lakes
vessels constructed prior to 1948. Details of this special examination are on file
at Commander Ninth Coast Guard District (mmt). (Report of Structural exami-
nations of Great Lakes Bulk Carriers dated 21 June 1968).
Recommendation 5.-Requiring the owner or operator of each Great Lakes
Bulk Carrier to furnish the Master a loading manual which shows the effect of
various loaded and ballasted conditions upon longitudinal bending moments
including the effects of dynamic forces of free water in cargo holds has been
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implemented. All vessels built after January 1970 are required, as a condition of
classification by the American Bureau of Shipping, to have a Loading Manual.
Recommendation. Ga.-46 CFR 113.25 has been amended to require all Great
Lakes freighters contracted for on or after November 19, 1952 to have an approved
general alarm system as called for.
Recommendation 6b.-No Coast Guard action has been taken to require separate
sources of power at each end of the vessel for the general alarm. After the sinking
of the Daniel J. Morreil, the Commandant reviewed the question of a general
alarm system at each end of the vessel so that if the circuit should be broken due to
a casualty, the forward and after general alarm could be operated independently.
After review of this question, it was determined that the complications of the
-system proposed were not engineeringly feasible.
Recommendation 7.-46 CFR 97.15-20 (Hatches and other Openings) requires a
vessel's Master to make his hatches watertight before leaving protected waters.
Recommendation 8.-A 24 hour interval reporting system was initiated after
-the sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell and remained in effect for approximately a
three to four year period after which it was felt by the marine industry and the
Coast Guard that it was not an effective system nor served its intended purpose.
As the result of this, the program fell into disuse.
Recommendation 9.-Action taken on this recommendation, which pertains to
additional watertight subdivisions for bulk Great Lakes freighters, was discussed
in my previous answer on that specific subject.
Recommendation 10.-The National Weather Service (then the U.S. Weather
Bureau) immediately initiated all the provisions of this recommendation into their
marine weather broadcasts after the sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell.
Recommendation 11.-Specifications require that signal pistols be constructed
as recommended by the Board. Coast Guard field inspectors were advised to
check signal pistols and a letter to manufacturers was sent advising manufacturers
of a need to adequately secure screws joining the two major component groups
-of many signal pistols.
The status of actions on Recommendations of the National Transportation
Safety Board in the Morrell case is as follows:
Recommendation A.-All Great Lakes vessels were examined to see that they
were structurally sound, in all respects, for operation upon the Great Lakes.
Those vessels found to have deficiencies were required to make permanent repairs
prior to certification of the vessel, and in one instance a vessel was required to be
taken out of service.
A program was initiated to inspect 25 percent of the internals (double bottoms)
-at each winter layup period. This would insure that at the end of the five-year
-period when all internals (double bottoms) are required to be inspected, that we
would have a structural history of the overall condition of the vessel's structural
and nonstructural members.
A program was initiated to inspect Great Lakes vessels in way of the cargo
hatches, hatch comings, bounding angles, and stringers during the operating
season to insure/detect that no cracks are propagated from these highly stressed
-areas.
Recommendation B.-Great Lakes vessels are inspected each year and only
issued a Certificate of Inspection for a period of one year. Any deficiencies or
-areas that require a special renewal program are brought to the owner's/operator's
-attention at this time and appropriate plans are sbumitted to the Commander,
Ninth Coast Guard District (mmt) for review.
Question. I understand that your SLAR or side-looking airborne radar system
provides radar images of ice on the Great Lakes on a near real-time basis-please
-describe in laymen's terms how this system works?
Answer. SLAR uses an elongated antenna and phased (vertical/horizontal
polarity) electronic signals to produce radar images of high resolution, so high
in fact, that a 1-inch ice edge is discernible out to the maximum detection range
of the radar. A trained ice observer can readily recognize ice formations in the
SLAR images. SLAR pictures show images out to 27 nautical miles on either side
of the aircraft. A Coast Guard HC-130-B aircraft is equipped with SLAR. The
-system works like this:
1. The aircraft transmits the electronic SLAR signal and receives the reflected
echos.
2. While a photograph negative is being produced aboard the aircraft, the
SLAR information is electronically beamed to the NOAA GOES satellite in a
synchronous orbit about the earth.
