PAGENO="0001" t~q ~ REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOiY U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS AUGUST 3, 4; SEPTEMBER 27; OCTOBEI~ 6, 12, 13, 19, 20, 1977; MARCH 21, 22; APRIL 4, 1978 [No. 71] Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology U.S. GOVEENHENT PRINTING OFFICE 96-205 WASHINGTON: 1978 PAGENO="0002" COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OLIN E. TRAGTJE, Texas, Chairman DON FUQUA, Florida WALTER FLOWERS, Alabama ROBEIIT A. ROE, New Jersey MIKE MCCOIIMACK, Washington GEORGE E. BROWN, Ja., California DALE MILFORD, Texas RAY THORNTON, Arkansas JAMES H. SCHEIIER, New York RICHARD L. OTTINGER, New York TOM HARKIN, Iowa JIM LLOYD, California JEROME A. AMBRO, New York ROBERT (BOB) KRUEOER, Texas MARILYN LLOYD, Tennessee JAMES J. BLANCHARD, Michigan TIMOTHY E. WIRTIX, Colorado STEPHEN I.. NEAL, North Carolina THOMAS J. DOWNEY, New York DOUG WALGREN, Pennsylvania RONNIE G. FLIPPO, Alabama DAN GLICKMAN, Kansas BOB GAMMAGE, Texas ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California ALBERT GORE, Ja., Tennessee WES WATKINS, Oklahoma ROBERT A. YOUNG, Missouri DON FIJQUA, Florida TOM HARKIN, Iowa ROBERT (BOB) KRUEGER, Texas RONNIE G. FLIPPO, Alabama MIKE McCORMACK, Washington GEORGE E. BROWN, Ja., California JOHN W. WYDLER, Ja., New York LARRY WINN, JL, Kansas LOUIS FREY, Ja., Florida BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR., CalIfornia GARY A. MYERS, Pennsylvania HAMILTON FISH, JR., New York MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico CARL D. PURSELL, Michigan HAROLD C. HOLLENBECK, New Jersey ELDON RTJDD, Arizona ROBERT K. DORNAN, California ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey CHARLES A. Mosnnn, Eweoutive Director HAROLD A. GoULD, Deputy Director PisILIP B. YisAosa, Counsel JAMES B. WILSoN, Technical Consultant WILLIAM G. WELLS, Jr., Technical Consultant RALPH N~ READ, Technical Consultant ROBERT C. KETCHAM, Counsel Josi n P. ANDELIN, Jr., Ecience Consultant JAMEs W. SPENSLET, Counsel REGINA A. DAvIs, Chief Clerk PAUL A. VANDER Mrnz, Minority $taff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY RAY THORNTON,' Arkansas, Chairman HAROLD C. HOLLENBECK, New Jersey ROBERT K. DORNAN, California MANUAL LUJAN, Ja., New Maxico (II) PAGENO="0003" CONTENTS WITNESSES August 3, 1977: Page Dr. Melvin Kranzberg, professor of the history of technology, head; Department of Social Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technology____ 4 Walter A. Hahn, chairman, International Society for Technology Assessment and Senior Specialist in Science and Technololgy, Con- gressional Research Service, Library of Congress Dr. Vary Coates, associate director for the program on policy studies in science and technology of George Washington University, Wash- ington, D.C 112 August 4, 1977: Dr. Daniel DeSimone, Acting Director, Office of Technology Assess- ment: accompanle4 by Tom McGurn, administrative officer, and Joseph Coates 134 September 27, 1977: Emilio Q. Daddarlo, president, American Association for the Advance- ment of Science 177 October 6, 1977: Hon. Larry Wlnn, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Kansas 205 Hon. Marjorie S. Holt, a Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland 214 Charle A. Mosher, Executive Director, Science and Technology Corn- mittee staff 222 October 12, 1977: Hon. Gilbert Gude, Director, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress - 245 Dr. Jack T. Sanderson, Assistant Director for Research Applications, National Science Foundation; accompanied by Dr. Joshua Menkes, Division Director, Division of Exploratory Research and Systems Analysis, National Science Foundation -._ 271 October 13, 1977: Daniel De Simone, Deputy Director, Office of Technology Assessment_ 281 Don E. Kash, director, science and public policy program, the Univer- sity of Oklahoma 321 AFTERNOON SEssIoN Elmer B. Staats, Oomptroller General of the United States 366 October 19, 1977: Dr. Edward Wenk, Jr., vice chairman, Technology Assessment Ad- visory Council, and professor of Engineering and Public Affairs, University of Washington 412 October 20, 1977: Jerome B. Wiesner, chairman, Technology Assessment Advisory Coun- cil, president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 443 March 21, 1978: Emillo Q. Daddarte, chairman of American Association for the Advancement of Science 465 March 22, 1978: Hon. Morris K. Udall, a Representative In Congress from the 2nd Con- gressIonal District of the State of Arizona and a member of the Tech- nology Assessment Board 490 Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Technology Assessment Board (III) PAGENO="0004" Iv March 22, 1978-ContinUed Dr. Lewis M, Branscomb, vice president and chief scientist, Interna- Page tional Business Machines Corp 522 Dr. Harvey Brooks, Benjamin Peiree professor of technology and public policy, Harvard University 551 April 4, 1978: Hon. John W. Wydler, a Representative In Congress from the 5th Con- gressional District of the State of New York, and member, Tech- nology Assessment Board Dr. Russell Peterson, Director, Office of Technology Assessment 575 Dr. John T. McAlister, Jr., member Technology Assessment Advisory Oouncil and director, Center for Technology Assessment and Re- source Policy, Stanford University .-~ 614 APPENDICES A. Additional Statements Submitted for the Reco1~d_ 623 B. Answers to Supplemental Questions Submitted to Witnesses 634 0, ~Tews Reports Dealing~ With OTA Assessments 696 D. Communications Received - 721 E. Memorandum on OTA. Assessments Mandated by Law 725 PAGENO="0005" REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT W]~DN~SDAY, AtIGtTST 3, 1977 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, StBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, Wa$hi'ngton, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:35 a.m., in rooi~i 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ray Thornton (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Present: Representatives Thornton (presiding), Brown, and Hollenbeck. Also present: Philip B. Yeager, counsel and John D. Hoimfeld, science policy consultant. Mr. THORNTON. Good morning. Today we open hearings on tech- nology assessment and the role of the Office of Technology Assessment. Our purpose hi these hearings is to review OTA's organic act and determine if it needs alteration based on OTA's experience thus far. To do this we need to inquire into the concept of technology assess- ment as used in the work of Congress and how the office established to assist the committees of the Congress in this field is discharging the duties assigned to it. Without objection, I have a formal opening statement which I will make a part of the record at this point as though I had given it in its entirety. ~The prepared statement follows :~ STATEMENT OF HON. RAY THoIu~To~, CHAIRMAN. SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY I am pleased to call to order today our opening hearing on technology as- sessment and the role of the Office of Technology Assessment. The cardinal rea- son ~or these hearings is to review OTA's organic Act and determine if it needs alteration based on OPA's experience thus far. To do this we need to 1n~nire into the concept of technology assessment as used in the work of Congress and how the office established to assist the committees of the Congress in this field is discharging the duties assigned to it. We are entering these hearings under the mandate expressed by the Chair. man of the full Science and Technology Committee, Mr. Teague. In hl~ report to the OTA Board submitted at the conclusion of his term as Chairman for the 94th Congress, Mr. Teague noted: "In considering the basic Act, we shall need to determine (`a) what changes may be in order and (b) whether they can better be effected with legislative revision or without such revision." Technology assessment as a concept goes back almost 10 years. In the post- war years it became increasingly evident that technology was becoming `a major and pervasive factor In our national life. Its effects both directly in terms of improved transportation, communications, housing, etc., as well as its Indirect effects, in terms of pollution, and Its general Impact on the style of life, work and leisure, was major. (1) PAGENO="0006" 2 To deal with these questions, the Science and Technology Committee began, as early as 1969, to hold a series of hearings which were supported by In-depth studies performed by both the Committee and by outside organizations, such as the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. ~These activities led, just ~5 years ago to the passage by the Congress of the 1Technology Assessment Act of 1972. Under this Act an Independent agency re- porting only to the Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment, was estab- ilished. Until very recently the Office was headed by a former colleague of ours in the Rouse, and, in fact, a former Chairman of this Subcommittee, our friend Emilio Q. Daddario. I take pleasure In using this opportunity to pay tribute to "Mliii" for his legislative leadership in bringing about the establishment of the OTA and for his dedicated directorship of the OTA Itself during the crucial early years of Its life. During these hearings we will examine how well the pi~oviSions of the Tech- nology Assessment Act have served the Congress. While we have no predisposi- tion that the Act may need amendment, we will have an open mind about possible changes which can serve to Improve the functioning of the OTA. We are aware that several studios of the OTA have been made, and that some of these have been critical of one or another aspects of the Office. I believe that we should look at any suggestions for improvement as constructive In intent, and I hope that our entire hearing will be aimed at making the Office and the Congress do a better job for the American people. rrbe hearings will be divided Into several parts. Today and tomorrow will con- stitute a short opening series ~,lmed at obtaining an overview of the concept and scope of technology assessment and acquiring basic data a~d information about the Office as it has developed so far. Following the August receSs we Intend to go into a more detailed examination of the functiorUng of the Officö including its major components such as the Technology Assessment Board, the Director's Office and the Technology Assessment Advisory CounciL Finally, I should make a comment about what technology assessment is. We will be hearing a variety of different definitions and versions in the days ahead-and it must be acknowledged from the start that there are many dif- ferent concepts and Ideas of this phrase. For our purposes, at least for the present, we will rely on the statute which reads as follows: Technology assessment Is a "means for securing competent, unbiased infor- mation concerning the physical, biological, economic, social, and political effects" of technological applications. Also that the function of technology assessment, Is "to provide early Indications, of the probable beneficial and adverse im- pacts of the applications of technology and to develop other coordinate infor~ mation which may assist the Congress." I welcome our witnesses today, each of whom has accepted our Invitation on comparatively short notice, They are distinguished experts In their field, and they have, each from his or her own perspective, a. strong interest in tech- nology assessment. We look forward to their testimony. Mr. ThORNTON. I do, want to summarize very briefly by saying that we are entering these hearings under the mandate expressed by th~ chairman of the full Science and Technology Committee, Mr. Teague. In his report to the OTA Board submitted at the conclu- siori of his term as chairman for the 94th Congress, Mr. Teague noted: In considering the Basic Act, we shall need to determine (a) what changes may be in order and (b) whether they can be better effected with legislative revision or without such revision. These hearings are going to be divided into several parts. Today and tomorrow will constitute a short opening series aimed at obtain- ing'an overview of the concept and scope of technology assessment and acquiring basic data and information about `the `office as it has developed so far. Then following the August recess, we intend to go into a more detailed examination of the functioning, of the office, in- PAGENO="0007" 3 eluding its major components such as the Technology Assessment Board, the Director's office and the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. I welcome our witnesses today, each of whom has accepted our in- vitation on comparatively short notice, and the renewed invitation to get here at an earlier hour on even shorter notice. I appreciate your meeting the schedule difficulties which we have. We are beginning a session of the House today at 10 o'clock discussing the energy bill. And while `it might be possible to gain the unanimous consent necessary to conduct hearings simultaneously, I did not want to risk the possi- bility that someone might object to that request and thereby frustrate the first of these hearings. Each of you is a distinguished expert in your field. And each has a prospective and strong interest in technology assessments which we would like to have brought to our attention. We are looking forward to your testimony. Our witnesses this morning are Dr. Melvin Kranzberg who is Call- away Professor of the History of Technology of the Department of Social Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technology; Mr. Walter A. Hahn, past president and chairman of the board of directors, Inter- national Society for Technology Assessment2 and Dr. Vary T. Coates, associate director, program on policy studies in science and technology, George Washington University. Each ~f you is welcome and at this time, Dr. Kranzberg, I would like to ask you to begin. [A biographical sketch of Dr. Kranz'berg follows:] Du. MELVIN KRANZBERG Melvin Kranzberg (born St. Louis, Mo., 1~17) received his LB. from Amherst College, 1938, and his M.A., 1939, and Ph. D., 1942, from Harvard University. He has received honorary degrees from Denison University, Newark `College of Engineering (now New Jersey Institute of Technology), and Northern Michigan University. Dr. Kranzberg's major professional contribution has been the establishment and development of a new field of history: the history of technology. He is the principal founder of the Society for the History of Technology and editor of its quarterly journal, "Technology and Culture." He was also instrumental in initiat- ing the International Cooperation in History of Technology Committee, and has been Vice-President of that international organization since 1968. In addition to books in European history, "The Siege of Paris, 1870-71" [Cornell, 1950; reprinted hardbound, Greenwood Press, 1970] and "1848: A Turn- ing Point?" [D.C. Health, 1959, 12th printing, 1971], Dr. Kranzberg is co-editor of the two-volume "Technology in Western Civilization" (Oxford, 1967). In 1972, Scbocken Books published "Technology and `Culture: An Anthology," co-edited with William H. Davenport; this collection was published (1975) In the paper- bound Meridian Series of New American Library. In 1975, G. P. Putnam's pub- lished "By the Sweat of Thy Brow: Work in the Western World," written with Joseph Gies, former Technology Editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. This book, the August 1975 selection of the Fortune Book Club, was published as a Capricorn paperbound (1976) and in an Italian tranSlation (1976) as "Breve storm del lavoro." The "Technology and Culture" anthology was published In Arabic (1976), and the second volume of Technology in Western Oi'villzation was translated into Japanese (1976). In addition, Dr. Kranzberg is the author of numerous papers and articles in encyclopedias and scholarly journals on `engiOeer- ing education, European history, and the history of science and technology. `Scheduled for publication in 1977 (San Francisco Press) is Patrick Kelly and Melvin Kranzburg, eds., "Technological Innovation: A ~ritlc'al Review of Cur- rent Knowledge." PAGENO="0008" 4 Dr. Kranzberg has served as Vice-President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and Chairman of its Section L (History and Philoso- phy of Science). He is former Chairman of the Humanistic-Social Division of the American Society for Engineering Education and former Chairman of the His- torical Advisory Committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Admirnstra- tion. In addition, he has been Vice-President of the Society for French Historical Studies, and `Chairman of the United States National Committee of the Inter- national Union of the Histoi-y and Philosophy of Science. Dr. Kranzberg has served on the Technology Assessment Panel of the National Academy of Sciences and on the Academy's Committee on the Survey of Materials Science and En- gineering. He remains a member of the NASA Historical Advisory Committee and also serves on the Advisory Committee of the Program of Science, Technology, and Human Values of the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 1977, Dr. Kranzberg was appointed chairman of the Advisory Panel of the Division Of Policy Research and Analysis of the National Science Foundation. Before coming to Case Institute of Technology (1952), Dr. Kranzberg taught at Harvard, Stevens Institute, and Amherst. He directed the Graduate Program in the History of Science and Technology at Case Western Reserve University, the first graduate program specifically involving the history of technology at any American university. In 1972, he became Callaway Professor of the History of Technology at Georgia Institute of Technology. Dr. Kranzberg is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and is on the National Board of Directors of Sigma Xi. He has been awarded the Leonardo da Vinci Medal of the Society for the History of Technology. Most recently, Dr. Kranzberg is the sole nominee for the office of President- Elect (1978) of Sigma Xi. STATEMENT OP DR. MELVIN KRANZBERG, CALLAWAY PROFESSOR 01? THE HISTORY OP TECHNOLOGY, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OP TECHNOLOGY * Dr. KRANZBERG. Mr. Thornton, I am flattered and honored to be here, for I am just a "ramblin' wreck from Georgia Tedh" and not even an engineer. For most of human history, technology changed very slowly. The vast bulk of mankind lived on farms; the hearth and home were the center of production and of all life: Work, education, health, and en- tertainment. Sons pursued the same occupations as their fathers, tilling the soil in the same, age-old ways. Nobody had to give serious thought to the impact of technology because technological and social change occurred at a snail's pace. The industrial revolution changed all that. The self-sufficiency of the agrarian village gave way to the close- linked interdependence of individuals in a modern factory setting. In- dustrialization revolutionized how and where people lived, worked, played, and prayed. It speeded up technological change and accelerated social change, Technologies are. interdependent and increase men's dependency upon one another and upon technology itself. As a result of this inter- dependence, perturbations in one element of the system can bring about almost disastrous consequences in other parts of the system. Thus, an electrical failure in New York City can tear apart the social fabric of America. Political events in the Middle East can affect petroleum prices, raise the cost of fertilizer and irrigation, and hence bring near starvation to many less-developed nations, In addition, there are problems of scale. One example will suffice. Exhaust emissions from a few automobiles pose no great threat to the PAGENO="0009" 0 salubrity of the air. But automobile smog is a threshold phenomenon, and when there are thousands of automobiles, their exhaust fumes can no longer be safely dissipated in to the atmosphere. Thus, at the turn of the century, automobiles were hailed as a solu- tion to the pollution, congestion, and safety problems posed by horse- drawn transportation. That was a time when in New York City alone horses deposited some 9,500,000 pounds of manure and 60,000 gallons of urine in one day. But as we know, pollution, congestion, and safety problems have returned again in altered form as a result of the wide- spread use of the automobile. Another reason for the deepening impact of technology upon our lives and society is that several technologies coming together and inter- acting with other elements of society produce widespread social effects which do not seem inherent in the separate technologies themselves. A series of technical developments can thus have synergistic social effects. For example, a series of technological changes are intimately bound lip with the black revolution in today's America. The development of the mechanical cottonpicker deprived the Negro fleldhand of his liveli- hood. There was no longer place or need for unskilled labor on South- ern farms, so a vast migration of blacks flowed from Southern rural regions to Northern cities. Between 1940 and 1970, some 4.4 million blacks left the South. But the black migrant to the Northern industrial centers was again the victim of advancing technology, for he could find no place in today's sophisticated technology. In the 1950's and 1960's we saw a new phenomenon in Western his- tory; large-scale unemployment while thousands of jobs went begging. There was simply no match between the openings requiring highly skilled workmen, and the available labor supply. Compounding the frustrations of the blacks was another miracle of modern technology, the television set. Into the shabby living rooms of the Negro relief client were piped the dreams and sugar-coated reali- ties of our affluent society. He was invited to spend hours watching how good life was-for everybody else-and hearing about products which everyone seemed able to buy, except him. For the first time in history, the disinherited could see the affluence `of the wealthy inti- mately, with immediate perception of what they were missing. They wanted to partake of the great outpouring of goods which advancing technology had made possible and yet they were denied all legal and socially accepted means to obtain them. And so we packaged wealth and privilege for television, We dis- played it publicly to the poor and nonprivileged whom we barred from the system. Then we wondered why they rioted and looted. This sad history, whose social repercussions are still working them- selves out, illustrates the wide-ranging reactions of technology with many different elements of our social environment. It demonstrates too the difficulties of evaluating long-range social consequence's when a cluster of technical developments interact with other social forces. Some opposition to technical advances appeared almost from the beginning of industrialization. The Luddite protest, for example, be- came symbolic of worker opposition to the machines. And then there was the literary protest by the 19th century romantics who saw only PAGENO="0010" 6 the horrors of the factory system, the uglification of towns, and the dis- regard for human values of the blinder proponents of laissez-faire in- dustrialism. Some, like William Morris and John Ruskin, wished to return to the handcraft technology of "Ye Olde Merrie Englande," a return to a simpler mediaeval past which seemed rosy and romantic in retrospect but which had never existed in actuality. Contemporaneously with them was Karl Marx, who might be re- garded as one of the early practitioners of technology assessment for he realized that technology had profound social and cultural ramiflca- tions. His assessment foresaw-incorrectly, as it proved-the im- poverishment of the workers in capitalist society and a class polariza- tion which would ultimately lead to warfare and the destruction of bourgeois capitalist society. Today we still have some questioning of technology arising from these older roots, the romantic longing for a nonexistent past and from the socialist critique of capitalistic society. But the most serious chal- lenge to modern industrial society arose with the mechanized slaugh- ter of World War I and the ensuing depression. Two things emerged. First the humanistic critique of technology: the modern novel, the con- temporary drama~ and much of today's poetry have as an insistent theme that man has become the victim of a dehumanizing technology. Second, there was the social criticism, namely, that technological advance was not really doing very much to benefit society. By the 1970's the denial of technology's worth had been taken up by the so- called counter culture. Authors like Theodore Roszak, Charles Reich, and the late Paul Goodman urged their young readers to turn their backs on modern technology. They claimed, as had social critics such as Lewis Mumford and Jacques Ellul, that engineering imperatives of efficiency and economy were taking precedence over humanistic values, ethical considerations and aesthetic concerns. Such generalized indictments of modern society are perhaps too grandiose to be called technology assessment. They provide no sys- tematic analysis of specific technologies nor do they offer any guidance to policymakers. Nevertheless, by raising basic questions about the benefits of technology to mankind, they prepared the public for some kind of governmental action in guiding future technological advance. But events had already been moving in that direction for over a century. The Enlightenment philosophy, which helped give birth to the American Revolution and, later, to the French Revolution had stated that government should be directed at the welfare of all citizens, not just an aristocratic elite. This notion had been fortified by the doctrine of utilitarianism, which stressed "The greatest good for the greatest number." Thus, through the enlargement of the franchise and the growing democratization of society during the 19th century, larger numbers of the population began making their voices heard in govern- ment and demanding public attention to their needs. Viewed in this light, today's technology assessment becomes an- other step in governmental intervention for the common good. Besides, almost from the beginnings of industrialization some prac- tical measures had to be taken to meet abuses resulting from some unanticipated impacts of technical advance. One example was the factory legislation in 19th century Britain in response to the abuse PAGENO="0011" 7 of child and women labor in the early factory system and in the coal mines. Today's analytical approach to technology assessment was antici- pated by the American Government's response to the disasters caused by bursting boilers on river steamboats. Since nobody knew the exact reason for the boiler explosions, the first order of business was to investigate the cause. So, in 1830 the Government made its first techni- cal research grant, employing the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia to investigate the cause of the explosions. The. institute presented its report and made detailed recommendations for legislation which finally led to the Federal regulatory power being employed to do away with some harmful and unanticipated effects of technology. This was but the first of many such interventions. No longer was Government to be merely a passive policeman as the classical eco- nomists had insisted; instead, the Government was increasingly `be- coming a service institution, providing roads, education, and multi- tudes of other services to the people. Not the least among those serv- ices was protection of the public from technical developments which gave rise to unexpected "disbenefits." The role of the `Government in pesticide regulation is particularly instructive in this regard because it also illustrates another trend, an enlargement of the "public" which the Government was endeavoring' to protect and serve. `The first Federal legislation in pesticides was to protect the farmer from being bilked by pesticide manufacturers; then the protection of the Federal Government was extended to the public, which ate the food sprayed by pesticides. Then by banning DDT, the Govern- ment began extending its protection to birds and fishes as well as human beings. So, looking at it another way, we find that the Govern- ment of the United State's has broadened its concern to include the welfare of all the inhabitants of our land-birds, bees, animals, and' fishes, as well as that peculiar animal, man. Similarly, legislatrnn to protect the physical environment repre- sents an extension of the Government concern not only for today's Americans but for future generations as well. Up until recently most governmental interventions into the free market for technological advance were designed to meet specific ~prob- lems or deal with very concrete and noticeable abuses. There were, however, two major attempts in the past 50 years to develop a gen- eralized approach to problems of second- and third-order impact. The `first was the Temporary National `Economic Committee (TNEC) whose 1937 report "Technological Trends and National Policy" grew out of the Great IDepre'ssion and the fear that increasing machine technology was responsible for `millions of unemployed and destitute people. The second major study of this nature came almost three decades later: President Johnson's Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress. It too was triggered by an economic turndown and by fears that the inroads of automation would brinp~ America again into a period of protracted unemployment and social distress. Neither the TNEC nor the Johnson Commission had any lasting effect, These large-scale studies were "Qne.-shot" deals, undertaken in response to what was perceived as a crisis caused by mounting or PAGENO="0012" 8 continued unemployment. When the particular crisis subsided, the anvestigations seemed irrelevant. Nevertheless, concern for technology's interaction with society re- inarned and by the mid-1960's it became a matter of paramount con- cern. Why? Another crisis. This time it was not an economic crisis but one of values. The combined impact and coincidence of the war in Vietnam, the civil rights movement, and the belated aftermath of World War II on morals and ideals led to a questioning of-and dis- enchantment with-American life and the "American dream." Since so much of the American way of life and hopes fOr the future are bound up with technology, this disenchantment helped precipitate the technology assessment movement. Now, let us look at this disenchantment a little more closely. When our grandfathers in the year 1900 peered into the future, they were filled with confidence and optimism about the century to come, for the advance of science and technology held forth great promise for the future. They saw the prospect of a world where poverty had ended, where democratic society had spread the bless- ings of liberty and equality to all mankind, where machines were to perform all wearisome toil so that men `could Jive in leisure, where universal education had blotted out all traces of ignorance and super- stition, and where international peace and brotherhood reigned. In many respects, the promise of the 20th century has been fulfilled. Technical triumphs there have been aplenty. But we have not yet reached the material utopia envisioned at the beginning of the century. Instead, every step we take along the way makes us as if we were running madly on a gilded treadmill. We find ourselves baffled by a series of paradoxes. Who would have thought that this Nation of presumably unlimited resources, glorying in the enormons treasure that we extracted from the Earth, would not be concerned by the profligate squandering of its treasury? Who would have thought that "America the Beautiful" would be pockmarked by the rash of nrban blight, the ugly scars of strip mining and the varicose arteries of the freeways? Who would have thought that our cities would become so large as to become virtually unmanageable, our traffic so heavy we might find it quicker to walk than to drive, and the right to drive itself threatened by political events in far-off places? Not that technology is to blame for all the problems which beset us~ but the point is that our technology has become so inextricably inter- twined with `both the dreams and realities of American life that it shared the general questioning of values and institutions. The basic question was : What went wrong? The way in which we employed our technology became part of the answer to that question. However~ technology is part of the solution as well as the problem- and this meant that technology assessment became part of the answer to the next question: What can we do about it? The first* ~uestion therefore is, What went wrong? and. the second question is, What can we do about it? in response to mounting public concern over some `highly publicized harmful byproducts of technical developments, the 1-louse Subcommit- tee on Science, Research and Development headed by Representative PAGENO="0013" 9 Emilio Q. Daddario, instituted a Series of hearings in the late 1960's entitled "Technology Assessment Seminars" and commissioned studies* of the problem. Daddario's subcommittee was aware that previous technology assess- ments had been limited in scope, fragmented in nature, and tardy in application. In cases such as thalidomide or DDT, the Government had failed to foresee or act in advance; instead, Federal agencies merely reacted to public pressures limited to specific matters. The su'b~ committee's purpose was to see if it were possible to achieve a legisla- tive capability for policy determination in science and technology that would be anticipatory and adaptive rather than reactionary and symptomatic. In the meantime, public pressures were mounting further, Three magic words, with a congeries of meanings, describe these pressures: environmentalism, consumerism, accountability. The public began to demand that scientists, engineers, corporations, and Government agencies be held accountable for the environmental, human, and social consequences of their actions. The passage of the Environmental Quality Control Act and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency represent the first major response of the Federal Government to the public's concern. Then the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established by Congress in October 1972. Former Congressman Daddario, who first used the term "tech- nology assessment" in a 1966 public document, was appropriately in- stalled as the first Director of the OTA. But in the 6 years since Daddario's original enunciation of the idea, it had grown from hi~ original concept of an "early warning system" to a much more compre- hensive and constructive process. By 1973 it was specifically stated in a document-I think written by Mr. Hahn sitting right here-that "technology assessment (TA) is not a search for only the adverse effect of a technology." Instead, it had become a neutral, scientific observational instrument, for "the thorough and balanced analysis of all significantly primary, secondary, indirect and delayed consequences or impacts, present and foreseen of a technological innovation on society, the environment, or the economy." Another point to be noted in connection with the establishment of the Office of Technology Assessment is its historic role in the con- tinuing battle between the legislative and the executive. OTA emerged as one of Congress~ weapons to combat executive prerogatives by providing Congress with an independent capability for obtaining information and saving it from almost total reliance on appraisals from executive agencies of the Government. Inasmuch as a great deal--perhaps' half-of all legislation con- sidered by Congress contains a technological component, the OTA has `been very busy. Between the time of its formation and July 1 of this year, when Mr. Daddario left the `directorship, it has published some 46 reports covering a wide range of activities, including such basic concerns as energy, food, health, materials, transportation and re~ search and development. In addition, the `OTA has fostered the `devel- opment of assessment capability and performance in both private industry and academia. PAGENO="0014" 10 However, technology assessment would be just a meaningless catch phrase unless we actually possessed the capability of assessing the second- and third-order consequences of technology. So the question arises: Is reliable assessment possible? And if so, how does one go about it? The fact is that technology assessment is not an easy task. Even assessing the first-order consequences of technological applications can go astray. Since most first-order assessments address themselves to the question of the profitability of a technical innovation to the innovating firm, a whole record of business failures and bankruptcies indicates that such first-order assessments are often far off the mark. If first-order assessments can go so wrong, how difficult it must be to figure out second- and third-order effects. This is particularly the case because no one discipline possesses the expertise to deal with the entire range `of second- and third-order effects. Technology assess- ment must therefore be multidisciplinary. One factor in our growing capability to assess social and human consequences of technological change is the fact that we now have a g1~owing body of data on society, plus increasing ability to collect and manipulate the data. Both the hardware and the `software are becoming increasingly accurate and sophisticated, enabling us to deal with dynamic variables in very complex situations. Along with these are fundamental developments in mathematics, statistics and general systems theory. But that is not sufficient by itself. We can gather and manipulate vast quantities of statistical data, but what do the figures meafl? For the data must be interpreted by experts, and here we run into difficulties, Many technology assessments have relied basically on the Delphi technique, or variations thereof, to produce a consensus of informed judgment among specialists in the field. One need not dwell upon the limitations of experts to see the methodological problems arising from this approach. However, it is important to* recognize that strong efforts are being made to cope with the weaknesses in the methodology and there have been resultant improvenients. For one thing, whole new subdisciplines are being called into being to assist in the development of technology assessment `capabilities. One of the most important of these is known as social indicators, to identify and compile the data base necessary for systematic analysis of the social impacts of technological developments, Social indicators deal with such intangibles as the quality of life, but that is an iffy thing, depending on an individual's subjective response. We can measure a lot of things but we are not ajways sure what the figures mean. For example, what does it mean when we discover that bicycles have begun to outsell automobiles, that the sale of health foods quintupled, in the 2 years from 1970 to 1973, that sterilization now exceed's abortions, or when divorce rates go up and down? There is likely to `be some disagreement over the relationships between any set of indicators and the quality of life. Parallel with social indicators is the development of science indi- cators. Sponsored by the National Science Board, these indicators are intended to measure American science. Their first publication in 1972 PAGENO="0015" ii was criticized partly because of the techniques employed and partly because of their failure to measure specific linkages between science and other aspects of society. Another criticism is that they neglected some items which might strictly be termed technology indicators. Science indicators-1974 was an improvement. It includes a discus- sion of industrial R. & D., and new information on the role of basic science and advancing technology, international aspects of technologi- cal innovation and changing public attitudes toward science. Just as each technological invention requires the creation of addi- tional innovations to make it effective, so the development of science indicators and social indicators have stimulated developments in social forecasting and technology forecasting. The point is that society re- quires better ways to anticipate the emergence of new technology, so that technology assessment can be anticipative and also consider positive alternatives to those technologies at hand. As one surveys the budding subdisciplines growing from the tech- nology assessment root, one cannot help but be impressed by the vitality and hardiness of these new growths. The problem of evaluat-~ ing the human and social consequences of technological applicatipns has challenged existing research disciplines, causing them to bring forth new tools of knowledge in order to meet the powerfnl societal demand for technology assessment. Nevertheless, some problems remain. For one thing, it is still not clear what criteria are to be used in deciding which technologies are to be assessed. Other problems include: Who is to do the assessing? At what point in the process of technological development is the assessment to be made? And we still have not resolved the problem of methodology. The growing literature in technology assessment is filled with differ- ent methodological approaches. That is fine, I thin1~, because it is be- coming increasingly clear that there might not be one single best; method for technology assessment but many different best niethods depending on the field of technology, nature of the innovation, time span, impacted groups and the like. Some of the methodological problems are inherent in the subject matter. Because technology assessment deals with enormously complex interactions, it is frequently difficult to disentangle the threads, even for analytical purposes. Furthermore, there are problems in linking the technology assess- ment with, policymakers and decisionmakers. Representative Charles A. Mosher, a former member of the subcommittee, has enumerated in concise and illuminating form some of the difficulties in coupling the technology assessment community with the political community. Ob- viously, the Congress is making a very determined effort to understand and employ this new tool, and looking at this from the standpoint of an outsider, I think the Office of Technology Assessment has also been very sensitive to the need for linking together the scientific and po- litical communities and for presenting its findings in a form which can be utilized by our decisionmakers. Decisions about technical applications are going to become more difficult in the future, I think, because the focus will gradually shift from the relatively easy task of monitoring negative side effects to the positive and constructive function of indicating the tradeoffs in- PAGENO="0016" 12 volved in selecting among several different technological options. That, of course, is a major problem for technology assessment. How is it to stimulate research and development which will promote those tech- nologies relating most closely to our social objectives? In brief, how can we make certain that our technology is directed toward meeting our national goals? Unfortunately, we have not always been certain of our national goals except in the broadest terms, and we have frequently been di- vided when it comes to specific goa]s or to the means to achieve them. Nevertheless, I remain optimistic about the future of technology assessment. For, in order to resolve the ills which beset our contem- porary, urbanized, industrialized society, we will have to employ more and better technology.-and with more wisdom than ever before. As America enters its third century, let me remind you that tech- nology assessment is an outgrowth of our revolutionary heritage. It is part of a growing political current which goes under the headings of "Participatory Democracy." The fact is that American democracy is extending itself to meet the ideas set forth in our great American Revolution. People are demand- ing a greater voice in their destinies-and since technology represents an important element in our human experience, they are demanding. and in a truly democratic society, they will obtain greater control of their technology. Technology assessmentprovides a rational means for democratic control and guidance of technology. Technology assessment.reaffirms my faith in man and it strengthens my faith in democracy. Let me explain. At a time when many nay-sayers deprecate American culture, say- ing that we have allowed technology to rule our lives, technology assessment insists that man is still in control of his destiny, and that we are not the playthings of a mindless technology which crushes us underfoot. We can control our machines, instead of the machines con- trolling us. After all, if ours is a manmade world, why cannot man remake it? Technology assessment is also democratic. It does not mean that a group of technocrats or a scientific and technological elite will make decisions for us. These will be made by the political process and that, in a democratic system, is where such decisions belong. Technology assessment does not tell us what to do, but merely the options open to us and their possible and probable consequences. So, even if we have highly skilled technology assessment, we can still make mistakes in our use of technology. But we will make our mistakes through choice, not through ignorance of the consequences. Arôhibald MacLeish once said "America was promises." I think America is still promises. We can make those promises come true if we have the will to utilize our technological skills and the wisdom to di- rect our technology to take us where we want to go. In that process, technology assessment can help make the American promises into real- ity, and enable future generations of Americans to go on to new promises. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you, Dr. Kranzberg, for one of the most ar- ticulate and complete summaries of a fine 50-page, well-documented paper that it. has been my privilege to hear and enjoy. PAGENO="0017" 13 Without objection, your entire statement including the appendixes will be made a part of the record. I want to commend you for high- lighting it in the way that you have done. [The full prepared statement and responses to supplemental ques- tions asked of Dr. Kranzberg follow:] STATEMENT OF Da. MELvIN KRANZBERG CALLAWAY, PROFESSOR OF TIlE His~o~~ OF TECHNOLOGY, GEORGIA INSTITTJTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ATLANTA, GA. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Technology assessment is almost old as man himself, dating from the time our pre-human forbears dimly sensed that certain actions might have conse- quences beyond the acts themselves. We can imagine one of the ancestors of home sapiens picking up a stone to beat a neighbor or his wife over the head. He had glimpsed the consequences In advance, and he immediately confirmed the ef- ficacy of his weapon, no doubt with grunts of delight. His neighbor would not bother him anymore, and his wife would forgo thoughts of women's liberation for some 50,000 years. Uncluttered by complicated formulas or statistics, our pre- historic man was correctly evaluating the immediate consequences of his actions. But, of course, he was probably not thinking 50,000 years ahead, nor would the idea of women's liberation ever have entered his mind. In this imaginary example, we can see one underlying element of technology assessment, and also one of its major problems. Every new tool, machine, process, design, or product has always been judged in the light of its efficacy In meeting some need. When confined to very narrow and immediate ends, the evaluation of a technology has a good chance of being correct. When broader and more remote consequences-what we call second- and third-order effects-are contemplated, the task is much more difficult. For most of history, the consequences of technological change were judged primarily in terms of such narrow ends as how to make work easier or life more pleasant for a few individuals, how to make money, how to kill or destroy more effectively, or, in sum, how to achieve very specific goals. More remote and broader social effects-the focus of today's technology assessment-~-were largely ignored. One distinction which might be made between the first-order effects and longer- range ones Is the matter of intention. First-order effects are "those which were intended by the Innovator"; second- and third-order effects go beyond immedi- ately foreseen profits; they deal w1ti~ unintended effects, and, indeed, "seventh- order effects can perhaps be more important than the first; (for) when we talk about first-order we are measuring intention, not Importance." Thus the auto- mobile's impact on the American economy, culture, and society-unintended ef- fects-are much more significant than were its effects on Henry Ford's bank account. Throughout history, most first-order assessments have been economic and military in nature. But second~order effects-environmental, cultural. and social effects beyond the economic one of Immediate profit-were rarely If ever considered. Yet failure to assess the remote impacts of technology did not keep them from occurring. Furthermore, these social and human consequences were not ipso facto harmful. Quite the contrary. Vast improvem~ts in man's living conditions, his conquest of the environment, and the uplifting of social, economic, and educa- tional standards were wrought by technological advances in agriculture, con- struction, transport, and communications-even though, for the most part, in- novations in those fields were made by men who considered only limited, first- order effects. Today, as always, most technical innovation comes from profit considerations derived from meeting, or perhaps creating, some market demand. Technology assessment, however, looks far beyond such Immediate goals to "the total range of social costs, the Impacts on the family, on legal, political and social institu- 1 Carroll Purseil, ~`Belling the Cat: A Critique of Technology Assessment," Lea et ~5ci~ntia 10 (1Q74): 131. Q6-205-78- -2 PAGENO="0018" 14 tions, on the environment, on international relations, on land-use planning, on the structure of cities, and `on the makeup of populations." 2 That defines technology assessment in terms of its scope. Other definitions stress its approach and its utilization in policy decisions. Thus technology assessment is described as "applied, problem-oriented, multi-disciplinary re- search which.. . is intended to inform and improve decision-making in the public and private sectors, by broadening the considerations that go into that decision- making, giving it a longer-range perspective and taking account of secondary, unintended consequences as well as immediate, direct costs and benefits." 8 This interest in investigating the broader implications of technological de- velopment is something quite new in history. Yet within slightly more than a decade, it has given birth to legislation and government agencies; has spawned academic programs and a flood of research publications; stimulated questioning of traditional value systems and Institutions; and has already begun to influence the pattern of our lives and our physical and social environment. Why, we ask, after so many millennia when technological developments occurred without challenge or were evaluated only in narrow terms, has this enlarged assessment of technology come upon us today? Like moSt historians, I propose to discuss the historical background of the onset of Technology Assessment In terms of long-range, underlying causes and the immediate causes. First, we will survey technology's broadening and deep- ening impact during the past 200 years, and the first perceptions of-and protests against-technology's role in society. We will also See the concomitant develop- ment of concepts and practices of social responsibility for technology, lnclud1n~ protection against its abuses. Then we will analyze what I regard as the Im- mediate cause of our current concern with technology assessment, precipitated by the recent disenchantment with and questioning of the value of science and technology. Finally, we will look at some of the major questions which have arisen `in regard to our ability to perform meaningful assessments, and discuss the relationship of technologly assessment to our national goals and future. I. THE BACKGROUND A. Technology's growing impact on society For most of human history, technology changed very slowly. The vast bulk of mankind lived on farms; the hearth and home were tl~e center of production and of all life: work, education, health, and entertainment. Life was traditional. Sons pursued the same ~oceui~ations as their fathers, tilling the soil In the same, age- old ways. Nobody had to give serious thought to the impact' of technology because both technological and social change occurred at a snail's pace. The Industrial Revolution changed all that. It represented a tremendous acceleration in technological developments and a consequent enlargement of tech- nology's impact on society. More people' were affected by technological change, too. For one thing, there were simply more people around. Throughout the ages, war, famine, and disease had kept the population down; but the 18th and 19th centuries witnessed a population explosion which, at least in percentage terms, rivals that in our contemporary world. The people of the Industrial nations found their lives completely transformed as `the self-sufficiency of the agrarian village gave `way to the close-linked Inter- dependence of individuals in a modern factory setting. Industrialization revolu- tionized how and where people lived, worked, played, and prayed. As a corollary of speedier technological change, there was accelerated social change. For one thing, several technologies-a cluster, for technologies do not develop separately-could come together to produce une*pected social impacts. In addition, technologies are interdependent and increase men's dependency upon one another and upon technology itself. As a result of this interdependence, perturbations in one element of the system can bring about almost disastrous consequences in other parts of the system. Thus, an electrical failure in New York Oity can tear apart the social fabric of America. Political events in the 2 Joseph F. Coates, "Technology Assessment," McGraw-Hill Yearbook, Science and Tech- nology (New York, 1974), pp. 64-74. ~ Vary P. Coates and John E. Mock, eds., "The Southern Regional `Conference on Tech- nology Assessment: Summary" (1974, National Science Foundation Contract ERP 73-05807 AOl), p. 1. PAGENO="0019" 15 Middle East can affect petroleum prices, raise the cost of fertilizer and irrigation, and hence bring near-starvation to many less-developed nations. In addition, there are problems of scale. Two examples will suffice. Fixhaust emissions from a few automobiles pose no great threat to the salubrfty of the air. But automobile smog is a threshold phenomenon, and when there are thousands of automobiles, their exhaust fumes can no longer be safely dissipated into the atmosphere. Thus at the turn of this century, automobiles were hailed as a solution to the pollution, congestion, and safety problems posed by horse- drawn transportation. That was a time when in New York City alone horses deposited some 2% millIon pounds of manure and 60,000 gallons of urine in one day. But, as we know, pollution, congestion, and safety problems have returned again in altered form as a result of the widespread use of the automobile. DDT provides another example of dangers arising from large-scale use. Only some three decades ago, DDT was hailed as a miraculous insect killer. In large- scale public health programs throughout the world following World War II, J)DT almost succeeded in wiping out one of mankind's greatest scourges, the malarial- carrying vector mosquito. When sprayed on crops, DDT enormously increased agricultural productivity. Yet today, only some two decades after the developer of DDT was awarded the Nobel Prize for medicine, DDT has been banned In most of Western nations as a potential threat to mankind. Through a process of biological magnification, slight traces of DDT build up in the food chain of fishes and birds, and eventually man himself. In this way, what was originally a boon to mankind has become at best a mixed blessing. Another reason for the deepening impact of technology upon our lives and society is that several technologies coming together and interacting with other elements of society produce widespread social effects which do not seem in- herent in the separate technologies themselves. A series of technical develop~ ments can thus have synergistic social effects. For example, a series of technological changes are Intimately bound up with the Black Revolution in today's America. The development of the mechanical cottonpicker deprived the Negro fieldhand of his livelihood. There was no longer place or need for unskilled labor on southern farms, so a vast migration of Blacks flowed from southern rural regions to porthern cities. Between 1940 and 1970, some 4.4 million Blacks left the south. Bu~ the Black migrant to the northern industrial centers was again the victim of advancing technology, for he could find no place in today's sophisticated technology. In the 1950s and 19&~s, we saw a new phenomenon in Western history: large~scale unemployment while thou- sands of jobs went begging. There was simply no match between the openings, requiring highly skilled workmen, and the available labor supply. Compounding the frustrations of the Blacks was another miracle of modern technology, the television set. As a revolutionary instrument, TV must surely rank alongside the Declaration of Independence and the Rights Of Man. Into the shabby living room of the Negro relief client were piped the dreams and sugar- coated realities of our affluent society, lie was invited to spend hours watching how good life was-for everybody else-and hearing about products which every- one seemed able to buy, except him. For the first time in history, the disinherited could see the affluence of the wealthy intimately, with immediate perception of what they were missing. They wanted to partake of the great outpouring of goods which advancing technology has made possible, and yet they were denied all legal and socially accepted means to obtain them. And so we packaged wealth and privilege for television. We displayed it publicly to the poor and nonprivileged whom we barred from the system. Then we wondered why they rioted and looted. This sad history, whose social repercussions are still working themselves out, illustrates the wide-ranging reactions of technology with many different elements of our social environment. It demonstrates too the difficulties of evaluating long- range social consequences when a cluster of technical developments are involved rather than a single, clear-cut innovation. And the fact is that innovations come in clusters, not singly. B. Growing airn~reness and criticism Despite technology's growing impact on society, It took some time before the general public became aware of it and began thinking that something could or should be done about it. True, some opposition appeared almost from the begin- ning of industrialization. There was an aristocratic protest, very mild In nature. PAGENO="0020" 16 In England members of the country gentry complained about the ruination of the countryside ; they had in mind their own hunting rights, which were now hedged in by railroads puffing their way across the landscape. They also resented the rise to power of the self-made men representing the burgeoning industrial sector of the economy. Far more dramatic was the Luddite protest, which became symbolic of worker opposition to machines. We now know that the Luddites destroyed machines, not so much because they opposed mechanization of their work, but as a means of venting their anger and frustrations at the practices of their employers.4 Yet, for the first time, there was an implicit challenge to the notion that only the profits of the factory owner were to be considered in adjudging the worth of technological change. Much more attention has been paid to the literary protest against technology by the 19th-century Romantics. They saw only the horrors of the factory system, the uglification of towns, and the disregard for human values of the blinder proponents of laissez-faire industrialism. Some, like William Morris and John Ruskin, wished to return to the handcraft technology of "ye merrie olde Eng- lande," a return to a simpler medieval past which seemed rosy and romantic in retrospect, but which had never existed in actuality. Contemporaneously with them was Karl Marx, who might be regarded as one of the early practitioners of technology assessment, for he realized that tech- nology had profound social and cultural ramifications. His assessment foresaw-~ incorrectly, as it proved-the impoverishment of the workers in capitalist society and a class polarization which would ultimately lead to warfare and the destriic- tion of bourgeois capitalist society. Eut Marx cUd not attack technology as such. He concentrated, not on mitigat- ing the effects of technology, as did some other socialist thinkers and some non- socialist humanitarians-but on rearranging, by revolution, the social order to spread the benefits of technology among the working masses rather than confined to the profit of a few. Marx was doing what we would today call macro~-assess- ment, viewing technology's Impact in terms of the broad scale of human social development. These 19th-century criticisms of technology's impact upon society have their counterparts in `the 29th century. We always have with us a romantic and nostalgic longing for the past. In his book, "Science: the Glorious Entertain- ment," Jacques Barznn, one of the most renowned humanists, lay virtually all our contemporary ills-the destruction of rural life, the mass exploitation of the poor, the cancerous growth of cities, and the uglification of the world through noise, fear, and filth-at the door of science and technology. In these days of urban rot and the ravenous bulldozer, it is not surprising that many people look back with fondness to small-town life and believe that the past was much superior to the present. Yet there is another literary tradition- that of Sherwood Anderson, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John O'Hara, and Tennessee Willia,ms-which questions the Idyllic picture of American small town life. Indeed, if the smail~town "good old days" were really so good, how are we to account for the fact that so many Americans fled to cities? Not all the broad-scale attacks upon t~bnologicai society arise from Romantic longipgs for a. non-existent past. The modern novel, the contemporary drama, and much of todgy's poetry have as an Insistent theme that man has become the victim of a d~ehumanizin.g technology. Employing the metaphors of Franken- stein's monster, the robots from Capek's play "R.ILR,", and the regimented citi- zens of Huxley's "Brave New World," they point to the imperfections of a world ruled by a technocratic elite. The implication is that man Is by nature so abu- sive, so evil an animal that he cannot be trusted with technology, and that he would use it simply to dominate his fellow beings or to create monsters which will turn upon their human creators. Stick assessments of technology's impact came shortly after the mechanized slaughter of World War I, and the ensuing worldwide Depression. It is not surprising that there were serious questionings of modern industrial society. Social criticism in the guise of science fiction was paralleled by philosophical attacks. For example, Lewis Mumford, while willing to admit that technology had "raised the ceiling of human achievement" in the past, voiced fears that 4See E. J. Hobibawn, "Labourlng Men" (New York, 1964), Chap. 2; and E. P. Thompson "The Making of the English Working Class" (New York, 1963). PAGENO="0021" 17 modern technology no longer is concerned about human values, but is "trans- ferring the attributes of life to the machine and the mechanical collective." nbc French legal philosopher, Jacques Ellul, expressed a similar apocalyptic view, claiming that technology has become the end of human life,8 while Herbert Marcuse attacked industrial civilization on the grounds that it flattened man into a "one-dimensional" being.7 Here was technology assessement of the most sweeping character-indeed, it would sweep all modern technology into the dustbin. By the 1970s, the denial of technology's worth had been taken up by the so- called "counter-culture." Authors like Theodore Roszak, Charles Reich, and the late Paul Goodman urged their young readers to turn their backs on modern technology. They claimed, as had Mumford and Ellul earlier, that engineering imperatives of efficiency and economy were taking precedence over humanistic values, ethical considerations, and aesthetic concerns.8 Such generalized indictments of modern society are perhaps too grandiose to be called technology assessment. They provide no systematic analysis of siDeelfie technologies nor do they offer any guidance to policy makers. Yet such sweeping indictments of technological society are not to be lightly dismissed. These social critics raised basic questions about whether or not technological innovations are really of benefit to mankind. Although they could provide no answers other than going back to an earlier pre-industrial society or a moratorium on further tech- nical advances, they helped raise public consciousness of the importance of technology in delineating the character of the modern world. And by raising the grave question of the control and direction of technology, they prepared people's minds for some kind of governmental action in guiding future tech- nological advance. But events had already been moving in that direction for over a century. C. DevcZopment of go~ernmentaZ actions When America was founded, there was widespread agreement that one of the government's functions was to encourage technological growth in every direction possible. To achieve that end, the basis for the American patent system was embodied in the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8 of that docu- ment, gives Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Ever since Alexander Hamilton became Secretary of Treasury in George Washington's cabinet, the federal government of the United States has actively sought economic growth-and that came to mean industrial growth. Tariffs, taxes, subsidies, land grants for canal and railroad building, and a benign policy of laissez-faire toward business expansion characterized America's attitude. The idea was that the government would do everything possible to assist technologi- cal advancement and would do absolutely nothing to hamper It in any way. For 1776 not only marked the beginning of America's fight for independence but was also the year when Adam Smith published his "Wealth of Nations." Smith de- clared that a nation's wealth lay in its productiye capacities, and these could best be strengthened by the government keeping its hand's off business enterprise. If businessmen were free to follow their self-interests, an "invisible baud" would somehow make these individual manifestations of self-interest add up to the benefit of the entire community. Ever since George Washington's time, American governments have never flagged in their desire to expand America's economy through encouraging tech- nical innovations. However, the laissez-faire approach to technology was subject to erosion. About a century ago, `society began to realize that rampant individ- ualism armed with natural rights doctrine concerned primarily with ~property interests did not necessarily result in the social welfare of the community. After all, the Enlightment philosophy, which helped give birth to the American Revolu- tion and, later, the French Revolution, had proclaimed the rights of all men and had stated `that government should be directed at the welfare of all citizens., not Lewis Mumford, "Autboritarian and Democratic Technics," Technology and Culture 5 (1964) : 1-3. 6 ,Tacques Ellul, "The Technological Society" (New York 1964). ~ Herbert Marcuse, "One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Indus- trial Society" (Boston, 1964). Hughes, ed. `~Changing Attitudes Toward American Technology" (New PAGENO="0022" 18 just au aristocratic elite. This notion had been fortified by the doctrine of Utilitarianism, which stressed "the greatest good for the greatest number." The reason that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" was unseen was that it simply wasn't there. The sum of individual self-interest did not automatically result in the welfare of the entire nation. If society were to ensure security and justice for all its members, it became evident that the government must exercise a very visible hand in controlling and limiting unbridled individual rights in the inter- ests of the community at large. This was particularly the case when, through the enlargement of the franchise and the growing democratization of society in both Europe and America during the 19th century, larger numbers of the popula- tion began making their voices heard in government and demanding public at- tention to their needs. Viewed in this light, today's technology assessment be- comes another step in government intervention for the common good. Almost from the beginnings of Industrialization, some practical measures had to be taken to meet abuses resulting from some unanticipated impacts of techni- cal advance. One example was the factory legislation in 19th-century Britain, in response to the abuse of child and women labor in the early factory system and in the coal mines. Morality and humanitarianism were the motivating fac- tors. Although the passionate rhetoric and biblical quotations which marked the parliamentary debates could scarcely be called a scientific assessment, the legisation which emerged marked the beginnings of the government's concern for some unanticipated consequences of technological action. More akin to today's analytical approach to technology assessment was the American government's response to the disasters caused by bursting boilers on river steamboats. In 1824 casualties from boiler explosions on steamboats, par- ticularly an explosion on the Aetna In New York Harbor which killed 13 and caused many injuries, made Congress take notice. A resolution was Introduced in the House of Hepresentatives In May 1824 calling for an inquiry into the expediency of enacting legislation which would bar the Issuance of a certificate of navigation to any boat operating at high steam pressures. This bill did not pass, but the continuance of such explosions during the next few years created a powerful public demand that something be done. Since nobody knew the exact reason for the boiler explosions, the first order of business was to investigate the cause. In 1830, finally, the government made its first technical research grant, employing the Franklin Institute of Phila- delphia to investigate the cause of the explosions. Not until 1836 did the Institute present its report which made detailed recommendations for regulatory legisla- tion. It was to take another two years before a law was passed, and it was so watered down-the suggested inspection criteria for boilers and the licensing standards for sthamboat engineers were eliminated-as to be Ineffectual. Boiler explosions thereupon continued with increasing losses of life, and It was not until 1852 that a law with teeth in it was finally passed with a regulatory agency to enforce it. But here was the federal regulatory power being employed to do away with Some harmful and unanticipated effects of technology, and it was done on the basis of careful study of causes and unintended impactsY Intervention of the government In the case of the bursting boilers was but the first of many such interventions wherein the government sought to protect Its citizens from unanticipated dangers of technical applications In many different ways-from food and drug acts to safety measures in factories, from fire pro- tection legislation to traffic laws. Indeed, the need to protect the public from unintended impacts of technology helped to change the whole idea of the role of government. No longer was government to be merely a passive policeman, as the Classical economists had insisted; Instead, the government was Increasingly becoming a service institution, providing roads, education, and multitudes of other services to the people. Not the least among those services was protection of the public from technical developments which gave rise to unexpected ."dis- benefits." The role of the government in pesticide regulation is particularly Instructive in this regard because it also illustrates another trend, namey, an enlargement of the "public" which the government was endeavoring to protect and serve. The first federal law dealing specifically with pesticides was the Federal In- secticide and Fungicide Act of 1910, which sought to protect the pesticide user- John 0. Burke, "llursting Boilers and the Federal Power." Technology and Culture 7 (19661 : 1-23: Bruoe Sinolair. `Phiiadelphl~'s Philosopher Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1824-1865" (Baltimore, 1974). PAGENO="0023" 19 the farmer-from being bilked by manufacturers who were selling inferior prod- ucts. It took almost another three decades before the protection of the federal government was extended to the public which ate the food products grown with the aid of pesticides; this was the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which was designed to protect the consumer from harmful chemical residues in his food. But then Rachel Carson gave a new dimension to the concept of the "con- sumer" by showing the effects of pesticides on wildlife. By banning DDT, the government began extending its protection to birds and fishes as well as human beings. This was not the government~s first action for the protection of wildlife, of course, but it was the first based on an assessment of unintended technological impacts. Looking at it another way, we find that the government of the United States has broadened its concern to include the welfare of all the inhabitants of our land-birds, bees, animals, and fishes, as well as that peculiar animal, man. Furthermore, the government's concern is not simply confined to living creatures in the present time but has been widened to include the entire piiysi- cal environment. The Environmental Quality Control Act and the Environmental Protection `Agency are based on assessment of technological impacts on the ecology; above all, they represent an extension of the government's concern, not only for the present generation of Americans, but to fulfill the Constitutional mandate of ensuring "blessings" for posterity. Interestingly enough, concern for the physical environment had begun mani- festing itself nearly a century before in American history. However, this con- cern was not derived from analysis of technological consequences, but rather from the desire to arrive at a rational exploitation of America'l natural re- sources. John Wesley Powell, who directed the U.S. Geological Survey during the last quarter of the 19th century, conducted an irrigation survey to identify, locate, arid conserve the fast~di:sappearing water resources of the arid western lands. His efforts were but partially successful, as were those of John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and others who developed the Conservation Movement.10 Yet, that movement was to give birth at a much later date to the environmentalist movement, which is one of the most powerful stimulants to technology in that very important field today. Pesticidal regulation derived from problems of scale and analysis of unin- tended impacts. But other governmental intervention has derived from changes in technology itself. For example, as products became more sophisticated, It became more difficult for consumers to detect defects in them. Indeed, one can't tell what has gone wrong inside the "black box" because one can't even open it! Hence, the common-law principle of caveat emptor, "let the buyer beware," has been abandoned by the courts, and the principle of strict corfiorate liability adopted in its stead.n A number of federal, state, and local bodies have been set up for consumer protection, the most notable being the Consumer Prod- uct Safety Commission, established by the 92nd Congress, to protect consumei s *by developing safety standards for many product categories. This is a form of technology assessment, even though it might not be called that. The point is that the impacts of industrial technology on health, land use, safety, and a variety of other areas are all being considered, thereby broadening the mandate of tLe government. Yet it should be noted that all these governmental interventions into the free market for technological advance were designed to meet specific problems ~r deal with very concrete and noticeable abuses. Were there no attemp(ts in the government to develop a generalized approach to problems of second- and third- order impact? There were, but they also tended in most cases to deal with very specific issues. True, they looked at broader issues or entire categories of tech- nology, but because they arose in response to particular problems, they tended to disappear when the prc~bIems disappeared or at least were no longer a matter of great public attention. The most comprehensive and systematic attempt by the federal government to confront the consequences of technological development was that by the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), whose report, "Technologi- cal Trends and National Policy," has been called the "first modern technology 101. L. Penick, Jr .,"The Resource Revolution," In Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, eds., "Technology In Western Civilization" (New York, 1967), Vol. 2, Chap. ~8. 11 MIchael 5, Baram, "Technology Assessment and `Social `Control," Science 180 (May 4. 1973) : 465-73. PAGENO="0024" 20 assessment." 