PAGENO="0001" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GIJAIW AND NAVIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS ON VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL INVESTIGATING THE TOTAL PROBLEM OF VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL AND THE PARTIOULAR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN CERTAIN AREAS JUNE 26, 1975-WASHINGTON, D.C. JUNE 27, 1975-NEW YORK, N.Y. JULY 7, 1975-PHILADELPHIA, PA. OCTOBER 3, 1975-NEW ORLEANS, LA. SEPTEMBER 21 AN]) 22, 1976-WASHINGTON, D.C. COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES IN THE UPPER GREAT LAKES OVERSIGHT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COAST GUARD PERTAINING TO THE FACIL~TIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER GREAT LAKES JULY 16, 1976-SAULT SAINTE MARIE, MICH. Serial No~ 94~39 Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 78-280 WASHINGTON: 1976 `1 f~ ~ PAGENO="0002" COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Ohio JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan THOMAS N. DOWNING, Virginia PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida JOHN M. MURPHY, New York WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California MARIO BIAGGI, New York GLENN M. ANDERSON, California B (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas RALPH H. METCALFE, Illinois JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana FRED B. ROONEY, Pennsylvania PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland BO GINN, Georgia GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi JOSHUA EILBERG, Pennsylvania RON DR LUGO, Virgin Islands CARROLL HUBBARD, Ja., Kentucky DON BONKER, Washington LES AuCOIN, Oregon NORMAN E. D'AMOURS, New Hampshire JERRY M. PATTERSON, California LEO C. ZEFERETTI, New York JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JIL, California GENE SNYDER, Kentucky EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey PIERRE S. (PETE) nu PONT, Delaware DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland NORMAN F. LENT, New York MATTHEW J. RINALDO, New Jersey DAVID F. EMERY, Maine JOHN M. MURPHY, New York WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina E (KIKA) DR LA GARZA, Texas PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi RON DR LUGO, Virgin Islands CARROLL HUBBARD, Ja., Kentucky JOSHUA EILBERG, Pennsylvania PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida FRED B. ROONEY, Pennsylvania LES AuCOIN, Oregon JERRY M. PATTERSON, California LEONOR K. SULLIVAN, Missouri, en officio FRANcIs D. HEYWARD, Counsel Ausriu P. OLNEY, Minority Counsel 1 Resigned December 31, 197~. 2 Appointed April 4, 1976. LEONOR K. (MRS. JOHN B.) SULLIVAN, Missouri, Chairman ERNEST J. CORRADO, Chief Counsel FRANCES STILL, Chief Clerk RICHARD N. SHAROOD, Chief Minority Counsel 1 W. PATRICK MORRIS, Chief Minority Counsel 2 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION MARIO BIAGGI, New York, Chairman PIERRE S. (PETE) flU PONT, Delaware GENE SNYDER, Kentucky DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana DON YOUNG, Alaska ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland DAVID F. EMERY, Maine PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan, en officio (II) PAGENO="0003" CONTENTS VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL Hearings held- Page June 26, 1975, Washington, D.C - 1 June 27, 1975, New York, N.Y 21 July 7, 1975, Philadelphia, Pa 65 October 3, 1975, New Orleans, La 119 September 21, 1976, Washington, D.C 181 September 22, 1976, Washington, D.C~. 233 Statement of- Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways: Statement No. 1 241 Statement No. 2 269 Antrainer, Norman, Fer River Towing Co., New Orleans, La 172 Barrow, Rear Adm. Winford W., Commander, 8th Coast Guard District 122 New Orleans vessel traffic systems 126 Bauman, Capt. Richard A., Chief of Port Safety and Law Enforce- ment, U.S. Coast Guard 182 Betts, T. R., Cargo Carriers, Inc., Baton Rouge, La 178 Blom, Kenneth 0., general manager, Reinauer Transportation Co~ 55 Boggs, Hon. Lindy, a Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana 122 Brite, Dr. Robert L., statistical consultant 241 Bullard, Capt. Jack R., American Commercial Barge Line Co 241 Burnham, George, joint executive committee for the improvement and development of the Philadelphia port area 114 Carlton, David, vice president, Marine Operations, Federal Barge Lines, Inc 290 Cleary, William, New York Towboat and Harbor Carriers Association 40 Cobb, James, representing Hon. Lindy Boggs, a Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana 122 Conrad, Capt. Ed, Compass Marine Services 241 DiMaggio, Anthony, representing AFL-CIO Marine Engineers Bene- ficial Association 44 Doucet, Norman K., president, Gulf Coast Towing Association_. -- 145 Eneix, Lloyd, Agri-Trans. Corp 219, 233 Fugaro, Rear Adm., Anthony F., Chief, Office of Marine Environ- ment and Systems, U.S. Coast Guard 182 Gardner, Robert L., Alter Co., Davenport, Iowa 163, 219, 233 Giallauza, Sam, senior vice president, New Orleans Steamship Association 157 Goodwin, Capt. Dudiley, C., U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port, Philadelphia, Pa 68 Gundlach, James, Canal Barge Co., New Orleans, La 171 Hickey, Comdr. Eugene J., Jr., Chief of Vessel Traffic Services, U.S. Coast Guard 13, 182 Ives, Capt. Paul, Pilots Association for the Bay and River, Delaware~ 103 Jackson, H. Willis, chairman of the joint executive committee for the improvement and development of the Philadelphia port area 113 Joifray, Capt. Henry G., associate port director, Port of New Orleans 142 Johnson, Lt. Comdr. Carl T., U.S. Coast Guard 21 Kruger, Oliver, General Accounting Office 13 Lambert, Stephen, Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission.__ 174 (~) PAGENO="0004" Iv Statement of-Continued Page Moser, Capt. Kevin, Port Safety Division, U.S. Coast Guard 13 McNeal, Wiffiam C., Marine Consultant 151 O'Neil, Wiffiam E., counsel for Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways 241 Perkins, Capt. David E., Chief of Staff, Third Coast Guard District__ 21 Posner, Paul, New York City Bureau of the Budget 60 Rea, Vice Adm. Wiffiam F., III, Commander, Third Coast Guard District, Governors Island, N.Y 68 Reinauer, Harold A., president, Reinauer Transportation Cos 55 Rush, Col. Early J., III, district engineer, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 139 Rush, Thomas, chief, Marine Division, New York City Fire Department 49 Sanders, Robert W., Red Star Marine, Inc.; member executive corn- mittee of New York Harbor Vessel Traffic Advisory System 40 Stegbauer, Frank T., executive vice president, Southern Towing Co., representing the American Waterways Operators, Inc 219, 233 Torrens, Capt. Kenneth C., Farrell Lines, Inc 39 Wheat, Capt. David, president, Crescent River Pilots Association_ - - 161 Whittum, Lt. Arthur R., U.S. Coast Guard 21 Additional material supplied by- Brite, Robert L.: Report to the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways: A statistical analysis of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Systems 271 Coast Guard: A comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of closed circuit television versus radar for VTS use in a River environment 227 Department of Transportation statement on GAO report 2 Distress calls - 260 Use of channel 13 259 VTS Rulemaking 198 Eilberg, Hon. Joshua: Article from The Evening Bulletin of May 15, 1975: "Philadelphia Port Led the World in Tonnage Last Year" 83 Recommendations on proposed vessel traffic safety system for the Port of Philadelphia and the Delaware River 78 Communications submitted for the record- Barrow, Rear Adm. W. W.: Letter of November 12, 1975, to Hon. Mario Biaggi 179 Goodwin, Capt. D. C.: Letter of April 28, 1975, to Charles Duld 88 Kenny, Thomas E.: Letter of September 14, 1976, to Hon. Mario Biaggi 293 Olney, Pierre: Memorandum of June 25, 1975, to Chairman Biaggi with background information 11 Siles, Adm. 0. W.: Letter of July 8, 1975, to Hon. Mario BiaggL~_ 19 Tinkey, J. A.: Letter of October 16, 1975, to Hon. Mario Biaggi 179 COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES IN THE UPPER GREAT LAKES Hearing held- July 16, 1976, Sault Sainte Marie, Mich 295 Statement of- Armstrong, Carol, District No. 4, United Steel Workers of America~. -- 355 Bluitt, John, port agent, Seafarers International Union, River Rouge, Mich -- 349 Bush, Thomas, District No. 33, United Steel Workers of America_ - 355 Chestnut, James L., Chestnut, Brooks & Burkard, Minneapolis, Minn 344 Deck, Comdr. John III, Chief, Ship Design Branch, Office of Mer- chant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters 301 Edwards, Charles, Johns Hopkins University, Laurel, Md - 335 Gracey, Rear Adm. James S., Commander, 9th Coast Guard Dis- trict, U.S. Coast Guard, Cleveland, Ohio 301 Mark, `Dr. Herman, NASA, Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio__ 341 Milradt, Capt. Charles, Commander, Group, Sault Ste. Marie 301 PAGENO="0005" V Statement of-Continued Page Nolawski, Stephen, Great Lakes Seamen's Local 5000, United Steel Workers of America, Cleveland, Ohio 355 O'Brien, Capt. R. W., chairman, Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc 344 Oberstar, Hon. James L., a Representative in Congress from the State of Minnesota 300 Reed, Daniel, Whitefish Bay Township Shoreline Owners Association, Paradise, i\'Iich 358 Rico, Capt. A. F., president, Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc 344 Ruppe, Hon. Philip E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan 298 Rutledge, Capt. Thomas H., Chief, Congressional Affairs Staff, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters 301 Slaughter, E. L., international vice president, International Long- shoremen's Association 344 Smith, Daniel L., District No. 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Asso- ciation-Associated Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO, Toledo, Ohio - - - 352 Trimble, Vice Adm. Paul E., U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), president, Lake Carriers Association, Cleveland, Ohio - 326 Additional material supplied by- Coast Guard: Boat requirements 372 Recent Major SAR Cases 309 Ruppe, Hon. Philip E.: Article from Inland Seas, summer 1976: "In Retrospect" 365 Man in cold water: Cooling rate in heavy winter clothing and treatment of accidental hypothermia: An experimental study of inhalation rewarming 312 Communications submitted for the record- Gracey, Rear Adm. J. S.: Letter of August 24, 1976, to I-Ion. Philip E. - Ruppe with answers to questions 372 Hoeft, John E.: Letter of February 16, 1976, to Hon. Philip E. Ruppe~. 364 PAGENO="0006" PAGENO="0007" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1975 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth Office Building, the Honorable Mario Biaggi (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting will please come to order. This is a briefing on port safety and port safety navigational systems. Captain Heyward? Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Chairman, before initiating the hearings that the subcommittee is going to be holding in various port areas, and the overall hearings later in the fall on the total problem of Vessel traffic control, minority counsel and I this morning were prepared to give a short briefing on the background for the information of the subcommittee, and also for the purpose of including in the record various documents and material which are applicable to this problem. I would like to ask unanimous consent from the chairman to pre- sent for the record a copy of a United States Coast Guard study re- port on vessel traffic systems analysis of port needs for August 1973, together with a study report for vessel traffic safety issues study, volume 1, executive summary, dated March 1973. Mr. Chairman, in addition, and for the record, I would like to have unanimous consent to include a report to the Congress by the Comp- troller General on vessel traffic systems, what is needed to prevent and reduce vessel accidents; the Coast Guard comments which were subsequently made on that report dated February 25, 1975, and some additional comments which were received by the staff from the Coast Guard yesterday. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of these documents is to set the stage for what the subcommittee will be looking at in the various visits to the port areas. Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, the material referred to will be placed in the record. [The material was placed in the hearing record files of the committee. [The Coast Guard comments on the GAO report follows :} (1) PAGENO="0008" 2 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STATEMENT ON GAO REPORT I. TITLE: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS-WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT AND REDUCE VESSEL ACCIDENTS? II. GAO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS It is the conclusion of the GAO Report that the vessel traffic system (VTS) program should be redirected in order to produce maximum benefit in reducing loss of life, injuries, and damage to property and the environment caused by vessel collisions, rammings, and groundings. On the basis of system acquisition and construction costs, GAO has classfied the various levels of VTS into two categories: "basic" and "sophisticated." "Basic" systems include regulations, traffic separation and routing schemes, and vessel movement reporting communi- cations systems (VMRS). Systems which utilize electronic surveillance or auto- mated equipment have been termed "sophisticated." GAO considers that greater incremental benefits can be gained from the devel- opment of "basic" systems in many ports and waterways than from the addition of "sophisticated" system elements in the major port areas presently under development. The GAO Report contends that the Coast Guard should follow a strict phased approach in all ports and waterways by first operating and evalu- ating the effectiveness of basic systems before adding increased system capa- bilities, such as surveillance or automation. The Report recommends that plans to add surveillance capabilities in Houston! Galveston, New Orleans, and sections of New York be deferred until "basic" systems have been developed in several other U.S. ports and waterways. Addi- tionally, GAO has concluded that expanded efforts in establishing regulations under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 are required. It is recom- mended that national emphasis and direction be given to establishing regulations including vessel speed limits, limiting the size of tows, and regulating the move- ment of vessels carrying dangerous, combustible and polluting cargoes. III. DOT COMMENTS ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In order to assess accurately the direction of the vessel traffic system program, clarification' of two points which form the basis of the GAO Report is essential. A misconception of the trend of costs for VTS levels appears in the GAO Report, inasmuch as only acquisition and construction costs are quoted. For a more complete analysis of system costs, annual operating expenses, such as personnel salaries, which comprise a substnatial component of total costs, must also be taken into account. All Coast Guard decisions concerning the selection of VTS levels for the areas under development have been based upon an analysis of total system costs and benefits. Appendix A provides detailed cost information for both initial construction and annual operating costs by system and level. Analysis of total costs rather than just initial costs provides more comprehensive information for decision making purposes. The second point which deserves expansion and explanation is the GAO Report classification of VTS levels as "basic" and "sophisticated." While there is merit in the basic concern for cost effectiveness voiced in the GAO Report, this classifi- cation fails to address the relevant system cost and complexity considerations of the specific ports and waterways. For example, the GAO Report categorizes a VMRS communications system as "basic" and those systems incorporating sur- veillance capabilities as "sophisticated." In many cases these labels are not accurate either from an engineering or cost standpoint. In areas where traffic density and volume are high and traffic patterns com- plicated, a VMRS may require automated (i.e., "sophisticated") equipment to provide fast, effective data retrieval for traffic management. Where this need exists, the only alternative to automated system components is greatly increased manning level (and cost), accompanied by an increase in the probability of human error. On the other hand, some surveillance systems may be very "basic" consisting of only a radar and scope presentation or low light level television (LLLTV) to monitor vessel movements and to validate the accuracy of VMRS reports. The GAO Report's classification of VTS levels is also inappropariate on the basis of total system costs. The following bar graph, from an earlier Coast Guard Study Report, depicts the general trend of annual costs by VTS level for the "typical" VTS. The cost figures in the bar graph are based on a hypothetical VTS in which all levels are employed, with. three to four remote communications sites PAGENO="0009" 3 1' General Trend oi i~anu~l Costs Versus VTS Lev~l1 Graph. essence hypcthc~tica1 VTS is rbLch all TIS levels Cr11 be used. Level of VTS 3Dcfinition of Levels mci Loganci of costs Vessel Bridge 1:0 Bridge Radiotslcphcsc Traffic Scpsrac:ioe Scberco . . *L5- Vessel 1Iovcsrnt fleporti~g SysBeec . Las is Surveilian cc . Adve~ced furvccillccnde L5 Accto::at.od Mvcncod Surveiflercco. 21.ncuel ~a::t Id dcf~ecd is thc cc.:rcctic. cost clivldsd Cif tee ilLS `hU a. sal orcraciii': ccrLe. (~nts ace hcc:ed ccc asCu:.' ~ for 1cc~ ct: Send I) mel S~.: :~:rcI * .o, sad en en eat ed c~. for Los icca. C5J `~ ~.tce end ~ca: Osl~r.:: (P'.~~ I) and two to three remote radar sites. Annual costs were computed by adding annual operating expenses to the initial implementation costs divided by 15 years. The figure of 15 years, estimated to be the expected life of each system, may be subject to argument, but this figure is considered valid since the costs of equipment replacement are included in annual costs. As portrayed by the bar graph, the most dramatic increase in annual costs occurs in moving from a traffic separation scheme to a vessel movement reporting system (VMRS). The establishment of a VMRS involves the construction and outfitting of a vessel traffic center, remote communications sites in most cases and extensive personnel costs for continuous watchstanding and operation. Compara- tively, the cost increase in adding surveillance capabilities is smaller. The initial capital outlay for surveillance, relay, and display equipment may seem substan- tial, but little or no annual operating personnel costs are incurred. L2 L3 L L 4 5 PAGENO="0010" 4 After close examination of costs by VTS levels, it is considered that the classi- fication of VTS levels as "basic" and "sophisticated" is inappropriate. Possibly, a more meaningful classification, on the basis of system complexity and costs, would be "manned" and "unmanned" systems. With these clarifications of the general trend of VTS costs:and of the classifica- tion of VTS levels, attention is directed to the GAO Report's "Recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation." Each of the four recommendations is dis- cussed in detail below. Recommendation 1: "-redirect its traffic program to emphasize the development of basic vessel traffic systems in TJ.S. ports and waterways;" In the implementation of vessel traffic systems, it has been the policy of the Coast Guard to proceed on the basis of cost/benefit considerations and national needs. Those ports and waterways with the most pressing marine safety needs and the most promising returns on investment receive first attention. In every area where VTS is instituted, the minimum level of VTS required is selected, and the decision is based on an assessment of total costs and benefits. The 1973 Coast Guard Study Report, "Vessel Traffic Systems-Analysis of Port Needs" provided a firm foundation for initial VTS planning decisions. In- cluded in the outputs of this study was a ranking of major ports and waterways based on their need for VTS, initial recommendations of the VTS levels justified in each area, and estimates of the expected number of accident preventions. In cer- tain instances, the GAO Report has relied exclusively upon the numbers of accident preventions in evaluating Coast Guard VTS implementation decisions, while excluding from their analysis other pertinent factors relating to VTS needs and benefits. These factors are addressed in detail in the discussion in response to the second recommendation. In the discussion of the Coast Guard's implementation of VTS the GAO Report states that systems "are becoming increasingly sophisticated and costly," and that, "in some cases, local maritime interests had expressed a preference for sophisticated systems." Notwithstanding, present funding levels and plans for system implementation and sophistication are more conservative than early plans when VTS was first introduced. The studies completed in 1973 were under- taken to structure VTS plans, and recommendations for system complexity are very conservative. While the Coast Guard does provide for adequate consulta- tion, comment, and coordination with local marine interests, as specified by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, system implementation is. being con- ducted in accordance with the plan based on national needs, implementation criteria and cost/benefit considerations. Local marine interests do express their preference for sophisticated systems and exert pressure on the Coast Guard, but the final configuration of each system is based on the Coast Guard's judgement of what level is required. While the Coast Guard does consider the addition of surveillance capabilities as planned for certain selected areas more beneficial than communications systems in lesser ports and waterways, GAO's assessment of the benefits to be derived from such lower level systems is fully concurred in. The Intracoastal Waterway (ICW) west of New Orleans has. one of the highest probabilities of accident in the nation. The GAO Report is accurate in identifying the large scale of vessel casualty prevention possible with a communications based VTS, and in selecting the optimal implementation approach in this area. The waters of the ICW are very similar and lend themselves to simultaneous treatment through a systems approach. It would be inefficient to address each specific: 10 or 20 mile section on a piecemeal basis. At the present time, detailed data collection efforts are underway. on the ICW. It is planned that as soon as an effective approach is identified the 10W will be the next area addressed in VTS developments. It is anticipated that a communications system alone will provide adequate safety; however, surveillance may be incorporated in selected areas if the need is clearly demonstrated. The Coast Guard recognizes the benefits to be derived from establishing relatively simple systems in lesser U.S. ports and waterways. In 1973, a com- munications system in the vicinity of McAlpine Dam on the Ohio River near Louisville, Kentucky was instituted. This system is placed in operation at those times when the flood stage at the McAlpine Dam exceeds 15 feet, a condition which causes strong outfall currents at the upstream approach to the canal en- trance to the locks. During such times, it is hazardous for more than one tow to be in the vicinity of the lock approach at the same time. The VTS coordina.tes the arrival of the tows at this approach. At the present time, it is a voluntary system based on a VHF-FM communications network. Personnel who man the system PAGENO="0011" 5~ intermittently are made available from their regular tasks by the call up of ready-reservists. Other similar systems may be initiated in response to hazardous situations in the future. The Coast Guard agrees that in many areas relatively low level systems will provide an adequate level of safety at a favorable cost/benefit ratio. However, a distinct need is recognized to address the major port areas now in planning with systems which will provide the reliability and effectivness demanded by local conditions. In order to provide maximum national benefit for marine safety, it is essential that those areas with the greatest needs and highest returns on investment be addressed first. In making its implementation decisions, the Coast Guard has been considering all relevant variables and examining the incremental costs and benefits involved with each system component implementation. As systems which achieve acceptable levels of safety are completed in the major ports and waterways now under development, those lesser areas identified by GAO will be addressed. It is strongly maintained that within the limited funding constraints, low level systems in lesser areas should not be undertaken at the expense of providing surveillance capabilities in the major port areas as pretlyens planned. Recommendation 2: "-defer its present plans for further electronic surveillance in Houston-Galveston, New Orleans, and the East River and Newark Bay in New York until basic systems have been developed and placed in operation in these ports and several other major U.S. ports;" This recommendation applies the concerns voiced in Recommendation 1 to the specific areas in which Coast Guard VTS planning and implementation are presently underway. The justification for present Coast Guard plans in each of these areas is duscussed separately below. It is true, as the GAO Report points out, tht in some cases more numbers of vessel casualties could be prevented with communication systems in lesser areas than with surveillance additions in major areas. However, a simple tahula tion of the number of vessel casualties may be misleading since there may be a large variance in the damage caused by an accident. The amount of physical damage and environmental harm resulting from a vessel casualty is dependent upon several factors including the vessel's overall size and cargo capacity, the capacity of the individual cargo tanks, the ability of the hull to withstand shock without rupturing, and the nature of the cargo. Typically, the major U.S. ports in which VTS developments are planned or underway are frequented by vessels whose average damage in accident exceeds that of vessels engaged in operations on the inland waterways. This is due in part to the factors enumerated above. Vessels engaged in international commerce calling at major ports are generally larger in overall size and in cargo capacity. Furthermore, the size of the individual cargo tanks is an important variable in determining the threat to public and environment. Although the quantity of cargo carried by a number of barges making up a tow may be the same as that of medium sized ocean going tank vessel, the number of individual chambers in the tow greatly exceeds the number of tanks of the tanker. The risk is quite different for the same cargo. The quantity of cargo released from a simple hull penetration of a barge tank would be less than that of a tanker sustaining the same damage. In fact the quantity of cargo permitted to be contained in a single tank for oil carrying vessels under IMCO standards is of the order of 30,000 cubic meters, a quantity that few tank barges are capable of handling. Another major consideration is the construction and maintenance of hull and system. Although foreign flag vessels calling in major U.S. ports are built in accord- ance with internationally recognized classification society standards (the U.S. Coast Guard plays a supervisory role in development of those of the American Bureau of Shipping) ocean going tankers vary considerably in reliability depending on their registry as a result of differences in national marine safety programs. On the other hand, buyers carrying combustible or hazardous cargo in U.S. inland waterways must conform to Coast Guard regulations for construction and main- tenance stipulated in Subchapter D and Subchapter 0 of Title 46 CFR, directed specifically at reducing the potential for damage resulting from casualty. These are the most extensive regulations dealing with tank vessels of any nation. The regulations in Subchapter D deal with vessels which carry flammable or combusti- ble liquids in bulk. The regulations of Subchapter 0 deal with vessels which carry certain dangerous bulk cargoes-those which have potential hazard beyond and including that of flammability, such as explosives, poisons corrosive liquids, etc. (See 46 CFR 151.01) PAGENO="0012" 6 In addition to the factors which govern the amount of physical damage to the vessel resulting from casualty, other variables must he taken into account for a complete evaluation of marine safety. Without a doubt, the cargo moving in the Houston Ship Channel is among the most hazardous in the nation. Likewise, the waters are very restricted, and have an extremely high probability of accident, based on past casualty data. Although a valid methodology has not yet been developed to quantify the potential for disaster, it is evident that vessel casualties in the Houston Ship Channel have a very high potential for catastrophe due to the nature of cargo moved and the proximity of industry handling this cargo and of the civilian population. In that area all the ingredients are present for a vessel casualty to lead to a major disaster. Surveillance coverage of selected areas in the Houston/Galveston area will add important capabilities to Coast Guard supervision. The principal purpose of the surveillance system is to confirm vessel movement radio reports. Based on experi- ence gained in operation of the St. Marys River system over a period of many years, it has been concluded that masters tend to hedge their movement reports to give them advantage and priority passage at critical points. This is particularly true when strict speed limits are posted. Furthermore, surveillance will detect the presence of any vessels which fail to report by radio, a condition which cannot be tolerated in an area such as the Houston Ship Channel. In the Houston/ Galveston VTS the Coast Guard is also installing automated equipment to process the vessel traffic movement information. Such equipment will provide for fast, reliable information retrieval and will reduce overall manning requirements. In New York Harbor, the GAO Report concurs in the need for surveillance of two areas, but questions the justification for surveillance in the adjacent East River and Newark Bay sectors, as planned by the Coast Guard. The same con- siderations present in the Houston/Galveston area also apply to New York VTS development. Furthermore, a consideration of broader scope must be taken into account in addition to the incremental benefits to be derived from surveillance in each particular section. In developing VTS for the various areas of a complex port, such as New York Harbor, the areas cannot be treated independently of each other. A total systems approach is necessary to achieve an effective system. The fact that the return on investment in surveillance is higher in one area has led GAO to the conclusion that surveillance is not justified in other parts of New York Harbor. The large number of intersections and "mixing bowls" with oppos- ing streams of traffic demand a high degree of reliability and coordination. There- fore, the plan developed for YTS applications in a complex port must provide suitable capabilities to support both a feasible and functional system concept for the port. In addition to defining the concept of operation for the system the plan must also consider the overall operational and regulatory aspects applicable to the port. For instance, the elimination of surveillance capabilities in the Upper and Lower Bay area would have a far-reaching and detrimental effect on the entire system, especially on the New York and New Jersey Channels. The Constable Hook area, where Kill van Kull intersects Upper Bay, is probably the most hazardous area in New York Harbor and is a prime example of this situation. Without totally accurate and complete information concerning vessel movements in Upper Bay, available only through surveillance due to the occasional unrelia- bility of VMRS reports, the effectiveness of surveillance in Kill van Kull would be significantly eroded. Surprise meeting situations would continue to occur in that area due to vessels entering from Upper Bay which had not, or had incorrectly, reported to the VTS, and the potential for serious casualty would remain. This consideration applies to each of the areas where selected surveillance coverage is planned. It should be noted that the surveillance planned for Newark Bay and the East River will not initially be designed to provide complete coverage. At the outset, surveillance coverage of both of these areas will be provided rela- tively inexpensively with a total of only three or four remote LLLTV sites. In New Orleans, as in New York, the potential for catastrophe cannot be discounted, as vessel density is high and millions of people are within close range of the affected waters. Considering all factors, the surveillance planned for selected areas of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of New Orleans is entirely justified. It will replace the personnel required to man the traffic lights operated by the Corps of Engineers and will provide significant benefits in vessel casualty, deaths! injuries, and pollution incident reductions as well as in vessel, cargo, and property savings. In summary, the GAO Report is accurate in pointing out that in some cases more numbers of vessel casualties could be prevented with communications systems in lesser areas than with surveillance additions in the major areas. How- PAGENO="0013" 7 ever, when all the factors are taken into account, including differences in vessel construction, cargo, traffic density, and the potential for catastrophic environ- mental and personnel casualty, it is concluded that the surveillance capabilities planned will be the most cost beneficial. Recommendation 3: "-adhere to a strict phased approach by first operating and evaluating the effectiveness of basic systems before adding more sophisticated elements;" The GAO Report correctly states the Coast Guard's policy as set forth in a 1973 Study Report, as follows: A phased approach will be stressed in the implementation of VTS (vessel traffic systems) in each port or waterway. This procedure will permit ex- perience gained while operating the existing system to be used in planning for a more sophisticated system. It will also provide means to accumulate a better data base. The GAO Report justifiably óalls attention to the apparent inconsistency between that statement and the Coast Guard's plans to establish initially major systems incorporating surveillance and limited automated capabilities. The cause of this discrepancy is the Coast Guard's failure to update that policy statement to reflect the planning advances which have been made in the interim. Through the development and employment of several analytical tools and tech- niques, VTS planning has been substantially iniproved and formalized. In the Coast Guard's Analysis of Port Needs Study completed in late 1973, vessel casualty, transit and damage data were examined in detail for many major U.S. ports and waterways. Estimates of the effectiveness of each VTS level in each of these areas were developed in order to augment the knowledge of VTS require- ments and the level of VTS necessary and justified in each area. More refined data collection and analysis techniques are now being employed at particular ports and waterways planned for VTS. Through the use of both side looking airborne radar (SLAR) and a mobile radar and communications van, detailed information is being collected concerning traffic patterns, communications loading, and vessel congestion. Likewise, simulation models have produced good projections of communications frequency and transceiver siting require- ments. In addition to these analytical tools, the Coast Guard's knowledge of VTS has been expanded by the experience gained in the operation of two major systems for more than two years, and from planning the major systems in New York, Houston/Galveston, New Orleans and Valdez. From the detailed analyses conducted in the major ports and waterways under development, the Coast Guard has determined that a higher level of VTS (than the minimum first step) is both required and justified. In such areas, that level of VTS which is considered necessary with a high degree of certainty is being established initially. It should be recognized that even in those areas, the initial implementation may be accomplished in a multi-year approach, but this "phasing" is due to budgetary constraints rather than uncertainty over system needs. The operation of all systems will undergo continuing scrutiny and evaluation. Any modifications or additions which are judged necessary will be undertaken in a subsequent phase(s). The Coast Guard recognizes the importance of continuing to add to the knowl- edge base concerning VTS Systems and Operations. Statutory responsibility to provide vessel traffic systems and services has existed for a very short time-just over two years, although the legislation was preceded by the establishment of an Advisory Radar System at San Francisco. San Francisco thus became the Field Testing Site for VTS research and development projects. At that location the operational system uses the High Resolution Radars that were developed on an R&D basis. Automated features representative of the more sophisticated VTS levels are maintained there on an experimental basis. Achievement of major hardware advancements, however, does not mean completion of research and development efforts, for much remains to be acquired in the way of operational knowledge before United States Vessel Traffic Systems reach maturity. This is especially evident in the fact that VTS operations have not yet entered into the more complex modes under which vessels are provided movement control by the Coast Guard. Accordingly, developmental emphasis is expected to shift from hardware to operations. Important areas of investigation and definition include the formulation of operational control concepts and the generation of port by port VTS System Functional Requirements based upon traffic analyses, hydrographic data and the (separately derived) operational control concepts. The Department of Transportation recognizes existence of certain parallels along with major differences between Air Traffic Control and Vessel Traffic Control. Without attempting to detail these, it is clear from the aviation experience that there are PAGENO="0014" 8 continuing lessons to be learned in arriving at a national set of Vessel Traffic Systems which operate effectively at lowest system cost. The VTS Research and Development Program in the Coast Guard builds on existing knowledge to help achieve this goal. Recommendation 4: "-give national emphasis and direction to establishing regulations as authorized by the 1972 Act to control vessel traffic, including more extensive use of speed limits; greater regulation over the movement of vessels carrying dangerous, combustible and polluting cargos; and limiting the size of tows." The GAO Report stated that the Coast Guard had made limited use of its authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to issue regulations for the control of vessel movements, and identified control of vessel speed, control of the movement of vessels carrying hazardous or polluting cargoes, and control of tow size as regulatory measures expected to be effective for prevention of accidents. The GAO Report further detailed inconsistencies between headquarters, dis- trict and field units in the approach to development of regulations under the Act. The promulgation of regulations was stated to be the measure least costly to the government for reducing accidents through control of vessel movement. The Coast Guard recognizes the essentiality of these constraints and they are being developed at Headquarters. However, the task of developing meaningful regulatory guidance at the national level is a good deal more profound than may be realized. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act empowers the Coast Guard to regulate the vessel with regard to its route. Such regulations must be merged in a harmonious way with other regulations by which maritime safety in the United States has for years been governed by the Coast Guard. Along with the operational constraints under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the preexisting regulation of safety and construction of the vessel, qualification of crew, safe handling and carriage of cargoes, anchorages, and Rules of the Road form a matrix addressing all elements of the system. The development of a regulation is an exacting process which requires care in the identification of the problem to be corrected by means of the regulation, recognition of varied geographic and operating conditions, and appreciation of the impact of the regulation on the public affected, including the broad economic effect of the measure, and finally, definition of the corrective regulation. Presum- ably in recognition of these factors, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act contains a provision for consultation and comment by interested parties in preparation of proposed regulations; this is in addition to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Inconsistencies which may appear to exist at the field level could well be due to local efforts to cater for variations in type of vessel, climatic conditions, and waterway configuration. Such local solutions with their differences will, as feed- back, prove beneficial in the preparation of a comprehensive statement from the headquarters level. The first significant rulemaking under the Act was accomplished in the Puget Sound VTS regulations which became effective on 30 September 1974. These regulations addressed a local problem, identification and solution of which were more rapidly handled than broad nationwide regulations. Once developed, how- ever, these regulations contained most of the elements which will be employed in other systems, and as such will serve as a model for VTS rulemaking in other areas. Draft regulations now in preparation for San Francisco and Houston VTS draw extensively on the principles worked out for Puget Sound. Regulations which address navigation and certain vessel operations have been promulgated for Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay and Apra Harbor, Guam. Principles employed in these regulations will be applicable to other areas. Rulemaking actions appeared in the Federal Register on 1 March 1974 and 28 June 1974. Final rulemaking under the first of these actions is now in draft and will be published in the near future. This regulation will enable the District Commander, Captain of the Port, or their authorized representative to direct or control the movements of vessels under emergency or temporarily hazardous conditions when necessary for safety. This is the first regulation of nationwide application under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The second action is an advance notification of a broad philosophical approach the Coast Guard intends to follow in regulating the safe movement of vessels by means of operating controls. The work of drafting principles for proposed rulemaking is in progress and addresses equipment required to be on board vessels, tests of machinery and equipment, movement of hazardous and polluting cargoes, and safe operating procedures. The specific principles will be referred to interested parties for con- sultation in preparing the proposed rules. PAGENO="0015" 9 The GAO Report places emphasis on control of vessel speed as an effective measure for prevention of accidents. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act gives the Coast Guard authority to control vessel traffic by means of speed limitations in areas determined to be especially hazardous. The U. S. Army, Corps of Engi- neers presently regulates vessel speed under authority of 33 USC 1. Preliminary arrangements have been made to relieve the Corps of Engineers of this function in all but certain waters of particular interest to the Army. The GAO Report indicated a greater incidence of accidents attributed to excessive vessel speed than Coast Guard analysis of the raw data can support. The Coast Guard is mindful that speed is often listed as a contributing cause to accidents. However, vessel speed alone is rarely the sole cause. The effective regulation of vessel speed is a complex matter related to vessel size and maneuvering characteristics, channel configuration, harbor congestion, weather and visibility, and involves far-reaching economic considerations. The Coast Guard will move forward with repromulga- tion of the Army Corps of Engineers' regulations where appropriate under au- thority of the Act, and the development on a case by case basis of regulations to limit vessel speed where necessary in especially hazardous areas. The GAO Report advised of inconsistency on the part of the Coast Guard in different ports in applying suitable controls to the movement of vessels carrying hazardous or polluting cargoes. Current regulations require advance notification of arrival of any vessel loaded with cargoes of particular hazard. Action taken by the Coast Guard locally upon receipt of that notification will vary according to the particular requirements of different ports, so that some inconsistency is inescap- able. The rulemaking, previously discussed for the operational control of vessel movements, will provide the regulatory tools necessary for effective action com- mensurate to the hazard and the particular area. As an adjunct the Coast Guard is considering an industry proposal to require visual, aerial identificaton of cer- tain inland barges which carry hazardous or polluting cargoes. Limitation of tow size and the powering of towing vessels were discussed in the GAO report, in part related to repeated casualties at two bridges. The Coast Guard has eliminated this problem at the West Port Arthur Bridge in Texas by widening the draw under the authority of the Truman Hobbs Act. Since that ac- tion, there has been no casualty attributable to the obstructive nature of the bridge, (or conversely those factors of tow size related so towboat power which could be addressed in regulations). In 1973 and again in 1974 the Coast Guard issued Special Navigation Orders for the protection of the Southern Pacific Rail- way Bridge at Berwick Bay, Louisiana. These orders, among other things, limited the size of tows permitted to pass through this bridge and established arbitrary horsepower requirements. Work is now in progress to establish a VTS at Berwick Bay for the protection of this bridge. Regulations will be developed for this VTS which will draw on the experience gained with the Special Navigation Orders. Efforts to establish criteria for tow boat power related to the ability to control barges, as called out by the N.T.S.B. report in 1972, have not thus far met with success. The Coast Guard is pursuing solution in two ways: research and develop- ment efforts in progress are addressing vessel maneuverability, of which power related to tonnage is a significant consideration; and, the problem has been referred to the Towing Industry Advisory Committee to the Marine Safety Council for an empirical solution based on industry practice. Other measures the GAO discussed which may improve vessel safety are the requirement for drawbridges to be equipped with bridge-to-bridge radio tele- phone (VHF-FM Channel 13, 156.65 MHz), and the requirement for vessels to have on board some form of precision navigation equipment. The Coast Guard has been generally successful in its efforts to have bridge owners voluntarily equip draw bridges with bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone. Furthermore, in order to address those bridges which have not been so voluntarily equipped, the Coast Guard has sought legislation which would require the bridge owner to install this equipment at the same time bridge protective systems (fendering) are constructed or altered. Loran "C" may prove to be the suitable form of navigation equipment suggested in the report. The Coast Guard has no plans at this time to require Loran "C" to be carried on certain classes of vessels. If the necessary study of this matter should indicate the installation of Loran "C" equipment should be re- quired, regulations towards this end may be developed under the Act. Recognizing the overall scope of the work of drafting regulations which lies ahead, the Coast Guard is undertaking the development of a comprehensive Ports and Waterways Safety Act regulation plan towards this end. In order to assure a uniform understanding of the basis for the development of these regulations and their equitable enforcement, timely guidance will be circulated to the field. PAGENO="0016" 10 Several errors and inaccuracies have been found in both the GAO Draft Report and final Report. The Comptroller General was alerted to these discrepancies in Appendix C of the DOT Statement on the GAO Draft Report, which was trans- mitted on January .21, 1975. IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTION The Coast Guard intends to implement the vessel traffic system program on the basis of cost/benefit considerations and national needs. In keeping with these considerations, and the recommendations of the GAO Report, the next major VTS start is planned for the ICW. Detailed data collection efforts are now under- way to identify the marine traffic safety needs more clearly and to help structure a comprehensive approach which will address the entire area most cost effec- tively. The VTS needs of Chesapeake Bay, an area which the GAO Report recommended for VTS implementation, are presently under study at the local level. By July 1, 1975 the Commander, Fifth Coast Guard District expects this examination along with system recommendations to be complete. While the Coast Guard's position concerning implementation through a strict phased approach has been previously clarified, analyses of operational effective- ness will be conducted annually for each of the systems. After the selected level(s) has been established and in operation, such analyses will be used to identify the need for possible system upgrading and modification. For the most part, the GAO Report's Recommendation concerning the promul- gation of regulations under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 is con- curred in. Efforts are underway to identify those aspects of marine safety which lend themselves to universal regulatory treatment. As such problem areas are identified, nationwide direction to field units will be provided by Coast Guard Headquarters. In other instances, the peculiarity of local conditions will require ocal regulatory remedies. In any case, greater emphasis is being given to marine safety regulations, and recent headquarters staff augmentation should expedite the entire process. 0. W. SILER, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant. APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF VTS COSTS BY SYSTEM BY LEVEL (COSTS BY LEVELS ARE INCREMENTAL) Port of waterway System component A.C. & I. cost (million) Annual operating expense 1 (thousands) Present value of total 15-year cost (discounted at 10 percent) (millions) San Francisco Present configuration: AC. & I. cost includes all VTS R. & D. Puget Sound VMRS Radar Total Houston/Galveston VMRS LLTV Radar Total New York VMRS LLTV Radar Total New Orleans and VMRS Mississippi River to LLTV Baton Rouge. Total Valdez VMRS Radar Total $5.8 $700 $11.1 1.0 1. 0 340 280 3.6 3. 1 2.0 620 6.7 1.2 .8 .7 570 120 100 5.5 1.7 1.5 2.7 790 8.7 1.6 1.7 1.2 800 250 180 7. 7 3.6 2.6 4. 5 1, 230 13. 9 1. 7 . 6 800 100 7.8 1.4 2.3 900 9.2 3. 1 1. 5 700 225 8.4 3. 2 4.6 925 11.6 1 Operating personnel costs are included. PAGENO="0017" 11 in each of the areas, the VTS levels indicated and costed are those which are presently in operation or planned for implementation. Additions or improvements may be made subsequently after experience is gained from system operations. The cost estimates provided in this appendix are based on August 1, 1974 engineering cost estimates, and do not in all cases coincide exactly with previous budgetary requests and documentation. Mr. HEYWARD. In addition, Mr. Chairman, minority counse', Pierre Olney, has prepared a brief memorandum which brings the issues into focus for the subcommittee, and I would like unanimous consent for him to present that, and to have that memorandum submitted for the record. Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, so ordered. [The document referred to follows :1 U.S. HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1975. MEMORANDUM To: Chairman Biaggi, Congressman duPont, and members of the Coast Guard Subcommittee. From: Pierre Olney, minority counsel. Subject: Background information for vessel traffic safety oversight hearings. (1) In response to increasing accidents in harbors and waterways, the Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. Among other things, the Act authorizes the Coast Guard to: Establish, operate and maintain vessel traffic services and systems in congested waterways; Require the installation of electronic or other devices necessary for the implementation of a traffic safety system; and Control vessel traffic when conditions require it through traffic control routing schemes and speed limits. (2) As part of its general review responsibilities, the General Accounting Office conducted an investigation of the Coast Guard's implementation of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The report of the Comptroller General was made available to the Congress on January 21, 1975. The GAO was critical of the Coast Guard's activities in two major areas: (a) The GAO found that the Coast Guard had given too much emphasis to the development of "sophisticated" systems in the six ports of Houston- Galveston, New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, Puget Sound and Valdez. The GAO's conclusion was that before refining the VTS systems in these ports, some expenditures for basic systems should be made in other ports. For example, the cost of the basic systems for Houston-Galveston, New York and New Orleans is expected to cost about $5 million and should result in preventing 72 casualties annually. The addition of sophisticated equipment could cost between $9.5 million and $11.5 million and may prevent about 30 vessel casualties annually.. With a lesser investment of between $3.5 million and $7 million, the Coast Guard could develop basic systems which could prevent an estimated 52 vessel casualties annually. In short, the GAO believes that basic vessel traffic systems across the board would be more cost-effective than the present Coast Guard plans for com- pleting basic and sophisticated systems in the six ports named above. (b) The GAO criticizes the Coast Guard for its limited use of authority to regulate vessel traffic movements. According to Coast Guard estimates, about 15% of the accidents considered preventable by VTS can be pre- vented by regulations if properly implemented. Such regulatory actions could include vessel speed limits, more stringent control over movement of dangerous and polluted cargoes, restrictions on movement during poor visibility, and limitations on size of tows. (3) This leaves the Coast Guard Subcommittee with four major issues: Should the Coast Guard redirect its traffic program to emphasize broad development of basic vessel traffic systems? Should the Coast Guard defer present plans for sophisticated electronic surveillance in Houston-Galveston, New Orleans and New York until basic systems have been developed in other major ports? 78-280-76----2 PAGENO="0018" 12 Should the Coast Guard adhere to a strict phased approach by first evaluat- ing the effectiveness of basic systems before adding more sophisticated elements? Should the Coast Guard give national emphasis to more extensive use of speed limits, more stringent regulation over movement of hazardous cargoes, and mandatory limits on the size of tows? Mr. OLNEY. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Heyward alluded, I have a memorandum that has been placed in the folders of the members, which briefly summarizes the issues that were identified by the General Accounting Office in their report that was submitted to the Congress in 1975. I think for the purposes of starting the hearings it is important not to necessarily accept the conclusions of the General Accounting Office, but to use them as a means of framing the issues which will be considered as the Subcommittee begins visiting some of the ports throughout the country. As you noticed in the memorandum, one of the first issues that was identified by the General Accounting Office was that the Coast Guard had, in effect, decided to go ahead and develop vessel traffic systems to an advanced, sophisticated stage in six major ports before develop- ing what is termed basic systems across a broader spectrum of ports. I think that the committee, when they are looking at these ports, should keep in mind whether, in fact, these sophisiticated systems must be added to these major ports first, and whether those sophisticated systems are essential to reduce accidents in those six before we con- sider the reduction of accidents in other ports that are not among the six major ports, through basic methods. The GAO report concludes that basic systems are more cost- effective in that initially they can affeèt a greater reduction of accidents, and that the addition of sophisticated equipment may result in only incremental reduction in accidents, so this will be one of the areas the committee should be considering in visiting each port. Should there be broad based implementation of basic systems, before the sophisticated systems are implemented in those 6 harbors. Another major issue which the committee will be discussing is that involved in the implementation of that section of the Port and Waterways Safety Act which calls upon the Coast Guard to establish regulations for control of traffic. Mr. Chairman, this would include speed limits, traffic separation schemes, limits on tow size and the like. The General Accounting Office report is critical of the Coast Guard in that they cite many accidents are caused by excessive speed, instances where perhaps Coast Guard imposed speed limits could have made a difference. When we get a chance to visit the different ports I know we will be hearing a lot of comments from the various operators, and probably from the captains of the ports, on how feasible it is to, in fact, impose speed limits on the traffic in the area. Bearing in mind that if the Coast Guard is going to impose traffic regulations on ships, what does this mean in terms of traditional notions of liability? Could the Coast Guard perhaps become jointly liable in the event of accidents where the vessel was under Coast Guard regulation? We also have to consider the responsibility that the masters and the pilots have under such regulations. PAGENO="0019" 13 Mr. Chairman, I think all of these issues involve new areas of the law, and will merit serious consideration by this committee. If the members of the subcommittee now have any further ques- tions we have witnesses here available to answer thse questions from both the General Accounting Office and from the Coast Guard. Mr. BIAGGL Thank you. Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Chairman, this morning, subject to whatever you wish, it had been my intention that we not go into detail in the GAO report, of the Coast Guard response to it, in view of the fact that we are going to be holding field hearings, and that report wifi be gone into, in depth, when we hold our hearings in the fall. However, in case there are any questions that the members may have, I asked Captain Moser, who is at Coast Guard Headquarters, and Chief of Port Safety, and Mr. Oliver Kruger, from the General Accounting Office, `who I understand was involved in the preparation of the report, to be ready to respond if you had anyquestions. I though it would be better to defer a detailed presentation of the exact contents of both the report and the response to it until a later time when the members were more familiar with the exact problems of the various port area or the various port areas. Whatever you would like to do Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. That is line, Captain Heyward. I would certainly suggest that the points Mr. Olney brought up be responded to by the Coast Guard in detail, but for myself, I think it would serve the committee's interest best if we could have a review of the basic system as contrasted to the sophisticated system, and then talk about the conflict of opinion between the General Accounting Office and the Coast Guard. In other words, how the whole navigational system should be treated in preparation for our planned meetings. Mr. HEYwARD. Do you wish to have them come up now, so ques- tions can be addressed to them? Mr. BIAGGI. Before they start to testify, we shall have to take a short recess to answer the quorum call. [Short recess.] Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is again called to order. At this time we will recognize Captain Moser and Commander Hickey of the Coast Guard, and Mr. Kruger from the General Accounting Office. Captain Moser, can you give us the GAO's point of view as con- trasted to the Coast Guard? STATEMENT OP CAPT. KEVIN L. MOSER, PORT SAFETY DIVISION, U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY COMDR. EUGENE HICKEY, U.S. COAST GUARD, AND OLIVER KRUGER, GENERAL ACCOUNT- ING OFFICE Captain MosER. Mr. Chairman, first, the terms "basic" and "sophis- ticated" were not terms devised by the Coast Guard. This was developed by the General Accounting Office in the course of their review of our activity in vessel traffic systems. As I understand it, the GAO definition, they would describe as basic any kind of a system which does not use a means of surveillance, PAGENO="0020" 14 such as a TV or a radar, or involve the use of a computer for whatever purpose, be it merely managing data or solving problems. Systems which have those features, ability to see the radar, or the TV, or the ability to process the computer would be described by the GAO as sophisticated, and all others would be basic. I think that this is really not useful to the way the Coast Guard would manage the program. For one thing, the computer, sir, is a laborsaving device in addition to some of the other things it might do. Mr. Chairman, one might have what would be otherwise a basic system using radio reporting alone, or with some other supportive things, such as regulations and the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone. At a certain point, the amount of work that a man must do in plotting and keeping track of this traffic overwhelms him. He is prone to error. He must bring in additional people at additional cost, and, quite frankly, it is more accurate and cheaper to buy a machine to do the work of the man. Therefore, we contest the use of a computer for that purpose is really not sophisticated at all, merely a laborsaving device. When one couples a computer to a radar, and has the radar prob- lems solved by computer, again, this is using a machine to do what it would take many men to do, and doing it more accurately, and immensely faster. Mr. Chairman, we could handle problems better, and leave the men to make the judgments about the information presented by the computer. Mr. Chairman, I think that pretty well sums up our thoughts on the difference between basic and sophisticated. Mr. BIAGGI. How do you justify the Coast Guard's position of deal- ing with six major ports with the installation of the sophisticated, if you will, system, rather than having a basic system in a large number of ports around the country first? Captain MOSER. Well, I think we started down this road at vessel traffic systems, Mr. Chairman, in order to get the problem solved where it was worse, and frankly, it is worse in the big ports. There are places, such as ports of the ICW, which have accidents by and large where the accidents are large in number because there are large numbers of small barges which may be involved in a single accident. But where one has a large busy port, for instance, New York, which is the second largest port in the world, New Orleans and its complex and its associate Port of Baton Rouge, is the third largest port in the world, and the Coast Guard judgment is that a basic system is not going to do the job there. We have to have it supplemented, and I use the word "basic" because I happen to be sitting here talking about basics, not because it is a Coast Guard term. The Coast Guard would use those tools necessary to do the things we would so wish to do in keeping track of traffic, and when we develop the regulations for these particular areas to operate the system in such a way that the vessels will not try to occupy the same place at the same time. Mr. Chairman, that is really what we are trying to do, space control by a number of stratagems, either by advising the mariner of other PAGENO="0021" 15 vessels, and concentrations of vessels, or by directing the mariner not to proceed in such a way which would cause a concentration of vessels. Mr. BIAGGI. We understand your concerns, and the mutual con- cerns for the larger ports. Just what is the picture in the smaller ports where we do not have such problems? Captain MOSER. There are accidents there, but I believe our study, Mr. Chairman, which was introduced into the record, the analysis of port needs, would give you a pretty good picture of incidents of accidents, the frequency of them, and their seriousness, and what kind of a vessel traffic system could prevent the accidents which have really taken place in these ports over the previous 4-year period during this study. What we did with this study, first, we charted out the ports by tonnage and transit, to see which were the really important ports in this country, organized them in descending order, and then investi- gated them by means of an algorithm, which studied different kinds of accidents, laid a value alongside of them, and then we examined each and every accident, almost 4,000 accident reports, perhaps 2,000 accidents, and asked the question, and the question was: "Would, let us say, bridge-to-bridge radio have prevented this accident if properly used?" Would a traffic separation scheme have prevented this accident if properly used? Would a VTS involving radar surveillance have prevented the accident? The answers were clouded, and quite frankly, I was surprised to find there were a number of places where my inclination would tell me that we would need, let us say, a radar, or some surveillance devise which the answers proved to us were not warranted. Mr. Chairman, I should go one bit further. We do look at this in a cost-benefit way. The cost of the installation should certainly prevent accidents of greater value than the cost, and if it cannot meet that test, we simply do not go that far. Mr. BIAGGI. Just for my own information, I see New York has had in fiscal years 1969-72 320 accidents, and Boston has had 15. I imagine there is substantially less traffic in Boston, but are there other factors? Captain MOSER. Factors for the number of accidents? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Captain MOSER. I think we took the port and said look, you are having many accidents, and that is what we are trying to attempt. We did in our early attempt try to get a handle on how difficult the port was, and what made one port more demanding in skills for the mariner than another port, but we quickly found we were not getting very far looking at that and decided that we would look at the accidents which are taking place, and try to prevent those things from happening, not the things that did not happen. Mr. BIAGGI. Do you have any navigational systems in Boston Harbor? Captain MOSER. Yes, sir, there are navigational systems in Boston Harbor, well-buoyed and well-marked, as are in New York, as in all of our ports. PAGENO="0022" 16 Mr. BIAGGI. We had some testimony that Philadelphia left some- thing to be desired, but we will look at that shortly. Mr. }IEYWARD. In connection with Boston, as contrasted with New York, other than the traffic volume, would you not say there are not as many complicating cross channels, and different directions that people move in Boston? Captain MOSER. Oh, yes, I would agree with the counsel for point- ing that out. New York is a complicated harbor. Staten Island sits smack in the middle of it. There are really four entrances into the harbor, streams of traffic that join and then split away, and go other places. Yes, it is a very complicated case. Mr. HEYWARD. I would suppose that perhaps Philadelphia and the Delaware River are somewhat comparable in connection with ap- proaches, because there is mainly one channel there. I am not saying it is the same, but what I am saying is the con- figurations of the harbor areas would probably influence the number of accidents if there is very little crossing of traffic, and fewer acci- dents shold occur. Would you not agree? Captain MOSER. I would tend to agree, but I think rather than just agree with you, we would have to go back and check the numbers out. I really believe that you are on target though, at least the simple channel is much more receptive to, say, the movement of vessels than a complicated one. Mr. HEYWARD. I notice from the casualty record, for instance, that the Delaware River and Bay had 107 accidents, as constrated to 320 in New York during this period, even though the volume of traffic in Delaware Bay, at least in some commodities, is much greathr than New York. I am speaking of volume now, and not the number of transits. Each harbor and port has its own problem area, and each con- figuration, each usage, each traffic pattern will dictate a different need and a different result. Captain MOSER. Absolutely, sir. These ports are quite individ- ualistic, and we try to look at them and treat their problems according to what is needed for that particular port. Early on, Admiral Benkert set this up in our mind, that we were not going to take a paint brush and paint the traffic system the same in every place. We have to meet the need that exists in a particular port. Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney? Mr. OLNEY. Captain, you mention that you do not agree with, rather you do not use the term "basic and sophisticated" to describe what level of vessel traffic systems you have in a given port, is there a classification that you would prefer that you think is more consistent with the way the Coast Guard analysizes different levels of traffic control systems? For example, in this letter dated February 25 to the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, on page 3 of the appendix you have levels of VTS systems where you define systems starting from bridge-to-bridge radio telephone through to advanced surveillance. PAGENO="0023" 17 Do those five classifications represent separate components that can be added in a series, or do they have to be added into an inte- grated system? Captain MOSER. No, they do not have to be added in a series. They are discreet things. For instance, some ports simply could not use a traffic separation scheme. I think the Delaware River in ~some places would not fit one in. It is not wide enough, so that would be one that could not possibly be used in that area. We have no plan for such a thing in New Orleans. However, in Puget Sound they have a separation scheme. These things are modular, if you wish to think of them in that way, and they can be placed in place, not necessarily depending on a previous placement of all the other ones. Mr. OLNEY. So if we looked at the port and it had, let us say, bridge-to-bridge, traffic separation, and a basic surveillance, and we compared that with another port which had advanced surveillance, we could make some comparison about the sophistication and cost effectiveness about those particular packages. Captain MOSER. Yes and no, sir. Because your surveillance is one device, or a series of devices that give you surveillance, and the price tag may differ depending on how many remotes you might have, but I think I could get right to the point here. If we are talking about dollars and cents, the real split between costly systems and a less costly system are those which are manned and those that are unmanned. The things that cost less would be regulations without an expensive system to support them-traffic separation schemes, the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone system, and those things have practically no cost attached. When one starts to put in things such as radios to make reports, all of a sudden yo~ have to have a man on the other end of the radio, and that is where your money starts. The capital costs are there, but the real continuing cost, the one that eats you up is the man. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Captain. Now we will hear from Mr. Kruger from GAO. Would you care to make some comment and respond to my ques- tions, Mr. Kruger? Mr. KRUGER. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I could give a fast rundown why we got into this job in the first place. Mr. Chairman, we wanted to take a look at the who'e Ports and Waterways Act of 1972, and what the Coast Guard was doing in that respect, and provide some sort of evaluation to the Congress as we were charged to do. I think Mr. Olney accurately stated what our function in this matter is, and that is to bring forth some issues for consideration by committees like yours. In this particular case, we have made some recommendations that we felt are necessary, based primarily on data we have obtained from the Coast Guard. Mr. Chairman, none of the data in our report is generated by the General Accounting Office. It is an evaluation and analysis of the Coast Guard's existing data. PAGENO="0024" 18 We try to use simple language in our reports. The terms "basic" and "sophisticated" to us were something that people on the street can understand. The definitions that we use, or the criteria that we use, I think was accurately stated by the captain here. Anything that has to do with electronics surveillance, be it radar or TV, we consider sophisticated systems. The captain here just mentioned that the manned versus unmanned. might be a better definition. Unmanned vessel traffic systems in my point of view, anyway, would consist primarily of just your regulations. The system that is currently in existence at Puget Sound, for example, and I do not know whether you have installed the radar out there or not, but before the radar we would consider the system out there to be a basic system. That included the vessel captains reporting into the traffic control center on their positions, their speeds, the plot board where the Coast Guard would plot these various ships, show them in the traffic lanes where they were, who was going to meet at various turning basins, and so forth. This, to us, was a basic system, Mr. Chairman. Now, the plans were to add radar surveillance in various sections of the Puget Sound area. To us this was getting into the sophisticated aspects of the vessels system. The Congress, as we interpreted the intent of the initial Port and Waterways Safety Act, was to get as much safety as we could for our dollars. The Congress in this whole program has been rather stringent in providing money for this program. Therefore, in the view of the General Accounting Office, in looking at this program with the limited resources we felt that we could get more safety for the same amount of dollars by spreading out the basic systems in more ports, and then as money becomes available, and as studies would show the necessity for adding on additional increments of a system, we can do this. We have no objection to this, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Mr. Kruger. Captain MOSER. May I make this statement, Mr. Chairman, con- cerning in some places the use of electronics surveillance devices I would take the Port of New York as the most extreme case where the traffic is complicated, and if one is to use a vessel traffic system in New York, it is virtually impossible to put one in without a radar. With a reporting system alone, it would fill the air up with reports, and challenge the people who are trying to keep track of what is going on. There will be so maiy reports you simply must have some book- keeping device, such as a computer, or some way of using eyes where they cannot see otherwise, such as a TV, or a radar, in certain other areas in a heavily trafficked port. Mr. Chairman, we do not believe it would be possible to put m successful YTS in many places without this "sophisticated" equipment, and I would include in that the Houston area, where we are limping along without a computer, but we will have to have one in order to keep track of the very heavy traffic in that area, and New Orleans for the same purpose. PAGENO="0025" 19 Mr. BIAGGI. As far as the New York area, that is not talking in terms of the Hudson River, is it? Captain MOSER. No, sir, unfortunately, just below the Battery things begin to happen. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. You have made it quite clear. Mr. Olney? Mr. OLNEY. Captain, I would like to follow up once more. I think I understand your last statement, and what you are saying is that it is not necessarily effective to, across the board, have levels 1, 2, and 3 of the basic system. What you are saying is in an area like New York, you have to go one through five. You have to start with bridge-to-bridge, and go all the way through to levels of automated surveillance. So, in effect, when we are comparing ports, we should not necessarily look at the degree of sophisitication in one port and compare it to another, but look at the port as a whole. Captain MOSER. Yes. The one thing I am not certain of is whether there will be devised a way to have separation of traffic in New York, so it might be inappropriate to suggest that they will have a traffic separation scheme. The other elements, though, would be appropriate, even including the possibility of a basic system if one were to put a TV to monitor certain restricted areas where the TV could work. That might be ap- propriate in addition to a radar. I have with me Commander Hickey, who has just come off leave, to be present at this briefing, and he keeps nudging me, and wants me to say it is life cycle cost that we are speaking about when we buy a piece of capital equipment, a radar, a center, and that is the kind of cost that we have applied in our thinking of our system when we measure cost-benefit ratios. Mr. OLNEY. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Captain Moser, Commander Hickey, and Mr. Kruger. At the outset, you will recall I asked the Coast Guard to prepare responses to the points that Mr. Olney raised in his statement, and we would appreciate it if you would do that as quickly as possible. Captain MOSER. We will have that in your hands as soon as we can get it. [The following was received :~ DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, July 8, 1975. Hon MARIO BIAGGI, Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On 25 June 1975, Mr. Pierre Olney, Minority Counsel to the Coast Guard and Navigation Subcommittee, submitted for the record a memorandum of background information for Vessel Traffic System oversight hearings. In this memorandum Mr. Olney summarized, in his own words, the two basic criticisms made by the GAO with respect to the Coast Guard's activities in the vessel traffic management area. These were contained, respectively, in paragraphs (2)(a) and (2)(b) of his memo. You asked that the Coast Guard pro- vide you with its response to the issues raised in the memorandum. PAGENO="0026" 20 The Coast Guard feels that Mr. Olney has accurately identified the major issues of concern to the GAO and to the subcommittee. Whereas Mr. Olney's memorandum has summarized the GAO's criticism of the Coast Guard, it would also be appropriate to summarize the Coast Guard's response to those criticisms. For an accurate assessment of the Coast Guard's vessel traffic system program, two points which form the basis of the GAO Report must be clarified. First, GAO's analysis of system costs is distorted and misleading, inasmuch as only acquisition costs were quoted. A valid cost analysis for any such program requires that annual recurring costs such as operating expenses and personnel costs be included. It is the total life cycle costs, not the initial acquisition cost, which must be examined in making implementation decisions. The second point which deserves explanation is the GAO Report's classifi- cation of YTS levels as "basic" and "sophisticated." While GAO's intent to arrive at terms easily understandable to the layman is appreciated, it is felt that these terms are oversimplified and tend to cloud rather than clarify the relevant system cost and complexity considerations. Those ports and waterways with the most pressing marine safety needs and the most promising returns on investment are receiving first attention. The decision to implement automated or surveil- lance system components in any area is made only after careful study of the total incremental costs and benefits. In assessing vessel traffic system benefits many factors in addition to the simple number of accident preventions must be weighed. These include differences in vessel construction, cargo, density, accident severity, and the potential for catastrophic environmental and personnel casualties. The Coast Guard agrees that in many areas relatively low level systems wifi provide an adequate level of safety at a favorable cost/benefit ratio. However, a distinct need is recognized to address the major port areas now in planning with systems which will provide the reliability and effectiveness demanded by local conditions. In order to provide maximum national benefit for marine safety, it is essential that those areas with the greatest needs and highest returns on investment be addressed first. For the most part, the GAO's Report recommendation concerning the pro- mulgation of regulations under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 is concurred in. Efforts are underway to identify those aspects of marine safety which lend themselves to universal regulatory treatment. As such problem areas are identified, nationwide direction to field units will be provided by Coast Guard Headquarters. In other instances, the peculiarity of local conditions will require local regulatory remedies. In any case, greater emphasis is being given to marine safety regulations, and recent Headquarters staff augmentation should expedite the entire process. As a summary of the Coast Guard's position concerning the GAO Report on vessel traffic systems, this letter should not be considered definitive in that regard. However, it is hoped that it is responsive to your specific request. For a com- prehensive review of the issues under consideration, it is suggested that the GAO Report and the lengthy response prepared by the Coast Guard be relied upon. For your convenience, a copy of each of these documents is enclosed. Sincerely, 0. W. SILER, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant. Enclosures. 1\'Ir. BIAGGI. The meeting stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] PAGENO="0027" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAviGATioN, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, New York, N.Y. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:07 p.m., in room 2705, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y., the Honorable Mario Biaggi, subcommittee chairman, presiding. Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order. This is the first of a series of oversight hearings of the Coast Guard Subcommittee that we will be making throughout the country in order to deal with the vessel traffic systems and safety plans that are on the boards. In order to evaluate them properly and to deal with the general comments made by GAO, the subcommittee has initiated the hearings by appearing in New York as its first site. I have with me the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the Congressman from the State of Delaware, my good friend, Mr. Pierre du Pont; also counsel, Mr. Pierre Olney, and counsel, Mr. Francis Heyward. We spent most of the morning making~ an overflight of the New York waterways, something that I have never been privileged to do as a resident of this city and an owner of a boat for many years. I have been all around the island and most of the islands and water- ways, but seeing it from the top is something else and quite an experience. We are privileged to have this afternoon Capt. David Perkins, chief of staff of the Third Coast Guard District, who will testify. Captain? STATEMENT OF CAPT. DAVID E. PERKINS, CHIEF OF STAFF, THIRD COAST GUARD DISTRICT, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COMDR. CARL T. JOHNSON AND LT. ARTHUR R. WHITTUM Captain PERKINS. Con gressinan Biaggi, Congressman du Pont, and gentlemen, first of all, Vice Admiral Rea, the District Commander extends his regrets that he could not be here today. I do think that, he is planning to make the hearings in Philadelphia on the 7th of July. The VTS problem was first addressed by the Coast Guard approxi- mately 3 years ago in the New York area. After we had worked on it a short time, we became aware of the fact that we had to have a signifi- cant input from people in industry who were a lot more familiar with the local situation than we were. (21) PAGENO="0028" 22 We, therefore, in April of 1973, formsd an advisory committee. I would like to go down the list and the current associations of the members of this advisory committee to simply give you an idea of the spectrum of expertise that we have in this group. The following are members of our committee: Adm. John Will, U.S. Navy (retired), currently associated with Arthur Tickle Engineering Works; Capt. Harry C. Breitenfeld, New York Sandy Hook Pilots; Capt. William H. Burrill, New Jersey Board of Commissioner of Pilotage; Mr. Giallorenzi of the Exxon Co.; Col. Thomas C. Hunter, Jr., New York District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Mr. Alfred Hammon, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; Capt. James G. Stillwaggon, Interport Pilots Associates; Capt. Thomas A. King, Eastern Region Director, Maritime Administration; Mr. Henry H. Anderson, Jr., North American Yacht Racing Union; Mr. Robert W. Sanders, Red Star Marine Services, Inc.; Capt. Stephen M. Seledee, American Institute of Marine Underwriters; Capt. Robert Donald Sante, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff of the Military Sealift Command, Atlantic; Mr. Vito J. Fossella, Commissioner of Marine and Aviation, city of New York; Capt. Kenneth C. Torrens, Farrell Lines-Captain Torrens is the chairman of the executive committee of our advisory board; Capt. Thomas J. McGovern, United New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots; Mr. Paul Elliot, Environmental Protection Agency. With this group we have been working for over 2 years to develop what we think is going to be a viable traffic system for the Port of New York. I am going to ask Lieutenant Commander Johnson in a moment to go into some of the details of what we see as the problem in New York, how we developed or identified this problem, and basically what we propose to do about it. Lieutenant Commander Johnson. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Representative Biaggi, Repre- sentative du Pont, Captain Perkins, ladies and gentlemen, my pres- entation this afternoon is intended to inform you of the purpose, background, and current status of the New York vessel traffic system. To fully understand our present position, some brief background information is desirable. The American public, through congressional action, has demanded that more action be taken to reduce the loss of lives, injuries to people, and damage to property and the environment that result from the steadily increasing number of serious vessel casualties that occur in U.S. waters. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 authorized the Secre- tary of the Department in which the Coast Guard operates to estab- lish, operate, and maintain vessel traffic services and systems for ports, harbors, and other waters subject to congested vessel traffic. This act also authorizes the requiring of vessels to use or comply with the system, as well as the control of vessel traffic during conditions of hazardous circumstances. I would like to digress for a moment and address the subject of control. The word "control" has ominous overtones to the maimer. The association of the word "control" with the word "Govermnent" often PAGENO="0029" 23 suggests to the mariner the usurpation of responsibility and freedom to act independently to maneuver his vessel according to his own train-. ing and judgment. I am sure as long as the word "control" is held in that context by the mariner, it will continue to be an emotional and frustrating prospect. The New York vessel traffic system does not expect to have the necessary information, the expertise, or even the desire to attempt maneuvering a vessel from a shore facility. You and I, as motor vehicle drivers, would tend to be emotional if the traffic patrolman at the intersection opened the car door and told us to move over so he could drive the vehicle through the intersection or, worse yet, he sat in the passenger seat, in heavy traffic, ordered us to disregard all outside activity and manipulate the steering wheel, brakes, and accelerator as he directed. Thankfully, such is not the case. The patrolman stands at the intersection, holds up his hand for us to stop, because he knows that we can and directs traffic to cross safely in front of us. Such will be the role of the Controller in our Vessel Traffic Center. DEFINITION OF VESSEL TRAFFiC SYSTEM With the passage of the Bridge-to-Bridge Radio-Telephone Act of 1971, and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, a vessel traffic system became defined as "an integrated system encompassing the variety of technologies, equipment and people employed to coordinate vessel movement in or approaching a port or waterway." The purpose of the New York vessel, traffic system is to reduce the incidence of `marine casualties that result from collisions and ground- ings by identifying and eliminating their causes while facilitating the orderly movement of vessels within the port. HEADQUARTERS PLANNING PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION In March 1973, the Commandant, Office of Environment and Systems, published the Vessel Traffic System Issue Study. The objectives of this study were: 1. To identify specific vessel traffic system program goals, antici- pated benefits and alternatives. 2. To analyze the potential vessel traffic system roles of Federal, State and local authorities, and private enterprise; and recommend the most beneficial role for the Coast Guard. 3. To analyze the quantitative and qualitative factors to be con- sidered in the determination of the needs for various levels of VTS in U.S. ports. 4. To prepare short and long-range staffing and funding plans. 5. To prepare a management plan to use as a guide in planning, developing and implementing new systems. In August of 1973, the Office of Environment and Systems pub- lished a report titled the "Analysis of Port Needs." This report was a follow-on to the VTS issue study. The cost/benefit analysis developed in the issue study was applied to 22 major ports and waterways in order to establish a relative ranking of their need for VTS. The ports were selected for analysis on PAGENO="0030" 24 the basis of tonnage of cargo handled, number of vessel transits, and number of vessels involved in marine casualties over a 4-year period, fiscal year 1969 through 1972. The output of this analysis was a listing of ports and waterways in the order their needs for a vessel traffic system should be addressed, and the initial recommendations concerning the level of need for each area. The Port of New York ranked No. 1 in level of need in terms of dollars lost in damages to vessels and environmental pollution. It ranked second, behind New Orleans, in deaths and injuries. New York also ranked No. 1 in benefits from estimated annual reductions of damage, deaths and injuries by the implementation of a vessel traffic system. The issue study estimates that 52 percent of the casualties in New York Harbor are preventable by a vessel traffic system. I would like to add some perspective to this estimate. New York Harbor has the largest amount of casualties because it is the largest and most complex harbor in the United States and has the most traffic. These casualties have resulted from over 2 million vessel movements in the 4-year time period. The mariner in New York Harbor is an expert and can be proud of the overwhelming number of successful harbor transits as opposed to those involving casualties. It is because there is such a large potential to do grievous damage of great magnitude with so few casualties that the public has demanded that these few casualties be reduced even further. Some of us overfiew the harbor this morning and have had a first- hand look at some of the factors which have influenced our system design. Each port has its own geographic and traffic density problems and is therefore unique. There is no one system that will solve the traffic problems of all ports and waterways. For those who did not make the flight this morning, let me briefly review the composition of the Port of New York in terms of geography and traffic. The Port of New York, according to the compact reached in 1921 between New York and New Jersey, is defined as an area of some 1,500 square miles within a 25-mile radius from the Statue of Liberty located in upper bay. As you can see, the actual navigable channel area, shaded in green, is substantially smaller than the total area, and in the lower bay the difference is more apparent-see figure 2. So you can see that although the total area is extremely large, the area available for the navigation of large vessels amounts to less than 15 percent of the total area. The port areas has a water frontage of 750 miles of which 460 miles are in New York and 290 miles in New Jersey. Geographically, it offers one of the best natural deepwater harbors in the world today. An ice-free port and seldom hampered by fog, it has an average tidal range of only 4~ feet. The upper bay can be considered the center of a huge wheel from which the port's major navigable channels extend. It contains a large protected anchorage basin. Deepwater piers along the Staten Island and Brooklyn waterfronts are only 9 miles from the open sea. The Port of New York has six major entrances for vessels. Entrances to lower New York Bay include Ambrose Channel and Sandy Hook Channel from seaward and Raritan Bay Channel from inland points. PAGENO="0031" 25 Upper New York Bay is served from seaward by the Narrows, Long Island Sound, the East River and Kill Van Kull. Together, these are the basic inner harbor channel systems from which the major branch and spur channels emanate. The channels range in bottom width from 150 feet through 2,000 feet, and a controlling mean low water project depth from 12 through 45 feet. According to available information, the total channel network of the port during 1973 served more than 216 million short tons of trade. The Port of New York and its channel system handles all forms of vessel traffic, including passenger liners, tour boats, container ships, break-bulk general cargo vessels, petroleum tankers, dry bulk cargo carriers, and a large volume of tow boat traffic. In 1971, some 18,193 of these arriving and departing ocean going vessels, operated by 185 steamship lines, united the Port of New York with other ports around the world. These vessels represent 21 percent of the total volume of ocean-going vessel traffic of the 11 major sea- ports of the United States during the same year. Particularly signifi- cant is the fact that the Port of New York accommodated over 8.5 million long tons of containerized cargo in 1971, more than twice the amount of the next leading U.S. container port. Serving all marine cargo facilities is a harbor fleet of approximately 250 towboats and almost 1,300 pieces of floating equipment, including barges, lighters, scows and carfloats, thus adding to the volume of vessel movements between terminals, shipyards, anchorages, and similar intraharbor movements. Particularly appropriate at this point are the remarks of Mr. Alfred Hammon; the supervisor of development and planning for the Port of New York Authority to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey and Navigation delivered on August 11, 1970, on the proposed `Torts and Waterways Safety Act of 1970." I quote: The Port of New York is and wifi continue to be a complex network of crossing and joining Federal channels, marked in various degrees by sharp turns, narrow constrictions, rip currents, narrow or low bridges and heavy concentrations of ocean traffic. At night or during periods of low visibility, navigational dnagers in such areas increase considerably. In many instances hazardous conditions are not physically remediable. Where remediable, they can often be eliminated or modified only at tremendous cost. Further, as ships, such as tankers and container ships become longer, wider, deeper and faster, they tend to intensify these hazards, particularly since the economics upon which their construction and operation are founded stimulate rapid and undelayed port turnarounds. Traffic, fog, rain and snow impede rapid port turnarounds and can cost up to $1,000 per hour in vessel time, not to mention the cost in dollars of injury and loss of time when accidents occur. A preliminary vessel traffic system survey was conducted from November 8 through November 16, 1973, during the hours of 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. The purpose of the survey was to determine the number of vessels subject to a vessel traffic system underway at any given time within New York Harbor. The vessels which we intend to make subject to the vessel traffic system are the same as those subject to the Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act, namely: 1. Every power-driven vessel of 300 gross tons and upward while navigating. 2. Every vessel of 100 gross tons and upward carrying one or more passengers for hire while navigating. 3. Every towing vessel, while towing, of 26 feet or over in length while navigating. 4. Every dredge and floating plant engaged in or near a channel or fairway in operations likely to restrict or affect navigation of other vessels. PAGENO="0032" 26 During the survey from 48 to 106 vessels subject to a Vessel Traffic System were actually observed underway simultaneously. From this traffic survey it was determined that a maximum of 147 vessels, subject to a Vessel Traffic System, could currently be underway at any one time. Subsequent traffic data has served to verify these figures-see Figure 3. Referring to the Vue-graph, the upper figures within the boxes are the mean and the lower figures are the maximum hourly traffic densities recorded at the locations indicated. The locations circled are particularly hazardous for the navigation of large vessels and tugs with tows because of limited visibility and narrow channels. The conditions in these areas merit particular attention in planning a Vessel Traffic System for New York. With the probable exception of very large oil tankers and dry cargo bulk carriers, the Port of New York may logically be expected to handle the largest of the vessels expected to call at any port of the United States in the next three decades. The preceding information provides an overview of the type of general planning and the quality of information available at our local level to undertake the specific tasks of implementing a vessel traffic system in the port of New York. In 1972, concurrent with headquarters planning, Commander, Third Coast Guard District, asked Captain of the Port New York to conduct a local Maritime Hazards Study which first dealt in detail with the complexities of local geography and traffic densities-see figure 4. Soon after that study, in response to a headquarters' request, an acquisition, construction, and improvement proposal for a New York vessel traffic system was drafted and was made up of the system elements recommended later by the analysis of port needs. In 1973, the Captain of the Port New York completed a vessel traffic system study which used the results of the maritime hazards study to make the first local effort in the transition from general to specific planning for the system. During 1973, the need for advice from the broad spectrum of mari- time interests and the need for a dedicated Coast Guard Project Staff were identified. This resulted in the establishment of the Vessel Traffic System Advisory Committee in April 1973, and the Vessel Traffic System Staff of Commander, Third Coast Guard District. Membership in the advisory committee represents a cross-section of the maritime community made up of shipping, port, maritime, boating, and environmental interests. This committee is a valuable associate in assuring that our system not only increases safety but meets the needs of those who will participate in it without undue burden. During the period August 1973 through February 1974, the vessel traffic system staff identified the local tasks and procedures necessary to implement our vessel traffic system. The initial planning effort was estimated at 60 man-years and several millions of dollars distributed over a 24-month period. National and Coast Guard priorities have dictated a substantially reduced planning effort coincident with available personnel and funds and the acceptance of the attendant risk that system effective- ness might be reduced. It was therefore necessary to minimize planning errors and maximize local staff effectiveness to insure that the fore- shortened planning would not result in an ineffective system. Far more detailed information on ship characteristics, traffic behavior, harbor geography, traffic hazards, and existing communica- tions usage was required for an acceptable functional design. PAGENO="0033" 27 We found that the most effective way to characterize both harbor and traffic parameters was through a well-structured data base that would be accessible in minimum time. A plan to accomplish both data collection and analysis was developed and resulted in a most efficient mformation system which has served us well. An expenditure of approximately $70,000 was required for necessary equipment. This information system, the harbor image data base, presently consists of 230 days of vessel traffic density, harbor geography, communications usage, traffic hazard, and environmental information that has enabled our staff to progress through a logically structured approach to the final functional design for the New York Vessel Traffic System. This approach is best described as follows: I refer to the Vue-graph. The harbor area was divided into small manageable areas, unrelated to actual system sectors because of the analysis techniques available. Data was collected reflecting the total environment, the vessel's characteristics, and the traffic density in the area. Harbor geography was defined in usable terms. Dimensions of all channels, descriptions of existing aids to navigation, and prominent land areas were quantified to form the boundaries of the areas where the vessels maneuver. Ship characteristics were analyzed to roughly determine the maneuvering capabifity of the various classes of vessels which use the harbor. This analysis has grossly defined vessel relationships to one another in the channels and has provided an assessment of a channel's ability to contain traffic. Weather effects limiting visibifity were considered versus vessel maneuvering capability to determine optimum safe traffic separation. The safe traffic capacity of each segment was then estimated. The segments which represent actual conditions were then assembled to form a dynamic traffic proffle of the harbor. See figure 6-the safe capacities of the small segments were used to define route networks throughout the harbor. It is this point where we find ourselves now with the remaining blocks in process of final implementation. An evaluation is being made to determine if traffic densities exceed the estimated safe capacities and, if so, then methods to reduce traffic to a safe level will be used, such as limiting traffic through an area. If the densities are safe, then methods to manage the flow along the routes will be used to preclude potentially hazardous encounters in physically restricted maneuvering areas. Hazards, both physical and operational, are being identified and listed and then ranked according to degree. Physical hazards, such as obstructions to visibility or obstructions near channels, are being evaluated so as to reduce their effect on traffic flow. For example, some hazards may be eliminated by establishing a new aid to navigation or by recommending a demolition or a dredging operation through the Corps of Engineers. Various rules and regulations will be developed and considered to minimize a particular hazard's effect on traffic flow. During this phase, the Vessel Traffic System Advisory Committee will be particularly involved in recommendations concerning the proposed rules. 78-280-76-3 PAGENO="0034" 28 In cases where conditions fluctuate to the extent that rules and regulations would be ineffective for all situations, it will be the direct action of the Vessel Traffic System Controller, through communicating advisories to the vessels concerned that will minimize the effects of potentially hazardous encounters in restricted maneuvering areas. Following this approach, it has become obvious that cost/benefit analysis and other general indicators of Port VTS requirements have not addressed the practicalities involved in actual system implementa- tion. I am sure they were never intended to. We found this illustrated when we estimated the ability of a partic- ular system level to manage the high traffic densities found in the relatively small navigable areas in New York harbor. We found, and the VTS Advisory Committee agreed, that a com- munications based VMRS could not effectively manage traffic, nor could it improve safety in the harbor. In fact, quite the opposite would have occurred. The mariner would have been burdened with additional communications loads that would have served to provide the vessel traffic center with information without any significant benefits returned to the mariner. The imposition of this system level would have unnecessarily diverted the mariner's attention from his primary task which is the safe navigation of his vessel. The Commandant's Office of Environment and Systems was notified of this development, and the VTS Staff was subsequently tasked to generate the specific operational requirements for the New York System. With the aid of our data base and the help of the VTS Advisory Committee, the specific operational requirements were completed in October 1974, and represents, without regard to cost, the system functions necessary to provide a safe effective traffic management system for New York harbor. It was readily apparent that the funds currently appropriated and the time necessary to apply existing technology were inadequate to implement a system containing all the functions specified in the SOR. Therefore, Commandant, Office of Engineering, responded with specifications for system hardware procurement which will provide, within present funding levels, most of the functions required by the SOR. The system hardware will be sufficient to allow us to engage in traffic management methods which will reduce potentially hazardous encounters, harborwide, with minimum burden on the mariner. We recognized that some near term action to improve harbor safety was necessary. Therefore, the current voluntary "Safety Broadcast System" was implemented-see figure 7. This system formalized and standardized the local practice of individual vessels broadcasting their intentions, on the bridge to bridge channel, to transit areas known to be hazardous if an approaching vessel encounters another without prior warning. The points at which broadcasts are made are shown in the num- bered circles. The direction that the vessels are traveling when they make the broadcasts are indicated by the arrowheads. The details of the system are published in Local Notice to Mariners, No. 33, dated July25, 1974. PAGENO="0035" 29 Participation has been excellent, and this system is providing a good evolutionary springboard for transition to an active traffic management system. This next Vue-graph, figure 8, is a simplified critical path network, showing the remaining tasks. It is the most realistic implementation schedule, considering available staff resources, that we are able to forecast at this time. The heading scale represents calendar months from April 1, 1975 to 1 May 1977. Each line, or path, represents a task versus time, and is drawn to show its dependence on, or relationship to, other tasks. The most critical path is Coast Guard Headquarters' procurement, installation and off-line testing of system hardware. There are several significant tasks that must be completed locally prior to activating a centralized traffic management system: First. Rules and regulations governing the system must be formu- lated with the aid of the VTS Advisory Committee. They must be in nearly final form before publishing the Operations Manual and Vessel Traffic Center Manual. Second. A controller training program must be developed and approved prior to the arrival of operating personnel. This program must be carefully prepared because we recognize that, initially, the controller will have never managed traffic and the local mariners will have never participated in a management system. We must build a basis on mutual trust and confidence with each other in order to have a successful system. Third. Controller training and on-line testing with the mariner must be completed prior to activating the system. I think that this explains most of the line items and our schedule should lead to system operation by mid-1977. This concludes my presentation. If there are any questions, I wifi be happy to answer them if I can. At the conclusion of the question period, please feel free to examine our display material which illustrates some of the techniques used in assembling our data base. My staff and I will be available to answer further questions. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Lieutenant Commander John- son, for an excellent statement. Mr. du Pont will, of necessity, be required to leave some time before the meeting is terminated. In view of that, we are privileged to accord him the opportunity to question you in this area. Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to have to leave even a little bit sooner. So, first, I appreciate Mr. Biaggi's initiative to get these hearings going, and I look forward a week from Monday to continuation on the Delaware River hearing where we have a situation that is very different than the problem that you have in New York. It is less sophisticated at the moment, the traffic problems are less in terms of volume, but the rate at which we have been having problems there, I think a hearing is perhaps overdue. I appreciated the tour this morning and had an opportunity to see, as the Chairman pointed out, from the air some of the very difficult areas that you have surrounding New York, particularly on the New Jersey side. PAGENO="0036" 30 Do you anticipate that the vessel traffic system is going to adequately be able to handle the more difficult blind corner problems? I can see it on the East River where the corners are not so bad, but in the New Jersey area there are some very difficult areas. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir, I think we will be able to handle it adequately. Of course, radar surveifiance in areas of this sort are traditionally ineffective because of the geography and sight ability. I think with the aid of some low light level television for local surveillance and the communications system which will support the vessel traffic sys- tem, it will be able to sequence traffic through these areas and reduce the hazards. Mr. DU PONT. Would you say that the limiting factor in the develop- ment of these systems is the technology, is the money, or is the training time required to get people to use the technology that wifi be available? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I think principally it is at this juncture the money. The technology is available that just has not been applied to this particular application principally, this harbor. There is a lot of plan- ming and development work that would have been necessary to support the system that we outlined in our specific operational requirements. There simply was not the time or the money at that time. I do not think that the system that is implemented in 1977 wifi be the final system in New York Harbor. I think that there are some other techniques that are available that might be marshalled to solve some of the problems in a little bit easier fashion than we are going to be able to do at the outset. Mr. DU PONT. I have never heard anybody testifying before a congressional committee that did not say money was the bottleneck. So maybe that is the expected answer. But, judging from what I have seen today, and from your state- ment, it sounds to me like you anticipate no technical problems other than getting the equipment in place, which is a physical and time one. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The other problem which is attendant to the money problem, of course, is the personnel that we have available to implement the system. The CPM chart that you saw at the end there was a pretty compli- cated chart. There are a lot of local tasks, but I think, given that amount of time, I think we can implement the system within the capability of the hardware that we are being provided. Mr. DU PONT. I thank you, Commander, and if I stay much longer, I am going to miss my train. So I am going to depart. But, at the conclusion of your questioning, my counsel has some specific questions that he wifi take up. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. Bon voyage. Do not travel m the harbor. Dealing with the money factor, Commander, what is the present level of funding these systems? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. The total funding for New York Harbor that exists is, I believe, $5.5 million, plus or minus a few thousand. PAGENO="0037" 31 Now, this amount covers the system hardware that we wifi be providing. This is a Coast Guard Headquarters' function. Our func.. tions are the other planning factors, generation of procedures, rules and regulations, various manuals that will be used, and the procedures that they cover and, of course, the training program. Mr. BIAGGI. Wifi there be any additional funds required? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I believe in the future that they will, and I believe that the Commandant, Office of Environment and Systems, is addressing this now. Mr. BIAGGI. You mentioned by 1977. What will be the time frame of the various phases of development of the proposal? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Beyond that, you mean, sir? Mr. BIAGGI. Up and until. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. To that time. Could I have the Vue-graph back up there? It is probably the easiest to explain by that. The whole thing. Next to the bottom line is the headquarters' task of procuring the hardware, bring it up onto on-line testing and turning it over to the local people. Now, also another headquarters' function is authorizing the people and seeing that they arrive onboard so that we can commence training at that time. Now, during-prior to that time, our training program has to be developed, but we really could not start in any detail in this unit we knew the capability of the system hardware that was being provided, and that has only been very recently given to us, sir. We have done an analysis of the capability now, and we are going to be able to proceed in here to generate the training program and, at the same time, a fallout of this will be rules and regulations and our operations manual. The operations manual is intended to be a mariner's guide. This will be the booklet that will explain how the system works to the mariner. Then, of course, we will have our own internal center operating procedures, and that will occur sometime after the rules and regula- tions are nearly in final form. Mr. BIAGGI. Tell me precisely where you are with that plan as far as New York Harbor is concerned now. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. We are-let us see. Right about here [indicating]. We just as a matter of fact, in defining the system performance requirements, we are just about finished with that now- OK, you point-we are just about there [indicating]. We have done some preliminary development in the training program and analyzing the task that we are required to do in order to implement this program, what skills are we going to have to give the operators in particular that come to us; what does he already have; how long is this going to take? And it is astonishing the amount of hours that it does take. It takes about 50 hours of preparation time for every 1 hour of classroom time. Mr. BIAGGI. You are talking in terms of three segments, if I recall correctly? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. PAGENO="0038" 32 Mr. BIAGGL You are talking in terms of radar? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. You are talking in terms of computers? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. And low-level television? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. In what order will they be installed? Let me put the question this way, can we expect a partial installa- tion so that we will have the partial benefit of the overall plan? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. No. I think the system should be installed in total before it is ever switched on to be used, because most of the other tasks will not have been completed by that time. It is all geared so that it comes together at the end, and we test it, and we are sure of what we have got. And we are sure that we are not going to needlessly burden the mariner in the harbor before we turn it on. And we must make some kind of assessment on how good the system operates before we turn it on officially. Mr. BIAGGI. What is your reaction to the GAO recommendation that it delay plans for the electronic surveillance in the East River and Newark Bay? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, I think New York's particular case, I think some form of surveillance in these areas are mandatory in order to efficiently manage traffic. It gives you- radios alone in these areas, because they are so short and so narrow, and there is so much traffic, tend to be ineffective because of the amount of traffic that you have to handle in the area. You can see and verify that someone is there. Mariners have a tendency to be not as precise as we would like them to be in reporting their positions, and this is a natural thing to do. But we require a little more timely information and a little more frequent information than the mariner can really provide. In other words, we would be burdening him needlessly with commu- nications. We can see him normally. We do not have to talk to him unless there is going to be a conffict. Mr. BIAGGI. I think you testified to the eligibility of ships, the re- quirement of certain ships to participate in this system? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Again for the record, what are they and also will the ships which do not fall within that area be able to receive information? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, ships not subject to the system for the most part in New York Harbor are light running tugs, and they are equipped to receive information and normally would be listening on the channel, or at least on the bridge-to-bridge channel, on the party line system that we have now, so they would have the information. Pleasure craft, probably not, but in the harbor area there is not that big an incidence of pleasure craft except down off Sandy Hook or up around the Throgs Neck area, and that would be dealt with separately. Now, for the record, the vessels we intend to have subject to the vessel traffic system are the same as those subject to the bridge-to- bridge Radiotelephone Act. They are every power-driven vessel over 300 gross tons while navigating towing vessel over 26 feet, while tow- PAGENO="0039" 33 ing, while navigating, every vessel of 100 gross tons and upward, carrying one or more passengers for hire while navigating, and every dredge floating plant engaged in or near a chanel or fairway in opera- tions liable to restrict navigation of other vessels. Now, there could possibly be individual exception to this if there are special cases. But, at this juncture in the planning, none are antici- pated. But we certainly leave the door open as necessary. Mr. BIAGGI. But pending the installation of this equipment in the implementation of the plan, what is the Coast Guard doing and what has it done in relation to GAO's recommendation for additional regulatory action dealing with hazardous cargo? New York is always concerned about liquefied natural gas among others. Lieutenant Commander JoHNsoN. Well, we are looking at that kind of cargo as part of the traffic management problem and, of course, as I said this morning, some of the facilities are located in not the most advantageous places for vessel traffic management, located where they are commercially more feasible. But I think possibly if dangerous cargo is involved, we have procedures that we use for ammunition ships, such things as that, I imagine special procedures will be devel- oped to handle this type traffic when it becomes a reality, where this is within our plan. Mr. BIAGGI. What does that mean, Commander? Right and special procedures will be developed? Lieutenant Commander JoHNsoN. Such as an escort for the vessel; such as requiring tugs, or such as establishing a security zone around the vessel during its transit if it becomes necessary. Those are some of the ways that type of vessel can be dealt quite effectively with. Captain PERKINS. Perhaps I can interject here. We have LNG movements, the barge Massachusetts made six trips into the New York Harbor area. During those trips, basically she was escorted. There was a security zone around her when she moved. She was permitted only to move during daylight hours. That activity has been terminated. The safety provisions that were provided seemed to be entirely adequate. There were no problems. When such activity is resumed, if it is, we would visualize similar types of control over that movement and that control would be ex- ercised through the VTS system. Mr. BIAGGI. You are completely satisfied that that is adequate in provision? Captain PERKINS. It appears to be completely adequate, yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Generally speaking, when we put out new regulations or start something new in the Coast Guard or Government, generally somebody out there in the public gets a little bit of a licking. What effect will this have on the industry as far as cost to the ship- ping industry in concerned? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I would hope that the cost of the shipping industry would be really zero in terms of dollars for addi- tional equipment or additional people that they might require. I think the only change the industry will notice will be operation-. ally. In other words, the way the man on the bridge conducts his PAGENO="0040" 34 operation. He would have to contact the Vessel Traffic Center in a minimum amount of times rather than pass movement information on vessel-on the bridge-to-bridge channel as he does now. So he would do things differently. It would not be additional things that he would have to do. Captain PERKINS. Can I add to that? Mr. BIAGGI. Sure. Captain PERKINS. There is one problem area, and that is the matter of the number of radio frequencies that these vessels have to guard. We are going to impose an additional-another guard frequency. We hope to resolve that so that it will not cost them anything by getting the FCC to agree to let the Coast Guard stand their guard on the channel 16 while they are in this system. If this works out, then there will be no increased cost to them be- cause they will still be guarding the same number of channels. Mr. BIAGGI. I know you have an advisory committee. Will counsel of the Coast Guard advise them directly of your plans through that committee? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We work very closely with the advisory committee. They worked as an associate in the development of our specific operational require- ments before they were submitted to headquarters. We tussled about this for a number of months, and the requirements that we laid down were those that the crossection of industry agreed with as being adequate and meeting the needs of the mariner in the harbor. Mr. BIAGGI. One more question-well, one of two. You testified-I am sure I will hear from the industry on that scOre-you testified that 52 percent of the accidents that occurred were preventable. Lieutenant Commander JoHNSoN. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Now, if these plans are implemented, total package, what effect will that have on those 52 percent? Lieutenant Commander Johnson. We hope that that 52 percent would go away. In other words, we anticipate that much reduction. Mr. BIAGGI. I asked you this question before, but I will ask you again for the record. I think the Indians could invade America, coming down the Hudson without anybody-without colliding with any ships. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Now, are those plans-will those plans be extended up the Hudson River and, if so, for what purpose? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. It is possible. We have looked at this and we have had a Hudson River group that has been a sub- committee of our advisory committee. And if the traffic density, or if the conditions warranted it, why, our system could extend this as far as Albany in the form of vessel movement reporting system. The reason that we need to go as far as the Yonkers Pilot Station at this time is to have control over the southbound input and to the system so that we knew if a vessel's route is around Manhattan or into the kills. Then we will need some advanced warning of their coming. Mr. BIAGGI. Here is an issue not necessarily germane to the purpose of this oversight hearing, but it relates to the total picture. PAGENO="0041" 35 Currently, New York City is undergoing a terrible fiscal crisis, and there is a threat of the elimination of New York City marine fire- fighting units. Does the Coast Guard have the capacity to fill that gap? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I would like to defer that to Captain Perkins if I may, sir. Captain PERKINS. On a one-for-one basis, no, sir. Their fireboats are much more sophisticated and much better outfitted than anything we do have. We do have in the port area several small harbor tugs that belong to the Coast Guard, that have minimal firefighting capability. We have several patrol boats that have portable pumps that can be used for firefighting capability. We do assist the city whenever we can, using these facilities, but I would not propose for a second that they were equal to one of the big city fireboats. Mr. BIAGGI. So if the fireboats are eliminated, any fire that starts along the shoreline or on the vessel, the best way to control it is to permit it to burn out? Captain PERKiNS. It could prevent a very serious problem if the fireboats were eliminated, yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. In pursuit of that thinking, as a result of the same fiscal crisis, there is a threat of eliminating the harbor unit, harbor precinct of the police department. If that were eliminated, could the Coast Guard be required to supplement its forces? Captain PERKINS. Here, again, we work very closely together with the harbor police. Many of our activities and patrols are coordinated. If they were withdrawn, it certainly would leave a void in many areas that we could not fill. Mr. BIAGGL And it is safe to say then if the vessels that are ordinarily calling for help are sinking or distressed in any other fashion, they would suffer as a result of the elimination of the harbor precinct? Captain PERKiNS. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. You could have a loss of lives as a result of it? Captain PERKINS. You could conceivably, yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Fine. Thank you. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with that last question, Captain Perkins, the Coast Guard has no statutory responsibility for fire- fighting? Captain PERKINS. No. We do it on a cooperative basis. Mr. HEYWARD. Let us suppose the Coast Guard were given that responsibility. How much would it cost to substitute for the firefighting capability of New York City in the harbor area. Do you have any idea? Captain PERKINS. I do not have-no, not a figure. I would feel that it would cost essentially what it is costing the city. Mr. HEYWARD. Plus, assuming some costs in taking over the boats themselves? Captain PERKINS. Right. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the last question the chairman asked about vessels in distress, the Coast Guard does have the re- sponsibility in search and rescue? PAGENO="0042" 36 Captain PERKINS. Yes. Mr. HETYWARD. That is not left to the New York City forces? Captain PERKINS. No. But there are many areas that they work with us. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with enforcement of criminal laws, there would be a lack of authority to enforce the criminal laws de- pending on what laws were being violated? Captain PERKINS. That is correct. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with your statement earlier, Mr. Johnson, there is-and I think this may have been what Mr. Biaggi was partially getting to-there is a partial utilization of some sort of vessel traffic control now in the reporting system, voluntary or otherwise? Commander JoHNsoN. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. Which would be a part of the new system, too, but your answer, I take it, was that the electronic equipment which would ultimately be required should all go online at the same time? Commander JOHNSoN. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. For whatever parts of the system it would operate? Commander JOHNSON. That is correct. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with incidental or single incidents of movement .of hazardous cargoes, liquefied natural gas and others, the captain of the port has the authority, does he not, to take whatever necessary measures there are to protect the vessel and the surrounding area as those cargoes move? Commander JOHNSON. Yes, he does. Mr. HEYWARD. It then becomes a matter of being informed as to what he is moving? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney? Mr. OLNEY. Thank you. Commander Johnson, on page 16 of the GAO report, which I think you are familiar with, there is reference to interim traffic regulation measures to be incorporated until a vessel traffic system is in p1ace~ According to the report, on December 4, 1974, these were still under consideration by Coast Guard Headquarters. S Could you tell us the status of those regulations? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I wonder if I might defer this to Captain Perkins? S This is with respect to the proposed speed limits-- Mr. OLNEY. That is correct. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. That are outlined here. I believe Captain Mosher yesterday of Coast Guard Headquarters made some remarks to the subcommittee regarding vessel speed limits. It has been studied. Some of the propositions about vessel speed limits have been discussed with the vessel traffic system's advisory committee, specifically by the captain of the port, and it is not generally felt that an arbitrary speed limitation would improve safety to any great extent because of the difference in vessel size and maneuvering characteristics. And there are so many factors involved, it would be very difficult to establish one speed limit that is applicable to all vessels. Mr. OLNEY. I understand that. PAGENO="0043" 1 just wanted to determine the status of the regulations at this time. A related question on page 18 of the same report; apparently the Captain of the Port of New York was proposing regulations for eliminating vessel movement during heavy fog conditions. What is the status of those regulations? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. As far as I know, it is still under study and it is also still part of the considerations that we have in implementing a vessel traffic system because we do recognize that reduced visibility increases the hazard of a vessel casualty collision in grounding measurably. Specifically what to do about it, we have not established yet, but we would certainly deal with it before any system is implemented. Mr. OLNEY. Then your intention is, if you are going to introduce regulations, to bring them on-line as part of an entire package? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. And I am sure if the captain of the port felt it was necessary before- hand, he would do so. Mr. OLNEY. Captain Perkins? Captain PERKINS. In the same general area, we have recently insti- tuted procedures that require much stricter watch standing on the vessels that are anchored in the anchorage of the upper bay. We have had a lot of problems in that area with vessels dragging one into another because they were not properly manned. This is the only recent major change that we have made. Mr. OLNEY. I have another request, and I am not sure if you have this information available. On map 2 of the pamphlet you gave us this morning, you cite that there were 195 reportable accidents during the period fiscal years 1969 through 1975. The captain of the Port of Philadelphia provided the subcommittee with a breakdown on each reportable accident occuring on the Dela- ware during this period. Each summary is about four or fives lines long. Do you have similar breakdown or a summary? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. We have a breakdown. This is in our data base and we access it by query. And it certainly could be provided. I am not sure if we have one with us. Mr. OLNEY. If it is not unmanageable, could you send it down? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I am certain we could provide it for you, yes. [The information was not received at time of printing.J Mr. OLNEY. A question relating to figure 8 on your presentation; the electronics equipment that you are requiring. Is this first generation equipment or are you purchasing technology that is already available? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. This is available technology. This is the so-called off-the-shelf state of the art. Mr. OLNEY. The reason that I ask is because Congress is a little bit sensitive about cost overruns, as soon as you get into develop- ment of new technologies, the estimates can vary widely. Lieutenant Commander JoHNSoN. Yes. Mr. OLNEY. And I have one last question in regard to monitoring the various frequencies. PAGENO="0044" 38 I have heard complaints from some of the operators that the master is required to monitor too many channels at the same time, and this is one of the fears of a VTS system, that this is yet another distraction from navigational duties. Could you elaborate on this? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Additional communications are always an onerous task to any vessel master because of the attention that he must give to maneuvering the vessel. But we try to recognize this in implementing the system by recommending, through Admiral Rea, to the FCC that the system assume the mariner's channel 16 guard and also to minimize any communications within the system directly related to the center, except in regard to hazardous encounter or things of this nature. Try to minimize the impact on the man maneuvering the vessel. Mr. OLNEY. But you are generally satisfied that there is not a lot of extraneous conversation on these channels today? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I think when we first started monitoring the bridge-to-bridge channel, in particular, there were a lot of extraneous transmissions on it. I think in a year and a half that we have been dealing with it, the extraneous transmissions have dropped off considerably. You still hear a few, but I think you always will hear some. But I think, by and large, it is fulfilling the function that it was intended to these days. It is very heavily used, but I think it is being used for its intended purpose. Mr. OLNEY. You do not feel there is a need for an additional frequency to be dedicated to VTS purposes? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, now, I was talking about the bridge-to-bridge channel. Yes, there is definitely a need for additional frequencies to be used in a vessel traffic system because the character of the communication system is different. The bridge-to-bridge communication system, the vessels are only taling to one another and principally they are talking to those who are quite near to them, and this takes advantages of favorable charac- teristics of the FM system. But, in a centralized system, I think if we try to implement it on a single channel, it would be a disaster. We just could not service that many potential users at once. So it must be sectorized and we must have additional channels for a vessel traffic system. But the mariner should not have to communicate with us except on them one at a time. Mr. OLNEY. Thank you for your presentation, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. One question, and we will move along. Is it within your contemplation that after the new systems are installed, you will maintain the same procedure as far as transporting hazardous cargoes? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. You mean with respect to po- tential escorts or security zones or things of that nature? Mr. BIAGUL Yes. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Very possibly so because without the assistance of automatic radar tracking and acquisition and auto- PAGENO="0045" 39 matic traffic management routines, I think we are kind of on a manual system in that regard in that the same kind of escort or security procedures would be necessary until the traffic management system is sophisticated enough to negate the need for any special escort. But this is a long way in the future, I think Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Perkins? Captain PERKINS. When the barge Massach'asetts was here, she only made six trips. She came in once every few days or few weeks-I have forgotten exactly-but these were very, time-wise, very isolated incidents. When this thing gets to be a-if I can use the expression "mass transit problem," transit of this type going frequently through the harbor, we undoubtedly will have to have a real hard look at it and we might do things differently. Now, what it might be, I do not know. Mr. BIAGGI. It is my understanding of the response of Commander Johnson and yourself, that there is no assurance that the same in- tensive attention will be given to hazardous cargoes once we get the new systems into effect. Captain PERKINS. No, I did not mean to convey that. Mr. BIAGGI. That was my understanding. Captain PERKINS. The same attention will be given. Whether we will do it with the same mechanics we did this isolated incident, we cannot say here. Mr. BIAGGI. What will be the alternative-I would suggest that- Captain PERKINS. Well- Mr. BIAGGI. It is a critical issue as far as the subcommittee is concerned. You are aware of it and I am aware of it, and the subcom- mittee is aware of it. We do not want any unfortunate occurrence to develop as a result of some omission on anyone's part, and I am sure that applies to every facet of the industry. We would suggest that you continue to focus attention on it in the measure that it deserves. I do not suggest that th~ new systems should result in a diminution of attention at all. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. No, that was never our intention at all. Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you, Captain Perkins, Commander Johnson, for a wonderful morning, an informative morning. And we learned more from the sky than riding these waters, and it only punctuates the need for new systems. Hopefully, they can be imple- mented to everyone's satisfaction as quickly as possible. Thank you for your testimony, and we appreciate your cooperation. Captain PERKINS. We appreciate the opportunity to be here. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Capt. Kenneth Torrens, would you care to testify? STATEMENT OP CAPT. KENNETH C. TORItENS, FARRELL LINES, INC. Captain TORRENS. As chairman of the Executive Committee of the Advisory Committee, Admiral Will, chairman of the Full Committee, is not here. I have no particular comments other than to confirm that the Advisory Committee has been working very closely with the Coast Guard, and we do represent a cross section of the industry and of the users of the harbor; that we hope to be of additional assistance to both PAGENO="0046" 40 yourself and to the Coast Guard in their formulation of a proposed system. We have, in fact, very substantial agreement in everything that they have said today in their proposals; that if you have any other questions, I am prepared to answer them. Mr. BIAGGI. One question. You heard the answer, and I would like to hear it from you as a representative of the industry. I posed the question, what, if any, additional costs would be imposed on the industry, and you heard their answer. What would your answer be? Captain TORRENS. I would substantially agree as long as we can keep the number of channels that are required to be monitored by the mariner to a minimum, and the Advisory Committee has gone on record as feeling that two channels should be the maximum that is required of a mariner to be monitored while he is trying to safely navigate his vessel. Above two channels would create two things-probably a more unsafe condition and, second, it would probably require equipment which would be a burden. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Torrens. Mr. William Cleary representing the New York Towboat and Harbor Carriers Association. STATEMENT OP WILLIAM CLEARY, NEW YORK TOWBOAT AND HARBOR CARRIERS ASSOCIATION Mr. CLEARY. Congressman Biaggi, at this point, I should like to defer to Mr. Robert W. Sanders, who is the representative of the towing and transportation industry on New York Harbor vessel traffic advisory system. Mr. Sanders. STATEMENT OP ROBERT W. SANDERS, RED STAR MARINE, INC.; MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OP NEW YORK HARBOR VES- SEL TRAFFIC ADVISORY SYSTEM Mr. SANDERS. Congressman, I do not have much to add, and I am in substantial agreement with Commander Johnson. I do have something to say, however, concerning the two aspects of this problem. I have to be repetitious. Counsel for Mr. du Pont was mentioning this factor of number of channels aboard a tug and its radio equipment, and I think it bears repeating as to what the real concern of the towing mdustry is. These tugs, there are probably 200 or 300 tugs in this harbor. A vast majority of them stay in the harbor 24 hours a day, as opposed to a ship that would be here for a few days, discharge its cargo and go back to Europe or wherever it would go. The men on the-in the pilothouse of these tugs have to listen to these radios 24 hours a day. Now, at the present time, we are required by law to monitor channel 16, channel 13, and because of the economics of the harbor, we have to monitor our own private channels which each towing company PAGENO="0047" 41 operates. So there are three channels at the present time on the air that we have to listen to. It gets to a point where we feel a problem will develop if the man is required to listen to any more because the pilothouse is confined; the radio equipment itself is compact; some of the equipment is made with one speaker so that it is difficult to determine whether you are hearing the channel 16 or channel 13, or your house channel. It is all coming from one direction. Now, there are some sets, and most of us have gone to a system where you can separate the speakers just for the purpose of assuring that they understand which channel they are listening to. A sectorized system in New York Harbor would require us to again listen to another channel, the vessel traffic system channel. It would also require, if there were several channels who are vessel traffic sys- tems, it would require the operator to constantly change from one channel to another. Now, there is one man in the pilothouse at the time, and he has to steer the tug, watch out for the traffic, look out for what is behind him and so forth, answer these radios. We feel that it is a definite safety factor involved here and that we should not progress beyond the need for a man to listen to three channels. If the Coast Guard were able to get the-what is it, the Federal Communications Commission, to allow us to-allow the Coast Guard to guard channel 16 while the vessel is within the control of the vessel traffic system, then the tugs would not have to monitor 16 and that channel would be open and free to be used for a vessel traffic system. If the tug left the harbor, why again he would have to stand his own watch on channel 16 in pursuance to the law. That is all I have to say on that subject. I think you asked a question, Chairman Biaggi on the economic impact. I think one of the problems with the economic impact is that we really do not know. Now, you just asked about the transportation of liquid gas, lique- fled gas. And as I understood the answer, the Coast Guard feels, at some place down the line, once the full hardware is in and the system implemented, they will be able to monitor traffic and control the traffic in such a way that they would have provided the same area of safety as now provided by, let us call it personalized watching of that particular gas vessel, which is probably true, and I think it probably could work. But the minute you say that you are going to control the traffic, then the industry has to arrive at the next conclusion, which means that somebody has to wait while all these other things are going on. Somebody is not going to get to the berth; somebody is not going to meet the ship, or a ship is not going to come into the harbor. And as soon as you have the power to control the traffic and to regulate it for whatever purpose, there has to be some economic impact on the financial condition of those vessels which must wait for the traffic to be cleared or whatever is going on. And so- Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me. PAGENO="0048" 42 But do you not have that condition now where you have these big liners waiting outside in the harbor, waiting to come into their berths because they are coming at a time when we have a lot of traffic along the river and in the harbor? Mr. SANDERS. No, I do not think that the-I think that the in- adequacy of the anchoraging ability for large tankers is the big problem in New York Harbor. There are some ships that have to wait outside for that, but I think most vessels proceed into the harbor without undue delay. Mr. BIAGGI. Why do not we get a response from Commander Johnson to that? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, there is, as we discussed earlier, there is a queue that forms outside of Ambrose waiting to pick up a pilot, but I do not think it delays commerce excessively in the same context of what Mr. Sanders was talking about. I think, by the same token, though, if a regulation was necessary to restrict the amount of traffic through an area, I do not think it would affect commerce as much as having a substantial casualty in the same area. This is disruptive to commerce as well as disruptive to property and potentially injurious to people. Mr. SANDERS. It is like being for motherhood and against sin. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, we realize this is the problem and we realize what control can lead to, and it is our intent in the planning to minimize any impact on commerce. Mr. SANDERS. I believe you are. I believe the Coast Guard will, and their record has been very good. They have cooperated with us. But I was trying to point out what our fears are. We were talking many years ahead, and then we hear you say things like, well, we can control traffic in such a way that will be just as safe. It makes us think that somebody is going to have to wait some place. Mr. BIAGrn. Let me ask you this, and I appreciate your concern, of course, in talking about it, it brings it out and we will explore it. What would be their purpose in delay? The Coast Guard would have no purpose in delaying except if it had a salutary benefit on the total picture. Mr. SANDERS. I agree. And it depends on who is defining what the salutary benefit would be. If we leave it up to the men on the vessels, I think we can arrive at the same benefit, just bridge-to-bridge communication. Let them figure out how they are going to pass. Mr. BIAGGI. That is why we have an advisory committee that works together with the Coast Guard. We know the possible problems, and it is better to deal with them before they are developed. In the spirit of cooperation, these things can be worked out, be- cause I get the impression that that is exactly what is occurring here. There is a spirit of cooperation on the part of industry and the Coast Guard and Government in order to help the industry, help the whole shipping industry in this area to make it as safe as possible. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I would like to add something, if I could, to this. Your fears about control are the principal reason why we have developed a traffic simulation capability of our own, of the staff, in order to try and measure what the effect of a particular rule limiting PAGENO="0049" 43 traffic through an area would be on the total commerce and if it would unduly restrict it, then we would look for another method to regulate traffic flow that was less restrictive. I think this is the current method that we are using to meet those kind of needs. Mr. SANDERS. I agree. Mr. BIAGGI. I got the impression that these new facets, this new technology that they will be installing, will be supplementing what you have, to deal with problems that really cannot be dealt with with this voluntary broadcasting system. We have seen these blind spots. We have seen these narrow cor- ridors of water which are treacherous and which have resulted in accidents. We have seen a number of these things, and the record speaks for itself. And with that purpose in mind, I cannot see any untoward delay occurring. If there is a delay, it is simply in the name of safety. I am sure you have some of that now, even bridge to bridge. It will never be-it will never be utopia, but at least, even if you have a little delay, you get there in one piece which is more important in the end. Any questions of Mr. Sanders? Mr. OLNEY. Mr. Sanders, since you are representing tow operators, I would just ask the question about a typical tug operator. If you were required to monitor more frequencies, would you have to buy new radios for your tugs? Mr. SANDERS. No. The majority of the tugs that we surveyed had VHF sets that had more than three channels. There were a few in the harbor, but I think it was something like 75 percent of all tugs had the VHF sets. The new sets that are coming out now have 24 channels, and the Coast Guard is rapidly filling them all up, I might add. Mr. OLNEY. Commander Johnson was talking about what, five sectors where you would have different frequencies? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, there would be three dis- creet vessel traffic system channels, only one of which would need to be monitored at a time in addition to channel 13, the bridge to bridge, if we are able to assume the channel 16 guard for the participants. Mr. OLNEY. But, for the majority of operators, that does not require buying new equipment? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. That is correct. Mr. OLNEY. If you did have to buy a new radio, how much would that be? Mr. SANDERS. I think it would cost us in the area of $3,000 for a modern VHF radio that we would use all the time. The pilots have another problem. They have to have a set that is a small hand-carried set, the ones that go aboard the ships. They cannot carry a big box over their back. They have to have something they can carry up the ladder. So they have to know what the limitation is going to be on channels. Mr. OLNEY. Thank you. Mr. HEYWARD. I would like to ask one question on this frequency problem. I do nOt think it has been asked before. That is in connection with monitoring house frequencies. Is there a possibility of call up on a monitored frequency, then shift to the house frequency, or are they- 78-280-76---4 PAGENO="0050" 44 Mr. SANDERS. Yes, it could do that on channel 16 and then-in other words, initiate a call on 16, and that would go over on house frequency. It could be done. But, then, everybody in the harbor would be on 16. Mr. HEYWARD. Yes. Mr. BIAGGr. Thank you, Mr. Sanders. Commander, you might as well sit there and relax, because I am sure there will be continuing colloquy between all the witnesses and ourselves and yourself. Mr. Anthony DiMaggio of AFL-CIO Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. STATEMENT OP ANTHONY DiMAGGIO, REERESENTING AFL-CIO MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION Mr. DIMAGGI0. How do you do. ~ Congressman Biaggi and the committee, I was caught short today. I only read about this in the newspaper yesterday. I wish I had known sooner. But where I represent the masters and the- Mr. BIAGGI. We only had a bridge-to-bridge communication. Mr. DIMAGGIO. We did not have our radio on. I represent masters, mates and engineers on the Staten Island ferries, and also the masters and engineers on the New York City fireboats. Now, our captains on the ferries are very concerned about this vessel traffic system, especially on the new supertankers and container vessels coming out of the Kill Van Kull crossing the ferry slips. I did submit a letter not too long ago to the Coast Guard hearing in Washington, and I understand that I was the only one from New York that was concerned enough to submit anything. It was a surprise to me. But we feel that any tug-assisted vessel coming out of the Kifi Van Kull should maintain the tugs so that they can keep maximum control at least until the Verrazano Bridge when they are clear of all the ferry slips and the anchorage. We also feel that had this been the fact with the Seawitch and the Esso Brussels, that there may never have been any collision if they stifi had their tugs. It is a practice to let go the tugs practically in front of the ferry slip. Then the vessel is hooking up and heading out to sea. Mr. BIAGGI. Wifi you hold on? Commander? Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, this is something that the- Mr. BIAGGI. I want you to know that I am completely uninitiated and I am in the learning process, and I would like to hear it from an authority. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Thank you. The captain of the port currently is addressing a problem-I think there was a meeting yesterday with the captain of the port, Port Authority, and a couple of the members of my staff, concerning the same matter. PAGENO="0051" 43 We are concerned about it. The captain of the port may feel it is necessary to take some steps to require tug assistance longer or maybe not. The question is being discussed right now. We realize it is a problem. We have heard from the Staten Island ferry people and, of course, the long term from the vessel traffic system, we are looking at the problem, because that is a bad corner right there. There is no doubt about it. Something that is equitable for everyone is going to have to be done, I do not think that we can get into a position of arbitrarily requiring tug assistance throughout the harbor. I think that would be a good way to shut us down. It would make the tugboat people happy for awhile. But, beyond that, we might be doing them more harm than we will good. But, yes, we see it as a problem and we are trying to do something equitable about it. Mr. DIMAGGIO. Another thing, we agree with the towboat outfits that spoke before-I think it was Mr. Sanders-on the confusion of monitoring all these radios, especially on the Staten Island ferry. Now, the route of the Staten Island ferry is the same. It has been the same for 100 years at least. In fact- Mr. BIAGGL Did not we lose one in fog once? Mr. DIMAGGI0. No. They do run in fog, by the way. They never stop. I think one hurricane- Mr. BIAGGI. Do you not have some tugs with the ferries? Mr. DIMAGGIO. No, never. Everybody knows-every ship that comes in, most every ship knows where the Staten Island ferry is going, but the Staten Island ferry does not know where every ship is going. Now, if the ships were to report their heading in the Kill Van Kull or their heading to the North River or their heading to the East River, then the Staten Island ferry would know where he is going. But he already knows where the Staten Island ferry is going. He can only go from St. George to the Battery. Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me. Is that a fact? All of these liners coming into the harbor know where the ferry is going? Are they all familiar with- Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. They are all pretty familiar with it, but they have a pilot aboard in most cases who is familiar with it. Mr. DIMAGGI0. He has to be, and most charts show the ferry route anyway. So our captains feel it is not really necessary for him to report under that location, radio reports. I think they do now. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. I think the participation has been very good from the Staten Island ferries. Mr. DIMAGGIO. Well, they are doing it, but some of them-some of them do not agree, because it is confusing when they report, especially in the fog. When they are navigating, they never stop, and it is quite difficult to monitor all the radios they have, the same as the tugboat. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. If I could respond to that in particular. PAGENO="0052" 46 I believe that when an active system is implemented, that require- ments for these safety broadcasts will be substantially reduced because of the system, and I would hope that the vessel traffic system would recognize the ferry routes. And if it looked like there was a perpetual hazard encountered, they would let both parties know about it, but I think the fear is for a lot of reporting requirements for the ferries are-I do not think they are going to be borne out when the system is finally turned on. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Heyward. Mr. HEYWARD. I just want to comment that I think that would be true of any operation which runs a regular schedule on a regular route. It might be treated somewhat differently from the other vessels in the system. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. DIMAGGIO. Now, I would like to speak, since you brought it up, about the LNG and the fireboats, which is a big concern of ours also. There is talk of cutting service, and 20 years ago there were 10 fireboats, and now there is 5. Since the most recent holocaust is the Seawitch and the Esso Brussels, in the newsclips that I have photo- stats of-I could not bring my files, of August 1973-it is a fact that all five fireboats were on the scene of the Esso Brussels and the Sea- witch and the rest of New York was uncovered, the whole other area of the waterfront. There are 578 miles of New York area waterfront, and 5 vessels were out fighting the Seawitch and the Esso Brussels. First, the commissioner denied this in his first report in 1973, August. Then, in December of 1973, Chief August Beekman came out with a report that they were very much concerned of increasing and reevaluating the marine division and increasing coverage from five boats. Now, the commissioner did an about-face and pointed out himself the holocaust between the Seawitch, wherein he said that all five of the department's fireboats were used for this blaze, leaving the rest of the waterfront unprotected. The commissioner said that an up-to-date recall system is being implemented for boats previously retired. Why, I am not certain that-I think there are members of the fire department here that will probably speak toward that. If anything, we have to increase the boats. I was hopeful that-I think now-I am not up on it, that there was a Federal assistance program for public safety organizations or units such as fireboats. I feel if these vessels, LNG, are coming in from Federal waters into New York Harbor waters, maybe the Federal Government could supply some assistance on implementing more fire vessels or imple- menting further firefighting tactics for an LNG vessel. Now, I disagree with the Coast Guard on-that they say there was protection offered on a barge that is coming in and out, the barge Massachusetts. And I state that when the fireboat, Firefighter, was escorting this barge around the kills and around Staten Island, it was window dressing. It was just window dressing for the people of Sta ten Island to believe that they are well protected. PAGENO="0053" 47 Here comes this LNG vessel in. We do not have to worry because look at this big red fireboat, he will protect us. That fireboat can't do one thing. If that barge leaked, there is no protection that is known right now that can put out an LNG fire or explosion or anything. The fire department itself only recently came out with a contingency plan, and what is it?