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3. The satellite relays the SLAR information to a NASA receiver at Wallops
Island, Virginia. The information is then transmitted to the Coast Guard Ice
Navigation Center in Cleveland by telephone line.
4. At the Ice Navigation Center SLAR image pictures are produced from the
signals.
5. Coast Guard Marine Science Technicians interpret the SLAR images and
produce ice charts.
6. The ice charts are sent by facsimile recording equipment to a commercial
marine radio station, several Coast Guard stations, other government agencies,
and the Canadian Coast Guard.
7. Vessels may obtain the facsimile pictures from the commercial marine radio
station broadcast or pick them up in person from a Coast Guard unit.
It takes about three hours for the entire process to take place.
Question. Can you furnish some representatives pictures with interpretative
data for the record?
Answer. Yes, attached are the following:
1. Figure 1: The presentation which is received from the aircraft via the
GOES satellite.
2. Figure 2: A facsimile reproduction of the transmission from the aircraft (2a)
and the ice chart (2b).
3. Figure 3: Photograph reproduction obtained from the aircraft after it has
returned.
Note: Figure 1 is not the same geographical location as figures 2 and 3.
~The figures were placed in the committee files.]
Question. Does the Coast Guard Ice Navigation Center superimpose recom-
mended routing or track lines on the SLAR image pictures? If not, why not-at
least in an advisory capacity?
Answer. No, we do not superimpose recommended routings on the SLAR
pictures. Selection of courses for a particular voyage is a responsibility that
belongs to the master of the vessel-and to him alone. It depends on weather
(including predicted ice locations), vessel loading, handling characteristics, etc.
Much of the information to do the job is snore readily available to the master
than to Ice Navigation Center personnel, who, in addition, are not experienced
in sailing lakers. Furthermore, SLAR images portray the situation as it was some
3 hours before. To select track lines one must predict where the ice will be when
a vessel arrives in a given area. This depends on wind conditions and changes.
Experienced masters of Great Lakes vessels are far better equipped to make the
necessary assessments of future wind effects than our Ice Navigation Center
Personnel.
Instead of trying to recommend specific routings, we think it better to provide
as much detailed information as possible to the master, including advice on how
to interpret the SLAR images. We also provide interpreted ice chartlets for him.
He can than add this information to other data he has, including personal observa-
tion at the scene, and plan his voyage according to his experienced, professional
assessment of the whole.
Question. What other applications have been developed for SLAR that would
contribute to safety of navigation?
Answer. SLAR has some limitations as a search and detection device-primarily
because it must be complemented by some other means to identify targets sighted.
However, some applications besides ice imagery are being explored and some are
in use. SLAR in used for iceberg detection by the Coast Guard's International
Ice Patrol. Other possibilities being looked at are detection of small objects in
the water, wide-path search to speed location of targets of all sizes and aerial
surveillance.
Question. To what degree does Loran-C now serve the Great Lakes?
Answer. For all practical purposes Lora.n-C is not used on the Great Lakes. It
is possible to get a line of position using sky-wave coverage from East Coast sta-
tions, but until very recently there were no charts a vessel could use. Even now
the charts are of such a scale as to he useful only for general positioning. To my
knowledge, very few of the "lakers" have Loran-C receivers aboard. Some of the
salt water vessels do have them but I do not know the extent to which they use
them in the Great Lakes area.
Question. What is the status of planning for the Minnesota Station which is
essential to complete Loran-C coverage for the Lakes?
Answer. We are proceeding with site selection and preliminary planning in
anticipation of future appropriations. We expect to have the station on the air
in 1980.
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Question. Once fully operational, will any existing aids become obsolete-such~
as radiobeacons?
Answer. No. We will have to continue existing aids such as radiobeacons for
users who do not have or cannot afford Loran-C. I expect the primary users of
radiobeacons will be recreational boaters eventually. Hopefully, the complexity*
of the radiobeacon system can be reduced. After Loran-C has proved itself with
commercial vessels, we would like to replace long range and sequenced radio-
beacons with marker beacons. I am sure that major vessels will all use Loran-C'
eventually. Of course normal audio-visual aids such as buoys and lights will
continue in use.