12 It was an outgrowth of the Great Depression, which, following clOse on the mass slaughter of World War I, made many people wonder about the presumed blessings of a technological society. There was particular fear that the inroads of machine technology were destroying employment opportunities and hence were responsible for millions of unemployed and destitute people. President Hoover had commissioned an earlier report (1933), "Recent Social Trends in the United States," wherein the authors (William Fielding Ogburn, sociologist; Charles E. Merriam, political scientist; and Wesley C. Mitchell, economist) had made clear the connection of technological developments with government, education, religion, and other aspects of society. No policy recom- inendations were made, except a generalized call for planning. Issued just when the Hoover administration was being replaced by that of Franklin P. Roose- velt, the report had no impact on policy makers. However, it provided the background for the PNE'C, whose formation was triggered by the economic re- cession of 1987. Beginning in December 1038, and lasting some 18 months, the PN1TIC hearings resulted In the most thorough investigation of technology and its implications in American history to date. The committee sat for 775 hours of testimony, heard 55 witnesses, and its published hearings, exhibits, reports, and transcripts fill two good-sized shelves. Although the problem under closest scrutiny was technological unemployment, it was big business which was at the whipping post. Hence, there was much discussion of the research potential of ln~ustry and the effects of the patent system in encouraging technological ad- vance, for there was some feeling that the big corporations were failing to work their patents in order to protect their monopoly positions. Although some con- sideration was given to the second-order effects of technological advance (see below), most attention was paid to technology's direct and indirect impact on unemployment. Nevertheless, the TNEC's bias toward planning implied the need for some evaluation of the applications of technology and their consequences if such plan- ning was to be meaningful. However, the notion of planning was so antithetical to the American political mood at the time, because of its implications of a socialist economy, that it can scarcely be said that the cause of technology assessment was advanced by the TNEC. Besides, the TNEO's report made no difference. The onset of war in Europe brought about a rush of orders to Ameri- can factories, wiping out the unemployment which had hung like a dark cloud over America for almost a decade. With unemployment gone and with factories busy, the fears and suspicions aroused by advancing technology were quickly forgotten. Instead of technology being ouestioned about its worth to American society, the emphasis was again on fueling technological growth for America's war effort. It was to take over twenty years before a similar large-scale effort was made to consider the effects of technological change on Ameri~n society. Again, as In the case of the TNEC, it was triggered by an economic turndown and by fears that the inroads of automation would bring America again into a period of protracted unemployment and social distress. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a Commission on Technology, Antomation, and Economic Progress. Despite its large-~caJe lnves!tigations, its work proved as ineffectual on the actual course of events as did that of the TNEO. For one thing, the Commission was so evenly divided between representatives from labor, who vb~wed advancing auto- mation as a curse, and thOse of business, wh~ viewed it as a blessing, that it could never agree upon any final recommendations involving the core of its concern, namely, what could be done about the expected decline in employment as a result of automation. But ag~in, as In the case of the TNEC, an upturn In economic activity, again partially as a result of military expenditures, ended temporarily the fear of unemployment. Like the TNEO study, the work of the President's Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress led `to no significant policy changes; it was put on the shelf for later study by academicians. Perhaps the lack of influence of these large-scale studies arose from the fact that they were "one-shot" deals; they did not represent a continuing effort in technology assessment. They were undertaken in response to what was per- 1~ Arlene Jnouye and `Charles *Silssklnd, "Technological Trends and National Policy (1957) The First Modern Technology Assessment," Technology and Culture 18 (October 1977), in press. PAGENO="0025" 21 ceived as a crisis caused by mounting or continued unemployment. When the ill which had given rise to these investigations bad subsided, interest in relating technological developments to social impacts temporarily disappeared again. But concern for technology's interaction with society remained, and by the mid-lOGOs, it became a matter of paramount concern. Why? Another crisis. This time it was not an economic crisis but one of values. The combined impact and the coincidence of the war in Vietnam, the civil rights, movement, and the belated aftermath of World War II on morals and ideals led to a questioning of-and disenchantment with-American life and the "American Dream." Since so much of the American way of life and hopes for the future were bound up with technology, it is not surprising that this disenchantment precipitated the technology assessment movement. II. THE IMMEDIATE STIMULtJS TO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: QUESTIONING THE "AMERICAN DREAM" When our grandfathers in the year :t900 peered into the future, they were filled with confidence and optimism about the century to come. The advance of science and technology held forth great promise for the future. They saw the prospect of a world where poverty had ended, where democratic society bad spread the blessings of liberty and equlity to all mankind, where machines were to perform all wearisome toil so that men could live in leisure, where universal education had blotted out all traces of ignorance and superstition, and where in- ternational peace and brotherhood reigned. In many respects, the promise of the 20th century has been fulfilled. Technical triumphs there have been aplenty: the expansion of our ability to produce a sufficiency of creature comforts and the development of such technical marvels as radio and television, computers and automation, atomic enegy and anti- biotics, airplanes and rocket ships. Yet, shortly after the century reached the halfway mark, the fear began taking root that technology bad grown so large and had presented mankind with such awful byproducts that it now threatens to engulf man and bring an end to Western civilization as we have known it. Technology, it has been said, Is a good thing-but it might be too much of a good thing. Look at the inhuman uses to which it has been and is being put. What about the devastation wrought by wars during the 20th century, and the present possibility of destroying the race through nuclear warfare? What about the deterioration of the environment, caused by air and water ~olIution, the spolia- tion of the countryside, and the rot of our cities? Technology, it is claimed, has destroyed the ecological balance between man and nature; not only that, but we are robbing future generations of their inheritance by plundering the ear ~h of irreplaceable natual resources. Not only have we not reached the material Utopia envisioned at the beginning of the century, but every step we take along the way makes us feel as if we w i'e running madly on a gilded treadmill. Just as we approached the ideal of producing enough goods and services to provide middle-class comfort for all Americans, we discovered that we still had a large number of people living at or below the poverty level. Our astronauts can whiz around the earth in less tb~u an hour, and anyone with a credit card and a reservation on the Concorde can breakfast in both London and New York on the same morning, yet suburban commuters can't get to work on time. Our cars are the most powerful a~d luxurious in the world, but we are running out of the gas to drive them. Our computers can solve in a few seconds mathematical problems that would require an indivIdual 50 years to solve; our Xerox machines multiply papers faster than the sorcerer's apprentl~e could dump them in the garbage can; and television and radio bring instant Information to us-yet men feel less and less capable of understanding the world in which they live. Despite our vast communications network, people agonize as never before over the "failure to communicate." In 17th-century London, John Donne preached that "no man is . an Island," and our technology has made this a reality through knitting an infinite number of threads of global communications, international trade, and social interle- pendence. Yet this very dependency upon our neighbors fills us with fear; the breakdown of a distant electrical relay plunges us Into darkness; strikes by de- livery men, garbage collectors., policemen, teachers, can deprive us of food,. pile up mountains of refuse, deprive us of education and security; the vagaries of International power politics can cut off vital fuel and material resources; the PAGENO="0026" 22 £Lctions of a few violent terrorists can destroy international transportation, dis- rupt the harmony of international sports, end the careers of gifted and talented leaders, and threaten the vital but fragile threads of our highly complex in- dustrial society. We find ourselves baffled by this series of paradoxes. Who would have thought that this nation of presumably unlimited resources, glorying in the enormous treasure that we extracted from the earth, would now be concerned by the profligate squandering of its treasury? Who would have thought that "America the Beautiful" would be pockmarked by the rash of urban blight, the ugly scars of strlpmining, and the varicose arteries of the freeways? Who would havq thought that our cities would become so large as to become virtually unmanage- able, our traffic so heavy we might find it quicker to walk than to drive, and the right to drive itself threatened by political events in far-off places? Not that technology is to blame for all the problems which beset us, but the point is that our technology has become so inextricably intertwined with both the dreams and realities of American life that It shared the general questioning of values and Institutions. Besides, technology has interacted with society in ways which we bad not foreseen. Because of this, the way in which we em- ployed our technology became part of the answer to the question: What went wrong? But technology is part of the solution as well as the problem. This means that technology assessment becomes part of the answer to the next question: What can we do about it? III. INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT As industrial technology developed in the 19th- and 20th-centuries, various unanticipated side-effects occurred and efforts were made to correct such prob- lems: factory safety legislation, women and child labor laws, boiler regulation, food and drug inspection, and the like. But all these had been pieicemeal efforts- aimed at specific abuses from which the public needed protection. Such ameliora- tive measures did not represent any attempt to investigate in depth other antici- pated consequences. Above all, these bits and pieces of legislation were enacted after the abuses had manifested themselves ; they could not prevent the harmful application of technology before it occurred. Pressure for foresight in looking at technological applications came first from the scientific community itself.~ Shortly after World War II some scientists began to evince concern about the destructive consequences of the nuclear weapons which they had created the long-range impact of radiation damage through nuclear testing. Not only did their military-technological assessment have im- portant consequences for American foreign policy, but they awakened the scientific-technological commulty to some awareness of the consequences of scientific and technical activities. Nevertheless, pressure from the general public for assessing impacts of tech- nology was not felt until Rachel Carson awakened the public to the possibility. of a springtime when the birds would be silent, and when Ralph Nader cast doubt upon the notion that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country." Carson's work led to further studies and the ultimate banning of DDT; Nader's work also brought about Congressional investigations and eventual legislation on automobile safety belts. In response to mounting public concern over these and other byproducts of technical developments, the House SubcQm- mittee on Science, Research, and Development, headed h~ Representative Emilio Q. Daddarlo, instituted a series of hearings, entitled "Technology Assessment Seminars" and commissioned studies of the problem." ~3This was not the first time that the scientific-technological community had been con- cerned about professional responsibility to society. For an interesting account in relation to engineering, see Edwin T. Layton, .Tr.. "The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Respon- athility and the American Engineering Profession" (Cleveland, 1971). "The National Academy of Sciences study. `Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice" (Washington, 1069) remains the basic philosophic Justification of the technology assessment movement. The National Academy of Bugineering report, "A Study of Tech- nology Assessment" (Washington, 1069), dealt with the methodology, feasibility, and potential value of technology assessment through case studies (e.g., electronic aids. multi- ~hasic health screening, subsonic aircraft noise). The renort by the National Academy of Public Administration, "A Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch" (Washington, 1970) limited Itself to the organizational apparatus for technology assess- ment within the Federal Government. PAGENO="0027" 23 Daddario's Subcommittee was aware that previous technology assessments had been limited in scope, fragmented in nature, and tardy In application. In cases such as thalidomide or DDT, the government bad failed to foresee or act iii advance; Instead, federal agencies merely reacted to public pressures limited to ~peclfic matters. The Subcommittee's purpose was to see if it were possible to achieve a legislative capability for policy determination In science and tech- nology that would be anticipatory and adaptive rather than reactionary and sym- tomatic. In the meantime, public pressures were mounting further. Three magic words, with a congeries of meanings, describe these pressures: environmentalism, con- sumerism, accountability. The public began to demand that scientists, engineers, corporations, and gov- ernment agencies be held accountable for the environmental, human, and social consequences of their actions. The passage of the Environmental Quality Control Act and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency represent the first major response of the federal government to the public's concern. The Subcommittee's original bill for establishment of a Technology Assessment Board at first languished, hut when it was reintroduced by Representative John I)avis (Georgia) Daddario's successor as chairman of the Subcommittee, it breezed through. Thus the Office of Technology AssesSmei1t (OTA) was estab- lished by Congress in October 1972. It was entirely fitting that former Congressman Daddario, who first used the term "technology assessment" In a 1966 public document, was installed as the first director of the OTA. But it is interesting to note that in the six years since Daddario's original enunciation of the idea, it had grown from his original con- cept of an "early warning system" to a much more comprehensive and construc- tive process. In Dacldario's original technology assessment bill, introduced in 1967, the stress was on "identifying the undesirable byproducts and side-effects of such applied research and technology in advance of their crystallization, and informing the public of their potential in order that appropriate steps may be taken to eliminate or minimize them." ~ But by the time the Office of Technology Assessment was established several years later, the technology's negative impact was only part of a mo:re comprehensive view of all of technology's second- and third-order effects. The Congressional Research Service specifically stated that `teéhnology assessment (TA) is not a search for only the adverse effect of a technology; it is not a determination that a technology should or should not be employed; it is not a mechanism to slow the development of technology." Instead technology assessment had become a neutral, scientific observational instrument, for "the throrough and balanced analysis of all significant primary, secondary, indirect, and delayed consequences or impacts, present and foreseen, of a tech- nological innovation on society, the environment, or the economy." `~ Another point to be noted In connection with the establishment of the Office of Technology Assessment is Its historic role in the continuing battle between the legislative and the executive. OTA thus emerged as one of Congress's weapons to combat executive perogatives, by providing Congress with an independent capability for obtaining information and saving it from almost total reliance on appraisals from executive agencies of the government. As Daddarlo himself pointed out, technology assessment "offers exciting prospects of redressing the unfortunate imbalance between the executive and the legislative branches in analysis and information on respective benefits and costs of new techologies." ~ Inasmuch as a great deal-perhaps, half-of all legislation considered by Con- gress contains a technological component, the OTA has been very busy. Between the time of its formation and July 1 of this year, when Mr. Daddario left the di- rectorship, it has published some 46 reports covering a wide range of activities, including such basic concerns as energy, food, health, materials, transportation, and research and development. `~ U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, "Technical Information for Congress." (Iteport to Subcommittee on Science Research and Development) 92d Congress, 1st session (Washington: U. S. Government ~Printing Office, revised April i'971), 18 [Walter Hahn and Rosethary Chalk] Science Policy `Research Division. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Office of Technology Assessment: Background and Status. Report to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 98d Congress 1st session (Washington: U.S. Governme5t Printing Office, 1973), p. 1. ~ Emilio Q. Daddario, "Foreword," to Leon Kirchmayer, Harold Linstone. and William Morsch, eds., A Technology Assessment Primer" (IEEE: New York, 1975), pp. hi-ri. PAGENO="0028" 24 The Office of Technology Assessment is not the sole agency performing assess- ments within the federal government. As far back as 1972, Dr. Vary T. Coates identified some 86 offices in federal executive agencies which were "chiefly re- sponsible for projects and programs of a technological nature." Of these, 76 percent were performing or sponsoring technology assessments,15 and we can assume that the number has grown in the five years since then. In addition, the OTA has fostered the development of assessment capability and performance in private industry and in academia. Hence, the sponsorship and range of technology assessment have broadened considerably from the initial focus in public agencies. Furthermore, technology assessment has spread from the United States to other industrialized nations, especially in Western Europe and Japan, and an International Society for Technology Assessment has been formed. The wide range of technology assessment activities in the industrial, academic, and governmental communities was indicated in a series of hearings (1976) before the Technology Assessment Board.19 Firms such as Monsanto, Coca-Cola, Ford Motor Company, Southern California Edison Company, Bell Laboratories, Systems Development Corporation, and others indicated that they made im- portant use of technology assessment in their corporate planning. Government agencies, such as the Department of Commerce, National Science Foundation, Federal Energy Administration, Department of Interior, performed specific tech- nology assessments involving their special concerns, as did quasi-governmental institutions, such as TVA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Academic courses and programs in technology assessment have sprung up at the University of Southern California, Oklahoma University, Cornell University, my own Georgia Tech, and many other institutions. The hearings indicated not only that technology assessment is being widely adopted in both the public and private sectors, but that these require a variety of TA methods and practices to fit their particular problems and resources. In both government and industry there is a "growing awareness of `TA's value for improving the policy making process and broadening the information base for decision making." Although but recently born, technology assessment is obviously a lusty infant. It suffers from the usual growing pains and occasional colic, and like most young children it is going through a difficult and ofttimes frustrating learning experi- ence., What is it learning and how is it going about it? Will it grow up to fullfill its potential and become a productive member of society? In brief, will it work? An~L how does it work? IV. FEASIBILITY OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT A. Shortcomings of early assessments Technology assessment would be just a meaningless catch-phrase unless we actually possessed the capability of assessing the second- and third-order conse- quences of technology. Instruments for controlling technology require a knowl- edge base and proper tools for making viable assessments. So the question arises: Even if technology assessment Is necessary and desirable, and even if it is already being carried on and growing, is It really feasible? En other words, is reliable assessment possible? And If so, how does one go about it? The fact is that technology assessment is not an easy task. Even assessing the first-order consequences of technological applications can go astray. Most first- order assessments address themselves to the question of the profitability of a technical innovation to the innovating firm. A whole record of business failures and bankruptcies indicates that such first-order assessments are often far off the mark. Technological innovation remains a very risky business. Not only small businesses are bedeviled by failure to assess correctly the chances of profit; large organizations possessing tremendous masses of Information about markets. costs, and the like can also make mistakes. We have but to look at the Edsel automobile and Corfam synthetic leather to recognize that even some of our 18 Vary T. Coates, "Technology and Public Policy: The Process of Technology Assess ment in the Federal Government." George Washington University Program of Policy Studie8 In Science and Technology (Washington, 1972). Summary Report, pp. 8-9. `~ "Technology Assessment Activities in the Industrial, Academic and Governmental Communities." Hearings before the Technology Assessment Board of the Office of Tech~ nology Assessment, 94th Congress, 2d session, June 1976. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.) PAGENO="0029" 25 giant corporations can make major miscalculations. If first-order assessments can go so wrong, how difficult it must be to figure out second- and third-order effects! Here we must distinguish between earlier assessments, usually qualitative in nature, and the more quantitatively-oriented ones of today. Karl Marx employed qualitative techniques in assessing the broad conse- quences of technical change. His method was guided by his dialectical theory of historical development. Although Marx's assessment has not stood the test of time, the qualitative method of analysis can still be very effective in examin- ing some of technology's consequences. For example, the great American econo- mist Thorstein Veblen must certainly rank as one of the most penetrating in- tellects ever to consider the social consequences of technological change. By such trenchant terms as "conspicuous waste" and "conspicuous consumption" he focused attention upon some of the cultural accompaniments of technological advances in late 19th-century America. Contemporary economists increasingly employ two tools of modern scientific analysis: statistics and model building. At first, their statistical measurements concentrated on economic indicators of costs, production, profits and the like; they did not bother to consider secondary consequences of technology. Indeed, until some two decades ago they scarcely considered the impact of technology at all. Instead, they developed equilibrium models wherein technology was as- sumed as given, or was considered an "exogenous variable." (English transla- tion: We don't know what to do with it, so we're leaving it out.) The dynamic Impact of technological change was completely ignored, with the result that the economic consequences, let alone social manifestations, of technological change were frequently misconstrued. That Is certainly not the case today. More and more economists are beginning to consider-to measure-technology's impact upon the entire economy, although some economists (for example, Robert Hell- broner) deplore that the concentration of the econometricians on the statistical data blind them to those consequences which are less capable of measurement. But in any event, we cannot expect the economists to do the job alone. Tech- nology assessment comprehends the full range of second- and third-order conse- quences, not just the economic ones. Hence, technology assessment must be a multidisciplinary field, requiring expertise from many different areas. Sociologists have long been concerned about the consequences of technological change, and they were the first to utilize a quantitative approach in their study. The pioneer in such investigations was William Fielding Ogburn, who was one of the leading scholars in the 19~7 TNEO study "Technological Trends and National cy~° In some of his earlier studies, Ogburn's pioneer assesments had gone astray because he made the mistake of considering individual technological advances in isolation, rather than dealing with associated technical advances and accom- panying changes in society. By* 1937, however, he and his colleagues were more sophisticated in their approach. The TNEO report, for example, included tech- nological forecasts (that is, what would happen in new technologies) as well as the social consequences thereof. Their predictions of future technical develop~ ments were based mostly on extrapolating existing trends. About half. of their predictions were off the mark, as for example, that diesel aircraft engines would be feasible and commercially important, that the bulk of railroad freight would be hauled by steam locomotives, that the dirigible would take over from the airplane for transAtlantic flights, that auto engines of the future would be smaller and lighter and hence use less fuel (a prediction which might eventually be true, but not for the reasons~ which they advanced back in 1937), and that electrical generating plants using steam power would not employ units larger than 50 megawatts. The PNEO authors did somewhat better in predicting some social consequences of technologies: that the automobile would bring about increased mobility in American life, that suburban living would grow, and that urban lifestyles would spread throughout rural America. They felt that safer ocean vessels and other means of transport would expand international business and affect political organizations, and they even anticipated that television, just then in its early stages, would grow-although some might question their prediction that televi. aba would create greater family cohesion. ~°See footnote 12. PAGENO="0030" 26 However, the most Important thing about the TNEC report is not how i~c- curate or Inaccurate its assessments and projections were when viewed some forty years later. The important thing about the TNEC is that is recognized that technological change produces all sorts of social and economic changes, and its underlying assumption that the impact of technology upon society can Oe anticipated. Easing itself upon Ogburn's notion of "culture lag," (i.e., society lags behind In adapting itself to technological changes),. the report stated that new technologies give out "signals" of impending social change, although it takes about 30 years for a new technology to make its social Impact felt. The methods employed by the authors of the TNEO report was largely simple extrapolation of current trends. Because they had no electronic computers or mathematical techniques for dealing with any complications or with any more than one variable, thOir extrapolations are unsophisticated by today's standards. Nevertheless, even with these crude methods, the TNEO report succeeded in achieving a respectable level of accuracy In description and prediction. Given the shortcomings of the TNEiC report, have we since developed the know-how for more accurate and meaningful technology assessment? We are certainly in the process of doing so, although there are still some serious methodological questions which have not yet been resolved. B. Improvements in hardware and software One factor in our growing capability to assess social and human consequences of technological change is the fact that we now have a growing body of data on society, plus increasing ability to collect and process-that is, manipulate-~-- the data. Both the hardware and the software are becoming Increasingly accurate and sophisticated, enabling us to deal with dynamic variables in very complex situations. Along with these are fundamental developments In mathematics, statistics, and general systems theory. Of course, sophisticated expertise in manipulating vast quantities of statistics can still lead one astray if one employs a basically faulty approach or if one misinterprets the meaning of one's computer printouts. That is what happened to the highly publicized systems analysis employed in "The Limits to Growth" study, sponsored by the Club of Rome. Its reliance upon a miseonceived extrap~ olation methodology and Its disregard of historical actualities led to strong criticism and to eventual modification of Its gloomy assessment of the future consequences of technological advanee.~' Despite such false starts, the fact is that It is now possible to produce dynamic models of systems involving complex human and social variables, and our skill is growing. Systems and operations researchers are increasingly competent to pro- vide probabilistic data regarding the Impact of scientific amid technological decisions on social trends an.d changes. However, the ability to store and retrieve information and to handle variables Is not sufficient by itself. We can gather and manipulate vast quantities of statistical data, but what do the figures mean? For the data must be Interpreted by "experts," and here we run Into difficulties, Many technology assessments have relied basically on the Delphi technique, or variations thereof, to produce a consensus of "informed judgment" among specialists in the field. To make certain that all eventualities are thought of with all possible outcomes, the experts' "guess-timates"-some of which are based on very sophisticated mathematical techniques (e.g., inpnt~output simula- tion models, Bayesian statistics, mathematical decision models, and the like)- are organized under such titles as "cross-impact," "cross-support," or "cross- rqlevant" matrices. Values are assigned, sometimes very subjectively, to allow for the systematic comparison of relationships between Impacts or objectjves.~ ~ Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens, "The Limits to Growth" (New York, 1972); Mihalo Mesaro~ric and Edward Pestel, "Mankind at the Turning Point" (The Second Report to the `Club of Rome) (New York, 1974). For critiques, see Andrew Weinraub, Eli Schwartz, and J. Richard Aronson, eds., "The Economic Growth `Controversy" (White Plains, N.Y., 1913) ; and H. 5. D. Cole et al., "Models of Doom" (New York, 1978). ~ For brief discussions of technology assessment methodologies see Marvin Cetron "Counter-Intuitive Thinking and Its Place In Technology Assessment," in Vary Coates and Mock, op. cit., pp. 16-17; Martin V. Jones, "A `Comparative State-of-the-Art Review of Selected IJ.IS. Technology Assessment Studies (National Science Foundation: Wasbin~- ton 1973). See also ~`rancois Hetman, "Society and the Assessment of Technology" (Paris. PAGENO="0031" 27 The dangers of relying on such partial-ofttimes inaccurate data-and upon the vagaries of such subjective judgments are obvious. One need not dwell upon the limitations of experts or even call attention to the catastrophic errors engendered by the ambiguous oracular prophecies of the Deiphic priestesses to see the methodological problems which beset technology assessment at this early stage of its development. However it is important to recognize that strong efforts are being made to cope with the weaknesses in the methodology, and there have been resultant improvements in technology assessments. The most recent ones, for example, are much more comprehensive, more objective, more specific, more conscious of their limitations, and much more reliable than the crude blackboard exercises in cross-impact analysis that we indulged in at methodological conferences only a scant five years ago. In brief, progress has been made. And, as we obtain more experience In the field and as it becomes the object of more scholarly study-as is now the case-we are getting better and better at it. C. Growth of iuwi~iary disciplines Whole mew subdisciplines are being called into being to assist in the develop- ment of technological assessment capabilities. One of the most important of these is known as Social Indicators,23 which identifies and compiles th~i data base necessary for systematic analysis of the social impacts of technological developments. We are familiar with indicators in other connections. Blood pressures, m~lne specimens, blood tests, X-rays give indications about the physical condition and some general idea of the health of an individual. Similarly, a number of economic statistics-gross national product, money supply, consumer price index, personal. income, and the like-give us information about the overall state of the nation's economy. Social Indicators can be somewhat more elusive. Although physical measure- nients can be used, Social Indicators deal with such intangibles as the "quality of life," which can depend on an Individual's subjective response in terms of his own perceptions of quality.~ The Social Indicator movement sets base lines for indicators and develops them for broad areas of life, including such things as the resPjentigl environment, the work experienCe (e.g., job satisfaction), marriage and family life, persona' resources, and the like. In brOad areas there a~e a number of sub-indicatQrs; for example, the general field of health would include such items as the cost of health services, quantity and quality of health education, infant mortality, life spans, and the like. We can measure a lot of things, but we are not always sure. what they might indicate. For example, what does It mean when we discover that bicycles have begun to outsell automobiles, that the sale of health foods quintupled in the two years from 1970 to 1972, that sterilization new exceeds abortions, or when divorce rates go up and down? There is likely to be some disagreement over the relation- ships between any set of indicators and the "quality of life." Parallel with Social Indicators is the development of Science Indicators, Spon- sored by the National Science Board, these indicators are intended to measure American science-"to demonstrate its strength and Weaknesses and to follow its changing character." The first publicatjon, "Science Indlcators-1972," ,`~ was criticized because of Its Concentration upon figures which measured the scientific endeavor in very ntlrrow terms. A Subcommittee on Science Indlcator~ of the Social SCience Research Council was highly critical of the NSB's efforts in considering what is meant by the "health of science," the techniques employed, the measurements of scientific productivity, and the failure to measure specifle linkages between science and other aspects of society.2' `~ The pioneer study was `Raymond A. Bauer, ed., "Social Indicators" (t~ambridge, Mass., 1966), which derived from a 1966 study sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. ~` See Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, "Social Indicators of Wellbeing: Americans' Perceptions of Life Quality" (New York, 1976) ; and `Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, "The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions" (`New York, 1976). ~` National Science Board, "Science Indicators~1,972" (N:SB_73_i),. (Washington: Government Printing Office, `1973); National Science Board, "Science Indicators-'19'74" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). ~` Robert Merton, Harriet Zuckerman, et al, "Toward a Metric of Science" (in press). PAGENO="0032" 28 Another criticism is that "Science Indicators" neglected some items which might strictly be termed "technology indicators." Certain activities which are meaningful in terms of the developemnt of technology, might not be covered in a quantitative study of the scientific enterprise. Anticipating such criticism, "Science Indicators-1974" included a discussion of industrial R&D, new Infor- mation on the role of basic science and advancing technology, international as- pects of technological innocation, and changing public attitudes toward science. Just as each technological invention requires the creation of additional inno- vations to make it effective, so the development of Science Indicators and Social Indicators have stimulated development in Social Forecasting and Technology Forecasting. Social Forecasting has long been practiced-from ancient seers to the science fiction spawned by H. G. Wells and his successors-but only recently has it begun to develop its methodology along the same lines as Social Indicators.2' Any Social Forecasting would be doomed to failure if it is based upon a static technology. To be effective, Social Forecasting would have to take into account changing technology. But how can one tell in what directions technology Is mov- ing? To answer that question still another methodological discipline is coming into being: Technology Forecasting. Like Social Forecasting, it has a long pedi- gree-Friar Roger Bacon in the 12th century "forecast" a long list of future innovations-but only recently has it begun to develop a methodology beyond the intuitive guesswork stage. Technology Forecasting is, as one of Its pioneers, James R. Bright, has said, "just past infancy. The methodology is Incomplete. Most basic concepts have not been rigorously tested, and some are little more than promising or Intriguing hypotheses. The field stands where economic forectisting stood perhaps 70 years ago." 28 The point is that society requires better ways to anticipate the emergence of new technolOgy, so that technology assessment can be anticipative and also con- sider positive alternatives to those technologies at hand. Still another new subdiscipline is evolving, calling upon the skills of political scientists, soicologists8 systems analysts, and others. Known as "evaluation re- search," it attempts to develop criteria for judging the degree of success or failure of various public policy measures. In other words, It attempts to. answer the question: How can we tell if a public policy is really successful in meeting its professed aims? Development of evaluation studies results from the increasing role of the social sciences in the making of public policy. Although its formal study dates only from the early part of this decade, evaluation has begun to become a neces- sary tool for public administrators, policy makers, budget controllers, and social service workers, and Interest In it has been heightened by the new federal em- phasis on zero-based budgeting and on accountability.29 Because evaluators are being asked to assess the impact of public programs on many of the social, eco- nomic, psychological, and political aspects of our lives, it promises to become a valuable tool for technology assessment in the future. As an historian, I am particularly happy that research is going forward in "Retrospective Technology Assessment." The purpose is to see if, given our present understanding of the interactions between technology `and society and our current statistical and mathematical know-how, one could have predicted at the time of their Introduction the eventual social impact of, say, the auto- mobile, or the telephone, or submarine telegraphy.3° As one surveys the budding subdisciplines growing from the technology as- sessment root, one cannot help but be impressed by the vitality and hardiness of these new growths. Their burgeoning is a manifestation of the urgent need for and interest in technology assessment. The point is that the problem of evalu- ~ Daniel P. Harrison, "iSocial Forecasting Methodology: Suggestions for Research" (Russell Sage Foundation: New York, 1976). ~ James R. Bright, "A Brief Introduction to Technology Forecasting" (Austin, Tex., 1972) ; Erich Jantsch, "Technological Forecasting in Perspective" (Paris, 1966) Robert V. Ayres, "Technological Forecasting and Long-Range Planning" (New York, 1969) and Joseph Martino, "Technological Forecasting for Decisionmaking" (New York, 1972). ~ See Gene V. Glass, ed, "Evaluation Studies Review Annual," Vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1976); Marcia Guttentag, ed., Evaluation Studies Reviews Annual, Vol. 2 (1977). ~° roel A. Parr, "Retrospective Technology Assessment" (Conference Report), "Tech- nology and Culture" 18 (October 1977), in press; the full proceedings of the Carnegie- Mellon University Conference on Retrospective Technology Assessment (December 1976) is scheduled for publication by the San Francisco Press. PAGENO="0033" 29 ating the human and social consequences of technological applications has challenged existing research disciplines, causing them to bring forth new tools of knowledge in order to meet the, powerful societal demand for technology assessment. Nevertheless, some problems remain. D. ~o'me un~resolved problems Now that technology assessment is out of the conceptual state, through the legislative process, and into its operational phase, there are still many challeng- ing problems. First, it is still not clear what criteria are to be used in deciding. which technologies are to be assessed. After all, If an assessment is made on every new technical development before it is applied, the OTA might bog down completely under the workload, and technology assessment would really become technology "arrestmertt" or "harassment" as some of its early critics claimed. Other problems include: Who is to do the assessing? At what point in the process of technological development is the assessment to be made? And how is it going to be made? In other words, what methodologies are to be used in technology assessment? As I have indicated above, many new subdisciplines are being called into being, and the `already flourishing and growing literature in technology assessment is filled with different methodological approaches. It is now becoming clear that there might not be one single "best" method for tech- nology assessment. Instead, there might be several different "best" methods, depending on the field of technology, nature of the innovation, time-span, im- pacted groups, and the like. A multiplicity of methods may give rise to some confusion, but the competing methodologies are also a sign of vitality and a source of intellectual stimulation. Furthermore, it might be advantageous to employ multiple methodologies in order to arrive at meaningful assessment, instead of a single study of potential impacts employing a single method.3' Some of the methodological problems are inherent in the subject matter. Be- cause technology `assessment deals with enormously complex interactions, it is frequently difficult to disentangle the threads, even for analytical purposes. For example, "Our knowledge of ecosystemic interactions is too limited to state with certainty and inclusiveness what aspects are itkely to b-e--~affeeted." Furthermore, there are problems in linking the technology assessment with policy makers and decision makers. Representative Charles A. Mosher, a mem- ber of this Subcommittee, has enumerated in concise and illuminating form some of the difficulties confronting Congressmen in dealing with technology assess- ment.33 Given Congressman Mosher's delineation of the difficulties in coupling the technology assessment community with the political community, the striking fact is that so much has been accomplished. Obviously the Congress is making a very determined effort to understand `and employ this new tool for compre- hension of the impacts of science and technology on America's life now and In the future. Looking at this from the standpoint of an outsider, I think the Office of Technology Assessment has been very sensitive to the need for linking together the scientific and political communities, and for presenting its find- ings in a form which can be utilized by our decision makers. To reinforce Congressman Mosher's point, we should take note of the fact that up to now the technology assessment movement has avoided the kind of ad- versary relationship with business interests that has characterized the environ- mental movement. Technology assessment takes no emotional stands, nor does it embody any particular social stance; instead, it is designed to indicate the probabilities of various second- and third-order consequences which might emerge from te~hnological applications. Decisions about technical applications will become more difficult in the future when the focus will gradually shift from monitoring negative side effects to the positive and constructive function of indicating the tradeoffs involved in several different technological options. For example, just a couple of years ago there was the danger that the "energy crisis" would abort the technology assessment move- ment In its infancy; in our haste to relieve ourselves of the energy "crunch," it ~i Frederick A. Rossini, Alan A. Porter, and Eugene Zucker, "Multiple Technology Assess- ments" Journal of the International Society for Technology Assessment 2 (SprIng 1976) ~ Donald N. Michael, "Risk-Benefit Analysis in a Turbulent Society," Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Science. Research, and Technology, May 5, 1977. ~ Charles A. Mosher, "A Creative Future for the Congress ?" Speech at 2d International Congress of Technology Assessment (Ann Arbor, Mich.; September 1976) ; printed in TA Update, Vols. 3-4 (1976-77). 96-205 0 - 78 - PAGENO="0034" 30 was feared that we might embrace technologies which would do irreparable damage to the environment and to that elusive entity, "the quality of life." Instead, it is now clear that in our efforts to cope with the long-term energy crisis, the emphasis will be on the development of new and socially more accept- able alternative technologies. That, of course, is a major problem for technology assessment. How is it to point the way to research and development which will promote desirable tech- nologies relating more closely to our rapidly changing society? In brief, what is to be the relationship between our technology and our social objectives? How can we make certain that our technology is directed toward meeting our national goals? v. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE The choices and alternatives which technology assessment can set before us must be judged in the light of their contribution toward meeting our national goals. Unfortunately, we have not always been certain of our goals except in the broadest terms, and we have frequently been divided when it comes to specific goals or to the means to achieve them. Indecision about the basic directions of American society and our failure to regain a consensus on the nature of our public commitment will hamper technology assessment in its choice of problems to assess and in investigating the options open to us. Nevertheless, I remain optimistic. Technology assessment is necessary if we are to remain a viable society, and I am happy to report that it is fast becoming an important and vital part of our American scene-and promises to become more so in the future. It is sometimes said that "nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come." That may be good rhetoric, but it is bad history. I could name several ideas-world brotherhood and world peace, for example-whose time has been around for the past 2,000 years but which have rarely affected the real actions of man. Yet technology assessment is a powerful idea whose time has come. For in order to resolve the ills which beset our contemporary, urbanized, indus- trialized society, we will have to employ more and better technology-and with more wisdom than ever before. As America enters its third century, let me remind you that technology assess- ment is an outgrowth of our revolutionary heritage. It is part of a growing political current which goes under the heading of "participatory democracy." The fact is tha1 American democracy is extending itself to meet the ideas set forth in our great American Revolution. People are demanding a greater voice In their destinies, and since technology represents an important element in our human experience, they are demanding, and, in a truly democratic society, they will obtain, greater control of their technology. Technology assessment provides a rational means for democra~c control and guidance of technology. Technology assessment reaffirms my faith in man and it strengthens my faith In democracy. Let me explain. At a time when many nay-sayers deprecate American culture, saying that we have become a nation of hedonistic materialists and that we have allowed tech- nology to rule our lives, technology assessment insists that man is still in control of his destiny, and that we are not the playthings of a mindless technology which crushes us underfoot. It means that man is master of the machine which be has created, not its slave. I think it is high time that we reaffirmed our ability to utilize the machines and tools and processes which human skill, imagination, and creativity have produced to serve the common weal rather than the narrow interests of a special few. Technology assessment is also democratic. It does not mean that a group of technocrats, or a scientific and technological elite, will make decisions for us. These will be made by the political process, and that, in a democratic system, is where such decisions belong. Democracy allows us the privileges of making mistakes. Technology assessment merely tells us the options open to us and their possible and probable consequences. So, even if we have highly skilled tech- nology assessment, we can still make mistakes in our use of technology. But we will make our mistakes through choice, not through ignorance of the conse- quences. Archibald MacLeish once said, "America was promises." I think America is still promises. We can make those promises come true if we have the will to utilize our technological skills and the wisdom to direct our technology to take us where we want to go. In that process technology assessment can help make PAGENO="0035" 31 the American promises into reality, and enable future generations of Americans to go on to new promises. HISTORICAL BACKO1iOUND or TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT (ABSTEACT OF INVITED TESTIMONY) For most of history, man's assessment of technology's consequences was limited to first-order effects, mainly military and economic, and restricted to considera- tion of the benefits derived by a small, elite group. Technological change was slow and its social impact almost indetectable. What makes today's Technology Assessment-the analytical consideration of the second- and third-order conse- quences-necessary and desirable at this juncture in human history? There are several underlying causes. First is the broadening and deepening impact of technology arising from the Industrial Revolution, which accelerated technological change and transformed where and how people lived, worked, thought, played, and prayed. The scale of technological application, the syner- gistic effect of clusters of innovations, and the interdependence of modern, urban, industrialized society have made technology's impact upon people's lives more profound than ever before. A second underlying cause is a growing awareness of-and in some cases, protest against-technology's impact upon life and society. Although 19th-cen- tury workers' movements, socialist critiques, and Romantic literary protests had little impact on the directions of technology, they did succeed in raising aware- ness of technology's impact on social life. The mechanized slaughter of World War I followed by the worldwide Depression first led to serious questionings of the technological foundations of modern industrial society. Concomitant with the Industrial Revolution were the American and French Revolutions with their emphasis on egalitarian philosophies. Public policy en- larged its sphere of interest to include concern for the wellbeing of the mass of the citizens, not just an aristocratic elite. Hence, a third underlying cause is the growth of political concepts and practices which provided a justification for governmental action in matters of technology. Nevertheless, concrete action against technology's "dis-benefits" was limited to legislation designed to remove precepts and by the popular view equating industrial progress with human specific abuses. Public policy remained restricted by laissez-faire economic welfare. Against this background came the immediate cause which precipitated today's Technology Assessment: Disenchantment with the failure of American society to achieve Utopia, and hence a questioning of all institutions, including the value of scientific and technological advance. The culmination of World War II by the atom bomb startled the public into an awareness that an unbridled technology could destroy the physical environment as well as human beings, and could threaten the life of unborn generations. In the early 1960s, two crusading indi- viduals, Rachel Carson and Ralph Nader, wrote popular tracts which shocked the public into facing the threats to present and future generations posed by the unheeding application of technology in pursuit of narrow, selfish interests. By the mid-1960's, studies were undertaken of the possibility of assessing technolo- gies before they were applied as an "early warning" signal of possible dangers; and within a short time, the U.S. Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment, as well as specialized agencies for environmental protection, occu- pational safety and health, and the safety of consumer products. By that time, however, the concept of Technology Assessment had been extended to the analysis and promotion of positive alternative technologies, not just a preventive instrument. Such political instruments for control of technology require a knowledge base and tools for making viable assessments. So the question arises: Even if Tech- nology Assessment is necessary and desirable, is it feasible? In other words, is reliable assessment possible? The development of computer "hardware" enables the culmination, storage, retrieval, and manipulation of vast quantities of data; growing sophistication in "software" makes it possible to assess the complicated interactions of technology with other sociopolitical-economic elements. In add!- tion, Technology Assessment has called whole new subdisciplines into being, such as Technology Forecasting and Social Indicators, and has stimulated his- torians to undertake "retrospective technology assessments." Nevertheless. It still faces some major methodological questions. PAGENO="0036" 32 Philosophically, Technology Assessment recognizes that technology is not an autonomous and determinant force; politically, it means that the people, rather `than a small ruling class or elite technocrats, should control technology. In its ideal form, Technology Assessment provides a rational means for democratic control and guidance of technological change, and represents an extension of our American heritage. Question 1. What courses do you teach in your institution which involve tech- nology assessment and to what extent Is the concept itself emphasized? Answer. I teach two courses: a survey course in the History of Technology and a seminar on Technological Innovation. In both courses, Technology Asses& ment is given prominent mention. In my History of Technology survey, it receives much attention when I get to contemporary times and also in the brief glimpse into the future at the end of the course. Technology Assessment also gets a great deal of treatment in my Innovation seminar when I deal with contemporary issues affecting innovation. I make frequent "guest" appearances in other courses at Georgia Tech. We have specific courses on Technology Assessment; these are taught by younger colleagues, and I am usually asked to give introductory, background lectures about the development of Technology Assessment in those courses. In addition, I am invited to give lectures in "professional development" courses given by my colleagues in the engineering departments. Thus, during the past year, I have spoken to the graduate students in Nuclear Engineering, the seniors in Chemical Engineering, the freshmen in Mechanical Engineering-and in all cases, Tech- ology Assessment has played a large part in my presentation. Let me explain why. My colleagues on the engineering faculty can teach our students all they should know about the technical aspects of engineering. My role as an historian of tech- nology is not to tell these technical students how things run or even simply to list "great inventions" in chronological order. Instead, my mission is to make them aware of the soclo-cultural context in which technology develops and the inter- actions between technology and society. That leads me directly into Technology Assessment, which thus forms an integral part of my course offerings as well as special lecture and seminar assignments. Question 2. Do you have an estimate as to bow many institutions of higher edu- cation in the country offer courses similar to yours? Answer. I assume that the question refers to courses in Technology Assessment or some form thereof-sometimes a course might be called "Technology and Pub- lic Policy"-rather than in the number who offer courses in the History of Tech- nology. More and more institutions-starting first with the engineering schools- offer courses d~allng with aspects of technology policy, and these courses perforce include Technology Assessment. For example, I first met Gail Pesyna, of your subcommittee staff, at a conference on "University Education for Technology and Public Policy" held at Washington University (St. Louis) last December. There were about 140 people at that conference, from government, industry, and public interest organizations, as well as from universities. There are major programs in technology and public policy at Carnegie-Mellon, MIT, George Washington lni- versity, Stanford, Oklahoma, and Michigan. A couple of years ago the Cornell University Program on Science, Technology, and Policy conducted a survey (by Ezra Heitawit) which attempted to list all the institutions and the specific courses dealing with technology policy. That number has grown since then and is constantly growing. Even institutions which do not have engineering schools-St. Louis University, for example-are developing programs involving the interactions of technology with society. Technology Assessment plays a pretty large role in such courses. I serve on the Advisory Committee of the NEH Program on Science, Tech- nology, and Human Values, and I can confident~v assert that courses called Technology and Society," or "Technology and Values," or "Science and `So- ciety, and the like are about the "hottest" thing on U.S. campuses today. These courses are not just a passing fancy. They will continue to grow in number and strength because of the importance of science and technology in our daily lives. our public affairs, and our future. Question 3. You mentioned in your testimony possible cooperation with regard to handling technological problems between nations. Do you see a problem here In differing reactions based upon different national interests? For example, the PAGENO="0037" 33 Toxic Substances Control Act recently enacted, has drawn a great deal of criti-. cism and fire from other nations. Answer. Yes, I see a problem in international cooperation in handling tech- nological problems arising from different national interests. Take the simple case of DDT. Nations such as the United States, in the northern, industrialized tier of states, are not troubled with malaria; our high technological level enables us to use alternative means of pest control to achieve the same results as DDT at a slightly higher cost. So we can afford to ban DDT. Other nations, however, are not so well placed. They must use any and every technological advance which they can afford in order to subsist, even if that technology might have harmful side effects. For example, India must have the insecticidal benefits of DDT de- spite its possible harmful side effects, because it would not be economically feasi- ble for India to change to an insecticide less persistent than DDT which would re- quire spraying every few weeks instead of twice a year. According to World Health Organization statistics (of about five years ago), the use of DDT in India cut down the incidence of malaria from 100 million cases a year to only 15,600 cases, and the death rate from 750,000 to 1,500 a year. Is it surprising that In- dians view DDT in a somewhat different light than Americans? Let me give you another example. When in 1972 the United Nations held its environmental conference in Stockholm, many of the less-developed nations re- garded it as a plot by the industrially-developed nations to exploit them. They dragged their heels on local action to save the environment, claiming that their needs for development were greater than the need for enviroiim' n~al protection. As Mrs. Gandhi, who was then prime minister of India expressed it, "Poverty and need are the greatest pollutions." And who can fault the developing nations for placing food and jobs for their people ahead of possible environmental damage? Differing ideas of national interests in regard to cooperation on technological matters will be a continuing problem, but it is not unsolvable. The United Nations put its environmental agency In the heart of Africa, partly to assuage those third-world nations who wanted this prestigious organization to place a head- quarters In their midst, but also to make them aware of environmental problems and feel that they are participating In their study and solution. What we have is a big educational task on our hands. We have to convince the less-developed nations that we are not trying to exploit them or to hold hack their industrial development when we try to diminish environmental pollution. In some cases, it is one of those "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situations. For example, certain polluting industries might find it too costly to comply with en- vironmental legislation In the Industrialized states, and these might then move to developing nations which have no such regulations; we would then be criticized for "exporting pollution." However, the proNem is also a technical one as well as an educational one. By promoting better technologies, that is, more efficient and less costly ones, we can show that it is profitable to avoid polluting the world. You will recall that there were dire prophecies of many American businesses having to go out of business as a result of the imposition of environmental controls. The Environmental Protec- tion Agency has given out figures which show that very few factories were forced to close because of environmental regulations; instead, new industrial opportun- ities arose in order to provide anti-pollution devices. Besides, newer and better technologies pollute less than the older, obsolete ones. So what we must do Is use a combination of (1) better technology (that is, less polluting and less wasteful, and more efficient and cost-effective), (2) social in- novations (getting the other nations to participate in decisions affecting all of us), and (3) education (to make them aware of possible harmful consequences in the future). This is not an easy task, but it is better than refusing to undertake it altogether. The problem of International cooperation with other industrialized countries is quite different from that with the developing nations. Instead of generalized fears of exploitation, the problem can be analyzed in terms of specific industries and specific technologies, because the developed nations are already aware of Technology Assesment and are in general agreement that something should be done. I think, therefore, that in dealing with such international problems with the industrialized nations, it might be done on a step-by.step basis-one industry or one technology at a time-with the governments involved getting togetht~r with the industries in their respective éonntries and meeting on that level. PAGENO="0038" 34 I shall be attending a conference in Edinb~rgh where I expect to see Dr. Fukashima, who has been active in environmental work on the Japanese Science Council, and I shall ask him for any suggestions lie might have regarding inter- national cooperation. The following week I shall be at a conference in Sweden, where I shall be talking about the development of Technology Assessment, and I intend to question some Swedish officials about their activities in Technology Assessment and possible internati'onal cooperation activities. Your question makes no mention of multinational corporations. If we disre- gard all the mythology about multinationals (although mythology plays a large role in political decisions, let us remember) and think about the multinationals solely in terms of their role as agencies of technology transfer and as devices for developing an international division of labor, we might consider the role which they might possibly play in resolving the technological problems between nations. In other words, we might regard the multinationals-at least in this partciular case-as possible instrumentalities to use at arriving at international cooperation; they are peculiarly well-placed to reconcile divergent national in- terests in technological matters, but no one has thought to use them in that way. Question 4. Would you comment on the importance of devising methodological standards or criteria for doing technology assessments. While the establishment of any single methodology is probably not possible, would it not be useful to be able to lay down certain guidelines on the basis of empiric research? Answer. Yes, we must devise methodological standards or criteria for doing technology assessments. I think it particularly important that we devise some means for deciding which technologies are to be assessed. We cannot attempt to provide a full assessment of every possible technological innovation, lest TA bog down completely. But we might try some "mini-assessments" in order to decide which technologies might have sufficient impact to deserve full scale assessments. Another idea which has been put forward is to require a "social-impact" statement for each innovation, similar to environmental-impact statements which are now required by the environmental legislation. This might be done through patent legislation. For example, the patent laws call for some statement regarding utility of a patent application. Why not also ask for some statement of social utility, including possible "dis-utility"? This might provide a means for screening out those inventions which might have some major impacts and sub- jecting them to major and detailed assessments. However, I am only lukewarm about this suggestion. For one thing, such social-impact statements might turn into routine formulas. Second, we could hardly expect an inventor to look very closely into negative impacts of his brainchild. And besides, I don't want to put any more hindrances in the way of innovation. There are other methodological problems besides deciding which technology is to be assessed. For example, at what stage in an innovation is the assessment to be made? If one waits until the innovation is ready to be test-marketed and go into mass production, that means that the company has already sunk millions of dollars in it and hence there are pressures to let it go through-just look at what happened to the automobile emission standards which were supposed to take effect with the 1978 models! Nevertheless, technology assessment should be an iterative process, and it seems to me that one should begin making quick assessments at the idea-generation stage of an innovation, not just at the very end when it reaches the pilot plant state or is being test-marketed. Perhaps the most sensible plan is to develop some key social indicators, and require that every new technology should be quickly assessed on the basis of possible impacts on these key indicators. That means that one will not have to assess every single social impact but a rough-and-ready assessment can be quickly done on the basis of a few indicators-and then it can be seen if a major and more detailed assessment is necessary. After all, the IRS has its computers programmed to throw out certain returns for review on the basis of some for- mulas which indicate that, say, the deductions for travel, or alimony, or medical care, or something of that nature are out of line. Well, it seems to me that one could over a period of time arrive at a set of key indicators which would enable *one to judge at a glance whether or not the impact of a given technological innovation should be more carefully examined in depth. These key indicators could be constantly reviewed and refined, as is done by the BLS on its cost-of- living indexes. PAGENO="0039" 35 We are already developing different methodological "schools" in technology assessment. Each of these "schools" might have their value, depending upon the field of technology which is involved, thus, it is entirely reasonable to expect that one particular type of assessment methodology might be better in looking at the impact of chemical innovations, another one for electronic innovations, and so on. But we should also try to see if different methodologies will arrive at the same results when dealing with the same innovation. In order to do that, the OTA might give out research grants for studying the social impact of the same technological innovation by two or more institutions employing different methodological approaches. Then we can see which ones seem to be giving us the plausible answers. After all, in bidding for government contracts, we allow two or more contractors to show how their products can perform. Why can't we let "think tanks" and universities compete with one another by doing assessments of the same technological innovation while using different methods. Once we have that experience, we can develop some guidelines and decide which method- ologies should be used for different kinds of technology or different kinds of inno- vations, whether incremental or discontinuous-but that's another whole problem. Question 5. Please elaborate on some of the "major methodological questions" that you see facing technology assessment. Answer. See answer (4) above. Question 6. Does it always require a crusading individual (Carson or Nader) or a crisis (energy, environment) to promote technology assessment or are there other means? Answer. I have given some more thought to my statement before the Sub- committee about the importance of crusading individuals in promoting technology assessments. For one thing, I see no reason why ours should be a "government by crisis." Indeed, one major reason for Technology Assessment is to inform us of risks which we had not earlier foreseen, so that we will not have to face the unexpected and unanticipated. Well, what mechanisms can we employ which would do the job of a Carson or Nader, or of a full-blown crisis? It seems to me that we have already begun to develop such mechanisms in a crude and primitive way during the past dozen years. Through the evolution of various public interest groups who have special concerns-Sierra Club, Barry Commoner's Scientists Public Information Group (or whatever it is called), and a whole host of local groupings. Almost 150 years ago Alexis de Tocqueville remarked on the propensity of Americans to form voluntary associations for one cause or another. Thus, in our country's history, many things have been accomplished by voluntary associations which in most European countries are left to the government; in no other country is there so much in the way of voluntary citizen participation as in our United States. In the past, this voluntary citizen participation has not been directed very much toward scientific and technical matters. Until a few years ago, almost every one believed in the myth of the benevolence of science and technology, and then we were suddenly faced with the opposite view of the malevolence of science and technology. All sorts of emotional and irrational responses have been aroused as a result of matters affecting the environment. (That has become almost a religious question nowadays, not a scientific and technical one.) But who is considering the tradeoffs involved in, say, siting a nuclear plant in New Hamp- shire against siting it elsewhere or against future energy needs, etc.? So, we have the propensity of the American people to form voluntary groups and, occasionally, to raise hell, as do some of the consumerist groups. The effectiveness of the crisis situation and of the crusading individuals rests on their ability to mobilize these voluntary groupings, but there must be some more effective way of doing `it. Thus, for example, the mere existence of a group of scientists who are "monitoring" the environment might be extended to other technological impacts. How can the government encourage citizen monitoring of technological impacts-and have it done on an informed basis rather than an emotional one from `individuals who are already committed to one "true solution"? I would hate to see the government get directly into the monitoring business any more than it has already done with the establishment of the OTA and the TAB. On the other hand, I think that our universities still enjoy some public regard and respect, and they tend to be more neutral and above the fray than other institutions in our society. Perhaps Congress might encourage the estab- PAGENO="0040" 36. lishment of two or three university-based technology assessment centers, which would serve as early-warning systems and which might indicate the tradeoffs involved in judging the worth of an innovation. These would help protect us against emotional protests by self-appointed guardians among our voluntary groupings. These centers might not be so effective as articulate, crusading individuals- but by bringing the combined might of academia and science-technology to bear, they might be listened to. Above all, they could sort out the competing claims of different groups among the scientific and technological community, which is not monolithic in character. On my own campus, for example, engineers from different departments differ greatly in their assessments of different technologies. Thus, the nuclear and solar engineers argue with one another all the time; the architects and city planners are engaged in constant debate with the civil engineers who are busy designing highways, bridges, and sewage systems. Any major engineering school has sufficient breadth and diversity to develop a monitoring center which would not be committed to any one particular tech- nology and which would also be concerned about social impacts. Indeed, the younger ficulty exhibit very much more concern about social impact than the older faculty. In other words, we could set up a new kind of institution-not centralized, but at several differen4 universities-which might be almost as effective as the crusader or the crisis in producing assessments. This new institutional mechanism certainly would not be nearly so alarmist as the crusaders, and hence might ~llow us to make more rational choices in a less-heated atmosphere. Think about that. Mr. THORNTON. While I would like to move rather quickly to the other witnesses, I want to ask my colleague, Mr. Brown, if he has any statement or questions at this time. Mr. BROWN. I think not, Mr. Chairman. I would just as soon hear the other statements and then we can pose our general questions to all the witnesses. Mr. THORNTON. Very good. That is the procedure that I would like to follow but I wanted to recognize you in the event that you had something to say at this time. We would next like to hear from Mr. Walter Hahn, who is the chairman of the International Society for Technological Assessment and the Senior Specialist in Science and Technology for the Congres- sional Research Service. Mr. Hahn, we have your testimony in prepared form before us. Without objection the entire document will be made a part of the record, including the appendices and exhibits thereto. I would like to ask you if you will to please proceed to summarize it. [The prepared testimony and a biographical sketch of Mr. Hahn follows:] PAGENO="0041" 37 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, Research & Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: SOME ALTERNATIVE PERCEPTIONS AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES by Walter A. Hahn Chairman, Board of Directors, International Society for Technology Assessment and Senior Specialist in Science & Technology Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 3 August 1977 Note: The remarks offered are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of either of the above organizations. PAGENO="0042" 38 1NTR000CT ION My name is Walter A. Hahn. I am employed as a Senior Specialist in Science and Technology with the Congressional Research Service in the U.S. Library of Congress. Also, I am the founding president, and now chairman of the board, of the International Society for Technology Assessment, a non-profit corporation chartered in the District of Columbia. As I present this testimony, I am speaking for myself only and not presenting the views of either of the above organizations. As I interpret my assignment this morning, it is to describe to this sub- committee the concepts and practices of technology assessment primarily outside tHe United States. Within the United States the Office of Technology Assess- ment hearings in June 1974 have well documented the technology assessment activities of the National Science Foundation. 1/ Similarly, the Office 1/ U.S. Congress. Technology Assessment Board. Technology Assessment Ac- tivities of the National Science Foundation. hearings, (of the Office of Technology Assessment),, 93rd Congress, 2d sess. June 12 and 13, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. rint. Off., 1974. 673 p. of Technology Assessment hearings in June 1976 have amply documented the practices of technology assessment in U.S. industry. 