-Spray water at the base of the leak and try to force it out to sea. I would not want to be the guys on the fireboat that are spraying the water on the leak of the LNG vessel. Now, MEBA has even implemented a course in their school in Baltimore because the Coast Guard is going to require that any engineer that works on an LNG ship that is coming out-very shortly, I do not know, maybe a month or two away-is going to be required to have a certificate of completion of an educational course. And I think it is a 144-hour course. It is a very lengthy and difficult course for the engineers on the ship. I am going to propose, and I have in negotiations, that they should train the engineers and the pilots, the masters on the fireboats besides the firemen. I am talking about the men that are operating the vessel. When you tell the master just shoot the hose at the base of the vapor and force that vapor out to sea, and if his hull goes into that vapor, it will crack like an egg. The hull will crack and explode or hit the engine room or flame up. And also when they do have this safety area, it is not enough. There have been many hearings. Councilman Gaeta has been holding them. The danger area is about 5 miles off when they go up the East River. Half of Queens could be wiped out. So there is not really a good plan. Plus the ferry service and every- thing in the harbor shuts down. If the ferry is just about to leave the slip, and this LNG ship is coming in, and the safety area is such and such, half a mile or a mile, that ferry just stays there for an hour. He cannot move. And all the people from Staten Island just sit on it if they are already on it. But there is probably a warning that such and such a time, we are going to shut down the harbor. So there is no service for an hour. So there are a lot of problems. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, you can see why they do that. They want to rid the waters of any possible difficulty with some ships. Somebody might be inconvenienced. It is equivalent to Mr. Sanders' concern about delay. Mr. DIMAGGI0. There is no doubt in my mind that LNG is coming to New York even though there are organizations trying to stop it and oppose it. I feel certain that it is coming. The ships are being built, and they are going to enter this harbor. But, instead of eliminating fireboat service, we certainly should have more fireboats because the boats are the ones that are going to be concerned with anything that will happen to the LNG vessels, not the land companies. Mr. BIAGGI. We share your view on that, Mr. DiMaggio. You know that. And I posed the question earlier on to Captain Perkins, who responded, and I will pose it again to you. PAGENO="0054" 48 What do you foresee as a possible consequence of diminution or the elimination of the fire units? Mr. DIMAGGI0. Just look at the Seawitch and the Esso Brussels. What could happen? In the fire department's own statement, on that night, or a very few days later, there was a fire at pier 90, 50th Street, in the Hudson River, which went to four alarms. The same night, a short time later, a pier at Hudson Street in the Hudson River went afire. Both places required the services of all but one fireboat in the fleet. Later that night, a pier at 200 Seventh Street in the Harlem River burned, and the services of a fireboat were urgently requested. The only boat available was Marine 9 on Staten Island, and the estimated time of arrival would be 90 minutes. We lost a boat in Whitestone not too long ago. It was a fireboat. They replaced it with a tender called the Smoke. There was a lot of screaming because there was a lot of marinas up there. It is opposite your side of the river in the Bronx. Mr. BIAGGI. That is the mainland. Mr. DIMAGGI0. Yes, the mainland on the-citizens came and spoke against eliminating their uireboats. It was a fireboat. * They put the tender Smoke there, no engineers, no masters. So the people saw a red boat and they said, well, we are still protected. They do not know that that boat did not have any pipes. Now, it has been converted but, in those days, it didn't. They just keep eliminating boats, and, like you say, if a blaze comes, you let it burn to the waterline. Mr. BIAGGI. Reduction of fire units could result in loss of lives and property? Mr. DIMAGGI0. And how! Yes. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney. Mr. OLNEY. Mr. DiMaggio, at the beginning of your statement, you talked about the need for increasing tug assistance on tankers. What size in terms of DWT were the Esso Brussels and the Seawitch, just approximately? Mr. DIMAGGI0. I do not have it. I do not think I have it, no. They were large, I can say that. Mr. OLNEY. As a general matter, when a tanker like this- Mr. DnWAGGI0. Well, the tanker was anchored, the Esso Brussels. Mr. OLNEY. So the Seawitch was moving? Mr. DIMAGGI0. Right. Mr. OLNEY. Presumably at some point as the vessel increases speed, the tug is no longer effective. At what speed approximately do you think that occurs? Mr. DIMAGGI0. Well, in the harbor, he cannot really hook it up full speed anyway. But you mean to control steerage? Mr. OLNEY. Yes. Mr. DIMAGGI0. I am not an expert. That would vary, to maintain the steerage way. How many revolutions and all that, I could not answer. Mr. OLNEY. What I am getting at is whether the collision caused by the Seawitch was caused by excessive speed or whether it was caused by inability to maneuver. PAGENO="0055" 49 Mr. DIMAGGI0. Well, there was talk that-I think the final investi- gation has not been completed, but it was a defect in the steering motor mechanism. So, just to have tugs, when that steering motor mechanism went out if he still had tugs, he would not have hit the Esso Brussels, because they would have discovered the defect in the steering motor, and the tugs would have been able to maneuver him away. As it was, they say that the steering motor hydraulic system rod was broken or something, defective. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Could I express another point of view? 1 think in a system that suffers a mechanical failure, such as hap- pened in the Seawitch, would cause you a hard over and the steering mechanism, you could very potentially have lost the tugboat, because if she was gaining way, why I do not think a tug would have had time to maneuver out of the way if she was alongside on the turning side of the vessel. Mr. DIMAGGI0. But she would not have been gaining way with the tugs. She would have been maintaining the same speed with the tug alongside. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. Well, this presupposes that the tug would have accompanied her at least to the narrows- Mr. DIMAGGIO. That is what I am saying, yes. Well, to the Verrazona Bridge where it would have been safe tO let her off. We say, in any event, they should not let go in front of the ferry slips. Mr. BIAGGI. That is a question that is obviously being looked into. Mr. DIMAGGI0. That is really our concern because of the captains on the ferry coming out or going in. Fortunately, it was not a ferry boat that they hit. Mr. OLNEY. In the vicinity that you are talking about, near the ferry boats, the tankers are moving at a speed where a tug could safely assist them in maneuvering? Mr. DIMAGGI0. As soon as they come out of the Kill Van-yes, I would say yes. Mr. OLNEY. Now, the practice is to leave the tug as they exit them out of that channel and then to pick up speed? Mr. DIMAGGIO. Yes. Mr. OLNEY. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Mr. DiMaggio. Chief Thomas Rush, marine division of New York City Fire De- partment, representing Commissioner 0 `Hagan. Chief. STATEMENT OF THOMAS RUSH, CHIEF, MARINE DIVISION, NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT Mr. RUSH. Congressman, first I would like to read a prepared statement that was the feelings of the Fire Commissioner in this regard. The New York City Fire Department maintains within its struc- ture a line division which is officially termed the marine division. PAGENO="0056" 50 Its primary mission is to provide fire protection and to conduct a fire prevention program throughout the waterfront areas and the waterfront and the waters of the city of New York. It has also rendered assistance throughout the years to adjoining communities, particularly the many small communities in the State of New Jersey whose resources are somewhat limited and whose water.. front protection can best be described as nil. The area served by the marine division is in excess of 500 miles. The marine division is composed, at present, of five marine corn-. panies, strategically located throughout the harbor. As recently as 1964, there were nine marine companies. The facilities of the Port of New York are unexcelled for the move- ment of cargo, passenger accommodations and service for ships needing repair. Its shorelines are also abundant with oil storage facilities, commercial and defense facilities, heliports, airports, tun- nels, bridges, powerplants, and so many other ventures that find access to the water advantageous. The waters of the city of New York have been the site of numerous disasters. Two of the most recent being the Alva Cape/Texaco Massa- chusetts collision in 1966, and the Seawitch/Esso Brussels collision in 1973. Many lives were lost at both. But the fact that many more casual- ties did not occur was due, in large part, to the fireboats of the New York City Fire Department's marine division. While the division has suffered from cuts due to budget problems previously, the most recent mandated adjustments will further ad- versely affect the services rendered by this unit. The five fireboats now in service represent the bare minimum for effective protection. To maintain this level, and yet meet the fiscal mandates, it wifi be necessary to reduce the maiming on four of these vessels, and to place a smaller vessel in service with an even more reduced manning schedule. The fireboats have been an effective ifre extinguishing weapon because of their ability to deliver large volumes of water to the scene of a fire, which is only possible with the manpower available at present. The reduced manning will necessitate the engaging of additional fire- boats with the result that areas of the harbor will go unprotected. The alternative of employing land units aboard fireboats will also be employed, but this has a disadvantage of depleting already overtaxed land forces and a delay in the response of the fireboats. As to the use of a smaller boat, where a situation previously could be controlled with one boat will now require two, reducing the avail- ability of vessels in an already marginally protected harbor. Beyond the threat that a major disaster could bring to its citizenry, the importance of New York Harbor and its continuity of service to the city, State, and Nation cannot be overemphasized. An adequately manned fleet of fireboats is a worthwhile investment in one of our most important commodities, the Port of New York. I may add that, for the past 3 years, we have operated at fires and communities in New Jersey for a total of 153 hours and 30 minutes at a cost to the city of $23,147.50. Now, that concludes my statement, Mr. Congressman. Mr. BIAGGI. That is the commissioner's statement? Mr. RUSH. That is the commissioner's statement. PAGENO="0057" 51 Mr. BIAGGI. What would happen if New York marine unit did not respond to the Jersey fires? Mr. RUSH. I would say, Mr. Biaggi, they would continue to burn. In 1971, the Trade Deering, that was a tanker that was tied up at one of the terminals in New Jersey. It took fire, they called for assist- ance, and the commissioner sent the fireboat down there. Usually, when this happens, we send a fireboat, and they supply the forces. When the fireboat arrived, the tanker that was involved had been cut from its moorings and let adrift. When the fireboat officer asked for assistance from the Jersey community he was refused, and he was told that since it was not tied up at our pier, it is not our problem, it is yours, with the result that I had to ask the commissioner for further-another fireboat and additionally take on land forces to go down, and with the assistance of the Coast Guard we were able to control the fire, but not with the assistance of the community that asked for our mutual aid assistance. So I think this would give you an idea what happens in the waters of New York were it not for the New York City fireboats. Mr. BIAGGI. You testified-Commissioner O'Hagan testified through you-that you have five fireboats and they represent a bare minimum? Mr. RUSH. Yes. Mr. BIAGGI. To be candid, it is less than a minimum required to provide the kind of service, because I recall when we had nine- Mr. RUSH. 1964. Mr. BIAGGI. I heard the same testimony. Nine was a bare minimum. I would suggest it is an administrative nicety to deal with the harsh reality of life, and that five boats are hardly adequate to deal with the total picture in the waters insofar as your responsibility is concerned. Mr. RUSH. I would agree. Mr. BIAGGI. Now, in light of that, I would like your comment. I realize that it might be somewhat embarrassing; if you choose not to answer it, please do not, but I have every confidence in your professional integrity. Mr. RUSH. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. The contemplated cuts, reduction in force in the marine units, will obviously have to affect your effectiveness. Mr. RUSH. That is correct. Mr. BIAGGI. Would that result in a loss of property that might otherwise be saved? Mr. RUSH. Yes, sir, it could. Mr. BIAGGI. Could that result in a loss of lives that might other- wise be saved? Mr. RUSH. By delayed response, it could, yes. Mr. BIAGGI. What would your reaction be to the Coast Guard's assuming some of this responsibility? Mr. RUSH. Well, I have every confidence in the Coast Guard, and I want to say that we work as a team wonderfully. We have almost a day-to-day liaison with the Coast Guard. I think we have to be frank, and I think that they would be the first to admit that they do not have the resources to deal with a major fire in the city of New York's waters. Mr. BIAGGI. I think they testified to that already. Mr. RUSH. Yes. PAGENO="0058" 52 A major fire, I would say, would be one similar to the Esso Brussels and the Seawitch, which we keep repeating. It is true there were five marine units there. Fortunately, we have two reserve boats, and they were pressed into service to cover the balance of the harbor. This took several hours, because we had to call people from home to man the boats. I also think it is true that perhaps one of the fire vessels at the Seawitch~Brussels might have been released. But the chief of the department at the time, now Commissioner O'Hagan, felt it was a good safety measure. We had a terrible catastrophe on our hands. We faced the loss of the Verrazano Bridge. Fortunately, the tide was on the way out. If it had been the other way, the vessels that were locked together would have drifted into the center of the harbor, and it might have threatened some land areas. I think this is the Commissioner's, and it is certainly my greatest fear, that if we do not have the fireboats sufficiently manned to handle a situation like this, we are going to run into a situation where the land areas are going to be threatened by a collision in the Port of New York. Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to concur. I know it is the commissioner's view. Mr. RUSH. Yes. Mr. BIAGGI. I chatted with him on a number of occasions, and he is a first-rate fire officer and administrator, and his prime concern is doing his job properly. But he has to be reinforced with equipment, and the fiscal crisis is working and that brings a hardship on his administration. One last question as it relates to vessel traffic systems. You have been on the water long enough. Are you familiar with the proposed vessel traffic system? Mr. RUSH. I have heard there is one proposed, yes; proposed, yes. * Mr. BIAGGI. Do you have any personal familiarity with it sufficient to testify? Mr. RUSH. I would say this, that any vessel traffic system that we can institute in the Port of New York that will aid us in the control of traffic and avoid collisions, such as we have seen in our harbor, would be well worthwhile. I know now we have bridge-to-bridge, which is the channel 13. We have it on our fireboats, and I know that this has been a great aid in the control of traffic in that we know what other vessels are moving. But I believe, if I understand it correctly, a traffic system, such as is proposed, would even further support the channel 13. I, as a marine division chief, would certainly be in favor of it. May I make a comment, sir, about the proposed LNG? I recently testified before the Federal Power Commission concerning Distrigas application to bring LNG into the harbor. While the Distrigas plant in Staten Island has been mothballed, I believe for several years, I think we all have to face the reality some day that it will come. The commissioner took the position against the movement of the barge Massachusetts throughout the harbor. He felt that it was PAGENO="0059" 53 running too big a risk to have 32,000 barrels of LNG moving through the harbor, a product about which we know at this moment very little. This was his biggest concern. I hope the committee will not take too lightly what Mr. DiMaggio said about the proposed plans for the fire department to combat LN G. What we know-from what we know at the moment, fog, spray nozzles is probably the most effective weapon we have at the moment, and that is the reason we went for a contingency plan which called for the use of fog nozzles. This is the only known weapon at the present time. But when six barges were brought into the Newtown Creek area to the Brooklyn Union Gas, it was the commissioner's policy to escort them. They came in via the Long Island Sound, down into Newtown Creek. We escorted each one of them in and each one of them out. Now, if the barge is permitted to come into the harbor-and I am sure the tankers will come into Rossvffle-I believe it will be the policy of the commissioner to escort each one of these. Now, each escort in and out is going to take in the area of 3 or 4 hours. And we stood by at the plant of Brooklyn Union Gas until we thought everything was running normally before we left the area there. So, here, if this happens, this will be a further regular depletion of our forces, as each tanker is brought into the port, and if it happens as each barge is brought from Rossville to Newtown Creek or the Astoria area to the Con Edison plant, by the barge accompanied by a fireboat, this will take this boat out of service and will not be able to be used for any other fires which leaves four vessels in service. And in niceties of Commissioner O'Hagan.'s statement-again, of course, this again is very marginal, if not below marginal-I think we plan our resources to combat two simultaneous fires. Obviously, with five fireboats at work at a collision, the two remain- ing could not handle a similar collision. If LNG does not come in, there is a proposal to bring LPG, which is an equally dangerous substance. In fact, they had an explosion over in Tokyo here recently, and the resources there, while their fireboats have maybe one-fifth the capacity of some of ours, they were not equal to the task, and the vessel was finally towed out and bombed and sunk. We had a fire in Marcus Hook, Pa., recently, and I believe that while the Coast Guard took the position that it was better to let the vessel burn out rather than risk water pollution, we in the city, .New York City Fire Department, we choose not to do that. We choose to combat the fires and put them out and avoid any possible danger to any other areas or vessels in the harbor. So we have vessels that run in capacity from 5,000 to 20,000 gallons a minute. We feel that anything below 5,000 gallons a minute should not be classed as a fireboat. Mr. BrAGGI. Thank you, chief. Mr. HEYWARD. I want to ask you, in connection with the LNG problem, do you know at what temperature LNG vaporizes? Do you happen to know? Mr. RUSH. I did know, and I went to Washington, but I am sorry, I forget. I am sure there may be some experts in the Coast Guard- Mr. HEYWARD. I want to ask you, chief, about the New Jersey side. PAGENO="0060" 54 Do I understand that the New Jersey communities do not have any fireboats of any kind in the New York Harbor area? Mr. RUSH. Newark had one at one time. It was called the Kennedy. Whether it is still in operation, I am not sure. Mr. HEYWARD. Where is the dividing line between the State of New York and the State of New Jersey; Is it in the center of the Hudson, or is it on the New Jersey shore, or where? Mr. RUSH. I believe it is over closer to the Jersey shore, but I am not sure. It runs down about the center of the Kill Van Kull, if you are familiar with that. Mr. HEYWARD. Yes, in the Hudson. Is it in the center of the Hudson? Mr. RUSH. I am not sure at this point. Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you. Mr. OLNEY. No questions. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, chief, and be sure to give my best to Commissioner O'Hagan. Mr. RUSH. Yes, sir, I will. Mr. BIAGGI. As Mr. Heyward stated at the outset, while I was not here, any person who feels he might like to make contribution to the hearing is perfectly free to come and testify and make a comment. All he has to do is rise and sound off. Captain Torrens? Mr. TORRENS. This is just a slight addition to my former testimony that occurred to me while Mr. Sanders was speaking. You asked what impact, financial impact, additional equipment would be, and I answered it would probably be none. That was based on two channel monitoring as I had already mentioned, because most equipment is built to only monitor the single channel that it happens to be working. All vessels which are presently required to have bridge to bridge do have two channel capability because they have to monitor channels 13 and 16 and, therefore, it would follow that if the Coast Guard were able to take over the watch on channel 16, it would leave that channel free for a vessel traffic system. So I wan ted to clarify my testimony to that extent, that additional monitoring, and the word is "the monitoring" aspect is most burden- some. Most sets today do have capability, of 12 to 86 channels of sending. Portable units, which the pilots have had difficulty procuring, may go up to five or seven channels sending, but they are only able to monitor one channel at a time. So, therefore, the addition channel monitoring would be the burden. Lieutenant Commander JOHNSON. May I add just a little bit of clarification about the economic impact of the monitoring and avail- able channels, that there is two things about VHF, FM radio that are affected. The first thing is the number of channels that have to be monitored simultaneously. That is the equivalent-if you must monitor three channels simultaneously-that is the equivalent of three receivers. Now, the amount of channels available per transmission, one at a time, they vary from 1, 3 or up to 8 or 16. This proposition is, No. 1, if you have to monitor three, that costs more because you have PAGENO="0061" 55 effectively three receivers. If you have to be able to shift to a number of channels, then this also adds to the cost of the unit in that more transmitting channels are required. So there is two things that affect the economics, the simultaneous monitoring of the channels, and the number of channels that are available to select to transmit on. Mr. BAIGGI. We are mindful of that. We would be mindful of that, too. Any questions? Sir? Will you identify yourself, please? STATEMENT OP KENNETH O~ BLOM, GENERAL MANAGER, REI- NAUER TRANSPORTATION COS., ACCOMPANIED BY HAROLD A. REINAUER, PRESIDE~TT, REINAUER TRANSPORTATION COS. Mr. BL0M. I am Ken Blom from Reinauer Transportation Cos., in New York. Mr. BIAGGI. You can come forward and sit here if you like. Mr. BLOM. All right. When you measure things in terms of the economic impact, one of the concerns that I have is that we have a fleet of tugs and barges in New York Harbor, and we run the whole gamut of sizes of tugboats. Now, we run from 800 horsepower to 3,200 horsepower. It is very nice for these fellows to sit down and plot charts, and say, hey, you know you are an underpowered tow, you are this or that. They might not be saying this right now, but, sooner or later down the line, the Coast Guard is going to say, well, you are a low-powered vessel so, therefore, you are assigned to this lane, and further put that vessel in an uneconomic position. We also have a 3,200 horsepower tugboat so, therefore, we would qualify to go into a high-powered lane as you traverse this habor. Now, it seems to me if this system is going to come into effect-I do not know where they are at right now, because I have heard so much talk about it- Mr. BIAGGI. We will sort of get a response to your question in a minute. Mr. BLOM. All right. Well, there was a hearing one time, or I was at one of these meetings, and the guy was saying, well, look, you have got to stay to the right. Well, I have bucked a lot of tides out of the Kifi Van Kull. And I did them with junky crappy little boats, and we were making a living. And, you know, we did not mind that a catamaran came by us and drove us under with their weight. We did not care about ships. We did the job. But we also had the advantage that, well, if it was a Sunday morning, I could go duck under the Bayonne shore and do 2 knots there. You did your work for the boss, and that is what it was. Now, they are throwing out all these terms, such as the systems approach and hardware. Well, I can be just as dumb as anybody else on the boat, and I look at the makeup of the crews. Now, the average crew you have today, they are all high school dropouts. OK. So am I. It does not bother me one bit. PAGENO="0062" 56 However, these guys- Mr. BIAGGI. How many vessels do you own? Mr. BLOM. My company has-I think it is 6 tugs and 10 barges. Mr. BIAGGI. That is not bad for a high school dropout. Mr. BLOM. I do not own this thing. I just work there. But the point I am trying to make is, you know, just like you cannot legislate love, you cannot legislate brains, and when you start talking about hardware, if you are talking about it to some of my guys, they think you are talking about hardware stores. They do not know about this system business. I get Scientific American and I follow some of the advances in computer technology and all these fancy terms. What I want to know is the leadtime. How long is it going to take to indoctrinate these fellows into the system? They are talking about, I think, next year of starting these things. You know, bureaucracy is bureaucracy. It is like a disease. It gets bigger and bigger and more cumbersome. What are you going to do with the poor fellow that gets caught in the squeeze? Mr. BIAGGI. Well, why do not we get some answers to some of your questions? Mr. BLOM. OK. Commander JOHNSON. Mr. Blom, I appreciate your fears about being relegated to a slow speed channel, or something like that. It would be nice if we had enough space in the channel system in New York Harbor to do something like that. The reality of the thing is that there is not enough space, and there will not be in the foreseeable future. So everybody that now is in the harbor area is going to be there probably 10 years from now and they will be operating in probably the same manner. We do not anticipate any special lanes for low-powered vessels or things of that nature. Everybody is going to have to learn to live together in the channel system under a centralized traffic management system. And I think to answer about how the operators are going to absorb the new technology, I think the answer to that is that they are not going to have to. They are not going to be doing things much different than they are right now. Part of this, we recognize. We talk in terms of technology, and that is fine as far as it goes, but there is another half of this proposition that jumps up and grabs you, and that is the relationship to people and the application of commonsense, and the appreciation of exactly what the individual operator's problems in the harbor are. There are many of them. We recognize this, and we have to do more to acquaint ourselves with what your problems are. That is one of the reasons why, in our training problem, we are addressing the possibility of our potential controllers getting out there and actually riding on the harbor craft and finding out first hand what the operator's problems are so that he really appreciates it when he gets back in his vessel traffic center and is faced with the task of actually managing the traffic. So if we apply commonsense this way, if we apply people-to-people approach, so to speak, I think you will have a system that you will be able to use, and I think it will help you as well as any other users in the harbor. PAGENO="0063" 57 Mr. BLOM. That is the first I have heard of it in terms of help. Commander JOHNSON. That is what it is for. Mr. BLOM. I am for avoiding collisions but not to the point that it is going to change the system as we have it. We have a workable system right now. Commander JOHNSON. That is correct, and I addressed that in my presentation. Mr. BLOM. But one more fact- Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me. Mr. Blom, you say we have a workable system. The record shows that we have a number of accidents that can he prevented by the implementation of some new technology, new systems, and there are spots out there that continue to remain very perilous even to the uneducated eye. It becomes quite apparent. The idea is to improve the safety of the harbor without causing any hard- ship to the industry. We are always mindful of the industry. At least I am, because I have a friend of mine out there who has been com- plaining to me about the Coast Guard ever since I have known him, my friend, Frank Barry of the Circle Line. If we asked him for an opinion, I am sure he would give us a dozen. I chatted with him yesterday, and he runs a first-rate operation. I have never lost sight of that fact, and I am sure the Coast Guard knows of my concern in that area. But we do not-we do not compromise to the extent of endangering the prime objective. Mr. BLOM. Well, sir, there is one other aspect here. Is this system going to be an advisory system, because, you know these things grow, too? This bit of control is-it is a little bit hairy. I have watched first- hand the collision between the Alva Cape and the Texaco and Massa- chusetts in which 39 guys died. And I spoke very strongly on behalf of bridge-to-bridge VHF radio, and I see it works. It clearly does. It was a dumb stupid case of misunderstanding between people. But, now, where is it going to go 5 years from now? When they go to implement the system, are there going to be things built in there so it remains an advisory system? Piloting is an art. It is a subjective thing, you know, to the degree-- Mr. BIAGGI. Why do we not get a response from that query? Commander JOHNSON. Yes, I would like to clarify what you mean by advisory. Mr. BLOM. For instance, if I am on a boat now, OK, and I am coming up the Bay, are you going to tell me where to go? Commander JOHNSON. I might tell you to slow down if you are going to meet somebody in a hazardous area where two vessels of your size and type should not meet, but I am not going to attempt to maneuver your vessel from my vessel traffic center. That is up to you. Mr. BLOM. Well, I have not read this document, but is that built in there? Commander JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BLOM. You do not anticipate a change in it? Commander JOHNS ON. No, sir. They would have to have a lot more information than is going to be available to us initially in the system when we turn on, to be able to maneuver a vessel from a shore facility. That is not our intention. PAGENO="0064" 58 During my presentation, I made the analogy of the patrolman on the corner. You would get upset if he hopped in on the passenger side and told us what to do with the accelerator, brakes and steering wheel. And I think that is what makes the mariner nervous. No, we are not prepared to do that at this time because we simply do not have the information to do it. I do not know that there is any need to do it. Mr. BLOM. One of my other concerns-I wifi try to shut up in a minute-but one of my other concerns is we have a situation now in some god-awful place down in Louisiana called Berwick Bay, or something, where the Coast Guard is seeking to impose horsepower to length of tow, to tonnage ratios and so forth, what you can do and cannot do. Now, this Nation was built on free trade and free navigation, and you get a regulatory body like yourselves come in here. Now, this is the first step. OK? Pretty soon-what I am concerned about is we do not have Coast Guard inspection on our tugboats. Thank God. Well, listen, we have a very good safety record with tugboats insofar as keeping them going. Now, if we get to the point where you are going to start saying to me, hey, look, you cannot take this 20,000-barrel barge with that 800-horsepower tugboat. Where is this thing going to begin and end with their control? That is the thing that makes me nervous. Commander JOHNSON. Well, I do not know that I could even begin to give you any guarantees of a bottom line on control and regulation. That is certainly not within my power to do so. But I think that in the majority of instances, when a rule or a particular regulation is instituted, there is a reason behind it, and usually the reason behind it, as far as the Coast Guard is concerned, at any rate, is damage to property, loss of life, environmental pollu- tion. These are our three chief reasons for regulating anything. And if that becomes necessary, now, I am sure we wifi do it, but if it is not necessary, I think our record is pretty clear that we sought to avoid it. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with that, I would just like to com- ment that whatever rules and regulations are proposed, there has to be a public hearing. And where the specific rules are objected to and objected to on reasonable grounds, at least theoretically they should not go into effect. As far as Berwick Bay is concerned, they did issue regulations. The fact of the matter is that there were a tremendous number of collisions with that bridge, putting the bridge out of operation, stopping traffic in the area, besides the loss of property and lives. Mr. BLOM. Well, sir, I respectfully submit that that was overcome then by the installation of a traffic light, a go/no-go basis. But, then, there was further consideration concerning horsepower to tonnage ratios or the amount of tow ratio- Mr. HEYWARD. I am not too sure, but I think the Berwick Bay regulations also address low-powered tows, at least as to the number ofjbarges that they are allowed to carry through that system. PAGENO="0065" 59 Commandor JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BLOM. One last shot. I live in Staten Island. It is the world's biggest garbage dump. Mr. BIAGGI. Do not let the paper hear you say that. Mr. BLOM. What is that? Mr. B1AGGI. The Staten Island Advance would not be happy about that. Mr. BLOM. I do not read it anyway. They wanted the bridge, too. The point I am trying to make is a little bit more serious. It is the stinking LNG. Who is going to protect us? Even with this system here, you know, I am sure that the air traffic controller that was out at Kennedy last week when the 727 went in, you know he had active control. Everybody had control, and there are a lot of dead bodies there just the same. Mr. BIAGGI. I am not so sure that that is true. The pilot apparently that flew that 727 was aware of the conditions and exercised his discretion. Perhaps if he had listened-well, I would not say, at that point-perhaps if he had taken the controller's advice or followed the course of conduct that his preceding flight had taken, he might have avoided that. But who is to say? That was obviously an unfortunate development. Mr. BLOM. My last shot. Mr. BIAGGI. That is what y~u said two shots ago. Mr. BLOM. I know. I cannot talk at home so I get away with it here. You know, this whole thing really hangs on one thing. I was thinking of it. It is a little glass cylinder with a metal tip on each end called a fuse. And what is there-you know, what is not spelled out is what is inherent in this thing. Now, a guy gets in the system and everybody is talking about systems, but his radios crap out. What is going to happen to this? Is this vessel now manifestly unseaworthy under the law? What provision have you got for this and what protection is there to the company for liability? If we are in your system now and you are controlling this, what amount of the liability are you taking? Are you going to take liability? Commander JOHNSON. Radio failure? Mr. BL0M. For anything. Commander JOHNSON. I would hope that we would have procedures built into the system to follow in case of equipment failures. That is a necessary part of every system. By that, I do not mean we intend to shut down the whole port because somebody has a radio failure. That is part of the common sense about the system that I was talking about. Mr. BLOM. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Mr. Blom. You were a refreshing contribution. You raised some interesting questions. Did you raise your hand a moment ago? Mr. REINAUER. I would just like the record to show, Mr. Biaggi, I am Mr. Harold Reinauer. r8-280-76-5 PAGENO="0066" 60 But I am here today as the vice chairman of region 5, American Waterway Operators, and I would just like the record to show that I support Mr. Robert Sanders. Mr. BIAGGI. Fine. If anyone else wants to be here recorded, please feel you are free to tell the reporter. No other witnesses? Sir? STATEMENT OF PAUL POSNER, NEW YORK CITY BUREAU OP THE BUDGET Mr. POSNER. My name is Paul Posner with the New York City Bureau of the Budget. I would like to address that one issue about the city's fireboats and the Coast Guard's responsibility. Mr. BIAGGI. Sure. Mr. POSNER. Some weeks ago, a letter was sent by the city, to the Secretary of Transportation, requesting that the Coast Guard assume a greater share of responsibility for fire protection in the port of New York. It certainly is the policy of the mayor and the budget bureau that we do not want to diminish the protection avail- able to the port of New York for marine fires. Rather it is a question of the appropriate level of government that should deal with this problem. The city presently has, as you know, an intense budgetary crisis, and as long as we are required to provide 100 percent of the funding for this service, I am afraid to say that the service will suffer as are most city services at the present time. At the present time, the city is in the position where it cannot do everything that it wants to do. It caimot do everything that people want it to do. So when you have a shrinking pie, so to speak, a shrinking base of resources, the question is you have to choose your priorities. And while we would like to satisfy everything and respond to all needs, as you know, the Mayor has been forced to make some rather painful choices. The city's primary firefighting responsibility is to protect its resi- dents and property from fires on land and, to the extent that they are threatened, on water as well. Our recent budget crisis has forced us to cutback on personnel in both land-based and marine fire units. In view of these recent reduc- tions in the level of fire protection available to our own citizens, we should now be relieved of the costs of providing fire protection for interstate commerce and for other cities and States-responsibilities which more properly rest with the Federal Government. Federal reimbursement or takeover of the city's marine fire service for the port could save approximately $5 million-money which we could allocate to rehire laid-off firemen and help restore fire protection to the city's own residents. I might note that $5 million is the equiva- lent to the costs of 200 city firemen. The problem of delivering fire protection to the port of New York is clearly an interstate problem for which the city, through an histori- cal series of events, has assumed the sole responsibility. PAGENO="0067" 61 And I think, at this point, the shrinking financial resources of the city have pointed out how unfair this division of responsibility is. The city currently provides marine fire protection to the New Jersey waterfront without reimbursement. This is an issue that other cities have handled differently. For example, the city of Seattle is in the process of entering into a series of agreements with neighboring cities and with shipping companies doing business within their port, requiring reimbursement for their marine fire services. Our city has been, for a long time, generously providing this service without charge to anyone except the taxpayers of the city of New York. Due to this fiscal inequity, the city has reviewed the issue and has promulgated some alternative approaches to seeking external financing. One alternative would be to charge neighboring communities in the State of New Jersey. However, this would pose problems of coordinat- ing fire protection and billing with each separate New Jersey town on the waterfront. Furthermore, the determination of fees is a sensitive and technically complex problem. The other more logical solution for the entire port would be to secure Federal participation in providing marine fire protection. Among the primary duties of the Coast Guard is the general legal responsibility to protect the safety of life and property on the waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction. We would argue that this responsibility extends to fire protection within our port. Elsewhere throughout the country, the Coast Guard exercises exclusive responsibility for fire protection in the ports of Norfolk, Charleston, and Miami. This is according to our own research. Thus, we believe that the Coast Guard would be the most appropriate agency of Government to offer marine flre services in our port, due to its legal authority and interstate jurisdiction. There is no reason why the level of protection should necessarily be diminished if the service is transferred to the Coast Guard. It is quite possible that arrangements could he worked out whereby the city's boats and equipment could be leased to the Coast Guard for this purpose. But, really, once again, it is a question of not wanting to diminish the service but rather wanting to have the most appropriate level of government deliver the service. Mr. BIAGGI. You said at the outset that you had made application to the Secretary of Transportation. My understanding is that entreaty was rejected. Mr. POSNER. I have not seen a letter of reply yet. Mr. BIAGGI. Because I made some inquiry after I learned about it. Mr. POSNER. Right. Mr. BIAGGI. I think the same reasoning was offered by the Secre- tary there that the President offered when he rejected Mayor Beame's plea that New York City could not be distinguished by singular treat- ment. Most cities have problems. However, I think this is a little bit different, a little bit of a problem. If you were here, you would note that throughout the testimony and the questioning, there was a string of questions to develop a logical, perhaps possible jurisdiction of the Coast Guard in this area, at least some Federal Govermnent responsibility. Whether it be the Coast Guard or not remains to be seen. PAGENO="0068" 62 But there is a bistate or tristate responsibility-at least the bistate area responsibility where New York City has been providing the pro- tection, inadequate protection at best. Although the people who work there are performing a yeoman's job, it is inadequate, simply because they have limited resources and equipment. It is my judgment that the request is sound, the approach is logical, and there should be some relief forthcoming. The Merchant Marine Committee has a bill, not yet subjected to the hearing process which calls for evaluation of the various needs of the ports throughout the country, and it might well be that we could work this concern of yours, this firefighting facet into those hearings, and perhaps arrive at a conclusion that might help the mayor's fiscal problems, and not diminish the firefighting units, and perhaps not even encroach upon current Coast Guard jurisdiction. Captain, did you want to say something? Captain PERKINS. Yes; I would just like to correct one statement. The Coast Guard does not provide fire protection for any port in the United States. Just like in the Port of New York, we have many facilities, as I mentioned earlier, that has some firefighting capabilities. This is installed primarily for search and rescue operations wherever it is available. We certainly wish to cooperate wherever there is a place for us to do something. The Coast Guard does not budget for, and does not build, or provide firefighting facilities in any port in this country. Mr. POSNER. This was just-the information we got was from the fire chiefs of these various cities who reported that they do not budget for fire protection for their ports, but rather that they depend solely on the Coast Guard. So the question is, the only agency that really has the legal re- sponsibility in any-even if you say in a vague sense-is the Coast Guard. Just as with the Port of New York, the city of New York does not have the legal responsibility for fire safety throughout the Port of New York, certainly not in New Jersey. Mr. BIAGGI. I would say in the light of history and tradition the city of New York now has assumed that responsibility. I think the courts will decree that. That is my judgment, but it is not a moot question. I think it is a vital question very much alive. Just off the top of my head I do not know that the Coast Guard would be the avenue through which we approach it, but certainly there is responsibility of the Federal Govermnent to participate. I think that is a logical conclusion. There is a moral responsibility as well as a real responsibility to provide some fiscal assistance. I am sure if that were provided the Mayor would be happier unloading, if you will, that particular responsibility. Mr. Heyward? Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just going to comment in connection with two of the three cities that were mentioned, it is obvious that there are large Naval installations. In Charleston and Norfolk, much of the activity in those harbors is Navy, and perhaps those localities depend upon the very fact that the Navy has its own protective equipment, and therefore neither has an adequate marine fire fighting budget, hoping to be assisted, just as other communities are assisted by New York. PAGENO="0069" 63 Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. DiMaggio? Mr. DIMAGGI0. Just one comment in response to that. I cannot see where you could take a fireboat and just say to the Coast Guard, here, operate this piece of sophisticated equipment. The pilots and engineers are firefighters first, then they promote to an engineer or pilot who are licensed by the Coast Guard. I would like to see the city say here, operate this boat and go and fight the ALVA CAPE fire. It is outlandish to consider it. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, if you understand the problem, you understand the city is desperately groping for alternatives, but the underlying issue is muddy. I come back to my original conclusion. I think the logical course to pursue is to pursue the Federal Government, and try to convince them that they do in fact have a fiscal obligation to assist in this area. And you might report this. We do have proposed legislation that will be subjected to the hearing process which will evaluate the needs of the various ports throughout the country. I repeat that. I am sure that firefighting will be one of those needs, and then the question becomes how much money can we get into it, and how will it trickle down to you. But at least there is an avenue. Mr. POSNER. I would say that that would be the preferable approach, to be reimbursed for the service, to keep it within the city. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I am sure you are familiar with Government. It will not be next week, it will be a long, tedious process. First we must get a notion accepted, and develop that whole concept, and pursue that hopefully to enactment. Until then I do not know that we will alleviate the city's problem in time to withdraw some of those pink slips. But in any event we are sympathetic, and we are aware, and we agree that there should be some monies coming in to support a service which is really bistate. I would like to thank you for your contribution, and Commander Johnson, Captain Perkins, gentlemen, we appreciate your participa- tion here today, and if you have any further contributions, we would appreciate it that you send it to us in Washington. Any comments as we go on with the implementation of the process, as I am sure there will be some variance of opinion and differences, and it is our purpose, as I said at the outset, to develop a plan that is satisfactory to all, without imperiling the prime objective. That being all, the meeting stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] PAGENO="0070" PAGENO="0071" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL NONDAY, JULY 7, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Philadelphia, Pa. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 1:05 p.m., in Con- ference room B, 11th floor, 1421 Cherry Street, Federal Building, Philadelphia, Pa., Hon. Mario Biaggi, chairman, presiding. Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting will be called to order. This morning we had an overflight of the Delaware River and the Port of Philadelphia, on which I was accompanied by Congressman Josh Eilberg and Congressman Pierre du Pont. After many confer- ences and consultations in Washington in relation to the conditions in this area, we are pleased to be here to receive testimony from the Coast Guard and from any member of the marine industry or the public that desires to make a statement. All they have to do is indicate to the chair that they wish to speak to the committee and it will be done. Before we get into the statement which I will read in a moment, I would like the people of this community to understand that the hearings today were the result of special and vigorous effort on the part of Congressman Josh Eilberg and Congressman Pierre du Pont, who have maintained sustained interest in the vessel safety features of the Delaware River, climaxed by the Queeny-Corinthos incident. The results of their efforts and their concern for the people and property of the area is the prime reason why we are having hearings in Philadelphia today. I am sure the people of Delaware and the people of Philadelphia will be mindful of their interest and contribution. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is meeting tins afternoon in Philadelphia for the second of a series of field visits and discussions related to the general problem of vessel safety in the various port areas and navigable waters of the United States. At the beginning of the present Congress, it became apparent that the Subcommittee, in order to carry out its oversight responsibilities, should inspect in some detail as many aspects of Coast Guard opera- tions as it could find possible to do. One of the significant areas of operation involves Coast Guard responsibilities in the promotion of the safe movement of vessels in our navigable waters. The increasing volume of waterborne traffic in the United States, as well as the expanding numbers of hazardous cargoes which move in waterborne commerce, make it particularly important that vessel traffic movements should be so organized and (65) PAGENO="0072" 66 supervised as to guarantee as accident free a traffic system as it is reasonably possible to accomplish. In early 1975, the Comptroller General submitted a report to the Congress which had been developed pursuant to the general auditing responsibilities of his office. That report was entitled "Vessel Traffic Systems-What Is Needed To Prevent and Reduce Vessel Accidents?" In view of the subcommittee's interest in this general subject matter, that report was particularly timely and its recommendations, together with the Department of Transportation comments on the report, serve to focus attention on the `issue to "be considered in evaluating the general problem area. The subcommittee, therefore, decided to address the subject in a series of hearings which hopefully can be concluded before consid- ering Coast Guard authorization hearings for the fiscal year 1977 budget. On June 27, the first of the field visits was held in the New York Harbor area, and the problems peculiar to that area' were discussed with the Coast Guard and various public witnesses. This morning, the subcommittee members made a helicopter ffight for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the general outlay of the Delaware River and Philadelphia Port area. This afternoon, we are meeting to receive a report from the Coast Guard and its local captain of the port, outlining specific problems of vessel traffic in this area, together with a discussion of existing and potential Coast Guard plans for solving those problems and improving safety in Delaware Bay, the Delaware River, and the inland port areas. ` Following the Coast Guard presentation, the subcommittee will be happy to receive comments from any members of the audience who may be interested in furnishing any information or in expressing their views on the general subject of vessel traffic safety. It would be particularly helpful if comments could be addressed to specific problem areas, such as the adequacy of aids to navigation, vessel movement reports, channel depths and configurations, means of communications, speed and size of vessels, vessel speeds and maneuverability controls, and the monitoring of vessel movements. With that brief introduction, I recognize the Commander, Third Coast Guard District, Vice Adm. William F. Rea III for any comments that he may care to make, after which we will hear from Capt. Dudley C. Goodwin, U.S. Coast Guard, captain of the port, Philadelphia, but before I do that I would like to give my colleague, the ranking minority member of the committee, Congressman Pierre du Pont, of Delaware, an opportunity to make any remarks. Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for scheduling these hearings in the Delaware River region'. We had a great many problems, especially along the Delaware River, all the way from Big Stone Beach where the tankers lighter off their view approximately from Delaware all the way to the city of Philadelphia where some of those lighter tankers arrive to discharge the rest of their cargo. Mr. Eilberg has been concerned, as I have, with the safety prob- lems in the river getting the best sort of a vessel traffic control system that we can establish for the Delaware River and I think our tour this morning and these hearings will be very helpful in doing that. PAGENO="0073" 67 Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions for the Coast Guard witnesses and I think that I will save those until they have completed their testimony. Mr. BIAiGI. Congressman Josh Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank the Coast Guard for their hospitality this morning, providing the helicopter trip over the lower Delaware and Delaware Bay. I might say that visibility was very poor this morning so that we were not able to see as much as we would have lilced. We had some difficulty with the intercom in the plane. I just wish that conditions had been better, although I must confess that the Coast Guard certainly did everything it could to make the morning profitable. Also their courtesy down at Gloucester City was very much appre- ciated where they briefed our staffs and provided us with some lunch and now we are ready to go. Mr. Chairman, the problem of vessel traffic safety on the DeiaWar~ River has become a very serious matter. I might say, Mr. Chairman, some of my remarks may be very strong, but the reasons therefor will appear. The problem of vessel traffic safety on the Delaware River has become a very serious matter because of the apparent lack of concern for this problem on the part of the Coast Guard and the Federal Department of Transportation. Recently, the General Accounting Office-and I say "recently"- the report was submitted in January of this year-made a study of the Coast Guard's implementation of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, which was passed by Congress in 1972. in its report, the GAO criticized the Coast Guard for its failure to provide better control of the movement of vessels carrying danger- ous cargoes and it listed the Delaware River in the area of the Port of Philadelphia as one place which needed an improved vessel traffic system. Regretfully, the Coast Guard has not seen fit since 1972, subject to the last remarks which I suppose we will hear about this afternoon, to make any changes by the GAO which report is in my possession. However, the Coast Guard has reported that Philadelphia is 12th in line for the establishment of such a system and that this means nothing will be done until the 1980's. Because of this situation, I recently met with Secretary of Trans- portation Wffliam Coleman and the Commandant of the Coast Guard who were kind enought to come to my office, but that discussion proved to be very frustrating at best. The Secretary told me that although the suggestions I had made for improving safety in the port were under study and that some may be implemented, nothing would be done if it was going to cost too much money. I must say that I find this attitude intolerable. I have spoken with the men who work on the river every day, including members of the Seafarers' Union, Docking Masters and River Pilots. All had suggestions for safer operation of the vessels which use our port. Somehow, the Coast Guard officials in that area do not seem to hear our suggestions. It is vital that at the very least, planning begin immediately for an improved VTS with an early implementation date rather than some nebulous time in the future. PAGENO="0074" 68 A recent report in the Philadelphia Bulletin listed Philadelphia as one of the Nation's largest ports. Somehow the figures of the Coast Guard, however, are quite different. With the coming devel- opment of the huge oil and natural gas deposits on the Outer Con- tinental Shelf off the east coast, we must expect that traffic on the Delaware will be substantially increased. Most of this increase will be in the form of tankers carrying oil and gas and so the chances of fatal accidents wifi also increase. Unless something is done now, I do not see how the Coast Guard wifi be able to assure the people who work on the river or use it for recreation as well as the people of Philadelphia and the surrounding communi- ties, that every possible action had been taken to guarantee their physical safety and the protection of the environment. It is my hope that during this hearing, we will receive the assurances that adequate steps are being taken so that we will not have to order them through the legislative process. I would say, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, then, it may very well be that legislative steps will have to be taken because nothing has happened as far as I know with minor exceptions since this matter was raised by us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Eilberg. It is my pleasure to welcome Admiral Rea of the Third District. STATEMENT OP VICE ADM. WILLIAM P. REA III, COMMANDER, THIRD COAST GUARD DISTRICT, GOVERNORS ISLAND, N.Y., AC- COMPANIED BY CAPT. DUDLEY C. GOODWIN, U.S. COAST GUARD, CAPTALN OP THE PORT, PHILADELPHIA, PA. Admiral REA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Vice Adm. William F. Rea III, Commander of the Third Coast Guard District and my headquarters is Governors Island, N.Y. I am very pleased to be here with you and the members of your committee, with Congressman Eilberg and Congressman du Pont, to have our captain give you an overview and some of the efforts that we are making in the Philadelphia area. This is your second visit, as you have indicated in your opening statement, to the Third Coast Guard District, you having held similar hearings in the Port of New York. As you will see today, although in New York we are fairly well along with some vessel traffic system planning, the Delaware River in the Port of Philadelphia is in a somewhat different category and this will be touched on and dealt with in the statement; and I can deal with that later in the questions if necessary. I think it would be sufficient to say that I am pleased to be here. I am very much available for questions and cooperation with your committee and particularly, Mr. Eilberg, to resolve the problems that apparently are unresolved in the Philadelphia-Delaware area. At this time I would turn the mike over to Capt. Dudley C. Good- win, the Captain of the Port of Philadelphia, who has a statement to make to your committee, sir. PAGENO="0075" 69 Captain GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman du Pont, Con- gressman Eilberg, there has been considerable interest demonstrated in the Philadelphia area in recent months with regard to safety prob- lems in the port and as concerns our plans for improved traffic safety- especially with respect to the vessel traffic system program. Of course, these are the very things the committee is here to review. I welcome the opportunity to discuss those subjects with you, and suspect that we will all benefit from constructive discussion of their various facets. Since you recently conducted a similar review in the area comprising the Port of New York, perhaps it would be worthwhile to underscore some notable contrasts between our port and that of New York. For example; (a) The area available for navigation of large vessels amounts to less than 15 percent of the total water area in New York. I would guess that ours is even less, certainly no greater; (b) The Port of New York incorporates a large protected anchorage basin. Our port has six rather widely dispersed federally maintained anchorages, each of limited capacity, adjacent to the roughly 80 miles of federally maintained channel. Enclosure (1) depicts the locations of our anchorages; Enclosure (2) contains a summary of the anchorage characteristics; (c) Whereas the Port of New York has deepwater piers only 9 miles from the open sea, our first facilities of consequence in this regard are located at Wilmington, 62 miles from the open sea. These piers continue, in varying densities, over an additional 47 or so miles; (d) While there are six major entrances to the Port of New York, we have two; namely via Delaware Bay and Chesapeake Bay C. & D. Canal; (e) Channel dimensions in the Port of New York range from 150 feet to 2,000 feet in bottom width while ours vary from 200 feet at Trenton to 1,000 feet at the lower end of the bay; (f) Controlling depths in the Port of New York range from 12 feet through 45 feet, whereas ours vary from 12 feet to 40 feet; (g) The network of channels serving the Port of New York accom- modated 216 million short tons in 1973; our single, somewhat restricted channel handled 80 million tons. Enclosure (3) contains a summary of vessel accidents investigated by our Marine Inspection personnel during the period January 1, 1967 through 1974. Enclosure (4) recapitulates causes, location, and other factors, by year. Enclosure (5) summarizes type casualties by location with regard to its channel characteristics. Enclosure (6) outlines my position on "whether or not the intro- duction of additional vessel traffic system measures would improve safety associated with navigation of the Delaware River." Copies of that position were previously mailed to you. I hope you received them. In the interest of brevity, I will only quote in part and in essence from that paper. For record purposes, I have annotated enclosure (6) to indicate the portions I will draw from; using a checkmark to desig- nate the appropriate paragraphs. I have no doubts that additional vessel traffic system measures would improve safety associated with navigation of the Delaware PAGENO="0076" 76 Admiral REA. Captain Smith. Mr. BIAGGI. Is the captain here? Is he prepared to testify before this committee at this point as to the basis of his charges as to what they are? Admiral REA. Mr. Chairman, Captain Smith did not come prepared for that. He really, in order to testify, ought to have the records before him. I think, if you would permit, we would get these records and the accurate information into the record as quickly as possible as to the status. Mr. BIAGGI. Let me pursue that, Admiral. I would like to ask Captain Smith, where are the records? Captain SMITH. They are in my office. Mr. BIAGGL How far is your office from here? Captain SMITH. Second and Chestnut Streets. Mr. BIAGGI. Timewise? Captain SMITH. Probably half an hour. Mr. BIAGGI. I think we will be underway for more than half an hour. Admiral Rea, may I suggest that the captain be permitted to go fetch the records? Admiral REA. Yes. Mr. DU PONT. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Mr. DUPONT. Before you go charging off to get the records, Cap- tain, let me raise a question of due process about the advisability at a public hearing, when airing charges against an individual, making them public before the individual has been served and I am concerned with that both from the point of view of the individual but also. from the point of view that if you do that, it may be that whatever prosecu- tion or legal action you take may ultimately be voided because his rights will be violated right in this hearing this afternoon and I would think we ought to have an opinion from someone more competent than I whether that is an advisable step. Admiral REA. I am without counsel at the moment but I think our counsel-or counsel, minority counsel, may support this. My intention was to furnish and what I was proposing and perhaps it was in terms, just for the record, just a status and if the charges have not been preferred, I think it would be premature because the man himself has not been advised what the charges are. Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, a few minutes ago you said that you had arrived at no conclusions with regard to the accident and that is the thrust of my question. I am not-certainly not interested in violating the rights of anyone, but apparently you have arrived at certain thoughts as to how this accident occurred and this is the thrust of my question. I would like to know what evidence, what kinds of evidence were involved. Admiral REA. Mr. Eilberg, first I was not on the board of investigation. I am not up to date on it but the action or the pro- posed action proceeding against a person's license is based on when this occurred, it's based on evidence of either negligence, misconduct or incompetence on the part of the person. This does not necessarily say then-dictate the conclusion that this is the cause of the casualty. PAGENO="0077" 71 And I run down, Mr. Chairman, through 20 cases there that I could go into if you would like me to, but for time purposes, you may want to study that later. Mr. BIAGG1. They all seem to have something in common, that VTS might have or would have- Captain GooDwiN. Might or should have. Mr. B1AGG1. Or should have? Captain GOODWIN. Yes, sir. And I concluded that-there, by saying that of the foregoing 20 cases under consideration, in order to justify VTS, I feel in only 11 cases could VTS have been considered necessary with regard to pre- venting or possibly preventing the particular casualty. I have marked those with an asterisk. The remainder should have been prevented through adherence to existing regulations or rules of prudent seamanship. Finally, if we consider the 20 cases by themselves, without discount- ing the nine which presumably would have occurred even with VTS, it becomes evident, that we averaged 2.5 accidents per year from January 1, 1967 through 1974, or call it 3. It is interesting to note that the GAO, inferring that we do not presently have a basic VTS, estimates that such a system would result in three fewer accidents annually. In reviewing the information contained in that paper, I have come to one conclusion: that regulations by themselves are of little use without a means of surveillance for purposes of enforcement, par- ticularly during periods of reduced visibility when they are most sorely needed. Radar in particular is an essential adjunct to any effective vessel traffic system. Consequently, I cannot as far as the Bay and River Delaware is concerned, consider the GAO report on vessel traffic systems, which calls for basic systems consisting of regulations, traffic separation schemes, or a communications network, including vessel movement reporting procedures, to have validity. We have the basic system here already, in the form of regulations, traffic separation, and the Maritime Exchange's vessel movement reporting system. If we want to improve our safety record, a means to conduct surveillance will be required. Based on the Port of Phila- delphia's safety, I do not feel* that the necessary electronic system; namely, radar, is justified at this time. The priority established by the commandant for installation in this port is not inconsistent with the priority implied in the GAO report, wherein the Delaware River and Bay is ranked after San Francisco, Puget Sound, Houston-Galveston, New York, New Orleans, five separate and distinct segments of the intercoastal waterway through Louisiana and Texas, and the Chesapeake Bay. While the foregoing position is derived by considering specific casualties, I have noted some general figures that are also noteworthy that I have received from the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, and they indicate the vessel traffic in terms of numbers at the end of December, from 1967 through 1974, have varied from 6,393 in 1967 to 4,815 in 1974. While they move up and down a little bit, there has been a consistent decline. PAGENO="0078" 72 The net registered tonnage is not available for 1967 and 1968, but from 1969 through 1974, it increased from about 42~ million tons to 53 million tons. And from the Coast Guard records, our accident rate from 1967 to 1974 has varied from 19 in 1967 to 16 in 1974, and that again has moved up and down a bit. I suppose an individual can interpret the foregoing figures any way he pleases. My interpretation is that since 1967 there has been a grad- ual decline in both numbers of vessels entering the port area and the number of casualties, while at the same time, there has been a gradual increase in vessel tonnage. Consequently, I suspect larger vessels are using the port. The Coast Guard has determined that the United States-that the U.S. ships of more than 30,000 deadweight tons have 66 percent more casualties than smaller ships. If this is valid, then we can reasonably expect an increase in accidents in our port with the arrival of increasing numbers of vessels such as the Notre Dame Victory at 37,785 tons, the Athos at 48,000 tons, the Spectra J at 34,000 tons, and the Gorinthos at 30,700 tons, unless we take effective steps to provide for a modern deepwater port in an effort to keep larger vessels out of the immediate and somewhat restricted port area. Elaborating on my comments relative to the increased chance of casualties with vessels over 30,000 tons, it is pertinent to note that in the Port of Philadelphia the trend in this regard, of late, has been- in March 1975, we had 54 vessels enter the port over 30,000 tons; April, 58, May, 93, and June, 85. Once having established the need for a vessel traffic safety system, it becomes a matter of determining what we want, need and can afford. We have two working groups in the Port of Philadelphia that will undoubtedly provide valuable inputs in this regard. First, under the auspices of the Joint Executive Committee for the improvement and development of the Philadelphia Port area, we have a VTS working group, chaired by Capt. Paul Ives, and secretary of the American Pilots Association. The function of this group, generally stated, is to evaluate and make recommendations to improve safety associated with navigation in the Delaware Bay and River. Beyond noting that I am an ex officio mem- ber of that group, I will defer to Captain Ives for further comment concerning the subject and related matters. Second, we have the Mariners' Advisory Committee for the Bay and River Delaware, chaired by Capt. Sam Schellenger, again of the Pilots' Association for the Bay and River Delaware. Once more, beyond noting that I am an ex officio member of that group, I will defer to Captain Schellenger for further comment concerning its functions and effectiveness. At such time as the Coast Guard finds it expedient to establish a Delaware River and Bay Traffic System Advisory Committee, I suspect that committee will be guided to a large extent by the find- ings, opinions, and recommendations of those two bodies. In further- ance of that purpose, I intend to furnish to them copies of the annual report from the New York Harbor Vessel Traffic System Advisory Committee, to be used as a guide in approaching the general subject. PAGENO="0079" 73 With respect to "when will a vessel traffic system for the Port of Philadelphia be operational," I can only note that in 1973, the Coast Guard completed a study of 22 ports and waterways to determine the needs of those areas for vessel traffic systems. This study included a case-by-case review of all collisions, rammings, and groundings for a 4-year period to determine the estimated per- centage reduction in these types of casualties that would result by having had various levels of vessel traffic systems. Analyses of casualties in Delaware River and Bay revealed that a vessel traffic system would not have had a significant effect in pre- venting these casualties. There appeared no need to go beyond the increased use of bridge-to-bridge telephone, a concept which has been employed in the Delaware since the early 1960's. This long successful experience in the Delaware contributed to the national adoption of bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone and may help explain why the area did not rank higher in need of a system. Using newly developed techniques, data collection efforts resumed in the Delaware River and Bay area in October 1974. Side looking airborne radar, SLAR, was used to determine vessel traffic densities and flow patterns. In March of this year, a data collection radar van was used to collect radio communication data and additional information on vessel traffic densities and flow patterns. Analysis of these data and other currently known factors will identify whether or not a vessel traffic system is needed, and if one is needed, the degree of complexity of such a system. New factors, such as the projected start-up of facilities handling cargoes of particular hazard, will be introduced into the data bank at such time as their implementation becomes reasonably firm. It should be recognized that Delaware River and Bay has been included inthe Coast Guard's long-range budget outlook. If the need for a system is identified, it is anticipated that moneys will be re- quested in the 1980 budget, which means an operational system might be a reality in 1981-82, depending on the system's complexity. In conclusion, and I did not include it in this particular statement, I would like to also note as I tried to point out this morning that the subject of port safety is a broad one. It includes not only requirements for traffic regulations and maintenance of an aids-to-navigation system of a base and navigation but also it requires consideration of how cargoes, particular by dangerous cargoes are handled aboard ship and at the facilities. It includes a review of how the facilities are maintained and how ships are constructed and maintained; how well crews are trained. To emphasize any one of these aspects at the expense of another would likely not serve to effectively improve our overal mission, accomplishment in port safety. Increased performance can only come about with increased personnel resources and equipment. If you are willing to concede that, by and large our personnel are fully and effectively employed at the present, not only here in Philadelphia but generally throughout the Coast Guard-and I feel they are-I feel it would be-I feel on our part it would be the height of complacency to say that we are presently doing all that needs to be done; we are not. But given adequate resources, I believe we can. PAGENO="0080" 74 Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to attempt to answer any questions you may have at this time. Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you very much, Captain Goodwin, Admiral Rea, for your complete cooperation in these hearings in providing the data and also your hospitality. At this point, I will defer my questioning and relinquish my time to Congressman Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Rea and Captain Goodwin. Captain Goodwin, I have no doubt of your sincerity and your seeing the job as you see it, but we seem to have differences of opinion. That is the purpose of this hearing and hopefully to take some steps to provide more safety for the Delaware and the people who live in the Delaware and work on the Delaware and to provide you with what additional facilities, if any, you may need. Now, you went to great length, Captain Goodwin, to analyze figures of accidents and I am not going to comment on those except to say that figures can be used any way you want to use them and in contradiction to the thrust of that statement, I would like to say that I have been told by members of the Seafarers Union that there is every day an accident on the Delaware River or Delaware Bay. By that I mean a ramming or grounding or collision and this infor- mation is given to me, so I suppose it is a matter of definition as to what is an accident. Nevertheless, the union people involved who work on the river in the bay tell us that there is an accident every day. Now a principal point that concerns me is the Queeny and Gorinthos incident of January 31 of this year. You niight say that I am a new member on this committee because I have felt the necessity of having a port watcher from Philadelphia, looking at the Delaware and the safety and development of the Delaware and no sooner do I become a member o this committee then this very serious acciden t occurs with the loss of a great many lives. That accident was on January 31, 1975, as I understand it. Can you tell me what conclusions, if any, you have arrived at as to the causes of that accident? Vice Admiral REA. Would it be all right, Mr. Eilberg, if I answer that one? Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Yes, sir. Vice Admiral REA. The data, that was subject to an investigation by the Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation and eventually and overview by the National Transportation Safety Board. The report has not been completed. It would be premature to say what conclusions, because the report has not been completed. When the report becomes public, certainly we will be sure that you and the committee becomes well aware of it. But it is an incomplete investigation. Mr. EILBERG. It is 5 months later, Admiral Rea, and you have no comment to make as to the causes of that accident? Vice Admiral REA. The Board of Investigation has not completed their work and it just would be premature, Mr. Eilberg, until it goes down approved by the Commandant and then the National Transportation Safety Board makes the final determin ation as to the PAGENO="0081" 75 cause of the casualty. I regret that they are not out sooner. The history of these boards, this procedure has been very time consuming. Mr. EILBERG. Since the accident, is it true that you have required locally that tugs of company vessels into the channel or out of the channel into docks? Captain GOODWIN. It is true that I gave it considerable thought. I put it out as a proposed regulation and quite frankly, based in large part on prodding from your office. I later changed it from a proposed regulation to an advisory, because of the economic impact that such a requirement would have on this port if it was not a general requirement in other ports of the country. Mr. EILBERG. What does advisory mean now? Captain GOODWIN. It is a recommendation. Mr. EILBERG. You mean vessels are free or companies are free to use a tug or not, is that what you are saying? Captain GooDwIN.Yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. So that YOU have withdrawn that temporary regulation which you have ordered? Captain GOODWIN. I have withdrawn it as a regulation and reissued it as an advisory, yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. Now, do you contemplate any time within the near future bringing any charges against any individuals for their con- duct in connection with the accident? Captain GooDwIN. I would like to pass this to Admiral Rea because that is not in my bailiwick. This is bureaucracy in action, I suppose, but there is an interface between my office and Marine Inspection and that is in the Marine Inspection's area of responsibility. Mr. BIAGGI. I might suggest that you feel free to move that microphone to each other and-whoever is desirous of answering the question please feel free to do so. Admiral REA. Excuse me. My apologies. Behind me is Capt. Wayne Smith, the officer in charge of Marine Inspection. When you're reached a stage in investigation that there is evidence of negligence or misconduct or incompetence, when these are turned over to his office for handling and I just consult with him to just determine where they stood and charges have been preferred; I shou~1d say they are being drawn up but have not been preferred as yet. These will be charges probably made of negligence or incompetence. We can furnish you exactly for the record what the status of this is, but that action does not have to await the approval of the Board of Investigation. Mr. EILBEEG. When there is evidence, then we should proceed with it. An investigation under article 4450 looking into action against a person's license or whether he should return his license or not should be gone into. Can you give us the basis of those charges? Are they in the stage of being prepared? Admiral REA. I do not have them. I can have the captain testify. I think the simplest thing is we can produce them as quickly as we possibly can for the record. Mr. BIAGGI. If the gentleman would yield and if I understood the response correctly, the charges are in fact prepared but have not been served. What was the captain's name again? 78-280-76----6 PAGENO="0082" 77 The cause of the casualty is the total picture and it may or may not have been in the alleged evidence of misconduct or negligence on the part of some individual. In a board of investigation, there are procedures when the board is proceeding, when they reach a point in their deliberations in gathering information and the facts, and they reach a conclusion that there is evidence of negligence on the part of one or more persons then that action is initiated looking toward further investigation against their license or document. It is a separate procedure, a separate operation and one does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that that man's negligence was the cause of the casualty per se, it might have been some other cause but even so you might proceed against his license. Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, I would like to suggest to you the legal possibility under the Freedom Information Act, we may very well have the right, the public may have the right to see the document that I have referred to. Do I understand you take the position now that you will not allow these to be explained or brought forward at this hearing, is that your position, Admiral? Admiral REA. My position now would be to seek advice from our counsel as to the propriety of releasing, prior to the person being charged being served and I would like to do that. Mr. EILBERG. How soon do you expect that the charges will be preferred, Admiral Rea? Admiral REA. I do not know whether Captain Smith is going to answer that. I would defer to him if he could answer it. I do not know whether he can. Mr. EILBERG. Captain Smith? Captain SMITH. I would estimate within a month. Mr. EILBERG. All right, thank you. Admiral, or Captain Goodwin, since my submission of proposed-a proposed VTS- Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me, would you yield? In light of the question raised by Congressman du Pont, after consultation at the table with Mr. Heyward, the need for Captain Smith to go get his records has been obviated. Rather than air the whole question of due process, we will wait and have you submit the information on the changes later. Mr. EILBERG. Since my submission of a number of suggestions for proposed vessel traffic system in the Delaware River Bay, have any of these been adopted? Captain Goodwin, you have been supplied with a list of regulations, proposed regulations which you have very carefully read. They were delivered by my district office administrator and you replied at length, highly critical of most of them. I would like to hear from you now as to whether you have adopted or looked with favor on any of the suggestions? Certainly you have your letter, document in front of you. Captain GooDwiN. Yes, I do. I am trying to pick out some areas that I can comment on. Of course you recommended a basic, as our vessel traffic system and I believe in quoting from my letter here, I indicated that the basic VTS is defined by GAO, as one that includes regulations, traffic PAGENO="0083" 78, separation schemes or communications network including YTS reporting procedures. I note that we have all these elements to the degree which I feel is required in the Delaware area. We have them as to the entrance of the bay, we have regulations in terms of rules of the road, regulations governing the handling, of hazardous matrials, regulations governing anchorage-we have the VTS managed by the Federal Maritime Ex- change, with a cooperation of the Pilots Association. Finally, we have a bridge-to-bridge communications network using 10 or 13 to facilitate the coordination of vessels in transit to and from facilities. I would think that quite honestly the only recommendation that you made, Mr. Congressman, that I felt might be worth a try at this time, in addition to what we already have is the proposal for tugs and I was convinced in my own mind that that would be economically unfair to the port and also giving it further consideration, the mere presence of tugs is not going to in my mind really preclude accidents. We had the Spectra J., one of our large ships, moving from an anchor- age assisted by three tugs here not too long ago, and he hit two ships trying to get into Arco. I suppose to answer your question, I am going to have to say that no, I have not implemented any regulations. Mr. EILBERG. And you do not believe that any of them have any merit in terms of alleviating any potential vessel accidents? Captain GoODwIN. I think the vessel traffic system in the port as I mentioned earlier, no doubt would serve to prevent some accidents. But again our requirements have to be put in perspective by the commandant as he gets a lump sum of money from the Congress and how he wants to divide it up. He has a bigger picture certainly than I do and I think that our requirements here in the Port of Philadelphia apparently are on down the line a ways. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission at this point to place in the record a list of my recommendations for the record and for the consideration of all of the members of the subcommittee. Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection. [Document above-referred to follows:] RECOMMENDATIONS OF lox. JOSHUA EILBERG ON PROPOSED VESSEL TRAFFIC SAFETY SYSTEM FOR THE PORT OF PHILADELPHIA AND THE DELAWARE RIVER PREFACE There is a pressing need for the adoption of regulations pertaining to vessel traffic throughout the ports of the Nation, and the time for action is now. However, I have a primary concern with the port of Philadelphia and the safety of my constituents and their property. The General Accounting Office report on vessel traffic safety reveals that there have been recommendations by the Coast Guard for a two-plan vessel traffic system: 1. A basic vessel traffic system. 2. A sophisticated vessel traffic system. The basic traffic system appears to be the ideal system in that it is effective through the enforcement of existing regulations and the implementing of updated regulations, coupled with the use of present equipment; that is, radio and tele- phone communications (cost factor being held at a minimum). The sophisticated system appears to be inadequate in that the end results are not sufficiently effective considering the cost factor. The system involves the use of closed circuit TV and radar. We must consider the cost of the equipment, installation, maintenance, and operating personnel. The limited effectiveness will not compensate for the high cost to the taxpayer. PAGENO="0084" 79 Through personal observation, as well as interviews with knowledgeable in- dividuals that have navigated the Delaware River waterways, it is my conclusion that a basic traffic system could be adopted at a minimal cost which would result in a marked decrease in merchant vessel traffic accidents. Radar and communications center The installation of a radar and radio communications center within the Dela- ware Bay area to observe and regulate vessel traffic preparing to enter the river channel. This will also control the flow of outgoing traffic. It will be manned by Coast Guard personnel, so material procurement and maintenance costs will be the only new major expenses. Visual towers The installation of a network of visual towers to operate in conjunction with the radar and communications center, to be manned by existing Coast Guard per- sonnel, along the route of the river at suitable sites on the Pennsylvania and New Jersey shores, with facilities for tower-to-tower telephone communications and tower-to-ship radio communications. Every outward bound or inward bound ship would come under the control of each tower as it progresses along the river route. The towers could relay to the ships messages of hazardous conditions and other ship traffic information, such as orders to lay to, where to pick up tug assistance, and anchorage information in event of emergencies. Speed limitations Require all vessels to maintain a safe operating speed of between 6 and 10 knots, depending on existing traffic conditions and maneuverability of the vessel. Vessel speeds can also be controlled by tower personnel. If a ship is unmaneuverable at low speeds, tug assistance would be required. Speed limits should be set and enforced for vessels transiting restricted naviga- tional waters. Transit speeds during hours of darkness should be slower than day- time speeds. Enforcing speed limits could present a difficult problem; but unless it is accomplished, the posting of speed limits will be of no value. Special details Require all vessels entering and leaving the Port of Philadelphia to maintain a special anchor detail, as well as additional engineering personnel on throttle watch and boiler room watch in the event that this is not now the practice. Tug control-In Require all merchant vessels, oilers, tankers, cargo ships, and so forth, to obtain tug control prior to leaving channel for a docking area. Tug control-Out Require all merchant vessels to obtain tug control prior to departing from dock. The tug will be responsible for bringing ship to midchannel and placing ship on its proper heading prior to release. Escorts It will be the responsibility of the Coast Guard to supply escort craft to all ships carrying dangerous cargo. These escort craft would use visual and audio signals, as necessary, in the escorting of these ships up and down the river. Ship movement The Coast Guard will assume the responsibility for restricting the movement of all ships-inbound and outbound of the port of Philadelphia-when poor visibility and other hazardous conditions exist. Inspections Upon completion of the docking of a ship bearing dangerous cargo, it will be the responsibility of the Coast Guard to inspect the mooring lines for proper mooring techniques, as well as requiring the command officer of the vessel to secure proper electrical grounding of said ship, if necessary. Vessel identification When approaching congested harbor/river entrances where numerous ships are entering, departing, embarking, and debarking pilots, it is extremely difficult to identify vessels which may meet or cross your track. Listening to the bridge- to-bridge conversations among ships and harbor pilots provides a wealth of Information regarding these ships' immediate and intended movements. Un- PAGENO="0085" 80 fortunately, unless the specific ships can be visually/electronically identified, the movement information is useless and, in fact, confusing. There is a definite need for providing an unmistakable means for identification. Verbal description given by each master/pilot of his ship's significant identi- fication characteristics. This is to be provided during the "call up" and "acknowl- edgment" while conversing with each other or with the pilot. Anchorages It is necessary for the expansion of existing anchorages such as Marcus Hook and Mantua Creek and the establishment of additional anchorages along the river route, especially in the upper regions. Improvement in navigation aids a. Targets for visual bearings.-The use of visual bearings to fixed beacons, towers, et cetera, is extremely valuable in fixing the ship's position in those areas where there are no easily identifiable topographic characteristics. The effectiveness of these navigational aids is diminished by the difficulty in locating them and their similarity in construction hindering positive identification. Examples of these aids in the lower reaches of the Delaware Bay are the towers at: (1) Egg Island-New Jersey side of Miah Maull Range. (2) Ben Davis Point, Dunks Point, and Arnold Point-New Jersey side of Liston Range. (3) Similar towers installed on the Delaware side of the channel. b. Lighted ranges which are difficult to use.-There are several lighted ranges which are extremely difficult to identify or use. They are (commencing with the area in the vicinity of Artificial Island, proceeding toward Philadelphia): (1) Liston Range-extremely difficult to pick up visually while proceeding in an outbound direction prior to entering the Range. This condition makes an accurate turn on to Liston Range very difficult. The Range lights and light towers are not easily distinguishable until actually on the Range (which is astern). (2) Bulkhead Range (in the vicinity of Pea Patch Island)-is difficult to see while proceeding in either direction. c. Navigational aids in the lower reaches of the Bay.-In general, difficulty is experienced in accurately fixing the ship's position in the area of Brandywine/ Crossledge Ranges and south. Visual bearings on topographical features are almost nonexistent and there are too few stationary charted objects to provide a sufficient number of visual and/or radar bearings. Though the bay is quite wide at this point, the width of safe water in several locations is limited. Traffic en- countered in this area is usually moderate; hence, accurate navigation is a must. d. The increasing of the amount of channel markers the entire length of the Delaware River, where needed, especially at the lower end in the bay area. e. Installation of range markers for headings in the areas where only astern readings are available. Channel changes Suggest that mid-channel at Billingsport range and where Cherry Island and Belivue ranges intersect be relocated. At present, ships must run too close to fuel piers at Billingsport Range. In the event of a human error or a mechanical failure, this could cause an extremely dangerous and hazardous situation. The intersection of the Bellvue and the Cherry Island ranges (south of Chester, Pa.) is extremely close to the western shore of the river. It presents extreme difficulty to ships transiting through the intersection in either direction. It de- mands precise judgment and timeliness to turn onto either range while proceeding at any speed. SUMMARY At the present time, it appears that the only communications system available to relay any ship movement information is in the very capable hands of the Pilots Association in conjunction with the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange. It must be noted that these dedicated people are performing an outstanding service. This is accomplished through the service of a pilots boat, supplied by the Pilots Association, which remains on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Since the Coast Guard has jurisdiction in enforcing the regulations of their respective ports, I feel that it is the Coast Guards' responsibility to assume the duties of vessel communications with the ships entering and leaving the port of Philadelphia. PAGENO="0086" 81 However, since pilot-to-pilot, via bridge-to-bridge communication is invaluable in nature, therefore, the radar and communications center should have personnel from the Pilots Association assigned to work in conjunction with the Coast Guard. If this system were to be established, it woud not necessitate the presence of the pilots boat. Transfer boats for the pilots could be tied up at the radar and communications center. Strict discipline should be exercised in using the bridge-to-bridge circuit. Unnecessary conversations clutter the circuit and could prevent the transmission of vital navigational information. It is advisable that the Coast Guard monitor these communications to enforce discipline. In addition to the proposals regulating vessel movement, "no passing" zones should be considered at various locations along the channel. Typical areas to be designated as "no passing" zones, as an example, could be: 1. Channel legs where the distance between turning points is limited- possibly 6,000 yards or less. 2. Intersections where two or more channels meet. 3. Areas of the channel adjacent to "busy waterfronts" such as: refinery piers, cargo loading/off loading piers, ferry crossings, and so forth. Questions arise regarding a speed limit, since our deep draft ships must pass the upper regions of the Marcus Hook Range during high tide. Dangerous rock formation reduces the channel depth during low tide. This would cause undue delay in that deep draft ships would be required to wait approximately 12 hours for the next high tide. It is therefore, recommended that dredging operations continue at this point to alleviate this situation. By no means should these proposals be considered as exclusive to the port of Philadelphia; but to the contrary, should be evaluated for their adoption and implementation at other ports, depending on that local area's needs. Sound judgment should be exercised in recommending and establishing vessel traffic systems. Basic vessel traffic systems, minimal in cost, should be established as opposed to any high-cost sophisticated system when it is indicated that this system would operate just as efficiently. Mr. BIAGGI. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Rea? Admiral REA. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Eilberg, for the record I would like to say that at the district level, third district level, we will take another look at these and see if there is any possibility that we should have different viewpoints on this. In other words, I would just like to say we will give further consideration. Mr. EILBERG. I really appreciate that, Admiral, very much, be- cause it seems to me Captain Goodwin has indicated a fixed mind about the subject and the recommendations that we have made, none of them were presented as my conclusions, my creation, or the creation of my district office assistants, but rather were the consensus of the views of many, many people who work for the Seafarers Union, work with the members of the Seafarers Union-men who operate tugs, masters on tugs, people who are active members of the United States Navy, this is a consensus of views presented by any number of people which Captain Goodwin casually discards and I therefore welcome your suggestion very much. Mr. Chairman, since the accident involving the Queeny and the Corinthos, has the Coast Guard adopted any regulations pertaining VTS that would prevent a recurrence or tend to prevent a re- currence of that type of accident? Admiral REA. Mr. Eilberg, Captain Goodwin may want to respond to this a little more, but the circumstances as I know the casualty you are talking about where the vessel was coming across the river, and my information is primarily from the news media because I PAGENO="0087" 82 was not on that board of investigation, but I am not aware of any steps that we could take to prevent that. It certainly does not fall in the pattern that the vessel traffic system would cope with. A vessel proceeding from one side of the river to the other and would not quite turn-would not quite turn the vessel in the dock- Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, if I may interrupt. It has been advanced to me by members of the seafaring com- munity, that if the tug had been attached to the Gorinthos into the center of the channel, the accident would not have occurred. Would you care to comment on that? Admiral REA. No, sir, I do not, because this again is in the very facts of the Board investigation trying to turn up and again it would be premature, even if I had the information to speculate, but I do not have it at hand. Mr. EILBERG. Would you care to comment on the suggestion that has been made that if there had been someone on anchor watch on the Corinthos when an order was given to release the anchor, if there had been an anchor watch, that that accident may not have occurred? Would you care to comment on that? Admiral REA. I do not think I could at this time, sir. Mr. EILBERG. I do not think you could. All right. Now, Admiral, this is probably related to you. Thursday, May 15, an article appeared in the Philadelphia Eve- fling Bulletin that indicated that the Philadelphia Port led in tonnage last year. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that this appears in a newspaper article, copy of which I have, dated Thursday, May 15, 1975, in the Phila- delphia Evening Bulletin. The Philadelphia Port led the world in tonnage last year. Reading a small part of this article by Rem Rieder: "The 1974 total for inter- national shipping in Philadelphia was 80,842,875 tons, a record high. Included were 73,871,950 tons in imports and 6,970,925 tons in ex- ports. New York City finished second with 71,827,951 tons, trailed by Hampton Roads, Virginia, with 56,697,133 tons, and Baltimore with 41,808,443 tons." Do you agree or disagree with that article? Vice Admiral REA. I have no comment. Each port, as you go around the country, makes different claims, uses a different basis. Some ports say we are first with vohime or international trade or other things. I am in no position to challenge that one way or the other, sir. Mr. EILBERG. The article also goes on to say-and perhaps I should say that the reporter got the information from the Delaware River Port Authority. Would that change your reaction in any way? Vice Admiral REA. No; I would say I have no comment. I would accept the figures but as far as-I have no reason to question them, but I do not have any basis to say they are good, bad or otherwise. Mr. BtAGGI. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Mr. BIAGGI. Just to clarify in my mind, for the record, what that article seems to indicate is that the Port of Philadelphia exceeded tonnage, the traffic in the Port of New York in toto. I think-at least that is the impression I get. PAGENO="0088" 83 Mr. EILBERG. Do you want to see the article? I will make it a part of the record. Mr. BIAGGI. Yes, you can do that, without objection. [The document referred to follows:] [From The Evening Bulletin, May 15, 1975] PHILADELPHIA PORT LED THE WORLD IN TONNAGE LAST YEAR (By Rem Riéder of The Bulletin staff) The Flyers were not Philadelphia's only champions last year. * The Port of Philadelphia also earned a No. 1 ranking. Final statistics released by the Delaware River Port Authority show that in 1974, Philadelphia was the nation's most active international port, judged by total tonnage of exports and imports. FIRST SINCE `64 It was the first time since 1964 that the local port had surpassed New York City in international trade. However, like Roger Mans' home-run record, Philadelphia's ranking includes an asterisk. When domestic trade is included, New York is still No. 1. In addition, Philadelphia continues to lag far behind New York in the most lucrative type of shipping-general cargo. General cargo includes goods which must be loaded and unloaded by human labor and generates about $26 a ton for the local economy. Philadelphia's supremacy is based on bulk cargoes-commodities like oil, iron, ore and grain-which generate between $6 and $8 a ton. Much of the recent effort to upgrade the local port, which stretches from Tren- ton to `Wilmington on both sides of the Delaware River and is called Ameriport, has centered on increasing general cargo shipments. But last year, local general cargo dropped by about 500,000 tons. At the same time, bulk shipping in Philadelphia rose by two million tons. The dollar loss in the general cargo category was roughly equal to the gain in bulk cargo, meaning the port's financial impact on the Philadelphia area was about the same as in 1973. With the economy in a general state of decline, port officials were pleased by the port's performance. "GOOD SHOWING" "Considering the state of the economy, it's a very good showing," said pQrt authority spokesman William Lynch. The 1974 total for international shipping in Philadelphia was 80,842,875 tons, a record high. Included .were 73,871,950 tons in imports and 6,970,925 tons in exports. New York City finished second with 71,827,951 tons, trailed by Hampton Roads, Va., with 56,697,133'tons and Baltimore with 41,808,443 tons. SLIGHT RISE Philadelphia's share of the four-port pie rose slightly over 1973, while New York City dropped 5 percent, Hampton Roads gained 4 percent and Baltimore 3 percent. Port officials said increases in imports of petroleum products, iron ore and iron and steel products helped Philadelphia earn its top ranking. Both imports and exports of machinery were up sharply. The sag in general cargo was due largely due to a drop in lumber imports, reflecting stagnation in the housing industry, port officials said. Exports of iron and steel scrap products also declined. Mr. BIAGGI. What I think it says is that Philadelphia did have more international tonnage than New York. Mr. EILBERG. That is what I said, Mr. Chairman. 1-1974 total for international shipping in Philadelphia. You are quite right in your statement. PAGENO="0089" 84 Mr. BIAGGI. Because I think the Port of New York must have three or four times as much total tonnage. Mr. EILBERG. If I did not read the word "international" shipping, I certainly meant to and that is part of it now. Mr. BIAGGI. Would the gentleman yield for another question? It is a question that I wanted to put to the Admiral before when we were talking about the Queeny-Corinthos. You testified that even if we had a VTS system in this port, it would not have prevented that accident. Vice Admiral REA. As I know it, Mr. Chairman, from newspaper accounts. I have tried to conceive afterwards what kind of traffic system would you conceive to prevent that. But it does not come out. But I think probably my remarks need to be qualified that we need to wait to see what the Board comes up with. Rather than accept- so I have to qualify my response in that regard. Mr. BIAGGI. Because of the unique nature of that accident? Vice Admiral REA. Well, the vessel traffic systems that we are designing or trying to develop the flow of traffic, in meeting and passing situations, low visibility, I do not know of any that play- the particular vessel turnaround with no other traffic in sight and not quite make much of a turn- Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter received from the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commandant Admiral Siler, dated March 24, 1975. He says that for the year 1974, the total vessel tonnage in Phil- adelphia was 52,193,000, whereas the figure on the Delaware River Port Authority is 80,842,000. Now, do you have any explanation of the disparity between those figures? Vice Admiral REA. Mr. Eilberg, I do not. Perhaps Captain Goodwin might. I do not. It is a matter that I will look into if there seems to be a disparity. Captain GOODWIN. I had a copy, but unfortunately I did not bring it with me, of that same letter. I read it over pretty carefully. I cannot explain the disparity, no, sir; but I certainly do not see anything in the Commandant's letter that I would disagree with. Mr. EILBERG. Well, the Commandant uses the figures 52,193,000 tons as tonnage. If the fact that it is greater than that-would that alter your opinion as to the necessity of the vessel traffic system? Captain GOODWIN. Here again, Congressman, we get all screwed up on these tonnage figures. It depends on what you are talking about or what the Commandant was talking about. We are the number two port in the country in terms of importation of petroleum products. I understand we are number one in terms of international trade, and number four overall. When you juggle these figures around, I would have to take a look at it a little more in depth before I could comment any further on it. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman,' I would like to make the newspaper article a part of the record if I might. Mr. BIAGGI. All right. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, on page 21 of the GAO report, under the conclusions, the first paragraph and the second paragraph, recon-i-~ mendation to the Secretary of Transportation. PAGENO="0090" 85 We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation require the Coast Guard to give national emphasis and direction to establishing regulations as authorized by the 1972 Act to control vessel traffic. These actions should include more extensive use of speed limits; greater regula- tion over the movement of vessels carrying dangerous, combustible, and polluting cargoes; and limitations on the size of tows. The Department advised us that it was undertaking a high-level review of the vessel traffic program because of the issues raised by our review. Now, have you heard anything about this review or the conclusions of the review, Admiral Rea? Admiral REA. I think the review is made but I would like to sug- gest, sir, that in response to that, any comments you may want to get on that, the Commandant's Coast Guard Headquarters had made the review and I would not be conversant with them at all as far as being able to testify or explain what they might be. I think when you develop your record at the Washington level, this would be very appropriate to get into the record at that time. Mr. EILBERG. As it is you have received no direction from the Secretary of Transportation as to any such review; is that correct? Admiral REA. We have not, sir, because I assume-or I am rather sure that the review was made in Washington; so we have not. Captain GoODwIN. If I could refer back, Mr. Chairman, I have the answer to the Congressman Eilberg's question. I believe, concerning the tonnage figures, you will note that those are contained on page 5 of the Commandant's letter. They are the identical tonnages that I had on page 12 of my statement and those figures were obtained from the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange. They are net registered tonnage excluding barges. Mr. EILBERG. Recent information that I have is that the Penndel Corp. has been commissioned to conduct a study for deep-water ports in the Delaware Bay area. Obviously, if a port such as this were to be established, would a vessel transportation system be established in the Port of Philadelphia? * We have a deep-water port system; do you see any need for a vessel traffic system? Admiral REA. I cannot make a direct response to that, Mr. Eilberg. It says the national level is made sort of priority where there was a need. I think Philadelphia is on the list; it is just not on a. very high priority. So there has been a determination made that some point in time they would be here; but there are other ports which are of a higher priority and more necessity to get on with it. Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, do you have an explanation as to why in the GAO report they keep putting Delaware River and the Bay in a relatively high priority? Look at the GAO report, page 10-that they refer to necessity of Delaware River Bay? And there are also various references to the viability of the Delaware River Bay? You just disagreed with the GAO report, I take it. Is that what you are saying? Admiral REA. It is not .a matter of me or Captain Goodwin. This is a national decision. This was not done at the local level. Again, I think this would be a matter that you would take up with Admiral Siler's staff. Mr. EILBERG. This report says that it is the function of the captain to make recommend ations. PAGENO="0091" 86 Captain Goodwin, have . you made any recommendations re- garding-that might lead to a vessel traffic system? Captain GooDwIN. No, sir. Not as of this date. Mr. EILBERG. The report also says that sophisticated traffic, vessel traffic systems, should be abandoned. and that the basic system should be installed first in the ports indicated in the report. Do you agree or disagree with that proposition? Admiral REA. I think Captain Goodwin spoke to that as far as here in New York. It was clear when we had the record over there. Our own view is that that would not be sufficient in the Port of New York. The Commandant again I think has addressed himself to this, and may I suggest that this would be his view; but certainly in the Port of New York, clearly the Advisory Committee support is that you cannot stop with the basic system that GAO talked about; the basic system just being a vessel movement reporting system and no surveillance and that in New York they did not think this was neces- sary in a couple of areas and it was the New York advisers and our New York staff and ourselves that would agree with that proposition. But again I think the Commandant of the Coast Guard and his staff that could give you insight as far as his comments on the national level when you take it up down there, sir. Mr. EILBERG. Admiral, I think it would serve the committee's interest if you would make the distinction between the basic system and sophisticated system, and also note that one of the important components of the basic system is bridge-to-bridge, which is manda- tory throughout the Nation. Admiral REA. For the GAO maintenance distinction, that a basic system was a-is the better reporting movement system; that is, you just get on the radio and you say, I am at point A, B or C. There would be no surveillance with low-light TV; no surveillance with radar and to quote the sophisticated system would be any system which uses this extra equipment. This is the distinction we made. We do not think you could sort it out that way, certainly as far as New York; you could stop at the basic system. In fact, our industry people there would not support that particular viewpoint. If they were going to get into it, they needed surveillance to get in with it. So you not only had radio communications but you needed the radar-now, the bridge-to-bridge radio, which was pioneered right here in the Delaware River, they have the bridge-to-bridge radio for some years on a voluntary basis, has been and is a very, very effective arrangement and it is being used by all vessels, basic vessels, foreign and domestic over a certain size coming in the port. I believe the passing we saw this morning probably, if we could have heard the vessels talking, we would have heard them talking about it. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, following the Queeny-Uorinthos, incident and statements that this Member made in Washington, there was a regular van established at the end of the bay, Tsubic Bay to make a survey as to the needs for vessel traffic systems. Admiral Rea, do you know the date that that van was there? Admiral RAE. No; but-unless Mr. Whittum has it. But we can produce it for the record. We are moving ahead and trying to collect data, so when Philadelphia- Mr. EILBERG. Approximately how long was the van there? PAGENO="0092" 87 Admiral REA. Lieutenant Whittum? Lieutenant WHITTUM. Each site was 1 week long. Admiral REA. Lieutenant Whittum's response was 1 week. That is 24 hours a day. Mr. EILBERG. The van was there 7 days? Lieutenant WHITTUM. Yes, sir. Admiral REA. Yes. The answer is "Yes." Mr. EILBERG. What were the dates? Admiral REA. I could furnish them. I do not have them at hand, but I could furnish them. Mr. EILBERG. Have you studied the results of what you have found? Admiral REA. I have not. I have not gotten a report from our staff yet. Captain Goodwin tells me that the information is at headquarters and they are being looked over down there. I have no direct informa- tion on them. This is one of the steps as you go along, the elementary steps that once has been made, to accumulate as much data about the traffic patterns so then you can make the decision of what kind of equipment you need, eventually whether you want a fancy radar or TV; just what you need. But in order to reach those determinations, you have to start collecting data. We have done that in the other ports and moved the van over here and started to do some of that over here. Mr. EILBERG. That was back in March, approximately, that you had the van there? Lieutenant WHITTUM. Yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. And that is about 4 months and you have no con- clusions or no impression of what that van discovered? Admiral REA. I have none myself; no. Mr. EILBERG. Do you, Captain Goodwin, have any idea what the van's findings were? Captain GooDwIN. No, sir; none whatsoever. We called headquarters and they are analyzing it. Again, I do not think-I think this takes some study. Mr. EILBERG. Do you have any idea when the study may be con- cluded? Captain GoODWIN. I am under the impression, if I recall correctly, it will be along about October. Mr. EILBERG. You are aware that the Waterway Safety Act was enacted in 1972; are you not? Captain GOODWIN. Yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. Now, Captain Goodwin, among other recommenda- tions that I made was the need for additional channel markers and other additional aids such as range lights and so forth. Have you considered these at all and has there been anything done to place additional markers? Captain GooDWIN. No, sir. Of course, as you are aware, we responded to this in a letter to Mr. Duld. I can run through my comments relative to the proposed aid system if you would like me to. Mr. E1LBERG. Would you summarize it at this point? Captain GOoDWIN. I will try. PAGENO="0093" 88 They wanted, as I recall, he wanted an improvement for the existing system of age navigation in the immediate area of Cape Henlopen and I noticed there was a radio beacon down there with a light on the south end of the Harbor of Refuge breakwater of such candlepower as to be visible 23 miles in the white sector and 20 in the red. Additionally, I noted that the sea lanes approaching the entrance are well marked, and that the bottom contours lend themselves well to assisting a navigator through prudent use of a fathometer, and that the adequacy of the existing system in that area probably explained why there had only been two significant vessel casualties in the area over the period January 1, 1967, through December of 1974. I noted that both those casualties were collisions. One in 300-yard visibility and close to an aid to navigation; and the other was in clear weather with both vessels having a pilot aboard. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a moment, please? I do not think that the committee is getting much sense out of that statement. I wonder if we could make that letter a part of the record? Mr. B1AGGI. Without objection, it is submitted for the record. [The material follows:] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, Philadelphia UISCG Base, Gloucester City, N.J., April 28, 1975. Mr. CHARLES DULD, 216 1931 Cottman Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa. DEAR MR. DULD: I am writing with reference to the Proposed Vessel Traffic Safety System for the Port of Philadelphia and the Delaware River, as published by Representative Eilberg, and the charts annotated to indicate proposed changes in the aids to navigation system as established in the Delaware Bay and River. Both the charts and the VTS proposal were left in my office by you after our meeting last month; you desired my comments relative to each. Starting with the charts, and proceeding from the entrance to the bay on up stream, the following comments are noted: a. There has heretofore been no need indicated for improvement of the existing System of aids in the immediate area of Cape Henlopen. I note there is a radio beacon at Cape Henlopen itself, with a light on the south end of the Harbor of Refuge Breakwater of such candlepower as to be visible 23 miles in the white sector and 20 miles in the red sectors; accompanied by a fog signal. Additionally, the sea lanes approaching the entrance are well marked, and bottom contours lend themselves well to assisting the navigator through prudent use of the fathometer. The adequacy of the existing system probably explains why there have only been two significant vessel casualties in that area over the period 1 January 1967 through December 1974. Both of those casualties were collisions, one in 300 yard visibility and close to an aid to navigation; the other was in clear weather, both vessels having pilots on board. The presence of a Vessel Traffic System (VTS) might have prevented either of them; similarly, so might prudent seamanship. I doubt that additional aids to navigation would have helped. b. As you are aware, the Coast Guard has plans to establish a VTS for Delaware Bay and River. The Cape Henlopen/Cape May areas are being evaluated in that respect. c. I have found no record of vessel casualties during the period 1 January1967 through December 1974 in the four mile stretch between South Shoal Lump Buoy 6 and Delaware Bay Main Channel Lighted Bell Buoy 9; therefore, I fail to see the need for additional buoys in that area. Also, it is noteworthy that there has been no need for additional aids indicated at our meetings of the Mariner's Advisory Committee for the Bay and River Delaware. Either I or one of my officers regularly attend those meetings. The committee is comprised of members of the Pilots Association, Norton, Lilly & Co., Inc., National Bulk Carriers, Inc., Mobil Oil Co., and Swann Oil Co. Additionally, representation is usually pro- vided by the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, the Joint Executive Committee PAGENO="0094" 89 for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port Area, the Corps of Engineers, and the Burlington Bristol Bridge Commission. d. I realize we have in excess of two miles between markers on the Delaware side of the Brandywine Range segment of the main channel. However, I fail to see where there is an indicated need for additional aids. Since January 1967 there have been two groundings on that side of that portion of the channel- both in the immediate vicinity of Delaware Bay Main Channel Lighted Bell Buoy 9. There have been two groundings on the east side-one well out of the channel. e. Although we have a record of three groundings in 8 years on Miah Maull and Cross Ledge Ranges (one within a mile of Elbow of Cross Ledge Light, on the east side, and two in the immediate area of Delaware Bay Main Channel Lighted Bell Buoy 32), I can find no record of casualties on Liston Range. Consequently in the absence of justification to the contrary, I again fail to see where there is an indicated need for additional aids on that stretch of the channel. f. You note that we have only one set of ranges marking the approximately 1.6 mile leg of Baker Range, and suggest a possible location for a complementary range for down bound vessels. In eight years we have had one recorded grounding in this area, and that was in the immediate vicinity of Reedy Island Range Lighted Bell Buoy 2R. The grounding involved an up-bound vessel in good visibility. It does not appear that an additional set of ranges is required. g. We are presently considering the Reedy Point area (entrance to the C and D Canal) as a possible site for a VTS installation. h. In a period of 8 years we have had 6 groundings on the New Castle Range segment of the channel. One occurred in the immediate vicinity of New Castle Range Lighted Bell Buoy iN/Buoy 2N-on the New Jersey side of the channel; two occurred between Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Junction Lighted Bell Buoy, and New Castle Range Lighted Bell Buoy 5N on the Delaware side; another in the immediate vicinity of Bulkhead Bar Range Lighted Bell Buoy 2B; and the final two in the proximate area of the intersection of New Castle Range with Bulkhead Bar Range, on the outside of the bend. Consequently, I see little to indicate a need for a lower range supplementing the upper range. i. In reviewing Coast Guard records over the 8 year period 1 January 1967 through 1974, I find no record of collisions (vessel vs vessel), groundings or ram- mings (vessel vs fixed object/moored vessel) in the area adjacent to Pea Patch Island; thus I see no need to sacrifice a portion of Anchorage 5, even if the Corps of Engineers had funds available to relocate the channel, for a questionable purpose. j. There have been no groundings and only two collisions, in the 8 year period of my survey, on Deepwater Point Range. The two collisions (1968 and 1970) occurred between Deepwater Point Range Lighted Buoys 1D and 2D. I fail to see ççrher~ an additional set of range structures (at the lower end of the range) are justified. k. A range light may be weak due to a dirty lense or faulty power supply; how- ever, because it appears weak occasionally, (you mentioned one complaint appar- ently entaffing one incident) we should not automatically assume increased candle- power is needed. I have had no complaints other than yours to the effect that Deep- water Point Range Rear Light is inadequate. If it becomes apparent that there is a demonstrated need for increased candlepower, I will make an appropriate recom- mendation to our aids to navigation people at Governors Island. 1. I do not understand your notation with respect to Cherry Island Range Front and Rear Lights, and Bellevue Range Front and Rear Lights. Specifically, I do not understand how their location makes it difficult for ships to make the turn. We have an unlighted buoy (Cherry Island Range Buoy 9C) guarding the shoal on the Delaware side, on the outside of the turn, and there is Bellevue Range Lighted Buoy 2B just opposite the intersection of the ranges and guarding Cherry Island Flats. Additionally, the pilot/master can depart either range early due to the fact that the area to the New Jersey side of their intersection has been widened beyond the general 800 foot project width; there is no need to run to the inter- section of the ranges. Of course any movement of the ranges would necessarily mean they would no longer mark the channel center line-a customary function of most ranges. m. As a side light, I note you have designated the "Scene of Fatal Collision" at the wrong site. n. I can find no record of any groundings on the Little Tinicum Range segment of the channel-over the period 1 January 1967 through 1974. We have had two PAGENO="0095" 90 collisions and two rammings on that stretch in that period. One collision occurred in fog, near Little Tinicum Island Range Buoy 4T with both ships communicat- ing with each other and near or at mid-channel; the second collision occurred when a vessel had a steering casualty and hit (rammed) a vessel at the Mobil Oil facility. The two rammings occurred when vessels were docking; one was blown onto a pier, the other suffered a power loss and struck a pier. I do not see where there is a demonstrated need for your proposed second set of range struc- tures. o. Your suggestion that the channel be widened and/or relocated to "mid stream" is noted. Along Billingsport Range we have experienced one collision and two rammings in 8 years. The one coffision occurred when a vessel hit a barge at the Mobil Oil facility, having experienced engine failure while undocking. Of the two rammings, one ship hit the Esso Paulsboro pier while maneuvering to get underway; the second rammed the BP Paulsboro pier while mooring. Whether or not the Corps of Engineers would feel widening and/or relocating the channel is justified is a subject best left to them. p. The statement that "Additional range markers should be placed in areas where vessels must take a heading from a stern view" is too general to comment upon. Proceeding on to a review of the congressman's Proposed Vessel Traffic Safety System for the Port of Philadelphia and the Delaware River, the following com- ments are offered: a. Page I.-The "basic traffic system" which is viewed as ideal would be of limited usefulness, particularly during periods of reduced visibility, without the use of radar for surveillance to assure compliance. The addition of radar of course leads to the designation" sophisticated system" which in turn is termed "in- adequate in that the end results are not sufficiently effective considering the cost factor." I do not agree. Just as radar is used for enforcement on our highways, most likely to reduce the number of law enforcement officers needed for surveil- lance, so do we need radar as a part of our VTS, for surveillance. b. Page 11.-The basic vessel traffic system is defined by the GAO as one that includes regulations, traffic separation schemes, or a communications network- including vessel movement reporting procedures. We have all these elements, to the degree which I feel is required, in the Delaware Valley area. We have a vessel traffic separation scheme at the entrance to the bay. We have regulations, in terms of: The Rules of the Road, regulations governing the handling of hazardous materials (and enforced by my men), regulations governing the anchorages, and orders stipulating vessel separation in periods of fog-to name several. Further, we have a vessel reporting system, very ably managed by the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange with the cooperation of the Pilots Association. Finally, we have a bridge to bridge communications net work using Channel 13 (FM), to facilitate the coordination of efforts as vessels transit the channel and maneuver to and from facilities. c. Page 1.-While the proposal seemed to initially rule out radar (since it would then escalate cost-wise to a "sophisticated system"), the discussion im- mediately visualizes the presence of radar. I am pleased to see this but fail to understand where the personnel will come from, since no additional personnel resources are apparently contemplated in the comment "-so material procure- ment and maintenance costs will be the only new major expenses." This is short- sighted and reflects no appreciation of our manning problems at today's level of mission implementation/accomplishment. Likewise, I am totally at a loss to understand how, given no increase in per- sonnel, we will carry out existing mission responsibilities and at the same time man an installed network of visual towers operated in conjunction with the pro- posed radar and communications center. Tower and equipment maintenance, in addition to the manning, wifi have to be accomplished, somehow. I need a more detailed statement as to exactly how the congressman sees his proposal being implemented before I can comment objec- tively. d. Page 2.-I can appreciate what the congressman is striving for by prescrib- ing speed limits and the use of tugs. Of course it would have an economic impact on the port. I would be interested in hearing what those organizations pro- moting the port (such as the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange and the Phila- delphia Port Corporation), and those whose livelihood is dependent upon and contributes to the economic viability of the port have to say about such a broad proposal. I am sure the 10 knot limit in the lower bay would be of particular PAGENO="0096" 91 interest to the pilots; it might well have some implication with respect to the need for increased anchorage dimensions. I am particularly gratified to note the apparent awareness that regulations without a means for surveillance are of little value. e. Page 3.-46 CFR Parts 146 and 147 contain a list of explosives and other dangerous cargos. The regulations governing the cargos covered therein are enforced by the Coast Guard. You have undoubtedly noted that a good number of the 914 pages of regulations are devoted to merely listing the products and stipulating stowage requirements. I am not of the opinion that a Coast Guard escort of all ships carrying dangerous cargo is necessary, desireable, or, in the absence of additional resources, possible. f. Page 4.-No comment except to note that we are essentially doing all that is discussed at the present time-on a random basis. Our safety record does not indicate a need for stepped up activity. g. Page 5.-The need for the expansion of existing anchorages was not sub.- stantiated in a recent study contracted for by the Corps of Engineers-except for improving Marcus Hook anchorage in the absence of a modern deepwater port. The study, the results of which is titled "Engineering and Economic Analysis of Delaware River Anchorages", was conducted in 1973 and 1974 by Tippetts- Abbett-McCarthy and Stratton, Engineers and Architects, of New York. h. Page 6.-The difficulty noted with locating and identifying the aids at Egg Island, Ben Davis Point, Dunks Point and Arnold Point, as well as similar towers on the Delaware side of the channel, is not understood, except perhaps as it per- tains to small craft. However, if we are primarily concerned with shipping in the usual sense, and I would expect that to be the case in a discussion of the need for VTS, we have adequate aids marking the shipping channel. The aids inshore in the bay are primarily for the benefit of smaller craft, and most especially at night. The characteristics of the shoreline, coupled with identifying marks on other aids in the immediate area assist in identifying those towers during daylight; the light characteristic provides identification at night. We are presently installing new dayboards on a number of ranges on the Upper Delaware River, to improve visibility. Similar changes can be made elsewhere if the users indicate there is such a need. More specific comments were made earlier in this letter with regard to specific segments of the channel and the aids to navigation system. i. Page 10.-The Coast Guard periodically monitors Channel 13 (bridge to bridge circuit). The enforcement of circuit discipline is a matter for the FCC. The Coast Guard, namely my office (in the Port of Philadelphia), does, on a continuing basis, consider "No Passing" zones at various locations along the channel. We presently have one in effect on Muffin Range. On occasion, we have closed the channel completely. j. Page 11.-The proposal concludes by again promoting a basic vessel traffic system; however, between Page 1 and Page 11 I am under the distinct impression that we are discussing our needs in terms of a sophisticated vessel traffic system. I am enclosing a summarization of my findings at the conclusion of a study I undertook with respect to vessel casualties during the period 1 January 1967 through 1974. You may have obtained a copy earlier, but I feel it is pertinent to our present discussion. I trust the foregoing is responsive to your desires. The subject of port safety is a broad one; it includes not only requirements for traffic regulations and mainten- ance of an adequate system of aids to navigation, but also it requires consideration of how cargoes (particularly dangerous cargoes) are handled, both aboard ship and at the facifities; it includes a review of how facilities are maintained and how ships are constructed and maintained-how well crews are trained. To emphasize any one of these aspects at the expense of another would likely not serve to effectively improve our overall mission accomplishment in port safety. Increased perform- ance can only come about with increased personnel resources and equipment-if you are willing to concede that, by and large, our personnel are fully and effectively employed at present, not only here in Philadelphia but generally throughout the Coast Guard. I feel they are. I also feel it would be the height of complacency to say we are presently doing all that needs to be done. We aren't. Given adequare resources, we can. Very truly yours, D. C. GOODWIN, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port, Philadelphia. 78-280-76-----7 PAGENO="0097" 92 Mr. EILBERG. Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not know exactly what procedure you would follow, but I would like to make a statement that we were given kindly by the Coast Guard, a statement of charts of the Delaware River and Delaware Bay which showed through 1974 all the collisions, groundings and rammings, their locations, their precise locations. We took those charts and superimposed upon them in very brief language, comments or suggestions as to improvements that might be made. I would like the chairman's permission to bring those charts up at this point and, with the assistance of my assistants, review those for the benefit of the committee so that you might understand and the committee might better understand the kinds of things that we are looking for. * Mr. BIAGGI. I have no objection to that, but I would ask Mr. Eilberg to defer until Mr. du Pont has completed with his questions. Mr. EILBERG. By all means. Mr. DU PONT. Do you want to continue on another subject? Mr. EILBERG. Excuse me, Congressman du Pont, I do not want to cOntinue on another subject; I wish to present the Coast Guard charts given to me and the comments. You can see from the charts, which are marked "Collisions, Groundings, Rammings," when they occurred, and what our recommendations are to minimize accidents from occurring. Mr. Dli PONT. Mr. Chairman, I would do it either way if that is the final question or area that Mr. Eilberg has. Mr. EILBERG. At this point. Mr. Dli PONT. Well, why do you not go ahead and do that? Mr. EILBERG. I know that you are in a bit of a rush. Mr. Dli PONT. Well, I have another hour. Mr. BIAGGI. Why do you not go ahead? Mr. Dli PONT.. You want me to go ahead? All right, I will go ahead in case time runs out. Captain Goodwin, I am at this point a little bit confused as to just~ what kind of vessel traffic system we have. I listened with interest to Mr. Eilberg's questions and it must be me that is confused. I thought that you said that we did not have, at one point, that we did not have the basic system and yet in your testimony you say that you already have the basic system, which is on page 11, in the form of regulations, traffic separation of the Maritime Exchange Reporting System. So would you say today that we have a basic vessel traffic system in iii the Delaware River? Captain GOODWIN.. Yes, sir, if I said we did not, I am sorry. I must have slipped up. I feel we do have the basic system and Admiral Rea commented on New York. I feel that any system of regulation requires the surveil- lance capability just as our police officers use radar and so forth and I would certainly wa.nt some form of radar in the por.t area of Philadelphia. Mr. DUPONT. Well, now, is that vessel traffic system, in some form that we could put it at this point in the record, listing exactly what it is and what its components are? Is there a public document? Captain GOODWIN. No, sir, it is an-pretty much of an informal thing and comprised of the regulations that the captain of the port PAGENO="0098" 93 put out for the anchorage down in Big Stone Anchorage, the regula- tions we have prescribing vessel separation during periods of reducect visability of 1,000 yards, of course the rules of the road and that nature. That is the regulatory part of it. The communications are under the auspices of the Maritime Exchange with their reporting stations at Henlopen and in the Marcus Hook area and the vessel traffic separa- tion that is referred to, I feel we have where we need it, and that is at the entrance to the bay. Mr. DU PONT. So if we have the basic system, the real issue is,. should we go to the more sophisticated system and I gather that is your conclusion that that would not be particularly helpful, but I would ask two questions-three questions. Surely it would not be harmful and, second, what would it cost if we went ahead and put in a sophisticated system appropriate to the Delaw are River that is in ballpark figures; and, third, would not it be particularly helpful in two of the pressure points, looking at your chart of accidents on the river, at the entrance to the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, where there have been a large number of accidents at one time or another and slightly north of there at the Goose Island Passage where you turn around the wildlife refuge. Those are the two places that show as the most susceptible to accidents and would not the system, more sophisticated just be more helpful at those two points? Captain GoODwIN. Yes, sir. I am in favor of a sophisticated system. It is the only system that I want. But I think that the priority that the Commandant has assigned to it, based on our safety record in the port, is realistic. When I made the study, if that is what you want to call it, I started off and I was a little bit worried for fear that maybe we had gotten so wound up in the day-to-day operations that there were things occur- ring that I was not aware of, maybe the situation was worse than I thought and I was not sure where it was going to come out. I was quite surprised, quite frankly, when I found that we averaged two and a half per year vessel accidents. Now, while we have those areas, and certainly they are areas that they are looking at, and that is why we had our radar van in those areas. We again have to look at the severity, or grounding or ramming, I don't think there is any man who had been a skipper of a vessel whose vessel has not touched a pier a little harder than he intended and you call it a ramming. That is a matter of dollar value that attaches to it, I believe. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. du Pont, would the gentleman yield? Mr. DU PONT. Yes. Mr. EILBERG. In your questioning concerning the vessel traffic systems referred to a sophisticated one. I wonder if you have a copy of the GAO report in front of you. Mr. nu PONT. Yes, with the table on page 6~ Mr. EILBERG. Would the gentleman be kind enough to look at the. paragraph at the bottom of page 7. It reads: With a total estimated investment of from $3.5 million to $7 million, the Coast Guard could develop basic systems in other ports and waterways that should prevent about 52 vessel casualties a year. The ports and waterways where a basic vessel traffic system should be more cost-effective in reducing vessel casualties include Chesapeake Bay, Baltimore, Norfolk, Hampton Roads and Newport News, Delaware River and Bay, Philadelphia, Trenton, and Camden~ and five sections of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, et cetera. PAGENO="0099" 94 So obviously there is some disagreement as to what is a basic vessel traffic system between the GAO and- Mr. du PONT. Well, that is a good observation and that is why I asked the initial question. But if you turn back to page 6 of the GAO report and look at the four elements that they list in the basic system, it appears that all four of those already are in existence here according to the Captain's testimony. The radio, the bridge-to-bridge telephone, the traffic separation scheme are in these parts of the river and the only remaining question is the regulations, which is why I asked the question. Mr. EILBERG. May I respond? I think we can secure agreement on the fact that all of these kinds of traffic systems, radar systems, you can have TV observations, there are a whole range which goes from very simple ones to compli- cated ones. I would suggest that the use of the language, "basic system" or "sophisticated system" really is an arbitrary one and really does not have a great deal of meaning. Mr. DU PONT. Well, the point of my question here is to find out what the cost would be and whether it would be effective to put these other three items in that they list, which they call sophisticated systems, and see whether they would be helpful, particularly at the two pressure points I mentioned and to see whether they would be a substantial financial cost. Captain GOoDwIN. Well, I am not prepared to talk about the cost because I am not familiar with it. I can certainly say from an opera- tional standpoint it would be helpful. I would like at this point to mention, too, that while there were a few comments in your report as concerns the Delaware Bay and River, it is, as I recall, this was one of the ports the GAO Committee person- nel did not visit. Mr. DII PONT. Just looking again at the GAO report, they estimate somewhere between $9 million and $11 million for the cost of the system in New York Harbor, which is many times more sophisticated in its problems than we have in the Delaware River. Would it be fair to say, or-let us say, at the outside, for $5 million we could develop a sophisticated data controlled system here? I am just looking for a ballpark figure, $5 million, plus or minus $1 million? That it is close enough for Government work. Captain GooDWIN. Yes, sir. That is a lot of money for the Coast Guard. Yes, I would say we could put one in for $5 million, would you not say, Admiral? I'm sorry. Vice Admiral REA. 1 would certainly say the starting point, Mr. du Pont, the radar certainly would certainly help, some surveillance would help, and reduce the possibility of an accident. Mr. DU PONT. So it would be your-as I said at the beginning, it certainly would not be harmful. Vice Admiral REA. No. Mr. DU PONT. If someone were to present you with the $5 million, things would get better. Vice Admiral REA. I think it is possible. Mr. DII PONT. Well now,- Vice Admiral REA. Also, our city of New York, and we also could use it better over there and I would not want to indulge in that argument with this committee here today. PAGENO="0100" 95 Mr. BIAGGI. Would the gentleman yield? I would like the committee to know that for the record, New York with all of its traffic, which is many times that of the port of Phil- adelphia or Delaware Bay, we are No. 7 in the priority list. It is a question of money and this area is scheduled No. 12. The fact is, no one disagrees that the "sophisticated"-which took on that characterization as a result of the GAO report-vessel traffic system would benefit the maritime industry. Again, it is the question of priorities and we sympathize with the representatives of Delaware and Philadelphia, but happily New York is five up on you. Mr. EILBERG. Would the Chairman yield for a moment? I think the application of terms and ballpark figures are really not very helpful in trying to find a solution to whatever problems there are. We have taken the trouble to provide suggestions. Many of these require the use of no money at all. The people we have consulted feel that many of these suggestions are valid ones. I do not take the position that we need a "sophisticated system." I say that some or all of these suggestions should be considered and that the figure would be nowhere near $5 million. Mr. BIAGGI. In response, I call attention to the reply from Admiral Rea stating that the third district staff will review your recom- mendations and perhaps have another point of view, but certainly give it additional consideration. Mr. DII PONT. Well, again, the point to be made is to try to get in my mind, somekind of idea of what we are really talking about here. I recognize that the admiral has a conflict of interest between the Delaware River and New York Harbor but we can settle those con- flicts with a few words in the appropriation bill as to where the money ends up and take that burden off your shoulders for you. We are talking only about $5 million to get the most sophisticated system and maybe that is not necessary. But the important thing was your statement that you thought, particularly at those two places in the river that I mentioned, that it would be helpful and I think that that is the primary response to come out. How it is funded is part of your problem, but it is also part of our problem. Captain GooDwIN. Mr. Congressman, could I just make one com- ment there? If you do give us the money to build it, I do hope that you will get us the men to man it because as Congressman Eilberg states here, on his proposed radar center, it would be manned by Coast Guard per- sonnel, some material, procurement, and maintenance cost would be the only major expenses, and it ain't true. Mr. Dii PONT. We would certainly do that and-as you recall, I had as a result of a meeting that you and I had in January, I had a conversation with Admiral Suer at the appropriations hearings about the assignment of additional men to Philadelphia in your harbor safety unit which you seem to feel is necessary. He did reply that he did not need any more money in his authorization bill, that he had plenty of money to supply the men if he thought the men were justified. So we would certainly look at the financial aspect of it. Mr. EILBERG. If I may interrupt for a minute. Do I understand that the money is there for manpower if the admiral decides that the system is necessary? PAGENO="0101" 96 Mr. DU PONT. We were referring in that authorization hearing to beefing up the port safety group and I was particularly concerned with inspecting hazardous cargo vessels and we were not talking about the vessel traffic system. But the point that I was making in this case was that if we had to have additional personnel, I would certainly put them in that appro- priation at the same time. Mr. HEYWARD. Mr du Pont, in that regard, I would like to state that the committee in its authorization legislation sets the level of personnel for the Coast Guard. If and when additional personnel are moved to Philadelphia or Delaware Bay it has to come from some- where else, unless the committee is going to authorize additional personnel to meet the needs. Mr. DIJ PONT. Probably they could come from New York City with no trouble at all. All right, let me move to another question. It seems to me, even though you have some regulations regarding vessel traffic in the river, that you could do more in that area. For example, when the tankers lighter off at Big Stone Beach and start up the river, it is my impres- sion that they do so with very little to spare in the way of draft clearance. They do not lighter off any more than they have to because it costs them money to do that. So sometimes they come up with just a few inches under the keels. They tie up on the high side of the tide and they pump fast enough so they do not go aground as the tide goes out. Would not it be appropriate for the Coast Guard to put in effect a regulation that says how much you have to lighter off and get a few more feet of clearance there so there would not be as many groundings there? Captain GOoDwIN. I think that could be a possibility, yes, sir. Mr. DU PONT. I do not know how many of your accidents that you tabulate here were groundings and I do not know how many of those involve tankers that have lightered off oil, but it seems to me that is a relatively simple way and easily monitored way to cut down on problems of that kind. Captain GooDwIN. I would want to take a look at the causes of the groundings and again it is easy to regulate and we have the authority and can do it very easily but we try to work closely with the maritime exchange. We try to consider the economic impact what we do, this cost-benefit ratio, perhaps thing. In 2 years, we have had one grounding that I am aware of that is-that has resulted in significant pollution in the port area and that was with the Mellon. But, we could prescribe that they lighter off to a lesser depth. Mr. BIAGGI. On that point, Captain, in pursuit of Congressman du Pont's question, how many groundings have you had as a result of insufficient lightering? Captain GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the figures on that, but I could work them up and get them with probably not too much trouble. All I would do is review those charts and the recapitu- lation here. [The information was not received at time of printing.] PAGENO="0102" 97 Mr. BIAGGI. For the record, I would appreciate if you do that, but for my own immediate information, does it happen with any degree of frequency? Captain GooDwIN. I would say no, sir, it does not. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Mr. m PONT. Captain, one question about the regulation and the procedures you used to issue them. Referring again to the GAO report, there are several paragraphs about how the captain of the Coast Guard, capatin of the ports in New York recommended various regulations on speed limits and vessel movements in fog, and so forth. When you propose a regulation, I am using that word as a term of art, does that regulation take on the effect of law or does it have to be-after you propose it, does it have to be further processed in some way before it gains the total affect of law? Vice Admiral REA. May I try to respond to that, Congressman du Pont? The authority and procedures available, if you need to get a regula- tion out right now because of some immediate situation, emergency situation, the captain of the port can promulgate that right now. It is not used very often because those situations did not cover authorities there. But in the more orderly manner and when you put a regulation out which is not quite that emergent, you had to follow the Adminis- trative Procedures Act, have public notice, put it in the Federal Register, have a public hearing, promulgation of the regulations. Mr. DU PONT. Now in the case of the Port of New York, this has from time to time been done. The proposed regulation has been issued and the procedures gone through. Has that happened here in the Delaware River? Vice Admiral REA. I will refer to Captain Goodwin. It certainly has happened in New York. It could have. Captain GOODWIN. I have right now three proposed report orders or regulations. They have not gone down to Washington yet and they are being observed by the Maritime Committee in the port, but they have not been finalized or registered in the Register. Mr. DU PONT. But you intend to pursue that? Captain GooDwIN. Yes, sir. * Mr. m~ PONT. Is, for example, the traffic separation scheme that exist at the mouth of the bay a proposed regulation or actual regulation? Captain GOODWIN. That is published on the charts. Vice ADMIRAL REA. The traffic separation scheme as you approach the Chesapeake Bay-in New York, are an international scheme which had been adopted by ENCO. Mr. DU PONT. But they have not-so they are not a regulation? Vice ADMIRAL REA. No, they are in the form of a regulation and IMCO has asked that all countries take action to-I cannot think of the word they have, but that the countries take action. Mr. DU PONT. Ratification? Vice Admiral REA. No, it is not a ratification. But IMCO is and has specialized, has recommended that the nation take steps to penalize or take actions against their mates who do not follow those separation schemes. If there was a port, master or mate failed to abide by those, when we would pursue against his license under RS 4450. PAGENO="0103" 98 Mr. DU PONT. What about the vessel traffic separation scheme up in the Delaware keeping greater distance in the fog, for example, is that a regulation? Captain GooDwIN. Right now that is an interim regulation. It has not been formalized and it is being on a cooperative basis, being adhered to. It is an interim regulation. Mr. DII PONT. That is one of the ones that you intend to pass on to Washington for final action? Captain GOODWIN. Yes, sir. Mr. DII PONT. Do you have any speed limit, regulations in effect now in the river? Captain GOODWIN. No, no, sir, no specific speed limit. Again to answer that, and to discuss the subject of speed, would be a little bit messy. I have some comments on speed that I would like to make if you feel we have the time. Mr. DII PONT. Well, my point at the moment is to make sure, just to see if there were any regulations. Captain GOODWIN. No, sir. I would not want to put a specific figure, not in the river. I understand the port in New York tried it and decided that it was not practical there. Mr. DU PONT. All right, I think that that would conclude my questioning, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we can go to Mr. Eilberg's chart and work on that problem. If I have any more, I will come back to them in a second. Mr. BIAGGI. All right. Mr. Eilberg? Mr. EILBERG. Yes, if I could have Mr. Duld from my staff come up to the maps. Mr. BIAGGI. May I have your attention, please? While the charts are being arranged, Congressman Eilberg has stated that he was in- formed by various labor groups involved with the marine industry that they have an accident every day. Would you respond to that? Vice Admiral REA. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Do your records reflect that? Vice Admiral REA. Not to my knowledge. I will respectfully re- quest that Mr. Eilberg pass the union's report to us because our records do not reflect any kind of data. Our files do not reflect any data like that. If there are accidents every day, then they should be reported to us and we will certainly investigate them and I would just urge that the unions be encouraged to make those reports to us so we can look into them. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, this information comes from the local Seafarers' representative John Fay and perhaps he might want to write to Mr. Fay and I am sure he would respond. Mr. BIAGGI. Yes, we will. If Mr. Fay would take initiative and just respond, make a statement of fact to this committee we would ap- preciate it. Let me raise a question. I have the advantage of the overflight this morning. How do you view hazardous cargoes now and how do you plan to deal with them in the future, in light of the proposed developments and in light of the nuclear plants being operational? Captain GOODWIN. Well, of course Mr. Chairman, our people board the vessels that are handling cargoes of particular hazards. PAGENO="0104" 99 I referred several times to the importation of liquefied natural gas this morning. We have come up with our proposed guidelines for this. In that particular case, we propose to escort the vessels. We strictly limit their movement in the port. We will require closer supervision of their hookups and when they unhook, things of this nature. I do not know whether that answers your question or not. Mr. BIAGGI. That is what you are doing now. What will you do, if anything, when the nuclear plant becomes operational? Captain GooDwIN. In that particular case, sir, we propose to pick up our escort a little further south than we initially intended. We have moved our intercept point from 6 miles below the C. & D. Canal to 18 miles below the canal to provide a Coast Guard escort and we also will require the provision of a commercial tug to accompany the ship as it is coming up the channel, in the event that he loses his propulsion or steerage. Things of this nature. But in the LNG tanker construction, they have built in redundancy to a degree that would probably preclude some of the accidents that we have had with conventional construction and there again we point out that we have double hull construction on our LNG carriers. At a hearing we held locally, some people I think looked-question- ably the testimony that entered that had the Queeny hit an LNG carrier down in that position rather than the Gorinthos, there probably would have been no explosion. As near as I can make out from what little I know of the occurrence, I think this is probably true because of the double hull construction on the LNG tankers. Mr. BIAGGI. Do they clear the waters of any other vessels when you have transportation of hazardous cargoes? Captain GOODWIN. No, sir, not-with the LNG; we have problems in this port that you do not have in other ports. The long transit time coming up the channel. The fact that you have just one channel serving the port. We could not prescribe just one-way traffic for instance. We would have to have a passing situation and we had to prescribe regulations that, if the local communities decide they want LNG in their area, we will have to prescribe the best regulations we can to minimize the chances of an accident. Mr. BIAGGI. One further question before we go to the charts. I recognize you have acknowledged the contribution of Capt. Paul Ives and Capt. Sam Schellenger and their respective organizations. Is it the committee's understanding of this contribution correct when they conclude that the Coast Guard works together with these various groups, bearing in mind the various considerations? Captain GooDWIN. I think we work closely together. I have no- I look to them for a lot of advice and I think we have a very close and harmonious working relationship. Mr. BIAGGI. And you regard their input? Captain GOODWIN. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, it was partly- well, yes, sir, no doubt about it. Mr. EILBERG. On that point, may I ask a question of Captain Goodwin? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Mr. EILBERG. Until recently, I understood that the Pilots Associa- tion had an opening at the bay from which the pilot would board ships for entering the bay. Also they had radar system on the ship. PAGENO="0105" 100 According to newspaper reports, that ship was taken out of action because of the expense involved. Is that correct, Captain Goodwin? Captain GooDwIN. I am not sure what the reason was, Mr. Con- gressman. I think that Captain Schellenger from the Pilots Association is here, and I think he would probably be better equipped to respond to that question than I. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a photograph from the Philadelphia Inquirer which indicates this ship from Philadelphia being tied up and the Inquirer stating that the former Coast Guard icebreaker is being laid up because of the expense of maintaining it, officials representing the Pilots said. Mr. BIAGca. Without objection. Mr. EILBERG. Now, Captain Goodwin, I understand then that they gave the ship up and went ashore. What did you do for radar control at the entrance of the bay during that period? Captain GOODWIN. What did I do for it? Mr. EILBERG. What did the Coast Guard do, if anything? Captain GoornvlN. We have noticed no difference in the operation down there. We have done nothing other than to monitor the situation. I do not-there has been no indication that the services have been reduced. Mr. EILBERG. So you do not consider that their contribution insofar asradar was any significance as far as the Coast Guard was concerned? Captain GOODWIN. Their installation of radar? Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Captain GOODWIN. I think after it has had a chance to be proven, it is quite new, that we may find that-that they are making consider- able contributions. It may have an impact on what the Coast Guard would decide to do down there. Mr. EILBERG. Now they have reinstalled the radar on shore now, permanent quarters on shore and you take the position that you do not know that that radar has any value, at all as far as ship safety is concerned, is that your position, Captain Goodwin? Captain GOODWiN. No, sir, it is not. I am sure it has value. Just for the relative merits of the installation, they will have to hold off and see what materializes, until we get a chance to gain some ex- perience or they get a chance to gain some experience. Mr. EILBERG. And you do not feel that there is anything unusual or anything questionable about having this as part of the government process if the prior installation became radar, you see no problem with that? Captain GooDwIN. No, sir. Mr. EILBERG. We may disagree on that, Captain. What happens if we decide that the radar is essential and the radar goes out. Does it become a matter of concern to them? Captain GoODwIN. It might and then I think it is incumbent upon the Coast Guard to find the funds and put their own radar in. Mr. EILBERG. But you have not sought to do so so far, have you? Captain GooDwiN. No, sir. Mr. EILBERG. All right, Mr. Chairman, we have these sketches which I would like to show to you if I may. This is a rather difficult place. Can we move this around somehow? Mr. BIAGGI. Let us go to it. [Pause.] PAGENO="0106" 101 Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Duld. Mr. DULD. To start off with Mr. Eilberg's proposal was at point one and two here for an establishment of a radar system that would have control over the Delaware Bay area insofar as vessel traffic control and its movement is concerned. At the present time the only traffic control that you have there is that which is established by the Pilots Association of the Maritime Exchange. Mr. Eilberg has also proposed additional channel markers in the particular area and we have stretches that go for as far as 2 miles and some places 1,800 yards apart without markers on one side of the chan- nel. In comparison with the chart that was supplied by the Coast Guard, it indicates in the particular areas that Mr. Eilberg. has made his suggestions that there have been some incidents which have taken place. Whether or not the establishment of what Mr. Eilberg has pro- posed will alleviate the present problem remains to be seen. If we go on to the next chart. In this particular area, we have also indicated the possible location for range markers. We have ships that are traveling south but must look over their shoulder to take a bearing on range markers that are behind them or astern of them. There are actually no range markers to line their ship up directly ahead of them. We have indicated this in various places along the river and this information by the way has not come from Mr. Eilberg or myself directly. We do not navigate these waters every single day but have been introduced as proposals and suggestions by the people that Mr. Eilberg has indicated in previous statements. We have also indicated that there is a possible widening of channels or a moving of channels, the midchannel because it runs too close to fueling piers and docking areas that cause a hazardous condition. These are contained on the charts. Especially now for the Delaware Canal, the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, Mr. Eilberg has indicated the need for a vessel traffic control spot. Now in comparison, if they will just look at this one particular area, the Coast Guard charts indicate a high degree of accidents or incidents within this particular area. However, I do find that Captain Goodwin, since we have come out with this, has indicated the need for a vessel traffic control at this particular point. We may, Captain Goodwin, have shown on this particular chart a wrong location by maybe an inch or two insofar as the scene of the fatal collision. In this particular area, we have asked for a relocation of the channel because we have found from ship masters, captains of naval ships that have navigated these waters on a weekly basis, have indicated that right in that area in the lower left-hand side that it is quite difficult in making the channel where the two ranges cross each other. However, I understand Captain Goodwin has indicated that they can make an early turn but it is not indicated on that particular chart and I am not sure about the foreign ships that are coming in, whether they would have that information unless the pilot says that we can make an early turn. However, if this was established, it would be a potential for alleviating the accidents or a potential hazard at the present time. PAGENO="0107" 102 Right here at Billings Port range, if ships making their turn at that point, and I understand from the Coast Guard charts, if you look at it, there have been incidents right over there, quite a few and that is a feuling pier. Quite a hazardous area. They may have been lucky up until this time, but who knows about tomorrow or next week? We have not gone any further up the river. We have stopped at this point. However, there are other charts insofar as all the way up to Morris- yule and Trenton is concerned, showing some accidents in regard to what the Coast Guard has logged. Mr. EILBERG. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral? Vice Admintal REA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think probably these are suggestions already made to Captain Goodwin, but rather than cut that off there, and have him give a reply, what I would like to do is perhaps suggest that perhaps your committee would refer these to me, Third Coast Guard District, and also I think you need to refer them to the Corps of Engineers because he is talking about matters in there about widening the channels, which is more appropriate to the Corps of Engineers. But I would welcome the opportunity to comment on these pro- posals and give you a possible response rather than to attempt to go over them now. Mr. EILBERG. Admiral Rea, I think that you only need to turn to Captain Goodwin to get those materials. We have presented all of this to Captain Goodwin. Vice Admiral REA. Well, Mr. Eilberg, Mr. Chairman, are these the same identical proposals to which Captain Goodwin has already responded? Mr. EILBERG. They are, Admiral. Vice Admiral REA. All right. We will look those over again, sir. The answers may not be any different but we will look them over again and try to give you another overview of them. Mr. EILBERG. And/or keep pressing until we get some action out of the Coast Guard. Vice Admiral REA. But I do think it is a matter for the corps. I do not know whether you want to refer them to the corps or not, but some of these matters are beyond us. Mr. EILBERG. You can make recommendations to the corps too, just as well as we can, can you not? Vice Admiral REA. Well- Mr. EILBERG. Do you not? Vice Admiral REA. We can. We can when we get matters of those that are referred to us, but I thought maybe the committee would like to. Either way. We can do it either way. Mr. EILBERG. We may do this, but you may also, if you think any change is correct. Vice Admiral REA. Oh, we can. Mr. BIAGGI. All right, no further questions, Admiral. Captain, thank you for your contributions. I suggest, if you will, stay where you are because I am sure there is going to be some interchange. It is our experience that interchange is full and wholesome. Vice Admiral REA. We will. PAGENO="0108" 103 Mr. BIAGGI. I would like Capt. Paul Ives. I believe you have expressed a desire to address us. Capt. Paul Ives represents the Pilots Association for the Bay and the iRiver Delaware. He is also the secretary of the American Pilots Association, and we welcome you. STATEMENT OP CAPT. PAUL IVES, PILOTS ASSOCIATION FOR THE BAY AND RIVER, DELAWARE Captain IvEs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome you and the other members of the committee to Philadelphia and by word of further introduction if I may, I would like to say that I am chairman of the American Pilots Association Electronics Aid Com- mittee and participate in numerous committees in Washington on planning of this sort. I am presently chairman of the Radio Technical Commission for Marine Services Special Committee. Sixty-seven, Vessel Traffic Systems. In addition to that, I am chairman of the Port of Philadelphia vessel traffic study group under the auspices of the Joint Executive Committee and in this capacity I wear two hats. I am a working pilot on the Delaware River and just as recently as yesterday morning I conducted one of those ships you were talking about from Big Stone Beach anchorage to the Port of Philadelphia. In the course of my activities on the national level, I have had an opportunity to visit the Port of San Francisco, I think at least four times in the planning stages of the VTS systems. I have been there as recently as a year ago. I have visited and observed the Seattle Puget Sound vessel traffic system. I was in the Houston control center and have been in touch with the New York group on their deliberations. Last January I was a guest of the Norwegian Government making some observations of the proposed electronic surveillance system for Oshofjord. I have a number of opinions and observations about vessel traffic systems; and, getting right down to the local level, which is what we are here to address today, I would like to give you some of my observations about the affectiveness of what we are presently doing here in the Delaware River. First of all I think we have to define what we are talking about in the vessel traffic system. I think the port was unjustly criticized recently, and I think the public was given the idea that we do nothing here to regulate traffic; that ships run willy-nilly up and down the river, careening off anything that might happen to get in their paths, at exorbitant rates of speed. I think that a little observation would show that that is not the truth. In fact, I think the opposite is more the case, in that I think we have a very highly defined vessel traffic system in the Delaware River. It is not federally sponsored, but it is industry supported and it is voluntary and enjoys almost 100-percent coopera- tion from the people who use it. By way of a little history, after the mission San Francisco casualty in 1958, the Port of Philadelphia, under the Joint Executive Com- mittee, which is a collection of all the maritime interest in the port, got together, and I wifi not burden you with a long history of the bridge-to- bridge radio telephone deliberations, but we were able to get a specific radio frequency in the VHF maritime mobile band to be used by pilots and shipmasters, specifically for the prevention of vessel casualties. PAGENO="0109" 110 Mr. ETLBERG. You had no others. Captain IvEs. Well, we have the backup system, the pilot boat, which is lying at a pier just inside Cape Hentopen and her equipment is ready to go, and in the event that we have a radar failure at Cape Henlopen, we can operate the radar on the pilot boat at a slightly reduced range. Mr. EILBERG. Do you think it would be useful to have an installa- tion anywhere else on the Delaware or Delaware Bay? Captain urns. Well, I think you run into a cost-benefit ratio, how much better is it going to provide for the amount of good that it can do. Some years a.go, the port sponsored a study and I do not have the exact facts at my fingertips now but it was suggested that we should have a chain of radar systems up the Delaware River. I am afraid I must disagree, again, with my friends and Mr. du Pont who said if New York's radar cost $10 million we should be able to get by for $5 million. I think if New York's cost $10 million, I think ours would probably be $50 million. Because, whereas New York can cover their harbor from 2 or 3 locations, I think the study that we had showed that we would need at least 10 to 12 radar sites to effec.. tively cover the long and winding Delaware River. I would say that complete radar survefflance would be very costly for the Delaware River. Mr. EILBERG. And you do not care for visual towers, either, I take it? Captain IvEs. Well, I think it is good only on clear days and a system which can only be used part of the time, I do not think is effective. Mr. EILBERG. Would you tell me something again about the Master Mariners Advisory Committee? What is their composition? Captain IvEs. This is a group of shipmasters who are now presently working as port captains, and marine superintendents, and in various executive positions in the tanker companies and dry cargo operators in the port, and it also has members, the representatives of the OCMI and the captain of the port, and the Corps of Engineers. This is an informal group that meets regularly several times a year, and more often if necessary. The president is Capt. Sam Schellenger, the presi- dent of the Pilot's Association, and the secretary is Capt. James Wallace, both of whom are here today. This group addresses problems on a professional basis. Mr. EILBEEG. This includes a number of shipowners? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. How many would you say? Captain IVE5. Every major tanker company. These are the larger draft tankers. The small freighters do not seem to present the type of problems that we address in this Mariners Advisory Group. This group is mainly to address the problems of the deep draft vessels, the hazardous cargo vessels, and the vessels that could present potential problems in thô port. Mr. EILBEEG. Captain Ives, I have absolutely nothing against this organization and I would assume from your words that they do agood job. But I think the obvious concerns that any outsider might have, if I may call myself that, is that an advisory committee that consists of all the major owners of vessels is going to be one that may be PAGENO="0110" 105 Now, as to the notoriety that we gained here from the most recent ship accident at Marcus Hook. I would like to support Captain Goodwin's contention that when we talk about improvements that can be derived from YTS, you have to address yourself to specific problems that you are trying to cure and I certainly have to agree as a working pilot, that I cannot see any information which could be gained from a VTS that could have prevented that accident. I am not pre- pared to comment on what the causes of the accident were except to say that it is possible that it was simple human error and a mistake in judgment. If that is what the Board of Investigation determines, I cannot see how any vessel traffic system would have improved that situation. I do not see how it would have prevented the tanker Elias from exploding at the pier, and I do not see how it would have pre- vented a plant casualty, an engineering casualty, on the Notre Dame Victory and the subsequent collision with the Athos. I think the port interests here have demonstrated, on a voluntary basis their concern f or safety in the Delaware River. I cannot think of any more people who are more concerned with safety; because, after all we are the direct beneficiaries of a safe port. We also have a long river. We are in direct competition with neighboring ports who are close to the sea. The action we take in promoting safety also has to be consistent with efficiency and we are striving to keep the port open and keep it moving efficiently so that it is an attractive place for vessel owners to send their vessels and for shippers to send their cargo. In line with this, we have numerous other systems working in the port which enhance the safety of operations. One of them is the Master Mariners Advisory Committee. This is a committee of representatives from the tankers and the large cargo carriers, their owners and opera- tors. The members of the committee are actually licensed master mariners, pilots, or ship masters who are working as port captains in supervisory positions for their companies. We also have, ex-officio, members of the committee, representatives from the Coast Guard and the Corps of Army Engineers. Now this committee, on a voluntary basis, has prepared recom- mendations for the maximum safe draft for vessels transiting the river. The maximum draft that a vessel can carry up the Delaware River is variable. So in cases of extremely high tides,, the vessel can safely come with more drafts than it can with less tide. I cannot think of anyone who is in a better position to decide what the safe draft of the vessel should be than the ship master or pilots who are actually going to be responsible for conducting that vessel. This system, incidentally, has worked very well. Our incident of in- channel groundings due to insufficient water has been almost negligible. I also credit the use of the tide gages to warn us of adverse tide con- ditions in this regard. We also review and prepare recommendations for channel dredging, channel maintenance, and anchorage improvement. We prepare recommendations for improvements to the aids to navigation and we address ourselves to specific problems that come up in the port that require answers from a navigational standpoint. In addition to this, the pilots and the masters and the operators cooperate in scheduling the transit of these deep vessels on the rising PAGENO="0111" 106 tide to prevent traffic congestion and confusion. That is to say, vessels are anchored at the IDelaware Capes awaiting favorable conditions for transit in the river. When the conditions are favorable as determined through our communications network, it is decided among the pilots and masters which vessels should go first, and the others follow in an orderly fashion with the spacing of several miles in between. So that the vessel that has the farthest to go up the river will go first and this prevents a lot of unnecessary overtaking and potentially hazardous navigation. The industry has also voluntarily scheduled vessel transits through the Taconic Palmyra Bridge during peak traffic rush hour openings. This has been at a considerable sacrifice to the industry in time and money but it has resulted in a marked decrease in rush hour congestion on the bridge and I am sure it has been appreciated by the monitoring public. The point of this is, in spite of the fact that we do not have a federally sponsored vessel traffic program, I feel that the Port of Philadelphia through its various agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, has voluntarily instituted those elements of a VTS which it feels are necessary for the operation of a safe port. The cooperation in the maritime industry here has been excellent. I think the question was raised about our relationship with the Coast Guard, and I can only say that I do not know of any other ports where industry and Government work more in concert than they do here in Philadelphia. I think if Federal money is to be spent in the Philadelphia area to solve problems, I think it might most effectively be spent in the area of channel improvement, deepening the channels, improving the anchorages so that ships will have a safe channel to operate in and they will have adequate anchorages to anchor in, in the event of bad weather or engineering problems. In this regard I would enlist the assistance of the committee in helping us obtain the funds which are necessary to maintain our project depths. This is the end of my formal presentation. I would appreciate responding to any questions that you might like to ask that I would be capable of answering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you very much, Captain Ives, for a very lucid statement and very informative one. I have one question. Do you have a copy of Congressman Eilberg's prqposal? Captain IvEs. I do not have it with me, but I have seen it, yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGL Congressman Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. Captain Ives, you are aware that I have talked to other pilots in preparation today? Captain IvEs. I had heard you were, sir, but I was not able to identify the pilots specifically. Members of my association? Mr. EILBERG. I do not know. I did not ask whether they were members of your assOciation because I unfortunately did not know you before you stepped up to the table here. Captain IvEs. Yes sir; I understand that you had talked to various members of the industry. PAGENO="0112" 107 Mr. EILBERG. You know that these are things not j ust out of my head but conversations with other pilots and a great many other people as well. Captain TIrES. Yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. You ended up with some recommendations or possible recommendations. Do you have any recommendations? You said you would like cer- tain things done if money was spent. In your comments prepared to the chairman, would you be good enough to add specifically what you think ought to be done, what anchorages ought to be developed, what portions of the channel ought to be widened and the other things? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. I do not mean to give the impression that we should be complacent. I do not mean to say that we have a wonder- ful system here and we do not need any help and that nothing needs to be done, because if you have one accident, you should always strive to eliminate that. I do think the records show that the Delaware River is one of the safest rivers in the United States and I was trying to develop the idea that this is through-this is not accidental, this is through concerted industry action. Mr. EILBERG. Captain, I will respond by saying that if we were to have another tragic accident today or tomorrow or next week or next month, I will be horrified and that is why I am doing what I am doing. Captain IvE~. Yes sir; I understand. Mr. EILBERG. One accident, no matter how many lives, is not too much to prevent and when we have made a number of recommenda- tions from professional sources, many of which cost no money, I find it very difficult and have not received satisfactory answers as to why some of these ideas cannot be examined more carefully and adopted. Now you mentioned the use of bridge-to-bridge communication and the VHF channel. In my conversations with people in your profession, they indicate that frequently these channels are cluttered or there is a great deal of chatter going on in these channels. Is that true or not true in your experience? Captain IvEs. I would say that there is more congestion and possibly misuse of the bridge-to-bridge navigation channel than we would like to see. I am not of the opinion in this port that it had rendered it ineffective. I think it may have rendered it somewhat less effective than it could be and we have been taking steps voluntarily in the industry to single out the offenders, in the absence of FCC monitoring. Of course, FCC, the Federal Communications Commission, is charged with monitoring these frequencies and enforcing its laws and regulations. The FCC, for various reasons, has not had the manpower to do the job on these frequencies that we would like them to do. So we have taken up a system of self-policing. The towboat industry who are the major users of the river and these radio channels that we are speaking of, and the pilots, have been in complete cooperation. I neglected to mention that before and they have helped by circularizing their masters and asked them to use the channels properly and we asked our people to please observe the rules and regulations and it is an ongoing self-policing. 78-280-76-8 PAGENO="0113" 108 Mr. EILBERG. Captain, have you complained to the FCC at anytime about these conditions that you talked about? Captain IvEs. I have not filed a formal complaint in letter form but I am on numerous committees in Washington which deal with these problems and I have access to the FCC through other channels and these type of problems have been brought up. It is a nationwide problem, not only in the maritime service but in other radio services and I was led to believe that the FCC was looking into the matter. Mr. EILBERG. Could I ask Admiral Rea or Captain Goodwin whether they had made any complaints with regard to the use of these channels? Vice Admiral REX. To my knowledge, we have not, Mr. Eilberg, but I would like to comment that I think the discipline and the use of channel 13 is improving all along as the people get accustomed to it. In the Port of New York, we have put out, through a. notice, some recommended points for which vessels could call in when they are passing. It is not a mandatory requirement. Just voluntary require- ment. Just so when you pass certain points. That also resulted in approved discipline because our Coast Guard vessels use it and they are all for that. So the situation is getting better on 13. To my knowledge, we have not filed a formal complaint. We have heard and are aware of the overuse of it in certain of the areas and made known to the FCC informally. Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Admiral. Captain, I was of the view of that condition, and of course we do not know what the cost would be and perhaps this would be some- thing for the Coast Guard to study, perhaps, but if there are-were a number of shore installations involving visual communication, would this not be a better system than the bridge-to-bridge communication that you have talked about? Captain IvEs. I am not certain that I understand you, Mr. Congress- man. Visual observation of vessels? Mr. EILBERG. That is right. Captain IvEs. Well, the bridge-to-bridge visual system provides information to the navigators of each ship, specifically in a meeting situation. Presumably, they are in visual contact with each other, either physically or through radar, and shore visibility and on the basis of the information from their navigational instruments and their conversations on the bridge-to-bridge radio, they arrange to make a satisfactory meeting or passing situation. I would say that of all the services which lends itself least to shore- side assistance, perhaps the bridge-to-bridge radio does not. It is strictly a self-contained operation aboard the two ships that are directly involved. Mr. EILBERG. I am saying if the channel is cluttered and the con- ditions prevent adequate communication, would it not be an effective safety device to have visual communication from the shore, with some towers scattered over the most congested areas. Perhaps the entrance to the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, for example. Captain IvEs. Well, a strictly visual system would be good only perhaps in the hours of daylight. No, sir, I could not-I could not really agree that that would be-that that would solve any specific problems that I know of. PAGENO="0114" 109 I do not know of any situation where a pilot has been unable to get through to another pilot due to channel congestion when he wanted to. Mr. ErLBERG. On the question of speed, you say that you are self- controlled. Yet the GAO reports indicate that over one-third of the accidents that have occurred and been reported, serious accidents, speed was irrelevant. Do you not think we should give some consideration to control of speed? I do not mean necessarily in the Delaware Bay but in the more congested areas north of the bay. Captain IvEs. Again, I would please ask your forgiveness for being somewhat opinionated on the idea, but 1 do work on board vessels and I am a working pilot and I think I have observed some of these problems firsthand and perhaps see them in a slightly different light than people who sit shoreside and analyze the accident after it has happened. I think that speed on the water is a highly relative thing. Whereas, on the land, people can appreciate a speed limit sign, an automobile is safe at a certain speed in a given area. On the water this does not follow. The speed for a tugboat in an area wotild not be the same safe speed for a supertanker. The problem is self-regulating, that the large vessels cannot make any appreciable speed. Because of their size and proximity to the bottom, they can not speed. Most vessels adjust themselves to the conditions and they seek a proper speed for the conditions that they are operating in. I do not think that speed limits have much applicability on the water. Mr. EILBERG. So you have had no complaints then about vessels speeding; do you go as far as to say that? Captain IvEs. Well, I think we fell into a statistical trap and I read the GAO report very closely. When accidents are being investigated, the boards of investigation analyze every facet of the problem. Quite frequently and I ask forgiveness of my friends in the Coast Guard, quite frequently it is fashionable for the Coast Guard to assess as part of a problem the speed as a contributing factor. More obviously, if a ship did get stopped in time from hitting something else, obviously he was going too fast. I think that this sort of statistic which has been creeping more and more into accident reports has finally caught up to us, to the point where we have taken a lot of bad information and made an observa- tion on it. Mr. EILBERG. So you disagree with one of the main points of the GAO report as far as speed is concerned, I take it. Captain IVES. Yes, sir. I do not believe that speed is a major fac- tor in most accidents. Mr. EILBERG. Now you mentioned radar, and until your reference to it, I was not aware that the entire area is covered by radar. Would you- Captain IvEs. Not the entire area, sir, just the Delaware Capes area at the present time, including the Big Stone Beach Anchorage and I would say 20 miles up the bay and 20 miles to sea. It is a 40-mile radar, but weather conditions being what they are, 20 miles would be a dependable average. Mr. EILBERG. You had one installation at Cape ilenlopen? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. PAGENO="0115" 111 slightly biased in favor of shortcuts as far as the shipowners are concerned. Now, how do you respond to that? Captain IvEs. Well, I think that is certainly a possible conclusion. However, I feel that the master on the bridge and the owner of a vessel is going to do what is best for his vessel and he is not going to endanger the multi-million-dollar investment that he has, and I think the interest of the shipowner in preserving his investment, certainly coincides with the interest of the Port of Philadelphia and we do not want any problems either. Mr. EILBERG. What is your reaction to the-having a tug accom- pany, one of these large vessels from the channel to the dock, or from the dock to the channel? Captain IvEs. You are speaking specifically of using tugs for docking operations? Mr. EILBERG. That is right. Captain TirEs. Very well, I think you have to understand as a State pilot, my responsibility is discharged when I bring the vessel off the pier or to a safe anchorage. It is not among my duties, except in cases of extreme emergency, to dock a vessel. I do not feel completely qualified to pass on whether a vessel should have a tug or not have a tug. I have seen very safe docking maneuvers with no tugboats and I have seen some catastrophes with four tugs alongside. Mr. EILBERG. With all things being equal, do you think the tug attached is not likely to reduce accidents if the ship has actually got into the channel, the center of the channel? Captain IvEs. I think a tugboat is a great assistance to a ship maneuvering, yes, sir. Mr. EILBERG. What do you think of the proposal to have the Coast Guard inspect the wiring of ships as they dock? Captain TirEs. Inspect their wiring? Mr. EILBERG. Yes, at the dock site. Captain TirEs. Well, I. am not qualified in that phase of ship en- gineering. I was not aware that the wirings-you are speaking of the construction of the vessel, the lighting system? Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Captain TirEs. Well, I think that the Coast Guard, especially on American flag vessels, has very stringent inspections of the ship's engineering plan, including their wiring. I would like to pass that on to Admiral Rca, if I may, Vice Admiral REA. Your question-I am not clear of your question-American flag vessels are fully inspected by the Coast Guard; the integrity of the electrical system is a very basic part of the inspection as far as crew inspection and maintenance of vessels. As far as foreign flag vessels which are signatory to IMCO, they have safety certificates and they get safe construction of those. So I am not sure of what wiring we are really speaking of, Mr. Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. Well, any wiring that would be involved when a ship docks. One of our suggestions was that wiring should be inspected by the Coast Guard when a ship docks. PAGENO="0116" 112 Admiral REA. I do not know how to respond to you too much because I do not quite understand the question. Maybe they are talking about the ground wires that you hook up before you start the discharge of the cargo. I am not really clear on how extensive an inspection we are speaking of. We do make inspection of vessels. Mr. EILBERG. We are talking about grounding regulations. Admiral REA. Yes. Mr. EILBERG. Now, you do make an inspection in each case, did you say? Admiral REA. No, we are not down there every case. But there is a regulation that requires that, and when our men are down to the dock they check to see if they are grounded, yes. Mr. EILBERG. Did you say if they are on the dock or when they are on the dock? Vice Admiral REA. When a vessel moors, and before it hooks up its cargo wire, it is good practice and our regulation requires that a ground wire be hooked up before you start discharging your cargo and loading your ca.rgo. Mr. EILBERG. Captain ives, I think a minute ago, said that this was done in every case by the Coast Guard. I am just testing to see whether this is so or not. Vice Admiral REA. I think Captain Goodwin responded to what is going on in Philadelphia. But as our people in the port get around us, that is one of the things they check, to see whether it is safe to load or unload. We are not necessarily there the moment they hook up, nor are we there when they disconnect. But there is a burden on the master and personnel to carry out this regulation like many others. Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Admiral. Captain Ives, we appreciate your testimony and we hope you will follow through, if you will, with a written statement on our suggestions. Captain IvEs. Yes, sir, this is the-I will at the~ very earliest opportunity convene the Vessel Traffic Subcommittee that I am chairman of, and if it is all right with you we will review these and give you written answers specifically. Mr. EILBERG. Which association now would you be submitting that to? Captain IvEs. This is the Vessel Traffic Systems Subcommittee of the Joint Executive Committee for the Improvement and Devel- opment of the Philadelphia Port Area. Mr. EILBERG. Now, I am not sifre of the composition of that. Would you repeat that again? Captain IvEs. Well, the chairman of the Joint Executive Com- mittee is here today and I would like to, if possible I would like to, defer to him. It is an industry committee. It represents nearly every user, including tow boats. Mr. EILBERG. Is this the Masters Advisory Committee? Captain IvEs. No, sir; this is not. This is a larger and more all- encompassing committee. This committee encompasses all of the Port of Philadelphia. Mr. EILBERG. Would you get a report back here as soon as you can on that? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. [No report was received at time of printmg.] Mr. EILBERG. Thank you very much, Captain. PAGENO="0117" 113 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry, counsel wished to ask you a few questions. Mr. HEYWARD. Captain Ives, in connection with the vessel re- porting system, how does it operate and who uses it? Captain IvEs. The system is informal, sir, by standards at other places, I would presume, and certain by Federal vessel traffic system standards but we feel it is adequate. It provides the amount of in- formation that is necessary. A list is prepared every day of vessel arrivals and departures, the approximate times of departures. This list is disseminated through the Maritime Exchange to the pilots and the operators of vessels on the river and the information is available through the VHF port operations radios, so that in case of poor visibility, they should become a matter of concern to a ship, they can radio in and ask how many ships they expect to be meeting or where they might possibly be encountered and when the ships get close enough, then of course they can maintain the contact by bridge-to-bridge radio. Mr. HEYWARD. Do they do it by monitoring radio transmissions? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir, every ship is monitoring channel 13, bridge- to-bridge radio channel, and by doing nothing more than listening. After you have been on the bridge for a short time, you can get a very accurate picture of what is moving around. Mr. HEYWARD. I assume it is updated by both ends of the river? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. How about the radar, what is the purpose of the radar and how is that used? Captain IvEs. The purpose of the radar at Cape Henlopen at the present time is to identify inbound ships and outbound ships so that the watch officer, who at this particular moment is the captain of the pilot boat, can dispatch pilots and provide a certain amount of information to the ships about what is moving in the area, should the visibility be poor. Mr. HEYWARD. So that it is used for safety purposes even though it is a privately operated organization? Captain IvEs. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Captain. Anyone else care to testify? STATEMENT OF H. WILLIS JACKSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT AND DEVEL- OPMENT OP THE PHILADELPHIA PORT AREA Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, my name is H. Willis Jackson and I am chairman of the Joint Executive Committee that was just men- tioned a few minutes ago. I have no prepared statement. I have no prepared statement as such except that I did want to back up what Captain Ives said about, if there is money to be spent in the Port of Philadelphia, we could use some help from you. I am going to submit to you copies here of our testimony before the civil-before the Public Works Subcommittee on Appropriations in the Senate and House of Representatives, asking for appropriations in PAGENO="0118" 114 connection with widening and deepening of the channel and approving our anchorages. This is a battle that we have had; this organization incidentally has been in existence since 1888 and included in the membership are labor unions, as you can see on the bottom-I will not list them all-we represent the industry, we represent labor unions and others and our purpose is to coordinate the activities for the port and we work very close to the Pilots Association and all the other organizations are with us. But I would like to place on the record our testimony which was made by our vice chairman in Washington on April 29th as to the battle that we are having to try to get this money and I am sure that you know what trouble they have in New York of trying to get it, but frankly if there is anything that can be done to help us with ap- propriations for channel maintenance and for anchorages, this would be money well spent and I would be very glad to answer any questions if anybody has any, but I will put this in the record. Mr. BIAGGI. We will have that for the record. [The document follows :J STATEMENT OF GEORGE BURNHAM, JOINT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILADELPHIA PORT AREA Summary of testimony by George Burnham, vice chairman, Joint Executive Committee for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port Area, before the Subcommittees on Public Works Appropriations of the United States Senate and House of Representatives on April 29, 1975; and calling for increased funding, as well as the institution of funds for which no provisions has been made, in the President's Fiscal Year 1976 Budget covering those federally authorized navigation projects under the administration of the Philadelphia District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO THE SEA 1. The President's FY `76 Budget contains no funds whatsoever for either Marcus Hook or Mantua Creek Anchorages; both are considered essential for safe navigation of the larger ships transiting on the Delaware River. We request that the following funds be added: a. Marcus Hook Anchorage: Add $6.5 million of which $2.5 million will be needed for the 40-foot depth presently maintained by the Corps over a 1400-foot width; with the $4 million balance used in restoring this anchorage to its fully authorized width dimension of 2300 feet. b. Mantua Creek Anchorage: Add $1.4 million in order to allow for continued maintenance of the existing dimensions of this anchorage. (See recommendation for additional monies as shown under CONSTRUCTION) 2. Add $1.5 million for maintenance of the Delaware River Channel, Phila- delphia to the Sea. In June 1975, Phase III of the rock removal contract for Marcus Hook Range will be completed improving the minimum depth of rock in that range from 35.6 feet to 41 feet. The employment of these additional funds for use in normal channel maintenance will serve to complement the achieve- ments made in rock removal insuring that we finally have the 40-foot channel authorized by the Congress in 1938. DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO TRENTON Add $1,759,000 in maintenance funds in order to bring this funding to the minimum level considered necessary to sustain the more than 21 million tons of commerce which will have been carried over this portion of the Delaware River. PAGENO="0119" 115 SCHUYKILL RIVER The $539,000 budgeted for the T Quarter and the Fiscal Year will permit the Philadelphia District to perform maintenance dredging only in the 26-foot channel. We request that $711,000 in additional funds be made available so that normal maintenance can be performed in the 33-foot section as well. The more than 18 million tons of waterborne commerce carried on this waterway annually comes principally from the 33-foot section. WILMINGTON HARBOR Less than half the normal amount of funding for maintenance of Wilmington Harbor channel and turning basin appears in the Fiscal Year 1976 Budget. To sustain the 4 million tons of waterborne commerce transiting via these facilities annually, we urge that the additional amount of $257,000 be added for this project. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO THE SEA In 1958 Congress authorized the construction of Mantua Creek Anchorage, 40-feet deep, 2300 feet wide and 11,500 feet long. This has never been constructed and is presently being maintained at a 37-foot depth, 1400 feet wide over its authorized length. In the interest of safety this anchorage is badly needed to its full dimensions and as a first step only, we urge that it be deepened to 40-feet over its existing dimensions, so that this portion will at least be compatible with our 40-foot Delaware River ship channel. To accomplish this will require $2 million. We urge that this be approved. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS My name is George Burnham. I am Vice-Chairman of the Joint Executive Committee for the Improvement and Development of the Philadelphia Port Area. The Joint Executive Committee, founded in 1888, serves as port-affairs spokes- man for twenty-two separate organizations in the Delaware Valley Region, whose common interest is a viable port. Members' names appear on the letter- head page of this testimony and to save time I do not propose to name these other than to say that this membership includes Chambers of Commerce, Civic and Trade Associations, Quasi-Governmental Bodies, and an International Labor Union. The members pay no dues aside from nominal amounts needed to cover the Committee's administrative expenses, and the Officers serve without compensation. TESTIMONY I have been asked by the members of the Joint Executive Committee to appear today on their behalf and to express to you the concern which they share upon noting the inadequate amounts which have been allocated in the President's 1976 Fiscal Year Budget for those federally authorized navigation projects which are administered by the Philadelphia District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These projects sustain ports located adjacent to the Delaware River in Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, commonly called the Ports of Philadelphia. This com- plex is ranked as the leading United States port in terms of international water- borne commerce handled and ranks second in the Nation in total waterborne commerce. Comparing the amounts in this Budget versus the needs we have to both main- tain our port standing and to assure that the vessels which carry this huge volume of commerce can arrive and depart in reasonable safety, we find that if we are to meet these objectives that we must have $14,127,000 added to this Budget. Allow me if you will to refer now to the specific projects which require addi- tional funding: DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO THE SEA We are distressed to find that the President's FY 1976 Budget contains no funding for the Marcus Hook or Mantua Creek Anchorages. Both were authorized under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1958, principally for the safety which they PAGENO="0120" 116 would provide to vessels transiting the Delaware River. Marcus Hook Anchorage was constructed to its authorized dimensions but was allowed to shoal and pres- ently is being maintained to its authorized depth and length over a width of 1400 feet instead of at its 2300-foot authorized width. Mantua Creek Anchorage has never been constructed to its authorized dimen- sions and is presently being maintained over its length to a width of only 1400 feet, instead of its project width of 2300 feet, and at a depth of 37 feet instead of its project depth of 40 feet. If anything, there is far more need today for these fully constructed anchorages than there was when the projects were approved. Vessels using the Delaware River today are longer and beamier and many find it necessary to schedule their transit on a rising tide because of draft limitations. These vessels cause us great concern because of the inadequacies of the two anchorages. Many are carrying energy related and hazardous cargoes in greater quantities than ever before. Most of the deep draft vessels can not use Mantua Creek Anchorage because it is being maintained at a depth which is incompatible with the greater depth of the channel. Because of width limitations at both Mantua Creek and Marcus Hook, the large vessels that do anchor swing through the channel on a change of tide or during a high wind, creating conditions of risk both to themselves and to vessels transiting in the ship channel. Following the explosion of the ill-fated tanker ELIAS and the recent ramming of the docked tanker CORINTHOS by the EDGAR M. QUEENY in the Delaware River, both incidents resulting in a heavy loss of life, much has been said in the press and elsewhere suggesting a need for the establishment of speed limits for vessels on the Delaware River as well as suggestions aimed at increasing Coast Guard control over vessel movements. It has been determined that neither of these accidents could have been avoided by such measures. Knowledgeable ship people however are far more concerned about the threat to safety posed by the inadequacies of our Delaware River anchorages. We therefore urge that the follow- ing amounts be added to the President's Budget to prevent needless loss of lives, property and damage to the environment: MARCUS HOOK ANCHORAGE-OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE We request that an additional $6.5 million be approved for use in restoring this anchorage to its full project dimensions. It is our understanding that $2.5 million of this amount would be needed to maintain the existing 1400-foot width to authorized depth of 40 feet while the remaining 900-foot width in the shoaled area would require maintenance funds in the amount of $4 million to deepen this to 40-foot project depth over its authorized length. MANTUA CREEK ANCHORAGE-OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE We request that $1.4 million be added to the President's Budget for use in providing maintenance for the existing 1400-foot width at a depth of 37 feet over its authorized length. CONSTRUCTION Aware that its existing depth of 37 feet is inadequate for many of the deep draft vessels using the Delaware River, and aware that this depth does not provide compatibility with the 40-foot channel depth, as intended when the project was authorized, we ask that the Corps be directed to construct this anchorage to its authorized dimensions. As a first step, in Fiscal Year 1976, we ask the Congress to add $2 million in construction funds needed to deepen the existing dimensions from 37 feet to 40 feet. Aside from the lack of funding for anchorages in the Delaware River-Phila- delphia to the Sea, we note that insufficient funds have been allocated to cover normal maintenance in the ship channel. In June 1975, Phase III of the Delaware River rock removal program will have been completed, improving the minimum depth of rock found in Marcus Hook Range from 35.6 feet when this program began to 41 feet. For the first time since our 40-foot channel project was authorized in 1938 we indeed have the potential use of a fully maintained channel at its project depth. To not provide the Corps with sufficient funds to maintain the improved depth appears to be self-defeating, particularly in view of the many millions of dollars spent in the rock removal program in order to attain this objective. Accordingly, we urge the Congress to upgrade funding for channel maintenance in the Delaware River-Philadelphia to the Sea, to full Corps' capability. To achieve this, we have been advised that $1.5 million in 0. & M. funding is necessary. PAGENO="0121" 117 DELAWARE RIVER, PHILADELPHIA TO TRENTON * More than 21 million tons of waterborne commerce are carried over this portion of our waterway annually. It is important to the port to be able to sustain such a high volume of commerce and Which cannot be done without funding the project to the full Corps' capability. To accomplish this we ask that Congress add $1,759,- 000 to the 0. & M. portion of the President's budget in the interest of protecting this valued commerce. SCHUYLKILL RIVER The $539,000 which appears in the President's Budget is intended principally for use in maintaining the 26-foot portion of the Schuylkill River channel. Accord- ing to the Philadelphia District Office, sufficient funds will remain only to initiate a contract for maintenance in the 33-foot channel. Inasmuch as the majority of the 18 million tons of annual waterborne commerce relates to the 33-foot section of the waterway, we consider it important that this section not be allowed to shoal up and accordingly we ask that $711,000 in additional 0. & M. funds be made available for this particular use. ~TILMINGTON HARBOR Over 4 million tons of waterborne commerce is handled annually at the port of Wilmington. The normal expenditure to maintain Wilmington Harbor and its turning basin to sustain this volume of revenue is in the range of $500,000 annually. The Budget provides a figure which is less than half this amount and in view of this we urge that $257,000 be added in 0. & M. funds for this project. Concluding our remarks, we should mention our interest in the Channel Dimen- sions Study, Delaware River, Philadelphia to Trenton. A Resolution adopted 3 May 1962 by the Senate Committee on Public Works, has produced information which indicates the desirability of the Federal Government assuming maintenance of the vessel maneuvering area in front of Tioga Marine Terminal. Based on these findings, the Philadelphia District Engineer and the New York Division Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have recommended that the Federal Government assume maintenance to a depth of 36 feet of the maneuvering area in front of the terminal including a turning basin of 1300 feet in diameter. The necessary local guarantees are being developed. We would urge that when this project is submitted to Congress that approval be granted so that the necessary work can proceed promptly. Thank you very much. Mr. HEYWARD. May I? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the Corps of Engineers problem, does the Division Engineer take any position or are they limited by what they get from Washington? Mr. JACKSON. They are limited by the money they get from Washington. Mr. HEYWARD. I do not mean money; I mean policy decisions. Mr. JACKSON. Oh, you mean priorities and this sort of thing? Mr. HEYWARD. Yes; as far as improving the anchorages are con- cerned. Have the local engineers supported- Mr. JACKSON. [interrupting]. They are very, very helpful. In fact, the testimony that is in here, we had a meeting with them and asked them what was their capability and what can we ask for within the range of their capabilities. Mr. HEYWARD. How about the Chief of Engineers in Washington? Has he supported these particular projects and the Delaware River? Mr. JACKSON. Yes; but we do not- Mr. HEYWARD. [interrupting]. So it is a matter of money being authorized? Mr. JACKsoN. It is a matter of money being authorized and we have one project in particular that we have in common with Baltimore and that is the C. & D. Canal where we have an excellent benefit/cost PAGENO="0122" 118 ratio and the completion of that is about 13 years behind time and now we are having trouble getting the dredging of the Chesapeake Bay so that we can both use it. So this is something that we, if you can help us- Mr. BIAGGI [interrupting]. May I see your testimony-- [Document handed to Mr. Biaggi.] Mr. HEYWARD. This is all operations and maintenance? Mr. JACKSON. That is right. This is broken down by operations and maintenance and it was within the budget figures. Mr. HEYWARD. But it is generally authorized already under the law? All they need is to appropriate the funds. Mr. JACKSON. That is right, to appropriate it. Mr. BIAGGI. You made your point. Thank you, very much. Anyone else desirous of testifying? [No response.] Mr. BIAGGI. There being none, we will adjourn the meeting and thank you very much, admiral, captain, gentlemen. [Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was adjourned.] PAGENO="0123" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, New Orleans, La. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in room 10, Rivergate Convention Center, Hon. Mario Biaggi, presiding: Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is meeting here in New Orleans to deal with the Vessel traffic system or service as it will be known in the future. I am delighted to be here and I am grateful for the hospitality that has been displayed, especially to Admiral Barrow and to the different gentlemen that have made our stay so pleasant so far. We have many demands for committee appearances throughout the country, but at the insistence of Congress- man Treen and the gentlelady from New Orleans, Congresswoman Boggs, New Orleans was made first priority. I would like to give Congressman David Treen the opportunity to make any remarks he would care to make. Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Chairman Biaggi. They are not all my constituents here, but a lot of them are. I would like to claim them all. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for selecting New Orleans as one of the places to have, and one of the priority places to have the hearing on this most important subject of vessel traffic. There is a lot that I need to learn about it and I hope not to display too much of my ignorance in the questioning today, but it is extremely important for this area, for the Port of New Orleans. The Intracoastal Waterway comes in here and leaves from here and, of course, this is a major port. We have had some problems in the recent years, especially during high water times with casualties and accidents. When we get siltation in the mouth of the river and get the high water, it makes it tough to control barges. My office has had tremendous cooperation from Admiral Barrow and Colonel Rush, from the Corps of Engineers, and from others to try to alleviate the problem. I do think the vessel traffic system holds forth a great deal of promise for relieving some to the difficul- ties, but we want, as Members of Congress, to hear not only from government people who are involved, but from industry members today. Just one last comment, Mr. Chairman. Some people may wonder why we have only two members of the committee here today. The reason-and I know that some of you are familiar with this-is that (119) PAGENO="0124" 120 there are so many demands and most Members of Congress are on a number of subcommittees. I am on six of them, three of them on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and three others, and this is true of all of the members. Many of the committees are meeting in Washington, some for the purpose of reporting legislation, and that has kept a lot of the other Coast Guard Subcommittee members away. rrhey will, of course, see the record and our staff is here so they can brief the other members of the subcommittee who are not here. But I did want to explain why we are a little bit short of membership today. It is because we are in session in Congress today. Sometimes we aren't on Friday, but we are today. That will also explain why I will miss a lot of votes today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Congressman Treen. Before we commence, we will provide as much opportunity as possible for witnesses who are desirous of providing testimony. We have some scheduled, and I understand there have been some requests from others not on the schedule to have the opportunity to testify. If time permits, we will do that. However, in the absence of avail- able time, we will leave the record open, and with that I ask if there is any dissent that the record be left open for future submissions. Without objection, so ordered. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is meeting this afternoon in this beautiful city of New Orleans as the third of a series of field visits and discussions with local officials and interested citizens related to the general problem of vessel safety in the various port areas and navigable waters of the United States. At the beginning of the present Congress, one of the subjects which the subcommittee felt should be addressed, in carrying out its over- sight responsibilities, is the promotion of the safe movement of vessels in our navigable waters. The increasing volume of waterborne traffic in the United States, as well as the expanding number of hazardous cargoes which move in waterborne commerce, make it particularly important that vessel traffic movements should be so undertaken as to guarantee as accident free a traffic system as it is reasonably possible to accomplish. At the same time, I, individually, and I am sure, other members of the subcommittee are concerned that whatever systems of traffic supervision and control are developed, there should be the minimum amount of Federal interference to this vital segment of our national economy, and that in developing any type of control system, we should take care that we do not, in effect, sanction an overkill. In early 1975 the Comptroller General submitted a report to the Congress which had been developed pursuant to the general auditing responsibilities of his office. That report was entitled, "Vessel Traffic Systems-What is Needed To Prevent and Reduce Vessel Accidents?" That report was particularly timely and although its recommendations may not result in total agreement, it has served to focus attention on the issues to be considered in evaluating this general problem. The subcommittee, therefore, decided to address the subject by making a series of field visits and acquiring personal familiarization with some PAGENO="0125" 121 local problems and to hold a series of hearings which hopefully can shed some light on the proper course to take in the consideration of Coast Guard authorization for appropriations for future fiscal year budgets. During the summer, the subcommittee visited the New York and Delaware River areas and received information on the problems peculiar to those areas. We found that those two visits were informa- tive and helpful for our purposes. This morning the members in ade a helicopter flight for the purpose of obtaining an overall impression of the Greater New Orleans Port Area. This afternoon we are meeting to receive a report from the Coast Guard outlining its views of the specific problems of vessel traffic in this area, together with a discussion of existing and potential Coast Guard plans for solving those problems and improving safety in vessel movements in the lower Mississippi River. Following the Coast Guard presentation, the subcommittee will be happy to receive comments from local representatives who may be interested in expressing their views on the subject of traffic safety. As to the witnesses, I would request that at the time they testify, they identify themselves and any organization which they represent, and I further request them to make sure that the reporter is informed of their proper mailing address so that their testimony may be for- warded to them for review before being printed as a part of the permanent record. I will further ask the speaking witnesses to submit their prepared statements for inclusion in the record, and to address their remarks to the summary highlights of their statements. It would be helpful if they could speak on specific problem areas, such as the adequacy of the channel and aids to navigation, vessel movement reports, means of communications, speed and size of vessels, vessel speeds and maneuver- ability controls, and the monitoring of vessel movements. Before proceeding to hear the first witness, I would like to state that the relatively small membership here today is not an indication of lack of interest by our subcommittee either in the overall problem or in the traffic problems of the New Orleans area. Unfortunately, several changes in the House schedule in the middle of the week shifted bills for floor consideration with which several other Members who had planned to attend today were directly involved. Those of us here also had difficulty in not being present in Washington today. However, because the plans had been made and the witnesses in this area had taken the time to prepare their views for presentation, to us, and because we consider this subject one of major importance, not only to our subcommittee and our committee, but to the Congress and the Nation as a whole, we resolved not to cancel the hearing if we could possibly avoid doing so. The first witness scheduled to appear was Rear Adm. Winford W. Barrow, but before we ask the admiral to testify, we would like to recognize a representative of the gentlelady from New Orleans, Con- gresswoman Boggs, who has a statement she would like to read in the record. PAGENO="0126" 122 STATEMENT OP FAMES COBB, REPRESENTING HON. LINDY BOGGS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS PROM THE STATE OP LOUISIANA Mr. COBB. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen, members of the committee staff, in Mrs. Boggs' absence, she has asked me to read this statement to you all this morning. I welcome the committee to the Second Congressional District and regret exceedingly that a markup session on an important committee bill preculdes my ability to welcome you in person. I am also sorry that I am unable to personally express my gratitude to the United States Coast Guard and its splendid officers and personnel who provide safe passage for the enormous amount of trade and commerce which is the life blood of our region's economic health. In addition, they are the beacon of help in the time of storms and floods which sometimes plague our area. I should like to commend the Coast Guard sepecially for their prompt action and sustained vigilance to solve the problems of barges breaking from their moorings. We are very proud to have the United States Coast Guard Eight District, commanded so ably by Rear Admiral W. W. Barrow, headquartered in New Orleans. My thanks to the members of the committee and to all of the persons who have made the arrangements for the hearing and to all who will be testifying today. Signed, Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs, Representative, Second District, Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, may your stay here today be informative and pleasant. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. We will now hear from Rear Adm. W. W. Barrow, Commander, 8th Coast Guard District. Admiral BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen and members of the committee staff. I would like to ask the committee if they would like me to present the statement which I had prepared covering the 1E[ouston-Galveston vessel traffic service? I can enter that into the record without comment or comment very briefly on it, either one. Mr. BIAGGI. We can enter the written statement into the record as it is and we suggest that you make whatever comments you might make about the highlights. STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. WINFORD W. BARROW, COMMANDER, 8TH COAST GUARD DISTRICT Admiral BARROW. I will not read the statement. I am Rear Adm. Winford W. Barrow, Commander, 8th Coast Guard District. I have a prepared statement on the Houston-Galveston vessel traffic system which, as you know, is a working system commenced by the Coast Guard in the Houston-Galveston area in February of this year. Mr. TREEN. Would you move the microphone a little closer? I think some people in the back are having trouble hearing you. Admiral BARROW. It is a pleasure for me to be able to make this presentation on the vessel traffic system in the Houston-Galveston area on behalf of the U.S. Coast Guard. PAGENO="0127" 123 HOUSTON-GALVESTON VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM On a per mile basis, few other waterways in the world can compare with the Houston-Galveston area in its potential for danger. Over 10 percent of the U.S. petroleum refining capacity and 20 percent of our petrochemical capacity are located here, with a resultant capital investment of over $5 billion. Of the cargo shipped here (some 117 million short tons plus 20 million tons passing through on the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway in 1973), 70 percent falls into the category of "dangerous". Although we do not feel we can make a firm statistical projection, the risks present in this area indicate that a vessel casualty could be catastrophic to both population and industry. In the Houston-Galveston watershed there are 533 square miles of water area, but less than 2 percent of this area is navigable by deep draft vessels with an additional 5 percent navigable by barge traffic. While most large port complexes have 1,000-foot-wide deep-draft channels, the channels width in this system are- 800 feet at entrance for 8 miles; 400 feet into Texas City for 6 miles; 300 feet into Texas City Inner Harbor for 1.5 miles; 400 feet into lower Port Houston for 35 miles; 300 feet into the new Bayport complex for 3.5 miles; 300 feet through Port Houston for 10 miles; and 250 feet to Port Houston Turning Basin for 1 mile. Where shore facilities are located, there is another 100-200 feet of additional width available. There are five turning basins plus another seven locations where vessels can be turned. At each of these the entire channel is blocked during the maneuver. Most barge marshalling is in the channel or on the channel edges. More than 7,000 ships and 15,000 tows entered these very restrictive channels plus more than 10,000 tows crossed through on the Gulf Intracoastal WaLerway in 1973. To add a little more complexity to this situation, there are 70,000 crossings by ferries at 2 locations every year. When the Port of Houston was christened from the deck of the Rev- enue Cutter T4'imdom in 1914, no one could have imagined the tre- mendous growth in this area. But with the same channels as in the 1930's, vessel sizes have steadily increased. In 1960, the Houston Pilots Association set up special rules, including mostly daytime passage only, for handling ships over 20,000 gross tons. They further stated "No vessel above 30,000 tons has called on the Port of Houston and any vessel above that tonnage would require special consideration." Vessels up to 40,000 gross tons now call routinely in Houston, day and night, with two way traffic in the channel. We have ships almost 900 feet long and 125 feet wide routinely traversing these channels. We have tows over 1,200 feet long and 100 feet wide routinely using the area. DEVELOPMENT OF THE VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM (VTs) In 1971, Coast Guard Headquarters began preliminary planning for the Houston-Galveston VTS, predicated on the probability that Congress would require greater navigational safety in our waters. With passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, the mandate was clear and planning proceeded in earnest on all levels, headquarters, district and local. A group of local representatives of the maritime 78-280-76-9 PAGENO="0128" 124 community was appointed in June of 1972 to advise the Coast Guard on first, whether or not a VTS was desireable for this area, and second, if so, what equipment, operating procedures and personnel training would be required. This advisory group continues to monitor the VTS and advise for the future. Throughout 1972 and 1973, radar communications, and closed circuit television surveys were taken, while planning got more specific. Construction was started early in 1974 and the system became oper- ational on February 1, 1975. Unfortunately the communications surveys which had shown that channel 13 VHF-FM could support both bridge-to-bridge and VTS communications soon proved to be faulty. Because of this difficulty, in March 1975 we changed operations to use another frequency for VTS. For those vessels with channel 12 capability, we now call on channel 13 and shift to channel 12 for working messages. Additionally, our efforts to "clean up" channel 13 have continued and produced noticeable results. Virtually everyone acknowledges that channel 13 is used more properly now than was the case before VTS came along. It is, therefore, much more available for what Congress intended its use to be. Relatively early in the development of VTS it was decided that electronic surveillance coverage of the VTS area would be necessary, principally to confirm vessel movement reports. For instance, in other areas the Coast Guard has found that vessel masters often hedge their ETA's at critical points so that they can get through first. In channels as narrow as those as the Houston Ship Channel, there are many such critical points. Of even greater concern to the users or operator of the system is the non-participator, whether he be an exempt vessel or one with inoperative radios. Surprises are definitely not welcome in the VTS area. Houston-Galveston VTS now has total communications coverage through three VHF-FM sites. There are 17 miles of low level light closed-circuit television coverage through some of the hazardous parts of' the upper Houston Ship Chennel. There are three significant developments in the immediate future of this VTS. First, is the installation of a computerized tracking sys- tem to replace our locally designed and constructed board. This new system will be far more accurate and timely, and will have additional capabilities, such as determination of time and place of all meetings, overtakings, etc. These capabilities must be available before we could incorporate proposed limitations on vessel sizes in all the various reaches of the channel. This system is due to be installed by next summer. Next will be a radar at Galveston. This will give positive surveil- lance over all of Galveston Bay, including Galveston and Texas City harbors, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Bolivar Roads mixing area, plus the approach from sea. Installation is scheduled for the end of 1976, and is eagerly awaited by all components of the maritime community. Finally, there will be a mandatory VTS, probably with some limi- tations on vessel sizes and operating conditions imposed. This sounds terribly controversial, but in fact is not. The advisory group has already recommended specific limitations on the conditions under PAGENO="0129" 125 which both large ships and large tows can navigate without prior arrangement. Everyone here agrees that limitations are necessary; the only real controversy is over the specific break-off points. VTS OPERATIONS Present VTS operations consist of gathering information about vessel transits, channel conditions, aids to navigation discrepancies, and weather and then passing that information back to the navigator to help him best plan his own trip. If we see unusual congestion building or are aware of channel blockage, we may make specific recommendations to slow, stop, or remain moored until the situation improves. Under no circum- stances do we, or will we in the future, attempt to navigate vessels from shoreside. In our first 6 months of operation we logged more than 6,500 large vessels and 32,000 tows transiting the system. As indicated by the percentage of vessels participating, acceptance by the marine industry seems to be nothing short of phenomenal. In addition to operation of the Vessel Traffic Center, we look at associated problems. For example, we have gotten a private hazard. to navigation properly marked. Before this, about two tows per month hit bottom; since, no one has hit bottom at that location. We in- vestigate every proposed new facility with an eye toward the impact on navigational safety. We have successfully campaigned to make lightering operations less hazardous. We are into many other problems and will continue to pursue them to an acceptable conclusion. We can verify a few cases where VTS has prevented a specific accident from happening. Statistics indicate that there are other, less provable, cases. As an example, this September VTS routed traffic in the Houston Ship Channel when a major fire at the Space Age Plastics plant forced the shutdown of the channel, followed by its opening to one way traffic before its reopening to normal traffic. Overall, shipping is up slightly, accidents are down somewhat. SUMMARY It is the opinion of the VTS personnel and the expressed opinion of the users of the Houston-Galveston VTS that we are performing a. useful function and that we are meeting the need for a reasonable and cost-effective means towards reducing the probability of a major catastrophe in the Houston-Galveston area, thus fulifihing the require- ments of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Mr. BIAGGI. In the comparable period before the new system became operational, what was the relationship in accidents in Houston and Galveston? Admiral BARROW. I think it is probably a little early to tell with regard to statistics how well we are doing. We can verify several cases where the vessel traffic service system has prevented a specific accident from happening. As an example, in September the vessel traffic system routed traffic in the Houston Ship Channel when a major fire at the Space Age Plastic Plant forced a shutdown of the channel, followed by its opening to one-way traffic before its reopening to normal traffic. This is an example of the use of the system over there. PAGENO="0130" 126 Overall shipping is up slightly and accidents are down somewhat. I can't give you the precise details of this at this time. I think it is a little bit early. Mr. BIAGGI. When did you say it was operational? Admiral BARROW. In February of this year. Mr. BIAGGI. How far along are you on installing that system in the New Orleans area? Admiral BARROW. The New Orleans vessel traffic system is supposed to be initiated in early 1977. We were originally scheduled to start it in the fall of 1976, but we are behind in some respects. Mr. BIAGGI. When will that voluntary system in Houston become mandatory? Admiral BARROW. The regulations for the system in Houston- Galveston are about fourth in the priority of producing in notice form. I would say it probably is perhaps 9 months to 1 year away. Mr. BIAGGI. Dave, do you have any questions on Houston? Mr. TREEN. On Houston, no. Mr. BIAGGI. Would you like to talk to New Orleans now? Admiral BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I will proceed to the New Orleans vessel traffic system. STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. W. W. BARROW ON NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS Admiral BARROW. The purpose of my presentation today is primarily to acquaint you with the proposed New Orleans vessel traffic system; its background, current status, and expected opera- tional features and capabilities. BACKGROUND The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 gave the Department of Transportation the authority for the development, administration, and operation of vessel traffic systems in U.S. ports, harbors, and other waters subject to congested vessel traffic, and designated the U.S. Coast Guard as the agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the act. Prior to the passage of the act, but in anticipation of its passage, the Coast Guard launched an intensive study of vessel traffic system needs. Based on the issues to be resolved the major objectives of this study as noted in volume 1-Executive Summary (final report) were to: (1) Identify specific VTS goals, anticipated benefits, and alternatives. (2) Analyze the potential VTS roles of Federal, State, local authorities, and private enterprise; and recommend the most beneficial role for the Coast Guard. (3) Analyze the quantitative and qualitative factors to be considered in the determination of the needs for various levels of VTS in the U.S. ports. (4) Prepare short and long staffing and funding plans. (5) Prepare a management plan to use as a guide in planning, development, and implementing new systems. PAGENO="0131" 127 The results of the study were published in March 1973 in four rather lengthy volumes, and was followed in August 1973 by a report entitled, "Vessel Traffic Systems-Analysis of Port Needs." This latter report is the summation of an analysis of port needs for vessel traffic systems throughout the United States. The output of this analysis is a listing of ports and waterways in the order in which their needs should be addressed, and contains initial recommendations concerning the level of need in each area. The date used in this analysis was from years 1969 to 1972. Based on this analysis, New Orleans ranked No. 1 in deaths and injuries caused by collisions, rammings, and groundings, and ranked No. 2 in dollars damage and pollution. Baton Rouge ranked No. 14 in death and injuries, and ranked No. 11 and No. 9 in damages and pollution respectively. These standings are relative to the 22 top ranking U.S. ports. More recently in June of this year, Operations Research, Inc.,-ORI-under a contract awarded by the U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Research and Develop- ment completed its study on vessel traffic and communications in and around the Port of New Orleans. This study attempted to deter- mine the average as well as peak density of vessel movement as well as communications on channel 13 at five selected sites on the river from Venice to Port Allen. This publication will be of value in attempt- ing to determine traffic and communications load that may be encountered in the different sectors. INTRODUCTION Before going into details on the proposed New Orleans Vessel Traffic System, there are certain features about the lower Mississippi River including the Ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge which make it unique from other ports or inland waters and I will touch briefly on some of these: (1) The Port of New Orleans, which is the first major port on the Mississippi River from seaward, lies approximately 120 miles upriver from the entrance. This entails a long river run for all vessels with a very definite transition from high seas piloting to river piloting and vice versa. Additionally, it is impossible for a vessel to duck in or duck out of port during short periods of clearing under foggy condi- tions. Thus either an upbound or a downbound vessel may encounter fog or reduced visibility at any location in the river and be forced to reduce speed, stop, or anchor at a most inopportune time. (2) The lower Mississippi River, which is the outfall for one of the largest river complexes in the world, is subject so severe silting and shoaling condition which may change almost from day to day. Addi- tionally, the lower Mississippi River is subject to a yearly high water condition which contributes greatly to these silting and shoaling con- ditions. This makes transits of certain portions of the river extremely hazardous under certain conditions and these hazards may be aggra- vated by chance vessel meeting situations encountered under less than ideal situations. (3) The lower Mississippi River is not a nice straight run but rather has numerous sharp twists and bends as well as a considerable current at all times. This combination of factors does not lend itself to easy piloting, nor is it conducive to an orderly flow of upbound and downbound traffic with all vessels keeping to the right in compliance PAGENO="0132" 128 with the Inland Rules of the Road which are applicable as far up as the Huey P. Long Bridge just north of New Orleans. The point and bend system of necessity has been adopted through common usage, all the way to the river entrance. This creates the problem that the cross- over point is different under different conditions of the river as well as for each type of vessel. With the numerous bends that exist in the lower Mississippi River, the definite potential exists for upbound and downbound vessels to suddenly meet in an embarrassing situation with both vessels attempting to crossover in the same area at the same time with no clear-cut port-to-port or starboard-to-starboard passing indicated. (4) The most notable feature of the traffic on the lower Mississippi River is the great variety and mix in size and type of vessels. These include deep draft general cargo, bulk cargo, and tankers engaged in foreign and coastal trade; medium draft vessels of the same type en- gaged in river trade; an enormous amount of river as well as ocean- going barges carrying everything from general cargo to dangerous and hazardous cargos; towboats and tugboats of every size, horse- power, and description; ferryboats which cross in numerous locations; excursion boats in the New Orleans area; crew boats, supply boats, and mudluggers which service the offshore oil facilities; a fleet of fishing boats engaged in numerous types of fishing; public vessels of various types; and last but not least a small but increasing number of rec- reational boats. This vast mix of vessels with their equally vast diversity of interests produces a complex problem in maintaining an orderly flow of traffic in the river. (5) The lower Mississippi River south of Baton Rouge has numerous arteries in the form of locks and canals connecting with the ICW as well as other waterways, thus adding to the complexity of maintaining an orderly flow of traffic in the river. (6) The lower Mississippi River is subject to a seasonal fog condi-. tion. The spring fog generally comes at the same time as high water which is caused by the spring thaw and runoff. The mixing of the cold river water with the warm air from the Gulf of Mexico produces a convection type of ground fog primarily at the entrance to the Mississippi River in the area of the Head of Passes. This shutout fog can be very persistent, due to the static nature of these two influences, and has lasted as long as a week during which time no vessels could transit the river entrance in either direction. When this fog exists for any duration of time, vessels tend to stack up on both sides of the fog awaiting passage, resulting in a heavy congestion of an- chored vessels. When the fog does lift, all vessels attempt to move at once in both directions, resulting in a potentially dangerous situation. (7) The last factor I should make mention of is the large volume of traffic on the lower Mississippi River. The Port of New Orleans boasts of being the second largest port in the United States after New York. The Port of Baton Rouge ranks seventh. As can be readily imagined any one or a combination of the above factors can produce a potentially hazardous situation of the Lower Mississippi River. STATISTICS The New Orleans Vessel Traffic System (VTS) area consists of approximately 243 miles of river which is mostly continuous curves and blind bends, as well as the Mississippi River gulf outlet (MR GO). PAGENO="0133" 129 There are 15 maj or entry points into the system such as locks and canals from the TOW and other waterways. Traffic counts indicate approximately 270,000 annual transits of the system or an average of almost 750 a day, with peak loads far exceeding the average. Ap-. proximately one-third of the traffic consists of tanker and tank barges transporting 140 million tons of petroleum and chemical products. In addition to the over 76,000 towboats, and between 6,000 and 7,000 deep draft ships entering and departing the area aunually, the fol- lowing classes of vessels greatly contribute to the complexity of a potential vessel traffic system: (1) Approximately 500 crewboats operating in and around the area primarily engaged in carrying personnel to the over 1000 off- shore oil structures in the area. (2) Approximately 25 mudluggers operating in and around the area primarily in support of the offshore oil industry. (3) Approximately .35 supply boats operating in and around the area also in support of the off shore oil industry. (4) Thirteen scheduled ferry crossings which make several hundred thousand river crossings per year. (5) Seven major excursion boats in the New Orleans area which carry hundreds of sightseers daily through New Orleans Harbor. (6) A variety of public vessels including the U.S. Navy, the Corps of Engineers, and police and fire boats. It is interesting to note that most of the above classes of vessels are not subject to the Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act. DESCRIPTION OF THE NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM The purpose of the New Orleans Vessel Traffic System is to enhance maritime safety and facilitate vessel movement by acting as a central maritime information collection and dissemination agency through use of a VHF-FM communications network, aided by a computerized realtime automated data system that will provide the VTS watch- stander with predicted vessel movement, position, and navigational information. In addition to the regulations, the New Orleans. system will consist of a vessel traffic center, a communications network, and limited surveillance in selected areas. The Geographical System will be divided into four operational sectors as follows: (a) Sector I-From the entrance to South Pass and Southwest Pass north along the Mississippi River to mile 75 Above Head of Passes (AHP). Also the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet . (MR GO) from the entrance (approx. 29-25.4N, 88-59.5W) to the Inner- Harbor Navigational Canal lock where it joins the Mississippi River. (b) Sector IT-Mississippi River from mile 75 AHP to the Huey P. Long Bridge. (c) Sector ITT-Mississippi River from the Huey P. Long Bridge to mile 159 AHP. . . (d) Sector TV-Mississippi River from mile 159 AHP to mile 243 AHP. . Each operational sector will have a designated sector frequency upon which all VTS communications within that sector will be passed between the VTC . and the vessel. VHF-FM channels 11, 12, and 14 have been designated as VTS frequencies, but channels 12 and 14 PAGENO="0134" 130 will be shared with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for lock opera- tions as well as bridge and canal communications. There will be sufficient transmitter/receiver sites located throughout the system to provide individual sector communications coverage within the sectors with minimum interference with any communica- tions in adjoining sectors or other sectors having the same working frequency. The VTS will utilize directional antennae to minimize interference between different sectors operating on the same channel. The New Orleans vessel traffic system, when operational, will control the traffic lights now maintained by the Corps of Engineers. The traffic lights will be in operation year round and will be manned by Coast Guard personnel. Initially the area covered by the traffic lights will be the only area within the New Orleans system with surveillance. After the installation of low level light closed circuit television in the vicinity of Algiers Point, the manned watch at the traffic lights will be discontinued after a period of familiarization. HOW THE SYSTEM WILL OPERATE Theoretically, the ideal vessel traffic system would be one in which every vessel would be protected against marine casualties resulting from collisions, rammings and groundings at all times and yet would be permitted complete freedom in the use of the waterways. Further, from the user's standpoint, the ideal vessel traffic system would permit a vessel to depart when desired and move to its destination without delay or interference from other vessels. The user's equipment would be only that which reflects his own individual needs. In reality, absolutely free transit of the waters within the New Orleans vessel traffic system will not be possible at all times due to the conflicting demands of the many users who travel within extremely small navigable areas compared to vessel size and maneuverability. Under these restricted conditions, the incidence of more than one vessel needing and attempting to use a given portion of the waterway at the same time is much higher than in areas, such as the open sea, where space is not a limitation. In phase one, the New Orleans VTS will function basically as a navigation data gathering and disseminating system through the use of a communications network utilizing VHF-FM channels 11, 12, and 14. In order for the system to serve its intended purpose, it must be a mandatory participation system. If not, those vessels not par- ticipating can and will become hazards because of the false sense of security assumed by those vessels that are participating. A mandatory participation system will require a listening watch on the sector frequency in addition to those now being guarded. Under existing regulations and the proposed draft regulations for VTS New Orleans, most vessels would be required to guard -when not transmitting- three channels: 13, 16, and VTS sector frequency. This mandatory sector guard is necessary in order to insure to the greatest extent possible a clear frequency for the VTC to pass navigational informa- tion to the user and to advise him of potential dangers or hazards ahead of which he might not otherwise be aware. This procedure allows the operator of the vessel to exercise his own discretion and coordinate his passing with other vessels on channel 13. When a hazardous situation is developing, all vessels destined for that area PAGENO="0135" 131 will be advised. The prudent operator will take the information of a developing hazardous situation, evaluate it and take timely action to avoid it, such as slow down, stop in a safe area, or depending on the potential situation he may wish to anchor. If everything worked in the desired manner, there would be no need for a vessel traffic system. Statistics show, however, that this is not the real situation. Therefore, in extreme cases, it may become necessary for the vessel traffic center to direct a vessel to take positive action to avoid a potentially hazardous situation in which the presence of his vessel would only add to the hazard on congestion. This direction by the VTC may take the form of advising the vessel to slow, remain moored or anchored, or possibly to anchor as soon as conditions permit. Again, this would only be done in extreme cases when there is no alternative, and then only when the. vessel does not take appropriate action on his own initiative in a timely manner. It must be clearly understood that the responsibility for the safety of any vessel and its crew remains with the captain or master and cannot and will not be assumed by the VTC. The proposed draft regulations for the vessel traffic system New Orleans as well as the published regulations for . the mandatory compliance system presently es- tablished in Puget Sound do, however, contain authority to deviate from any direction in an emergency, to the extent necessary to avoid endangering persons, property, or the, environment. Obviously any deviation from a direction issued by the VTC that resulted in a casu- alty would have to be strdngly justified and the burden of proof would have to be borne by the vessel. In a similar manner, any direction issued by the vessel traffic center that resulted in a casualty or other mishap would have to be strongly justified and the burden of proof would be borne by the Coast Guard. Under normal conditions a properly functioning VTS would prevent hazardous conditions from occurring by recognizing them in advance. However, certain situations will occur which no human effort could avoid. To mention a few, unpredicted localized fog conditions, vessel loss of control or power, breakaway barges, localized squalls or heavy weather, or possibly an explosion or burning vessel caused, by some-, thing other than a collision, ramming or grounding. Under unusual circumstances such as these the VTC would obviously have to~ take a direct control of the situation to minimize present damage. as well as to prevent additional damage. A VTC in a situation such as those cited above would be exercising an authority much the same as the COTP now exercises under the Magnuson Act. ELEMENTS OF VTS NEW ORLEANS Having thus described the proposed operation of the vessel traffic system in New Orleans in very general terms, allow me to address specific areas in which the vessel traffic system may improve the overall safety of shipping relative to the unique features of the lower Mississippi River which I previously enumerated: (1) Long river transit.-As noted previously the Port of New Orleans is a considerable distance up river from the mouth and vessels are subject to encounter fog in any section of the river. Initial reports of fog from en route ships would be reported to the VTC which in turn PAGENO="0136" 132 would pass such information to other vessels approaching the area and allow them to better determine an appropriate* course of action. Additionally the VTC would queue vessels so that they might meet in the more favorable areas .of the river, or would impose one way traffic in restricted areas. Lacking surveillance or continuous reports from all along the river, this would be about the extent of the vessel traffic system's participation during periods of short duration fog in isolated sections of the river. (2) Shoaling and silting.-Changes in the bottom contour resulting from shoaling and silting are continously taking place but are aggra- vated during the spring high water. Chance meetings obviously can be eliminated by a vessel traffic system. When due to conditions of high water and increased current navigation in certain shoal areas becomes hazardous, vessels will again be queued and one way traffic imposed if necessary. A maximum draft limitation based upon the most current information available could also be imposed to meet temporary shoaling conditions. (3) Navigating the bends.-If the Lower. Mississippi River were a relatively straight run, it would be possible to establish a traffic separation scheme with all traffic remaining to the right of a separation zone similar to the system in Puget Sound. Such is not the case, how- ever, and a potential hazard exists as vessels cross over in seeking the point or bend as appropriate. Again the vessel traffic system by queuing vessels to meet either above or below the ambiguous area for crossing over, where a port to port or starboard to starboard passing is more clearly indicated, will help to alleviate this hazardous condition. The situation at Algiers Point in New Orleans Harbor is so potentially dangerous that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has seen fit to enforce one-way traffic around this point during periods of high water. through the use of traffic lights. These traffic lights have been in operation for over 20 years and are well liked by the maritime users. Additionally, local efforts have pushed to have these traffic lights operated year round. A vessel traffic system exercising positive control in the form of the continued operation of these traffic lights is obviously indicated and is included in the Coa.st Guard's proposal. Examination. of certain other areas in which imposed one-way traffic may he appro- priate as recommended in "Vessel Traffic Systems-Analysis of Port Needs," is still under evaluation. By queuing vessels and imposing one-way traffic regulations where necessary, the hazards associated with the sharp twists and bends in the river ca.n be greatly reduced. (4) Variety of river traffic.-The vast mix of river traffic with its varied interests is an area of great concern in attempting to maintain an orderly flow of traffic. On the one hand, mandatory participation of all vessels in certain areas is impractical and would cause a communica- tions saturation. Discussions with local marine interests are still underway in an effort to determine the optimum level of mandatory participation in areas of high traffic density. One problem area exists at the entrance to the river with the literally hundreds of crew boats, supply boats, and mudluggers operating in support of the offshore oil industry. Another problem area exists with boats engaged in fleeting operations which may or may not pose a potential hazard t.o other i~raffic while engaged in fleeting operations. These two areas as related to the vessel traffic system in New Orleans are not yet totally resolved but will receive the Coast Guard's most careful consideration. PAGENO="0137" 133 (5) River junctioms.-As noted above there are no less than 15 arteries in the form of locks and canals which join the Lower Missis- sippi River with other inland waterways. Delays of 24-36 hours at the Inner Harbor Industrial Canal are sometimes experienced result- ing in traffic backing up. A vessel traffic system could advise all vessels upon their entry into the system of what the expected delay at any given lock would be at any time based upon the computer output. Based upon this estimate a vessel might find it advantageous to alter its original intended plan. Increases or decreases in speed of vessels might also be recommended so as to provide a more even flow of traffic when approaching the canals and locks. Some form of landline. communication between the VTC and each of the locks is also being investigated, as a means of reducing the radio communications load on channels 12, 13, and 14. A direct coordination between the Corps of. Engineers lock operators and the VTC could result in a queuing of vessels into a more desirable sequence so that a combination of vessels could more efficiently utilize the lock space. The overall congestion caused by vessels entering and leaving the main flow of traffic in the river can thus be reduced to some degree by the vessel traffic system. (6) Extended periods of fog.-The potential role of the Vessel Traffic System is perhaps as great in dealing with this situation as with any other. Even lacking radar surveillance the vessel traffic system will be able to receive reports of fog from vessels anywhere in the system and advise other vessels who will enter that sector of the, reported condition, in a manner similar to the reports made by aircraft pilots (PIREPS). This advance information will probably cause a small percentage of vessels to alter their proposed plans and reduce some congestion. During the enroute stage of piloting in fog, while a vessel still has sufficient visibility to comply with article 16 of the inland rules (speed in fog), the vessel traffic system will once again be able to queue traffic so that vessels may meet and pass in the most favorable areas, or impose one-way traffic in restricted areas. During extended periods of "shut-out" fog at the entrance to the river, as delayed traffic builds up and the anchorage becomes crowded, the VTC may prohibit additional vessels from getting underway enroute this area when additional suitable anchorage is no longer available. In this way the congestion in the anchorage may be limited so that when the fog lifts the hazards of vessels attempting to get underway up and down the river will be reduced. The VTC will also be able to direct the order in which vessels weigh anchor and get under- way to prevent a "free-for-all" situation. This same procedure is also applicable to extended periods of fog encountered elsewhere in the river. (7) Large volume of traffic.-'The large volume of traffic transiting the Lower Mississippi River is one of the basic factors which mandate the establishment of the vessel . traffic system in New Orleans. With only one vessel present in an area, the potential for a collision or a ramming to occur is zero. With the addition of each subsequent vessel the potential for collisions or rammings increases in some mathematical progression. It is to the problem of attempting to organize and coordinate vessel movements that the vessel traffic system addresses itself. The groundings of a vessel except as a result of being crowded by another vessel, is considered to be generally unavoidable by a vessel traffic system and there should be little impact on the number of grounding incidents. PAGENO="0138" 134 SUMMARY The New Orleans vessel traffic system will be an operational system with built-in elements of regulatoins, communications and surveillance that will funètion as an aid to the mariner by gathering and dissemi- nating navigational information vital to his need. The greater portion of the time, appropriate action will be taken by the operator upon receipt of advisory information from the VTC pertaining to future situations which he may expect to encounter. Only in unusual cases will the VTC authority to direct a vessel to take a particular course of action be exercised and then only to the extent that the course of action itself will not create a dangerous or hazardous situation. This directed action will be limited to stop (when and where conditions permit), slow, anchor, remain at anchor or berth, or specifying times when a vessel may enter the system. Never will rudder commands, courses or actual maneuvering commands be given. The responsibility for the safety of any vessel remains with the master or captain, regardless of any VTC direction. That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have with me several people in the room who with me will attempt to answer any questions which you might have for us. Commander Oberholtzer who is the project officer in the district staff and Commander Boyce who is the CO of the vessel traffic center. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Admiral. There are a number of questions. In the light of numerous accidents we have had in the New Orleans port area, how do you account for not having the system installed at an earlier date? Admiral BARROW. The emphasis on vessel traffic systems throughout this country commenced somewhere around the 1970-71 timeframe. In fact, this system was one of the first ones studied during that time period, before the Ports and Waterways Safety Act which specifically authorized the establishment of vessel traffic systems. We had in this country some very minor systems in effect, but the Ports and Water- ways Safety Act was the first positive direction to create vessel traffic systems, and this system was initiated at that time, at least the plan- ning for it. Mr. BIAGGI. I had the advantage of the overflight this morning and looking at the maps and viewing the condition myself. It became apparent there are quite a number of potentially serious trouble spots along the river, the very winding nature of it, and I am sure that in some of those areas ship captains are operating almost blindly, but one of the outstanding potentials for the difficulties was the arteries coming into the river. What devices or precautions or procedures do you have for their safe entry into the river? Admiral BARROW. In each of those arteries which come into the system, the entry point, or before you arrive at the entry point, a reporting point will be established for the vessels to report into the system and they will be able to proceed only after getting a rundown on the traffic which will be in that specific sector which would affect their particular operation. Mr. BIAGGI. You say, "will be established." What do you have there now? Admiral BARROW. We have no system at all now covering this. PAGENO="0139" 135 Mr. BIAGGI. During the same flight I observed barge fleeting at the same point in the river on both sides that seemed to narrow the free water as far as the ships are concerned. Do you have restrictions as to whether or not-don't you think you should have restrictions or some regulations that would eliminate that practice? Admiral BARROW. I think the point that you are referring to proba- bly was at the Mississippi River-gulf outlet. I don't believe those are fleeting areas, but there are barges which do tie up on both sides. It is an area that we could look at. So far as I have been able to deter- mine, we have had no complaints about the traffic flow in that par- ticular area or the barges building up on either side of the waterway causing any difficulty, but I will agree that on very narrow waterways where you do have ships on either side plus in some cases fueling operations going on outboard of that, there is a potential problem. Mr. BIAGGI. We were in a position to witness the anchorage where dangerous cargo ships were moored. Would you tell this committee what special procedure or precaution is taken in connection with any dangerous cargo vessel? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. One of the elements in the reporting process into the vessel traffic system is to indentify any hazardous cargo which is aboard. This information will be entered into the com- puter and will be available for use of the operator to pass onto other users of the waterways. We will know at all times within the system what vessels have hazardous cargoes on board. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I asked you this question earlier and in my own judgment I don't think that the potential that the dangerous cargo bears is sufficiently met by simply passing along information. In the New York area we have some transportation of liquefied natural gas and, obviously it is a very potentially dangerous situation and the community is upset about it because of the potential danger. The admiral in that area has established a special procedure to deal with that. Now, sometimes a ship gets out of control for one reason or another and there could be a collision, an accident, explosion, and I don't think that the simple procedure of information passing or trans- mission would be adequate for that eventuality. Admiral BARROW. Excuse me, sir. There are other things, of course, that through the vessel traffic system are possible and not specifically tied to the hazardous cargo, although many many of the ships that pass through this area will be ships that carry hazardous cargo of one nature or the other. I think inherent in the system of knowing what you have is the capability to do other things with regard to having ships not meet at specific points which are going to cause you problems. I think you have indicated quite correctly the number of blind curves in the river where it is possible, knowing the ships, to be able to recom- mend to a vessel that they take such action as necessary so they will not meet at dangerous points in the river, and this is something that we can do. Mr. BIAGGI. Congressman Treen. Mr. TREEN. Admiral, what mechanisms have you used, either you or your predecessor, for getting industry input into the development of the vessel traffic system in this area? Admiral BARROW. In this specific area we have not had established a vessel traffic system advisory group; advisory committee. In the Hous- ton-Galveston area in 1971 or 1972, an ad hoc advisory group was set up. That was not done here. PAGENO="0140" 136 Mr. TREEN. Was it helpful in Houston to have that group? Admiral BARROW. I think very much so. ~\`Ir. TREEN. Can you tell me why that wasn't done here? Admiral BARROW. I don't believe I can answer your question on the initial stages, the 1971 or 1972 time frame. An advisory committee was asked for in late 1973 or early 1974, as my memory serves me. That coincided with a period in which there was a concern in the Govern- ment over the proliferation of advisory committees, and the judgment of Coast Guard Headquarters at that time, and this was early 1974, was that a formal advisory group was not necessary to the develop- ment of this specific system. I can't speak for that particular judgment. The judgment was made and this is not to say that there was no consultation. I think there has been since this system was first started, consultation individually and collectively with the people in the industry in this area. There was at the outset of the study process for vessel traffic systems as a whole a symposium to which people from New Orleans came. There has been published in the Federal Register a draft of environmental impact statement covering the system as well as a final environmental impact statement covering the system with very little comment. So I think there has been some consultation. Personally I think that we would have fared better to have had an earlier input in a more formal way. Mr. TREEN. Are you saying then quite frankly that you disagree with the policy established at the headquarters? Admiral BARROW. I think that a committee would have been useful. Mr. TREEN. I don't have a copy of the act, I have sent for a copy of the act and maybe counsel can help me on this. If I can't find it right away, I will come back to this point. Of course, the establishment of regulations is subject to the Administra- tive Practices Act, which calls for publication in the Federal Register, and so forth, but the feeling I get from the act is that there should be a mechanism for input by industry. I would just think-and I am not an expert at all in this area-that that is the most important thing. The act provides: In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this title, to promote the safe and efficient conduct of maritime commerce, the Secretary shall consider fully a wide variety of interests which may be affected by the exercising of his authority hereunder. Is there anything in here specifically about a committee? Mr. OLNEY. No. Mr. TREEN. Well, it appears to be the flavor or the tone of the legislation, that we must get input from all of the interests involved and I would hope that (I realize that you are bound by policy made elsewhere), but I hope that we would have a regular means of input. I assume your consultation has been on a random basis, Admiral? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. I would not want to leave the impression that this has been minimal, I don't think it has been minimal, I think it has been substantial consultation. The difference is in the format of the advice, whereas the system that was used in Houston-Galveston was a more formal process with the group sitting around the table and discussing the system and its operational requirements, as op- posed to this one. PAGENO="0141" 137 Mr. TREEN. You did feel that was helpful? Admiral BARROW. Oh, I don't think there is any question. Mr. TREEN. And you would agree it would be helpful in this area? Admiral BARROW. Well, I go on from this point to say that the package that has been developed was given by me to the Port Safety Advisory Committee in New Orleans and they have been reviewing the package that we have and are due to come up with comments on it to me at some time, I believe, during this month. Mr. TREEN. We have a representative of the Port Safety Advisory Committee here? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. What costs will be incurred by the industry, that is, the owners of vessels, in implementing your final program? I know under, of course, the previous acts, such as the Bridge-to-Bridge Communication Act, this required industry to install this equipment. Now, what, just generally what other equipment now will be required of vessel owners when your program is fully implemented? Admiral BARROW. A full answer to this is going to have to wait until a decision is taken on the question of channel 16 guard, but perhaps I can ask Commander Boyce if he has any figures on the costs involved at this time. I know we are working on development of that aspect of the economic costs on the participants and I don't know whether it has been completed at this time, but perhaps I can ask him. Mr. TREEN. Yes. Commander BoYCE. I have nothing on it, sir. Mr. TREEN. The reason I asked is that Congress, this committee and the Congress, is interested in what it costs the taxpayers generally for new rules and regulations and systems, but we are also interested m what the impact is going to be on the industry involved. This is a fortunate feeling of sensitivity that has been growing in Congress. We require a committee to report what a new bill or new law is going to cost in the terms of revenues and we are getting around now to where we are requiring the committee to report on what it is going to cost the industry or the affected people. So that is something that we will be interested in; I would, at least. How many people are you going to have assigned to this program when it is fully implemented? Commander BOYCE. Thirty-nine. Admiral BARROw.Thirty-nine altogether. Mr. TREEN. Of course, you will have some people on around the clock, won't you? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. That would mean a total of 39 people given the around- the-clock operation? Admiral BARROW. No, sir. The 39 people is the total manning requirement for the center itself including the commanding officer and supervisory personnel and watch standers within the system. Mr. TREEN. At any one time it would be 39 people? Admiral BARROW. No, sir, that is the total requirement for the center. I don't know whether that includes the personnel to man the lights at Algiers Point. Commander BOYCE. It does not. PAGENO="0142" 138 Admiral BARROW. It does not. There will be some additional person- nel required to initially man the lights at Algiers Point which are now being operated by the Corps of Engineers. We are not unmindful of the economic cost of this. I might point out that we are not at the point of a notice of pro- proposed rulemaking, we are still in the consultative point at this time. We have not forwarded any of the regulations on the system to Coast Guard headquarters, so the process of developing an eèonomic impact on the industry is still to be accomplished, as well as necessary leadtime for the users of the system to secure the equipment and get it into place. Mr. TREEN. The economic impact would include not only the addi- tional equipment that industry might have to acquire, but additional manning requirement that industry might be subjected to. Your system is going to control access or entry into the system from the Gulf Intracoastal Waterways. If that begins at the point where the Intracoastal enters the Mississippi or the inner harbor navigational canal, it is a little bit too late then, isn't it, to tell a tow that they can't enter? It would seem to me that if you are going to deny or delay entry at the access point, that it would be better to cover a little larger area. I would suspect that some of these tows would find it easier to lay back a few miles away than to get stacked up at the locks. If I am all wet, say so. Admiral BARROW. I don't think you are all wet, Congressman. On this specific point, one of the committees, the subgroups of the Port Safety Advisory Committee that is looking at the package which was developed as a proposal is an area subgroup, subcommittee, and presumably this would be something perhaps they could recommend to us. If indeed you need to go 1 mile or 2 miles or a certain distance in the canal in order to lead into it, I would think that this is something that they could come up and make a recommendation to us on. I agree that it is not always best to wait until you get right into the area in order to plug into the system, but this is something that they could give their recommendations on. Mr. TREEN. I hope that I will hear from industry members on that subject. One last question, Mr. Chairman, I was under the impression thatthe harbor traffic light system was in use all of the time. Is it just in periodic use, just in high water times? Admiral BARROW. High water times. Mr. TREEN. Only? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. There have been recommendations over the years to continue this on a year-around scheme. Mr. TREEN. What is involved? Assuming that there is some benefit, what is the cost of going from just seasonal or intermittent use to full-time use? Admiral BARROW. I think I would defer to the Corps of Engineers. Mr. TREEN. That's right; it is under the Corps of Engineers jurisdic- tion. You haven't taken that over yet? Admiral BARROW. No, sir. In fact, we have not formed an agreement with the Corps of Engineers on this subject; we still have to negotiate an agreement. Mr. TREEN. You want some of their budget along with some of their responsibilities. PAGENO="0143" 1') 10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Admiral. We have 10 witnesses and in order to provide each one, as I said at the outset, with an oppor- tunity to speak, I will ask respective counsel to hold their questions and submit them in writing to you, Admiral, and you can respond and serve them in the record. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you for your contribution. Col. Early J. Rush III, district engineer, New Orleans. STATEMENT OP COL. EARLY ~1. RUSH III, DISTRICT ENGINEER, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OP ENGINEERS Colonel Rusn. Mr. Chairman, I am Col. Early J. Rush III, district engineer, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of En- gineers. I appreciate the fact that the subcommittee recognizes the role that the Corps of Engineers plays in the development, operation, and maintenance of our Nation's waterways. I also appreciate your invitation to appear before this subcommittee today in its evaluation of local vessel traffic safety problems and the Coast Guard's plans for a vessel traffic system on the Mississippi River. I believe you should know that I assumed my current position as district engineer on August 25, 1975. Additionally, I have with me Mr. Henry Schorr of my operations division. My statement is brief and, therefore, I would like to give it in its entirety. Since 1933, the Corps of Engineers has operated a visual system of traffic control lights in the New Orleans Harbor. This system is essentially designed to limit traffic to one way around Algiers Point during periods of high water only. The system consists of three lights: One located below Algiers Point on the east bank of the river atop the Governor Nicholls Wharf; a second light on a tower on the west bank levee at Gretna, La.; and a third light on a tower on the west bank levee at Westwego, La. The Governor Nicholls light controls upbound vessel movements while the Gretna and Westwego lights control downbound traffic. Vessels proceed or hold up, depending upon whether the light is green or red. The Governor Nicholls and Gretna towers are manned by professional pilots who are temporary hire employees of the New Orleans District. These locations have radio communications with vessels using the river. The Westwego light is remote controlled from the Gretna tower. Historically, the operation of the system has been governed by the river stages as read on the Carrollton Gage located at River Mile 102.8 above Head of Passes. Originally this system went into operation at a reading of 12 feet on the Carrollton Gage when the river was rising and went out of operation at 15 feet when the river was falling. In 1955, regulations were revised, and the lights were turned on at a 10-foot gage reading on a rising river and discontinued at 12 feet on a falling river. Since 1968, because of the increase in number and size of vessels using the river, the lights are operated between an 8-foot gage reading on a rising river and a 9-foot gage reading on a falling river. During the last three high water seasons, the lights were operated an average of about 6 months a year. 78-280-76-10 PAGENO="0144" 140 While we feel there is a definite need for a vessel traffic system, particularly in the New Orleans Harbor, we do not feel we can properly address the scope or manner in which the system would operate with- out the advantage of extensive studies with the Coast Guard and maritime interests. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today, and I or Mr. Schorr will be happy to answer any questions that you, Mr. Treen, or your counsels may have. Mr. BIAGGI. I have one question. The problem of shoaling and silting seems to be perpetual. What can be done besides dredging? Colonel RUSH. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Mississippi River drains approximately 41 percent of the United States, that is, the continental United States. As water is generated in the watershed area, it does erode soil and that soil is carried with the Mississippi as the sediment load. The area here, of course, was built by this type of action as far as the river and its sediment load are concerned. Therefore, we have to expect that we will continue to have sediment deposited in this area and that we will have to continue dredging in order to maintain shipping channels for our navigation potential and also for the com- merce of the Nation. I guess the real question is the quantity of dredging that is required in any given year. During periods of extreme high water, such as we have experienced in the past 3 years, the need and quantity of dredging increase dramatically. At those times we have to pull together as much of the dredging capability that we can in order to cope with the problem. We have done this in the past, not without some impacts elsewhere and not without a significant increase in the funds required for it. Mr. BIAGGI. Are there any efforts or any studies or research being undertaken in connection with finding alternative methods of dis- posing of the silt? Colonel RUSH. We do have a study underway at the present time which is an effort to identify ways which will permit more consistent maintenance of channel dimensions, particularly in the Southwest Pass area, which is where we do the most significant amount of our dredging. We hope that these structures would tend to control the river and reduce the rates of siltation in the navigation channel. In our deposition of materials we are, of course, at the present time utilizing two methods; one, a corps-owned hopper dredge which works for New Orleans district most of the time when it is not in mainte- nance, and two, contract cutter-head dredges, which work the other areas that are most suitable for that type of equipment. The hopper dredge actually uses two disposal methods. When river velocities are strong enough to carry resuspended materials out to sea, the hopper dredge simply agitates the bottom material into suspension. This method moves more material out in a given amount of time. However, as river velocities decrease, the dredge must load its hoppers and haul the material to disposal sites in deep waters of the gulf. The cutter-head dredges utilize pipelines and water to deposit that material into disposal sites adjacent to the river banks. Mr. BIAGGI. How does the existing visual system relate to the vessel traffic system once that is put into effect? PAGENO="0145" 141 Colonel RUSH. Well, as Admiral Barrow indicated, the system would be turned over to the Coast Guard for its operation. I don't know specifically how that integration will take place, but that would be the concept, we would no longer operate it in the corps. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, will that visual system be continued or dis- continued or incorporated into the whole system? Admiral BARROW. The visual system would be continued in opera- tion by the Coast Guard until the low light level TV surveillance system was placed into effect and then some period beyond that time to insure that the needs of navigation could be taken care of through the television system as compared with the actual onsite people. After that approved period and once we were satisfied that the system could be controlled from VTC, we would discontinue the people who were actually operating the lights on scene. Mr. BIAGGI. Congressman Treen. Mr. TREEN. Colonel Rush, I appreciate you being here very much. The Atchafalaya takes part of that 41-percent drainage- Colonel RUSH. It certainly does, Mr. Treen. Mr. TREEN. I want to note for the record that goes through my district, too, the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya. We have lots of problems over there in that area, too. How many people are involved in manning the traffic light system? Colonal RUSH. There are nine people involved. Mr. TREEN. Nine when you have it in operation? Colonel RUSH. That is correct. Mr. TREEN. That is about 6 months out of the year for that? Colonel RUSH. For the last 3 years. Under a normal year, when we don't have extensive high water, our operation has averaged about 2 months per year. Mr. TREEN. You just hire pilots for that time, and then they are off your payroll? Colonel RUSH. Yes, sir. We have a list of people who are available and interested in that type of work and in our judgment qualified to perform that function. We then hire them on that temporary basis during either the 2-or up to 6-month timeframe when we are in the high water period. I might add- Mr. TREEN. That is just for control around Algiers Point? Colonel RUSH. That is correct, Mr. Treen. I might add that the cost which was questioned before is approximately $14,000 per month in order to employ the nine individuals to provide around-the-clock operations. So the annual cost would depend upon the degree of time that we actually operated the system. Mr. TREEN. What else under your jurisdiction are you going to surrender to the Coast Guard when this VTS is fully implemented? How about permitting of fleeting operations, will you retain that? Colonel RUSH. We will retain permitting of fleeting operations. Mr. TREEN. And of the locks? Colonel RUSH. And the locks remain under our control as well. Mr. TREEN. I would presume under the vessel traffic system ac- cess would become the Coast Guard's responsibility then, wouldn't it, under the system? If they scheduled the ships through the access into the system, then they are going to be necessarily telling you-well, I guess they will be telling the vessels. PAGENO="0146" 142 Colonel RUSH. I don't know the exact details that will be worked out in that regard, however, I am sure there will have to be close coordination between the corps and the Coast Guard. Mr. TREEN. Do you have any or do you see any problems? Colonel RUSH. I don't believe so. Mr. TREEN. I am sure there won't be any problems between you two gentlemen- Colonel RUSH. I don't believe so. Mr. TREEN. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Counsel has some questions and they will submit those to you in writing. I would appreciate it if you would respond through them to the committee. Colonel RUSH. We will be pleased to answer those for the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. I imagine when the day of surrender comes of jurisdic- tion, the meeting will have to take place in Geneva. STATEMENT OP CAPT. HENRY U. JOPPRAY, ASSOCIATE PORT DIRECTOR, PORT OP NEW ORLEANS Capt. Henry G. Joifray, associate port director, Port of New Orleans. Mr. JOFFRAY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Treen, gentlemen of the staff, I am Henry G. Joffray, associate port director for the Board of Com- missioners for the Port of New Orleans. I have rendered a statement on the Board's position relative to the vessel traffic system, but I would like to highlight certain facets of the statement. [The statement follows:] STATEMENT OF HENRY G. JOFFRAY I am Henry G. Joifray, associate port director of the Port of New Orleans. In the calendar year 1974, 144,000,000 tons of waterborne commerce transited the Port of New Orleans area. During this period, 125,000 barges passed through our port area. On any given day, 10 percent of all the barges on U.S. inland waterways are in the Port of New Orleans. In addition, there were 15,181 cargo vessel movements thrqugh the Port of New Orleans. Also, there were 1,921 tankers moving through our port. Safety statistics indicate that most of the accidents in the Port of New Orleans involved collisions between inland barges and tugs and oceangoing vessels. If barge traffic continues to increase and ships continue to get larger and less maneuverable, accidents will be more frequent and more costly in terms of lives, property damage, and damage to the environment. There are certain adverse conditions that recur each year to test the navi- gational skills of both the small and large vessel operators. During the period from December through February, heavy fog reduces visibility as a result of cool air from the north meeting warmer moist air from the Gulf of Mexico. According to NOOA statistics, New Orleans has 31 days of heavy fog per year. This is not any higher than other post areas on the Gulf, Atlantic, or Pacific Coasts, however, the heavy traffic and type of traffic in this port area makes navigation particularly hazardous during this period of reduced visibility. Also, the heavy traffic in the restricted passes at the mouth of the river presents additional navigational hazards. The hazardous situation on the river is compounded by other problems during this same period of time (December through February) because in addition to the fog, the current velocity on the river is at its highest. With increasing stages of the river, we can expect swift and unpredictable eddy currents and a changing channel bottom. PAGENO="0147" 143 River elevations reached flood stages in 1973 and in 1974. In 1973, we were plagued with barge breakaways resulting from swift currents, inadequate barge fleeting areas, and questionable fleeting practices. In 1974, as a result of safety measures initiated by the U.S. Coast Guard and traffic controls which were made mandatory, the Port of New Orleans did not experience the barge breakaway problem to the extent as in 1973, even though the fog and river currents were comparable. This attests to the fact that safety measures and traffic controls are effective. A safe port is a healthy port. By considering current trends in commerce, vessel traffic, known geographic and logistical factors, known weather and river condi- tions, and considering the opinions of persons knowledgeable in navigation through the port area, we can make some progress on safety and environmental conditions. We believe the following procedures and programs will contribute to an effective safety program for our port: A vessel traffic system acceptable to Government and industry. Additional barge fleeting areas which comply with appropriate safety standards. Maintenance of Mississippi River authorized project channel depth of 40 feet and provision of a deeper navigation channel for the longer term. A new ship/barge lock downstream of the general anchorage area to more safely accommodate barge traffic and to provide an alternate route to the Gulf of Mexico for deep draft vessels. Mr. JOFFRAY. We naturally have a great concern for the safety of our port area. As Admiral Barrow indicated, we are the second largest port in the United States in total waterborne commerce. Last year we handled over 144 million tons of cargo through our port area. The vessels that accommodate this cargo represent a tremendous amount of traffic. In fact, within our port reaches, this is the most dense traffic area on the inland waterways system in America. On any given day, 10 percent of all of the barges of the United States are located in the Port of New Orleans. We have 2,000 to 3,000 barges in our port region, for instance, today. We have anywhere from 50 to 100 vessels per day. As I mentioned before, compounding this traffic, we have some physical restraints in our geographical layout. As you know, the city is in a crescent and one of the areas that presents a tremendous hazard and a difficult problem for navigation is the Algiers Point. In excess of 180,000 bottoms rounded that point last year. This is a 90-degree bend where you have limited visibility at best and you compound that with about 30 days of fog during the navigational year and any- where from the 4- to 6-knot current during high water, you can see you have the ingredients for some serious holocausts that could occur. We are very concerned in that respect, also. Another factor that is entering in, we see more and more in our deep draft vessels an increase in size. It used to be that a 500-foot vessel with maybe 12,000 tons was a considerable-sized vessel in the normal day-to-day port operation. Just in the first month of this year we handled more large vessels of the OBO type, 600 feet and over, than we handled all of last year. So we see tremendous growth factors in the size and dead weight of the vessels that come upon us very rapidly. Naturally your larger ships are confronted with the restraints that I just mentioned, the currents and fog and reduced speed because of congested situations within your harbor area, the maneuverability is essened to the extent that is is more difficult for them to safely op - erate within the restraints of the port's physical layout. PAGENO="0148" 144 In 1973, we had here within the port during this high water inci- dent and during our fog season a situation where we had 130 runaway barges* that got loose in the port area. Fortunately, the extent of the damage was minimal considering what could have happened in that instance. Well, immediately after, and particularly more so in 1974, the Coast Guard initiated safety measures and operations that I think attest to the effectiveness of the traffic system or the initia- tion of such measures as to the safety of the port and its cargo ac- tivities because on 1974, the incidence of runaway barges was prac- tically nil, mainly because of the industry cooperating with the Coast Guard that we were able to have a very good track record for that year. I heard an economist mention the other day in another panel dis- cussion that I attended that maritime commerce, if you generate $100 in revenue, you net out about $5, but for every $100 that you save in preventive measures on accidents will increase your cash flow by $50. I think it is of vital interest to the industry, anything to enhance safety improves their profit picture in the overall financial return of their operations. So in conclusion and consideration of these facts that has led our Board to very definitely support the initiation and operation of a vessel traffic system within our area, and I would be glad at this time to answer any questions. Mr. BIAGGI. I don't think I have any questions, Mr. Joifray, hut I would like to first thank you for your contribution and your testi- mony. I think it should be said that the Coast Guard and the indus- try, by working together, ought to be congratulated because from my observations this morning, it confounds me that you . don't have more serious accidents on this river, and it is a tribute to the industry and the men who pilot those boats and, of course, the Coast Guard. Hopefully, the installation of the vessel traffic system will reduce that incidence of accidents even more. I like the perspective you put on it. You make more money by not spending it on accidents. Of course, the. economics are very compelling and industry, I am sure, will cooperate. Thank you very much for yor contribution. Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Joifray, for coming. What kind of economic impact do you see to the port from the full implementation of this system? I realize that we don't know all of the details of the system yet. We talked about the industry already. Is it going to have any impact one way or the other on the port itself or the revenues of the port? Mr. J0FFRAY. I would think that if the system is advisory in nature and if it is not too rigidly structured that there are encumbrances* placed upon the industry that could hamper or delay their operations, I think it would be a positve measure in the port. If it is, say, an over- kill type situation where it is too rigid and too structured and you entail delays, I can't speak too well for inland waterways costs, but on the deep sea you are going anywhere from $5,000 to $30,000 per day per vessel. As I say, if you delay these ships for any period of time because trying to adhere to certain provisions of the system that are compelling or mandatory, it could have a detrimental effect in that regard, but, otherwise, other than the financial outlays of the industry, and I think most of them have the necessary radio equipment and PAGENO="0149" 145 some have radar. I don't know what the encumbrances would be on industry as far as financial outlay, but I think in the long run if these safety measures were initiated, it would enhance not oniy the revenues of the port, but those of the industry. Mr. TREEN. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. One question. You mentioned that the size of the ships were increasing. What is the width of the largest ship that can pass through these locks? Mr. JOFFRAY. Well, the present lock is 75 feet wide; there is a new lock proposed, construction of a new lock, which I think in conjunction with the vessel traffic should help the overall safety situation of the port, and the width of that lock will be 150 feet. Presently we are re- strained because we have got a lot of ships 90-foot in beam that can't get through the existing locks because that is the controlling width within the lock. Mr. BIAGGI. That seems to be a trend, the increasing size of ships. I was down in Panama and they are just about skimming through. Mr. JOFFRAY. It certainly is. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. Mr. Norman K. Doucet, president, Gulf Coast Towing Association. STATEMENT OP NORMAN K. DOUCET, PRESIDENT, GULP COAST TOWING ASSOCIATION Mr. D OUCET. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen, members of the committee staff, 1 have a prepared statement. First of all, I should say my name is Norman Doucet. My address is 2614 South Bayou Drive in Golden Meadow, La. I am president of the Gulf Coast Towing Association. I have a prepared statement here which I will make and a time or two I may stray from it. The Gulf Coast Towing Association is a 3-year-old trade organization which represents approximately* 59 towing companies operating throughout the gulf coast. Originally formed to respond to the towing vessel operators licensing regulations, the Gulf Coast Towing Assothation gives a voice to the smaller firms that operate on the Mississippi River and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. Our members are committed to safety on the waterways. When your livelihood depends upon a vessel that you own and operate, it is easy to become personally involved in waterways safety. We are sin- cerely interested in the Coast Guard's proposed vessel traffic system regulations and we appreciate having this opportunity to express our views on the general subject of vessel traffic controls. The members of the Gulf Coast Towing Association believe that radio telephone communications are the singlernost important factor in vessel traffic safety. We note that a Coast Guard vessel traffic sys- tems issue study completed in 1973 concluded that the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone requirements would result in an 80 percent reduction in collisions between moving* vessels. If that projected improvement has not been realized, it is because there has been a lack of enforce- ment of proper radio procedure on the channel 13, the bridge-to-bridge frequency. PAGENO="0150" 146 Mr. BIAGGI. Would you be a little more detailed as far as that last statement is concerned? Mr. DOUCET. Yes, sir, I will come back to that a little later, if you don't mind. I have got something that I want to come back to on this certain thing here. Improved bridge-to-bridge communications will contribute the most to vessel traffic safety at the least expense. We feel that the Coast Guard should not give up on the present system without a concerted effort to realize its full safety potential. The Gulf Coast Towing Association is currently conducting an education program in proper radio telephone procedures for its members. We urge the Federal Communications Commission and Coast Guard meet their respon- sibilities for enforcing circuit discipline on the bridge-to-bridge frequency. A review of the Coast Guard's draft regulations indicates that the proposed communications system may be unworkable. Existing regulations require a vessel operator to monitor channels 13 and 16 in addition to the company frequencies he may be using. The proposed regulations would require the addition of three more radio channels to the vessel's communications equipment and the continuous moni- toring of at least three separate frequencies. Aside from the additional expense this requirement would entail, we feel that the proposed system would not be practical because it will burden the already busy operator with the requirement to listen to and sift through three continuous sources of radio communications. In short, we feel that a system already exists which will improve vessel traffic safety in the New Oreleans area; a more effective utiliza- tion of channel 13. We recommend that the Coast Guard, FCC, and industry try to make the present system work before implementing a multimillion dollar system that may create more problems than exist now. We recommend that the Coast Guard, FCC, and the industry try to make the present system work. Now, this is where I will answer your question. We also have FCC, Federal Communications Commis- sion. The FCC is, I believe, the Federal agency, regulatory agency, for any kind of radio communications. I have been to meetings throughout the State of Louisiana and throughout other States and I have talked a lot about the traffic system, but up until today I have never seen an agent of FCC in any of our meetings, and yet they are the people that are going to regulate us. I believe-and this is my only thought- Mr. BIAGGI. Have you invited them? Mr. DOUCET. I think they have been invited to some of our Port Safety Council meetings. Mr. BIAGGI. They should be there. Mr. DOUCET. I know they have been invited to our association meetings, but it seems like they are too busy monitoring stations in Allegan, Mich., and Kingsville, Tex., and issuing out citations for not using call letters and not waiting for 2-minute intervals, they are too busy doing that and they can't come to New Orleans. Mr. BIAGGI. New Orleans is part of the United States and it is part of their responsibility. Mr. DOTJCET. Well, I believe-and this is my belief only-but I believe if FCC would have gotten involved in this and would have PAGENO="0151" 147 taken the local people that cause these traffic jams off of the air, and I think it is very simple to do that, I don't believe we would have to even talk about a vessel traffic system around here today. However, we are in favor of a vessel traffic system for the city of New Orleans because the way it is operating now, we need it. I think I have gotten my point across about the FCC. Mr. BIAGGI. Before you go further, Mr. Doucet, I would like to stay with that point because that was the question I was going to raise. I think the admiral touched on it when he mentioned the three fre- quencies and he thought there might be some difficulty. If I recollect correctly, Admiral, you testified that you were dealing with some alternatives in connection with the three frequencies? Admiral BARROW. One of the recommendations that has been made here, as well as in New York, is that once vessels report in to vessel traffic systems, the requirement for monitoring channel 16 be dispensed with. So, in fact, if that were the case, and this, of course, has not been agreed to by FCC or anybody else, but if this were the case, a vessel in the system would be required to monitor the sector frequently and channel 13. Mr. BIAGGI. Has the Coast Guard been in touch with FCC in connection with this problem? Admiral BARROW. This is a matter which is going to be taken care of between Coast Guard headquarters and FCC. It is a matter under active consideration and active interplay right now; yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. How does that proposal set with your industry? Mr. DOUCET. Well, sir, I am speaking as a man that has put in 28 years of actually running up and down this river in this part of the country. I just got off the boats in the month of February and I think I know the ropes. I still say that the way this VTS program is set up now, that it will not work on that one condition, that there will be too many radio frequencies for a man to listen to all day long. You have got channel 13, which you do have to stand by on the river now for ships traffic; you have got channel 16, the emergency frequency for the Coast Guard, and it is also an emergency frequency put out by FCC. You also have a company frequency that you have got to keep in contact with your company. That gives you three frequencies and then if you add one or two more frequencies that you have got to operate for VTS, you will have just too many people talking at one time. Mr. BIAGGI. Is your point of view reflected on the advisory council? Mr. DOUCET. On the VTS advisory council? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Mr. DOUCET. I am on the steering committee here in New Orleans on the YTS group. Mr. BIAGGI. You should make your point emphatic in that area. Apparently there is an effort to conciliate that situation. I think it has been acknowledged that there is some confusion. Mr. DOUCET. Well, to tell you truthfully, I would like to see a good .VTS program, but something that will work. This is the only drawback that I can see, too many frequencies involved to monitor around the city of New Orleans at one time and that is the only drawback that we have got on it. Now, to keep on with my statement- PAGENO="0152" 148 Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, in connection with this discussion, how would you resolve this so that there is mutual agreement, consistent with the safety of the vessel in the vessel traffic system? Admiral BARROW. I don't believe I understand the question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. The witness testified very strongly that there is an extra burden and obviously some diminution of effectiveness of a three- frequency process. I think you and I chatted about this, and I think you testified that there might be some confusion and something should be done. Just how far can you go and be consistent with your ultimate objective? Admiral BARROW. At this level, Mr. Chairman, I think nothing other than to make recommendations to the Commandant for pursuing through FCC. I would agree, and I'm sure that the people in our Coast Guard contingent here would be that for a towboat to try to monitor channel 16, channel 13, and a sector frequency would be awfully diffi-. cult, if not impossible, in connection with running a good vessel traffic system. I think there has to be some relief on this in order to have a viable system. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Mr. TREEN. Can I ask a question? Mr. BIAGGI. Certainly. Mr. TREEN. Norman, you have got three frequencies that you are monitoring now, 13, 16, and your company frequency? Mr. DOUcET. Right. Mr. TREEN. Under the VTS system it would be one additional, rather than three additional. I mean, there are three frequencies used in the system, but you have only been monitoring one of those; is that correct Admiral Barrow? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. I think what the .witness was trying to say was the additional channels that he would have to add to his radio in order to accommodate- Mr. TREEN. Right, but as far as monitoring, you have got one more? Mr. DOUcET. Right. Mr. TREEN. Now, one of the frequencies that you monitor now is channel 16, the emergency frequency? Mr. DoucET. Right. Mr. TREEN. That is used by the Coast Guard for emergency messages. When you get into the VTS system, Admiral Barrow, why couldn't the requirement for monitoring 16 be expended and emer- gency messages then given over the VTS system? In a sense it is going to be run by the Coast Guard. Why should operators have to monitor two Coast Guard frequencies? Admiral BARROW. The channel 16 guard is an FCC requirement purely and simply. Vessels would in addition have to guard the VTS sector frequency and channel 13, the bridge-to-bridge frequency. Mr. TREEN. I mean, from your point of view, do you see any problems? Admiral BARROW. No, sir, although the monitoring of channel 16 for ships in the system would probably require additional equipment and personnel in VTC. Mr. TREEN. What do you think of that, Mr. Doucet? Mr. DOUcET. Well, that still falls under FCC, the regulatory agency, and still we don't hear from them people. PAGENO="0153" 149 Mr. TREEN. I understand, but assuming that this can be accom- plished, do you have any problem with that? In other words, as you move into the YTS system, then you are monitoring-I realize you still have got to have all of these channels on your equipment-but as far as monitoring these frequencies, if you have only the one fre- quency, the YTS frequency for the sector that you are in over which you would also get any emergency messages that you would get on your channel 16, is there anything wrong with that? Mr. DOUCET. No; if FCC will comply with it. Mr. TREEN. Thank you. Mr. DOUCET. If a VTS is implemented in the New Orleans area, we recommend that it not extend above the Huey P. Long Bridge. A review of the proposed VTS rules by the ad hoc steering committee indicated that there is some question of justification of a vessel traffic system above the bridge. In light of that question, we feel that a logical step-by-step approach should be used to implement the VTS. In fact, this form of phased approach was recommended by a General Accounting Office study of vessel traffic systems. We ask that the Coast Guard follow the GAO recommendation by using a phased approach in the New Orleans area. Ouly after experience is gained in limited area and a need is identified in an additional area should the program be expanded. Discussions by the ad hoc steering committee also indicated that this vessel traffic system may be the forerunner of more extensive forms of vessel traffic control. The members of the Gulf Coast Towing Association do not feel that there is identifiable need at the present time for the implementation of other forms of vessel control such as tonnage, horsepower limitations, or speed limits. President Ford has asked the executive agencies to seek ways to reduce the administrative and regulatory burden they place on the private sector. We hope that the Members of Congress will help the Chief Executive hold the regulatory agencies to his orders. In conclusion, we feel that the goal of improved navigational safety can best be achieved by using and improving the present system of bridge-to-bridge communications. We feel that we should try to make the present system work before spending millions of dollars on an untried and possibly impractical form of vessel traffic control. If a vessel traffic system is to be implemented, we ask that it extend above the Huey P. Long Bridge only if the need exists and only when the system is tested in a smaller area. We further ask the Members of Congress to do what they can to check the growing power of Federal bureaucracy. Thank you again for giving the members of the Gulf Coast Towing Association this opportunity to express their views. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Doucet. I have no questions. I think we, in our colloquy, established a very important point and one that I'm sure will be given proper attention by the Coast Guard and FCC as well as this committee. It recognizes a problem and the question is how to resolve it. As far as the Coast Guard is concerned, apparently there seems to be no objection to the suggestion of Congressman Treen, that it is a question of dealing with FCC. I don't know the flexibility of that agency as far as this particular regulation is con- cerned. I see smiling faces and that means the executive will continue to remain the executive and intransigent. PAGENO="0154" 150 Mr. TREEN. Not altogether. Mr. BIAGGI. I hope this is the exception that proves the rule. I don't simply mean this administration. Now we agree. Mr. DOUCET. I must say this, that around the city of New Orleans there is very good harmony between the U.S. Coast Guard, between the industry, the ship pilots, the pilot's association and, as far as I am concerned, the only people that we haven't been able to get too much out of or associate with us is the Federal Communications Commission. Mr. TREEN. Could I ask one question; Do you see any problems with regard to entry into the vessel traffic system area from the Intra- coastal Canal? If you get to the point of entry and you have got to get stacked up there, what sort of problems--- Mr. DOUCET. Well, my understanding, as far as the inharbor navigational canal is concerned, my understanding is that the YTS program will extend to the, well, I know it will extend to MRGO- Mr. TREEN. Extend to what? Mr. DOUCET. Extend to the Mississippi River-gulf outlet. (MRGO) That is where most of these tows that are coming from the east, they have got to come through the system, so they will be through the system at the intersection before they ever come through the locks. Am I right, Admiral? Admiral BARROW. Yes. Mr. TREEN. Within a section of the- Mr. DOUCET. Of the Industrial Canal and the Mississippi River- gulf outlet. Mr. TREEN. There is not a lot of distance there, is there, from that intersection---- Mr. DOUCET. That may not be a lot of distance, but by God, there's a lot of waiting. Admiral BARROW. One of the things that we are going to investigate and, in fact, are investigating are improved communications between the vessel traffic center and each of the locks in order to determine what the status would be at the locks. One of the things we can do with that would be to pass this information to tows that are ap- proaching the reporting-in point to give them what the waiting time is going to be at that specific area, and hopefully to decrease some of the problem in getting to a lock and having to stay there and wait. We are investigating teletype communications, and things of that sort, with the lock. Mr. TREEN. How about coming in from the west? Mr. DOUCET. I don't know where the traffic system will start from the west. I would like to see it start anywhere west of the Algiers Lock or Harvey Locks. If we do wait until the boats come into the river itself to enter them into the system, then it's a little late. Mr. TREEN. How far, in your judgment, would you have to go in distance from the locks back to accommodate periods of heavy traffic? Mr. DOUCET. I think that if the locks themselves would be put into the system, when a man calls in for lockage from the canal side, it gives them plenty of time to be prepared for what he is going to meet. Mr. TREEN. How far away is a tow when it calls to the lock? Mr. DOUCET. Usually around the Harvey Locks, usually about a mile away from the Harvey Locks and at the Algiers Locks, he is usually about three-quarters of a mile when he gets to the Algiers PAGENO="0155" 151 Highway Bridge, and that should give them sufficient time to be prepared for what is out on the river when he gets out. Mr. TREEN. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. William C. McNeal, marine consultant. STATEMENT OP WILLIAM C. McNEAL, MARINE CONSULTANT Mr. MCNEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you said that this record would be open for people to submit contributions, would that be for as long a period as 30 days? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Mr. MCNEAL. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak here today. I am William C. McNeal of 2519 Bristol Place, New Orleans, and I appear on behalf of Mid-South Towing Co. and Gulf Coast Transit Co., both of 4251 Henderson Boulevard in Tampa, and I personally subscribe to this statement. We know that vessel traffic safety in this area, with respect to avoiding collisions, has improved in the past few years despite major floods in 1973 and 1974. The primary reason was congressional action in 1971 in passing the Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Act. This made it mandatory that all large commercial vessels have a common radio with an ability for pilot-to-pilot communication. It was effective January 1, 1973. Other safety improvements have come from the law licensing most towing vessel operators and the increased on-the-river presence of Coast Guard vessels and personnel. We do not believe that the wide-ranging and costly vessel traffic system now being imposed on the area will substantially improve safety. We do believe that full time, instead of seasonal, use of the New Orleans Harbor traffic lights would contribute to increased vessel traffic safety. We urge this full-time operation. The lights have been run by the Corps of Engineers since 1952, and we think that a vessel movement reporting system in the immediate New Orleans Harbor area would improve collision avoidance to a degree that warrants establishment of such a system. This should be done between the Huey P. Long Bridge and Belle Chasse. We also suggest that you closely review the actions of the Federal Communications Commission in establishing rules that require listen- ing to more than one marine radio channel simultaneously and in failing to enforce their rules about misuse of vessel radio telephones. These are general views; let me explain them. The New Orleans Vessel Traffic System, as now being built by the Coast Guard, covers about 330 miles of Louisiana's rivers and canals. This plan was devised without any consultation with industry despite the fact that in 1971 the then Commandant of the Coast Guard assured your subcommittee that such would be done prior to the imposition of a traffic system. In 1969 discussions, the Coast Guard's local officer in charge of marine inspection and captain of the Port of New Orleans both agreed that a vessel traffic system was needed in New Orleans Harbor, but only from Algiers Point downriver to Meraux. Now the Coast Guard has a new, much-expanded view. We recognize difficulties inherent in PAGENO="0156" 152 the formation of formal advisory committees caused primarily by over- regulation, but they have been used to formulate vessel traffic systems in New York, Houston, and Louisville. We think the use of such a group here would have precluded the planning errors now apparently built into the monster system. We urge the Coast Guard be instructed not to repeat this mistake in other areas in the future. With full Coast Guard cooperation, I have been able to review the casualty data that is given as the jurisdiction for the giant vessel traffic system. My analysis of the data indicates a need for the sys- tem from the Huey P. Long Bridge to Belle Chasse, a possible need for a system downriver from Belle Chasse to the sea buoy, no need whatsoever in the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet where commercial vessel traffic is rare, and no need upriver from the Huey P. Long Bridge. The Coast Guard data includes the period from 1968 to 1973, and includes only 6 months of operation under the Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Act and none under the Towboat Operator Licensing Act. The data does include such unrelated items as groundings, barge breakaways, and rammings of docks and other fixed objects in water- ways as well as vessel collisions. We do not think a vessel traffic system will be of much help except in preventing vessel collisions. I am certain both my analysis and the Coast Guard analysis can be questioned since the data is suspect. Maybe the Coast Guard phrased it best when they stated: The total benefit of a particular vessel traffic system cannot be determined from available data. . . . These benefits are either difficult to convert to dollars or dollar benefits are difficult to obtain; however, they must be evaluated before a conclusive cost/benefit analysis . . . can be made. We urge you obtain such analysis for the Louisiana vessel traffic system. We also feel that the Coast Guard should comply with the spirit of Executive Order 11821 and submit a study of the inflationary impact of the vessel traffic system plan as it affects both the industry being regulated and the high cost to the American taxpayer. We also need your help in dealing with the radio communications problem in our business. The Coast Guard planned rules under the Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Act that made it possible and necessary for nearly all vessels underway to have and use a radio to talk with others in the immediate area. This was a simple, common- sense, and good sense idea. Then the Federal Communications Com- mission stepped in and said that a pilot had to listen simultaneously to a second radio channel. You can imagine how this works. Now the Coast Guard plans to have us monitor simultaneously a third channel while in the vessel traffic system here. The primary reason for this is simply the failure of the Federal Communications Commission to police misuse of the original bridge-to-bridge channel so it is overcrowded and cannot be relied on for vessel traffic. Obviously a pilot cannot listen effectively to three radio channels at once. If any of you have ever tried to take simultaneous orders from your mother- in-law, your wife, and your daughter, I think you will understand the problems. As a result, safety suffers. In summary, we recommend that the Algiers traffic light be put into full-time service; that a vessel movement reporting system be insti- tuted from the Huey P. Long Bridge to Bell Chasse; that the formal PAGENO="0157" 153 advisory committee be organized to consider vessel traffic system plans; that the New Orleans-Louisiana system be properly analyzed for economic benefits; that an inflation impact statement be drawn up for the system; that the marine radio telephone rules be both corrected and enforced. I thank you for your time. Mr. BIAGGI. I want to thank you for a very precise statement. Apparently you have touched a number of very critical and sensitive areas. I know you were in the room while we were talking in terms of the three-channel business and obviously the FCC will have to be dealt with on that basis, so I think there is a unanimity of opinion as far as the burdening of the pilot in receiving messages from three people at the same time. Mr. MCNEAL. What happens, sir, is that obviously one of them is going to be received and the other two are going to be tuned out. Mr. BIAGGI. That is obvious and we are aware of that. The admiral has testified to that fact and the Coast Guard will talk to the FCC, as stated by Admiral Barrow earlier in connection with this particular relation. It causes a problem and it has been recognized. I was under the impression, correct me if I am wrong, but I was under the impression that we had a form of advisory committee in this area. Admiral BARROW. We do not have an advisory committee estab- lished in accordance with the formal process whereby the people's names are submitted, with their background, and they are agreed to formally with the agenda published in the Federal Register, no, sir, we do not. Mr. BIAGGI. Is there any particular reason why we don't? Admiral BARROW. I think that the record will show that I stated previously that in early 1974 a request was made for a formal advisory committee with a charter forwarded and it was Headquarters' con- clusion at that time that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act require- ments for consultation did not have to be by that process. That was during a period of time when formal advisory groups were being looked on as a proliferation of committees and Headquarters decided not to go through that process. They encouraged, as this thing progressed, full consultation with those affected by the requirements, and that the product that was worked up be submitted to various groups of local people who were interested in the system for their advice on the application, and that has been done. We submitted in May or June the proposals to the port safety advisory council which has formed up subcommittees to deal with the proposal and to come back to me with a report. Mr. TREEN. Will you yield to me for a moment, Mr. Chairman? Would you explain the port safety advisory committee. How is that made up and who serves on it? Admiral BARROW. It is a very broad-based group of people in New Orleans consisting of agents, port authority people, dock board, and towing-barge people. Mr. TREEN. Is the Coast Gouard represented on it? Admiral BARROW. The Coast Guard does attend the meetings. Mr. TREEN. You serve on it informally? Admiral BARROW. The package which we referred to them is being considered by a group formed up out of the port safety advisory committee and Mr. David Wheat is the chairman of that group. PAGENO="0158" 154 Mr. TREEN. You serve on that, Mr. McNeal, or you did at one time? Mr. MCNEAL. Yes. Mr. TREEN. You serve on it now? Mr. MCNEAL. Right. Mr. TREEN. I want to get back to that in a moment, but I don't want to interrupt you. Mr. BIAGGI. The testimony of several of these witnesses, Admiral, seems to be consistent with one another as some of the points of con- tention are concerned. Has the Coast Guard been advised of these points of contention, and have they been taken up for discussion by this advisory committee that you have? Admiral BARROW. Which point? Mr. B1AGG1. Well, the three-channel thing which we all agree may cause some problems and confusion. I would like to know whether or not as a matter of procedure it was discussed generally by the industry? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir. It has been and that particular item has been forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters within the last month as a particular trouble spot in the establishment of the system. That has gone forward. The report from the ad hoc committee that Captain Wheat has will be coming to me sometime in the middle of this month and we will then consider their comments that have been made to us by that group, modify the proposal that we have now, and send it forward to the Commandant. Mr. BIAGGI. Earlier you said that your request for a charter of the advisory committee was turned down by the headquarters. Was it, in fact, turned down by headquarters or someone higher up, to your knowledge? Admiral BARROW. Well, sir, it was not my recommendation. This would have gone back to a previous district commander. The proposal for a formal vessel traffic committee was turned down by headquarters. The chief counsel of the Coast Guard had been requested to deter- mine if a formal advisory committee was mandatory to satisfy the requirements of section 104 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the chief counsel of the Coast Guard answered this question in the negative, and the establishment of the formal committee was not determined to be in the best interests at that time. Now we are talking about a formal committee; we are not talking about the consultative process that has been going on and is going on right now. We are not at the point of putting out a notice of proposed rulemaking, so we are in the consulting phase right now. I have agreed all along with Mr. McNeal and others that I think that the consultative process going back to 1971 probably would have been a better way to have gone about it, but notwithstanding that, I don't think we are completely lost. We are in that process right now. Mr. BIAGG1. I am not so sure that I got a concise response to my question. Let me rephrase it. Was this decision made at a departmental level? Admiral BARROW. No, sir. The response which we got came from the Commandant, Coast Guard Headquarters. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, that may well be. When I said, "to your knowl- edge," do you know whether it was made at the departmental level? Admiral BARROW. No, sir, I know of no decision taken on that particular subject at departmental level. PAGENO="0159" 155 Mr. MCNEAL. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on the advisory committee that may help clear up some of the problems? I proposed here that a formal advisory committee would have been an excellent idea at the time that the planning was done, was underway. This was what was envisioned in the questioning. I'm sure that was made by Mr. Corrado of the Commandant in 1971, and that is what gen- erally we felt in the industry. The formal advisory committees have been used in every other vessel traffic system that I am aware of and, as a matter of fact, as recently as last May in Huntington, W. Va., the Commandant of the Coast Guard praised this industry committee with respect to a VTS system at Louisville, and this is in the Coast Guard's proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council. The point here is that until this spring and until within the last 5 months, the individuals have not been brought in on any sort of a formal, informal, organized or however you would like to call it, basis to talk about the system. Now, the only thing individuals have been asked to comment on in this board safety advisory committee and/or ad hoc steering committee are the regulations. We have not been asked to address ourselves as to whether or not the system is necessary, as to whether or not the areas are correct, as to whether or not the entire system might or might not be needed and/or the costs involved. It is these basic things that I believe are questionable about the New Orleans vessel traffic system as now proposed. Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask one question and put this business to rest. 1 get the notion that we do have a formal advisory committee in other ports. Is that what you testified to, Mr. McNeal? Mr. MCNEAL. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. To your knowledge, is that a fact, Admiral? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir, this is true in some ports. Mr. BIAGGI. New Orleans is treated somewhat differently? Admiral BARROW. New York does have a formal vessel traffic system advisory committee. Mr. BIAGGI. That was also my notion. Can you explain why New Orleans is treated in a different fashion? Admiral BARROW. No, sir, other than the fact that a charter was requested and turned down, I can't tell you whether the facts and figures upon which the initial system was predicated were considered to be of such overpowering nature that at that stage one was just not considered necessary, I have no idea. Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to say in connection with the last state- ment you made that there have been no formal meetings. Admiral Barrow did testify that he has been meeting with the members of the industry. Is that a fact, Admiral, informally? Admiral BARROW. Yes, sir, we have people who have been meeting with the ad hoc group on a regular basis. Mr. TREEN. You stated, Mr. McNeal, in your statement on page 2: "This plan was devised without any consultation . . ." Do you stand by that up to this point "without any consultation"? Mr. MONEAL. Yes, sir, I stand by it. To my knowledge, nobody in the business has been in consultation with the people who drafted, who devised and drafted the plan. To the best of my knowledge, this plan was drafted and devised in Washington in Coast Guard Headquarters. 78-280-76---------1 1 PAGENO="0160" 156 Mr. TREEN. You are talking about the plan for New Orleans? Mr. McNEAL. I am, sir, and I think it was devised in 1.971 and 1972, and the first time I think that any individual-and there are many people in the marine business in this room-knew the extent of what was being proposed in any detail was when the draft of the environmental impact statement was issued on August 6, 1974. At that time I, for the first time, saw it and I do try to follow things of this type. There may be others here who are better acquainted than I. I have not been able to find a person who was in that early consultation. So I will stand by the statement, sir, even though I may be proved wrong. Mr. TREEN. I would like at this point in the record to read in a. section of the operative statutes that I had in mind earlier, and that is this part of section 104. Section 104 states: "The Secretary may issue reasonable rules and regulations and standards necessary to implement this title. In the exercise of his rule making authority the Secretary is subject to the provisions of Chapters Five and Seven of Title Fifteen, United States Code." That is the Administrative Procedure Act, which, of course, requires him to publish the proposed regulations in the Federal Register. Now, the iiext sentence, I think, is apropos to our discussion here, and that is as follows: "In preparing proposed rules"-and note the words "proposed rules' `-"In preparing proposed rules, regulations and standards, the Secretary shall provide an adequate opportunity for consultation and comment to state and local governments, repre- sentatives of the marine industry, port and harbor authorities, en- vironmental groups, and other interested parties." That is the end of the section 104. I am not quarreling with you, Admiral Barrow. I think you are following orders from your head- quarters; It would seem to me that if the Secretary is mandated by the law passed by Congress in 1972 to provide an adequate oppor- tunity for consultation and comment, that means some sort of mecha- nism to provide it. I think there is a mandate there, not necessarily to set up an advisory committee under the appropriate statutes that deal with advisory committees, but to set up some sort of mechanism. It doesn't direct the district Coast Guard commander but rather it calls for the Secretary to provide an opportunity. That means to me that the Secretary is bound to l)ut out some sort of regulation or statement ii he is mandated to 1)rOvide some opportunity for the consultation. 1 don't want to beat this thing to death, but I think both the Coast Guard and industry are in agreement that a more formalized consultation mechanism would have been helpful. I would add this to my good friend, Bill McNeal. I'm sure that the Coast Guard will be pleased to receive all of your comments on the VTS system, including the basic question of whether it is needed at all. You are certainly not going to be restrained in the kind of comments that you make in response to the requests for comments. Mr. McNEAL. May I say, Congressman Treen, that restraint is not one of those things that I exercise too often. I will say, too, and I believe it should be noted here that Admiral Barrow has been most receptive to any type of comment that has happened. Most of the uncommunicativeness that I have talked about here certainly didn't occur on his watch in the Coast Guard. PAGENO="0161" 157 Mr. TREEN. I know he appreciates that and I do, too. Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to address myself to the point that was just made, how you justify the distinction between New York and New Orleans. Obviously, on its face it is not equitable. I have been advised by counsel, however, that the Federal Advisory Committee Act of January 1, 1974, in order to deal with the proliferation of com- mittees throughout the Federal structure established certain criteria that made it more difficult to establish these advisory committees as contrasted to the situation that existed prior to the enactment of the law. For the record I have to get it down so that we didn't make New Orleans look so bad. Admiral BARROW. May I make one other comment on that. I think despite the fact that perhaps a political mista.ke was made in not establishing a full advisory committee with a charter and publishing in the Federal Register, I think that the consultative process by which we come forward with a notice of proposed rulemaking is going on now. I have noted no reticence on the part of Mr. McNeal or anybody else to tell me what they think about the system, and I'm sure that the notice of proposed rulemaking that goes forward will reflect, at least at this stage, a lot of the comments which are made. I think the system, its extent, is going to have to stand on the record and on the facts and on what is needed. This advisory committee, whether or not it be a formally constituted one under the system, I think doesn't matter to that process. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. McNeal. Mr. MONEAL. Thank you, sir. I would only comment, if I may, that if the Coast Guard feels that we should obey the law, I have the feeling sometimes that they ought to obey the Federal Committee Act, too. Thank you, sir. Mr. TREEN. He had to get that last punch in. Mr. BIAGGI. We will take a short recess. [A short recess was taken.] Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order. Mr. Sam Giallauza, vice president, New Orleans Steamship Association. STATEMENT OP SAM GIALLANZA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION * Mr. GIALLANZA. Thank you. I am Sam Giallanza, senior vice president, New Orleans Steamship Association. I am delighted that you came down to visit our port city and I express my thanks to Congressman Treen for all the help he has been to us, especially in the past 2 years when we experienced silting in Southwest Pass. He has been a big help. Thank you. * I appreciate the opportunity of appearing here today in behalf of the New Orleans Steamship Association, a trade association which has been in existence since 1912. Our association represents the steam- ship owners, the steamship operators, agents and stevedores that operate in the port area from the mouth of the river up to the port limits of Baton Rouge. PAGENO="0162" 158 During the last year, 1974 calendar year, the members of our as- sociation handled more than 6,000 deep draft vessels that called at the public and private facilities along the Mississippi River from the Passes to the Port of Baton Rouge. I will cite some statistics so that you will have a better understand- ing of our statement and our position. Our statement is not too lengthy. This port area, as late as 1960, was served by only one grain eleva- tor; today, eight elevators deliver grain to vessels with still another elevator presently under construction just above Reserve, Louisiana, and expected for completion by 1976. The growth in number and the increase in capacity of these elevators attribute to making New Orleans the leading grain exporting port in the world. Annually, more than 1,400 vessels load millions of tons of grain at these elevators with most loadings into the larger bulk carriers and tanker class vessels, many of which are in excess of 100,000 deadweight tons. I think a question was asked earlier about the size of vessels. Well, just yesterday a vessel sailed from the reaches of the river, and this was above the Huey P. Long Bridge. This vessel had a deadweight tonnage of 118,167 and was 856 feet in length. This morning, and you may have seen this when you flew over the port area, there was a vessel, the Canadian Bridge, of 117,613 dead- weight tons and 858 feet in length. There is another vessel, still in the same reaches of the river just above the port area of the IE[uey P. Long Bridge, of 103,225 deadweight tons and 841 feet long. So, we do have large vessels now calling at the port. Just as with the grain elevators, this area has seen other growth of new industries settling in Louisiana along the river from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, such as the new Energy Corporation of Louisiana's tanker facility now being constructed. Within the past decade new industries, including petrochemicals have moved into this reach of the river which the Louisiana Department of Commerce estimates as more than a $10 billion investment. Industrial growth along these banks continues and all of these complexes are and will be serviced by both deep draft ocean carriers and shallow draft vessels. This port is also recognized as the Lash/Seabee capital of the world due to its location as a natural port for this newest concept in ocean commerce. In 1969 the first barge-carrying vessels went into service at the Port of New Orleans, and since then there has been a continuous increase in the number of barge-carrying vessels calling at this port. At this time 16 vessels of the Lash/Seabee class are calling regularly. These barge-carrying vessels have in themselves added con- siderably to the barge traffic in the port. The construction of additional elevators within the past 10 years has caused an increase in the number of barges that transit the reaches of the river in the port area. The rapid growth of petrochemical complexes, many of which are served by barges, reflect a definite increase in river traffic as it relates to barges and large inland tows. As far back as 1964, our association, in the interest of safe naviga- tion on the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge to the Gulf, in cooperation with the local pilot associations, instituted a bridge-to- bridge voice communications system. This system, financed by our members, provided each pilot with a portable radio which has since PAGENO="0163" 159 become an integral part of pilotage and provided bridge4o-bridge voice communications, at least between deep draft vessels. Following the inception of this system, the Corps of Engineers and the State department of highways added similar equipment on all bridges crossing navigable channels. It must be noted that this was initiated by the deep draft vessel interests prior to the bridge-to- bridge law, which was only implemented on January 1, 1973. The Corps of Engineers' regulations require that at certain stages of the river, the traffic lights controlling vessel movement around Algiers Point are put into effect and we have proposed the continuous use of these lights the year round due to the ever-increasing traffic in this most strategic area. After study of the proposed Vessel Traffic Service by our Technical Committee of Captains, we are of the opinion that in view of the continuing increase in river traffic, such a service could effectively contribute to safe navigation. However, for it to be effective, the following objectives are essential: The service should cover South and Southwest Passes and the Mississippi River up to and through the port area of Baton Rouge and the Mississippi River-gulf outlet from the sea buoy to ~the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal; All vessels should participate in the service; Each vessel should report in to the service at designated check- points in order that the vessel traffic center will be able to track the movements of all vessels, and; It is important that the capabilities of the Vessel Traffic Center be such that the participation by all traffic would not overload the service and result in a detriment to safe navigation. It is our position that under normal conditions a properly function- ing vessel traffic service would prevent hazardous situations from occurring by recognizing them in advance. However, certain situations will occur which no human effort could avoid. To mention a few, unpredicted localized fog conditions, vessel loss of control or power, breakaway barges, localized squalls or heavy weather, or possibly an explosion or burning vessel caused by other than a collision, ramming or grounding. Under unusual circumstances, such as these, the vessel traffic center will obviously have to take a direct control of the situation and issue directives. Such directives by the vessel traffic center should take the form of advising the vessel to slow, remain moored or anchored, or possibly to anchor as soon as conditions permit. This should only be done in extreme cases when there is no alternative, and then only when the vessel does not take appropriate action on his own initiative in a timely manner. In view of the above, it is anticipated that in cases of such emergen- cies, directions from the vessel traffic center must be adhered to. Only the senior watch officer, who is an experienced mariner with sufficient experience and knowledge of the Mississippi River to enable him to render proper judgment in such situations will be authorized to issue such directives to a vessel. I would like to say thank you for giving me the opportunity to present our position on this all-important service. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Giallanza. I would also like to con- gratulate you and your organization for having the foresight to PAGENO="0164" 160 implement the bridge-to-bridge communications system long before it was mandated by law. I would like your reaction to Mr. McNea.l's and Mr. Doucet's statements that the vessel movement reporting system be instituted from the Huey P. Long Bridge to Belle Ohasse. Mr. GIALLANZA. As I mentioned earlier in my statement., we handle more than 1,400 vessels in the area of the river above the lluey P. Long Bridge to Baton Rouge; additional complexes are being built; and in recent years, the capacities of the existing elevators have been in- creased, all of which create more shallow draft traffic. For instance, I don't think you could put a traffic light on Canal and Bourbon Streets and only have Chevrolets obey it. I think if we have a traffic system, it has to encompass all craft to be effective. Mr. BIAGGI. I agree on that point, but I think the contention or the premise is you don't put a cop in the middle of the desert as an analogy. You might like to have a. cop every place, hut you can't afford it. As to the area that is excluded from the suggestion made by Mr. Doucet and Mr. McNeal, in youi' judgment, should that be included? Mr. GIALLANZA. We feel it should. I think we were extremely for- tunate during the past 2 years of unprecedented silting in Southwest Pass. that mo~re serious accidents did not occur. Silting, with its related problems, is not limited to Southwest Pass only; it is also experienced at about 11 crossings of the Mississippi River above the Huey P. Long Bridge where there a.re changes in the configuration at the bot- tom of the river, the natural relocation of the channel, which I under- stand is not an uncommon occurrence over a 24-hour period. In that area of the river, there are fleeting areas that service most of the facilities, and certainly fleeting areas tha.t serve the elevators in the upper reaches of the river. So, we do have increased traffic. Mr. BIAGGI. It is also recommended t.hat the Algiers traffic light be put in full-time opera.tion. Mr. GIALLANZA. We have proposed that and we urge it. We cer- tainly feel that a.ny delay experienced by any of the vessels we handle is greatly offset by the safety factor. Mr. TREEN. On that particular point, you are the second person that has recommended that they be operated all-year-round. Now, apparently it is discontinued when you don't have the high-water problem? Mr. GIALLANZA. That is right. Mr. TREEN. Is it really needed the other times? I mean, have you had collisions at other times that t.his particular traffic signal would have prevented? Mr. GIALLANZA. I can't answer that; I am just a layman, not a pilot nc~r a mariner, but I have occasion quite often to be in the ITM Build- ing and, when I look out the window and view the traffic, involving large vessels and large tows, it is assuring t.o have the lights in opera- tion. The problem we have had, as we do in all of these programs, a.re finances and the Corps of Engineers has not been able to continue their operation due to lack of funds. Mr. TREEN. Well, that is the point. As the chairman points out, we don't want to put cops in the middle of a desert. But if this thing would really have some value commensurate with the cost, then I for one am prepared to push the Corps of Engineers, as long as it remains PAGENO="0165" 161 under the jurisdiction of the corps, to do this. Can you give me some- thing a little bit beyond your statement that as you see the traffic you think it would be good? Has the Steamship Association made a study of this and made a definite decision that they would like to have it? Mr. GIALLANZA. I think our records will reflect that we had re- quested the Corps of Engineers a number of times in the past years that the time be extended which they did. Mr. TREEN. Extended up to 6 months the last 3 years? Mr. GIALLANZA. Well, this is right, and due to the- Mr. TREEN. You want it all year round is what I am saying? Mr. GIALLANZA. This is correct. I think that the pilots who are here in this room could perhaps answer that question better than I can, but we certainly feel that it is a good safety precaution. Mr. TREEN. I think we are going to have a pilots' representative. Thank you, Mr. Giallanza. I did have one more question. Do the shipowners represented by your association, have they ever indicated any problems with the barge fleets that extend out into the river a pretty good distance? I saw one fleet of barges that looked to me like it occupied about 30 percent of the width of the river, which I had never seen before. Mr. GIALLANZA. Yes, we do have problems. If you had occasion to fly over the inner harbor navigation canal, you would wonder how they could put a skiff through it, much less a vessel, and this is not a barge fleeting area, but just an accumulation-perhaps a barge is being repaired. Mr. TREEN. I am referring to the fleeting in the river. This was upriver, probably at Jefferson Parish. Mr. GIALLANZA. We have not had any great problems, with the extension of the fleeting area channel wide as far as the deep draft vessels go. Before a fleeting area goes in we, of course, receive a notice from the Corps of Engineers that a request for permit has been received from an applicant. This is reviewed by our technical committee of captains, all of whom hold master licenses, and a deter- mination is made as to whether or not they feel that it would create any navigational hazards. Mr. TREEN. To fleet at that point? Mr. GIALLANZA. To fleet at that point. Mr. TREEN. I am talking about the stacking of barges alongside each other way out into the river. Do I understand that you haven't had any complaints by your shipowners? Mr. GIALLANZA. This is right. Mr. TREEN. OK. Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Capt. David Wheat, the president of the Crescent River Pilots Association. Captain, before you make your comments, you were in the room when we were questioning Mr. Giallanza regarding the area above the Huey P. Long Bridge. In your judgment, do you feel the vessel traffic system could be justified and installed upriver? STATEMENT OP CAPT. DAVID WHEAT, PRESIDENT, CRESCENT RIVER PILOTS ASSOCIATION Captain WHEAT. Mr. Chairman, the area north of the Baton Rouge-the Huey P. Long Bridge is out of my piloting territory, so I would rather not comment on that, b~ t I would comment on the PAGENO="0166" 162 lower part of the river. If you have any questions pertaining to that, I would be glad to answer them. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Treen, and members of the staff, my name is David Wheat We are river port pilots for the lower Mississippi River and the Port of New Orleans. I would like to speak in behalf of the ad hoc steering committee that I happen to be the chairman of. This com- mittee was formed some 3 months ago through our port safety council, in other words, an informal committee. It was made up of some 60 members, roughly, of all sections, shallow draft, deep draft vessels, and a cross section of the industry and the port and river and canal areas. Out of the steering committee we formed small working committees, we formed five subcommittees. One committee is in feasibility, one in areas, one in communications, one in operations, one in mandatory volunteering. These subcommittees were chaired by outstanding professional men. They submitted reports to the steering committee and we have this process in motion to go back to the district com- mander with the final report sometime prior to the 15th of October. As I mentioned earlier, with permission of the district commander, he would like to submit a copy of this report to your committee, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. I~ would be delighted to receive it. Captain WHEAT. That is the end of my statement. I would answer any questions on the lower Mississippi River pertaining to the VTS system. Mr. BIAGG1. I noticed you were sitting here throughout the hearing, Captain, and I think we have come down to several points that seem to be in contention. I would like your reaction to the extra channels in the radio communications. Captain WHEAT. It would be, in my opinion, impossible to monitor three channels. I think it is not practical to have to do it anyway. I believe it was well covered that if channel 16 can be eliminated, then we can operate very efficiently on channel 13 and the sector channel. Mr. BIAGGI. As to the Algiers traffic light, that is recommended for full-time operation. Captain WHEAT. The Algiers traffic light, if we put it on tomorrow, we would be 1 day too late. Mr. BIAGGI. That is succinct and informative. Congressman Treen. Mr. TREEN. That was my question, about the traffic light system. Have you had any casualties in the last several years involving Algiers Point during the time that the signal system was not operative? Captain WHEAT. Mr. Treen, we had a casualty in 1969, that I have always believed-that was on Easter Sunday 1969, with the Union Faith, and I have always believed that had the traffic light been in operation, the casualty would have never occurred. Several people lost their lives, including one of our pilots and a ship was lost and the expense-which I am not familiar with, I'm not sure what the expense of operating a traffic light would be within the system the corps has, but it is a very effective system and I think if you could prevent one casualty, that it would be well worth it. PAGENO="0167" 163 Mr. TREEN. You think it would be a very beneficial factor to have it all year round? Captain WHEAT. I do. I think it would be not only a safety factor, I think it would more or less expedite our work a lot because we have a lot of ships in that area that have to turn and turn downriver to proceed to sea or to other berths and by having that light in effect in that particular area of the river, it's a great aid to pilots and to the mariners. Mr. TREEN. All right. Thank you, Captain. Mr. BIAGGI. You couldn't testify to the value of the traffic system upriver. I-low about the lower river? Captain WHEAT. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we need a system in the Port of New Orleans and at the Pilottown and Southwest Pass area. If you have a system, I'm a firm believer that you should have a system and remain in it. I don't believe it would be feasible to get into a system and out of a system, into a system, out of a system. I would prefer to have it all the way on the Lower Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico to the 1-luey P. Long Bridge. Mr. TREEN. Where do you take over, from Pilottown to the 1-Iuey P. Long Bridge? Captain WHEAT. That's right. Mr. BIAGGI. All I know, Captain, is that I have been listening to some stories at lunch being told by river people and people in the industry and I marvel at the way the pilots perform almost magical maneuvers coming upriver and downriver with these vessels. We are grateful to you for your testimony today and for your very incisive response to pertinent questions. Thank you very much. Captain WHEAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Robert L. Gardner, Alter Co., Davenport, Iowa~ STATEMENT OP ROBERT L. GARDNER, ALTER CO., DAVENPORT, IOWA Mr. GARDNER. I must at the onset apologize for the quality of the copy. I opened my briefcase in St. Louis yesterday and realized I had left it at home, so this came over the wire this morning. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Counsel, Congressman Treen. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My testimony is rather lengthy, as you can see, and I have been asked by Congressman Treen to paraphrase or summarize whenever possible. My name is Robert L. Gardner and I represent Alter Co., 2333 Rockingham Road, Davenport, Iowa. We are a leading scrap mer- chandiser and commercial barge line officed in Davenport, Iowa. We have terminals along the Mississippi River from St. Paul, Minn., to and including the Port of New Orleans, La. The latter installation operates under a subsidiary name of Alter Fleet, Inc. and is engaged in commercial fleeting and switching in and around the New Orleans Harbor. My capacity with Alter Co. is port captain, which carries the responsibility of operations of all its 212 barges and 7 towboats. I furthermore am responsible for operations of remote locations such as the local one here as Alter fleet. I am a graduate of Western Kentucky University and currently hold a U.S. Coast Guard first class pilot PAGENO="0168" 164 license, any gross tons, for portions of the lower Mississippi River with endorsements for operator on western rivers and waterways. I have been employed in the river trade since 1955, and have served in many and varied functions. The next portion of my testimony deals primarily with the area that Alter Co. serves and the intent of this piece of testimony is to indicate to the committee that this is not just a local issue, but rather an issue that has national implications. Any delays that occur to our vessels in the movement of phosphate rock coming out of Tampa, Fla., which we move a great deal of; in the movement of grain into the area simply causes the barge freight rates to increase and thus pass it on to the consumers. This would affect farm produce originating in Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and points north of New Oreleans. If delays, as a result of mandatory vessel traffic controls, are incurred and cost of transporting fuels for generation stations in Iowa and Wisconsin will he substantially increased, resulting in higher electric power cost to citizens in these communities. As a first class licensed pilot and with the operational knowledge of Alter Fleet, Inc~ in the area, my company must take the stand of being opposed to the implementation of a vessel traffic control system in the New Orleans Harbor as proposed. rfhe system itself is non- workable due to many technical reasons and highly unnecessary. Furthermore, I would like to charge the U.S. Coast Guard with misuse of powers granted to them by the Ports and Harbor Safety Act of 1972. The misuse pertains directly to the procedures and reasoning behind the proposed VTS for the New Orleans area on the Mississippi River. On August 4, 1975, 1 received in my office a. Department of Trans- portation Coast Guard local, notice to mariners issued by the *2d Coast Guard District dated July 29, 1975. In this notice, the U.S. Coa~t Guard informed the i~ub1ic that they were in the process of developing regulations under which a vessel traffic system would operate in the Port of New Orleans from the sea buoys at South Pass to mile 243 above head of passes. The notice indicated an ad hoc steering committee had been chosen from a wide cross section of the marineS industry to review and make written comment to the U.S. Coast Guard concerning a draft proposal for the VTS regulations. On August 19, 1975, the ad hoc steering committee, to which I was added as a member, held its first meeting to discuss and review the proposed regulations and discuss problem areas that had been outlined by Comdr. Ransom K. Boyce, com- manding officer, U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans vessel traffic system. It was decided at this meeting that the system needed a broader base for the discussion, that there were too many members, and as Captain Wheat testified, the committee was broken into five subcommittees and the subcommittees then were to go off and meet prior to another meeting of the ad hoc steering committee, which was held on Sep- tember 23, 1975. During our initial meeting, several questions were put to the officers in attendance. I believe the highest ranking officer in that meeting was a lieutenant commander, and to my knowledge, the industry has not had the opportunity to discuss with an officer of the Coast Guard of any high rank the problems involved in this system. PAGENO="0169" 165 One question was was there to be an economic impact statement done for the proposed VTS regulations. The answer was that Wash- ington had been questioned in this matter and they decided that none was necessary. A second question posed to the U.S. Coast Guard was could the ad hoc steering committee have a 90-day extension on submitting com- ments for the draft proposal. The committee was answered, with a comment that more than likely no such extension would be, granted sinèe the computers and hardwa.res needed for the VTS in New Orleans more than likely had already been placed on order. I have since learned-I don't know how factual it is-that this equipment has been placed on order, bids have been out for many months. At this point it became obvious to me and many others on this committee that we had been invited to New Orleans, a great distance from our homes,: to participate in an ad hoc committee that wa~ supposed to advise the U.S. Coast Guard on the draft proposal and operational problems with the vessel traffic control system, only to have had these questions already answered prior to us ever leaving home. . . . . The shape of things continued to become clear after receiving Adin. Owen W. Siler's' letter to GAQ answering to the Coast Guard's po- sition to the ComptrQller General's recommendations. Also contained in the letter were GAO's recommendations. In this letter the ad hoc steering committee was given the first `black and white information as to what was the basis for the need of the' vessel traffic control system other than the one that presently exists in the New Orleans area. The basis is said to be a 1973 Coast Guard study report entitled "Vessel Traffic Systems Analysis of Port Needs." There have been no copies of this report made to members of the ad hoc steering committee. as of this writing~ I was fortunate, however, to obtain a Xerox copy: froiñ another source and found that this report began two years prior to the passage of the Ports a.nd Harbor Safety Act in anticipation of its passage. The information contained therein is inaccurate, mis- leading, and not current. The date of Admiral Siler's report to GAO is unknown to me. However, I must conclude it was composed many many months prior to the establishing of an ad hoc steering committee. In the writings found on page 5 of this report, Admiral Suer indicates that "The Coast Guard does provide adequate consultation, comment, and coordination with local marine interests as specified by the, Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972." It is obvious to me-. Mr. TREEN. Are you referring to the report by Admiral Suer on the GAO findings and recommendations? Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. The fifth page of that? Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, 1 am. Mr. TREEN. For your information, the date is February 1975-it looks like February 25, 1975-if that helps you. Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, sir. I don't know if it does or not. Mr. TREEN. You were reading from page 5? Mr. GARDNER. I was reading from page 5, yes, sir. \[r. r1i1~EEN. `\~\bat part of page 5? PAGENO="0170" 166 Mr. GARDNER. I don't have that. The quote is taken from there- Mr. TREEN. I see it now. Mr. GARDNER. Okay, sir. That does confirm that it was written- my opinion that it was several months prior to the ad hoc committee being formed, if it was written on February 25. Recommendation No. 4, and this recommendation is a GAO recommendation, found on page 10 of Admiral Suer's letter, is: Give national emphasis and direction to establishing regulations as authorized by the 1972 act to control vessel traffic, including more extensive use of speed limits; greater regulation over the movement of vessels carrying dangerous, combustible and polluting cargoes; and limiting the size of tows. Admiral Suer says: The GAO report stated that the Coast Guard had made limited use of its authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to issue regulations for the control of vessel movements, and identified control of vessel speed, control of the movement of vessels carrying hazardous or polluting cargoes, and control of tow size as regulatory measures expected to be effective for prevention of accidents. The promulgation of regulations was stated to be the measure least costly to the government for reducing accidents through control of vessel movement. It becomes clear that we have a battle between GAO and the Coast Guard over funds for hardware to be used for VTS in New Orleans. The people being caught in the middle of this battle are the waterway user and eventually the American public. GAO is saying, "Cut your spending and start regulating." On page 11 of Admiral Siler's report, he says: The development of a regulation is an exacting process which requires care in the identification of the problem to be corrected by means of the regulation, recognition of varied geographic and operating conditions, and appreciation of the impact of the regulation on the public affected, including the broad economic effect of the measure, and, finally, definition of the corrective regulation. Pre- sumably in recognition of these factors, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act contains a provision for consultation and comment by interested parties in preparation of proposed regulations; this is in addition to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. I charge once again that the U.S. Coast Guard, by the use of such verbage, is trying to convince GAO and others that they have com- plied with the terms of the development of regulations as outlined in the Ports and Harbors Safety Act when, in fact, they have not. Statements such as the above are numerous and were written long before any such action was ever begun. What we have here before us is a whitewash. A number of years ago a vessel traffic control system was conceived and a study begun to establish data for its basis. I would like to charge the U.S. Coast Guard with the misuse of power in its endeavor to establish a vessel traffic control system in the New Orleans area. The charges are numbered as follows: Gathering of information to be used as a basis for VTS prior to the enactment of the law which would give the Coast Guard authority to act. No. 2, failure to study economic impact and effects as prescribed by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Public Law 92-34086, statute 426C5. No. 3, failure to comply with the Ports and Harbors Safety Act, statute 426C in carrying out his duties and responsibilities under this PAGENO="0171" 167 title to promote the safe and efficient conduct of maritime commerce, the Secretary shall consider fully the wide variety of interests which may be affected by the exercise of his authority hereunder. The interests referred to in this law have only very recently been con- tacted for consultation and the works of the committee established for that purpose have only begun. No. 4, the U.S. Coast Guard has placed on order and spent Federal moneys for equipment to be used under regulations yet to be estab- lished. The $4.4 million involved in this equipment was spent prior to a realistic need being shown for the system or consideration as to its design as required by law. No. 5, the forming of an ad hoc steering committee is being used as a whitewash to cover up for statements earlier made by Admiral Siler and referred to in this writing that the Ports and Harbors Safety Act required consultation and input from a variety of interests which may be affected by the exercise of his authority. The workings of this com- mittee are designed to be powerless and to be used to satisfy a legal requirement. In summary, a vessel traffic control system, as proposed for the New Orleans Harbor, is not needed. There is no basis for the needs of such a system, as the one currently in operation is working extremely satis- factorily to all shipping interests. If the U.S. Coast Guard wishes to spend money and time to prevent damage to, or the destruction or loss of vessels, bridges, or other structures on or in the navigable waterways of the United States, it should concentrate on doing the jobs it has currently undertaken well, prior to moving into newer and more sophisticated endeavors. The $4.4 million to be spent for a vessel traffic control system in the New Orleans Harbor with an annual operational budget of $900,000 is ridiculous. These funds could be put to use in areas with far greater benefit to the waterway community and the nation than in a VTS as proposed. If efforts were to be channeled towards using the existing vessel traffic control systems in the New Orleans Harbor and promoting the proper use of vessel bridge-to-bridge radio telephone, then a safety factor would result from a minimum of expenditure and effort on the part of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would like to make one other comment, if I could, Mr. Chairman. In regard to the subject of the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone that has been discussed quite a bit, it has been said in several of our meet- ings involving the communications aspects of VTS, when we asked them the question, asked the Coast Guard: "How do you propose to clear these channels that you have elected to use in the VTS, because it is obvious that these channels have to be clear for vessel traffic control communication and can't be used for other port needs at the same time?" The Coast Guard's answer to this question, sir, was that "The mere presence of the Coast Guard," that they have found, like in Houston, that "The mere presence of the Coast Guard in a monitoring function serves this purpose and does, indeed, police those frequencies for the use that they are intended." My question is why, why cannot these moneys and the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard be put into effect in that area to police our existing vessel traffic system, the Radio Tele- phone Act, why can't these efforts be channeled in that direction which is far less costly than the proposed system? PAGENO="0172" 168 They have a radio network capable of doing this. If their findings are that, why is there such an impellin.g need to spend all of this money? As Admiral Barrow indicated, the proposed regulations say that the pilot is not admonished from any responsibility that he might have for the safe navigation of his vessel, regardless of what the VTS tells him or may direct him to do, it is his final responsibility. Mr. TREEN. "Absolved" or "admonished"? You said, "adinon- ished." Mr. GARDNER. Absolved, I'm sorry. The final responsibility rests with this pilot and it is only through the eyes and ears of this pilot that the person giving the orders in the YTS will obtain the informa- tion necessary to direct traffic except through the localized use of low level television, et cetera. rfhe computer is not an exacting process whereby there is going to be transponders placed aboard these vessels, and this type thing. It is still dependent upon the information coming from the bridge of that vessel. Mr. BIAGGL That is it? Mr. GARDNER. rrhat is it. Do you have any questions? Mr. BIAGGI. Your summary is quite extensive and you make any number of charges. I would appreciate it if you would give Admiral Barrow a copy of the statement, so that he can provide this commit- tee with responses and explanations to them. You have been in the room while the people have been testifying. A number of them have testified as to the desirability of the system and they apparently have expertise and have indepth experience in safety. How do you account for the wide variance in opinions and the conflicting positions? Mr. GARDNER. I can't really speak for their opinions. You have severa.l interests involved here. You have deep water interests and you have shallow water interests and I think from the testimony that I have heard today that the deep water interests favor a vessel traffic control system and the shallow water interest~s do not, as proposed, sir. I am not saying, and I would like to go on record as saying that I am not outright opposed to some form of vessel traffic control, but not as proposed. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, how do you feel about deep water control? Mr. GARDNER. I beg your pardon? Mr. BIAGGI. Deep water vessels, VTS for deep water vessels. Mr. GARDNER. How do I feel about them? Mr. BIAGGI. Does your position change or do you just oppose it on the shallow------ Mr. GARDNER. No, sir. What I am opposed to primarily, and from my statement I did not address myself to the things that you asked us to address ourselves to at the beginning, sir, but I didn't know that is what you wanted me to address. The details of the system and how things work, you know, like for example, Admiral Barrow touched on the points and bends system. I don't think he accurately described that system. That is a safety system, that is not a system that was designed or used to speed up vessels by catching slack water. Actually you give UJ) a lot of slack water in using the points amid bends system. But this is a system that has been locally worked out between deep water interests, basicallv-well, both, deep water and shallow draft interests-and works rather well, and it is a safety measure. It is not designed to speed things. PAGENO="0173" 169 So I feel as though that we are in a position, the barge line carriers, to have our tows cut and drafts limited much easier, sir, than a deep draft vessel is because you can't cut a deep draft vessel in half, but we can be required to drop barges. Our barges are small units, as you understand. I think that leaves us wide open to someone making that decision and critically curtailing operations at a great expense to the consumer. Mr. BIAGGI. Are you suggesting that you have no limit on the number of barges that you should be towing? Mr. GARDNER. I am suggesting that that is-yes, sir, that there be no limit on the number of barges that a vessel may carry. This industry has been existing for maiiy, many years with an excellent safety record, and we, I think, are the experts in that area as to how many barges a vessel can safely handle. You see, the one thing that people very seldom indicate is what dictates this to us. What dictates this to us is profit or loss, and we can't make money having accidents. Mr. BIAGGI. That is true, but you don't function under the theory that you are going to have accidents. You function under the theory that you will not have accidents and nfl things being equal, we let the carriers carry as ina~ iy barges down or upriver as possible. Mr. GARDNER. Safely. Mr. BIAGGI. Of course. But the fact is there have been a number of accidents. Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, I realize that. rfhe1~e have always been accidents on the river. r1iheI~e are accidents on the highways. Mr. Nader~ Mr. BIAGGI. We put up lights, we install safety- Mr. GARDNER. The point I am making is there is always going to be an element of risk, sir, and the car, I think, is a good example. Mr. Nader thought the American public wanted to buy that, but people didn't and they are willing to risk their lives by not wearing a crash helmet inside their automobile because it is inconvenient. There is always going to be that element of risk, but we think that this job is being done rather well, and if there were a basis for this, sir-I am charging that this is not a good basis for such an expensive, elahoi~ate system. If there were a reason for it, then I would have to go along with it. Mr. BIAGGI. All right, you certainly raised some interesting points and the committee will certainly look into it and give it very serious consideration. Congressman Treen. Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, There was one charge that I am not going to comment on, although I think you must know that I am concerned about the consultation provisions. I think we are going to try to get some explanation on that from the Coin- mandant, or from the Secretary of Transportation, actually. But your charge No. 1 of "Gathering of information to be used as a basis for VTS prior to the enactment of the law which would give the Coast Guard authority to act." I don't see that this is any abuse or anything, gathering information before-- Mr. GARDNER. Let me apologize once again, and I guess you put me under fire for my words there, and I would do this, but the intent behind that was to show how old it was and when the information PAGENO="0174" 170 was gathered and that the thinking for a VTS has been around an awfully long time. Mr. TREEN. In other words, you are charging that they are not using up-to-date data? Mr. GARDNER. That's correct, that's absolutely correct. Mr. TREEN. You said, Mr. Gardner, that you approved the system that is in operation now. You don't approve the proposed system. Now, what do we have now in the system that you approve of specifi- cally and what are the items in the proposal that you don't approve of? Mr. GARDNER. OK, sir. The system at present that has been discussed is the control light at Algiers Point. I am told- Mr. TREEN. That has been there since 1952. Mr. GARDNER. It has been there a long time and I approve of that system. Mr. TREEN. Don't we have some low level television there? Admiral BARROW. Not yet. Some bridges have them. Mr. GARDNER. When I refer to a system, sir, you mentioned earlier-one of you mentioned earlier-that you noticed that there were a lot of arteries flowing into the river and you asked Admiral Barrow, you know, there's no system. Yes, sir, there is a system and the system I am referring to are the laws and regulations that apply to the piotage of a vessel, including the Radio Telephone Act. When one of you made the comment that when approaching a sharp bend you have virtually-you don't really know what is coming around that bend, if the act was being followed, you would. This is the system that I am referring to, sir. Mr. TREEN. The bridge-to-bridge radio was enacted in the law several years before this, in 1971. I don't consider that part of the VTS system- Mr. GARDNER. That is what I am describing as a vessel traffic control system in connection with the rules of the road. You under- stand you have rights-of-way and it becomes-one vessel is under the law required to hold and stay clear of other vessels under certain circumstances and this is all very clearly defined by the rules of the road. This is the system to which I am referring. That is a vessel traffic control system in my mind that is adequate. Mr. TREEN. What you don't want is all of this team of people, this computer and the monitoring system. You just feel that that would be a waste of money? Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, as proposed. Mr. TREEN. Do you think it would impose an economic burden on industry? Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, I do. Mr. TREEN. But I think the size of the tows can be controlled by regulation without respect to vessel traffic systems, if that is one of your complaints. Mr. GARDNER. No, that is correct. The act-well, the act gives the Coast Guard broad authority to do that. Mr. TREEN. We don't have to set up a vessel traffic system to adopt a regulation about the size of tows, and I think that apparently is one of your complaints, isn't it? Mr. GARDNER. it is my complaint that that would be done, sir, as testified to, under extreme conditions, and what worries me is who PAGENO="0175" 171 is going to be making that decision and the quality and the caliber of the individual that will make that decision at the time. It has to be a spot basis. The captain of the port, for example, can halt every bit of traffic in that harbor. They stopped traffic at Vicksburg Bridge and I didn't even know their district went up to the Vicksburg Bridge until they stopped it, and he has that power, but the captain of the port is not going to be sitting behind that vessel traffic control system monitor, as proposed. That is going to be a duty officer of some sort and his information that he receives is coming in from various means and I question whether or not this person would have the ability to make such a judgment and then limit the size of my tow, tell me to tie up, stop, or what have you. Mr. TREEN. Well, your company, is a big operator and there may be some smaller operators willing to gamble on this a little bit more. I would like to think that, being a free market advocate, the economic consideration of individual companies will force the safety. Your insurance rates are going to have an affect on you. On the other hand, the Southern Pacific railroad bridge crossing the Atchafalaya River between Morgan City and Berwick has been hit how many times? Over 100 times? Admiral BARROW. Over 500 times. Mr. TREEN. Over 500 times by tows and the economic impact of that has got to be pretty bad on these companies. Mr. GARDNER. I would agree with you 100 percent. Mr. TREEN. I get calls from constituents every time that bridge gets knocked out or a chlorine barge gets lodged up against it. That illustrates to me that the economic impact isn't always sufficient to regulate. A small VTS system there apparently has helped a great deal. Mr. GARDNER. I am not that familiar with it, but I understand it has. Mr. TREEN. Do you operate on the Atchafalaya? Mr. GARDNER. No, sir, we do not. It is my understanding that the system there and at Houston is a good system. Mr. TREEN. It is a small VTS system, and I think Admiral Barrow will confirm, and the record shows it has been very effective. I have often wondered why, with all of those losses, the towing industry itself didn't do something about it. Now you can't answer that because you don't operate on the Atchafalaya. Thank you, sir. STATEMENT OP IAMES GUNDLACH, CANAL BARGE Co., NEW ORLEANS, LA. Mr. GUNDLACH. I just wanted to make one statement about that last statement- Mr. TREEN. Just one moment, I don't think you have been identi- fied for the record. Mr. GUNDLACH. I am James Gundlach with Canal Barge Co. of New Orleans. Members of the towing industry that do operate down the Atcha- faiaya River for years have been proposing to the Coast Guard to put in some vessel traffic advisory in Morgan City. It was finally adopted 78-280-76--------12 PAGENO="0176" 172 just recently after many months and years of our insistence that this would help. Mr. TREEN. rfha.nk you for adding that. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Norman Autrainer with the Fer River.Towing Co., New Orleans, La. STATEMENT OP NORMAN ANTRAINER, PER RIVER TOWING Co., NEW ORLEANS, LA. Mr. ANTRAINER. Gentlemen, my name is Norman L. Antra.iner, port captain with the Fer River Towing Co., New Orleans, La. Our company operates 175 dry cargo barges and six river towboats ranging from 800 to 5,600 horsepower. We navigate from mile 60 ahead of Pass below New Orleans north to all points on the Mississippi River system, hauling millions of tons yearly in grain products to export elevators. This is done in 38,000 cargo ton units, 1,100 feet long and 175 feet wide, dea.d weight 44,515 tons. As operators in the New Orleans and Baton Rouge area, we are opposed to any additional vessel traffic system, reasons forthwith. The marine industry, the U.S. Coast Guard and the FCC have ample regulations at present to improve safety and promote good seamanship. Additional regulations will confuse all interests. Economic losses due to unwarranted vessel lost time would be disastrous to companies such as ours. Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me for interrupting, but that is the second time that has come up and I didn't propose any questions to have it eluci- dated. The implication of that statement, or you might say almost a direct statement, charges that this vessel traffic system would cause delays. Mr. ANTRAINER. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Would you please tell us how? Mr. ANTRAINER. For example, if a northbound ship was proceeding to Baton Rouge and the VTS told one of my tows to hold up, it would take us-we are moving 13 miles an hour, it would take us probably close to an hour to get that thing settled down and backed into a bank somewhere to where that ship could get up around the point, and then we have to pull back out in the river and drop down and probably have to swank, that's a maneuver that big tows use, floating with the cur- rent, take additional time. So many times of this and it just adds up to excessive lost time. Mr. BIAGGI. Why would VTS order you to do that? Mr. ANTRAINER. If they felt the ship had the right-of-way and needed to navigate the bend before we got there, even though we might have right-of-way because we are southbound vessel. Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to ask Admiral Barrow. Now we require the expertise and I don't possess it, but why would YTS stop a tow as described by Mr. Antrainer? Admiral BARROW. I think he is really reaching for an excuse. I can't see this thing at all. The only possible reason to slow anybody down would be that if you have two vessels trying to occupy the same space at the same time. If, indeed, we don't facilitate traffic on the river as a result of this VTS, we will not be doing our job. I can't see slowing traffic down. PAGENO="0177" 173 Commander BoYcE. One comment. It is our proposal that all passing situations will be originated by the two vessels involved. We do not concern ourself with the lateral position of the vessels, in other words, left or right of the river. We do not anticipate ever having any consideration for that and the situation stated here would be the responsibility of the two vessels on channel 13 to originate their own passing signals and if it came to the point where it is obvious they could not reconcile, in other words, we would be monitoring 13 and if they could not satisfactorily reconcile it, hopefully we might be able to take action and direct one of them to hold up and, again, the extreme case and not the normal course of action contemplated. Mr. BIAGGI. Is it your contention, Admiral, that the system would expedite rather than delay? Admiral BARROW. I am certainly-that is one-half of the purpose of the VTS, and that is to facilitate, to make it move smoother, to prevent pileups of traffic in specific situations. Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Wheat, are you in a p.osition to make an observation on that point? Captain WHEAT. Well, he mentioned the fact that he was south- bound with a heavy tow and a northbound ship-I think he has got his story backward. I think the northbound vessel would be the one to hold up. That is the way we work on the lower river, maybe he is up above Baton Rouge. Mr. ANTRAINER. Correct, that is the way it does work, but under this VTS, unless you have someone in that office that actually knows what the rules of the road are for the western rivers, and so forth, what do you know what is going to happen? Mr. BIAGGI. I don't think it is expecting too much to expect that somebody in the office will know the rules of the road. Mr. ANTRAINER. I hope so. Mr. BIAGGI. Is there any possibility that- Mr. ANTRAINER. I don't think these gentlemen understand the Algiers traffic light, if what they are saying they are not going to regulate the vertical movement or the passing of the vessels. The Algiers traffic light does just that, it holds traffic at one side of the Algiers Point so other traffic can pass around the point. They do it on a regular rotation basis, northbound moves, stopping southbound traffic, and southbound moves after northbound traffic has moved. Mr. BIAGGI. You are not the first witness, you are the second, perhaps the third, that may have raised it. Admiral, 1 think that is an important point that bears some extra i~ttention. For the record, we would appreciate your providing the committee with the information clearing up that point and stating your position as contrasted to the assertion here, that is, whether or not this system would expedite rather than delay. Captain Wheat, we would appreciate a comment for the record on this point from you and your association, a'so, whether or not the proposed system would delay or expedite because obviously we have an economic factor in delays. Captain WHEAT. Sir, I really-it is hard to answer a question like that because it is new. We have never had a system like this before. The system has been a system that we have made of our own to a certain, extent, however, the Algiers traffic light which is operated PAGENO="0178" 174 at certain periods of the year, and I don't really think we could consider that a delay because basing it against the safety side, I wouldn't consider it a delay. Mr. DOUCET. Sir, may I say something to this point here? We have been talking today about the safety of navigation and everybody in this room considers Algiers Point traffic light the biggest safety factor we have got here in the New Orleans Harbor, and we would like to see it 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, yet you do have lost time at the Algiers traffic light, but it is one of the biggest safety- any time you deal in safety, you have got to deal in lost time. But your lost time-your safety is a heck of a lot better than lost time. Commander OBERHOLTZER. I think one of the factors is that the lost time in the event of a catastrophic accident or in the event of any accident has to be taken into account. The amount of lost time and economic impact of any type of accident is going to far outweigh the losses that might be delayed by such as the Algiers traffic light. Mr. BIAGGL That may appear to be on its face, but if you have a sustained run of continued losses, the accumulative effect could almost equal perhaps a catastrophic loss. Mr. ANTRAINER. The personnel in the U.S. Coast Guard of the VTS would need extensive training in river navigation at the taxpayer's expense. River navigation versus ship navigation are different in many respects and I feel that whatever-if the system does come into effect, we need these people in the VTS to understand what is involved in river navigation. Deep sea navigation or shipping is-there is quite a difference. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I think there is no question about that, and I am sure that is one of the reasons why all portions of the industry should have constant communication with the Coast Guard and Admiral Barrow, on a formal basis if necessary. At least, the input is essential if we are to come up with a final product that is compatible with all interests. Thank you very much. Mr. Stephen Lambert, Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission. STATEMENT OP STEPHEN LAMBERT, GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION Mr. LAMBERT. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Trene and staff, thank you for the privilege of being heard by you all. I think any study about marine safety, Mr. Chairman, you might not be familiar with the Lake Ponchartrain, but I think any discussion of marine safety should include the problems we are having out there. Before I get a poisonous dart in the back of my neck, I want to say that the commission wants to be a good neighbor to the marine industry, but with our lake, I think they will agree, is capable of being quite treacherous under certain conditions. Let me go into my introduction- Mr. TREEN. Explain to the chairman that you operate the bridge across the lake. Mr. LAMBERT. Right. I live at 100 Green Acres Road, Metairie, and I am in Congressman Treen's district, and I am a member of the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission which is also known PAGENO="0179" 175 as the Causeway Commission. It is the legal authority which admin- isters the operations of the 24-mile-long causeway toll bridge across Lake Ponchartrain. It is the longest bridge over water in the world. I have been a member of this commission only about 2 months, having been appointed after the accidental death of my father, who was chairman, on July 27. He had been chairman for 12 years. Although I am a newly-appointed member of the Commission, all of my family has been living with the trials and tribulations of the causeway, nearly since its inception. Furthermore, all of us are proud of the fact that under my father's leadership the toll bridge has become one of the most successful type operations in the country. At this point, if you don't mind, I would like to show you, Mr. Chairman, so you may familiarize yourself with these copies of press clippings on barge rammings and you all can look through them during my talk. My purpose for appearing here today is to urge you to include the Lake Ponchartrain area in the Port of New Orleans Vessel Traffic System. If it is not practical to include the lake area as an integral part of the Port VTS, then a separate subunit VTS should be set up for Lake Ponchartrain, all under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the 8th Coast Guard District. Gentlemen, I fully understand that the criteria used to establish the priorities for the installation of the vessel traffic system include: 1, tonnage of cargo; 2, number of vessel transits; 3, number of vessels involved in collisions, ranimings and groundings. These criteria were stated in an August 1973 report entitled, "Vessel Traffic Systems, Analysis of Port Needs." I submit that not only have these criteria never been applied in a serious analysis of the Lake Ponchartrain marine traffic by Federal agencies, but also as Congressmen you should take an overall view, per- haps from the standpoint of the Department of Transportation itself, which is over both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Highway Administration. If anyone had bothered to look into the marine problem, they would have found that there are over 15,000 barge tows a year crossing through the marine openings in the causeway, each of which has the potential to knock the bridge out of service, and kill people in auto- mobiles who are using the bridge. I know that Congressman Treen is very familiar with the series of tragic accidents which have occurred over the past 15 years or so, all of which have been a direct result of irresponsible and unregulated marine traffic in Lake Ponchartrain. However, for those of you who may be unfamiliar with these occurrences, I would like to go over a few high- lights of news stories covering these tragic events. You all have them and you can see it is a pretty ghastly sight from those pictures. I repeat, these have not been responsible marine operators. We have had problems with men sleeping, nobody awake on the tow, just heading for the causeway until they finally hit it. I must comment, at this point, that it has been sort of proven out that the equipment and man- power operating on the river tends to be of a much better grade than that operating in the lake. Now, only last week, in the dark at 5 in the morning, a barge tow was attempting to cross through one of the marine openings in the PAGENO="0180" 176 causeway in high seas which were a result of weather systems in advance of Hurricane Eloise, when a cable securing the barges to- gether broke and the fender systems and navigation lights were damaged. In other words, these tows-barges--were apparently out in front of the tug and one of the cables broke, allowing it to jacknife into the fender system. If the seas were that bad and it had happened a half-mile out away from the bridge and turned all of the barges loose, we might have killed no telling how many people. As a matter of fact, the causeway commission-and this is how we found out, the causeway commission received notification of this from a ham radio operator who happened to be monitoring the marine band and called the causeway office when another tug captain reported the navigation lights out. Fortunately, there was no structural damage to the bridge itself, but the real point is that this barge tow should never have been at- tempting to cross through the causeway in weather like that and cer- tainly not at night. Gentlemen, this is a very common occurrence. Another incident which might hit home with Mr. Tréen, knowing *the problems we have had with hurricanes, on the Sunday morning before the Monday that Eloise could have possibly hit, we had a tugboat out in these same rough seas beginning to have trouble. He lost power and eventually rolled over and sunk, almost taking dOwn two other vessels that were trying to assist him. rrhat vessel stayed there and as of Monday at 5 o'clock when we were forced to close the bridge and~ build a levee across the entrance to protect the levee system from the high water, that tug was stilT out tl.iere and buoys out in the gulf- Mr. TREEN. Where was it with relation to the causeway? Mr. LAMBERT. 500 yards off the east side of the bridge, just about 6 or 7 miles out. The wave action of Eloise recorded by the U.S. Weather Bureau, which, thank God, didn't hit here, caused some seas in its path some 40 feet high. In a lake that averages 15 feet deep, you can appreciate that it would have slammed this tugboat right through the bridge. It had no business beinginthat water under those conditions. I fear that the continuing lack of regulated marine traffic may result in a far worse tragedy than has occurred thus far. In the last accident on August 1, 1974, the causeway police officer hurrying to the scene- and all he had received was a sketchy report that there had been an accident on the bridge, and further I would like to say this officer happens to be my brother-he was rushing out there to find it and the tow that struck the bridge struck and knocked out the downside of a high-level hump, which means as you approach the hump, it looks like a normal approach until you get on the top and then there is nothing there. In other words, he skidded to a stop sideways less than 50 feet from the edge-two vehicles containing three people having gone in before he got there. He was able to stop and if he had gone in, not yet having verified the accident, it's possible that other vehicles could have followed him in. I think if you will notice in that thing-book of clippings-one of the most serious occurrences was when a bus went in out there. Another major point that should be considered by you as U.S. Con- PAGENO="0181" 177 gressrnan is that the causeway provides a vital link between two maj or east-west interstate highways, 1-10 and 1-12, and is the only such link for 40 miles in the Greater New Or'eans area. When the bonds are paid off, the causeway will become part of the State and probably the Federal highway system. Admiral Barrow pointed out in a letter dated March 4, 1975, to the Lake Ponchartrain `Safety `Committee that "The major threat to the causeway is `from tugs and barges operating under State leases," and, therefore, he felt that the State bears a special responsibility for anticollision measures. What the admiral is referring to is the fact that the shells dred'ged from the western end of Lake Ponchartrain come from State-controlled leases, and it should be made clear that the tugs and barges themselves are licensed by the TLS. Coast Guard. The State is really not in,' the business u! regulating marine traffic- nor should it be. Furthermore, it seems `totally irrelevant whether or not the `shell leases are State Or' privately controlled. The important fact, however, is that the shell deposits in Lake Ponchartrain provide the' only economical aggregate source in southeast Louisiana. rfl~ese clamshells are used in place of gravel, which is scarce and expensive, primarily in highway construction, `and primarily on Federal highways. The existence o'f this clamsl'iell deposit is extremely important to the Louisiana Department of Highways and the Federal Highway. Admin- istration. Therefore, it seems quite apparent that the problem con- cerns both the U.S., Coast Guard and the Federal Highway Admin- istratiOn, which are both agencies of the Department of Transportation. Last year the commission hired safety engineers to make `an' indepth detailed study of the causeway. One of the major recommend a- tions was the installation of a VTS consisting of a manned radar tracking station, with provisions for radio operated `alarm sys- tems installed on each: tug' operating in the lake. If the radar operators were unable to cause the course of an errant barge tow to be altered after calling on the marine radio, the alarm system could be set off by radio. This `would ring on every tug on the lake and would not only tend to wake up the sleeping crew of the tug in question, hut also' alert' all other tugs on the lake so that they could assist in any way possible. Gentlemen, the Congress has the authority to provide funding for the installation and operation of such a system for Lake Ponchartrain under `the provisions of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. It makes no difference to us whether this YTS is an integral part of the Port 0 New Orleans VTS or a separate one. You are here to consider the safety of operations involving commerce in the Port of New Orleans. We beg you to consider the lives of the passengers in the 2i~ million vehicles which cross the causeway each year. Thank you very much for allowing us to present this desperate problem. ` Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Mr. Lambert. The presentation was revealing,' so were the pictures and the statement in connection with the many accidents that have occurred. Obviously, the general subject of boat safety comes within the purview of this committee and the Coast Guard. I don't know that it comes within the precise thrust of what we are discussing today, but it certainly merits further consideration. PAGENO="0182" 178 Mr. LAMBERT. I would not be dramatic, but I close with this thought: Suppose it was a bad-weather night and suppose, say, a cavalcade of students had gone to a game across the lake and they were returning late tonight and a tow went through that bridge, we would all feel a little funny tonight when we found out about it. Mr. B1AGGI. Your position is sound. Mr. LAMBERT. We are having trouble getting help on this; we really are. This has been going on for a long time and we really need help bad and we want to cooperate. Mr. BIAGGI. All I can tell you is you have two very esteemed and vigorous Congressmen in the persons of Congressman Treen and the gentlelady from New Orleans, Congresswoman Lindy Boggs, who I am sure will do all they can. Mr. LAMBERT. They have been trying to help us, but we need all the help we can get. Mr. TREEN. We have got Mr. Biaggi now. Mr. BIAGGI. The gentleman from Baton Rouge is the last witness. Would you please identify yourself. STATEMENT OP T. R. BETTS, CARGO CARRIERS, INC., BATON ROUGE~ LA. Mr. BETTS. Yes. I am T. R. Betts, Cargo Carriers, Inc., Baton Rouge, La. I think one of the reasons that you have difficulty in finding whether or not the VTS is needed above New Orleans is that the committee and hearings have all been slanted to New Orleans. Certainly Baton Rouge is the seventh largest port in the United States and we think that if we are going to be regulated, that there should be more consideration given to the needs and the operations within the Port of Baton Rouge, and not be tied in with the operations of the second largest port, Port of New Orleans. Mr. BIAGrn. Nobody quarrels with you, except we have a series of ports that we have to survey and we will try to make as many of them as possible. Mr. BETTS. What I am saying is we are being tied in with New Orleans right now. All of the regulations being discussed will not only apply to New Orleans, but apply to Baton Rouge. Mr. BIAGGL That is true, and to New York as well. We try to get as much input as possible. Our only regret is that we don't have as much time as possible to travel to each of these places when we would like to. The hearings will continue for many months to come, I'm sure. Mr. BETTS. We appreciate it. Mr. BIAGGI. Hopefully, we will be able to hold hearings at Baton Rouge. Mr. BETTS. Thank you very much. I appreciate you coming. Mr. TREEN. I want to say that just because the VTS will en~ compass the Ports of New Orleans and Baton Rouge doesn't mean that the regulations applying to Baton Rouge won't be consistent with its needs. Mr. BETTS. This may be true; however, the regulations that we have seen have been consistent for all four sectors, at least regulations PAGENO="0183" 179 we have seen drawn have applied throughout the sector of the Mile Zero to 243, which we are talking about Baton Rouge. Mr. TREEN. I'm sure your industry representatives will be sure to offer your comments on the proposed regulations. Mr. BETTS. I don't understand. Mr. BIAGGI. In that connection, this record is open; it will be open for a month. You can make any contributions from any source in Baton Rouge, from any sources in the area. We are extremely anxious to get as much input as possible. Mr. BETTS. Thank you very much. Mr. BIAGGL The meeting will adjourn. [The following was submitted for inclusion in the record:] MID-AMERICA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, St. Louis, Mo., October 16, 1975. Hon. MARIO BIAGGI, Chairman U.S. Coast Guard Subcommittee, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN: I would like to officially go on record on behalf of Mid- America Transportation Company as being opposed to the V.T.S. as presently proposed. We feel the vessel traffic control system from the sea buoy to mile 243 A.H.P. is not needed. Properly managed and manned the present traffic system (the stop and go lights at Algier's Point) coupled with the monitoring require- ments of channels 13 and 16 currently in effect should and would provide a viable and safe system of vessel traffic management in the New Orleans area at a fraction of the cost of the proposed V.T.S. The monies that have been earmarked for this system 4.4 million dollars for the initial investment could be spent in countless other areas to promote safe and economical transportation of goods by water. The vessel traffic control system as presently proposed was developed without the proper input of industry in the form of a formal advisory committee. We feel that had there been a proper advisory committee working in coopera- tion with the Coast Guard on this, the proposed regulations would have been contested at the onset. Yours truly, J. A. TINKEY, Vice President, Manager Traffic and Personnel. [Enclosure 5] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, New Orleans, La., November 12, 1975. Hon. MARIO BIAGGI, Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Rouse Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Rouse of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. BIAGGI: During the field hearing on Vessel Traffic Safety on 3 October 1975, you asked me to provide, for the record, comments on two aspects of the proposed New Orleans project. The first aspect was the statement made by Mr. Robert L. Gardner of Alter Company, Davenport, Iowa, which contained charges concerning the Coast Guard's actions in attempting to implement the New Orleans Vessel Traffic System. After reviewing Mr. Gardner's letter and the preliminary transcript of the hearing, I have come to the conclusion that his charges encompass a policy area which is in excess of my authority. I have therefore requested the cognizant staff within Coast Guard Headquarters to respond to these allegations. You will receive a response from the Commandant for inclusion in the record. The second aspect of the hearings which you asked me to address is the question of whether the New One ans Vessel Traffic System will expedite rather than delay traffic. PAGENO="0184" 180 Delay of traffic in the Coast Guard's existing Vessel Traffic Systems has not been a factor which has been raised as an industry objection, nor can I statistically prove that these systems have expedited traffic. The major area of comment in both the presently operational Houston-Galveston and Berwick Bay Vessel Traffic Systems in my District has been the vessel operators' opinions that these systems provide a feeling of confidence enabling transit of these hazardous areas with a greater degree of safety. The New Orleans Vessel Traffic System's operational area is so geographically different from our existing systems that our experience may not be directly comparable; but I believe this same increased confidence on the mariner's part will occur in the New Orleans System. As I stated in my testimony, one of the basic purposes of the Vessel Traffic Services is to facilitate vessel movement by acting as a central maritime informa- tion collection and dissemination agency. My requirements for the New Orleans system were also stated in the record; in essence, there will be times that vessels will be required to slow down, stop or not be able get underway within the system at the precise time that the operator desires. Obviously this could be termed as delaying or slowing traffic but such a procedure would only occur when a situation existed whereby a prudent operator would take the same action (delay departing, slow down, stop, etc.) if he were aware that an unsafe situation existed or was developing in his intended transit route. By making full use of the vessel movement reporting system, aided by a computerized real-time automated data system, the Vessel Traffic Center will be aware of a potential hazardous situation developing Directed action by the VTC to an operator in the form of advice to stop, slow, remain moored, etc. to avoid an unsafe condition from occurring, would only be given when an operator is not aware of a potential unsafe condition or was aware of and ignored his responsibility to act in a pludent manner. To slow down traffic for any reason other than for safety would be in direct conflict with one of the basic purposes of a VTS previously mentioned (i.e. to facilitate traffic move- ment) and will not be practiced or tolerated. If there are any aspects of this or any other subject on which I can he of assist- ance, my staff and I will be pleased to respond at your request. Sincerely, W. W. BARROW, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District. [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, sine die.I PAGENO="0185" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1976 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FisHERiEs, SUBCOMMiTTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAViGATION, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Mario Biaggi, chairman of the subcom- mittee, presiding. Mr. B1AGGI. The meeting is called to order. This morning, the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation is continuing its hearings begun last year in connection with its oversight responsibilities for Coast Guard programs. Early in the Congress, the subcommittee decided that it would be advantageous to take a detailed look at the Coast Guard program involving vessel traffic services, a program formally initiated subse- quent to the passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. Since that time, plans for the development of vessel traffic systems in various port areas have been undertaken. The relative soplustication of the services contemplated varies significantly, depending upon the port area involved and its peculiar needs, but some kind of system has been initiated for the Ports of San Francisco, Houston, Sault Sainte Marie, Puget Sound, New York, New Orleans, and Valdez, Alaska. It is understoodl that consideration is now being given for such a system in the Chesapeake Bay and pos- sibly in the Delaware River. Other port areas should receive atten- tion as future needs direct. As a part of its review of the program, the subcommittee held hear- ings on the subject in New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and Sault Sainte Marie. Unfortunately, it was unable to make scheduled visits to other port areas, but expects to do so when visits to those ports can be scheduled during the next Congress. The hearings today and tomorrow are scheduled for the purpose of bringing the subcommittee up to date on the overall program and to permit testimony from several interested witnesses who have requested the opportunity to appear and express their views, particularly on the plans for the vessel traffic services in New Orleans and the lower Mississippi River. I have requested the Coast Guard to review the current status of vessel traffic services in each port area where such services are either in place or being developed, to furnish the subcommittee with a summarized history of the appropriations and expenditures for each (181) PAGENO="0186" 182 port area, together with anticipated future needs, to inform the sub- committee of the exact status of the development of the program in each port area, and to advise us of any plans for areas where the program is not yet underway. In conducting these oversight hearings, I wish to comment that the subcommittee is, in no way, desirous of substituting its judgment for that of the Coast Guard in the details of these various port programs. We do, however, wish to assure ourselves that the manner of satisfy- ing the needs of each port area is rational and reflective of the overall needs, and we wish to be sure that funding which we authorize will be utilized effectively, consistent with those needs. Our first witness today is Rear Adm. Anthony F. Fugaro, who has recently assumed duties as Chief of the Office of Marine Environ- ment and Systems at Coast Guard Headquarters. As the officer responsible for the overall vessel traffic service pro- gram, Admiral Fugaro will review for us the overall program and will discuss future plans for its expansion into new areas. Admiral FUGARO. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ANTHONY F. FUGARO, CHIEF, OFFICE OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SYSTEMS, U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. RICHARD A. BAUMAN, CHIEF OF PORT SAFETY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND COMDR. EUGENE L HICKEY, 1R., CHIEF OP VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES Admiral FUGARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to testify concerning the Coast Guard's vessel traffic services program. I am Rear Adm. Anthony Fugaro, Chief of the Office of Marine Environment and Systems, Coast Guard Headquarters. With me on my right is Capt. Richard Bauman, Chief of Port Safety and Law Enforcement, and on my left is Comdr. Eugene Hickey, Chief of Vessel Traffic Services. My statement is lengthy, and if there are no objections, I will read it at this time. This morning I would like to summarize the historical back- ground- Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, excuse me. I note the extent of your statement. I do not know if it is possible-' if it would be possible for you to summarize your statement, or would it be necessary to go into complete detail? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I am ready to-I would be more than willing to summarize it. I assume, of course, that the entire statement will go in the record, and I recognize that we are a little late, sir. I would be more than very happy to summarize. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. [The statement follows :1 PAGENO="0187" 183 STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. ANTHONY F.. FtTGARO, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is a pleasure to appear before you today to testify concerning the Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Service program. I am Rear Admiral Anthony Fugaro, Chief of the Office of Marine Environment and Systems, Coast Guard Headquarters. With me, on my right, is Captain Richard Bauman, Chief of Port Safety and Law Enforcement; and on my left is Commander Eugene Hickey, Chief of Vessel Traffic Services. My statement is lengthy, and if there are no objections, I will read it at this time. This morning I would like to summarize the historical background of vessel traffic management in the United States; discuss the justification and rationale behind the Coast Guard's VTS program; and identify the essential considerations taken into account in arriving at the current stage of VTS development. The concluding part of this testimony will address the specifics of each VTS currently operational or under construction, and will touch on current planning for future systems. While some foreign ports, namely, Liverpool, Hamburg and Rotterdam, have had some form of VTS since 1964, the United States, despite the large number of ports and high volume of waterborne commerce, has been slower in the establish- ment of systems intended to provide some form of marine traffic control. Table 1 is a list of some rather basic traffic services that were being operated in United States ports and waterways prior to 1972. The only Coast Guard opera- tion was in the St. Marys River. Legislation for this dates back to 1896. TABLE 1 Port or waterway Type Operator St. Marys River VMRS,1 TV U.S. Coast Guard. New Orleans Traffic lights Corps of Engineers. Cape Cod Canal Traffic lights, VMRS, radar, and TV_ Do. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Traffic lights, VMRS, and TV Do. St. Lawrence Seaway VMRS St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. Honolulu Signal tower Harbor master. Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor radar, teletype net LA/LB pilots. Baltimore VHF-FM communications Private. Portland, Dreg do Do. Boston VMRS Do. 1 Vessel movement reporting system. It has taken the United States some twenty years to achieve general acceptance of systems intended to provide some form of marine traffic control. A shore based harbor radar service was established in 1949 by Jacobsen Pilot Service, Inc. in Long Beach, California, and has been operated continuously by them ever since. This was just one year after the first harbor radar installation in the port of Liverpool, England. The pilots employed by the city of Los Angeles followed with their own harbor radar in 1951. The radars in Long Beach and Los Angeles were installed in the pilot dispatch offices and used by the pilots for their own purposes. They have not been continuously manned and do not provide for overall traffic mangement in these ports. In 1951 a harbor radar demonstration, patterned after the systems in Liverpool and Long Beach, was conducted in New York Harbor. This was initiated and funded by the New York Port Authority. The potential of harbor radar was demonstrated, but funding and management problems for a permanent system were not resolved. The demonstration was terminated in 1952. From 1962 to 1965 a second demonstration project was conducted in New York, this time by the U.S. Coast Guard. This project was known as Ratan, Radio Television Aid to Navigation. Technical problems led to a termination of this demonstration, although the concept may possibly have future application. In November 1968, the Coast Guard forumlated plans for a Harbor Advisory Radar Project. This experimental project was developed in San Francisco Harbor in 1969. Later the same year, a Coast Guard position paper concluded that there was a definite need for harbor advisory systems in congested U.S. ports and that the Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation, should provide national leadership in this field. PAGENO="0188" 184 In January 1970, the Coast Guard began operating the San Francisco Harbor Advisory Radar Project on an experimental basis. On 5 February 1970, Congress- man Downing of Virginia introduced the first bill which included specific provi- sions for vessel traffic control. In May 1970, the President, in his oil pollution message to Congress, urged enactment, among other things, of legislation directed at vessel traffic control. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Transportation submitted its own Ports and Waterways Safety proposal, which was introduced as H.R. 17830. Testimony on H.R. 17830 favored the marine safety and environmental purposes of the Bill, but was almost unanimous in opposition to many provisions of the Bill. The general tenor was that it was too loosely drawn and too broad in scope. On 18 January 1971, while an improved version of the Bill was being drafted, the Oregon Standard collided with the Arizona Standard in San Francisco Bay, with the resultant discharge of 800,000 gallons of oil into the Bay. This casualty emphasized the possible need for vessel traffic control in our ports. On 10 July 1972, a more compact version of the Ports and Waterways Safety legislation was signed into law by the President. This authorized the Secretary of the Deparment in which the Coast Guard operates to establish, operate and maintain vessel traffic services and systems for ports, harbors and other waters subject to congested vessel traffic. The American public through congressional action had thus demanded that mere action be taken to reduce the loss of lives, injuries to people and damage to property and the environment as a result of the steadily increasing number of vessel casualities occurring in U.S. waters. Prior to the passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, the Coast Guard Office of Marine Environment and Systems was established in July 1971. One function of this office was to prepare and implement a national plan for vessel traffic services. The numerous ports and waterways of the United States are visited by almost every size and type of vessel currently in use in the world. These vessels transport thousands of different types of cargo. Many of these cargoes when spilled are hazardous or polluting. The size of vessels and the volume of shipping continue to increase. The potential for major marine disasters exists. According to U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty statistics, the number of collisions and grQundings in U.S. waters rose from 1,185 cases in fiscal year 1965 to 1,918 in fiscal year 1975. The reported losses to vessels, cargo and property from these casualties was $33 million in fiscal year 1965; in fiscal year 1975 these losses were $103 million. A recent study of the Coast Guard marine casualty reports suggests that due to unreported casulaties and underestimates of the dollar losses for those casualties that are reported, the actual annual dollar losses are probably several times that amount. The annual loss of lives and number of serious injuries during this same period was 50 and 39 respectively. These figures do not include the substantial damages to property ashore, such as the costs of spilled oilcleanup. During calendar years 1971 through 1975, the years for which complete data on pollution are available, there was an annual average of 170 polluting incidents caused by collisions and groundings which spilled an annual average of 5.2 million gallons of pollutants into U.S. waters. Statistics indicate that waterborne commerce in the U.S. will increase substan- tially and the carriage of hazardous and potentially polluting cargo will be a significant part of this growth. Thus, the forecast for the future shows increased waterway congestion and greater potential risk of traffic accidents. Historical casualty data and the future outlook for waterborne commerce indicate a need for improved marine traffic safety in U.S. ports and waterways. Vessel traffic services can make significant contributions to this effort. This, then, is the situation that confronts the Coast Guard today. The Con- gressional mandate is clear. What follows is a description of the Coast Guard's activities to date in establishing vessel traffic services. First, to establish the terms of reference, the concept of vessel traffic manage- ment should be examined, as it is vessel traffic management that is practiced by a vessel traffic service. Vessel traffic management seeks to establish two principles: good order and predictability; and can take many forms. Essentially, vessel traffic management encompasses every measure applied to affect (and improve) the relationship of vessels with respect to each other. The Rules of the Road are statutory and regulatory measures that must be practiced by vessels, in order to prevent collisions. Another form of traffic management is routing, one element of which may be a traffic separation scheme, which is a network of one-way traffic lanes, and separation lines or separation zones, designed to PAGENO="0189" 185 physically separate vessel traffic proceeding in opposite or nearly opposite direc- tions. Additionally, depending upon the individual configuration of a port or waterway and the complexity of its vessel traffic patterns, other regulations may be established to further affect vessel movements, such as speed limits, limita.- tions on vessel size, and restricting vessel operation to vessels that have particular operating characteristics and capabilities. Each of these forms of traffic manage- ment can be very cost effective in reducing vessel casualties, in that government equipment and personnel are not required except in the administration and enforcement of the laws and regulations. For the sake of convenience, all of the foregoing forms of vessel traffic manage- ment can be categorized as passive. It is when people external to a vessel become involved in its operation, either directly or indirectly, that vessel traffic manage- ment becomes active. Such is the case when a Vessel Traffic Service is established. It has been recognized throughout the world, through detailed vessel casualty analysis, that passive vessel traffic management is not sufficient to prevent some serious vessel casualties. At the most recent international symposium on marine traffic systems, conducted at The Hague,. April 11-14 1976, representatives of 25 nations submitted some 40 technical papers on the subject, and I quote from one: "Is a captain still capable to navigate his ship safely, taking into account the increased traffic flows and the greater risk level of cargoes? Is a captain still able to anticipate the oncoming dangers without proper knowledge of what happens beyond the limits .of visibility? Is it necessary to provide a captain with traffic information to facilitate the process of taking decisions? "Evidently, a great public interest is at stake. The tragic marine accidents of the past decade demonstrate the fatal consequences of strandings and collisions in terms of loss of human lives, pollution of the environment and the loss of capital." These observations, made by His Excellency, Dr. M. H. M. va.n Hulten, Secre- tary of State of the Netherlands Ministry for Transport and Public Works, reflect the general consensus of the international marine safety community. It is gratifying to note that the United States is now considered to be at the fore- front in the development of vessel traffic services. The Coast Guard developed harbor surveillance radar, being installed in New York, Galveston and Valdez, Alaska, has established a new international standard in its accuracy, effectiveness and reliability; the extensive use of low light level television, as a primary method of surveillance ,was pioneered in VTS Houston-Galveston; and, the Coast Guard's procurement of traffic analysis and display computers is being closely followed by authorities in several major foreign port areas. An active role in vessel traffic management presupposes the operation of equip- ment and people that have sufficient capability to fulfill that role. In the United States, we view the situation from the perspective of providing user services; p~. that is, providing services to the master of a vessel-generally, furnishing him with information, critical to the safe navigation of his vessel, that he would not normally be able to obta.in readily on his own. It remains, as in the past, the ultimate responsibility of the master to control the movements of the vessel, after correlating all available information, to ensure its safe passage. Each component of a vessel traffic service is designed to derive this information that is critical to safe navigation, and to enable its communication to a vessel master well in advance of its need. The management approach to designing a vessel traffic service is a logical progression: first, identify the needs, cost, benefits, and vessel traffic options of a port or waterway (in the form of user services); second, identify the capability necessary to meet these needs (in the form of system components); and third, identify the specific engineering requirements necessary to provide the capability desired (in the form of specific electronic equipments). Thus, system operations management precedes system engineering management. In order to accomplish the first step in traffic management systems design- establishing need-the Coast Guard examines four broad areas: (1) historic casualty experience, (2) potential for future serious casualties, (3) port or waterway configuration and traffic patterns, (4) future port or waterway growth. This step must be conducted on a port-by-port basis. In 1973, the Coast Guard conducted an analysis of port needs for vessel traffic services. The output of this analysis was a listing of ports and waterways in the order in which their needs should be addressed, and initial recommendations concerning the system components necessary to meet these needs. This study (Vessel Traffic Systems, Analysis of Port Needs, August 1973) indicated that seven U.S. ports or waterways were experiencing the number and type of vessel casualties that would require a vessel PAGENO="0190" 186 traffic service to prevent. These ports and waterways were identified as: New York, Houston-Galveston, the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico to Baton Rouge, Chesapeake Bay, San Francisco, Puget Sound, and several sections of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (JCW). The study also found that in eleven other U.S. ports and waterways vessel casualty experience warranted a future detailed examination with respect to what passive vessel traffic management measures could be applied. In most cases, it was felt that compliance with the then recently promulgated Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act and regulations would be sufficient to significantly reduce the incidence of vessel casualties in those waters. With respect to the second step in system design-required capability (compo- nents)-a number of essential considerations are made. In order for any vessel traffic management system to be effective, the traffic manager must be provided with four basic components: (1) the ability to communicate, (2) the ability to analyze and display information, (3) surveillance, (4) qualified personnel. The ability to communicate with Participating Vessels.-A Vessel Movement Reporting System (VMRS) is the keystone of any vessel traffic service. It consists of a VHF-FM communications network that permits direct radio contact with the master of every participating vessel in the VTS area. While participation by vessels is currently voluntary in all VTS areas other than Puget Sound and Berwick Bay, the Coast Guard is considering issuing Federal regulations to require parti- cipation by vessels in every VTS. In a VMRS vessels provide information to the Vessel Traffic Center (VTC) as to their location, intended movements, size, cargo, and conditions that may adversely affect their safe navigation or the safe naviga- tion of other vessels, such as observed discrepancies in aids to navigation, con- centrations of fishing or recreational vessels, and obstructions to navigation. Vessels must maintain a continuous listening watch on the VTS frequency desig- nated for the geographic area within which the vessel is operating. In those ports and waterways where the number of vessels participating at one time exceeds the number that can be accommodated on a single radio fre- quency, as in New York and the Mississippi River, the VTS area will be sectorized, and vessels will change frequencies when crossing sector boundaries. As each vessel is also required to maintain a continuous listening watch on VHF-FM Channel 13, the vessel bridge-to-bridge radio-telephone frequency, a common radio frequency is available to vessels in proximity of each other, but in different VTS sectors. Channel 13 is also listened to by each VTC sector operator; consequently, this frequency serves as a backup for immediate communication between the VTC and vessels, in the event of congestion on the sector frequency. Additionally, a continuous listening watch on the VTS sector frequency establishes a "party line" concept, wherein masters are able to discern substantial valuable information concerning the movements of other vessels in the vicinity by listening to com- munications with the VTC. The ability to analyze and display information.-In order to provide the user services necessary to avoid the hazardous conditions that lead to vessel casualites, the traffic manager must be provided with the component that will analyze and display all relevant information obtained through the VMRS and other sources. Generally, this can be accomplished by automatic data processing and computer generated displays. The Coast Guard is looking at computers as an aid to the traffic manager in his decisionmaking process, by performing accurately and rapidly those time consuming functions otherwise required to be accomplished manually. Additionally, computers can perform complex tasks, such as auto- maticaffly accepting and displaying vessel location and movement data from surveilance devices. And, most important, computers can forecast the develop- ment of vessel congestion-the primary cause of vessel collisions-so that the traffic manager can alert vessels in time to develop remedial courses of action. It should be emphasized that the Coast Guard does not put decision making in the hands of a computer-that is the role of qualified humans. We do, however, wish to take advantage of this superior resource for freeing the traffic manager of the manual functions that needlessly detract from his time available to com- municate and to think. Surveillance.-The need for a surveillance component in a vessel traffic service is directly proportional to the level of accuracy of information necessary to provide user services. In areas where vessel traffic density is high and traffic patterns com- plex, and in areas where the waterway configuration presents natural constrictions to traffic, it is generally advantageous to allow the traffic manager to "see" and exactly measure the situation on a real-time basis. The accuracy of vessel location PAGENO="0191" 187 and movement reports is limited by numerous governing factors, including errone- ous information input by participating vessels. Currently, surveillance is provided by three means: visual observation; closed circuit, low light level television; and radar. Other surveillance devices, such as magnetic or acoustic detectors may have application in U.S. systems, and are now under study in the VTS Research and Development program. In selecting the type of surveillance to cover any section of a VTS area, two primary criteria govern: 1) the geographical configuration of the waterway, 2) the purpose of the surveillance. Experience in the operation of Houston-Galveston VTS has shown that closed circuit, low light level television (CCTV), augmented with infrared illumination equipment, is one of the best means of electronic surveil- lance, in that it most closely duplicates the capability of the human eye-the ideal method of surveillance. CCTV's application is limited to the river environ- ment, however, and is not as well suited to coverage of large harbors and bays as is radar. High resolution, harbor surveillance radar can detect and track vessels up to 24 miles from the antenna site. By using microwave links, any number of remote radars can bring surveillance coverage to the traffic manager. Radar, while lacking CCTV's ability to positively identify all vessels within range, has the advantage of being effective during periods of extremely limited visibility. Thus, it is possible to assist vessels in fixing their location during reduced visibility, when they may have lost the ability to do so independently. Additionally, radar video data can be digitized for automatic entry into computer processors. We are currently developing a capability for automatic radar tracking of vessels by com- puter, thus introducing further speed and accuracy into the system, and further freeing human operators of time consuming manual functions. Qualified Personnel.-The most important component of any vessel traffic service is the complement of personnel tasked with operating it. In the initial planning stages of VTS development the Coast Guard has manned its vessel traffic centers with military personnel. The Coast Guard recognizes that, in general, its personnel do not possess the specialized qualifications of the pilots that navigate the vessels sailing the waters of the VTS area. Nevertheless, as a seagoing agency of long standing, the Coast Guard does possess highly competent mariners. The Coast Guard does intend to assign these men to its vessel traffic services, and feels that they will be both fully trained and fully qualified to perform the specific functions required. Keep in mind, we recognize the role of the master and pilot as the sole authority in the maneuvering of the vessel-the traffic manager ashore cannot supplant that role. The criteria that the Coast Guard has developed in manning vessel traffic centers are based on complex factors relating to the amount of necessary communications; vessel traffic density and complexity; and electronics equipment configuration. Each VTC is manned on a 24 hour day basis. A Coast Guard officer in the grade of lieutenant is continuously on duty in the capacity of watch supervisor. He is in direct supervision of several enlisted sector operators, who do the actual communications with vessels and perform the data management functions of the center. It is the watch supervisor who is solely responsible for decisionmaking and who exercises the authority of implementing Federal regula- tions. On a longer term basis, alternate manning arrangements, considering the use of local personnel, including pilots, are being studied. The expressed intent of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 is the prevention of damage, destruction or loss to vessels or bridges or structures and the protection of the navigable waters from resultant environmental harm. There- fore, a basic principle in the operation of any vessel traffic service established under this Act is that necessary action be taken to prevent collisions and groundings, within the capability of the system. Should a watch supervisor perceive a certain set of circumstances to constitute a situation that may result in a vessel casualty, he is authorized and required to take whatever action that he feels is necessary to prevent that casualty. Generally, his actions will involve a timely exchange of advice and information with the master, pilot or other person in charge of the navigation of the vessels. Nevertheless, if in his opinion it is necessary, the watch supervisor will issue orders directing the movement of the vessel or vessels in- volved. Even then, this does not lessen the responsibility of the master or pilot for safe navigation and prudent maneuvering of his vessel. The master or pilot may choose to disregard this order under the provisions of Section 161.111, 33 CFR, which reads: "In an emergency, any person may deviate from any section in this subpart to the extent necessary to avoid endangering persons, property, or the environment." He must then report his actions to the VTC, in accordance with Section 161.134, which reads: 78-280-70-13 PAGENO="0192" 188 "Whenever the master of a vessel deviates from any section in this subpart because of an emergency or radio failure, he shall report, or cause to be reported, the deviation to the VTC as soon as possible." A recent marine casualty in the Houston Ship Channel involved the accidental grounding of an 893 foot lash ship (in the 400 foot-wide channel) after it collided with a tug pushing barges. The tug experienced a steering casualty while being overtaken by the larger vessel. During the period from the time the collision occurred, at 7:50 p.m., to the time that the ship was again under way, at 2:40 a.m. the next morning, the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Center in Houston actively managed traffic to prevent further casualties as a result of the extreme congestion that resulted. The summary of events, which I would like to submit separately for the record, graphically ifiustrates the capability of a VTS, wherein the components of communications, surveillance, and competent people functioned ideally to avert potential disaster. No one can say what would have happened had the downbound, 585 foot liquified petroleum gas (LPG) ship not been advised of the several other deep draft vessels anchored in the narrow channel. The fact that the Houston Ship Channel is in the heart of a heavily populated area containing dense chemical and petroleum storage facilities greatly exacerbated the already hazardous situation. It is possible that most, if not all, of the costs of establishing VTS Houston- Galveston were recovered that night, in the form of loss of life and property that was prevented. Having first identified the needs of a port or waterway, and then the system components necessary to provide the user services to meet those needs, the final step in the management approach is to identify the specific engineering require- ments to provide the capability desired. An evolutionary process has taken place in this regard since initial vessel traffic services were procured in 1972 and 1973. Originally, specific electronics equipment and services were selected by the Coast Guard and procured through the applicable GSA Federal Supply Schedule Con- tract. A review of this procedure by the General Accounting Office resulted in the recommendation that the Coast Guard procure future systems using a detailed work statement and competitive procurement. In writing a detailed work state- ment, electronics equipment operating and design requirements are specified; but, the specific equipments are left to the prospective bidder. Thus, the Coast Guard seeks to define its electronics engineering needs in the form of specific operating requirements. In all candor, it should be noted that the Coast Guard has not meet with general acceptance of its plans by the marine industry, which has been understandably skeptical to date. Such is not the case in those areas that have actually been pro- vided the user services of a VTS. The Port of Houston, in particular, has signifi- cantly benefited from the Houston-Galveston Vessel Traffic Service, both in hazards reduced and faciliation of marine commerce. In my opinion, there would be substantial marine industry opposition to any proposal to withdraw those services. I am just as confident that general industry acceptance will be gained by each new VTS as each is given the opportunity to demonstrate its worth. Thus far I have briefly described the history of VTS in the U.S. I have also described the methodology we have used in selecting and designing systems for specific ports. I have attached to my statement a brief chronological history and description of existing or planned VTS in the following areas: San Francisco, Puget Sound, Houston-Galveston, New York, New Orleans, and Prince William Sound. In the seven areas identified in the 1973 "Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report as having a potential requirement for active vessel traffic management, five vessel traffic services are currently operational or under construction. The remaining two areas-Chesapeake Bay and the Gulf ICW-are stifi undergoing study by Coast Guard planners in the Fifth and Eighth Coast Guard Districts respectively. Our preliminary analysis of Chesapeake Bay indicates that a VTS for the entire bay area may not be cost beneficial. We are looking at sectors of the bay area to determine if VTS in these areas would be justified. In any event, we intend to hold public hearings in both Maryland and Virginia to ensure that all interested parties have an opportunity to comment on needs in the bay area. This will ensure that the broadest based information will be considered by the Coast Guard before any final decision on VTS in the Chesapeake Bay area is made. With respect to the Gulf ICW, we expect to complete our detailed studies of costs versus benefits during calendar year 1977. At the present time, no other U.S. port or waterway is being actively considered for establishment of a manned vessel traffic service. Nevertheless, the Coast PAGENO="0193" 189 Guard is pursuing a program of data collection and analysis for each area where marine commerce is significant, so that we will be prepared to identify any future needs as they develop. Further, we will be monitoring existing operations to assure that they are, in fact, cost effective and are producing desired objectives. We will also update these systems as necessary. Already we have developed a long-range R&D plan looking towards improvements in future systems. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. I or my staff will be happy to answer any questions that the Committee may have. ATTACHMENT 1 SAN FRANCISCO VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE The first formal involvement of the Coast Guard in vessel traffic management occurred in 1968, as planning began for an experimental harbor advisory radar system in San Francisco, CA. San Francisco was selected as the site for this initial research and development effort for several reasons: (a) The bay had an established voluntary vessel movement reporting system (VMRS) and an existing, well developed, communications system. (b) The relatively high occurrence of fog allowed a more complete evaluation of system benefits in facilitating vessel movement during low visibility. (c) Traffic density was not high enough to require complex data collection and analysis methods during the experiment. (d) The bay presented several complex traffic patterns; the experience gained could therefore be applied to similar areas in other ports. The Coast Guard began operating the San Francisco Harbor Advisory Radar (HAR) Project on an experimental basis in January 1970. Our original concept was to proceed rather deliberately with the HAR experiment before trying to develop any fully operational systems. The collision between two tankers beneath the Golden Gate Bridge on 18 January 1971, with the resultant discharge of 800,000 gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay, greatly accelerated our plans. On 22 August 1972 the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service assumed operational status. During 1973 a traffic separation scheme was instituted, the traffic center was expanded and moved to Yerba Buena Island, and improved communications equipment was placed in operation. Also, communications coverage was extended to the delta region, and a vessel movement reporting system was instituted between Point San Pablo and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. One radio frequency has proven sufficient in San Francisco to handle all VTS communications. VHF-FM channel 13 is now being used, but plans call for a shift to channel 12 as the primary VTS frequency in the near future. At present San Francisco VTS is voluntary, but user participation and acceptance are excellent. Regulations to require participation of certain classes of vessels are presently under review within Coast Guard Headquarters, and will be the subject of public hearings prior to implementation. San Francisco VTS is manned by seven officers and 21 enlisted personnel. Including all research and development work, the system cost $5.8 million to establish; annual operating expenses are $780 thousand. White statistically valid conclusions on the operational effectiveness of the system cannot be drawn due to limited data, merchant vessel casualty statistics for the first three years of operation are most encouraging. Although vessel transits have been steadily increasing, the annual number of collisions has fallen from 12.4 in the pre VTS period to 2.3 since San Francisco VTS was commissioned. During the three year period of VTS operations there have been no deaths/injuries or pollution incidents caused by vessel casualties, and the annual damages caused by vessel casualties have dropped from $2.3 to $1.7 million. No system changes or improvements are planned. ATTAChMENT 2 PUGET SOUND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE In September 1972 the second U.S. vessel traffic service was established in Puget Sound, WA. This area is made up of long, narrow, deep waterways, and is subject to visibility of less than two miles more than 12% of the time. Large numbers of commercial fishermen and recreational boating enthusiasts take maximum advantage of the area's pristine environment. PAGENO="0194" 190 A fiscal year 72 appropriation of $1.0 million provided funds for the initial system establishment. The vessel traffic center was constructed in Seattle and a buoyed traffic separation scheme implemented in Puget Sound and adjacent waters. Regulations requiring vessel participation went into effect in September 1974. Puget Sound VTS operated solely as a communications based vessel move- ment reporting system until October 1975, when limited radar surveillance of congested areas was added. This system augmentation was funded by a fiscal year 74 appropriation of $1.0 million. Puget Sound VTS operates on a single VHF-FM communications channel. VHF-FM Channel 13 is presently being used, but a shift to Channel 14 is planned within a year. As the United States and Canada share common traffic management problems in the boundary areas, close coordination has been maintained. In March 1975 a voluntary traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Juan de Fuca was jointly implemented. In February 1976 technical agreement was reached on provisions of a United States/Canada joint vessel traffic management agreement for boundary waters. The personnel complement for Puget Sound VTS is seven officers and 23 en- listed men. The total establishment cost is $2.0 million, with annual operating expenses of $830 thousand. As with San Francisco, the casualty statistics have been favorable, if not con- clusive, since the system assumed operations. The annual number of collisions dropped from 3.5 to 1.0, and annual monetary damages from vessel casualties have decreased from $800 thousand to $400 thousand. In the three years of operations there have been no pollution incidents or deaths/injuries caused by vessel casualties. Two system modifications are under consideration for Puget Sound VTS. First, the addition of radar coverage of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Rosario Strait is needed to provide positive surveillance capabilities for effective implementation of joint U.S./Canadian vessel traffic management in those waters. Secondly, the present manual means of maintaining vessel position and status is proving in- adequate in handling the more than 240 daily vessel transits which are actively being managed by Puget Sound VTS. The addition of a computer based informa- tion and display system is being studied. ATTACHMENT 3 HOUSTON-GALVESTON VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE The Coast Guard's third VTS was established in the Houston-Galveston, Texas, area in February 1975. The area includes Galveston Bay and entrance, a section of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, Bolivar Roads, and the entire 1-louston Ship Channel. The Houston Ship Channel is a narrow man-made channel with many sharp bends and extends about 40 miles from Galveston Bay to the turning basin in Houston. Annually, there are over 80,000 vessel transits carrying 82 miffion tons of cargo, over 60 percent of which is petroleum and chemical products. The 1973 Coast Guard "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report ranked Houston-Galveston third, behind only New York and New Orleans. An average of 36 collisions, rammings, and groundings occur annually, causing an average of three pollution incidents and $4.3 million in direct damage to vessels, cargo, and property. It is estimated that the operation of the VTS will prevent 38 percent of the collisions and 25 percent of all casualties and will produce direct monetary benefits of over $1.0 million. Presently, this system incorporates a communications based vessel movement reporting system, with surveillance of the four most critical sections of the Houston Ship Channel provided by low light level, closed circuit television. VHF-FM channel 12 is the single VTS operating frequency. Regula- tions are now being drafted to make participation of certain categories of vessels mandatory. The manning complement of Houston-Galveston VTS is seven officers and 24 enlisted personnel. System additions for which contracts have been awarded include radar surveillance of Galveston Bay and computer based information and display system. The total system establishment cost of $2.8 million has been funded by appropriations of $2.0 million in FY 73 and $800 thousand in FY 76. Annual operating expenses are $890 thousand. No further modifications or major system changes are planned. PAGENO="0195" 191 ATTACHMENT 4 NEW YORK VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE New York Harbor represents the greatest vessel traffic management challenge in the United States. It is the country's largest port, handling the largest amount of commerce, and has very high vessel density and complex traffic patterns. About one half million vessel transits take place annually in greater New York Harbor. In the 1973 Coast Guard "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report, New York ranked No. 1 in priority for improved vessel traffic management serv- ices. About 80 collisions, rammings, and groundings occur annually, causing an average of six pollution incidents and $9.0 million in direct damages to vessels, cargo and property. It is estimated that the operation of New York VTS will prevent one half the collisions, about one third of all casualties and produce direct monetary benefits of $2.4 million annually. New York VTS is scheduled to start operations in July 1978. It will maintain radar surveillance of the Upper and Lower Bays and television surveillance of six critical areas in Arthur Kill, Kill van Kull and the East River. Computer based automated techniques wifi be used to store, process and display vessel information for traffic management functions. Due to the geographical size of the area and the large number of vessels, New York VTS will be divided into five sectors, using VHF-FM channels 11, 12 and 14 as operating frequencies. The $7.3 million cost of system establishment has been funded by appropriations of $4.2 million in FY 74 and $3.1 million in FY 77. Annual operating expenses are estimated to be $1.21 million. The manning complement will be seven officers and 45 enlisted personnel. ATTACHMENT 5 NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE New Orleans VTS will cover the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge to 15 miles seaward of the entrance, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and portions of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, Harvey Canal, Algiers Canal, and the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Annually the Mississippi River in the vicinity of New Orleans carries over 1.5 million tons of cargo, half of which is petroleum and chemical products. Annual vessel transits exceed 150,000. The 1973 Coast Guard "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs" Study Report ranked New Orleans second nationally in its need for improved vessel traffic management services. In the last three years an annual average of 165 collisions, rammings, and groundings has occurred, causing an average of $7.8 million in direct damage to vessels, cargo and property. It is estimated that the operation of New Orleans VTS will prevent over half of these casualties and produce $2.6M in direct monetary benefits annually. New Orleans VTS is being developed in phases, with initial operations sched- uled to commence in July 1977. A vessel movement reporting system will utilize three VHF-FM communications frequencies: Channels 11, 12, and 14. The oper- ation of existing Corps of Engineers traffic lights at Governor Nicholls Wharf, Gretna, and Westwego will also be incorporated in the VTS. We intend to operate the system initially with voluntary participation. When we may issue regulations requiring mandatory participation will depend upon our experience under volun- tary operation. In the second phase, tentatively scheduled for completion in mid 1979, low light level, closed circuit television surveillance coverage of the Mississippi River from mile 89 AHP to mile 112 AHP will be added. In a subsequent phase, radar surveillance of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of the Head of Passes could be added. The total initial system cost of $3.9 million has been funded by appropriations of $1.7 million in fiscal year 74 and $2.2 million in fiscal year 76. Annual oper- ating expenses are estimated to be $1.04 million. New Orleans VTS will be manned by seven officers and 40 enlisted personnel. ATTACHMENT 6 PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (P.L. 93-153) requires the Coast Guard to establish a VTS for Prince William Sound and Valdez, AK. It is expected that of the 17 daily transits of vessels subject to VTS, four will be tankers in the PAGENO="0196" 192 80,000 to 125,000 DWT range. Geographically, the area is comprised of deep, open waterways surrounded by mountainous terrain. The only constrictions to navigation are at Cape Hinchinbrook, the primary entrance to Prince Wffliam Sound and at Valdez Narrows, the entrance to Port Valdez. Annually, the area is subject to restricted visibility of less than two miles about half the time, due to rain, fog, and snow. Prince William Sound VTS, which is scheduled to assume operations in October 1977, will provide reliable communications coverage of Port Valdez, Prince William Sound and 90 miles seaward of Cape Hinchinbrook, as well as high resolution radar surveillance of Valdez Arm, Narrows, and Port Valdez. In addi- tion, traffic separation schemes are being established in Prince William Sound and its approaches. Offshore tanker routing between Prince William Sound and West Coast ports is under development. Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN-C) coverage of such routes will provide accurate means for position determination for vessels to maintain the charted tracks. The $7.1 mfflion cost of establishing the system has been funded by appro- priations of $2.36 mffiion in fiscal year 1975 and $4.74 million in fiscal year 1976. Annual operating expenses are estimated to be $1.24 million. The vessel traffic center will be located in Valdez, AK, as part of a Marine Safety Office. Facilities will include a 65' tug, family quarters, and barracks space. The total complement is 6 commissioned officers, 3 warrant officers, and 40 enlisted personnel. No additional changes or modifications are anticipated. ATTACHMENT 7 OTHER VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES In addition to the six major vessel traffic services, the Coast Guard has estab- lished two less extensive systems since passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Each of these systems was undertaken to remedy a particular hazardous situation. In 1973 a communications system was instituted in the vicinity of McAlpine Dam on the Ohio River near Louisville, Ky. Louisville VTS is placed in operation at those times when the flood stage at McAlpine Dam exceeds 13 feet, a condition which causes strong outfall currents at the upstream approach to the canal en- trance to the locks. During such times, it is hazardous for more than one tow to be in the vicinity of the lock at the same time. The VTS coordinates the arrival of tows at this approach, and maintains communications with the nearby railroad drawbridge. Personnel who man the system intermittently are made available from their regular tasks by the call up of reservists. Louisville VTS cost approximately $12,000 to establish and $20,000 per year to operate. Berwick Bay VTS was established in 1974 on the Atchafalaya River and Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, in the vicinity of Morgan City, LA. Two bridges over the Atchafalaya River at Berwick Bay make vessel navigation difficult, especially during periods of high water and fast currents. Berwick Bay VTS is a communica- tions based system. It operates full time to coordinate traffic flow to ensure that vessels do not meet in proximity to the bridges. During periods of high water additional limitations apply to vessel operation restricting the size and makeup of tows. Berwick Bay YTS is manned by one officer and nine enlisted personnel. System establishment cost was $24,000, and annual operating costs are $152,000. ATTACHMENT 8 SUMMARY OF EVENTS Collision of M/V Delta Norte and Tug Mississippian and subsequent grounding of M/V Delta Norte on 10 July 1976, in the Houston Ship Channel, vicinity of LT-51A All vessels and tows underway during this incident were VTS participants. All communications with the two vessels ~Delta Norte and Mississippian) other than initial call were on Channel 12 and Channel 6. Traffic summary at time of collision: Three inbound tows between HSC 25 and 26 and Redfish Bar and no inbound ships. Next expected arrival was M/V Hellenic Sun (522' x 76' x 23') at 2300. There were six outbound ships at time of collision, five more eventually came off dock. Four outbound tows below Morgan's Point. All ships anchored between HSC LT-84 and Redfish, all tows pushed into the bank on Redftsh Bar. PAGENO="0197" 193 ALL TIMES CDST 1950 VTC overheard that a collision occurred between the Lash Ship Delta Norte (outbound from Barbours Cut to Sea) and the Tug Mississippian (outbound from Ideal Cement to Bolivar, pushing 2 loaded, sand barges). The display showed the Delta Norte in an overtaking situation with the Mississippian in the vicinity of HSC LT-51A. Informed COTP Galveston that a collision had occurred. ~952 The pilot aboard the Delta Norte informed VTC that he had collided and subse- quently grounded the vessel. The channel was blocked by the ship and the pilot indicated he was unable to maneuver. VTC inquired about casualties, and damage to the vessel. The pilot indicated that there were no casualties, the Delta Norte had suffered little damage during the collision but that the Tug Mississippian had been holed. The watch inquired if tug assistance was requested. The pilot indicated that no tug assistance was requested and that as soon as the tanks had been sounded aboard the vessel that he would attempt to back off. This information was passed to COTP Galveston. The watch was directed to inform all outbound traffic below Morgan's Point and all inbound traffic above 1150 LB's 25 and 26. 1954 VTC alerted the Harbor Tug dispatcher in Galveston and Houston and told them Harbor Tugs might be needed because of the size of the Delta Norte (893' long, 101' wide and 32'8" draft). 1955 VTC finally succeeded in contacting the Tug Mississippian. The skipper said he had been holed aft (barges were intact) and that none of his crew was hurt. He had power and was proceeding to Bolivar. The watch asked if he needed pumps or other assistance. The Mississippian said that he had pumps aboard and did not require assistance. 1959 Delta Norte pilot advised VTC that the ship could not back off and that two tugs had been ordered. COTP Galveston was notified. The pilot office and pilot boat were notified. 2000 The outbound crude carrier Essi Flora (516' x 66' x 30') anchored two miles above the Delta Norte. 2005 VTC notified COTP Galveston that VTC had closed the channel between Redfish Bar and LB's 25 and 26. The watch commenced notifying traffic. 2009 The channel was closed. COTP Houston was notified and informed of traffic. 2031 Pilot of the Delta Norte and tows in area recommend one-way traffic. COTP Galveston was notified and the channel was opened to one-way traffic. The Delta Norte was informed by the watch that two harbor tugs had just left Baytown (approximately 15 miles upchannel to assist the Delta Norte). COTP Galveston directed (through the Center) that the Mississippian wait at Government Moorings in Bolivar to be boarded by MIO personnel and that the Delta Norte wait in Bolivar anchorage for boarding by MIO personnel. 2036 Commanding Officer VTS briefed on the incident, the action taken, and the proposed course of action. He was subsequently informed of all major changes in status. 2045 Pilot of the Delta Norte indicates that vessel is grounded in pipeline area. VTC slide of area shows pipeline crossing above the position of the Delta Norte. The watch requested to know if there were any visible signs of discharge from a pipe- line. The Delta Norte replied that there were no apparent leaks. COTP Galveston PAGENO="0198" 194 was notified and the vessel was requested to cease attempting to back off until the contents of the pipeline could be ascertained. 2048 Closed channel due to the jostling effect of passing vessels. 2104 COTP Galveston indicated that the Delta Norte could continue to back off, if, in VTC opinion, the traffic situation required it. Note.-Among the outbound traffic was the Trina Multina (LPG) (585' x 71' x 23), the Essi Flora (516' x 6' x 30') (crude), the Multitank Westfalia (298' x 45' x 21') (crude) and the Tuliahoma (585' x 80' x 34') (crude). The Esso Bahamas (569' x 85' x 25') had just come off dock in Baytown loaded and two other Exxon ships were scheduled to sail prior to midnight. The Master of the Delta Norte had shifted cargo aft and pumped his forward (water) peak tank raising the bow three feet. VTC advised the pilot he could continue his attempts to back off and notified COTP Galveston of the action taken. Note.-A total of eleven outbound ships from Houston had been advised of the traffic situation and requested to slow until the Delta Norte cleared. All even- tually anchored in the channel between LT-84 and Redfish Bar. 2139 Delta Norte position and draft were finally obtained (bearings and ranges) and passed to MIO Galveston. 2225 Pilots on-scene recommended one-way ship traffic in area due to lack of move- ment on Delta Norte. COTP Galveston notified and one-way traffic outbound for ships approved. 2234 Delta Norte backs off. Pilot indicates it will take him ten minutes or so tO get straightened out in channel. Channel re-opened by COTP Galveston. All ships notified of situation. 2247 Delta Norte is in irons and is unable to get straightened out. More tugs are ordered. COTP Galveston notified and the channel is re-closed. 2305 Notified Exxon Baytown and recommended that their two large crude carriers remain at berth until the Delta Norte clears. Exxon concurs. VTC watch relieved. 2325 Relieved the watch with 13 ships anchored above M/V Delta Norte. Five tows pushed in at Redfihs Reef and 14 twos in the vicinity of Galveston Freeport cutoff Buoy #2 and HSC 25 and 26. Delta Norte hard aground with two tugs made up alongside one tug enroute. Delta Norte reports no success with two tugs and is waiting for the third and asked if we can round up more. Called G&H Towing and put two tugs at Exxon Baytown on standby. 0226 M/V Delta Norte underway with tugs assisting. 0240 Delta Norte reports all systems functioning properly, opened channel to all traffic. VTC coordinating participants, user cooperation excellent all passed without further incident. Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, in here it has been, as I have indicated in my statement in the historical background, we have been about 20 years since we first initiated some form of vessel traffic services. At least it has taken that length of time to gain acceptance within the United States. Other nations have had systems such as Liverpool and Rotterdam, but we have come a long way, I feel, within the vessel traffic services PAGENO="0199" 195 in development, and we have come to the point now where I think we are one of the leaders in the world in the development of hardware and in the development of systems and management in vessel traffic services. iPart of my statement I listed the existing systems in the world, including the one existing mandatory service in St. Mary's River near Sault Sainte Marie. And in my statement I also indicated the Coast Guard's history with the development of vessel traffic service and, in particular, the analysis and methodology that we used in developing the systems that we have today. I have indicated the primary steps, Mr. Chairman, that were taken to insure that we get an adequate system, and on what we base our system. First, for example, in determining whether or not there should be a system, we try to identify the needs, the cost, the benefits and the vessel traffic options of a port or waterway in the form of user services. Second, we have identified the capability necessary to meet these needs in the form of system components. And, third, identify the specific engineering requirement necessary to provide the capabilities required in the form of specific electronic equipment. I also indicated what points we considered in establishing criteria and I also indicated what the steps we followed in insuring that we meet these needs. And, finally, Mr. Chairman, at the summary of my statement, I have included a fact sheet on each of the currently oper- ating and planned VTS, vessel traffic services, within the United States along with some budgetary data on each one. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one.brief summary statement. In all candor, it should be noted that the Coast Guard has not met with general acceptance of its plans by the marine industry, which has been understandably skeptical to date. Such is not the case in those areas that have actually been provided the user services of a VTS. The Port of Houston, in particular, has significantly benefitted from the Houston-Galveston vessel traffic service, both in hazards reduced and facilitation of marine commerce. In my opinion, there would be substantial marine industry opposi- tion to any proposal to withdraw those services. I am just as confident that general industry acceptance will be gained by each new VTS as each is given the opportunity to demonstrate its worth. Mr. Chairman, that, in a sense, is a brief summary of the statement, and I and members of my staff will be pleased to answer any questions at this time. Mr. BIAGGI. I asked you to summarize briefly. I did not expect you to do such an excellent job of such extensive material. We appreciate that, but it leaves us up in the air to an extent. My experience with vessel traffic service in the short time that I have been involved with it is that in certain areas some people-in the New York area specifically-are not so sure that the traffic up there warrants such an extensive system. Then we go to New Orleans where I have spoken to many operators who indicate-and I am sure the gentleman from New Orleans, Mr. Treen, will make more specific observation in reference to it-that there is some conflict and an absence of cooperation, a lack of input from the operators, insofar as vessel traffic service is concerned. PAGENO="0200" 196 As a matter of fact, to be very specific, they came there "raising hell." We had hearings, and we were left with the impression that there was a lack of cooperation. Apparently that is not exactly the fact. I have been all over New York Harbor. That is where I come from. And I did not see any extreme traffic problems in those areas. I know that the industry gets along quite well with the Coast Guard, and with Admiral Rea, but some of them were quite candid with me, and I get the notion that vessel traffic service should be reserved for traffic conditions in congested areas. In Philadelphia we had an over- sight flight there, and we must have hit the quietest time of the day, because there was literally no traffic at that point. What occurs to me is that this is a system that was conjured up as an ideal objective just for the sake of having a perfect situation, whether it is justified or not. Are we getting a dollar returned for a dollar spent? You put a traffic cop where there is traffic, not in an intersection where there is none. That, I think, is the crux of it. Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I think what we have based all of our vessel traffic systems upon, is an analysis of each of the ports wherein we have put a system. First, we did do a rather extensive analysis, and the study which we call the Vessel Traffic Services and Analysis of Port Needs, which I believe the committee has already seen. In this we have studied the needs of each port, we have studied the casualty data of each port, and it was based upon these factors, among others, in which we determine whether or not there was a need for a system in each of these ports. In the process of doing this analysis, one of the factors is to insure that we are getting a favorable cost benefit for any moneys which we expend in these systems, and I believe in each instance wherein we have put a system that we have established that there is a clear cost benefit for these systems. With respect to the point you make, Mr. Chairman, concerning an ideal system, or a need for a system with respect to traffic control, the type of systems which we envision are not positive, all encompass- ing systems, similar to, say what the FAA has within their air traffic control systems, where they are positively controlling the actual course, speed, height of a plane. We have no such similar thoughts that these will be applicable to the marine mode. Essentially what our system will be, and essentially what our sys- tems are really, is where we are providing advice to mariners in these areas, so that the mariner is aware of the possible and potential haz- ards which he faces as he navigates along the waterway. We will not be a positive control system. We will essentially be an advisory system, telling the mariner what is ahead of him. Mr. BIAGGI. I got the notion that you do advise him, but he is also required to react to the advice in a manner conforming with your concept of proper response. Admiral FUGARO. If the particular watch supervisor at a vessel traffic service determines that a specific action is necessary, for ex- ample, that a vessel should not proceed beyond a certain point, that a vessel should slow down before reaching a certain bend, in order to PAGENO="0201" 197 avoid meeting a certain vessel at the bend, that sort of service by the watch supervisor will then be transmitted to the participant in vessel traffic service. If the system is mandatory, and if the marine operator feels that he cannot, for some reason, obey the particular control advice that was given to him, he under the regulations has the privilege and option to take any action that he deems necessary for the safety of his vessel. Initially, Mr. Chairman, such as in Houston, and such as is con- templated in New Orleans, these systems are voluntary systems, there is no mandatory requirement in these systems. Nor is there any mandatory requirement that the watch supervisor will control these vessels, as we were talking about a minute ago, to steer this way, or to steer that way. That is not contemplated in the system. Mr. BIAGGI. There is one question, one area that I think we should get cleared away. My experience has been that no matter what I say, after each one of the conferences that I have had with the representatives of the Coast Guard, nothing changes. Recently the Coast Guard published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning New Orleans vessel traffic service. Can you tell the committee exactly where we are with regard to that advance notice, and when the proposed rules are expected? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, we issued that advance notice of proposed rulemaking, I believe on the 9th of June. We extended the deadline for comment once until-extended through to the third of September this year, and we have received quite a few comments concerning those proposed-advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. Our present thinking at this time, Mr. Chairman, is that until such time as we make the system mandatory, there is a question as to whether or not we will have to come out with the proposed regu- lations, stemming from that advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. If the system becomes voluntary, as we currently anticipate, we will not need to put out proposed rule makinguntil such time that we decide that there is a need to go mandatory under the system. So at this time I cannot give a prognosis for when we intend to go out with proposed rulemaking. In my statement, in attachment No. 5, concerning the New Orleans system, you will note in there, sir, at the bottom of that first page, I do refer to the fact that the system will be voluntary, and when we may issue the regulations concerning mandatory operation will depend upon our experience under a voluntary operation system. Mr. BIAGGI. For the record, to refresh my memory, can you give me the detailed process, from the very beginning to the conclusion of the whole rulemaking and who participates? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I think I would prefer, if it is agreeable with you, to submit this for the record. I think that would be a rather lengthy response, and I would have to check quite a few records to determine-as you mentioned earlier in your statement, I did take over in June in this office, and in order to adequately answer this question, I feel I would have to do a little research to answer that question. Mr. BIAGGI. You may submit that for the record, but let me give you my thinking. PAGENO="0202" 198 [The following was received for the record:] VTS RULEMAKING The Administrative Procedure Act, as it relates to VTS rulemaking, affords interested parties opportunity to review proposed actions and to submit recom- mendations, pro and con, during the development process. Section 104 of the PWSA requires that in preparing proposed regulations "adequate opportunity for consultation and comment to State and local governments, representatives of the marine industry, port and harbor authorities, environmental groups and other interested parties" be provided. While there is no specific requirement to hold public hearings on proposed rulemaking, it is the Coast Guard's policy to be as open as possible in the development of any regulatory package relating to vessel traffic services. We value the views of any interested party. Consultation is accomplished by one or more of several means: through in- formal meetings with interested individuals or groups; through a formal industry advisory committee; and, through the process of an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), as was done in the case of VTS New Orleans. Upon completion of the initial consultation process, the proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The Coast Guard customarily holds public hearings in connection with all proposed VTS regulations. We also allow at least a 45-day comment period. All documents received by the Coast Guard are available for public examina- tion in Coast Guard Headquarters. At the end of the comment period, the Coast Guard evaluates all responses and may revise the regulations in light of the comments received. If there are recommendations in the comments that the Coast Guard feels have merit, but need further consideration and additional input from the public, the Coast Guard may issue a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to solicit comments on the proposals not included in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Again, the Coast Guard allows a 45-day com- ment period and all documents received are available for public examination in Coast Guard I-Ieadquarters. Another period of review, consideration and evalua- tion follows the comment deadline. The regulations are then published in the Federal Register as final rules. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. These thoughts are shared by many people in the industry. The Coast Guard gets a notion that an area requires attention, rightly or wrongly, and then it proceeds to promulgate some rules, and the input from the industry is either limited or invited late so that in fact nothing really changes, and even when it is introduced, the contention is it is done more for appearance than effect. I would like to believe that if we are going to have a process it must be meaningful, and there must be substantial participation, and participation that is to be recognized. Now, that is not intended to mean that if industry submits some- thing, the Coast Guard must submit itself to the industry's judgment. What we are asking the Coast Guard to do is to give serious con- sideration to it, so that there can be accommodation where possible. I have had any number of complaints from industry in various areas that the rulemaking process is perfunctory, and unilateral, and I would like you to know that the Chair does not think that is a valid process. Of course, I would expect the Coast Guard to respond and say that it is not the fact-but obviously there is something awry in the process. I am not satisfied as to a full democratic process in the sense that we intend it to be. That is why I asked for detailed record of the process. PAGENO="0203" 199 As you do it, be aware where the industry comes in, at what stage of the game, has the regulation been that far developed, so that any input will have little or no effect? Have the minds been set so that there will be resistance to any suggestion? This is a matter of human frailty, if you will, to be sufficiently conversant with agencies, and institutional conduct, to know that it is a potential danger in consideration of rules and regulations. Admiral FIIGARO. Mr. Chairman, as 1 said, I would like to submit a reply for the record. I would, however, at this time like to support you in the fact, that I agree that if the process is to be meaningful, that there must be two- way communication, and then the Coast Guard cannot operate unilaterally and hope to be meeting the needs of this two-way com- munication. I would also indicate to you at this time that I have discussed the vessel traffic service, and the proposed rules which we are contemplat- ing here today, in great detail, with both the commandant and vice commandant of the Coast Guard. Without any doubt, I can support that any process which we go through must be meaningful, and that we must consider the needs of the industry which we are regulating. I would, without equivocation, assure you that this is the intention of the commandant, and certainly which I will follow, too. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you for your response. To get back to the advance notice, can you tell me what the main substance of the comments on the advance notice were? Admiral FUGARO. Essentially, Mr. Chairman, I think the main thrust of the comments received were that many people did not feel that the system was necessary. They were actually questioning some of the elements and components of the system as opposed to com- menting upon the individual regulations which were indicated in that advance notice. There were some very pertinent comments which were made by people concerning items such as the distance going down, I believe it was the Southwest Pass, where there should be clearance before another vessel enters the pass. There was some question about we had indicated, where a vessel must have sufficient horsepower when towing. These, of course, were rather general statements and needed to be clarified. And I would agree we do need to look at them. They were not simply specific enough. I do have some-in my papers here some other comments which were made, and if I could just have about 30 seconds to look through them, maybe I could give you a better response to that question. One of the complaints, Mr. Chairman, was the fact that we had based our system on old statistics and we did not consider bridge-to- bridge and operator-license requirements. Actually, while the initial study I referred to earlier was based upon statistics back at the time of the study, analysis which was done subsequent to the bridge-to-bridge regulations indicated that there is even more favorable cost-to-benefit ratio in proceeding with the system, particularly in the New Orleans area. As I mentioned before, there was some complaint about the com- ponents of the system. People felt that they should get into the actual planning for the hardware of the systems. PAGENO="0204" 200 I submit that this would be rather difficult to do through a corn- mittee, and that the Coast Guard, through this analysis process, had done the best work we could in determining what specific equipment would be needed to perform the type of system which we envisioned. Again going back to this advisory type system with surveillance being a key factor to the system, as well as communication being a key factor to the system, I think we have responded to these and will respond if and when we do put out a proposed rulemaking. Mr. BIAGGI. Do you believe that the communications system, as proposed for the New Orleans area, is adequate, particularly in con- nection with the available channels for use in different sectors? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do, and with your per- mission, sir, I have got a chart up here on the left, and I would like Commander Hickey, who is the project officer on vessel traffic serv- ices, to give you a very, very brief description, particularly at this point, of what is entailed in the system and what we envision with the communication work, with your permission, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Certainly. Commander HICKEY. Mr. Chairman (referring to a display of the geographic area) in order to get the entire area of coverage on one display, we had to break the chart down. So these dashed lines will show where they connect and where it ends here. And it again starts here. The system itself will start at the Gulf of Mexico, and the equip- ment that we have purchased, that we have awarded the contract for, will be delivered in June, gives us the capability to operate all the way up to mile 243 in Baton Rouge. The communications are broken into four sectors. We will use three VHF-FM freQuencies. That is channels 11, 12 and 14. The first sector, which comes all the way up through the Passes to just before you get into the downtown New Orleans area, will be on one sector frequency. When you get into the downtown New Orleans area, there is a change to another VHF-FM sector frequency. There will be another operator at the traffic center who will be coordinating vessel move- ments in that particular sector. When you leave that area, you are in sector 3, and there is a third sector frequency there. When you get up into sector 4, we repeat the sector frequency we had in sector 2. We designed the system from an engineering standpoint to physi- cally separate our transceiver sites, our antennas, so that we feel that we will not have mutual interference from communications that are sent out from the antenna down in New Orleans and the area up in the vicinity of Baton Rouge. There is sufficient geographical distance between the two so that there will not be mutual mterference. Also, in VHF-FM communications there is a "capture effect." Technically that just means that when an antenna receives a signal more than twice as powerful as another signal, the receiver will be captured. So the only thing the receiver will hear is the strongest signal. During a silent period we may get communication from the Corps of Engineers lock up in the Algiers area, but as soon as a vessel in the vicinity of our antenna transmits to us, his signal will capture our PAGENO="0205" 201 receiver so we will only hear him. The converse is true when we trans- mit from this local site down here, which will capture the receivers of all the vessels in its vicinity. We have taken action through the Federal Communications Com- mission to reserve these sector frequencies for Coast Guard use in the vessel traffic service sectors. The licenses of the limited stations that are licensed to be on these frequencies at the present time will not be renewed. So there will be no new users on these frequencies. At the most, at the end of 5 years, there will be nothing except the Coast Guard and vessels participating with the Coast Guard in these sectors. Thus, we feel that we do have dedicated frequencies, and that we can adjust the "loading"-or the number of vessels that have to communicate with us-by changing the regulations or the operating manual to determine what size vessels we require to par- ticipate. We can narrow the scope of the regulations down to where we have sufficient time available in a 60-minute period to handle all the communications that we feel are necessary to get the information from the vessels to us, and to be able to turn around and take this information, convert it into something useful, and give it back out to the user. That is really the objective of the service. It cannot be a one-way system. In addition to the four sectors, we also have surveillance of sector 2-basically the whole area from mile 89 to mile 112. We estimate it will take about four locations, four separate camera sites to give the sector 2 operator in the traffic center the ability to actually see what is happening on the river. Mr. BIAGGI. Is sector 2 the most highly congested area? Commander HICKEY. Yes, sir; that is the most highly congested area. The cameras will be low-light level, which means they will have nighttime availability, and infrared illumination capability, so that they can illuminate the vessel close to them without hindering the night vision of the pilot. He will not be able to see the light. We have a system that will be the optimum surveillance system for about 97 percent of the time. The only time it will not be effective is during periods of low visibility. When it is low visibility the traffic tends not to move. We feel that we have designed a surveillance system that is the optimum for the area. Later we would hope to add radar surveillance to encompass the Piottown area, including the general anchorage here. They experience a higher frequency of reduced visibility in this area, and we feel radar would be more applicable there. That encompasses our plans for the present time. We have no budgetary request for radar in at the present time. Mr. BIAGGI. What happens to the radar? Commander HICKEY. We have specified in our requirement to the contractor that we have 99.9 percent reliability; 99.9 percent reliability is provided with redundant equipment. In all sites we have redundant transceivers; we have diverse communication paths, so that if a micro- wave link is interrupted we have an alternate path. We do not feel that communications or radio failure will be a failure on our part. It is possible on the vessel's part, in which case we go to dead reckoning the vessel to where he can contact us. Mr. BIAGGI. How would you contemplate the use of radar? Commander HICKEY. We would contemplate the use of radar in the Head of Passes, in the Pilot Town area, possibly as far north as PAGENO="0206" 202 Venice. It would give us a 24-mile coverage from the site, both up and down river. Mr. BIAGGI. Is all the information you get out of the systems run through a computer? Commander HICKEY. Yes, sir, the computer is just simply a method for the operator to keep track of the information that he has. He takes the information from the vessels on the radio, and enters it into the computer. The computer will keep track of the information for him. He will have a synthetic display upon which he can call up information that he needs for the various sectors of his operation. The computer will also generate a look ahead capability. It will be able to take the information as to the location and speed of the vessel, and predict the encounters that the vessel will have during its transit, Of course, that is the real service that we are attempting to provide, to tell the user who he may expect to encounter over the next period of time, say 15 minutes or half an hour; at what interval he will en- counter them; and who they are, so that he can then arrange for safe passage on channel 13, which is the vessel bridge-to-bridge radio tele- phone frequency. It is to enable the vessel operator to contact other vessels. Mr. BIAGGI. You have radar in one area and you do not have it in other areas. How accurate would the information you receive from other areas be, as contrasted to that where you have radar? Commander HICKEY. Well, in the television area, the information will be just about as accurate, because the operator will be able to observe what is happening, and he will have geographic reference points on the shoreline to correlate with the position of the vessel. In the areas where we have no surveillance at all, our confidence level is lower. It is directly proportional to the information that we get from the mariner. If he says he is at mile 73, then we enter that he is at mile 73. If he says that he is making 5 miles an hour, then we enter into the computer 5 miles an hour, until the information is verified or updated. At any time we can call the vessel and ask him where he is. If he now, in 15 minutes, says he is at mile 82, we enter that into the computer and we can calculate how fast he is actually moving. Mr. BIAGGI. I get the impression that where you have television and radar, they would be more critical areas? Commander HIcKEY. That is correct. Our casualty analysis shows that it is the Pilot Town area, and the downtown New Orleans area where we feel we cannot operate without some form of surveillance. However, we do not feel that it is that critical in the other areas that we can justify surveillance. Surveillance over long distances such as we have here is very expensive. The microwave relay of the information is very expensive. Mr. BIAGGI. In light of the disparity, the difference in the critical nature of the different sectors, have you contemplated the possibility of phasing in the system sector by sector? Commander HICKEY. In effect, sir, that is what we have done. We have phased in the surveillance. We did not intend to phase in the surveillance in the sector of operations in Algiers in section 2. The original project that we considered included surveillance. How- ever, surveillance was separated for administrative purposes, and the PAGENO="0207" 203: item was because we were not ready to operate the system as originally scheduled. As far as implementing the entire system, we feel that surveillance gives us an incremental benefit, but we do have some benefit on our ability to communicate with the vessels and keep track of them on the computer. Therefore, we have not phased in the communications part of it. We felt that we could start operations from the Gulf of Mexico to mile 243, based solely on the information that we get from the radio, and still prevent enough casualties to make it cost effective. Mr. BIAGrn. One last question. Does the Coast Guard contemplate engaging any new employees or advisors to inform them of the local peculiarities of an operation in these various areas? Admiral FIJGARO. Mr. Chairman, we are considering the hiring of local advisors. We are definitely considering the use of pilots for the traffic lights within the sector 2 zone at Algiers point, which the com- mander is pointing to now, and as we have done in other areas, we do intend to train our people before we put them as a sector watch. And in this regard, yes, sir, we do anticipate that there will be local training and by locally qualified people. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much. Mr. Treen. Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have not had a chance to read your full statement, Admiral, which I would like to have done prior to getting into this questioning. That would have helped me be a little more orderly in my questions, so I will probably be all over the subject because I have not had the time to correlate my questions with your statement. You made reference to the system being voluntary. In your state- ment, on page 10, you say "While participation by vessels is currently voluntary in all VTS areas other than Fuget Sound and Berwick Bay, the Coast Guard is considering issuing Federal regulations to require participation by vessels in every VTS." When do you expect to move from a voluntary to a mandatory participation? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Treen, that will depend on each system. Mr. TREEN. Let us talk about New Orleans. I will base my questions on New Orleans. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Thank you. I would anticipate that we would have at least a 6-month period of voluntary operation and, in all probability, a lot longer than a 6-month period of operation of the systems before we considered going into a mandatory system. We would use experience that would have a port such as Houston, which is perhaps similar to New Orleans, as opposed to San Francisco or the Puget Sound system, where we would try to achieve a high level of voluntary participation before we went into or considered going into a mandatory system. At the current time, in Houston, we are achieving something like a 99-percent participation rate, and we are considering that once having achieved that high level that we should perhaps take the final step and make the system mandatory so that everybody participates in the system since, obviously the majority of operators are participating. 7S-280-76----14 PAGENO="0208" 204 This is what we anticipate in New Orleans. There is no plan right now to require that this, a 3-month or 6-month period, that we will go mandatory in the New Orleans system, but rather wait and gain the experience and determine when we should progress further. Mr. TREEN. Would you compare Houston and New Orleans in the types of vessels? I am not that familiar with it, but is Houston a port that has much larger proportion of deep draft vessels, oceangoing vessels as opposed to tugs and tows? Admiral FUGARO. I think Houston has more. I say that in the sense that while the percentage may vary, but I believe the two ports are very comparable. They both have deep draft vessels plus quite a bit of barge operations, plus quite a bit of petroleum products being shipped. I think Houston is more analogous to New Orleans than any other system we operate around the country. Mr. TREEN. And you had 99-percent participation under voluntary participation? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. And you expect that you will get 99-percent participa- tion in New Orleans as well? Admiral FUGARO. We would hope so, yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Well, assuming you do, and you have 1 percent that do not cooperate. How do you manage this with 1 percent of the vessels not participating, not reporting, and you presumably then are unable to communicate? What do you do when, as you indicate in your statement, you have to take over management of the traffic and issue directives and you have even the 1 percent not participating? Admiral FUGARO. Where we do not have full participation, we would hope that when we got the surveillance system going, that we would be able to communicate this information by looking through the surveillance system and finding out what else is on the river system. Mr. TREEN. What kind of system are you talking about, radar or television? Admiral FUGARO. I am talking about television, which is primarily the system in Houston, and which we would use in sector 2 of the New Orleans system. This would provide us visual, whether or not they are voluntarily participating in the system. We would also hope that through the communications system that we would be getting feedback from other participator vessels on those vessels nonparticipating. Mr. TREEN. Well, I do not believe I know enough about the tech- nology-I am certain I do not know enough about the technology. But I wonder how a vessel that is participating will be able to visually determine that another vessel out there is not participating? Admiral FUGARO. We would already advise the vessels based upon the system input, and based upon the automated vessel reporting system, by computer, which Commander Hickey referred to, what that vessel could anticipate. We would assume that if the vessel ran into unanticipated traffic that was not participating in the system, which was not in the com- puter, that they would advise us of the fact that they passed or came upon a different vessel. PAGENO="0209" 205 Mr. TREEN. In your proposed regulations, only when a vessel expects its estimated time of arrival at the reporting point to be more than 10 minutes off, must it then report back in. That leaves a pretty wide margin, it seems to me, considering that you have estimated some 740 transits through the system per day. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. In a congested area that would be appreciably higher. If you got variations of 5, 6, or 7, 8 to 9 minutes which did not have to be reported, it seems to me that in that period of time, you are talking about a lot of vessel confrontations. For a vessel that is participating to be able to identify vessels that are not participating, given that degree of unreported variation, presents a question to me as to the effectiveness of the system. I am not now arguing for mandatory participation-I am just raising a question as to how you can have it voluntary, which would mean partial participation and partial nonparticipation, given some of these variables in reporting that you now have in your system. In other words, a vessel arrives at a reporting point 9 minutes off frOm what it estimated before, and it has not reported back in to you because it is not a 10-minute variation. So that vessel is going to be confronting traffic that you did not anticipate, because that vessel arrived there 9 minutes off. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; I follow your question. The requirements which were put forth in the rules, of rulemaking, were just that, proposed rules. We would hope that before we develop a final operator's manual for this system that we will have gotten sufficient input and feedback from the operators to be assured that they will come forward with a more realistic and effective system. I appreciate what you are saying, the fact that someone who is 9 minutes late, he will be encountering traffic, or 9 minutes earlier that he will be encountering traffic that the computer might not have already given him. We would hope that nothing would preclude operators from re- porting into the system at any time. Depending upon the usefulness of the information, we would hope that the mariners would call upon the system as their positions change. There are several checkpoints which are required to check in. Mr. TREEN. Well, I hope they can get through if they desire to participate more than required by the regulations. I am concerned about that. One of the other persons who will be testifying before us has furnished us certain data, and we also have had counsel of this com- mittee prepare some data which raises some questions about the amount of radio traffic one might have. I think you have assumed, as I mentioned before, 740 daily vessel transits through the entire system, and you are going to have three VTS frequencies, and there are about 9 to 10 routine reports per vessel, so that the average vessel will have about 6 minutes to es- tablish contact and will probably have a maximum of 36 in each port. And it seems to me a very short period of time. We are probably going to have more transits than you anticipate here. PAGENO="0210" 206 This is based upon a study of a couple of years ago, is it not? I am not certain. Then you have a spacing problem. This assumes that all of these reports are going to come into the VTC, spaced out in an idealistic way. The ideal of the point of management will probably not happen. Then, of course, as you mentioned you have the competition by Corps of Engineers and other licensed users. I understand what you are saying, Commander, about FCC agreeing not to issue licenses over 5 years. But, of course, you do have that problem in the meantime, and you do have the problem of the Corps of Engineers. And I will ask you to respond in a minute, but I will add one other concern, and that is that-the concern that in the pilothouse of a small vessel, where you have got the monitoring now of house channel, and then channels 16 and 13, and then they have to add one of these three channels, depending upon which of the three, four sectors they are in. You have to four channels in a pilothouse, pretty noisy situation, I would imagine. They, with the requirement they report in, as I say, 9 or 10 times, the transit and maybe more if the ETA-well, no, I do not think-I do not think that increases the number if the ETA is off 10 minutes. But 9 or 10 reports by the mariner who is monitoring 4 channels raises lots of questions. I have been all over the map on that, I would appreciate your response, particularly to the question of how we are going to manage all of these reports going into the vessel traffic centers. Do we have enough time, considering the number of transits? Admiral FUGARO. The placement of the communications system in the sector was based upon these various transits. As we have in- dicated, we will have four sectors and we will have four sector op- erators taking each of these messages. You indicate that there will only be 30 seconds per report. Hope- fully, 30 seconds would be an extremely long report. We anticipate that most of the information will be transmitted in a very quick fashion. That it will not be necessary to make that long report each time that they are reporting in. We have has this experience, as I mentioned, in other traffic services that were run. They do not have to feed in the entire information each time they are reporting in. Sometimes they just have to give their name and the fact that they are passing a certain checkpoint which could be just a matter of a couple of seconds. Mr. TREEN. The minimum under your regulations would be named the vessel, position, type of passing, next reporting point, and ETA reporting point. Those are the five things required? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; I would anticipate that as long as the vessel is making that report, it can come across very quickly in just a matter of a few seconds. Mr. TREEN. How about the spacing problem? If the particular channel is in use in one of your sectors by a vessel reporting in from VTC, that precludes any other user at that particular time from using it, does it not? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. You can only get one report in a given period of time? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. PAGENO="0211" 207 Mr. TREEN. In your most crowded sector, adjacent to New Orleans, I am concerned about the operator getting through in time when he passes his reported point. Has there been a study of the kind of traffic flow study to determine whether it is realistic to expect that with 740 transits that the fre- quency channels will be open enough for these reports to get in reason- ably on time? Admiral FUGARO. The preliminary analysis, we do believe that there will be sufficient time to make these reports. Again the initial operation of the system is to help us gain further experience within the particular area. In the case, again referring back to Houston, we seem to have enough time to make the communi- cations and receive and transmit the communications if necessary. I would anticipate that if the demand upon communication system became too great, particularly within the sector 2 of the New Orleans area, we would have to review that and determine whether we need to further split up that system or to eliminate the need for certain vessels reporting into the system. Mr. TREEN. Well, I hope the other witnesses will address themselves to this. I think this is one of the major problem areas, as I see it. Could you give us, on a fiscal year basis, what the costs are in par- ticipating in a program, in implementing your program as you further anticipate it? Admiral FUGARO. Within the New Orleans system, sir? Mr. TREEN. Yes, within the New Orleans system, sir. Admiral FUGARO. In phase- Mr. TREEN. Capital costs and operating costs if you have it broken down. Admiral FUGARO. We have indicated the total initial in attachment 5, the last paragraph refers to the total initial system cost is $3.9 million, which has been funded by appropriations of $1.7 million in fiscal year 1974 and $2.2 million in fiscal year 1976. It anticipates that the annual operating expenses for New Orleans will be $1.04 million. Mr. TREEN. That is for what kind of system, including what kind of mechanisms? Admira' FUGARO. That will be for the automated movement vessel system. The computerized systems with communication links that we referred to. It will not include the television. Mr. TREEN. It will include some radar? Admiral FUGARO. NO, sir, not at that point. Mr. TREEN. No radar and no television? Admiral FUGARO. That is right. Mr. TREEN. Would radar be the next step? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. The first step would be the computerized movement reports system with the communication link. Mr. TREEN. These figures would be the same, all mandatory? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. The second step will then be the installation of the low light level closed-circuit television within sector 2, within the New Orleans system. PAGENO="0212" 208 Mr. TREEN. That is in three locations? Admiral FUGARO. Well, we anticipate it will probably cover four locations within sector 2. However, we will not be putting out an end requirement for a specific number of televisions. What we will be putting out is a bid with operating requirements. That is, we will determine what area we want of visual determination, visual detection of vessels, and then let the bidders come in and determine how they can best meet the operating requirement. Mr. TREEN. Can you give me an estimate of that cost? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. We are estimating that we will have about $1 million-$1 million for cost for the closed-circuit television. Mr. TREEN. That is the outlay? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. We are anticipating that that will be within the 1978 budget. Mr. TREEN. All right. Now, the radar addition? Admiral FUGARO. The radar, currently we are planning this for fiscal year 1979, and we are anticipating that this will cost $1.5 million. That will be, as Commander Hickey mentioned, down in the Pilot-town area. I would also like to make one qualification. These, of course, are all Coast Guard present plans, and all of these figures will be subject to other budgetary considerations throughout future budgetary cycles. Mr. TREEN. Now, how about additions to personnel required as you move in these new phases? Admiral FUGARO. I do not think we will have much additional personnel requirements. Based upon our experience in Houston, this will just be an adjunct and aid to the existing personnel in the system. The one system operator will also have the television. Once we in- stall the television, that will be a visual presentation that will be an adjunct and aid rather than requiring a separate operator. Now, with the radar, of course, we will have the feedback again back to the centralized vessel traffic center, which will be up in the New Orleans area. Mr. TREEN. And for $1 million in equipment, you expect to have television surveillance of that entire congested area in downtown New Orleans? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. In terms of the length of the river, what are we talking about, sir? Admiral FUGARO. We are talking about mile 89 to mile 112, sir. So it is 23 miles. Mr. TREEN. With four television locations? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, that is our present estimate, that we will need four television sets. Mr. TREEN. IDo these receivers rotate so that they are sweeping? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, they sweep. Also you can change the lenses on these, to get a zoom effect, to narrow in. It will also have infrared, so that even at nighttime we will be able to see and actually pick out the names of the vessels. PAGENO="0213" 209 Mr. TREEN. And those camera or receivers are operated from the VTC? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, with a switch the operator can move the television camera around to see wherever he wants to see. Mr. TREEN. I have to say, aside from the question of the effective- ness of that, I am a little amazed that we can, for $1 million, get 23 miles of television surveillance. I will be interested in seeing how that develops. Admiral FUGARO. A lot of these estimates, Mr. Treen, are based upon the experience that we have had in other places, in installing them. Mr. TREEN. I understand. I do not know a great deal about the technology, but I am surprised at that. .111 your statement on page three, Admiral, you referred to demon- stration projects in New York. You talk about a Coast Guard system known as ratan-Radio Television Aid to Navigation-and you say, "Technical problems led to a termination of this demonstration, although the concept may possibly have future application." Just briefly, what was that? Radio television aid to navigation? Admiral FUGARO. This was a system in which a radar transmitter was installed which showed a radar picture of the harbor. Then a television camera took a picture of this scope, and transmitted this picture over a television frequency. With the installation of a television aboard a vessel, an operator would see a centralized radarscope from the vessel traffic center. Mr. TREEN. Now, that is not what you are talking about doing here? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. We are talking about visual surveillance by television, and the radar we are talking about will be centralized radar in the area where we indicated, Pilottown, which will have a range of approximately 24 miles, both up and down the river. Mr. TREEN. Let me ask you a question about this training that you propose for your personnel. How do you propose to do that, and for how long a tour of duty do you expect for personnel, once they have been trained, to remain in a vessel traffic system in a given area? Admiral FUGARO. Well- Mr. TREEN. Would the regular rotation apply? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, initially we anticipate that that will be military people, and rotated in the normal tours of duty. We would anticipate a 3-year tour for these people, and we will of course, be rotating them. In other words, they will not all be coming on the scene 1 day, or 1 month, or year. So there will be a movement through these operators to insure that we have qualified operators at all times, and a cadre at all times that will assist in the training. As to initial training, as I mentioned before, we will have set up training programs in the area. Also we will call upon local, knowledge- able personnel, including pilots, to assist us in this training. Mr. TREEN. Do you expect the personnel to actually gain firsthand experience by going on vessels, all the various types that will be- Admiral FUGARO. That will be part of our training. We already indicated, I think, we anticipate that it is part of the ongoing training PAGENO="0214" 210 that the people should have. Even though they are in the system, and already operating, that it will help them to go out and take a look at the other side. We intend to get them aboard vessels that are using the system, so they get a better feel of what it looks like from the other side. Mr. TREEN. You do anticipate being on the vessels that will be using the system? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Getting them trained? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Let me get to a kind of basic question here. What are we trying to do basically with this vessel traffic service. Again, let us relate it to New Orleans. We are trying to avoid collisions, pollution from accidents, and things of that nature, is this correct? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Well, again I am a little concerned, given the variance that is permitted under this system, in reporting on estimated times of arrival at different points prior to you getting into your television surveillance. That presumably would aid in the location of vessels, although there is some dispute, I think, about that. But prior to getting to that, with having a requirement for report- ing changes in ETA, reporting positions only if the variance is 10 minutes or more, that that is going to have significant effect on colli- sions. In my law practice I was not a maritime lawyer, but I have had enough exposure to know that collisions, especially on the river, occur as a result of events that are set in motion within a minute or 2 minutes. So if you have got a variation here of 10 minutes, I fail to see how that is really going to help us avoid collisions, which is one of the pri- mary purposes of this. Could you address yourself to that? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Just coming around a bend. Admiral FUGARO. Hopefully, the type of system we are envisioning will be to advise that mariner what he can expect, on what he cannot see around a point, and give him a description of all the traffic that is coming toward him. For example, if he is proceeding up river, hopefully through this type of advice to him, will enable him to better plan how he is going to navigate around a particular bend. This will give him some insight as to what is coming down the river, and what he will be meeting at approximate time intervals. We recognize that there will not be a fully-as I mentioned before, a positive control system, but rather provide advice, with which we hope that we will be able to better navigate. The whole premise of our system is that the individual operator is still completely responsible for his vessel. We are not taking over the control of his vessel. We are trying to give him better advice than he has now, which in some cases is approaching a particular bend, without knowing what is coming down. Mr. TREEN. Again, I do not know, but it seems to me most people transiting that river know that there is liable to be vessels around any bend, every bend. PAGENO="0215" 211 Well, I hope other witnesses will address themselves to that par- ticular point. In that same area, do we have any studies of prior commissions, of accidents, that we feel the system, as we now envision it, would have prevented? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, we did in determining the need for a system. We reviewed the casualties, and on a case-by-case basis, we tried to make the determinations, within each of these casualties, which were preventable casualties, and which were not preventable casualties, and which casualties, which were preventable, by more passive means. That is which could have been prevented by, say specific regulation requirements. So this was the basis for the entire need for a system, and what we predicated the benefits on. We do not anticipate that we will prevent all the collisions that will occur in any one port area as a result of any massive traffic system. But we are hoping to achieve, that we will achieve a significant reduction in these collisions. I think in the statement you will see what percentage we are estimating in various categories of casualties that occur. Mr. TREEN. All right, I will study that when I get an opportunity. Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Heyward? Mr. HEYWARD. Admiral, in connection with a few of the points that have been raised, does the Coast Guard have any statistics which would indicate conclusions as to effective use of the bridge-to- bridge radiotelephone in casualty prevention? Admiral FUGARO. I do not believe we have the specific study, based upon solely the bridge-to-bridge usage. Mr. HEYWARD. Have you made any tentative conclusions as to whether that act has reduced accidents, or improved safety? Admiral FUGARO. Our tentative conclusion is yes, that it has had a favorable effect. But to quantify that, we are not able to do that at this time. Mr. HEYWARD. How would the coverage of participants in this system differ from the requirements now in bridge-to-bridge radio- telephone? Admiral FUGARO. This would be an adjunct to the bridge-to- bridge. After we have advised the mariner, he will still arrange for passage with individual vessels, hopefully having been warned ahead of time what is coming down, through the bridge-to-bridge. That is, through channel 13. Mr. HEYWARD. You use channel 13 in the bridge-to-bridge communications? Admlral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. That is required to be initiated when a vessel is in sight? Admiral FUGARO. Well, yes, sir. But they can do it at any time. Once they are advised about it. Mr. HEYWARD. Once they know that another vessel is there, they can initiate? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. What kind of requirement on radio equipment would this new system put on the users that are in the system? PAGENO="0216" 212 Admiral FUGARO. I am not quite sure. Of course, again, initially the system will be voluntary. There will be no requirement placed upon anybody to put the equipment aboard. Mr. HEYWARD. Change requirements to need. What will they need? Admiral FUGARO. They will need the capacity to communicate on all four; 11, 12, 13, and 14. I believe most of the existing equipment already have this capability of switching from channel to channel. Mr. HEYWARD. How about 16? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; and also 16. Mr. HEYWARD. Are all these vessels required to maintain a watch on channel 16 now? Admiral FUGARO. Thirteen. Mr. HEYWARD. Thirteen? Admiral FUGARO. Yes. Commander HICKEY. Captain Heyward, the present FCC regula-. tions exempt foreign-flag vessels from a channel 16 watch at the present time. The FCC has also exempted towing vessels under 1,600 gross tons from the channel 16 watch requirement while they are participating in a VTS, and in effect have a continuous listening watch on the VTS frequency. Mr. HEYWARD. The VTS may take over some of their responsi- bilities on other channels? Commander HICKEY. We are not taking over their responsi- bilities. It is just that they are being relieved of the responsibility. We already have the responsibifity, from a safety and distress standpoint. But we do not want to get in the public correspondence part. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the sector channels that you refer to, you mention the fact that, in the future, licenses would not be renewed for some of the recent users of those channels. How much congestion would there be until the time came when the present users were phased out, so to speak? Admiral FUGARO. We are not sure of the amount of congestion. We would hope that as the Vessel Traffic Service utilizes the service there will be less and less confusion and conflict with our utilization of these channels. But it is hard to tell you exactly how much we anticipate will be interfered with our system. Mr. HEYWARD. It is my understanding that, for instance, channel 12 will also be used in connection with lockage of vessels. Admiral FUGARO. That is correct, by the corps. Mr. HEYWARD. That will continue? Admiral FUGARO. That will continue. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the mandatory versus voluntary aspects, you say that the initial phase at~ least will be voluntary, and I understood that you do nOt therefore believe that it would be neces- sary to go forward with the proposed rules. Did I hear you correctly? Admiral FUGARO. As long as we are only contemplating a volun- tary system, the actual imposition of the rules will not be necessary. One of the purposes of the advanced notice was to try to get some information, additional information, in respect to how we should proceed. PAGENO="0217" 213 Mr. HEYWARD. Then how would you propose to publicize what- ever you finally arrived at-through notices to mariners, or some other system outside- Admiral FUGARO. The first step we are going to have to go through is the development and eventual promulgation of an operator's manual, which all voluntary participants will be required to have. We will give this to them once we have the manual, and this will provide the instructions of how the individual operator will par- ticipate in the system. Mr. HEYWARD. To be initiated next summer: Is that correct? Admiral FUGARO. The system will be initiated next summer. We are already at work, and will be working in the development of the manual in the next coming months. Mr. HEYWARD. When do you anticipate that the first television components will be in place, assuming that your present plans go forward, to get the funds? Admiral FUGARO. We do not anticipate the television in the near future. It is in the 1978 budget. But by the time we put out contracts, once we get the budgetary authority, we are anticipating to be fiscal 1980 before we get to television surveillance. Mr. HEYWARD. In effect, what you propose to do is to be operating a movement reporting system for about 3 years before you start surveillance? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the personnel, you said "7 officers and 40 personnel." I assume these are divided into watches. What kind of watch system does this cover? Admiral FUGARO. Well, we will have one watch supervisor, who will be an officer. Usually a lieutenant. Then we will have at least one sector operator for each of the sectors, and there will have to be some redundancy to provide for some break. Mr. HEYWARD. The sector people are purely communications people, or do they make some sort of judgment as to what kind of critical conditions are developing? Admiral FUGARO. To a degree they will have to be making the initial determination of hazardous conditions. However, whether or not any control will have to be exercised, will have to be by the lieutenant on watch. These people will be trained within the automated system. They will be trained in the use of the automated system, and also trying to detect when hazardous condi- tions are occurring. So that they may advise the traffic supervisor. Mr. HEYWARD. Is it fair to conclude that if local knowledge becomes critical, that it is perhaps critical only in the status of the individual who is making judgment as to what directive should be issued? Admiral FUGARO. Local knowledge for making the decision, or any advice that he is going to give to the traffic supervisor, or to the vessel that is participating. Mr. HEYWARD. I understand, but I was trying to find out whether you thought that that should be limited to him-whether the people simply handling the communications facilities need to know anything about local conditions, other than the fact that the river is there, and how it is convoluted. PAGENO="0218" 214 Admiral FUGARO. No, we feel that each of the sector operators needs to have the information, too. Mr. HEYWARD. So it would be the sector operators plus the duty officer himself? Admiral FUGARO. It would be all the people involved in the watch, both the sector watch as well as the Vessel Traffic Center watch super.- visor. Mr. REYWARD. In connection with your statement, you had at least considered the utilization of local knowledgeable people. Would these be people standing watch? Would these be hired by the Coast Guard as a watch stander, or what do you envision? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. Initially, we are still anticipating the actual sector operators will be Coast Guard personnel. What I was referring to was the utilization of these other people for training purposes. Mr. HEYWARD. Well, they could still be Coast Guard personnel if you hired them as civilians, could they not? What is so critical about whether they have on a uniform? Admiral FUGARO. We are trying again to gain experience within the system to determine what should be our permanent needs. Mr. HEYWARD. You do have civilian personnel who are expert in individual fields throughout the Coast Guard that are not rotated as are uniformed personnel. I am just asking whether you consider that maybe one or two of those people at the vessel traffic center, might be an aid to the duty officer in performing his functions. Admiral FTJGARO. We consider these people as a training super- visor who would perhaps on a permanent basis provide for the training of the people involved in the system. Mr. HEYWARD. You have not considered separate billets then? Admiral FUGARO. We have not, not within the sector watch, no, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Treen asked you about RATAN. Is RATAN rejected now? Does this television setup that you contemplate, is it better, or is there still a possibility that RATAN might be used sometime in the system? Admiral FUGARO. It could be used but, at the present time, we have no plans to reinstitute the system anywhere. Mr. HEYWARD. Is that a cost factor for the participant? I am just wondering, for instance, since you have a setup for the television surveillance, whether the television surveillance could be retransmitted to a television receiver onboard a vessel, if the in- dividual wanted to buy it and put it on there? Admiral FUGARO. Certainly it is a possibility, but we have to do an analysis to determine what the cost factors are in transmitting this information. Another thing, of course, is the fact that these-the television sys- tem essentially, the cameras are set up from the viewpoint of sector operator, and he will be scanning with these televisions, and it might not be the type of information or usable to the particular vessel unless he knows exactly in which angle the camera is pointed. PAGENO="0219" 215 Mr. HEYWARD. It would differ from the RATAN? Admiral FUGARO. The RATAN was fixed. Admiral FUGARO. The ratan was fixed. Mr. HEYWARD. Stationary and the receivers are looking at a central radar picture? Admiral FUGARO. That is right. Every operator within the RATAN system was getting the same picture within the sector where he was. This would not be the case if we tried to retransmit the television pictures that we are talking about here. Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to go back to one area, engaging local people who are familiar with the areas. In pursuit of that, I do not think it has been sufficiently nailed down. If I understand the Admiral, in response to a question of Captain Heyward, it is your contemplation to engage local people for super- visory training? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Now, what that means to me is that you will have some rotating watch people who will always be in a position of being trained by the supervisory local person. It occurs to me then that if you need supervisory local people 24 hours a day, or on all watches- Admiral FTJGARO. No, sir, we are anticipating that initially the training officer or training supervisor will be utilized to train all of the sector operators. He will not necessarily be on watch at all times. This will be for training personnel as they come on the scene to insure that they are capable of handling the system. They will not necessarily be on watch. That is not what we are initially contemplating. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, handling the system is one thing, but handling the system in relation to local conditions is precisely our concern at this point. And that would be the need for the local talent. Admiral FUGARO. We are hoping, through training, to provide the people with that necessary level of local knowledge and local training which would permit them to operate within the system as we have defined it. We do not anticipate that they will have the level of local knowledge that the pilot will have nor is it required that they are required to have that degree of knowledge that the pilot would have. I would make an analogy to FAA traffic systems which perhaps you are more familiar with. Here again the particular operator is not necessarily a fully qualified pilot who runs the systems. He is merely someone trained within the capabilities of that particular control system. He is not a fully qualified pilot nor do we anticipate that our operators would be fully qualified nor is there a need for them to be fully qualified as a pilot. Mr. BIAGGI. You raise an interesting point. Would it not be better if you are a full qualified pilot? Admiral FUGARO. I think that would be overqualification. I do not think the man needs to have that degree of expertise. Mr. Chairman, I have had personal experience with the vessel traffic service. I was the commanding officer of the Sault Sainte Marie base in 1971-72, and I found some benefit in the fact that these people were rotated through the vessel traffic service. These become a PAGENO="0220" 216 rather routine function and, in a sense, if you get a highly qualified person for these jobs, you perhaps-it is not necessarily that the longer the man is on the job the better he becomes. After awhile, the job becomes a routine function. And to avoid this, we keep rotating the men on the watch. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Olney. Mr. OLNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have two questions. Admiral Fugaro, there has been a lot of discussion about crowding of the frequencies that are going to be used in the vessel traffic service, bridge-to-bridge, and for emergency and distress. Why are we so limited in the number of frequencies? Why does the vessel traffic service system have to use frequencies that are already crowded or already being used by other licensed users? Admiral FUGARO. Well, we are going to have a minimum of two dedicated channels that will be channel 11 and channel 14. Channel 12, which is the one currently used by the Corps of Engineers, I think, that is the one you are referring to. Mr. OLNEY. That is right. That is used by the Corps. But 11 and 14 are currently used by individuals holding 5-year licenses? Admiral FUGARO. But essentially they will be totally dedicated to the vessel traffic service. Mr. OLNEY. Why are you not able to get a frequency that is exclu- sively dedicated to vessel traffic service at this time? Admiral FUGARO. That is because of channel frequency allocation. Mr. OLNEY. That is the obstacle? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. OLNEY. Does the FCC plan to dedicate more frequencies to- for marine use in the future? Admiral FUGARO. Not at the present time. I think these are the ones they have allocated to us. In order to achieve this, they will have to drop out or not renew the permits. Mr. OLNEY. At some point the FCC is going to have to reallocate the frequency uses that exist today, is that correct? Commander HICKEY. In a sense they have reallocated them to us, by not reissuing the licenses of some of the people using the channels. Mr. OLNEY. They are not providing them with alternatives? Commander HICKEY. Yes; they are. Mr. OLNEY. On which frequencies? Commander HICKEY. I do not know, sir, but they have stated that they are providing alternate frequencies. Our primary concern is for a vessel going from one port to the next. He only has to be crystalized for channels 11, 12; and 14 in order to participate in any U.S. vessel traffic service. Mr. OLNEY. As you may know, the FCC has come under some criti- cism for not giving the maritime interest enough frequencies to work on. That is the reason I raised the question. Admiral Fugaro, I am confused as to what the policy of the Coast Guard is in relation to the role of the master when he is participating in the system.~ In your statement on page 14, you state, and I am quoting: "Keep in mind, we recognize the role of the master and pilot as the sole authority"- PAGENO="0221" 217 In your advanced proposed notice of rulemaking in section 11, entitled "Vessel Traffic Service Directions," you have three paragraphs where you provide the vessel traffic service with authority to issue directives, specific times when vessels may enter or move in the system, and provide the VTC with authority to impose one-way traffic, and authority to establish vessel size limitations in any VT~ area. Finally, you state that the master or person in charge of the vessel participating in VTS area shall comply with each direction issued to him under the section. I do not see how you can square that type of authority with your enunciated policy in your statement that the master and pilot are still the sole authority. Admiral FirnAno. If you will notice on page 15 of my statement- Mr. Olney, we do at this point, and that is that while we are giving them this advice and direction, the ultimate control is still vested with the pilot, and I refer to the part of section 161.111, 33 CFR, which says, "in an emergency, any person may deviate from any section in this subpart to the extent necessary to avoid endangering persons, property, or the environment." The idea being that the ultimate responsibility is still vested in the master. Mr. OLNEY. I am glad you raised that point, because I think that on its face, the vessel traffic service regulations would appear to be in vesting more authority in vessel traffic service, than perhaps you intended with the other provisions, and perhaps in your next rule- making that would be made clear. Admiral FTJGARO. I would hope so, too. Mr. OLNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. TREEN. On that same line, this is an issue raised by one of the other witnesses we are probably going to hear from tomorrow, Admiral. Take a situation in the absence of radar when we have a radio failure onboard a vessel, and when at the same time the vessel traffic service has taken control of the traffic. Let us say there are some large vessels that have radio failures. You are going to be directing only the vessels that you do have communications with in the system, which seems to me could present peril to both the vessels in communi- cation, and those that are not, because of this blindness. Have you decided how that particular problem is going to be resolved? Is it a problem? Admiral FUGARO. I would agree with you, under the circumstances which you have stated, that there could be a problem. In response to your particular problem, this would hopefully be a part of the operator's manual, and how we will operate the system. Again, I would not say that we have specifically addressed the point that you are talking about, because in order to completely be re- sponsive to these situations, we would almost have to go into some sort of positive control system, which I do not feel we could justify. Mr. TREEN. Radio failure is going to occur. I think we have to face that fact. I will be interested in how you address yourself to that particular problem. PAGENO="0222" 218 In other words, perhaps it gets back to something that I am harping on too much again, that is partial control, without having full control, perhaps making greater hazards. This worries me a great deal. Is there any problem with respect to communications if you are transmitting on a 50-watt output, and I think that is what you an- ticipate, is it not? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. From your tracking center in New Orleans, what effect would this have on the bridge-to-bridge communication channel within, let us say, 20 or 30 miles from the VTC? Admiral FUGARO. While transmitting on channel 13? Mr. TREEN. Yes, sir. Admiral FUGARO. We would assume that there would be, if the Coast Guard was transmitting on 13; yes, sir, there could very well be interference with other transmissions on 13. We would hope, through the utilization, the other dedicated channels, that communications by the Coast Guard on 13 would be at an absolute minimum, except we will be monitoring, listening on that channel. Mr. TREEN. A couple of other questions. I recognize you have not been involved with the VTS system very long. How long have you been involved with the New Orleans system, Admiral? Admiral FUGARO. I assumed the particular office June 10. Mr. TREEN. Did the studies initially support radar as far as the New Orleans vessel traffic service system? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. I do believe that the studies indicated the need for surveillance, but I do not think there was any initial justification for radar. Our general policy with respect to radar versus television is, we feel that the positive identification aspects of television outweigh the benefits of radar, with the one benefit being that the radar can give you a more positive and exact location on an upriver, downriver basis. At the same time, they also operate during the small percentage of the time while we are experiencing low visibility. What we feel capability with television provides us with a more positive control than radar would. Mr. TREEN. You are saying that there has not been any change in the position of the Coast Guard with respect to radar? Admiral FUGARO. The initial studies did include radar, but again it was the surveillance that was the indicated factor, and not neces- sarily radar or television was the determination on the initial. Mr. TREEN. Your change in position was not dictated by budgetary considerations? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. As a matter of fact, in reviewing the cost for both television and radar, the cost is comparable. It is not a ques- tion that we are trying to save money by putting in television. Mr. TREEN. Who made the decision to use the computer without radar? Use the system without radar? Who is responsible for that decision? PAGENO="0223" 219 Admiral FUGARO. That was part of the initial study of the system requirement, and I think, as Commander Hickey mentioned earlier, this system alone provides the greatest benefit of any of the com- ponents we are talking about, and that is to provide some automated system by which we can be giving out advice to the mariner in each location what the traffic situation in his particular area is. To try to do this through mechanical means would be too cumbersome. So we feel the greatest benefit would come through the computer system initially. Mr. TREEN. Have you had discussions with the shallow draft interests about the deletion of radar from the system? Admiral FUGARO~ I know that Admiral Barrow in the Eighth District has had meetings and has discussed these systems with the interests down there, yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Is anybody here from the New Orleans Coast Guard District? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir, not today. Mr. TREEN. Do you expect to have anybody here today or tomorrow? Admiral FUGARO. We did not anticipate to have somebody, Mr. Treen. Mr. TREEN. Is there any particular reason why we do not have anybody? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir, there is no reason why we do not have somebody. Mr. TREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused. The next witness is representing the American Waterways Op- erators, Inc., Mr. Frank T. Stegbauer, executive vice president, Southern Towing Co., accompanied by Mr. Robert Gardner, Alter Co., and Mr. Lloyd Eneix, Agri-Trans. Corp. STATEMENT OP PRANK T. STEGBAUER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESI- DENT, SOUTHERN TOWING CO., REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT GARDNER, ALTER CO., AND LLOYD ENEIX, AGRI-TRANS. CORP. Mr. STEGBAUER. Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Frank T. Stegbauer. I am executive vice president of Southern Towing Co., Memphis, Term. I appear here today on behalf of the American Waterways Operators, Inc., as do Mr. Gardner on my left and Mr. Eneix on my right. I believe, following Admiral Fugaro's testimony, we could probably dispense with the formal statement. I believe you all have copies of it, and I do not see anything to be gained by reading it. [The following was received for the record.] STATEMENT OF FRANK T. STEGBAUER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, SOUTHERN TOWING Co., FOR THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC. Mr. Chairman: My name is Frank T. Stegbauer. I am Executive Vice President of Southern Towing Company, 1814 First National Bank Building, Memphis, Tennessee 38101. 78-280--76------15 PAGENO="0224" 220 I am speaking for The American Waterways Operators, Inc., the national trade association of the inland and coastal barge and towing industry. The industry is composed of approximately 1,800 companies operating 4,100 towboats and tugs, and 25,400 barges. The industry operates on 25,000 miles of the inland waterways system of the United States and is regarded as the safest, most fuel-efficient and lowest cost mode of transport available. A large majority of the towing and barge operators on the Lower Mississippi River in the area of New Orleans are members of The American Waterways Operators, Inc. The members of our association are in favor of a service that would increase the safety of operations on the Lower Mississippi River and in the New Orleans Harbor area in particular. We believe that a properly designed and properly operated vessel traffic service would serve to improve safety in any port or harbor where restricted waters and high density traffic combine to create potentially unsafe conditions. A vessel traffic service will work not only to improve safety but, if it is properly designed and operated, it will assist the movement of water- borne commerce during periods of reduced visibility. This is being accomplished in European ports. Rotterdam is an excellent example. In designing a vessel traffic service (VTS), it is incumbent upon the architects to develop data based on experience. This can only be done correctly by going to the individuals and organizations who possess that all-important experience. This certainly must have been in the minds of the Congress when the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 was enacted. The need for this type of investigative research is borne out by the wording in Sections 102 and 104 of the Act. The U.S. Coast Guard has chosen to interpret Sections 102 and 104 in an ex- tremely restricted manner. The members of the towing industry have expressed their dissatisfaction with the Coast Guard's reluctance to consult within the spirit and intent of the Act. However, the complaints have fallen upon unreceptive ears. The Coast Guard evidently feels that our industry has been given an adequate opportunity for input into the development of the VTS and they cannot be con- vinced otherwise by our association collectively, or by any of its individual members. Our association firmly believes that they have not carried out the man- dates of the Act. Our need for consultation centers on the basics of a vessel traffic service, namely, communications, surveillance, cooperation, and the absolute necessity for experienced vessel traffic control center operators. We are sure in our mind that the proposed system for the Lower Mississippi River falls far short in every one of the fore-mentioned categories. Communications is recognized by all concerned as a vital part of the service. This requires little elaboration. Failure to communicate rapidly and clearly can endanger the vessel attempting to establish communications as well as other vessels in the vicinity. We know this to be true. The Coast Guard knows this to he true. Yet, the Coast Guard has refused to sit down with us and discuss this crucial problem to see what the safe communications minimums might be. Radar survefflance is the real heart of a vessel traffic service. In the absence of radar surveillance, the VTS control center personnel must rely on voice com- munications to pinpoint locations of the large number of vessels within the confines of the vessel traffic service boundaries. Since all vessels are subject to variances in their predicted positions, constant position updating will be required. This will further burden the badly congested communications channels. Moreover, the accuracy of vessel positions at any given time will not be validated. This will lead to serious system errors in times of poor visibility and compound vessel movement reporting problems in the control center. In such cases, no information might well be better than misinformation. We wish to quote the following observation made in respect to the proposed vessel traffic service for the Lower Mississippi River: There are too many areas where accident rates are high to attempt getting by with minimum radar/radio coverage. Full radar and communications must be provided if the high maritime accident rate in the New Orleans area is to be re- duced". Strange as it may seem, this observation was made by the Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, New Orleans, Louisiana, in his Draft Environmental Impact Statement on. the proposed Vessel Traffic Control System for the Lower Mississippi River area, on August 6, 1974. Yet, in spite of the .Coast Guard's apparent reversal from a position which coincided with that of our industry, they will not respond to our request for con- sultation on these fundamental issues. PAGENO="0225" 221 The pilot or master of a vessel must not be subjected to a situation wherein lie cannot place the utmost confidence in the information and guidance he receives from a vessel traffic control center. He is called upon to exercise his own experi- enced judgment time and time again in piloting his vessel in restricted waters. Any conflict between the plans and intentions of the pilot/master and the guidance or directions emanating from the control center will create a chaotic situation.. The pilot/master must place complete trust in the control center. It is unreasonable to expect him to do so if the VTS has no radar surveillance, and the personnel manning the control center have no piloting experience. The maneuvering of tows and ocean-going ships in the Lower Mississippi River cannot he safely controlled by inexperienced personnel. Another vital need then, is the employment of experienced and qualified per- sonnel to man the vessel traffic control center. Again, we would appreciate ai~ opportunity to discuss this with the U.S. Coast Guard. The only reasonable and proper way to commence the much-needed two-way dialogue between the Coast Guard and the affected users of the VTS is through the formation of a joint industry/Coast Guard Committee. Without such a corn- mittee, we will see a continuation of the Coast Guard listening to, but not heeding the constructive comments and views of the waterways industry. In short, Mr. Chairman, we only ask that they sit down and talk with us about the fundamentals which contribute to a good vessel traffic service. They must be made aware of the full reasoning behind our suggestions and we should be en- titled to be apprised of the reasoning behind their differing views. At a Board of Directors meeting on September 15, 1976, The American Water- ways Operators, Inc. adopted the following resolution on the proposed Vessel Traffic Service for the Lower Mississippi River: Resolved: Recognizing the necessity for the protection of life, property and the environ- ment, and the necessity to provide for the expeditious movement of water-borne commerce, especially during periods of reduced visibility, The American Water- ways Operators, Inc. will fully support the establishment of a fully implemented Vessel Traffic Service for those portions of the Lower Mississippi River, where it has been adequately determined there is a need, by measures in compliance with Sections 102(e) and 104 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. AWO's definition of a fully implemented Vessel Traffic Service is as follows: 1. The VTS will open for service with constant radar surveillance of the areas encompassed by the VTS. 2. The VTS will open for service with adequate radio communications frequencies assigned to the VTS, solely for the use of vessels in the VTS and the Vessel Traffic Control Center. 3. The VTS will open for service with fully trained and qualified vessel traffic controllers. 4. The VTS will open for service with a permanent Coast Guard/Industry VTS Advisory Committee established so that a conduit is provided for the exchange of information between Coast Guard and Industry. AWO recommends that only the following portions of the Lower Mississippi River be considered for installation of VTS: 1. From 5 miles seaward from Southwest Pass entrance buoy, and Southeast Pass entrance buoy, to mile 15 AHP-(This would control the restricted area of the Passes and the Pilottown Anchorage which becomes severely congested during periods of reduced visibility.) 2. From mile 75.0 AHP to mile 140.0-(This area encompasses the lower approaches to New Orleans Harbor, the general anchorage, and northward to include the barge fleeting areas and petro-chemical complexes above NORCO, LA.) There appears to be little justification for such service outside these designated areas at this time, but AWO will support an expansion of the system if experience and increased shipping activity should dictate. Of paramount importance is the inclusion of the above-noted four necessary elements in the system. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my presentation. I would be most pleased to answer any questions you or members of the Committee may have. Thank you. Mr. STEGBATJER. I would like to read to you a resolution that was passed last week, September the 15th, to a Board meeting in Chicago. It starts on page 4 of my statement: PAGENO="0226" 222 Resolved: Recognizing the necessity for the protection of life, property and the environment, and the necessity to provide for the expeditious movement of water- borne commerce, especially during periods of reduced visibility, The American Waterways Operators, Inc. will fully support the establishment of a fully imple- mented Vessel Traffic Service for those portions of the Lower Mississippi River, where it has been adequately determined there is a need, by measures in compliance with Sections 102(e) and 104 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. AWO's definition of a fully implemented Vessel Traffic Service is as follows: 1. The VTS will open for service with constant radar surveillance of the areas encompassed by the VTS. 2. The VTS will open for service with adequate radio communications frequen- cies assigned to the VTS, solely for the use of vessels in the VTS and the Vessel Traffic Control Center. 3. The VTS will open for service with fully trained and qualified vessel traffic controllers. 4. The VTS will open for service with a permanent Coast Guard/Industry VTS Advisory Committee established so that a conduit is provided for the exchange of information between Coast Guard and industry. AWO recommends that only the following portions of the Lower Missippi River be considered for installation of VTS: 1. From 5 miles seaward from Southwest Pass entrance buoy, and Southeast Pass entrance buoy, to mile 15 AHP-(This would control the restricted area of the Passes and the Pilottown Anchorage which becomes severely congested during periods of reduced visibility.) 2. From mile 75.0 AHP to mile 140.0-(This area encompasses the lower ap- proaches to New Orleans Harbor, the general anchorage, and northward to include the barge fleeting areas and petro-chemical complexes above NORCO, LA.) There appears to be little justification for such service outside these designated areas at this time, but AWO will support an expansion of the system if experience and increased shipping activity should dictate. Of paramount importance is the inclusion of the above-noted four necessary elements in the system. Now, I believe that in some respects I personally feel like Alice in Wonderland wandering through the maze, trying to get out through the garden wall. Some of the things that we have gone through in New Orleans, we had a group of us-had a conversation with the Coast Guard yesterday in which we were informed that the system would be voluntary. It was my impression that it would be for some time. Today we are hearing 3 to 6 months. Now, New Orleans vessel traffic service people had made a statement to us before that it would be voluntary for a 6-month period just merely for a shakedown. That was our understanding. But, yesterday, we thought we had understood that it would be voluntary for some time. We do not call 6 months some time. Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me, Mr. Stegbauer. I think with that the admiral responded-left me with the impres- sion that it could be much longer; that the Coast Guard had not fixed a time. What I will say is that, once the course of events has started, mandatory is almost inevitable. The question is, When? Mr. STEGBAUER. I think we recognize this, Mr. Chairman. What we do not give into is the way the system is being proposed. We recognize this It would be difficult for the system to function on a voluntary basis because there would be too many people that would supposedly say, well, I am not going to check into it, and then the system becomes invalid. But I did hear the 3 to 6 months somewhere this morning. Mr. BIAGGI. You heard the 3 to 6 months, but you did not hear that as an absolute timeframe. PAGENO="0227" 223 Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, voluntary versus mandatory is a big factor for us, because if it is voluntary, you can take it or leave it, but when it becomes mandatory it has to be fully equipped. Now, Houston is voluntary, and the reports from our pilots, and from many other company pilots say that the information from the vessel traffic service at Houston is better than nothing. But it is not, because it does not have the surveillance, except for the television in certain strategic areas. I understand radar surveillance is proposed sometime next year in the Galveston area, at which it is supposed to become mandatory. The reason that the industry wanted some input into the com- ponents of the system, was because we did want to see that we get the best system that we can, one that will work, and one that will enable the controllers to pass on reliable information to the captains and pilots. Now, I think one of the bases of success for the vessel traffic system is for the captains and the pilots to be able to put complete reliance on the system. If they cannot put complete reliance on the system, then it is not going to work. Mr. BIAGGI. Let me interject at this point. I imagine that the Coast Guard has the same concern. By raising the question inferrentially, you are saying that the components that are being installed fail to measure up if they in fact- Mr. STEGBAUER. I am saying that the computer, that the Coast Guard has been talking to us over a year, is nothing magical. It is a computer that does computations of time and motion, that is impos- sible to do by hand because of the volume of traffic. It does nothing more than that, and it is on a visual display. But the age-old saying is garbage in and garbage out. If you do not have accurate information going in, then you do not have accurate information coming out. Mr. BIAGGI. What do you propose as an alternative? Mr. STEGBAUER. Surveillance. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, the computer is not an alternative, from my understanding, if it is correct, it is an addition. They have not pro- posed surveillance yet. They have radar, television, sonar. Mr. STEGBAnER. We were told that there was no radar planned. I was told a matter of months ago by the eighth district that they were going to try to install one low light level television in the area of Algiers Point, period. That was the surveillance. Mr. BIAGGI. You heard the admiral testify this morning that there is radar in this very section? Mr. STEGBATJER. I did. That is why I feel like Alice in Wonderland. What we heard this morning is not what we heard for the last year. Mr. TREEN. What he said is that television is planned for the fiscal year 1978 request, and radar for 1980. Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, we were told no later than yesterday that there was no radar planned. Mr. TREEN. Well, the money has not been appropriated for it yet. Mr. STEGBAUER. I understand funding, but it was not planned. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, if that is what you were told, then there is a communication problem somewhere. PAGENO="0228" 224 Mr. STEGBAIJER. This is part of the whole problem. What I heard today, we have had the most monumental com- munication breakdown between the industry and the Coast Guard that was ever involved. Mr. BIAGGI. You were here when we opened this meeting, and I am sure you heard the remarks that were made. That is a very critical situation as far as I am concerned, with relation to the Coast Guard and industry, and we must have input and communication. * I mean total input, not just in symbolic communication. I am talking about meaningful relations, and I keep hearing about it, but I also keep getting criticisms from industry that this is not taking place in a proper and meansingful fashion. Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, Mr. Chairman, most of the men in this room today attended a meeting after me in the eighth district in New Orleans, and I am sure in the letter that you received from Captain Woods, from the Coast Guard, he listed all the participating com- panics. In fact, he was short some companies. There were more com- panics than he listed. But the meeting had been meaningless. The first meeting we ever had was in August of 1975, with a pseudoadvisory group, because it had been decided not to have a formal advisory group. It went under the guise of an ad hoc committee to the New Orleans Port Safety Committee. We walked into a room of 150-some-odd people, and were given a set of regulations that said this is it, fellows. There is no change to be made. That is not what we call dialog, and this has been going on all the time, and we cannot have any input, we did make some input, none of it materially changed the first set of draft regulations that I believe were drafted sometime in the early part of 1975. They were a rough draft by the eighth district, not Washington, and they have basically changed since then. Mr. BIAGGI. We have a quorum call. We will have a 10-minute recess, and then we will resume upon our return. {Short recess.] Mr. BIAGGI. The committee is called to order. * Before we start, I will state we will be required to leave the room at 1 :30. There is another hearing scheduled at that time. We will continue with these hearings tomorrow morning. Mr. Stegbauer. Mr. STEGBAIJER. Mr. Chairman, I believe we were talking about the reasons that the industry wanted some input into systems components. * One of the big differences we have with the Coast Guard is the lack of radar surveillance. We have, I think, a basic philosophic difference in the use of radar versus television. * Now, a number of us have experimented with low-light television and found that it had some definite limitations. It can be made to function according to light intensity that is available by the addition of infrared equipment. Some of the drawbacks are it has no perspective, no depth percep- tion at all to it. It does not have the ability to track vessels. It can only see what the eye can see or what the use of magnifying lenses, what the eye plus binoculars can see. PAGENO="0229" 225 Therefore, you are limited to the field of vision of the lens just as you are limited to the field of vision of the eyeball. Radar does not have this drawback. It can see more area than the eyeball, and it can also allow VTC to track vessels and use it as a check against their projected or computer projected track of vessels in the VTC. As stated before, there is some margin of error. As a matter of fact, there is quite a bit of margin of error on the computer projections. We feel that radar is essential to check against the computer readout on the visual display. Now, we understand and propose that television will be approxi- mately 97 percent effective, which brings-you say, well, what about the other 3 percent, the other 3 percent cannot see in fog? Radar can see in fog. Television cannot see in fog because your eye cannot see in fog either. A number of us, most modern vessels are equipped with radar and other types of navigating equipment that will allow our vessels to navigate in nightfall, and we feel that the television will be of no assistance to the VTC in these periods. I believe that New Orleans, contrary to some numbers kicked around, like 29 days out of the year, I believe that fog is rather prev- alent in New Orleans, especially in the early morning hours. - Getting a little into this radar thing, the Coast Guard in their initial environmental impact statement which was out by the 8th District Coast Guard, under date of August 6, 1974, stated that radar and television would be both employed. I quote from the diafted environmental impact statement, and by the way, we do not know whether this is the final impact statement or not-I do not believe any of our group have seen one, if there is one, so we do not know whether this has been changed or not, but this is the drafted environmental impact statement: The leasing of a sufficient number of radar and communications installations is planned to provide complete communications coverage of the system and radar surveillance of selected hazardous areas. Wherever possible, these installations will be constructed on existing structures on Federally owned or leased property. The purpose of the radar coverage is to provide an electronic presentation of all vessels in the Port of New Orleans to the Vessel Traffic Center. The purpose of the VHF-FM communications will be to provide direct communications between vessels within the geographic boundaries of the system and the Vessel Traffic Center. Television coverage of selected areas wifi allow the Vessel Traffic Center to visually monitor and identify vessel traffic. The way we read this, really television was planned in addition to radar. Going over a little further in the drafted environmental impact statement, where they discuss possible alternatives to the proposed VTS, one alternative is: Partial communications net only. Their comment is: In view of the number of vessels on the river at any given moment, this was deemed unacceptable. The amount of traffic on a given radio frequency, each minute, would render the net useless. Many masters would be unable to forewarn others of their presence due to inability to "breakthrough." A fully implemented VTS would eliminate this danger. Partial radar and communications only. There are too many areas where accident rates are high to attempt getting by with minimum radar/radio coverage. Full radar and communications must be provided if the high maritime accident rate in the New Orleans area is to be reduced. PAGENO="0230" 226 I believe that this document would show that the Coast Guard did consider quite in depth radar and the VTS system in New Orleans' VTS in January. Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me, Mr. Stegbauer. Let us talk about the 97- percent effectiveness, when TV can be operative. Would TV be superior during that period to radar, in the light of the congestion in the harbor? Mr. STEGBAUER. This is where I think our basic difference is on the use of TV and radar. Our group does not think it would, because TV cannot see around corners. Radar can see around corners. You could put a radar at one of the bends up there, and the radar will give you a picture around the bend. The TV will not-not any TV that we are familiar with. Now, we have-a number of us have viewed the TV, and used the VTS at Morgan Point, which is the entrance to the old Buffalo Port, or what is now the Houston Ship Canal, as you come west on the Galveston Bay. It is fine-I mean, you look out there and as far as the TV camera can see, by swinging the camera, you can see just as if a man would be there, and sitting and looking both ways, but when it comes to a bend, you cannot see. Also, when you are asking the TV, I think one of the sectors were given to be some 20 miles-23 miles, covered by four TV cameras. I think that figure is 4.6 miles per camera, which would be the camera in the middle, 2.3 miles each way, 4.6 each way, and I know of no equipment, and perhaps the Coast Guard could provide us with that, but we know of no equipment that will perform this satisfactorily. Mr. BIAGGI. What you are talking about really is that there would be-it would be necessary to have strategic positioning of the different cameras so that if we do have a bend we should be able to see both sides of that bend. Mr. STEGBAUBR. Well, if you wanted to do that, yes. I would check that, and in order to gain proper perspective, because TV has no perspective, whereas radar does. A number of .us visited the Puget Sound VTS, where there was the radar coverage. It is very effective, you stand there and watch the blips of the ships moving down in the la.ne separation. Mr. BrAGGI. Let us stay with that, because in my own experience in this area, I can see a congested harbor, where the blips may not be as distinguishable as the actual visual image of the scene, where you get that on television, and radar would not be fully reflective of the picture, so that it would be of benefit to the controller. That is my own immediate reaction to this point. I would say that, in other areas, other than congested areas, then radar would suffice, but in congested areas it is like being in Times Square, looking at Times Square through a camera, you know where all the cars are, and now if you look through radar, radar will tell you the number of cars there, but it would be difficult to distinguish and handle this. That is my own immediate reaction. Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, I think one thing that radar does that TV does not view, and I am sure, Mr. Chairman, you probably have seen radar pictures, the radar, even though this is confined to an area, we use it on all our boats, shows you, for instance, which side PAGENO="0231" 227 a vessel is favored on the banks of the river, which TV-the TV that I have seen, will not do this, because it has no depth perception at all, and to me, to a controller, if he were able to see which side of the river side the vessel was favoring, he could be more abreast of the conditions existing of two vessels approaching each other. Mr. BIAGGI. I am sure the Coast Guard has taken that into consideration, and I see where we have a difference of opinion. I would appreciate it if the Coast Guard would submit to the committee their comments on this particular issue. Admiral FUGARO. Be glad to, Mr. Chairman. [The following was received for the record:] A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV) VERSUS RADAR FOR VTS USE IN A RIVER ENVIRONMENT, BASED ON EXPERIENCE IN THE OPERATION OF CCTV IN THE HOUSTON-GALVESTON VTS SINCE FEBRUARY 1975 ADVANTAGES OP CCTV 1. The primary advantages of CCTV are in actually being able to see: (a) What the mariner sees or is trying to describe to the VTS. (5) What a tow looks like (make up; number of barges; type of barges; how it's loaded; the size of the tow boat in relation to its tow; whether it has a bow steering unit or a tail boat; company marking, name and the barge numbers; load line and lights.) (c) Whether a tug is aground or just pushed in for a crew change. (d) When a two boat loses its coupling or is broken up by a passing ship, incle- ment weather, current, collision or grounding. (e) Man overboard and recovery. (f) Oil in the water, debris, a loose barge, a navigational hazard or channel obstruction. (g) Tows swapping barges and when they've completed. (h) A missed turn. (i) Position of dredges and pipelines. (j) Docking and undocking ships; heavy lifts; bunkering operations; special loadout operations; men working over the side; and, tow boats with long tows backing out into the channel. 2. Since commissioning the Houston-Galveston Vessel Traffic Service, in February 1975, there have been seven major fires on the Houston Ship Channel; three of the seven were within CCTV camera-range and the VTC was the first to report the fire to the proper agencies. 3. The CCTV requires very little operator training. The controls are few and simple and, as a result, have a low fatigue factor. The CCTV serves as a window that presents a changing scene. This helps the operator to identify with the mari- ner, see his environment and appreciate his problems. ADVANTAGES OF RADAR 1. Radar Provides: (a) Low visibility and heavy weather penetration ability; however, the tor- rential rains characteristic of the Houston-Galveston area can affect even radar. (5) Surveillance of a large area. (c) Bearing, range, course, speed, range-rate and movement of contacts. (d) Position surveillance on aids to navigation. (e) Capability of tracking weather fronts. (f) Ability to effect intercepts, either vessel to vessel or vessel to terrestial points. (g) Ability to compute the set and drift of a disabled tow or ship and determine the probable point of grounding. DISADVANTAGES OP TELEVISION IN VTS (a) Cannot see effectively long distances. (b) Reduced capability during darkness, even using infrared illumination. (c) During periods of fog or heavy rain, a total loss of capability is experienced. (d) Very directional in nature. (e) Low accuracy in vessel speed/direction detemination. PAGENO="0232" 228 DISADVANTAGES OF RADAR IN VTS (a) Radar is a time study and requires a series of marks to develop a surface picture. (b) Radar is physically demanding on the operator, requiring manipulation to obtain the desired picture. Resultant fatigue and error factor is considerable. (c) With every scale shift the time slot development procedure must start again. (d) Small boats with radar reflectors can appear as large contacts; tows with hull-down barges can appear as boats. (e) It is impossible to accurately determine size, type, owner markings or other characteristics important in traffic management. (1) It takes many hours to train an effective operator. (g) The geographic limitation of the area makes the radar useless for the higher scales. For example, the intracoastal waterway would appear as ~2 of an inch on the sixteen mile scale. This can, however, be overcome with an offset feature on a lower scale, but then disadvantage (c) becomes the problem. CONCLUSION From a VTS point of view, considering that vessel traffic will be confined to the limits of a narrow channel, CCTV is preferable to radar because: (a) Target (type) identification is immediate with COTY. (b) No target interpretation is required. (c) Operator fatigue is less. (d) Operator functions are significantly reduced. (e) Operator interpretation error is greatly reduced with CCTV. (f) Background clutter and adjacent land masses have no significant effect. (g) Other factors affecting channel traffic such as fires on landside; oil spills; fog; overhanging booms on ships; vessels docking or undocking; and vessels bunkering or conducting heavy lifts are all visible on CCTV and not on radar. (h) Most any visible problem can be detected on CCTV including flag and dis- tress signals. Mr. STEGBAUER. Also, one cannot help but wonder where you have limited surveillance, and this is one of the reasons why AWO was selected to remedy that, possibly, two sections of the proposed area be implemented, at this time. Now, we could have the finest vessel traffic control system, rather than spending money for areas, so-called noncritical areas, we just have a communication network. One then begins to wonder if maybe we have not got the cart before the horse, maybe we should have-if these areas are agreed to be critical, and we certainly agree with the Coast Guard on those two areas, that the radar should not be down, and certainly, in our opinion, the system should never be mandatory without full imple- mentation, radar and the whole bit. Now, in regard to the other critical areas, one must ask what is so much better with a communication network than rigid, enforced compliance with the bridge-to-bridge communication act which is not being done. We have been to the Coast Guard and FCC for years, and asked for a cleanup of chit-chat, if you may, on channel 13, and confine it to what it is designated for, the exchange of navigation information, and we have gotten no relief from either agency. This is one of the problems with 13, so crowded, particularly in the New Orleans area, that its usefulness is seriously hampered. We need cleanup on this area, and if we got cleanup plus rigid enforce- ment of the use of 13, we say, why even have the communication network in the noncritical areas, what is better about the commtini- cation center than normal bridge-to-bridge communication. PAGENO="0233" 229 The statement was made by the Coast Guard that the industry was relieved from channel 16. This is what we had hoped for, but there was a catch in the FTC order. The catch was you are only relieved from channel 16 if you monitor a so-called house frequency. So this will force you to have a minimum of three radios on your boat, whereas most people only carry two now. So in order to comply with these regulations, and engage in VTS, we see everyone will have to add a new radio to his vessel. Now, we are still talking with the FCC. We have gone back to ask them to reconsider their order and withdraw this release from chan- nel 16 and the house frequency, and we feel that if a man wants to stand on a house frequency, that is his business, but it should not be mandatory. That would enable people to navigate with two radios, one for 13, and one for VTS, separately. Hopefully we will get some relief. However, in dealing with FCC, our efforts have not been too successful in the past. We also feel that the Coast Guard should request from FCC frequencies that would be dedicated to VTS, without taking them away from the public sector, which is what is being done. We are already short of a frequency area. Channel 11 is presently being used by a number of people in the New Orleans area. They will have to get off the channel within 5 years. The FCC simply says they will phase them out, they will not renew their radio license to operate on this channel, so there will be a phaseout period of these people when they renew their licenses. Channel 12 and channel 14, whereas the scheduled use of these frequencies over the various sectors is probably what I would say probably is the best visible traffic system you would probably have, but it still does have the propagation of some radio waves over the possibility of some interference. We feel that these frequencies should be totally dedicated to VTS. There should not be extraneous conversations on them, and that the Coast Guard would be the center, and would be better off in this area, as would our vessels, but we feel the Coast Guard should stand up to FCC and insist on these channels. Now, channel 14 and channel 12- Mr. TREEN. May I ask a question on that point? Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. Mr. TREEN. You have expressed some concern for the public that use these channels having to give up their license. You are also saying the Coast Guard should stand up to the FCC, and demand they have clear channels. What are the other channels that would be available? I mean, we cannot serve both of these purposes, or can we? Do you have a proposal for solving that particular problem? Mr. STEGBAUER. We have some channels-I am not an expert in this area, and probably some more witnesses will brief you a little bit better, but there are some channels that are dedicated to inter- national use by treaty, but there is a provision in the treaty that you may use these frequencies on a condition they do not cause inter-~ ference with international use of these channels. PAGENO="0234" 230 The FCC has been extremely reluctant to allow these frequencies to be used by U.S. maritime interests. We feel that they could be used, and that they should be used, as long as we do not interfere with any international treaties. This is an area where some additional frequencies are available; 12 and 14 were not dedicated solely to the engineers. They are listed in the JFCC usage chart as port operation frequencies. They are available to the general public also, not just the Corps of Engineers. So the general public, in effect, is losing three frequencies to this VTS in the New Orleans area, and as strapped as we are for fre- quencies now, because of the increasing use of VHF, and the increase in the growth of traffic, it does present a problem to us. I believe this is about all I have. Bob, would you have some- Mr. GARDNER. I will just make myself available for questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. STEGBAUER. Lloyd? Mr. ENEIX. I have nothing. Mr. BIAGGI. Will you gentlemen be in town tomorrow? Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. We have heard so much on this committee about lack of communication, and so forth. You have indicated that your attempts to communicate with the Coast Guard have fallen on deaf ears. Could you be specific? What have they refused to consider? I am not talking about what they may have refused to do, but when have they failed to listen, in what respect? Mr. STEGBAUER. In one respect they have failed to listen to our pleas to, "let us implement the system to a graduated basis." Now, yesterday, for the first time- Mr. TREEN. Have you been able to communicate your thoughts as to why, such as you have done in your statement here? The four points that you mentioned on page 5 are an excellent sum- mary, I think, of your position. Essentially your position is you should not put this system in operation until you have all the things you need: trained personnel, good communications, and the radar sur- veillance that you want. Have you not been able to make these points to the Coast Guard? Is that the problem, they have not sat down and listened to you? Or is the problem that they do not agree with you? Mr. STEGBAUER. The problem is they do not agree with us. We have sat down with their project officers in New Orleans. We have a small group of us that do sit down in the District Commander's office, and they just do not change at all. Mr. TREEN. Then the next question would be, how would the formal adoption of an advisory committee change that? The idea of a committee is not to dictate policy, but to communicate. Mr. STEGBAUER. May I be very honest? Mr. TREEN. Yes, sir. Mr. STEGBAUER. I think some of you gentlemen have been snowed by the Coast Guard, by the amount of conversations that have been going on with industry, because there are no minutes, there are very little records of the conversations, so particularly in the letter from PAGENO="0235" 231 Captain Woods, for instance, where he gives this broad view of all these people they have talked to. Sure, we have been called in. Mr. TREEN. In view of the transcript of the hearings we had in New Orleans, I was pretty vocal about the establishing of better communications at that time. I agree with you, but I was trying to get to the point of whether or not the problem is really that they have not listened to your arguments, and to the points that you make. Or is it that they have listened, but they simply have not been responsive in the fashion that you would wish them to be? I think you have more or less answered, but if you have got some- thing else to say- Mr. STEGBATJER. Well, Congressman Treen, I believe you are addressing this situation in the hearings in New Orleans probably had about the same results as our endeavors. They will talk to us, but we make no headway whatsoever, now. I do not think-I should say, we do not think-our whole group does not think it is uureasonable to ask that this thing be implemented on a smaller size basis, and let us all get in and get our feet wet. Now, 243 miles, one crack right out of the box, will go 243 miles, has a) lot of area to cover. I am not familiar with how many-how the worldwide VTS system, how big they are, but I venture to say that is probably the biggest one in the world. Mr. TREEN. Essentially what you are saying is, let us narrow the geographical scope of what we are trying to do, and implement that with radar and trained personnel-there is no quarrel about whether you are supposed to have trained personnel. We agree with that. You may have quarrel as to what is going to be necessary to train them, but essentially what you are saying is, Let us narrow the scope to the two sectors you mention in your statement as a possible narrowing of geographical scope, and not open until you have four things that you outlined in your statement. That is essen- tially your position? Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. And that has been communicated to the Coast Guard, certainly if not before, it has been communicated today. I think from my knowledge of it, it has been communicated to the Coast Guard prior to this time. Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask you-you have no quarrel with the whole system, implementation of the system, and its objectives, if I under- stand correctly, but it is a question of- Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, I would have to be very candid with you. There are a number of us who have some reservation about how many benefits would derive to the industry or the general public from the expenditure of this money, and a number of us think the Bridge- to-Bridge Communication Act with the cleaned up channel, and rigid enforcement, would contribute in large measure to helping avoid accidents. Of course, it would not have the radar, just the communication network, but the bridge-to-bridge communication requirement, when they became law, they did not even affect most of the people running PAGENO="0236" 232 the upper river, because they had been doing it for years on their own volition, but they recognized how much of an assist it was to them. The question is, When you talk about money, talk about cost benefits, one has to wonder whether they are really going to be this many cost benefits derived from a YTS. I think most of us are reconciled we are going to get YTS, and in the end we are going to get it mandatory, but there are some reserva- tions about the cost benefits that we as taxpayers have. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, that is always a concern of ours, too, Mr. Stegbauer. With relation to the question you raised on the sector-to-sector application, it has been touched on several times, and rather than an overall application in this particular area, I think it was the testimony of the admiral that there has been substantial reduction in accidents, or virtual improvement in safety records in the areas where the system has already been installed, and it would seem to me that that would be the basis for their installation over this extended area. Mr. STEGBAIJER. We would be very interested in seeing this type of numbers. We have never seen this, to our knowledge. Mr. BIAGGI. I am sure that can be made available to you. They were made available to me. Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, the reason we do not know is we do not have the figures. Mr. BIAGGI. We will make them available to you. Mr. STEGBAUER. If we could have the figures, we could look at it, too. We are not in this thing with closed minds. We are interested in safety as much as anybody else. After all, if you want to look at it just from a cold, hard money standpoint, we are the ones that pay for the bills after these coffisions. Mr. BIAGGI. We are aware of that, Mr. Stegbauer. Mr. STEGBAUER. We are interested also if the thing will materiali- ally decrease casualties, both in property and in lives. Now, nobody could fail to support that. Mr. BIAGGI. It is now 1:32, beyond our tenancy, and we will be dispossessed, if you like. You will appear tomorrow if you have further comments to make, and we would appreciate them. Thank you very much. Mr. STEGBAUER. Thank you. iWhereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon- vene at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, September 22, 1976.] PAGENO="0237" VESSEL TRAFFIC CONTROL WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1976 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Mario Biaggi, chairman of the sub- committee, presiding. Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order. When we recessed yesterday, Mr. Stegbauer, Mr. Eneix and Mr. Gardner were at the witness table. Will you please come forward? CONTINUING TESTIMONY OP PRANK T. STEGBAUER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, SOUTHERN TOWING CO., REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT GARDNER, ALTER CO., AND LLOYD ENEIX, AGRI-TRANS. CORP. Mr. BIAGGI. Do you have a statement, Mr. Eneix? Mr. ENEIX. I do have a statement, but in the essence of time, I will more or less reiterate our concern, and we would just like to basically highlight the statement that I have. Our prime concern is, of course, the communication of the VTS. And, of course, the incorporation of radar into the system, and I think the basic functional thing dictates that they be incorporated, and it is the concern of our industry, a number of systems without incorporation of clear-cut communication and radar, and I think I would like to leave it at that, in the essence of time. Mr. TREEN. I just want to ask one question. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Treen. Mr. TREEN. On page 2 you state, "the use of YTS systems is grossly misrepresented." Please briefly say who did the misrepresentation, and misrepre- senting, and what specifics are you referring to? Mr. ENEIX. We specifically refer to the type of research, which in our opinion has been gleaned from the Coast Guard form 2692. Mr. TREEN. I am still having trouble hearing you. Can you bring the mike a little closer, please? I do not know if the volume is up. Mr. ENEIX. The Coast Guard form 2692, having been presented to us, was the vehicle which the information was gleaned from to justify a YTS system, accident reporting. (233) PAGENO="0238" 234 A form 2692, for example, has to be produced for each barge of a tow, even though one barge may be the only piece of equipment that is involved. That also includes a 2692 for the towboat itself. The only information, of course, that is available has been Coast Guard records, and we in the industry have not kept records, although we have been the producers of the 2692's, and it was explained to us that this was the method of justifying a VTS system. Basically, accident prevention, and the number of accidents were gleaned from the 2692's, was an astronomical number, but not valid. Mr. TItEEN. Well, what you are saying is that the Coast Guard has misrepresented the numbers, or misinterpreted, or deliberately- Mr. ENEIX. I would suggest- Mr. TREEN. Or falsified records, or what? Mr. ENEIX. I would suggest to you that that is probably a combina- tion. Determinations were made from 2692's as to what type of acci- dent could have been prevented with a VTS system. Now, we have no way of knowing who made this determination. Mr. TREEN. All right. Sir, if you would care to submit something in addition for the record as to where you think the misrepresentation specifically has occurred, I would be most interested. I have nothing further to ask at this time. Mr. HEYWARD. Mr. Stegbauer, I want to go back again to your proposal for a sector implementation rather than an overall imple- mentation. I believe that you are suggesting in your testimony that the Coast Guard, rather than covering the entire sector, should initiate the program, if any, only in two sectors in the beginning, and from experience determine what to do in the two other sectors. Is that correct? Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir, that is correct. Mr. HEYWARD. Would it not create a problem if you are going to have a gap in the system for vessels that are moving in the river system, or going into the blind areas, so to speak? What is the problem, or difficulty for the industry in participating in that blind sector, in between sectors one and three-whatever the proper numbers are? Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, there are two. One, we do no think it is needed from a navigational standpoint. Our groups do not feel it would be any problem at all. Mr. HEYWARD. I beg your pardon, without any- Mr. STEGBAUER. Without any problem at all, from going to a non- controlled sector to a controlled sector. In large measure we do it quite often, even when you go into a lock, in a sense this is a con- trolled sector, because you come under the control of the lockmaster. So it is no problem as far as the navigational problems. We do not believe that the money spent in the other systems would have good cost-benefit ratio. Also, the Coast Guard has told us they are constrained by lack of funds, and we would like to see the funds spent in the most productive area, since they are limited funds. We certainly understand that, and these are the areas we feel would be most productive. Mr. HEYWARD. But initially, the expenditure, as I understand it, is for the computer and the vessel traffic center. If it is there, and has PAGENO="0239" 235 the capability of receiving and analyzing your reports from that midsector, what is the problem of funding? Mr. STEGBAUER. This goes to the heart of our argument. The in- formation received by the VTS has no validity without the ability to cross-check the computer with radar surveillance. Mr. ETEYWARD. I can understand that, but there is a report by GAO on this matter, criticizing the Coast Guard for going too sophisticated in the system, and proposing that they have basics, that is, com- munication systems only in all the ports, before they go into the surveillance aspect. They are getting advice and recommendations from more than one direction. Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, I am familiar with the GAO's report, but I have not known GAO to be experienced in the maritime navigation field. Mr. HEYWARD. I do not know that that is a particularly critical answer. We are talking about the expenditure of Government funds, and GAO should be an expert on that aspect. Now, the real question is-what burden is `placed on industry to make vessel reports in this middle sector, if the other two sectors are going to be put into effect? Mr. STEGBAIJER. I do not see the necessity for it. The information that goes into the nonsurveillance sectors, in our opinion, will not be valid information, and could seriously- Mr. HEYWARD. I guess what you are really saying, you do not think one or two or three ought to be into effect without the radar surveil- lance in the beginning. That is really the answer; is it not? Mr. STEGBATJER. Absolutely. Mr. HEYWARD. But if they are going to put it on a voluntary basis for vessel movement reporting systems despite your argument that it should be an overall surveillance, then the midsector is equally war- ranted as the two sectors surrounding it; would that not be correct? This is not a separate objection on your part, as I understand it. You are saying that there should be radar surveillance, and it should be radar surveillance in the two critical sectors, leaving the other two alone, because there is not really a problem demonstrated there. Is that fair to state? Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. But despite your position, if they go ahead and put in a vessel movement reporting system on a voluntary, not mandatory basis whether you can consider it cost beneficial or otherwise, the same objection would exist with the midsector as those other two. Is that not right? Mr. STEGBAUER. The objection to the nonradar sector is the fact the information is not valid, and we feel that our captains and pilots will not be able to place reliability on it. Now, in light of that, I guess, you all perfectly figured out we spent a lot of time yesterday afternoon, I believe the word is caucusing up here, and we have come forth with a little statement from AWO, and and if I may read it to you: After listening to the Coast Guard's comments yesterday, and studying their prepared statement, the members of AWO who are 78-280--76-16 PAGENO="0240" 236 concerned with New Orleans' VTS will recommend, with great re- luctance, to the board of directors of AWO that due to the following facts: 1. The Coast Guard's refusal to consider the installation of radar surveillance in the New Orleans' VTS. 2. The Coast Guard's unwillingness to provide clean VHF channels for VTS communication that will not interfere and/or deprive the maritime industry of presently used VHF frequencies. 3. The Coast Guard's failure to provide industry with a compre- hensive plan for the proper training of VTC personnel. 4. The Coast Guard's failure to provide a vehicle for ongoing dialog between the Coast Guard and industry. The New Orleans VTS as presently proposed, will have the potential to provide mariners in the system with unrealiable and erroneous information, that will make the system unsafe, and will be a con- tributing factor to the possibility of accidents to those mariners using and relying on the system. Therefore, the AWO board of directors should advise our member- ship not to use the New Orleans VTS as presently proposed on a voluntary basis, and that AWO work against the mandatory imposi- tion of New Orleans VTS in its present form, with al] measures avail- able to AWO. Now, most of the people that are members of AWO, who are here today are not administrative people. These are all operational people, and we feel this very, very strongly. Mr. HEYWARD. You do not want a voluntary system. You do not want a mandatory system unless it has radar, and you do not want a mandatory system except in two sectors, and that is what it boils down to. Mr. STEGBAUER. We did not accept mandatory systems, but if you have got radar surveillance for the full length of the system, and the Coast Guard sees fit to spend the money, and the Congress- Mr. HEYWARD. So you do not want a voluntary system. You want it mandatory. Is that correct? Mr. STEGBAUER. We do not want a voluntary system that is not radar surveilled. Mr. HEYWARD. Suppose they had radar, would you be in favor of voluntary or a mandatory system? Mr. STEGBAUER. Well, we are on record either way would be fine with us. Mr. HEYWARD. You do not care? Mr. STEGBAUER. No, as long as you have the radar system and proper communication. That is what we are working for. We realize that it will go mandatory, and we are not sticking our head in the sand. We realize this and only want the best for the system. Mr. HEYWARD. There is another question in connection with input, and I can understand the problem which you have had in connection with your dealings with the 8th District Coast Guard. As you recall, there was a meeting in the chairman's office and the commandant of the Coast Guard and your group, AWO of which you were a member- Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir. PAGENO="0241" 237 Mr. HEYWARD. At that time the complaint was made that the Coast Guard was not keeping the industry advised of their proposal. And as I recall, the basic thrust was that you wanted to know exactly where the Coast Guard was at that point in their planning, if any. Is this a fair statement? Mr. STEGBAUER. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. And as a result of that the Commandant agreed to issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking-not proposed rules, but an advance notice-so that everybody would have notice, not only the industry, but any other interested people, including the public who were not involved in transportation by water. He did that shortly thereafter, and now we hear that, presumably, the Coast Guard has now changed its mind on going forward with proposed rules and wants to put this thing in on a step-by-step basis beginning with a voluntary system. And yet you say you have no input. I think the result indicates that somebody has a hell of a lot of input. Mr. STEGBAIJER. I have to agree with you there. The Coast Guard also told us they intended to put this system in on a voluntary basis all the time. Now, this is the Coast Guard in Washington, but the Coast Guard in the 8th District in New Orleans has told us this is not so. I have a letter here from the project officer that says it will go in on a 2-month voluntary basis at which time he will train his VTC people on using our vessels as a guinea pig, and at the end of the 3-month period they will go mandatory. Mr. HEYWARD. That is not what we were told yesterday, and apparently there are no present plans to go mandatory in 3 months. Mr. STEGBAUER. This is reading a letter of February 13, 1976, from the 8th District. Mr. BIAGGI. Excuse me. I notice Admiral Fugaro is in the room, and it appears he is listening as we are. There seems to be some discrepancy here. Mr. Stegbauer has a letter indicating 3 months and then mandatory, and your testimony is at variance with that letter. We would appreciate a firm position and a clear one. Admiral FUGARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I can only reaffirm what I said yesterday, that our intentions are not to go mandatory, and there was no fixed period of any 3 months or 6 months. I believe I testified yesterday that our intention was to go for a reasonable period of time, and I believe I did indicate that I would estimate a minimum of, say, a 6-month period before we would even consider, and probably longer than that. While Captain Stegbauer has some letter from the project officer down there, the ultimate control of the project is still here in head- quarters. And I can assure you that what I told you yesterday what will come about, that is that initially it will be a voluntary system. There is no fixed voluntary period that we are imposing now. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Admiral FUGARO. While I am here, I would like to make perhaps one clarification to other testimony that was given this morning with respect to the Coast Guard form 2692, which is now our accident reporting form for reportable marine casualties. What Captain Eneix said was correct with respect to the fact when there was a casualty, each barge involved in the casualty has to be PAGENO="0242" 238 reported on a separate 2692 form inasmuch as each of the vessels is a registered vessel. But when we consider casualties, we only con- sider the casualty as a whole, whether there is 1 or more than 1, or 10 barges, is 1 accident. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. TREEN. May I just ask for clarity, do you mean that if there are eight barges and one tow, a 2692 is filed on each of the eight barges? Admiral FTJGARO. Yes. Mr. TREEN. But in your computation you are saying that you would count that as one casualty if that tow is involved in a collision? Admiral FTJGARO. That is right, sir. Mr. TREEN. OK. Thank you. Mr. STEGBAUER. Mr. Chairman, this is a problem that we have had over and over and over again. New Orleans tell us one thing, and we have conducted our dealings with New Orleans up until the time of the advanced proposed rulemaking. We base our replies to the advanced proposed rulemaking on what we have been told in the 8th District. We have had no knowledge of these items until the day before yesterday. If I remember correctly, and you can correct me, Mr. Heyward, Admiral Price said the same thing in the meeting with Mr. Biaggi's office that we had with the Commandant. Mr. HEYWARD. I think there was an agreement in Mr. Biaggi's office that there had been a lack of communication which was un- fortunate. But it seems to me that you have taken a position that anything the project officer said was something that had been estab- lished, and that is simply not so. The only way under the law that the Coast Guard can establish this system and require rules to be followed by the maritime industry is by publishing rules which apply. Now, the Administrative Procedures Act requires them to go through a certain format to do that. Each time any form of paper has come out, you have said, in effect, at least this is my impression, that they have put this in concrete and we have not had a chance to do anything with it. I think the result has demonstrated that nothing has been in con- crete, and then you criticize them because there has been a change which, in many cases, I am sure, has been caused by the comments that you have made which, to me, demonstrates that you have had input, whether or not what you have recommended is exactly what comes out or not. I think if right now we were to address ourselves to what the future role should be of this vessel traffic system, and what the proposed rules are going to contain, this is the way that all of us should see that it goes. Now, in the proposed rules, Admiral Fugaro said yesterday it was a voluntary system, that they would not issue proposed rules because it would not be mandatory. They are not required. They would do it by a manual which would be issued. If they decided at the time they deemed it required to go manda-. tory, they cannot go mandatory without issuing a proposed rule, giving the public the opportunity to comment. PAGENO="0243" 239 So they are not going to be able to one day say, Mr. Stegbauer, tomorrow morning this is mandatory. They cannot do that, whether they want to or not. Mr. BIAGGI. Before you respond, if you will forgive us, we are subservient to those bells. There will be a 10-minute recess. [Short recess.] Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order. Mr. Stegbauer, you were about to respond. Mr. STEGBATJER. Could I have the question again, please? Mr. BIAGGI. It was not a question. You were responding to a comment made by Mr. lEleyward. Mr. STEGBATJER. Well, the basis of our problem has been the difference in what we are told in the 8th District and what we have now been told since Sunday night by Washington. Evidently there is some breakdown in communication between Washington and the 8th District. But in our prior dealings we have been confined to dealing with the 8th District, and we had no way of knowing what the Washington area was speaking about. Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I am inclined to agree with you. There seems to be some confusion, and I think the result of the testimony today on both your part and all the hearings on the part of Admiral Fugaro of the Coast Guard, will possibly clear that up. Communication obvi- ously is a problem, and has always been a problem with a large insti- tution. And I guess that is one of the reasons we have hearings, to resolve them. But one question I would like to put to you is do you believe an advisory committee would help resolve our problems? Mr. STEGBAUER. If we could get an advisory committee where we could have an exchange of information and not a briefing by the Coast Guard is really what we have been going to when we to the meetings in the 8th District, we get a briefing. I believe we could make some progress, and both parties go into it with an open mind. And we certainly stand ready to. I believe progress can be made. Now, whether it is a formal advisory committee, I realize this is a rather ponderous mode of operation, and I do not think we have any objection to an informal advisory committee, which I am not sure whether that is in compliance with the law or not as regards advisory committees. There has been some condemnation of these about anything we can have in a group and meet and make records of the dialog that goes on in the meetings. We would welcome the opportunity to try it. Mr. BIAGGI. Why could you not use those records or recordings of informal meetings? Mr. STEGBATJER. That would be perfectly all right with us. That is no problem at all. We have got into this thing really and did not realize what we were getting into, and we did not make arrangements to keep recordings. And we learned rather slowly, but we have learned in the future that we will do so. Mr. BIAGGI. I would like to think that, when you sit down with the Coast Guard, all parties concerned, in good faith, will have an honest PAGENO="0244" 240 exchange with one purpose in mind, and that is to resolve the im- mediate or anticipated problems. Whether it is formal or informal is another question. Certainly there should be these meetings. I could not contemplate the Coast Guard operating in a vacuum and, conversely, I could not expect that industry would be functioning within its own parameters without having some input into the Coast Guard and in its deliberations. Mr. STEGBAUER. We have always been able to do it before on many other bills that affected our industry, the writing of the subchapter on hazardous cargo regulations, all pollution prevention regulations, many other regulations, we have had input, and we have worked with the Coast Guard and got something they could live with, the Con- gress could live with, and we could live with. We see no reason why we could not work this out, talk and be listened to. Mr. BIAGGI. I think we are in the process of doing that and have been doing that for the past number of months. I think the con- clusions may not always be compatible with your thinking, but some- where along the line you have to fish or cut bait, and the decisions are made, and some you like and some you do not like. But I always believe that the decisions are made for the benefit of the total picture. As far as this committee is concerned, it is our policy to have an honest exchange and prolific exchange because we are as much in- terested in the industry as we are in the policing of it by the Coast Guard. And I know that reflects the views of Chairman Sullivan. It is important that all components work together. We like to help rather than impede. We have enough problems under our roof created through the bureaucracy. Mr. STEGBAUER. We appreciate this attitude, and that is why we are here to ask your help. Mr. BIAGGr. Madam Chairman. Mrs. SULLIVAN. I have no questions at this time. I am sorry I was not able to come over here and hear the testimony, because I am ex- tremely interested in some kind of a system that can work. And I feel as Chairman Biaggi feels, that there needs to be, and we hope there will be, a communication and general discussion, so you can give the benefit of your experience. You know the river, you know it well, you know your tugboats and the vessels that you operate, and pos- sibly in that connection better than the people who are going to be responsible for administering any rules or regulations that are set up. If there is not a free exchange, so that we understand each other, it is just that much more difficult, So I hope that the Coast Guard will adhere to this and work with the men on the river. I have no questions at this time. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Stegbauer, Mr. Eneix, and Mr. Gardner. Mr. BIAGGI. Representing the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways, Capt. Ed Conrad, Compass Marine Services; Capt. Jack R. Bullard, American Commercial Barge Line Co.; and Dr. Robert L. Brite, statistical consultant, accompanied by William E. O'Neil, counsel. PAGENO="0245" 241 STATEMENT OP CAPT. ED CONRAD, COMPASS MARINE SERVICES; CAPT. JACIC R. BULLARD, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BARGE LINE CO.; AND DR. ROBERT L. BRITE, STATISTICAL CONSULTANT, AC- COMPANIED BY WILLIAM E. O'NEIL, COUNSEL Mr. O'NEIL. Thank you. We have consumed a great deal of time yesterday and today talking about communications and vessel traffic systems. It is the objective of this committee, which was formed on the 15th of July primarily to evaluate the problems that have existed in the past between the Coast Guard and the barge-towing industry, to look at it from a legal point of view, and from a statistical point of view, and from a practical pomt of view to find out exactly where their problems are, to point them out and hope for some sort of relief. We have filed with the Coast Guard our comments-19 pages of which relate to what has gone by the boards. I do not see any point in reiterating anything that has been said in the past 2 days about communications. I think that this committee recognizes that there is a problem. I would hope that at the end of the testimony of Dr. Brite, Captain Conrad and Captain Bullard both, that I would be allowed again to make some comments and some constructive thoughts-set forth some constructive thoughts on how perhaps we can proceed and get off center in this matter. We have two statements-one which will be given by Captain Conrad, which specifically relates to the communications part of the planned vessel traffic system. This is the nerve center of the New Orleans vessel traffic system. The statement by Captain Bullard will relate to management prob- lems in that system; and I hope that we can now address ourselves to the problems that we have so diligently tried to convey to the Coast Guard and show you why we are so concerned about what is going on in New Orleans from a tower's point of view, and the river operators' point of view; and I would like to turn this now to Captain Conrad, and if permissible, Mr. Chairman, and other members, I would like to not have his comments read into the record, but rather just go right to the heart of the problem and have him summarize basically what he is going to say, and this will be done in his presentation. Mr. BIAGGI. We will accept his entire statement to be included in the record, and he can summarize. [The statement referred to follows :J STATEMENT No. 1 OF AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR PORTS AND WATERWAYS On behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways, we submit herewith our comments which will be presented by Captain Ed Conrad on the communications problems in the proposed Lower Mississippi River YTS system. I am here on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways to testify in connection with the Coast Guard's proposed regulations dealing with a VTS system on the Lower Mississippi River. Specifically, I would like to address my comments to what we feel are the weaknesses of the system's communication net and what we think is required for its proper functioning. Briefly, the proposed regulations provide that each vessel participating in the system must make an initial report 30 minutes or more before entering the system, a movement report upon actually entering the system and each time the vessel passes a reporting point, and a final report whenever the vessel anchors, moors, or leaves the system. The initial report must give the following information: name of vessel, position of vessel, estimated entry time, point of entry, destination PAGENO="0246" 242 and route, ETA, draft, number of barges, length of tow, dangerous cargoes, and notice of any handling defects. The movement report must provide the vessel name, position, time of passing reporting point, next reporting point and ETA at next reporting point. The final report will consist of the time and place of mooring, anchoring or leaving the system. Additionally, a vessel must make supplementary reports whenever any of the information it has furnished to the Vessel Control Center changes. This will include ETA changes of more than 10 minutes. Three VHF channels have been assigned to the VTS system: 11, 12 and 14. Communications in each of the geographical sectors of the VTS system will be assigned to one of these channels as specified in an operations manual which has not yet been developed by the Coast Guard. Our reservations about the communications aspect of the VTS system center around the problems of an insufficient number of frequencies, ineffective policing of the frequencies, the monitoring of three frequencies, the effect of equipment failures, and the accuracy of reported information. At present, the frequencies assigned to the VTS seem totally inadequate for the job. The Coast Guard in the preamble to its proposed regulations estimates a total of 270,000 vessel transits yearly in the VTS area. It is noteworthy that this figure is taken from data which is over three years old. Since that time, cargo tonnage has increased so presumably vessel transits have likewise increased. However, for the sake of argument, we will use the Coast Guard's old figures for a simple example illustrating the likelihood of overloading the VTS communication network: Assuming there are 270,000 vessel transits of the area yearly, there will be an average of 740 daily vessel transits of the area. The three channels assigned to the VTS will provide 72 hours of air time each day during which communication may take place. Thus, the average vessel in the system will have approximately six minutes each day in which it must establish contact with the vessel Control Center, give its required reports, and receive whatever information or instructions which the Center wishes to transmit. Experienced vessel operators have, after hav- ing reviewed the reporting requirements, conservatively estimated that they will have to make 9 or 10 routine reports per transit. This works out to a maximum of about 30 seconds for each routine report, during which time the vessel operator must confirm contact with the Vessel Traffic Center, give his report, and receive acknowledgment of his report along with any communication the Vessel Traffic Center wishes to relay to him. This time limit may be possible to meet under the best of circumstances, but the Coast Guard has not shown this to be the case, and our simple example has not taken into consideration several other important factors. First of all, channels 11 and 12 are not dedicated to the exclusive use of the VTS system. Channel 11 is presently still being used for commercial marine operations. While the F.C.C. has promised to grant no new commercial licenses on this channel, it will be several years before all the presently outstanding licenses expire and the channel becomes fully usable by the VTS. Until that future date, an unknown quantity of air time will continue to be used for non-VTS purposes. More importantly, channel 12 is shared with the Corps of Engineers for communications at their locks within the VTS area. At the present time, there are no plans to change this situation which obviously reduces VTS utilization of channel 12. Both of these facts will, for the foreseeable future, significantly cut down on the maximum of 30 seconds which the average vessel will have to complete a routine report. In addition, all of this has assumed that vessel reports will be evenly scattered throughout the day. What will happen if there is a peak of vessel traffic during the day? This will obviously bunch the routine reports into a shorter time span and could easily prevent many vessels from making contact with the VTC at all. What are these vessels to do then? If they proceed anyway and report later, will this be a statutory fault making them liable in case of an accident? Or are they to wait until they can make contact with the VTC and be forced to suffer the eco- nomic consequences of delay? As far as we know, the Coast Guard has not even considered these possibilities in assessing the economic impact of its regulations. Interestingly enough, under the regulations proposed by the Coast Guard, such a communication tie-up could, and probably will be, considered a hazardous circumstance sufficient to authorize the VTC to take direct control of vessel movements. This control will undoubtedly consist of making the vessels wait for instructions from the VTC. PAGENO="0247" 243 The Coast Guard has yet to make any determination whether such foul-ups are possible during times of peak radio traffic, nor has it given any indication of how it will meet such a crisis~ We in the industry feel that the most likely result of the inadequate communication facilities of the VTS will be to make the vessel traffic slow down and wait for the government to catch up, regardless of what actual traffic conditions are. There are 300 frequencies available for aircraft communications and additional private channels are available to airlines. The marine industry must rely on a tenth of that number of channels for all of its communications. We cannot under- stand why the Coast Guard has not attempted to get clear channels for its VTS system rather than taking over channels already in heavy use. We can only surmise that the Coast Guard feels it is more expedient to impose on the maritime industry than to work with the F.C.C. in getting additional channels. The Coast Guard has also not considered the problem resulting from the significant override of the VTS channels by improperly adjusted signals. from taxicabs, paging companies, and security guards' walkie-talkies in the New Orleans area. This problem, which is well documented by the industry's complaints to the F.C.C., has caused great. difficulty in the communications on channels 13 and 16 mandated by the Bridge to Bridge Radio Communications Act and the F.C.C. Whatever attempts have been made to police channels 13 and 16 have been totally unsuccessful from the industry's viewpoint, and we see no reason why the situation will be any different on the VTS channels. This kind of interference will hamper VTS communications in some of the most heavily traveled areas in the VTS. As far as we know, this problem has not even been recognized by the Coast Guard. Another area of our concern is in the fact that vessel operators will be required to maintain a 24 hour radio watch on channels 13, 16 and a VTS or in-house channel. The first is required by the Bridge to Bridge Radio Communications Act and the second by the F.C.C. for distress, safety and calling. The third will also be required if these regulations are adopted. Beyond the fact that monitoring the additional channel will require the industry to~ incur the cost of additional equipment, we will now have the situation where a vessel operator must try to listen to three radios at the same time he is trying to run his boat. This is ob- viously nearly impossible and is bound to result in confusion. It is hard to see how such a requirement is consistent with the safety which the VTS system is supposed to promote. Equipment failure is another area of considerable concern on our part. The Coast Guard informs us that radio failures should not prevent vessels from entering the system. In the normal situation, this may create no greater difficulties to shipping than are presently encountered under the Bridge to Bridge Radio Communications Act. What worries us is what will happen during times when the Vessel Traffic Center has taken control of traffic and there are large vessels with radio failures navigating the system. The VTS system, in the absence of radar, will be completely blind to these vessels and may inadvertently put participating vessels in positions of extreme peril as a result of this blindness. We are informed that the Coast Guard is undecided as to how this will be resolved, and we submit that this is just the sort of thing which must be resolved prior to implementation of the VTS system. Other questions concerning the accuracy of the picture perceived by the Vessel Traffic Center arise. From what we have been given to understand, the information received from participating vessels will be fed into a computer which will generate an artificial display representing the projected positions of vessels in the VTS area. Certainly, the reliability of this picture is very suspect. There are possible, indeed probable, inaccuracies every step of the way. In addition to the fact that vessels with radio failures will not be tracked by the computer, there are numerous other vessels which will be invisible in a practical sense. Vessels working in barge fleets will not be pictured nor will non-towing vessels under 65 feet. It is readily apparent that vessels falling within both of these classifications are capable of inflicting serious damage in a collision, but the com- puter will not know where they are. Furthermore, there is a serious question of how errors will be found which are introduced by the traffic controllers into otherwise accurate vessel reports. Given the speed at which these controllers will have to work, the possibility of human error seems significant. In a system with radar surveillance of traffic this problem is done away with, but in the Coast Guard's proposed system such errors are bound PAGENO="0248" 244 to occur, and it is simply a matter of time before some unnoticed error becomes the basis of a serious miscalculation during hazardous conditions. It may well be that there is no way to eliminate such errors, but in that case, it would seem wise to reevaluate the benefits which are claimed for this proposed VTS system. Finally, there is the problem of the accuracy of the vessel's reports themeselves. Even assuming the best efforts on the part of our vessel operators, we feel that the Coast Guard is imposing an impossible burden upon them to produce accurate reports. A couple of examples will illustrate this. The VTS sectors will be approximately 20 miles long and a vessel transiting a sector will, upon entry, be required to estimate his ETA at the end of the sector. After this report, he will be required to give a supplemental report whenever his ETA changes by more than 10 minutes. Presumably, this means that reported ETA's are to be within an accuracy of 10 minutes. For a vessel travelling 4 mph. a change in speed of less than 0.1 mph. will result in an ETA change of more than 10 minutes. There is absolutely no way that the present level of technology on most vessels can measure such slight increments of speed. To do so would require an enormous investment in radar-operated speedometers. Furthermore, the use of such equipment would not solve the problem because the vessels are constantly encountering current variations of more than 0.1 mph. and the vessels must of necessity change speed in negotiating bends in the river and upon encountering other vessels. As a result, the captain of a vessel will have to make an estimate of his ETA based upon these variables. Since there is no way he can reliably estimate his ETA within 10 minutes, it is a foregone conclusion that he will be forced by the regulations to make amended reports whenever he can make a better estimate. As it is a foregone conclusion that such supplemental reports will be necessary, he will not be able to simply proceed in the customary manner, but will have to continually revise his ETA due to constant variations from his estimate. We understand that accurate reporting is necessary in order for the computer to plot an accurate picture, but we are afraid that an on-board computer will be necessary to provide information of the precision demanded by the Coast Guard. Let us assume for the sake of argument, however, that the captains of the vessels in the VTS system are paragons of navigational ability, and that they are able to reliably estimate their ETA at a point 20 miles distant based upon their knowledge of river currents and the various speeds that they will make on bends, etc. When this information is given to the VTS computer, unless it can read the captain's mind, it will project on its display a dot moving at the constant speed necessary to arrive at the next reporting point on the captain's ETA. The com- puter will accurately show this vessel's position at the time it enters the sector and at the time it leaves. Whether the vessel is where the computer thinks it is in the meantime is simply a matter of chance. This is because the captain in estimating his ETA took into account such things as slowing down for bends and speeding up in between. Suppose the vessel loses 10 minutes at each of 3 bends, intending to make up the time on a straighter stretch of river. The vessel will be 3~i mile behind the position the computer has plotted for it but its ETA will not necessarily have changed. How such inaccurate information can be used in a VTS system is beyond us, but this is what will be used unless radar surveillance is incorporated to show the true positions of all vessels. Such inaccuracies in the computer picture could cause serious safety and economic detriment to the industry, especially during hazardous conditions when traffic control has been taken over by the VTC. In fog or rain or other conditions of low visibility for example, any traffic information which the VTC can give will be more than useless if it contains such large errors. This has been the case in the Houston VTS system where vessel operators unanimously report that VTS sup- plied information is of no assistance to them. Vessels will have to proceed as they do now, relying on their radar and bridge to bridge communications. The VTS will be of no help whatever, and the VTC will more than likely simply shut down traffic in the VTS area rather than allow it to continue on its own devices. In summary, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends that the proposed VTS regulations not he implemented until the Coast Guard satisfactorily resolves the problems of overloading the communication channels due to insufficient available airtime, sharing of frequencies with other interests and land-based radio inter- ference. Also to be resolved are the problems of equipment failure, the numerous channels which must be monitored simultaneously, and the inaccuracies inherent in the computer's visual display. It may well be that these problems cannot be resolved, or that the incorporation of radar surveillance into the system will be necessary for satisfactory results. In any case, the existing problems in the com- munications area are so great as to require a satisfactory solution prior to putting PAGENO="0249" P245 the VTS into operation. To do otherwise will be counter-productive to achieving the desired results from the VTS. Mr. O'NEIL. And therefore I would like to submit his entire record to be studied as well as Captain Bullard's statement; and Captain Conrad can now be allowed to go ahead and make his statement. Mr. CONRAD. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Sullivan, gentlemen, my name. is Edward Conrad. I am a towboat operator in the New Orleans area. I would like to limit my remarks to the communications portion of the YTS. Let me explain the problems as we see it, being the heart of the VTS-communications. I would like to take a look at the sector channels one by one and we would like to say what the Coast Guard did not say. I would like to give a brief explanation if I may on the channels, and the uses of those specific channels. The first thing I would like to address myself to is the channel 11,, which is- Mr. BIAGGI. Captain, if you would for a minute, we had a chart up there yesterday, which the Coast Guard put up. Reference was made to the sectors; and I wonder if we could have that so that I can see it. Mr. O'NmL. Mr. Chairman, the other chart was super-imposed on the Coast Guard chart because the Coast Guard chart deleted what we considered to be a very significant portion of the waterways of New Orleans and which have a direct bearing on communications. That is why we put it on top. Mr. CONRAD. When I need that chart I will ask them to turn it over. Mr. BIAGGI. Continue, please. IVIr. CONRAD. Channel 11, from what I was able to understand from yesterday's comments, is the channel to be used for VTS in the sector of the New Orleans Metropolitan Area. Channel 11 is classified as a commercial channel, operates on 156.550. It functions, as specified, by the FCC's Intership, meaning vessel-to- vessel, and ship-to-ship; meaning a commercial, duly licensed FCC holder may use this channel to speak to his vessels. There are only eight channels of that classification available to our industry, which we all must have and live with. Commercial channels are used for the purpose of exchanging pay- rolls, taking orders for groceries, supplies, and so forth. It is the activity of operating a business of a land-based station, trying to communicate with the vessel which is always mobile. If we lose One of these eight channels, which are already desperately crowded in our New Orleans area, it would put a tremendous burden on our industry. Remember, now, that I specified it is only one of eight available channels and I submit to you an exhibit showing the breakdown of the channels, that you may refer to. If the Coast Guard gets on that channel and uses it for VTS, there is no such thing as sharing the channel. The Coast Guard will monopo- lize it. We will be moved off. The license-holder will have to find anOther place. The FCC will give him, assumingly, one of the existing seven channels. Channels 12 and 14 I would like to approach next. The other two VTS channels that the Coast Guard is going to use in their sector operations is 156.60146.700. PAGENO="0250" 24~6 These channels are classified as port operations. Thes e are the channels that we must use in communicating with our vessels. Their change of orders, their tow makeup instructions, fleeting operations, and the entire operation of a tremendously busy harbor are all communications done on VHF channels designated as port operations. These port operation channels seem to have led one to believe one had an exclusion or an exclusive right of the Corps of Engineers. This is not so. The Corps of Engineers by local custom in the New Orleans area uses channel 12 or 14 as a switchover channel to communicate to the vessels their intentions of locking, and their position of locking; and their position of locking; and it is a tremendously busy channel; and the reason for the use of these channels is because these are two of the most popular channels aboard all vessels for port operation. The removal of these two channels from our sector would greatly- greatly hurt port operations. These two channels would be removed from a total of only seven port operation channels issued to this industry; and I am not referring only to the towing industry; I am referring to the Maritime industry; I am talking about dredging; I am talking about pipe-laying; I am talking about marine construction and contractors; and I am talking about vessels that are licensed to have these channels. We have a tremendous amount of people that are demanding the use of these channels. People have a lot of money invested in antenna and radio equipment for communication. These people, it is true, they will move elsewhere and they will get off the 12 and off the 14 and they will be run off, but what will they have left? They will have only five port operation channels to use for the entire area. I find that this would be an impossibility for us to live with. I wonder if the Coast Guard has also considered the licenseholders of these channels, both 11, 12, and 14, that are not directly in the New Orleans area, but are in places like Morgan City, Homer, Dulac, all of the Bayou country. There are many, many licensed people in these areas that have these channels that use them also for port operations. There will definitely be a bleeding through a communication. You need clear channels; you need perfectly clear channels to dispatch information as VTS presumes they are going to dispatch to us. I would like to now approach channel 13, which seems to be a channel with quite a bit of niisunderstanding. Channel 13 is 156.650. Its classification is navigational. It is the only navigational channel for the use of all vessels on the waterways of the United States. Every bridge-to-bridge communication is to take place on this channel. Every vessel seeing an approaching vessel planning to make a passing, a landing or relay, whatever his intentions are to the vessels in his immediate area must by law be communicated on channel 13. The Coast Guard has informed us that they will use channel 13 in emergencies to communicate with vessels in the VTS. I cannot see that. I would like to get onto that a little further on in my discussion; but we do have the communication from the Coast Guard that they will be able to operate on 13. PAGENO="0251" 247 Channel 16 is 156.800. This is a channel that we are told we do not have to monitor any more if all this goes into effect. I find that hard to believe. The classification is to stress safety in calling. They say if we do not monitor 16, we can monitor the house channel. It is still another channel that you have to monitor. We do not have any such thing as a house channel. No one has an exclusive channel. When you monitor a house channel, you are monitoring all of the dispatching of commercial activities of numerous vessels, not just a house. It does not stay blank until somebody wants you. It is in constant and continuous use. I would like to explain the FCC's procedure on the use of 16. A licensee on a channel of land-based channel is obligated by law to monitor 16, and any other frequency that he has as a working fre- quency simultaneously. He is supposed to make all communication contacts, the initial contact, on channel 16. If you tell the vessels where you do not have to monitor 16 any more because you know we are going to relieve you of that burden that that means the port operation must try to make contact some other way. The relief of 16 may sound like it is a monitoring and may seem like it gives us some relief of our burden; but the only thing it does is add to the confusion of, where do you find the vessel when you want him? Where is he heading? What frequency is he on? We cannot transmit on a VTS frequency, which he must be on. We cannot transmit on 13; so you cannot find him there. He is relieved of the obligation of watching 16. You may have a lot of difficulty in making changes of orders on emergency-all kinds of things that happen on the bank that must be relayed to the vessels. So I find this is not any relief of our obligation. It is also necessary to monitor channel 16 so that you can make use of the public cor- respondence channels that the telephone company operates because they also make their initial contact on channel 16, if you change from one of their sectors to another. So the relief of monitoring channel 16 to me sounds like it is just another way of making us have a little bit more difficulty in our communications on a day-to-day basis. So I think the Coast Guard again is somewhat a little bit misled on this because of the September 3 regulation of the FCC, telling the base station they must monitor 16, must use 16 to make the initial contact. So the relief of that obligation does not seem like it is going to help us too much. I would like to refer to this chart that I brought along today, and you gentlemen have a copy up there; because I think the geography of the area is very important to fully understand. The chart supplied by the Coast Guard is showing the implemen- tation of the vessel traffic system with the Mississippi River in the appearance like it is indicates it exists in its own world. This is not the case. We live in an area that is completely covered by havigable waterways. They are actively and completely surrounding us on all sides. VTS may-and I say "may"-help control traffic on the Mississippi River, but what it would do in outlying areas may cause complete and total disaster to the commerce in these areas. PAGENO="0252" 248~ If I may, I would like to refer to the map. The red line that I have indicated on the map shows the paralleling and corresponding waterways of the Gulf Intercoastal Canal. I have outlined it as far as Morgan City, which is only about 80-some air- plane miles from New Orleans. The route running north and south is a portal route. The Mis- sissippi River is shown right along there, running almost totally parallel to these two waterways. The commerce-the traffic on these waterways is literally bumper- to-bumper. The intersection is the intersection of Harvey Canal and Algiers Canal, with one tremendous amount of traffic. People are making decisions to go from one canal to another, to locks out in the Mississippi River. It is an area of total congestion. The red lines on the east side of the Mississippi River indicate the Gulf Intercoastal Canal, to the east, across the Mississippi Sound, Mobile, and so forth. The red line running south and parallel to the Missis~ip~i River indicates the ship channel known as Moregood. There is also a tremendous amount of marine commerce in Lake Pontchartrain, shell dredging, yachts, pleasure boats; all of these are licensed and operating on our frequency. There is also a tremendous amount of oilfields and connecting waterways that we did not even bother to try to outline all through the south of there-sulfur mining, the oil industry, drilling platform contractors, and so forth, all relying on VHFradio as their means of communication. Transmitting on VHF on the sectors, as I have indicated, will only cause problems to a tremendous amount of people in an awfully large area. The type of transmitter-and just as we were told yesterday by the Coast Guard, which is absolutely fact-the most powerful trans- mitter takes over; the rest of them just blank out. They do not even exist. So when you have a communication going on an area, and the Coast Guard keys one of these transmitters, everyone else is wiped out; everyone else having any commerce or communication on any of the channels that they expected to work on will be eliminated off the air; but the people monitoring will be monitoring not only the Coast Guard's conversations, but they will be monitoring people in these areas who are still duly licensed to operate on these channels. I would also like to explain what I feel is a tremendous hazard to our industry, with the Coast Guard having the permission or au- thority to transmit on channel 13. I think it is horrendous that they could even consider it. If a vessel were approaching the Harvey- Algiers intersection and he met a boat with a tow coming out of each of those canals, and he was just about in the situation in which he was exchanging information, getting an agreement with these two vessels as to how they would meet and pass, if the key was pressed-if a button was touched by the Coast Guard on channel 13, these people would not even exist. They would be blasted off the map. They are limited to 1 watt of power-i watt of power on an antenna mon- itored on the top of a boat; and the Coast Guard will have an an- tenna-I do not know where or how large or what-but I am sure PAGENO="0253" 249 it would be of sufficient size to completely and totally eliminate any communication on channel 13. This I make as an example of only one vessel, but what could happen is, there could be at the same time, simultaneously, some 15-some innumerable number of vessels meeting each other in this broad area, all sharing one channel and not conflicting with each other because of the 1-watt power requirement; and the Coast Guard could eliminate these people from getting an understanding and putting themselves in a position that could really be disastrous. What, therefore, could be the solution of the VTS problem? I suggest that the first channels, 11, 14, and 12, should remain in the control and used exclusively by commercial marine interests. Al- ternatively, the Coast Guard could and should procure from the FCC the necessary frequencies for their VTS and they still could do this. We are limited to what channels are available to us. There are many channels that are available, that fit into this band spectrum that could be used for this purpose; but that consideration apparently was not even given. May I also refer to the chart that I gave to you gentlemen showing VHF channel selections. There are channels that are classified as noncommercial, which we have no ability to use-channels 9, 68, 69, 70, 71, and 78, for instance. The Coast Guard has at their disposal channel 21, 23, 81, 82, and 83. We do not know what these channels are used for; but possibly they could be used for this purpose. There are also numerous other channels that are excluded by inter- national agreement. These channels are available or could be made available for this purpose but these channels are not available for our use. This is a copy of the card that I am referring to and, as you can see, the things that are colored in blue are the ones limited from our use by international agreement. It far surpasses the ones lined off in green that are available for commercial interests. Second, I would like to summarize channel 13. Channel 13 should remain exclusively for bridge-to-bridge with 1-watt transmission power, as specified by the FCC requirement. Utilization of that channel for purposes other than direct, bridge-to- bridge vessel communication should be considered a potential hazard of such magnitude that even the consideration of a shore-based station, especially one operated by people whose object is to protect life, proper- ty, and environment, astounds and frightens me. The Coast Guard could even consider that they should have the capacity to contact some- one and to ask them to switch over to VTS and to press a button on 13 with a shore-based station is criminal, and the consideration of such astounds. me, that the Coast Guard would even think they should have the ability to do this. I was told, "Well, this will only be done in case of an emergency." Who determines what is an emergency? Is an emergency a vessel that has the audacity to pass through the system without reporting? He knows he can be contacted on 13, so the radio operator switches on 13 and says, "Come on over to 11. I want to talk to you." I cannot visual- ize this as an emergency; and I think .the capacity to even be able to transmit on 13 should be left-I state these things not with just theory; I say this might happen or it could happen. PAGENO="0254" 250 I am saying this, that with personal knowledge that it is happening. It is happening in the Morgan City area. There is the Morgan City YTS that has not been brought up. It is a control and it is a control that was needed. I cannot argue with that, of vessels in a one-way traffic situation through a very hazardous situation in which what is known as the Burwick Bay Ring and highway bridge, and this control is necessary but, again, transmissions are taking place on channel 13 from a shore-based operation. When that key is pressed-and I am certain this station on that bridge does not have the power output nor the antenna that is proposed for the VTS system-when that button is pressed, it wipes out all bridge-to-bridge communication in an area of approximately 30 miles around the Morgan City area. So we feel that-we know that this is something that is being done and we know that it could be done again if it were implemented in the New Orleans area. I would like to quote yesterday from the record by Mr. Heyward to the admiral on bridge-to-bridge communication. Mr. lEleyward asked the admiral, "Does the Coast Guard have any statistics which would indicate conclusions as to effective use of bridge-to-bridge radio telephone in casualty prevention?" And the admiral's reply was, "I do not believe we have a specific study, based upon solely the bridge-to-bridge; no." This has been an act that has been in force since 1973. If there are no studies based on whether bridge-to-bridge has helped the industry, a direct communication from vessel-to-vessel; if we do not know whether there is any good or isn't any good, then what basis are we using to implement a VTS? YTS as proposed is nothing more than another bridge-to-bridge with somebody standing in the middle and telling you where the people are supposed to be. We have YTS right now; bridge-to-bridge is VTS. When we meet a boat, if the channel is available and clear to us, that vessel tells us who is behind him; he tells us everything that is in the immediate area that he has just recently passed. This is passed on to the captain of boats for him to evaluate. We are not interested in what is going on at the head of the path or 20 miles or 30 miles or 50 miles down the way. It only adds confusion to the situation. Our interest in making our decisions in navigation are based strictly on what is immediate; what is immediate. You do not want to know what is happening 15 or 20 miles down the highway when you are driving a car. You are interested in what is in your view, who is going to come out from a side street, who is approaching you. You cannot make a decision 15 or 20 miles away or even need that knowledge to safely operate your vehicle nor do you need it to operate a vessel. In closing I would like to make an example as to how we visualize the time consumption at VTS. What we did is try to make as honest an evaluation as possible in making a contact and hypothetical situation in which a vessel wants to leave a dock; and we made it simple because the vessel was leaving the dock within one VTS zone. He is not crossing into or coming from PAGENO="0255" 251 anotherone and we would like to try to show the amount of time that is consumed just for one vessel merely to report in, just to report in, and then he has to be given back all the information VTS can make available to him. At 0100, the vessel is tied to the clock and he is preparing himself to leave; I mean 1 minute after midnight, he calls the Coast Guard. He is in sector 3, which is the New Orleans sector, which starts out about mile 129 as the chart indicates. He is at dock mile 122: the vessel calls as prescribed. "This is the tow vessel, Big Tow WXZ-5729, calling Coast Guard vessel traffic control sector 3. Come in, please. The Coast Guard answers, "This is sector 3, Coast Guard, New Orleans, come in." "This is tow vessel Big Tow WXZ-5729. Our position is mile 122- at the ABC chemical dock. We presume we will be able to get under- way within 30 minutes. That would be 03100, please. Our destination is southbound in the Mississippi River to our chemical dock down on Venice mile 10. Our ETA of our destination is approximately 12 noon tomorrow. Our deep draft is 9 feet. The number of barges that we have in tow, sir, are four. Our dimensions are 175 feet long by 104 feet wide. Yes, sir, we do have Danish cargo on board, ethyldichlorene. No; there was no phone available here. We could not call in. That is why we had to come in on channel 11. We will be getting underway in approximately 20 to 30 minutes. We will call you at that time." Then before you can leave the dock, he must make his contact again. Of course, he does not have to give all this information, but still another contact is made. At this time, the Coast Guard would relay to him all of the vessels that should or could affect him in the YTS area. That means not only vessels approaching him from the south because he will be southbound, hut he has to know of the vessel that are coming from the next sector so he will have to talk to sector 4 as well as sector 3, because sector 3 could not give him the southbound information coming from Baton Rouge, so sector 3 would fill him in on what is northbound. Sector 4 would have to fill him in on what is southbound, and by this time, the guy is already behind 10-minutes on his schedule, so he will ha.ve to update his thing because it was a quarter to 11-a quarter to 2 before he finally got away from the dock. If this would end, that would not be so bad; but if as the Coast Guard proposes every 10 or 15 minutes, and I am quoting from the record of yesterday. "This man would be updated." This sounds really fine, if this guy was the only person on the river in this sector coming down, but he is having to listen to everyone else update every- one else's traffic. I cannot visualize how this channel could have a minute of free time in sector 3 area. I think it would just have to be total dialog to relay all this infor- mation and for the VTS to relay this information back. The only thing that I can see here that would help, you know, is what we would put in before. We feel the bridge to bridge should be limited to vessel traffic only. I am in strong favor and feel that if a bridge-to-bridge investigation had been made to evaluate the use of bridge to bridge, we would have a system now that could be maybe 78-2S0---76-----17 PAGENO="0256" 252 in operation but, if not, at least prOpQsed and which we would have sector bridge-to-bridge. This, gentlemen, is what I feel is the answer to our communications problem in the New Orleans area, the area in which the traffic situa- tion is the greatest, and everyone is having to share one channel for all contacts. You must listen to vessels on Lake Pontchartrain, listen to vessels on the Gulf Intercoastal Canal; you must listen to vessels negotiating the locks. All of this traffic takes place on channel 13. If there is a sector bridge-to-bridge service available to us in which the operator would know that he would change his bridge-to-bridge channel at certain locations so that there would not be an intermixing or a crossing of bridge-to-bridge communications; that the only traffic that you would hear would be traffic that interests you in your immediate area, and I think we would have the best VTS that could be offered to us. And with that type of a bridge-to-bridge communication there is no reason that I can see-that I speak again for my industry-that they can see there is any necessity to go through a third party to get the information that we have readily at hand from oncoming vessels, from vessels behind us, vessels we approach, and the information that we relay to our fellow people in the industry. Going through a third party can do nothing but confuse the issue, because we are having to try to decipher that which pertains to us and weed this out through a tremendous amount of other stuff. If you would try to visualize the root that you are probably best familiar with from your home to your office that you take each morn- ing and each evening, you know that route like the back of your hand. You know without even thinking where you are going to turn, where the top signs are, et cetera. If someone were to ask you at what time do you cross Main and 7th, could you tell us? Even though you do it each day? It is just one-third or two-thirds of the way down from your office to your house. You do not time that. You do not try to predict an ETA in the middle of a voyage. It is not necessary, just as it is not necessary in an automobile. I find that this would be a perfect example of trying to drive to work with two citizen band radios going in your car at one time, and your wife and your mother-in-law shouting orders at you, trying to concentrate on the job at hand of trying to prevent someone from getting run over by some damned fool coming out of an intersection; and this is how we evaluate what bridge-to-bridge would do to our industry, based strictly on a voice communication as set up at the present time. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you very much, Captain Conrad. Yours was a very vivid description of the conditions. You pose some very interest- ing questions, the answers to which we certainly will obtain; and I suggest the Coast Guard be in a position to respond to them. As I see it, there are some very real problems here. I do not know that everything you say is accurate or is as critical and crucial as you make it appear; but until we get a response from the Coast Guard, that is the picture that is in my mind. We have always had a question, frankly, of whether or not we have sufficient channels, and I have heard witness after witness, in hearing PAGENO="0257" 253 after hearing, make reference to the same problem. What we contern- plate doing is bringing representatives of the Federal Communica- tions Commission to provide some answers; and we will inquire of them in connection with the problems of communication. Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for just a moment? I do not want to upset your hearing schedule, but I just wonder if there are any Coast Guard officials here now who might briefly explain to us why these changes are made in the channels, as the captain has explained it. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Fugaro, could you answer briefly, so that those who were not here yesterday- Admiral FUGARO. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman. With respect to the channel which we have selected, these are the channels for VTS all over the country, 11, 12, and 14. So part of our thinking in assigning these channels to the various port areas is to assume or achieve some degree of standardization, not only for river traffic, but for all vessels which are using YTS. So this is why these channels have been allocated for just VTS. Going back to the point the captain was making-Captain Conrad was making with respect to channel 13, the law does authorize the use of channel 13 for navigation, taking information, and also, as he stated, with respect to locks and bridges; it is authorized for the passage of navigation and safety information. One thing, though, I think needs to be clarified. The Coast Guard transmitter on channel 13 will be a 1-watt transmitter, which is the maximum allowed by law so that we will not be blocking out other people as he indicated. I think again perhaps he had misinformation on that point. rfhe blockage that he was talking about or the frequency capture that he was talking about was really for the YTS channels that we are talking about, 11, 12, and 14, and the various sectors. Mr. TREEN. That would be the 50 watt? Admiral FUGARO. Maximum is 50 watt. We do not intend to go up that high. Mrs. SULLIVAN. May I just comment on that. I can see the reasoning of designating certain channels for certain uses; but would that channel be used in the same manner in other areas as it would be where these towboats are running in a particular part of the river? Admiral FUGARO. Again, we have got experience in this area, Mrs. Sullivan, which indicates that we are able to work within the channels under the system as we contemplate for New Orleans. Mrs. SULLIVAN. Now, your men, captain, your men who use these channels, what is your answer to this? Do you think that could be worked out, that others using that channel only use it for the same thing you would, or is it going to be too crowded for everyone to use that channel for that same information? Captain CONRAD. There is no guarantee that channels 11 and 14 and 12 would be aboard any vessel that would come into the New Orleans area. Probably our biggest vessels to control are tankers and large grain ships that come through the area. There is no guarantee these vessels would be equipped with these channels. I feel that the harm of taking these channels away from our indus- try, leaving us nowhere to go except to be pushed over and be further PAGENO="0258" 254 crowded in trying to dispatch and operate our industry provides a burden on us far greater than a specific additional channel that would be specifically for VTS use, and I think with New Orleans, you know, I am in agreement that it is nice to have everything uniform; but the kind of vessels that we are interested in, kinds of vessels we have are limited by design and style and so forth, to the inland waterway, which is known as the Western River and goes up the Mississippi; and these vessels are not going to he going to Seattle or some place like that; and I just feel the taking of these channels away from us will really cause us a lot of grief. Mrs. SULLIVAN. Admiral, is it your idea to unify all vessels that come up and down in these areas to use, regardless of whether it is a ship, towboat, or whatever else, runs- Admiral FUGARO. Mrs. Sullivan, if and when a VTS system does become a mandatory system, then, yes, there would be complete standardization within communications. The vessels which would come into the port would be required to have these channels to communicate with the YTS. Mrs. SULLIVAN. How would you make it mandatory, by law or regulation? Admiral FUGARO. By regulation. The law providing for the estab- lishment of YTS has already been passed, of course, as you know, ~through the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The regulation which would then have to be promulgated under this a.ct could then require these particular channels under the regulations be required in order to participate in the system Mrs. SULLIVAN. Is it possible to limit what can come over these particular channels within an area, or would there be a jumbling of various orders and instl uctions coming through at the same time to really mystify the person who is receiving it? Admiral FUGARO. We do anticipate dedicating the channels for just YTS, as Captain Conrad just stated; and, in effect, they have to go-leave the 11, 12 and 14 channels. We will be facing that; and there is approximately a five-year period during which already- existing permits will. not be reissued on these channels. So we do expect some problems during this phaseout period, hopefully less and less, to the point where we would have a totally dedicated channel for VTS. Captain CONRAD. I can confirm that my channel 11 was taken away from me. Mrs. SULLIVAN. That is why I wanted it answered now, not when we read it some time later, because you are the people who are in- volved and, you know a lot more than we will ever pretend to know. We cannot just decide who is right and what is right without a good discussion among all those who are involved; and it just seems to me that there has to be a meeting of the minds; because when you need information you need it now; and they cannot wait 10 or 20 minutes, if the channel is cluttered up with other messages. So these are the things that I think we are all trying to accomplish to try to help work this out and get a system; but I would like to see you argue this out in the open so that you can come to some kind of a satisfactory solution. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PAGENO="0259" 255 Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Captain Conrad contended that when the Coast Guard, with its antenna power got involved, everything else would be blocked out because they are limited to 1 watt. Admiral, to respond, they could only have 1 watt, and that would be a fact that that would not happen on 13? Admiral FIJGARO. On 13? Captain CONRAD. Sir, if he had, as he first stated, I find it hard to believe that Morgan City blankets the area with 1 watt, but we will leave that up for discussion; but if this is so, if the Coast Guard has Only the capacity to transmit on 1 watt on channel 13, sir, they have no reason to transmit. They cannot cover their VTS area. They could only cover a vessel that was in sight of the antenna, so there is no reason for them to transmit. The reasoning that I was giving today and yesterday for having the capacity to transmit on channel 13 was that they could blanket the industry with necessary information if it became an emergency, or they could communicate with a vessel that did not have the capac- ity to communicate in VTS and give them instructions, pass on messages on something that was necessary; but if they have the capacity to transmit on only I watt, that means they can only talk to vessels that are in sight of their antenna. Admiral FTJGARO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman; but as I think: we pointed out yesterday, we will have multiple transmission sites which are planned to cover the entire area. I believe that on our chart we point out the four transmission sites, one down river, one in each sector; but Captain Conrad is correct that these will cover the entire area. The 1 watt will be with the channel 13 only. The other channels will be on a higher wattage. Mr. BIAGGI. I want to stay with his response that it would be ~ 1 watt. When you a.re on a 1-watt transmission- Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir; on channel 13; right, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Conrad contends that it would be limited. He could only transmit to ships that are in sight. Now, I think you responded, if I understood you correctly, that you have four transmission sites. Are they 1 wattage, or~ Admiral FUGARO. Let me verify this, Mr. Chairman, if I may. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. There are five, not four, transmission sites, represented by the red triangles shown on that chart there~ and these will be the transmission sites for all of the channels which will be transmitting within any one sector. The operator at the VTC will control which channel and in which area he will be transmitting. Mr. BIAGGI. All right. Now, let us go back to 13. Thirteen, I assume, is one of those channels which the operator will be functioning. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. Now, we get on 13, they are all 1-watters. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir, wherever the 13 will be a 1-watt transmission. Mr. TREEN. Where will they be? PAGENO="0260" 256 Admiral FUGARO. There will be five different sites. The CHAIRMAN. How many miles away? How far is one watt? Captain CONRAD. Theoretically, just strictly at a line of sight. Mr. BIAGGI. Will those five transmission sites and the 1-watt power, will that be adequate to deal with the problem? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. They will cover the entire VTS area with the channel 13. Mr. BIAGGI. Only on the 1 watt? Admiral FUGARO. On the 1 watt; yes, sir. Captain CONRAD. Sir, I beg to differ. If you have a transmission of 1 watt coming out of this antenna and sector 1, looking at the Gulf of Mexico, 15 miles out into the sea buoy, you are looking above mile 10 Venice, mile 15, VHF at 50-watt transmission will cover this area nicely. One watt from this transmission site may have a trans- mitting power if no one else is using the facility or the chnanel as far as possibly the head of the passes, certainly not down these passes. There is no way that 1-watt transmitters from these sector sites could cover a sector. You would have to switch over to more wattage or you have nothing really to transmit; but even a 1-watt transmission from this sector site would interfere greatly with innumerable vessels trying to negotiate locks, bridges, meetings, crossings, and in a highly congested area right here because their antenna which is an important factor will be higher than anybody else's antenna, so it will blanket an area far greater than a lower antenna; but with one watt, it probably could cover the metropolitan area; but that would probably be all. But certainly no 1-watt sector antenna from this area here could cover this sector and especially these bigger sectors. Mr. TREEN. May I ask a question? Captain Conrad, a minute ago you said 1-watt power would only permit you to communicate on a line of sight. Captain CONRAD. Theoretically; that is, supposedly; but the higher the antenna, sir, the longer the line of sight. If you are standing on the ground on a flat surface you can see less; with your eyes 6 feet off the ground, you might see about 10 or 14 miles; but if you put your- self up on a mast of a ship, your vision increases, generally speaking, you know; and a line of sight is pased on the height of the two antennas; and so if you have one antenna that is more greatly raised than the other, naturally, his line of sight will increase. Mr. TREEN. The question I specifically had was that transmitter located, it is about at the Algiers point, is it? Captain CONRAD. On top of Governor Nichols Street, I assume. Mr. TREEN. Would you be able to communicate down river there, past that large crossing there; in other words, toward the end of the sector? Captain CONRAD. To the end of the sector. Mr. TREEN. Your response is, if that antenna were high enough, yes, it probably could? Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Thank you. Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Treen, these antennas will be approximately 100 feet high; so they will be fairly high antennas for these purposes, as Captain Conrad stated. They will extend a line of sight by this height. PAGENO="0261" 257 Mr. BIAGGI. So what Captain Conrad has said, as a matter of fact, as far as the limitation on 1-watt power transmitters is not accurate? Admiral FUGARO. We believe with the antenna height, we will be covering this area. Mr. BIAGGI. You have certainly taken that into consideration, the distance? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. BIAGGI. The committee will be going to vote now. It is 11:45. We will stand in recess until 1:30, and then we will return, and hope- fully complete the testimony of the various witnesses. Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that Mr. Treen may not be able to be back, may I just make one statement which I think- Mr. TREEN. I just will not be here at 1 :30. I have got another meet- ing at 1:30 and I have got to take 15 or 20 minutes. Mr. O'NEIL. If I may say one thing that I think will focus the problem that this industry has had with the Coast Guard from the inception of this project, it is apparent right here at this moment, based on what has happened in the last 5 or 10 minutes. Yesterday, upon questioning from Mr. Treen about the 50-watt antenna, the question I have in front of me was put to Admiral Fugaro in this fashion: Is there any problem with respect to communications if you are transmitting on a 50-watt output; and I think that is what you anticipate; is it not? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. From your tracking center in New Orleans, what affect would this have on the bridge-to-bridge communication channel within, let us say, 20 or 30 miles from the VTC? Admiral FUGARO. While transmitting on channel 13? Mr. TREEN. Yes, sir. Admiral FUGARO. We would assume that there would be, if the Coast Guard was transmitting on 13, yes, sir, there could very well be interference with other transmissions on 13. Now, we go from'~50 watt back to 1 watt to a tower, and this is where the frustration that this group has where the Coast Guard comes into play. There is no firm footing on what is going on, and I do not wish to fault Admiral Fugaro-I know he has just gotten into this-but this has been the cause of some of the frustration that this industry has encountered in the past year. Thank you. Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, could I suggest they have a friendly discussion before they go out and eat and see if we can come to some agreement here? Mr. BIAGGI. I think it is more friendly after they eat. We will recess now. [Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. this same day.] AFTERNOON SESSION Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral, would you come and sit at the witness table, please, so we can continue this dialog? Admiral FUGARO. Surely. Mr. BIAGGI. I believe when we left off, Mr. O'Neil was making a comment. PAGENO="0262" 258 Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, the comment I was making was in reference to highlighting what we feel has happened before about switchjng of positions and communication and I just used that as an example of what this industry has been confronted with for some period of time. This is the sort of thing that makes it so frustrating at times to deal with the people who want to put the system in because sometimes we think the Eighth District Coast Guard says one thing and then we are confronted and faced off with Washington; and when Washington is confronted, they have no knowledge of what is going on in the Eighth Coast Guard District; and I used that as a reference point. That was all. Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Conrad, let us get back to 1-watt power transmitter. Are you satisfied with Admiral Fugaro's response? Captain CONRAD. I am satisfied with, you know, with the under- standing that the wattage will not be in excess of 1 watt; but I am not satisfied in the response that it will be used without really making that clarification as to how and when, because even if 1 watt of power in the line of sight and antenna, as we explained, on a high tower, as they envision, would still knock out a tremendous amount of bridge- to-bridge communication in New Orleans Harbor, by utilizing 13. I think that should be of the utmost discretion, whenever that would ever be implemented. Mr. BIAGGI. If I understood you correctly, you say initially about the 50-watt now we have reduced it to 1 watt because you have a high antenna of saying we transmit with a high antenna 1 watt and it will still have the same effect? Captain CONRAD. No, sir, it will not have the same effect-will not have broad coverage, hut in the New Orleans area, with the convert- ing of the canals coming from the west and the east, ship channel running parallel, and so forth, it is a tremendous amount of vessels that are, even outside of the system, not counting the ones that are in the system that would be affected by transmission even of the 1 watt on channel 13, and channel 13 is designated to be specifically a bridge-to-bridge voice communication in making and understanding of passing and meeting and so forth. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Fugaro. Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I think both of these points are the points that Mr. O'Neil made and Captain Conrad made and are tied together. Yesterday in my testimony, when I referred to the fact that we anticipated there would be some level of interference for channel 13, it was the fact that Captain Conrad is saying when we do come on other frequencies, somebody else will be working on that, that is when the Coast Guard will provide a level of interference. But getting back to his point about the utilization of this channel and the control of the Coast Guard's utilization of this channel, we would have specific instructions certainly within the operating manual that will be developed so that there will be strict limitations placed upon the Coast Guard VTC when it is actually utilizing the channel. It is not a blanket taking or utilizing any time you have any trouble with anybody else. That is not the intention of our use of channel 13. Mr. BIAGGI. What is the intention? PAGENO="0263" 259 Admiral FUGARO. It is our intention with the use of channel 13 as an emergency backup in the event there is some reason for us to get some particular information of a rather emergency nature to a vessel. Perhaps if we see a couple of vessels together and have only been able to communicate with one; that is the sort of thing where we feel it is imperative that we do communicate something to vessels within the system. Mr. BIAGGI. If you could estimate on the basis of your experience, how frequently do you estimate that would occur? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I really do not have any personal information on the utilization of this; but, say, within the Houston area, however, I will be happy to get this estimate from Houston and submit it for the record. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, sir. [The following was received:] UsE OF CHANNEL 13 It cannot be determined from experience in the operation of existing vessel traffic services how often we may expect to resort to the use of the vessel bridge- to-bridge radiotelephone frequency, channel 13, to contact a vessel that cannot be reached immediately on the VTS sector frequency. The Coast Guard does not yet operate a VTS wherein vessels are required to maintain a continuous listening watch on a frequency other than channel 13. It is estimated that when all participating vessels are maintaining a continuous listening watch on the VTS sector frequencies in the New Orleans VTS, the vessel traffic center's use of channel 13 will be minimal (i.e., less than one transmission per hour). Experience in the operation of YTS Houston- Galveston has shown that, because of Coast Guard presence on channel 13, the efficiency of usage of that frequency has risen from 56.2 percent, in the pre-VTS month of June 1974, to 97.0 percent during August-September 1976. Channel efficiency is the ratio of valid messages (i.e., conforming to the intended purpose of the Act) to total messages on that frequency. It is expected that the establishment of VTS New Orleans will have a similar beneficial effect. Captain CONRAD. The designation by the FCC for safety, Mayday calls and distress is channel 16, not channel 13. Everyone is supposed to be monitoring 16. That channel should be adequate with 50 watts of output to get across any message necessary. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral? Admiral FTJGARO. I think though we want to save channel 16 for the very intended purpose that Captain Conrad said, as a distress frequency; and I do not think necessarily we are talking about distress in high frequency when we are talking about passing navigation safety information. I think we would be better to leave channel 16 clear for its intended purpose and utilize channel 13 for this purpose, of course, within the limited utilizations and controls as I mentioned before. Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask you this question. What experience do you have on the frequency of the distress calls, Mayday calls? Admiral FUGARO. I know in all distress frequencies, part of the problem has been unauthorized utilization sometimes, interfering with distress situations. For this reason, I would advocate that the utiliza~ tion of any distress frequency should be kept completely clear of any extraneous communication. Mr. BIAGGI. I can appreciate if you do not have the answer to my question; but notwithstanding that, I would appreciate if you could submit for the record the experience you have had with distress calls. Admiral FUGARO. Yes; be glad to, Mr. Chairman. PAGENO="0264" 260 [The following was received:] DISTRESS CALLS During fiscal year 1975, the Coast Guard received 14,446 distress calls from vessels on VHF-FM frequency 156.800 MHz (channel 16). Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Mr. Heyward. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with the channel 13 usage, this is no change from the present use of the channel; is that correct, the proposed change? Admiral FUGARO. No, sir. The utilization we are contemplating is within-in accordance with the law. Mr. BIEYWARD. And if the Coast Guard transmissions are at the same level of power as the transmissions from the ships, it would really mean one more "ship" on the channel. Is that not so? Admiral FUGARO. That is right; and that is the level of interference I am referring to, the fact that one more- iVir. HEYWARD. And also I would assume that any rules you have in the use of that channel would restrict its use, at least, except in a dire emergency, to a situation where you would not interfere with information being exchanged by two passing vessels at the time you wanted to send transmissions? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. Frankly, I think that while it is entirely proper to keep the channel restricted, that the use by the Coast Guard, in special situations, would not create a tremendous impact on the use of the channel. Is not that channel used by more than two ships in the same area at times? Admiral FUGARO. This is channel 13 you are referring to? Mr. HEYWARD. Yes; I mean, there are passing situations between ships now that are potential interferers with other conversations going on? Admiral FTJGARO. Definitely; yes. It is being used by more than one ship. Mr. HEYWARD. Improperly used? And one should not be using it to interfere with somebody else's use of it at that time? Admiral FUGARO. That's right. Mr. IE[ETY-WARD. Is it not really a question of monitoring the system to see that it is properly utilized and not being used for purposes other than it was designed to be used for? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. HEYWARD. Does the Coast Guard have any responsibility in that regard? Admiral FUGARO. With respect to channel 13, and the bridge-to- bridge, these are promulgated under Coast Guard regulations which require the equipment to be aboard and which require or state the situation under which the equipment would be utilized. Our experience in the Houston area with channel 13 is the fact that the Coast Guard is on the system and has helped to clear up extraneous communication on the system. PAGENO="0265" 261 With respect to monitoring the system, the Coast Guard has promulgated regulations, as I mentioned, with respect to the equip- ment and the utilization of the equipment; but the actual monitoring of a particular frequency usage I believe is a province of the FCC. We have occasion when we have heard unauthorized transmissions on channel 13; have been able to identify the particular unauthorized user and have communicated to this user and found this somewhat of a beneficial effect, even though it is not strictly an enforcement procedure. It is sort of an acknowledgement to that user that he should not have been using the system at that particular time. Mr. HEYWARD. Does the FCC have adequate monitoring of that system, in your opinion? Admiral FIJGARO. I would defer to the FCC to comment on that. it is apparent, though, that channel 13 is not serving its purpose in the sense of there is more communication on there than there should be. Mr. HEYWARD. How about the wattage, Captain Conrad; in connection with the wattage, are the vessels and their equipment limited to the use of 1 watt, or do they have the possibility of using higher power on their equipment? Captain CONRAD. Sir, they are limited legally but, of course, YOU have equipment that could be in service that would have been built prior to the enactment in 1973; and it seems it is just general policy to let the stuff wear out before you have to replace it, and we alsQ have the condition of many foreign vessels coming into our system~ These foreign vessels, when they are clipped with the use of VHF channels in the area, pilots tend to use them when they are not using: their hand-held sets; so the strength of the signal coming from a. channel 13 user could vary tremendously. In theory, the signal should be the strongest signal that is being put out from the closest vessel, but that is not always the case. Mr. HEYWARD. Is one of the problems presently on 13 that, perhaps on occasion, the people who are using it are using more power and therefore interfering? Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir, that is right; definitely so. Mr. HEYWARD. Do you know whether the FCC has done anything about correcting that or attempting to correct it? Captain CONRAD. Do I personally know? Mr. HEYWARD. Yes; I wonder whether you were familiar with any complaints that had been made to the FCC. Captain CONRAD. No. Personally, I don't think there that FCC is ~monitoring as such. They do on channel 16 and issue citations. I think the reason for this is because of the very limited scope of the channel that they do not pick up as much citations about. They have listening posts, we know of, down in Texas, near the border, near Mexico; and most of the citations orginated in our area come from there; so unless there is some kind of an alarm they would not be able to receive a channel 13 communication. Mr. HEYWARD. Well, in your opinion, is channel 13 being abused now, without regard to this VTC? Captain CONRAD. Channel 13 is being abused, sir, only because it is being overworked. I think overwork is a form of abuse. It is not serving our purposes because there are too many people having to share too little space. PAGENO="0266" 262 Mr. HEYWARD. When you say "sharing," are they restricting their lransmissions to the legitimate use of the channel? Captain CONRAD. Well, I do not think that you could say that with a blanket "Yes." I think the average boat operator follows the law. He makes his initial contact; if he has nothing more, makes a passing-. on agreement; and they generally do it right on 13. If the conversation is going to be extended past that they are supposed to agree on a mutual channel that they can both switch over to if they have more to discuss than just the normal passing or meeting situation, and the agreement. Of course, it is abused. I think everything is abused; and policing would definitely help; but we have too much overriding characteristics of the channel because of the close proximity of too many waterways in one area, all running parallel, nothing stopping. This is not mountainous area. Ther is nothing going to stop a transmission from coming across the flat on the land down there; and so 3TOU can receive a strong channel signal, you might be receiving out of the middle of the Mississippi Sound, maybe a ship coming up the Mississippi River down at Pilottown, which is defmitely no distress; and we have experienced that, continuously. Mr. HEYWARD. Now, as to 11, 12, and 14, and the fact that these will be dedicated to VTC use, during the overlap period, obviously there is going to be a tremendous problem on this same type of thing. Ultimately, in terminating present uses on those channels over a period of time and forcing those people, including you, to shift to some other channel, has the FCC indicated any plans at all for alternative channels for usage to replace these channels? Captain CONRAD. No, sii~, they have not. They have not. We have not been able to get any assurance whatsoever that anything else will be made available. At the expiration of my license, I was just to pick out another channel. I selected the channel that was overcrowded 10 years ago. Mr. HEYWARD. That is an existing channel for the same type of ~isage? Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir. I had to select a channel that I passed lip when I got my initial license on this 5 years ago. Mr. HEYWARD. How were these choices made originally? Why did you pick one of these three, because the others were saturated? Captain CONRAD. Yes, sir. You can only, depending on your business and the situation you are in, you are normally licensed only on two channels, 16, which everyone must have a license on, and a working channel. The working channel could be either a port operation channel or It could be a commercial channel. They will not issue two commercial channel licenses simultaneously. Mr. HEYWARD. You have to make a choice? Captain CONRAD. You have to make a choice. If you can prove need, you can go back to the FCC with this application and get one port operation channel and one commercial channel, so that we had an alternate; but normally they will not give you that alternate. Mr. HEYWARD. How about the port operation channels; are they being saturated with nonessential usage? Is that one of the problems? Captain CONRAD. I think you have so much business being con- ducted on so few channels that I cannot say that, you know, you could PAGENO="0267" 263 clean it up just by removing the nonsense; because with the Corps of Engineers using those channels 12 and 14, it is both 12 and 14, the Corps of Engineers switches over to make their agreement with you and giving you your position at the locks- Mr. BIAGGI. When the Corps of Engineers injects itself onto the channel, do they block out everybody else? Captain CONRAD. No, sir. The Corps of Engineers has transmitting capacity on those particular channels about equal to that of the ves- sels; because on those channels everyone is allowed to have either 25 or some stations have up to 50-watt sets; but the corps has no more power than ABC; and so they are just sharing those channels. They have no control over them with all kinds of other port operations that are going on, blasting ships loading, just the whole gamut-the whole facet of operating the port and surrounding area, dispatching grain barges to elevators, et cetera. Mr. HEYWARD. In connection with your statement on page 3 of your statement-and it was the basis for one of Mr. Treen's ques- tions-you referred to 270,000 vessels transiting earlier. Is that the total vessels transiting? Is that including- Captain CONRAD. Sir, the admiral is in a better position to answer that. We said we got this information from them. Mr. HEYWARD. I would assume that that would include, for in- stance, all the barges in tow, rather than those that are reporting. Admiral FUGARO. That is correct. The number that is cited there, 270,000, represents total vessel transit; so it includes the figures of barges. I think within that figure, the 270,000, we are really talking about 70,000 communicating vessels. The rest would be the other 200,000, which would represent barges which, of course, are not manned. Mr. HEYWARD. 70,000. What does that work out to, approximately 200 daily? Admiral FUGARO. About one-quarter of the total. Captain CONRAD. On a daily basis. Admiral FUGARO. Yes; on a daily basis. Captain CONRAD. But you see you are only counting vessels in the system. You have to count the vessels that are in the adjacent system. This is the crux of my situation, and I am trying to put us into-you cannot look at the Mississippi as an entity in itself. It is only the main- stream of so many branches coming off and, after all, having to share the same communications network, and so even if there were 70,000 vessels in the system and the YTS system, that still does not answer the question of all of the vessels, port operations, land-based stations, et cetera, that are sharing this net of communictions; because you must take into consideration the whole picture; and not just the VTS system. Mr. HEYWARD. At such times as these channels became dedicated to VTC, these other transmissions in the area outside of the VTC are not going to be conducted; is that not correct? So that aside from your other problem of getting adequate channels for your own use, this interference problem you are talking about is in the overlap period. Captain CONRAD. And how far is the control that the FCC has placed on not renewing licenses? The FCC gets a license renewal from PAGENO="0268" 264 a station, a shell operator on Lake Pontchartra~n with a very high an- tenna, using channel 14 for a number of years. Is the FCC clear enough to be able to determine that this would interfere with the VTS net, or do they just eliminate people who have an address of New Orleans? Mr. HEYWARD. It is my understanding that this would be dedicated to vessel traffic control, not only in New Orleans, but elsewhere; is that correct, Captain? Admiral FUGARO. I believe that is correct, Mr. Heyward. And I believe certainly within the New Orleans area, when and if the sys- tem comes into existence, utilization of 11, 12, and 14, that the issuance of permits will be ceased in the surrounding areas also, and exactly what the geographical limits of ceasing these issues, I am not sure. As I say, I think it is the intention to dedicate these frequencies to ITTS. Mr. HEYWARD. Well, I think Captain Conrad has done the com- mittee a great service in bringing his viewpoint here, and I think a~ lot of the problems are problems that are beyond this committee's pur- view, but nevertheless, as the chairman indicated, we are going to have the FCC come up here and we will discuss with them these problem ~areas and see what kind of assistance we can get from them in resolv- ing some of these issues. Captain CONRAD. Does he give latitude and longitudes of what he ~an serve, the area that would be served? Mr. TREEN. Before we go to vote, I just want to have Captain Conrad touch on this question of the regulation requiring that the communication be in the English language. I represent a lot of people who only speak French down there. What is it going to do to these people? And is this a significant problem or not? Captain CONRAD. I think that that is the-kind of an oversimpli- fication, sir. I think that it would not be necessary, however, for a real "Cajun" to stand by the radio, but I think what this situation does call for is to have the person who is capable of understanding the local knowledge and customs. We look at this thing as if we were running a railroad track or an interstate that is conveniently marked along the side of the road every mile is a little number which comes up and shows you practically where you are. This is not the case. These people have engrained in their own minds local names, and some of these names are in French and some versions of French; but they have called these areas for years and years and these people that operate in this system are not capable and exceptions were made, realizing these capacities in the licensing. These people are not capable of reading a mile chart that would designate that such and such a place is exactly so many miles. Mr. TREEN. All right. That part of the proposed regulation which requires communication in the English language is not a problem then? Captain CONRAD. I think that most of the people can get by on the English. I would not say they would be non-English speaking, but I would say they are-there are many that their English is very, very limited. PAGENO="0269" 265 Mr. TREEN. Has there been any problem under the Bridge-to- Bridge Act with respect to local color and local language? Captain CONRAD. I think people who are in a better position would be some of your Yankee friends that come through the area. Mr. BIAGGI. The Civil War is stifi on. I think we will recess for 10 minutes. [Short recess.] Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order. Mr. O'Neil. Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one comment on the French language, to put that to rest. The only point we had in raising that is the fact that some of the transmissions in the New Orleans area, particularly the Morgan City area and the canal, are not in French, but they are not in English, either. They are in something between; and our own purpose was perhaps some consideration to be given to having someone on watch in case you get a critical situation where the transmission back an& forth between the vessels cannot be understood because of that prob- lem, which does in fact occur. But it is not to be misunderstood as a requirement that transmis- sion be made in French. That is not what we pointed out as the local custom that has given rise to potential companies. Mr. BIAGGI. It comes back to the question of whether we engage local people-employees. Mr. O'NEIL. Precisely. Mr. BIAGGI. I am sure the Coast Guard will take that into considera- tion. And that is an important factor. Mr. Treen. Mr. TREEN. One other question. In your statement on page 4, Captain Conrad, you talk about training. You said: * * * it is uncontestible, we believe, that there is no position in the Coast Guard where a person may gain practical knowledge concerning the day-to-day operation of a large seagoing vessel and river tows navigating the proposed VTS area. As I understand from Admiral Fugaro, there will be on-the-job training, so to speak, on the various types of vessels which will be transiting this area. Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Treen, that was Captain Bullard's statement, which we will get into, that you read into this proceeding in that direction, and perhaps you can address that directly. Mr. TREEN. Maybe you can answer that now. One of the issues you have raised here is that you do not think the people in the VTC will have the knowledge necessary to under- stand what is going on in the river. What kind of training do you think is going to be required? I would like to have that answered while the Coast Guard representative is here and perhaps can respond to your response. Captain BULLARD. Congressman Treen, the Coast Guard insists that we have a minimum of 3 years' service in on-the-job training before we can set a pilot license under the new license program and operators license; even after we have obtained this license, that does not necessarily prove that we are capable pilots. It is up to the individual companies to review and see if you are capable by putting you on the job and seeing if you are capable. PAGENO="0270" 266 My group contends that the Coast Guard should not let a yeoman or a seasoned lieutenant, as they so refer, direct traffic over this 243~mile stretch of river. Mr. TREEN. Does one who would be operating in the vessel traffic center have to have the same knowledge as one who would have to have to actually be operating a vessel? There are many things you have to learn as a pilot or as a seaman that do not really apply to the movement of the vessels. Captain BTJLLARD. We contend that the vessel traffic center officer should be familiar with the river, should be familiar with boats, barges, river stages, currents at different stages. We run from 0 to 54-15 feet, and you are well aware of the condi- tions that are created during these stages of the river, and you cannot take a 3-foot stage in New Orleans and pilot the boat the same way you do when you are 55 feet; and we have been, and I am sure we have a consensus of opinion, it is going to be somebody with more of a qualification than a man who rotates from one job to another every 3 years, spends 3 or 4 months training himself under the previous VTC officer to do his job. We will have to have enough confidence in this officer to tell us what to do in case of emergency or how to meet a vessel or where to hold up or where to turn the tow around or what to do. Mr. TREEN. Does the Coast Guard want to respond? Admiral FTJGARO. Yes, Mr. Treen. We have established within the existing VTC's very strict quali- fications, training requirements before we certify a man as capable of taking the watch. * I go back to the point I made, too, sir, that the qualifications that this man needs is not the full qualification of a pilot. He is at entirely different purposes; and we are going back to the very basic philos- ophy, the essentials of the VTS. The essentials of the VTS is not to literally guide an individual vessel through this maze of other vessels which it will meet. The purpose of the VTS is to provide the maximum amount of safety infor- mation to that operator to enable that master or that pilot to safely guide the vessel through whatever hazard he may be meeting. In other words, our operator must be capable of operating this particular equipment, the TV or radar in other areas, or the com- munications equipment. He must be familiar with the operation of the computer system; how to get in and get out; how that works, as well as the procedures on passing this information. Mr. TREEN. In other words, you are talking about this man just locating the vessels. You are not going to be telling him how to maneuver it? Admiral FUGARO. Exactly. Mr. TREEN. What to do if he encounters- Admiral FUGARO. No, sir, that is not the essentials. If we expect a man to be able to do that; I would agree with Captain Bullard that we do need to have fully qualified pilots. When you direct a vessel with a pilot he should have the same qualifications; but this is not what we are intending to do. Mr. TREEN. Mr. O'Neil, you wanted to comment? PAGENO="0271" 267 Mr. O'NEIL. Congressman Treen, I think you have posed what is a very serious problem and a very difficult one to answer. I think that any pilot or the admiral and myself certainly cannot tell you how long a man must be trained to learn the river, its bends, its currents, its bars, and how to navigate it, although- Mr. TREEN. Let me stop you there. Does the fellow in the traffic center have to know where the bars are? Mr. O'NEIL. I do not think he needs to know and have the exact knowledge as the pilot has in the pilothouse. I do have one area of concern, and that is the Vessel Traffic Center operator has, under rule 11, the power to determine what is a hazardous situation and stop traffic. Now, I do not know under those circumstances what the degree of knowledge is that one must have to make that determination. For example, let us assume we have a situation where we have a setout fog, and we have vessels jammed up in the area of the head of pass on the lower Mississippi River. I do not know how someone in the Vessel Traffic Center, perhaps, can make the determination on who should go first or what vessel should move where, this sort of thing. Obviously, if all the employee of the Vessel Traffic Center has to do is to accumulate statistical knowledge and put that into a device and then record it back, you do not need anything more than a techniicna. a computer technician. I do not think that is the minimum and that certainly is not enough for what we are talking about. Somewhere between that point and a master is a neutral ground that is going to be necessary for training. I do not know how and to what degree that training will be necessary. I do not know what the Coast Guard's training manual is, but I think this entire industry would like to see how they have trained their VTC people in other areas, particularly Houston, so we could make some sort of comparison of what is necessary. Mr. TREEN. I think then we are narrowing it down. Except in those cases where some control would be issued directly by the Vessel Traffic Center, all that is is a reporting system. Individual decisions with respect to management of the vessel are made by the people in charge of these vessels. So it gets down to what kind of directives and controls. Admiral FUGARO. Precisely. Mr. TREEN. Is everybody shut out and to stay put and may be that does not-Admiral Fugaro, you do not want to get into the position where you have a technician holding up the river and making decisions something like that. Captain CONRAD. Mr. Treen, I think, too, what troubles us, though, in this ability of being a pilot and being the computer operator is that what we have a fear of is the lack of local-not piloting ability, but the local knowledge of the local terminology which is going back to the same thing about the same thing about the language problem in that it probably could be worked out; but we have a feeling of a little bit of unease about this. If you are familar with a route and the other guy is familiar with a route and y'all talk to each other and say, "I just passed farmer 78-280-70------18 PAGENO="0272" 268 Brown's house," you will have a mental picture where you are; but if you pass the same thing on to another guy who has got a road map, and he looks at the map and he says, "Well, farmer Brown's house is not on this map, where are you?" The guy says, "I am about halfway between here and there, and I just do not know farmer Brown's house and I am lost. I do not know where I am." J\'Ir. TREEN. I guess we will have a glossary of terms. Captain CONRAD. That is correct. But what has happened, sir, is that these terms that are in everyday use in piloting, which is a part of piloting, are not on charts and they are not on maps. They are just common knowledge of an area. It is something that is called local custom, local situation, that you cannot exactly put down on a piece of paper and say, this point is this place, and this mile 103 has got maybe a half dozen different names that are known locally; and some of these things have not existed for 10, 15, 20 years, but they are still called by the name of what may have been there years ago, a farm or a plantation or a dock. It does not exist; but we are not lost. We know where we are. It is-you just cannot put a finger on it and put it in exact mile points, what that is, all the time. Mr. TREEN. Do you want to comment? Admiral FUGARO. Yes. Mr. TREEN. In commenting, would you cover the question of the reporting points? I understand you have a number of reporting points in the system. Admiral FUGARO. I believe we have indicated those on the chart, have we not? Those are the red diamonds. We will point them out. Commander HICKEY. Red are down and green are up. Mr. TREEN. Red are the reporting points. You have to agree upon what you are going to call them. Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Whether you number them or call them Farmer Brown's house, or whatever, you must agree on the names. You've got no more than 20 or maybe 30 reporting points in all. Admiral FUGARO. Approximately about 20. So I would agree that the names~ Mr. TREEN. You expect they will be reporting in between the specific points? Admiral FUGARO. Some degree of reporting in between them, I would believe would be occurring between some of these points. If there is a bend between two points and I am looking, say, just below Belle Chasse, where there is a bend, we would possibly be reporting to the vessel that he can expect to be meeting a vessel coming around that bend; that would be part of the VTC information for that vessel. With respect to the local knowledge, that these people should have, we recognize that there is a requirement for local knowledge in any- body who is going to be a section operator, much less the watch supervisor. We definitely intend to include knowledge and training through the utilization of local knowledge instructors, perhaps pilots them- selves, to instruct these people. In addition to that, a requirement will be these people take trips to these sectors in which they will be operat- ing and not oniy before they take over a section of operation. After PAGENO="0273" 269 they become a sector operator they will still he required to periodically to go tour these areas to see what problems there are and to continue familiarization with that area. I think we are looking for a minimum level of local knowledge before we qualify the sector operator. We cannot hope to make him a fully qualified pilot, but then again we do not feel that that is necessary. We recognize, however, as it has been stated, there is a need for some level of local knowledge in these sector operators. Mr. TREEN. Thank you. I know there is more that could be said. I guess we have to move on. Mr. BIAGGI. Any other statements to be made? I might caution you we will continue until 3 p.m. We do have time ~constraints. Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, I think we have covered many of the points in Captain Bullard's statement and I do not see any reason to pursue as Congressman Treen has centered on those particular ~problems. We would like to make Captain Bullard's statement a part of the record, however. Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, all of these statements will be in their entirety made a part of the record. [The statements referred to follow:] STATEMENT No. 2 OF AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR PORTS AND WATERWAYS On behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways, we submit :herewith our comments which will be presented by Captain Jack R. Bullard on the manning problems which we foresee in the proposed New Orleans VTS system. I am appearing on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways, an association of numerous companies operating on the inland waterways who are concerned with the Coast Guard's proposed Vessel Traffic System on the Lower Mississippi River. The Ad Hoc Conimittee objects to numerous aspects of the proposed Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), hut we shall confine our comments to the lack of a respon- sible plan for the manning of the System. The Vessel Traffic Center has been delegated enormous power in the proposed regulations. It will be the nerve center of the entire system. All of the information given and received by the Service will pass through this Center and the Coast Guard's computer will be located there. Presumably, all the orders that the regulations authorize the Coast Guard to give to vessels in the VTS will emanate from this Center and from the persons operating the Center. These orders may include speed limits, vessel size, limitations, one way traffic requirements, and control of the movement of nearly every vessel on 259 miles of the Mississippi River. In fact, the Vessel Traffic Center could conceivably completely shut down the 2nd and 8th largest ports in the country without exceeding the power delegated to it under the proposed regulations. Incredibly, however, there are absolutely no provisions in the regulations establishing the qualifications or ability of those who wifi man the Vessel Traffic Center and who will exercise these broad powers. The only reference at all to personnel is contained in Proposal Rule 2 which indicates that the Vessel Traffic * Center wifi be manned by the Coast Guard. In connection with questions posed to them by the Ad Hoc Committee, the Coast Guard has indicated that its * intention is to place the Vessel Traffic Center under the supervision of a "seasoned duty officer" with communications and the monitoring of computer visual displays to be performed by personnel of lower grades. They have not indicated, however, the criteria by which an officer is considered "seasoned" nor have they shown what qualifications the lower grade personnel will have or how they will be trained. Considering that the proposed VTS is simply an adaptation of existing Federal Aviation Authority systems minus the radar, we cannot understand why the Coast Guard persists in ignoring the maritime community's plea for the establish- :~ment of some minimum standards of competence similar to those promulgated by PAGENO="0274" 270 the FAA for the certification of air traffic controllers. Among other things, the' FAA regulations require that its traffic controllers pass a written test demon- strating knowledge of flight rules, traffic control procedures, communications procedures, air navigation, and weather. In addition, these traffic controllers must pass a practical test to demonstrate proficiency with control tower equipment and knowledge of the geographical area in which he will work. In particular, he must demonstrate knowledge of the physical features of the airport and the control zone, traffic patterns and holding procedures, and search and rescue. Even after passing these tests, the air traffic controller must work as a trainee for 6 months under the supervision of a senior controller before he is allowed to work on his own. Obviously, all of the areas in which an air traffic controller must demonstrate expertise are directly analogous to inland water transportation within a VTS system. Such a system is, by definition, heavily traveled and governed by rules and procedures concerning navigation and communication. Nowhere in the pro-- posed regulations, however, do we find any assurance that the Coast Guard. personnel operating the YTS will have the knowledge necessary to promote safety and expedite the movement of traffic in the affected area. Within the 259 mile length of proposed YTS system, there are two different sets. of navigational rules including the inland rules and the western rivers rules. There are a multitude of buoys, lights and other navigational aids in this area, not to~ mention submerged wrecks, pipelines, cable crossings and constantly shifting sand. bars. As everyone involved with water transportation well knows, a detailed knoweidge of all of these things is required for successful navigation of large~ vessels but the proposed regulations do not require the slightest familiarity with. them on the part of the Coast Guard personnel who will operate the system. Other countries give credence to our insistence on experienced and qualified controllers. Of the 12 VTS systems operating in 1973, including Liverpool, three~ systems in London, Southhampton, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Montreal, two systems in Japan, and the Elbe and Weser River system, all are manned or supervised by Master Pilots familiar with the areas under control and and who, in addition, have the benefit of radar surveillance. Since the proposed VTS system does not in-~ corporate radar surveillance, and to our knowledge, the Coast Guard has no river pilots in uniform, it is difficult to see how the system could be anything but inferior in operation to every foreign system on which information is available. This is not to say that the Coast Guard does not possess intelligent and corn- petent personnel. They are undoubtedly well qualified for the traditional duties undertaken by the Coast Guard, but it is uncontestible, we believe, that there is no position in the Coast Guard where a person may gain practical knowledge~ concerning the day-to-day operation of the large seagoing vessels and river tows. navigating the proposed VTS area. Such knowledge and expertise will obvisouly be necessary to avoid confusion and disruption of traffic under any type of VTS operation. It may well be that given sufficient time and on the job training, the Coast Guard could develop a corps of operators trained for this VTS area, but thern point is that the Coast Guard presently has no such trained operators and has established no qualifications whatever for the persons they intend to use. Further- more. it is well known that the Coast Guard rotates its personnel every 2 or 3 years, often to positions completely unrelated to the past positions held. While this may encourage versatility among the Coast Guard's people, it seems to us that this practice will insure that the VTS system will be regularly deprived of its most experienced operators and that the industry will be continually subjected to untried and unfamiliar VTS operators. The Coast Guard cannot, moreover, simply transfer~ operations from other YTS systems to the proposed sytem. There are several reasons for this. First, the Mississippi River and the connecting waterways in this proposed system are totally different from a physical standpoint from every~ other VTS system opera.ting in the U.S. None of these include a major river of the~ Mississippi's dimensions. Secondly, no other system uses the variety of navigating. rules found in the proposed system. Lastly, probably no other port in the country except New York has anywhere near the traffic found in this system and none~ whatsoever have a similar mixture of vessels, including oceangoing ships, tugs, ferries, large river towboats and tows, canal towboats and their tows, fishing vessels, water taxis, floating oil rigs, pleasure craft, and old fashioned river steam- boats. There is simply no YTS area in the country where experience in dealing with. this melange of vessels can be obtained other than in the proposed VTS area itself. There is also no provision in the regulations for communication capabilities in the French language. Such capability is absolutely essential in Southern Loui- siana with its large population of persons of French descent, many of whom still depend upon their native tongue, a situation which is officially encouraged by PAGENO="0275" 271 -the State of Louisiana, and who depend upon maritime pursuits for their liveli- hood. Their maritime heritage goes back generatiOns and as a group, they have :achieved worldwide recognition of their masterful and intrepid seamanship. This :15 demonstrated by the fact that when oil companies exploring the North Sea needed seamen to insure the regular operation of their supply vessels under some -~f the worst weather conditions in the world, they brought these French-Americans to Europe to run the boats and to re-train English sailors and captains for this hazardous duty. Unfortunately, the proposed regulations require that each vessel under control of the VTS have a person proficient in English to stand radio watch at all times. This will impose an impossible burden on the shipping and fishing industries in South Louisiana who depend upon these French speaking personnel for a signifi- cant portion of their manpower. Many vessels are run as small family operations which will now have to hire additional crew members to meet the requirement -of the proposed regulation. This may seem simple enough, but for many the costs involved will mean the difference between earning a living and going out of business. Similarly, many of the larger companies hire these French speaking people in all positions from deckhand on up and are glad to have them. The *proposed regulation will end this practice since these people will not be able to meet the language requirement which the Coast Guard wishes to add to their jobs, and their employers will not wish to break the law by hiring them. This creates a double burden on the public. First, the people will lose their jobs and be forced to look for employment which does not take them through VTS areas. This will not be so easy to do. Second, their employers will suddenly be faced with a drastic reduction in the number of qualified personnel to man their vessels. They will have to rely on less qualified applicants because in this hotly competi- tive industry, it is not possible to just increase crew size to insure that a person proficient in English is on the radio at all times. The additional crewmen are -not available, and the increased labor cost would be prohibitive. These problem areas which I have just discussed are so basic to the safety of this system and can be so easily rectified that it is hard to understand how the Coast Guard can continue to ignore them. If the problems are not solved now, it is likely they will be solved later on a collision by collision basis after unjustified damage to the economic position of the industry has been done. The Coast Guard should staff its control center with Master Pilots working on rotation basis from area pilot associations and transportation companies. The -savings which the Coast Guard can make in training expenses by hiring ex- perienced civilians will offset the increased labor costs, and the safety benefits are obvious. Failing this, Coast Guard supplied VTS operators should work under the 24 hour supervision of Master Pilots from the area and the Coast Guard should establish by regulation the qualifications and training necessary for its personnel to become operators of the system. Otherwise, the Coast Guard's job rotation - system will result in regularly staffing the VTS system with cooks and quarter- masters. If the Coast Guard refuses to accept the experience and ability of civilian pilots, and if they are able to justify this position, which they have not yet done, -then it will be absolutely necessary that their personnel who are assigned to the SITS system be exempted by regulation from the present job rotation system undertaken by the Coast Guard. This will be needed in addition to regulations -establishing their training and qualifications. These regulations will preferably *require service as observers on commercial vessels in the area. Otherwise, there is no way that the VTS system will he staffed with persons with the level of ability necessary to promote the system's objectives of safety and facilitation of - commerce. Finally, the regulations should provide for French language communication capability at the Vessel Control Center. This would require little effort on the Coast Guard's part and would be much cheaper to the taxpayer and consumer than requiring all the vessels passing through the system to have English language * communication capability. Such a simple step would prevent the confusion and dislocation in the maritime industry which will otherwise result. REPORT TO THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR PORTS AND WATERWAYS: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM My name is Robert L. Brite and I have been asked to testify on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways concerning the statistical validity of studies which have been performed by the United States Coast Guard and the conclusions relative to the presently proposed Vessel Traffic System. PAGENO="0276" 272 I. INTRODUCTION During the past three to five years, the United States Coast Guard has con- ducted a number of studies on the establishment of a Vessel Traffic System (YTS) for various ports in the United States, including the Mississippi and the port of New Orleans. These studies have involved a minimum of 9,300 man hours and have been performed for the purpose of: 1. determining the need for a vessel traffic system in the various ports, and 2. determining the level of vessel traffic system needed. Essentially, these systems are divided into basic (non-surveillance) systems andl sophisticated (surveillance including radar and/or television) systems. During the course of the Coast Guard study, a great deal of data analysis was. performed with the intent of computing the probability of an accident of a given type occurring to a particular type ship in a certain port. This probability was then used to compute expected damages from such accidents. These accidents. were individually analyzed in order to determine the level of VTS necessary to prevent such an accident. A revised probability was then computed and an ex- pected damage reduction was calculated. There are many problems with the data and with the procedure used. Although. the result of this analysis is the presently proposed Vessel Traffic System, New Orleans data were not included in the development of the initial algorithm upon. which the calculation of the probabilities is based. The United States Coast Guard Study Report "Vessel Traffic Systems: Issue Study," Volume 3, written by Computer Science Corporation, March, 1973 (hereafter referred to as Issue Study) concludes that tlìe algorithm must determine the expected casualty losses as a result of the accidents and determine the effect that a proposed VTS will have on the probability of accidents and recalculate the expected casualty loss. They note that "an accident-by-accident analysis, as indicated in the algorithm, should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of various levels of Vessel Traffic Systems." (Issue Study, p. 2-15.) The report also notes the expected effect of VTS: "The data suggests that a VTS may also reduce the expected damage either through prevention of some of the more serious accidents or thorugh reduction to the severity of those that do occur. However, we were not able to quantify this reduction sufficiently to justify a revision in the expected damage per acci- dent." (Issue Study, pp. 6-8.) Based on these statements from the Issue Study, I would have to conclude that. the New Orleans area is sufficiently different from those ports studied and suffi- ciently unique in its geographic configuration to require its inclusion in the~ development of the algorithm. It is very difficult to take into account the unique~ characteristics and requirements of an individual port unless the algorithm is~ specifically designed for that port. Based on my statistical analysis of the Issue Study and the United States. Coast Guard Study Report "Vessel Traffic Systems: Analysis of Port Needs" (August, 1973) and other related publications including the background data. supporting these studies, I have come to the following conclusions: 1. The data base used in the analysis is very poor and requires a great deal of judgment in drawing any conclusions; 2. There are a number of problems with the statistical techniques used. in the algorithm and its application to studies of individual ports; and 3. Nothing I have seen in the data, the statistical analysis, or the studies of the Coast Guard in any way supports the presently proposed Vessel Traffic System based solely on a voice communication network. I would now like to elaborate on these points. II. PROBLEMS WITH DATA BASE There are a number of problems with the data which lead me to believe that it. is virtually impossible to draw reliable conclusions from this data. In the Issue Study, it is noted that: "The method chosen uses recent empirical data to estimate the expected casualty losses in a port which are caused by the types of accidents that may be prevented by a vessel traffic system and then uses a combination of empirical data and judgment to determine the expected reduction in casualty losses if a vessel traffic system is implemented or improved." (Issue Study, p. 6-2.) "This evaluation must quantify the effect of VTS on the probability of an accident. Present experience with VTS is so limited that a rigorous mathematical PAGENO="0277" 273 formulation cannot he developed from existing data with sufficient reliability to justify its use." (Issue Study, p. 6-7.) Data deficiencies were noted to be a significant problem in the Issue Study. They include problems with correlation of accident locations to port areas covered. by VTS. The statistics on vessel transits available from the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers "Waterborne Commerce of the United States," 1969- 1974, are difficult to correlate with information available from the Coast Guard. concerning the location of accidents. The Issue Study also concludes that it is. difficult to correlate the effect of a specific Vessel Traffic System to casualty cause. Thus, the data is difficult to use in the support of any conclusion according to their own statements. Another significant problem is the reporting of accidents. It is clear that a large number of accidents go unreported for a variety of reasons. It also appears that the percentage of accidents actually reported varies over the period 1969- 1972 (the Coast Guard study period). This would of course lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the accident probabilities in given port areas. The four-year time period used was very brief. This problem could not have been overcome at the time of the study; however, data are now available through 1974 and show some significantly different patterns from those of the 1969-1972 period. Other data problems include errors in the Marine Vessel Casualty Reports (MVCR CG-2692). "The information called for in the `Report of Vessel Casualty or Accident' Form 2692 . . . lacks adequate detail in several areas, especially on factors related to the cause of the accident, vessel movement and specific location." (Issue Study, p. 6-61.) "The data which is transcribed to punch cards . . . omit some valuable data on the report form. The associated coding instructions leave too much room for judgment in assigning codes to the data in the reports with a resulting lack of consistency." (Issue Study, p. 6-61.) The Issue Study would thus lead us to believe that the information available concerning the number of accidents, the cause of accidents, and the coding of~ information reported is totally unreliable. It is difficult to see how any conclusions ba.sed on such data could be given much weight. It is therefore quite apparent that the data base is very inadequate for decision making purposes. The con- clusion that a particular level of VTS should be installed in the New Orleans~ area must therefore be based on something other than statistically factual information. This conclusion is probably best supported by the Issue Study: "The information contained in the Vessel Casualty Report Form CG-2692 provides very little to establish the cause of the accident and even less to deter- mine what might have prevented it. This is presumably left up to the Marine Inspector, since to require such information from the vessel master or the owner might involve self-incrimination in some cases." (Issue Study, p. 6-68.) This is the data set upon which the decision for the presently proposed system is supposedly based. III. PROBLEMS WITH STATISPICAL TECHNIQUES USED The development of the algorithm is fairly straightforward but does include a. number of assumptions which may or may not be applicable to the New Orleans area. My major reservation, however, is not with the logic of the algorithm but with the application of the algorithm to the New Orleans port area. Since the original Issue Study did not include any New Orleans data, it is impossible to determine whether or not such information would have affected the construction of the algorithm. It is not difficult, however, to see that the algorithm must use a. combination of empirical data and judgment to determine the effect through the expected reduction in casualty losses. The method used in the Issue Study was analysis on a case-by-case basis of each reported accident. "The method presented here is based on estimating separately the effects of various VTS levels in reducing each type of casualty . . . It has the disad- vantage, however, of requiring a considerable amount of judgment when esti- mating VTS effects." (Issue Study, p. 6-109.) Thus, we see that the method used was to analyze each accident case chosen for analysis in order to determine the level of VTS necessary to prevent the* accident. Because of problems with the data base noted earlier, such a decision would require a great deal of judgment and could of course be influenced by any biases of the reviewer. The general guidelines used were: "any collision, ram- ming, or grounding involving a participating vessel is potentially preventable,. PAGENO="0278" 274 but only if the VTS would actually affect the vessel's movement or its location given the same circumstances causing the accident . . . The estimated accident prevention rate for any level of VTS at a specific port should properly take into -account the causes of different types of accidents in that port in determining the degree to which they would be affected by the proposed VTS." (Issue Study, pp. 111-112.) The classification of a given accident into preventable or not preventable is -obviously extremely subjective and requires knowledge of the individual port conditions. "Application of the case-by-case analysis method requires not only a consid- eration of the factors cited for the previously discussed method, but also a detailed examination of the causes and circumstances of each casualty for contributing factors such as qualifications of person(s) in charge, currents, location in the port, traffic congestion, etc. For this reason, this method can best be applied by personnel at the port who are familiar with conditions there and have access to the original casualty reports." (Issue Study, pp. 113-114.) ~jT~ again see that conclusions must, for the most part, be based on subjective *judgment rather than on hard statistical facts. Recall that the Issue Study points out that the MVCR Form 2692 "provides very little to establish the cause of the accident and even less to determine what might have prevented it." In the application of the algorithm to the New Orleans area, a great deal of such subjectivity entered the analysis. The United States Coast Guard Study Report "VTS: Analysis of Port Needs," August, 1973, (hereafter referred to as Coast Guard Study Report) concludes that: "at present, it is estimated that ~accident reports are filed on only 30 % of the reportable casualties . . . For purposes of this analysis, it was estimated that casualty reports were completed on accidents accounting for approximately 50% of the total cargo and vessel damage;" (P. 5.) Amazingly, the analyst chose to adjust for this factor arbitrarily. "Therefore, the total, annual vessel and cargo loss values calculated using the algorithm were multiplied by a factor of 2." (P. 5.) Statistically, such a procedure cannot be justified. To further complicate the problem, they concluded that the damage reported on the casualty reports were only about half of the actual damage and "therefore, to compensate for inaccurate loss estimates, a second factor of 2 was applied to the vessel and cargo figures calculated by the algorithm . . . In summary, the vessel and cargo loss values were multiplied by a factor of 4 to compensate for unreported accidents and inaccurate vessel and cargo damage estimates." (Coast Guard Study Report, p. 6.) Again, such a procedure is statistically totally unjustifiable. There is little more justification for multiplying the data by a factor of 4 than for multiplying by 3, 5, or 2.6. Such a procedure would allow the analyst to come to any con- elusion by simply deciding what the conclusion should be and choosing the data adjustment factor accordingly. Other problems with the statistical analysis were apparent. The size of a ship was not considered as a separate factor in the analysis. This may or may not be justifiable. Only analysis of accurate data could determine this factor. Un- fortunately, in the development of the algorithm in the original form, the re- searchers found that "the appropriate level of VTS for any given port can only be properly determined from a cost-effectiveness analysis of the various VTS options available to the given port, and this is beyond the scope of the current study." (Issue Study, pp. 6-39, 40.) The damage reduction figures for the New Orleans port were therefore based upon the analysis in the Coast Guard Study Report of August, 1973. This is the * same data base which has been described as being unreliable for determining necessary VTS levels for accident prevention. Although ports comparable to -the New Orleans area with radar-based vessel traffic systems are available, no analysis of such ports has been performed, to my knowledge. I am specifically referring to the port of Rotterdam, which has for a number of years had a Vessel Traffic System including surveillance. A thorough - analysis of such a system should be deemed essential prior to the implementation of a working system in the New Orleans-Mississippi River area. It would seem to me to be much more cost-effective to analyze an existing situation rather to install a Vessel Traffic System such as the one which has been proposed and which existing data does not support. I have begun to collect information concerning the port of Rotterdam. However, the collection and analysis of this information will be very - time consuming. PAGENO="0279" .275 IV. PRESENTLY PROPOSED VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM The Coast Guard has proposed a Vessel Traffic System which would include only a voice communication network and would not include surveillance in the form of radar or television cameras. It is my feeling that statistically this proposal is without any support. This view was shared in the original Coast Guard Study Report recommendations: "Algorithm results indicate some form of surveillance is necessary from Mile 75 to Mile 109." (P. B-5). Thus, the original Coast Guard Study Report concluded that New Orleans ranked very high in need for a VTS. The report shows that New Orleans was divided into three sectors.L3 was recom- mended for two of these sectors and L3 for one of the sectors. Thus they concluded. that the statistics available indicated that L3 (radar and/or television surveillance) was desirable in the most heavily trafficked area of the New Orleans port. It is easy to see how this conclusion came about. Chart I shows that level L2 reduces Type 1 accidents by approximately 52 percent while L3 reduces it by approximately 72 percent. Total accidents with L2 are reduced by about 19 percent while L3. reduces total accidents by about 29 percent. In dollar terms, the reduction in damage by L2 is about $520,000 as estimated while level L3 reduces dollar damage by about $800,000. The Coa.st Guard Study Report on pages B-8--10 therefore presents a very strong argument for some form of radar and/or television surveil- lance in this particular sector of the Mississippi River. This follows the conclusion in the Issue Study that "in most ports different levels of VTS would be indicated for different sectors of the port." (P. 6-109.) This Issue Study also concluded that the preventable accidents indicate the expected savings that would result from a Vessel Traffic System a.nd thus are very useful in a cost-benefit analysis of various levels of Vessel Traffic Systems. The Coast Guard Study Report ran into a number of problems in analyzing the New Orleans port area. The problems with the data and the manipulation of data have already been noted. They found it difficult to determine the effect of various levels of VTS. "Tue basic surveillance mode does not include sufficient features for positive~ control, but does considerably improve the shore-based center's knowledge of the presence and movement of vessels in the area. "In a case-by-case study, it was difficult to determine whether surveillance would have been necessary to prevent any particular accident." (Coast Guard Study Report, p. 14.) Thus, the Coast Guard Study Report concluded that it was difficult to deter- mine the level of Vessel Traffic System necessary to prevent the accident on a case-by-case basis, but that surveillance in some form does improve knowledge of ship movement. This would be particularly true of the New Orleans area. The Coast Guard Study Report also concludes that: "it was difficult to determine whether this level would be required to prevent any particular casualty. It was evident from plotting accidents on charts and from reviewing transit data, that some port areas were extremely congested and dangerous. Collision avoidance radar and computer-interfaced equipment was considered to be necessary to pre- vent many of the casualties which occurred in relatively open water where traffic density was high, and traffic patterns diverse and complicated." (P. 15.) While their conclusions do support implementation of a Vessel Traffic System with surveillance, they note: "It must be kept in mind that the estimated reduction in accidents based on this lengthy analysis is subjective. The actual effectiveness will be determined by evaluating the results obtained from operating systems." (Coast Guard Study Report, p. 23.) Although the Coast Guard recommends that the actual effectiveness should be determined by evaluating an operating system, it is my understanding that the computer configuration currently on order does not include data collection capa- bilities and will not be able to provide any information concerning the amount of use of the system, the effectiveness of the system, or any basis upon which to decide whether the system is in fact desirable or not. I find it incredible that the~ Coast Guard would install a system which is unable to supply such statistical information for future analysis. Various other reports were also enlightening on this issue. The United States Coast Guard, Department of Transportation, "Vessel Traffic System-What Is Needed to Prevent and Reduce Vessel Accidents," by the Comptroller General of the United States, noted that the sophisticated systems were installed in San. Francisco and Puget Sound because ". . . in some cases, maritime interests had. PAGENO="0280" 276 ~expressed preference for the more sophisticated systems." (P. iii.) Thus local views were instrumental in the types of systems installed. This is not true of the New Orleans experience. The study further concludes that "the instrumental benefits of using sophisticated systems are not really known and that the actual ~effectiveness would have to be determined by evaluating operating systems." (P. 5.) Again, such a system is operational in the port of Rotterdam. The concern that many have with the presently proposed system is the voice communication effectiveness and as noted in the United States CoastGuard Study "VTS IssuesStudy, Final Report," Volume I, Executive Summary, March, 1973, "the effectiveness of the system can be no better than the weakest component." (P. 6.) The weakest component of said system is the communication network. Other data indicate that the need for a system above New Orleans (between the Hiiey P. Long Bridge and Baton Rouge) is actually not great. The problems in this area certainly could be handled without surveillance. The report by the Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard Draft, "Vessel Traffic System New Orleans," Environmental Impact Statement, August, 1974, concluded that there were too many vessels for a partial com- munication network. "The amount of traffic on a given radio frequency each minute would render the net useless. Many masters would be unable to forewarn others of their pres- ence due to their inability to break through. A fully implemented VTS would eliminate this danger." (Vessel Traffic System New Orleans, p. 7.) Of a partial radar and communication only, they conclude that: "there are too many areas where accident rates are high to attempt to get by with minimum radar and radio coverage. Full radar and communications must be provided if the high maritime accident rate in the New Orleans area is to be reduced." (Vessel Traffic System New Orleans, p. 7.) They further state that: "consideration to using other combinations was con- sidered, and on a partial implementation basis, was deemed unacceptable and unreasonable. A VTS does, in fact, have all the combinations of the above. How- ever, it is the use of all combinations at maximum efficiency that makes the VTS useful and effective." (Vessel Traffic System New Orleans, p. 7.) Thus conclusions of studies commissioned by the Coast Guard and performed by the Coast Guard indicate that a full radar surveillance system is essential for the safe operation of the port of New Orleans. No factual information supports the presently proposed system. TABLES 1-Vill Tables I-VT represent the number of accidents, the number of vessel transits, and the calculated probability of an accident occurring for the fiscal years 1969 through 1974, respctively. These data are divided into ship type (k) and accident type (j). We are therefore able to determine the probability of ship type k having accident type j in year t. A ~, k represents the number of vessels in accidents by ship type k and accident type j. N k represents the number of vessel transits by ship type Ic and P(A) ~ indicates the probability of ship type Ic having accident type j. The probability of an accident by each ship type for all accident types is also computed and shown as a total within each of the ship type cells. At the bottom of each table are probabilities of accidents by accident type; thus, P(A) repre- sents the probability of accident type j for all ship types. The figure at the bottom of the probability column represents the probability of an accident of any type occurring to any ship type. In 1969, this figure was 31.83 x 1O_~. In scanning the tables, we see that the probability of an accident occurring has increased signifi- cantly between 1969 and 1974 based on the number of accident reports filed. Table VII shows the total accidents ,vessel transits, and probability of accident by ship type for the years 1969 through 1974. The total for all ship types for the 1969-1974 preiod is represented by a probability of 92.46 x 1O~. Table VIII shows the number of accidents, vessel transits, and probability of an accident by accident type for the period 1969-1974. Following is a description of the accident types by number as they appear in ~the tables: 1. Collisions in meeting, crossing, or overtaking situations; 2. Collisions in docking, mooring, or anchoring situations; 3. Rammings of fixed objects; 4. Rammings of non-fixed objects; 5. Groundings. PAGENO="0281" 277 ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS AND PROBABiLITY OF ACCIDENT, NEW ORLEANS, FISCAL YEAR 1969-74 TABLE 1.-FISCAL YEAR 1969 Number of vessels in Total number Probability of Accident accidents, of transits, accident X Ship typek type] A~,k N k ~ P(A)~,k Tanker 1 0 0 2 1 20.73 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 2 41.45 3 4,825 62.18 Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 11 33. 15 2 5 15.07 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 2 6.03 18 33,180 54.25 10 13.02 6 7.81 0 0 O 0 2 2.60 Total 18 76, 790 23. 44 barge 1 6 6.24 2 13 13.52 3 2 2.08 4 0 0 5 0 0 Total 21 996, 158 21.84 1 15 26.73 2 6 10.69 3 3 5.35 4 0 0 1 1.78 25 56,111 44.55 j A~ N 1 42 15.73 2 31 11.61 3 5 1.78 4 0 0 5 7 2.62 85 267,064 31.83 PAGENO="0282" 278 TABLE IL-FISCAL YEAR 1970 Number of vessels in Total number Probability of Accident accidents, of transits, accident X Ship type k typej A ~, Nj, 104 P(A)3, j, Tanker 1 2 36.25 2 9 163. 13 3 2 36.25 3 54.38 90.63 Total 21 5, 517 380. 64 Cargo ships and passenger vessels 18 52. 11 2 19 55. 01 3 2___ - 5.79 4 2 ____ : 5 17 49. 22 Total 58 34, 540 167. 92 Tank barge 1 18 23 68 a 15 19.73 3 2 2.63 5.26 2 2.63 Total 41 76, 023 ~ Cargo barge 12 11.56 10 9.63 6.74 1 .96 ___________ 3.85 34 103,807 32.75 Tow, tug 1 30 55. 15 2 18 33.09 3 10 18.38 4 7.35 5.12 Total 65 54,393 119.50 _________ N 1 80 29. 17 2 71 25.89 3 23 8.39 4 14 5.10 5 31 11.30 Total 219 274, 28~ 79 84 PAGENO="0283" 279 TABLE 111.-FISCAL YEAR 1971 Number of vessels in Total number Probability of Accident accidents, of transits, accident X Ship typek typej A~,k N k 10~~ P(A)j,k 1 3 53.70 2 1 17.90 3 2 35.80 4 0 0 5 5 89.49 11 5,587 196.89 18 63.92 12 42.62 I 8 28. 41 1 5 17.76 13 46.17 56 28, 159 198.87 1 10 12.60 2 12 15. 11 3 2 2.52 4 4 5.04 5 3 3.78 79,395 39.05 8 7.30 38 34.70 9 8.22 0 0 5 4.57 60 139,524 54.78 Tanker Total - Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 Total...._.. Tank barge~___ Total Cargo barge Total Tow,tug 2 3 4 5 1 19 34.26 2 27 48.68 3 11 19.83 4 2 3.61 5 10 18.03 69 55,465 j Aj N 1 2 3 4 5 . 58 90 32 11 36 20.85 32.36 11.51 3.95 12.94 Total 227 278,130 81.62 PAGENO="0284" 280 TABLE IV.-FISCAL YEAR 1972 Number of vessels in Total number Probability of' Accident accidents, of transits, acc~dent X Ship typek typej A, j,k N k 10_aP(A)~, 1 5 95.82 2 3 5749 3 1 19.16 4 0 0 5 8 153.32 Total 17 5,218 325.80 Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 15 16 5355, 22 73.64 1 2 6.69 9 30.12 Total 64 29, 876 214. 22 Tank barge 1 15 17.62 2 7 8.22 3 4 4.70 4 1 1.17 4 4.70 Total 31 85, 108 36. 42 1 20 14.99 2 15 11.24 3 8 6.00 4 0 0 5 0 0 Total 43 133, 440 32. 22 Tow, tug 1 22 35.23 2 16 25.62 3 12 19.22 4 1 1.60 5 2 3.20 53 62,451 84.87 I A3 N P(A)j - 1 2 3 4 5 77 57 47 4 23 24.36 18.03 14.87 1.27 7.28 208 316,093 65.80 PAGENO="0285" 281 TABLE V-FISCAL YEAR 1973 Number of vessels in Total number Probability of Accident accidents, of transits, accident X Ship typek typej Aj,k N k 10-~P(A)~,k Tanker 1 1 17.89 2 4 71.61 3 4 71.61 4 0 0 5 10 179.02 Total 19 5, 586 340. 14 Cargo ships and passenger vessels 1 18 61. 05 2 54 183.15 3 15 50.88 4 4 13.57 5 19 64.44 Total 110 29,484 373.03 Tank barge 1 14 16. 15 2 32 36.92 3 3 3.46 4 1 1.15 5 1 1.15 Total 51 86, 672 58. 84 Cargo barge 1 12 9. 24 1 60 46.21 1 27 20.79 0 0 0 5 4 3.08 luLal 103 129, 847 79.32 Tnw tue 1 26 42.11 45 72.88 25 40.49 2 3.24 5 8.113 103 61,743 166.82 j A1 N P(A)1 1 2 3 4 5 71 195 74 7 39 386 313,332 22.66 62.23 23.62 2.23 12.45 132.19 PAGENO="0286" 282 TABLE \`I.-FISCAL YEAR 1974 NEW ORLEANS ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS AND PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT Number of vessels in Total number Probability of Accident accidents, of transits, occident X Ship type k type j A k N k 10 -~, P(A)~, 1 2 29.27 2 9 131.71 3 0 0 4 2 29.27 5 32 468.32 45 6, 833 658. 57 17 58.25 150. 76 10 34.26 1 343 154. 18 __________ 117 29,186 400.88 19 22.86 34 40.92 6.02 6.02 6 7.22 69 83, 098 83.03 17 12.20 110 78. 95 5.02 2.87 15 10. 77 153 139,334 109.81 70.79 42 67. 57 14 22.52 14.48 18 28.96 127 62.154 204.33 A~ N 1 30.88 2 239 7455 3 36 11.23 4 21 6.55 5 116 36.18 511 320,605 159.3 TABLE VII.-ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS, AND PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT BY SHIP TYPE-NEW ORLEANS, FISCAL YEAR 1969-74 Number of Probability of vessels in Total number accidentX1O-~ Ship type k accidents Ak of transits N~ Tanker 116 33, 566 3115 59 Carlo ships and passenger vessels 423 184, 425 229. 36 Tank barge 241 487, 091 49.48 Cargo barge 414 712, 110 58. 14 Tow,tug 442 125.46 Total 1, 636 1, 769, 509 92.46 Tanker Total Cargo ships and passenger vessels Tank barge Total TrthI Csrgo barge Total Two, tug Total Total PAGENO="0287" 283 TABLE Vlll.-ACCIDENTS, TRANSITS, AND PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT BY ACCIDENT TYPE-NEW ORLEANS, FISCAL YEARS 1969-74 Accident type J Number of vessels in accidents A~ Total number of transits NJ Probability of accidentXl0-5 P(A)j 1 2 3 - 4 5 427 683 217 57 252 24.13 38.60 12.26 3.22 14.24 Total 1, 636 1,769, 509 92.46 Mr. O'NEIL. I would, if the committee would allow me a few minutes, like to perhaps try to put this in perspective and make some suggestion on where we could go from here. I think I speak for everybody who is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee for Ports and Waterways and AWO, and in saying we are gratified that this committee presented itself and listened to what we have had to say today. We hope we have impressed the committee on our concerns, particu- larly with what is going on in New Orleans. Most of the people whom I represent have been on the river for at least 50 years. They know every bend, every turn, every sand bar and other bars, I am sure. They have been in the wheelhouses of the boats. Theyare realists, not obstructionists, and I hope we have not conveyed to anybody that we are trying to obstruct the implementation of this system. They foresee very real problems in what has been developed so far, and only want the opportunity to give the Coast Guard what they feel is safe methods of operation. They are very concerned with the hazardous materials regulation and the pollution statute. If a system is put out on the Lower Mississippi River which is in the least bit unsafe or unworkable or unfeasible, many of these people could well go out of business with the penalties under those statutes. They carry a great deal of chlorine; they carry dangerous cargo, hazardous cargo in great quantities, and for those reasons they are so vitally concerned. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act in section 122(e) sets forth the criteria that must be followed in implementing that and I think we have illustrated today many of these have not been met. There is said much as to the scope and the degree of hazardous material, and I am sure that is appreciated. I do not know of any study-and Dr. Brite will make just a few comments on that-on whether or not the intercoastal waterway overlapping areas were ever considered. 78-280-76-19 PAGENO="0288" 284 `~he econoi~ic impact au~l `ef~ect `on these people ~rom their point of view of licensing-and their -radios, 140 not believe that it has been given serious considera~iom Th~ local pl'actice, knowledge, and custom, to which Cotrgressm'an -T-reen referred -to~ ~gain is anotber -area that `all `o~f `t'h~e ~st forth as criterion must be -considered by -a wide variety of interests. Perhaps this will be considered in the ñitüré. It èeñainly tb our knowledge has not been considered in the past, although we haire had a soundmg board and-there has been no response. We wou'd suggest therefore that perhaps the following piocedure should be followed in this matter; and that is that, subject to, again, Dr. Brite's comments, I think I preempted him~ but I myself might as well go ahead and finish, `fur the cothmit'tee whom I represent discussed this last night and we would like Tto suggest these procedures and perhaps have them endorsed b~r this `committee. We think that it is absolutely essential that advance notice of proposed regulation be withdrawn. These regulations in their present form are unworkable and they do not represent the cOmments cer- tainly which this industry has made. * Mr. TREEN. Are you going to file, or do you have one filed now under the procedure, under the advance notice, or are you going to file comments in the i~~cord? Mr. O'NEIL. Congressman, we have filed as of September 3 over 30 comments to those and we are cut 6ff procedurally from doing anything else, and it sits with the Coast Guard to determine what they will do. That has been done. The `second point is, I do net see personall~r any need for a formal *.~advisory committee at this time., aIthongh I do hot ~aht to waive that right if in fact that exists. I would hope `that ~ah `informal com- mittee could be established composed of eight people from the barge towing industry, representing a cross-section of their interests to `deal with the Coast Guard. Now, this committee must deal both with Washington and New Orleans because the reason we have to put a stop on the 8th Coast Guard District blaming Washington and Washington blaming the 8th Coast Guard District, we cannot e.fford to have `this any more and we are not responsible and we do not know what is happening. We submit `that all `of the meetings that this committee to treat the problems which have arisen today be recorded with testimony, with a court reporter so that there will be no misunderstanding what *has been said and what has transpired. We suggest that these meetings take place in New Orleans and that, `subsequent to these meetings, perhaps on April `1, 1977, if that :time span is adequate, that `that jbiht committee report be resub- mitted to this committee, resubmitted to this committee On what progress has been made. This will, I think, give us an opportunity to insure this committee that the system which will be put into New Orleans will be rational and reflective of our needs and that the funding that you have author- ized will be utilized effectively. We are not sure that that will happen right now. We think that no system could go in on a volunatry basis at all until these critical questions are resolved, and that is the position I think that we take. PAGENO="0289" 285 Dr. Brite `has done `a thorough analysis of the statistics which the Coast Guard `initially used to `design this `system for New `Orleans; and Ii would like now to defer to him `for one moment so that he can summarize those things because there are sOme `pro1biems that have been raised and we have done `our homework. We have "lodked at the statistics. We have tried to ~flnd out `how wo got to where we are `and we are `not sure `how we got to where `we `are; and `we are afraid-we `hope this is not `the case., `that `we may have been puthed `into an ~entbarrassing `situ'ation `that we may have a system that perha~ps is not the, right one for New Orleans, and if `that is the case, we ought to know `right `now `before we `~o `one `step f'urther'; `and ~[ `think Dr. Bri:te could `make some comments. Mr. B'IAGGI. Yes, `bii~f comments. Mr. BR!TE. Mr. `Chairman, Mr. Treen, gen~lernen': I `have ~been asl~ed to testify `for the `ad hoc committee and my complete report will be `available for `the record, ~but `for `time con- sid'era'tions, I `will just `make some `very `quidk `comments. The `analysis that I did was `for the purpose of determining what `statisticai procedure was us'ed by the Coast Gurad in proposing the present system. `Baaically, what I found `was that `there `were `a number `of prohiems with the data, a number `of problems `with `the statistical analysis; that `is, the statistical techniques `used, `and `a `number of problems with "the presently `proposed ~ystem. `The first `problem `was `that in the `devdlopm'ent `of "the methodology or analyzing the various `ports `in `determining `What''type of `syatem was necessary, New Orleans was not included in the development of what we call algorithm; that `is, the New ~Oileans `area, ~whieh is a ~artic'ularly `unique-unlike Houston, Puget `~Sound, `and various "other `areas, was not included in the `development `df this algorithm. The "cbncluaion `that `I have come to ~f'ter looking over `these reports and studying them in great detail is `that the "data base `use,d is very poor; that is, the `data deals `with reported ac~idents w'hich varies `considerably from one time ,period to the `next. One statement of the Coast `Guard `report was "that ~only ~bout `30 percent of actual accidents are in fact reported. The statistical tech- niques `they used were questionable in one particular case. The data concerning th'e number of `accidents `was doubled in order to `adjust for t'his `lack of `rep'ort"ing, and `then in ord~' to estimate th~ damage that was done,, the data was .again doubled; therefore, !%~J~ have a multiple of 4 used in `determining `the "outcome. Mr. TREEN. How do you know that that is inaccurate? Mr. BmT'E. T'h'e multiple of `4? Mr. TREEN. Yes. Mr. BRITE. I `have no `way of `knowing `that it is `not accurate, `but `there was nothing to justify it, `either. What I am `saying is one could choose any multiple and come to any conclusion that anyone `conid wish. Statistically it is j'ust `not justified with'out more justification than I have seen. The analysis of the data `was `based on a `case.~by-case analysis of the 2,692 forms. The result is that a great deal of judgment is neces- sary in `determining whether or not an accident can in fact be pre- vented; and I will not go `in'to the quotes, but they are available in the report-quotes `from the `Coast Guard report'; and I am specifi- cally referring to t.he issue study that was completed in March of PAGENO="0290" 286 1973, indicating that in fact someone familiar with that particular port, someone knowledgeable at that port should be available when analyzing the 2,692 forms to determine whether or not the accident could have been prevented. So there is a great deal of judgment involved in the analysis. The present proposed change, which is based on the Coast Guard's analysis of these reports, however, does recommend that, and I quote, "Results indicate some form of surveillance is necessary for mile 75 to mile 109. That is the most heavy congestion of the New Orleans Port." The conclusion of the Coast Guard report and the conclusion of the report that I have seen is that there must be some form of surveillance in order for the system to be workable, particularly in the section which is designed sector 3; and I did have some charts to verify this but I do not think I have time to go into those conclusions but again, my conclusion was that the reduction in accidents was approximately 52 percent, using the voice communication, network only, and approx.. imately 72 percent using the more sophisticated radar system. Now, I do not know that these figures are accurate. I have no way of knowing because, as I said, whether or not a particular accident could have been prevented is based to a great extent on judgment. In any case, the conclusions based on the statistics that the Coast Guard has was that there needed to be some form of surveillance, and I have seen no statistics, no data at all to indicate that the presently proposed system, not including surveillance, would be the appropriate one. So in conclusion, available data- Mr. TREEN. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, we are getting into the horrible question thing as far as I am concerned, and what I raised yesterday, and that is applying this system to the accidents that we have had using that as the basis on which we proceed with these things that are proposed to be implemented in the first phase, second phase, will they prevent the things that have happened on the river. That is the big issue as far as I am concerned. Mr. BRITE. No, sir. Congressman Treen, I have not seen in any of the statistical studies indicated that the presently proposed system of voice communication only will prevent a significant portion of accidents. There has been no study. Mr. TREEN. How about with radar added? How about with the full radar net? Mr. BmTE. The estimates of the Coast Guard are m their reports, are available in their reports; as I said, they are based on a very poor data base, and some questionable statistical techniques. Various studies have shown that in one case, 72 percent of the ac-. cidents could have- Mr. TREEN. I understood that; but what I want is your opinion as a statistician. Mr. BRITE. Statistically, I would have to go back to the original reports, the 2,692 forms and analyze them with the knowledge of the neople in the industry; that is, I would develop an algorithm specif- ically based on the New Orleans port and determine whether [or not their conclusions* were verifiable based on present data. PAGENO="0291" 287 Mr. TREEN. You are not able to say here that their conclusion is incorrect? You are just saying you do not believe scientifically that- Mr. BRITE. Statistically, it is not. Mr. TREEN. And they contend that it is correct. Mr. BRITE. Yes, sir; that is correct. Statistically, it has not been verified. Mr. TREEN. From your point of view, we do not know the answer to that basic question of how much- Mr. BRITE. That is true. Mr. TREEN [continuingi. Reduction in accidents we could receive from the proposed system in any of its stages, and you are not saying we do not have the answer to that? Mr. BRITE. Yes; that is correct. However, the Coast Guard does conclude that the New Orleans radar surveillance and TV is essential for the safe operation of this system; and that is-I have the quotes in the report; what I was going to suggest is the logical next step would be to actually look into the effect of the presently proposed system; that is, does a study based on the presently proposed system in order to try to determine what effect would there be because all other studies have come to the conclusion that this is not the correct system. Mr. TREEN. What other studies? Mr. BRITE. Studies of-all of the studies of the Coast Guard that I am including there, the issue study, which is a four-volume study done by the Coast Guard that came out in March of 1973, the analysis for the Fort Meade study, which is the basic document for, I assume, this recommendation. There was an environmental impact study in 1974; again, a con- clusion of all of these was that a full VTS system was essential for the safe operation of the New Orleans port. Mr. TREEN. Well, then, your contention is not the full system will not work. Your contention is that the initial phases of it would not work; is that correct? Mr. BRITE. What I am speaking to is the general proposed system is the one, including radio communication only; that is correct. Mr. TREEN. OK~ Go ahead. Mr. BRITE. Well, as a final statement, I just want to indicate, or to reiterate, I suppose, that the projection is based on the data from 1969 through 1974; indicate that there will be a tremendous increase in traffic, as we all suspect, through 1980; and I have projected through 1980 and we would also expect that accidents would increase at least as rapidly, with no VTS. There is nothing which I have seen which statistically supports the presently-proposed system and therefore I suggest that we need some justification of that system, statistical analysis, which does speak to the presently-proposed system and reduction that we could expect from it. V Thank you. Mr. BIAGGI. Admiral Fugaro? Admiral FUGARO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a couple of points. PAGENO="0292" 288 I am, not familiar with the points that Dr. Brite was making, with respect to New Orleans not being included in the algorithm and `I' would have to check that. But I believe the algorithm was developed to try and permit us to make a relative rating between the individual ports to give them a priority rating as to which ports should we go to first. I am not sure exactly which points Dr. Brite is referring to in that case, but as I think we have indicated, New Orleans came out as one of the prime priority ports, which should be addressed if and when we put VTS into existence. I believe the point he is making with respect to the case-by-case analysis of accidents is correct. We did this on an individual, case-by- case basis, and if anything, we were extremely conservative in the subjective judgment which we made on each of these cases. That is, if there was any doubt as to whether or not this was in effect or in fact a preventable accident, we did not include that in the category of preventable accidents. We were just looking for accidents which there was no question about, that if a VTS had been in existence, there was a possibility that the information provided through the YTS might have assisted in preventing that casualty. Again, in no case have we made the statement or indicated that all accidents are going to be prevented. That is not, I think, what the situation would be. What we are hoping to do is to reduce the number of accidents and, again, going back to existing systems, I think we have shown that these have provided a benefit and reduced the number of accidents that have occurred in ports where the VTS's are in existence. Within this category we also do feel that while we think surveillance is neces- sary, and we definitely want it, especially in the congested areas, as we have referred to, that while we consider surveillance necessary to complete the system,, communication is really the heart of the system. The communication and the passing of the advisory information, as I mentioned before, is going to be really the meat of the system and hopefully will achieve the maximum benefit of any part of the system. The most cost beneficial part of any VTS is the communications aspect. So while we love to have the complete system in all at once, and turn a switch, we~ still do feel that it is essential that we take this phase in operation, the first step of communication which is very vital, and will be very beneficial- Mr. TREEN. Was your analysis of your judgment as to which acci- dents were avoidable based solely upon your review of the 2692 form? Admiral FUGARO. Yes. We' took it case by case. Mr. TREEN. It is a matter of record which ones you judged could be prevented and which ones could not be? Admiral FTJGARO. Yes, sir. Mr. TREEN. Is there any reason that information could not be made available to those who wish to look at it? Admiral FUGARO. Yes, sir. It can be made available. Mr. TREEN. Well, it seems to me you ought to look at the 2692's and see how the Coast Guard analyzed them and- PAGENO="0293" 289 Mr. Q1Ni~i,i~ I. tried tp get tjiat information, congressman,.. We did not meet with any success m New Orleans Dr Brite went out to the vessel traffic center and got some statistics but by no means complete. One thing I think that should be emphasized is that the statement by Admiral, Fug~ro leads, me. to believe when they made the judg-. m~ent-my question is when, they made the judgmeht on. preventable. accidents under a VTS, were they talking about a fully-implemented VTS or the system with, which, we. must live, until 1980? Mr. TREEN. I understood thee was, one figure Qf~2 pe~'cent reductiop. during the early part of this and a 72 percent in the fulJ, irnplelp.9ntation; so you had two judgments, on each accident. Mr O'NEIL But that included some sort of surveillance that we would be operating, at least,, to 1980 without any-~ Mr T~EEN All I am saying is the Coast Guard has offered to make that information, available. Since you contest, Dr Brite, on a statistical basis, the justification for a system on which we are going t~. spend millions of dollars to taxpayer money, I think that if the Coast Guard is willing to let you into this, this committee would be interested in your analysis Mr. BRITE. Mr. Treen.,, quoting from, the report of the, Coast. Guard's Issue Study, ~orm 2692, lacks adequate detail, in, several areas, es-. pecially on factors relatip.g, to the cause of accidents, vessel move- ments, and specific locations That is, by admission of the Coast Guard studies, these forms lack a great deal of information And in fact it is very, very difficult to determine the cause of an accident and whether or not it could have been prevented. Somehow, this needs to be statistically justifiable, that is, we need to-one thing i~ would', suggest, is that we need some local input, on determining whether or not an accident could have been prevented, someone who is thoroughly faxnthar with the local area Mr. TREEN. I understand the Coast Guard is now saying these records on which they based. their judgment would be made ayailable to representatives of your group.,I do dot want to push yeu, Admiral, but-if it is not against your regulation or your authority, but i'f'you are agreeable to. do soinethiug: about this- ` ` Admiral FTIGARO. Yes, sir:. Mr. TREEN [contin,uing}., Then, you have a chance tQ look at them, and you can conclude that there is not sufficient infor~ati~u to make, a determination, and so forth. Mr. BIAc~GI. I have onc question, Captain Conrad. I think it was estimated. ~0Q vessels. in, the main stream-yop., responded there were many others and other channels in, other areas. How would you estimate that?' Captain C0NR'AD.. I would say probably' within the area, general area of New Orleans, there are many ves~els in the adj acent water- ways that would be. in the main streams ~f the Mississi.ppi; probably more, because generally speaking, vessels that negotiate the Missis- sippi River hav'e many, many barges in larges groupings handled by, one boat but those same barges., when they are broken down for distribution, throughout the canal network; whereas, arriving in New~ Orleans `under the power of I vessel with, 30 barges are now under PAGENO="0294" 29O~ a number of vessels which from 1 to 4 barges, in each tow, there is a multiplication that happens in New Orleans. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, captain. Once again the bells are ringing. We have two other witnesses and, in deference to their patience and convenience, we will return to listen to their testimony, but first, I would like to assure Mr. O'Neil and his group that the testimony collectively was more than informative. I am sure by this time you gather the intention of the committee is to obtain the best possible resolution to what seems to be a very complex problem in an area that has multiple problems. Once again, I address myself to the Coast Guard. I think that a very sincere, cooperative effort should be mani- fested. I do not mean just a facade, not just a token effort, but a very sincere, cooperative effort. I do not intend to substitute our judgment for your professional judgment, but on the other side of that coin, we have professionals who have been in the business for a lot longer, in most cases, than the members of the Coast Guard, and who have intimate knowledge of many of the problems. I am sure you have a common interest, at least in defining and providing safety, and let us assure ourselves that the Coast Guard and the industry are on "all fours" in seeking the optimum system, to follow. In the end, we would like to be satisfied that there has been substantial input and very serious consideration-very serious con- sideration to the total picture. Any doctrinaire position adopted by one side or the other should be given short shift. This committee feels very strongly about that. So, at this point, we will recess again for 10 minutes- Mr. O'NEIL. Mr. Chairman, the final two witnesses have indicated that we have touched all of the bases and that they have waived their right to oral comment; and we thank you very much for your indul- gence; and we would like to have their statements made a part of the record. Mr. BIAGGI. Without objection, is ordered. [The statements referred to follow:] STATEMENT OF DAVID CARLTON, VICE PRESIDENT, MARINE OPERATIONS, FEDERAL BARGE LINES, INC. Mr. Chairman-members of the committee-my name is David Canton. I am vice-president of marine operations of Federal Barge Lines, Inc. The company I represent was founded by the U.S. Government as the Inland Waterways Corp. during World War I, to pioneer barge line service on this Nation's waterways. The corporation was operated and expanded by public demand until 1953, when in its wisdom, Congress decided that a sufficient number of privately funded barge lines were in operation to serve the needs of the shipping public. At that time, the Government divested itself of the Inland Waterways Corp. and all of the equip- ment was purchased by the present owner, Pott Industries, Inc. As a private concern, Federal Barge Lines has continued as a leader in the inland waterways transportation field, serving the shipping public throughout the entire Mississippi River system. Federal Barge Lines is one of many barge lines serving this Nation, providing the service that transports 16 percent of this Nation's freight. A great portion of that freight is farm products, produced in the bread basket of the Nation-the Midwest. As you are well aware, it is farm products and farm products alone, that keeps this Nation's balance of payments in proportion in the world market. The Port of New Orleans exports more farm products to world markets than any other port in the country, and the major part of that grain is brought to New Orleans by barge. Those barges are towed by towboats owned by companies PAGENO="0295" 291 who employ men of great expertise in the towing industry-expertise that has been gained by many years of practical experience. Many of the top operating personnel of all barge lines are men who came up through the ranks from an assignment as deckhand-mate-pilot-captain and on into management positions. Men who know every facet of barge line operations. The barge line industry has, without a doubt, the finest safety record of any mode of transportation. This record has been accomplished and is maintained today by the facts I just stated. Men of great expertise are responsible for day-to- day operations of the towing industry and they are constantly striving to improve their safety record. That is one of the reasons you will always find barge line industry representatives willing to discuss any plan that will enhance their opera- tions to a greater degree of safety and efficiency. On August 6, 1975, a notice to mariners from the 8th Coast Guard District in New Orleans, dated July 29, 1975, was received in the St. Louis office of Federal Barge Lines. The contents of that notice was to notify all interested parties that a committee had been appointed to advise the Coast Guard of the industries' viewpoints on a proposed vessel traffic system, from the sea buoy to mile 243, Lower Mississippi River. The rationale behind the selection of this committee has never been fully understood. The notice indicated that the industry committee would be chaired by the president of the Crescent River Port Pilot's Association, who, at that time, was Captain David C. Wheat, Jr. The committee list I received was composed of many ship pilots belonging to various associations, several deep- draft shipping companies, and only a token amount of shallow draft operators, who were local in nature. There were no barge line representatives on the committee. After a hurried meeting among a number of barge line operating personnel, I contacted our American waterways operators representative in New Orleans, Captain Merle Harbourt. I expressed to him our grave concern that the segment of the industry that would be most affected, was not represented on this committee. Through his efforts, we were successful in having 12 major barge lines added to the list-Federal Barge Lines being included. It appeared to all of the barge line representatives that we had been purposly deleted. However, we were assured by the Coast Guard that this was not their intention. The revised advisory committee first met in New Orleans on August 19, 1975 at Coast Guard headquarters. We were under the impression that this would be the first step of industry input to the Coast Guard, to determine what type of system, if any, was needed in the New Orleans area. That illusion was soon shattered when a draft proposal was passed out to the members of the committee, outlining in detail the system proposed by the Coast Guard. We were informed by the commanding officer of New Orleans vessel traffic system that 18 days prior to this time, he had no knowledge of VTS systems whatsoever. He was, however, now the commanding officer of this proposed new system. Numerous Coast Guard officers advised the committee repeatedly that it was imperative we make a fast decision and recom- mendation because there was a contract on the street for the purchase of a $4.2 million computer. This astounded the entire committee, barge line operators, deep draft interests, and pilot associations alike! There was no question in industry representatives' mind that the dye had been cast for a computerized system and in fact, all items in the draft proposal were, in essence, really not negotiable. There was no ques- tion that all of this had been decided before any conversation had taken place with the affected parties. We did, however, agree that the industry should form several subcommittees to study different aspects of the Coast Guard's proposal. The subcommittees were broken down as follows: (1) A feasibility committee. (2) An "area to be covered" committee. (3) A mandatory voluntary participation committee. (4) A communications committee. (5) An operations committee. I was selected to chair the "area" committee. Members of my committee represented barge lines, ship pilot associations and Coast Guard. My committee met on September 17, 1975 and all of the affected parties, i.e., industry and pilots associations, agreed that the area the Coast Guard desired to implement a VTS over, was entirely without merit. Our recommendations were that an area cover- *ing New Orleans Harbor proper, a distance of approximately 30 miles, be used PAGENO="0296" ~%S ~ starting base with radar surveillance, which could be instituted much mOre ecOnomically and more effectively than the elaborate computerized system, as jtoposed by the Coast GuarcL During that COmmittee fneeting, Captain Henry Durham, president of the NOw Orleans-Baton Rouge Pilot Association, furnished data covering the prior 10-year period, which illustrated that his association had been involved in 55,622 ship movements and there had been, during that time, 24 collisions that could have conceivably been prevented by some type of vessel traffic control system; however, as he pointed out, there was no guarantee that the collisions would not have occurred had there been a system. He pointed out that percentage-wise, this amolinted to Only .0004 of 1 percent accident ratio. A figure so minute that there was certainly no justification of any expenditures of the taxpayers money to institute a VTS system. The other committees also reported back to the Coast Guard, as we did in the "area committee," that the system as proposed by the Coast Guard, was not justified or workable for many reasons. Two of the outstanding reasons were: laCk of radar surveillance and a totally unacceptable radiO communications sys- tem. Other testimony will be given at this hearing in greater detail of specific problem areas, that I will not endeavor to go into in my testimony. After all reports of the subcommittee had been turned in to the Coast Guard at a meeting held September 24, no further meetings were held until April of 1976. However, communications were received from Commander Boyce in February, flJ76, saying in effect, that he thanked us for our time and efforts as subcommittee chairmen and for all of the input we had contributed. He said, however, that he was recommending the Coast Guard implement the system in its entirety-, as originally proposed in the draft proposal we received on August 19, 1975. The maritime industry represebtatives that have attended meetings conducted by the 8th Coast Guard DistriCt cOncerning this matter, feel unanimously, that their attempted input into the development of the proposed system has been conipletely and totClly ignored. It seems apparent to all concerned that the course of events had been predetermined by the Coast Guard. Also, the high-handed and dictatorial manner in which the meetings were conducted, was certainly not conducive to a meaningful cooperative effort by the two parties to arrive at a constructive conclusion, or to correct aily problems in navigation, if indeed, such pi-oblems do exist. Without open-minded dialogue between the maritime indtistry and the U.S. Coast Guard, in this and in future matters, we will be left with no other choice but to believe that the proposed vessel traffic system, and other programs, are nothing more than a scheme of empire building on the part of the Coast Guard, at the expense of the maritime industry and the American public. There is grave concE~rn that the lack of expertise, knowledge and understanding of the shallow draft towing industry, by the U.S. Coast Guard, no matter how noble their intentions, could lead to a serious impairment of this Nation's inland waterways. The Coast Guard does not have among its ranks, to my knowledge, one man who has the practical experience or capabilties of operating a towboat and barges of the type used on the Lower Mississippi River. It is apparent that they have chosen to ignore the real experts of this industry ahd would like for the industry to conform to their manner of thinking, regardless of the Cost. As I was told at one meeting in New Orleans, "We (the U.S. Coast Guard) have been mandated by Congress through the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 to embark on a vessel management program." I tind it hard to believe tlìat the Congress ever intended to place in the hands of the military the po'~ver to resttict, interfere with and dictate programs and policies to private industry, as they so choose. I would like to assure the members of this committee that the barge line industry will always be willing to work with Government agencies in order to promote the safety and efficiency of our operations that are so vital to the economic well-being and defense of this Nation. We do, however, feel that it is imperative that officers of the Coast Guard be directed to heed the advice of the experts before attempting to implement regulations that have such a far-reaching effect. In closing, I would like to state that throughout this industry, after our experi- ence in this matter, we are cognizant of the meaning of the statement of Justice Brandeis, and I quote: "Experience should teach us to be on guard, to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." This concludes my testimony. I will be more than happy to answer any ques- tions on what I have stated or on technical matters that will be discussed. PAGENO="0297" 293 WIsCoNsIN BARGE LINE, INC. Hartford, Iii., September 14, 1976. Hon. MARIO BIAGGI, Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Room .1334, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515 DEAR CONGRESSMAN BIAGGI: I am in receipt of your letter of September 10, 1976, wherein you invite me to appear before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation in regards to the Proposed Vessel Traffic Service to be instituted by the U.S. Coast Guard as proposed in Volume 41 of the Federal Register, No. 18 (Thursday, June 17, 1976), at Pages 24604 to 24670. I am opposed to the institution of the Vessel Traffic Service by the U.S. Coast Guard on the Lower Mississippi River embracing the Mississippi River from its gulf outlet to Mile 243, AHP, Lower Mississippi River. In the following paragraphs I list some of my objections. My first objection to the proposal that have been given in this Advance Notice is the fact that the system as proposed is not a complete system that would bring about the reduction of accidents in what is commonly known as the New Orleans-Baton Rouge port area. A system such as proposed in the Advance Notice wherein you have a radio or audio system use in conjunction with a computer is not practical in being able to determine at any given time where a vessel and its tow would be situated in this area. I feel that any vessel traffic system along with the rzdio communication set up within it, and along with the computer into which the radio communications set up within it, and along with the computer into which the vessels within the area would contribute input; must also have a radar surveillance incorporated in the system. With a radar surveillance component in the system you would not only have the audial informa- tIon to which the computer could produce projections on traffic, but you would also have a visual check that would verify and show any discrepancy that the computer might make with the information that had been supplied it. In my estimation, you cannot have one without the other, to have the system that is needed .to produce the results that are projected. Originally as I had understood it and according to comments made by the Coast Guard in explaining to us the proposed vessel traffic control system, the Coast Guard had taken a position at that time that a system would not be satisfac- tory without radar surveillance. Now I find that in an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that a system will be installed that does not have radar surveillance and in my opinion I concur with the Coast Guard's previous statement that it would not be sufficient or practical. Looking through the different sections of the Advance Notice I see nowhere in the Advance Notice where there will be employment of civilian professional pilot personnel to help in the operation of the VTS. I am aware that the Coast Guard is a military organization and that one of the doctrines within this military organization is the transferring of its personnel throughout its military locations anywhere from two to four years. Therefore, if this VTS system as proposed is put into operation, we could have personnel directing the movement of towboats and ships within the VTS area, individuals who have never seen the Mississippi River and who do not have any degree of expertise in the art of piloting tows in the VTS area. At this point, I would also like to bring out that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, another military organization, does have operations on the Mississippi River and its tributaries. They differ in their methods of operation in comparison with the Coast Guard, in the fact that they employ civilians who do have expertise in regards to the river and who have the ability to develop themselves and their career in the Corps of Engineers due to the fact that they are not transferred from one location within the Army Corps of Engineers operation to .another. I am aware that in some of the districts the gentlemen who are civilians in the Army. Corps of Engineers have been employed for ten to 20 years and have become experts over the specialized area in which they have contributed their time and talents. This is not true of the Coast Guard and their method of operating within the Inland Waterways in the United States. It seems just about the time that we have an officer of the Coast Guard who is in charge of some particular function pertain- ing to navigation on the Mississippi River and its tributaries; and who has devel- oped a knowledge and expertise over a period of three years, that at that time he is transferred our of the district into another district of the Coast Guard. The man who replaces him comes in as a man who is not aware of the problems that he is assuming in regards to river navigation. PAGENO="0298" 294 I feel that professional licensed pilots who have been engaged in piloting ships and towboats in the VTS area should be employed on a permanent basis with the incentive to make a career of employment in the VTS. These men have been em- ployed in the movement of towboats or ships in the VTS area. This would remove the objection that so many of the members of the towing industries have in re- gards to the Coast Guard personnel that would be operating this VTS. I feel that we should have Coast Guard officers in charge of the VTS but the actual operation of the system should be in the hands of professional licensed pilots. I also find in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that the requirements that we will have to comply with in the operation of the VTS system; in that we must monitor three channels; will lead to confusion to the master and pilot on watch on board the towboat or ship. In some cases I doubt where we are going to be sharing a channel with another government agency in regards to one of the VTS sectors, that the volume of transmission that would be made on that channel will be such that we will have nothing but a garble of noise and interference. My thoughts in regards to using the VHF channels for each individual sector should be that there would be a clear VHF channel for each VTS sector. Even with a clear channel to each VTS sector, depending on the density of ships and towboats in that individual sector, a pilot might find great difficulty in breaking through the traffic that would already be transmitting on that clear channel assigned to that VTS sector. Another point that I wish to bring up at this time is that I feel the total area covered in the VTS is too big. Some months previous when the Coast Guard was conferring with an Ad Hoc Committee of better than 50 members in the towing industry; the Ad Hoc Committee had brought up the point that they felt it would be more advisable to have a selected area possibly from Mile 85, AHP, Lower Mississippi River, to Mile 120, AHP, Lower Mississippi River. The Ad Hoc Com- mittee pointed out as a specific instance that a VTS in the area of Algiers Point would be a good practical installation to try the system. This would enable the experience gained in operating such a VTS system and would provide an area where there are many ships and towboats going through such an area. At that time the Coast Guard took this information that had been offered by the Ad Hoc Committee and said.they would take it under advisement. In a subsequent letter the commanding officer of the VTS system politely thanked the Ad Hoc Committee members for their suggestion, but that he had decided that they would install the complete VTS system from the sea buoy at the mouth of the Lower Mississippi River to Mile 243, AHP, Lower Mississippi River. As I expressed to the gentlemen in a letter I felt that our participation in that Ad Hoc Committee was purely for the mechanics of complying with the re- quirement that the towing industry be consulted. I still feel that a good area to use as the initial area in which a VTS system would be installed and operated therein; would be an area which would encompass 15 miles south of Algiers Point and 15 miles north of Algiers Point. This would give one of the best opportunities to observe and determine the efficiency of a VTS system in the New Orleans port area. There are many other points that raise questions in regards to the proposed VTS for New Orleans. I am in complete agreement with all comments that are being submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee for ports and waterways, to the Coast Guard in regards to this Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Yours truly, THOMAS E. KENNY, Vice-President, Administrative. Mr. BIAGGI. I want to tell Capt. David Canton, vice president of marine operations of the Federal Barge Lines, and Mr. Thomas E. Kenny, vice president, administrative, of the Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc.-let me extend on behalf of the entire committee and myself our sincere thanks. The meeting is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.] PAGENO="0299" U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES IN UPPER GREAT LAKES FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1976 HOUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Sault Sainte Marie, Mich The subcommittee met at the Cisler College Center, Lake Superior State College, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., Hon. Eligio de la Garza, acting chairman, presiding. Mr. DE LA GARZA. The subcommittee will be in order. I bid all of you good morning. This subcommittee is the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and we are meeting this morning here as part of the general responsibility of this subcommittee for the oversight responsibility over the operations of the U.S. Coast Guard. For some time the subcommittee has been trying to get up here at the insistence of Congressman Ruppe. Unfortunately, there is always a problem with one member or another of the committee and we have finally managed to select a date at which at least three of the members of the committee are here. Unfortunately, our subcommittee chairman and colleague, the Honorable Mario Biaggi of New York has been engaged this week in the activities of the Democratic Convention in New York City and he found it impossible to be here. I might add he was one of the leaders in having our colleague, Mr. Rodino, made the Vice Presidential nominee and he wasn't too successful in that endeavor. He has asked me to serve as chairman in his absence and he, along with all the other members of the committee, look forward to hearing and receiving our personal impressions and information derived from this hearing. I might add that I represent a district-if you went south from here, and you hit the other border, that is where I live. We also have a bridge that crosses into Mexico and we cross the Rio Grande River, so I represent a very similar area, but at the op~. posite extreme of our country. Brownsville is probably the southern~ most part of the continental United States. Hawaii is lower, but Brownsville is the southernmost part. Well, sometimes the people from Key West argue. [Laughter.] But at this time this morning I might mention to you that we are trying to listen to you and have all the information that we can and still we would like to get to the locks on one of the boats on the lake, (295) PAGENO="0300" 296 and so on, so we are going to ask your indulgence that you limit your testimony as brief as possible without cutting anyone off, but you have the availability, as I'm sure all of you know, of inserting into the record any information you would like. It doesn't necessarily have to be mentioned here. For that purpose, the record will remain open until August 2, 1976, foi any inclusions or enclosures or addi- tional views that anyone here might wish to submit. Our primary purpose in coming to the Soo, of course, is to review the vessel traffic movement in the area and any associated problems, including navigational equipment and applications for improving traffic movements generally and for promoting marine safety. In the latter connection, of course, we are also interested in the adequacy of Coast Guard search and rescue facilities in this area and in the upper Great Lakes generally. As I said before, if you would address yourselves to the pertinent parts of your testimony and if you would cooperate with us, it would help us to be able to conclude the hearings as early as possible, we are hoping by 1 p.m., in order that we might have an opportunity to visit and see as much as we can see that we can coordinate your testimony with our actual perusal of the geography here. With that, I would like to inform you that we have to my right our colleague, Mr. Jim Oberstar, who, while not a member of this par- ticular subcommittee, is a member of the full committee and he is your neighbor-what are you, west?-to the west, and of course, Congressman Ruppe, who is not only a ranking minority member of the full committee, but represents you here in this area. Before we start with the witnesses, Mr. Ruppe, do you have a statement or would you like to say something? Mr. RUPPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement. However, I would like to paraphrase a portion of it at this particular time. I also would like to extend greetings to you and Congress man Oberstar on behalf of the people in Sault Ste. Marie, and all those present in this room. I realize between your official duties in Washington, Texas and Minnesota and your necessary and I am sure enthusiastic interest in the convention that it is difficult for you to take time to come here to northern Michigan, so I am very pleased that you would see fit to do so. I would like to make a few further comments concerning these hearings here today. Long before the sinking of the steamer Edmund Fitzgerald, in 1975, I had indicated an interest in a public hearing into the adequacy of Coast Guard search-and-rescue facilities on the Great Lakes. That interest has expanded into concern for vessel traffic control systems, for associated and improved navigational systems as well as for vessel znd crew safety. The Fitzgerald incident seems to highlight deficiencies in rescue forces. These deficiencies are in no way the fault of the selfless and heroic individual Coast Guardsmen who are as dedicated today to the saving of life as were their predecessors of the old days. They reflect rather upon those of us in a position to see that there are enough of these dedicated individuals and that they are adequately supported by the lifesaving technology available to us today. PAGENO="0301" 297 Changes at one time may have bQen j~stifie4. They ~,ay ~ve.justi- fled closing of statiQn~ an4 the reduetipu of rescue ~u~t~rs. Oirçum- stances today, however, warrant a reappraisal of needs, More winter sailing, for instance, is taking place than in the past. Even if this traffic is not into ice-clogged channels, the traditional November and December weath~ron the lakes subjects men and their vessels to the curelest of taskmasters: The vagaries of nature in a northern winter. I submit that these vagaries demand innovation from the safety point of view which perhaps surpass what a rescue station alone can provide; they sugge~t, rather a need for a greater rescue cutter presence. A further need becomes evident for a preventative vessel traffic control system including winter advisory services that will lessen the need for on-scene assistance. Innovative navigational aids such as LORAN might lessen a dependence on other manned aids. An auto~ mated vessel reporting system will trigger assistance when needed. This is a system that was not available to the Bradley, the Morrell, or the Fitzgerald, but which would be feasible once LORAN is fully implemented in the lakes. While acting upon shoreside innovations, however, attention in my opinion must also be focused on ship and crew safety, and these must be especially tailored for Great Lakes vessels. Crewmen on these lakes are keenly aware that November is the crueliest month and Lake Superior the most treacherous of all the lakes. Out of adversity often comes accomplishment or, as some would say, even with failure there can be achievement, Already since the Fitz- gerald tragedy, Admiral Gracey has redeployed a modern 44-foot motor lifeboat to Marquette. I have also secured funding for the construction of a similar craft for Grand Marais, Mich. The Coast Guard, through Admiral Gracey's persistdnce, has established and is perfecting a Mini-LORAN system for the St. Mary's River and has published proposed safety equipment regulations for Great Lakes vessels. These regulations are similar to what the industry has pro- posed for itself. There is one need that we may be unable to explore today but which we must consider in the near future. This is the need for better over- water weather forecasting for the Great Lakes. The Fitzgerald sinking and Dr. Wolff's subsequent article in the summer 1976 issue of Inland Seas establish that there was nothing to indicate that Lake Superior skippers had any inkling that a November 9 storm warning would involve "hurricane" winds such as developed on November 10. In that same fateful November, I asked the National Advisory Com- mittee on Oceans and Atmosphere to consider the use of weather buoys on the lakes to improve forecasting. This may not be the answer to the weather advisory problem, but some solution seems to be imperative. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity this hearing affords to air many pent-up feelings perhaps of frustration, and for this singular attention to the perils and needs of the Nation's fourth seacoast. These needs are not merely those of a region. We must never forget, in this space age, that all of us in these 50 United States in our third century are still ultimately dependent in large measure on the men who-as did those who first discovered and settled our magnifi- cent land-go to the sea in ships, even if these "seas" are five great inland "ponds." PAGENO="0302" 298 Mr. Chairman, I again want to thank you and my colleague from Minnesota for being here this morning and participating and leading these hearings. [The statement follows:] STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP E. RUPPE, A. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Mr. Chairman: I appreciate your consideration and the Committee's indulgence in taking the time at the heels of one busy convention and just before another to visit what many seem to consider the hinterland of the United States. In reality, however, this is one of the great manufacturing regions of our country, containing some 14 percent of its population. This area produces the goods and raw materials involved in the more than 100 billion ton-miles of water~. borne commerce that move over the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway system each year. The misconception in the minds of much of our nation of our region as a hinterland reminds me of a distorted chart I have seen that pictures a Bostonian's Idea of the United States. By that view, we of the Midwest live beside ponds in the western prairies. A footnote to that chart warns that it should "Not be used for navigational purposes". Perhaps it is because of such misconceptions, in addition to our concern for maritime safety that we meet here today, a first for the Subcommittee. We are also motivated by an important concern for "Government in the sunshine," and by a need to get a feel for things, to feel the pulse of concern that throbs in this community for the safety of its mariners and vessels. As long as men have gone to sea, the communities who have sent them out have watched the horison, anxiously awaiting their safe return. These great "ponds," especially with their ferocious northern winters, have claimed more than their share of seafarers in spite of an historical concern with maritime safety. There was once a time when all major lights were manned and when a host of Lifesaving Stations ringed the shores of the Great Lakes. I am reminded of the search-and-rescue stations that served the Lake Superior mariner from Whitefish Point, Vermilion Point, Crisp Point, Big Two Hearted River of Hemingway fame, Deer Park or Muskalonge Lake, Munising, Ship Canal or Portage, Eagle Harbor, and Grand Marais (Min- nesota). All that remains now are the Grand Marais (Michigan), Marquette, Bayfield, and Duluth Stations. Additionally, a Coast Guard cutter was once stationed at Two Harbors as well as at Duluth. Now only the Cutter Woodrush remains at Duluth. Sault Ste. Marie at one time had additional cutter resources than those which presently exist, including a 180-foot buoy tender. Leafing of the pages of history would reflect similar reductions but to a. far lesser degree in the lower lakes. The northern reaches of Lake Huron would seem to warrant attention where no station exists between Tawas and St. Ignace-at one time the Hammond Bay and Walker's Point Stations filled this gap. I realize that changing traffic patterns, automation, mechanically propelled ships of higher horsepower and related innovations have mandated that changes occur. It is well, however, to sit back at this point and reevaluate trends, to ap- praise the degree of essential statutory services being provided the mariner in this vast Great Lakes region. There is no way to do so without input from the affected segments of the community. I have long felt that, with the shutdown of community field services of the kind referred to, an administering but remote agency runs the danger of losing touch with the public it was established to serve. Government must, therefore, meet the public as we are doing today to provide some balance and avoid becoming a detached administration. Long before the sinking of the Steamer Edmund Fitzgerald in 1975, I had in- dicated an interest in a public hearing into the adequacy of Coast Guard search- and-rescue facilities on the Great Lakes. That interest has expanded into concern for vessel traffic control systems, for associated and improved navigational systems as well as for vessel and crew safety. The Fitzgerald incident seems to highlight deficiencies in rescue forces. These deficiencies are in no way the fault of the selfless and heroic individual Coast Guardsmen who are as dedicated today to the saving of life as were their predeces- sors of the old days. They reflect rather upon those of us in a position to see that there are enough of these dedicated individuals and that they are adequately supported by the lifesaving technology available to us today. PAGENO="0303" 299 Changes at one time may have been justified. They may have justified closing of stations and the reduction of rescue cutters. Circumstances today, however, warrant a reappraisal of needs. More winter sailing, for instance, is talking place than in the past. Even if this traffic is not into ice-clogged channels, the traditional November and December weather on the Lakes subjects men and their vessels to the cruelest of taskmasters: The vagaries of nature in a northern winter. I submit that these vagaries demand innovation from the safety point of view which perhaps surpass what a rescue station alone can provide; they suggest, rather a need for a greater rescue cutter presence. A further need becomes evident for a preventative vessel traffic control system including winter advisory services that will lessen the need for on-scene assistance. Innovative navigational aids such as Loran might lessen a dependence on other manned aids. An automated vessel reporting system will trigger assistance when needed. This is a system that was not available to the Bradley, the Morrell, or the Fitzgerald, but which would be feasible once Loran is fully implemented in the Lakes. While acting upon shoreside innovations, however, attention in my opinion must also be focused on ship and crew safety, and these must be especially tailored for Great Lakes vessels. Crewmen on these Lakes are keenly aware that November is the cruelest month and Lake Superior the most treacherous of all the Lakes. Out of adversity often comes accomplishment or, as some would say, even with failure there can be achievement. Already since the Fitzgerald tragedy, Admiral Gracey has redeployed a modern 44-foot motor lifeboat to Marquette. I have also secured funding for the construction of a similar craft for Grand Marais, Michigan. The Coast Guard, through Admiral Gracey's persistence, has established and is perfecting a Mini-Loran system for the St. Mary's River and has published proposed safety equipment regulations for Great Lakes vessels. These regulations are similar to what the industry has proposed for itself. There is one need that we may be unable to explore today but which we must consider in the near future. This is the need for better overwater weather fore- casting for the Great Lakes. The Fitzgerald sinking and Dr. Wolff's subsequent article in the Summer 1976 issue of Inland Seas establish that there was nothing to indicate that Lake Superior skippers had any inkling that a November 9th storm warning would involve "hurricane" winds such as developed on Novem- ber 10th. In that same fateful November, I asked the National Advisory Com- mittee on Oceans and Atmosphere to consider the use of weather buoys on the Lakes to improve forecasting. This may not be the answer to the weather advisory problem, but some solution seems to be imperative. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity this hearing affords to air many pent-up feelings perhaps of frustration, and for this singular attention to the perils and needs of the Nation's Fourth Seacosat. These needs are not merely those of a region. We must never forget, in this space age, that all of us in these 50 United States in our third century are still ultimately dependent in large measure on the men who-as did those who first discovered and settled our magnificent land-go to the sea in ships, even if these "seas" are 5 great inland "ponds." Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much. Mr. Oberstar. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement which I will submit for the record. I merely want to summarize by saying that my area is Lake Superior, but the Great Lakes are really not divisible. They must be considered as a unit and that the problems of one are the problems of the others and your problems are our problems here in the Soo, around Lake Michigan or `farther down in the lower I akes, and I believe that together we must work for lasting solutions for the problems that affect all of the lakes as I said as a unit, so we must work together on our common interests and that is why we are very pleased to be here this morning to join with you in looking at the needs of the extended season and the problems that all the men who go down to the sea in ships face as they brave these enormous bodies of water. 78-280-76----20 PAGENO="0304" 300 [The statement follows:] * STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAB, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all those who risk their lives on Lake Superior and the other Great Lakes, and on behalf of the Lake Carriers and other Carriers who send their vessels out on these vast waters, I thank you for making these hearings possible. The sinking of the S.S. Fitzgerald last November brought to the surface of our consciousness what we all acknowledge, constantly and subconsciously: that these waters are treacherous, dangerous; and that the men who sail them lead very precarious lives at the mercy of nature. These hearings are designed to touch all aspects of safety: on-board equipment for the men; the Coast Guard's Search and Rescue capability; new communica- tions and aids to navigation; and other features of water safety. We want to know what precautions are needed to protect the Longshoremen and others who brave the elements on icy docks to service ships while they are in harbor. We also want to know specifically what caused the Fitzgerald disaster: why did the vessel break up; why did it sink as fast as it did; why were no rescue efforts possible. In addition, I hope we can focus in, for at least part of the time, on safety aspects of late season sailing. For five years now the Coast Guard, the Corps, 8 other Federal agencies, labor and private industry have been investigating the feasibility of extending the winter navigation season. But all economic benefit studies are in vain, if we cannot assure the safety of the men involved, during the worst part of the year. Until doubts about safety during winter sailing are answered, we cannot, I feel, proceed with further Federal involvement in the program. I would point out, for the record, that this Subcommittee, under the distin- guished leadership of its chairman, Mr. Biaggi of New York, and with the strong and necessary support of today's chairman, Mr. de la Garza of Texas, authorized the reopening of the Coast Guard SAR station at Grand Marais, Minnesota, and strengthening of the SAR mission of the Coast Guard station at Grand Marais, Michigan. This Committee also authorized the procurement of 7 new icebreakers for the lakes. These vessels, in addition to keeping the lanes open during winter will be able to serve SAR missions during the ice-free months of the year. Both the authorizing and funding legislation are awaiting final action by the Congress and, I hope, prompt signature by the President. And while the author- ization does not provide all the icebreaking capability we need, I believe we have established the record of need, and can build on this year's progress in the years ahead. In conclusion, I hope that these hearings can help resolve the doubts we now have regarding safety at sea; that they will pinpoint where safety is still lacking; and establish what can be done in the short term as well as what should be done in the long term to make year-round sailing safe and, particularly, to prevent in the future disasters of the magnitude of the Fitzgerald. Thank you. Mr. DE LA GARZA. The first witness this morning is Rear Adm. James S. Gracey, commander of the 9th Coast Guard District, U.S. Coast Guard, Cleveland, Ohio. Admiral, I will be very happy to hear from you at this time. You might identify for the record those that accompany you. PAGENO="0305" 301 STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES S. GRACEY, COMMANDER, 9TH COAST GUARD DISTRICT, U.S. COAST GUARD, CLEVELAND, OHIO, ACCOMPANIED BY COMDR. JOHN DECK III, CHIEF, SHIP DESIGN BRANCH, OFFICE OF MERCHANT MARINE SAFETY, U.S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.; CAPT. THOMAS H. RUTLEDGE, CHIEF, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS STAFF, U.S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND CAPT. CHARLES MILRADT, COMMANDER, GROUP, SAULT STE. MARIE Admiral GRACEY. Yes. Good morning. I have with me Capt. Thomas Rutledge, who is from headquarters in the congressional liaison staff, whom you all know very well, and Comdr. John Deck from the Head- quarters Merchant Marine Technical Division, Ship Design Branch, who has done a great deal of work on lifesaving improvement; and also with me is Capt. Charles Milradt, who is commander of the group here at the Soo. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues to talk about Coast Guard activities on the Great Lakes. I have been in command of the 9th Coast Guard District-the Great Lakes District-for almost 2 years. In that time I have come to realize as never before what a vast, beautiful, and challenging part of our country this is, with its extremes of weather, its richness of natural resources, its great public interest in the waters and water quality and the extensive use of those waters for recreation, its colorful marine traditions, rife with dramatic tales of heroism and skill, its impressive record of contributions in all aspects of marine transportation, and its great significance to the economic well-being of the United States. The Coast Guard and its predecessor agencies have long been a part of this vibrant and challenging Great Lakes history-this year marks the 100th anniversary of lifesaving stations here, for example. And we continue to have a major role, its aspects expanding in scope and volume of activity. I would like to give you a broad overview this morning of what we are doing to meet the challenges facing us. There is not time to speak in detail of all our missions, so I will con- centrate on safety, which is your primary interest here today. Coast Guard efforts to enhance the safe use of the waters of the Great Lakes really fall under two broad headings-rescue and prevention. The term "rescue" incorporates such activities as search, location, self-survival, and communications. "Prevention" includes such activities as education, communications, enforcement of laws and regulations, aids to navigation, and insuring personnel qualifications. Some of these fail into specific Coast Guard program categories and some cross several programs. To stay consistent with the subject of this hearing I will speak in terms of the broad hearings of rescue and prevention instead of specific programs. PAGENO="0306" 302 RESCUE In fiscal year 1975 Coast Guard forces on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River responded to over 8,000 calls for assistance. Of those 278 were in Lake Superior and 352 were in the area for which Coast Guard Group, Sault Ste. Marie is responsible, viz, extreme northern Lake Michigan, the Straits of Mackinac, northern Lake Huron, the St. Mary's River, and eastern Lake Superior. Please note that there is some overlap where I speak of group Soo statistics versus Lake Superior. I will try to clarify it, if it is confusing. We saved 450 lives and $10 million worth of property throughout the district. Some 19 persons and $92,000 in property were saved in Lake Superior while in group Soo we saved 22 persons and $1,203,000 in property. We do not yet have detailed figures for this year, but our total district response figure should be about 9,200, with 520 lives saved and $10,200,000 worth of property saved. By far our heaviest workload is in the area of western Lake Erie, Lake St. Clair, and the connecting rivers-part of our group Detroit, which has about 53 percent of the cases in the district. By comparison, all of Lake Superior plus the rest of group Soo combined have about 6 percent of our cases. Our primary SAR response comes from 3 air stations and 46 sta- tions, 9 of which are seasonal. Of the seasonal stations, 3 are manned primarily by Reservists and 6 are manned during peak boating periods by Auxiliarists. In the Lake Superior/group Soo area we have 9 sta- tions, 3 of which are Auxiliary operated. To permit our regular personnel some relief during the heavy work- load season and to increase our ability to respond when needed, we rely on the special help of about 1,000 Reservists, who assist at many of our stations, especially on weekends. We also rely heavily through- out the district on our 5,500 Auxiliarists, with their privately owned facilities-some 1,713 vessels, 40 aircraft and 105 radio stations. In 1975 they provided 2,222 SAR responses, saving 163 lives and $1,323,000 worth of property. Our five 180-foot buoy tenders, five 110-foot harbor tugs, two major icebreakers, and one 82-foot patrol boat also provide some SAR capability to add to the boats of the stations and the aging HH-52A helicopters and the venerable HU16E fixed wing aircraft. To improve our response capability from stations we have started to replace our 40-foot utility boat-the workhorse of SAR in recent years-with the new 41-foot boat, which has greater speed, range, crew endurance, and electronic navigation and search capability. Three of the nine we have so far are in the Lake Superior/group Soo area. As these boats arrive we are rearranging our fleet to upgrade capability in as many areas as possible. We have also relocated the 44-foot motor surf boats to areas having the greatest need for heavy weather capability. Of the 22 we have, 4 are in the Lake Superior/ group Soo area. One more is in the fiscal year 1977 budget and it will go to Grand Marais, Mich. to replace our last 36-foot lifeboat. We also make extensive use of other resources such as our own C-130's from North Carolina and 11-3 helos from New York, the Air Force, CAP, Army, National Guard, State, county and local police, park rangers, and a cooperative agreement with Canada, not PAGENO="0307" 3;Q3 to mention vessels of opportunity when in the vicinity of a case, and this is a very real benefit. We now have VHF-FM communications coverage for the entire U.S. portion of the Great Lakes except for a few "shadow areas" we have discovered. I expect those minor voids to be covered this year. In addition to the things I've mentioned above and the rather extensive prevention effort that I am going to discuss in a moment, there are some other things the Coast Guard is doing to improve our rescue capability. One major contribution will be the replacement of our 110-foot icebreaking tugs. Not only will these vessels greatly enhance our efforts to assist winter navigation, but they will have a year-round utility the 110 footers do not have. The 110 footers were built as harbor tugs, and consequently are subject to severe operating limitations in heavy weather. They are very sensitive to high winds and become unstable and unsafe in winds above 45 to 55 knots, depend- ing on loading and vessel class. They take on water very readily and their freeing ports are not adequate to permit it to run off. In cold weather they also ice up badly in a storm and become un- stable. Obviously these characteristics severely impede their useful- ness in the vicious sea and wind conditions that occur so often on the Great Lakes. The new vessels have been designed with this in mind and thus should greatly enhance our heavy weather capability. One will be located at Sault Ste. Marie, the first one. We are encouraging boaters to make out a "float plan" and leave it with their marina operator, family or friends so we can get prompt notification when they do not return as planned and so we will know where to start looking for them.~ Following the loss of their son in a boating accident a family recently erected a memorial at Grand Marais, Mich., city dock. It includes a booth much like a phone booth with a float plan notebook in it that boaters can fill out when they depart. There is also space for boaters to log in when they return, so interested or concerned people who check the book, can readily detect a potential problem and advise the Coast Guard-before the situation becomes a 2 a.m. emergency. A similar type of effort consists of sunset patrols, primarily by Auxiliary surface and aircraft. The purpose, of course, is to locate boaters who may be in trouble and thus preclude difficult, often futile, night searches-or any search at all for that matter-or at the least save the boater the anguish of a helpless night on the lake. This has paid considerable dividends in some areas. An FM emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) is being developed as are detection devices such as a special forward- looking radar for fixed-wing aircraft, application of our oil-detection side-looking radar, an infra-red system for helicopters, and an improved illuminating system for helicopters. - People caught in an emergency must have ways to take care of themselves-to survive-until we or some other rescuer can reach them. They also need to have ways to help us find them. Efforts to improve survivability must per force include the means to deal with a wide range of situations-and so they do, ranging from simple flotation devices for water skiers to self-launching survival craft for ore boats. They include such things as exposure suits, positive flotation for recreational boats, radar transponders to aid detection, a "mayday PAGENO="0308" 3k04 streamer", radios, cold water survival techniques, strobe lights, et cetera. This spring a team of Coast Guard personnel, ships, boats and aircraft conducted some in-water tests of several of these items. The results ranged from successful to promising to surprisingly disappoint- ing. The work continues. Meanwhile, commercial operators and the water-sport industry are also working on developing ideas and equipment to meet the various needs. And we have published advance notice of proposed new regula- tions which would provide for more extensive and improved equipment aboard lakes vessels. They include lifeboat exposure protection, life- boat maneuverability, survival craft availability, launching of survival craft, ability of lifeboats to float free automatically, personnel exposure protection, communications equipment on survival craft, lights and refiectorized materials, and standards for substitute equipment. Of course the best way to solve a problem is preventing it from coming up in the first place-the old saw about "an ounce of preven- tion being worth a pound of cure." `That is what most of the rest of our safety effort is all `about. You are `aware of the basics of our commercial vessel safety, , port safety and security, short-range aids to navigation, and radio navigational aids programs, which `are the heart of our preventive effort, so I will discuss only new developments and specifics that affect the Great Lakes. Efforts to help the recreational boater enjoy his chosen sport more but with less risk are particularly significant on the waters of the Great Lakes region because 35 percent of the boats in the entire coun- try are in use here-that's more than 2,550,000 `boats. To help the boater understand how to use his boat safely we are pur- suing an aggressive public education program. Last year we provided lectures for 36,000 people. We ha~d over 1,500,000 people visit our exhibits at `boat shows, et cetera. We `had 13,000 radio and `TV spots, and we gave over 2,000 boating safety courses to 120,000 people. We also gave over 41,800 courtesy exams to check boat equipment, pa- trolled almost 400 regattas, and we made 5,000 safety patrols. These activities were done, primarily, by our 5,500 Auxiliarists and our seven Boating Safety Detachments (BOSDET). BOSDET personnel also conducted extensive training programs for `State, county and local marine law enforcement personnel. I might add that it is a point of great pride that two of the `States in `my district have had all the marine law enforcement personnel in the State trained now by Coast Guard Boating Safety Team Person- nel and we are expecting the third State to make it this year. The fourth State that has been primarily in our responsibility has been two-thirds trained. I should no,te that we also have an `aggressive enforcement effort in areas where Our statistics showed the greatest need. To illustrate how effective this overall program can be I should like to tell you about one particular case. In the early months of the 1974 season we were horrified by an appalling rate of carnage in the Fox Chain of Lakes in Illinois. By August, 20 people had died in this `area alone. Our BOSDET moved in and `started an aggressive enforcement program. They also worked with local and State officials, providing training and setting a positive example. The results began to show in PAGENO="0309" 305 the latter months of 1974, but were really evident in 1975, when not a single life was lost in that area. To help the navigator, particularly on large commercial vessels, two developments in aids to navigation are significant. First is extension of LORAN C coverage to the Great Lakes. The first station will be built in Seneca, N.Y., and should be on the air in 1979. The second, which will complete coverage, will be built in upper Minnesota and is planned to be on the air in 1980. The other major development in aids to navigation, we call Mini LORAN C. It is a `ow-power, specifically configured LORAN-C chain we've built for the St. Mary's River. It is now on the air in a dQmonstration phase, and we are developing special user equipment. When done, we expect it will provide accuracies as fine as 25 feet. In some areas we have already had demonstrated accuracies down to 10 feet and in some cases even better, like zero, but that is special. Even more exciting ate some features of the user equipment being developed. These will provide, on a continuous read-out, such infor- matioiI as speed Ovet the ground, time and distance to next turn, course to next turn, vessel position and attitude with relation to the desired track, et cetera. We hope to demonstrate this second generation. user equipment this August. Later we expect to install a set on a com- mercial vessel for a trial. In other actions to improve safety of Great Lakes commercial oper- atiOn, we are continuing Our long standing vessel traffic service on the St. Mary's River, but we are now monitoring meeting situations at the critical turn at the lower end of Soo Harbor and asking vessels to adjust speed to avoid arriving simultaneously at that turn. We are also providing more complete information on rates of flow through the Soo control gates ~o masters can better control their vessels. We have developed, with Canada, a joint contingency plan for traffic control in case of emergency in the critical Detroit and St. Clair Rivets, a.hd we have installed a "hot line" between the District a~d Sarnia control centers to insure immediate positive communi- cations. New regulations last year provide increased authority for Coast Guard captain~ of the port to take prompt affirmative action to deal with a ratige of possible hazards. Finally, on a grim note, this report to you really would not be complete if I didn't talk a little bit about the tragedy last November which shocked and saddened the entire Great Lakes maritime community. The investigation of the Fitzgerald sinking continues, with the 19 hours of TV tape and 1,000 pictures taken during this spring's underwater survey still being analyzed~ That survey, you may recall, was made by the Coast Guard from the Coast Guard cutter Woôdrush. In selecting a method for conducting the survey the Board considered many different possibilities. Since the depth of water precluded divers, the Board ultimately chose to contract with the Navy for use of its CURV, a sophisticated, remote- cOntrolled underwater vehicle. CTJRV and its associated people and equipment were flown from the west coast in Coast Guard C-130 air- craft. Like all who sail in or otherwise care about Great Lakes shipping, I certainly hope the Board will be able to find, in the meager informa- tion available, enough to permit them to reach some conclusion about what happened that fateful night. PAGENO="0310" 306 Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you this morning and to talk about two topics which are very much in my mind and heart-the Great Lakes and the U.S. Coast Guard. I will be glad to answer any questions that you have. Mr. lYE LA GARZA .Thank you very much, Admiral. Any questions? Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief be- cause we have so many witnesses. The portion of your testimony that refers to the- [Microphone noise.] Admiral GRACEY. I must be radiating personal magnetism or some- thing. Mr. OBERSTAR. With all that sophisticated LORAN C and all the rest we have on the lakes, the microphone doesn't work. Where you talked about the safety aids, I was interested in the exposure suits; are those being especially developed for winter navigation and avail- able for seamen that serve on those vessels? Admiral GRACEY. There are a number of suits that are being de- veloped by different people, and we tested two types this spring. Commander Deck put on one suit and Commander Mason from my staff put on another one and went into the 42 degree water this spring to see how the suits work. One of them was relatively successful and the other was surprisingly disappointing. Those are one of the things I referred to in my statement. I don't know it we approved the suit, but there is considerable work going on. There were suits recommended before, but our tests indicated they didn't do the job and perhaps would create some false sense of security. To answer you briefly, yes, the work is going on. Mr. OBERSTAR. This is something of concern to me. It. has been expressed by longshoremen, and seamen as well, who are exposed to the elements in these increasingly longer voyages in the winter months. I strongly encourage the Coast Guard to intensify its efforts in providing the kind of research necessary for the personal protec- tion of individuals, and we would be glad to have any recommenda- tions and reports in more depth as the Congress and certainly the House Public Works Committee later this summer will consider cxtensions to the demonstration programs for the winter navigation season, and we would like to be able to focus more on measures to protect the individual. One last question about the Fitzgerald. Do you have any information beyond what is stated in your state- ment that you could provide for the committee, any indications now of what might have happened? What does the vessel look like down there at the bottom of the lake and is it possible for the subcommittee later on to look at some photographs that the Coast Guard might have had as a result of those deep water investigations? Admiral GRACEY. I think, Mr. Oberstar, it would be-I'm sure there are a lot of opinions as to what happened and I am sure that the Board has probably started to form some. I don't know what they are. I very carefully avoided trying to find out what they are because I think it would be inappropriate to discuss until the Board ha~s reached its final conclusions. I am not hiding anything, I just don't know. I can tell you what they found essentially on the bottom was the vessel in two pieces PAGENO="0311" 307 with one of the two pieces badly broken. They were hoping to be able to get a good total look at the hull with a view to trying to get some idea of what might have caused the wreck or the sinking. What we found was that the stern section was upside down and separated from the forward section, the forward section broken, and with the bow buried in 27 feet of mud. It was a very soft bottom so that as the curve device went down, it tended to stir up the bottom. We didn't get the same quality pictures we were hoping to get. Of course we were most hoping to get some evidence from near the bottom and that is buried in the mud. So whether they will be able to interpret the pictures, whether they get it or not, I don't know, but it is going to be a very difficult job. Mr. OBERSTAR. Your statement made a very commendable out- line for the extensive SAR, prevention and protection. What puzzles was there was a Coast Guard station relatively near, and yet the Coast Guard either couldn't or for some reason did not send a rescue vessel out and there are some who say, even if the weather had been such that a vessel could have been ordered out, they didn't have one capable of providing the rescue mission that would have been necessary. Could you respond to that? Admiral GRACEY. Let me see, where do I start. 1 think if you look at the chart of where the Fitzgerald sank-John, would you point out on the chart where that is, please? Mr. BRUCE. Just this point, just over the international line. * Admiral GRACEY. And would you run to Sault Ste. Marie and Grand Marais? Mr. BRUCE. ~Indicating.1 Admiral GRACEY. If it were possible to predict where a sinking would take place and where you would put a station to be reasonably available to handle it, the only place that would be better so far as the location is concerned, would be on White Fish Point. You have to select your sites in places where you have support and some community capability for your people unless you have some particular reason to believe that the investment ought to be out there. That is an isolated event. We did not have capability for vessels-the vessels we had were not capable of going out in that weather. Mr. OBERSTAR. That is the thing that concerns people. Admiral GRACEY. As I said, the 144-foot tug which will replace Naugatuck will have this heavy weather capability. When we get the five 110's replaced with the 140's, we will have reasonably heavy weather capability. I did an analysis of where the major disasters have occurred on the Great Lakes since 1958 and if the committee would be interested, I can show you a chart to show you how that is configured. I was rather interested to see how they spread out. Would you be interested in such a thing? Mr. OBERSTAR. I don't know whether we have the time now, Mr. Chairman. Admiral GRACEY. I can do it very quickly. See the red circles? [Indicating chart.] PAGENO="0312" O DISTRICT OFFICE *~ MULTI-PURPOSE BAUD o BIN STATION o STATION-SAN o AIDS TO NAVIGATION TEAM 0 LIGHT ATTENDUNT STATION GROUP BOUNDARY RVIVB INTERNATIONAL BOUNSA~y STATE BOUNDARY Ii' U. S. COAST GUARD NINTH C.G. DIS1RICT PRINCIPAL. U:NITS ON THE GREAT LAKES PAGENO="0313" 309 [The following was submitted:] RECENT MAJOR SAR CASES These are cases which. involved, large vessels and/or considerable- damage, loss of life or public concern-. Medevacs, cases occurring in restricted- waters where tugs would normally not. present- an improvement in- SAR response, and cases where Coast Guard' assistance was not required nor used have not been included. There are innumerable groundings and collisions in the lakes, most of which are minor and most of which occur in harbors, rivers, bays,. etc. 1. 18 November 1958-Bradley san-k south of Beaver Island, Lake Michigan. Thirty-one loss of life. Cause, material failure and, weather., Major search effort by several Coast Guard units. 2. November 19.66-Ivioreel sank off Alpena, Lake Michigan- with. approximately ~0 loss of life. Cause,, material failure and weather. Major search. effort, by several -Coast Guard units. 3. 30 April 1970-Fitzgerald and Hochelaga collided just south of Detroit River light causing considerable damage to both. Cause, suction from passing, close while overtaking. No loss- of life. No Coast Guard assistance required, both vessels -proceeded to port. 4. 14 July 1970-Eästcliffe Hall grounded and sank in St. Lawrence River at. Chrysler Shoal. Nine lives lost. Cause, poor navigation and weather. Maple responded. 5. 12 August 1971-Ethel Marie, Patriciar and Mein Kapitan' all experienced heavy storm damage during severe weather in the Straits of Mackinac. No loss of life. No Coast Guard assistance required. 6. 4 October 1971-Maplecliffe Hall and Wieldrecht collided near Detroit River light causing consi'derable damage to both. No lives lost. Cause, steering failure on Maplecliffe Hall. No Coast Guard assistance required. 7. 13 April 1972, Nicolet sustained heavy ice damage in position 45-50N/85--50W, Lake Michigan when caught between shifting ice fields. No loss of life. Mesquite escorted vessel to port. 8'. 27 November 1972, Stolt Falcon sustained heavy damage from fire 15 miles north of Manitou Island, Lake Michigan. No loss of life. A helicopter from air station Traverse City evacuated- four injured crewmen, the vessel proceeded to. port. 9. 10 June 1973, barge Oil Queen capsized and sank in position 45-35N/85-20W; Lake Michigan when her cargo shifted in heavy weather. No loss of life. No Coast Guard assistance required, barge was unmanned. 10. 26- September 1973, fishing- boat Viking II exploded and. sank 7 miles. north-- west of Big Bay Point in Lake Superior. No loss of life. Cause, explosive vapors., Survivors picked up another fishing boat. Operator claimed he radioed for help, but transmission was not received. 11. 2 October 1973, ROLTV I and Marathonian collided in fog in position 45-46N/ 85-SaW, Lake Michigan. No loss of life. Cause, poor navigation and weather. Extensive damage to both. No Coast Guard assistance required, both vessels proceeded to port. 12. 30 March 1974, tug Castel started to flood while towing the Crapo. Position 45-43N/85-57W, Lake Michigan. Two men lost overboard. Cause, material failure and weather. Helicopters from air station Traverse City and Sundew responded. 13. 23 May 1974, Ste'inbrenner and Cardinal collided in Lake Erie, position 41-51/82-34. Extensive damage to both. No loss of life. Cause, poor seamanship. Injured were evacuated by air station Detroit helicopters and Bramble escorted the Cardinal in. Steinbrenner required no assistance. 14. 12 September 1974, tug Killarney sank in Lake Erie, position 42-06N/ 81-11W. No loss of life. Cause, material failure. Another tug picked up survivors. 15. 20 November 1974, Jodrey grounded and sank in St. Lawrence River at Alexandria Bay. No loss of life. Cause, poor navigation. Station Alexandria Bay removed crew before sinking. 16. December 1974, Jennifer sank in Lake Michigan, position 43-32N/87~-08W. No loss of life. Cause, material failure and weather. Two merchant vessels and several Coast Guard units responded.4 Crew taken-off by air station helicopters. Rest picked up by Fortuna (UK). 17. 23 February 1975, Hannah Barge l~91 grounded on Milwaukee breakwall causing major oil spill. No loss of life. Cause, material failure and weather. Station Milwaukee saved barge from sinking, no persons on board. Major cleanup. PAGENO="0314" 310 18. 26 July 1975, tug Sachern and barge collided with a cabin cruiser 1~ miles north of Marblehead. Four lives lost. Cause, poor seamanship. Station Marblehead, station Sandusky and air station Detroit responded, two survivors. 19. 10 November 1975, Fitzgerald sank in Lake Superior 15 miles north of White-. fish Point. Twenty-nine loss of life. Cause, weather and material failure. Massive search effort by Coast Guard, Canadian, Air Force, Navy and civilian forces. 20. 10 December 1975, Thayer grounded hard in Lake Erie position 41-51N1 82-35W. No loss of life. Cause, apparently poor seamanship. Kaw stood by until refloating. 21. 19 May 1976, Gaelic Barge 117 grounded on Cleveland breakwall after towing tug became disabled. No loss of life. Major oil spill resulted. Cause, weather and material failure. Kaw and station Cleveland Harbor responded. Major cleanup. 22. 22 June 1976, Nepco Barge 140 grounded in St. Lawrence River near Alexan- dria Bay. Major oil spill resulted. No loss of life. Cause, poor seamanship. No SAR assistance necessary. Major cleanup. Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. Admiral GRACEY. They group here in the Straits of Mackinac and down here in the west end of Lake Erie. We have one here in Lake Huron which was Morrell, and you have the Fitzgerald, of course, here and you have one over here by Whitefish Point -Keweenaw. You have a couple in Lake Michigan, but they are near rescue stations and near heavy weather capability. The Jennifer occurred off the port where we have the Westwind and the Westwind was underway in less than 2 hours. We got two survivors off with heli- copters and the vessel sank before we could get anybody else out. Fortunately the British vessel, the Fortuna, was nearby. The master of the abandoned ship 4 minutes before she went down* and the Fortunately the British vessel, the Fortuna, was nearby. The master of the Jennifer abandoned ship 4 minutes before she went down and the Fortuna picked up the rest of the survivors. That is what I mean by ships of "opportunity." We could not have been better located, but we just didn't have time. I really believe the statistics show that we are properly located. We do have plans to improve our heavy weather capability with the 140-footers and any statistical analysis that I am able to make and a review indicates we are in the right place and we will have the right equipment. Mr. OBERSTAR. The location I have no quarrel with. The equip-. ment capability, I am glad that is being upgraded. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr.. Ruppe? Mr. RUPPE. Thank you. First of all, does the Coast Guard maintain any facility plan based on some kind of established time and distance criteria? Admiral GRACEY. Well, we do have facility plans that are of rel-. atively recent origin, meaning within the last 4 or 5 years, and part of the criteria on which the needs are determined is time and distance from high workload areas. I cannot tell you what the standards are offhand. Mr. RUPPE. Could you supply whatever plan or plans you have for the record here? Admiral GRACEY. That portion that is pertinent, yes, sir. [See p. 372 for information.] Mr. RUPPE. Admiral, is there any particular or specialized de- tection equipment that is carried aboard Guard search aircraft assigned to the Great Lakes region? PAGENO="0315" 311 Admiral GRACEY. No. Just the standard radar and so forth. No, there is no particular detection. Mr. RUPPE. I had reference to night-sun illumination equipment. Admiral GRACEY. Yes; we do have night-sun, but not on all our helicopers. Mr. RUPPE. Is it the intent of the Coast Guard through the ap- propriation process to equip all your aircraft in that regard? Admiral GRACEY. I might note that while the night-sun is not on all helicopters, they all have mounts and it is relatively easy to shift the equipment from one to another. It is about a 5-minute job. In theory, any aircraft that is in the air at night would have the capa- bility. If there were two or three helos aloft as on the night of the Fitzgerald, we would not have enough. Mr. Ruppn. I understand the Coast Guard has a detection package ready to go aboard its proposed new medium surveillance craft. Could you give us a description of the equipment and possibly its expected effectiveness and, of course, its availability? Admiral GRACEY. I can give you a general rundown from some notes I might have, but it might be more helpful to provide it for the record. I think it would give you a better rundown on the specifics. [See p. 372 for information.} Mr. Ruppn. Does the Coast Guard have some pretty specific plans for replacing the 111152's presently assigned to your district? Admiral GRACEY. All the 111152s we have will be replaced when the new short-range recovery aircraft that the Coast Guard hopes to buy one day are bought. We are not in the buying phase; there has been no money appropriated for that helicopter as yet. When it is, all the ones in this district will be replaced in the same numbers that we have now. Mr. Ruiin. All right, a couple of questions on the survival factor: Could you tell me what the status is of studies relating, and I under- stand there are studies underway or studies have been completed, relating to survival of vessel crews? I was referring to exposure protection, man-overboard alarms, et cetera. Admiral GRACEY. I will ask Commander Deck to answer. He is the man who is working with that, Mr. Ruppe. Commander DECK. Through the extended season program, we got our start in the cold water survival problem. We developed a program very early in the game, had some initial studies that were * done by Battell which indicated that in order to improve our survival capability, we had to make improvements on a number of fronts, We couldn't just optimize one particular facet. We couldn't come up with a super lifeboat and expect that was going to solve all our prob- lems, so we had to work on activities which looked at personal pro- tection, group protection, early distress alert, distress detection enhancement, as well as man-overboard, which, surprisingly man- overboard statistics account for half of the lives that are lost off of commercial vessels. We have made, I think, a considerable amount of progress. We have underway now an engineering study based on a feasibility study looking at a physical system for a man-overboard alarm. This en- gineering development should be completed sometime by the end of this year. PAGENO="0316" 312 We ~had :ma~d~ improvements of cold water capability of inflatable life rafts. We have looked at a number of, different types of personnel exposure equipment, survival `suits, different kinds of jackets-some rof `it is Rube Goldberg type of activity, `but I think we have looked at a considerable number of pieces of equipment. We have actively *m~der test and evaluation by Underwriters Laboratory two different types of exposure equipment to be qualified., certified and approved by the Coast ~Gnard as personnel flotation `devices. These `tests and evaluation are underway `now. It probably will `b.e 6 weeks or better ~bOfore the ~fin'al results and approval of those particular pieces of equipment are out. We have been working in `the training `and education phase. We have had `a number Of studies :on personnel survival. We have a survival pamphlet that speaks to cold `water survival, survival techniques an'd'clothing protection. that has `been published. A limited ~mmb'er of `copies have been distributed. We are in our second printing `in which a very significant number, somewhere "in the neighborhood `of about 50,000 copies `will be printed and there will `be a very `large distribution made this Tall prior `to this yeai'~s winter ,season. Mr. RUPPE. Congressman Oberstar and I have Introduced legis- lation to `extend `the studi'es and the demonstration program involving the winter `navigation season for an additional 2 years. Do you think that legislation, `if indeed it passes, will be of some help in giving `you the, direction and possibly the financial wherewithal to carry on additional studies of the nature you have suggested, `to completion? Commander DECK. Yes, sir, we do. Mr. RuPPE. Commander, were you i'n~olved in `the develpoment of cold water and heavy winter clothing? `Commander DECK. Yes, Ii was. I essentially `developed the contract wi'th Dr. Hayward from the University `of Victoria. Mr. RuppE. With unanimous consent, perhaps `I could place this in the record. It would be an interesting `observation. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Is it a statement or graph? `Mr., `RUP.PE. A study, `really. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Very well. `[The `document follows':] MAN `IN COLD WATER: `COOLING RATE IN HEAVY WINTER CLOTHING AND TREAT- MENT OF ACCIDENTAL HYPOTHERMIA: AN ~XPERIMENTA'L STUDY OF INHALATION REWAR'M'ING uNIVERSITr OF VICTORIA These two reports are the results of a study funded by the U.S. `Coast Guard, Ninth Coast Guard District, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio, 44199. Contract r~ference No. `O9~702'5-~75. DISCUSSION These results show that `the `survival time `of `average men in cold water can be significantly increased by a combination of two factors: 1) wearing "heavy winter clothing"; and 2) adopting a behaviour in the water which reduces heat loss (H.E.'L.P.). The `68% increase in predicted survival time over that predicted for lightly-clothed subjects who did not adopt the thermally-protective behaviour (7) is a consequence `of both the above factors. The relative importance of each can be estimated as follows. `Data available in two previous studies (6, 7) permit the calculation that adoption of the H.E.L.P. behaviour would increase survival time approximately 35%. The remaining 33% increase would be attributable to PAGENO="0317" ~31~3 the heavier clothing. Therefore, the generalization seems warranted that survival time in typical heavy clothing is ~about `cine-4hird -greater thafl' that of lightly- clothed man in cold water. Previous data on the effect of heavy clothing on cooling rate of man in cold `water `was available `from a study `by Kea'tinge (2). He compared `the oooling rates `Of `5 `men, wearing eithe~ bathing "tninks o1~ heavy clothing, While holding still in 5°C water. The mean falls in rectal temperature during the 20 minutes of immersion were 1.23 and 0.29°C for the unclothed and clothed situations respec- tively. The rate of cooling with heavy clothing is only 24% of that of the unclothed subjects. The difference seems much larger than might be expected. Also, the cooling rate of the heavily clothed subjects in Keatinge s study would equal 0 87° C/hr a vilue which is less than one half the 1 85° C/hr cooling r'tte foi similerly-ckithed subjects in Our study. The -difference of `only 2°C in watOr ~temperature `could not account for this large discrepancy. The reason, we reel, is That eooling `rates of the body core which are based on `only 20 minutes of immersion in cold water are invalid. This is because unifOrm cooling rates of rectal and ~yInpanic temperatures are not established until after 20 minutes of immersion. Including temperatures before this `time underestimates cooling rate and -cannot be used to predict survival time `The survival and toleranOe time predictions of this study seem as valid as it is possible to obtain experimentally. If `this is so, `then on `the basis Of Fig. 4, the following generalizations can be made regarding the situation on the Great Lakes. At the average temperature of the surface water in November (7.8°C), a heavily- clothed seaman, who adopts the H. E.L.P. behaviour, can -be expected to reach a degree of hypothermia at which -unconsciousness is -likely and death impends, in about 4 -hours. He -may be almost incapacitated with regard to assisting with his own rescue -in about 2~ hours. Withou't the -H.'E.L.P. behaviour, `survival time would decrese by about 25%, and by another 25'% if the victim was swimming or `treading water. Similar generalizations can be made for other water tempera- 4ures from Inspection of -Fig. 4. ;It -seems worthwhile to mention, `that from -our ~experience, significant curtail- ment of -peripheral neuromuscular function occurs within the first 15-30 minutes of -immersion, even before significant core ~hypotherm-ia results. However, this does not mean the person is incapacitated for we find that `useful activity" -of the limbs, although-slowed, is still possible -for much -longer -periods. This early -loss of dexterity, -onset of -stiffness, and `decrease in skin sensitivity, may be one -reason for the tendency of many survivors of -brief immersions in cold water to overestimate their degree of hypothermia, and to spread the "lore" of hopeless- -ness regardin'g `attempts to improve survival time in cold water. It must be emphasized that the predictions in Fig. 4 are for the "average" `individual. From the variation in cooling rates -among `individuals in -this study, it `-is to be expected `that approximately -two-thirds of accidental immersees would have survival times within the range -of 25% -more or less than the predictions of -Fig. 4. Regarding the example given for 7.8° C water temperature, -this would 5mean that two-thirds `of the immersees would have survival times between 3 and 5 hours. If the water temperature was approaching freezing, survival times would be 2-3.5 hours for two-thirds of the immersees. This duration may seem longer than is conventionally assumed, but-it must be remembered that it applies to the victim who is heavily-clothed, and who does adopt a thermally-protective behavior. This study has shown that `even for immersees t'hat `have `the therm-al `benefit *of heavy clothing and the H.'E~L.P. behavior, a further doubling `of predicted `survival time can `be achieved by -wearing a UVic `Thermofloat Jacket. This con- cePt of a work `or `casual jacket `which also provides bouyancy and significant thermal~ protection -deserves consideration as a compromise between the -insignifi- cant thermal protection of most standard flotation devices (5), and the more insulative, but less wearable, survival suits.i In summary, it iS hoped that the experimental data and predictions of this ~tudy `will assi'st in educational programs on cold water safety, and will be useful in providing a time base `for rescue services concerned with man in cold water. ~ An estimate from our findings of the survival `time of an average seaman, who was wearing an Imperial Survival Suit in the Great Lakes In November (mean temperature of 7.8'C), would -be 15-16 hours. PAGENO="0318" 314 PART 2 TREATMENT OF ACCIDENTAL HYPOTHERMIA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF INHALATION REWARMING By John S. Hayward and Alan M. Steinman, Department of Biology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, and U.S. Coast Guard Air Station, Port Angeles, Washington 98362 ABSTRACT Ten men were immersed in the sea at a temperature of 70 C to determine the effect of heavy winter clothing on body cooling rate and predicted survival time. Mean body cooling rate in heavy clothing was 1.85° C/hr. This cooling rate cor- responds to predicted survival times at different water temperatures which are one-third greater than for lightly-clothed subjects. When subjects wearing heavy clothing adopted a thermally-protective behavior in the water (H.E.L.P.), a 68% increase in predicted survival time over lightly clothed subjects was observed. * When the subjects also wore a thermally-protective flotation device (UVic Thermo- float Jacket) their predicted survival time was doubled, to a duration 3.5 times that of lightly-clothed persons. The relevance of these findings to the situation of seamen on the Great Lakes is discussed. INTRODUCTION Survival time of man accidently immersed in cold water is determined by a variety of factors: body size and fatness; activity and posture in the water; indi- vidual variations in control of shivering and circulation; and the thermal pro- tection capabilities of the clothing and flotation device being worn (3, 6, 7). Recent findings (7) have provided a prediction equation for the survival time of an average adult in cold water of various temperatures, which is based upon cooling rate in light clothing, such as that often worn by recreational boaters. The question arises: to what extent would "heavy clothing", such as that worn by seamen during winter, slow cooling rate and extend survival time? This question has obvious relevance to many occupational groups who must work on water at the colder times of the year. The situation for seamen on the Great Lakes is typical of this concern. The average temperature of the surface waters of the Great Lakes exceeds 15°C (59°F) for only 3 months (July-Sept.) of the year and is lower than 10°C (50°F) for 8 months of the year (8). For example, in Novembei~ which is typically a month with bad storms that have resulted in ship casualties (8), the average surface temperature of the Lakes is down to 7.8°C (46°F). With such a prevalence of cold water, it is essential that those responsible for regulating the safety of seamen on the Great Lakes, those charged with rescue operations, and the seamen themselves, should all have the maximum information available that is relevant to their fate, if mishap should put a man or men in such cold water. It was the object of this study to increase the knowledge of cooling rate incold water of man wearing heavy winter clothing, and to use this to improve predic- tions of survival time in cold waters such as those of the Great Lakes. METHODS Immersions were conducted in the sea (7°C, 45°F) near Victoria, B.C., from on board a research ship. Ten adult male subjects were studied whose characteristics were: age, 29 + 9.0 years; weight, 83 ± 10.8 kg (188 lbs); height, 184 cm (6'O"); body fat, 16.1% (by skinfold thickness method of determination). Subjects passed medical screening according to procedures outlined elsewhere (7). Clothing variables The definition of "typical seaman's winter clothing" is extremely difficult, even if one delimits to a region such as the Great Lakes. In an attempt to aid such a definition, Dr. Eckerson, of this research team, spent two days on an ore carrier, the "Stanley" which travelled across Lake Superior early in April, 1975. This was a time when "winter clothing" was still necessary for those exposed to the 10-20°F air temperature which prevailed. His conclusion regarding clothing worn by the men on board was that it was impossible to generalize on any particular style of typical winter clothing. In fact, most of the 26 men, including the officers and engineers, had little direct exposure to the environment and wore light clothing similar to that of "indoor" workers anywhere. The "deck crew" consisting PAGENO="0319" 31.5 of about ii seamen, were most exposed, especially during loading and unloading procedures at dockside. There was no uniformity in their particular clothing. Some wore long, woolen underwear. Both denim and wool pants were evident. A great variety of jackets and sweaters were worn. Gloves and head-coverings were consistently present. Occasional "snowmobile" suits were seen. It was necessary to come to some decision as to one or two forms of "typical seaman's winter clothing". The clothing should adequately represent that being used by the seamen of the Great Lakes, and at the same time, be relevant to professional seamen, offshore oil-rig workers, and coastal fishermen, wherever cold water occurs. The array of clothing which was chosen is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In Fig. 1, two styles of "heavy clothing" are shown which vary only in the nature of the outer coat or jacket being worn. In Fig. 1, the layers of clothing are: (a) "Long-john" woolen underwear, and woolen socks (b) cotton shirt, heavy wool pants, and ankle height, work boots (c) down jacket, wool cap, and waterproof gloves (d) standard foam flotation device (lifejacket) of the vest type (e) down vest (no sleeves) and wool jacket (alternative to the down jacket of illustration c) (f) standard foam flotation device with clothing alternative (e). Therefore, the two "heavy clothing" styles which were worn in the water are shown in Fig. id and if. Five individuals were tested in each of these two clothing variations. These two variations were not chosen with the a priori expectation that they would cause significant differences in cooling rate, but to avoid being too narrow in the definition of heavy winter clothing. Obviously, many further variations of heavy clothing could be tested, but with the likelihood of being insignificantly different from the forms chosen here. One other format of heavy winter clothing was considered to be worthy of study for its effect on cooling rate of seamen in cold water. A wearable windbreaker- type jacket (the 1] Vie Thermofloat jacket'), which provides significant thermal protection (5) in addition to flotation and visibility, has been developed in our laboratory. It replaced the wool jacket and standard flotation vest of Fig. if, and is shown in Fig. 2a. When the "convertible shorts", which are attached inside the back, are deployed, this flotation device appears as in Fig. 2b and 2c (the fluorescent red hood with retroreflective tape is also deployed). This jacket provides more than 15.5 lbs of buoyancy with good flotation position, so that an extra "lifejacket" is not required. Each ot the ten subjects was immersed a second time wearing the iJVic Thermofloat Jacket as is shown in Fig. 2b and c. Single immersions of one subject (J.H.) were also conducted with two forms of "survival suits". Fig. 2d illustrates the Mustang Survival Suit (Mustang Sportswear, Vancouver, B.C.) which is a nylon coverall with buoyant and thermally protective, closed-cell foam (W') between the layers. It was worn over the clothing in Fig. ie without the wool jacket. The other survival suit (Imperial Industries, Bremerton, Washington) consists of u-inch, closed cell foam that can be tightened over the clothing by closure of zippers on arms, legs, and trunk (Fig. 2e). It was worn over the same clothing as the TJVic Thermofloat and Mustang Survival Suit. These single tests on the thermal protection capa- bility of the two survival suits were considered a worthy comparison within this study, since both models are currently used for cold water safety, despite lack of experimental data on their effectiveness in reducing body cooling rate. Temperature measurements Core body temperatures were measured at the tympanic and rectal sites. Tympanic temperature was monitored with a small, padded thermocouple placed gently against the tympanum. The ear canal was then sealed with a wax plug. Rectal temperature was recorded with a thermistor inserted 15 cm beyond the anus. Temperatures were monitored continuously throughout pre-immersion, cooling, and rewarming phases. Immersion precedure Body temperatures were monitored for 10 minutes prior to immersion, during which time the subject sat in an air temperature of 8-10°C. The subject then walked a few meters to a ladder which he descended into the sea (7°C). The sub- ject was instructed not to swim or make gross movements since these have been 1 Manufactured by Mustang Sportswear, 540 Beatty Street, Vancouver, B.C. 78-280 O-76----21 PAGENO="0320" 316 shown to increase cooling rate (7). Instead, he remained still and adopted a thermally-protective behaviour, H.E.L.P. (Heat Escape Lessening Posture) which reduces cooling rate (6). The posture entails curling up in a "foetal-like" position, which results in decreased rate of heat loss from critical areas of the body surface (6). Therefore, the behaviour in the water was designed to minimize cooling rate, and thereby complement the potential of the heavy clothing to ex- tend predicted survival time. The results would then represent the situation of a heavily clothed man attempting to take best advantage of all his insulative capacity. Immersions were terminated when the deep body temperature reached 35°C (95°F), or when sufficient hypothermia hadoccurred to yield a uniform cooling rate. Immersion time varied from 45-120 mm depending on clothing variables and individuals differences in cooling rate. Subjects were rewarmed by either hot bath or inhalation techniques as described elsewhere (see Part II). RESULTS Cooling curves Fig. 3 presents cooling curves of tympanic and rectal temperature of an indi- vidual who showed typical responses. It is important to note that a fairly uniform cooling rate of the body core was no testablished until approximately 20 minutes of immersion. Therefore, cooling rate determinations were based upon temperature decreases from 20 minutes onward (mean immersion time was 85 mm). Analysis of cooling rates Table 1 summarizes the cooling rate findings for the different clothing variables. There were no significant differences between the cooling rates of the tympanic and rectal temperatures. Hence, the cooling rates of these two sites can be aver- aged to provide a single measure of cooling rate of the body core. Using this measure, no significant difference occurred between the cooling rates with the two forms of heavy clothing while wearing the standard flotation device (1.78 and 1.92°C/hr). Therefore, these two values can be combined to yield a single, mean value for cooling rate of 1.85°C/hr for subjects wearing heavy clothing and a standard flotation device. In comparison to this value, the UVic Thermofloat Jacket caused a highly significant (p<0.01) reduction of mean cooling rate to 0.89°C/hr. Analysis of the cooling rates in Table 1 shows the degree of variation between individuals in this study. The standard deviations of the cooling rates were often about 25% of the means. ABSTRACT Inhalation rewarming of hypothermic humans with heated, humidified oxygen was compared to rewarming by immersion in a hot bath. In ten subjects cooled to approximately 35°C core temperature, there was no significant difference in the amount of temperature "afterdrop" with the two rewarming procedures. Inhala- tion rewarming provided rapid commencement of increase in tympanic and eso- phageal temperatures, indicating effective rewarming of critical core regions, especially heart and brain. This method of core rewarming avoids the physiological hazards associated with the peripheral vasodilation which accompanies external rewarming. Moreover, the simplicity of application of this method suggests its greater use in both first-aid or hospital treatment of accidental hypothermia. INTRODUCTION Accidental hypothermia in man is a common, but serious problem in cold air and water environments. The rapid rate of cooling which occurs in cold water immersion (12) and in mountain accidents (10, 23) can readily progress to a medical emergency. Hence immediate recognition and therapy of this condition are necessary to overcome its high mortality (6, 22). Many current articles (9, 10, 16), medical texts (2) and military survival pub- lications (8, 32) recommend rapid peripheral rewarming as the treatment of first choice for hypothermia. Indeed, this has been shown to be effective even in the profoundly hypothermic victim (1). Many modalities are used to accomplish this, including immersion in hot water baths, wrapping in electric blankets, appli- cation of heated objects to the skin surface (3), and recently, circulation of warm water through special garments fitted to the victim (33). These methods are all effective in treatment of rapid-onset hypothermia, but certain physiological problems may arise with active, peripheral rewarming of the PAGENO="0321" 317 slow-onset, unconscious, profoundly-hypothermic victim. The well-described "after- drop" of the core body temperature following removal of the cold stress can be increased in magnitude by peripheral rewarming. This occurs through vasodila- tion in the cold periphery and subsequent return of cooled blood to the body core, further chilling the myocardium (33) and potentiating the possibility of ventricular fibrillation (1, 17, 33). Furthermore, in hypothermia of long duration, in which intravascular volume is decreased secondary to fluid shifts, rapid rewarming may precipitate hypovolemic shock as peripheral vasodilation further diminishes central blood volume (17, 33). To obviate these problems, some authorities (17, 31) recommend rapid rewarming for rapid-onset hypothermia, and slow rewarm- ing for slow-onset hypothermia. The difficulty in many accident situations of ascertaining the degree of hypothermia and its duration, complicates the decision of which type of therapy to apply, at a time when delay decreases the chance of successful resuscitation. Theoretically, core rewarming of the hypothermic victim avoids the physio- logical hazards mentioned above, through delivery of heat directly to the central circulation and tissues, leaving the limbs and peripheral tissues to warm more slowly. Several core rewarming methods have been used including extracorporeal circulation (7, 30); warm, peritoneal dialysis (18); direct warming of the heart after thoracotomy (19); endotracheal administration of warm air alone (28) and in combination with heated, intravenous fluids (27). Although all of these tech- niques have proven successful in many instances, they are clearly limited to the hospital environment. Recently, Lloyd (20) has described a means of core rewarming through the airway using warmed oxygen. He presents case histories showing its effectiveness in the hospital treatment of hypothermic patients, and in addition, describes a portable apparatus based on this principle (21). Inhalation rewarming is also receiving the interest of mountain rescue organizations (26) and of physicians as- sociated with mountaineering medicine (15, 29). Therefore, inhalation of heated, water-saturated gas (such as oxygen) by the hypothermia victim may best combine the merits of core rewarming and first-aid applicability at the accident site. The purpose of this experiment was to compare the effectiveness of inhalation rewarming (using heated, humidified oxygen) to peripheral rewarming in a hot whirlpool bath. In other that the results be most relevant to accidental situations, immersions were conducted in the sea using persons of average build, who wore standardized clothing and lifejackets. In addition, the rewarming apparatus was selected so as to be compatible with rescue aircraft and vessels, such as those of the U.S. Coast Guard. MATERIALS AND METHODS Immersions were conducted in the sea near Victoria, British Columbia, from on board a research ship which provided laboratory space for recordings and re- warming procedures. Sea temperatures were between 7 and 8°C and a slight cur- rent and small waves prevailed for the 4 days of immersions. Ten healthy male subjects (all athletically active) volunteered for the study and satisfied rigid medical selection criteria described elsewhere (12). Their characteristics (means and ranges) were: age 29 (20-48); weight 83 kg (75-105); height 1.84 m (177-191); and percent body fat 15.4 (9.3-25.7) based on standard measures of skinfold thickness. Core temperature was measured as follows. A fine, padded thermocouple was placed gently against the tympanum, and the auditory meatus sealed with a wax plug. Rectal temperature was monitored with a thermistor inserted 15 cm beyond the anus. In one subject only, esophageal temperature was obtained using a thermistor inserted nasally and positioned to lie at about the level of the cardiac atria. Production of hypothermia.-Each subject wore an outfit of typical seaman's clothing and a personal flotation device. With tympanic and rectal temperature being continuously monitored, 10-minutes of pre-immersion values were recorded. The subject then entered the cold sea water and remained motionless beside the ship while clinging to a life-ring. Constant visual surveillance of the subject was maintained. The immersion was terminated when the core temperature declined to 35°C or when the subject became too uncomfortable to continue. The range of immersion times was 45-120 mm. The subject then climbed out of the water up a 3 meter ladder to the deck, removed his wet garments with assistance, and walked 20 meters to the rewarming site in the laboratory of the ship. The time interval from leaving the water to initiation of rewarming was 3-4 mill. PAGENO="0322" 318 Rewarming procedures.-Each subject was cooled twice (on separate days) and rewarmed once by each of the two procedures. The order of use of the two re- warming procedures was randomized for the different subjects. Fig. 1 shows the inhalation rewarming apparatus. Oxygen from the cylinder was passed at a variable rate through the heating and humidifying apparatus. It was a standard Bennett model heater and vaporizer commonly used on hospital respirators. It consisted of a 1-liter water bath with a thermostatically-controlled, electric, immersion-heater element. The oxygen was bubbled through the water and delivered to the subject via a loosely-fitted, ventilation mask. The mask was fitted with a rebreathing bag to act as a reservoir which helped conform the variable ventilation flow rate of the subject to the uniform flow of the oxygen. The water was heated to about 700 C such that the water-saturated oxygen flowed from the Bennett heater at about 550 C and arrived at the subject's mask at 40-45° C. This was the maximum temperature of inhaled oxygen that the subjects found to be comfortable. The flow rate of oxygen was regulated to maintain the 40-45° C temperature of the inhaled gas. This required high flow rates for the first 5-10 minutes, because the subjects had high ventilation rates associated with vigorous shivering thermogenesis. As shivering subsided, oxygen flow rates were reduced to 10-12 liters/mm for the remainder of the rewarming. Inhalation re- warming was discontinued when the subjects had rewarmed about 1.5° C by tympanic recordings, involving a total period of about 45 mm from initiation of the treatment. During the inhalation rewarming, the subjects lay prone on a foam mattress. Room temperatures wa 24-26° C. The subjects were exposed to the air until their skin temperatures in the trunk region reached air temperature, requiring 7-10 minutes. They were then covered with an unwarmed blanket for the remainder of the rewarming period. Bath rewarming was accomplished using a 5 ft long, whirlpool bath. The subject reclined in the bath so that the water was at neck level. Initial water temperature was about 26° C and was then raised steadily to 42° C over the first 7-8 mm. Vigorous stirring continued at this temperature for the remainder of the rewarm- ing. The lower initial water temperature was required due to the severe discomfort to conscious, hypothermic subjects if suddenly immersed at the higher temperature. RESULTS A typical recording of core temperature changes during cooling and inhalation rewarming of one individual is shown in Fig. 2. A fairly uniform cooling rate was established by approximately 20 mm of immersion and the subject exited the cold water when the core temperatures were near 35 °C. Temperatures continued to decline during the period before inhalation rewarming began, and this "afterdrop" continued for another 0.3° C over the first 10 mm of rewarming before being arrested. Temperature increase of the tympanic site proceeded at a faster rate than the rectal site. For the ten subjects, comparison of the effectiveness of the inhalation and bath rewarming techniques is presented for the tympanic and rectal sites in Figs. 3 and 4 respectively Change in temperature before and after the onset of rewarming is shown. Tympanic temperature exhibited marked acceleration of cooling during the interval of physical activity that was associated with movement from the cold water to the rewarming laboratory. In this 3-4 minute period, tympanic tempera- ture declined an average of 0.4° C. For the tympanic site, there was no significant difference in the amount of continued cooling with the two rewarming methods. Inhalation rewarming had a mean afterdrop from commencement of rewarming of 0.38° C compared to 0.48° C for bath rewarming. The inhalation technique appeared to provide a slightly more rapid onset of increase in tympanic tempera- ture. By 15 mm of rewarming with each method, uniform rates of temperature increase were established, such that by 30 mm of rewarming a temperature rise of 1.3°C above the minimum was achieved. Rectal temperature (Fig. 4) showed less response to the physical activity during the transition from the cold water to the rewarming site (only a 0.1°C drop). Again, no significant difference occurred in the amount of afterdrop between the two rewarming methods. With inhalation rewarming, there was a further mean afterdrop of 0.40°C compared to 0.33°C with bath rewarming. At the rectal site, inhalation rewarming appeared to provide a slightly slower rate of temperature increase than bath rewarming. Approximately 20 mm was required to establish a steady rate of temperature in- crease, such that at 30 mm of rewarming, temperature rises above minimum of about 0.6° C and 0.4C occurred for the bath and inhalation techniques respectively. In comparing the rate of temperature increase of the tympanic and rectal sites during inhalation rewarming (Figs. 3 and 4), rectal temperature increase was significantly lower than tympanic from 15 mm of rewarming onward. PAGENO="0323" 319 Fig. 5 presents the temperature change curves for the one subject who had esophageal temperature recording in addition to tympanic and rectal measure- ments. Esophageal temperature showed essentially no afterdrop once inhalation rewarming began. Furthermore, this site showed a rapid rate of increase ia temper- ature, gaining 2.1°C in the first 5 mi Tympanic temperature showed a small afterdrop of 0.3°C and onset of temperature increase in less than 10 minutes (similar to the pattern in Fig. 3). Again, rectal temperature had a greater afterdrop and slower onset of increase than tympanic when treated with the inhalation technique. 0 0 cr I- 0 a- 0 F- TIME (mm) FIGURE 2.-Typical recording of core body temperatures during cooling in 7°C water and subsequent inhalation rewarming. PAGENO="0324" 320 1.2 1.0 0.0 ~0.6 w I - ______________________ -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 TIME (mm) FIGURE 3.-Comparison of tympanic temperature changes occurring with in- halation and bath rewarming. Changes were calculated from the temperature at the beginning of rewarming (time 0). The mean tympanic temperature at time 0 was 34.5° C. The difference in cooling curves from 15 to 5 minutes before rewarming was due to clothing differences (being studied separately), and had no bearing on the afterdrop findings. Vertical lines denote standard errors of the means. [~~ANIC cx,, cold wc'/er / beg',, rewarm PAGENO="0325" U UI 0 z x C-) UI cr~ I- cr UI £1- hi I- 321 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 BATI -0.4 I I s - o is 20 25 TtME V.Q15 30 (mm) FIGURE 4.-Comparison of rectal temperature changes occurring with inhalation and bath rewarming. The mean rectal temperature at time 0 was 35.3° C. Other conditions as in Fig. 3. DISCUSSION These experimental results confirm the theoretical expectation that inhalation rewarming can be an effective treatment for hypothermia in humans. The lack of difference in core temperature afterdrop and rewarming rate between inhalation and bath rewarming allows the inhalation technique to be considered an "active" or "aggressive" therapy. Although cardiovascular variables were not measured, the lower rectal and skin temperatures, and the more persistent shivering with the inhalation method testify to less warming and consequently less vasodilation of the peripheral regions. Hence, the further advantage results that rewarming shock and induction of ventricular fibrillation by cold and acidotic venous return are minimized, despite rapid rewarming of the "critical core". With the inhalation method, direct warming of the grain would occur by conduction from the naso- pharynx, and by circulation of warmed vertebral and carotid arterial blood. The more rapid rewarming of the brain would both reverse cold-induced depression of the respiratory centers and more rapidly stimulate regaining of consciousness of the severely hypothermic victim. PAGENO="0326" 322 FIGURE 5.-Changes in esophageal temperature in comparison to tympanic and rectal temperatures in an individual being rewarmed by the inhalation method. The mean temperature of the three sites at time 0 was 34.1° C With regard to the need to stop further cooling of the hea~t and begin its re- warming, the extremely rapid response of the esophageal temperature to inhala- tion rewarming deserves emphasis. Previous studies have shown that a close parallel exists between esophageal temperature and the temperature of the heart and great vessels (5). The esophageal recording would therefore indicate that inhalation rewarming facilitates rapid myocardial rewarming. Transfer of heat from warm, humidified gases to the airways is rapid (34); and heat may then flow from the airways to other structures of the mediastinum. The heart would be warmed from the pericardium inward. Probably of greater significance, however, is the return to the heart of warmed blood from the lungs, leading to myocardial warming both through direct heating of the endocardium and through coronary perfusion. Rapid rewarming of the heart in this manner would minimize the possibility of ventricular fibrillation and would potentiate increased cardiac output (24, 25). C) V Lu z 2: C) Lu 1.0 Lu Q. Lu 1- wa/er TIME (mm) 5 10 PAGENO="0327" 323 A further advantage of inhalation rewarming with heated, humidified oxygen can be anticipated. Since the oxygen supply to the myocardium is decreased in hypothermia, both from decreased coronary vascular flow (13) and decreased oxyhemoglobin dissociation (4), the possibility of ventricular fibrillation from a limitation of myocardial energetics is enhanced (14). The inhalation of heated oxygen in the treatment of hypothermia would not only be therapeutic in terms of warming of the myocardium, but also from a concurrent increase in coronary arterial oxygenation. Nevertheless, one report (31) recommends against the use of 100% oxygen for respiratory support of severely hypothermic subjects, on the assumption that oxyhemoglobin is not dissociated, CO2 transport is consequently impaired, and CO2 narcosis results. However, this assumption needs verification and most authorities (10, 16, 20, 21, 22) recommend oxygen therapy to counteract hypoxia in severe hypothermia. In fact, the use of heated oxygen has been used successfully in actual case histories of hypothermia (20, 21). Finally, a practical reason for use of oxygen for rewarming is its easy availability through widespread use in emergency medicine. In the context of minimizing the amount of afterdrop of core temperature and maximizing its rate of increase, some combination of inhalation rewarming and peripheral rewarming may be optimal. Peripheral rewarming should omit the limbs and concentrate on transfer of heat into the trunk. The most effective surface areas for application of heat to the trunk, while avoiding peripheral vasodilation, would be the neck, lateral thorax, and groin regions. These have been shown thermographically (11) to have high heat transfer with the "core". Another aspect of the results of this study deserves note. Tympanic and esopha- geal temperatures showed sharp temperature declines during the period of physical activity involved in climbing out of the cold water, removing outer clothing, and walking to ths ship's laboratory. The significance of these findings for those involved in rescue operations is clear: hypothermia victims should be recovered with as little physical exertion on their part as possible, so as to minimize the post-rescue afterdrop in core temperature (32). In conclusion, the simplicity, effectiveness, and safety of the inhalation rewarm- ing technique warrants its adoption on a larger scale for both rescue and hospital treatment of all levels of hypothermia. Mr. RUPPE. I understand the American Bureau of Shipping in- creased draft marks for lake vessels in 1973 with a reduction in freeboard. Do you feel that there are any. adverse effects that may have come about on vessel structural integrity because of these changes in draught? Admiral GRACEY. I am going to ask Commander Deck to respond in a little more detail, sir, but I have looked at that question, and my understanding is that it was done under the auspices of a. joint Canadian-U.S. Coast Guard Committee. It was not a carte blanch approval to increase draft. It was done only on certain vessels under certain conditions. The people that I have talked to have not indicated to me that there is any increased safety hazard to this, but I will ask Commander Deck to give you some more details. Commander DECK. I probably should point out, I think, one slight inaccuracy. The American Bureau of Shipping didn't bring this about themselves. They are acting as agent for the Coast Guard and they essentially do the physical work in making the calculations and the inspections and placement of the Plimson marks on the vessels. The change in 1973 to the Great Lakes load lines was only for a very limited particular class of vessels. These were vessels which were of fairly recent vintage that had a number of safety features, such things as watertight hatch covers, certain kinds of enclosures over portholes, watertight doors on house fronts, different kinds of closures for their vent syste~ns. So far as the structural adequacy of these vessels, each was analyzed in depth prior to giving this deeper load line draft. PAGENO="0328" 324 One of the, I guess, anomalies of naval architecture is that the deeper the draft in its deeper loading, the vessels in the loading condition did not really increase the stress of the vessel to any signifi- cant degree. As a matter of fact, in the analysis, it is shown that, the vessel suffers greater stress when she is in the ballast condition than in the loaded condition. As an example, we use a figure of four tons per square inch being the limit. Deeply loaded vessels, that is the summer load line vessels, their stress may be somewhere in the neighborhood of one and a quarter tons per square inch, whereas the vessel in the ballast condition may be two and a half to three, perhaps three and a half tons per square inch. So the deeper loading really did not have a significant impact as far as the stress loadings were concerned and, therefore, did not have a significant impact as far as the structural capability of the vessel was concerned. Admiral GRACEY. Of the three major lake vessel casualties we talked about, two of them were in ballast at the time they broke up. Mr. RUPPE. In your opinion, has the Mini-LORAN-C been an effective navigation tool and, if so, do you foresee the possibility or likelihood of extending its use to other areas of the Great Lakes? Admiral GRACEY. We cannot say it has been an effective tool yet, Mr. Ruppe, because we really haven't had a chance to put it into operational practice. I think it has great promise. The success we have seen is with a very primitive piece of user equipment. And if the designer who I think is here will forgive me for those words, we have got great hopes for the future for equipment that is being developed now. But even that will show great promise. Mr. RUPPE. You indicated in your statement-you referred to my persistence on this and I have been persistent, and of course the Coast Guard itself is very interested and excited about this because we think it has great prospects. Admiral GRACEY. One of the reasons that we think it has prospects, we figure if it will work in the St. Mary's River, it will work anyplace. We thought it was a marvelous opportunity to have a go at it. As far as the Great Lakes are concerned, I think there might be some other areas, for example the Detroit-St. Clair area, but the expense there probably isn't warranted. I know the St. Lawrence Seaway people are watching our development very interestedly. There are some parts of the country where we have some thoughts of using this-for example, in some of the lower regions of the Missis- sippi. Mr. RUPPE. Thank you, sir. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Admiral, you mentioned that we have a co- operative agreement with Canada. Does Canada~ have a cooperative part of our Coast Guard in the lakes? Admiral GRACEY. No, they really don't. There is a Canadian Coast Guard and it does do a lot of the things that we do, but law enforcement is handled by the Canadian police and search and rescue is handled by another group, so no, there is no country in the world that has an agency that does all the things that your Coast Guard does. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Do you limit your activities solely to our jurisdiction, or do you go across the line? PAGENO="0329" 325 Admiral GRACEY. We have cooperative agreements with Canada on icebreaking, SAR and pollution surveillance. The pollution sur- veillance agreement was worked out and has since been approved by the State Department. It was worked out on the basis of efficiency. Instead of our flying down one side of the border and their flying over the other, we said, "Why don't you fly over Erie and Ontario and we fly over Superior and Huron and we can exchange information on what we see." That is being done. There is a law that permitted us to join in icebreaking with foreign countries. That was subject to agreement. There is an agreement being worked out now. However, for years and years icebreaking has been shared on the Lakes and that has been continuing. The Canadians helped on the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers. Mr. DE LA GARZA. The icebreaking is normally limited to geo- graphic limitations of the two countries? Admiral GRACEY. No, as you go across the lakes, you go in and out of Canada all the time. The natural tracks of vessels do not follow the border at all. In fact, the Fitzgerald is just barely in U.S. waters. It is just about on the Canadian border and had been coming down from Canadian waters. Mr. DE LA GARZA. So if someone is in distress in Canadian waters, you nonetheless go out and assist him? Admiral GRACEY. Only if we have a request for help from Canada and vice versa, but it is a very frequent event. Of course, usually with the rescue case, if you hear it, you don't wait for a lot of for- malities, you go. Basically, we are so busy responding to our calls, we only respond to Canada on request of the Canada Rescue Agent. Mr. DE LA GARZA. You mentioned about 1,000 auxiliary service assists on weekends. Do you pay those? Are they doing volunteer service, or how is that, Admiral? Admiral GRAcEY. I think I have kind of confused things a little with my statement. The 1,000 figure referred to Reservists. We don't have 1,000 who are on duty every weekend. We draw from a pool of 1,000 to derive the number who come in on weekends. Yes, they are paid. The volunteers are the Auxiliarists. Some are paid for fuel and damage to their boat when they are on the job. Mr. DE LA GARZA. You provide them fuel for the boat? Admiral GRAcEY. If they are under orders. A large portion of what they do, they do on their own time. Mr. DE LA GARZA. On their own? Admiral GRAcEY. On their own time. Marvelous organization. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Yes, I know, I have been hauled in by one of them. [Laughter.] Admiral, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony and your cooperation, and we look forward to working with you and having continued oversight. I might mention that many times people associate congressional oversight responsibility with trouble, but that is not the case. Over- sight means that we work with you and we oversee the good and the bad, so when we say oversight, it doesn't mean we are only having oversight hearings where there are problems or trouble, but there are PAGENO="0330" 326 many oversight hearings in which everything worked right and is fine and we just want to come out in the field and take a look at it and look at the people who have done the work. In this case we have a little of both. We appreciate your cooperation and your testimony. Admiral GRACEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Now, I might add mostly for the benefit of my colleagues, if my two colleagues would bear with me, I would like to follow the procedure of having the testimony of each witness and then deferring any question and then inviting all the witnesses together at the end for questions, if that would be agreeable. The next witness is Vice Admiral Paul E. Trimble, USCG (retired,) president, Lake Carriers' Association, Cleveland, Ohio. And we will be very happy to hear from you, Admiral. STATEMENT OP VICE ADM. PAUL E. TRIMBLE, U.S. COAST GUARD (RETIRED), PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION, CLEVE- LAND, OHIO Admiral TRIMBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee and welcome to the Fourth Seacoast. We are very pleased that you have chosen this locale for your look at the facilities in the Great Lakes area. At the outset, as far as lake shipping is concerned, the Coast Guard here on the lakes does a fine job of carrying out its public responsibili- ties and managing its available resources. Its personnel, headed by an outstandingly capable District Commander, by and large are com- pletely dedicated to their tasks round the clock, round the calendar, and without regard to weather conditions. To the extent that there is a weakness or a problem it is in available resources which I will touch on subsequently. Mr. Chairman, in the interests of time, I would like to introduce my statement for the record and then just touch on parts of it. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Without objection, your full statement will appear in the record as if delivered and you may quote from it as seen fit. [The statement follows:] STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. PAUL E. TRIMBLE, PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, welcome to the Fourth Seacoast! We in the lake shipping industry are pleased that you are holding hearings at the Soo on the adequancy of Coast Guard facilities in this area. We do have more important ports in terms of tonnage but this is really the hub of the Great Lakes navigation system. This locale presents more marine problems than any other section, such as aids to navigation, ice obstruction, vessel traffic control, and variable weather. Consequently, Coast Guard operations here are correspondingly more extensive. I represent the domestic bulk vessel fleets on the lakes so my comments on Coast Guard facilities will reflect that point of view. As this Committee is particularly aware Coast Guard activities and capabilities impact heavily on the shipping industry. Coast Guard responsibilities start with approval of plans for construc- tion or modification of merchant vessels, approval of safety equipment, licensing of personnel, and annual inspection of the vessel and safety equipment. The Coast Guard is responsible for aids to navigation, including electronic, such as Loran-C and vessel traffic control. Its multi-purpose vessels perform search and PAGENO="0331" 327 rescue missions, break ice to meet the reasonable needs of commerce, and are available for marine law enforcement work, including enforcement of marine pollution regulations. In addition to vessels, both fixed and rotary wing aircraft are used in support of its missions, especially search and rescue, law enforcement and ice surveillance. The Coast Guard is also responsible for research and devel- opment in support and furtherance of its activities. At the outset I will state for the record that the Coast Guard here on the lakes does a fine job of carrying out its public responsibilities and managing its available resources. Its personnel, headed by an outstandingly capable District Commander, by and large are completely dedicated to their tasks round-the-clock, round-the- calendar, and without regard to weather conditions. To the extent that there is a weakness or a problem, it is in available resources which I will touch on subsequently. Since your committee, Mr. Chairman, is responsible for Coast Guard legislation and authorization, as well as oversight, your activities and performance are also important to shipping and the Great Lakes. The authorization process for Coast Guard capital improvement items was instituted by your Committee during the early sixties. It is a fact that Coast Guard facilities during the intervening period have become steadily more adequate for the statutory tasks assigned. At the same time some of those tasks have been broadened in the area of fisheries surveillance, pollution abatement, and Loran-C coverage under the national navigation plan. Recent extension of our fisheries zone to 200 miles will further tax Coast Guard resources, perhaps even coming ahead of those needed in the Great Lakes. Before looking at the adequacy of Coast Guard facilities here, please bear with me very briefly on the what and why of domestic bulk lake shipping, its importance to the national economy, and effect on the Coast Guard. As has been well publi- cized, water transportation takes pride in being the lowest cost mode of trans- portation, the lowest energy consumer per ton-mile of cargo moved and in having the least environmental impact. We are down to 137 vessels compared to 240 in 1970 when the average age of the bulk fleet was over 45 years. Extension of benefits to the lakes that was pro- vided for in the Merchant Marine Act Amendments of 1970 has given considerable impetus to replacement of the smaller and older vessels with larger, safer and more productive vessels that the improved navigation system and the Poe Lock will now accommodate. Why is lake shipping important to the Great Lakes and the nation? Improvement in vessel productivity is helping to keep shipping costs down, which in turn affect utility costs to the consumer; what the farmer gets for his grain; and what the consumer pays for products containing steel. It also helps to keep domestic steel production costs competitive with foreign supplies, and this impacts on employment, our economy, and the balance of payments. In 1974, imports of foreign steel exceeded our exports by $3.4 billion. In 1975 the world-wide slump reduced steel demand and the deficit to less than $3.0 billion, still a significant figure when we think of lost business and employment in our own country. This is especially important to the Great Lakes area, the industrial heartland of the Nation. / Looking ahead from the slump we are emerging from, economists are f ore- casting steel expansion requirements of 25 to 30 million tons by 1980-81, with increased employment from the mines to the mills of 90,000. Planning towards that goal is well under way with specific expansions announced by most of the major steel companies. On the raw material side to meet that demand, and that is where lake shipping is directly involved, construction is already under way to increase domestic taconite pellet production from 55 million tons annually to 85 million tons by 1980, over a 50 percent increase. Dockside ore handling facilities are being modernized or replaced at the head of the lakes to handle the expanded raw material movement. An ultra-modern dockside facility has just been completed at Superior, Wiscon- sin to handle up to 20 million tons annually of western coal for Great Lakes utility plants. S With the bulk cargoes projected, over a dozen new vessels are under construction or contract through 1982, and others are in the design stage, each with winter navigation capability. Still others are being lengthened or modernized as yard capacity permits. Under the Congressional authorized and funded season extension program during the past five years we have successfully demonstrated that appropriately designed or modified vessels can safely and economically operate on the lakes from 10 to 12 months, instead of the normal 8~ months' season. PAGENO="0332" 328 This substantial improvement in lake shipping productivity, along with newer, larger and self-unloading vessels, has been accomplished with our existing Great Lakes waterway, and has involved little additional public investment. Forecasted stockpiling savings can only occur if stockpiling is reduced and land use planned accordingly, Vessel use for the year must also be planned ahead for optimum productivity. Carefully coordinated long-range planning in connec- tion with expanded steel production, the supporting pellet production and loading facilities, western coal movement and handling facilities, and shipping is necessary to achieve those savings. Huge capital outlays are involved, so the planning is not something that can be turned off and on each year. A good example of the situation and problem is the expanded pellet production in Upper Michigan that has been going on during the past few years, with a further substantial increase just announced this past month that will create an additional 1,000 jobs in this depressed area. The capacity of the rail systems to Escanaba and Marquette are limited, as well as the dock loading facilities, so the only way, without building new facilities at added capital costs and construc- tion time, to move this added capacity is by operating during the winter. This certainly makes sense as a flexible step that should be taken before going to the expense of new construction. It should be noted that it has even been necessary to operate ships into the winter the past two years to move needed pellets. That situation is expected to continue this coming winter. The expanded bulk shipping under way and other changes described have a significant effect on the Coast Guard in the Soo area, especially the following programs: Aids to navigation. Vessel assistance, both search and rescue, and ice breaking. Vessel traffic control. R. & D. in support of Coast Guard responsibilities, especially marine safety. In the aids to navigation field, the Coast Guard has under way two important improvements in facilities. Loran-C coverage, as recently announced under the national navigation plan, is being extended to the Great Lakes with completion by 1980. This will provide a much more accurate position keeping capability for vessels equipped to use the system. It will be especially helpful in Lake Superior, but will also enhance safety in other lakes. A mini Loran-C system, affording an accuracy of 25 feet in critical locations in the St. Marys River, should be ready for testing on a commercial vessel later this year. This system will minimize lost time resulting from poor visibility, will improve navigation safety and should minimize groundings. I credit Rear Admiral Gracey, the Great Lakes Commander of the Coast Guard for recognizing this requirement and pushing the development to the stage of success currently in sight. It has other interesting potential uses that the Coast Guard is exploring separately. The picture is not nearly so rosy when it comes to the Coast Guard's general purpose vessel fleet available for Great Lakes service. None of these vessels were designed specifically for Fourth Seacoast duties. In fact, no vessel has been built for Great Lakes service since the World War II era. The duties, the operating environment and the available technology have changed considerably since then. As might be expected, the Coast Guard vessel fleet has grown exceedingly tired in the intervening years and is increasingly difficult to provide parts-support for, and assure the traditional Coast Guard reliability. I refer primarily to the five harbor vessels, such as the Naugatuck here at the Soo, the winter-time work horses of the fleet. These vessels are not only assigned for rescue and law enforcement, but also for ice breaking. If replacements were so designed, they could also tend aids to navigation. Today these vessels are of marginal value for rescue services in severe weather. While in service these vessels have performed yeoman duty helping to keep the St. Marys River channels open during the winter. Such ice breaking responsibili- ties of the Coast Guard stem from 14 U.S.C. 2 and also Executive Order 7521 issued December 21, 1936 that provides in substance that: "The Coast Guard is directed to assist in keeping open to navigation by means of ice breaking operations, insofar as practicable and as the exigencies may require, channels and harbors, in accordance with the reasonable demands of commerce." Through the dedicated maximum efforts of its crews using World War II vin- tage vessels with varying ice breaking effectiveness, ice breaking has kept up with the limited level of winter demonstration effort, the proving period, so to speak. Except for the MACKINAW, the vessels were not designed for extended season PAGENO="0333" 329 operations nor for the super-size carriers that have already started to make up the fleet. With more vessels and more ports involved in winter operations, super- imposed on normal Coast Guard winter operations, the needed ice breaking capability is just not there. Lead time for authorization, design and funding for vessel procurement is 3 to 6 years, depending upon whether a satisfactory, already designed and operationally tested vessel is available. I am not proposing additional vessels nor personnel for the lakes, just faster replacement of present overage multi-function vessels than is included in current Administration planning to be ready for increased cargo movements by 1980 . . . so as not to be a drag on this phase of the economy and employment. Without such action, the Coast Guard is not going to be ready, ice breaking-wise, for lake shipping of 1980, and probably not even that of 1977, 1978 and 1979. Your committee is aware of this deficiency, Mr. Chairman, and its action on the Coast Guard Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1977 speaks for itself. On the House side, Congressmen Ruppe and Oberstar were especially aggressive in developing and presenting the facts, and supporting a more adequate program, as reflected in H.R. 11670 passed by the House earlier this year. With respect to vessel traffic control in the Soo area, the Coast Guard has been exercising its authority since the turn of the century. We in industry feel that the program has been successful in the interest of safety and minimum traffic delays. To minimize shore erosion and property damage, speed control zones have also been established. We agree with the objective but have had difficulty complying to the gnat's eyebrow. The problem is the varying current through the speed zones resulting from changes in the number of Soo compensating gates in operation, weather conditions and water level changes. I see improvment ahead for two rea- sons: First is the furnishing tomasters of current change data by the Coast Guard here at the Soo as the vessel passes, a procedure instituted this season. Secondly, the mini Loran-C vessel equipment is expected to provide an accurate speed meas- uring capability as a dividend to its other benefits. As to Research and Development in support of its Great Lakes responsibilities, I feel the Coast Guard has not been sufficiently aggressive, especially in marine safety. That service does have regulatory responsibility and has to approve each item of safety equipment used on a merchant vessel. Safety regulations and equipment required is largely evolutionary and for the most part stems from casualty experience rather than a systematic approach, technological develop- ments or development of equipment to meet a specified marine safety objective. Since Coast Guard approval is required before safety equipment can be used, there is not much incentive for nongovernment research unless the Coast Guard is involved or shows interest. Incidentally, the Coast Guard has recently pub- lished proposed regulations in the Federal Register of June 7, 1976 to facilitate the development and use of more effective lifesaving safety equipment on Great Lakes vessels. The Coast Guard's Research and Development program is of such national importance that I urge oversight by your committee. I recommend that it be added to the programs requiring authorization, as well as to having an annual progress report filed with the committee, or such a report included in scheduled oversight hearings. This action will permit review as to the adequacy of the annual program and also long-range objectives. The Coast Guard investigation into the tragic sinking of the Edmund Fitz- gerald last November in nearby Lake Superior waters, with the loss of all hands, has not been completed * * * and Admiral Gracey has commented on it. Because of the safety implications the shipping industry is very interested in the results. According to a statement attributed to the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry appointed to investigate this casualty, something happened to the Fitzgerald between three and three-thirty in the afternoon of November 10 north of Caribou Island. At that time the ship started taking on water and taking a list, and her master reported that, by radio. And subsequently the hull suffered a rather sudden failure * * *. However, it appears that the master was unaware that his vessel was in jeopardy until it was too late. * * * Consequently, no S.O.S. was broadcasted nor was Coast Guard assistance requested. Result: Loss of the entire crew, 29 valued and experienced men; a fine vessel; and her cargo of pellets. Tragedies such as this are most infrequent on the lakes . . . and with the technology available today in our great country, we should not have any more. PAGENO="0334" 330 Here are some steps, all within the current state of the art, that are being under- taken and others that need to be undertaken to accomplish that result. I think our lake fleet is the safest in the world, and construction and design reflects that objective, but these additional steps, with Coast Guard or appropriate federal agency taking the lead with industry cooperation, will be a quantum step forward. (1) Develop a computerized hull monitoring system with an appropriate pilothouse readout to interpret hull actions in all wealher situations and to alert the master that trouble is developing. (2) Develop an all-weather capsule that will float free in the event the vessel sinks. Capsule should carry a portable VHF radio or other appropriate electronic signalling equipment capable of being received by search aircraft and vessels. It should be of distinctive color; have radar reflecting qualities. At least two would be carried on each vessel. Such development should not be much of a challenge to space age technology. It would not be dissimilar to the presently available Brucker capsule in general use in the Gulf on oil rigs; the cumbersome launching system would be eliminated. (3) National Weather Service should expedite planning and development of a marine weather and ice forecast center for the lakes. Lake shipping has been making this recommendation to NOAA and the National Weather Service for a number of years. While the Weather Service personnel on the lakes are ex- tremely cooperative, the fact remains that there is no marine forecast capability for the Great Lakes system, and the marine aspect is inadequately funded. Having full-time marine forecasters here would permit monitoring the progress of a lake storm full-time by experts and making appropriate marine broadcasts. Weather reporting equipment is not effectively located. To some extent this stems from the station automation program of the Coast Guard. At manned stations Coast Guardsmen were available to record and report selected weather data. The Weather Service now has to rely on automatic reporting equipment in isolated areas and often not located for best results. (4) NOAA should deploy or develop weather buoys for use on the lakes to fill in these critical gaps in data reporting: (a) Eastern end of Lake Superior (b) Lake Michigan to replace the automated Lansing shoals Coast Guard station (c) Lake Huron to replace reporting from the former Coast Guard Light- ship. I note with interest Congressman Ruppe's comments about weather buoys and I heartily concur. I understand that Canada is also interested in weather buoys for reporting Lake Superior data. Perhaps the weather services of our two countries should mount a joint program. (5) Develop a weather manual for deck officer training and use that is oriented specifically towards Great Lakes weather and wave conditions. Note: This has been initiated. (6) Lake vessels should be permitted to carry an effective "utility" boat, such as a Boston Whaler, for man-overboard rescue and other purposes in lieu of lifeboats, which are largely obsolescent in my opinion. The availability of rescue capsules will hasten the phasing out of lifeboats on the lakes. (7) Loran-C coverage and related charts should be expedited for the lakes. Reliability and accuracy in position keeping will be in the interest of safety. * * * (8) United States and Canadian Coast Guard have now completed VHF radio coverage of the lakes for emergency and distress. Reliable communications are available. (9) A replacement ptogram for the obsolescent 110-foot harbor vessel is about to be commenced by the Coast Guard. The new multi-purpose vessels will be capable of responding to distress calls in all-weather conditions. I have made recommendations to this Committee at earlier hearings what the operational characteristics should be so I won't repeat at this time. (10) Replacement of the aged 36-foot lifeboat at the nearby Grand Marait Coast Guard Station with a modern self-righting 44-foot lifeboat will permit all-weather response from that station. We appreciate Congressman Ruppe's successful efforts this year for that accomplishment. (11) The deck officer training provided by our own Great Lakes Maritime Academy at Traverse City is already and should continue to produce officers for tomorrow's sailing who will be equal to the challenge and advances in technology. * * * Thank you very much for the opportunity to be heard today, Mr. Chairman. PAGENO="0335" 331 Admiral TRIMBLE. Before looking at the adequacy of the Coast Guard facilities, please bear with me on the when and why of bulk shipping. As you have been told I am sure a number of times, water transportation is the lowest cost mode of transportation, it is the lowest energy consumer per ton-mile of cargo moved and we feel it has the least environmental impact. Why is it important to the Great Lakes and the Nation? We are talking about domestic lake shipping, hauling of coal; it means wheat, limestone, petroleum products, sand, and so forth. Improvement in vessel productivity is helping in keeping shipping costs down which in turn affect utility costs to the consumer; what the farmer gets for his grain. And we are talking about the auto industry, the pipeline industry, the oil rig industry, agricultural implements that the farmer uses, the heavy construction equipment, and so forth, so this touches a wide swath through the economy. It also helps to keep domestic steel production costs competitive with foreign supplies, and this impacts on employment, our economy, and the balance of payments. In 1974, imports of foreign steel exceeded our exports by $3.4 billion. In 1975, the worldwide slump reduced steel demand and the deficit to less than $3 billion, still a significant figure when we think of lost business and employment in our own country. This is especially important to the Great Lakes area, the industrial heartland of the Nation. Looking ahead from th~ slump we are emerging from, economists are forecasting steel expansion requirements of 25 to 30 million tons by 1980-81, with increased employment from the mines to the mills of 90,000. Planning toward that goal is well underway with specific expansions announced by most of the major steel companies. On the raw material side, to meet that demand, and that is where lake shipping is directly involved, construction is already underway to increase domestic taconite pellet production from 55 million tons annually to 85 million tons by 1980, over a 50-percent increase. Dockside ore handling facilities are being modernized or replaced at the head of the lakes to handle the expanded raw material movement. An ultramodern dockside facility has just been completed at Superior, Wis., to handle up to 20 million tons annually of Western coal for Great Lakes utility plants. This is one of the most modern coal-handling facilities in the world, including the dust handling and other environmental precautions. With the bulk cargoes projected over a dozen new vessels are under construction or contract through 1982, and others are in the design stage, each with winter navigation capability. Still others are being lengthened or modernized as yard capacity permits. Under the congressionally authorized and funded season extension program during the past 5 years we have successfully demonstrated that appropriately designed or modified vessels can safely and econom- ically operate on the lakes from 10 to 12 months, instead of the normal 834 months' season. This substantial improvement in lake shipping productivity, along with newer, larger, and self-unloading vessels, has been accomplished with our existing Great Lakes Waterway, and has involed little additional public investment. 78-280 0-76-22 PAGENO="0336" 332 There is a tabulation showing gradual extension from 1968 up to the entire winter in 1974-75 and 1975-76 when we operated around the calendar. In fact, in the last few years we operated up to February. Forecasted stockpiling savings can only occur if stockpiling is reduced and land use planned accordingly. Vessels use for the year must also be planned ahead for optimum productivity. Carefully coordinated long-range planning in connection with expanded steel production, the supporting pellet production and loading facilities, Western coal movement and handling facilities, and shipping is necessary to achieve those savings. Huge capital outlays are involved, so the planning is not something that can be turned off and on each year. A good example of the situation and problem is the expanded pellet production in upper Michigan that has been going on during the past few years, with a further substantial increase just announced this past month that will create an additional 1,000 jobs in this depressed area. The capacity of the rail systems to Escanaba and Marquette are limited, as well as the dock-loading facilities, so the only way, without building new facilities at added capital costs and construction time, to move this added capacity is by operating during the winter. This certainly makes sense as a flexible step that should be taken before going to the expense of new construction. It should be noted that it has even been necessary to operate ships into the winter the last 2 years to move needed pellets. Tha situation is expected to continue this coming winter. The expanded bulk shipping underway and other changes described have a significant effect on the Coast Guard in the Soo area, especially the following programs: Aids to navigation; vessel assistance, both search and rescue, and icebreaking; vessel traffic control; and R. & D. in support of Coast Guard responsibilities, especially marine safety. Admiral Gracey has discussed what is being done in the aids to navigation field and I respectfully concur. On LORAN-C, I admire Admiral Gracey for pursuing this solution for a matter that has been bothering us. I'm optimistic about its use. The picture is not nearly so rosy when it comes to the Coast Guard's general purpose vessel fleet available for Great Lakes service. None of these vessels were designed specifically for fourth seacoast duties. In fact, no vessel has been built for Great Lakes service since the World War II era. The duties, the operating environment and the available technology have changed considerably since then. As might be expected, the Coast Guard vessel fleet has grown exceedingly tired in the intervening years and is increasingly difficult to provide parts-support for, and assure the traditional Coast Guard reliability. I refer primarily to the five harbor vessels, such as the Naugatiick here at the Soo, the wintertime work horses of the fleet. These vessels are not only assigned for the rescue and law enforcement, but also for icebreaking. If replacements were so designed, they could also tend aids to navigation. Today these vessels are of marginal value for rescue services in severe weather. With respect to vessel traffic control in the Soo area, the Coast Guard has been exercising its authority since the turn of the century. PAGENO="0337" 333 We in industry feel that the program has been successful in the interest of safety and minimum* traffic delays. To minimize shore erosion and property damage, speed control zones have also been established. We agree with the objective but have had difficulty complying to the gnat's eyebrow. The problem is the varying current through the speed zones resulting from changes in the number of Soo compensating gates in operation, weather conditions, and water level changes. I see improvement ahead for two reasons: Fisrt is the furnishing to masters of current change data by the Coast Guard here at the Soo as the vessel passes, a procedure instituted this season. Second, the mini loran-C vessel equipment is expected to provide an accurate speed-measuring capability as a dividend to its other benetfis. As to R. & D. in support of its Great Lakes responsibilities, I feel the Coast Guard has not been sufficiently aggressive, especially in marine safety. That service does have regulatory responsibility and has to approve each item of safety equipment required on a merchant vessel. Safety regulations and equipment required is largely evolutionary and for the most part stems from casualty experience rather than a systematic approach, technological developments or development of equipment to meet a specified marine safety objective. Since Coast Guard approval is required before safety equipment can be used, there is not much incentive for non-Government re- search unless the Coast Guard is involved or shows interest. Inciden- tally, the Coast Guard has recently published proposed regulations in the Federal Register of June 7, 1976, to facilitate the development and use of more effective lifesaving safety equipment on Great Lakes vessels. The Coast Guard's R. & D. program is of such national im- portance that I urge oversight by your committee. I recommend that it be added to the program requiring authorization, as well as to having an annual progress report filed with the committee, or such a report included in scheduled oversight hearings. This action will permit review as to the adequacy of the annual program and also long-range objectives. The Coast Guard investigation into the tragic sinking of the Ed- mui~d Fitzgerald last November in nearby Lake Superior waters, with the loss of all hands, has not been completed, and Admiral Gracey has commented on it. Because of the safety implications the shipping industry is very interested in the results. According to a statement attributed to the chairman of the Board of Inquiry appointed to investigate this casualty, something happened to the Fitzgerald between 3 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. of November 10, north of Caribou Island. At that time the ship started taking on water and taking a list, and her master reported that, by radio. And subsequently the hull suffered a rather sudden failure. Now this was a statement that the chairman of the inquiry made and it was quoted in the Michigan papers. However, it appears that the master was unaware that his vessel was in jeopardy until it was too late. So it wouldn't have made too much difference what sort of external facilities are available if the ves- sel itself does not know it is in trouble. Consequently, no SOS was broadcast nor was Cost Guard assistance requested. Result: Loss of the entire crew, 29 valued and experienced men, a fine vessel, and her cargo of pellets. PAGENO="0338" 334 Tragedies such as this are most infrequent on the Lakes, and with the technology available today in our great country, we should not have any more. Here are some steps, all within the current state of the art, that are being undertaken and others that need to be under- taken to accomplish that result. I think our lake fleet is the safest in the world, and construction and design reflects that objective, but these additional steps, with Coast Guard or appropriate Federal agency taking the lead with industry cooperation, will be a quantum step forward. (1) Develop a computerized hull monitoring system with an ap- propriate pilothouse readout to interpret hull actions in all weather situations and to alert the master that trouble is developing. (2) Develop an all-weather capsule that will float free in the event the vessel sinks. Capsule should carry a portable VHF radio or other appropriate electronic signaling equipment capable of being received by search aircraft and vessels. It should be of distinctive color and have radar reflecting qualities. At least two would be carried on each vessel. Such developm~ent should not be much of a challenge to space-age technology. It would not be dissimilar to the presently available Brucker capsule in general use in the gulf on oil rigs; the cumbersome launching system would be eliminated. (3) National Weather Service should expedite planning and develop- ment of a marine weather and ice forecast center for the lakes. Lake shipping has been making this recommendation to NOAA and the National Weather Service for a number of years. While the Weather Service personnel on the lakes are extremely cooperative, the fact remains that there is no marine forecast capability for the Great Lakes system, and the marine aspect is inadequately funded. Having full- time marine forecasters here would permit monitoring the progress of a lake storm full time by experts and making appropriate marine broadcasts. Weather reporting equipment is not effectively located. To some extent this stems from the station automation program of the Coast Guard. At manned stations Coast Guardsmen were available to record and report selected weather data. The Weather Service now has to rely on automatic reporting equipment in isolated areas and often not located for best results. (4) NOAA should deploy or develop weather buoys for use on the lakes to fill in these critical gaps in data repoting: (a) Eastern end of Lake Superior. (b) Lake Michigan to replace the automated Lansing Shoals Coast Guard Station. (c) Lake Huron to replace reporting from the former Coast Guard lightship. I note with interest Congressman Ruppe's comments about weather buoys and I heartily concur. I understand that Canada is also interested in weather buoys for reporting Lake Superior data. Perhaps the weather services of our two countries should mount a joint program. . (5) Develop a weather manual for deck officer training and use that is oriented specifically toward Great Lakes weather and wave conditions. Note: This has been initiated. . . (6) Lake vessels should be permitted to carry an effective utility boat, such as a Boston whaler, for man-overboard rescue and other PAGENO="0339" 335 purposes in lieu of lifeboats, which are largely obsolescent in my opinion. The availability of rescue capsules will hasten the phasing out of lifeboats on the Lakes. (7) LORAN-C coverage and related charts should be expedited for the lakes. Reliability and accuracy in position keeping will be in the interest of safety. If the charts are available, we can start using LORAN-C equip- ment before 1980 when the last station is completed. There is fair coverage even at present so expediting availability of charts will be helpful. (8) United States and Canadian Coast Guard have now completed VHF radio coverage of the lakes for emergency and distress. Reliable communications are available. (9) A replacement program for the obsolescent 110-foot harbor vessels is about to be commenced by the Coast Guard. The new multipurpose vessels will be capable of responding to distress calls in all weather conditions. I have made recommendations to this committee at earlier hearings what the operational characteristics should be so I won't repeat at this time. (10) Replacement of the aged 36-foot lifeboat at the nearby Grand Marais Coast Guard Station with a modern self-righting 44-foot lifeboat will permit all-weather response from that station. We appreciate Congressman Ruppe's successful efforts this year for that accomplishment. (11) The deck officer training provided by our own Great Lakes Maritime Academy at Traverse City is all ready and should continue to produce officers for tomorrow's sailing who will be equal to the challenge and advances in technology. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be heard today, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Admiral. We appreciate your testimony and we invite you to stay for the rest of the hearing and be available for questions at the conclusion. The next witness is Mr. Charles Edwards, Johns Hopkins Univer- sity. We offer you the same advantage, Mr. Edwards, of inserting your full statement in the record and then quoting from it if you would like to utilize shorter time. STATEMENT OF CHARLES EDWARDS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, LAUREL, MD. Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM The St. Marys River forms part of the United States and Canadian border and links Lake Superior and Lake Huron. Throughout much of the 65 miles of the river, large vessels-up to 1,000 feet in length and 105 feet in beam-are confined to dredged channels no more than 300 feet in width. To facilitate the large volume of traffic, the Coast Guard maintains an extensive array of buoys, day beacons and visual ranges, as well as a radio vessel reporting system. However, during the winter months, additional aids to navigation are needed to compensate for (1) frequent poor visibility, (2) buoys removed or pushed under the ice, and (3) confusing radar returns because of ice ridges. Prior to the installation of the LORAN-C mini-chain, other PAGENO="0340" 336 techniques, such as a laser reflector system and a high resolution radar system, were tried. The St. Marys River mini-chain is functionally identical to a conventional LORAN-C chain except that it has shorter baselines- that is, the transmitters are closer together-and uses lower power transmitters. Four transmitters are used, two in Michigan and two in Canada. Using short baselines assures good time difference geometry and signal strength within the coverage area. The design goal stated by the Coast Guard wa~s to determine a boat's cross track position- that is, left or right of channel-with an accuracy of plus or minus 25 feet for 95 percent of the time. Beyond the design coverage area, the accuracy degrades rapidly because of poor geometry. Thus, the mini- chain should be used only in the immediate vicinity of the St. Marys River. COGLAD NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT In 1967 the Applied Physics Laboratory developed a LORAN Assist Device (LAD) for a classified military operation requiring precision aircraft guidance. Since that time, APL has developed a number- of newer and more sophisticated versions of the original LAD. In 1970 the Coast Guard funded APL to develop a civilian version of LAD which became known as CO GLAD (Coast Guard Loran Assist Device). Two CO GLAD systems were eventually built for the Coast Guard and have been used experimentally for positioning buoys in Lake Huron, ice patrol in the North Atlantic and oceano- graphic research in the Gulf Stream. CO GLAD was patented by APL in 1974 and the patent signed over to the Government to insure that the technology would remain available to all. One of these CO GLAD systems now forms the nucleus of the equipment currently being used for test purposes aboard Coast Guard vessels in the St. Marys River. Utilizing LORAN-C for precision guidance is basically a two-step process, data measurement and data transformation. Three or more LORAN transmitters and a suitable receiver provide the raw data for determining a position fix. Navigation with the raw data is awkward because the lines of position are hyperbolic curves and the units are microseconds of time difference of arrival. Manually reducing this data to a position fix-when LORAN charts are available-negates much of the true potential of LORAN-C, especially in speed and accuracy. The second step consists of using some form of processor to mathematically transform the raw data into a form usable for navi- gation and piloting. In the art of piloting, the typo of position information most mean- ingful is position relative to a known point, an intermediate way point, or a final destination. The entire St. Marys River from Whitefish Bay to Do Tour Passage can be described as a series of 25 to 28 straight line segments where each segment is the center line of its respective channel. Where the center line of two adjacent channels intersect has been defined as an intermediate way point. Each of these way points for the entire river has been numbered and the LORAN coordinates surveyed. By storing these LORAN coordinates in the extended mem- ory of the CO GLAD system, continuous navigation guidance can be provided throughout the entire St. Marys River relative to known points. A special display unit mounted on the bridge provides Along Track Distance to the way point in statute miles, Cross Track Distance rela- PAGENO="0341" 337 tive to the center line of the channel in feet, Along Track Speed in miles per hour, Cross Track Speed in feet per second, bearing angle to the next way point, time to the next way point in minutes, as well as the number of the way point. For evaluation purposes, an X-Y plotter and a digital printer are also part of the system. Figure 1 is a picture of the CO GLAD navigation system and figure 2 is a system block diagram. While the Coast Guard normally refers to CO GLAD as User I equipment, it was designed as a research tool and not intended to be a prototype for commercial production. [The figures mentioned follow:] FIGURE 1.-COGLAD NAVIGATION SYSTEM PAGENO="0342" 338 It is APL's opinion that the analysis of the test data indicates, with an 80 to 90 percent confidence, that the mini-chain concept is a viable approach for piloting boats in confined waters. To improve the confi- dence level, more long-term stability data is needed. It must be es- tablished that the required accuracy can be maintained throughout all seasons and all forms of precipitation. Distortions in the LORAN grid have been observed in some parts of the river. These distortions must be compensated for in the data processing. Beyond this, additional effort will be required, both on the trans- mitting equipment and the user equipment, to make the St. Marys River mini-chain an operational navigational system. It was found that the most precise LORAN measurements of the way points could be performed in the winter when the river was com- pletely frozen over. When the boat was stopped in the ice, neither current nor wind would move the boat off station while LORAN coordinates were being measured. Prior to the start of field testing, it was anticipated that the large ore carriers would produce local distortions in the LORAN grid, and degrade the accuracy during a passing situation. Numerous tests have been conducted and to date, no such distortion has been observed. Distortions observed while passing through the Soo locks were also much less than expected. Only when passing under the International Bridge were the signals observed to be significantly distorted. FIGURE 2.-COGLAD NAVIGATION SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM FIELD TEST CONCLUSIONS PAGENO="0343" 33~ Figure 3 is a comparison of CO GLAD (User I) position data versus autotape. Autotape is a line-of-sight radio ranging device which was used as a reference. This track plot was made with the CGC Naugatuck downbound just south of Six Mile Point and steering on a visual range. The difference in cross track distance measured by the two systems is typically less than 15 feet. Again, I must stress that the LORAN mini- chain must be tested in all seasons and all types of weather. A final report will soon be released to the Coast Guard covering all of APL's participation in this program. The CGC Naugatucic has been assigned to the mini-chain program throughout most of the field testing. The exclusive availability of this boat has been a distinct asset to the program, and the cooperation from the crew has been outstanding. Before commerical boats can begin using the St. Marys River LORAN mini-chain, assuming the all-weather accuracy requirements are met, the transmitters must be upgraded to operational status and commercial user equipment made available. Upgrading the trans- mitters would consist mainly of adding redundant equipment and emergency generators at the transmitter sites. The Coast Guard has funded private industry for the development of User II equipment, which may prove to be the prototype of the first commercial user equipment. Testing of this system on the St. Marys River is expected to begin soon. [The figure mentioned follows :} ALONG TRACK DISTANCE TO GO EMILLS) o ~AIJ1OTRPE DATA ~USER I DATA LA 42.5 L DATE 4/~7/76 TIME PM DIR. DCLhJEGUND + + + 150 h~e!i~ iog + + + + + 0 Li Li U- Li Li z b U 0 U + -SO + + + 1.50 .1.25 1.00 + + + .75 .50 .25 c~. oD FIGURE 3.-Track Plot of COGLAD and Autotape Position Data PAGENO="0344" 340 FUTURE APPLICATIONS APL feels that the technology was ready for the development of the mini-chain navigation system. The main challenge has been to assem- ble the right combination of components and fine tune them into a precision navigation system. We feel that the technology is also avail- able for more sophisticated applications, such as vessel reporting and traffic control, search and rescue, and port-to-port navigation. Assume, for example, that all commercial vessels on the St. Marys River are equipped with mini-chain navigation systems. Each vessel's position could be reported to Soo traffic control in LORAN co- ordinates. Upon receiving an interrogate code from Soo control, the shipboard navigation system would transmit its LORAN coordinates on a time-shared marine UHF channel. A computer at Soo control would then display a composite picture of the river and vessel locations on a television screen. An operator could expand any portion of the picture for greater detail. As an added refinement, the composite picture could be transmitted on a UHF-TV channel. Each vessel could view the entire river or any portion of it. Another possible refinement would be to interface the boat's radar to the LORAN navigation system. Search and rescue would be greatly enhanced by shipboard LORAN navigation equipment. A boat in distress could automatically or manually transmit its LORAN coordinates. Other boats would enter these cooidinates as a destination and be guided directly to the boat in distress. If the LORAN coordinates are not known and an area is to be searched, a series of way points can be entered to guide the search boat in a precise search pattern unaffected by set and drift. Additional Coast Guard applications for LORAN navigation systems include patrolling oil slicks, offshore dumping, and the new 200-mile fishing limit. U~e of LORAN navigation systems need not be confined to the St. Marys River. The expanded east coast LORAN chain will provide coverage throughout all of the Great Lakes, the east coast and the gulf coast. Expanding the memory of the shipboard equipment would allow continuous navigation information from port to port. Accuracy would be less than the mini-chain but ± 100 feet or better seems reasonable. Other rivers and harbors with critical navigation requirements could be equipped with LORAN mini-chains and benefit from the development work here on the St. Marys River. The St. Marys River is uniquely qualified as a test area for developing future vessel con- trol systems. It has the only Coast Guard mini-chain in operation. The river is larger than most harbors and has a full range of weather conditions including liberal amounts of ice, snow and fog. There is a large volume of big boats with severe channel requirements. De- veloping user equipment is greatly facilitated by the regular flow of boats through the river. Unlike ocean-going vessels that visit a given harbor infrequently, most of the commercial boats pass through the St. Marys River every 3 or 4 days. Potential aircraft applications for LORAN-C navigation systems are very similar to the shipboard applications. Even with allowance PAGENO="0345" 341 for the greater speed and mobility of aircraft, most of the shipboard technology is directly applicable. Experimental navigation systems have been successfully flown by APL on Coast Guard aircraft as early as 1970, and aboard Navy aircraft still earlier. Use of LORAN-C for air traffic control has also been studied by APL. RECOMMENDATIONS Based on results to-date, APL would like to make the following recommendations: (1) Work should continue toward developing the St. Marys River LORAN-C mini-chain into an operational system; (2) Program management and expenditures should be directed towards a more expedient development of this system; (3) Additional personnel for field test support are needed. Technically qualified Coast Guard personnel available for shipboard evaluation are spread too thin with other job assignments; (4) To encourage and accom- modate commercial development of navigation systems for the St. Marys River, a data package should be prepared containing: results of the St. Marys River tests, suggested systems configurations, and any expected Government performance requirements. Documentation on hardware, software, and transformation algorithms for systems previously developed by APL and others should be referenced in this data package; (5) A study should be conducted to determine the projected requirements for navigation systems on the St. Marys River and to plan an orderly evolution of the necessary equipment. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, sir, and we invite you to remain for the rest of the hearing and be available for questions. Dr. Herman Mark, NASA, Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio. You may proceed, sir. STATEMENT OF Bit. HERMAN MARK, NASA, LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER, CLEVELAND, OHIO Dr. MARK. Good morning. I am Herman Mark, Chief of the Aerospace Applications Branch of the NASA Lewis Research Center located in Cleveland, Ohio. The duties of my position include the development of advanced technology that can be applied to civilian needs especially if the capability can be deployed with the use of satellites in a cost/beneficial way. This effort is part of the ongoing program in the NASA Office of Applications which has already successfully demonstrated many such applications with its series of developments of weather satellites, communications satellites, earth resources survey satellites, and other similar space developments. The purpose of my appearance is to discuss existing capabilities for all-weather observations of the Lakes by means of side-looking airborne radar, and recent applications of these capabilities by the Coast Guard as an aid to vessel traffic. This capability was deployed during the multifederal agency effort to determine the feasibility of extending the shipping season on the Great Lakes to include the four extending the shipping season on the Great Lakes to include the 4 winter months. I will also describe a cooperative Coast Guard/ NASA/NOAA/Navy effort to deploy the same equipment to aid PAGENO="0346" 342 Arctic shipping along the west and north coasts of Alaska during the period when military and civilian shipping attempts are made to resupply critical locations in that icebound part of our country. Perhaps the most relevant effort I will discuss is the cooperative Coast Guard! NASA effort which has been under way for the last 2 years to de- termine the utility of this equipment for detecting icebergs and ships in the North Atlantic during the international ice patrol. For the past 3 years as part of the Federal program called for by the Congress, including Public Law 91-6 11, to extent the Great Lakes shipping season, the Coast Guard, NASA, and NOAA have been working cooperatively to provide timely aliweather images and interpretive charts of the ice cover in all areas where such information is critical to shipping. The plan for providing this ice information is as follows: When the Coast Guard Ice Navigation Center, located at the 9th District Headquarters in the Federal Office Building in downtown Cleveland, determines there is a need for ice information on the Lakes, the Officer in Charge of the Center signals the Commander of a Coast Guard HC-130B stationed in the area and the aircraft sets out directly to fly over these critical areas at an altitude of about 41,000 feet. From this altitude when passing over the areas of interest, the SLAR equipment on board can make an image of the Earth below right through cloud cover since clouds are transparent in this wavelength. The swath width of the image collected aboard the aircraft is 100 kilometers (approximately 62 miles). This image is digitized and scanned at a convenient rate for transmission (6,250 bits per second) from the aircraft via a UHF radio link to the NOAA/GOES-1 satel- lite in orbit at Easth synchronous altitude 22,000 miles above the Equator. From the GOES-i the signal is relayed to NOAA's com- mand and date acquisition station at Wallops Island, Va., thence via an ordinary telephone line back to the Ice Navigation Center. Thus as the aircraft flies the area of interest, an image approxi- mately 62 miles wide appears in real time in the Ice Navigation Center for the length of duration of the aircraft flight line. `When a satisfactory area of 100- to 200-miles long was been collected, per- sonnel in the. Ice Navigation Center who are experienced in ice inter- pretation make an annotated chart at the same scale as the received image. Ice thickness measurements are also made remotely by a sounding radar as well as by drilling measurements added when available to the chart. This image/chart ice information product is then transmitted via a MARAD-sponsored VHF-FM radio system with transmitters at various locations around the lakes, directly to the vessel wheelhouse where they. are received on telefax equipment installed for that purpose by winter shippers. This system has been in operation during the last two winters and has provided over 300 such ice information products to vessels shipping during the winter. As a demonstration the program has been quite successful and has been a definite assistance to shipping which continued for the first time for 24 consecutive months (1974-1976). The agencies involved have been sufficiently encouraged to plan a deployment of this very system to aid shipping in the Alaskan Arctic this summer. Since the shipping which resupplies Arctic military sites PAGENO="0347" 343 and the shipping which supplies the North Slope civilian efforts to bring oil from this extremely hard-to-reach location is essentially coastal, the format required for ice information by those vessels is similar to that for the open Great Lakes winter shipping. The Arctic demonstration is to begin next month in the middle of August. For over 50 years the International Ice Patrol has been collecting information on the icebergs that may drift down from the higher latitudes into the North Atlantic shipping lanes and cause a hazard to vessels operating in that area. For the last 2 years NASA has been cooperating with the International Ice Patrol in evaluation of methods involving this same SLAB for improving the efficiency of the patrol. Since the North Atlantic in the Grand Banks area is very often covered by fog and by a low overcast for most of the rest of the time, covering the area employing human observers involves a great deal of low-altitude flying and is often too dangerous or even impossible to accomplish. The very same SLAR equipment described above, to which fog and clouds are transparent, is being used to evaluate the advantage of such a system to perform the surveillance required by the International Ice Patrol. In this evaluation the following results have been determined: (1) SLAB greatly increased the effectiveness of the patrol. (2) There were no misses. All bergs seen by the chase plane had been detected by the SLAB. (3) Small bergs are consistently detected. (4) Large bergs are detected in sea ice. (5) All vessels in the area were also detected. Although all targets are detected by this system, one cannot yet reliably distinguish between icebergs and ships and this problem is continuing to receive attention. From my own personal experience in working with the Coast Guard in cooperative interagency efforts, such as those I have de- scribed above, I have found the Coast Guard to be cautiously deter- mined to develop and to assist in the development of the capabilities it requires in performing its mission. I believe the Coast Guard is going down the right path in providing themselves with the advantages of the technological advances that have been made in recent years. If a role or requirement develops for very large area surveillance responsibility, or for the application of SLAB to vessel traffic assistance or for search and rescue, it seems to me the Coast Guard will be in a position to deploy the appropriate system toward this need. It is my personal hope that in the not-too- distant future when appropriate systems are shown to be effective and cost beneficial from satellites, the Coast Guard and the Depart- ment of Transportation will be able to deploy a system of Coast Guard satellites. I would like to add that in my experiences with the Coast Guard, I have found the 9th District, the Elizabeth City Air Station, the Office of Ocean Operations, and the International Ice Patrol are especially interested in modernizing, upgrading, and improving the cost effectiveness of the methods by which they perform their func- tions. I would like to recognize, with pleasure, the assistance the programs I described above have received from the Commander of the 9th Coast Guard District, Bear Adm. J. S. Gracey; from the PAGENO="0348" 344 Chief of Ocean Operations, Capt. Richard J. Knapp; from Comdr. A. D. Super of the International Ice Patrol, and from Lt. Comdr. Leon Thomas, Elizabeth City Air Station. Thank you very much. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Doctor, and we invite you to remain for the rest of the hearings and be available. I understand the next two witnesses, Mr. Reed and Mr. Hutton, would prefer to appear at the end of the other witnesses and that Mr. E. L. Slaughter from the ILA has some scheduling problems and would like to appear now and that you would be accompanied by Captain Rico, is that correct? Mr. SLAUGHTER. Yes, sir. STATEMENT OP E. L. SLAUGHTER, INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESI- DENT, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AC- COMPANIED BY CAPT. A. P. RICO, PRESIDENT, UPPER GREAT LAKES PILOTS, INC.; JAMES L. CHESTNUT, CHESTNUT, BROOKS & BURKARD, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.; AND CAPT. R. W. O'BRIEN, CHAIRMAN Mr. CHESTNUT. Mr. Chairman, I am Jack L. Chestnut, counsel for Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc. We have coordinated the positions of several interested parties in the statement of Mr. Slaughter. Mr. Slaughter is immediately on my left. To his left is Capt. A. F. Rico who is president of Upper Great Lakes Pilots and to my right is Capt. R. W. O'Brien, who is chairman. In addition, a number of employees are here in the audience as well as other interested parties involved in the maritime industry in Duluth and Lake Superior. Mr. Slaughter has a short statement from which he will read excerpts and very general comments. At this time I offer the statement of E. L. Slaughter for the record. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Without objection, the full statement will appear in the record and then we will be very happy to hear from you at this time, Mr. Slaughter. [The statement follows:] STATEMENT OF E. L. SLAUGHTER ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION I am E. L. Slaughter, appearing on behalf of the International Longshoremen's Association of which I am Internationa.l Vice President. I reside in Duluth, Minn. Also in attendance with me at this hearing is Captain A. F. Rico, President of Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc., who also subscribes to the positions set forth in this statement. There are a number of matters that are of major concern to the organizations we represent, with respect to navigation and the handling of maritime commerce in the Great Lakes, particularly during winter seasons. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Corps of Engineers, industry and labor must all be prepared to improve our current operating system if we are to insure safety. It has come to our attention that in recent years the Coast Guard has main- tained a practice of removing navigational aids in November. Oftentimes this is 45 to 50 days before the closing of the navigational season for those vessels en- gaged in foreign commerce and many days before the closing of the system for those ships in interstate commerce. There have also been delays of as high as 30 days or more in properly installing navigational aids at the beginning of the PAGENO="0349" 345 season. These aids are absolutely essential for operating the system in a safe and efficient manner. The Coast Guard must find methods by which to maintain these navigational aids during the entire season, regardless of the winter weather condi- tions. They are more important during these periods of potentially hazardous weather conditions than in periods of "blue bird" weather during the middle of the season. Private industry has engaged in the hazardous practice of handling its lines by use of ship's crew. This is a dangerous and inefficient procedure during good weather. Private industry utilizing the Great Lakes navigational systems during winter navigation conditions must be required to use adequate shoreside personnel to handle the vessel's lines and to insure that docks, piers, and all maritime facili- ties are maintained in such a maner as to protect the ship's crew and dockside personnel. Line handling by ship's crew should not be permitted during the winter navigational season. It is dangerous to the life and limb of those involved. In respect to those vessels engaged in foreign commerce which may be using the Great Lakes system during periods of winter navigation, the entire system should be "designated" within the meaning of the Pilotage Act of 1960. In the area known as District No. 3, where necessary three pilots should be required to be on each ship in all areas. It is essential to have three pilots due to the inability to service these vessels with pilot boats during winter navigation conditions. It is imperative that a watch-standing pilot be on the bridge 24 hours a day to preserve the safety of these ships and the system. Designation of the entire system should commence on December 15 and end on April 15 of the fol- lowing year. Present search and rescue equipment maintained by the Coast Guard on the Great Lakes and in the Soo region is antiquated. New and substantially larger Coast Guard cutters are essential, not only to normal operations on the Great Lakes but would become critical to any attempts for an extended winter navigation season. In addition, communication service should be such that it would facilitate immediate search and rescue by helicopter. Facilities should he established at sufficient locations throughout the Great Lakes area to provide for 15 to 20 minute contact in the event of a disaster endangering human life. Additional attention should be paid to the area of lifesaving equipment and proper training of Coast Guard personnel to insure their paramedical ability to meet emergencies that will occur. It is essential that both the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers be prepared to maintain all systems throughout the entire Great Lakes navigational area on a 24-hour basis. Currently we believe that a number of these operations are sub- stantially reduced in the winter season. They cannot be reduced. They must be increased as the weather hazards increase. Obviously the Coast Guard must have sufficient year round equipment and personnel available to maintain regular channels year round. However, we do not believe that these channels extend to the private slips or dock facilities maintained by industry. The ice free conditions of these facilities should be maintained to a safe standard established by the Coast Guard but at the expense and maintenance of industry. We are concerned, obviously, with the economics of an extended winter naviga- tion season and the possibility of new jobs that might he created. We are not in a position to comment at this time about the costs which must be borne by the Government in respect to maintaining the system during an extended winter period. We do understand that these costs will be explored at later hearings. There is one cost which we are discussing. The system cannot, should not, and will not be maintained at the cost of human life and limb, of ships' crews or shoreside personnel. That expense is too great. Mr. OBERSTAR. If I may just extend a word of welcome to Mr. Slaughter and Captain Rico who are constitutents of mine. And Jack Chestnut is an old freind of all the pilots I know. It is a pleasure to have you, Buster, on the opposite side of the table, although we have always been on the same side of the issues that affect the people of our area. Mr. SLAUGHTER. Thanks, Jim. Gentlemen, I am E. L. Slaughter, appearing on behalf of the International Longshoremen's Association of which I am international vice president. I reside in Duluth, Minn. PAGENO="0350" 346 There are a number of matters that are of major concern to the organizations we represent, with respect to navigation and the han- dling of maritime commerce in the Great Lakes, particularly during winter seasons. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Corps of Engineers, industry and labor must all be prepared to improve our current operating system if we are to insure safety. It has come to our attention that in recent years the Coast Guard has maintained a practice of removing navigational aids in November. Oftentimes this is 45 to 50 days before the closing of the navigational season for those vessels engaged in foreign commerce and many days before the closing of the system for those ships in interstate commerce. There have also been delays of as high as 30 days or more in properly installing navigational aids at the beginning of the season. These aids are absolutely essential for operating the system in a safe and efficient manner. The Coast Guard must find methods by which to maintain these navigational aids during the entire season, regardless of the winter weather conditions. They are more important during these periods of potentially hazardous weather conditions than in periods of "blue bird" weather during the middle of the season. Private industry has engaged in the hazardous practice of handling its lines by use of ship's crew. This is a dangerous and inefficient procedure during good weather. Private industry utilizing the Great Lakes navigational systems during winter navigation conditions must be required to use adequate shoreside personnel to handle the vessel's *lines and to insure that docks, piers, and all maritime facilities are maintained in such a manner as to protect the ship's crew and dockside personnel. Line handling by ship's crew should not be permitted during the winter navigational season. It is dangerous to the life and limb of those involved. In respect to those vessels engaged in foreign commerce which may be using the Great Lakes system during periods of winter navigation, the entire system should be "designated" within the meaning of Pilotage Act of 1960. In the area known as district No. 3, where necessary three pilots should be required to be on each ship in all areas. It is essential to have three pilots due to the inability to service these vessels with pilot boats during winter navigation conditions. It is imperative that a watch-standing pilot be on the bridge 24 hours a day to preserve the safety of these ships and the system. Designation of the entire system should commence on December 15 and end on April 15 of the follow- ing year. Present search and rescue equipment maintained by the Coast Guard on the Great Lakes and in the Soo region is antiquated. New and substantially larger Coast Guard cutters are essential, not only to normal operations on the Great Lakes but would become critical to any attempts for an extended winter navigation season. In addition, communication service should be such that it would facilitate immediate search and rescue by helicopter. Facilities should be established at sufficient locations throughout the Great Lakes area to provide for 15- to 20-minute contact in the event of a disaster endangering human life. Additional attention should be paid to the area of lifesaving equipment and proper training of CoastS Guard personnel to insure their paramedical ability to meet emergencies that will occur. PAGENO="0351" 347 It is essential that both the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers be prepared to maintain all systems throughout the entire Great Lakes navigational area on a 24-hour basis. Currently we believe that a number of these operations are substantially reduced in the winter seaon. They cannot be reduced. They must be increased as the weather hazards increase. Obviously the Coast Guard must have sufficient year-round equip- ment and personnel available to maintain regular channels year round. However, we do not believe that these channels extend to the private slips or dock facilities maintained to a safe standard estab- lished by the Coast Guard but at the expense and maintenance of industry. We are concerned, obviously, with the economics of an extended winter navigation season and the possibility of new jobs that might be created. We are not in a position to comment at this time about the costs which must be borne by the Government in respect to maintaining the system during an extended winter period. We do understand that these costs will be explored at later hearings. There is one cost which we are discussing. The system cannot, should not, and will not be maintained at the cost of human life and limb, of ships' crews or shoreside personnel. That expense is too great. Thank you. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Slaughter. Mr. SLAUGHTER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add a couple of comments that I think might be interesting. I have been asked about year-round navigation. Actually, I look at safety aspects of the additional jobs. And I want to point out that we just have opened up a brand new facility at the head of the lakes. It is located over in Superior and it is known as Oretron. It is a new highly automated million dollar facility. When it is in full operation, the trains will shuttle from the west with 100-car trains carrying 100 tons per car, and that will be an around-the-clock operation. They claim, they think that this year, and it is not in full operation yet, that they are going to have between 8 and 9 million or 15 million tons of coal. Of that coal, 90 percent is going to be used by Detroit Edison. We are shipping coal out of there now. There are surveys being made where there are other industries that are interested and they claim there will be at least two or three more of these facilities built and a lot depends upon the coal being shipped the year round, and year-round navigation. One point I wanted to bring out, they also ask how can you load ships during the winter time? Well, there is nothing difficult doing that. We have loaded grain. We have unloaded grain. We have devised a system where we used to have to cut the ice with saws, 25 to 30 inches of blue ice. In our own way we devised a way where we can cut a ship out in a matter of hours, so these things can be done, and, of course, keeping the safety in mind all the time. I just wanted to bring this part out, that one little area up there alone could mean jobs, it could mean several hundred jobs alone just loading and handling coal from dock to ship, and I think that this is a forerunner and maybe we won't be around, some of us, to realize it, but I think they are going to pop up like topsy all over because they found something out there that they never had before. 78-280-76----23 PAGENO="0352" 348 Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you. Mr. CHESTNUT. If we could beg the committee's indulgence, we have meetings that the pilots are conducting so we will not be able to stay for the remainder of the hearing. Mr. DE LA GARZA. I will ask my colleagues if there are any questions; if not, we might excuse you because of your other commitments. Mr. CHESTNUT. Thank you. Mr. RIJPPE. Just one question. Mr. Slaughter, you bring up that you desire as a part of any winter navigation program to have a Coast Guard capability of getting on scene in 15 or 20 minutes. I think that is important and it behooves all of us to follow up to determine once contact is made, if it is by fixed-wing aircraft, how rapidly a subse- quent followup by helicopter can be accomplished, whether that helicopter is in a position to drop lifesaving equipment or to actually undertake the rescue mission itself, how quickly a surface vessel can get on station and what is the likelihood of survival of any individuals in the open water prior to the arrival on scene of a Coast Guard vessel. I think there are a number of questions to .be answered, both in terms of how quickly can the Coast Guard get to the scene and what then can be the followup to any contact that might be developed within the very short time frame that you suggested here this morning. As an example, there was a good question about the helicopters------- Mr. SLAUGHTER. I had an experience one time where we were trapped in an airplane and something happened where we could not put the gear down and it wasn't a very nice feeling, and they wired ahead or they called ahead, and we were met by helicopter from the Army and they couldn't get the gear down and it was supposed to land way off in left field someplace and they met us and we were no sooner on the ground and they were over us with ladders and asbestos suits and everything else.. It was just absolutely amazing what they can do if it is planned out. It would depend on where they were calling from and how far they would have to travel. If they were spaced out where they could service us- Mr. RUPPE. Yes, because in the case of the Fitzgerald, there is really a very good question whether if a helicopter had indeed gotten to the scene and there were crewmen alive, whether they could have effected a rescue mission because of the tremendous winds and the high seas at the point of the accident. I question the usefulness at least or the capability of available helicopters effecting a rescue, at the point and time of the sinking of the Fitzgerald. Mr. SLAUGHTER. Well, I cannot talk too much on the Fitzgerald. People at the table were in the immediate scene. You are right. I have often wondered. If they can do it in Vietnam and they went in and hauled out a lot of people in worse conditions than the Fitzgerald, and they did it and with safety, that should tell somebody something, that they have had that much experience. I don't know, this is up to the experts. A lot of people are talking this way. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Oberstar? Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any ques- tions. I do want to commend Mr. Slaughter and his panel on the excel- lent statement that focuses in on people needs of this winter navigation season. I think you have rendered a great service to your constituents and to ours and to this cause of the winter navigation program by PAGENO="0353" 349 focusing as perceptively as you have done on the needs which should be-additional technology that should be put in place by the Coast Guard and the responsibilities of industry as well as the Government. I think it is a great service and we appreciate having you here this morning. Mr. SLAUGHTER. I would say this, Congressman Oberstar, that if there is any information that the committee desires, they can com- municate with us and we will give them anything and everything we possibly can because we are very interested in this. When you put something together, it has to be put together in the right way. It cannot be haphazard. We have got a lot of bodies, but we have none to spare. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Slaughter, Mr. O'Brien, Captain Rico and Mr. Chestnut. Our next witness. You may proceed. STATEMENT 01' IOHN BLUITT, PORT AGENT, SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, RIVER ROUGE, MICH. Mr. BLUITT. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Jack Bluitt. I am the port agent for the Seafarers International Union in Detroit, Mich. The Seafarers International Union repre- sents merchant seamen employed on American-flag vessels of all types engaged in our Nation's foreign and domestic trade, including approxi- mately 2,500 seamen on vessels operating on the Great Lakes. As such, we are especially pleased to have this opportunity to present our views to the House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard on the opera- tions and activities of the Coast Guard in this area, the Nation's fourth seacoast. As you know, the U.S. Coast Guard has been given the congressional mandate to protect life and property at sea. In this regard, the Sea- farers International Union supports the realistic development and expansion of such aids-to-navigation as LORAN-C and Vessel Traffic Systems. Both have proven successful in other regions and, through consultation between the Coast Guard and all segments of the mari- time industry on the Great Lakes, they should prove equally helpful and successful in our region. rfhere is, however, one extremely important point which must be made, especially in light of past and present Coast Guard policies and practices. We firmly believe that the development and expansion of any aid-to-navigation system-LORAN-C, Vessel Traffic System, or any other-should not be considered as a substitute for trained and qualified shipboard personnel. Such systems should instead be de- veloped to complement the experience and expertise of merchant seamen. Mr. Chairman, the prime concern of the Seafarers International Union is and has always been the occupational safety and health of the merchant seamen working on board U.S. flag vessels. We strongly believe that the shipboard worker is not only the most important component of any successful shipping operation, but also the most valuable. Replacing a highly trained, skilled and experienced mer- chant seaman who is injured or killed in the course of his employment is far more costly in the long run than insuring that each worker is provided with a safe and healthful place of employment. PAGENO="0354" 350 Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Coast Guard, in the administration of its congressional mandate relative to merchant vessels and their personnel, is indifferent to occupational safety and health considerations on the Great Lakes as well as in other port areas. All too often the Coast Guard acts unilaterally to eliminate job ratings and to reduce the number of crewmembers necessary for the safe and efficient operation and maintenance of vessels without first determining the impact of such decisions on the working conditions of the remaining crewmembers. We have on numerous occasions, Mr. Chairman, expressed our willingness and desire to work with the Coast Guard to develop and implement regulations which protect worker safety and health. As the representative of workers directly exposed to the hazards inherent in shipping operations on the Great Lakes as well as on the inland waters and deep sea, we believe we can contribute the experience and expertise needed to promulgate meaningful and effective regulations. Regrettably, the Coast Guard persists in its refusal to develop formal, regular, and objective procedures for consultation with the representatives of merchant seamen. Similarly, and of equal import- ance, the Coast Guard refuses to develop minimum manning standards applicable on a uniform basis to similar type vessels. Instead, the Coast Guard grants each of its districts autonomy to determine man- ning on a vessel-by-vessel basis within each port. In other words, each Coast Guard district, on its own, without consultation with maritime labor, without review by Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C., without consideration for occu- pational safety and health, sets a vessel's manning. As a result, we are confronted with instances in which similar class ships have crews which vary significantly in number and ratings, and with vessels with such reduced manning that crewmembers work overtime in excess of 100 percent. One example which clearly demonstrates the Coast Guard's dis- regard for life and property is its decision to significantly reduce engineroom manning aboard three vessels owned by American Steam- ship Co. These vessels-MV Sam Loud, MV 0. E. Wilson, and MV Roger M. Kyes-were originally granted manning certificates requir- ing four licensed and three unlicensed men in the engineroom. How- ever, after only one full season of operation with this manning, the Coast Guard arbitrarily reduced the engineroom manning by elimi- nating entirely the three unlicensed oilers. In the above-mentioned instance, Mr. Chairman, we believe the Coast Guard once again failed to consider vessel maintenance as well as vessel operation when it issued the new manning certificates. In fact, the Coast Guard's own Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 1-69, dated January 8, 1969, dealing with engine room manning, states that: Sufficient qualified personnel will be required to: (1) Operate and monitor the plant in event of control failure; (2) make emergency repairs in event of machinery casualties; and (3) perform daily or periodic operations, inspections, and mainte- nance to insure the continued quality of plant performance. We believe the guidelines set forth in this circular requiring that sufficient personnel be on board to operate and maintain the plant are valid and absolutely essential to safe shipping operations. Simply PAGENO="0355" 351 put, a vessel cannot be operated safely if the onboard equipment is not properly maintained. And, a reduced number of personnel, sufficient to operate a vessel under optimum conditions, will not be able to respond adequately to emergency situations or to normal shipboard maintenance requirements. Mr. Ohairman, the Seafarers International Union has a collective bargaining agreement with American Steamship Co. which requires three oilers on board these vessels. The action by the Coast Guard to arbitrarily reduce the manning certificates with no consultation with maritime labor representatives illustrates that agency's disregard for congressionally mandated Federal labor policy which declares it to be the policy of the United States to encourage collective bargaining. By rewriting and eliminating ratings at will; by failing to develop uniform, objective manning standards; and by failing to work with maritime labor representatives, the Coast Guard thwarts national policy in the name of automation. Finally, with respect to search and rescue operations, the incident involving the Fitzgerald, a 729-foot ore carrier, serves as an example of the need for new, stringent regulations. The Fitzgerald sank suddenly on November 10, 1975, on Lake Superior during a storm. No distress call was given; no bodies or survivors were found. Mr. Chairman, Coast Guard search and rescue operations proved meaningless in this situation because an ore ship such as the Fitzgerald will sink in approximately 5 minutes or less once it is broken up or ruptured in some way. This happens because ore ships are little more than one large shell-they have no watertight compartments and the self-unloaders have one continuous conveyor belt underneath the cargo holds. They are completely hollow with no watertight compartments. We believe that these vessels should no longer be allowed to be built in this manner, posing an enormous risk to the lives of the crewmembers. These, Mr. Chairman, are only a few of the areas indicative of the Coast Guard's failure to execute its responsibility to advance the occupational safety and health of merchant seamen on the Great Lakes and throughout the Nation. The Seafarers International Union believes, Mr. Chairman, that this subcommittee should undertake an extensive investigation of these and other Coast Guard policies and practices as they affect the privately owned merchant marine so as to eliminate the threats to the health and safety of merchant seamen. Again, thank you for the opportunity to express our views on this important area of mutual concern. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Bluitt, and we invite you to remain through the rest of the hearing and be available for questions. I might interject, though, that this subcommittee has a program for hearings in September in Washington with the areas in which you address yourselves to and we invite you or your union to participate and it will be a public hearing with witnesses from the public sector. Mr. BLUITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WE LA GARZA. I understand our next witness, Mr. Melvin Pelfrey, has been detained because of flight problems, but that Mr. Daniel L. Smith will appear in his behalf. PAGENO="0356" 352 STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. SMITH, DISTRICT NO. 2, MARINE ENGI- NEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION-ASSOCIATED MARITIME OF- FICERS, AFL-CIO, TOLEDO, OHIO Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the subcommit- tee, honored guests: My name is Daniel L. Smith. I am a representative of District No. 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association-Associated Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO, 967 Summit Street, Toledo, Ohio, 43604. District 6, MEBA-AMO is a labor organization that represents li- censed officers employed aboard American-flag vessels. I'd like to thank the Chairman and the members of the subcommit- tee for inviting me here to offer my views on the U.S. Coast Guard's operations on the Great Lakes. I will confine my remarks today to the topic of crew safety, which we believe is the Coast Guard's most important jurisdictional area. Crew safety has become Great Lakes maritime labor's major concern in the wake of the sinking last November 10 of the ore carrier Edmuv~d Fitzgerald. We who represent Great Lakes maritime officers felt, like everyone else, a deep shock when the Fitzgerald went down in the steel-blue waters of Lake Superior. We felt as though the impossible had hap- pened; the Fitzgerald, after all, had been considered by those who sailed her to be one of the finest and safest vessels in service on the lakes. By lakes standards, she was a new ship, a grand lady, the flag- ship of the Columbia Transportation Fleet. Yet 29 men were lost- 29 good men, who had loved their work and who had performed it well. And we are reminded of the 1958 sinking of the SS Garl B. Bradley in Lake Michigan and the 1966 sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell in Lake Huron. Both ships went down under circumstances similar to those that brought the Fitzgerald to her violent end. The parallels between the three disasters are shocking: Each vessel went down in the open waters of the Great Lakes; each vessel sank within minutes of being stricken; and the hull of each vessel was found broken. Of the total complement of crewmen, only three survived, and. under circumstances that can only be called "miraculous." The Coast Guard's investigation of the Bradley sinking droned on interminably but failed to . answer many questions to our satisfaction. The investigation of the Jl/Iorrell disaster concluded that the vessel broke in half because. of a structural failure in the hull girder amidships. But nothing was done to improve the overall structural integrity of Great Lakes vessels following the Bradley a.nd Morrell sinkings, and there is a feeling in the industry that we are heading down the same inconclusive, uninformative, bang-your-head-against-the-wall path with the inquiry. The frightening thing about the loss of the Fitzgerald and her crew is the great speed with which the vessel went under. The n~en aboard apparently had no time to don lifejackets or launch lifeboats. We know the Fitzgerald was taking on water; the cargo holds must have flooded almost immediately beca.use the Fitzgerald-no exception to the Great La.kes rule-was not equipped with watertight bulkheads between cargo compartments. The ship was lost within minutes a.fter she was stricken. PAGENO="0357" 353 Contrast this with the story of the SS Maumee, an ocean-going tanker that struck an iceberg at the South Pole recently. The collision tore a hole in the ship's bow large enough to drive a truck through, yet the Maumee was able to travel halfway around the world to the repair yard, without difficulty, because she was fitted with watertight bulkheads. It's amazing-a stricken ocean tanker, with her bow nearly torn off, can travel halfway `around the world for repairs, and one of our best Great Lakes freighters taking on water could not make it 55 miles to the safety of Whitefish Point. It is my opinion that watertightbulkheads, which are required on all ocean-going vessels, have never been required on Great Lakes vessels because most of the people in Washington who write the laws are under the mistaken impression that the Great Lakes are really not much more than knee-deep ponds. Gentlemen, here is a 769-foot ship lying in the mud under 600 feet of water in the "knee-deep pond" we call Lake Superior. Watertight bulkheads should be required on all Great Lakes vessel~. Great Lakes shippers claim that such bulkheads would cut down on loading and unloading times, cut into valuable cargo space, and curtail the efficiency of their operations. But it's time we decided that men will come before cargo. Human life must take precedence over ma- chinery. If shipping must be slowed down s~iewhat, then so be it. Let's stop saving money to make more money. Let's stop cutting corners at the expense of the men who move these ships. And it's time for you, the Congress, to pay as much attention to human over- head as you have to economic efficiency. And the Coast Guard must revise its existing safety regulations to take into account the proven fact that stricken Great Lakes vessels have the demonstrated capability of sinking rapidly. The agency must require that each man aboard each vessel be issued a quick- donning, cold-resistant survival suit of the type that I have argued for for at least 5 years. The dramatic ~ords of Great Lakes historian William Ratigan writing about the Bradley sinking, speak forcefully for surviva1 suits Could anything live, unprotected, out there in that berserk water? It seemed incredible that men might be clinging to life out there tossed and tumbled in the crashing blackness, struggling in a 36-degree water with the air temperature fallen to the twenties, feeling the ice form in their hair, fighting sleep and night- mare thoughts, praying for strength to keep their heads above the suffocating seas, steeling themselves with the will to live for just one hour, and then another, until dawn Assuming the 29 men aboard the Fitzgerald might've had time to escape the doomed vessel, I doubt they would have survived without such suits. The waves and the wind were strong enough to. capsize any liferaft. or boat that might have been launched, and the. water itself was at a temperature that surely would have brought on hypo- thermia and death within minutes. As I've said, district 2, MEBA-AMO has continually urged the Coast Guard to require these suits aboard .Great Lakes ships, par- ticula.rly since the idea of. extending the navigation season on the lakes grew beyond the drawingboard stage. But 5 years into the winter navigation demonstration program, the suits still do not exist on these ships. . . PAGENO="0358" 354 We want to go on record here as being supportive of extending the navigation season through the winter, because continued season extension would be a portent of continued prosperity in the industries providing maritime jobs on the Great Lakes. But we are opposed to i~xtending the season at great risk to human life. And a storm situation on the Great Lakes can make launching a Jifeboat impossible. Accordingly, the Coast Guard must require that Great Lakes vessels be equipped with self-launching Brucker-type survival capsules, which offer warmth and protection from icy sprays, waves, and high winds. Another area we are concerned with is the Coast Guard's cargo load limitations for Great Lakes vessels. In 1969, the Coast Guard gave a number of Great Lakes ships additional feet of draft. Draft refers to the distance a loaded vessel drops into the water, measured from the keel of the boat to the water line. Further draft increases have been made since then. Vessels are sitting deeper and deeper in the water. Additional draft allows freighters to carry tons of extra cargo- more cargo than the vessel was originally designed to haul. This in- creased cargo must surely put tons of additional stress on the vessel's hull. It also results in considerably less freeboard for each affected vessel. We question the Coast Guard's wisdom in permitting the changing load-line limitations. How do the new limits affect a vessel's stability? Do they lessen a ship's ability to withstand stress and survive a storm? Do they make it more difficult to navigate and maneuver in a storm? We want an independent agency to review the Coast Guard's altered load limits. We want that agency to answer our questions and the questions of our membership. And we cannot forget the families of those seamen who are lost in disasters like the ones we've experienced on the Great Lakes. It is of the utmost urgency that Federal legislations setting company lia- bility limits be amended or repealed because it encourages the industry to ignore the safety of vessel crew members. The law permits the owner of a sunken vessel to limit its economic responsibility to the survivors of the crew to an amount that is sadly below any humanitarian or civilized standard. It is the vessel owner, not the crew, that determines the seaworthi- ness of a vessel. It is the vessel owner who is responsible for the ship's movements. And we deeply resent present Federal legislation which shifts the awful economic burden of a seagoing catastrophe to those persons least able to afford it-the seamen and their families. The companies can afford this economic burden; they can distribute the expense throughout the industry as a cost of doing business. The present liability limits do nothing to encourage vessel owners to seek higher safety standards for their ships. Insofar as it affects the crew of the vessel, the law of liability must be repealed or, at the very least, the limit of $60 per deadweight ton-established in 1936- must be increased to a figure commensurate with 1976. There are other recommendations that we have made of the Coast Guard, and which we will make to you, the people with the power to change existing laws and rules and regulations. (1) Stress meters should be installed on all Great Lakes ships that do not have them, so that the man in the pilothouse can monitor stress at critical hull points; PAGENO="0359" 355 (2) Depth and King gages should be installed on those vessels that do not have them, so that officers can know how deep their vessel sits in the water and if the ship is taking on water; (3) Existing navigational aids should be improved upon; (4) Methods of keeping ice from forming on deck and topside equipment should be developed; (5) A "large craft" advisory system should be instituted; (6) Navigation during the treacherous month of November, which presents unusual hazards because of the weather changes that occur during that month, should be regulated by the Coast Guard; and (7) All officers and seamen should be carefully educated in abandon ship techniques. Let's not let the memory of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald and the 29 men abroad her fade into history, as did the memories of the Bradley and the Morrell, without some positive action taken to prevent dis- asters and minimize human loss in the future. There's no question that shipwrecks will continue to happen. But the great loss of life that accompanies shipwrecks on the lakes need not take place. It's time for you and the Coast Guard to stop bowing to company pressure that the safety measures we've called for would cut down on the efficiency of a vessel and its cargo-handling capabilities. The real issue here is money. The vessel operators naturally will not spend the money to implement real safety measures unless they are forced by law to do so. Economic scare tactics must not cloud our judgment when it comes to protecting the lives and well-being of the men who give their best to keep the American merchant fleet moving on the Great Lakes. After the Fitzgerald went down, everyone joined in praising the bravery of the lakes sailor. But bravery is not enough to keep a man alive and in one piece. We've had enough of these frustrating investigations. Now it's time for action. I thank you for your attention. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Our next witness is Mr. Lucci. Mr. Stephen Nolawski, and Mr. Bush will accompany you, and Mr. Armstrong, too. STATEMENT OP STEPHEN NOLAWSKI, GREAT LAKES SEAMEN'S LOCAL 5000, UNITED STEEL WORKERS OP AMERICA, CLEVELAND, OHIO, ACCOMPANIED BY CAROL ARMSTRONG, DISTRICT NO. 4, AND THOIV[AS BUSH, DISTRICT NO. 33 Mr. NOLAWSKI. We are staff people with the United Steel Workers of America. Mr. Armstrong and myself out of District 4, Mr. Bush out of District 33. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Will you kindly identify them by first name? Mr. N0LAw5KI. Mr. Carol Armstrong, staff, U.S. Steel Workers of America, District 4, myself, Stephen Nolawski, staff, District No. 4, Mr. Tom Bush, District 33. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much. We will be happy to hear from you. PAGENO="0360" 356 Mr. NOLAWSKI. Well, I have a short presentation. I sat here and listened and I agreed with a lot of papers prior to my coming here. Mine is short. I issue this statement on behalf of the Steel `Workers of America and on behalf of the Great Lakes Seamen, Local 5000, who lost two vessels within the last 2 years, namely, the iViorrell and just lately, the Fitzgerald. As a union speaking for unlicensed seamen employed in transporta- tion of raw materials on the Great Lakes, the United Steelworkers of America recognizes the realities of this industry. Like all others within our economic system, it is a profit-making venture. Rightly so, its continued profitable operation means employment producing a decent living for our members and their families. That the different operators compete with each other for the profits to be realized is likewise a basic rule of the system. With all of this we have no quarrel, nor should we. Our members are among those who benefit from the workings of this industry. That the master of a vessel has full authority and final discretion in the navigation of vessels has been accepted by consensus as neces- sary as long as humans have traveled over the water. This we accept. But when the operation of vessels and the judgment of their masters are influenced by considerations of profit, prestige and competitive advantage to the point of endangering and even sacrificing the very lives of our people, we object. We protest in the strongest possible terms. We demand constructive measures to end this roulette game with seamen's lives. To get down to concrete terms, what do we mean by endangering crew members' lives in pursuit of profits? This is what we mean. In shipowners' accounting offices, as in shipowners' dispatching offices, the watch word is "Time is Mloney." The faster the load, the faster the transit, the quicker the turnaround, the greater the profit. Delays for whatever reason, are translated into red figures in ledgers. The master who runs his vessel through a heavy storm to arrive on schedule generates profits. The master who goes to anchor in lea of land does nOt. Masters competing within a fleet for the more desirable vessel as- signments have reason to believe that their chances are enhanced by a reputation as "a real money maker, not .afraid to go out in any- thing." The results of this mental set are vividly shown by separate episodes on November 10, 1975, as gathered from union shipboard reports. November 10, 1975, the Str. Armco arrived Silver Bay approximately 10 am. Coming up Lake Superior the ship was so battered in rough seas that the couch in the Chief Engineer's room broke loose. Oil barrels tore loose and rolled around in the Engine Room. The Armco loaded and departed safe waters going back out into the Lake Superior Gale for more battering. November 10, the Strs. Cort and Beeghly left Taconite Harbor approximately 9 p.m., going out into the same Lake Superior storm which claimed the Str. Fitzgerald less than two hours earlier. On the night of November 10, the Str. Midletown was in the St. Mary's River downbound. Instead of anchoring in safe waters, the master took this ship out into the battering waves of a Lake Huron Gale. Everything on deck was washed off-the deck lights, deck safety blocks, even the aluminum ladder had the squares that hold the rungs torn loose. PAGENO="0361" 357 November 10-Lake Erie. Per the crew the Str. G. A. Tomlinson was at the dock in Fairport. After unloading it took approximately 1~ hours to wend around. The By-pass on the engine had tobe opened up to get enough power to make the turn in the face of the wind. Tremendous seas were pouring over the breakwall. Instead of tying up and laying alongside the dock in sheltered waters, the Captain took the ship out into the Lake Erie Storm. Out on the lake he could not head the vessel for Detroit. Turning in battering seas, he finally got the ship to shelter behind an island. With the anchor down the ship would not hold due to the wind and seas. So the engine had to be run at full speed to maintain position. At the height of the storm, some of the crew members put on their life jackets. Upon seeing this, one of the mates informed them if he were the Skipper, he would fire every goddamn one of them-excuse the English. It should be obvious that the judgment of these masters was un- duly influenced by a compulsion to competitive performance beyond prudence and ordinary good sense, thereby damaging equipment and placing vessels and crews, themselves included, in extraordinary peril. We will never know whether the decisions of the late master of the Fitzgerald were influenced by his awareness that the Str. Anderson, a comparable vessel of a competing operator, was making headway through the disastrous storm of November 10, 1975. The records and testimony introduced in the investigation of that disaster raise an inescapable surmise that such a consideration did enter into the event, with tragic results. The urge to excel and the urge to compete, which can be assets in normal conditions, can, in other circumstances, imperil life itself. To eliminate this kind of hazard in future operations, the United Steelworkers of America recommends, as it has on prior occasions, what it has tentatively named an "All Craft Warning"-the issuance by the Coast Guard in collaboration with the National Weather Service of a general warning for all craft and vessels of whatever size, to seek or remain in shelter, or safe harbor. We will not at this time attempt to recommend specific levels of gales or seas, or exact weather patterns which should activate such a warning. We would only urge that the specifications be realistically set with reference to what they should accomplish. Such a warning would in effect declare "a whole new ball game," officially~ sanctioned and recognized by the entire industry, when such is warranted by dangerous weather. It would have the effect of saying to the masters of all vessels in the waters involved, "Now your first and only concern is the lives of your men and the safety of your vessels. Your usual concerns over profitable operation and competitive position must be temporarily suspended." Clear guidelines would thus be set for the exercise of the master's discretion.. Adoption and use of an "All Craft Warning" would benefit the steelworkers sailing members first and foremost by saving their lives. By reducing the hazards to vessels and equipment, it would benefit the entire industry in which they earn their living. We urge that the Coast Guard* and other appropriate agencies devise and implement such a warning policy prior to the next fall storm season. This will be one appreciable step toward making the Fitzgerald disaster the last of its kind on the lakes. Mr. DE LA GARzA. We thank you very much, Mr. Nolawski, we appreciate your being here. PAGENO="0362" 358 We invite you to stay for the remainder of the witnesses. Mr. N0LAwsKI. I might add one more comment before I leave. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Yes, sir. Mr. NOLAWSKI. I notice that there are some people, due to their lack of experience here on the lakes, that cannot realize some of the statements that were made around here. I have sailed for the 35 or 40 years, both salt water and on the Great Lakes, both in wartime and in peacetime, and the difference only is because of the smallness of the lakes. Our seamen are as good, our officers are as good, I think our vessels are as good, but where a master in a storm at sea can alter his course to ride out a storm and possibly alter his course for 2 or 3 days, outside of losing a little time he didn't do anything. Here if you alter your course in order to weather the storm, you are either beaching it in Canada or the United States. It is a terrific situation and this is why we believe the conditions of the sea being in the right condition, all vessels have to be asked to get off the lake. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much, sir. The next witness is Mr. Peter J. Benzoni. Mr. BUSH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Benzoni is unable to be here today. Mr. DE LA GARZA. All right, sir, we will inform Mr. Lucci and Mr. Benzoni of the availability of the record, Counsel, in order that their statements might be incorporated. Mr. AMATUZIO. Likewise with him. Mr. DANIEL REED. Is Mr. Reed here? STATEMENT OP DANIEL REED, WHITEFISH BAY TOWNSHIP SHORELINE OWNERS ASSOCIATION, PARADISE, MICH. Mr. REED. Yes. Mr. DID LA GARZA. We have come down to you now, sir. Are you and Mr. Hutton together? Mr. REED. Mr. Hutton would be with me if he were here. He was unable to come. He notified me last night. He concurs in the statement that I will make and also would have added a few comments of his own because of his personal knowledge. He has sailed on the lakes, himself. He now has two sons sailing and he would have concurred in some of the remarks made by the last speaker in regard to ship usage during severe weather. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Well, you might inform him, sir, that the committee will welcome in writing any recommendations he might like to make. Mr. REED. I will be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DE LA GARZA. And we will be very happy to hear from you now. Mr. REED. I received the invitation to appear only Tuesday, and my home is in Paradise and Paradise does not have a duplicating ma- chine available, so I have only two copies to leave with you. You have more equipment in Washington than we have in Paradise. That is partly what makes it "paradise." {Laughter.] Mr. DE LA GARZA. We apologize for the delay in getting the in- vitation to you and we can understand your problems with making copies. We will take care of that, sir. Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PAGENO="0363" 359 I am Daniel Reed, a resident of Paradise, Mich. My home is on the shore of Whitefish Bay of Lake Superior, about 10 miles south of the Whitefish Point light which has been referred to several times. It is the oldest active light on Lake Superior and actually what I will submit to you in writing is more or less a summary of what I would say. I hope the points are clear in the statement. The Whitefish Point light and foghorn with radio beacon are important to commercial navigation, but also to the fishing fleet and to an increasing number of small craft which are operating in Lake Superior. The light marks a course change in navigation and the area is one of the true "graveyards" of ships on the Great Lakes. This goes back many years, but it is still a hazardous area. A harbor of refuge is located about a mile south of the Point and the light on Whitefish Bay. The station is presently operated by remote control from Sault Ste. Marie which is a road distance of approximately 75 miles. Servicing of that station depends on the Sault Ste. Marie area. In this whole situation, apparently dependability is the name of the game and there is a need for manning the station for dependable operation, to render service also which is not now available such as observation of accidents, disasters and potential disasters and render- ing such service as possible and calling for appropriate assistance. No residences are located within miles of the Whitefish Point light on the Lake Superior shore. Just within the past 2 weeks two of our men, one of whom is a fisherman up there, Gustafson Brothers did observe a sailboat tipped over on the lake, it was drifting away from the shore, three people involved. They were the only ones apparently that observed it. They finally were able to launch their boat because of a problem at the launching site, but they got out and saved the people and then went back out and brought in the boat. This is a potential minor disaster in terms of the number of people involved, perhaps, but it is the sort of thing that is increasingly happening as we are encouraging additional small boat travel in the area. On November 10 of 1975, which has been referred to as the date of the Fitzgerald sinking, both the light and the foghorn were not oper- ating. As far as I know, the radio beacon was dead. Whether or not this had anything to do with the Fitzgerald's problems is certainly questionable, but it is significant that the master of the Fitzgerald asked a ship that was lying in Whitefish Bay whether of not the light was working. It was not. It did not work the rest of the night. It did not come on automatically as it should and the next morning our telephone serviceman in the area, in checking the lines to see what was wrong, to see if it was anything connected with the telephone lines, found that the machinery was not operating and at the request of somebody here in the Soo station jiggled the relay, I suppose, and set it in operation, but regardless of the sophistication of some of the equipment that has been discussed and described here this morning, there still is not real substitute in the final analysis for the human touch. The unmanned automatic equipment failed at the very time when it could have been useful. All the rest of the year it operates. Right when you needed it, it didn't. PAGENO="0364" 360 There is also the need in this area, by the way, for the physical lresence for someone in authority, both for the protection of the Government property in that area, and also for the protection of people who are far from any police protection and yet that is an area which attracts many people because it is a very significant agate hunting area and thousands of people a year are up there, and yet there is nobody up there of any authority to be of any assistance to people who may be there. However, there are two good houses there, now closed and boarded up, which are attached to or very closely adjacent to the light. These homes, we believe, should be housing two families, probably under contract, with housing, utilities and a modest sum as an annual sti- pend furnished, to provide the dependable servicing that these in- stallation require. This would also provide the official presence that I mentioned in the area and would give other service in terms of health problems that might occur where many people gather and some kind of contact with the outside world. Telephone, electricity, snow-plowed roads and schoolbus service are available to service families that might be placed there. Manning this operation would permit the elimination of a disturbing nuisance in the area. At present, the light and foghorn operate year around, night and day. The foghorn blasts every 30 seconds and the decibel count is very high. I realize that a foghorn would not have been much help to the Fitzgerald, but it is kind of an odd thing, isn't it, that that blast, every 30 seconds, was not working during the storm. We had a dedica- tion ceremony for a historical marker 2 years ago there. Captain Bloxsorn, who headed the Coast Guard at the Soo at that time was very embarrassed. He was very embarrassed that he had to stop every 30 seconds until the foghorn ceased. It is kind of an odd thing, too. I serve on the Michigan Environmental Review Board which reviews the environmental impact statements covering highways, structures for housing elderly people-many things, and one of the items we constantly concern ourselves with is the decibel level of noise that may be around. Believe me, the decibel level of noise interfer- ence, noise pollution at Whitefish Point is very high and it makes no sense. It puts government in a ridiculous light to be operating that sort of situation year round every 30 seconds, when at other points we make a big effort to try to reduce and suppress noise pollution. The light and the total installation at Whitefish Point needs pro- tection from the severe erosion which is now being caused by the con- tinued high water levels which results from the storing of extra water on Lake Superior in order to reduce the levels on the lower lakes. Last fall in the same storm that sank the Fitzgerald, primarily in that storm, although some other storms may have contributed, approximately one-half of the distance between the water and the lighthouse installation was destroyed, leaving now only about 150 feet separating that installation from the sea. Groins which were put in there many years ago and which were footed back into the shore only last summer, now are standing out in the lake, the inner end some 75 to 100 feet in the water and, as you know, a groin, when it has been undercut at the back end, is more damaging than it is good. PAGENO="0365" 361 Something ought to be done at that point soon, or the installation will be lost. I had occasion to talk with a U.S. Steel captain about 3 or 4 weeks ago and I won't divulge his name because I did not tell him I was interested in knowing what he thought about it for reasons other than just curiosity, but after some discussion, he said that the foghorn at Whitefish Point isn't really very much of a factor to us now, but he said, "Don't let them take the light away." That was his observation. I am president of the Whitefish Bay Shore Erosion Association, an organization of about 150 families who own shore properties, homes, and cottages along the shore and who are suffering and have suffered considerable damage from the artificially high water levels. We have as yet received little recognition and no relief from what we believe to be an unfair situation foisted upon us and the Government now is facing that same situation in connection with this installation. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, it is very good to be able to present this to you and I will stay for questions. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you very much. We appreciate your cooperation, and we invite you to remain right there. Is there any person that is not on the scheduled list of witnesses that might wish to appear with any testimony? Our official reporter has been working hard and we will allow her about 5 minutes. The committee will stand recessed for 5 minutes, and then we will invite everyone who has testified with the exception of the admiral who has already been questioned, to come forward and be available for questions. We will take a 5-minute recess. {Reeess.J Mr. DE LA GARZA. The subcommittee will be in order. We will invite all the witnesses to be at the witness table. You may bring enough chairs if there are not enough. Thank you very much. We appreciate your cooperation, those of you that have stayed to be available for questions which we hope that we might expedite here in order that we might continue with our oversight of the area. Mr. Oberstar? Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to set an example of being brief. Admiral Trimble, in your judgment, will the new equipment for heavy weather capability which Admiral Gracey cited be adequate to respond to the emergency situations that we have heard described this morning? Admiral TRIMBLE. I am satisfied that they will, Mr. Oberstar.. Mr. OBERSTAR. Is this something that ought to be more heavily focused upon during the future winter navigation demonstration program? Admiral TRIMBLE. No, sir, I don't believe that that is indicated. I think that the oversight that this committee is giving to it in the authorization hearings of the Coast Guard and hearings such as this will be adequate in the situation because I think this is a Coast Guard PAGENO="0366" 362 responsibility rather than a winter navigational board general responsibility. Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Edwards, how far off, in your judgment, is the mini-loran system from being an operational system and how much more of an investment would we need in this winter navigation demon- stration program to further that purpose? Mr. EDWARDS. That is a difficult one for me to handle. The equip- ment-I specialize in shipboard equipment and that is going on in parallel with verifying the ability of the change to meet the year- round requirements. I would speculate that in the order of a year or so depending upon the definition of operational-how many boats will they have? As far as the cost, I'm afraid I cannot address myself to that. That is being handled by the Coast Guard. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. Mr. Smith, you had a very comprehensive statement that I greatly appreciate having. It will be very helpful to the committee and for the Public Works and Transportation Committee on which I also serve and which has authorized the winter navigation demonstration pro- gram, and I will make your testimony available to my colleagues on that committee as well. Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that, sir. Mr. DE LA GARZA. That is Mr. Peifry's statement. Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. You suggested having watertight bulkheads and also pointed out that the industry felt that these would cut down on their loading and offloading time. But don't we have experience with the same type of thing on ocean vessels? Are they that different from lakers? Mr. SMITH. They are, in the basic type of cargo they carry, yes. The Great Lakes vessels are mostly bulk carriers. Mr. OBERSTAR. We see them leaving every day from the port of Duluth. Mr. SMITH. That is right, if you are talking about grain vessel converted to tanker use, carrying liquid to bulk-in light of that, yes, there are comparable types of cargo being carried. Mr. OBERSTAR. Are there no bulkheads at all on the taconite and other ore carriers? Mr. SMITH. There are bulkheads, but they are not watertight. A Great Lakes vessel does not possess any watertight integrity in its cargo spaces which is the major portion of the vessel. Mr. OBERSTAR. Have you studied the problem enough to know whether that could be done by Coast Guard regulation or whether new Federal legislation is needed? Mr. SMITH. Well, we view the Coast Guard as the enforcers of the Federal legislation. We would assume that it would have come down from a Federal level to provide for the construction of watertight bulkheads in the Great Lakes vessel. Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, that is something that we will have to deter- mine, whether it needs new legislation or whether it can be done by Coast Guard regulation. I will address that question to the Coast Guard later. Mr. SMITH. Thank you. PAGENO="0367" 363 Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Nolawski, again a very helpful statement. It is obviously based on extensive experience that you have gained both on salt water and fresh water. You suggested that there ought to be a system by which all vessels could be ordered off the lakes at the time of severe water. How could you reconcile that statement with the. almost. unchallenged authority of the .ship captain to command his vessel, and can that be done by regulation of the Coast Guard or is legislation needed to do that? . , ... Mr. NOLAWSKI. Well, I haven't'investigated that thoroughly, but I am informed that the Coast Guard does have that authority now, but this industry such as it is, there ~re many, many pressures and they always use an excuse that we are..'infringing on the judgment of' the master. We don't want to infringe on the judgment of the master. We say. the industry itself infringes on his `good judgment because he has got to .compete for his job, he has got to compete. for his wages to~ actually stay out on the lakes and we are asking for a door to be opened:. for him, that he c~n use his good judgment and not get into trouble. T.o give, an example, the Fitzgerald was the. second vessel we lost in 10 years. The Morrell was the one we lost 8 years prior to that. The Morrell was in anchor in the Huron River. It wasn't going out. Here comes the steamer Townsend, same: company, but there is a gung ho skipper on it,' he is going out. This is a bad reflection on, the man on :the hook. He picks up and. follows; `Yes, the Townsend got' ~battered,. yes, it had to be' scrapped after that, but who lost the crew. and vessel? The Morrell. This is what. we are trying to get away from.' We've ;got to give some of these masters~the'.right to use their judg- ment without getting themselves . in trouble .with their employers. This is what we are looking for. I :do believe the Weather Bureau can and did predict to the Fitzgerald: with plenty hours to spare, the severity, of it, `but the `industry, such as it is, is gung ho-go. Time is money and this is what is involved. Mr. OBERsTAR.. Is there any information or will we ever be able `to tthtain information indicating whether the captain, the skipper of `the Fitzgerald, actually knew the severity, of the conditions at the `time he sailed right into it? Mr. N0LAwsKI.' I think he~ knew. because Captain Cooper, the `skipper of the Anderson, which was just a couple of hours behind' him, and he testified in the hearings in Cleveland that he plotted the whole storm and he predicted 80-mile-an-hour winds and when Fitzgerald lost its radar equipment and a lot of other things, he w.as giving them instructions `from his vessel, `so I knew they knew the severity of that storm. " . ` Mr. :OBERSTAR. So you are saying ~fl addition to the modern `technOlogical devices that have been developed as aids to navigation, plotting the weather, determining .its~ .`intensity and charting its course, in addition to that, there is a judgment factor that in some way must be subject to Federal regulation? Mr. NOLAWSKI. I don't quite- Mr. OBERSTAR. What I am saying, your testimony indicates that even if we give the skipper all the information he needs with radar and satellites, weather and navigation~. he still has to make a judg- .ment. He has to get that cargo through. You are saying somewhere there ought to be a check on rash judgment? 78-280-76------24 PAGENO="0368" 364 Mr. NOLAWSKI. Due to the makeup of the lakes, like I mentioned before in my testimony, we have storms just as severe and more severe out in the ocean, but because of the size of the ocean, you cannot alter your course. I have been on vessels where you altered your course for practically a week to ride out a storm and maybe we lost a couple of days from where you are supposed to be. Here, you cannot do that, so if you use your judgment and you are wrong, you are in trouble, and if your judgment is influenced by the people you work for and the competition around you, against your better judg- ment, you do things-what I am trying to stress, maybe I am using bad language, is that we have got to get these skippers off the hook because there are many, many good skippers, there are. Some are more gung-ho than others. I say that our people out there are just as capable as anyone anywhere else, but the competition they are involved with and seeing another man in your own fleet go out and he stays there, he has got to follow because a black eye is developing. I am looking for something that the weather conditions are so severe that the Coast Guard issues an all-craft warning, that .you shouldn't be out there, then at least the man who stays on the hook cannot be ostracized too badly because he was told he shouldn't be out there. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Nolawski, talking to the Coast Guard, what you would like to have is the Coast Guard formulate a plan similar to what they now have for small craft warning that at a designated wind velocity or turbulence intensity of such a nature, they issue a general warning unsafe for craft? Mr. N0LAwsKI. And direction, because the direction of the wind and the direction of the sea-if it is lengthwise of the lake, it doesn't hurt anything, but if it is at such an angle that you are going to have to buck the storm and buck the wind, you should not be out there. Mr. DE LA GARZA. And once issuing that, then of course it is still up to the individual master. Mr. NoLAwsKr. Yes, it would be up to the master, but at least the one who used his judgment couldn't be ostracized because the Coast Guard said it wasn't weather to be out in. He used his good judgment and stayed in. He could use his vessel a little different to the other fellow, but it gives him something more than just the competition; I have to go out because he is going out, which affects his good judgment. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Thank you. Mr. Ruppe? Mr. RUPPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a letter from Mr. John Hoeft of the Waldorf Corp. of my district. May I have unani- mous consent to make this letter, which is in effect a statement, part of the record? Mr. DR LA GARZA. Without objection, it will be incorporated. [The letter follows:] HOERNER WALDORF CORP., Ontonagon, Mich., February 16, 1976. Hon. PHILIP E. RUPPE, House of Representatives, 509 Cannon Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR PHIL: Thanks very much for sending me the 1976 calendar. I appreciate this as well as your note soliciting further ideas. PAGENO="0369" 365 I have neen following with interest your current inquiry into the adequacies of the Coast Guard, especially with reference to the sinking of the Fitzgerald. While this is showing up certain deficiencies regarding the search and rescue capabilities for commercial vessels, I believe if you would look into it further, you would find greater discrepancies as regards pleasure boaters. The Coast Guard's current dependency on the volunteer efforts of Coast Guard auxiliary amounts to almost complete abdication of their responsibilities for search and rescue on pleasure boaters. At present instead of the Auxiliary helping the Coast Guard, it has approached the point of the Coast Guard helping the Auxiliary. The Coast Guard, in order to fulfil its obligations certainly needs more staffing and equipment. I have also been watching their activities regarding all winter shipping. It seems that a tremendous amount of energy, attention, and money is being cx-. pended to promote all weather shipping. As you have pointed out, this is at considerable discomfort and inconvenience to others, such as those on Sugar Island. This is an expenditure of taxpayer money for the benefit of a few shipping cempanies and the money could be better spent for the benefit of the Coast Guard in their traditional search and rescue efforts. Sincerely, JOHN E. HOrm'T. Mr. RUPPE. Mr. Chairman, I also have one additional article entitled "Inland Seas." It is an article in retrospect by Dr. Wolf addressing the Fitzgerald sinking and perhaps with unanimous con~ sent, I could make that a part of the record as well. Mr. DE LA GARZA. Without objection, it will be incorporated in the record. [The article follows :} [From the Inland Seas, Quarterly Journal of the Great Lakes Historical Society,, Summer, 1976) IN RETROSPECT (By Dr. Julius F. Wolff, Jr.) "Regarding your interesting story of Lake Superior shipwrecks, in the Spring 1976 issue of INLAND SEAS, may I question your statement that the Fitzgerald and several other major ships unsuspectingly sailed into the weather monster. Unheedingly, very likely, but not unsuspectingly. "Gale warnings were posted for Lake Superior at 9 P.M., e.s.t., November 9th, and these were upgraded to storm warnings at 4 A.M., November 10th. At the latter time I would place the Edmund Fitzgerald very near Keweenaw Point, affording good shelter from N. and NW. winds. The frequency and diversity of weather warning broadcasts make it incredible that the Fitzgerald and others would be unaware of what lay ahead of them, weatherwise. "This seeming disregard of severe weather warnings shows up in other fields of transportation also. As I write this, the radio tells us of the Eastern Airlines Kennedy Airport disaster report, in which it is clearly established that said aircraft and others were attempting to land through a violent thunderstorm. It is interesting to note that the next succeeding storm, to the one on November 10, found at least one large ore carrier in Marquette Harbor, waiting it out." Since receiving the above letter and after checking and reviewing a large number of newspaper reports on the Fitzgerald case, I'm afraid I have to stand by my terminology, "unsuspectingly." There is nothing to indicate that Lake Superior skippers had any inkling that this particular storm warning would involve "hurricanic" winds, such as developed during the late afternoon and early evening of November 10. The writer's chronology of the weather warnings differs from those reported in Lake Superior circles, but not by many hours. Gale warnings in western Lake Superior were correctly posted in the early evening of November 9, some seven hours after the Fitzgerald had sailed, and winds from 39-54 miles per hour apparently did materialize, with same snow, beginning at Duluth a little after 7 p.m. The Fitzgerald was hit by this weather, reporting to the Cleveland office at 1 am., November 10, that she was beset by- winds up to 52 knots with 10-foot waves. She encountered no troubi; though she was off Keweenaw Point at this time. Six hours later, when perhaps 40-50 miles east of Keweenaw, she again reported that the wind had dropped to 36 knots per hour, seemingly indicating that the worst was over. PAGENO="0370" This report out of Cleveland (in Duluth Herald, November 20, 1975, p. 15) coincided with the information furnished to the chief vessel agent of another large fleet of ore carriers operating on Lake Superior. His company received the gale warning on November 9 (winds 34-47 knots), which was taken down some hours later, to be replaced a few hours thereafter by storm warnings (winds in excess of 48 knots)-the hurricane warning is not used on the Great Lakes. Later a ranking meteorologist of the Weather Service informed him that the original low-pressure system had been moving north on the afternoon and night of November 9 and was expected to pass northward over central Lake Superior with a center near Marquette on the morning of November 10. Instead, the storm center veered sharply to the east, resulting in the near hurricane conditions locally in the extreme eastern lake that afternoon, and evening. Numerous reports of winds gusting to 70, 80, and even 90 kno.ts were received for late November 10 by the Coast Guard Board of Inquiry. The Weather Service had no data antic- ipating this type of situation which might previously have occurred in November. 1872, November 1908, November 1913, and December 1927, and possible in other instances over the last 100 years. It was obvious that four professionals skippering four of the largest and most powerful ships (Fitzgerald, Anderson, Blough, and Fort William) felt that the' forecast of rough weather held no terrors for their respective vessels. For that matter, neither did the skippers of several vessels which had headed west in the hours before the Fitzgerald was sunk. Very rarely do the modern high-powered carriers anchor for protection under Keweenaw Point. My vessel agent contact could recall only one instance in the last ten years in his fleet. If a carrier was, waiting in Marquette harbor during a following storm, I would suspect that ship' ~~as probably loaded there, as Marquette is over 70 miles south of the down-' bound vessel lane, and a skipper would not move that far for shelter. The loss of the giant Fitzgerald and her 29 men was most regrettable, but can find no suggestion that her skipper and the other captains disregarded orni-. nous meteorological forecasts. Our present methods of weather forecasting still remain, inprecise in that formidable 75 miles of eastern Lake. Superior ~which historically is known `as the "Graveyard of the Lake." ` Dr. Julius F. Wolff, Jr., in his two-part article, "One Hundred Years of Rescues: The Coast Guard on Lake Superior," included reference to the Edmund Fitzgerald and her tragic sinking, in the Spring issue of Inland Seas, referred to above. A resident of Duluth, Minnesota, Dr. Wolff is Professor of Political Science at the lJniversity of Minnesota. For many years he has had an absorbing interest in research concerning Lake Superior shipwrecks, about which he `has written several earlier articles for our Journal. Mr. RUPPE. It is interesting' to' note how the whole question of our' knowledge of the ,weather and our ability to forecast weather is so. much in doubt. I am not questioning what you say in any way, but I am pointing out how good men and different minds can come to vari- ous conclusions because he states, and this is Dr. Julius Wolf saying that, "I can find no suggestion that her skipper and the other cap,tains disregarded ominous meteorological forecasts." Our present methods of weather forecasting still remain imprecise in that formidable 75 miles of eastern Lake Superior which historically is known as the "Graveyard' of the Lake." I only bring that up because I. agreeto a large measure with what. you say beyond that. I think we are woefully short of the weather, information and the weather reporting facilities and techniques that we really ought to have not only to run a normal shipping season, but particularly an extended winter navigation season. Mi~. NOLAWSKI. I believe in generality what you say is true, our weather forecasting can be improved and refined. However, in this, case, when. these vessels left their loading docks, the storm warnmgs and the intensity of the storm was known, but they still left. So the warnings were there. Mr. RUPPE. Admiral Trimble, I understand that you have given a, lot of very serious and thoughtful time to the whole question of the PAGENO="0371" 367 Fitzgerald and the sinking of it; do you have any particular ideas of your own as to what very likely caused the sinking and the loss of the Fitzgerald? Admiral TRIMBLE. As you know, the board has not finished it~ deliberations yet, but nevertheless quite a bit of the information has been made available through the testimony that was in a public posture. It is my conclusion, based on that information, and I think this is the general feeling of the industry, that the Fitzgerald did damage herself by grounding on the shoal in the vicinity of Caribou Island. That started the train of events that led to her sudden break-. ing up and going down. It apparently happened without the knowledge of the master, I have to assume that because he did not issue a broadcast SOS or ask for help in any way. He did not have the crew alerted, it would seem. It sounds like by the time the vessel did break in two, he did not know before that. Now, if we follow this reasoning and I think that this theory will be proved largely when the results of the Canadian hydro- graphic soundings are completed later this year. The board did ask Canada to recheck the soundings and Canada apparently agreed and they will do it before this year is out. I think it is quite likely that we will find that the shoal area is larger than shown on the charts. Keep in mind that the present soundings date back to the early part of the century. There has been no recheck. If we find the shoal area extends further toward the island, eastward, it was established that the vessel was in that vicinity, Captain Cooper of the Anderson did testify that he plotted the vessel in that area. The chart shows only a small shoal area so the masters would have no way of knowing that it was inaccurate. I think this theory will be proven or disproven when the Canadian hydrographic work is in. Mr. RUPPE. Mr. Reed indicated a few minutes ago very possibly in addition to the light and foghorn not operating, the radio beacon could well have been out of commission. Would this in your opinion cause the vessel to navigate less accurately than might otherwise be the case? Admiral TRIMBLE. It certainly could. On the other hand, if the shoal extent is not shown on the chart, even if the vessel knew where he was in relation to the plotted shoal, he could still be in trouble. But any time your navigation equipment is not working, that is a problem. This is one of the reasons we are looking forward to the LORAN-C coverage of the lakes. I'm sure you are aware it is not a new device. It has been tested in the 1950s in connection with the missile program as well as being used in Vietnam. So its accuracy has been proven. Here, in addition to the other navigational aids, it should certainly improve the situation for navigation in the Great Lakes and especially Lake Superior. Mr. RUPPE. Since you have a good measure of contact with the shipping companies, several of these gentlemen have indicated that operators apply directly or indirectly efficiency ratings for their vessels in terms of turn-around time and in terms of the ability of the master to make the trip in the shortest possible number of days. If that is the case, would not that really have the effect of forcing a master to drive his vessel in the face of adverse and unsafe weather possibly of the type that beset the Fitzgerald? PAGENO="0372" 368 Admiral TRIMBLE. I think this is a bone of contention, Mr. Ruppe. If a master does go out in adverse conditions and sustains damage, I think he is going to get a worse rating whether it is a written rating or whether it is in someone's mind. Either way, he is going to get a worse rating because of his bad judgment in that respect. I don't think any of the companies have a policy that says "You go through tinless weather is so adverse that you can't move." I don't think any of them have. I have heard them instruct their masters with their crews at their annual meeting before the season starts, that the master is expected to exercise judgment as far as going out in adverse weather. Of course, this is one of the reasons why we have been pushing strenu- ously for improved weather forecasting on the Great Lakes as a navigation system. Mr. RUPPE. There are two things that several of the gentlemen have taised previously and obviously will be brought out in greater detail in the hearings that the chairman has referred to later in this year; but in any event, several of the witnesses in the latter stages of the hearings have indicated that the vessels should have watertight compartmentation and also one or more of these gentlemen indicated that the liability limits should be increased to offer better protection to the families of those that suffer from these accidents. Are you in a position at this point to comment on either suggestion? Admiral TuMBLE. I am not in a position to comment on the second point, particularly, Mr. Ruppe. I would comment on the first, just generally. When you talk about watertight integrity, that they did specify in the cargo hold area, sometimes there have been statements made that there are no watertight bulkheads. There are on most on the bow and the stern area on either side of the cargo department, so that it has been referred to as primarily in that broad expanse in the cargo hold area. This has been brought up numerous times and of course when ~ou look at the situation, if the Fitzgerald did drown on the shoal off Caribou Island, then we have a physical condition that caused the accident and not a matter of a structural defect or something that would be materially improved by changing the watertight compart-. mentation. We are all very interested in the safety of the crews, vessel, and the cargo-~crews, by all means, first. This is something that would have to be weighed. I think the testimony of naval architects would be ~very helpful, people who are specialists in the field, would then look at actual experience. I think it has been brought out by Admiral Gracey and Commander Deck that the Morrell and the Bradley were in ballast rather than loaded. The Fitzgerald is the first vessel in recent or modern times that has sunk in a loaded condition. So it does not appear that we have a problem. I think we have to look at the ex- perience, to some extent, as well as the theoretical possibility. Mr. RUPPE. If the loads are increased and the load line is reduced- Mr. NOLAWSKI. Increased. Mr. RUPPE. It has been several years since I put in my time in the Navy. A witness has indicated it would not put stress on the lower hull. Does the increased load at any time put stress on the so-called upper hull or so-called superstructure? PAGENO="0373" 369 Mr. N0LAwsKI. I thought the testimony was it did not increase the stress in the loaded condition; it was primarily in the ballast condition that the problems have occurred in the past. So increasing the loading would not seem to be part of the problem. The newer ones, the larger ones will carry more. They have been designed on that basis, so their strength on the various skeletons and their framework has been strengthened to meet the loading requirements that are planned as far as the cargo carrying mood of that vessel. Mr. RuPrE. One last question. I thought that one of the witnesses indicated along the way, perhaps as early as 3 or 3:30 that perhaps something happened along the way to the vessel, that it had listed a bit or it had taken on water. I don't know if that is fact or conjecture. I would ask any one of you if that happened, wouldn't the captain have sent out some kind of SOS or distress signal or told the crew to be on the alert, that they might have some trouble lying ahead? I have a difficult time following the possibility of something happening at 3 o'clock or 3:30 and the vessel going down without any distress signal coming from it a number of hours later. Mr. NOLAWSKI. Mr. Ruppe, I included a statement attributed to the chairman of the board of inquiry along that line. He did not expand on it and say what happened. The testimony in the board of inquiry did indicate that they had lost a vent or vent cover, this is to one of the ballast tanks, and that they did have some water in a ballast tank. However, the pumps in accordance with the captain's conversation with the Anderson, were handling the water and he did not seem to be too concerned about it, so it must be-if he damaged himself on the shoal, it is possible with the sea pounding that he didn't realize that he did violence. I have been in vessels pounding in heavy seas in salt water and I sure thought we hit bottom and I knew we couldn't have hit bottom though it felt like it. The problem could be such that he really bottomed without knowing about it and if he cracked the hull in such manner the wave motion caused the vessel to break in two suddenly, that is what must have happened, or he would certainly have gotten off an SOS. He was standing on the bridge with a radio in front of him. It would only have taken seconds for him to say some- thing over the radio. He didn't have time for that, apparently. He must not have, from his conversation with the Anderson, considered the water threatening that was coming in through the vent. This is the vent on deck. The water coming in there compared to the capacity of his pumps did not excite him, apparently. Mr. RTJPPE. I have one question for Admiral Gracey. But before I do, I want to congratulate my very fine constituent Dan Reed for his statement. On one point, Dan, I think you bring up a very important point to consider and that is that Coast Guard surveillance and equip- ment attendant on the Great Lakes has to necessarily involve the small boater who in terms of numbers is the greatest user of the Great Lakes. It is certainly true that an accident of this type, the accident to the Fitzgerald, triggers inquiries and studies of this nature, and hearings, and I think we should never lose sight in deploying Coast Guard forces and achieving better information of the small boater. He is a very important and very numerous individual. One thing I am glad you bring out is that the winter navigation board considered transportation problems and environmental problems related to the winter navigation season. PAGENO="0374" 370 The legislation that Congressman Oberstar and I have introduced to extend the demonstration period for an additional 2 years would give the winter navigation board new authority to look at transportation problems and environmental damages. I hope that the winter navi- gational board will look further at environmental damage and deter-~ mine how much of the shoreline loss is caused by natural conditions, how much by extended winter navigation, and how much is caused by the higher water levels that the International Joint Commission has unilaterally maintained on the Great Lakes, especially on Lake Superior, in the past few years. The last question, if I might, Admiral Gracey, I understand that the Ports and Waterway Safety Act of 1972 would authorize the Coast Guard to "control vessel traffic in areas especially hazardous or under conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather," et cetera. Has the Coast Guard ever considered applying this authority to situa- tions such as beset the Fitzgerald some months ago? Admiral GRACEY. I can't speak in terms of broad policy for the entire Coast Guard. I assume you are alluding to the sailing when there were some storm conditions predicted? Mr. RUPPE. Yes. Admiral GRAcEY. Is that the kind of situation you mean when you said beset the Fitzgerald? Mr. RUPPE. Yes; the sort of typical November weather which is the most hazardous period. Admiral GRACEY. I don't know what the whole Coast Guard has done, but I will tell you I have given it serious thought on the lakes as to whether it would be feasible or not and I have not given up looking at it. In fact, I am very seriously considering taking a look at whether or not the conditions of the lakes and the kind of marine traffic we have here would warrant our instituting a large craft warn- ing system, if you will on the lakes. It would be a warning system. I have not really seriously considered a program which would deny a large vessel the right to decide whether it sailed or not. Even on a small craft, we do not tell the men "Don't go out." We warn them. We tell them it is unsafe; we do everything we can to try to convince them not to go in terms of providing them information and education, but the small boater still goes out and we still wind up going out and trying to find him. Mr. RUPPE. Weather information is a difficult thing to predict. I know in the copper country we may have a storm warning when only a fool there will go out and again, maybe because of some local peculi- arity of the weather, it is really not all that unsafe although the per- son considering going out ought to take a little extra thought and precaution about putting his boat out in face of the Coast Guard warning. Admiral GRACEY. There has been a good deal of concern about the weather service no longer asking us to fly the storm warning flags. A lot of people have voiced concern about that, and we have tried to explain that action on the basis that the flag is good only for those who can see it and once you have left the place where the flag is and it is hoisted after you get out, it doesn't do any good be- cause you can't see it. What we are trying to do is to have the peopl& buy a small $12 radio, whatever it costs, and they have constant PAGENO="0375" 371 weather broadcasts and you carry it in your pocket or on the boat and listen to it before you sail and listen to the weather~ But, I have been doing a lot of reading about shipwrecks on the Great Lakes, not just in preparation for the hearing, by the way.~ As I mentioned in the beginning, I am rather entranced with this part of the world for some strange reason these days and I have done a lot of reading about shipwrecks over the years, and it just comes through time and time again about the weather and the patterns and the peculiar patterns, and even in the face of what seems to. be very fine capability to predict, when the weather gets out over the lakes, strange and wonderful things happen to it. Wind and weather con- ditions change. The big storm in November of 1913 was the case of three violent hurricane force storms all coming together at once, but none of them were predicted to do that. Very much the same kind of thing happened in the storm last year. The only thing we didn't have was the third storm coming from the South, but we had two other ones that came together, but they weren't predicted to do that. It is a very tricky part of the world as far as weather is concerned. Short of having some buoys or something out there to give some data or using the satellite information, there is no way to determine what the weather is going to do. Mr. RUPPE. Would it not be the duty of your organization and the maritime agencies to develop a system of large vessel warning? Admiral GEACEY. I wouldn't consider instituting such a thing without consulting with the industry and weather service and all kinds of other people. iVir. RUPPE. Mr. Nolawski? Mr. NOLAWSKI. I think the Secretary did give the Coast Guard the right to control the vessel traffic. It is there now, but somehow or another the people are dodging a responsibility that should be exercised by somebody. Let's hope the Weather Bureau could accept it. Let us hopethat somebody with some authority accepts it, because they are sweeping something under a big rug which endangers the vessels and the people's lives on the vessel and endangers the profits. It does not follow. I don't know why they even write it, if this is what they are doing. Mr. RUPPE. You bring up two questions. The first one is, should we have a large vessel warning system, and second, what materializes after such a warning is issued? Do you let the master go on his own risk or do you actually tell him to seek refuge? Mr. NOLAWSKI. We are using a lot with the master's discretion at sea and the master's discretion in navigable waters. When the Coast Guard and regulations are in force, he doesn't use his discretion. He can only use his discretion when he is at sea. Here is the discretion of man going out-whoever is in authority, that Coast Guard or whoever says it is dangerous-they cannot control it. Why doesn't anyone exercise authority? Everyone seems to think they are infringing on the master. He is the master at sea. But here he is not. The Coast Guard has regulations which they think can regulate them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DE LA GARZA. We appreciate all of you being here. Your testi- mony has been most helpful. I would like to thank Lake Superior State College and the staff of. Congressman Ruppe and the staff of the committee that made the arrangements for the hearing; and pending the statements that will PAGENO="0376" 372 be submitted later, questions that may be submitted to witnesses, the committee will stand adjourned. [The following was submitted for inclusion in the record:] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, Cleveland, Ohio, August ~4, 197G. Hon. PHILIP E. RUPPE, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. RUPPE: Enclosed are my personal answers to the questions sent with your letter of July 22 re: the Soo hearings. I have tried to write them to sound as they would have had I answered them during the hearing. They are numbered according to the subject matter, using the following code: SAR-Search and Rescue; HS-Human Survival; SS-Ship Safety; SLAR-Side-Looking Air-. borne Radar; LC-Loran C; ML-Mini--Loran; and VT-Vessel Traffic Control. You asked two questions about weather forecasting which I have not tried to answer. I think a more meaningful answer would come from the National Weather Service, who, I understand, maintain rather extensive data on the accuracy of their forecasts. You also asked for an assessment of the Whitefish Point erosion problem which was discussed at the hearing by Mr. Dan Reed. Unfortunately, the copy of the transcript I received did not include Mr. Reed's testimony, so I cannot provide a pertinent answer now. I have asked for a copy of that part of the transcript. When it arrives, I will promptly provide the assessment you asked for plus an answer to your later letter on Whitefish Point. I hope to be able to get that out later this week. I have sent a copy of the answers to Coast Guard Headquarters, but I have not coordinated the answers with them. Your consideration during the hearing and your kind words since are much appreciated. The same is true of Mr. Oberstar and Mr. de la Garza. Sincerely, J. S. GRACEY, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Ninth Coast Guard District. Enclosures. Question. Does the Coast Guard maintain a facility plan applicable to ships, aircraft and rescue stations, based upon some kind of established time and distance criteria? Answer. The Coast Guard has a facility plan which consists of 3 parts: Cutter Plan, Aviation Plan, and Shore Facilities Plan. The ultimate facility requirements development in each part are based on a wide range of critieria which are determined by the mandates of our many missions. Since Coast Guard facilities derive their special record of effectiveness in part from their multi-mission capability, their selection and numbers must per force be based on critieria of many sorts. "Time" and "distance" are factors used in part in the Cutter Aviation Plans. They are not used, per se, in the Shore Facilities Plan because of the wide variety of geographic locations, climatic conditions, population densities, "clientele" characteristics, caseloads and case severity and assigned missions in which our shore units are placed and with which they must cope. Question. Would you furnish such plan or plans as they relate to all of the Great Lakes? Answer. Each of the three Plans I discussed in answering the previous question consists of a rather large volume. Except in sections which provide tables of projected facility needs the texts are not divided by specific geographical areas nor are discussions so oriented. 1 have excerpts, which I will provide for the record to give a feel for the thought process upon which decisions are made for the Search and Rescue Program. III. BOAT REQUIREMENTS A. ANALYTICAL PROBLEM The requirements for Coast Guard boats have been determined in the past by program managers using a variety of analytical and non-analytical techniques. A major task for the first update of the Boat Plan in 1975 will be the development of a standard methodology for determining boat requirements which can be applied to all programs. PAGENO="0377" 373 In many cases, especially for those newer stations with primary responsibility for the Search and Rescue (SAR) program, a computer simulated queueing model has been exercised to determine optimal SAR boat standby requirements. In most cases, however, the results of many years of trial and error has established the stations' needs. It can be argued that this approach could result in over- capacity at many units if the true needs were unconstrained. The tendency would be to overequip for the most demanding missions expected. In fact, personnel and financial constraints have been imposed throughout the Service. The limited availability of personnel and operating expense funding induces program managers, as well as operational commanders, to minimize the number of boats which will consume these constrained resources. Despite this acknowledgement, the study has identified a major need for future in-depth analysis of actual station requirements. The short time period allowed for this first year's plan was insufficient to carry out that analyses. However, some time was available to frame out the methodological approach to be used during 1975 for the first updating of the Plan. B. PROPOSED SOLUTION The boat requirements may be developed by describing a~series of~potential operational constraints which are imposed on boats carrying out the wide variety of mission tasks. Tasks that boats will be required to perform for each Coast Guard program are first listed. Operational constraints are then determined from environmental conditions as well as from human, social, and institutional factors that affect boat operations. Historical workload data is then grouped into these categories and future demand expectations are estimated. The resultant projected workload within each category should provide a descriptive statistical basis for determining future demand for boat services. BOAT TASK DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS Search and Rescue (SAR) Search for vessel Search for person in water \Tector another unit to scene Provide communications assistance Provide direction finding assistance Provide navigational assistance Provide engineering assistance Provide medical assistance (advice) Rescue personnel from water Rescue personnel from sinking burning vessel Rescue personnel from land Remove property from sinking burning vessel Remove property from land Refuel Deliver medical supplies Deliver pump Dc-water Fight fire Refloat Make repairs Stand-by Provide escort Tow Fight fire and tow Dc-water and tow Fight fire, dc-water, and tow Refloat and tow Refloat, repair and tow Refloat, repair, dc-water, and tow Fight fire and escort Dc-water and escort Fight fire, dc-water, and escort Relieve tow Provide diving platform Recreational boating safety (RBS) Board boat Pursue boat Patrol regatta Visit marina Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (EL T) Board fishing vessel Patrol Security Zone Interdict drug traffic or Interdict alien traffic Aids to Navigation (A/N) or Inspect day beacon Inspect minor shore light Inspect unlighted buoy Inspect lighted buoy Inspect bridge light Check signal Check buoys mooring Recharge buoy Hot pack buoy Repair buoys visual equipment Repair buoys audio equipment Clean buoy Paint buoy Relieve buoy Land on breakwater Recharge fixed aid Hot pack fixed aid Clean fixed aid Repair structure Replace structure Paint fixed aid Renew Reflective tape Establish temporary aid Load batteries Load buoys PAGENO="0378" 374 Tow buoy Replace lamps Replace lanterns Replace flasher Replace wiring Replace lampchanger Replace dayboard Supply lightship Supply light station Replace engine-generator Operate in exposed location Operate in semi-exposed location Operate in protected location Service aid located on sea coast Service aid in bay, harbor, or inlet Service aid in river or canal Service aid on breakwater Service aid on shore Remove ice from buoy Remove ice from fixed aid Drag for buoy remains Provide, diving platform Reserve Training (RT~ Train coxswain Train engineman Port Safety and Security (P58) Supervise hazardous cargo transfer Supervise radioactive material transfer Board merchant vessel Board barge Visit pier Patrol security zone Patrol safety zone Patrol harbor Patrol remote harbor area Patrol off-shore structure 1. Boat Tasks Inspect waterfront Control vessel movement Escort vessel movement Observe special interest vessel Investigate accidents on vessel Investigate accidents on bridge Investigate accidents at port facility Provide communications for traffic control Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) Monitor liquid bulk transfer Monitor removal of discharged material Remove discharged motor oil Investigate discharge Monitor ocean dumping activity Deliver oil containment boom Deliver oil absorbing material Deliver pump and hose Deploy oil boom Deploy hose Distribute absorbent material Operate skimming pump Collect water samples Collect contaminated wildlife Board vessels for sanitation systems inspection Provide communications for on-Scene Commander Bridge Administration (BA) Inspect bridge lights Inspect bridge for signals Inspect bridge material condition Observe drawbridge operations Observe waterway traffic Each program can be described by listing all tasks that are accomplished in carrying out that program's work. These are tentatively listed and are shown for each program in Table Ill-i. ~. Operational Constraints Operational constraints are factors that determine how program tasks are performed with boats. They can be grouped as either environmental conditions of as human, social, and institutional factors. Environmental conditions.-T hose external elements that arc part of the environ- ment surrounding the boat are classified and assigned numerical values where appropriate. These include climate, weather and sea conditions, visibility, location in reference to land, etc. A proposed classification scheme is shown in Table IJI-2. A preliminary analysis attempted to correlate climatological data of selected coastal regions with environmental conditions reported during SAR assistance cases. A rough analysis indicated that the two data sources generally conform. The next step will be to relate the potential climatic severity of each region with explicit levels of operational capabilities and crew protection afforded by each class of Coast Guard boats. Severity thresholds may be useful to determine miaimum boat capabilities required for each geographical area. The work to date suggests that this approach will provide the environmental constraint descrip- tions which are necessary for the task analysis. PAGENO="0379" 375 TABLE 111-2.-ENvIRoNMENTAL CONDITIONS Sea state (feet high): Visibility (miles): Distance from shore o to 2 0 to one-fourth (miles): 3 to 4 one-fourth to one-half 0 to 3 5 to 9 one-half to 1 4 to 10 lOtol9 ltoS 11to25 20 plus 6 to 10 26 plus Water depth (feet): 11 plus Breaking waves on: 0 to 2 Relationship to land: Bar 3 to 4 High seas Beach 5 to 6 Coastal Shoal 7 plus Inlet Condition: Wind speed (knots): Bay Daylight 0 to 10 Sound Dusk 11 to 21 Harbor Night 22 to 33 Marsh Fog 34 to 47 River Rain 48 plus Lake Snow Sleet Haze Human, social, and institutional factors.-These factors should describe existing and anticipated conditions such as human physical capabilities, organizational responsibilities and boundaries, laws, public expectations, planning rules-of- thumb, policies, and other factors both inside and outside the Coast Guard which affect how boats can be used to perform various tasks. For example: lives are to be saved before property, communications are to be maintained between operating units and higher commands, district and group boundaries, legal implications of an improperly positioned aid to navigation, etc. 3. Demand for Boat Services Historical demand.-Existing program data should be used to develop tables showing historical utilization of boats in fulfilling program tasks. Data would be broken into groups that parallel the environmental categories and human, social, and institutional factors. For example: number of searches for vessels between 10 and 50 miles off-shore in the 12th Coast Guard District, number of trips to manned lights within bays in the 5th Coast Guard District, etc. Future demand parameters.-Future demand parameters are those factors that have been identified for use in transforming historical data to projected data. There are three types of changes in the marine environment and concepts of Coast Guard operations that can have an impact on the future demand for boat services. The first step is to identify and measure those factors which can be quantified (e.g., extrapolations of the SAR data base). The second step is to identify and estimate those other factors which cannot be quantified exactly, but can be roughly estimated to describethe range of possible future conditions (e.g., locator beacons to be required by law on all pleasure boats. The third step is to list other imaginable but not predictable future events (e.g., fuel rationing im- posed on maritime users). Future demand estimation.--Future demand is estimated by applying the three types of parameters to the historical demand. First, the parameters which can be quantified exactly are applied to the historical demand to project future de- mand. These projections are spread through the range of secondary parameters. Lastly, note is made of the speculated effects of the unpredictable future events upon future demand for Coast Guard boat services. C. USING REQUIREMENTS TO SELECT RESOURCES 1. Model Development After the requirements are developed, a methodology is needed to select boats to carry out the programs. The selection process should result in the most cost- effective fleet possible. There are, however, a wide choice of boat classes that can be used to satisfy program objectives. The problem then becomes how to find the least expensive resources to carry out well defined tasks at explicit levels of service. The resource allocation process has two stages in its solution. The preliminary decision concerns what boats classes should be pre-positioned by assignment to which shore facilities. The operational decision is what boat should be ~disp~atched PAGENO="0380" 376 by the officer-in-charge to carry out each task requirement. The model to be devel- oped cannot resolve the on-the-scene question. This is done by the dispatching officer applying his judgment based on experience to his knowledge of all factors affecting the decision, including the preconstrained choice of boats at his station. Other models, such as Computerized Assisted Search Planning (CASP), are available to assist in that decision. Clear definitions of tasks are necessary but they are not always easily described. For example, multiple tasks can often be carried out simultaneously. Some of these multiple usages may support the same program while others will support Tmore than one program. In many other cases, one task requirement precludes use of the boat for other assignments. There is also an interrupting mode of operation, where the task is of a routine or scheduled nature, and the other task is an emcrg- ency or is unscheduled. Provision for interrupting the routine use of the boat can be made through proper design, outfitting, communications, and training of ~personnel. In a few instances, the boat may provide an immediate life or property-saving ~elief while waiting for the arrival of a Coast Guard resource better-suited for the mission. In another case, additional resources or personnel may be delivered to the boat which is on the scene. Given that provision can be made for describing these forms of boat task applications, complete listings of each program's tasks will define the effective- ness side of the cost-effectiveness equation. The cost side will be determined with life cycle costing of all existing and proposed boat classes. This is also a method- ological problem area, but additional analysis will probably result in useful estimates of costs. 2. Resource Capability Matrix The Resource Capability Matrix may be the key to the resource allocation problem as a cost-effectiveness mechanism. It uses a broad list of factors which describe boat tasks. These capability factors are determined as environmental conditions, human limitations, and operational capabilities of the boats. The matrix is shown in Table 111-3. It was originally developed for use in the Search and Rescue Simulation Model (SARSIM). The matrix is a binary coded table which indicates the capability of each boat class to carry out the tasks described with the capability factors listed. The number "1" is assigned in the body of the table only when a resource can satisfy the demand attribute. When a boat cannot satisfy the description, the number "0" is assigned. The task is described by selecting those capability factors needed for the task. Only those resources that produce a product of "1", when all appli- cable factors in a vertical boat vector are multiplied, can be assigned to the task described by that list of attributes. Relative boat costs are to be indicated and the least expensive boat among those capable of providing the service is assigned. Sufficient time was not available during this initial study to complete the development of the matrix as a usable decision making tool. The original proposed matrix was expanded, however, to include all boat classes discussed in the Plan. Expert advice was then sought to determine the capability factors applicable to each boat class. 3. Additional Methodological Problems Some of the undeveloped aspects of this methodology require additional study. One concern is how to deal with the geographical and time distribution of demand for boat services. Another problem area is how to combine demands for scheduled patrols and response actuated sorties. One possible solution may be in establish- ing specific minimum levels of response availability based on various thresholds of expected demand. For example, if expected operations will take place in sea states over 10 feet during 5% of SAR cases, one 44' MLB must be assigned. Similar rules could be established concerning availability of suitable resources within specific distances or response times. Development work will continue in order to improve the model for use in subsequent boat plans. Relief boat allowances must then be determined to provide suitable backup for boats placed out of service due to scheduled overhauls and major casualties. Relief boats should be assigned to centrally located units to minimize delivery time. Determination of the ideal numbers, types, classes, and geographical dis- tributions is to be developed. At present, provision is made for relief boat pro- curements in the Boat Plan for 44' MLB, 41' UTB, and 30' UTM replacements where allowances already exist in OPFAC. No reliefs are programmed in the MRB and PWB procurements since they will be backed up with excess PAGENO="0381" 377 MSB(SU)'s and relief UTB's in the early years of their introduction to the boat fleet. TABLE 111-3.-Resource capability matrix. CUTTER PLAN In recent years, the tremendous expansion of recreational boating, the increas- ing use of small powered vessels for commercial fishing, and the acceptance by the United States of providing a higher level of assistance to the mariner on the high seas has created new problems in the Search and Rescue field. The Coast Guard has responded to these changing maritime patterns by relocating SAR stations to inlets and bays, by establishing different capacity cutters to assist in the variety of offshore waters, and by establishing a series of safety oriented programs such as Merchant Marine Safety, Boating Safety, Port Safety, and Automated Merchant Vessels Reporting System. Modern managerial methods are now available to assist in determining the SAR resource mix needed to keep pace with these changing demands. C. ECONOMIC Tangible economic benefits that form a basis for the SAR program are normally measured in terms of prevention of death and property loss. Less tangible economic gains for the nation are accomplished by the program's encouragement of recrea- tional boating and maritime commerce. Practically any maritime activity profits directly or indirectly from the Coast Guard's SAR program. III. Resource Capability Required The specific SAR resource capability required varies from performance of vessels in direct location and quick recovery to use of rescue craft specially equipped for long searches. Resource performance is also dependent on environ- mental factors such as visibility, sea state, temperature, nearness to shoals or other hazards. In general, High Endurance Cutters and Medium Endurance Cutters have the endurance and seakeeping capacities to provide SAR at ranges C'45~LfTY FACTORS BOAT CLASSES 44' 52' 1,f L B 16' 26' 25' 41' 45' 30' 25' M U U U U U R S T T T 1' B B S B M L 32' w B 31' S B 63' 46' 21' 55' A B T A 45' N U A N B B S N B U0,tOO)L lB T C 16 W SSSAE A KKKRRT N BMLCVB E~!NC~1ENTAL bet h~5h) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111 ~2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 100111 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 000111 31 319 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 006000 006100 *Eo: 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111 E::nh 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111 S'n~ 1 1 1 0 0 Vs~' 3npth feet) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111 32 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 111111 :3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 111111 3: 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111 5r~' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 11.0111 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 000110 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 000000 f47 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000 45+ 1 1 0 0 ~: 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111001 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 000110 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 o00000 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B 600000 5 0 1 0 0 6 Conr+"a~r+ Pc,t:oo 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 111111 Seat 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 000110 3:ndehe)d 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 600110 Ce4Cted 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 B 0 000110 En~oced 0 1 0 0 NOTE: 1h)s sloe u tease p)annin5 too) and not asa d)recs.e ,B operat:one) commanders, PAGENO="0382" 378 up to 1000 and up to 300 miles respectively. These cutters provide coverage while engaged in other missions or while in homeport. Patrol Boat Cutters have endur- ance and seakeeping characteristics to effectively handle SAR cases up to 100 miles from the coast. IV. Performance (Mission) /Response Criteria CRITERIA 1. Program criteria a. The philosophy of' basing SAR response on "worst case"; i.e. ability to handle the heaviest workload situation previously encountered or envisioned could render the use of cutter and personnel resources dysfunctional. A philosphy of basing SAR response on maximum allowable risk permits planning for resources within a frame work of acceptable tolerances. The currently accepted value is a risk not to exceed 3 % failure to respond to serious cases. In some areas 3 % is considered too high for planning purposes and 1 % has been used. b. Tolerance time is the waiting time involved upon initial notification of the Coast Guard to when first Coast Guard resource arrives on scene. Longer tol- erances result in higher over-all utilization of resources since slower less expensive resources may be selected. A distress client should be served within a given toler- ance time which varies with five levels of distress severity. Tolerance time is established within specific geographical areas based on conditions of survivability of that area and the guidelines of B-09, B-b of the SAR Report Manual CG-397. All resources which are capable of serving the needs of the client, under existing environmental conditions, within the tolerance time are considered equally satis- factory. It should also be noted that the tolerance time as defined is Coast Guard criteria and does not fully consider client tolerance. In the eyes of the client, his tolerance time is a function of when the distress occurred, not when the CG was notified. The time of occurence is a critical factor in client survival and consequently has a definite impact on the probability of successfully responding to a given distress incident. A ranking based on cost is made to select the preferred resources among those that can meet the tolerance (Ref Tab A). 2. Response criteria a. A SAR cutter shall be capable of reaching the scene of distress within the 100 to 300 mile zone of the U.S. coast within 36 hours, search for seven days at 15 knots, and return to port with ~a tow. A second cutter of same capability shall be able to reach the scene within 48 hdurs. b. A SAR cutter shall be capable of reaching the scene of distress within the 10 to 100 mile zone of the U.S. coast within 12 hours, search for two days at 12 knots and return to port with a tow. A second cutter of same capability shall be able to reach the scene within 18 hours. c. No response criteria is specified for distances beyond 300 miles from the U.S. coast. 3. Demand criteria a. The density plot of SAR cases illustrates that the major portion of distress cases, which are responded to by cutters, occurs within the 10 to 100 mile zone of the U.S. coast. b. A SAR cutter shall be capable of reaching the scene of 75% of the cases occurring within 100 miles of the U.S. coat within 12 hours and 90% of the cases within 18 hours. c~ A SAR cutter shall be capagle of reaching the scene of 75% of the cases occuring with 100 to 300 miles of the U.S. coast within 36 hours and 90% of the cases within 48 hours. V. Trade-off possibilities Trade-offs exist among small boats, patrol boat cutters, and helicopters in many mission areas. The Cutter Issue Study resource selection matrix outlines the considerations involved when choosing an appropriate resource. It is antici- pated that the SAR Simulation Model now in use will enable analysts and man- agers to better evaluate the significance antnd exte of these trade-offs. VI. Benefit and Effectiveness Rationale The benefits of the SAR program are the prevention of death and loss of property. To develop the number of deaths prevented from reported statistics five factors are combined: (1) the number of lives saved, (2) a percentage of the number of PAGENO="0383" 379 persons assisted who were reported in severe danger, (3) a lesser percentage of the number of persons assisted who were in moderate danger, (4) an even smaller percentage of persons who were in little or no danger, and (5) a percentage of persons assisted by the Auxiliary. The percentages developed depend on the probability of loss by assistance that hss not been rendered in the 45 categories of distress listed in the SAR Reports Manual CG-397. The value of property loss prevented is considered a percentage of property which was assisted. Estimated percentages of probable loss, had assistance not been provided, are assigned to each of the 45 distress categories. The dollar value of property assisted within each distress category and degree of severity is obtained from assistance reports. EFFECTIVENESS Effectiveness reflects the degree of success of the SAR program in rendering aid to persons and property in distress. Effectiveness can be improved by de- creasing time delays in providing assistance by such methods as (a) earlier de- tection of distress by better communication systems and search resources, (b) faster response by increased speed of recovery resources, (c) increased density of resource facilities. Effectiveness is decreased by increasing clientele without a proportionate increase in men and facilities. Effectiveness must be examined with each proposed change in resource assignment or method alteration. AvIATIoN PLAN The Maritime Region has been divided into three zones: 1. Long-Range-the areas beyond 300 miles from the coast. 2. Medium Range-the band between 150 and 300 miles from the coast. 3. Coastal and Harbor-this zone includes rivers, bays, and inlets, and ex- tends 150 miles to seaward. From the standpoint of where SAR operations are conducted, Assistance Report Data files provide detailed information as to the specifics of each SAR. case, including position. Analysis of assistance report files reveals that over 90% of all assistance calls to which aircraft have responded are located within the Coastal and Harbor Zone.2 * * * * * In an effort to determine the validity of the criteria established by the 1967 Aviation Issue Paper in this area, the 1971 Aviation Resources Study examined the historical performance of aircraft as to compliance with the desired criteria. For FY 1970, statistics reveal that of all incidents responded to in the Coastal and Harbor Zone by Coast Guard air facilities, 70.5 per cent could have been reached by a recovery aircraft in one-half hour and 86.7 per cent could have been reached in one hour. Appendix A-8 presents a tabular illustration of this analysis. Coverage factor-The Coast Guard's re~ponsibility for providing aid to persons and property and distress over vast ocean areas was previously discussed and is illustrated in Figure SAR-1. To meet this offshore responsibility, there exists a requirement for the Coast Guard to operate long and medium range SAR aircraft capable of reaching distress incidents anywhere within the prescribed areas. As a result of the foregoing considerations, the following SAR mission criteria have been established. 1. Each SAR aviation unit shall be provided one aircraft system capable of immediate response to a distress incident. A second alert system shall be provided for those units at which the queue demand is such that two systems are required' outside of normal working hours nine or more times per year. 2. SAR aviator units shall, within the Harbor and Coastal Zone, be capable of flying to the scene of 75 per cent of the assistance cases within one-half hour and 90 per cent within one hour and be capable of recovering (rescuing) persons in distress. 3. The SAR aviation forces shall provide aircraft capable of reaching any point within the maritime areas of SAR responsbility and rendering some form of aid to persons in distress. 1 Aviation Issue Paper, September 1961, Volume I, pg. 5, USCG Headquarters, Office of Operations. 2 Ibid., pg. 7. `Ibid., pg. IV-63 tliru 65. `78-2S0-76----25 PAGENO="0384" 380 Those areas which appeared to he inadequately serviced in accordance with the preceding coverage and response criteria were subjected to further scrutiny. Where indicated, the Search and Rescue Simulation Model (SARSIM) was exer- cised on a selective basis to provide information as to the potential utilization of aircraft in areas showing an apparent need. The model is able to present a "before and after" evaluation which compares responses of a theoretical air station with those of existing adjacent resources, both surface and air. When the results of this comparison showed that aircraft could be utilized to provide an improved SAR response capability, those areas were subjectively evaluated from the standpoint of potential response to other program requirements. When the results of these multiprogram considerations indicated that it would be advantageous to do so, new units were included in implementation plans. For ease of analysis and to ensure that consideration was given to the complex interrelationships resulting from aircraft procurement, aircraft relocation and establishment of new units, all air stations were considered on an annual basis. Accordingly, the following paragraphs described the development of requirements on a year-by-year basis, starting with FY 1974. Question. In 1974 Coast Guard Authorization Hearings Admiral Bender furnished this Committee with a table showing "times necessary to provide surface, fixed wing, and/or helicopter response to the furthest point in the Beaver Island, Munising, Portage, and Isle Royale areas." I have a copy for your perusal-can the Coast Guard still meet those response times? TIMES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE SURFACE, FIXED WING, AND/OR HELICOPTER RESPONSE TO THE "FURTHEST" POINT IN THE BEAVER ISLAND, MUNISING, PORTAGE, AND ISLE ROYALE AREAS Craft Beaver Island Musising Portage 1 Portage 2 Isle Royale Surface 2h 1h 51 mm 2h 50 mis 5h 18 mm 5h 32 mis. Fixed wing 33 mm lh lh 18 mis lh 29 mm lh 41 mis. Helicopter 57 mis lh 53 mis 2h 31 mis 2h 54 mis 3h 18 mis. 1 Keweesaw Bay. 2 Offshore of western end of Keweesaw Waterway. Answer. Our ability to respond within a given time to a call within a specified area depends on weather conditions enroute and whether or not the available rescue unit is involved in another case when the call is received. If a unit is already underway in an area closer to the case than the home base and/or if it is blessed with favorable winds, the response can be quicker than planned. The opposite conditions would cause a slower response. The times shown in the table Admiral Bender provided are based on normal cutter, boat and aircraft speeds and they assume departure from homeport or air station. Given conditions which permit realizing those speeds and departure from the same points, we can meet those times today. Question. Do you consider the single Coast Guard vessel for Lake Superior at Duluth, Minnesota, capable of meeting established criteria and response times? Answer. The 180-ft buoy tender whose homeport is Duluth, the cutter WOOD- RUSH, is not capable of reaching cases in the eastern part of Lake Superior in a timely fashion unless she is underway in the Lake when a call is received. How- ever, we do not rely solely on WOODRUSH for Lake Superior surface coverage. We have several other units capable of responding in all but the most extremely severe weather. We have 44-foot motor lifeboats in Duluth and Marquette and another is in the FY 77 budget to replace the 36-foot boat at Grand Marais, Michigan. We have 41-foot rescue boats at Bayfield, Wisconsin and the Soo. And we have a 40-foot boat at Duluth and a 30-foot boat at the Soo. We also have the 110-foot tug NAUGATUCK at the Soo. When it is replaced by the first of the new 140-foot tugs that have been authorized, we will have heavy weather capability at both ends of the Lake. Question. Would you not consider the assignment of another vessel to a more central location warranted today? Answer. To increase our heavy weather capability in mid-Lake Superior we have recently moved a 44-foot lifeboat to Marquette, Michigan. Last year we also considered proposing that an even larger vessel be added. It would not be feasible to move WOODRUSH because her primary mission is aids to navigation and she needs the logistics support available in Duluth. There is now no other vessel we could move that would be more capable than the 44-footer, which, I might add, PAGENO="0385" 381 is a~ very capable boat. We are presently giving serious thought to suggesting that one of the new 140-footers be homeported in a port like Marquette or Munising. Question. Is not the northern reaches of Lake Huron in need of additional attention-in view of the gap between the stations at Tawas and St. Ignace that was once covered by two former Lifeboat Stations? Answer. The two stations have been closed for more than 25 years, so it is difficult to draw any parallels between operational need when they were open and now. Analysis of 1974 and 1975 cases in the area between lines 15 miles north of East Tawas Station and 15 miles east of St. Ignace Station shows the following experieflce 1974.-32 cases (at least 5 of which were false alarms) 7 were "severe" (4 others that were treated as "severe" turned out to be false alarms) 12 were handled by air, 3 were medical evacuations, 13 were disabled small craft, and 5 were "overdues." 1975.-29 cases (at least 3 of which were false alarms) 7 were "severe" (1 other that was treated as "severe" turned out to be a false alarm), 11 were handled by air, 7 were medical evacuations, 3 were disabled small craft, and 9 were "overdues." Most of the cases were within 30 miles of East Tawas. There is an Auxiliary flotilla at Alpena but it has not been necessary to call on them for emergency assistance. This case experience does not warrant the large expense of establishing a station between St. Ignace and East Tawas. Question. What, if any, special detection equipment is carried aboard Coast Guard search aircraft assigned to the Great Lakes region? Answer. Aircraft regularly assigned to the Great Lakes area have no specialized detection equipment. We do have NIGHT-SUN illumination on helicopters and radar on the HU-16E aircraft. Question. How does NIGHT-SUN illuminating equipment work? Answer. The NIGHT-SUN is an illumination device manufactured by the Spectrolab Division of Textron, Inc. which consists of a high intensity xenon light of 3.8 million candlepower. It is mounted on the port side of Coast Guard helicopters only when needed as its weight of 65 lbs. would be a burden during daylight flights or when it cannot be used. It can be installed on the helicopter in 3 to 7 minutes when needed. The light is trainable ahead, astern, to the left, and to some degree beneath the helicopter to its right side. Either the crewman in the cabin controls the light with a portable toggle switch or the co-pilot controls it with a fixed toggle switch. The beam diameter on the surface of the water (or land) when the helicopter is at 500 feet is a maximum of 166 feet 8 inches. From a 1000 foot helicopter altitude its beam diameter is 333 feet 4 inches. Question. Are all search aircraft so equipped? Answer. No. We have equipment for one HH52-A helicopter at each Air Station. The device can be readily transferred from one helicopter to another, so we always have NIGHT-SUN capability with the ready helicopter. Question. In two recent drowning cases in Green Bay and off Eagle 1-larbor in Lake Superior, lives were lost that might have been averted if sophisticated electronic detection equipment was available. The Commandant has indicated to me that this was an on-going Reserch and Development effort. Can you advise of the status of this development project? Answer. Research and Development of the following equipment has progressed as shown for each: Forward looking radar for the new Medium Range Search (MRS) aircraft in the final operational test phase. Active gated television (AGTV) . . . under development. Wide area illumination system (WAILS) for the HI1-3F helicopter . . . under development. Forward looking infra-red (FLIR) for helicopters . . . specification ready for prototype to be contracted for in Fiscal Year 1977. Infrared/ultra violet line scanner . . . being developed. Question. I have heard that the Coast Guard has a detection package ready to go aboard its proposed new medium surveillance aircraft. Can you describe this equipment, its expected effectiveness and its availability? Answer. Detection capability planned for the new medium range search (MRS) aircraft is as follows: All aircraft will have a new forward looking radar for weather and collision avoidance and search. It will be a quantum improi~ement over present equipment, which has very limited surface detection capability. The new unit is designed to provide search capability as well as flight safety functions. PAGENO="0386" 382 Selected aircraft will also have a sensor package called Aireye installed. I believe. this is the package your question alludes to. Aireye is a remote, all weather, day/night, wide area, airborne surveillance. system with the capability to detect, map and identify and document targets. The system consists of the following: Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), SLAR provides long range, day/night, all-weather detection of oil, ship/boat, ice and aids to navigation targets. SLAR will also be capable of recording the radar picture to provide hard copy for further operational review and/or for documentation. infrared/ultraviolet line scanner (IR/ UV-L5), IR/TJV-LS confirms the presence of oil and maps the real entent of oil pollutants and when combined with some ground measurement reference~ provides an abso- lute surface thermal temperature map. It also can be used to discriminate between various targets (i.e., the ability to distinguish icebergs from ships or oil from kelp beds). Aerial Reconnaissance Camera (ARC), The ARC, during day time only, provides hard copy photographic evidence which can be used to identify targets of interest. Active gated television (AGTV), The AGTV provides a recordable day/night target identification; classification, and activity determination capability. Airborne Data Annotation System (ADAS), ADAS annotates SLAR, IR/TJV-LS, ARC and AGTY with aircraft position and other enforcement data. Control, Display and Record Console (CDRC), The CDRC acts as the nerve center for the system. It controls, displays and records all sensor generated data. The individual sensors which comprise AIRE YE each satisfy a portion of the total system performance requirements. Each sensor has limitations of weather penetration or day/night or target type detection capability. The integrated combination of the sensor provides complimentary performance to meet desired requirements. Question. What are the plans for replacement of the Traverse City HU-lo. search aircraft? Answer. The HU-16E aircraft at Traverse City will be replaced with an equal number of fixed wing aircraft as part of the Coast Guard program to acquire a new medium range .search (MRS) plane. The planned date of replacement depends on progress in the overall program. Question. What are the plans for replacement of the aging 1111-52 helicopters assigned to the Ninth Coast Guard District? Answer. The HH-52A helicopters at our three Air Stations will be replaced by an equal number of short range recovery (SRR) aircraft as part of the Coast Guard program to acquire replacements for all its HH-52A helicopters. The actual' date of replacement depends on when the overall Coast Guard program starts. Question. What is the extent of Coast Guard Auxiliary coverage of the Great Lakes Search-and Rescue region? Of Coast Guard Reserve contribution to this effort? Answer. On the Great Lakes we have one of the most extensive, active and dedicated group of Auxiliarists in the entire Coast Guard. There are 5,500 of them and they provide over 1,700 vessels, 40 aircraft and 105 radio stations. Last yearS they responded to 2,222 SAR cases, saving 163 lives and over $1,300,000 worth of property. Auxiliarists man seasonal stations during peak boating periods at Sodus Point, NY, Sackets Harbor, NY, Munising, MI, Portage, MI, South Haven, MI, and North Superior, MN. We also have three seasonal stations manned full-time by Coast Guard Reserv- ists. But that is only part of what our Reservists contribute. Reservists in my District are also among the most dedicated and active in the Coast Guard. In addition to manning the three stations they also augment regular personnel at stations and in boats during peak periods and for special needs. Question. Should Auxiliary strength decline, as I understand may be the caseS in a few locations such as Munising, what regular Coast Guard forces are avail- - able to fill the void? PAGENO="0387" 383 Answer. Our Auxiliary forces in most areas are pretty stable. We do experience `èhanges, of course, as individual members come and go. When strength declines in a relatively isolated area like Munising, we do not have any regular forces that can fill the void at the site itself. We rely on the nearest regular stations for boats to handle the surface portion of searches and long range cases, and we count on `the local police or sheriff or volunteers to help with localcases. As a long range solution, however, we try to restore the Auxiliary Flotilla to its needed strength through local recruiting and training. Question. Do all rescue stations have the* modern 44-foot motor lifeboats at- tached? Answer. 22 of our 40 year-round stations have 44-foot MLB's assigned. An- other-Grand Marais, MI has an older version, a 36-footer. It will be replaced by the 44-footer which is in the FY77 budget. Question. If not, why not? Answer. The extra expense of providing the special capability of the 44-footer to work in heavy seas is not warranted in all our areas. Some of our busiest sta- tions are in relatively protected waters. They need the greater speed and fiexi- `bility of our 30, 40 and 41 ft boats more. Examples of these stations are Belle `Isle on the Detroit River; Alexandria Bay on the St. Lawrence River and St. ~C1air Flats on the St. Clair River. There are other stations in more exposed areas that don't have 44-footers he- cause they are near stations that do. By alternating we can provide the benefits of both types of boats in a general area and still have but one boat at a station when that is all the workload warrants. An example of this is Grand Haven, MI, which is between Muskegon and Holland, each of which has a 44-footer. Question. How effective are the helicopter services provided by other military agencies as an adjunct to youi State and Rescue mission? I recall that an Air Force helicopter dispatched to the recent Eagle Harbor drowning incident was unable to remain on scene due to high winds and that it did not appear to have searchlight equipment? Answer. The effectiveness of helicopter services provided by other military agencies is somewhat limited by their design and intended mission. The heli- copters at K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base and those assigned to the 316th Army Air Detachment in Cleveland are quite small. Their primary missions are search and rescue over land in moderate weather and medical evacuation. They are not designed or intended for lengthy searches over water and are not equipped with suitable illumination equipment for over water searches at night. Question. Are all Coast Guard-manned units provided with a boat or some kind `for emergency use-even if by the public-including Light Stations such as Eagle Harbor? Answer. All operational Coast Guard-manned units are provided with a boat of some kind except Auxiliary operated stations. Recruiting offices, and other primarily administrative units are not equipped with boats. We do not allow the `public to operate Coast Guard boats. Question. If not, why not? Answer. Units that do not have boats assigned are those whose missions do not require waterborne activities-either for direct operations or logistics. Units `that do have boats assigned have boats of types that are compatible with their need. We do not allow anyone, public or Coast Guard, to operate a Coast Guard boat unless he or she is trained and qualified in the use of that boat and the mission `for which it is to be used. If there is a Coast Guard boat at a unit, there are people there to use it, so there would be no need to call upon a member of the public to operate one of our boats for us. Question. In an earlier exchange of communications from the Coast Guard I was `advised that one of the new 140-foot icebreaking tugs would he stationed at the Soo instead of in Lake Superior. Is this advisable from a SAR standpoint in the light of transit time through the Locks and Upper St. Marys River to a likely point of distress? Answer. In selecting a homeport for a vessel the size of the 140-footers we must `use sites that are in reasonable proximity to primary operating areas and which can provide adequate logistics for the ship, residences for families of the crew and morale and recreation for the crew. Unfortunately, in the eastern end of Lake Superior and Whitefish Bay, the areas of greatest SAR concern for Soo-based `ships, there is no community except the Soo that can provide adequate homeport facilities. We are looking very closely at the possibility of also putting a 140-footer in Lake Superior-probably in Marquette. This would complement the ship at ~the Soo. PAGENO="0388" 384 Question. A communication from Kewaunee, Wisconsin, made a comparison between war time days and today when the number of pleasure-bound fishing vessels has mushroomed with no available rescue boat. Can you comment on this scene? Answer. Recreational boating and pleasure fishing are burgeoning all over the Great Lakes-in many areas at an even greater rate than Kewaunee, WI. Fortunately most of the areas of greatest activity have Coast Guard stations well situated to provide coverage. While we do not have a station withrescue capability in Kewaunee, we do have one at Two Rivers, about 24 miles to the south, and another at Sturgeon Bay Canal, about 30 miles to the north. Neither has had a particularly heavy caseload. Question. What is the status of studies relating to survival of vessel crews? (Consider exposure protection, distress alert; detection, man overboard alarms, protective clothing, evacuation techniques.) Answer. The below listed studies are completed and are available to the public: a. Climatological and Environmental Factors that Influence Surivval on the Great Lakes-C G-D-1 1-74 b. Evaluation of Survival Suits for the Use of the Crews of the Great Lakes Carriers-CG-D-14-73 c. Assessment of the Requirement for Survival on the Great Lakes-CG-D-- 55-74 d. Man Overboard Feasibility Study-C G-D-75-75 e. Man in Cold Water: Cooling Rate in Heavy Winter Clothing-University of Victoria f. Treatment of Accidental Hypothermia: An Experimental Study of Inhala- tion Rewarming-University of Victoria The below listed studies are in progress: a. Test and Evaluation of Three Escape System b. Development, Test and Evaluation of A Self-Encapsulating liferaft. c. Testing and Evaluation of Portable Hand Held Radar Transponders to Enhance the Aerial Detection of Small Survival Craft. d. Investigation of Concepts to Define an Inclined Plane Launch System that can be Used to Deploy, Fully Loaded, A Recovery Boat or Survived Craft directly from the Deck of a Merchant Vessel. e. A study to Address the Viability of Designing Survival Systems that will Reliably Float Free from a Vessel as it Sinks. f. Testing of VHF-FM EPIRB's in The Winter Environment to Determine Effectiveness and Limitations in Performance. g. A Sociological Examination to Investigate added Stress Factors to which Personnel Participating in Winter Navigation are Subjected. Question. What crew safety and survival activities have been tested and studied under the auspices of the navigation season extension demonstration program? (See Page 61, 62 of Demonstration Report.) Answer. The work program continues to bear heavily on the four most needed areas of survival-individual exposure protection, group exposure protection, distress alert and detection enhancement, and man overboard alarm. Activities in individual exposure protection saw the prototype constant-wear exposure jacket developed by the Naval Air Development Center delivered for evaluation with the enhanced survival module tested in summer. Determination of survival times in cold water while wearing typical seaman's winter clothing was conducted by the University of Victoria under the direction of the noted physiologist, Dr. John Hayward. Further, pamphlets describing the latest in- formation and techniques for survival in cold water will be distributed to the crews this next winter season. Activities in the early alert and detection enhancement area included an exercise held last December 1974 with four Coast Guard personnel set adrift in a raft in Lake Huron to test the effectiveness of a radar transponder and other equipment. That test was highly successful. A follow on to that is the distribution of a new radar transponder to several ships in the fleet for evaluation. Further testing was conducted in Lake Erie in April 1976. Efforts in group exposure protection continue to track with the Coast Guards own major work. A contract has been let with the U.S. Naval Academy to deter- mine the feasibility of the concepts of launching a survival or rescue vehicle down a ramp or inclined plane to the water and float-off survival craft capability where the ship abandons the survival craft. The results of these initial studies will be available in the fall of 1976. PAGENO="0389" 385 In the previous fiscal year program, a feasibility study to determine the viability of a man overboard alarm system was made and concluded that two different techniques were viable. Accordingly, a contract has been let this year which will settle on a particular design. Lastly, while not directly related to the above work, but within the charter of the subcommittee, a contract was let to complete the study of the psychological and sociological impact of the extended season on the personnel working in the extended season. This study was initiated last fiscal year. Question. Have any special studies been conducted with regard to survival time in cold water and the contribution that special winter clothing would have in prolonging life? Answer. Yes. "Man in Cold Water: Cooling rate in Heavy Winter Clothing", a study and report done by J. S. Hayward, J. D. Eckerson and M. L. Collis of the Departments of Biology and Physical Education, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada. Studies are continuing in cooperation with Canadian Defense Forces and the Australian Air Force. Question. Describe any other techniques or procedures that such studies may have disclosed for prolonging life? Answer. Life in cold water may be prolonged by: (a) Reducing activity, (b) Bringing the body into a tight position to cover the high heat loss areas of the crotch, arm pits, neck; and (c) Tightening and gathering clothing to cover the above mentioned areas. These items are fully explained in the Cold Water Survival Pamphlet which is to be printed and distributed to all the Great Lakes Merchant Seamen. Question. Is accidental hypothermia a problem in cold weather and water environment? Answer. Yes, it is a common and serious problem which has been the subject of considerable study in recent years. It results from the rapid rate of cooling which occurs when the human body is immersed in cold water or is exposed to extremes of cold air in accidents ashore. Question. What studies have been made and what procedures developed to cope with this. Answer. "Treatment of Accidental Hypothermia: An Experimental Study of Inhalation Rewarming." A study and report done by Professor J. S. Hayward, A. M. Steinman, of the Department of Biology, University of Victoria under Coast Guard Contract and completed in June 1975. The methods and techniques. developed in that study are now being tested and refined by the Canadian Armed Services and the Australian Air Force. Question. I understand that the American Bureau of Shipping increased draft. marks for Lake vessels in 1973-with a reduction in freeboard. What adverse effect might this have had on vessel structural integrity? Answer. To be allowed an increased draft under the 1973 amendments to the Load Line Regulations a vessel had to meet the Federal Strength Standard at the new draft, the Standard being 10% or more greater than the A.B.S. standard for vessels over 710 feet in length. In that the strength standard is a factor of both length and depth, a greater requirement was imposed at a greater draft. This prohibited some vessels from obtaining a deeper draft and required other vessels to add strength members to obtain approval for the new drafts. Additionally vessels approved for the new drafts had to remove any square hatch corners, have single piece hatch covers, update all structures to meet the 1973 scantling requirements, and provide for the use of the master and mates an approved loading manual. The total effect actually improved the overall structural integrity of the vessels affected. Question. Are any regulations or plans under consideration for critical stress points of a vessel's hull? Answer. This problem is still under study through Coast Guard and ABS. sponsorship in the Society of Naval Architects and panels hull strength-i and hull strength-2 and through the studies sponsored by the Ship's Structure Committee.. No regulations are presently contemplated. Question. What lifesaving equipment regulations, if any, does the Coast Guard contemplate issuing for Great Lakes vessels? (See Federal Register for June 7,. 1976). Answer. The Coast Guard is considering proposing amendments to the regula- tions governing lifesaving equipment on vessels operating on the Great Lakes. PAGENO="0390" 386 The proposals under consideration include requirements concerning the following subjects: a. Lifeboat exposure protection. b. Lifeboat maneuverability. c. Survival craft availability. d. Launching of survival craft from stowed positions. e. Lifeboat capability to float free automatically from a sinking vessel. f. Personal exposure protection. g. Communications equipment on survival craft. h. Lights and reflectorized materials. i. Standards for equipment substituted for required equipment. Use of equipment proposed in this notice should improve chances for survival following a casualty requiring vessel abandonment. Question. What plans does the Coast Guard have for placing Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons aboard Great Lakes vessels? Answer. The Coast Guard is presently developing a portable battery operated EPIRB which will be suitable for storage and use in cold environments. The Coast Guard is also actively engaged with the FCC relating to frequency designa.. i~ions for those devices. Question. Is it feasible for all new Great Lakes ship designs to have crew quarters above the waterline? Above the main deck? I have been advised that when loaded some living spaces are below the waterline. Answer. Current construction regulations for Great Lakes vessels require the deck of the crews quarters to be above the deep load water line. This has been a specific point of review prior to allowing any increase in draft under the 1973 Load Line amendments. Since the period on new construction began with the designs of the Cort and the Blough in 1968, all new Great Lakes vessels have been designed with all the crews quarters above the weather deck. Question. Do all automated Light Stations have an emergency generator and/or battery-powered system as a backup? Answer. Yes. Question. What consideration has been given to additional watertight subdivi- sions for bulk Great Lakes freighters? (See Morreii Marine Board of Investigation.) Answer. The status of recommendation 9 made by the Marine Board of In- vestigation involving the Daniel J. Morrell regarding watertight integrity and subdivision is as follows: The development of subdivision requirements for cargo vessels, both dry cargo ships and tankships, was given consideration by the Coast Guard following the loss of the Morrell. Draft regulations were prepared for cargo vessels in 1970 and 1971. These draft regulations were carefully evaluated within the Coast Guard and discussed in relations to international application with the appropriate United States SOLAS Working Groups. On the basis of their evaluation and discussions and in light of the preparatory work being done for the 1973 Pollution Convention relative to subdivision further development work on these draft regulations was suspended. Emphasis was then placed on presenting the topic of subdivision requirements to the Joint U.S./Canadian Technical Committee for Great Lakes Load Lines. This committee was considering revisions for the updating of the 1935 Great Lakes Load Line Regulations. This portion of their work extended from 1969 to 1973. After careful evaluation of what little agreement could be obtained within this Committee, the Coast Guard felt that the partial requirements which could be imposed would not only be inadequate but would create a false sense of safety. Therefore, further efforts along this avenue of approach were suspended. Subdivision regulations for new tankships have been placed into effect by recent regulatory action. The regulations affect both ocean and Great Lakes tankships and tank barges. At the present time, the matter of subdivision for dry cargo ships is an item on the agenda of the IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision, Stability and Load Lines. No specific studies have been conducted into the possibility of altering existing Great Lakes vessels to provide subdivision. Question. What action has been taken to require mechanical disengaging ap.. paratus for lifeboats suspended from Great Lakes vessel davits? (See Bradley Marine Board of Investigation) Answer. 46 CFR 94.10-5(a)(4)(i), 46 CFR 33.lO-l5(a) and 46 CFR 75.10-5 (a)(6)(i) have been modified to require that each lifeboat on all Great Lakes vessels of over 3000 gross tons be fitted with mechanical disengaging apparatus. PAGENO="0391" 387 In accordance with 44 CFR 75.10-90 and 46 CFR 94.10-90 existing common hook installations may be continued in service so long as they are maintained in good condition for vessels contracted prior to May 26, 1965. However, all new installa- tions or major replacements shall meet the requirements of an approved mechanical disengaging apparatus constructed in accordance with Subpart 160.033 of Sub- chapter Q. Question.. Have you reviewed the five (5) principal recommendations of the 1959 Marine Board of Investigation into the foundering of the Steamer Bradle~j and, if so, can you advise to what extent they have been accomplished? Answer. Recommendation l.-The recommendation that all life preservers be provided with crotch straps to hold the jacket down on the body and with a collar to support the head out of the water was not concurred with by the Com- mandant of the Coast Guard. Leg or crotch straps are not considered desirable on approved life preservers because of the added complications and time element involved in donning and adjusting. Recommendation 2.-46 CFR 94.10-40(a) and 46 CFR 94.15-10(c)(3) have been modified to require two approved inflatable liferafts for every Great Lakes vessel of 300 gross tons and over, when crew, berthing, and/or working spaces are widely separated. The capacity and location of the liferafts shall be to the satis- faction of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection. Recommendation 3.-Please refer to my answer to the previous question. Recommendation 4.-46 CFR 94.20-15(a), 46 CFR 94.20-10(a), 46 CFR 33.15-10(a), and 46 CFR 75.20-15(a) have been modified to require two painters on all Great Lakes vessels. Recommendation 5.-46 CFR 94.20-10(a), 46 CFR 94.20-20(a), 46 CFR 94.20-15(hh), 46 CFR 94.20-25(n), 46 CFR 33.15-5(a), 46 CFR 33.15-15(a), 46 CFR 75.20-10(a) and 46 CFR 75.20-20(a) have been modified to require at least six red parachute type flare distress signals and the means to project them on each lifeboat and liferaft on Great Lakes vessels. Question. Have you reviewed the eleven (11) principal recommendations of the 1967 Marine Board of Investigation into the sinking of the Steamer Morreli, the Commandant's Action, and additional recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board and, if so, can you advise to what extent they have been implemented? Answer. The status of actions on the principal recommendations of the Morreil Board and the Commandant's Action is as follows: * Recommendations 1 and 2.-46 CFR 94.10-40(a) and 46 CFR 33.05-20(c) have been modified to require the forward and aft liferafts to be of the inflatable type and to provide for 100 percent capacity for Great Lakes cargo and tank vessels of 300 gross tons and over. Recommendation 3a.-Regulations as recommended have been implemented and a separate source of power close to the radio telephone and well above the water line is required for Great Lakes vessels. Recommendation 3b.-Requirement for an emergency radio with self-contained source of power was incorporated in the Great Lakes Radio Telephone Agree- ment between Canada and the United States. Recommendation 3c.-The U.S. Coast Guard promulgated rules and regulations on 18 March 1974 which required certain inspected vessels in ocean and coastwise service to carry an emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB). The Coast Guard has supported the use of EPIRB's for many years. However, it was * not until several major marine casualties occurred that opposition to the carriage of EPIRB equipment, principally from the U.S. Air Force who feared that the radio beacon might disrupt the use of 243 MKz as a military emergency channel, could be overcome. As a compromise measure it was necessary to limit the number of vessels which would be required to carry the radio beacon. It was determined that the device would be most beneficial to those vessels operating beyond the range of VHF radio distress coverage. Consequently the regulations did not extend to vessels transmitting the Great Lakes where VHF radio distress coverage is considered adequate. Recommendation 4.-A structural examination was made of all Great Lakes vessels constructed prior to 1948. Details of this special examination are on file at Commander Ninth Coast Guard District (mmt). (Report of Structural exami- nations of Great Lakes Bulk Carriers dated 21 June 1968). Recommendation 5.-Requiring the owner or operator of each Great Lakes Bulk Carrier to furnish the Master a loading manual which shows the effect of various loaded and ballasted conditions upon longitudinal bending moments including the effects of dynamic forces of free water in cargo holds has been PAGENO="0392" 388 implemented. All vessels built after January 1970 are required, as a condition of classification by the American Bureau of Shipping, to have a Loading Manual. Recommendation. Ga.-46 CFR 113.25 has been amended to require all Great Lakes freighters contracted for on or after November 19, 1952 to have an approved general alarm system as called for. Recommendation 6b.-No Coast Guard action has been taken to require separate sources of power at each end of the vessel for the general alarm. After the sinking of the Daniel J. Morreil, the Commandant reviewed the question of a general alarm system at each end of the vessel so that if the circuit should be broken due to a casualty, the forward and after general alarm could be operated independently. After review of this question, it was determined that the complications of the -system proposed were not engineeringly feasible. Recommendation 7.-46 CFR 97.15-20 (Hatches and other Openings) requires a vessel's Master to make his hatches watertight before leaving protected waters. Recommendation 8.-A 24 hour interval reporting system was initiated after -the sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell and remained in effect for approximately a three to four year period after which it was felt by the marine industry and the Coast Guard that it was not an effective system nor served its intended purpose. As the result of this, the program fell into disuse. Recommendation 9.-Action taken on this recommendation, which pertains to additional watertight subdivisions for bulk Great Lakes freighters, was discussed in my previous answer on that specific subject. Recommendation 10.-The National Weather Service (then the U.S. Weather Bureau) immediately initiated all the provisions of this recommendation into their marine weather broadcasts after the sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell. Recommendation 11.-Specifications require that signal pistols be constructed as recommended by the Board. Coast Guard field inspectors were advised to check signal pistols and a letter to manufacturers was sent advising manufacturers of a need to adequately secure screws joining the two major component groups -of many signal pistols. The status of actions on Recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board in the Morrell case is as follows: Recommendation A.-All Great Lakes vessels were examined to see that they were structurally sound, in all respects, for operation upon the Great Lakes. Those vessels found to have deficiencies were required to make permanent repairs prior to certification of the vessel, and in one instance a vessel was required to be taken out of service. A program was initiated to inspect 25 percent of the internals (double bottoms) -at each winter layup period. This would insure that at the end of the five-year -period when all internals (double bottoms) are required to be inspected, that we would have a structural history of the overall condition of the vessel's structural and nonstructural members. A program was initiated to inspect Great Lakes vessels in way of the cargo hatches, hatch comings, bounding angles, and stringers during the operating season to insure/detect that no cracks are propagated from these highly stressed -areas. Recommendation B.-Great Lakes vessels are inspected each year and only issued a Certificate of Inspection for a period of one year. Any deficiencies or -areas that require a special renewal program are brought to the owner's/operator's -attention at this time and appropriate plans are sbumitted to the Commander, Ninth Coast Guard District (mmt) for review. Question. I understand that your SLAR or side-looking airborne radar system provides radar images of ice on the Great Lakes on a near real-time basis-please -describe in laymen's terms how this system works? Answer. SLAR uses an elongated antenna and phased (vertical/horizontal polarity) electronic signals to produce radar images of high resolution, so high in fact, that a 1-inch ice edge is discernible out to the maximum detection range of the radar. A trained ice observer can readily recognize ice formations in the SLAR images. SLAR pictures show images out to 27 nautical miles on either side of the aircraft. A Coast Guard HC-130-B aircraft is equipped with SLAR. The -system works like this: 1. The aircraft transmits the electronic SLAR signal and receives the reflected echos. 2. While a photograph negative is being produced aboard the aircraft, the SLAR information is electronically beamed to the NOAA GOES satellite in a synchronous orbit about the earth. PAGENO="0393" 389 3. The satellite relays the SLAR information to a NASA receiver at Wallops Island, Virginia. The information is then transmitted to the Coast Guard Ice Navigation Center in Cleveland by telephone line. 4. At the Ice Navigation Center SLAR image pictures are produced from the signals. 5. Coast Guard Marine Science Technicians interpret the SLAR images and produce ice charts. 6. The ice charts are sent by facsimile recording equipment to a commercial marine radio station, several Coast Guard stations, other government agencies, and the Canadian Coast Guard. 7. Vessels may obtain the facsimile pictures from the commercial marine radio station broadcast or pick them up in person from a Coast Guard unit. It takes about three hours for the entire process to take place. Question. Can you furnish some representatives pictures with interpretative data for the record? Answer. Yes, attached are the following: 1. Figure 1: The presentation which is received from the aircraft via the GOES satellite. 2. Figure 2: A facsimile reproduction of the transmission from the aircraft (2a) and the ice chart (2b). 3. Figure 3: Photograph reproduction obtained from the aircraft after it has returned. Note: Figure 1 is not the same geographical location as figures 2 and 3. ~The figures were placed in the committee files.] Question. Does the Coast Guard Ice Navigation Center superimpose recom- mended routing or track lines on the SLAR image pictures? If not, why not-at least in an advisory capacity? Answer. No, we do not superimpose recommended routings on the SLAR pictures. Selection of courses for a particular voyage is a responsibility that belongs to the master of the vessel-and to him alone. It depends on weather (including predicted ice locations), vessel loading, handling characteristics, etc. Much of the information to do the job is snore readily available to the master than to Ice Navigation Center personnel, who, in addition, are not experienced in sailing lakers. Furthermore, SLAR images portray the situation as it was some 3 hours before. To select track lines one must predict where the ice will be when a vessel arrives in a given area. This depends on wind conditions and changes. Experienced masters of Great Lakes vessels are far better equipped to make the necessary assessments of future wind effects than our Ice Navigation Center Personnel. Instead of trying to recommend specific routings, we think it better to provide as much detailed information as possible to the master, including advice on how to interpret the SLAR images. We also provide interpreted ice chartlets for him. He can than add this information to other data he has, including personal observa- tion at the scene, and plan his voyage according to his experienced, professional assessment of the whole. Question. What other applications have been developed for SLAR that would contribute to safety of navigation? Answer. SLAR has some limitations as a search and detection device-primarily because it must be complemented by some other means to identify targets sighted. However, some applications besides ice imagery are being explored and some are in use. SLAR in used for iceberg detection by the Coast Guard's International Ice Patrol. Other possibilities being looked at are detection of small objects in the water, wide-path search to speed location of targets of all sizes and aerial surveillance. Question. To what degree does Loran-C now serve the Great Lakes? Answer. For all practical purposes Lora.n-C is not used on the Great Lakes. It is possible to get a line of position using sky-wave coverage from East Coast sta- tions, but until very recently there were no charts a vessel could use. Even now the charts are of such a scale as to he useful only for general positioning. To my knowledge, very few of the "lakers" have Loran-C receivers aboard. Some of the salt water vessels do have them but I do not know the extent to which they use them in the Great Lakes area. Question. What is the status of planning for the Minnesota Station which is essential to complete Loran-C coverage for the Lakes? Answer. We are proceeding with site selection and preliminary planning in anticipation of future appropriations. We expect to have the station on the air in 1980. PAGENO="0394" 390 Question. Once fully operational, will any existing aids become obsolete-such~ as radiobeacons? Answer. No. We will have to continue existing aids such as radiobeacons for users who do not have or cannot afford Loran-C. I expect the primary users of radiobeacons will be recreational boaters eventually. Hopefully, the complexity* of the radiobeacon system can be reduced. After Loran-C has proved itself with commercial vessels, we would like to replace long range and sequenced radio- beacons with marker beacons. I am sure that major vessels will all use Loran-C' eventually. Of course normal audio-visual aids such as buoys and lights will continue in use. Question. What other applications are contemplated for the Loran-C system?* Answer. A large number of miscellaneous uses for Loran-C are planned for or' under consideration. The following are some examples: 1. Offshore Helicopter Navigation to Oil Rigs, etc. 2. Overland Aircraft Uses. Forestry Service-(Firefighting).-__Men on ground with a light portable receiver' retransmit LC signal so aircraft can rendevous with ground crews in remote areas. Also, firefighters can be airdropped with accuracy within a few feet. Department of Agriculture-To maintain spray patterns for pest control. FAA.-Area navigation, point to point, for aircraft and non-precision terminal' approach navigation. 3. Vehicle tracking.-Police cars, ambulances, etc. Control vehicles by retrans- mitting LC signal every 30 seconds. UMTA.-Keep track of buses, routes, and schedules. FRA.-Keep track of boxcars. New York State.-Develop reference system on rural roads. The state was planning to establish 0.1 miles sign. LC grid saves this cost. Tracking of vehicles carrying dangerous or precious cargo. 4. Census Bureau.-Use in developing demographic grids of various kinds.' Question. What attention has been given to the development of an automatic' vessel position-reporting system using Loran-C? Answer. As I mentioned in my discussion of other potential uses of Loran C, it can be used for vehicle tracking. The same basic principle could be used for' keeping track of vessel positions within the Great Lakes. Except for being aware' of the potential to meet some future perceived need, little attention has been devoted to this application of Loran C in the Great Lakes. Except during iceS season, when information on vessel progress is essential to planning icebreaker operations, a general position reporting system for vessels on the Great Lakes would be of questionable value, considering the excellent communications available' when needed and the staggering load that would be added to the communications. net by such a system. Question. Would not such a system reduce the dependence on voice radio reporting? Answer. Such a system would reduce dependence on voice reporting, but that would not be all good. It would substitute for voice reporting a heavy load of data reporting. It would also require separate frequency allocation and other technical coordination and clearances on an international level. Voice reporting now is limited to special situations in specific areas and to winter operations (when relatively few vessels are operating) so the reduction from present practice would not be significant. At present the benefits do not warrant the cost and complica- tions. Question. Can you estimate what impact a vessel reporting system would have on Coast Guard resources? Answer. Not in any meaningful way. Resource requirements depend on the' nature of the system that may be selected, and we have not yet really addressed that in any specific way. Question. What is Mini-Loran? Answer. Mini-Loran is, as its name implies, a miniature version of a coastal' Loran-C electronic navigation system. Because the "mini" system is intended for' use in restricted navigating areas such as the St. Marys River, it must provide' much more accurate positioning data than a coastal system. does. In the St. Marys River, for example, we are striving for a positioning accuracy of better than 25 feet as compared to the 50 yard accuracy generally accepted as "good enough" for the coastal system. This is achieved by strategically locating a master station and its secondary stations to provide optimum geographical relationships for near- right angle crossing of lines of position. Because they cover a very small geographic- PAGENO="0395" 391 area, the "mini" system transmitters can be of much lower power (and cost) than *for a conventional system. This small geographic area of coverage is also what makes the higher degree of accuracy possible because it permits optimal crossing angles of lines of position throughout the coverage area and reduces the oppor- tunity for signal distortion by terrain and atmospheric conditions. The USER equipment being designed for use with this system will provide the following information to a ship master: position quality, off track distance in feet R or L, cross track speed in feet per second, attitude to track in degrees R or L, present track heading in degrees true, next track heading in degrees true, miles to next turn, along track speed in miles per hour, time to next turn in hours, minutes, and seconds, and lead distance in feet. Question. How succ~ssfulhas the pilot installation been? Answer. Sofar we have been very encouraged by the few test runs we have made using rather basic first generation equipment. The signals are very stable and h ave produced aCcuracies even better than expected in some reacheS of the St. Marys River. I am confident the system will be very successful once we get all the "bugs" out. Question. What is the status of user e4uipment? Answer. The:;USER-_II system, commercially developed under Coast Guard contract, has recently arrived at Sault Ste. Marie. It will be installed in CGC Nastgatitcls, which will navigate the St. Marys River using the USER-TI system. The USER-I system, used to develop calibration information for the river, will remain installed in Nauqatuck to provide additional and comparative data for evaluating both systems.' We hope to evaluate USER-Il on board a commercial vessel this fall and to receive additional user imput to design needs. Question. What other areas are likely subjects for Mini-Loran systems? Answer. In the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway region, the only other areas that are worthy of consideration for Mini-Loran are the Seaway itself and the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers. We do expect it to have considerable application in other parts of the country, however-in navigation areas whose problems are similar to those of the St. Marys River. Question. Is this user equipment compatible with standard Loran-C receivers? Answer. This is one of the design criteria we established at the very beginning of the project-and someday it will be so. At present, however, not all Loran-C receivers are capable of the fine resolution needed to produce the accuracy required to take full advantage of Mini-Loran's capabilities. Recievers capable of full tie-in with Mini-Loran User equipment can be used to navigate anywhere in the Loran-C coverage area, however, The solution for the near future is for vessels, such as lakers, which operate regularly in a Mini-Loran coverage area, such as the St. Marys River, to install receivers capable of using the Mini-Loran signals. Those making occasional passages will have to rely on normal audio visual aids complemented by regular Loran-C. Later, we hope to be able to use portable equip- ment, installed for the voyage, for these vessels-until Mini-Loran is more common and they have receivers installed that can work with the USER device. Question. Would a "salty" coming into the Lakes be able to "plug" his standard Loran-C receiver into the Mini-Loran system? Answer. That, too, was a basic design criteria of the system. As explained in my answer to the previous question, where vessels have receivers of required capability, they will be able to "plug in" to the USER equipment. Transient vessels would have portable USER equipment which they would use only for the particular voyage. Question. We have asked questions (or will) relating to Loran-C, Mini-Loran, and SLAR-as aids to navigation and as possible integral parts of a Vessel Traffic Control System-will you briefly describe the component parts of the St. Mary's River Control System? Answer. The regulations regarding navigation of the St. Marys basically provide for a manned vessel traffic control service which includes bridge to bridge radio- telephone (Great Lakes Radio Agreement, 1973), speed limits, anchorage regula- tions, traffic separation (around Neebish Island), vessel movement reporting and limited surveillance. The Captain of the Port operates the service from a control center at Sault Ste. Marie. Vessels report in and receive appropriate directions via VHF-FM radio telephone. Surveillance is conducted with a low light level, closed-circuit television camera located at Mission Point in Little Rapids Cut and with a manned lookout station at Rock Cut in West Neebish Channel. The primary purpose of the surveillance is to monitor visibility and ice conditions in PAGENO="0396" 392 the river. The secondary purpose is to monitor vessel passages and speeds. Vessel speeds are also checked by mobile teams with radar. Vessels and boats are available for use in controlling traffic, if required. Equipment now under evaluation includes Mini-Loran-C and remote visibi1ity-moni~oring equipment. Question. What is your authority for this operation? Answer. Anchorage and Navigation Rcgulations; St. Marys River Michigan (33 CFR 92) are issued under the authority of 33 USC 474 (Anchorage and General Regulations for St. Marys River.) Question. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 would authorize the Coast Guard to "control vessel traffic in areas. . . especially hazardous, or under conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather . . . etc.". Have you considered applying this authority to situations like those that beset the Fitzgerald? Answer. Yes, I have considered it and I have generally concluded it to be un- warranted and impracticable. There is a variation of the idea, however, to which I am giving serious thought. That is the feasibility of working with the National Weather Service to develop a large craft advisory system along the lines of the small craft warnings that have been issued for years. The present storm warning system may suffice for this purpose, however. Que3tion. Have you consulted with representatives of marine industry, etc., with regard to such an exercise of authority? Answer. Only in a very general and preliminary way-and only as regards the large craft advisory idea. [Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]