Question. What other applications are contemplated for the Loran-C system?*
Answer. A large number of miscellaneous uses for Loran-C are planned for or'
under consideration. The following are some examples:
1. Offshore Helicopter Navigation to Oil Rigs, etc.
2. Overland Aircraft Uses.
Forestry Service-(Firefighting).-__Men on ground with a light portable receiver'
retransmit LC signal so aircraft can rendevous with ground crews in remote areas.
Also, firefighters can be airdropped with accuracy within a few feet.
Department of Agriculture-To maintain spray patterns for pest control.
FAA.-Area navigation, point to point, for aircraft and non-precision terminal'
approach navigation.
3. Vehicle tracking.-Police cars, ambulances, etc. Control vehicles by retrans-
mitting LC signal every 30 seconds.
UMTA.-Keep track of buses, routes, and schedules.
FRA.-Keep track of boxcars.
New York State.-Develop reference system on rural roads. The state was
planning to establish 0.1 miles sign. LC grid saves this cost.
Tracking of vehicles carrying dangerous or precious cargo.
4. Census Bureau.-Use in developing demographic grids of various kinds.'
Question. What attention has been given to the development of an automatic'
vessel position-reporting system using Loran-C?
Answer. As I mentioned in my discussion of other potential uses of Loran C,
it can be used for vehicle tracking. The same basic principle could be used for'
keeping track of vessel positions within the Great Lakes. Except for being aware'
of the potential to meet some future perceived need, little attention has been
devoted to this application of Loran C in the Great Lakes. Except during iceS
season, when information on vessel progress is essential to planning icebreaker
operations, a general position reporting system for vessels on the Great Lakes
would be of questionable value, considering the excellent communications available'
when needed and the staggering load that would be added to the communications.
net by such a system.
Question. Would not such a system reduce the dependence on voice radio
reporting?
Answer. Such a system would reduce dependence on voice reporting, but that
would not be all good. It would substitute for voice reporting a heavy load of data
reporting. It would also require separate frequency allocation and other technical
coordination and clearances on an international level. Voice reporting now is
limited to special situations in specific areas and to winter operations (when
relatively few vessels are operating) so the reduction from present practice would
not be significant. At present the benefits do not warrant the cost and complica-
tions.
Question. Can you estimate what impact a vessel reporting system would have
on Coast Guard resources?
Answer. Not in any meaningful way. Resource requirements depend on the'
nature of the system that may be selected, and we have not yet really addressed
that in any specific way.
Question. What is Mini-Loran?
Answer. Mini-Loran is, as its name implies, a miniature version of a coastal'
Loran-C electronic navigation system. Because the "mini" system is intended for'
use in restricted navigating areas such as the St. Marys River, it must provide'
much more accurate positioning data than a coastal system. does. In the St. Marys
River, for example, we are striving for a positioning accuracy of better than 25
feet as compared to the 50 yard accuracy generally accepted as "good enough"
for the coastal system. This is achieved by strategically locating a master station
and its secondary stations to provide optimum geographical relationships for near-
right angle crossing of lines of position. Because they cover a very small geographic-
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area, the "mini" system transmitters can be of much lower power (and cost) than
*for a conventional system. This small geographic area of coverage is also what
makes the higher degree of accuracy possible because it permits optimal crossing
angles of lines of position throughout the coverage area and reduces the oppor-
tunity for signal distortion by terrain and atmospheric conditions.
The USER equipment being designed for use with this system will provide the
following information to a ship master: position quality, off track distance in feet
R or L, cross track speed in feet per second, attitude to track in degrees R or L,
present track heading in degrees true, next track heading in degrees true, miles to
next turn, along track speed in miles per hour, time to next turn in hours, minutes,
and seconds, and lead distance in feet.
Question. How succ~ssfulhas the pilot installation been?
Answer. Sofar we have been very encouraged by the few test runs we have made
using rather basic first generation equipment. The signals are very stable and h ave
produced aCcuracies even better than expected in some reacheS of the St. Marys
River. I am confident the system will be very successful once we get all the "bugs"
out.
Question. What is the status of user e4uipment?