2/ Following this 2/ U.S. Congress. Technology Assessment Board. Technology Assessment Ac- tivities in the Industrial, Academic, and Governmental Communities. Hearings, (of the Office of Technology Assessment), 94th Congress, 2d sess. June 8, 9, 10, and 14, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 391 p. (OTA-x-41.) testimony, it is planned that tomorrow the Acting Director of the Office of Technology Assessment will describe the activities of that institution. Thus, I will concentrate on non-U.S. activities both in the public and PAGENO="0043" 39 private sector and attempt to describe both the ir~stitutional and in-practice aspects of technology assessments in other countries of the world In order for me to communicate accurately what I am saying about this sometimes vague and emerging concept of technology assesanent I will precede my descriptive remarks by some observations on the alternative concepts, some alternative terminology, and attempt to highlight some related activities that sometimes are a part of technology assessment or are at least very closely re- lated to it I will close my remarks with some observations -- please note that they are not analyses with detailed supporting data -- of the implications of my observations I will not attempt to draw conclusions It is perhaps proper at this point to pause and identify the limitations of the information gathered and of the one who has gathered it. First, even the descriptive data of te~hnology assessment activities around *the world are impossible to communicate in detailed form in brief testimony, written or oral I am unaware of any detailed or comprehensive survey of this material but certainly if it were to be gathered in one place the volume would indeed be very large Thus I face the problem of presenting to you in capsule form a plethora of information from a variety of sources My observations are neceasarLly in- fluenced by my many years of experience in the development of the concepts and practice of technology assessment and futures research and from my previous experience in strategic planning analysis and goals setting activities I have been in a central situation in technology assessment due to my position in the International Society for fechnology Assessnent I have participated in organized and critiqued many of the meetings that I will refer to later I have written and reviewed many papers in this area dnd I have taught tech- nology assessiient and futures research at the graduate and undergraduate levels. PAGENO="0044" 40 I state these obvious points to qualify myself as a broadly informed observer and to highlight the obvious biases in favor of the utility of these approaches that must be attendant to that process. Upon being invited to testify at this hearing (14 days ago) I was in the fortunate position to be able personally to conduct interviews at a large gather- ing of informed technology assessors from a variety of countries. I have followed up these personal interviews with similar telephone interviews and the inspection of recent documents from the files of a variety of organizations. I do not in- tend to identify the specific sources, for the responsibility of what I will say is my own. I suspect that some of my individual data are wrong for I know I have received some conflicting descriptions and views from persons within and outside organizations and, occasionally, even between different parties within organizations. Nevertheless, I feel confidant in the pattern presented. First, may I present some concepts and some terminology so that my de- scriptive information will hopefully be more clear. PAGENO="0045" 41 A FRAME OF REFERENCE Although the words technology assessment have been in use about ten years there are still a wide variety of meanings as to what technology assessment is, what is unique about it, and who these assessors are. I will resist the temp- tation to offer yet another definition of technology assessment and instead refer the committee to the ones in use by the Office of Technology Assessment, the National Science Foundation, or those in this committee's Science Policy Glos~~. 3/ All of these definitions are close enough to each other and are 3/ U.S. Congress. house. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Science Research, and Technology. Science Policy: A Working Glossary. Prepared by the Science Policy Research Oivision, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Third Edition-1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., March 1976. (Committee Print) familiar to the Subcommittee and therefore, will serve to convey what I am at- tempting to communicate when I use the words technology assessment. One aspect of technology asseessment is clear and relatively uncontested and that is that it is a process that concerns impacts. The impacts referred to particularly are those beyond the so-called first-order, or intended and expected consequences of the introduction or use of a technology. As might be expected from the foregoing, what TA focuses on are the unintended, cumu- lative, or so-called second-order impacts of the introduction of a technology. There is also general agreement -- although some scientists, engineers, and lawyers disagree -- that the technology referred to in the term "technology assessment" concerns both those hard technologies associated with engineering and materials, along with the so-called "soft technologies" or social inven- tions. Included in this latter category are insurance, organizations, stan- dards, and other devices that man has constructed for the operation of PAGENO="0046" 42 society arid toe conduct of his affairs rhere is also almost universal agree- ment that the impact areas involve society, other technologies, the economy, the physical environment, and political affairs. (Beginning students of tech- nology assessment help remember this list through the use of the acronym STEEP -- society (other) technology economy environment politics While continuing to refrain from formal definitions perhaps it would be useful to answer three questions frequently posed to those of us involved in TA: What are the elements of a technology assessment? What is new or unique about TA? Who are the assessors? What are the Elements of a Technology Assessment? There may be as many lists of steps or elements in the technology assess- ment process as there are TA practitioners 4/ But they all have in common 4/ Among the two most widely cited are: The Mitre Corporation (Washington Operations) A Technology Assessment Methodology Prepared in cooperation with and for the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President. Washington, June 1971; and 2) Joseph F. Coates. Some Methods and Techniques for Comprehensive Impact Assessment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 6, 341-357 (1974). the objective of communicating the point that TA is a process that extends be- yond evaluating a technology for its feasibility beyond the degree to which it achieves its intended (first order) effects beyond its marketability and beyond the absence of environmental degradation LA is more than technologi- cal forecasting (TF) of what may or most likely will exist in the future al- though TF makes a major contribution to TA. What follows is a description of 14 key elements that characterize tech- nology assessment This list is adapted from the two cited above and includes PAGENO="0047" 43 ideas from a variety of additional sources. While other writers would com- bine some of these terms or separate out others, I feel there is no major disagreement among technology assessors that the list reasonably well de- scribes the range of elements included in TA. My thesis is that if all, or almost all, of these 14 elements are present, what we are talking about is technology assessment. If only a few of the ele- ments are involved perhaps we are only preparing a feasibility study, an economic (or cost! benefit) evaluation, an environmental impact statement, or some other valid and necessary but narrower or different process. Please note that I do not argue that TA is superior or inferior, or better than other analytical and policy approaches -- just different. Note also that in practice these elements are not a series of ordinal steps. Rather, the process starts at various places, recycles many times, and the emphasis on each element varies widely with each assessment. PAGENO="0048" 44 Problem Statement. What is the subject of this TA? Values, Codes, and Objectives. Toward what objective is the technology under assessment being directed, whose value system shall be applied to the choices, and what are the rules and regulations that obtain? System Definition. What is the scope of this particular inquiry? What things shall be left out of this exercise for some later one, versus included, for assessment? Impact Identification. What are the range of consequences of the intro- duction of this technology on society, other technologies, the economy, the environment, and political affairs? Parties at Interest. Who are the affected parties, who produces and pro- motes the technology, and who are the decision-makers? In other words, the com- plete list of actors involved in this issue and Its outcomes. Methodology and Data Selection. What methods shall be invoked to perform the analyses and what are the data and resources involved? Project Management and Participation Plans. Who will be the project man- ager and by what means shall he conduct the affairs of this assessment, e.g., in-house team, contracts, consultants, or other arrangements? By what means shall the affected parties, the interested parties, and decision-makers be in- volved in the process of assessment? Impact Evaluation. What are the consequences of the impacts identified in the foregoing steps? Who are the winners and losers? PAGENO="0049" 45 Options. What are the alternative ways in which these impacts can be varied or the technology varied to change either the desirable or undesirable impacts in directions more favorable? Identification of Decision-making Apparatus. Who can, and will, make decisions as a result of the assessment? In the case of client-oriented TAs this is often very clear whereas in an early warning TA it may be too soon even to identify who can make a decision. Identify !~xogenous Variables. What can happen that is outside "the sys- tem" defined in the third element that can drastically alter the outcomes or influence the findings? Macro-Alternatives (Other Systems). In what other ways might the same de- sirable ends be achieved or the undesirable impacts avoided? This is often a very difficult area of the assessment for it involves stepping outside of the standard pattern of thinking and looking at completely different alternatives and views. Conclusions and Recommendations. Communication, Dissemination, and Follow-up Plans. Unlike many analytical studies which stop with the production of the report, an essential element of technology assessment is the follow-on communication and dissemination of what was found. This is particularly the case in early warning or alerting tech- nology assessments but often is also important in the client-oriented case. Just submitting a report or a flip-chart presentation at the conclusion of the study to a decision-maker is often insufficient for understanding and action. Only recently have technology assessors followed the lead of the U.S. National Science Foundation initiated in 1972 and included this item explicitly in their budgeting and scheduling. 96-205 0 - 7s - 4 PAGENO="0050" 46 What is New/Unique About technology Assessment? In part, technology assessment is unique in including all 14 of the above elements in its scope in contrast to other more limited process. Of course, technology assessment is also unique in being limited to these elements (and the below characteristics) and not spreading out to include broad science and technology policy, public policy analysis, or futures research in general. As in the previous case, others involved in TA have different lists of those characteristics and stylistic features that dif- ferentiate TA from similar activities. Below is my synthesis of these many lists of features. Again the point being made is that, if all (or most) are present of these ten characteristics it is TA and not some other processes. Policy-Oriented. Technology assessment focuses on ill-defined complex problems that almost invariably involve some change in existing policy or the creation of new policy. Both public policy and the policies of private institutions can be involved. Active. Technology assessment is a process where the analyst takes the initiative with respect to a problem or a technology rather than reacts to a specific dispute as is normally the case in the judicial system. Concerns Beyond Immediate-Intended Impacts. While the primary focus of technology assessment is on the second-order impacts and books have even been written with that title, attempts are made to go beyond to the tertiary and other lapacts to the degree possible. Where appropriate, all reasonable social, technological, economic, environmental, and political impacts are outlined; but of course, the intensity of the focus in each area will vary in accordance with the object of the assessment. It should be noted that both the positive and the negative impacts are investigated in the TA process. In contrast to some early quips, TA does not stand for technology arrest- ment or harassment and is viewed today very positively. PAGENO="0051" 47 Comprenensive and Open-ended While no study would ever pretend to deal with all aspects of the problem TA deliberately tries to extend the range of analytical depth of view of the subject and the variety and range of re- sults. A technology assessment is invariably "open-ended' for one cannot as- sess everything simultaneously and must limit the effort to the problem and systems definition mentioned earlier to the availability of data the time available the resources available the imagination and endurance of the an- alyst and the patience and understanding of the client-decision-maker Interdisciplinary The analysts involved in technology assessment may come from a variety of disciplines like engineering, operations research, law, sociology, information technology, anthropology, etc. Interdisciplinary is used in contrast to "multidisciplinary" studies where the specialties of the various disciplines are preserved in the analysis while interacting only to a limited degree In technology assessment a synergistic reaction has been observed to occur as disciplinary barriers disappear in the continuing inter- action among the various members of the team This latter desirable effect is an added or bonus that comes from the intense and focused effort observed in successful technology assessments. Quantitative Plus Qualitative. Qualitative information is as important, and. often may be more important, in the TA process than quantitative. Certainly, all efforts to be quantitative and specific are desirable but the absence of those traits is no excuse for ruling out important evidence processes and data Both analysis and synthesis are integral parts of the TA process The formal and powerful tools available to skilled analysts and synthesizers are PAGENO="0052" 48 to be used to the utmost, but so are the creativity, imagination, and free- wheeling aspects of other inquiry systems. TA is an iterative process. Seldom does TA proceed from an orderly beginning through some identified series of steps to a usable conclusion but rather recycles back and forth and repeats many of the steps until understanding and confidence reach acceptable levels. Certainty and Uncertainty Made Explicit. In the TA processes, attempts are made to identify the areas of ignorance that are present along with the confidence levels in those things that are only partially known. Impacted Parties/Areas Explicitly Identified. To the degree possible all fuzziness is removed as to who are the winners and losers and what is it that is won or lost. Policy Alternatives. It would be a rare technology assessment that came up with a single definitive answer. Since many parties to the process are involved, there is seldom an optimum or "right" answer. Thus, the result is usually ex- pressed in the style of an "if . . . then . . ." statement. It is here that the analyst identifies the policymaking mechanisms to be used. In other words who are the decision-makers? What processes, rules, customs, and institutions will be involved? What information is needed? Conclusions and Recommendations. The technology assessment community is of two minds with respect to this aspect of the process. Normally those who come from scientific, engineering, and operations research or systems analysis back- grounds favor leaving the making of conclusions and recommendations completely to the decision-makers. A second school of thought says that so much is learned by those who engage in the assessment process that can never be conveyed to non- participant decision-maker parties, that it is wasteful to wrong not to ask the analytical team to offer conclusions and recommendations. If the view that PAGENO="0053" 49 decision-makers and affected parties are in fact at least intermittent partici- pants in the process, this question is softened considerably, for then the learning does occur and the analysts are Oot encrouching on the decision-maker's territory. The views of many parties, analysts, and policymakers on this is- sue are very strong. All parties would do well to be clear, before the assess- ment is undertaken, as to whether or not recommendations shall be made by the analysts and if there are special constraints on their form and disclosure. Who are the Assessors? Most frequently "the assessors" are thought of as being the team of an- alytical specialists engaged in the detailed processes of the technology as- sessment. Certainly, they must be there and they must have a team leader to bring the results into a suitable homogeneous form and to the client or publisher on time. The most popular view of technology assessment is that analysts alone are the assessors and that decision-makers who would use the assessment are a separate group. Many, including this speaker, argue that the decision-makers are more appropriately a part of the assessment process per se. They are invaluable in defining the scope and supplying values and judgments necessary for com- plete analysis and synthesis. Most importantly, it is necessary for them to be in on the proceedings if they are to fully understand the complex and subtle nature of the results. Obviously, legislators, chief executives, and cabinet secretarys cannot be intimately involved in every step of the process but the argument is that they be frequently and personally involved if a two way benefit of their presence is to be incorporated in the process. Practice to date in technology assessment increasingly shows that analysts and decision-makers are necessary but insufficient for viable PAGENO="0054" 50 results. Most importantly, there is a role for the impacted party -- the in- dividuals or groups who suffer the consequences of the technological initiative under investigation Beyond the directly affected parties there are those at interest in citizen groups consumer groups environmental groups and so on who are concerned with the class of actions but maybe not the specific results of an individual action They too feel not only that they must con- tribute to the process, but they may either stop the process or thwart the results if not permitted to do so On the positive side the learning exercise as well as the substantive and procedural contributions from these individuals and groups often is extremely valuable in achieving reliable understandable and acceptable results There is also a fuzzy responsibility for some one of these three parties -- the analysts the decision-makers or the affected parties -- to represent those not present. Those not present include those who are not yet aware of the pos- sible impacts of the study or of the conduct of the assessment and thus are unable to represent their own interests But beyond this the vague notion the public interest must be served Paradoxically civil servants and elected representatives along with appointed officials all feel that it is their profes- sional responsibility to "represent" the public. But increasingly, this same public, while admitting that these individuals are "their representatives," wish in addition to participate personally in these processes One often hears the phrase No one represents me but me A final group not able to represent itself are those unborn of future generations who might be impacted by whatever policies or programs are being initiated as a result of the assess- ment in process As yet it is not clear how these various participative mechanisms can be structured. It is not clear by what rules and customs one person or group PAGENO="0055" 51 is authorized or selected to represent other persons and groups Procedures and rules of conduct for this type of participative process are yet to be in- vented Participation of all of the types of parties and their interests is an area of much confusion and considerable emotion upon which much research, experimentation, and attention will need to be lavished in the very near fu- ture Degree and style of participation are among the major differences in the practice of TA in various countries Types of Technology Assessment As might be expected any process or approach this complex has evolved in several distinct but overlapping styles and viewpoints Because these varying approaches all bear the same label "technology assessment" it is necessary to distinguish among them for clarity in reviewing progress in the application of technology assessment in various institutions and countries If one starts out to assess the social and other impacts of a specific existing emerging or possible hard or soft technology the process starts with analysis of the characteristics of the technology itself and of the intended or expected impacts It then goes through a number of the steps referred to earlier as elements, proceeding from the technology toward the impacts, options, and conclusions. This process is referred to as a technology-oriented technology assessment If on the other hand some social environmental problem is identi- fied something is not proceeding in accordance with expectations goals are not being achieved or unpleasant side effects or surprises are coming from some unknown phenomenon, the process is reversed and the assessment starts with the problem and goes back through the chain of events to identify a PAGENO="0056" 52 technology (hard or soft) as a possible cause. Not unexpectedly, this pro- cess is identified as problem-oriented technology assessment. These tech- nology and problem-oriented terms were coined in 1969 in a U.S. National Academy of Engineering study cited elsewhere in this testimony. Third, an umbrella-like class of technology assessments is labeled policy-oriented. If society, its legislature, a corporation or an executive agency manager are facing some specific decision, developing a strategic plan, or establishing goals and objectives, TA can often be an important element of the decision or action process. Policy-oriented technology assessments are usually concerned with public policy decisions, particularly those of sufficient size or critically of interest to a legislative body that would be expected to call on its office of technology assessment for inputs to the decision process. Nevertheless, the same process can occur in the private sector but the policies are, of course, narrower and of less general interest and impact. As Dr. Melvin Kranzberg, in testimony to the same subcommittee has shown, people were assessing technologies, in however informal a manner, long before the term technology assessment and such classifications as elements and characteristics as has been described above were made explicit. This process was referred to in the White House National Goals Report as "people's technology assessments." 5/ This point is mentioned, since people will continue subjec- 5/ U.S. National Goals Research Staff. Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity with Quality. Report. July 4, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. tively to assess techology for there are not enough resources or time to for- mally assess all of those phenomena that might be of interest in terms of the consequences on society, other technologies, the economy, the environment, or PAGENO="0057" 53 politics. In connection with description of technology assessment in planned economies, the translation of what goes on often amounts to a term equivalent to "peoples' technology assessments" also. The listener should be alert to the dual and different uses of this terminology. While not another category or type of TA, it should be noted that some technology assessments appear to have been conducted not to achieve primarily substantive results for use in policymaking, but to develop or test methodology. Some writers refer to a class of TA studies called "project oriented" but I find these,either not to be technology assessment or adequately covered by the terms suggested above. One last classification scheme hopefully will complete my description of the range of ideas and words involved in the label, "technology assessment." This duality concerns the motivations for initiating a technology assessment. Two terms are used: alerting and client-oriented technology assessments. An alerting, early warning, or broadcast TA is performed at the initiation of an individual or organization that has identified a problem, a technology, or a social discontinuity and performs the TA to inform society or potential decision or action parties of the situation. In contrast, public or private policymakers, e.g., a committee of Congress, a Cabinet secretary, a corporate executive, may order an assessment for use in a specific decision or action setting. Beyond the vagueness or specificity of who will use the results of the technology assessment, these terms also connote a different balance of attention to the various elements in the TA process. For example, as has been mentioned, it may not be possible in an early warning TA to as yet iden- tify the decision-makers. In a client-oriented TA the range of options, the sets of values, and the like may be much more severely limited for they are constraints on the process accepted from the beginning. PAGENO="0058" 54 In the abstract, the above distinctions may appear a bit academic, but they are very real in technology assessment as practiced by academic institu- tions versus industrial institutions, or by Government agencies, or in different social and economic settings among countries. For convenience, the 14 ele- ments, 10 characteristics, list of actors in the TA process, and the names of the "types" of TA are reproduced in four separate exhibits at the end of this paper. It is hopeful that these distinctions will be useful in under- standing the variations on approach, style and content in the descriptive material to follow. PAGENO="0059" 55 AN IDEA SPREADS The origins in the precursors of this Subcommittee of the term technology assessment" and its conceptual implementation are both well known and amply documented. I am unaware of any formal longitudinal studies that have traced the global spread of the awareness and development of the TA ides. Perhaps a quick review of some of the major technology assessment meetings will convey the extent and intensity with which the TA concept has been transferred de- bated transformed and ~.mplemented internationally Many additional significant meetings than there are on this list have been held but a comprehensive list (if one were to be compiled) would be too long for this presentation. Most of the meetings selected were labeled "inter- national" but many of the domestic meetings were attended by individuals from other countries and their proceedings are known to have been studied abroad Technology Assessment Andover N H August 1969 This was the first meeting sponsored by the Engineering Foundation in response to the invitation of the then House Committee on Science and Astronautics. The proceedings were published in a committee hearing document 6/ The program of the hundred attendees was both a state- 6/ Proceedings of the Engineering Foundation Research Conference on Tech- nology Assessment Proctor Academy Andover N H Aug 4-8 1969 In U S Congress House Committee on Science and Astronautics Subcom- mittee on Science, Research, and Development. Technology Assessment. Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st sess. Nov. 18, 24 and Dec. 2, 3, 4, 8, and 12, 1969. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. pp. 359-502. of-the-art survey of TA concepts and methods and of early practice within and outside of government. In particular, the conferees reviewed and PAGENO="0060" 56 discussed the three core documents that served as the bases for the even- tual passage of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972, viz: A. National Academy of Sciences. Committee on Science and Public Policy. Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice. Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 163 p. (At head of title: Committee print.) "[Printed for] the House Committee on Science and Astronautics." B. National Academy of Engineerit~g~. Committee on Public Engineering Policy. A Study of Technology Assessment. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 208 p. (At head of title: Committee print.) "[Printed for] the House Committee on Science and Astronautics." C. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development. Technical Information for Congress. Report . . . prepared by the Science Policy Research Divi sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 92d Congress, 1st sess. Apr. 25, 1969, Rev. Apr. 15, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Of f., 1971. 845 p. (Committee print) Technology Assessment: Management, Andover, N.H. September 1971 Manpower and Methodologies This was the second meeting sponsored by the Engineering Foundation. In addition to the topics in the title the workshop dealt with the organi- zation of TA in the public sector. OECD First International Seminar Paris January 1972 on Technology Assessment Held to implement the 1971 decision of the Ministers of Science, this was an exploratory and organizational meeting of 40 distinguished scholars, technologists, and politicians. The seminar was devoted to discussions of possible TA approaches and usable methods, as well as to first experiences in the field. It led to the 1973 publication by OECD of a comprehensive (and later widely used) publication, Soc~~y~ and the Assessment of Technologj by Francis Hetman. PAGENO="0061" 57 Technology Assessment: Problems Hennekir, N.H. July 1972 and Practice This third Engineering Foundation conference was much more of an indoctrination and educational exercise conducted by leaders in the TA movement for interested industrial, academic, and governmental per sonne 1. Technology Assessment and the Salzburg, Austria September 1972 Quality of Life This was the Annual meeting of the SAINT (Salzburg Assembly: Impact and New Technology) General Assembly. Involving 60 invited participants from 10 countries, a deliberate attempt was made to link the new approaches of TA to achieving specific quality of life ends. A key issue was ways of "putting values to technologies" and of choosing among conflicting goals and values. Technology Assessment: A NATO Lake Garda, September 1972 Advanced Study Institute Italy Involving approximately 40 individuals (not "representatives") from 35 countries, this study institute went quite deeply into the concepts, methodologies, data requirements and institutional forms available for performing impact evaluations of various technological initiatives. No recommendations were forthcoming as this was primarily an exercise in mutual learning among early and would-be practitioners of technology as- sessment. Many of the papers given at this meeting appear in M.J. Cetron and B. Bartocha's book, Technology Assessment in a Dynamic Environment (Gordon and Breach, 1973). First International TA Congress The Hague May 1973 This first large international non-invitational meeting was held to determine the degree to which a world-wide common interest in technology PAGENO="0062" 58 assessment was developing Who were those interested? What were they doing? Attended by about 250 people from 21 countries were scholars from a broad spectrum of scientific engineering behavioral and analytical disciplines politicians interest group representatives legislative and executive branch officials; students; and a few interested citizens. It was the first major gathering sponsored by the new (1971) International Society for TA (ISTA) which had published 20 quarterly issues of its international journal technology Assessment which from its beginning had 18 countries represented on its editorial board The proceedings at the Congress are rewarded in a privately published book by Thomas J Knight Middletown Pa 1976 International Symposium on TA Tokyo November 1974 Jointly sponsored by the ISTA and the Japan Techno-Economic Society, attendance was predominantly Japanese as was the program focus In ad- dition to exploring developing and newly applied methodologies a number of completed governmental and industrial technology assessment cases were presented Southern Regional Conference on TA Atlanta, Georgia May 1974 Sponsored by the National Science Founation, this was an orientation meeting for State and local officials and academics in the Southern States TA (Practitioners) Workshop Columbus Ohio June 1974 Sponsored by the National Science Foundation and conducted by the * Academy of Contemporary Problems, this was a workshop to compare ex- periences and to search for generalizations among people who had com- pleted or were nearing completion of technology assessment. The results were reported in the book by Sherry Arnstein and Alexander Christakis PAGENO="0063" 59 Perspectives on Technology~ Assessment (Science and Technology Publishers Jerusalea 1975) Expert Group Meeting on Technology New York June 1975 Assessment Held under the auspices of the Office of Science and Technology, of the United Nations approximately 20 UN and specialized agency representa- tives met with half as many outside experts The meeting was an attempt to develop an overview of the then existing situation regarding technology in developing countries and in particular to define the concept of "societal assessment of technology" (SAT) and its relationship to technological eval- uation. Recommendations were drawn concerning the application of "SAT" to both developed and developing nations. TA and the Limits to Growth Ottawa February 1975 Jointly sponsored by ISTA Bell Canada and the Canadian Ministry of State for Science and Technology the program focus was on TA in global planning and analysis. There was no solid connection made between the huge world modeling activities and the more national program focused TA efforts but the meeting provided a good exchange among the many nation- alities sectors and disciplines represented Proceedings are available from IS'~A Western Regional Workshop for TA Salt Lake City June 1975 Utah Same as Atlanta meeting for Western States. International Conference on (Marine) TA Monaco October 1975 Jointly sponsored by ISTA and the European Oceanic Association with support from the U S Coast Guard the U S Maritime Administration and PAGENO="0064" 60 the U.S. Army, the program was limited to TA and ocean affairs. Many of the ocean-oriented papers paid little attention to second order impacts and many of the TA papers emphasized methodology over substance. While a successful meeting, the applications of TA to ocean policies was clearly in its early stages. ISTA also published these proceedings. TA of Energy Alternatives Troy, M.Y. May 1976 Jointly sponsored by ISTA and the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, the program focused on TA in the energy area. TA: An Evaluation of Ten Years Hennekir, N.H. June 1976 Experience Fourth in a series sponsored by the Engineering Foundation, this was a working session on methodology and practice. Second International Marine TA College Station, October (5-6) Conference Texas 1976 Jointly sponsored by ISTA, the European Oceanic Association and the Texas A&M University Sea Grant Center for Marine Resources, the program was again limited to TA and ocean affairs and the advances in applying TA to ocean problems and opportunities were noticeable. Second International Congress on TA Ann Arbor, October (2k- Michigan 28) 1976 ISTA sponsored a comprehensive program in cooperation with University of Michigan College of Engineering Institute of Science and Technology on the theme "Creative Futures." While apparently very successful as a multi- national and inter-disciplinary exchange affair, the widening gap between the ideals and practice of TA and actual performance and use was becoming noticeable. PAGENO="0065" 61 Technology Assessing: the Honolulu, Hawaii June 1977 Quest for Coherence Held at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, the goal was to explore the possibility of international technology asesaments, There was heavy emphasis on TA in technology transfer and as it applies to ap- propriate technology. There were sessions on divergent processes and convergent goals, institutionalization of TA, evaluation of research and innovation, TA in the social sciences, its role in planning and TA in industrialization (agriculture and energy). Systems Assessment of New Laxenburg, July 1977 Technologies: International Austria Perspectives Sponsored by the International Institute for Applied Systems An- alysis (IIASA), this invitational meeting was attended by 50 participants from 16 countries and 16 international agencies pl~ia IIASA staff. Of significance was the almost equal representation by representatives of OECD countries and CMEA countries. A major thrust of the meeting was to explore the possibilities for the conduct of a truly international technology assessment (ITA) to be performed by and for two or more countries with mutual interests. Comment These and the many other national and international meetings over the last ten years have resulted in creating a large and active world wide "invisible college" of TA practitioners and users. It operates effectively across national, sector, disciplinary and language barriers. As one ob- server put it, "The international language of technology assessment is broken English". 96-205 0 - 78 - 5 PAGENO="0066" 62 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Separate from sponsorship and participation in meetings, technology as- sessment is an area of interest, discussion and research for many public and private international organizations. At this time I do not know of any in- ternational organization that has or is conducting an international tech- nology assessment, i.e., one performed jointly by two or more countries. Of the many international organizations only a small sample will be mentioned below to suggest the nature of activities and interests beyond or across na- tional boundaries. United Nations (UN) While various elements of the UN have expressed interest and closely followed global technology assessment developments, there have been few major pronouncements or actions. The previously mentioned 1975 New York Expert Group Meeting on TA produced a thoughtful and readable report. It urged the developed countries to promote the Social Assessment of Tech- nology (SAT) concept, to develop concepts and methods, to build up an "in- frastructure" of performing organizations and data bases, and to learn from action through experimenting with SAT. The report urged the UN system to provide developing countries with financial and technical assistance for SAT and to incorporate SAT concepts and methodologies in providing devel- opment assistance. Plans are under discussion for a second meeting of experts, perhaps in New York this coming December. Again, both TA (they appear now to have dropped the `SAT" terminology) for developed and devel- oping nations will be considered. The UN has no formal organizational element with technology assess- ment in its title but the major focus on it is in its Office of Science PAGENO="0067" 63 and Technology. Some TA-like work, but with more of a forecasting flavor, has been conducted in the UN Economic Commission for Europe particularly the Trade and Technology Division Various UN agencies are looking at TA as useful in preventing problems of wrong technology transfers It ap- pears that the emphasis of TA by the UN will be increasingly focused on TA for developing nations. It is being linked very closely with the ap- propriate technology (AT) movement. There are some signs that this TA/AT combined approach may be more of a technology selection process based upon predetermined social economic environmental and political criteria than an analysis of the social and other impacts of technological initiatives It is highly likely that this issue might be part of the agenda for the planned 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology since a number of or- ganizations have already made preliminary preparations to raise it. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) OECD approached technology assessment by asking the question (still unanswered) as to whether TA was an outgrowth of science and technology policy or a new branch of general policy stemming from a disenchantment with the social and other results of the so-called technological imperative (Oversimplified, the technological imperative says, if it can be done, it will be done.) Among the first discussions of TA in OECD were those of the October 1971 meeting of science ministers. This led to an exploratory re- search program including the January 1972 meeting mentioned before These efforts resulted in the book Society and the Assessment of Technology Spurred by the guidance of a high-level Adivsory Committee on Control and Management of Technology of member country representatives, another panel of experts PAGENO="0068" 64 helped produce the volume, Methodological Guidelines for the Social Assess ment of Technolqgy~. This book offers member countries (and others) a gen- eral framework for conducting SAT studies. OECD also initiated an effort to "test" SAT by applying it "to real problems of the interested member countries." Three areas were chosen: New Urban Transportation Systems; Humanized Working Conditions; and Tele- communications (as an instrument of regional planning). An attempt to pool resources in a common effort having failed, it was decided that the studies would go on in parallel at the national level. Scant and conflicting in- formation is available on the fate of the working conditions and telecom- munication studies but it appears that they were never completed, if started. The Urban Transportation study was initiated with six participating countries and proceeded for two years. The OECD Methodological Guidelines for the Social Assessment of Technology proved too advanced for this first effort with limited individual country resources. In the end, only two "SAT as- pects" of the project emerged -- the use of social scenarios and the in- volvement of concerned groups. To illustrate the latter, the West German public participation effort in the city of Marl on the subject of "cabin- taxis" will be described later. In a paper presented at the IIASA meeting in Laxenburg, Austria two weeks ago, an OECD official (speaking unofficially) listed the main problems in conducting international social assessment of technology. Since technol- ogy directly affects acheivement of national interests, competition, not cooperation is more the normal behavior. Since unilateral, precipitous action is probable -- and occurs -- at any time by any of the parties, sus- tained SAT is difficult to manage and to complete. There are no appropriate PAGENO="0069" 65 institutions for either SAT conduct or international decision-making. SAT is often perceived as an intrusion" into national economic (or other) policies or even "as a smart trick by foreign competitors to reduce the competitive force of national firms." He ended on a hopeful but not optimistic note that in theory international SAT was possible, but in practice, though needed, it is very difficult to bring off. Commission of the European Communities (ECC) Following a study performed by a U.S. contractor, the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in January 1974, launched a "Europe Plus Thirty" project team to answer two questions: 1) "Should the European Communities undertake a majority study entitled `Europe Plus 30' concerning the foresee- able or possible developments over the next thirty years which a~e likely to affect the program of Europe?"; and 2) "Should the European Communities create their own Technology Assessment Office in an attempt to evaluate in advance the effects of scientific and technological development on the society and the economy of the Community?" By September 1975, a project board of Community representatives and an international team of experts produced a report to the ECC recommending it establish a long-term forecasting instrument (to be called Europe Plus 30) with technology assessment "as an integral part of its work." In-house and external priority areas of work were defined along with an elaborate or- ganizational structure and generous budget (approaching $6 million). The report stated that unless at least a professional staff of 30 was authorized, the effort was "probably not worth it" but that over 100 were "not necessary." It added, "About seven people within Europe Plus Thirty should be engaged on TA at any one time." PAGENO="0070" 66 Budgetary limitations and attention to higher priority short-range problems are cited as the major reasons for failing to implement the rec- ommendations. The report has been severely criticized by many as being too ambitious and of uneven quality. It is understood that a more modest forecasting and assesssment version of Europe Plus 30 is once again under active consideration. Organization of American States (OAS) The OAS is known to be interested in and to be following technology assessment activities but I am unaware of any major TA activities. TA often appears in connection with technology transfer activities which are part of the OAS Eegional Scientific and Technological Development Program. Several quotations from a report of the OAS General Secretariat 7/ on 7/ Teniere-Buchot, P.F. Methods of Technological Assessment. In Or- ganization of American States. General Secretariat. Methods of Evaluation of Technology, vol. II. Washington, D.C., General Sec- retariat of the Organization of American States. Sept. 1973: 1- 102. (Part of the Pilot project on transfer of technology, re- gional scientific and technological development program, Dept. of Scientific Affairs.) "SG/P.l, PPTT/7b" "Methods of Evaluation of Technology" demonstrate its focus of interest in TA. But first, it is intriguing to note the OAS's impression of the reasons for initiating technology assessment in the United States. The report says that, "Civil servants, representatives, and senators . . . suffered . . frustrating impressions of being manipulated by technicians, more ambitious for their own area than for the national interest (this) therefore led to the conduct of technological assessment studies mixing systems of values and technical and economic approaches." PAGENO="0071" 67 The report continues: "Technological assessment uses calculation only occasionally. Its purpose is to lead to understa~~~ and to lend todis- cussions. If a calculation, an aggregation procedure of any kind, is necessary, it will be used/but, incidentally, simply as an instrument." (Emphasis in the original.) The report also cautions, "The assessment techniques which will be described, have a status policy characteristic. The innovation policy which they are responsible for formulating is always near to power (pouvoir). There is therefore a danger, which must not be underestimated, of directions from activities undertaken for the benefit of personal interests or for ends of a small number of persons." International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Founded by groups of both East and West governments including the U.S. and U.S.S.R., IIASA is a non-governmental research institute located in Schloss Laxenburg, Austria. It was created to enhance East-West profes- sional dialogue both through the work of its resident scholars and by means of a network of cooperating institutions and individuals. IIASA focuses on systems analysis as a key instrument for improved, wise, and internationally cooperative decision-making. In addition to work in critical substantive areas such as food and energy and its core systems and computer work, IIASA has a major program on management and technology. It is in this area that it looks to possible international cooperative endeavors in the Systems As- sessment of New Technology (SANT). Included in SANT are technology fore- casts, technology assessment, alternative technologies, evaluation of R&D, and indicators of the science and technology potential of an organization or a country. As was mentioned, at a week-long meeting in July 1977, IIASA *and rep- resentatives of 16 East and West countries and 6 international agencies, a PAGENO="0072" 68 group explored areas and means for the possible conduct of international technology assessments (ITA). It appears that selecting topics for trial efforts, choosing methodologies, acquiring data and even providing finan- cial resources for an ITA all seem feasible. Some argue that IIASA may be the most feasible institutional device beyond an ad hoc bilateral ar- rangement between two countries in which to perform an ITA. The biggest stumbling blocks may be politics and personalities. There is optimism that personality problems can be readily solved if political issues can be clarified first. The OECD experience, the UN's caution, and the frank remarks of the OAS report point to the nature of the problem. Technology assessment lays bare alternatives, strengths and weaknesses. It shares data and good and bad news equally with all participants. It re- veals which paths are open and those that are closed. For implementation, TA requires disclosure of values, goals, priorities, and almost invariably involves commitment of resources and to a path of action with the usual attes~~risks. While technology assessment may be a great aid to politi- cal decision-making and even an eventual necessity, it takes great political courage to enter into this process with another sovereign power. Since tech- nological initiatives and technological impacts have little respect for national boundaries, the conduct of international technology assessments appears inevitable. Skilled analysts and courageous statesman can bring it about and there is optimism at IIASA (among other places) that with time and patience ITA will come about. International Society for Technology Assessment (ISTA) The International Society for Technology Assessment (ISTA) was founded in Holland in 1971 and later incorporated in the U.S. as a new world membership PAGENO="0073" 69 organization serving as both a bridge and a forum for a broad spectrum of disciplines, organizations and constituencies which can contribute to the structuring, study, control and resolution of the world's technological challenges, dilemmas and opportunities. ISTA is established as an inter- national society whose membership is drawn from a variety of institutions, communities and persons all over the world interested in the exploration and resolution of problems associated with technological growth. It tries to link together centers of thought devoted to the analysis of the effects of technology. Along with the multi-disciplinary practitioners of TA, its journal's articles are directed to (and prepared by) legislators, public and private executives, and most important, to the educated layman who is affected by the results (or lack of them) of all assessment activity. In addition, such subjects as assessment's role in the policy process, compara- tive methodologies and the role of higher education in providing trained professionals are considered. A key element is the use of the journal as a forum for exchange of information and for criticism and rebuttal. The Society's founders thought long and hard about the questions, "Why a society?", "Why an international society?", "Why another journal?", and "Why more international congresses?". They concluded that this society and its activities were viable mechanisms to meet an emerging class of rec- ognizable problems that demand control and solution and for recognition of a number of opportunities that otherwise would be missed. Technology impact problems are interrelated to a degree never before recognized; interdisci- p~inary in a way that requires the participation of physical, biological and social scientists, engineers and humanists; and international in that the proper treatment of the subject cannot be limited by national boundaries. PAGENO="0074" 70 There was no existing written or face-to-face information exchange that allowed a continuing display and discussion of the impact of these problems. More important, there was no forum in which the sophisticated analyst-assessor could directly interact and be accessible to 1) his "customers", the decision and policymakers, and 2) the public who are affected by him and his cus- tomers thoughts and actions. ISTA publishes quarterly, The Journal of the International Society~f~ Technology Assessment, a bi-monthly newsletter TAUpdate, and a popular mono- graph series called ISTA DOCUMENTATION. ISTA's address is Cleveland Park Station, P.O. Box 4926, Washington, D.C. 20008, U.S.A. Some Other International Organizations The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) has estab- lished a joint task force on developing technological forecasting techniques for use in processes very close to technology assessment. The World Bank in- corporates in its ever-widening evaluation procedures many techniques and approaches similar to TA but, according to one observer, is in a state of "guarded watchfulness" with respect to uses of TA by others. The Nordic Council has conducted a variety of science policy and energy studies quite parallel to the technology assessment approach. There are many more organizations that similarly use part or all of the technology assess- ment approach both without formalizing it or calling it by the U.S. name. In most cases, adaptations have been made to the process to fit it to the values, style, and resources of both the performing and using organizations. PAGENO="0075" 71 COUNTRY BY COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS In essence the material thus far in this testimony has been about tech- nology assessment for few, if any, actual studies that have been accomplished have been described. In this next part, therefore, I will attempt to present selected observations from a variety of countries to highlight the institutions involved in the various aspects of technology assessments and where possible identify some of the substantive areas of interest Again please note that this is a selection for it seems reasonable to assume that most countries in the world have some small or embryonic activity that can be identified with the notion of technology assessment. The order of presentation is not signifi- cant except that I have chosen Sweden and Japan for more detailed attention for they have the widest vange of activities and institutions involved in technology assessment outside of the United States Sweden At the national government level technology assessment studies are con- ducted as part of the Secretariat for Futures Studies in the Swedish Cabinet Office in the Office of the Prime Minister While not large in number this organization has been in existence almost eight years and has been in engaged in a variety of planning and decision studies of interest nationally An- other Swedish technology assessment activity dating back to 1971 is the Swedish Association of Futures Studies which is a subsidiary of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences The Association was formed to strengthen efforts in futures studies and technology assessment in Swedish industry and government with particular reference to the interplay between technological development and social change. The work of the Association in these areas is coordinated with the general activities of the Academy PAGENO="0076" 72 In addition to internal studies and seminars, a major aspect of the As- sociation's work is on specific projects for clients, including consulting, tailored specifically to industrial and academic clients needs. En practice the technology assessment activities are carried on in parallel with those of technological forecasting. Some of the areas of particular interest have been in a technology assessment of telecommunications for the health sector and a ten-year perspective of EDP-technology. Other studies have included background work for the Swedish National Industrial Board and, in particular, on technological developments in the construction industry and in construction materials for the period 1980-85. Closely allied to the technology assessment and technology forecasting work are those in the area labeled "technology and societal change" where the emphasis is on the barrier between the so-called "two cultures" and the goal is to improve understanding between technologists and non-technologists. A major effort here has been a joint study with a number of industrial companies and government agencies on possible changes on Swedish society during the 1990's labeled "Sweden 2000." The Associaton is also involved in a number of methodological studies both for futures research and for technology assessment and forecasting. A third and complementary technology assessment (among other areas) ac- tivity in Sweden is the Swedish National Board for Technical Development which is a state agency under the Department of Industry and is known as STU. STU has a main task of allocating state funds to technical research and development programs that are not of direct concern to departments other than that of in- dustry. Technology asaessment itself is seldom the end of these studies but we have been told that its concepts and ideas are an integral part of most of the studies. Among the areas of interest are process control, educational PAGENO="0077" 73 technology, materials technology, societal needs (medical, occupational, con- sumer), technologies, and many others. Swedish representatives tell us that there is considerable interaction among these many groups within this small country and that their efforts tend rather naturally to complement each other. There is also a tie in by various of these groups with activities in the other Scandanavian countries and with members of the Nordic Council. As with many other activities in Sweden, we hear that technology assessment is a relatively participative process on the part o~ interest groups, industry workers, unions, and the like, but at this time I have no definite information on the nature of the processes and institutional forms involved. The year 1969 marks the first recognition of the notion of technology assessment in Japan. Through the efforts of a Subcommittee of Technology Ad- vancement of the Economic Council following internal discussions, the Japanese characteristically mounted a mission to the United States to explore the various concepts and techniques then available in the area of technology as- sessment. Upon the return of the mission to Japan, the Science and Technology Agency began experimental studies partly for use in anticipated decision-making but also to develop methods for technology assessment, technology forecasting, and futures research. The early studies of the Science and Technology Agency were in computer-aided instruction, pesticides, and tall buildings. By 1971, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) also became involved in technology assessment studies in its Agency of Industrial Science and Technology. Some of its early studies were in iron works with atomic energy, medical electronics, and the electronic calculator. More recently, the Science and Technology Agency has gone into investigating vertical takeoff PAGENO="0078" 74 and landing aircraft, technologies for new town construction, visual communica- tióna, waste transportation systems with pipelines, artificial rain showers, and saltwater fish farming. In parallel, MITI is looking into new technology of electricity transmission plastics new technology for packing microcomputers synthetic paper automatic vending machines and a variety of other studies One Japanese official informed me that as of 1976 approximately 70 percent of Japanese industry was aware of the notion of technology assessment and that 30 percent had some studies in being or were "practicing TA." Another very active group has been the Japan Techno-Economics Society which has been engaged in a similar variety of studies over many years. JATES, as they refer to it, also includes in its program many conferences, seminars, and educa- tional meetings to "spread the word." In 1974, a technology assessment section was established in the Japan Industrial Technology Association, which is a non- profit organization chartered by the Agency for Science and Technology of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. A number of other private and public corporation think tanks are also engaged in technology assessment ac- tivities such as the Nomura Research Institute which has ~~orked on synthetic paper the Mitsubishi Research Institute which has done work on the electric car (among other things) and the Institute for Future Technology which has done a technology assessment in electrical communications for the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation. It is interesting to note that the Japanese view technology assessment as involving an explicit interdependence among three key elements and they draw a triangle with the elements at the apexes to illustrate their point: value sys- tems technological systems and social systems Often particularly in in- dustry TA is a part of a larger strategic evaluation and planning process entitled "business assessment". The Japanese state that they are in the third PAGENO="0079" 75 stage of industrialization as a nation. The first stage is the Industrial revolution; the second, one of technological innovation; and the third, the age of technological reexamination -- technology assessment Some of their writings and speeches indicate that the fourth age might bear the title "the age of civil participation" but it is clear from what we hear and observe that Japan has not yet entered this fourth age. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Nations (CMEA or Comecon) The Soviet Union apparently does not have formal organizational activities dedicated exclusively to technology assessment At the highest level tech- nology assessment is of concern to the State Committee for Science and Tech- nology of the U S S R Council of Ministers In practice technology assess- ment is very closely tied to both technology forecasting and the evaluation of technology for production and for other social needs. The important centers of activity are in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Novosibirsk. The activities are normally conducted in the various academies throughout the Soviet Union which both exchange information and occasionally personnel through seminars and courses We understand that during one of the regularly convened commissions of the All Union Council of Scientific and Technological Societies forecasting large system development was discussed which included many aspects of tech- nology assessment. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the Soviet Union is also a participant in the IIASA activities involving technology assessment and through it works with other CMEA and OECD nations In Poland technology assessment is described by one key academician as an instrument of social policy and planning beyond politics The Polish National Academy is the leading center of technology assessment and related studies There are no formally organized sub-elements of the Academy with PAGENO="0080" 76 the label technology assessment but my informant added the note, "as yet." The Poles see technology assessment as an attempt to "humanize science and technology" in accordance with the teachings of Marx. I was told that in a planned economy such as in Poland, one should be able to avoid negative impacts and unpleasant surprises due to technology, but of course, the performance of technology assessment is a long way from that of the theory at this time. This speaker of course, was referring to the state-of-the-art of technology assessment worldwide and not just in Poland. The Polish apparently are exploring new forms of social participation par- ticularly suited to their style of management but few details are yet avail- able. Czechoslovakia ties technology assessment into a process called "selective goals analysis." TA focuses on research and development project selection so that only those projects yielding the desired level of productivity are the ones funded with the scarce resources available. There is no formal technology as- sessment activity in Czechoslovakia that we are aware of. The German Democratic Republic has no independent TA activity but TA-like functions are performed in the Planning Commission and at several institutes throughout the Republic. Common Market Countries Great Britain has no formal technology assessment activity by that name, but in the government is the very competent and respected Programmes Analysis Unit (PAU) which was started in 1967 and is financed jointly by the Atomic Energy Authority and the Department of Industry. It has performed a large number of mostly proprietary (to the client) studies over the years and is now working in the areas of technological forecasting, futures alternatives, PAGENO="0081" 77 and labor. PAU is currently engaged in an industrial planning activity called Strategic Studies for Britain. There is a Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology in the House of Commons that formulates policy statements on items within its jurisdiction and occasionally seeks contractual and consultingadvice. It frequently uses the hearing mechanism both to obtain information and to air views. Under the Cabinet is a central Policy Review Staff, which as its name suggests, works on high level problems of interest across the government. At present, there is a Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution that has been studying the environmental impacts of nuclear energy over the past year and is expected to continue. In parallel is an activity called the "Windacale Inquiry," in Whitehead especially investigating nuclear reprocessing impacts. This inquiry is a highly participative device unlike the more in-house analytical activities of PAD. The Royal Society and its related activities from time to time take "positions" within the scientific community on various affairs but generally they maintain a low political profile. The National Research Development Corporation founded in 1948, is mainly in the business of technology transfer of results developed in the public sector to the industrial sector, but it states that it is be-- coming increasingly aware of technology assessment in its studies. There are two university activities of special note, one the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex and the other at the University of Manchester entitled the Technology Assessment Consumerism Centre. The latter has worked in the areas of insect pest control technology, recy- cling, carcinogens in the factory environment, dietary fats, and coronary heart disease. 96-205 0 - IS - 6 PAGENO="0082" 78 France under tue Bureau du Plan has had continuing interest in sub- jects akin to technology assessment with a broadening interest in the impact of the studies beyond their primary evaluation. Since regional development is a major activity, much of the work has focused in subjects of interest to the particular regions such as water supply runoff pollution and the like In 1972 an Inter-Ministerial project group for environmental problems took a very close look at technology assessment activities in several countries A number of technological forecasting studies have been done in conncction with French land use policy and individual studies have occurred in many of the other major executive departments. There have been discussions in the French Parliament for almost five years about the possible creation of a French OTA but until recently the pro- posals never got very far A delegation including a French Parliamentarian visited me United States recently assessing U S progress and formats and upon its return the President of tue French Assembly received what is known as the Hamelin Report recommending the creation of a French office of tech- ology assessment. On July 9, 1976 a bill was introduced for that purpose. The model is very similar to the format of the U.S. Congress OTA. Of interest is that the bill (as translated) is only three and a half pages long and consists of three articles The first states the objective The Office of Technology Assessment must furnish Parliament with objective in- formation concerning the consequences be they physical biological eco- nomical social or political of the initiatives that Parliament might take on scientific and technological programs." Article two describes the com- position of the French OTA with a board, an advisory council, and an office as in the United States Article three describes the process for initiation PAGENO="0083" 79 of an assessment; `The Presidents of the assemblies can ask the Office for advice. They are empowered to do so when 60 Representatives or Senators have requested it." Once a request has been approved, a program director is appointed and the act calls for then submittinb the planned IA to the public. The act also calls for contracting out the studies and the parallel appointment of a commission of experts to assist the program director in controlling the progress of the assessment. The Federal Republic of Germany in its executive departments has a long history of performing detailed studies which include many of the elements of technology assessment although almost none of the studies are identified by that term. A number of studies have centered on both the development and con- sequences of nuclear research centers and many others in the area of trans- portation and communication A similar variety of studies both on water sup- ply and pollution in connection with the Rhine River have been undertaken. Many of the large industries have systems analysis capabilities that perform TA-like activities, again without using the terms. At Karlsruhe is a major non-profit systems analysis group, another in Heidelberg, and the Battelle Institute at Frankfurt all of which contribute in the area of technology as- sessment. The discussion of a possible office of technology assessment similar to the U.S. OTA for the Bundestag have been on and off for a number of years but is now dormant. Part of the reason is that the "Bundestag is excluded from the medium-term financial planning of the Government" 8/ and this exclusion bars 8/ All quotes are from Paschen I Institutionalizing the TA Function The German Experience A paper presented at the Workshop on Systems Assessment of New lechologies International Perspectives 18-21 July 1977, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenberg Austria PAGENO="0084" 80 it from participating early enough in many political decisions. In other words, technology assessments by the Bundestag could not influence programs and policies at an early enough stage to be effective. The debate on creating an office for the evaluation of technological developments was started in the Bundestag in April 1973 by the opposition party. One observer states that the "decisive factor for the rejection of the bill (to create an OTA) was the apprehension that such an institution would simply be an additional instrument of power in the hands of the opposition." One signal of this plea for increased power was the request by the opposition for an equal number of seats in the political steering body of the proposed Parliamentary TA institution which is a case without precedent in the German Parliament. This same observer goes on to state that `there is no doubt that the debate in the Bundestag has stigmatized TA as an instru- ment serving mainly the interests of groups opposing current or planned technological programs. It can be seen primarily as a `negative' instrument that one can use to hamper technological progress and much less as a `positive' approach to channeling technological progress into socially desirable direc- tions." A final conclusion of this close observer of the German scene is that, "the failure of the attempt to overcome the information deficit in the field of science and technology by the institutionalization of the TA func- tion in the Bundestag has made it clear that in this respect the possibilities of Parliamentary Democracies are extremely limited." 8/ One of the more outstanding cases of public participation in technology assessment, from the very beginning of the process, comes from West Germany. The assessment was the German contribution to the OECD project "Social Assess- ment of the New Urban Transportation Systems. In the autumn of 1975 the PAGENO="0085" 81 Ministry of Research and Technology commisioned Battelle-Institut in Frankfurt to investigate possible ways of citizen participation in planning the use of so called cabin-taxis in the city of Marl in the northern part of the Ruhr district. A variety of methods of participa- tion were tried including a `controlled planning game" where experts and non-experts interacted on all phases of the project including design features and route plans. Details are available in project reports so suffice it to say here that these experiments were very successful. The techniques are now being used both in further experiments and in actual projects in other areas. In the Netherlands, the pattern is rather similar to that of West Germany. There have been a variety of TA-like studies concerning the environment and particularly the effects of land reclamation from the sea, flood control, and water transportation. Several attempts, again by opposition parties, to create an OTA-like activity in the Dutch Parliament have been unsuccessful. However, it will be interesting to watch the present situation for a leader of the party that had been proposing it when he was in the opposition is now part of the ruling party and the proposals are planned to be reintroduced. The vote in 1974 on the proposal by the then opposition was reported to be quite close. In connection with the "Delta debate" there are the activities of the Royal Commission on the Rhine Dam concerning the impact on the Rhine estuary. For each of the six options under consideration, there is a TA- like study on the consequences and impacts. In regional planning, similar studies of impacts are called for but the TA terminology is not popular. Dutch industry and some of the exeuctive departments do studies similar to TA in their respective areas of interest, but as one observer put it, PAGENO="0086" 82 "the Dutch bureaucracy resists evaluation techniques" and progress in technology assessment will come slowly. ~ also has no formal TA organization. Some impact evaluation goes on in several of the large industrial corporations like Montedison which ac- tually has a TA department that has studied such areas as materials substi- tution, non-conventional protein sources, resources of the sea, and chemicals and health. Some executive agencies are concerned with the second order im- pacts of various regional development proposals and studies but do not call the work technology assessment. One American observer characterized the Italian "mood" for TA as parallel to that of the Club of Rome -- alarm over the long term consequences of experimental growth but without a prescription or action plan to do anything specific. He added that there is a growing interest in "social assessment" and that hope for analysis and action lies with the powerful trade unions. Finland's Science Policy Council, composed of seven ministers and seven scientists is looking into the possibilities of TA. It is expected that the decision whether to formalize the activity will be made by December of this year. In the meantime, the Science Policy Council is developing science policy guidelines for 1980 and many TA-like activities contribute to the development of those guidelines. The Council has commissioned a specific study (SITRA) to determine the feasibility of TA in Finland. One Finn expressed the point of view that a key problem for technology assess- ment in Finland would be to have it performed at high enough levels so that various ministers in labor industry and the like could interact on the problems and not have it done at what we would call the suboptimal level. PAGENO="0087" 83 A Random Look at Some Other Nations Canada has a small Technology Assessment Division in the Ministry of State for Science and Technology. This division includes among other activities, a Secretariat for Futures Studies. Among the projects completed are studies of the implication of urban growth and on the changing age structure of the popula- tion. In progress are studies of the implications for the notion of developing a conserver society rather than a consumer society Canada seems to be shifting more toward a futures research approach that what we in the United States would label technology assessment In 1976 the Privy Council Office cre- ated under contract an Institute for Research on Public Policy: `i) to identify which things in Canadian society are in fact changing most rapidly today, ii) to provide commentaries and projections on data collected and published by other agencies, and iii) to examine the effects of economic and technological `changes on Canadian society." 