Answer. The:;USER-_II system, commercially developed under Coast Guard
contract, has recently arrived at Sault Ste. Marie. It will be installed in CGC
Nastgatitcls, which will navigate the St. Marys River using the USER-TI system.
The USER-I system, used to develop calibration information for the river,
will remain installed in Nauqatuck to provide additional and comparative data
for evaluating both systems.' We hope to evaluate USER-Il on board a commercial
vessel this fall and to receive additional user imput to design needs.
Question. What other areas are likely subjects for Mini-Loran systems?
Answer. In the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway region, the only other areas
that are worthy of consideration for Mini-Loran are the Seaway itself and the
Detroit and St. Clair Rivers. We do expect it to have considerable application
in other parts of the country, however-in navigation areas whose problems
are similar to those of the St. Marys River.
Question. Is this user equipment compatible with standard Loran-C receivers?
Answer. This is one of the design criteria we established at the very beginning
of the project-and someday it will be so. At present, however, not all Loran-C
receivers are capable of the fine resolution needed to produce the accuracy required
to take full advantage of Mini-Loran's capabilities. Recievers capable of full
tie-in with Mini-Loran User equipment can be used to navigate anywhere in the
Loran-C coverage area, however, The solution for the near future is for vessels,
such as lakers, which operate regularly in a Mini-Loran coverage area, such as
the St. Marys River, to install receivers capable of using the Mini-Loran signals.
Those making occasional passages will have to rely on normal audio visual aids
complemented by regular Loran-C. Later, we hope to be able to use portable equip-
ment, installed for the voyage, for these vessels-until Mini-Loran is more
common and they have receivers installed that can work with the USER device.
Question. Would a "salty" coming into the Lakes be able to "plug" his standard
Loran-C receiver into the Mini-Loran system?
Answer. That, too, was a basic design criteria of the system. As explained in
my answer to the previous question, where vessels have receivers of required
capability, they will be able to "plug in" to the USER equipment. Transient
vessels would have portable USER equipment which they would use only for the
particular voyage.
Question. We have asked questions (or will) relating to Loran-C, Mini-Loran,
and SLAR-as aids to navigation and as possible integral parts of a Vessel Traffic
Control System-will you briefly describe the component parts of the St. Mary's
River Control System?
Answer. The regulations regarding navigation of the St. Marys basically provide
for a manned vessel traffic control service which includes bridge to bridge radio-
telephone (Great Lakes Radio Agreement, 1973), speed limits, anchorage regula-
tions, traffic separation (around Neebish Island), vessel movement reporting and
limited surveillance. The Captain of the Port operates the service from a control
center at Sault Ste. Marie. Vessels report in and receive appropriate directions via
VHF-FM radio telephone. Surveillance is conducted with a low light level,
closed-circuit television camera located at Mission Point in Little Rapids Cut
and with a manned lookout station at Rock Cut in West Neebish Channel. The
primary purpose of the surveillance is to monitor visibility and ice conditions in
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the river. The secondary purpose is to monitor vessel passages and speeds. Vessel
speeds are also checked by mobile teams with radar. Vessels and boats are available
for use in controlling traffic, if required. Equipment now under evaluation includes
Mini-Loran-C and remote visibi1ity-moni~oring equipment.
Question. What is your authority for this operation?
Answer. Anchorage and Navigation Rcgulations; St. Marys River Michigan
(33 CFR 92) are issued under the authority of 33 USC 474 (Anchorage and General
Regulations for St. Marys River.)
Question. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 would authorize the
Coast Guard to "control vessel traffic in areas. . . especially hazardous, or under
conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather . . . etc.". Have you considered
applying this authority to situations like those that beset the Fitzgerald?
Answer. Yes, I have considered it and I have generally concluded it to be un-
warranted and impracticable. There is a variation of the idea, however, to which
I am giving serious thought. That is the feasibility of working with the National
Weather Service to develop a large craft advisory system along the lines of the
small craft warnings that have been issued for years. The present storm warning
system may suffice for this purpose, however.
Que3tion. Have you consulted with representatives of marine industry, etc.,
with regard to such an exercise of authority?
Answer. Only in a very general and preliminary way-and only as regards the
large craft advisory idea.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the
call of the Chair.]