9/ In addition to doing forecasting and 9/ Memorandum of Agreement 28 October 1976 between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. supplying commentary on projections and data of other agencies, the Institute is concerned with "the examination of the effects of economic and technological changes on Canadian society Among Canadian industries the TA work of Bell Canada stands out both analytically and for the systematic way it brings customer and affected party opinions into its studies None of the following countries appear to have any formal technology as- sessment organizational elements but this comment is made without the benefit of a thorough search into the matter. Israel looks into social and other im- pacts of technology at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Tel Aviv, PAGENO="0088" 84 while at the Weissman Institute there is research on methodology. In Indonesia is an organization of their Academy of Science and Engineering I can identify only as LIPI which is involved in population, food, and economic studies. Another area of TA-like activity is in BAPANAS in the Ministry of Finance and Economics. It has sought assistance from U.S. firms specializing in technology forecasting and assessment. The Andes Pact Nations are working in appropriate technology projects with overtones of TA. Jamaica has a project on "TA for Developing Countries" and the Carribean Development Bank is using TA approaches in job related studies. It might be surprising to note that at the University of the South Pacific in j~jj there is a center for research, teaching and consultation on technology assessment. The surprise is dispelled when one notes that a former Vice-Presi- dent of tue ISTA and former senior staff member of the now defunct Milan In- ternational Institute for the Management of Technology moved to Fiji to devel- op the interest and practice there. Ghana, ~ Mexico, the Philippines, Pakistan, and many other nations are exploring the concepts and approaches of technology assessment. The em- phasis, however, seems to be on Appropriate Technology, the selection of those technologies that meet the national goals and aspirations of the na- tions involved rather than on impact evaluation per se. Very frequently developing nations start their TA work through employment of individual and corporate consultants, often with UMESEC or UMIDO funds, and then later adapt and continue on their own. As one firm's representative put it, "TA is an export business but it doesn't last long." PAGENO="0089" 85 SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS What does all this add up to? Are there lessons about technology assess- ment that we in the United States can now learn from other countries and from international organizations which view TA in different contexts and which have tried it in different settings? While far from being able to offer conclusions, I think I perceive a few general tendencies and some common elements among some groups. May I ask the Subcommittee to accept these as hypotheses that might be tested by appropriate research and analysis? TA is Widely Known Abroad One observation can be made with considerable confidence. The TA idea originated by the members and creative staff of this committee has, like that famous paint, spread over the world. Albeit, the coat is thin and full of holidays but there are few places in the world's technical and management centers where the words "technology assessment" do not convey some meaning. However, to put it mildly, technology assessment is not a household word in any country. As might be expected the meaning varies with the cultural, polit- ical, economic and technological context of each location. There may be, and usually are, differences in interpretations within countries and with- in organizations. This of course is also true within the United States. TA and the Social Management of Technology Are Needed There seems to be little doubt among all who profess to understand tech- nology assessment that this broader, more farsighted, more explicit approach to the social management of technology is necessary. By putting it this way, I am, of course, also saying that there is widespread recognition and con- sensus that technology needs to be managed by society. Naturally, there is considerable disagreement as to who in society shall do the managing and as PAGENO="0090" 86 to what approaches and methods will be used. The most numerous and deep dif- ferences concern the applicable values, goals and criteria for making decisions about technology. Perhaps it is because the technology assessment approach attempts to deal with all of these incommensurate factors that it holds appeal for most of the1 parties Is TA a Method1 or a Participatory Decision Process~ Technological elites whether in market planned or developing economies tend to view technology assessment in a rather similar Cartesian reductionist fashion. They see TA primarily as an objective, analytical process to be corn- plated by skilled disciplinary practitioners who then present "value free" al- ternatives to decision-makers ~4anagement and politically oriented individuals and groups (also with limited variance due to culture or political beliefs) perceive TA in a more holistic and dynamic sense -- an open ended participa- tive process for achieving synthesis balance and compromise In Developing Countries Is It TA or AT? In the United States the central theme of TA is concern for the impacts of technology on society, other technologies, the economy, the environment and politics In developing countries the emphasis understandably is more on selection of the right technology(s) to achieve social and economic goals Environmental and other technological impacts are not ignored but they often influence decisions less In practice developing nations are beginning to use the term "appropriate technology" in very close connection with technology assessment. The approach is as stated above, to select the most "appropriate" technologies for development or impact that will achieve the desired social and economic ends A variation of technology assessment is thus used as an PAGENO="0091" 87 instrument of appropriate technology selection. Some international organiza- tions, for example the UN, are thinking along parallel lines but with at least one very significant difference. International agencies and developed country government representatives think of appropriate technology as tech- nology that is less sophisticated, more suited to the local environment, and more culturally adapted than that in developed nations. The ambitions of many developing countries often are for duplicates of what they see in the rich nations. What is appropriate for operation, maintenance, and efficiency reasons may not be appropriate as symbols of progress, equality and status. It appears that AT may be having similar definitional and application problems to those in TA. Planned Economies Have Adapted TA Planned economies attempt to view the full range of impacts but the pro- cess most often starts with determination of the desired impacts and proceeds toward the selection of technologies to achieve them. In the absence of majority-minority political party near balance, and with no private sector as we know it, the goals and values conflicts are considerably lessened and take the form of inter-agency and inter-personal exchanges rather than among sec- tors. In the jargon of TA, the analysis-synthesis aspects of the TA process favors the reductionist paradigm and are much more cybernetic and closed- system in style. In other words, TA is conducted in a more structured, quan- titative and less open-ended fashion than in the United States and other market economies. TA is Hard to Introduce Under Parlimentary Form Some countries with parliamentary forms of government, for example the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Holland, have experienced difficulty in PAGENO="0092" 88 establishing a U.S. OTA-like institution. Proposals have been made to do so in all four countries but none have materialized. Observers in these coun- tries identify as the key element (there are others) a struggle over control of information between the party in power and the opposition. There appear to be two parts to the "information is power" issue -- access and participation in decision-making. Since the party in power controls both the executive and legislative functions of government there is strong resistance to creating a parliamentary OTA which would provide access to much vital information by the opposition. If the U.S. model were to be followed closely, the situation would be worsened for that information would be available prior to policy, program, and resource allocation decision-making and thus permit increased (and informed) opposition participation. It will be interesting to watch events in both Holland and France for in both cases, leaders in opposition parties that previously suffered defeats in proposing "an OTA," have now won power and are introducing similar proposals from the inside. TA Methodology: Reductionist or Holistic? The subject of methodology for TA continues to be a lively one, almost independent of nationality. Those trained in the physical sciences, en- gineering and in the methods of operations research and systems analysis tend to strive for development of a consistent or standard process that might universally apply to technology assessment. Others even call the (undefined) technology assessment process "a methodology." I join those who take the alternative view that, as a particular aspect of broad policy analysis, the methods of technology assessment are electic, broad, heuristic and much looser than for traditional academic research. 10/ Different PAGENO="0093" 89 10/ For more on this see U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Committees. Working Papers on House Committee Organization and Operation. Committee Information: Some Comments on Selected Sources [By] Walter A. Hahn, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology, Congressional Research. 93d Congress, June 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 9 p. (Committee Print) methodologies are applied to the different substantiVe situations, to fit the style of the assessment team members, as limited by time and resources, and as dictated by the data that is or can be made available. An attractive feature of TA to analysts is the need and opportunity to adapt, combine, and creatively advance the methodologies as part of the assessment process. It is the opinion of this observer that the range and power of methodologies available to technology assessors far exceeds the present state of practice This is not to say that more advanced and new methodologies are not and will not be needed. Imaginative research for new approaches and adaptation of existing technologies should continue to be initiated in all countries, particularly on methods applicable to the problems of each country. And the free exchange of this information for the benefit of all should continue as it does today. But just as the results of technology assessment can be industrially or nationally proprietary, there is the lurking danger that significantly novel or effective methodologies might also become proprietary if deemed to be of competitive advantage. As the OAS report reminded us, technology assessment is an activity involving the power structure and not always a neutral academic pursuit. Global Institutionalization of TA is Proceeding Slowli Technology assessment has not been formally institutionalized in any countries except the United States, Sweden and Japan although several other PAGENO="0094" 90 nations are engaged in it to some degree In the U S the TA focal point is in the national legislature in OTA Executive branch activities except for the TA research program of the National Science Foundation are less formalized and many are not yet essential parts of agency decision processes A few activities exist u~ider the label TA that are not at all involved with the subject as outlined earlier. Academic institutions do some alerting TA studies teach a variety of courses and contribute much to improved method- ologies U S industry does some TA work sometimes in the larger context of strategic or development planning and more in the narrower areas of product and market analysis In Sweden there appears to be more balance in both levels of activity and influence of results among the three principal areas of TA effort. The activity in the Futures Studies staff in the Office of the Prime Minister is mainly in the general government and long time frame areas. A variety of intensive studies are conducted in the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineer- ing Science within the Academy in the Swedish Association of Futures Studies which has TA as one of its five major areas of work The other areas are planning for business and government, technology and society, the development of geographic regions, and methods. A third focus of more specialized TA efforts is the National Swedish Board for Technical Development -- known as STU Japanese technology assessment activities also seem to be in relatively even balance among the sectors but along with many others this observer has difficulty perceiving the subtle distinctions among the various institu- tions As has been mentioned one key activity is the TA work of the Science and Technology Agency within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. PAGENO="0095" 91 Another major contribution to TA has been the Japan Techno-Economics Society which includes participation by a broad spectrum of Japanese industry A variety of think tanks play strong roles in TA including the Japan Research Institute, the Institute for Futures Technology, Mitsubishi Research In- stitute and the Nomura Research Institute Several universities also are active in TA circles in Japan. No International TAs are in Process or Completed There are no examples of technology assessment performed jointly by two or more nations for their mutual use in decision-making The second IIASA meeting in Austria had as~ one of it8 major purposes to explore such a pos- sibility. In the light of the OECD experience and fate of the ECC proposals ITA -- International Technology Assessment -- is being approached very cautiously TA A Special Case of Policy Analysis and Futures Research Earlier it was mentioned that OECD dealt with the issue of technology assessment as a part of science (and technology) policy or as a new element in general policy analysis. Because of my training and recent experience here on Capitol Hill, I would have to ask a third question: Is technology assessment a special case of broader more long range futures research? I am aware that I will spark considerable debate when I suggest that the answer to all three questions is yes TA is an outgrowth of S and T policy particularly with respect to its subject matter and to many of the methodologies applied. TA is also an element of general public policy as evidenced by its focus on society other technologies the economy the environment and policies as the impact areas of concern And PAGENO="0096" 92 lastly, it is a special case of futures research with its stress on alternative choices for the future and the use of some of the more heuristic methodologies. The Term "Technology" is a Stumbling Block We in the International Society for Technology Assessment carry a subtitle on our letterhead saying that ISTA is "A Forum for Social Impact Evaluation." We do this for two reasons. We want to signal to the "soft" behavioral disciplines that we are not only concerned with the hard tech- nologies which the term "technology" usually connotes but the other dis- ciplines as well. We also hope to indicate that while TA necessarily in- volves "technology" and its first order effects, it is the evaluation of impacts that is of major interest. These same difficulties inter- fere with understanding, performing and using TA around the world. We are always called on to explain the hard and soft technology point. We also must continously try to point out the distinction between tech- nological feasibility (does it work?) and evaluation of impacts. There is another point about the term technology worth mentioning. At the time the term technology assessment was coined in the late sixties, we were still enjoying the halcyon days of science and technology. True, the labelers of TA foresightedly perceived the coming difficulties society would face in managing its technology -- that is what TA is all about. What they did not perceive were the negative connotations many segments of society -- in many countries as well as in the U.S. -- would come to place on the word "technology". This is not a major point and may not apply at all in developing countries but there is an annoying item here that just will not go away. PAGENO="0097" 93 Citizen Participation: A Difficult Methodological and Institutional Task Citizen, public, affected party . . . . participation is a critical issue worldwide. In the developed countries, individuals and groups are making their participative decisions known through persuasion, ju- dicial process and even extra-legal means. Problems of exchanges be- tween experts and non-experts, objective and interested parties, and rational and irrational parties are becoming the rule rather than the exception. Just who is entitled to represent someone else is far ftom clear as is the means to determine the answer. In developing countries national pride, ignorance, apathy and priority attention to survival needs alter the nature of the participation process. In planned economies there is meaningful participation but of a kind often incomprehensible to those in a market economy. Whatever the setting, pressures for more direct involvement in technology assessment and other processes seem to be mounting at a pace faster than the development of acceptable and workable processes and institutional forms. Participation is an area for urgent, research experimentation and action. Summary The concept of technology assessment, if not its terminology, is alive and well worldwide. The TA idea is being adopted and applied cautiously in many countries in forms suitable to the cultural, political, and technological variants of those countries. Methodological expertise to perform technology assessment does not appear to be a limiting factor in spite of the need for improved methodologies. Institutional forms are adapting very slowly to utilize the possibilities of TA for it offers no free lunch -- there are 96-205 0 - 78 - 7 PAGENO="0098" 94 major political and professional risks that accompany the possible bene-.. fits. Just as other nations have learned from and modified this United States initiative, now we can learn from their efforts as to how to improve our own approaches and to work jointly with other nations in assuring areas of mutual interest. I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to share these thoughts. I will be pleased to answer any questions and to amplify or discuss any of the foregoing material. Walter A. Hahn 8/1/77 * * PAGENO="0099" 95 ELEMENTS (MODULES) OF A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PROI3LEM STATEMENT VALUES, CODES, AND OBJECTIVES S~sitti DEFINITION IMPACT IDENTIFICATION PARTIES OF INTEREST ItTH000LOGY AND DATA SELECTION. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION PLANS. IMPACT EVALUATION OPTIONS IDENTIFICATION OF DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS IDENTIFY EXOGENOUS VARIABLES MACRO-ALTERNATIVES (oThER SYSTEMS) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOt4'IENDAT IONS CO~1UNICATION, DISSEMINATION, AND FOLLOW-UP PLANS, 1 PAGENO="0100" 96 ~*V\T IS NEW/UNIQUE ABOL.ff TA? R)LICY ORIEiI1U) FOCUSES ON ILL-DEFINED, C(X'PLEX PROBLEMS ACTIVE (As DISTINCT FROM REACTIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEM) CO~CERNS BEYCW IIIIEDIA1t-INltI'I)ED I1~PACTS Soc~*i., EcoLoGIcAL., Ecotsiaiic1 POUTICAL, OTHER TECtt~ICAL - POsITIVE ~ NEGATIVE IfPACTS W1~HB'1SIVE AND OPEN-ENDED IN1ERDISCIPLINARY QUPSI-1~ALY1ICAL AMALYSIS AND SmmEsIs - QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE - CONVERGENT AND DIVERGENT THINKING PROCESSES - ITERATIVE THE ANALYST IS - Q~JFCT1VE VIS-A-VIS THE PROBLEM OR OUTCO(~E - SU&JECTIVE VIS-A-VIS APPROACHES TOOLS1 DATA - DEALS WITH "ORGANIZED COMPLEXITY" CERTAIiftY AND UNCERTAINTY ~14DE EXPLICIT II'PACTED PARTIES/A1~AS EXPLICITLY IDENTIFIED R)LICY ALTERNATIVES (INCLUDES IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY MAKING MECHANISMS) CC~CLUSIONS ~D RT~E~il)ATIONS [TA CCfliJN IT? OF TWO MINDS ON THIS ITEM] PAGENO="0101" 97 1*1) ARE 1W. I\&SESS(f'~? A~V~LYSTS DECISI(*1 MN'~EF~ AN4IYSTS ~ J)ECISU1N P'AI~3ERS P~BLIC/!~K1F1) PARTIES - PI~SEN~ A%~AI~ - PIfSEI~ff ttI~WA~ - FIJThRE ThE ~B1?~IE 3 PAGENO="0102" 98 TYPES CF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS(~U4T RIICY ORIENTED IECHNOLOGY ORIEIfltD ~r~mw~i oRwNm "F~CP1ES" TECHNOLOGY ASSESS1~Ef{1 AND SOt'E TEC)+IOLOGY ASSESSIVENTS ARE CONDUCTED NOT TO ACHIEVE PRIMARILY SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS BUT TO DEVELOP CR TEST ~THODOLOGY TECHNOLOGY PSSESSF(NF M~Y ALSO ~ FOR: ALERTING OR EARLY ~LA!~ING OR CLIENT ORIENTED PAGENO="0103" 99 WALTER A. HAHN Walter A. Hahn has attended New York, AmerIcan and Syracuse Universities and holds degrees in physical science and public administration. Following re- lease from active duty in World War II as a Naval Reserve officer, he was em- ployed as research administrator, for the Office of Naval Research. In 1949 Hahn joined the staff of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council to work in the area of Undersea Warfare. Eight years of industrial experience in planning and operations research was gained with the General Electric Company. Returning to public service he joined the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as its Director of Management Analysis. In 1964 he transferred to the Department of Commerce where he was head of policy plan- ning in the Weather Bureau and its successor, the Environmental Science Services Administration. In 1969 Hahn was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology, a position he held until selected as Senior Research Associate on the White House National Goals Research Staff, Upon completion of the NGRS effort he returned to the Department of Commerce as its Director of Policy Analysis. Transferring from the Executive Branch in 1971 to the Legislative, he now serves in his present position as Senior Specialist in Science and Technology with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. In 1975 Hahn, on a "reverse sabbatical" leave was Visiting Professor of Public Technology Policy and Engineering in the Program for the Social Management of Technology at the University of Washington. A frequent lecturer and contributor to professional journals, Hahn is active in The Institute of Management Sciences, National Conference on the Administration of Re- search, American Society for Public Administration, World Future Society, and the International Society for Technology Assessment which he served as its founding President. He has been elected a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and of the U.S. Association for The Club of Rome. STATEMENT OP WALTER A. HAHN, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND SENIOR SPECIAL- IST IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Mr. HAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here this morning. As you are aware, I am speak- ing for myself and not the Library of Congress or anyone else. And as I understand my assignment, in addition to highlighting a rather long paper on alternative perceptions of technology assessments out- side the United States, I will precede it with some vocabulary and ideas about technological assessment so that when we discuss the activ- ity in other. countries, the words that I km using hopefully are the same ones you are hearing. The data about foreign technology assessment activities are very scattered. Much of it is anecdotal. The information that I have been able to gather to contribute to this subcommittee is from a variety of sources and some of the information that I have is conflicting. Regret- ably, I do not know where the individual errors are, although some of my colleagues have been kind enough to point some of them out already and, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to cor- rect those before we print the prepared testimony. They are minor, Mr. THORNTON. You will be afforded an opportunity to make such changes and corrections to the prepared paper as may be necessary in order to correct it.. Would you please consult with the staff about the timing for that. Mr. HAHN. Yes, sir. PAGENO="0104" 100 As Dr. Kranzberg has indicated, the phrase "technology assessment" means many things to many people, not only within the United States but certainly in the other cultures and the other countries as well. The questions that we, who are in the so-called technology assessment move- ment are asked most frequently are: What is it that is unique about technology assessment? What is included in technology assessment? Who are the technology assessors? I would like very briefly to attempt to answer some of those questions. Will you be kind encugh to turn to the four exhibits that you have been Iurnished separately? I will cover the first 17 pages of my prepared text from tl'iose sheets. FIGURE 1.-Elements (modules) of a tecl,,nology assessment Problem statement Values, codes, and objectives System definition Impact identification Parties of interest Methodology and data selection Project management and participation plans Impact evaluation Options Identification of decisionmaking apparatus Identify exogenous variables Macroalternatives (other systems) Conclusions and recommendations Communication, dissemination, and followup plans What I am suggesting in figure 1,' which is entitled, "Elements or Modules of the Technology Assessment," is that these are the ele- ments or parts that make. up a technology assessment. While perhaps ]n logical order, the analysts do not proceed in a nice, neat order from Problem Statement to the second item, Values; Codes, and Objectives, and the like. In fact the process is one that may start at a variety of places, loop back and forth, and even cycle many times as performed by the technology assessment analyst. Please read the list of items in figure 1 and in the questioning, if you want me to, I will go into what the meaning of some of them is in more depth. The basic proposition I am making is that all of the elements in figure 1 are what go into a technology assessment. If one is discussing `market research, or product testing, or other activities, only a portion of these steps or elements would appear. This does not make tech- nology assessment better or worse, it just makes it different. Note that in this technology assessment process we `are taking into account a wide variety of activities, including the system we are talk- ing about, what values, codes and objectives obtain, and what are the limits of this particular subject under investigation. Also, technology assessment identifies the parties of interest, and what methodologies will be applied (as referred to by Dr. Kranzbe.rg), and what data are available or can we get. We need a leader for the management of the process to bring it to fruition within the time, resources, and patience of the decisionmakers who will use the results to look `at the impacts- the first, second, and other order impacts, if we can go that far. We also look at the options, what alternatives are there for other ways of solving this? PAGENO="0105" 101 In particular and perhaps very unique to technology assessment, is identification of the decisionmaking apparatus. Who can make a de- cision and who will make a decision with respect to the consequences? Is it the Government? If in Government, what level of Government? What agency of Government? The buzz word identified as exogenous values, refers to what from the outside can walk in and change the situation under study. We also look at completely different ways of performing the function(s), the macroalternatives of approaching the situation. We would hope to find conclusions and recommendations in all technology assessments. I will come to this point again in the next chart. Most importantly, in technology assessment is communi- cating the, results of this extraordinarily complex process to people who have not participated in it, or from the decisionmaker to the out- siders that are affected by it. Fiennu 2.-W1i~at i8 flew/unique about TA? Policy oriented: Focuses on ill-defined, complex problems Active (as distinct from reactive judicial system) Concerns beyond immediate-intended impacts: Social, ecological, economic, political, other technical positive and negative impacts Comprehensive and open-ended Interdisciplinary Quasi-analytical: Analysis and synthesis Qualitative and quantitative Convergent and divergent thinking processes Iterative The analyst is: Objective vis-a-vis the problem or outcome E~ubjective vis-a-vis approaches, tools, data Deals with "organized complexity" Certainty and uncertainty made explicit Impacted parties/areas explicitly identified Policy alternatives (includes identification of policymaking mechanisms) Conclusions and recommendations [TA community of two minds on this item] If you would be kind enough to refer to figure 2. This is an attempt to answer a second question, what is new and unique abouttechnology assessment? My summary point on this chart is the same as one the first one-if most or all of the characteristics that are listed on the sec- ond chart are present, it is technology assessment; if only some of them are, it is something else. If more' and longer-range great public policy issues, and so on are involved, it is again something different. Technology assessment is policy oriented. This can be public policy that is of interest to this subcommittee and many other committees of Congress or it can be private policies for corporations or universities or whatever. Technology assessment is an active process as Dr. Kranz~ berg has suggested, where we try and get out ahead of the problem and not wait for it to come to a dispute between two parties as is char- acteristic of our judicial system. We attempt to go beyond the first order effects of the technology- did it work-and look at what happens if it works. Technology assess: ment is comprehensive and open ended. Technology assessment almost invariably ends with many unanswered questions, but hopefully, answers some or all of the questions of interestto the decisionmaker. PAGENO="0106" 102 Technology assessment is multidisciplinary or, more accurately, inter- disciplinary. In the technology assessment community there are differ- ences between these terms which are not important to discuss at this time. It is quasi-analytical which is a word to suggest that qualitative and quantitative phe~iomena are mentioned in the same logical system. As I said in connection with figure 1, the process repeats over and over. The analyst-the practitioner of one or more of the disciplines which have been previously referred to-is presumably objective with re- spect to the outcome. He is not a stakeholder in the result of a tech- nology assessment as to whether some process will go forward or not or be altered. But the analyst cannot pretend to be objective about the methods and the data. lie has to select those that are appropriate to the problem, he has to choose the data that fit and the way in which he can manipulate it and he must recognize the limitations of this very complex process. Certainty and uncertainty about those things that we know are usually stated in a technology assessment. But we also try to state what is unknown which presumably is helpful to the decisionmaker. The im- pacted parties, the winners and losers, are identified, as is what they might win or lose. The policy alternativ~s are posed for the decision- maker. It is seldom that the technology assessment will come up with one right answer. There is great dispute within the technology assessment community as to whether the assessment team, regardless of its organizational affil- iation, should produce conclusions and recommendations. All we sug- gest is that it be very clear between the' person asking for the technology assessment and those performing it as to whether or not conclusions are expected, recommendations ought to be made and under what conditions before the assessment is undertaken. FIGuRE 3.-Who are the a88e88or8? Analysts Decisionmakers Analysts an~d decisionmakers Public/hnpacted parties: Present aware Present unaware Future All of the above Another key question that I attempt to answer in figure 3 is, who are the assessors? Certainly the analysts and the skilled disciplinary prac- titioners that Dr. Kransberg has mentioned are part of the team. But the decisionmaker who knows the values, has the experience, the hunches, all of the soft things, if you will, has much that is essential to contribute and is also part of the total assessment process. True, he cannot be there every day to participate. But the more interaction be- ~ween the two that can occur, the higher the value of the result. Some also argue that a third party, the person affected by the second order or other consequences of the technology should be part of this process. Indeed some of the parties on the outside will either march, throw bricks, or otherwise insert themselves into the process, if not invited in. They have much to* contribute because they have to live with the result as we see about us all the time. PAGENO="0107" 103 There is a fourth party to the TA process, albeit somewhat of a mythical one, because these are the yet unborn. Some one of the other three groups-the practitioner, the decisionmakers, or the directly affected parties, must look out for the future generations who might be impacted by the technological initiative. Some of us argue rather strongly that all of these parties are the assessors who make up the total assessment process. There is consider- able argument from many scientists and engineers, and others, that only the analytical personnel are the assessors. Fiouim 4.-Type$ of technology a88essment Policy oriented Technology oriented Problem oriented "Peoples" technology assessment: And some technology assessments are conducted not to achieve primarily sub- stantive results but to ueveiop or test Methodology Technology assessment may also be for: Alerting or early warning or client oriented A last point, on figure 4, to go over it quickly, is some terminology. The words "technology assessment" mean many things. There is policy-oriented technoiogy assessment. That is an umbrella-like term that usually applies to the work of interest to committees of the Con- gress or of other national legislatures and concerns amending laws, creating new legislation, or some major program activity. One can start a TA with the focus on the technology. These tech- nology-oriented assessments as they are called, are ones where one looks at the effects of the technology on society, other technologies, the environment, the economy, and politics. Bu~ one can reverse the process and have the feeling that something is. going wrong out there in society and that something ought to be done about it. Thus, one can look back up through the chain of events and logic to see if a technology, a hard or soft technology, is in fact the cause. That is known as problem-oriented technology assessment. There are two uses of a phrase I put in quotes, "1~eople's Technology Assessment." This was used in the 1970 White House national goals report. It identifies those phenomena that Dr. Kransberg has men- tioned, where over the years, without fancy analytical techniques on mstitutional forms, people have been "assessing" or evaluating the effects of technology for years. People's technology assessment hope- fully will continue because we do not have the resources or time to use the formal TA process on everything. However, when we turn to the planned economies abroad, we find that they use peOple's technology assessment as a rather obvious different term, where. the establishment is doing TA for the people and with the people. TA there is a different participative process than that we engage in. Lastly, there are two other terms that one hears in connection with technology assessment. Dr. Kransberg has already used one, warning or alerting. The point here is that someone feels that, you in the Con- gress, or someone in the executive branch or the public, ought to be alerted to the fact that a technology is having some effects on society which were unanticipated. A specific client is often not involved. PAGENO="0108" 104 Client-oriented technology assessments, on the other hand, are the ones that are done on specific orders from clients who need an impact analysis for some specific decision situation. I have listed a long variety of international and national meetings in the text and I do not intend to read all about those meetings to you. But I suggest that scanning this list of meetings covering a period of 7 or 8 years indicates that the notion of technology assessment has been quite literally spread around the globe. TA is understood quite differ- ently by many nations, but nevertheless there have been a wide variety of organizational meetings, technical meetings, public meetings like the ones of the international Society or Technical Assessment, and aca- demic meetings primarily on methodology. There is a large invisible college, possibly over 5,000, of people in the United States and abroad who are in some kind of communication with each other directly, or through meetings of this kind. They are exchanging, modifying, build- ing upon or improving these ideas of technology assessment. It is very clear that technology assessment is here and itis not about to go away very quickly. Again, I will not try to cover all the material listed later on in the prepared document on international organizations. The United Na- tions for example, has been watching the technology assessment move- ment ever since it started. It has held meetings of experts and pro- duced some reports. But it is not a major active force in the world in technology assessment as yet. There is a tendency of the United Na- tions agencies to look at technology assessment for the developing countries more in the context of appropriate technology. The flavor of that approach almost invariably starts from the country viewpoint, emphasizing the desired social effects or economic effect and proceeds toward the selection of an "appropriate" technology that will pro- duce the desired result. This is sort of a reverse TA process, if you will. The U.N. is also encouraging the developed countries to develop tech- nologies and help select technologies that are good for the developing countries and not just ones they desire to export. The OEOD has been active from the very early days in technology assessment. Again through the work of experts and the conduct of meetings it has produced some very fine documents referred to in the paper. One sort of a reader, one of the first and one of the best in the field, is used by students of technology assessment all over the world. OECD has also produced a rather thick tome on methodology which is very useful to the analytical practitioners but it has not turned out to be a TA cookbook or anything like that. Some argue that it never will and that that is good for technology assessment which is a much more open and adaptive process, and there is no standard method for it. The OECD attempted to run some experiments of 1oint technology assessments in several countries. They pretty much failed for a num- ber of reasons. One of them was that the money could not be pooled. Each country financed its own portion of the study and then behaved unilaterally so joint work was very difficult. There were studies done on urban transportation systems iii Germany that demonstrated some rather fihe public participation processes which the Battelle Institute in Frankfurt was able to develop for the German Government. More details are available in the documentation. This project went quite far PAGENO="0109" 105 in bringing those affected by the technologies, the third parties if you will, into the total technology assessment process. The Organization of American States has followed technology assessment, urging it in the various countries in Latin America. As you will note from the full text, OAS has some pithy remarks on the relationship between the technological and the political aspects of technology assessment, and points out the difficulties of mixing these two as has already been suggested. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is .a non- governmental agency supported by governments that is exploring the social assessment of new technology-we have a lot of acronyms: this one is SANT-and hopes to bring about improved technology as- sessment methodology through cooperation between the planned econ- omies and the Western economies. They also hope to be able to perform joint-country technology assessments but, as the IIASA meeting just a week ago indicated, it is going to be a long haul to bring this about. There are many political difficulties involved. The Commission of the European Communities has attempted to get into the technology assessment and future research business as a combined activity. The initial proposal of a very large effort for the ministers of that activity resulted in a proposal for approximately 150 or 160 people and about $6 million. They specified that there should be seven people doing technological assessment full time in that group for the whole of European Community. That was not the reason it has not been adopted. I think the $6 million was not available. The proposal is being reviewed in a more modest form for possible current imple- mentation. I have singled out from the list of countries that we have looked at-Sweden and Japan as being two of the major countries that have organized or institutionalized, if you will, technology assessment. The Swedish experience, I think, is particularly interesting. There is a futures research component in the office of the t?rime Minister with an office of technology assessment that works at the itational govern- ment level. There also is an organization known as the-the Swedish names are in the text-STU, that works on a variety of studies sup- ported mainly by industrial funds. And there is the Swedish Association of Future Studies, a subsid- iary of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering. These three ac- tivities supported by work in the academic community contribute to decisionmaking in the executive, legislative, and industrial sectors~This mix of activities works in close cooperation in Sweden in con'traM~o most any other countries in the world.1 Personally, I have difficulty in distinguishing the subtle differences among the agencies in Japan. But the situation is somewhat similar to that in Sweden. There are a -`Variety of TA activities in the Science and Technology Agency, in the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and in the large think tanks that in part are supported by industry and in part supported by the government. There is great harmony among these several organizations. Japan is an area that one can look to for models that go beyond the formats that we see here in the United States. The Comecon or CMEA countries are not, active in. technology as- sessment in the sense of having an OTA or an OTA-like activity. But PAGENO="0110" 106 in the Soviet Union, for example, the State Committee on Science and Technology has followed TA very closely and the academies of the various segments of the Soviet Union in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Novosibirsk, and others, are quite active in technology assessment. The approach in the planned economics is a little different from ours; it is a much more deterministic approach. Great Britain is one of a number of parliamentary nations-Hol- land, France, Germany are the others-that has made several attempts to bring about an OTA for the parliament or the equivalent in the other countries. Each time the proposal has failed. Oversimplified, the issue has been a proposal by the opposition party, on the outside, to create an office of technology assessment with equal partnership between the parties for organization to perform technology assessment. In each case the party in power has viewed this as an intrusion and a way of passing on more information, more power and a more participatory role in the decision process to the opposition, and it has been voted down. As the text indicates, there are some interesting cases coming up, because some of the proponents of TA in Holland and in France of the then opposition, are now in power. The proposals are being reintroduced and it will be very interesting to see what happens. Many of the developing countries have explored technology assess- ment, usually with the use of either U.S. consultants or U.S. coun- suiting firms. They have done some fine studies of the conceptual back~ ground of TA and its organization possibilities through the use of peo- ple from this country. Then they have adopted it in many cases to their particular form of government and style of research. The term "ap- propriate technology"-a technology more suited to the culture and economic and technological base of the country-is very closely asso- ciated with the technology assessment movement in the developing countries. The approach here is to select, as I have mentioned, the tech- nology "appropriate" to thatparticular country's needs. It is sort of a backwards TA affair. It is working well in many places, and there are some examples in the text. I have ended the text with some obeservations which I will go over here very quickly. One is, technology assessment is known worldwide, if not in every country. It is no household word, of course, but among the technological elites and in many of the Government centers, the term TA, or some synonym of it, is a word you can begin a conversation with. And sometimes it can be a very exciting one, because we often are talking about different things. As Dr. Kranzberg indicated, the social management of technology, through the use of a process like technology assessment, seems almost ihevitable with the increasing pressure from technology on social decisions. There is an argument within the TA community as to whether or not the analytical phase of TA should be performed more in the classical ~scientific and reductionists fashion, or whether the loose, eclectic, some ~y~"mixed.up," participative process is the more desirable one. Vari- ous cotmtries have adopted TA in various forms and these kinds of arnuments go on in the United States as well. I have mentioned the question of whether it is technology assessment or appropriate technoio~y, or what the problems of the mix between these two are, in developing countries. PAGENO="0111" 107 The planned economies have a participatory peoples technology as- sessment, but we do not recognize the participatory role of the people as the same role as when our citizen, consumer groups, or environmen- tal groups participate. It is hard to introduce technology assessment under a parhamentar- ian system but it yet may happen. Many proponents have not given up and the pressures for this type of an activity are very strong. There are no joint TA activities that I know of between two coun- tries on a problem of mutual interest. But many in the field argue that this is almost inevitable between at least neighboring countries or groups of countries with similar problems. `There is also the discussion of which is the larger and which is the smaller activity. Is technology assessment an outgrowth of science policy? Is TA an outgrowth of general social policy analysis? Or is it part of futures research? I am perfectly willing to bear the wrath of some of my colleagues by answering "yes", technology assessment is a part of all three and draws from the roots and the strengths of all three. I should add this academic distinction does not need to interfere with the performance of any of the activities. Citizen participation in TA in all countries, perhaps including our own, is one of the toughest problems we face. We lack institutional forms, we lack codes of behavior, we lack the means of determining who represents whom? We also have the problem of people like y.our~ selves as an elected official, or of myself as a career public administra- tor. I thought I had been representing the public for many, many years. And yet there are people out there that are saying, "I represent me" and nobody else does. We must face this issue because it is there. I will stop here and be glad to entertain questions, and I thank the committee. Mr. THORTON. Thank you very~ much, Mr. Hahn, for a. very fine, summary of your excellent paper. We do appreciate the thought that has gone into its preparation. [Answers to additional questions asked of Mr. Hahn follow:] Qaestion 1. In your testimony you indicated a divergence of views as to whether conclusions and recommendations are an appropriate part of technology assessment. Would you summarize the arguments on this pro and con? Answer. In my prepared testimony I highlighted two major variations of the overall technology assessment process. One was where the analytical effort was essentially separated in time and In process from the participatory activities of interested parties and of the decision-maker. Also suggested was a second more participative process emphasizing interaction among the analyst, decision-makers, affected parties and the public. Obviously, the above question refers to the first class of technology assessments and, as I understand the question, it essentially asks, should the technology assessment analyst present conclusions and recom- mendations to the decision-maker? The arguments In favor of this practice are that the experience gained, and the insights obtained by those who engage in the analytical, process Is extremely difficult to communicate to another party. Also, there is much about lioth the substance and the method involved that influences the decisions made as a result of the analysis that can never be conveyed to one who Is unaware of much of the detail of both. Thirdly, there is the need for interaction among all the parties. The experiences, values, nuances of style, and the constraints on decision-makers and affected parties can never be fully understood by one not having those responsibilities i.e., the analysts. The synergistic interaction be- tween the decision-makers and analysts is lost in the sequential type analysis and may yield answers quite different. A weaker but not negligible point is that PAGENO="0112" 108 without attempting to formulate conclusions and recommendations for either policy or action, it is hard for the analyst to be sure that all of the information to do so has been supplied. In Industry (and perhaps in other organizations) if the person performing the analysis is on the payroll of the organization demanding the result, there is often a requirement for that person to "stand up and be counted" by making appropriate recommendations as a result of analytical work. The arguments against analysts making recommendations follow our tradi- tional role differentiation between staff and line-analysts and decision-makers. The analyst has no responsibility and no commitment to take action and thus should not step outside that role. To some decision-makers, analysts doing so are felt to be interfering with the decision-makers' prerogatives and responsibili- ties. Similarly, since this argument cuts both ways, analysts can itever fully perceive or represent the values, ob~Je~tives. style. or reflect the pressures that hear upon the one ultimately responsible andY thus the recommendations might In part be faulty. Others argue that the policy maker becomes a "hostage" of the staff analyst who makes recommenda1~ion for now If he chooses a different con- clusion then that recommended, he must overcome the hnrdle of differing with the staff person~ This can bring about occasional personal difficulties between the individuals. It also makes the task considerably harder, both methodologically and substantively, for the decision-maker who now must be very explicit about things that he might otherwise wish to retain implicitly. Some are concerned that if analysts draw conclusions and make recommendations on one or the other side of a given issue, it compromises their utility to perform future "objective" studies for other clients; Lastly, many members of the scientific and analytical communities view the making of policy recommendations as not "scientific" and appear to subscribe to the scIentists on tap, not on top theory. As suggested in an earlier point, many decision-makers feel this same way. Some in the PA community suggest there is a middle ground where analysts develop conclusions (but not recommendations) that derive logically and demon- strably from the analytical processes. These conclusions can be stated in the form of alternatives, perhaps pointing out the consequences for each of the altOrnatives without specifying which of the alternatives is "more desirable" according to ejther explicit or implicit criteria. * The key point with respect to the making of conclusions and/or recommenda- tions at the end of a technology assessment is not whether they should be made or not, The real issue is to agree among all parties prior to undertaking the study what the ground rules are. As long as it is clear that the analysts should or should not make recommendations the possibility of dissension among the parties at the end is reduced. As was mentioned, in certain institutions, for example industry, it may be highly desirable for the technology assessment analyst whose salary, incentive compensation and perhaps his futñre employment is hinged upon the outcome to make the recornendations. In contractor situations it may be highly undesirable f~r the contractor to presume on the turf of his client. In certain political situations, the decision-maker may demand recommendations as the only way of sifting through the many alternatives and being able to make a choice based on intuitive feel, demonstrated competence or even faith in the analyst making the recommendation. As long as the issue of making recommenda- tions or not is faced early enough and agreed upon, there is likely to be no problem. Question 2. In your testimony you commented that we "can't use formal TA on everything." Undoubtedly this is true, but could you suggest some guidelines or parameters? Answer. Technology assessments are performed for purposes of early warn- ing o:r alerting of some emerging issue Or potential problems in society that might be caused by a hard or soft technology. Also, they are performed to pose or review alternatives for dealing with technology caused problems or opportunities. Some- times technology assessments are performed just to broaden the information base and understanding of the nature of alternatives and impacts. And lastly, tech- nology assessments are performed to aid in specific decision-making about issues that are well recognized and upon which it is desired to create or change policy or to take new action. From the now extensive literature and significant practice of TA it is possible to synthesize the following five criteria be met prior to launching a technology assessment: PAGENO="0113" 109 (1) Re~ognition that a problem or opportunity exists~ (2) Substantive knowledge about the technology is or can be made available. (3) Concepts and methods for analysis and synthesis are available. (4) There is the possibility or belief that action is possible as a result of the assessment is possible. (5) The available human financial, institutional resources are available to perform the assessment in the time required. Question 3. To what extent could OECD be used for promulgating TA tech- niques if at all, on an international basis? Would this organization be more likely to prove useful than the UN? Answer. As outlined in the prepared testimony, the OECD has been very active in promulgating technology assessment concepts and techniques. Its 1973 book, "Society and the Assessment of Technology," and, its 1974 volume "Methodological Guidelines of the Social Assessment of Technology," have been distributed to all member nations and are available world-wide. It would be difficult and perhaps incorrect to suggest that any organization is more likely to prove better than another in the promulgation of technology assessment concepts and techniques. The United Nations serves, in the main, a different clientele than those of the more limited OEOD. The OAS, EGO, IIASA, and our own National Science Foundation all, in various ways, provide informa- tion on technology assessment to potential users. Each of these has a different style, a different orientation and are favored by their constitutency organizations or possibly by outside organizations and individuals in varying degrees. In part, the United States' OTA also serves this purpose through the release of documents by its clients which are then available to all of the above and to the public for whatever use they may make of the documents. As in several other cases, this pluralistic approach to the documentation and dissemination of the information is to be favored over selecting any sinEie source as being a favorite instrument. Question 4. While the establishment of any single methodology for doing tech- nology assessments Is probably not possible, would it not be useful to lay down certain guidelines on the basis of empiric research? Answer. Certainly any guidelines that can be derived from empirical research and experience should be made available and applied where useful in all future technology assessments. Actually, the original 1971 MITRE studies of "A Tech- nology Assessment Methodology", the OE'OD books described above, and the 1975 book by Arnstein and Christakis "Perspectives on Technology Assessment", among ninny others, have in fact offered such guidelines and they have proved very useful. Both past and studies underway by the U.S. National Science Foundation are directed tOward this end. E~plicit efforts should be made to learn about coin'. mon elements and useful techniques from every assessment that is performed in addition to the more substantive findings. In spite of the above, and as my brepared testimony suggests, tecbiiology assess- ment as practiced is not methodologically limited. There are considerably more powerful and helpful tools available than are being applied at the present. The priority needs are for improved ways of managing the interdisciplinary teams involved in technology assessment. Similarly, improved methods of mixing quantitative and qualitative information in the same "system" analysis are needed. We also need ways of incorporating values and other intangibles in the same explicit logical process as the more quantitative material. Ways of incorpo- rating participation in TA processes are needed above all. Technology assessment researchers (ones who study the TA process) should continue to look to the parent fields of science policy, policy analysis and future research for those aspects that are particularly useful in the performance of technology assessment. One point I feel responsible to highlight is avoidance of "cookbook TA". Any guidelines that are developed should emphasize their flexibility and the need to be bent to the nature Of the problem, the style of the analysts, and the needs of the decision-makers. We should be very cautious not to rule out the creativity and flexibility that is the hallmark technology assessment approach over some of the prior analytical efforts such as operations research, systems analysis and management science. Question 5. You mention that the Interest in TA in the so-called "planned" countries centers about methodolgy. Could you expand on this and perhaps indi- cate why this situation exists in those countries? 96-205 0 - 78 - 8 PAGENO="0114" 110 Answer. I hope that. the prepared testimony, as well as that given orally, cor~ rectly conveys that the observations about technology assessment in the planned economies are my perception of what is going on. Certainly methodology, would appear to be a natural first step for any country to embark upon technology assessment activities. Once the concepts and methodologies are known to be available and feasible, they can then be applied to the problems and Opportuni- ties faced by decision-makers in any country. In many countries the methodology is the most visible portion of technology assessment and information on its is exchanged quite freely in the international community. In many areas it is harder to exchange information on the substantive aspects of the technology assessment and even more limited is discussion of the application and results of the technology assessments performed. It is not known to this observer whether the apparent emphasis on methodology is merely an indication as to how far the planned economies have progressed with technology assessment or whether it is just that the specific applications and results of TA `are not discussed publicly. Representatives of planned economy nations have stated that while their na- tions are interested in technology assessment they have not formally organized at the top levels of government to perform them in the way the U.S. has in creat' Ing its Office of Technology Assessment. Question 6. Other countries have studied our Office of Technology Assessment before attempting to establish their own analogous organizations. After so doing, have they proposed organizations similar to or different from OTA? Were the differences attributable to considerations related to their political institutions or to modifications in the basic concept of OTA? Answer. France, Germany and the Netherlands have approached the creation of technology assessment offices that look similar to the tLS. OTA but none of these ofilees have been implemented for reasons outlined liT the prepared testi- mony, I.e., it is very difficult to initiate this type of activity In a Parliamentary form of government. Sweden and Japan on the other hand, have a lot of the elements of U.S. TA-like activity but they have explicitly structured this In parallel to executive industrial and academic activities that all operate in some sort of harmony and balance and not concentrated TA on legislative affairs Canada has a technology assessment oriented activity but much of it Is performed in a contractual unit with a special relationship to the Privy Council. There appear to be no major challenges to the concept of a technology assess- ment office. Rather, other nations appear to be adapting the concept to suit their own political institutional forms, national style, and timing. Progress varies i.n terms of the availability of resources, severity of the need, and the coalition of forces that can agree that this partlcula.r approach can alleviate the problems that are being faced nationally at this time. Question 7. Technology assessments have been conducted by the private sector In the United States and Canada. Have similar attempts been made by Euro~ pean and Japanese corporations and with what degree of success~i Answer. As was indicated in part in the prepared testimony, Industrial orga~ nizations in France, West German, Italy, and Switzerland have been modestly active in performing technology assessment. Sometimes these have been per- formed for government clients, sometimes for other industrial clients, and there has been `some in-house assessment as part of strategic or development planning. Most of the technology assessment-like activities that are performed are not performed undOr the label "TA". Only a few are of the `broad, comprehensive policy oriented technology assessment suggested early In the testimony as suit- able for major corporations and for governmental activities. Most of the efforts appear to be on the avoidance of possible problems with the environment or with subsequent government regulation. Some industrial assessments are performed to seize an opportunity and to understand better the possible side effects of tak- ing the initiative. Japanese corporations have performed a similar array at studies but because of the more interactive nature of the technology assessment activities in Japan, it is hard to evaluate the degree of success for Industry purposes alone. On the whole, industry has not picked up and run with thç technology assess- ment idea in any country the way that some of the early' spokesmen for TA hoped it would. In part, there is a fear that if one in an Industrial setting per- forms a technology assessment It will be asked to disclose that information `by some sort of technology assessment office in the government. There Is a feeling, hard to support with data, that the technology assessment is practiced PAGENO="0115" 111 considerably more than the finding of studies or organizational elements with the laoel TA would indicate. Industries, citizen groups, academic institutions, unions and many other groups world-wide are showing increased interest in evaluating the potential direct and indirect iinpacts-social, other technological, environmental, economic and political-of bard and soft technological thitia- tives. As a member of the ISTA I wish they would all call it "TA". But as a world citizen, I am just glad it's going on. Question 8. Would you comment upon the concern that some have that tech- nology assessment by government can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies with attendant constraints imposed by government to ensure that the "optimum" predicted impacts do occur? Answer. I find this a very difficult question to answer for if such a concern exists, I do not share it. But in a sense, Isn't this what technology assessment is really all about? Is it not a role of government to investigate the beneficial, possibly hazardous and the unexpected consequences of both public and private, technological initiatives? Should not government take policy or programmatic steps to assure that the positive effects of such initiatives are achieved by society if they meet societal goals and constraints and that the negative effects are reduced or eliminated? Regrettably this question brings one back to the sticky problem of defining technology assessment. If technology assessment is selecting appropriate tech~ nologies to achieve national aspirations as is the case with the developing coun- tries, this would seem to be a perfectly proper role for TA. in that setting. Sim- ilarly, in the planned economies where it is desired to achieve specified social and economic ends, the technology assessment process is used to screen unde- sirable effects and perhaps locate those technological initiatives that bring the desired results about. This type Of TA would seem proper in that context. In the United States where technology assessment is often used for early warn- ing and alerting it would seem that identifying the desirable and undesirable Impacts would be a proper goal for governmental technology assessment. The same might be true for government client-requested technology assessments. A major advantage of public policy oriented technology assessment in the U.S. is that it is almost invariably an open process where all parties of interest can share the information, or at least have access to it, thus hidden motives or processes are the exception rather than the rule. Question 9. When government agencies in other developed countries have made technology assessments, has the tendency been to utilize government re- sources or contract studies? Answer. Almost all countries involved in technology assessment sponsor a mix of In-house and contractual activities. Many countries, when initiating the effort, usually start with a small contract, or several of them, to give them an idea of what can `be done and what the nature of the processes and products are. This has particularly been the case in developing countries where the analytical in- frastructure has been large enough to conduct, studies in-house at the `beginning. Many countries have very excellent in-house activities such as the Programmes Analysis Unit in the UK and the several organizations in Sweden and Japan. But here again, all three countries also sponsor contract studies and occasionally set up separate commissions and boards on an ad hoc basis to carry out the detailed work. It would seem that there are continuing roles for both in-house and contract efforts in connection with a technology assessment function, In-house staffs that would sponsor contractual technology assessments must perform enough of them to develop the expertise to draft technology assessment contract statements, select contractors, set standards, monitor the progress, evaluate the results, and communicate those results in client terms. This is somewhat analogous to the so-called von Braun theory of doing sufficient in-house work to be a good government buyer, supervisor and evaluator of out of house work. As second area for in-house activities is the conduct of special studies that are of a sensitive nature either because of the subject matter or because of the use of the results and it is therefore not practical to bring in outsiders. A third in-house role Is the synthesis of sets of related contract studies at a higher level of generalization and that of systematic cumulative learning from the many possible ad hoc efforts done outsIde. On the other hand, external or contracting activities have the advantage of being able to select the optimum mix of skills for the team to be applied to PAGENO="0116" 112 each individual assessment with little worry about long-term payroll commit- ments after this job is competed. Contracting arrangements also permit the flexibility of letting several kinds of contracts, pursuing several different view- points and styles-perhaps even to the point of advocacy technology assess- ments-and of the mixing of all of these with a selected partial or even a parallel study in-house. When the study involves in any way the organization sponsoring the study, the contractor can supply the external objectivity that is needed. It is recognized that it is also possible to "buy the right answer" but It is. equally possible to find contractors whose objectivity is unquestioned. Mr. THORNTON. Thank YOU very much, Mr. Hahn, for a very fine summary of your excellent paper. We do appreciate the thought that has gone into its preparation. At this time I would like to ask Dr. Vary Coates, the associate director for the program on policy studies in science and tech- nology of George Washington TJniversity, to proceed and make her presentation. [A biographical sketch of Dr. Coates follows:] VARY T. COATES, Pn. D. Associate Director, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, the George Washington University, Washington, D.C.; and adjunct professor, the George Washington University (Graduate Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy). Past president and member, board of directors, International Society for Tech- nology Assessment. Education: B.A. (political science), Furman University, South Carolina, M.A. (public affairs), the George Washington University. Ph. D. (political science), the George Washington University. D. Sc. (honorary), Webster College, Mo. STATEMENT OP DR. VARY COATES, ASSOCIATE FOR THE PROGRAM ON POLICY STUDIES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OP GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY Dr. CoAi'ns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the com- mittee. I am glad to have the opportunity to talk with you about the status of technology assessment in the Federal Governmen~, primarily in the executive agencies, since you will be hearing fró~m OTA tomorrow. The group which you mentioned, the program. of policy studies in science and technology, is an interdisciplinary research group at the George Washington University, which has been doing technology assessment studies since about 1967, and has served most of the Federal agencies at one time or another. But my remarks today are based on research I have in progress on technology assessment in the Federal executive agencies, supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. This is a followup to my earlier review o.f TA in Federal agencies prior to 1971. This study covers activities from 1971 to the present; where TA is done in the agencies, how it is initiated, how it is performed and the problems encountered, its utilization and its perceived value. The study is still in progress. We have almost firnsh~d the .inter- viewing which will amount at the end to about 400 interviews in all the major departments and most of their constituent agencies. When that report is finished, as it soon will be, I will be very happy to provide copies to the committee. PAGENO="0117" 113 Mr. THORNTON. Dr. Coates, we would be very pleased to receive a copy of that report for study and analysis by members of the staff, and I appreciate your volunteering to make it available. Without objection, I do want to make your complete testimony a part of the record and invite you to go ahead. Dr. COATES. Thank you. In this survey, interviewing in the executive agencies, we use this definition of TA: Technology assessment is a class of policy-oriented research aimed at the antici- pation, identification, and evaluation of the potential impacts or consequencies of a technology (or project) on society, on a region, or on a community. TA must consider secondary-unplanned or derivative-impacts and consequences; that is, must go beyond questiOns of technical feasibility, direct or internalized costs, and safety considerations. As I say, I am speaking without having quite completed the inter- views, but it is clear that technology assessment is now being done in many Federal agencies. It has evolved from the concept introduced by Mr. Daddario while a member of this committee, and from an ex- ploratory and highly useful program in the National Science Founda- tion, to a widely used planning tool in Federal line agencies such as the Department of Transportation, ERDA, EPA, and the Depart- ment of Agriculture. Even in agencies which have not yet done com- prehensive technology assessments, the growing awareness of its im- portance has stimulated increasing social, economic, and environmental impact analysis. Two or more Federal agencies have in several instances cooperated in assessments of technologies which do not fall clearly within the responsibility of one agency or which cut across the responsibilities of several agencies. Finally, TA has greatly contributed to a growing realization throughout government, industry, academia, and the con- cerned public that we need better techniques of policy analysis, futures research, and interdisciplinary research, and progress is being made in all of these areas. I will only mention. a few of the departments today as illustrative. Several Federal departments have established or are now develop- ing strong in-house technology assessment capabilities. In the De- partment of Agriculture the Agricultural Research Service and the Economic Research Service have joined forces to assess advances in agricultural technology; these assessments will be done through the Regional Agricultural Experimentation Laboratories. In addition, the Economic Research Service has established a program on technology and innovation in the food and fiber sector (TIFFS) to carry out technology assessments. They are currently assessing solar energy use in agriculture, biomass techniques, automatic checkout technology in food retailing, and new tractor technology. The assessment procedure in USDA begins with an in-depth study of the economic feasibility and adoption potential of a technology and if it appears to have significant possible impacts., moves into a com- prehensive technology assessment, which covers all the facets which Walter Hahn has spoken of. ERDA has recently created an integrated assessment program in its Office of Technology Overview. The program includes comprehensive impact assessments of major energy options including solar, geo- PAGENO="0118" 114 thermal, coal, oil and gas, oil shale, and nuclear energy development and conservation. The ERDA program will also undertake evaluation of alternative regional energy futures, considering resources, needs, constraints on development, and a wide range of impacts. The major current effort in this program is the national coal utilization assess- ment. * The National Center for Health Statistics Research which is a part of HEW's Health Resources Administration, is currently designing an in-house capability and research program in technology assess- ment. The present plan is for the staff to perform four or five small exploratory assessments of innovations in health research and tech- nology. These are expected to lead to a series of comprehensive as- sessments to be performed by grantees or contract organizations under the direction of the center staff. The majority of technology assessments done for the Federal Gov- ernment are carried out by contract research organizations or uni- versity groups such as our own. The largest technology assessment program among the line agencies is the EPA integrated assessment program in the Office of Energy, Minerals, and Industry. There are currently five energy-related technology assessments underway here. Two are national in scope; an assessment of electrical utilities and an assessment of advanced coal technologies. The other three are regional; western energy development, energy development in the Ohio River l3asin and energy development in Appalachia. These assessments follow the regular technology assessment pat- tern which Walter Hahn has described of identifying potentially affected parties, potential impacts and policy issues but they deal with clusters or mixtures of energy development strategies and tech- nologies. Other Federal agencies have also dedicated sizable resources to comprehensive technology assessment. ERDA has looked into the long-range impacts of electrification of transportation, synthetic fuels, solar energy, and fusion energy. DOT has investigated automated guideway transit, pipelines and diagnos- tic motor vehicle inspection systems. DOT also collaborated with NASA on assessment of intercity transportation systems. HUD as- sessments include modular integrated utility systems (MIUS), and residential energy conservation techniques. The lead agency for technology assessment in the executive branch has been and continues to be the National Science Foundation. Under the research applied to national needs (RANN) program. NSF has provided over $10 million for 43 technology assessments and 23 re- lated methodologiCal studies, surveys, and conferences. This program has provided the experience and methodological development which enabled technology assessment to become accepted as an aid to plan- ning and decisionmaking in mission-oriented agencies. NFS assess- ments have included physical, biological, biomedical, social,. and in- `stitutional technologies. They have included a few exploratory, one- person assessments, as well as large team comprehensive assessments. In order to develop a better understanding of the relationship of technological change to social change in the past, NSF has also sponsored four retrospective technology assessments; the study of PAGENO="0119" 115 the effects of major technologies developed during the last 100 years, so that we can better understand the effects that similar technologies may have in the future. Finally, the NSF program has developed innovative approaches to technology assessment report dissemination and utilization, how to get these things to the decisionmakers and to the concerned public which is, of course, the ultimate decisionmaker. Some Federal agencies, however, use the term "technology assess- ment" in ways not included in the generally accepted meaning of the term. Therefore, the title can be misleading. The Department of Commerce, for example, has an Office of Technology Assessment which is concerned wholly with the tracking and monitoring of patent trends. Some studies are called "technology assessments" which are in fact technical and economic feasibility studies. EPA has `adopted the term "integrated technology assessment" for its technology assess- ment program because the simpler term "technology assessment" is routinely used in some of its divisions for state-of-the-technology summaries. In other agencies, first attempts to perform or sponsor technology assessments have betrayed a lack of understanding of what is encom- passed in this kind of analysis. There is a great temptation in that direction, because many of our Federal agencies have in their charter the promotion of a technology, and they are uncomfortable in asking what may turn out to be un- pleasant questions about the impacts of that technology. Such studies may limit analysis to a very few preselected impacts or to possible impacts on a small segment of society or of their primary constituency. Some are concerned with the effects of a technological change on one industry. Some are, studies of the barriers to commer- cialization of a technology or of the effects of a technological change on one industry. While such studies may be useful and necessary, there is no real reason to call them technology assessments and doing so can be misleading to the users of the studies, to decisionmakers and to the interested public. I would like to conclude my brief remarks by highlighting son~ie of the changes which seem to me to have occurred in technology assess- ment over the last 6 years, or since my earlier survey. Some of these changes I celebrate and some I view with considerable apprehension. We have now built up a considerable body of experience both in performing technology assessment and in using it. From this hat's evolved a large area of understanding and consensus about what tech- nology assessment is and about what must go into it. While the concept and methodology still are evolving and I trust will continue to do so~ we no longer need as we did in 1970 to start from scratch with each new assessment. We have learned a great deal about the problems and how to meet them from the experience of each other. In particular, technology assessment practitioners and technology assessment sponsors are no longer quite as dogmatic about the `neces- sity for developing quantitative technique. This remains a goal, as it should, but we have learned that decisionmakers and the public will accept both quantitative and qualitative data and analysis if it is appropriate and useful and they will reject either qualitative or quan- PAGENO="0120" 116 titative information if it is not responsive to their need or if it distorts or ignores valuable information about the possible consequences of policy actions. Early TAs emphasized physical, that is, hardware technologies, and to som~ extent biomedical technologies. Those are still important. But we now realize that social science also produces data and theory which are turned into applied technologies which may move quickly, some- times too quickly, into wide utilization. I am thinking here of social technologies such as Head Start and busing to achieve school inte- gration, in the public sector, and alternative work scheduling and new credit arrangements, for example, in the private sector. I think that decisionmakers and technology assessment practitioners increasingly recognize that these social technologies also need technology assessment. We have, I think, reached a much more balanced appreciation of the uses of TA. Because the concept, as Dr. Kranzberg indicated, grew out of the serious concerns about the detrimental impacts of tech- nology, the early emphasis tended to be on TA as an early warning system. This is still important. But increasing awareness of resource limita- tions and intractible national and global problems have brought about a new emphasis, not on recklessly promoting technology development, but on wisely guiding and in some cases stimulating the development of a socially desirable technology to meet such problems. This is par- ticularly appropriate and I think will become increasingly so, when a more socially desirable technology is handicapped, cannot get started in the marketplace, because of competition from older, very heavy capitalized technologies which may be less socially desirable. This is a clear incidence where Government intervention in the marketplace may~be necessary. Many agencies have now established, as I said, continuing programs of technology assessment and many more have had some experience with its performance or use. Again I would like to emphasize that one of the great influences of the TA movement has been that the other agencies which have not yet taken up technology assessment as such, have perceptibly broadened the factors which they considered in plan- ning and decisionmaking. And this is evidenced by the great frequency with which the term "social impact an:alysis" appears in Government research programs and planning documents. But there are other trends which are not so promising. Because TA has increasingly gained acceptance, some agencies claim to be doing, or using, technology assessment on grounds which I believe to be mis- taken and misleading. / For example, "Impact Analysis" of a technology may be done in several areas of a department or agency; environmental studies in one office, economic study in anOther office, social studies in a third, tech- nicRi design and commercialization stiidie~ somewhere else. Some agencies claim that this Constitutes TA because all of these impact studies are integrated in the head of the decisionmaker. I think this is misleading, for several reasons. Such studies may and usually do use different data hases, different assumption about the technological configuration, different assumptions about its eventual PAGENO="0121" 117 level of utilization, and different degrees of precision in analysis or different kinds of analysis. Therefore, these studies do not allow reliable comparison across the studies of the effects and consequences and do not therefore promote identification of the necessary tradeoffs. We always have to make tradeoffs in public policy because no human action is without its costs and unwanted effects. The decisionmaker may not at any one time be able to locate, acquire, or have access to all of these studies and the public is almost never able to do so. Therefore, those multiple studies do not constitute a readily accessible record of the assumptions and data which went into the decision, for the purposes of evaluating, revising, or defending that de- cision at a later time. And this is one of the most important uses of TA. For other reasons I think that the growing success or acceptance of TA could be its undoing. Because Government decisionmakers are increasingly asking for technology assessment to assist them in formu- lation of a specific policy or the making of a specific decision, there is a tendency to narrow the concept of "usefulness to the decisionmaker," and to address only those issues of which the decisionmaker is already aware and knows he needs help on. This, of course, misses the primary objective of TA, the open-ended search for long-range, indirect, unin- tended impacts, unrecognized areas of uncertainty and risk, and emerg- ing policy issues. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this is one of the difficulties which OTA has encountered in trying to be extremely responsive to requests from congressional committees. Also TA is increasingly used to study the problems and opportuni- ties of existing and rapidly developing technologies simply because it has now demonstrated its usefulness. But because funds for applied policy research are always very limited, and because there are a limited number of technology assessors, particularly those who have gained some experience in this area, the increased demand to look at exisiting and rapidly developing technologies tends not to stimulate but to replace the assessment of still newer technologies, those which are just emerging from the laboratories or still in the concept stage. Recom- bina~it DNA is a good example of that. The more we concentrate on the anticipation and preparation for the short-term future, the more likely it is that the long-term future will catch us unawares. Thank you. [The complete prepared statement of Dr. Coates plus response to additional questions follows:] STATEMENT OF DR. VARY T. COATES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, PROGRAM OF POLIOT STUDIES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen: Thank you for inviting me to speak with you on the status of technology assessment in the Federal government. My name is Vary Coates, I am associate director of The Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology at The George Washington University, an Interdisciplinary research group which has carried out a large number of technology assessment studies, beginning in 1967. I am also a past president of the International Society for Technology Assessment. My remarks today are based on research in progress, on Technology Assess- ment in Federal Executive Agencies. Thth study, supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, is a follow-on to my earlier review of TA in Fed- PAGENO="0122" 118 eral agencies prior to 1971, and covers activities from 1971 to 1977: where TA is done, how it is initiated, how it is performed and the problems encountered, its utilization, and its perceived value. This study is still in progress; we are still interviewing officials in some agencies. My remarks today therefore repre- sent my own perceptions and opinions and should not be taken as the final results of our study; nor do they in any way represent the opinions of the University or of the National Science Foundation. The definition of TA which we have used in our survey is the following: Technology assessment is a class of policy-oriented research aimed at the anticipation, Identification, and evaluation of the potential impacts or conse- quences of a technology (or project) on society, on a region, or on a community. TA must consider secondary (unplanned or derivative) impacts and conse- quences-that is, must go beyond questions of technical feasibility, direct or inter- nalized costs, and safety considerations. Technology assessment is now being done in many Federal agencies. It has evolved from the concept introduced by Mr. Daddarlo while a Member of this Committee, and from an exporatory and highly useful program in the National Science Foundation, to a widely used planning tool in Federal line agencies such as the Department of Transportation, ERDA, EPA, and the Department of Agriculture. Even in agencies which have not yet done comprehensive technol- ogy assessments, the growing awareness of its importance has stimulated in- creasing social, economic, and environmental impact analysis. Two or more Federal agencies have in several instances cooperated in assessments of tech- nologies which do not fall clearly within the responsibility of one agency or which cut across the responsibilities of several agencies. Finally, TA has greatly contributed to a growing realization throughout government, industry, academia, and the concerned public that we need better techniques of policy analysis, fu- tures research, and interdisciplinary research, and progress is being made in all of these areas. Several Federal Departments have established or are now developing strong in-house TA capabilities. In the Department of Agriculture the Agricultural Research Service and the Economic Research Service have joined forces to assess advances in agricultural technology; these assessments will be done through the Regional Agricultural Experimentation Laboratories. In addition, the Economic Research Service has established a program on Technology and Innovation in the Food and Fibre Sector (TIFFS) to carry out technology assessments. They are currently assessing solar energy use in agriculture, biomass techniques, automatic checkout technology in food retailing, and new tractor technology. The assessment procedure in USDA begins with an In-depth study of the economic feasibility and adoption potential of a technology and if it appears to have significant possible impacts, moves into a comprehensive tech- nology assessment. ERDA has recently created an Integrated Assessment Program in its Office of Technology Overview. The Program includes comprehensive impact assess- ments of major energy options including solar, geothermal, coal, oil and gas, oil shale, and nuclear energy development, and conservation. The ERDA program will also undertake evaluation of alternative regional energy futures, consider- ing resources, needs, constraints on development, and a wide range of impacts. The major current effort in this program is the National Coal Utilizaticm Assessment. The National Center for Health Statistics Research, which is a part of H.E.W's Health Resources Administration, is currently designing an in-house capability and research program in technology assessment. The present plan is for the staff to perform four or five small exploratory assessments of innova- tions in health research and technology. These are expected to lead to a series of comprehensive assessments to be performed by grantees or contract organiza- tions under the direction of the Center staff. The majority of technology assessments done for the Federal government are carried out by contract research organizations or university groups. The largest TA program among the line agencies is the EPA Integrated Program, in the Office of Energy, Minerals, and Industry. There are currently five energy-related technology assesments underway here. Two are national in scope: an assess- ment of electrical utilities and an assessment of advanced coal technologies. The other three are regional: western energy development, energy development in the Ohio River basin, and energy development in Appalachia. PAGENO="0123" 119 These assessments follow the regular TA pattern of identifying potentially affected parties, potential impacts, and policy issues, but they deal with clusters or mixtures of energy development strategies and technologies. Other Federal agencies have also dedicated sizable resources to comprehensive technology assessment. ERDA has looked into the longrange impacts of electrifica- tion of transportation, synthetic fuels, solar energy, and fusion energy. DOT has investigated automated guidew.ay transit, pipelines, and diagnostic motor vehicle inspection systems. DOT also collaborated with NASA on assessment of intercity transportation system. HUD assessments include modular Integrated utility systems and residential energy conservation techniques. The lead agency for TA in the Executive branch has been and continues to be the National Science Foundation. Under the Research Applied to National Needs (RANN) Program, NSF has provided over ten million dollars for 43 technology assessments and 23 related methodological studies, surveys, and conferences. This program has provided the experience and methodological development which enabled TA to become accepted as an aid to planning and decisionmaking in mission-oriented agencies. NSF assessments have included physical, biological, biomedical, social, and institutional technologies. They have included a few exploratory, one-person assessments, as well as comprehensive assessments. In order to develop a better understanding of the relationship of technological change to social change in the past, NSF also sponsored four retrospective tech- nology assessments. Finally the NSF Program has developed innovative ap- proaches to TA report dissemination and utilization. Some Federal agencies, however, use the term technology assessment in ways not included within the generally accepted meaning of the term; therefore titles "an be misleading. The Department of Commerce, for example, has an Office of Technology Assessment which is concerned wholly with the tracking and monitoring of patent trends. Some studies are called technology assessments which are in fact technical and economic feasibility studies. EPA has adopted the term "Integrated Technology Assessment" for its TA program because the simpler term "technology assessment" is routinely used in some of its divisions for state-of-the-technology summaries. In other agencies, first attempts to perform or sponsor technology assessments have betrayed a lack of understanding of what is encompassed in this kind of analysis. Such studies may limit analysis to a very few pre-selected impacts, or to possible impacts on a small segment of society or of their primary con- stituency; they may be studies of the barriers to commercialization of a tech- nology, or the effects of a technological change on one industry. While such studies may be useful and necessary, there is no real reason to call them tech- nology assessments, and doing so can be misleading to the users of the studies, to decisionmakers, and to the interested public. I would like to conclude by highlighting some the changes which seem to me to have occurred in technology assessment over the last six years, some which I applaud and some which I view with considerable apprehension. We have now built up a considerable body of experience both in performing TA and in using it. From this has evolved a large and significant area of under- standing and agreement about what TA is and what must go into it. While the concept is still evolving (and I trust will continue to do so) we no longer need start from scratch with each new assessment. We have learned from the ex- perience of each other. In particular, technology assessment performers and technology assessment sponsors are no longer auite so dogmatic about the necessity for developing quantitative techniques. This remains a goal. But we have learned that decision- makers and the public will accept both quantitative and qualitative data and analysis if it is appropriate and useful; and they will reject either qualitative or quantitative information if it is not responsive to their needs or if it distorts or ignores valuable information about the possible consequences of policy actions. Early TAs emphasized physical (hardware) technologies and, secondarily, biomedical technologies. We now realize that social science too produces data and theory which in turn produce applied technologies which may move quickly into wide utilination. I am thinking of social technologies such as Headstart and school bussing, in the public sector, and alternative work scheduling and neW credit arrangements in the private sector. Decisionmakers increasingly realize, I think, that these too call for technology assessment. PAGENO="0124" 120 We have reached a more balanced appreciation of the uses of TA. Because the concept grew out of the serious concerns of the late 1960's about the detrimental impacts of technology, the early emphasis was on TA as an early warning sys- tem. That is still very important. But increasing awareness of resource limita- tions and intractible national and international problems brought new em- phasis-not on recklessly promoting unexamined technological development- but on wisely guiding and in some cases stimulating the development of socially desirable technology to `attack such problems. This is particularly appropriate when a more socially desirable technology is handicapped by competition from older, heavily capitalized, less socially desirable technologies. Many agencies have now established continuing programs of technology as- sessment; many more have had some experience with its performance or use. Most of the other agencies have perceptibly broadened the factors which they consider in planning and decisionmaking. This is evidenced by the great fre- quency with which the term "impact analysis" appears in government research programs and planning documents. There tare other trends which are not so promising. Because TA has increasingly gained acceptance some agencies claim to be doing, or using technology assessment on grounds. which I believe to be mistaken and misleading. For example, "impact analyses" of a technology may be done in several areas of a department or agency: environmental studies in one office, economic studies in another office, social analyses in a third, technical design and commercialization studies elsewhere. The claim that this constitutes TA be- cause it "is integrated in the head of the decisionmaker" is, I repeat, misleading, because: Such studies may use different data bases, different assumptions about the technological configuration and its eventual level of utilization, and different degrees of precision in analysis; they do not allow reliable comparison of effects and identification of necessary trade-offs. The decisionmaker may not at any one time be able to locate, acquire, or access all of these studies; the public is almost never able to do so. Multiple studies do not constitute a readily accessible record of the assump- tions and data which went into decisionmaking, for purposes of re-evaluating, revising, or defending that decision at a later time. Because government decisionmakers are Increasingly asking for technology assessment to assist them in formulation of a specific policy or the making of a specific decision, there is a tendency to narrow the concept of "usefulness to the decisionmaker," that is, to address only those issues of which he/she is already aware. This of course bypasses a primary objective of TA, the open-ended search for long range, indirect, unintended impacts; unrecognized areas of un- certainty and risk; and emerging policy issues. TA is increasingly used to study the problems and opportunities of existing and rapidly developing technologies. But because funds for applied policy re- search, and the time and energy of technology assessors, are limited resources, this tends not to stimulate but to replace the assessment of still newer tech- nologies-those just emerging from laboratories or still in the concept stage. The more we concentrate on the short term future, the more likely it is that the long term future will catch us unprepared. [Additional questions and answers asked of Dr. Coates follows:] Questioa 1. Could you indicate whether the technology assesments supported by NSF are directed toward developing methodologies or toward doing a sub- stantive technology assessment? Or is it both, and if so, which is the predomi- nant reason? Answer. NSF program objectives in regard to technology assesment have consistently been stated in terms of both conducting substantive TAs and "develop(ing) and improve(in.g) analysis and management tools for the execu- tion of these complex projects". (The statement quoted is from NSF program reports, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1977.) I believe these two goals have been given approximately even emphasis and there is a sound record of achievement in both areas. Many more substantive technology assessments have been funded than methodological studies, of course (43 ~abstantive studies, for a total of $7,467,000, as compared to methodological studies and several conferences or workshops, for a total of $1,598,800). PAGENO="0125" 121 The contribution to methodological development, however, is not solely or even predominately a result of the methodological studies. It has come about in my judgment, as a result of: (a) Conscientious and consistent concern for sound and innovative metho- dological approaches in preparing program annuoncements (project solicita- tion), evaluation of proposals, review and assistance during the course of the projects, and careful consideration throughout the process for needs for potential users, including both decisionmakers and the concerned public. (b) The practice of involving other members of the technology assess- ment community in NSF sponsored studies as peer group reviewers and as members of oversight or advisory committees. (c) Frequent interaction between NSF TA program managers, NSF grantees and contractors, and others concerned with TA methodological development (in research organizations, university faculties, industry, and other government agencies) in the course of conferences and workshops sponsored by professional societies, TA organizations such as ISTA, NSF and other government sponsors. (d) An active outreach program of discussion, consultation, and coopera- tive assessment activities with other government agencies. These practices have stimulated and encouraged a productive interchange among members of the larger TA community and together with the early and consistent TA funding which NSF provided, have allowed the development of a large area of consensus about what a TA should include, as well as development and testing of TA methods. OTA, unfortunately, has been less active in cultivat- ing and maintaining relationships with the larger TA community and In en- couraging its own staff to both learn from and contribute to on-going methologi- cal development. Question 2. You spoke in your testimony about "socially desirable technology". Could you enlarge upon this and provide several examples? Answer. By "socially desirable technologies" I meant those which (a) promise to contribute substantially toward meeting a national need or goal, or solving a persistent, intractable national problem, and (b) for which the direct and long- range social benefits appear to far outweigh social disbenefits. Technologies for generation of energy from renewable sources, for example, meet the first criterion; technology assessment of such systems is necessary to determine whether they also meet the second criterion. In the context of my remarks before the subcommittee, I suggested that such socially desirable technologies are sometimes prevented from' successfully reach- ing wide utilization because of initial competition from less socially desirable technologien which are already heavily capitalized before they reach economies of scale which lower consumer costs. In this situation, government interventions may be necessary to promote the technology; there is then a particularly serious obligation to anticipate and control any detrimental societal impacts. Question 3. Would you say that there is a possible link-up for conducting "futures" activities and/or research between OTA and OSTP? Answer. For effective long-range social planning, it is obviously desirable that both the legislative and executive branches of the government conduct futures research and technology assessment, and It is necessary that each set of policy- makers thoroughly understand the assumptions, values, information, and con- straints that affect the perception and resolution of policy issues by the other branch of government. There are of course two critical factors that limit the feasibility of the strategy which is suggested: In setting up OTA, the Congress placed great emphasis on the need for a source of policy-related scientific information that was completely independ- ent of the executive branch, and not subject to the institutional bias of Executive agency justification of programs and projects. OTA was carefully planned to be bipartisan in structure and nonpartisan in selection of researCh topics and in research results. Although some liaison functions have been allowed to develop ~zhich threaten to perturb this crucial balance, in general it remains a guiding principle of OTA procedures. OSTP on the other hand is and necessarily must be, directed and constrained by Administration policies, since it is part of the Executive Office. PAGENO="0126" 122 While both 0Th and OSTP would, I am sure, strive mightily to achieve complete scientific objectivity and detachment in selecting and carrying out research results, I also suspect that at the stage of report writing-if no where eLse-the tension between the two organization's practical imperatives would become unmanageable, and the credibility of any results would be damaged. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Coates, for a fine statement. If I may address a first, general question to the members of the panel, and following right along the thought which has just been expressed and that is the difficulty of focusing attention of a formalized tech- nology assessment process upon problems which have not achieved the dimensions of an energy crisis or a materials and substitution problem or a DNA research question, is there an institutional deficiency some- where that can be addressed? Should there be a charge to explore more broadly and to report back those areas in which it appears that a problem is going to develop, to recognize in advance where a problem area may lie? Is this part of the function of technology assessment, or should it be? You cannot investigate everything. Now, let us start With that, We do not have the capacity to make a study of every conceivable technology that exists or may exist. How do you select? Dr. CoA~n~s. I think that clearly one of the things which was envi- sioned when the first discussion of setting up of OTA occurred was the idea that one of its functions at least would be to alert the Congress to issues they were not yet concerned about, problems they had not fore- seen that were going to arise. And perhaps in the very necessary and understandable effort to be completely responsive to the present needs of the Congress in the form of requests made from committees, this function has perhaps been overlooked a bit. But it is also true of technology assessment in general that we need better ways of fore- seeing what is going to happen in the future. This is one of the ques- tions that we have been looking~ at in doing a retrospective technology assessment. We are studying the consequences which submarine teleg- raphy, the first transatlantic cable, had on the United States. And this gave rise in our thinking to the realization that some technologies are much more apt to have significant consequences on society than others. This is particularly true when a new technology promises to give society a capability which it never had before. In the case of the transatlantic cable, it was the ability to communicate reactively in a very short time across the oceans. In newly emerging technologies it may be the capability to go to the Moon, it may be the capability to split the atom and produce energy. In the future it may be the cap- ability of transplanting organs or modifying behavior or creating life in a test tube. Certainly those things with which we have no ex- perience to guide us need technology assessment at a very early stage. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you, Dr. Coates. Dr. Kranzberg, would you like to address that question? Dr. KRANZBERG. I have been thinking, how did certain items which resulted in some sort of technology assessment and some legislative action really attain this result? And that is largely through the ac- tivity of publicists. Mr. THORNTON. That is what I was wondering about. Nader has been responsible for a lot of technology assessment. PAGENO="0127" 123 Dr. KRANZBERG. I once gave a speech in which I credited' Rachel Carson with getting us all involved because she wrote a book which graphically depicted a spring where the birds would not be singing any more, and that really grabbed the public's attention. A representa- tive from the Department of Agriculture was incensed at. my state- ment; he pointed out to me that many years before Rachel Carson the Agriculture Department had been warning about the effect of large- scale use of DDT. He sent me a whole stack of documents to prove his point, including hearings before the House Agriculture Committee where, in say 400 pages, there would be about 2 pages of warning about the possible large-scale impact of DDT, but there would be about 150 pages saying we have got to use more DDT because it is going to help the farmers. Included were articles in the poultry journals and similar publications about the possible harmful effects of DDT. But still it took Rachel Carson to write a best seller and get the public aroused. So the best way to attract public attention is to have pub- licists do this. Mr. THORNTON. Is that the way it should be, though? Must we rely upon the advent of a Rachel Carson to highlight a problem so that we focus on it? Is this part of a democratic society, that we do not react up here until someone stirs the public and they, in turn, stir us? Is that the way it is? Dr. KRANZBERG. That is the way it is. You are asking if that's the way it should be? Mr. THORNTON. Yes; I am also asking that question. Dr. KRANZBERG. I do not know the answer to that. I'll have to think about it some more. (See answer to supplement question, question 6, page 35 of this hearing record.) Mr. THORNTON. I was very interested in the apparent distinction between your testimony and that of Mr. Hahn with regard to the variations of technology assessment between the democratic society and some of the European societies which may be less parliamentarian and which may be more balanced or organized, without highlighting any particular country; you said something to the effect, Mr. Hahn, that a technological assessment was most difficult for a parliamentarian society. Did I misunderstand what you were saying? Mr. HAHN. That is not what I hoped to communicate, Mr. Chair- man. I hoped to communicate that it is very hard to set up an institu- tion like OTA, a formal government institution reporting to a legisla- ture in a parliamentary form. Many of the countries with a parliamentary form of government, in fact, are performing TA in various of their ministries, in industry and in the academic areas. Mr. THORNTON. I am glad I have opened the question because you are saying, it is not a question of philosophy of government but rather of structure of government that makes this difficult, is that correct? Mr. HAHN. That is correct, sir. Mr. THORNPON. Do you have any comment with regard to the need to be able to analyze and spotlight emerging problems of technology before those are brought to our attention by someone who picks them up and highlights them in a very visible way? PAGENO="0128" 124 Mr. HAHN. Two comments. * We see a model where some other countries, such as Canada, Sweden, Japan, are in fact using the concept of future's research and forecast- ing as sort of a cousin to technology assessment. They are using an organizational form, or approach to the problem which is a little broader and a little larger than our appropriate technology assess- nient. It is not the technology, per se, which is perceived as the prob- 1cm in some of the countries. Technology assessment is part of a larger futures research movement. In Canada, for example, technology assess- ment is a subsidiary of the futures movement. In the Swedish parlia- mentary office the same is true. The word "futures" seems to be a much looser, more relaxed and broader term that appears generally acceptable, let us say, to parlia- mentarians, legislators and others. It is not a frightening term. It does not bring the reactions of organized institutions that have a large capital investment in technology or in a research area. We see evidence of this type of phenomenon emerging here in our own Congress with the changes, for example, in the chamber with modification of rule X to include a foresight provision. The Members of Congress appear to be leaning in a broader, almost more relaxed fashion toward this early warning approach rather than zeroing in on a specific target like technology. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Hahn, your suggestions of these models in other countries raises the question of whether anyone is making a sur- vey and reporting back to the Congress on thos.e variations which may have occurred in other countries' search for means of assessing tech- nology and its impact. And I am~'sure they learned a lot from us, they patterned many of their activities, I am quite confident, upon the pio- neering efforts from this country. Have we made an effort to learn from them? Mr. HAHN. In the formal sense of, did someone ~o out and make a survey? I am unaware that anyone has systematically visited and searched the literature of other countries. In fact, the difficulty I have had in bringing even this material together for the attention of the subcommittee, suggests the answer is pretty much, no. But I mentioned this invisible college, of frequent communication among our industry people, consultants, academicians, and people like myself who are constantly in interaction, with people in many of the other countries. There is a very viable exchange. There is a lot of knowledge resident, if you will, in U.S. he.ads about the technology assessment experiences, good and bad, and alternatives that are avail- able that could be systematically put together. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much. I do have quite a few more questions but I want to recognize at this time Mr. Brown for such questions as he has. Mr. BROWN. I would like to elicit views from each of the panel members or any of them who desire to comment as to whether the Congress has done the right thing in setting up an Office of Tech- nology Assessment, or could we do this merely because a knowledge- able, popular, and respected Member of Congress settled on this as a useful device, `and was able to get it through? Would, in a broader per- spective, the needs of the Congress have been better served by some PAGENO="0129" 125 other mechanism? And I think particularly here, say a program planning analysis within which technology assessment could have been, as has been the case in some of the other examples cited, a subset of activities. I recall, Dr. Kranzberg, you referred to the impact of the mechanical cottonpicker. There was a technology assessment made of the n'iechanical cottonpicker, I am sure you know, in the late thirties under the aegis of the National Resources Planning Board at the time. And the results were quite correctly redirected. But nothing was done. And the Planning Board subsequently disappeared. Butthe question arises, If we are to have effective technology assessment, must it not be im- bedded in a framework which does program planning and decision- making? Or since I think all of us have commented on the variation produced by a different perception of goals, maybe we ought to have some sort of a goal analysis unit instead of a technology assessment unit. The White House sought with some encouragement from Congress to set up this goals program which you participated in, Mr. Hahn, apparently. In other words, I am seeking some general comments as to whether we are doing the right thing or we have done a good thing, maybe, as an expedient thing rather than because it is the best thing that could have been `done. Dr. COATES. The setting-up of the Office of Technology Assessment, I think, in some ways was almost inevitable. It is part of a general movement through which Congress has moved in the last few years to supply itself with better technical science and policy analysis sup- port: such things as the Congressional Budget Office, the expanded duties of the GAO, the futures unit in the Congressional Research Service, the foresight provision for legislation, and so on, all of these things I think point to an increasing awareness of Congress that since Members of Congress, like most of the population, are not scientists but laymen in this sense, they need to be alerted and advised by those who have science and technological capabilities. And I think the use- fulness of OTA and its inevitability almost is evidenced by the fact that it has performed a great many services ~or Congress which are not strictly technology assessment but have been very successful and useful; for example, review of the ERDA plan and the EPA budget and so forth. In other words, the Office of Technology Assessment appears to be evolving toward a general purpose scientific support and policy analysis unit for the Congress and in that context I see no reason why the needs for technology assessment cannot be well served by that office. What I tried to suggest before was that sometimes this long-range view, this goal setting or goal sifting function, does tend to get side~ tracked, since the OTA must respond to committees of Congress which have specific policy needs at any moment. I would suggest that the needs you are speaking of now could best be met by progressively encouraging OTA to also set aside part of its activities and energies and budget for this sort of long-range view. Mr. BROWN. That is a very perceptive comment. I think the OT.& is evolving. And the root of my question is, should we look on OTA 96-205---78-9 PAGENO="0130" 126 as a discreet and well defined, somewhat static organization with a carefully defined niche or should we look at it as in the process of evolution. It may be-and this is the thing that bothers me-that our fuzzi~ ness-and this is true of most Members of Congress-about what TAB does, does not permit us to conceive of this development toward a broader policy planning function, what some people call a strategic policy planning function, implying long-range planning of course. If we devote the energy and resources to the Technology Assessment Board that we are, are we foreclosing a more effective development to- ward a policy planning role or a futures planning role., both of which are needed in Congress, both of which are incipient in some of the other things that we are doing. I obviously hope that the Technology Assessment Office will perceive its role broadly and move toward ful- filling these needs. But I am concerned that maybe it is not, maybe it is precluding our moving toward these goals. Dr. KRANZBERG. Mr. Brown, I am not certain what you mean by a planning unit. But I would like to go back to something that Mr. Hahn said when he was talking about centrally planned economies and their use of technology assessment. Mr. BROWN. I am thinking of policy planning, not planning in the sense of physical planning. Dr. KRANZBERG. I am still not sure that the OTA should move quite rn that direction. I think that there is some value in keeping the policy function separate from the diagnostic and analytical function, be- cause I think it would deprive them of some of their freedom to in- dulge in "blue-sky thinking" and to take into consideration those other `factors which M~. Thornton just mentioned, namely, that we should be thinking of what might happen in the long run. If on~ is con- strained by policy limitations, this might be a constraint also upon broadscale, long-range thinking. And I do know that in some. coun- tries where they put all this together into some kind of planning unit, they do not really take into consideration the second and third order effects. Theoretically they should, but in actual practice it does not work out that way. Mr. BROWN. Do you have any wisdom to contribute, Mr. Hahn? Mr. HAHN. I wish you had not used the word "wisdom," sir. I have one comment. I think some of the models we see abroad- and this is what I came prepared to shed some light on-for example, the Swedish example may offer some clue. A multiplicity of approaches is their strength. It is something we lack in the United States. We have a legislative Office of Technology Assessment and we have a wide variety of (at least as observed from here) completely uncoordinated activities in the executive branch. We have rather sporadic and limited efforts in industry, the larger ones being carried on behind closed doors for proprietary purposes but access sometimes is made to this information later. Our academic institutions perform bits and pieces of TA. Some of it of high quality. But we have no way of combining these strengths of the unique things that a legislative' OTA can do, the unique things that executive branch, strategic planning and supporting mechanisms do, and of harnessing the great strength of the industrial and academic community in a sys- PAGENO="0131" 127 tematic fashion.. Other countries are perceiving this integral approach as a great asset and I suggest it is something that we may want to look at very closely. Mr. BROW~T. M~ Chairman, suppose we rotate questioning. I am not going to monopolize it any longer now but if we do have furthe~r time later on, I could go on. Mr. THORNTON. Off the record. [Discussion was off the record.] Mr. THORNTON. Back on the record. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown, for that observation. We have been signaled that we have a vote presently in process on the floor of the House of Representatives. At this time I would like to recognize the ranking minority member of our subcommittee, Mr. Hollenbeck for such statement or comments as he might wish to make. Mr. HOLLRNEEOK. Mr. Chairman, in view of the time and the pend- ing vote, I would ask consent to insert my remarks at the appropriate point in the record. Mr. THORNTON. Without objection that will be done. And the subcommittee will stand in recess for 10 minutes at which time we will reconvene here in this room. [Recess.] Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come toorder. Pursuing the line of questioning which we have been embarked upon, a variation in question oeei~rs as to whether policy planning, the recognition of the effects, anticipated effects as a result of a tech- nology assessment, and policies based upon those anticipated effects, might not result in a feedback. so that the èoncerns and the problems which are foreseen actually come about in part because of govern~ mental intervention based upon an assumption that these are the problems. Is this a danger? Is there a possibility of having a feed- back effect where something is foreseen, and policies and plans are developed on that basis and then as a result the world shapes itself in accordance with the views of the planners? Do you have any observa- tions to that with regard to other countries which may have more planned or directed program than our o*n,, Mr. Hahn? Mr. HAHN. I think this' is pre;tty much what is happening in the de- veloping countries which are attempting to cause a given set of events to occur starting with the desired social impaot. The feedback comes from selecting, as the terminology goes, the appropriate technology to bring about specific ends. This will inevitably cause them, although they have not brought this `into practice yet, to assess what will happen as a result of these selections, There will be other environmental im- pacts, `other technological impacts that had not been seen at the rno~ ment,. In an urge to catch' up to us, and in some cases just to eat, they are deliberately setting aside, for now, these second order effects. In other cases it is incidental. Since they are just in a rush to develop or in many cases to stay alive. In the planned economies the situation is somewhat parallel but with obvious differences in the form of administration for the conduct of state planning. The cybernetic models developed in the Institute at Kiev, for example, are massive devices'for bringing about an aware- ness of many of the impacts of alternative choices. PAGENO="0132" 128 I do not have the citation handy, but I remember 2 or 3 years ago that the Chief Justice of the United States i~ his State of Justice message, or whatever that particular event is called, proposed the idea of legislative impactive statement. lie suggested that when a statute was passed, it would have accompanying it something analogotis to an environmental impact statement which would highlight some of the possible consequences on the public, on other laws, and that the im- plementors could be aware of in terms of the passage of that particular statute. Mr. THORTON. That is an idea which I noted at the time as being a very interesting one. We actually have a great deal of trouble in un- derstanding what the problem is that we are trying to cure and often our responses may raise other problems that we don't recognize at the time we set about to cure the problems we know of. it is an interesting concept. Going forward with the dichotomy between planning, the separation of the planning function from the assessment function, goals and analysis as distinguished from academic or scientific explo- ration and relating that to the question of the multiplicity of effort that you referred to, you suggest that Sweden had a good program, in that they had a wide assortment or multiplicity of effort. In this country we have probably a much larger multiplicity of effort. However it is not coordinated. And there is probably a great deal of duplication. Do you have any comment, any of you, as to which is better, coordination or allowing some duplication. Dr. COATES. Mr. Chairman, I think that one thing to understhnd about technology assessment is that it is never intended to be a one- time answer, a one-shot solution to the problem. You mentioned the feedback question. There would of course be a danger if you foresaw certain consequences and concentrated all your attention on worry about those. But one of the major objectives in technology assessment is to map out the uncertainties, to clarify for the decisionmaker the areas where we really do not know what is going to happen and alert the decisionmaker to watching for those and doing some contingency planning. But the technology assessment itself should be a reiterative process. We ought to do it. at a very early stage of technological de- velopment. But we should do it progressively at later stages of the technological development also, so that we catch the things that we miss the first time, and we keep track of the impacts as they begin to develop. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you for these observations. Dr. KRANZ~EEG. I would like to say that I do not see a dichotomy between coordination and duplication. As a matter of fact, we might have several teams working on the assessment o.f th~ same thing; but these teams would be composed of individuals with different back- grounds and employing different methodologies, and then we would coordinate their results. I think they would comeS out with different answers, and one could select among them what kind of technical solti- tion might be considered most desirable. A team with a mechanical engineer on it is likely to come out with a mechanical solution to a technical problem. A chemical engineer will come out with a chemical solution, while an electrical engineer will come out with an electrical solution to the same problem. PAGENO="0133" 129 Using that analogy, I think it would be good to have some kln(i of duplication, providing it is coordinated. Mr. THORNTON. Some writer once said that you could lay all the economists in Washington end to end and they would not reach a conclusion. Now, shift roles for a moment with us. We are called upon to make decisions. And yet I am hearing that sometimes all you can do is to tell us where the unknowns are. That is most uncomfortable for people faced with maybe a decision, to simply be told-and it is useful, we need to know where the unknowns are but that puts a rather un- comfortable choice upon the decisionmakers. And it also may make us uncomfortable when we have a wide variety of opinions presented. I suppose that I would rather have a collection of all of the opinions available than to rely upon an insufficient base. Is that what you are saying? Mr. KRANZBERG. Not only that, but you know we have never made a. decision based upon 100-percent knowledge of the facts. The facts are always ehanging~ especially in a techni~al assessment. And I mp- pose that the uncomfortable part of your job as a legislator is to make decisions based upon incomplete knowledge of all the facts. Mr. THORNTON. Yes, knowing that it is incomplete and that the thing is changing. Dr. COATES. There is another point, also, Mr. Chairman: as a legis- lator you are constantly assailed with opinions. I am sure that you get more of those than you need. That is to say, all the competing interests rap on your door. But it seems to me that what the legislature needs and recognizes it needs is also a source of independent objective analysis which takes all of those opinions into account but tries to integrate them into some sort of balanced statement so that you get everything at once. Mr. ThORNTON. We are getting around full circle to the question raised by my colleague from California Mr. Brown, as to whether we could make a good program better by ailowing some analysis of iden- tification of technology assessment to national goals. And there is a real difference, I believe, here in the panel this morning, of opinion, as to whether it is best to keep those functions separate or whether to have some means of combining and analyzing technology assessment in view of national goals. Dr. KRANZBERG. Mr. Thornton, I think that you, the legisi~tors, provide the linkage between the national goals and this kind of assess- ment. I think that is the way it should be, Mr. THORNTON. But in enabling us to meet that task, where can we draw upon, what sources do we have to draw upon for help? Dr: KRANZBERG. Well, you have, of course, the OTA and the Con- gressional Research Service and you have a multiplicity of sources for assessment of one sort or another. In addition to technology assess- ment, you have also political assessment and economic assessment, and the like. It is up to you to link those with national goals in the percep- tion of the country's interest. Mr. THORNTON. I do not want to encourage any different system than the one that we now have. However, a~ we analyze this particular institution, I think it is appropriate to ask questions as to what ways PAGENO="0134" 130 it might be modified, if at all, in order to better assist us in meeting this task that we are discussing. In the same spirit of cooperation which Mr. Brown showed a few moments ago in yielding back for additional questions, I would like now to yield to him. Mr. BROWN. I think we are exploring the same general kind of a problem, which is how to best utilize the resource that I think we would agree we need, which is the objective analysis of all of the relevant data concerning any particular policy decision, with emphasis on those with a high technological impact. When we bring in the question of goals, the parallel between what the technology assessment does and what the economic analysis does is a little clearer because we have a number of organizations or institu- tions in the economic area. We have the Joint Budget Committee, we have the Council of Economic Advisers and we have the Joint Econo- mic Committee. These try to make economic projections, all of them. They all come across the same kind of a problem. Economists differ in their perception of reality. They have different value systems under- lying their analysis. I suppose technologists or scientists making tech- nology assessments, perhaps, are subject to the same kinds of problem. This is not to belittle the contribution that their objective as tech- nologists or their objective as economists can make to the decision- making process. And it is true that we, as Congressmen, have to finally reconcile those views and policy recommendations, or policy choices, which are presented to us with the utmost objectivity in the light of some politi- cal way of determining values. In a sense, what we are doing here is a soft technology assessment. We are assessing an institution, to OTA, and it's the Technology Assessment Board. We are using an identifying type of process. And we are getting iterative responses from experts with regard to whether or not this mechanism is functioning. So we are encraged in a tech- nology assessment in this hearing as the whole of &ngress does in its analysis of most problems. But I still raise the question, we have created an instrument which, in effect, is a sort of. a crutch for the Congress to assist us to operate more effectively. In creating that crutch, we sometimes neglect repair- ingor enhancing our own capabilities to function. this is a thing that we do with a large number of congressionally mandated programs. The issue of busing was brought up, and the issue of various forms of aid to education. There is a considerable body of analysis which holds that many of these are counterproductive. ~nd yet we created these crutches to help us meet goals without think- mg too much as to whether they would really achieve them. And we need ways of evaluating these things. More specifically, to put it in very concrete institutional factors, Mr Hahn, you mentioned that Great Britain has an effective program analysis unit which does theft technology assessnient. ~f the Congress were, to construe their Budget Office, for example, as their programs analysis unit, which it does to a very large extent, would technolo~y assessment be an effective' addition to the capabilities of that unit, and in that way could we get the whole realistic approach, since the Budget Office does deal with the totality of Federal programs? If it PAGENO="0135" 131 categorized them in a dozen or more major areas, and would a tech- nology assessment unit as a service unit within that Budget Office be an e~ective way to do this, or would it be dor~e as effectively as a part of the Library of Congress? You have an excellent science policy unit and an environmental policy unit. How about a technology assessment unit there? The mandate of the Library is to serve the Congress. It is another arm. Would it be more effective in meeting this need for the additional technological analysis if placed within one of these other arms of the Congress? Mr. HAHN. It would be very difficult for me to give an objective answer to that question, sir, since I belong to one of the units you in- quire about. I really believe the multiplicity of organizations here on Capitol Hill are a strength. I am the first to admit the point that both you and the chairman have made in your informal assessment of the Office of Technology Assessment that a second order impact of the creation of that Office was making your job more difficult. All of us engaged in these types of activities-policy analysis and futures-sin- cerely believe that we are making some part of your job easier, more objec~tive, more open, and more manipulative. But, inadvertently, we are making the problems of choice and the handling of this multiplicity of data definitely harder. I think this is one of the things that all of us have to learn, with your help, that is, how to cross this hurdle and make these things that we are doing for you simpler to digest and to use. I would be very reluctant to say which of the types of activities, in the economic analysis and forecasting activities of CBO, are candidates for expansion in depth for research of a technology assessment-like nature. Similarly, I would be reluctant to see the many disciplinary areas in CBS, or the type of technology assessment we have described here which go on in OTA, or the program evaluation and auditing functions of GAO, all go on in one organization. I believe there is strength, to you, in the varying style of these organizations and in their parallel missions. If occasionally you have the side problem of overlap or healthy competition among them, I suggest that that is a good prob- lem to have rather than a monolithic structure with one set of bureau- crats encroaching on what is fundamentally your job and should remain your job. Mr. THORNTON. Do you care to comment, Dr. Coates. Dr. COATES. One thing I wanted to restress is the fact that economic analysis is not different from or alternative to technology assessment, it is very much a part of technology assessment. Technology assessors should come from a great many disciplines. I suggest that we really need to strengthen, in most .of the technology assessment activities, we really need to strengthen the social science element, because the impact we are talking about comes in terms of the behavior of people, the effects on people, the way in which institutions, which are simply structured groups of people, operate. So we need social scientists to be involved much more than they are. But to go back to the point of economics, the economic analysis, as I said, is simply one of the techniques which technology assessment uses. If you try to rely entirely on economic analysis, by trying to treat everything *in a very simple single measure of dollars, you have to completely ignore many of the most important kinds of impacts which PAGENO="0136" 132 cannot be directly translated into dollars or if you try to do so, you dis- tort those. So I think that technology assessment, as Mr. Hahn indicated, could well be a part of the activities of each of those organizations. But while the multiplicity of organizations is good, you also need one organiza~~ tion which has as its primary mission to look at the whole broad pic- ture and use all of the available techniques, social science, physical sci- ence, economics, and every other kind of human wisdom we can bring to bear on these things. Mr. BROWN. Of course, the economists which, for I guess a long time, had almost a monopoly among the policy scientists rnterms of their role in the system iii Congress and the executive Branch, in their role in making cost-benefit analyses, and economic projections, and so on, would contend that as they mature they encompass a broader role, they are able to quantify or internalize more and more of these external factors, including the discounting of future benefits and that sort of thing. They would probably argue with you that they are quite capa- ble of proving all of the policy input that technology assessment can bring about. Dr. COATES. Well, the difficulty with cost-benefit analysis, by itself, of course, is that the cost-benefit analysis deal with an objective which has already been specified and with factors which have already been speci- fied. It does not search for additional unexpected factors which are in- volved. Mr. BROWN. They haste an implicit.value that they are talking about. Economizing is considered to be a very high value in our culture, that is, getting the most for the least, and I think they would probably im- ply that that is all that technology assessment is trying to do, the most values for the least detriment. Dr. COATES. Yes; I have heard that argument. Mr. BROWN. I infer from the responses that you would concur that there is a unique contribution from this additional capability repre- sented by developing the science of technology assessment, broadly defined, which should not be subordinated to other forms of service to the Congress; is that correct? Mr. THORNTON. Let the record show that Dr. Kranzberg is nodding affirmatively. Mr. KRANZBERG. Also I commend what Dr. Hahn said. Mr. BROWN. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Mr.. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown, for a very thoughtful line of questioning. We are intruding upon other potential uses of this committee room at this time and because of that I would like to ask each of the witnesses this morning if you would he willing to respond to such written ques- tmns as may be addressed to you by committee members or by the staff? Dr. KRANZBERG. Yes, sir. Mr. HAHN. Yes. Dr. COATES. Yes. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much. I want to thank you for your participation and your testimony. And this hearing is now adjourned to meet again at 8:30 in the morning in this same room. [Whereupon, at 11. a.m. the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 8:40 a.m., Thursday, August 4, 19~7.] PAGENO="0137" REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT THUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1977 HotrsE ou' REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMIrrsE ON SciENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SUBCOMMIITEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHN0LOG~, Wa~1iington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 8:40 a,m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ra~y Thornton (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Present: Representatives Thornton (presiding) and Brown. Also present: Philip B. Yeager, counsel, and John D. Hoimfeld, science policy consultant. Mr. THORNTON. The committee will come to order. This morning we continue our hearings on the Review of the Tech- nology Assessment Act and we are very pleased and privileged to have with us today Dr. Daniel DeSimone, who is the Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, who is accompanied by Tom MeGurn, Administrative Office, OTA, and Joseph Coates. Gentlemen, you are welcome. We look forward to hearing your testimony and having an opportunity to engage in some discussion concerning the subject matter. Dr. DeSimone, you may proceed. [A biographical sketch of Dr. DeSimone follows:] DR. DANInI DESIMONE Dr. DeSimone has been with the Office of Technology Assessment since it began operation in December 1973, serving as deputy to Mr. Emillo Q. Daddarlo, OTA's first director. His background is In engineering and law. Prior to his appointment to OTA, he had been Assistant to the President's Science Advisor and Executive Director of the Federal Council for Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President (1971-73) ; Director of the U.S~ Metric Study for Congress (1969-71); Planning, Programming and Budgeting Manager for the Technology Program of the U.S. t~epartment of Commerce, Office of the Secretary (1967-69) ; Director of the Office of Invention and Innovation, National Bureau of Standards (1964-67) ; Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Com- merce for Science and Technology (1962-64) ; Bell Laboratories protessional staff, advanced computer and communications systems (19~6-62). In 1972 he received the National Civil Service League Award for distinguished achievement In the Federal Service. lie served in the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War. He is the authov of Technological Innovation, Its Environment and Manage- ment (1967); Education for Innovation (1968); and A Metric America (1OT1). He Is a regular contributor to the World Book Encyclopedia and has published articles in the New York Times and other journals. (133) PAGENO="0138" 134 STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL DeSIMONE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OP TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY TOM MoGURN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, A}fl) J~OSEPH COATES Dr. DESIMONE. Thank you very much. I am pleased to have this opportunity to report to the subcommittee on some of the aspects of our activities to date. I realize that it is not your intention to go into the details of these activities today. As you have requested, my testimony today will con- sist of a brief description of the background and principal elements of OTA, an explanation of the ways in which we perform our work for the Congress, some basic statistics on our products and resources, and, finally, how our program capabilities have been developed. in later hearings we shall be pleased to provide whatever further information and interpretive observations this subcommittee may require. I shall not read the entire text of my written statement this morning, but I will highlight the major points. Mr. THORNTON. Without objection, the entire prepared testimony will be made a part of the record. Dr. DESIMONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first point to be made is that there is no need to elaborate on the origins of OTA and the Technology Assessment Act for this com- mittee:, since OTA was conceived by this committee, nurtured and finally brought to reality by it. It is fitting, therefore, that we should present to you our first report on what our development has been these past 3½ years. It was in October 1972 that the Congress established OTA with. the passage of the Technology Assessment Act, although appropria- tions to begin operations were not provided until November 1973. The purpose of OTA, as you know, is to make comprehensive, balanced, and informative appraisals of issues arising from the applications of technology and their potential impacts on society. OTA assessments must be objective and nonpartisan. The chips must lie where they fall. They thust be timely, for they are aimed at assisting Congress in committee hearings, drafting or marking up bills, and in debates, all of which have their own rhythm and flow. They must be organized and presented in a format that suits congressional customs and practices. The format OTA has found most suitable for congressional purposes is what we call the issues format. It requires that the assessment be driven by the issues involved and that each of these issues be analyzed in terms of options, their conse- quences, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. A specific example of this will be given later when I discuss the energy program and how it was developed. As you know, OTA is a congressional agency, not a committee. But, unlike any of its sister agencies, it has a congressional Board, one member of which, the Director, is, in effect, the chief executive of the agency. Chart 1, which is included in my prepared statement, shows the over- all relationship of OTA to its sources of information and to the con- gressional committees it serves. PAGENO="0139" 135 Chart 2, which is a more formal organizational chart, shows tile organizational breakdown of the agency starting at the top with the congressional Board, the Director, and so on and indicatmg how we have developed our activities into programmatic elements which I will describe later. The congressional Board, as you know, includes 12 Members of Con- gress equally divided by party with 6 from the Senate and 6 from the House. In addition, the Director of OTA is a nonvoting members of the Board. Senate Members of the Board are selected by the Presi- dent pro tern of the Senate, and House Members are chosen by the Speaker of the House. The chairman and the vice chairman of the Board alternate between Senate an.d House with each Congress. Much like the board of directors of a corporaton, OTA's congres- sional Board sets the overall policies of the office, approves congres- sional requests for assessments and ultimately transmits reports to the requesting committee. In releasing an OTA report, it is important to note that the Board, which reflects diverse political views, does not necessarily certify the findings or the recommendations or whatever conclusions are reached in the report. But it does certify the nonpartisan objective process by which the assessment was performed. Selected by the Board for a term of 6 years~ the Director is responsi- ble for organizing and managing OTA's resources in accordance with the Board's overall policies. He is assisted by a Deputy Director, who serves as the Acting Director in the absence of the Director. There is, in addition, a 12-member Advisory Council which provides advice on questions put to it by the Board. Its membership consists of 10 individuals from technical and other areas relevant to O'TA's work. In addition, as ex-officio members, the Comptroller General of the United States and the Director of the Congressional Eesearch Service serve on the `Council. As chart 2 shows, OTA is broken down into the six major program areas shown. Each of these programs is headed by a manager who is responsible to the Director. In addition, an exploratory assessment program exists to handle new initiatives not covered by the major program activities. OTA op- erates with a small staff of skilled professionals augmented and com- plemented by outside contractors and consultants. The Technology Assessment Act specifies how requests for assess- ments may be made `and there are three sources indicated in the statute. The chai~rmail of any committee of the Congress may request `an assess- ment of O'TA, or the ranking minority members of the committee may request `an assessment though the chairman. In `addition, any member of the Technology Assessment Board may request an assessment and, finally, the Director of OTA, in consultation with the Board, may re- quest an assessment. All of these requests in the final analysis must be approved by the Board as a whole. Now, this procedure distinguishes OTA from its sister le~isla~ive agencies, the Congressional Research Service and the General Lcou,iit~ ing Office, which `are equipped to initiate projects which are re4nes~ed by any Member of the House or Senate. PAGENO="0140" 136 OTA receives more requests for assessments than it has resources to undertake and, consequently, when OTA receives a request from the chairman of a congressional committee, or from whatever source, the Office subjects it to the following general selection criteria to deter- mine whether or not it should be approved by the Board: Is the subject matter of this request now or likely to become a major national issue? Second: Can OTA make a unique contribution or could the requested assessment best be done elsewhere, perhaps by a sister legislative agen- cy, an agency of the executive branch, or a private organization? How significant are the costs and benefits to society of the various policy options, and how will they be distributed among the various impacted groups? Next: Is the technology impact irreversible? How imminent is the impact? Is there sufficient knowledge available to conduct the assessment? Is it of manageable scope? Can it be bounded within reasenable time and budgetary limits so that we can be of assistance to the requesting committee? And what is the likelihood of congressional action in response to the assessment? Finally: Would this assessment complement, hinder, or aid other projects that we have underway? Mr. THORNTON. I hesitate to interrupt but if you are able to deter- mine the likelihood of congressional action in response to an assess- ment, then you have perhaps a source of information which I have not been able to find. There are some things that appear to be very likely to develop and other things jell pretty rapidly later on. Dr. DESTMONE. It is probably an impossible criterion to apply in most cases, Mr. Chairman. We try to apply it anyway. I guess the only time that it becomes relatively easy to do is if the request is for an assessment of an issue that has to do with the 21st or 22d century, and the Congress is not likely to be looking at it for a while. Mr. THORNTON. At least not this Congress. Dr. DESIMONR. But it is true, as you say, Mr. Chairman, that it is not easy to determine what will be happening in this Congress, let alone the 96th Congress. After an assessment request has been approved by the Board, it is developed by the relevant program staff. The work plan for the assess- ment is formulated in sufficient detail so that we can marshal the neces- sary resources to undertake the work. If we might go back to chart 1 again, it illustrates, I think, the OTA process in good perspective and shows how we try to take resources of all kinds in our work, so that we may bring the proper expertise to bear on the issue before Congress, or the requesting committee that asked for the assessment. We try to involve through advisory committees, and working groups, and task forces, people that are int~rested in the issue who c~n bring expertise to bear upon it, who may be impacted by it, interested parties from labor, industry, the academic community public interest groups, State and local government, and so forth. We include, obviously, whenever the issue concerns an area that has been well developed through other studies, executive and legislative agencies in our work. PAGENO="0141" 137 We' cooperate quite closely with the GAO, anU the CBS, and the CBO, the Congressional Budget Office. We bring into our work consultants and contractors from the out- side to complement our in-house core staff and we work with staffs of the committees of the Congress that are concerned with the issue at hand and especially the requesting committees. We try to bring all of these groups together, and under the direction of our in-house staff, the program managers, and the project leaders bring this assessment to fruition for the requesting committee. This is an important form of public participation, as well as a means of getting to the facts and information that are required. The process is continually developing. We have tried many ap- proaches, found some that work and others th.at don't or need to be developed. Obviously we will never reach perfection but we are work- ing toward improving that process all the time. For the purposes of quality control, OTA reports when they are completed, are subjected to a review process. The advisory panels I mentioned are involved in this. They review the work that has been done. Final drafts are reviewed by senior office personnel, and con- sultants and, in some cases, outside organizations. When these reviews have been completed, the final draft is presented to our Board for transmittal to the requesting committee, and for publication to be made available to the public and other interested parties. The process does not end, however, with the publication of an OTA report for there is usually followup assistance to the requesting com- mittee which requires testimony at hearings~ helping to draft questions to be asked of witnesses and points to be covered, and, ultimately, updating and evaluating specific points of interest to the committee. I wish to turn to some of the basic statistics that indicate our devel- opment over the past 3½ years that we have been in business. These are. `shown in charts 3 through 10. Beginning with chart 3, which shows the history of funding for OTA, we can see that it `has grown along with the development of our staff capabilities from $2 million appropriated for part of the fiscal year 1974 to $8.3 million for fiscal year 1978, the next fiscal year of operation. The $2 million, I should indicate,, actually applied to about 6 months because we opened for business about the middle of the fiscal sear. The first full fiscal year funding for OTA. was $4 million in fiscal year 1975. `. ` I should note that there is. an error in the written text which indicates that in fiscal year 1978 we are :going:..to get $813 million. Actually we will be appropriated $8.3 million. Mr. THORNTON. I am sure you would `prefer correcting that at the other end of the spectrum. `. . ` . ` Dr. DE'SIMoNE. Yes, sir. , ` ` Mr. THORNTON. But, for `the record, we will put a decimal point now in the figure. Dr. DESIMoNi~. The next chart, chart 4~ shows the spending obliga- tions .of OTA from fiscal years 1974 through 1977 and shows how these funds were applied, the `distribution of effort among staff con- sultants, contractors, and other purposes. The figures sho~' that OTA initially had to rely heavily on contractors, And this was found in PAGENO="0142" 138 certain respects not `to be entirely satisfactory. But we have adjusted that. I will mention something about this later. To achieve a. better balance of resources, OTA has built up its core staff and thus the staff cost has increased `from about 20 percent of the budget in fiscal year 1974~ to roughly 30 percent in fiscal year 1977. Chart S is a summary of the full-time staff of OTA. and shows that in fiscal year 1974 we had a level of 42 people and gradually built up our staff to the present level of 155 persons. This growth in the core staff has been necessary to meet the increasing congressional demand for assessments, not only ~becaue of ~the in~hou~e' work that has to be done, but in supervising and orchestrating the outside re- sources that we employ. We have found that it is not sufficient, and actually unsatisfactory to operate `on' the same basis as other agencies of the Government that retain contractors to provide a complete un- edited report, the agency acting more or less as a conduit for whatever purpose the report is intended. This is not to say, however, that outside resources are not helpful in our work. They are essential because they complement and bring to bear upon our activities expertise that we `do not have iti-house and could not efficiently maintain at a level sufficient to serve the needs of the Congress. `Chart 6, the next chart, shows"the staff and consultants distributed by program. As you can see, the distribution l's somewhat uniform among the major programs, `but varies in the others, which are not as mature as the programs in energy, food, health, and so on. Consultants and panel members for projects normally serve only for the duration of the project and in many cases staff professionals in our core staff are hired only for the duration of a particular project. Some of our people are detailed to us on a reimbursable basis `from other agencies. We also have professors on sabbatical leave from universities. And they are here for the duration of a project and then go back to their institutions. The next chart No. 7 shows the number of requests that we have re- ceived to date. OTA has received 147 requests for assessments frOm congressional committees.~ Of these, 102 have been approv~d by the Board and the remaining 45 hai~e not been approved, either because they could not be accommodated within the mission and resources of OTA or because they were more appropriate for consideration by other agencies, especially the CRS and the GAO. Chart 8 now shows the origin of assessment requests and it shows that of the 147 requests, `134, or 90 percent of them, have come from congres- sional committees. Further, the chart shows that despite year-to-year variations, the total number of projects requested by each House of the Congress is pretty nearly balanced, 5. from the House and 65 from the `Senate. In addition, 10 requests have been received from joint committees of the Congress. We come to chart 9, which shows by program area the total number of requests received, the number'of studies published, and the number of projects currently in progress. The figures do not always match because several requests may be combined into one project or, con- versely, `one request may' `produce several published reports. For ex- PAGENO="0143" 139 ample, in a major assessment we did that spanned 2 fiscal years, an assessment of community planning for mass transit, there were several case studies of major urban transit systems, each one of which re- sulted in a report. The distribution of funds for programs is shown in chart 10. The development and growth in each of OTA's program areas is reflected in this chart which traces the summary of obligations by program area for each of the fiscal years from 1974 through 1978. The first column shows the total obligations for each program area through fiscal year 1977 and you can see from this chart that assessment activities account for nearly 80 percent of OTA's total obligations over the period in question. I would like now, Mr. Chairman, to conclude my testimony with a description of the programmatic structure that has characterized OTA's development. I will not attempt to catalog' the projects within each program or describe the uses that have been made of OTA product since it is my understanding that this subcommittee plans to consider these points at a later date. In February 1974, the OTA congressional Board established six priority areas of assessment for the Congress. These were-perhaps not surprisingly to you-energy, food, health, materials, oceans, and transportation. Two others have been added since then-technology and world trade, and national research and development policies and priorities. The remaining program area, the ninth, undertakes exploratory as- sessments on issues that are not covered by the other eight programs. I will not go into all the programs at this time that are in my writ- ten statement but I would like to give the subcommittee two examples, the energy program and the food program, because they do illustrate the process by which we have developed our capability. First: The energy program. The development of our energy assess- ment program exemplifies the step-by-step approach in establishing the means and techniques for serving the Congress that we employed in many areas. From the start it has been demand oriented. That is, rather than starting out to assemble a complete capability to supply any and all energy assessment needs that might arise, OTA paced its develop- ment as congressional demands were expressed or perceived. One of the first requests received by OTA was for an evaluation of the contribution that solar energy technologies could make to solving energy problems. That was early in 1974. With this request in hand, an in-house staff, consultants, contractors, and a Solar Advisory Corn- mittee were assembled. This was a long-term assessment and was only recently* completed with the issuance of the final report with which members of the subcommittee are acquainted. * Another example of the development of OTA's analytic ~ompetenc.e in the energy area-this one an, intense short-term effort in contrast to the solar long-term effort-was the assistance OTA provided in an- alyzing the $4.3 billion Energy Research and Development Adminis- tration budget submitted to Congress in January 1975. This was the first consolidated ei~ergy R. & D. budget sent to the Congress by ERDA. There was little time or opportunity for a thorough consideration by the Science and Technology Committee of the issues posed by this *budget and so your committee, Mr. Chairman, turned to OTA for help. PAGENO="0144" 140 OTA assembled consultants, contractors~ and advisory panels and over the course of a few weeks, produced an analysis for the Science and Technology Committee in time for its hearings on the ERDA budget. The analysis indentified the major issues and options posed by the ERDA budget, summarizing the pros and cons of each, providing background information and laying out the kinds of probing questions that needed to be asked of ERDA witnesses when they appeared be- fore the committee. This analysis of the ERDA budget served as a prelude to later OTA evaluations of ERDA plans and programs which, by law, as you know, are required to be submitted to the Congress annually. Two major eval- uations of the ERDA plan and program have since been performed for this and other committees of the Congress. In a similar vein, OTA last year analyzed the first 5-year research and development plan presented to Congress by the U.S. Environ~ mental Protection Agency. And we did this, as you know, Congressman Brown, for your subcommittee and ultimately the Science and Tech- nology Committee as a whole. These analyses served as a basis for this committee's consideration of ERDA's and EPA's R. & D. budgets, plans and programs. And, most recently, OTA provided Congress with a comprehensive analysis of the administration's proposed national energy plan. Now, in addition to serving the immediate needs of this committee and other requesting committees these assessments that we have con- ducted have served to strengthen OTA's competence for handling other assessment requests on issues concerning energy supply, demand, conservation, and future alternatives and, finally, for handling special projects to meet urgent congressional requirements. The second example I wish to give is the food program. This con- sists of three categories that span the food cycle: The production. of food, the marketing of food, and, finally, the consumption of food, in- cluding issues concerning nutrition. OTA began building its capability for conducting assessments in this area in 1974 when it received a re- quest to assess the adequacy of food information systems. Congress *as then concerned about.the world food emergencies that were occur- ring and especially the unanticipated large-scale tradin~ of U.S. grain stocks overseas that had brought price increases at home. This assess- ment provided an excellent basis for developing the food program because it dealt with the indispensable links to informed policymaking for all aspects of the food cycle. As in the energy program, a variety of resources was marshaled to satisfy thi.s congressional request and to launch the food program. Staff members were appointed, advisory committees established, con- sultants were retained, contracts let, and contacts made with the vast community of people in the institutions that make up or rely upon the food information system. Even while the assessment was in progress, the OTA food assessment staff contributed preliminary findings and information for use in congressional hearings and activities, includ- ing the preparation of backup materials for Congress use in the World Food Conference in 1974. Once again, this illustrates a fundamental principle that guides OTA. Its assistance must be timely if it is to meet the schedules and practical needs of the committees of Congress. PAGENO="0145" 141 And, therefore, if interim reports are required from our ongoing assessments, no matter how long term their duration may be, we do provide the committees with that kind of assistance. Building upon the capabilities developed in this assessment, the food program staff was able to undertake subsequent assessments in a variety of fields, including studies of agricultural research and de- velopment, the transfer of food processing technology to developing countries, food grading systems, government nutrition programs, and issues to be considered in developing a national food policy. Mr. Chairman, these two examples illustrate how we have developed our programs. The other programs are described in my written statement. Mr. Chairman, the dt~ta and descriptions I have provided today do not go fully into the details of OTA's projects and the many uses to which they have been put by the committees of Congress. However, I hope that this preliminary information will be helpful to the subcom- mittee. I would be pleased at this time to discuss any questions that you may have. [The full statement of Dr. DeSimone follows:] STATEMENT OF DANIEL DESIMONE, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Good morning. I appreciate this opportunity to testify before this Subcom- mittee on the Office of Technology Assessment and its development. As you have requested, my testimony today will consist of a brief description of the background and principal elements of OTA, an explanation of the ways in which we perform our work for the Congress, some basic statistics on our products and resources, and, finally, how our program capabilities have been developed. In later hearings, we shall be pleased to provide whatever further information and interpretative observations this Subcommittee may require. For those not completely familiar with OTA or its origins, a brief considera- tion of the underlying concerns that led the Congress to establish this legislative agency may be helpful. The need for a technology assessment capability for Congress was expressed in a report by this Subcommittee In 1966, when it observed: "We can no longer blindly adapt technology to our needs with the traditional assumption that there will be ample time to iron out any bugs in a leisurely shakedown cruise." These words emphasized the growing concerns of the Congress during the i 960's, as technology came to be considered more and more In legislative debate. Toxic pollutants, pesticides, electronic "snooping," radioactive waste materials, and other technological applications suggested the need for an "early warning" system that could aid Congress in considering the potential unforseen side effects of technology, as well as the potential benefits. In 1967, Representative Emllio Q. Daddario, then chairman of the Subcom- mittee on Science, Research, and Development (and, as you know, later ap- pointed the first Director of OTA), defined technology assessment as: "A form of policy research which provides a balanced appraisal to the policy maker. Ideally, it is a system to ask the right questions and obtain correct and timely answers. It identifies policy issues, assesses the Impact of alternative courses of action and presents findings. It is a method of analysis that system- atically appraises the nature, significance, status and merit of a technological program . . . and is designed to uncover three types of consequences-desirable, undesirable, and uncertain . . ." There followed some six years of deliberation, debate and study on just what technology assessment could be and how it might be performed in a Congres- sional environment. The concept was shaped over this period and legislation to bring It to practice was forged by this Subcommittee. On the Senate side, the need for such an advisory mechanism was espoused by Senator Kennedy: 96-205-78-10 PAGENO="0146" 142 "The present mechanisms of the Congress do not provide the legislative branch with adequate independent and timely information concerning the potential ap- plication or impact of~ such technology, particularly in those instances where the Federal Government may be called on to consider support, management, or regulation of technological applications." Finally, in October 1972, the Congress established OTA with the passage of Technology Assessment Act (Public Law 92-484, although appropriations to begin operations were not provided until November of 1973. The purpose of OTA is to make comprehensive, balanced, and informative ap- praisals of issues arising from the applications of technology and their potential impacts on society. OTA assessments must be objective and nonpartisan: the chips must lie where they falL They must be timely, for they are aimed at as- sisting Congress In committee hearings, drafting or marking up bills and debates, all of which have their own rhythm and flow. They must be organized and presented in a format that suits Congressional customs and practices. The format OTA has found most suitable for Congressional purposes is what we call the "issues format". It requires that the assessment be driven by the Issues involved and that each of these issues be analyzed in terms of options, their con- sequences, and the advantages and disadvantages. A specific example of this will be given later when the Energy Program is described. I. STRUOTURE AND PROCESS OTA Is a Congressional agency, not a committee. But unlike any of its sister agencies, it has a 13-member Congressional Board, one of whom, the Director, is the chief executive officer of the agency. Chart 1 shows the overall relation- ship of OTA to its sources of information and assistance and to the Congressional Committee it serves. Chart 2, a more formal organizational chart that Illustrates the programmatic breakdown of the agency, shows, at the top, the statutory elements of OTA: the Board, Director, Deputy Director, and Advisory Council. PAGENO="0147" 143 Chart I The OTA Process Kam ( Advisory Committees Congressional Committees * Budget Authorization * Appropriations * Decisions * Substhntivt Legislation * Oversight Function * Policy tlavelopment OTA August 4, 1977 CONGRESSIONAL BOARD DIRECTOR'S OFFICE ADVISORY COUNCIL PROGRAM STAFF Interested Part * Labor * Industry * Academic * Public Interest * State & local Government * ci. al Consult~nts & Contractors PAGENO="0148" 144 Chart 2 Office of Technology Assessment Organizational Structure -i~~ ___ ___ I ___ Esergy [ Oceans Materials Food Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment Program Program Program Program I __________ _____ _____ I I Technology arid [~ Health National R&D Transportation I Exploratory World Trade Assessment Policies and Priorities Assessment I Assessment Assessment Pro~am Assessment Program Program Program Program j __________________ CIA August 4, 1977 The Congressional Board consists of twelve Members of Congress, equally divided by party, with six from the Senate and six from the Rouse and the Director of OTA, who is a non-voting member of the Board. Members of the Board are selected by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. House members are chosen by the Speaker of the House, The chairmanship and vice chairmanship of the Board alternate between the Senate and House with each Congress. Much like the board of directors of a corporation, OTA's Congressional Board sets the overall policies of the Office, approves Congressional requests for as- sessments, and ultimately transmits reports to the requesting committees. In releasing an OTA report the Board certifies the assessment process and not necessarily the Views expressed in the report, Selected by the Board for a term of six years, the Director is responsible for organizing and* managing OTA's resources 4n accordance with the Board's over- all policies. He is assisted by a Deputy Director, who serves as Acting Director in the absence of the Director. A twelve-member Advisory Council provides advice on questions put to it by the Board. Its membership consists of ten individuals from fields relevant to OTA's work. In addition, the Comptroller General of the United States and the Director of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress serve as e~v-offioio members of the Advisory Council. As Chart 2 shows, OTA is broken down into eight major program areas. Each of these programs is headed by a manager who is responsible to the OTA Director. In addition, an Exploratory Assessment Program exists to handle new initiatives not covered by the major program categories. OTA operates with a small staff of skilled professionals, augmented and complemented by outside contractors and consultants. The rpechnolo~ Assessment Act specifies how assessments may originate. As- sessments may be presented to the Board from three sources only: the chairman of any committee of the Congress (or ranking minority member through the Chairman) ; a member of the Technology Assessment Board; or the Director of OTA, in consultation with the Board. This procedure distinguishes OTA from its sister legislative service agencies, the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office, which are equipped to initiate projects at the request of any member of the House or the Senate. PAGENO="0149" 145 OTA. receives more requests for assessments than it has the resources to undertake. Consequently, when OTA receives a request from the chairman of a congressional committee, the Office subjects it to the following general selec- tiOfl criteria to determine whether it should be approved: Is this now or likely to become a major national issue? Can OTA make a unique colitribution, or could the requested assessment best be done elsewhere? How significant are the costs and benefits to society of the various policy options and how will they be distributed among various impacted groups? Is the technology impact reversible? How imminent is the impact? Is there sufficient knowledge available to conduct the assessment? Is the assessment of manageable scope-can It be bounded within reason- able time and budgetary limits? What is the likelihood of congressional action in response to the assessment? Would this assessment complement or aid other OTA projects? Requests for technical evaluations or information which are not appropri- ate for the Office of Technology Assessment are referred, as may be appro- priate, to the Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, or the Congressional Budget Office. After an assessment request has been approved by the Board, it is developed by the relevant program staff. The work plan for the assessment is formulated in sufficient detail to marshall the resources for carrying out all necessary tasks. Assignments are made to staff, consultants, contractors, task groups and advisory panels. Generally, outside contractors and consultants are used to provide tech- nical information or specific analyses, while OTA staff develop the overall work plan, integrate findings and data, and perform policy analysis. Thus, OTA project leaders are responsible for planning and staying on top of the study throughout its duration. During the planning stage advisory committees and panels are assembled and brought into the assessment. Most program areas have program advisory com- mittees made up of individuals experienced in fields relevant to the particular program. These committees generally advise each program area and critique work plans, position papers, analyses, and draft reports. Individual assessment projects within a program may also have an ad hoc advisory panel that brings together various persons who are concerned about the technology under study. In addition to critiquing work plans, papers, and draft reports, such panels often actively participate in the study. The use of such advisory committees and panels is important, not only for the expertise derived, but also because of OTA's desire to involve individuals outside of government. OTA must often meet interim or urgent congressional needs for information on issues before the Congress. When such needs arise, interim reports are pre- pared to present findings to the Congress from studies that are still in progress. For purposes of quality control, OTA reports are subjected to a review process Advisory panels review early drafts. Final drafts are reviewed by senior Office personnel and consultants and, in some cases, outside organizations. When these reviews have been completed, the final draft is presented to the Board of trans- mittal to the requesting committee and for publication. The process does not end, however, with the publication of an OTA report. Follow-up assistance to the requesting committees is often required-e.g., testify- ing at hearings, helping to draft questions to be asked of witnesses and points to be covered, and updating or elaborating specific points. PAGENO="0150" 146 II. BASIC STATISTICS The development of OTA's capability to serve the Congress Is Illustrated by the statistics cOmpiled in Chai~ts 8 through 10. Chart 3 Funds Available (Dollars in Thousands) Thousands of Dollars 10,000 $97j7* 9,000 $8,090 $2.920 TQ $7400 Carryover $6,797 Appropnat,on 4,000 I $4,041 - 3,000 20 $2,000 1,000 J~ ~ . - 1974 1975 1976+TQ l977 1978 OTA August 4, 1977 Fiscal Year `Exctudes $569,090 FY1977/l978 supptementat for mandated assessments 0T4's budget S OTA's budget, as shown in Chart 8, has grown along with the development of the Office's staff capabilities, from the $2 million appropriated for part of fiscal year 1974 to $8.3 million for fiscal year 1978. The $2 million for fiscal year 1974 actually applied to about six months, since OTA dId not begin operations until ea~~ly 1974. The first full fiscal year funding for OTA was for- $4 million in fiscal year 1975. The $8.3 million for fiscal year 1978 includes $900,000 in carryover funds for continuing projects from fiscal year 1977. PAGENO="0151" 147 Chart 4 Summary of Obligations FY 1974 - 1977 (Dollars in Thousands) $5,170 Other $976 (18.9%) Contracts $1,131 (219%) Consultants $589 (11.4%) Dollars in Thousands 10,000 - 9,500 - 9,000 - 8,500 - 8,000 7,500 - 7,000 6,500 (n ~ 5,500 5,000~ 4,500 4,000 - 3,500 - 3,000 - Consultants $286 2,500 - (7.1%) 2000 - Other"\ $88 (6.6%) 1,500 - $1,345 1,000 - Contracts 500 -~L (71.7%) Consultants' $26 (1.9%) $9,717 lo Be Carrie Over to FY 78 $900 .S2~3~) - - Rental `~ace Costs $500 (5.1%) Other $1,486 (15.3%) Contracts $2,857 (29.4%) Consultants $908 (9.3%) Staff & Benefits $3,066 (31.6%) $4,022 - Other (`2; Contracts $2,377 (59.1%) N---- Staff & Benefits $1,025 (25.5%) Staff & Benefits $2,474 (47.8%) I~F\ St aft & Benefits 1975 1976+TQ 1977 (Estimate) $266 (19.8%) Fiscal Year OTA August 4, 1977 PAGENO="0152" 148 How fwuls were applied Chart 4 reflects the spending obligations of OTA from fiscal year 1974 through 1977. Th~se are broken down by major categories of outlays: staff, consultants, contracts, and other expenditures. The figures show that OTA initially had to rely heavily on contractors and this was found to be unsatisfactory. To achieve a better balance of resources, OTA has built up its in-house core staff. Outlays for OTA staff have thus increased from 19.8 percent in fiscal year 1974 to 34.7 percent in fiscal year 1977. Chart 5 Summary of Full-Time Staff, FY 1974-1978 OTA August 4 1977 staff, consultants and panelists Chart 5 shows that the OTA staff has grown from a base of 42 three years ago to its present level of 155 persons. This growth in the core staff has been neces- sary to meet the increasing Congressional demand for assessments. Number of Full-Time Staff 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Fiscal Year PAGENO="0153" 149 As can be seen, the staff will be reduced to 130 in ~1scal year 1~78 in keeping with the limitation specified in OTA's fiscal year 1978 appropriation. Chart 6 shows the distribution, by program, of full-time staff, consultants and panelists currently employed by OTA. Consultants and panel members for projects nor- mally serve only for the duration of the project. In many cases, salaried staff professionals are also hired only for the duration of a particular project. Chart 6 Current Staff and Consultants By Program Energy Food Health Materials Oceans Transportation Technology and World Trade R&D Policies and Priorities Exploratory, New & Emerging Technologies, and Telecommunications G&A/TAAC/TAB/Other 51 Total 155 9 39 2 245 Full-Time Active Staff Consultants 16 78 12 13 15 10 14 28 10 30 11 19 5 1 12 25 Active Panelists 11 9 12 18 23 8 65 12 158 OTA August 4, 1977 PAGENO="0154" 150 Chart 7 Number of Assessment 1974 to Date Requests Total: 147 OTA August 4, 1977 PAGENO="0155" 151 Reque8ts ~nd whe~'e tliei, come from Since its inception, OTA has received 147 requests for assessments from Con- gressional committees, as shown in Chart 7. Of these, 102 have been approved by the OTA Board. The remaining 45 have not been approved, either because they could not be accommodated within the mission or resources of OTA, or because they were more appropriate for consideration by other agencies. Chart 8 Origin of Assessment Requests No. of Requests 55 - 50 - 45 - 40 - 35 - 30 25 - 20 15 10 5 53 0Th Board 5 Senate Committees 2~ I-louse Committees 20 Joint 3 Committees 41 OTA Board Senate Committees 19 House Committees 15 Joint 3 Committees OTA Board 19 Senate Committees House Committees 11 34 OTA Board Senate Committees 14 House Committees 13 Joint `~ Committees 1974 1975 1976 1977 to Date Fisc~1 Year OTA August 4 1977 PAGENO="0156" 152 Chart ~ traces the origins of requests for assessments. it shows that of the 147 requests, 134 or 90 percent have come from the committees of Congress. Fur- ther~ the chart shows that, despite year-to-year variations, the total number of projects requested by each House of Congress is nearly balanced-59 from the House and 65 from the Senate. In addition, 10 requests have been received from Joint Committees of the Congress. (The excess in the total of requests represents joint requests from two or more committees.) Chart 9 Cumulative Total of Requests, Published Studies, and Studies in Process Requests Published Studies Program Area to Date Studies In Process Energy 38 10 4 Food 23 4 7 Health 9 2 7 Materials 14 4 7 Oceans 16 7 5 Transportation 15 20 2 Technology& World Trade 3 1 Research & Development Policies&Priorities .... 6 - 14 Exploratory, New & Emerging Technologies, and Telecommunications 14 7 3 TAAC&Other 9 3 - Total 147 57 50 OTA August 4, 1977 PAGENO="0157" Program Energy. Food. Health . Materials Oceans Transportation Tech. & Worldlrade Natl R&D Policies and Priorities Exploratory Support Services, Admin., TAAC, etC Reserve for New Initiatives Total-OTA °This total includes $900,000 carried over into E'.' 1978. Distribution of funds for programs The development and growth in each of OTA's program areas is reflected In Chart 10, which traces the summary of obligations by program area for each of the fiscal years from 1974 through 1978. The first column shows the total obliga- tions by each program area through fiscal year 1977. Assessment activities account for nearly four-fifths of OTA's total obligations over this period. 153 ~Studies published and in prooress Chart 9 shows, by program area, the total number of requests received, the number of studies published, and the number of projects currently in progress. The figures do not always match because several requests may be combined Into one project, or, conversely, one request may produce several published reports. An example of the latter was the request for an assessment of community plan- ning for mass transit by the Senate Committee on Appropriations which resulted in twelve separate publications, including case studies of major urban transit systems. Chart 10 Fiscal Year Summary of Obligations By Program Area, 1974-1978 (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1976 Estimated Total (Thru FY 77) FY 1974 FY 1975 and Revised Transition Qtr. FY 1977 Plan FY 1978 3,263.2 322. 432.9 1,074.3 1,434 736 1,545.6 16.1 267.7 383.8 878 429 987.9 161.7 69.4 391.8 365 412 3,076.3 0.4 1,257.4 597.5 1,221 760 1,769.5 11.6 709.5 492.4 556 512 * 2,215.0 471.6 402.4 488.0 853 458 242.7 0. 55.6 70.1 117 220 856.5 1,033.6 4,363.8 20,254.1 0. 0. 132.5 724 721 0.7 177.2 425.7 430 174 360.9 650. 1,113.9 2,239 2,334 - - .. .~ 1,544 1,345.0 4,022.1 5,170.0 9,717* 8,300 OTA August 4, 1977 PAGENO="0158" 154 III. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT I would like to conclude my testimony with a description of the programmatic structure that has characterized OTA's development. I will not attempt to cata- log the projects within each program or to describe the uses that have been made of OTA products, since it is my understanding that this Subcommittee plans to consider these points at a later date. In February 1974, the OTA ~ongressionalBoard establjshed six priority areas of assessment for the Congress. These were: Energy, Food, Health, Materials, Oceans and Transportation. Two others have been added since then: Technology and World Trade, and National Research and Development Policies and Priori- ties. The remaining program area undertaken exploratory assessments on issues not covered by the other eight programs. ENERGY PROGRAM SUBCATEGORiES Supply; demand; future energy alternatives; and special projects to meet congressional requirements. A, ~nergy.-The development of our Energy Assessment Program illustrates the step-by-step approach to establishing the means and techniques for serving thO Congress. From the start it has been demand oriented. That is, rather than starting Out to assemble a complete capability to supply any and. all, energy assessment needs that might arise, OTA paced Its development, ~ ~gr~ssional demands were expressed or perceived. One of the first requests received by OTA was for an evali~átibhof thO~oI1tJ?lbu- tion that solar energy technologies could make to solving energy `problems, That was early in 1974. With this request in hand, an in-house staff, consultants, con- tractors and a Solar Advisory Committee were assembled. This was a long~term assessment and was only recently completed with the Issuance of the final report, "Application of Solar Technology to Today's Energy Needs". Another example of the development of OTA's analytic competence in the en- ergy area-this one an intensive short-term effort-was the assistance OTA pro~rlded in analyzing the $4.3 billion Energy Research and Development Admin- istration budget submitted to Congress in February 1975. ThIs was the first consolidated energy R&D budget sent to Congresi by ERDA. There was little time or opportunity for a thorough consideration by the $ci- ence and Technology Committee of the issues posed by ,this budget, and so it turned to OPA for help. OTA assembled consultants, contractors, and advisory panels and, over the course of a few weeks, produced an analysis for the Science and Technology Committee in time for its hearings on the ERDA budget. The analysis identified the major issues and options posed by the EJIDA budget, summarizing the pros and cons of each, providing background Information, and laying out the kinds of probing questions that neeed to be asked of ]~IRDA. This analysis of the ERDA budget served' as a prelude to later OTA evalua- tions of ERDA's plans and programs which,, by law, are required to be submit- ted to the Congress annually. Two major evaluations of the ERDA Plan and Program have since `been performed for this and other Committees of the Con- gress. In a similar vein, OTA last year analyzed the first five-year research and development plan presented to Congress by the 13.5. Environmental Protection Agency. This analysis served as a basis for this Committee's consideration of EPA's R&D budget. Most recently, OTA provided Congress with a comprehensive analysis of the Administration's proposed National Energy Plan. In addition to serving the immediate needs of the requesting committees, these activities have served to strengthen OTA's competence for analyzing Issues con- cerning energy supply, demand, conservation, and future alternatives and for handling special projects to meet urgent Congressional requirements. FOOD PROGRAM SUBCATEGORIES Production; marketing; and coneumption and nutrition B. Food.-This program consists of three categories that span the food cycle: production, marketing, and consumption, including nutrition, OTA began building its capability for conducting assessments in this area In 1974, when it received a request to assess the adequacy of food Information sys- tems. Congress was concerned about world food emergencies at the time and PAGENO="0159" 155 large-scale trading of t.LS..grain stocks overseas that had brought price Increases at home. This assessment provided án~ ex~eUent basis for 4eveloptng the food program because it delat with the indispensable links to infoi~med policy making for all aspects of the food cycle. As in the Energy Program, a variety of resources was marshalled to satisfy this congressional request and to launch the Food Program. Staff members were appointed, an advisory committee established, consultants retained, contracts let, and contacts made with the vast community of people and institutions that make up or rely upon the food information system. Even while the assessment was in progress, the OT.& food assessment staff con- tributed preliminary findings and information for i~se in congressional hearings and activities, including the preparation for the World Food Conference of 1974. Once again, this illustrates a fundamental principle that guides OTA: its assist- ance must be timely if It is to meet the schedules and practical needs of the Coin- mittees of Congress. Building upon the capabilities developed In this assessment, the rood Program staff was able to undertake subsequent assessments In a variety of fields, includ- ing studies of agricultural research and development, the transfer of food pro- cessing technology to developing countries, food grading systems, government nu- trition programs, and issues to be considered in developing a national food policy. HRALTII PROGRAM SUBCATEGORIES Costa; quality; and delivery C. Health~-The OTA Health Program launched the first assessment project to be finished by OTA. Again, the marshalling of resources for the project, ~ne of the first three undertaken by OTA, helped to establish the structure and competence of the OTA health program. This study dealt with a long-standing health policy Issue concerning drug costs. It centered on the therapeutic equivalence of drugs having different brand names, but consisting of the same chemical composition. The Senate Committee on Labor.and Public Welfare had requested the assessment. To perform this project, OTA project leaders, with the cooperation of the com- mittee staff, selected a panel with broad experience In medicine, pharmacology and biostatistics to carry out the assessment. It was completed In three months, and because of its usefulness to the Senate and the House, led to requests from four Congressional committees for over a dozen assessments of health and medica.l care issues. MATERI4ZS PROGRAM SUBCATEGORIES Mining and ectraction; processing; f~brication; use; recycling; and diSposal I). Materla2s.-The Materials Programs, adresses issues that span the materials cycle, from mining and extraction tbrqngh processing, fabrication, use, recovery and reuse, and finally disposaL In developing the program, OTA has responded to Congressional concern over the future availability of adequate quantities of ma- terials resources. The first step in the development of this program was a review of the history of national materials policy and legislative actions which was prepared for OTA by Dr. Frank Huddle of the Congressional Research Service, who has been of enormous help to OTA since Its inception. Included in this review was a broad program prospectus with suggested topics for both long and short-range assess- ments. Next, concurrent with recruitment of In house project management staff, a 19-member Materials Advisory Committee was appointed to provide a broad range of outside expertise. Additional planning information was supplied by a survey, conducted, at OTA's request by the Federation of Materials Societies, an association of professional and technical societies representing more than 500,000 scientists and engineers. This survey addressed the adequacy, completeness, and accessibility of Informa- ti.on about supply and demand of key materials and resources.' These surveys and the initial review by CR5 were considered by the Materials Advisory Committee and by the OTA Advisory Council in determining the topics for assessment which should be given highest priority. flased on these priorities, the materials project staff, working with the requesting congressional commit- tees, developed plans for the performance of five assessments that were later au- thorized by the Board. PAGENO="0160" 156 A recent assessment pr6jeet In the Materials Programs deserves separate men- tion. It is one that was mandated by Congress last year 1~n `Section 10 of the Coal Leasing Amendments Act, wblch requires 0Th to: condudt a completes study of coal leases entered into by the U.S. under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. NATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PRIORITIES PROGRAM SUBCATEGORIES Health of the enterprise; applications; and deoisionmaking E. National resear~h and deix~lopment policies and priorities program.-In 1975, OTA received requests or expressions of concern from six different com- mittees and the Congressional Budget Office as to the appropriate role of the Federal government in supporting basic research. In response, OTA called upon the Advisory Council to assist in establishing the Office's National R&D Policies arid Priorities Program The Advisory Council assumed oversight responsibility for this program and three advisory panels. l~ach comprised of lfi to 1(3 highly experienced and recog- nized leaders in varioris R&D activities, the panels' are helping OTA address issues In three R&D categories: the health of the scientific and technical enter- prise, the applications of science and technology, and the decision making process by which research and development policies and priorities are developed and implemented. OCEANS PROGRAM SUBCATEGORIES Coastal zone management; marine transportation; marine resources; marine environment; and marine science arid technology F. Oceans.-One of the first steps taken in this program area, after Initial staff were retained, was the formation of a nine-member ad hoc advisory group, including experts on legal, economic, environmental, geological, industrial and governmental aspects of offshore oil development. The panel included partici- pants in recent studies of the subject sponsored by the National Science Founda- tion and the Council on Environmental Quality. In May 1974, this group met to review procedures for the allocation of Federal resources which may be dis- covered in Submerged lands beyond the three-mile limit. It recommended that OTA assessments dealing with the Outer Continental Shelf should address the manner In which offshore-based energy facilities of various types may perform in a specific geographic region and the Impacts they may have on the adjacent coastal area. Thus, when an assessment was proposed of tbe potential effects of locating deepwater ports, floating nuclear power plants and oil exploration and produc- tion off the coasts of New Jersey and Delaware (where all three were under active consideration), the Oceans Program was able quickly to work out with the requesting committee a plan for a workable project. An 11-member project advisory panel was formed to assist OTA in all phases of this assessment. In addition, the project team augmented its capabilities with contractors, con- sultants, and post-doctoral fellows. With these core resources in place and operating, the Oceans program has been able to respond to a series of requests for analyses by congressional committees and has developed a capability in the four subcategories noted above. TECHNOLOGY AND WORLD TRADE SVBCATEGOEIES Industry sector studies; and general studies G. Technology and world trade program.-Responding to specific congressional concerns about a declining balance of trade and its possible relation to tech- nological productivity, the OTA Board established a new program in 1976 to examine issues and assumptions relating to the technological relationships of the U.S. and its trading partners abroad. The Program staff is currently developing an information base on the rela- tionships of technology to world trade. Using an advisory committee to help define the issues and plan specific projects, OTA is assessing the state of tech- nology and world trade trends in selected industries, such as chemicals, that are technology intensive and figure prominently in world trade. In laying the foundation for this assessment program, OTA is consulting widely with, and tapping the resources of, other Federal agencies and private institu- PAGENO="0161" 157 tions with interests In technology and world trade. These include the General Accounting Office, National Science Foundation, the Departments of State and Commerce the Export Import Bank, and the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering. TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM StTBOATEGORIES Rail transit; mass trajnsit; and antomobile H. Transportation program.-The Transportation Program illustrates how OTA, working with the requesting committees, can expand on a project or pro- vide Congress with additional information and analyses covering a range of Issues and concerns. Addressing Issues grouped around the theme of providing safer, less costly, and more energy-efficient means of meeting national transporta- tioñ needs, three series of assessments have dealt With the railroads, urban mass transit, and the role of the automobile. Beginning In January 1974, when an assessment was begun of railroad tech~ nologies and the need, for upgrading roadbeds and rlghts~of-way,' OTA in .1975 turned Its attention to assisting the Congress In Its deitheratlons on how to revive the railroad Industry. Currently, OTA Is conducting an assessment, man- dated by Congress, of railway safety issues. In the area of mass transltr OTA. began by assessing in 1974 small-scale, per- sonal rapid transit systems, such as those used in Morgantown, West Virginia, and the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. In 1975, based on the staff expertise and the capability that had been developed to draw upon experts from labor, man- agement, government, and engineering associations, OTA undertoOk an evalua- tion of the cost, safety, and efficiency issues associated with using automatic control equipment for rapid transit rail systems. Later, nuder the guidance of the Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel, the automatic train control assessment was broadened to consider the decision mak fag process by which communities plan for mass transit This as~essment de veloped as a separate project since a different mix of expertise was required. Using case studies from nine U.S. cities, OTA developed alternative means by which Congress could upgrade mass transit systems throughout the country. Logically following these, a third assessment dealt with the effects of the 1973-74 energy crisis on the economy and the relationship Of energy and employment to mass transit. OTA has examined elements of auto safety for the Congress and is now broadly analyzing the role of the automobile in America's future. ExPLOBATOnT PROGRAM New and emergency technologies; tel~communiCatiOfl8, computers, and infor- mation policies; and demographic trends infruencing elementary and second- ary education I. Ecoploratory prograni.-OTA screening procedures for evaluating assess- ments requests which I listed earlier include smaller scale exploratory assess ments undertaken to provide a better basis for decisions by the OTA Board as to whether a certain major project is warranted. Some examples will clarify this activity and its role both In OTA's structure and Its service to the Congress. One activity involves planning an assessment program on issues relating to telecommunications, computers, and Information policies. In an earlier activity, a preliminary analysis of rural telecommunications examined a range of issues that might be addressed by a series of new assessments. Another preliminary study brought forth issues of privacy, civil liberties, and the due process rights of taxpayers raised by the computerized Tax Adminis tratlve System proposed by the Tnternal Revenue Service. A third exploratory activity recently reviewed long-range trends and issues which may influence elementary and seëondary school education In the U.S. Undertaken to assist the House Committee on Education and Labor in Imple menting the foresight provisions with regard to the Elementary and secondary Education Act of 1965, the project employed senior, OTA staff, consultants, and' a workshop involving demographic and educational experts from government agencies and private and academic institutions. Another project is beginning to develop methods for Identifying new and eInero~. ing technologies, thereby further developing OTA's early warniflg function. 96-205-78- ---11 PAGENO="0162" 158 Mr. Chairman, the data and descriptions I have presented today do not go Into the details o~ OTA's projects' and the many uses to which they have been put by the committees of Congress. fliwever, I hope that this prelim1narl~ iflfOr~ mation will be helpful to the Subcopimittee and I would be pleased at this time to discuss any questions you may have. Mr. Ti-I0ENTON. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSimone, for an e~- ceflent presentation. With regard to the kinds of work which you do and the judgments that you may make as to winch prolects should be selected and ap- proved from the applications which are made, I wonder if we could get a couple of illustrations of types of projects that might be ap~ proved and perhaps same that might fail `because of scope. That would help me to understand the dimensions of it I want to throw out two different subject `matters and see if either or both of them would b~ the kind of project that you might dig into and respond favorably to an assessment. I think I will give you the easiest one, recombinant DNA. research. Would this be the kind of project that you might `consider appropriate for investigation and a report'? Dr Sm~owr Yes, Mr Chairman, I believe that would s'ttisfy all of our criteria. It is a matter of urgent çqncer~i. There is a great deal of activity in Congress with respect to ~t Jt Is something that will be before `Congress for some time to conie~ There are obviously a great many people in the country who a~e concerned about it Theie are many people who feel that the potential impacts would be very serious and awesome. And others who feel that it is a great oppor- tunity for furthering science and the attack on disease, and so on. It is a `subject that I think would qualify for consideration `by our Board and one that, if it were requested by a committee of the Congress, our Board would consider very seriously. It certainly satisfies all the criteria for selection. Mr. THORNTON. To give you one which might be in some doubt, at least in my thinking-and I would like to lay it out to see whether this might be appropriate-~-the general subject of climatology, whether there is a greenhouse effect, and whether the world is alter- ing its climate so as to bring about hazards of flooding of coastal cities, and the many varied things. that go into that kInd of study. Would this one run into some trouble, or would there also be a program that you might assess? Dr. DESIMONE. I think it would be appropriate for OTA to assess. We have had requests from committees of the Congress that relate to climatology, but not in the global sense that you have indicated, Mr. Chairman The issue is long term, in the sense of an impact that is not with us now but one which may be in the bug-term futuie It is part of OTA's responsibility to be concerned about these kinds of ques- tions, as specifically stated i.n our statute. We are continuing to build our capacity for early warning issues of this kind and, to sum up, I think it would be an appropriate issue for consideration by our Board. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. Would the gentleman yield at this point? PAGENO="0163" 159 The question illustrates a fairly fundamental difficulty that afflicts the members of the Technology Board, I think, in trying to formu- late the problem: What is the technology assessment? The climatological issues are interwoven with the other issues, For example, the CO2 effect arises out of the combustion of fossil fuels which is an element in the energy program. And the question of how you would handle the broadly posed question, say an assessment of the need for a climatology program, probably needs to be examined rather thoroughly to determine just what it is that we want to ex- amine or to assess and I, personally, do not feel that we have a very good answer to that question but it is one which I suspect requires considerable consultation between competent professional staff and those who perceive a problem in the congressional field, as we do here in this committee, with regard to climatology. In other words, to formulate a description of a question or a request for a technology assessment, that would be more fruitful in meeting our needs. Mr. ThoRNToN. I thank the gentleman for that remark. It illus- trates, I believe, the nature of the question that I am posing. There are certainly many features of climatology which are examinable. But there is an integral mix of questions here. And as I have listened to your listing of things, whether the assessment was of manageable scope, can it be bounded within reasonable time and budgetary limits? It might be that the overall question might be terribly difficult and yet there are parts of it where the contribution could be tremendously valuable. How do you limit it? Would you undertake to study the whole spectrum of climatology? Dr. DESIMONE. Mr. Chairman, both you and Congressman Brown have hit upon the governing criterion to measure such a request against, namely, can the issue be bounded? And as you indicated, Congressman Brown, there is an interconnectedness of issues on this particular question, energy, environment, and oceans, almost every- thing we are doing, including transportation, all of the means by which CO2 is produced. And then there is the matter of having to define what the assessment project would involve. I can give you an example, an assessment project we now have underway, which is not quite -as global as clima- tology, but which is, nevertheless, equally difficult to bound and that is the assessment of the future of the automobile in the TJnited States. It leads to myriad questions of the kind Congressman Brown has indicated, questions on energy, fuels, transportation, the society, em- ployment, international relations-it is a very unwieldy subject to assess. We would be faced with the same problem if we were asked to assess the climatology issue that you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and, first of all, we would have to do what Congressman Brown has indicated, home in on the issues and ask ourselves: What are the essential ones that OTA can do something practical and useful about? If we try to do everything we will end up doing nothing really well. Mr. ThoRNToN. Mr. Yeager. Mr. Yi~A~R. Along those lines, Dr. DeSimone, your chart shows the number of questions you have received and those which have not been done. Almost 30 percent have not been. PAGENO="0164" 160 Of that group, could you give us a rough estimate of how many have not been done because the subject matter is too difficult to handle or is inappropriate to handle, vis-a-vis the number of that has not been done because you do not have the money to do it? Dr. DESIMONS. Mr. Yeager, we do not have the exact figures here, but we can provide them for the record. Let me give an example.. Mr. THORNTON. We would appreciate receiving them for the record. Dr. DESIMONE. Mr. Chairman, we will do that. I can give you an example, Mr. Yeager, of a request that we received which was an important issue, but one which we turned down because we did not think it appropriate for OTA to take it up. And that was in the early winter of 19~T5 when we received a pair of requests, one for an assess- ment of what would be the impacts of the curtailment of natural gas supplies in the United States, and, secondly, an assessment of the consequences of deregulating the price of natural gas. We presented these requests to the Board with the recommendation that the first one was appropriate for us to do, namely, the conse- quences of the curtailment of natural gas. The second one was not appropriate because it had been thoroughly studied by~ universities, the executive branch, by committees of the Congress, and there was not anything that we could add to it, and we recommended that we not go forward with it. It was an urgent issue, obyiously, and still is before Congress.. But OTA could not, in our judgment, have contributed any further enlightenment on that question at that time, or even at this time, I believe, and, therefore, we did not undertake it. But the thrust of your question goes further. There are many cases where requests are not undertaken because we feel that the subject matter is completely outside the scope of our charter, and the best examples of that are the requests we receive for technical feasibility evaluations of a piece of hardware, for example, or a new engine, or a technology that would be more appropriately evaluated by an . ex- ecutive agency. We refer such requests to the executive agency. `We will provide data for the record on your question, Mr. Ycager. [The information requested follows:] Of the 45 requests turned down or for which no planning has been done, 20 could be classified as of inappropriate ~ubject matter and the remaIning 25 have not been addressed because of low priority and budget constraints. Mr. BROWN. Would the gentleman yield on that point? Mr. THORNTON. Yes. Mr. BROWN, It has been my observation, in practice, there are certain other broad areas in which we are somewhat reluctant to move for assessments. I suggest as one of those the general area of advanced research and development in the weapons and defense area, or matters related thereto, and, as I understand it, there is no legal exclusion hut it is just a matter of good judgment on the part of the Board and the staff that we do not move into those areas. I am n~t quite clear as to what extent that has actually been done forinerly~ I am also raising the question as to our other similar broad areas whereas a matter of con-imonseuse we have, not sought. to expend substantial resources. Couldyou enlighten me ~n that? ` . . PAGENO="0165" 161 Dr. DRSIM0NE. The military area is one, as you indicate, Congress- man Brown, that we have not been active in, We have had one assess- ment in this area, as you know, which was requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the effects of limited nuclear war, and we performed that one. We have not been requested to do any- thing in that area by any of the Armed Services Committees of the Cougress, Another area in which we have not `been asked to make assessments is in social programs, generally, the technology of systems, the so~ia1 security system, and other systems of that sort. We have not been asked to do any assessments of that kind, nor has our Board suggested any such studies. Space is another area in which we have not per- formed any assessments to date. Mr. BROWN. I note that under your description of exploratory pro- grams that you have indicated you are working with the Education and Labor `Committee on an assessment involving educational matters. I do not know how that request was structured or if it is in the proc- ess of `being structured. But it seems to me that this is one of the fruit- ful areas of social systems which might be amendable to an assessment and which you are apparently at least exploring the possibility of be- ing of some service to the appropriate congressional committees. Can you say anything further on this? Dr. DESIMONE. It is an area in which we have been asked to assist the Congress. It is a fruitful area. We have made a preliminary anal- ysis of a request by the House Education Committee to assess the rela- tionship between demographic trends and planning for educational institutions. We have performed that analysis and the requesting com- mittee held hearings on the results. We are waiting' to hear from them what further requests they might make of the Tec~nology Assessment Board. Mr. BROWN. Let me be more specific and elicit any comments that you might have. There has been a number of major studies of the effectiveness of national educational policies, the flow of money and the relationship between that and the quality of educational output done by, I think, people at Harvard and there have been studies of the relationship `between the various educational technologie~, ~new teach- ing devices of an electronic nature, and so on, in an effort to determine whether the educational output is actually improv~e4. The result is frequently negative, that neither better machines nor more money necessarily produce better education which seems to me might be a subject suitable for a rather more exhausting analysis to see (a) is it true, and (b) why, if it is. And I am inquiring whether this might be, if requested, a suitable subject for a farily substantial exploration. Dr. DESIM0NE. I believe it would be and, indeed, when we began our exploratory' effort in education trying to consider issues that would be appropriate for OTA to assess, we considered a broad spectrum of issues, including the one that you indicated, namely, the effects of technology on education and, vice versa, the effect .of~ education on technology. The project director `for this exploratory effort is Joseph' Coates, who is here. I would like to ask him to, comment briefly on your question, Congressman Brown. PAGENO="0166" 162 Mr. CoAn~s. May I comment on what we did and how that originated? Mr. BROWN. You could save the Government a lot of money if you could find out that we are not getting results from all this educational funding. Mr. CoA~rEs. We prepared a fairly rich menu of interesting educa- tional projects over 11/2 years ago at Chairman Teague's request. They found no ready client at first, but the House Committee on Education and Labor thought we might help it to exercise the foresight provision. As you recall, there is a resolution requiring a look at the future. We prepared a preliminary planning piece for the committee outlining what might be useful and doable in terms of exercising foresight. The committee came back and asked us to do some further work of a quantitative, objective, and future-oriented nature that would be use- ful to the committee. Specifically, we undertook to look at the effects of demographic trends on elementary and secondary schools. We did a preliminary study for our Board and that was submitted to the committee which used it as a basis for hearings. As an incidental point, the committee's report was the first House publication to exercise the foresight provision. As it stands now, they seem to be satisfied with that preliminary effort and have not yet asked us to proceed further. There is a menu of potential projects. This specific one was foresight. We do have another larger menu of what I would take to be quite important and useful educational projects but we shall have to await an indication of congressional need. Mr. BROWN. Thank you. Mr. THORNTON. I appreciate your moving in. Let us work on this kind of as a panel and as issues come up, I hope we can have an oppor- tunity to dig right into it. Do you have any further questions! Mr. BROWN. I do have a number of further questions but I have to attend a markup session down the hall at least for a few minutes. So I wish to be excused. Mr. ThORNToN, Thank you. Pursuing the boundaries of the type of programs, focusing upon maybe what the definition of technology is Exactly what is it that you assess'~ Clearly technology includes the visible technology devices that may be used. I think it also expands to include technologies, po- tentially at least, in the social areas, such as have been discussed but is the term a limiting one. Or does it just relate to the way things are done? Is there a boundary on that? Are these some areas that reach beyond the definition of technology in which you would not go into it because you feel that that term does not include that on certain areas? Dr. DRSIM0NE. That is very important and a very elusive question. The definition of technology, as you indicate, goes beyond technical devices. It includes the technology of know-how and process and that can be process in the technical sense of how to get to the ~oon, but it can also be a process of accomplishing something in the social realm. We have tried, and in most cases have succeeded, in limiting our work to issues that have a technological connection that is fairly clear PAGENO="0167" 163 but. We have note as I indicated to Congressman Brown, assessed any social technolo~ies~ such as the social security system, although one can find a technical basis for assessing almost anything. We have tried to be prudent in our selection of work. Mr. PII0RNT0N. You mentioned deregulation as a subject you did not assess and cited as the reason for that decision, that work had already been done and you felt there was little you, could contribute. I wonder if that might also be an area in which the consideration would be a policy one~ a consideration of the effect of law on a change in law as opposed to the development of a particular new or different technology. Is that an appropriate criteria for i~n issue like thati Dr. DESIMONE. In that case, if we had gone ahead with it, the tech- nical connection would have been the effect of increased investment potential on the part of industry and new research and development for increased activity in discovering and extracting natural gas. Mr. ThORNTON, Flowing from the change.? Dt. Th~SIMoNE. From the change. You are getbing to the heart of the problem we have in trying to determine what we do. There are many issues we have been asked t9 do by our Board and by committees of the Congress which on their face do not have any technical connection but which are never the less, an integral part of the larger scheme of things that we are concerned about. For example, we have, done assessments in the field of transportation, with an obvious technical connection like advanced research and de- velopment for mass transit in the cities. We have also done some studies for Congress which have no tech- nical connection, prima facie, at all, such as the ConRail proposition which we were asked to assess, and GAO, incidentally, was also asked to assess ifl a parallel effort. We undertook that study because: ~t did provide an information base for the larger questions that we were looking at in the tr sportation area. Thus, an individual study which we undertake may not, have an obvious technical connCc'tioh but it iS. an important piece of information for a larger assessment project that we may be doing. This question will always plague us in the senSe' that there are viousconeerils in the Congress and needs felt and we would like to be helpful. , OTA's Board does not summarily re)ect a request on the basis that it has no relevance to technology. There was the i~istanee of the Conrail study. But we could justify that in terms of its being helpful to our larger assessmei~t of transportation which has an obvious technical. connection. Mr. THom oit. To give you an illustration of sothething that I think might fit within an assessment question and whiehi `had not previously really thought nught flow to OTA is a study of the effect of having a uniform patentpolicy among the different Federal research ag~n4ies~ the effect that n~ight have ii~pen moving innovations into the market- place and making them availa~ble to the public. Is this a question that might have a sufficient relationship to tech- nOlogy? Dr. D~SI~oNE. I believe so. It is one that fits very nicely within our scheme `of things, the iSsues `are clearly concerned ~`itli incentives for PAGENO="0168" 164 technological innovation. The options are many. The consequences of different èourses `of action woula be assessed, the advantages and dis~ advantages of eacl3 would be described. It would be an assessment that would be appropriate for 0Th. and I think it would bea very useful one for the Congress. This committee has been concerned with this question since its incep- tion.' ~ is ~ti important issue and is still'with us~ And it is obviously one that would be appropriate for technology assessment, if it were done in the issues-driven mode that I mentioned in my statement. Mr. YRAGER. Do you have, Dr. DeSimone, any patent problems being examined in the course of assessments whi~liyou have already done as part of the overall program? Dr. Di~SxMoi~. There are two programs in which patents are con- si'dered explicitly, the technology and world trade program, which is in the planning atage, `and the national R. & D.~ policies and' priori- ties program which, at this stage, is also mostly a planning effort. The latter program consists of three panels, one of which is concern~d ~itli the applications of technology and incentives for technological mnova- tion~ which `would inelude the patent issues. Mr. YDAGEE. Who chairs that group? Dr. DESIM0NE. The chairman of that panel is Dr. Louis J3ranscomb, the vice president for research and development at IBM. Mr. THORNTON. In noting the breakdown of the origin of requests for assessments, it was my observation that there were `very few re- quests which originated from within the Board as compared withthose' originating from congressional committees., In fact, it seems to me that there might have been none; is that correct, or have there been some? Dr. DESIMONE. There have' been, as you have indicated, very few. On the average, `roughly 10 percent of our activities is requested by the Board itself. ` ` Under the early warning provision of the `Te~hnology Assessment Act which I mentioned earlier, we~~ ~`probably w~ll have more requests' from the Board members themselves. You `are correct in pointing out that a relatively small number do originate from within the Board. : Mr THORNTON There were none in the first year and then it appears that there were four in the 1975 and 1976 and three s~ far in 1977 Dr. DESIMONE. Some members of our Board are also chairmen pf committees of Congr~ss and, tberefbre~, they are entitled to ask in two ways~~they wear twohats. , : Mr THORNTON And their requests would be treated as coming from the committee if' they sponsored it as a committee action. Dr. DESIMONE. Yes. Mr. YE~toER. While on thi~ subject, would you diseuss the problem of mandated `assessn~enth? ` ` Dr. `DzSI~oNE. De glad to. This problem arose lastyear for the first time. `There have been a number of bills, as yon know, that have been proposed since the creation of' 0TA.'which woul4~eqnire by law, rather than a decision by our Board, that we perform ~n assessment Last year two of these bills came to fruition and were enacted into law One requires the Office to assess the performance under the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1920 and involves a rather exte~i- sive survey of questions, partly technologically based, ~bnt mostly not, PAGENO="0169" 15 of a teclniical nature. The Qthê1'~ mandated assessti~ent cone rs~raii~' road safety and we are directed to evaluate what has occurred pnrsuant to legislation in this field, including the performance of the Federal Railroad Admitustration and otber governmental agencies that have been responsible~ for railroad safety implementation. These two assessments came at a time in our fiscal year when we had already made plans and committed funds for other activities in energy, health, and so forth. We had no choice, however, but to make preparations for conducting these mandated assessments because the.y were required by ~aw, We asked for a supplemental appropriation in the fiscal year 197~ a~ppr~- priations bill and we were granted appropriations to conduct those assessments. Our Boardwas quite concerned about that and as1~ed that we make arrangements with the leadership of the house an4 Senate, so that in the future when bills are in committee which would require OTA to perform an assessment, that the Technology A.ssessment Board be consulted and, therefore, allow for an orderly and prudent planning for OTA's activities and priorities. We have, for example, already planned over budget strategy for fiscal year 1978 and have determined how we are going to expend our `firmds. If we were required by mandated assessments to perform additional activities beyond that, this could undermine the Board's plawn~g strategy So we are going to try to work out something with the leader- ship o~ the house and the Senate whereby there can ~be consultation ;while these bills are in committee and the Board can then consider these legislative requests br technology assessments as. they would any other requests and perhaps the need for legislative mandate would not be necessary in that case. Mr. TBORNTON. In these instances to which you refer, am I correct in the assumption that they did not result from an unsuccessful at- tempt to get you to study these things, that is,a request was made and it was denied? Dr. DESIMoi~z. A request to the Board had not been made in either case, Mr. Chairman. It had never been. presented to the Board in a formal way. Mr. Yi~oiin. I think there was a case somewhat similar involving the air crash bag that the Appropriathms Committee require it to be done before they would include funds for that program in. the next fiscal year. Right? Dr. DDSIMoiis. Yes. There were a number of bills to that effect. I think there were 15 in all. I do not mean.to imply that we were. not aware of theselegisiative items, but the two bills that passed did cause some problems We were aware of them and had been asked in one case if it woulcibe possible for OTA to undertake an assessment without an appropriation, and so we did have sOme conversations with the committees. It is not a question of their having ignored us, just that this. was the first time that it happened and we were all sort of unaware of the consequences of a mandated.assessment. In any case, we are workingwith the spon~ soring committees and we are going to satisfy their needs Mr THORNTON Now, as to the method of origin of assessments, I believe you said. there wererthree w~ys~ one by committee, a~seôo~d. by PAGENO="0170" 166 the Board, and third through the ()TA Director. Have there be~n inai~y or any studies initiated by the Du~eetoii Dr. D~SwoN1~. There have not been any studies initiated by the Di- rector. The reason is we have b~d such a huge backlog of requests from committeos of congress that we felt our first obligation was to try to satisfy them. We have had no flexibility to date. This is not to say, howevei~, that there has been no consultation between the Director and members of the Board who are intereseted in certain areas. The Director has, and I think quite rightly, refrained from putting forward an assessment which he felt should be undertaken while we had such a large backlog, 14~T requests, from committees of the Con- gress, including some from the Board itself. Quite rightly, he deferrød to the requesting committees and the Board. in future, I think there will be an opportunity to propose assessments which normally do not come through the congressional process, pf the long-range kind that were referre~ to earlier. Mr. ThORNPON. We spent time yesterday trying to decide whether you could distinguish and separate goal-oriented assessments from technology-oriented assessments. It appeared that the OTA made an e~ort, from those witnesses' viewpoints at least, to deal only with the scientific and ascertainable questions, factual questions that might be raised, and not t~ substitute or forirrulate policy goals. I have two questions. One: Is this desirable? Some :Euro~ean cóun- tries do include, incorporate the concept of technology assessment within a broader look at whether it is desirable to move in a certain direction and, if so, what will be the technological consequences of that. First; Is it desirable? Second: Can you really make such a distinctiän between the effects of a technology and the ascertainment of what goals should be sought ~ Dr. DESTMONZ. Sometimes the two, that is, whether an iSsue thatwé are assessing is technologically [driven] or goals driven, sometim~s these are inseparable But, generally, we are able to distmguish be tween the two. ror example, we have been asked to assess specific technological initiatives in energy, and we have done so. They were obviously technically driven. We have also been asked to assess, at least as many times, issues that are concerned with national goals where technology is only one factor. For example, the cost of health and medical care, the quality of health and medical care, the delivery of health and medical care. Those subcategories of our health program are really national goals oriented Technology is a factor to consider in them When we are analyzing, f~r another example the energy research and development plan and program, we are mostly concerned with technological initia- tives which then provide issues to be analyzed for the requesting committee. Mr. THouwToi~ Of course, in the criteria for selection of projects to be approved, assessments to be approved, you do focus ~pon such thing~ as whether it is likely to become a major national issue which necessarily gets around a little bit to the question of whether you are making a goal oriented decision, you are at least makrn~ that in deter- mining whether this is something you will go intO, right? PAGENO="0171" 167 Dr. D~SIMoNE.. Yes. I can give you many examples of that. I. an~ sure that this subcommittee has many examples to offer, too. The most recent one, the question of the breeder reactor is more than just a technical question. It involves many factors that concern society and national goals outside of energy, per se. Mr. THORNTON. Dr. Hoimfeld, any questions? Dr. HoLMn~w. Yes. Dr. DeSimone, yesterday in the testimony several people raised a question about whether it would or would not be possible to develop a methodology to do this kind of thing. I think the feeling by at least two of the witnesses was that might not be the case, that we could never write a handbook on how to do it. Based on your experience, what is your feeling about that? Dr DESIM0NE I agree with the witnesses Technology assessment was not created with the creation of the Office of Technology Assess- ment. Certainly it existed in all of the environmental impact state- ments and many other analyses that had been performed before OTA came into existence. We have an entirely different realm to operate in. It is one that is sui generis to OTA, it is a congressional environment. We have to fit into the rhythm and flow of the Congress. Our analyses are quite different from the analyses performed by other agencies for their customers. Our customers are different. Our customers are unique. Every one of our assessments is different from the others. It is something that we are learning, we are all l~arnirig as we go along We have learned a great deal, and we are going to learn more as we evolve. The short-term assessments have a flavor that long-term assessments do not have. And even within these groups they are different. It depends upon the subject. It depends upon the nature of the issue. It depends upon the schedule and plans of the requesting committee. It depends on what is happening in the Congress. And it depends upon so many other things that all of these variables conspire against a methodology that can be written down in a handbook for technology assessment. Dr. HOLMFELD. Related to that, it is our understanding, I can see from the chart in the presentation that your reliance on contractors has been reduced, in terms of the percentage. I wonder whether you could comment on the Office's uses of con- tractors, in terms of their ability to tell them what you want, to give them a handbook which you do not have, that would not go through the conventional process to enable people to develop a product which meets your needs andthe needs of your clients. Dr. DESI~oNE. That is very important, because it goes to the heart of the difficulties we experienced at the beginning of our operations. When we opened for business, we had a very small staff, just a handful of people. And we had to rely on outside contractors to augment otir capability. In fact, we had to rely on outside contractors to do the bulk of the work. And the problem we had was, as you have indicated, that we were just beginning to get attuned to this rhythm and flow in the environment of the Congress and how to be most helpful. Contractors had an impossible time getting the sense of that because they really were not here. They had never had this kind of PAGENO="0172" ~ti assignment before. We `have n1~de some progress now in deve1opifl~ solid relationships with contractors They are essential to our worl~ and We are striving'to `getthe kind of stáff..contractor mix that en~bles our assessment activities' to be as effeQtive and efficient as possible. The right mix we do not know yet. `I `think we are .~etting closer to it. `Contractors are not used by OTA, as I indicated in my testimony, in the sense that NSF; `or the ~BS, or other executiye branch agencies might use contractors. Our project directors' on a particular assess- menit' project ar~ completely in charge. of. that project. They. have the fundamental responsibility for carrying it through to fruition They orchestrate all of these resources. They do not simpiy monitor a contractor's activity and then, in the final phase of the. assessment prç~jeot, pase that contractor report to the committees of the Congress They are in charge of the project from start to finish.. `We have come a. long way since that early phase when we had to rely almost exclusively `on contractors. We continue to work at making this mix more effective and efficient. Mr. YBAGER. In that connection, Mr. DeSimone, as. the chairman pointed out in his opening remarks yesterday, this is a review of the organic act The intent of the act in this regard is very clear The managers Of the bill When it was on the floor of the House in b:dth legislative reports. went to considerable length to make clear that OTA would be a contract operation, not done in-house. In Mr. Teague's letter to Dr. Harold Brown' when he stopped `down from chairman of the council make this comment: We have something of a dilemma ~vhen It comes to the matter of In-house versus contract assessments. I agree that some mixture Is desirable. I cannot agree that anything like a balance should be attempted. 0Th was sold to the Congress `from start to finish; flouse and Senate, a's a contract operation. It `was also sold on the basis of a small but highly capable In-house staff. `I can `say In all candor as one who must justify OTA's budget to the Appropriations Com- mittee each year that OTA would be unfunded today without those assurances. This year's act of the Appropriations Committee in cutting down the staff size seems to suggest that some of these people recall that. I am not throwing this out at this point, Mr. Chairman, to `ask for a comment from you, but simply `to pinpoint it as one area in which we will probably have to spend some time next fall, as to whether or not the act `should or should not be amended and if so, in which direction it ought to go to clarify that problem. Dr. DESIMONE. It is a very important consideration Mr. Yeager, and one that we are giving a great deal of thought to. `Obviously-an'd you are `absolutely correct-the legislative history shows, as Chairman Teague indicated, that from start to finish, OTA was intended to be a small agency in terms "of staff. We are a small agency, in term's of staff, when compared `with the GAO, and the National Science Foundation, and other agencies. But that, again, does not excuse us from being very `concerned about the'mandate of the `statute and the legislative history that you mentioned. And I am certainly pleased that the committee will be. considering this for OTA needs to c'ome to grips with it and we will do'everything we `can to give this, the' most' serious thought and attention. ` ` Mr. THORNTON. Dr. DeSimone,,. `in u~esponse .to questions~ by.. Con- gressman Brown, you listed some areas' of exclusion which appe~ared to PAGENO="0173" 169 have `developed' `whether by deoiSion~or otherwise, aM v'a~'ied from one area to tbenext. `. You listed military, social problems, social security, and spaee and I wrote down on my list a question whether there had beei~ an e~- elusion of a study of institutions. And then you went on into education which, is a study of an m~titu- tion. I then went further and mentioned the.patent policy thing which would be a focus upon some of the Federal institutions as to apolicy~ that those institutions have and its `e~ect on technology. That is an area where you have not yet made a study but which m~ght be on- which is appropriate for study. I am coming to this question. At hearings before the Subcommittee, which I was chairing during the last session of Congress, Dr. Stayer and other witnesses made the comment that a good deal of research money in the private sector was going to defensive research, that is that it was being expended by people in order to meet new standards propaulgated by Federal rules and regulations, that a. great deal of e1~ort was going into meeting governmental rules and regulations and not'to innovate, develop, new technologies. An. this is a rather hroad.area. It might lie outside the scope of OTA but I wonder whether some limited parts of this ques- tion might not be subject to consideration, that is, what is the impact of the rules and regulations, of some of the instit~ions `of government as inhibiting or deterring the development of technologies which might be beneficial to the people of this country. Dr. DsSI~oNE. It is an issue that is ~very important and not ap~ predated general~y by the public, because it is arcane. It goes to the heart of the question, what kind of an environment, what kind of a. climate do we have for the development of technology in this country. There' is `concern, expressed most forcefully by this subcommittee, about the capability of the United States in terms of technological innovation and international trade and, at `hand, for the increased. standard of living and the development of our own' economy that we are all interested ~in Mr THoRNToN If you can look at world climate you can certainly look att'he climate for technological innovation.', Dr DESIMONE. It is not the kind of climate that people normally think `about, but it is ~" very important' one an.d ~t is one that I think would be appropriate for OTA to look at, an4 especially in the area of national B.. &, D. policies and priorities. It definitely concerns the application of technology `and incentiyes and' barriers to it, and the impact' ~f regulatory rules,,which, in themselves, obviously `have desir-' able `en4s~ One aspect of these regulatory rules, which is not ~normally looked at, but `which is OTA's business, is the unanticipated conse- quences of imposing a certain regulation on an industry, or on an activity, which may then impede scientific or technical progress in-~ directly, perhaps as a second- or third-order effect. This question that you raise, Mr. Chairman, is clearly one that OTA would be justified in undertaking. Mr. THORNTON.' I am delighted in that answer. It seems to me that" dealing with some of these institutional problems is most important and something where the report of OTA to the Congress might lead~ PAGENO="0174" 170 to corrective m~a~ures being taken'as~ inst.it~tions formed by Cougrees are sometimes easier to, deal with than institutions ~which i~re not wIthin the s~ope of congressional authority. Any further questions3 Mr. Yeager4 Mr. YEAGER. Just a couple brief ones. Does your testimony contain the number of in$etec~ pi'ojex~ts by program, and if not, cou1~ that number beprovided for the record ~ ~ `Mr. Yeager,~e d~ not ha~re that but we will prcwide it for the record. W~ will imeMde that aa another chart~ We will be glad to do that. : Mr. Tixon~o~. We will be pleased to recerveit. Dr. Th~Sn~or~. The nun~bèrof completed projects by program area. [The information re~ueste~ follows:] OoMrLErim Pao3EcTs rnoGnAM ~ND TITLt Energy: 0n~site solar total energy systems; ERDA budget analysis (pts. I and II) ERDA plan and program analysis (pts I and TI) analysis of impacts of projected natural gas slurrtage f~r winter 6-~Th~i't ; enhanced recorery of Ml and gas; unclear pro eratlen and safeguards ~ EIt'A research and development plan analysis and national energy policy analysis. l?ood Foo~L piformnti~n systems, agriculture research and development organiz ing and fInancing basic researcl~, to enhance food proctncti on rice blenthitg and options; and alt~rnatftes to special sup~i~nienial feeding program for women, infants, and children. Health Drug bsoeps&vaience adverse drug reaction, development ot medical technologies; development of medical technologies-cost and quality oirnedi- c~l care; development of medical technologies-computed tomography (()~f) scanners; health data systems; and coiputerised medical information systems. Materials: Materials informetion systems; national stockpile; resource recovery, recycling and reuse; and mineral accessibility on federal lands. Oceans Coastal effects of offshore energy systems tantocrs trnblie~ participation (for coastal effects stndy) fisheries technology;' ecean energy technologies ~ OCS oil and gas and transport of liquifled natural gas technology study Transportation Automatic train control in rail rapid transit, community plan mug for urban mass transit energy the economy and nimisS transit auto matte guideway transit; antoirrobtie co1iI~ion thita; rail re1fabt~1itatiou ap- proaches; financial viability OtCbnIh'sfl; railroad national isener ;~ atid urban transit velitcheresearcir anv~e].)pmnetit. Exploratory: Telecommunications, computers and information policies; and hearings on technology assessment. Mr. TiiORNTON. Thank you~ I would like to ask if you. would agree to respond to such specif~.e questions ~s might be addressed `toyou in writing following this hear-j u~ and also as we go further into the fal1,~ that there might be a possr bility we would want to esk you. to retu~rxit toward. the end ofthe hear-. ings, either in person,. or to respond to sw~.h issues as may have dee- veloped, or to respond to. some written questions which might develop as the result of further hearings on the question. Would.you be agree~ able to that? Dr. DESIMONE. I would be pleased', Mr. Chairmam, to be of' whatever help I can to this subcommittee in the form of additional questions and further testimony. Mr. THORNTON. We certainly would like to have an opportunity to explore those questions with you. PAGENO="0175" 171 And I very much appreciate your response to the questions con- cerning the possible inquiry into institutional barriers, hindrances to the development of technology. Mr. Brown, we have pretty well completed the questions that I wanted to ask. Do you have any questions? Mr. BROWS. I will pass, Mr. Chairman. I get the chance to query Mr. DeSimone more frequently than you do. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much. If there are no further questions, this hearing will be adjourned. [At 1:05 p.m. the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 10:09, Tuesday, September 27, 1977.] PAGENO="0176" PAGENO="0177" REVIEW OF TH~ TECUNOLOGY ASSES:SMENT 4~T, TUESDAY, SEPTE~BEE 27, 1977 HOUSE OF REFR~8ENTATIVES, COMMrrrEE ON ScIENCE AND TEcHNOLOGY, SvBaoMMirrixs oi~ SOrF~NCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington; D.C. The subcommittee reconvened, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 0~ a m, in room 2825, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon Ray Thornton, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. MaP. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. This morning we are resuming hearings on a review of `the Tech- nology Assessment Act qf 1972 and of the Office of Technology As~ sessrnent which the act created. As I indicated when these hearings opened in August, the review was requested by the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Teague, who is here with us today, abouI~ 1 year age. Mr. Teague, who was then also chairman of the Technology A~~ess- ment Board, believed that such a review would be timely after 3 years of operational experience These hearings can be important in do- terminmg whether OTA is carrying otit its functions of gathering in- formation alid communicating that infO~rmation to' Congress. `The pCo; ple charged with making decisions should be proyidecl. with a solid factual basis from which they can determine what questions to ask and what the consequences o.f various choices may be in order to articulat& public policy in vital issue areas. Our purpose is to learn what, if anything, Congress can or should do. to turn the operation `and organization of an accepted valuable and necessary tool of the legislature into an improved instrument The purpose of the hearingc3 15 to see how effectively OTA Is per- forming the ~fuiiction for which it `wa~ established. The original `con- cept was that rdecisiohmakers needed. a `small professiohal group to do~ intensivestudy on major policy in issue areas, such as `energy,"or tráns- portation, Or re~earc1r into recombinant DNA. The question before us is whether OTA is gathering information' and communicating it to decisionmakers so that they can be informed about major policy is~ues, know what questions to ask, understand the~ consequences of different courses of action, and thereby make better policy decisions. In conducting this review it's' impOrtant tO understand how 0Th. fits into the broad research facilities available to Congress, such f~cih~ ties as `the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office; what `distinctions should be drawn be- tween the roles of these organizations.. W~ will want to examine against the question of whether the head' of the Congressional Research Service and the Comptroller General (173) 96-2O~-78----i2 PAGENO="0178" 174 should be on the OTA Advisory Board, and whether providing for other changes in the structure of OTA might enhance the achievement of the objective of ,focusing the attention of OTA upon major national policy areas and communicating its work product to decisionmakers rn such a way that. the decisionmakers seek and accept the Board's services and use those services in making policy decisions I should like to mention some. of this cornthittee's recent experi~ ences, which seem in keeping with. our task today. We have been involved in a very deep and complex fashion with critical matters, such as agricultural resea~eh,: energy research, mate~ rials research and development, effective climatology, finding ways of replacing archair, outmoded transportation, the handling and use of technological information, our hearings on. recombinant DNA, and, overall, the creation and imp1ementat~Gn of a truly useful s~ience policy mechanism for the Federal Government. I think it's very significant that time after time in the pursuit of information relative to these issues, we have either made direct use of OTA or wished ~e had some comparable service available in non- technological fields I was especially struck, during the month 0± heai ings that we held on recombinant DNA to find witnesses repeatedly refer to OTA as the kind of resource needed to assist in the evalua- tion of that controversial effort in basic science. It is my impresSion, based on requests which congressional corn mittees are making of OTA, that this is also true for other commit~ tees whose jurisdiction lies outside the realm of technology, such as economics, taxes, finance, public works, and the like. We don't expect to be able to conclude these hearings or our revie* of them during this session of Congress. Our time is too limited. But we do jnteud to resume and complete this survey as early in the next session as our schedule will, allow. We'll be hearing then from many important witnesses who where unable. to appear this year, or whom we could not find a method of accommodating to our present committee agenda. Our witness this morning is Mr. Ernillo Q. Daddario, whose name is inextricably linked with technology assessment since' that concept'first surfaced in the Congr~ess. Mr. Daddario has had a d~stmguished career which I. Reed net re- count here. lIe was a member of the flouse for 1~ years; chairrn~n of this subcommittee, under a slightly d4fferent name, for 7 years; OTA's first, and, to this moment, only, Director for nearly 4 years. Mr. Daddario is presently president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Your presence here this morning, Mr. Daddario, is primarily to give us a feel for the motives an expectations of those who formulated the OTA legislation. We do hope and expect to ask you to come back again at ,a later to learn from you what your experience may suggest by way of recommendations for improvement in the OTA area. Mr. Daddario, I am going to ask Mr. Hollenbeck if he has any opening remarks, and then ask you to proceed. Mr. Hollenbeck. Mr. HOLLENBECK. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. PAGENO="0179" I'75 I too ta1~e great pie.asur~ in welcoming Mr. Dadclario here~ today. i: look forward t~ hearing his ob~ervations COtIt~rfliflg the expectati . ons und~r1ying the eon~ption ofth~ Office of TechnoJogy Assessment. I also concur with you, Mr. Thornton, on the need to periodically assE~~s~ the tharter of OTA. The questions raised b~r these review hear- ing~; ar~.te?ribi3r impOrtant ai~td, I thirth~ terribly difficult. They ..g o far b~yo~d~ their de~ted purpose, of examining the operation of. .OTAI the Technology Msess~nent Board, and the Technology A~sessment Advisory ounciil, to qeiestion~. for example, the purposeful interaction between society's values and technological irmovations~ whemweir and wherever it occurs. Mr. Daddario's testimony this morning and later will, I am certain, contribute, to our understanding ~f this. process, through.his experience in sponsoring and then directing OTA from its inception. The evolution of technology requires the continued assessment of the purpose and methods of technology assessment. One example is. pro- vided by the creation of the Olhce itself Before the 1950's, the analysis of scientific and technological development was the province of histo- rians and philosophers of~sdenue. Men such as William James, Alfred North Whitehead,' and Lewis Mumford were concerned with. under- standing the impact of scientific ideas and technical inventions on so~ ciaI, political, and economic institutions. But seldom in their writings does one find any sugg~stioix that. the course of Science and technology could or should be consciously directed as a matter of public policy. Indeed, that thought ran counter to the philosophic notion of freedom of inquiry. Even today, we see the heritage o~f that position as one element in the unresolved debate o~ver research on recombinant DNA, on which hearings are presentl~ being held by this subcommittee. Explosive economic growth after World War II, driven largely by scientific and technical discoireries~ themselves often inconceivable a mere 10 years before, together with the emergence of unanticipated environmental and social costs resulting from these applications, led to the realization that possible side e~ects, as well as the direct benefits of new technoiogies~ must be assessed prior to their deployment. The awareness~ ~ro~wi1ig through the 1960's, that the Congress should undertake technology assessments as an integral component of its legas- lative proecedings led to the. establishment of 0Th in 1972. Sinica then that' oflire has provided us with high~iy informative analyses of onierg- ing technologies ranging freni so4!ar energy to cOmputer tomography scanning. Now, as~we look ahead, a further:dimension of technology assessment is apparently unfolding: namely, the assessment of the. process of technological innovation and application. Energy policy probably provides the most arresting example currently before the public and before the legislature. In this debate the Congress is faced, for the first time ever, as a matter of conscious choice, with an overhaul of the Nation's energy structure. This process will, if history is a guide, take approximately 50 years to complete and will question the basic style and purpose of economic development along with the appropriate tech- nology for its realization. The controversy over hard and soft, oraiter- native, energy systems, and over the priority to' be accorded conserva- tion vis-a-vis energy production are the initial questions raised by the PAGENO="0180" 176 long-term assessment of. all energy technology, not just sglar energy or nuclear power or coal. combustion. Complementing that assessment in the area of energy is the examination of materials policy to be under- taken bythis subcommittee. How. shall the Congress assess the evolution and the consequences of technology for this Nation? This question wherever it appears,~ from the support of basic research to the choice of energy and mate- rials in the design of economic prosperity, will occupy our best minds for years to come. The only certainty is that tio final answer exists; each generation must find its own from its expectation and hopes for the future. Once again, I welcome Mr. Daddario before the subcommittee. I'ni sure, Mr. Chairman, that his experience will greatly illuminate what we can expect. Mr. TITOUNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Hollenbeck. Mr~ Dadda.rio, you may proceed. [A biographical sketch of ~Lr. Daddario follows:] EMILX0 Qt7xNc~ DADDAEI0 Born in Newton Centre, Massachusetts, . September 24, 1918; graduated T1F~~ ton AeademV, Tilton, New Hampshire; graduated Wesleyan University, Middle- town, Connecticut, BA., 1939; President of Skull and. Serpent, Senior Honorary Society; Captain, Football team, 1938; graduated University of Connecticnt Law School, LL.B., 1942; member of Connecticut and Massachusetts Bar Associa- tions enlisted in army in 1042 assigned to 1~ied1tertanean Theatre with Office of Strategic Services; awarded U.S. . Legion of Merit and Italian Medaglia d Argento Mayor of Middletown, Connecticut, 1946-1948 Judge of MiddletOwn Municipal Court, 1948-1950; reactivated with 43rd Division at . outbreak of Korean conflict; served as Major with Far East Lii~ison Group In Korea and Japan. Member of United States House of Representatives, 1959-1971; member of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics; Chairman of the Sub- committee on Science, Research and Development; member of the Manned Space Plight Subcommittee; Chairman of the Special subcommittee' on Pati~nts and Scientific InventiOns; left the United States House of Representatives to become' the Democratic nominee for Governor of Connecticut in 1970. Senior partner,. Daddario, Slitt, Jacobs & Sullivan, Attorneys ~it Law, Hart- ford, Connecticut, 1952-1973; Senior Vice President, Gulf & Western Preci- sion Engineering Group, Gulf and Western Industries, Inc.,. i,~1-1973. .. Director Office of Technology Assessment of l~he United $tates Congress, 1973- July 1977. . . President-Elect, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1976. Member `Board of Trustees, Wesleyari University. `, Member Board of Trustees, University Corporation for Atmospheric Research~-. Member Board of Vl~ltor~, Vanderbilt~School- of Engineering, . Member Board of Directors, American' Association' for the Advancement -of Science (AAAS). Member National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer. Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Member Institute of Medicine. Member Space Applications Board of National Academy of Engineering, Member Board of Directors, Institute forthe Future. Member Citizens' Commission on Law, Drugs, and the Food Supply. Member Council on Trends and Perspectives, National `Chamber of .Cbmmerce4 Member Committee on Science and Technology, National Association of Manufacturers. Visitlng Professor at MIT, 1970-1971. Pollack Lecturer at Harvard UnIversity, 1971. Marganeau Lecturer at Hartwick College, 1071-72. l969~497~ Board of the Harvard Program for Technology and S'ociety~ PAGENO="0181" 177 Member Cosmos Club. Honorary degrees:' Wesleyan University (Doctor of Science), 1967. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (Doctor of Laws), 1967. Philadelphia `College of Osteopathic Medicine (Doctor of Laws), 176. Recipient of Ralph `CoatS Roe Award, American Society of Mechanical `Eug~i- neèrs, 1974. . Recipient of Stevens Institute Of Technology, Ilono~ Award and. M~4a1~ .1975. Recipient Of National Academy of Sciences' Public Welfare Award 1916 Married former Berenice Carbo three sQflS A Bdward StephEOl, an4 flieh~trd STATEMENT OP EMILIO Q. DADDAItIO, PR~SIDENT, `AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADV4NCEMENT OP SCIENCE Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: lappra- ciate having the opportunity to appear here. before the. subcommittee this morning, particularly on a matter of such importa1io~ `to' the Congress. `` , , I'm happy to have heard the remarks'made by you, Mr. Chairman, and `by `Congressman Hollenbeck,' which indicate the `seridusness'*ith which you've approached this task a.nd `the implications that come from that as to its importance to the Congress at. this particular time. I would also, by way of Oomment, like to mention my. apprpeiatlofl to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Olin Teague, for being here this morning, and to Congressman Don Fuqua, both of whom were instrumental in the formation of the technology assessment con- cept, the formation of legislation which led to the creation of the Office~ of Technology Assessment, and have been interested~ in its de- velopment to this time. ` ` .` 1 May I, Mr Chairman, as these hearings on technology assessment resume, reiterate a basic philosophy of: mine? ,. That is, that science policy, of which technology assessment is only a small part, is not an end in itself. It has significance only in ~he role that it, can play in helping a nation achieve its overall goals and ambitions. Ho~ ambi- tious our scientists may' be in playing that role shapes the worth of their contribution, the perception the public has about them, arid the level of support they will receive, both moral and financial, in achiev- me- a place for themselves in the scheme of things. Itis in keeping with this committee's traditional view of decisiori- making within the legislative process that you are holding this review It will help perhaps for me to place my comments within this con- text, if you wlll permit, me a brief quote from an article I prepared for the~ Harvar4 Journal ~n legislation in 1969, some months befoi~ê the introduction of legislation on technology assessment: What `I would like to do here Is to discuss some of the considerations which will go jnto draftipg the biri, a~md. same of the things we will have to decide. I should point out again, however, that this Is not to be set' In concrete, and the `specific provisions will hàvO tO be subject to coñstant review. In fact, I `am sure that even after the technology assessment' mechanism is formalized in legislation there will be a need periodically to review Its charter aa the organi- zation gains operating experience. ` ` ` Both you and Mr~Hollenbeck, Mr. Chairman, have.referred to the continuing function that this committee has in making such a review which. isto observe closely `the character of `what you have developed PAGENO="0182" i7~ and what the operating experience of that development has been over the course of time. The continuing nature o~ congressional eozicern about important problems, its constant review through the hearing process oI~ issues that deserve attention even though the public is attracted elsewhere, the education that is an important function of congressional debate relative to the ~hoiees society has available to it, are characteristics of the Congress which may be viewed with pride You, Mr Chairman, and the members of your subcommittee are involved in a close study of recombinant DNA at this time. Certainly the month of hearings you have already devoted to this matter suggests the vigilance of Congress even in esoteric areas and its willingness to do a lot of homework on matters which promise no particular political advantage. Mr. Chairman, in the same article referred to a moment ago, I also mentioned research still in its early stages, but about which "we should be aware and considering its implications even now." I'm going back to the period 19~9 in that quotation. Reference was to work underway at Harvard University in isolating the gene, and I quoted the scien~ tist guiding that effort, Dr. Jonathan Bracewell, Professor of Bac- teriology and Immunology, who observed: it Is our feeling that progyess In the field of molecular genetics has been extraordinary in the last few years and that in Isolating the pure lac gene we presented a graphic, useful and easliy understood example of that progress. (This) makes it likely that the time when at least some steps in genetic eng1~ neering can take place is not very far off~ perhaps 35 years. Thus the public is entitled to know what is In the offing, because the implications of the progress belngmade In the field are tremendous. We don't want to work In an Ivory tower, make some contribution to science, then turn It over to the Government and say "do what yo~ want with this." Twe~ty-flve years from now we dont want to be a group of J Robert Oppenhejiners, beating our breasts and mumbling mourn- fully "We shouldn't have done It" Ha'ving made the point that I do not consider any legislation en- acted to be the final word, I would like to deal with some of the legis- lative histo~y of technology assessment. This may help explain what was expected then, as against what the operating experience of the past few years may lead you to conclude is needed now to accomplish constructive change. In that regard. my own interpretation of technology assessment in 1969 may be useful: that is, "an attempt to coordinate~ interpret and structure social values in relation to scientific and technological ad- vances." I saw it then as the process of identifying and studying con- sequences of the npplication~ of science with the objective of optimiz- ing the use of knowledge for the benefit of society-and in such a way as to enable us to manage more effectively the affairs of a complex, technology-based civilization, Philosophically, I felt that the real inheritance of the modern age was an ability to apply rigorous moral principles to the correlation of society and the future of man's affairs-and that technology assess- ment would be one more helpful step in thatdirectiou. This committee has developed a keen perception of the impact pf pci- ence and technology on America's future. tu enhancing its ~onctitu- tional responsibility to promote the prouress of science and useful arts from the constitution it has had to deal with broad policy' deci- PAGENO="0183" 179 ~SiLOES aimed a~t the irnplementa,tioxi o~ our constitutioiu~1 ~uz~poses while faced with the many social, political and economjc skye e~eots created by the current technological revolution. Th 1940 the total Federal B. & P. effort was paid ~or by a mere $74 ~flhii1O~i: Following World War II the rate o~ R. & D. expenditures, increasing by 20 percent a year, reached $17 billion by the year 1969. It is now over $26 billion. Those figures are significant both for their magnitude and for the precipitous shift from non Government to O~ernment support. The $16 ~biliion being spent for It. & 1). in the private sector, however, also signifies an accelerated effort and cannot be ignored as we consider our overail technological assets. As expenditures have accelerated the rate of technical knowledge, opportunities have multiplied and, in time, have generated new de- mands. Basic philosophic conflicts have resulted as. well, so that we must now find a reasonable balance between controls which the Gov- `~`~ must exert to protect the public and the freedom which the individual researcher and entrepreneur must have to express their creative energies `and apply the results of their e~orts. Finding a balance is complicated by the fact that there is no legis. lative process to survey and direct the complex national R. & D. pro. gram as a coordinated whole rather than isolated pieces scattered among many agencies. There is., ~further, `an Executive difficulty of making decisions on scientific projects within a too small or closed political circle And there is the ever~present multitude of admimstra- trve problems which attend 20th Century ventures of science and tech- nology-problems of securing adequate and objective advice for the Congress, plus those of maintaining efficient management of programs tiy the Executive. It is worth repeating that, because of this evolution, the Subcom- iwttee on Science, Beseareb and Development was created in August of 1963 Several of its objectives will, in my view, always retain their im- portalice, and among these are two that I would like to point out First Strengthening congressional sources of information and `ad. vice in the fields of science `and technology; Second. Achieving the most effective utilization of scientific and engneering resources l~i an effort to accomplish the national goals which affect the jives o~ `all Americans. In essence, I believe the subcommittee has a mandate to focus its at- tention on science and technology throughout the Govenirneut and on the many duiinistrative and operational facets of science. in its `rela- tion to Government, including multidisciplinary approaches to the solution of major issues. In the furtherance of this mission, the subcommittee, in its early years, examined a umnber of specific topics ranging from indirect costs associated with research grants to patent policics of NASA to creation of a standard reference data system in the Bureau of Stand- ards. Gradually it sought a broader understanding of the factors con- tributing to the deveJopment of a sound science policy, and it initiated a number of actions aimed in that direction, For example, a Research Management Advisory Panel was created which functioned as a spee~al task group in pointing the way to improved It. & D. management. An arrangement wa~ worked out PAGENO="0184" 180 with ,~ Na~tiona1 Science ~`oundationfor ~tudies ~oncething:science education in, the United States at all levels. It contracted with ~the National Academy of Sciences. Despite the factthait over the course of years the Natio~aJ Academy of Sciences had on a spóradió b~is worked, for t~ie Congress, that was the first' formai' arrangement, and that was to review and report on some of the more serious questions of science policy. The Academy's initial report, entitled "Ba~ic Re~ search and National Goals," was one of the first efforts made. by scientists `to relete their work `to' the overall `objectives of their ~Overiiment.. ` As the subQommittee gained experience, it began to look more `~t the "big picture." In 1965, it requested the Research Management Advisory Panel to undertake `a preliminary~ study of the status of U.S. technical capabilities to control environmental `pollution. The publication of,' a number of hearings and ` reports on air and `water pollution, and the broader ecological cohsiderations which eaihe. from that effort, made it apparent that, in additibn to looking at a problem such, as pollution as an integrated''systeth, `it was even, more `.fimda~ mental to obtain prior warning of the consequences of applied science before they created a need for major, costly e1~orth to reverse un- desirable trends The subcommittee determined that to do this would require us, as a nation; to reorient our thinking in relation to an early understanding of where our collective decisions might lead In `the second progress report of the subcommittee iii `1966, we pointed this out by noting Tjaere ,I~ an additional featur~ to the ~yelopment and. appUpation of new technolog~ which the subcomthittee does not believe has received the `attention it deserves 1~ut which is nonetheless a grav~ affair We re~er to t~e dangerous side effects which applied technology is ~teating, or is likely tO"~&eate for humanity: Today we can see the ill effects on'a'dozen dlfferent'frOnts a~id suspe~± them on many more * * ~* , ` ,, `` ` ` `Time was wl~eii man could afford to look upon innovations o,f technology with `~ome complacency For the intiovatlons came slowly, they wore put to use iii a ` Felatively slow and modest faéliion, `and their side effects developed, at a sufficiently relaxed pace to permit man to adjust to' them-Or to' alter his course if the `threat were great' eriô~gb * * ~ The ~ubcomi~ittee believes that' we can no longer blindly adapt' technology to oi~r needs with the traditional assumption that there will be ample time'to iron out any bugs', ~ ~. A bigger effort must be made not only to foresee the bugs but to forestall their deve1opik~ent in the first place The alternatives could be disastrous and Indeed might turn our physical and s~c1al world into something almost uninhabitable The following year, on March 7, 1~7, I introduced Ii ~t 6698 to provide a method for identifying, assOSsing, ~ubhciziug, and dealing with the implications and effects of applied research and technology by the establishment of a Technology Assessment Board. `The bill recognized' a need to identify the potentials of applied r~search' and technology, and to promote ways and means to accomplish their `trans- fer into practical use. It further sought to identify the undesirable byproducts and side effects of such applied' research and' technology in advance of their crystallization. It was designed to `insure that the public be informed of this potential in order that appropriate steps `might be taken to'eliminate or minimize them. , " , `This `bill was introduced, not asperf ected, legislation', bntas `a stimu- lus to discussion. The many thoughtful comments, criticisms, and sug- PAGENO="0185" 181 gestiOns on the concept of ~udii a ~oø~rd led,ii~.fact~,tj~ a seminar which the suJ~committeo sponsored an September of 1967 Subsequently, the subcommittee contracted for special technology `aBsessment studies with the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Legislativc R~ference Service, which led in turn to hearings in late 1969 and throughout 1970. These were the hearings which started the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 on its way. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to submit a brief chronology of specific events which led to the final reporting of a technology assessment bill by this subcommittee. I believe the chronology will be informative and useful Since it identifies at what time and by what method some of the most fundamental pr~ncip1es underlying the Technology Assessment Act became recognized. I should like to request its inclusion in the record, and T would make that available to the committee so you can do that if you would like. Mr. THORNTON. Without thjection, the material will be made part of the record at this point in the record. [The material to be provided is as follows:] SUPPLEMENTAtMATERTAL TO STATEMENT OP ML DADDARIO More than 15 years ago this Committee began to be aware of (1) certain prob. lems arising from applications of technology and (2) needs of the goverliment for better information on which to base decisions with marked technological components. After several years of informal discussion, the Subcommittee on Science, Re- search and Development addressed itself directly to these problems in its 1966 Progress Report for the 89th Congress. It Identified 13 problem areas which have become major Issues and which now consume a very large share of total Congressional attention. At that time the Subcommittee saw "technology assessment" primarily in terms of "early warning." But much remained to' be learned concerning what needed to be done, how and by whom. Especially, what should be done about legislation- if anything? The Subcommittee held a seminar on technology assesument in September 1967. Fourteen exceptionally astute observers of the Government Technology milieu met with the Subcommittee in public discussion to explore growing technology problems in terms of philosophy and policy There were many ideas and view points presented-but from this conference came an initial important point (1) Fundamental policy decisions by government of "what to do with what we know" would have to be made in many technological areas during the next several decades. ` " ` :Som~th1ng:else the Subcommittee wanted to know: bow had Congress been dealing with technological matters since `World War II when the science boom reafly~ let go? It asked the Legislative Reference Service to research the matter. The result ~as "Technical Information for Congress," (1968) a classic study of 16 case histories of major legislative initiatives involving technological issues- how and why Congress acted, and on what information From this came a second important point. (2) Invariably the Congressional action, whether for better or worse, was based on Inadequate, data provided by biased parties and was often misinter- preted in a variety of ways by the `legislators. `The Subcommittee contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to review the Federal scene and endeavor to pinpoint, organizationally, where a technology assessment process might best be inaugurated and managed. From the Academy's ad ~hoc committee report, "Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice" (1969), evolved a third important point. (8) While technology assessment, both as a concept and a mode of evaluation, should bea part of the decision making process of both Executive and Legislative branches, the latter had greater need of Independent technical advice and a start in that area would be a rational procedure. PAGENO="0186" 182 The Subcommittee also wanted an Jdea of hQw to go about dohig technology assessment it asked the National ~&c~tde~n~r ~ Engineering to try some pilot assessments and repOrt its l3iidings The ensuing r~O~~t `A Stiid~ ot ~techtiolo~y Assessment" (1969) , detailed ef1~orts to assess 3 thffer~iht te~hnologtes lii the con~ text of contemporary problems : teaching aids, subsonic alrc~raft noise and health screening. From this caine a fourth Important potht. (4) A single method of carrying out technology assessment is never likely to emerge, but with consistent ~xnp1rical effort assessment methodology should reach a level of sophistication and utility that will warratit Its contiauou~ application. ~ With this background, the Subcommittee in 1~69 went into comprehensiVe set of hearings oil basic technology assessment ~oncepts-l!stening to scientists, engineers, government oMcials, indu~tr1al managers, etc. From these inquiries, a number of additionaliiiiportant axioms surfaced: (5) The original idea of simple early warning was hot enough In the technology assessment process, consideration would have to be given to the "plus" side-i.e., identification of areas of need where currently unapplied or unknown technology is essential to the solution of contemporary problems. () With the rapid rise of technological issues requiring legislative considera- tion, there would have to be, in the technology assessment mechanism, an ability to respond to the more immediate, short-range interests and demands of Con- gressional committees. Equally Important, a capacity to evaluate certain tech- nologies as currently being used would be required. (7) So far as the Legislative branch was concerned, an inhouse entity would not meet the needs, Use would hav~e to be madsi~ on an ud ho~ baaia, of expertise and authority from many sources throughout the nation and on a constantly shifting basis. The inbreeding and natural bldg i~h1ch develops Inevitably through single~gronp evaluation shoUld be avoided. The Subcoinfrtittee held extensive hearings throughout ~97O on specific legis- lation. Those hearings resulted in the bill which (with modification) became the Technology Assessment Act of 1972~ It should be emphasized that in the course of the 1970 bearIngs, sevetnl additional important points became apparent. (8) No existing ~edera1 agency, Executive or Legislative, as durrently chartered, was doing the job enid5ion5d i~r O~A or was Intended Or equI~iped to do that job. (Both the General Aecorilifing Office and the aougressional lie- search Service bolstered this ~1ew when tbey testi~ed In favor of the cr5ation of OTh~) (9) The policy-making Board, if one were created to oversee th~ OiieVattOn of the new Ot1k~e1 should contain within the Beard itself the hedeesary repre sentatives to assure that essential niterests and Viewpoints wamild be eensi~I ered It should Include members of Congress~ inemnnera from the public with ~aried qualthcations, representathteg elf ether Legislative branch ~etrViee d~'emi cies, and the Director or chief eaecuttve of the ogee onarge~1 with ndahi.nistra~ tion and operations. I should like to add the following summary Obsertatlen~ baSed en deVelop- ments since enactment of OPA's enabling legislation: (1) The bill *hich ee:mn froth thd Cfointnittse and to the ~onse fleer In 19~l!2 gave recognition to ali of the foregoing pcdnts~ (2) Thehe fundamentals formed the basle on which tile pectations ef th~rne who bad developed tbe~OTA concept dud legiSlation Wdrè currted~ (3) Abrupt and unexpected changes *ere made cii the house floor by anWlld~ monte which did away with the Board eoiwerit deteloi*id by tIld Z~On5O 4hitfi~ mittee and substituted an all Congressional board in the form of a Joint com~ mrtfre-'~-i e, proportioned majority and minority memnbersiup (4) These changes prompted thd Sexlitto~ with hlouse eohenrrenee~ to eqtnthze minority membership on the Board. ~ dsbtn'e bipartisanship (buti othetwlae leave the Board all-Oongtesslolial) and to Invent the TechnOlogy Asse~met1t Advisory Council in a hurried effort to provide for soffie nOw method of piIblie input into OTA activities, even thobgh unforthnatOly Its role was lll-deihned~ Mr. DAtDAIIP. Mr. ChaIrman, as ~veweut gbctit rethihig t~e 1j~ia~. tion, what did we believe the respozMbflit~e~ Qi~ this new cir~azation `~hould be'1 How should it acquire the i,nforination it wiulcl need ~ How should that itiforniaticmn be e tiete4? .W1~at ~ôtt1d be ~ with iti~ PAGENO="0187" 183 To my recollection, we considered its function to he. exclusively in- formational, with no authority to require that a parti~u1ar research project be inaugurated or terminated, nor would there be any power to issue regulations, for safeguards or other purpose Aware of various concernS that such a new activity within the Congress might be con~ sidered either a regulator or a barrier to technological advance, or both, we were thinking then not of granting authority in terms of a "stoplight," but rather in terms of an "early warning" system. The mechanism of technology assessment was seen as a way to report to the Congress and, through it as a public forum, to the public at large. In this regard the National Academy of Euginesring's Committee on Public Engineering Policy was particularly helpful as it em- phasized that the technology assessment entity should-and I quote from their report to this committee: 1. Olarify the nature of existing social problems as they are Influenced bY technology, possibly With in.di~atlen5 of legislation needed to achleYe satiSfactorY control. 2. Provide insights into future problems to make possible the e~tab1ishment of long-term priorities and to provide guidance fot the ~11ocati~n of natlonal resources. 8. Stimulate the public and private Sectors of our society to take those cotirses of action for the development of new technology that are most socially desirable. 4. Educate the public and the Government about the short-term and long- term effects of the range of alternative solutiolis to current probleths. The role envisioned, Mr. Chairman, for the Congress in this process was that its committees would be mainly responsible for the initiation of assessments and that those assessments, when completed, be referred to the appropriate House and Senate committees. It was considered that an added function of all congressional committees would be ~o give direction to the assessment efforts, to provide a forum for public debate as to the assessment results, and to bring to the attention of the Congress as a whole, the executive, and the public those issues in need of critical decisions and the possible alternatives available All the organizational structures considered at that time to ac~ complish the foregoing objectives had as their primaly objectiie, tbere-~ fore, the fundamental ingredient of serving the Congress. As earlier indicated, it was never assumed that any legislation en- acted would be the last word. This committee, which over the course of several years developed the original legislation, has been much allied to the evolution of technology assessment. Some of the members of the committee have served on the Technology Assessmei~t Board and some of the major assessments have been initiated by the fttll comrn mittee. That continuing involvement, I believe, gives you the. oppor- tunity to add another measure of congressional judgment to the devel- opment of OTA's operations and structure. The organic act of OTA began its long legislative trip, within the confines of'this subcommittee. I believe `it now deserves your renewed attention in accoritmnee `with established principles of continuing review `and adjustment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to appear here this morning to lay out in an historical w~y the thoughts that I have about OTA at that time and to bring it up to date. I w~uid be glad to an- swer any questions that you *~ay have, and, as you indicated in your PAGENO="0188" 184 remarks, I would be happy to come back again at a later time if yqu would like, Mr Chairman Mr. rrH0RNT0N. Thank you very much, Mr. 1)addario, for a very articulate and stimulating discussion of the conceptual origin of the Office of Technology Assessment, its purposes and policies. We are all indebted to you, and it's a great privilege, I think, to be in a place where we see the results of vision being translated into, practicality, of ideas and ideals being translated into action. I think it's appropriate that we do look at this in~titution in th~ context which you have phrased, in order to determt~ie what changes might be made in order to see that it better performs the tasks which you have described. . . It seems to me that underlying your `statement is a sense of national purpose, that this organization should be considered in context with other research capabilities available `to `the Congress and that its ef- forts should be focused toward those broad and vital national issues which require the indepth work that this Office is capable of giving. Is that a fair summary? Mr. DADDARIO. It certainly is, Mr. Chairman. The Congress has available to it various advisory mechanisms and staff capabilities all aimed at helping to perform its work. I have b~en pleased that over the years. `the `Congress has moved `to strengthen these capabilities so that it could compete on `a more even basis with the executive branch, and so that it could understand what were the `policy implications of the recommendations made by the executive. Over the course of the years the Congress has moved to establish better' and larger committee staffs in order to improve the scientific and technical capabilities with.- in the library of `the Congressional Research Service. This committee has been involved in all of those. The use of the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, the. Office of Technology Assessment, the Budget Office, the capability that the Congress has to bring in advisory individuals on a consultant basis have au been improved over the course of time The Congress has learned how to use these'b~tter. ` H ` ` .` ` . .. , , I think implicit in your question is that as these have developed it is necessary to make certain that each of the organizations carefully re view its mandates There will be a certain amqunt of spillover, obvi ously, hut there should, not be an excessive an~ount, It is the responsi- bility of the Congress to see to it that the work of these gioups is coordinated and developed so that it is all forced in a useful direction for legislative purposes You have done this recently, Mr Chairman, by bringing together under Dr Franklin Huddle, all of the key people of those organizatiohs "ifi the' field :of öuzt materiâl aII4 mineral resources. ` Mr Thom~roN Thank you very much I have many questions which I would like to i~ursue, but I want to next recognize the chairman of the full' committee, who h9s *I~n instrumental in developing this concept, ~for ~tny questions that Jm may like to ask von. , ,, . " Mr TPAoui~y Thank you, Mr Chairman I think that if any man may be called the father of this whole situ ation it's Mr. Daddario. At very few times does a man in' Congress PAGENO="0189" 185 have the opportunity to be the father of a piece of legislation and then be responsible for the child growing up. Mr. Daddario had that re- sponsibility and did,a great job. I would like to ask about a dozen question, but two or three in particular. I don't think an oversight hearing would be complete unless you do consider some of the internal workings of the Board, and if anyone believes that taking on six Members of the House and six Members of the Senate and the chairmen of all the committees of the House and the Senate is an easy job, it isn't. What amazes me is he's got as much hair as he'had, after watching him, operate for a ~ew years. [Laughter.] But, Mirn, I think you ouotht to `tell; for the sake of the record, some- thing about, for example, t~I1e council For example, take the energy question that we had. How was the panel `appointed? `We're in the process noW of selecting a new director2 ançl beTor~ you finish your testimony I want you to tell this committee *hat advice you would give the next director. ` Mr. DAnDARIO. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank you for your very fine compliment. But I do think that one of the very, wonderful characteristics of the Science Oommittee, and particularly this subcommittee of which' I am so fond, has `been that it has always operated on a nonpartisan rather than bipartisan basis, that it ha~ approached these very compli- cated scientific and technical matters in such a way so that as those issues have been examined the committee as a whole has been able to deal with them for the benefit of the entire society. But I do think that what this subcommittee obviously intends to do is to examine the operating experience of the Congress as against some of the questions that I asked purposely in my remarks, some of the questions I point out that we asked at that time. I think they still need to be asked. I do think we have some problems in expecting that the Board, eon- sisting of 12 members, can from day to day act as Members of the Congress and committees of the Congress, where the activity is so com~ petitive and the adversary relationships are so obvious, and then to expect that those same'.1~ people can, set themselves aside and' operate as a board. rather than as, a committee. , ` We contemplated then, and I think that an examination will show, that there wpuld need to be a learning process to accomplish `that objective and that it would take time. Since OTA began its operation the Board has been sble to develop characteristics~that show it~ is look- ing in that direction, but it will take more time. Logically, the other part of that formula is that the Congress also has, to recognize how difficult that task `is and must find ways of learning how to utilize the Office of Technology Assessment. This will be difficult,~for not `only must the Congress be involvedi~ the growth and development of a new and complicated institution, it must also recognize that changes will continue to take place over the years and that there will need to be oversight review and' adjustment `from time to time. ` I feel that the Director's office needs to be examined from the stand- point of continuing types of support, and how the Director, as the head of the Office, should be gF~~en support to accomplish the stafutory objectives. This committee has had experience in that regard. L think PAGENO="0190" 1S6 the lessons learned during the examination of the National Science Foundation, under somewhat similar conditions, where there was an examination of the legislative record and amendments made, is a case in point. The National Science Board had certain responsibilities given to it by law and it was important to understand the authority that the Board was given by the Congress and how that authority affected the Director of NSF and his ability to carry out his duties. These are matters you have to examine and come to some determina- tion about. As the hearings go on I believe that you will be able to develop a constructive attitude about that and to make recommenda- tions which improve the relatlQnship. Mr. TEAo~. Mr. Chairman, may I go a little further? Mr. ThORNTON, Please continue. Mr. T~oui~. The Couneil, I believe there are 12 members? Mr. D4WDARIO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ti~otin. Do you think they should serve more than one term? And I understand the terms are staggered so that there's no complete turnover of the Board at any one time. Mr. D~nn~tnio. First of all, I would like to preface my remarks in that regard I would hope that this subcommittee would examine the various structures that were contemplated when the legislation was being put into effect, and with the recommendation, I think the highest priority in the structural arrangements was that the Board consist both of Members of Congress and people from the private sector, the people from the private sector to be appointed by the President with the advice of the Senate. This subcommittee felt at that time that it was important to have people appointed separate and apart from the Congress itself so that there would be the highest possible objectivity, and that by being ap- pointed by the President it would not oniy accomplish that, but you would also give the Board the opportunity to bring people in of the highest visibility and prestige in the society. Considering the separation of powers, although such an appoint~~ ment certainly is not, in my opirtion, disallowed for that reason, or ought to be disallowed for that reason, the Congress, during the course of the legislation, chosen to do otherwise. I think this subcommittee has to examine how the operating experi- ence has worked out so far as the way in which the Advisory Council has been appointed, and their ability to act, to give independent ad- vice, and how they have structured themselves, together with the Board, in order to accomplish the mandated objectives of the legisla- tion itself. I would think that amongst the recommendations, Mr. Chairman-~-- not recommendations, but amongst those things which the subcommit- tee will examine, as a matter of mere logic, would be the question that you have raised, and my own philosophical approach to that would be that it's. important that as many people be given an opportunity to participate in advisory relationships t~ the Congress, for obvious rea- sons. It gives a fresh view. It also gives more people an opportunity to work with the Congress and understand its mechanisms, to be able to go back home and to be better able to tell people about what the Con- gress is about. PAGENO="0191" 187 Advisory mechanisms over the course of time have been related more to the executive than to the Congress. I think that situatiou. is iwprov. ing ?eople who work with the Congress understand the Congress better, and as they understand, the Congress better then as they go back home people themselves understand, the Congress better. I would expect that the advisory groups that have worked with the OTA's various assessment programs would bear me out, that their work has been helpful, not only because it gives the Congress better advice but because as they understand the Congress better they have a better view of the Congress and the people that they have talked to back home also have understood, the process a lot better, and that's one of the necessary oifshoots of this work. Mr. Thoi~ToN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a supplemental question along that `line? Mr.Th~.otE. The Ohair is yours, not mine. Mr. THORNTON. Pursuing that line o:f inquiry as to whether a stag- ?ered tez~ni ini~ht be useful, might there be any usefulness in provid- ing for periodic changes or limitations upon the period of service of Board members to insure a continued infusion of new ideas into that Board structure? Mr. D~DDAiuo. I would, think, Mr. Chairman, that the subcommittee should give serious consideration to that type of change and limita- tion on service It would obviously be better it the concept of the Board `could be strengthened. I think that what you have suggested would strengthen it Considering that there are 53~ Members of Congress, it would be better over the course of time, I would expect, if more of its members served on the Board, and that people once appointed not be locked into place as they are on committees. 1 would think that that would be something that this subcommittee should give deep considera- tion t~. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you. Mr, T~oui~, Mr. Chairman, I wonder, Mr. Daddario, without tak~ ing any more of our time, if in the record you would place your inter~ pretation of what the powers of the Council should be, and also how a consulting panel should be appointed. For example, on cycling, energy, coal slurry pipeline, how where the panels appointed, and what should be the proper procedure to get the best panel there is in the country? Mr. DADDARIO. I would think that the subcommittee in examining that particular question, Mr. Chairman, would find that in most in- stances the panels have been chosen with these basic ingredients in mind: That they be people who have knowledge about the assessment subject; that they be people with varied opinions about that; that they be as expert as possible, not only in the scientific and technical aspects' of what was to be assessed, but also in the social aspects a~ well; and that they be given the opportunity to meet about these matters while the issue is being developed rather than after d~r~isions about that issue have been made, so that they can discuss their differences within a rational atmosphere. When people are chosen in that way, their dif- ferences are not completely eradicated, but there's a better understand- ing, more good will, and, I think, less rancor and less emotion about the subject matter. PAGENO="0192" 188 As you examine each of the OTA programs, you will probably i~nd some places where the panel membeis have not been chosen with those broad range characteristics in mmd I don't think that anyone was trying to pack the panels or to achieve any preconceived result~. There are times when people are brought together about an issue that the Congress is anxious to come to some conclusion about very quickly, where the expediency of the situation sometimes forecloses broader panel choices. As you examine this, you will find that most of the panels which have been chosen adhere to the characteristics that I have touched on. Since the memb~rship of' the OTA panels is so important to the in~ tegrity and quality of the a~essni~nts, this is a matter that needs to,bo constantly examined. Mr. THOR~TÔN. Thank you. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, may I ~k one~ more question, a~idthen Iliquit? , `~ Mr. THoRNToN. Yes, sir. , ` Mr. TEAirn~. Mim, there have been some' internal' problems, wl~ich you know more about thananybody I know of. Were those problems of law or men? Should the law be changed, or is the law adequate the way it is? ` Mr. DADDARIO. I'm not really prepared at this time, Mr; Chairman, to say that the law should iemain exactly as it i~, or to make specific recommendations about it I would like to have an opportunity to think more about that, to follow the hear~ngs very `closely~ to go over this, now that this committee has asked me to participate, and I will give my thoughts, I will give my specific thoughts, about it, if I might, at a later time. But I would expect that the basic act ought to be looked at, and yet itseemsto me that the basic act was well written. There's sufficient flex~. ibility within it in order to accomplish the objectives prescribed. The questions you've touched on here today, for example, if you were to determine that there should be more of a turnover in the member- ship, that certainly is not a matter of faw but a matter of internal understanding and agreement within the. Board itself. ` ` Mr. TEAGUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ` Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Teague. And thank you for your good responses. We shall look forward at a'later time to hearing further discussion of this' area a~fter we have completed our other hearings. I should now like to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Fuqua. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. MeCormack has to isave, and I yield to him for ~3O seconds. Mr. M000RMACK. Thank you, Mr. Fuqua. That's alli ask for. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate ybu' for holding these rneeP~ ings and to pay my respects to Chairman Teague for proyiding~ the lead~rship to create OTA. after Mim had left the committee, and the strength'to keep it going through these tough formative days. `Mim, I have nothing but the highest regards' and compliments for all., that you've done. I think it's been tremendous, and I.want to congrat~ilat~ you. . , I do think that we need to recognize that the experience that we've had so far with OTA, its having been born in the midst of peculiar PAGENO="0193" ~nd difflettit interhai ptlftical pr6b!~is a~IO~ri~ th~ nibe~ if ~ Congress who were involved in the T&~hno1o~y Ass~s~ñtent ~B~tftl, and th~ fact ~h~t so~neof the question~ fer~t1 ta OTA ~re ~o highly contrth~ersiaI and ~poi~ri~ed before they ~ot there th~ it wa~ á1~ti~Mt impossible to gt enough strength b~hi~id any re nm~tidations ~dU ~~uld ni~ke1~o thaet th& chttilenge~, ~dm~what clouds Out tiVe. / But I think it's necessa~ to recognize that we need to go ~n ~x~d bthld, ih/ tthM ~hat the ~h~i~m~n mehtio~1ed, Mat4~4I, Mktk~-iiT, or ~Mark-~-IV, or ~whatever step it's going to be of OTA. It strikes n~e~ a~ 1 ~as ref1eetin~ on t~he c 1rnu~n~s qi~e~tion, f~h~t sbthehow *~ heed on the one hand, to get more strength and more support froM the ~ gress, but still have it more at arm's length, ~o tO speak, so th~tt we have les~ persowtl involvemeiit in the operation of the organii~tion and yet more support for it. I hope that ~Ou' can make re~bththendation~ for aniendmehts t~ modify' the law so that~!t will' Ø~re ~ven i1tof~e ~t~gth `t~ OTAi±~ the futu~e to~o on an&fulfill th~ role that ~o ineMá~ it~ Again, I want to `~omplinient. you ~or everything you've done. Mr~ DAbbAM0 Thank yon, Mr. ~1~E&~n~ek.' I a~preci~te both ~your personal refere~e~s and the eonce±~t~ ~tbbtit the O~I~A &ct.i~itiee b~raus~ I think what you've s~id is extre~çly important., / T think you n~u~t edifibine th~ i~ns, the rig~hthil coiicerh~, that you ha~e in4Ioated with ~ I ha~re sñM ~a~l1er tho~tth~ 1~arnin~ro~es~, `t~he `priot~itie~ ~1ii~h haste been ~bl1~he~ ~o~'~'M hav~ in each 4n~tan~e been `the Wo~l~ oP th~ Technolo~'As~e~rne~t Boakrd. It h~. deternth~ed~ as ~t ~rop~r ftgent ~f~the Coi~gree~. ~h~t the;'po1i~y of the O~& ought `to~ be and~ that work jt should do. i?here'~ been some orit1~s~ ab~ift those ohoiees~ tet, if ~ôt tha~t the~Boardi hadto start from sCratch, th~ the ~oafd in~*~bet~ were. i~nvolved with~other eong~~ionai dt~tie~' blk~ ~ bee~ quite objective and worth doing. Mr. Ye~ger, as the ~iouñ~el of th1~ `committee~ dafl p~O~vide the dO1~n~itt~ with ~ list of ~s~lble a~sess- rnent subjects which we spelled out as areas ~iat ne~ded to b~ looked at bâ~k' in' i~; m~ / ~ at~ound th~re.' They are son~icwhàt the sam~ ~k~nd~ of ~s~ue~ with whMh the ~ongr~ *i~ wi~e~tling `no~.5 These~ are types of issues thn~t don't g~o away. Th~fl~ highly ~ontro$ers1al,. and OTA a e~sfrient~ n~e~ being pe otn~ed~ ér hare bCe!1cornpletec~ in ~e~of those ar~~ ~: ~ ` S It seemS to me that the Technology Assessment ~oard,~ With %h~ myri~d~of ~r~b}eiiiaOat w e'~r~nted to itJhi fo~n1n~ a~d l*i~lno t~gether ~~e*o i~tioii. and~~the type~ of iS~e~ th4t tI$ Otif~ g~res~ *as tanti lint with' ha~ ~htsei~ ~jui~e Wise~ ftt~ they will izapreve. When 9PA~began Its work it eat~l~~ti, ~lth the h4~ of the Library of Oo~gr~ss~ ~Ii~those `pi~es of le~si.at5io~i b~bre th4~ Ooiigres~ that had an~eeh~ol~i~aI' irn~h~eth~nt. The re~lo'nal e~nmitthe~ ~ere ~oli~ for the i~sue~ th~ttho~ Mffiifte~ felt w~ important. Some re~rional panels w~te `~et up throflØ~M th~ ~4in~- t~y s~ that w~iil~et a ~ro4s ~&~ion àf ~i~rtMn at~n~io~kies. Those $~l~ nie~ ~nd elo~Mi b~l~t~ ~ii~ fhe~ M~e ti~ cnTfl~ o~t ~f $h~ S ~oo4 wa~ o~ the hig~tr~r1d~it~;, ~ th~ international trade; the problems of health. These are matters which PAGENO="0194" 190 the country was concerned about, which the Congress was, concerned about, and which the Board chose to deal with,. That, process, of ~ourse, can.' be improved. 1 would expect that the iwpr~vement would be one of a continuing degree., with one basic objective, and that is to serve better the Congress as a whole as it deals with these issues, rather than any of the bits and pieces for which any member may have a particular regard, and that's a question of degree. . *.. `, , , Mr. ,MCCORMAOK. Thank you, Mr. chairman. ¶L'haiik you,, Mr. Fuqua. * Mr. ~UQUA. Mr. Chairman, may I resume with my, 4 minutes and 3Q seconds? Mr. THoRNToN. Please. Mr. `FUQUA. I want to, first of all, thank you, ,~[im, for the fine job that you've done in the many years-I recall hQW many-that we've sat to~etlier on this committee and subcommittee under your chair- manship and also both of us serving on the $a~ned ~Space Flight Subcommittee, chaired by our present chairman of the full committee, Mr. Teague. . .. . Mr~ DADDARIO. It's quite obvious, Mr. ,Fuqua, that. this committee has had something to do with manned space flight. jLaughter.] Mr. l~UQUA. Yes. . But I do recall the'infant .daysof OTA. when it was in the drafting stage~. you did some work with Mr. Yeager, Mr. Davis,' and many others; `George Miller, who was the chairman of the committee at that time. And, `as Chairman Teague said, I'm very pleased, particu- larly with the leadership that you've given, `to. see it get through Congress and then to see you become the first Director of it You've done a very fine jo&, and I've been pleased. I i~ealize you have tostarb and proceed at a crawling pace maybe, but y~n have proceeded in that and you've: ee~tainly kept a ~very good' reputation for `excellence in `the work done. I want to ask two questions, and :~QU have mentioned that several times. ~* ., ` In the relationship of the Board to the OTA, I noticed in the annual report of March 19'TG, there was a letter:' to Chairman' Teague from ~Dr Harold Brown, now Secretary of Defense, in which he mentioned the fact that the Legislative Reference Service and GAO had always had a very good reputation and that OTA ~vas moi~ing in that direction. *. . ` , But they don't have the direct control over their a~ti~ities frem a Board madeup of Congressmen, as you ment~bned,'who~are busy, en-. gaged in the rough and tumble of partisan politics and then have to sit down and act as a bipartisan Board,~giviiig policy evaluation to the OTA, and what it should do, and how it should proceed Is there too much direction from that Board? Are they involved, once policy is made, in the day to day operation of the OTA? Could you elaborate .~omemore on `that? ` *` ` ` `` `~ Mr DADDARTO Mr Chairman, I don't see the Teehnolog~y Assess- ment Board as being a burden, but rather an a~set The f~mt that such a relationship was not established in ether pli~ces within the Congress is an indication that Congress, in this thstanee, wants t4j~ be more in- PAGENO="0195" `191 volved, and I think that'~ ~io~ `only' good, but necessary. I i~i~w it as~a strength, not a weakness. ` ``` I touched earlier on the fact that r believe there h~s bee~n a~learning experience. I think that will continue over the course ~of' time. I do think that as the years go by the'Bóard will, in fact, actinore ahd niore as a board rather than as a committee of the Congress .and I believe it's important that it does. ` `. `The `Office of TechnologyAssessment is' a different kind of `an iiisti- tution than the General Accounting Office or the Library. Individual members can go directly to tlio~e organizations for help. The Comp.' troller General can initiate investigations on his own I have always seen the Office of Technology Assessment as being the kind ~of an orga- nization which will do assessments, will develop methodology, people capabilities, and' relate to the private sector in such a way so that there ~will be a learning experience with outside people and' outsk~eagen- cies who will then develop additional capabilities to give, advice to the Congress. Such an advisory capability would be develçped so as not .~to be aimed at supporting one policy objective, but rather, a series of ~a'lternatives "to solve intricate problems. The Congress must be ready to examine policy recommendations with several alternatives in mind, * and' that is going to take both time and effort. Neither will the development of an assessment capability within the `private sector `be readily accomplished. As OTA' has built its ap- proaches to private institutions to assist in accomplishing assessments, it has had to recognize that, such skills were not easily found. How- ever, organizations which have han experience in working with tech- riology asbessments over the years are developing strong capabilities As an example, the University of Oklahoma group, headed by Dr "Don Kash, which has had broad le'arninig experience starthig with' the `National" `Scien~e" Foundation' and now with some of ~the OTA `programs. Mr. FUQUA. And it's relationship to OTA is a plus, rather than a ~m~nua? Mr. DADDARIO. Yes; I think' it is a plus; I think that it can continue "to be, and I `believe `that by the observations you make you can `help in `that process. ` ` " ` ` ` ` `Mr. FUQUA. What about the relationship between the Board and the ~oirndil? Do they sometimes ~conffict with the objectives that OTA is trying to achieve? ` Mr, DADDARIQ. I l~ad ~ouc~ied earlier op what this subc~mmitt'ee' had felt was ñecèssar,y, in the first instance. I don't think there's any reason to go into the legislative history because Mr Yeager will certainly pro- vide"that. ~ut this subcommittee, `and the full committee supported it at the time, felt that here oueht to `be a different kind of a structure than that which noW exists. `That came about as a result of activities `th~tt topk place during the legislative' proôess. What needs to be examined at this particular time is Is this a good str,uctui~e? ilow ha~ it worked out? Should it be'mahitalned ii~ its pi'e~- exit form, and ho~ it can be improved ~ Mr FT~QUA How woul4 you suggest we improve it `J Mr DADT~ARIO I would like, ~tr F\iqua, to think thout thi~ It's a very important question you ask. I wouM `like to `thb~k abOut this. I PAGENO="0196" :i~2 ;am coming ba~k~as~I widetsi~aizd. it. L wi~ gfte that ~ome tho~ht, ar~d if the subcommittee, in dealing with this, has~1iot ~orno tG a pos~ition of its owns with *Meh I c~i ae~I'wouldt t~ily make sornocomxnent. Mr. Fi~tri. Thank you veiry much, Mr. Chaitm~n, Mr. Tiro~ToN. Thank you, Mr. Fuqua~ Mr. Flippo. Mr. FLIPPO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I noticed~ in ymr eári~r~emarks irt tk setmd pará~graph you said there : Eow ambItTh~s' our seleutists may be tn ~Ta~iug that ro1~ shapes' the ~c~orM rt their contrlbutió~, the perception the public lias about them, an~t the ie~eT of support * * * and so forth. ]~`ni interested in yonr personal e~perien~e as' to' the degree of par- tiei~ati~bn orx the part of ~ientists, their wiiIixigness to~ continue to par- `ticipate' arid `~o in'fo~rn the priblic of what is going on in the st~c areas in which they~re opbrating I have read some ~cent articles wh~ich inchlca~tcd that within the sclentific'comflninity there was some he~itsncytodea1. with the pribl~tc in revealmg what nature of work they were doing Do you fii~d, is this trend up; or down~ Do people wai~t to participate mOre or less! Mr DADDARIO Mr Congressman,~ ~rst of all, thIene is a typo in that quotMion winch you quoted It's- * * * i~. playing that' role shapes the worth of their contributIon * * * rather than `worhi~ I don't thi~tk scientists are any' diffrrent as individuals from ai~y other ~peo~ple in our society We hat~ oftsri said that a scientist who ~ve.s testimony on a ~cicntific su~hjectwhi~1a is njotcin his e~pert~ ai~ia is no more proficient in coming to conclusions about that scieMific~ sub- ~)eCt than weaslaymen are. I think it's a mistake to look at the scientific community and~ ~ut theta' in one ~ategor~ because' they represent a myriad of `thoughts of people, of characteristics, of hopes and ambitions. I have found that the scientific community is very anxious to be of help. I believe that this subcommittee anti this committee as a ~rholo has leariuect ever the course of y~ars how to deaJ better with `the scientific eouimun~ky, and I think the scientific community also' has been helped by' its `retioiiship~ if there ia a ptoblemt it is in that `scientisi' in their training ~o through a di1~!erent process in approaching their work, their research, than a `lawyer does, anti those are characteristics' you build `withiii yourself as a `result of the work you do from' time to time.. I don't believe thattherø is any undue secrecy, beyond that'of peo- ple trying to protect their areas of research. I feel; also tliat-and~ I ~think. the rscor4 would sbow~-seiemtists 4o have appeared before this. cornimttee ha~e been. extremely helpful, anti the work that this committee has done in opening' up eomn micationa with the ~cien.~ tthc community~ ~n develop&ng relationships with sewntist~ themse'ves .and the societies wb~eh they represent, tbe~ nnprov~inent of thosa corn~ mubticatioris, i~eede to go; one., ` S PAGENO="0197" I would not in `way characterize scientists as `holding a~,d. c1utcb-~ lug totheniselves their thoughts;. but that perhaps, if.the~o is a prob~ lem, a problem that we have generally throughout ~sooiet?y, it ~ improving the communications amongst'aii our people. . Mr. Fi~irro. That was going to be an area that I wa~ited to asic you about too, and ask your opiniOn on. It seems that the number of `science writers that we have in this country are decreasing, that the press and the media, ~n general, seem to have less interest in communicating scientific endeavors to the `people unless they are some glamorous type of activity, Would you have any thoughts about how We could improve, or' what role this committee could play in improving~ th~eomn'i~ations between the scientific community, on the' one hand; and~ ou~ peOple' on the other~ `` Mr. DADDARIO. I think both `this subcommittee and the full com~ mittee should continue close liaison with the scientific community as it has in the past and to increase that relationship as much ~s `it possibly can. You have had over many yea~s `a day~to~day p~ttio~pa~': tion with the scientific community. When the Office, of Tech~iology Assessment was created, further advisory mechanisms were developed:' and these have brought over 1,000 indIvidual scientists of one ty$ ~r another in~ contact with issues that are fâcing'the Congress and *hieh~ have a scientific and' technological bake'. Over'thO course of time thOse numbers will increase' and there will be better': ad~icé and bettet understanding of what goes into the 1egislative~rooess. I believe thati is not only helpful but n~cessary' for the Congress and the éountry. But I don't know how"you can characterize The prpbiem that yOu raise' many real way, about how scientific w'iiters~erfOi~m, how mauy. there are, `and it seems that there are tithes when there are more rather' thau'less. I picked up the paper the other day'~ for e~ampie. There was an article `in the Washington Post on Thursday, Mr. Cha:i'rman, ~here~ Dr. Jean Mayer, the président of Tufts `TJni'versity and a `specialist in i~utrition, wrote an article in ~hich"he referred to the `Office of `Tech- nology Assessment's Report on Food Grades and the importance of nutrition to the society, and he wound `this ~up by' asking his rekd'ers "How can you help ?" His answer to' that rhetorical question waS: ]~or one thing, you can urge your Congressman to read the OTA repor~, and to act to ~imp1ffy the confusing food grading system. You can also ntge `h1m,~ te sup- port the nutrItional labeling of more foods." This is the way in which important communic'ations develop. They get to the outside community; they come back to the Congress; and they begin moving back and forth in such a way s~ that it bécome~ a pervasive force, and I would hope that `it would `~ontinue `and to' b~- come even more so. ` ` ` Mr FLIrro I thank the gentleman for his response Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ` Mr. THOnNTo~'. Thenk you, Mr. Flippo.' Mr. Wydler. ` ` ` " Mr. WYDL~.' The witness,' Mr.. Chairman, whom `you have here is one Of the people that I admire `the most, both as a former Member of Congress with whom I served and for the work he did in'OPA. I won't' talk about his experiences in Connecticut. PAGENO="0198" 194 Mr. DADDARI0. My experienées in Connecticut have usually .be~n good, Mr. Wydlér. But elections do&t always turn `out as one ,woui,d like. .[La~ighter~] Mr. Wnn~i~. As both a `member of the committee and a member now of OTA,. of course I have great interest in these hearings, and I think these hearings have a lot of potential for good. I. don't want to speak as an expert on OTA yet. I haven't been on there long enough to-do that. I hope the gentleman didn't leave that position because he knew I was going `to become a member. [Laughter.] Mr. DADDARIO. If I had known you were going to become a member, Mr. Wydler, I would have stayed on. [Laughter.] Mr. Wi~i~n. The thing that struck me about the questioning here,:' I think the two big unresolved issues, other than the issue of whether OTA is worth it all, and that's something the committee could go into, are the relationships within OTA of the Director, the Board, and `the Council. Those are tricky questions, and there's been a lot of agony, I think, caused about them already on the Board, and the sooner they're resolved in some fair way the better. I'm just going to give you some observations. You can comment-on the~m or not, as you please. The first would be the relationship between the Director and the Board. My experience already indicates to me the Board is in no position to run the `OTA, only because it's'made up of Members of Congress and the-Members of Congress are busy individuals, and very few Members of Congreés can get to a meeting at any one time, in any one place very often. We find that we have enormous difficulty: doing that in any meeting of the Board. It's very hard to get a quorum, and that's typical of anything run' by Congressmen. There's nothing we can do about that at all. There's no solution to that problem. So as a practical matter, the pressures of the responsibility of run- ning the OTA are going to fall on the Director,' and the only `question is how far the Board- is going to make the Director -feel that he's in charge, and how far' the Board is going to make the Director feel that he has' to check everything of any importance with the Board.- I think that~s really-the- significant `decision Board members'have to come to, their relationship with the Director- of OTA. You can comment on that if you like. Mr. DADDArtI0. Mr. Wydler, that falls well within some of the con- cerns that have already been shown by various members of the sub- committee through their remarks. There is nothing inherently impossible about the relationship be- tween the Director of the Office ~f Technology Assessment and the' Board. It seems to me that it has, in fact, worked out quite well to this particular point. I have not found any real inhibiting factors which prevented me as the Ditector `from accomplishing the `purposes behind the policies established by the Board. This is evolutionary in nature.' It's always going to continue, that there will be real conflicts and the appearance of conflicts because of the very nature of the institution that the Congress is. - I -would ,not look upon these as' being weaknesses, but rather, strengths. I think that the situation has developed properly-up to this' PAGENO="0199" 1~5 particular time. Obviously, there hav~been some problems in. the ad- justment over these first formative years, but I dOn't think there's any- thing particularly significant that would indicate that this would not improve as time goes on. I referred before to some observations that this subcommittee had made at the time it e~amined the National Science Foundation. It made certain statutory changes, but it also made recommendations in its report about the way in which the National Science BQard should relate to the Director. It gave the Director support by what it said at that time, and it also indicated to the National Science Board what it was that the Congress, when. it formed the National Science Foundation in. the first place, expected that the Boa~rd would do. I would guesss that this committee would, as it examined the situa- tion, come to certain conclusions, in the report you will ultimately write, which will give force, direction. and support to the reh~tionships which you are concerned about, and I think that's healthy and, at the same time, something whiç~i can not be ignored. The development of the Board and Director relationship ought to be looked ~it as a ~aovel type of congressional activity which over the course of time, with your help, can be improved and strengthened Mr W~r~zB The other thing was the relationship between the Board and the Council, and again I'll just make my feelings known, and then yott can comment on it or not, as you wish I feel the CounCil was set up for an Obvious reason. I think after we realized that we were setting up a Board that was, in effect, ask- ing other Members of Congress and committee chairmen to. ask for information, we were going to end .up with alot of information that was very top~ç~al and related to problems on the committees, that it would be a very current type of thing, we might lose any input regard- ing long range needs ana. go:ais of our country in technology, and that we needed something to be giving us a push and a shove and guidance So we formed this Council of eminent scientists, and I think tba~ as long as it performs that function it's doing a very good and worth- while thing Its advice can be translated to the Board, and the Board, in turn, can say to t~e Director, "Let's look into the future needs of our Nation in such knd such a scientific area" What I think is the danger with the Coi~mcil is if you get the Coun cil involved in management problems you're faced with one or two bad situations. One. Is that you're. going to accept the recommenda- tions of the Council, in which case it looks like you really don't need the Board, or, the second ~s you're not going to accept the recom mendations of the Council, in which case it looks like you're turning down your own experts. . We've seen Presidents do that by setting up commissions, and then when they come in with the wrong report saying, "Well, I'm not going to pay `any attention to that." Sometime~ it makes you wonder what it's all about. In.. `other words, don't ask for advice unless you intend. to take it. .. ,I i~eally, think 1~liere is a tendency, because we have such eminent scientists, to ask them for their advice on everything, some of which they may be qualified to give and some of which they may. not. PAGENO="0200" SQ ~ain, I feel that th~ Board, whatev~ ma~gement they don't delegate to the Director, and they should c1ei1eg~te most `of it to him, ~hau1d retain, for themselves. I don't thin,k that's ~aii area in which they should be seeking advice from the council. I think they should be asking the Council to give them sc~en~ific advice in which this large, diversified group of seientjfio people have expertise and the greatest knowledge. It can certainly fill in what the Bo~d itself lacks in that area. Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Wydlér, you've asked a ~questiQn that actually has been asked in different ways before this morning and, again, it ~lls somewhat within the oontext of my remark~ to your previous questjon. The ques~icms yQu raise can be, and should, be, examined as against the ~trueture that evolved through the legislative pi~ocess, and ho~w that l~as worked, and how it can be improved. chairman Thornton has asked me this morning to go through the formative development of the program and to make some observations ~bon,t ~iQW that worked out through the time when the legislation was ~rrned with some general remarks from that point on, `an4 he has asked me to, and I would he very .hap'py.to,. return, and giye some thought to such matters `as you've jmmst.r~ised and to give the coiiunit~ tee, 4~ it would like, `at a~ later time my judgment about these relation~ ships, both as you see them after some examination, and ~p* what you ~ in them relates to what my operating e~petié e. ahou1~ them has been. Mr. WYDLRR. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you, Mr. Wydler, very much. We will look forward, as I previously mentioned, to: yoi~r returnmng to our subcommittee hearings at a later time. I would like to recognize next Congressman, W~nn, who is Vice chairman of the Technology ~s~essment Board, for ~uch questions or comments he may have. M~. WmNN. Thailk you, ~ Chairman,. I'm so1~ry that I haven't been able to spend mbre ti~ with this sub~ committee in these hearings, but I was at theiin~mittee mceting, where we had three rnarkupsthis morning. I want to `commend Mim Daddario for tliø great worktha~ he did for OTA. We're sorry to lose him. It may have been, broi~ght out by the members now that we're looking for a new Director. But I would like to ask Mim, ~imde we're on the record, and since I'm `a little confused at this stage of the ga~me, having just taken over a couple of days ago as the vicechairman, how mitch: oversight do ~CkU thin,k that time ~~ard should tabe upon itself or exercise over the Council? : Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Wimi it's not really ]ust the r~iation~h~p between the Board and the Council that needs to be looked at. This subcomn- mittee needs to examine the way in which this relationship has, in, fact, worked out over the course of time, and to come to a judgment `about hOW that relationship, in fact, fits with your ow~i interpretation, of what was intende4 in the legislation in the first~ place. YQiI must then determine if there should be changes and how they ought to be brought PAGENO="0201" 197~ about~ ~Im~rn~nerit~s ~an be.f~inni~d, ~f c~ourse through th~ rtti~s~ prO~&1ifl~e~, ~xid regulatitns which the Bo~a~rd has thé~authority to pto~ pomn~dfor itself, or by ~n~nding ~h e ba~ic act. ~ ~ I thinktlmt your qu~sti~ in part, falls in with the question that Mr. Wydiü~askeda~thomént ago. It's a piec~ ofthe sa~~e thing. I would sa~r this, ~ that the re1atio~ship of the Adviso~ry Council to the Board ought to be what the Board ~vauts.that `r~latio~ ship to be,: and it ought to be~a miatioi~ship which ie~dètermiiied by the needs 0± the Congre~s~ and for ~io other purpose ~f}~t is a matter en tirely up to th~ Board at this pa~rtu~uJar times and I would think that the Board, m `aiialy~mg the role of the Ath~isoty Council, must ~con~ tinue to seek tbe proper niche for the Advisory Council, ~or that has not been ~roperly determined ~s'yet. Again, it's not unusual that in the process of developing anew in~ stitutiOñ within such a cothplex fra ork ~s the TJ.S. Congress, that there' would he some probleuis, and it's healthy that there hai~e been s~ifle and. that they are beiug talked about here. I do beliove that.therê~ is a high degree of ~good will,,, especially on the part of th~ BoaH i~i perforn-iing their responsibilities, that as' time goes on the fu'n~tions~ the Board, the Council, their relationship to eaeh other atid to tIre operating activities of the Office of Technology Assessment Will ~wotk~ themselves out. In f~ctç I think they haVe been working them~elv~ out, and will continue to. In' specific arts~er tO your questioñ~ Mr. Winu, I do believe this cOin- mittee should give setious co~isideration to ainending the statute if, upon completion of the hearings, the evidence suggests that this is the best way to go. I Mr. Wi~c. I~o you think we're still'going througli'a period of grow- ing pains in some of the relationships? Mr~ DADOARTO It *äs felt, Mr~ Wiun, and I think the recOrd will bearThis out, that it would take a decade for the Office of Techn'ol'og.y Assessment to~ work itself out Of its problems and intO' a arm, soliff agency. I `believe it `will, and one of the reasons is that it w~s never contemplated that the Office of Technology As~essment' would be a large agenôy. it ~as contemplated as a small b~t special kind of instru- ment where ta~ks of a complicated nature would be a~signed, a~id that in the process of performing assessnieuts,capabiliti~s woi~ild be devel. oped as to methodology and procedures which' would then be trans- ferr~d throughout the congr~ssioftal structure ~o as to' imprbve the overall staff capabilities of the Congress in han~dlitig techtdèai issuea. I believe it's' headed `in that direction. `As time goele on~ one of the best things this obmmittee can do is to remain sensitive to the~need o~ `prO-' viding `Congress with staff capabilities hi sciMice and teehnologr w~'ich will be of immen~iraJue in the future. Mr. Wn~. How can `we tighten up the relationships of Mt. Thorn- ton's `snbcomthittee with those of us who represent the House on the ~oard? T have a feelhig, without any proof positive, that other thafi et~ maybe we're n~t `as close together in that tyi~e of' `oversiglit-Boatd relationship as we should be, because they're the persons responsible for authorizations. ` I'm corry I mis d~your~arlier CommehtL' PAGENO="0202" 198' Mr~ `~ADbARIO. ~oui' question iS a very good ~oi~e~ `Mr. `Winu. 1 said, earlier that: the. concept in the `first.:iilstance was: tknt the Office of Technology Assessment would, represent the interests of the Congress, and the Congress alone, and that ~t .had to develop ways and means to do that. What you're examining here :today"is how the. Office of Technology.:.Assessment is performing those functions for which it was mandated.'. ` `Th~ere are various ways ~in which the ~eu'thorization committee can. relate. These hearings are one example. But most efforts necessarily take p'l'ace.with long time gaps inbetween. This comlnhi3the does have, however, a ~precedent',in developing informal relationsMps with other' committees which are working on scientific and technical subjects. There is no reason why some informal arrangements could.' not be worked out with OTA. You will recall, Mr. Winn, that at one time this subcommittee, in examining just this question about how to improve the communica- tions within the Congress' to this subcommittee, we recommended that they be informal meetings of various committees on specific subjects. One such uctivity conducted with the Senate~was a forum: on the en- vironment that led to a great deal of what. eventually `found its way into the `Clean Air Act; and that forum, including several House and Senate committees, fashioned a report which was the first joint effort of its kind. Dean Don Price of Harvard University, in looking over that in- formal relationship, felt it to be a most important procedural prac~' tice and that Congress should continue to develop such informal communications. I think that's what you're asking about at the moment, and I think the principle is as sound now as it was then. , Mr. WINN. `I would hope, through OTA and through.. the exp~endi- ture~ made~ from the Congress~ that even though basically it's what's in the interest of `Congress, we would truly keep in `mind what's of interest to the people of the United States and to the ~people of the world, through our ability and our technological know-how. Somewhere, sometimes, I feel that some of our scientists and our highly technical people may forget that. Somewhere, I feel that mem- bers of our Board forget that. I think, if nothing else, a service that I might give as the vice chairman, is to keep reminding our Bo'ard, and to keep "reminding TAAC, and to keep reminding the staff that that's really the intention of this. I really think it's the intention of Congress, through their expenditures, to fund national programs. It's not always easy to'just put it down in black and white. I have noticed the press coverage from time. `to time hasn't"been too good on certain phases of it, particularly phases not of the imaginative and exciting, sexy, and gut-sizzling steak-type maybe. But it's pretty hard for the average person in the streets to realize what we're trying to accomplish, and I would hope that through `the work of this subcommittee, through the work of the Board, and through the work' of the Council and the experts who are out in the field, that we wo'uld be' able to accomplish this. The other thing, which is more of a statement and not a question, Mr. Chairman-and I think there's a time limit. I think I'm well' o~e~ 5 minutes, if we're going by the 5-minute rule. PAGENO="0203" 199 Mr. THORNTON. You're completely within your time limit. Please continue. Mr. WINN. I wish some' of the other subcommittee chairmen would say that. [Laughter.] The interest of Congress 99 percent of the time is probably the interests of the people. But sometimes I think we go a. little astray, in trying `to take care of our colleagues in Congress, and be sure that we do a study that helps a subcommittee chairman or a cdmmittee `chair- man, or helps somebody's reelection efforts. I don't think that's what `the basis for OTA is at all, and I would hope that somewhere the Board can maybe get a little tougher, with a smile on their face, and still say "No." Because it's so easy for us to dump it on the `back of the Director, and he makes the decision, "Well, I don't know `if we want to go that direction or not." That's a statement. It isn't a question. If you care to observe there, or comment on it, I would like to have you. Mr. DADDARIO. I would be very happy to comment, Mr. Winn. I have great faith that the Congress, through activities such as OTA, will continuously develop better ways to handle intricate problems. That is not going to be a solution for every individual's problems or neces- sarily be favorable to some interest or another. But the better we understand a problem and the more we analyze it objectively and openly, the better Congress will be doing its work `for the society as a whole. How has the Office of Technology Assessment, in what it has done to date, accomplished the objectives which you have just touched upon and which so properly concern you? When this subcommittee was bringing the Office of Technology Assessment through the legislative process in the first instance it reflected your concerns and continually repeated that it must, in fact, serve the society for those broad pur- poses which you've touched upon. Mr. WINN. Thank you very much. I would like to say just that I appreciate the service of Mr. Daddario not only to C'ongress and to OTA, but to his country. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Winn. We're looking forward to your testimony before our subcommittee at a later date during the process `of these hearings. Mr. WINN. I may change directions about five times before we get that prepared. Mr. THORNTON. We do appreciate your input to our subcommittee's efforts. I have a number of questions which I had wanted to ask. Would you agree to respond in writing to such questions as may be submitted to you in writing? Mr. DADDARIO. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. One question that Mr. Winn has just alluded to is the question of adequacy of budgets. Has the budget been a limitation on OTA? Has it handicapped OTA in its performance of duties so far, and, if so, to what extent? Mr. DADDARIO. I certainly feel that that has not been `the case, Mr. Chairman. The record will show that the Congress has dealt very genei'ously with the Office of Technology Assessment. Its growth has PAGENO="0204" 200 been proper, not astounding, and ought not to be. I think in almost every year there has been a slight increase. The Office has never bee~t given everything that it has asked for, but it would `be unusual if it, or ~ny other agency, did, in fact, get everything that was asked fOr. Iii keeping with that, it li~s always been my principle that the Office of Technology Assessment should accomplish its assessments in such a way so as to satisfy the broad purposes Congressman Wrnn was talk~ ingabOut, w1~atcver thesize of its budget. Mr. THoRNToN. Thank you very much. Mid ~n that note, and with the announcement that the subcommittee will meet again at 2 p.m. tomorrow to continue this series of hearings, we'll stand adjourned. Mr. DADn~RIo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Whereupon, at Ii :55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon~ vene at 8:30 a.m., on Thursday,' October 6, 1977.] PAGENO="0205" REVIEW OI~' TIlE TECIINO~LOGICAL .AS~ESSME~~T .ACr THURS]L~Y, OCTOBEB 6,1977 HOrrsE or ~S]~i~IvZS, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECIINOLOqT, S~ECo~MI~E ON SCIENCE, RESEARCI~. AND TECIINOLOGT~ WaMi~Øo~, D.C. The subcommittee convened. a~ 8 :3O~a.m~, in room~ 2~3~5 Bayburn House Office Building, pursuanttQ notice, Hon. I~ay Thornton (~hair~ man of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives' Thornton, Brown, Yeager, Wydler, and Hollenbeck. Mr. THORNTON. This morning we are contrnuing our reviaw, of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 and of the Office of T'~ehiiológy Assessment which that act ci~ated. Senator Edward Kennedy, chairman of the Technology Assess~ ment Board. in the current Congress, was scheduled to te~tif~y on sév- eral different occasions during the past 2 weelcs. However,; due to c~ci~stances beyond anyone's control, he has ~been prevented from~ aappea'ring.. Senator Kennedy has suggested aud~ we have agveed with tM~, .th~ he should subin~it `a prepared statement for the' record at this, tithe in ord~er that it might be made available' to the committee and the, public. He has invited commentary from other witnesses or' from members of the subcom'mitte on this statement. `At this ~point, without objection, Sen~ator Kennedy's statement will be carried in full in the hearing' record',. I believe that subcommittee members and today's witnesses have received copies of Senator Ken- nedy's statement and there' may be aaa opportunity to eo~iment on that statement during the course of these proceedings. [The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows :`j STATEME~ OF Siu~A~von EnWARD M~. ~CnN~innT, CHAIRMAN OF T~1E~ ~I~EOIn~'QLO4Y A~Ss~5SMENT BOAIW, EuFOEJ3~ TUE. SUBCOM~LLTTEE o~ S~IEi~ca, R~nrW~cn ~ ~ECRNQLOGY I want to thank the dtsthigtiished Chairman of the' Subc~n~niltte~, ~ngre~s~ man Thornton ,and the ~embers of the Subcommittee o~ Science,: e~êai~eh and' Technohg~~ for this opportunity ,to review the potential' for imp,ro n~ei~tiñ the Office of P~chnolbgy' Assessment 4s' a. Senate sponsor of. the ~ehCMog~'4ssess- ment Act' of 1972' and as Chairman of the Technology Assessment ~ar~ in the 93rd' (~Yongi~ess and in this C~ongre~s, T~ have had' the op rtÜ~i1~' `~d be' h~vo'1~ed' with the birth and growth O~ the Office of TecbnoIog~ Assessment; ~uid I ap~ predate thIs chance to dl*seuss the is~ues fdent1fie~t `b~r the Siibconnnlttee for' review. , , , , ` ` , ` ` ` The 1~erntLers have received testtn~ony on the. ori~1n~ o~f technology~' assessment in this coflutTy and 12~rong1tout `the wotltl; anif the S~Thcommitt~e h~as' bea~rd' expert witnesses on t~c~inoJogy assesSment programs; th~ the e~x~eeut1ve ag~netes (2~Ol) PAGENO="0206" 202 and in private industry. Mr. Daniel DeSimone, the Acting Director of OTA has given the Subcommittee a comprehensive outline of the OTA program activities and accomplishments since November, 1973, when the office was first funded by the Congress. And Mr. Emilio Daddario, the former Director of the Office of Technology Assessment outlined for the members of the Subcommittee the devel- opments leading to enactment of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 from his unique perspective as the author of the Act and the first Director of OTA. In addition, Mr. Chairman, we have all had the benefit of three comprehensive studies of the operation, management, program activity, and objectives of the Office of Technology Assessment: The Report of the House Commission on In- formation and Facilities; the Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate; and the Report of the Chairman of the Tbehnology Assessment Board, Congressman Olin Teague who brought the leadership, foresight, and direction for which he is so well known ii~ the Congress to the Chairmanship of the Tech- nology Assessment i3oard during the 94th Congress. I am hopeful that at the conclusion of these hearings, we will have the benefit of this Subcommittee's recommendations for an improved operation at OTA; and to assist in that objective, I would like to offer my suggestions in the follow- ing areas: (1) The goals of the Office of Technology Assessment. (2) The operation and management of OTA. (3) The functions of the Technology Assessment Board. (4) The effective use of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. GOALS OF THE OFFICE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Mr. Chairman: Because the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 contains no precise definition of "technology assessment," there has been a great deal of discussion before this Subcommittee, in the science and technology community, among members of Congress, and in the journals in this field on the extent to which OTA's focus should be short range policy' analysis or long range early warning on emerging or alternative technologies. The confusion resulting from the lack of a precisely defined objective for the Office of Technology Assessment has resulted in concern that the work of OTA may overlap or' duplicate the achievements of the `othez~ ~support `agencies of the Congress: the Congression,al Research Service, the General AccOunting Office, `and the Congressiona~ Budget Office. And the differing views of "technology assessment" on the Tegiinology Assessment Board and in the committees of the Congress has meant that no clear guidelines exist for allocating resources and determining priorities in assess- ment project requests. Despite this lack of precise goal definition, there has been, minimal demon- strated duplication by OTA and the other support agencies. Tn addition, many of the experts who have studied the agencies concluded that overlap and' com- petition among these support groups may very well be desirable in bringing timely, expert, and differing perspectives to issues of major concern to the Congress. In allocating the limited OTA resources to technology assessments requested by the committees, there is no question that the emphasis in these early, forma- tive years of OTA has been to provide, within a brief period of time, limited policy analyses to requests for the most part requiring a short range study of Imminent policy implementation. Clearly, the reCord of achievement' which has generated repeated committee requests for additional OTA assesSments is the direct result of OTA's demonstrated ability to provide needed short range policy assessmeP~ta quickly. Mr. Chairman: The. TechnolOgy Asssessment Act of 1972 describes the basic function of `the Office as follows: "To provide early indications of the probable beneficIal' apd adverse impacts of. the applications of technology and to develop other coordinate Information which may assist the Congress That description is broad enough to encompass the achievements of OTA to date but it also clearly directs OTA to examine long range issues,. including the `secondary im- pacts of emerging technologies. Toward these . objectives, OTA has launched two programs with longer time frames. One of these, the New and Emerging Technologies Program is specifically aimed at performing the early w'arning function. This program is still in the planning stage, but I would' hope it would' become a more vital part of OTA's ongoing assessments during the coming fi~cal year. PAGENO="0207" 203 The other long-range assessment activity is the OTA program on R&D policies and priorities, which is now fully operational. The purpose of the program 15 to provide the Congress with better tools for managing the Federal investment of $25 billion In research and development. From this program we expect to de- velop the facts and methodologies fo~ assessing the health of the scientific and technical enterprise, fo~ Improving the application of R&D to Industrial Innova- tion and national problem5~ and~or giving Congress valid criteria for evaluating R&D budgets. The decision facing the Technology Assessment Board in the coming months, as it reviews the requests* for assessments which far exceed the 0Th budget, Is whether to give added emphasis to long range, more comprehensive assessments to provide an early warning Initiative for the Congress. As Chairman, I am prepared to recommend to the Technology Assessment Board that OTA signifi- cantly increase its emphasis on longer range assessments, which help provide early warning indicators for the Congress. It is clear that OTA is the uniquely * appropriate si1~port arm of the Congress to perform this urgently needed service. Unlike the other support agencies, QTA's single focus is technology as~essment. In addition, 0Th haS been able to attract the highest quality technological ex- pertise from every part of this nation to assist in its assessments through Its advisory panels and expanded use of contract authority. It Is that unique combi- nation of a single purpose and the delnotistrated availability of a wide range of talent which make 0Th singularly~cepable of becoming a valuable early warn- ing system for the Congress. The development of long range technology assess- ment proposals by the Technology Assessment Board itself and the Director of OTA can assure we meet that objective. THE OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Mr. Chairman: Many of the difficulties in daily operation of OTA are those `that might b~ expected in any new agency. The OTA staff~ scattered In six work locations, has performed exceptionally well under the most difficult working ~onditi'ons. Because OTA Is an institutional innovation in `the Congress, there iias necessarily been a period of ad hoc `decision-making in the developni'ent of OTA's operations. This has led to the resulting confusic~n, and the failure to de- lineate' specific lines of authority and responsibility within OTA may liave hampered job efficiency. In spite of these difficulties OTA has been able to attract the most talented men and women to develop its program activities and monitor and direct the extraordinary accumulation of experts from all parts of the country Who have participated In the advisory panels or who have worked under contract to assist the OTA In-house staff~ Fortunately, the spacu problem has been resolved, and within thenea~' future, all of the OTA staff and program activity will be located in a single facility at 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. l~or the first time since OTA' began, communica- tion and cooperation between all of the program personnel and administrative staff will be si~~ple and direct, rather than eumber~Ome and time-consuming. To assist In t~ie de's~eloptaeut of standardized and consistent personnel policies, I will recommend to the Technology Assessment Board tliS± we ask the new~ Dlre~- tor of OTA to place `high `priority on a complete review of staff hifing and promO- tion policies, personnel assignments and duties and* salary levels. When' this comprehensive review Is complete, the Technology Assessment Board will be in the best position to adopt personnel policies which are eoosistent and equitable. In order to insure t~iat OTA achieves the reduction in staff ~eeessary to meet the personnel cei~lng Of 130 as directed by the Congress, and more importantly so that OTA can continue to attract the same high quality men and women t~ its ~ervlce, it is linperative that a priority both for `the new DIrector and for' the Technolegy Assessment Board ~nust be to struc,b~re, streamline, and make con- ~istent the ad~n1nistyative functions of OTA. THE FtNCTION5 OF THE TECHNOLOGY A$5ESSm~tE1~T )3OARD Mr. Chairman': Many of the difficulties relating to the functiOns of the Tech~ nology Assessment Board `are directly attributable to the logistical problem of finding a convenient time and place for 12 very busy Senators and Congressmen to thoughtfully formulate OTA poli~y. Board members often find themselves required to be in committee meetings, on the Senate or flouse floor, and at the PAGENO="0208" 2~4 Tëohno~ogy AssessmeM ~onrd~ ~ieethigs-aJJ~ at t1~ sa~*~ t&me. ~ Qf~e~, ti~e~ pre- CI4MLS limited i~ieeting time Js ~suaieU with ~eyi~ew of ses~~iit requests, ~th~afts, o~r~ final reports wh~eb are urgeut1~ ~e~ieçT by t1~ req~e~t1~ coinu4ttees, biutwh~e1~ tbeBoarc1~mauibers bi~ve 1~iaU Utt1e4~iwe tø ~evisw. ~ Coi1~res~man ~reagL~e~ lu his ~epc%~t c~J~ t~1~e Oha~rmaz~ ~ two ~e11en~t~ sug- gestion~ t~ improve toa~ ~uu~l~toutn~ : U) ~ev~i~n ~ Boa~ci r~1es t~ shirt ~tactkv adixttnistrativadu~1~s ft~ the QtflQ~ ~ ~u4~)~ ~I~e i~orma- tion of a TAB Executive Committee to handle man~7 of the mat~ers ~io~w con- s~dered by the full ~3oard wthl~~ut ade~u~te p~~a~at~oa ~r cousLd~atiou. I would make the ~olIowipg eomui~4atious fo~the Sübcomn~ittee'~ r~view: ~iirst, that we follow 1\~Lr Teag~~ suggostlon and m~ake eve~y effort within the Boar4 to shift strictly aUminlstr~tivo duties away from the 1~oard to~ the Diro~- toz~Seeond, that in the futures we utilize ad ho~ ~hcomn-~jttees of t$ Board, eönsis~i1~g &f four uiembers with one f'~om each hou$e a~lcl each ~rty; to give t~e detailed co*s oration nece~sa~y. to pQIi~y i~sues ~4 a~sess~nt 4ecisi~ns prior to fuR J3o~rd aetion. J~ver~!= member of the ~ard~wou1~ have ~l~o oppor- trnidty to wO~ on a subec ittee conc~~~raj~ing on a ~peoide pø~cya~'e~,, `J~4s wot~ ass~e thatth~ ~uU spectrn~ of point~~f vie~w on~cthe Beard ~ to hear on the ~ o~ specille issues for B~a~'çi ~p~ovg1,. ~V14is would enable the J~oard to play the vital role ia~ O~ affair~ whiel4was int~u~de~ w~th- out tying up the time of~a:l3~ Boarç~ meruber~ on e~ee~sive details. I lo~k forward to wo~h~g closely with ~ur new Vi~e~Cbairman, ~Jongressma~i Larry Wiun, who has glyen an enormous a~a~ount Qf his timeaud energy to OT~ s1nce~eIoction t~ tho Boar~ to ~leyeJQp ~ prop~sal for the ~oari's ccuisiUei~a~tion which would insure that every proposal, repep~~nd pØ~cy ~ectsjon has be~i ~r~- fully and thoughtfully reviewed prior to Board action. EFFECTIVE USE OF TIlE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AflVISOItY COUNCIL ~4r~ Cha4rm~n: ~be ~peniJ~ers of this Subc~inipittee will have ~ diithig this seriea of bearings to obtain ~rst-b~d fron~~4f~ Chairm~ a~cl luea~- h~'sef tl~e. Technology ~&ssess~ent~ Advjso~y Couqcil~, tbei~ reco n~at~o~a fpr 1an~~oying the effectiveness an~fnrther dei~ning the ro~of the 4~tv~sory.Counc~. Very brje~y, I o~er these st~ggeat~ons: ~ reoo~xpen~ that the role the ~nincil has ma1s~taine~ in t~e s~iaplng o~ the R&D policies and priorities program, andthe new anct e~e~ging tectino1og~~s ~r~g~am be cont%nuec1~ and augmented. Though such Involvement the Có~nc11 can a~d should play an ef~eetive part in orienting OIA a~ssessme~ts toward the lo~~- x~ange, early ~varniug activities whjcb are so v~ry in~portspt to the future o~ onr Natiop~ Second, I believe the Council should emphasize a quali~ control function for OTA as~ossmen~s~ by contiunhig to develop criteria and~ metIiodo~ogy Whereby wecan )~etter design op~ as$Gssm~nt~ and eyaluate their re~ults. T~4rc1~. I. recommon4 that the Council defina its advi~ury ro1~ t~ the ~oard to ~erve both tl~ç immediate neçds P~ the Board in ~Aapin~ the grOwth, and directloh of O~4~ and the Boajd ~ development of long term po)~7 fqr OTA ~4?he ~~uu~il ~ recop~Lmeudations on f~ diliug of~Qouncil vkvaucies a*4 tt,~ év 1~~f candi- dates for director of ~ have been enormo~u~1y helpfuTto ~1~~ebuology A~- aessmênt Boarc1~ In addition, I am coulldebt that the Boa~'d, wo~ld welcome the CouuciVs advice on all ma4or policy Issues which the ~oar4 will confront in the coming months. : ~inally, I support the ~~ggestLOi~ that we find better ways to improve corn- n~uuicatloh b~tweeu ~3oar4 and. CornieR members. In, this Wa~, the Council can pi~y the vita3~ cz~~tiy~ role which, the jegislatloil Intended for It, ~f~r.Chairthan: In n~~ing théserecommendations, ~ have dis~ss~ed some of the l~u~s ~1átcd t~ Q~4~s purpose and function where hnp~ovement is needed and ~ feasihl'e.;~lut I want to ~piphasiza to the mu~4her~ of th~ StlbcomIn1tte~? that there is a very bright future 1~or th~ Ofl~ce of TethnoJog~r Assessment I base that view both on OTA's performance to date aTh~ the goOd wIll anttenergy I am confident support tbecffortstp bnpr&vc ~ OTA is a v1go~rous iie~ ag~eney stnffed'by a young, hard-working, highly com- p~tent staff. D4sti,ngnisb~4 load~rs in ~ vari$y of spee~a~i~ed fietds in science ~ technology ~ery~ Q~L'A on the ~visory Cou~ci1 and on the advIsory panels in ~f tiis ma~or prog~azp areas. All of the members of the Techpology A~sessment ~~oard~ the Adwisory Council, an4 thoR' staffs,, and the O~ staff deserve sepeejal recc~nil4Qn ~o~tb~e .ennrmous a~9twl Of ~hi~ietli~y ba~e ~ ~u~y to u~ssure PAGENO="0209" 205 that the b,est qual}tled candidates ~or the positiOn o~ DirectQr rece4ve fufl and fair consideration. OTA has received' 147 reQuests for technology assessments and has published fl7 reports. Over half of the ()ong~eas&ona~ commttt~es, obviously impressed with the q~ality of OTl'A wo~ have roturned for additioual assessments~ QTA studies have covered a broad range of major issues before the Congress and the NatiOn Solar energy, nuclear proliferation, the national energy plan, food processing and nutrition drug costs e11~ shore energy facilities developing transportation technologies, and numerons others. Mr. Chairman: What we have learned in the last decade is that technology de- velopment tends to be more rapid than' Congressional action; that the only de- v~lopments which seem to move faster than technology are the latest crises result- ing from the depletion of our resources; that emerging aild controversial technol- ~giea are reported on the front pages of oar worni~g papers before any decision by any elected representatives is made on the purpose, the directiOn, or the meaning of the new technology for the next geheration of Americans. Dr. Melvin Kranzberg pointed out in his testimony before this Subcommittee eTechnology assessment provides a' rational means for democratic control and gui4ance of technologicaL ~bange"~-technology assessment means. informed de- cisio~i-maJdng. by the people çf this Nation: on issues that touch~all our lives. It is clear that improvements are needed to firm the direction and streamline the operation of the Office of lechnology Assessment That is a challenge I am confident th~ members of the ~eehnology Assessment Board, the Advisory Coun- cil, and the staff of OTA look forward to meeting. The Congress and the Nation may then be In a better position~ to guide the development of technology' which can give shape and form to a better future. Mr~ T~EI0RNT0N. it is expected that Senator Kennedy will appear in person to answ~ir questions later this month as this set of hearings draws to a close. I would lii t~ mention that Chairman Teague, who is the only u~ember ~f the Board other than Senator Kennedy to have served as chairman, issued a substantial commentary on OTA at the end of his term as Board chairman. This report has now been printed in the. I97'~' Annual Report of OTA to the Congress and will he incorporated into the hearings at this point-~.but by reference only.. I should also explain that along with the. former vice chairman of the Board who are appearing as witnesses today, an invitation was also extended to Senator Case of New Jersey, who is still a member of the Board and who served as vice chairman during the 94th Congress Senator Case has not been able to arrange his schedule to testify thus far but he will be given an opportunity tQ do so later on Qur first witness this morning is a committee colleague `and good friend', the Hon:ovabIe Larry Winn, Jr., `of Kansas, who is vice chair~ man of the Technology As'~essmerit Board for the present 9~th Con~ gress Welcome to you, Mr Wmn, we appreciate your being here, and. you may pr4ceed. sTATElvl~N4r OP ~IO1L LA1U~Y W1~NN, SR., A R]~PRESENTATIVK IN eOI~'ORNSS ~`ROM Th~ STATE OP KANSAS ~ir. WINN. ~tr, Chairman, it is a real pleasure to appear before the subcommittee today to offer some of my perspectives of the opera~ tion of the Offlèe of Tech~noloo'y Assessmeht (OTA) My direct afflhia~- tion as you know with~ OTA. Tegan at the beginning of the 95th Con gress when I v~ as appointed to the OTA Board ConsequenUy, I feel that my insights `oi the operating details of OTA are relatively fresh. Even though my direct affiliation is recent, 90-205-78---14 PAGENO="0210" 206 I have been closely associated with many facets of OTA. As a member of the Science and Technology Committee, I participated in the for- mulation of the original OTA Act. Additionally, I have long been involved with the application of space age technology to current social needs. I have witnessed the direct and short-term impacts of these appli- cations of technology and generally have been favorably impressed. However, the indireOt long-range impacts have always concerned me. I think I mentioned that the other day in the hearings. Another aspect of technology that concerns me is: its vastness. As Congressmen, we continually encounter technically related policy issues ranging from recombinant DNA to liqutd metal fast breeder reactors to carcinogenicity of saccharin. Because of these two concerns: Long-range impacts and the vastness of technology,: I have been strongly supportive of the Office of Tech- nology Assessment. As an arm of the 13.5. Congress, assisting in tech- nically related policy issues, I feel that OTA is an invaluable asset and with proper nurturing and driection will continue to perform in this capacity. Mr. Dadclario has laid a good fundation to build upon. However, OTA will probably continue to feel some growing pains. I Shave not seen Senator Kennedy's statement. I have seen Mrs. Holt's and She refers to the same problem. I think this is pretty much a concensus of the Board members. In light of my support for the concept of technology ás,~essment and OTA, I would like to lodge some cOnstructive criticisms based upon my exposure. * I feel that. the capabilities of the Board are not being utilized properly. The Board is the best body to ascertain the short- and long- term needs of the Congress. Instead it appears that the capability of the Board is being diluted by spending too much' time debating the merits of ~individual projects with little or no awareness of `how that project will help to fulfill the objectives.of the program. Ideally, I envision the process operating between two extremes. On one extreme would be the "brush firO" assessments that respond to some immediate need of Congress. The other extreme can be charac- terized as the "crystal ball" which would refer to the purely visionary assessments. in anticipation of congressional needs. The Board's role would be to define where' OTA should be operating between those two extremes. If we represented the "brush fire" extreme by "zero" and the "crystal ball" extreme by 10 a realistic position for QtA to operate would be around seven. This implies that OTA would still have the flexibility of responding to unforeseen,. immediate needs of Congress. However, they would be predon~inantly anticipating the needs of Congress. * The role of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council (TAAC) has been somewhat `different than what I had originally anticipated. I have viewed the TAM)' as an advisory bodytto the Board. Obvi- ously, they should respond to whatever task the Board may charge them with, but they should predominantly be involved with assisting the Board in defining the overall direction of OTA at the program level. ** * PAGENO="0211" 207 When the Board defines the overall direction of OTA it should be predicated upon what is best for the Nation as opposed to partisan politics. This philosophy is reflected in the nonpartisan struct~ire of the Board. The Advisory Council has the unique capability of pro- `yiding the Board with a broad and diverse representation of what is best for the Nation. And, perhaps I should add, what is best for the ~world. This capability should be capitalized upon to the fullest extent possible. To accomplish this,. better direct lines of commurncation should be established. Another aspect of the technology assessment process that should be considered is the lack of OTA Director-instituted assessments. This situation has undoubtedly occurred because of the manner in which the Board has functioned to date. With the Board functioning pri- marily `at the project level, it has not given the Director enough lati- `tude to institute his own assessments. If the Board and the Advisory Council were operating at the program level, establishing overall pol- icy, the individual project definition could be left to the Director and his staff. This seems like a reasonable method because of the intimate knowledge that the Director and his staff have at the project level. The final point or criticism that I would like to make regards the perception of technology assessment. This expression is viewed in a multitude of ways which results in some assessments which, appear to overlap the capabilities of committee staff, the `Congressional Re- search Service or the General Accounting Office. I think it is impera- tive that each assessment be directed to assess "the. consequences of technological applications." OTA should be very careful to perform only those assessments that correspond to this criteria to prevent that overlap or competition with her `sister agencies. In light of the budg- etary constraints `we have encountered this year, we must be more selective in this regard. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I will be glad to respond to any questions. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Winn.. Mr. WINN. I would like to say' that I appreciate your holding these hearings. You are doing a thorough job and I hope Senator Ken- nedy, chairman of the Board and Senator Case can participate be- cause they have, I am sure, some thoughts that would'be of great ben- efit to your committee on making any decisions in this area. Mr. THORNTON. Thanks again. We will now have a 5-minute recess. [Recess.] MI'. THORNTON. This hearing is again in session. Congressman Winn, I want to congratulate you' on a very excellent statement, highlighting some of the problem areas and giving us a good base upon which to niake some judgments as to the policy direction and functioning of the OTA Board. We welcome your testimony here today. Mr. WINN. Thank you. Mr. THORNTON. I think `that your'testithony has focused upon the proper role of the Board as setting policy of OTA i~at1icr than dealing with the day-to-day objectives of this institution~ It seems to "me that this focuses upon a very real issue, `and that is how the Board can go about selecting areas of broad national interest PAGENO="0212" 208 to achieve t'~iIs mix~that you suggested of;seventy percent crystal ball as opposedto zer~on crash programs, crisis ~rograms. How would youthink that that might'bé bêtter'aehie~ed Mr. Winn? Is it needful to ehange the structure of the B.oard, to consider revising it~ membership~ bringing in pnblic members, or~ can it be done within the present structure of the Board? Mr. WINN. Well, first I think we, have to bear in mind that we, the Board members `are nonteehrdcai people. Therefbre,T think that it is more important that we direeti policy than it is that we become involved in~ 1~lie programs and the projects that the staff, the Advisory Council, and the pa~ieis are involved in. A~ far as the threct~on-there has been some discussion, of the pos~ Sibthty of brmgnig in son~e outside people other than members of the house' and the Seiiat~e. If we cannot develop this perfect perceiltage of seven ~ut of ten that I referred to in my testimony, it m~y be necesSary to go outside. At the present time, with approximately a'third, of the Board mem.~ bers `being' new, very enthusiastic,. with a' lOt of ideas, with, good a't~ tendance at meetings, which you probably know'is one of our big, big probelnis, I would like te, continue to gr~e the twelve man board a chane,e to fimetion. But we do have to decide oiirsehres with your help, the direction that our Board should go. There seems to be a variation of opinion which way the various Board members want to go But unless we ~et better cooperation and better attendance, I think we are going to continue to flounder We have bad some problems earlier this year, as you know And I think and feel, like most of the other members of the Board, that the time we have spent so far has been very frustrating, and we have not really gotten down to the nitty-gritty of deciding diraction of our own ]3~oard. * C * * *, * * Whether we bring outside help in to achieve the balance between long-range planning and what' I call crisis planning, is pretty hard to say. We, as a Board, need to sit down and d~scuss it `but we never do that I am self criticizing tJi~ Board for not taking the time to ait clownand anal'y~e our own ec'tiona Mr TiIOR~oN Of course this iniigbt be one reason for having some outside n bersi~ip'.. The. pressures on con~ressionai members of the Board are enormous,, as you know. Mr. WINN. That is true. Mr. THORNTON. I be~ã~éve a recén,t sti~d~r indicated that 4~ percent of ti~ie thn~ we, hftve tOk be in two ptiaees at once in o'rde~ tn meet our obligations~ Mr WIWN That is very tru,'e It sounds ridiculous, but ~nat try~ng~ $~pt~ ~ Øa~ee Lor our ]3onrd~ meetings is~a problem We' never meet i~n the same place. We never know exactly, except for a few Iiou~rs or maybe a few days ahead of time, where we are going to meet. To me t~at just adds to the' eo~nfusion of gel*mg everybody tn a~ ear- tarn place at a certain tune, when we can reall~r sit down and look i~ the mirror and analyze' where we~a&i,'waoit togo., ` Mr. `T~~nx~'oi~. I wonder if'i~ might~ be appropriate to ceusicler PAGENO="0213" 20Q For one thing, do you have a thought as to whether we should have a continual turnover of membership on the Th)ard~ You mentioned that maybe one~third of the Board is now new. Is it a good thing to have limited terms of service on the Boards Mr. WINN. I think that it probably is. It is like anything else. I thmk you have got to bring `some new blood in from time to time. ~ç There certainly should be some. system where you retain carryover experience. We do have that on the Board, Mr. Brown certainly would fit into that category. But I think that there should be new people from time to time. Normally that would take care of itself, on the House side particu- larly, by elections and resignations. Mr. THORNTON. Don't remind me. Mr. WINN. But we have on that Board some very busy, very power- ful people that have been entrusted with a lot of other jobs, assign~ ments, and obligations. And it is understandable that they cannot get *to as many Board meetings as they would like, On the other hand, I think the inconsistency of our meeting place and time adds to the difficulty of attending. We don't have an estab~ hsbed meeting place arid time. If we had an estnblished meeting place and time we could conceivably work the rest of our schedule around it. Mr. THORNTON. This is a point that I was wondering, about, whether it might be. useful to determine how often the Board should routinely meet and to schedule a meeting at that time. You think monthly or weekly or- Mr. WINN. I think weekly is probably too often for the people, the type of people we: have on the Board. I don't think we would be im- proving the situation. I think a monthly meeting is a must. Without a meeting at least once a month, we don't know what we are doing. We can't keep track of things, even though we have good staff~ Mr. THORNTON. If you were..to have a monthly meeting scheduled at a. definite time throughout `the year, that would help in planning, wouldn't it'? "Mr. WINN. I don't think there is any, doubt about it. `If we could allow ourselves anho'ur-and~a-half to two lrour~of meeting time, pref' erably, when we are',not going to be interrupted by rolleall votes,~we çôuid resolve many of' these issues. The House or the Senate has to run' back and forth. to the' floors all the time.' It is mass confi~ision with the Members going in and out of the room for votes. Mr. THORNTON. Should the director' of the OTA be a voting member of the Board? V Mr. WINN. No., -I,don't think so. The director by consensus has been present during the meetings and has offered good advice and direction to the Board.. However,, `to my knowledge-I am not sure about the history. We have not had any voted that require breaking a 6 to 6 tie. We are. trying to .do what' is best for the Nation, what is best for the people of the country, when we approve a technology `assessment. HopeT fully tha't gets.beyond the realm of politics. Sometimes it's pretty hard to do that. Mr. THORNTON. There are several areas which might be appropriate for Board action in establishing maybe formal policies, such things as PAGENO="0214" 210 liaison between OTA and congressional cothmittees, liaisOn with the other research resources, General Accounting Office, CR5, CBO, man~ dated assessments, quality control of assessments,' and the division of emphasis, which you have already dealt with, between long-range: and short-term projects. Do you think it would be useful-I don't suggest this as a compre~ hensive hst-for the Board formally to decide what policy areas it should look into and develop policy guidelines for that? Is that over- formalization? Do you have any comment with regard to that? Mr. WINN. I don't think it is overformalization, no. We have got to work with these sister agencies that you referred to. Truthfully, I am not quite aware, because I am relatively new on the Board, how much liaison there is between the sister agencies and OTA. I am aware of some of the information that is in the annual report, which I think is an outstanding job. We don't want to get into an overlapping function. As we well know, we do too much of that anyway. There is a tendency to make an assignment to someone, give him a request, ask for a tech- nology assessment, or whatever it might be, and then sort of let it take its own course. The next thing we know, when the report comes out, we say, well, this is almost exactly what `somebody else did, and: that wasn't the directiOn we wanted to go. But in most cases we have not had that overlapping. I don't know exactly what you mean by a mandated assessment. Mr. THORNTON. Well,' I mean an assessment which would be obliga- tory upon OTA, required by statute. The question was whether there' should be some policy set un to deal with those when they occur. Mr. WINN. It `is my understanding that we will `be allowed to re- spond to several general onestions subsequent to this hearing. I will respond to this question at that time, if I may. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. `Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I value very much Congressman Winn's contribution. I think I am in total agreement with the comments that he has made `with regard to the need's of the technology assessment operation `and the existing de- fects. Some of these defects, specifically the inadequacy of the Board's attention to `policy matters, are pretty much criticisms that can be made of `Congressmen in their other activities, too. We don't get enough `attendance `at this committee meeting, for example, `and at conference committees, or any number of functions, because of that overdemand on our time. And that needs to be corrected on a broader basis. This question of the composition of the Board and whether we could remedy the problem has led us, of `course, to `consider whether or not the original scheme for a mixed Board might not have been a better idea. Let me just pose to you this kind of `a format. What about a board with the present six House members, six Sen- ators, `and, say, six outstanding public figures, possibly `persons who have served on the Advisory Council, or who have been nominated by the Advisory Council. Possibly the Council could be a steppingstone for some of its members who display unusual competence or interest to `move up to a voting role on the Board and who `in the nature of PAGENO="0215" 211 things might be `able to schedule their time for attendance better-sq that at a normal Board meeting, instead of the two or three we often have, we might have five or six of the public members, plus three or four Senators and House members who would constitute a quorum. And it would tend to give more stability and continuity to the policy, role of the Board in that `fashion, because there would be a cadre of persons. At the same time it would tend to break up this tendency toward factionalism, a problem which has existed since the founding of the Republic. We would not have, then, a case of where the Senators or the House members would tend to vote as a bloc, just to protect each other; the Republicans and the Democrats, which I find less common than the two houses voting as a bloc. And I think it would strengthen the policy focus of the Board. Now, how do you react to that kind of a format? Is it worth pur- suing in your opinion? Mr. WINN. I think it is well worth pursuing at this particular stage. I think we are either going to have to get new members that dedi- cate themselves to technology assessment and to the Board, or bring in outsiders. I would hope that the 12-man Board, as it is now set up, could func~ tion from here on out in the manner in which we are supposed to function. If we cannot, we may well have to change our setup and bring in the outsiders. You and I are both aware that we have got some very capable and talented people on the outside, some who have served on the Advisory Council, some who have served on the. Board. People, that gave many years of good dedicated service, that are still around Washington. They would probably enjoy sitting in and being voting members. I am not really sure how important the votes are. Since I went on there in January I think we have only had one or two votes. We have had a great deal of discussion, but not much in the way of voting. So I don't know that we are giving them such a plum if we allow them to vote. But we do have capable people available. I would certainly not want to rule out that possibility. As I said, possibly before you came in, to `the chairman, I would rather try it the way that we are mandated at the present time. If that doesn't work, I think it is pretty obvious that we are going to have to do something else. Something to get the factionalism out of this Board. Because of the way we are set up, with half Democrats and half Republicans, and half Senators and .half House members, I think it is pretty hard to take that out. As you know, some of the factionalism showed up in the process that we are now going through, trying to select a new director. I think the end result may show that it is substantial; I hope not, but it may show up that way. To take that o~it of there, let's say we pick six outside people. I am sure politics would become involved in which six people we picked. I don't think we can get away from that. Mr. BROWN. I would agree with that. And I would concur with your analysis that the basic problem is that the Board members have PAGENO="0216" hot d~m~n~th~d th~tt ~he~r ha~ ~ tb~i~ fo~ iiith~ri~tpt~d ~tt~ tion to give, we will say, the monthly Board meetings that should be d~v~te~d. to this. t~f tht~y were able to partieip~tfe 1M~i~tei~ lii the pi~o `es ef' th~ office,. I think we ~o~ct1d ha~~~e f~r Jr~ of ~ ,tOw~rd factie~l voting which Is e~cour~ged b~ ~to~y voting of Onb per~o~i for SeW er~il others ~nd so on. ~3ut the question of ho~icr yo~ti g~t-~-- Mr. WINN. I don't think we, ought to allow pi~o~ ~otiiig. But thei~ I ha~e thtrnght so in `Congres~,too. M~r: Th~Ow~. How do you g~t the un1~rit~riiiptetl %l~iè, Se~, for ~ hour-per-month Board ~neeting ~ `You h~ tuttle ~rne very good suggestions that it ought to be at a regular time, at a regular place. Well, that handicaps the Congress in many other ~ays a1so~. ~`r. Wii~. It does. I3nt I know what ~ would ~do.. But then I ~m probably, not typical of yvhere I live and, the fact that: I ~th hOi~ ~/O~t Monday. t wouM set up at 1OaSt~ oii~e ~ ni~ohth ~a i~ee%htg'at S t'~lock Monday morning. That is normally before the start of busin~ss. It does make it rough for some of the f~llOws in the West, particularly somebody like yourself from California, that m~y fly the red-eye and fly all night to get back for the start of business. But I think that if we knew the dates, if We hatl a ~et ~chedtile, clear through the year, I think we cOuld have a good 11/a- or 2-hour meeting and get a lot accomplished before we all had to break up and go to committees and conferences and things like that. Mr. BRowS. Well, thy opinion-S-and I gather that you would concur to some degree *t 1ea~t~-~-i~ that that woui'd solve abotit half the prob~ lems that the Board has. Mr. WINN. I think it would?sOlve it. W~ are not~gOing to get ~ lot accomplished if we don't get everybody to sit down together and talk, and we just cannot get everyb~x1y to'~sit down. It is worth a tr'y, in my opiniou. I am going to suggest that to the chairman. Mr. BROWN. The other alternative, to have Board members who have fewer demands on their time, means that we would pick the junior members who have not yet gotten into a I)attern of intetest and par- ticipation, as some of our SenioF members, such as Tiger Teagne, for ç~xample. He serves oi~ such a multitude of committees that it is dif- ficult for him to cover them all. And yet we would be deprived of a vast amount of expertise and judgment if we were precluded from Using him. . Mr. WINN. That is very true. But I would think that my suggestion of, let's just say-I am arbitrarily picking Monday because it is usually a little lighter day than the rest of them. However, let's say that we have a set day, once a month, the first Mouday of `every month. I think that Congressman Teagñe and sothe of the senior statesmen on the committee would, because of their past history and their true involve- ment and interest in technology assessment, set aside and be there for those meetings. Where if we set these meetings on a random basis and we get 2 or 3 days' notice, and never quite know what room we are going to be in, it is very difficult for those busy, busy people to try to work it into a schedule that ~o~fIicts with `a previous schedule. I really don't think it is that tough, if we wotild make up our minds and do it. We can all find very good reasons why we cannot be PAGENO="0217" 213 at any meeting, and the most convenient reason is we have to be at other meeting. Mr. BRowN. Well, I wouki lice to try that. I appreciate the sug- gestion very much. I have no further questions. Mr. TBORN~ON, Thank you very much, I want to thank you again for your very ~ei1ent~ testimony and your very responsive answers. We have beeti given up here a comprehensive s~t of questions re~ lating to the ~oar~d. ,~nd. as we move farther into this matter, espe- ciaiiy since you. are a member of the full committee, Mr. Wiimn, I would hope that you would share with us, either fo~xnally or infor- mally as you may choose, your ideas and suggestions with regard to these many other questions. I would like to ask Mr. Yeager if he has sny questions to ask of you at this time. Mr Yr~aom~, Just one When the subcommittee finishes this review, it will be coming out with some sort of action recommendations or what ever. Would you concur with the proposition that to the extent that policy chancres as determined by the subcommittee, that e~Yorts be made to dQ this a~mrnistratively or by rule changing, whem e po~ible, rather than by amending the statute? If it is not possible to do it by ad- mii~istratión ~r jy rules, then consider the statutory route, But as a general propoMtion, would yo~ think it would be ~referabie to make the changes that way? Mr WINN Unless there is something more than what I haye he'trd. ~o far, or what I have read in other testimony, I think that most of the changes, whatever you might recommend, c~n be acted upon ad-~ winistratively. I think for the ~pod o.f the OTA Board *~e need some outside euggestions and som~ outside directions. If for noother reason, as comments fm~om the subcommittee, to get us together to, talk, to face ourselves in the mirror, tO try to analyze what direction we ar~ going. Because truthfully, I thi~ik we all have an idea of where we ought t~ be going But right now, without a Director, only an Acting Di rector, with the turnoyers on the Board, I think we are floundering. `Eiie first thing we have got to do is get Oi~r team on the field, that means get the members of the Board to sit down and start playing the ball game. Then, second,, if you have strong recommendations. and we can't work them out froin an administrative standpoint, then I think they should be put in mandated rules, Mr YE4GER+ That is vety helpful ~ftank you,. Mr. ~liairman, Mr, TiXORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Winn. I want again to express my appreQiation for this very excellent testimony. Mr. WI~m. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. Mr. TIIORNTON. Our next witness is Congresswoman Marjorie bit, who is past vice chairman of the Technology Assessment Board, a very capable and articulate colleague. We are .delighte~ to have you with us this morning and you may proceed. PAGENO="0218" 214 STATEMENT OP HON. MAR~~ORIE S. BOLT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS PROM THE STATE OP MARYLAND Ms. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity. Let me first commend you and the other subcommittee members for convening these hearings. After approximately 81/2 years of, actual operation I think it is' extremely approprinte to review the Organic Act and the structure and operations of the Office of Technology' As~ sessment and just see where we are going. and where we have been. As we all know, the rapid proliferation of technology is having pro- foun'd effects on all of us. As Members of Congress, it is increasingly necessary for us to attempt to judge what that is going to do to us and so this situation, as you all know, led to the passage of the Technol- ogy Assessment Act, and the subsequent creation of the office. So, I am delighted to have this opportunity and I want to particu~ larly praise Chairman Teague for his interest in these oversight hear- ings. I think that he really saw the need to evaluate OTA `and to try to make some constructive changes. I was privileged to serve as a member of' the Board from 1975 to July 1977 and from January 1977 I was vice chairman of the Board. So today I would like to concentra,te my remarks to the Technology Assessment Board and the Advisory Council. These are two areas in which I feel that I have had significant experience and a~bout which I have firm convictions. I don't have any technical background, so I cannot discuss the merits of the OTA re- ports and I am going to leave that to you scientific gentlemen. But I would recommen.d strongly that the report of' `Chairman Teague-I would hope that this would be made a part of tbe record. Mr. THoRNToN. We have incorporated that by reference just this morning. Ms. HOLT. Very good. That is, I think, an outstanding evaltiation of what has happened and what we need to look at. And I certainly want my comments here to be construed as con- structive criticism and not a derogatory critique. Sometimes you have to yell and scream to get any attention at all and maybe I have done `a lot of that. But I do feel strongly about O'TA and I want it to be' developed into the kind of institution that can really do `some good and this is a critical period. It really is. It is small enough now, but we are seeing `it begin to proliferate. I think the biggest danger that I see is that OTA is becoming so prestigious. Mr. Daddario has really developed a tremendous shop over there and it is being recognized all over the world as being presti- gious. And because of that there is a `danger if it is used in a way that is not `positive. So the question that I think we have to look at is, is success going to spoil the OTM I think that there are certain actions that should be taken to try to prevent this. The future problems I see will occur because of OTA's growing reputation for timely, independent analyses. If the integrity and ob- jectives of the officers are to be preserved, then it is imperative that PAGENO="0219" 215 steps be taken to prevent the office from functioning as a simple ex- tei~sion of the committee staff or avoid becoming a vehicle for blunting or delaying the tough political decisions that should be made by the standing committees. A number of requests for assessments submitted by committee chair-~ men were justified on the basis of a heavy workload of the committee staff. We all sympathize with an overburdened committee `but I do not believe that assisting them with their normal work is or should be a proper role for the office. And that really is a great danger. Second, the question of mandated assessments must be dealt with. There are currently two public laws which mandate assessments by OTA and there are many more bills in the hopper which would do likewise. You run into budget problems, who is going to pay for' it, can a committee just say that the OTA has to do this study. So I hope this ~committee will consider ways in which OTA can be insulated from these pressures. It is really devastating to the budget and a grave dan- ger that the continued use of mandated assessments' will result in a ~system where technical legislation will routinely be expected to re- ceive a stamp of approval from OTA which', as you know is a very short step from advocacy. `And there is the big problem. Once this process becames institutionalized, the office will be required to adopt a position on legislation. I urge strongly that a mechanism be developed `to prohibit the continued use of mandated assessments. A related need is the development of a more precise definition of the term "technology assessment" and more specific criteria for Board ap- "proval of assessment requests. During my tenure on the Board there were a number of requests for analyses which seemed to bear no rela- tion to technology. I do not question the' need for the study but wonder if OTA is the appropriate organization to undertake these efforts. `Due to personal friendships, fear of offending the requesting chairman, ~or what-have-you, these' requests were generally approved and the' studies undertaken by the OTA staff. A more precise definition of the proper undertakings of the Office would be helpful in coping with this problem. There is, according to my experience, widespread dissatisfaction with the operation of the Technology Assessment Board. The most common complaint is that it is operating as'a joint committee rather than the Board ,of Directors of a corporation. I concur with this. An inordinate amount of time is spent discussing petty administra- tive matters which, in my judgment, could best be handled by the Di- rector. It is most difficult to get six House Members and six Senators to sit down in the same room at the same time; this problem is com- pounded when `they are expected to spend several hours discussing some obscure personnel matters. The Board should be responsible for setting the overall tone of the Office, for insuring that the needs of Congress are being met and for overseeing the general operations of the Office. Their responsibility of establishing broad policy directives should not be extended to the point where they oversee every detail of the implementation of such policy. ` PAGENO="0220" 216. Currently the Board must approve both. the initiation of an assess- ment and the release of the final report, I would recommend that these practices be retaine~,. It is extremely important that the Board act as a buffer between the Director and the OTA staff and the various committee chairmen. These approval requirements are an integral part of this buffer activity. A necessary duty of the Technology Assessment Board which has received too little attention is time development and implementation of a system to gage the quality and effectiveness of OTA reports~ There is not suffioient evaluation of the assessments, Based on the in- creasing number of requests and on the positive acceptance of sOme of its major efforts, it can be concluded that OTA is capable of turn- ing out a high quality product. This knowledge is reassuring, but it is no substitute for a formalized method of gaging and insuring quality. in the future. S I am not in the position to prop asystenmtoday, but let me state, that the Board by itself is not capable of deitermmmg quality, as most Qf us come fr~w nontechnical bacl~grounds. Thi~ is pe~rhaps an area where TAAO could properly assist the Board. At the present tin~e, we generally receive an. acknowledgment from the r~quest~ng committee, which contains some `type of routine statement of praise. I would hope that a more intensive system could be devised tQ provide a frank esti- mate of the assessment by the affected committe~ and other users, in- cluding private concerns. There is a danger that as `the prestige and size of the Office grow, it is: going to begin trading off quafltity and: qua1ity~an adequate quaLity control system ~hould be in effect before this begins. S S S S S / SS~ There has been some discussion of the proper composition of the Board-~-specjficaJly whether an all~eongressionai board should be re~, placed by one of. broader composition. I would urge this committee to seriously consider amending the act to provide for public representa-. tion on the Board. As you know, this structure was proposed in the original bill but changed on the House floor. There are a number of potential benefits which could, accrue from this structure, including tIme elimination of the current joint committee atnmQsphere and a reduced possibility of Board polarization by political party or Senate versus House. S S S S Another controversial subject has been time issue of Board: staff. Rule 12 of the rules of pro~e~ure permits the appointment of OTA staff members to serve as aides to the Board. It is my. under~~anding that most of the Senate membere and several of the House members have taken advantage of this mechanism to obtain, a professional staff member. S ` I urge the repeal of this rule. It is my contention that this system unnecessarily results in conflicting loyalties and in the long run will not serve the best interests of the Board or OTA. If the Board is to effectively fulfill its primar,y role of overseeing the Office, it cannot use staff members attached to the various functional programs It is both unreasonable and unfair to .expe~t such staff to serv~ two masters sunultalmeQusly If, in fact, staff are required, it would be far prefer- able to have them funded by OTA but attached to the Board member or members' offices rather than have them have a vested interest in an OTA program. S PAGENO="0221" 217 The Technology ~sse5s~nent~ Advi~ory C~onnel} ~iae ct~eated t~lffio~t as an afterthought when the House decided te elimmate the 3~OIt- congressional members from the Technology Assessment Board. in the act, TAAC is charged with theresponsibility of reviewing and making recommendations to the Board On OTA activitieS and the findings of any assessment and undertaking any additional tasks as directed by the Board. As in the case of the Board, I do not feel that anyOne is truly happy with the operation of TAAC and I feel that the responsibility for this * situation must rest with the Board. The simplicity of the statutory responsibilities of the ~ouucii is the underlying cause of some of the problems. They are charged with the responsibility of advising the Board; frankly, I do not believe that the Board quite knows what to do with them. The Board has, in my opinion, failed to adequately define the Ad- visory ~ouneil's role. They have alternated from giving them nothing of substance to do to the other extreme of ceding their own respon~- sibilities to the Council. .1 maintain that a happy medium exists whereby the Council can be given challenging and useful taskS and the Board can retain its own statutory duties. Mr. Chairman, it is no secret . that earlier this year I strongly opposed' proposals giving TAM) significant responsibilities in selectingtheir own members and the OTA Director. I do not intend to dwell at length on. this matter but let me stress that I think it is extremely unwise to permit TAAC to assume Board responsibilities. We must also exercise caution that the Council does not become excessively inbred or a self-perpetuating segment of the scientific community. In Chairman Teagu&s 19~T6 letter to Dr. Harold Brown there are five specific suggestions for appropriate undertakings by the Advisory c~tmciL. Gongi~essman Teague urges that the Council help the Board togetagrip'on~ The national research and development program. Identification of long-range assessments. Specific problem areas of such assessments upon which OTA might reasonably begin to coneentrate~ How other entities may be making use of technology assessment. The number and nature of the varying concepts of technology assessment; who holds which, what has their experience been in this area; how effective have they been; what lessons are in it for OTA. I concur with this list In addition, I think that the Council can and should play a maior role in assisting the Board and the Office in devising an adequate quality control system They also could be tapped to aid the Board in formulating an operational definition o~f technology asse~sment and drafting. criteria for reviewing assessment requests. There has been some d&scuesion of the compoition of the Advisory Council and the rOtation of Council members' terms. I urge that this not be subjected to detailed legislation or procedures. Attenipte to balance the Co~ia~til according to any criteria~-whether it be by geography, field of study, or what have-you-~-w'll ultimately result in instttn1uon~a~lized q~iotas~f some sort~ I ha~ve faith that the 1~oard knows wIu~t type of ~ice it needs an1~ wilL thns seLct~ a Cowicil which PAGENO="0222" 218 reflects these needs. `I fear that any attempt to mandate a balanced Council would result in an unnecessarily rigid structure which emphasizes form but not necessarily substance. The current law limits the Council members to a maximum of two `4-year terms. I support the retention of this restriction, as it will guarantee th'at the Mvisory body and alternately the Board is given the benefit of fresh insights which are so important, especially in the rapidly-changing world of technology. In conclusion, let me stress that the Council is a tremendous re- source composed of some of the finest scientific minds in the country. It is indeed unfortunate that it has not realized its full potential to date, but like OTA' itself its role is evolving and I have every hope that it will be strengthened in the future. ,I hope that the removal, of some of the `routine administrative burdens from the Board would give them more time for working with th~ Council. ~Again let me thank you, `audI really do appreciate your going into this. It is very important. Thank you. Mr. THORNTON. I do want to `thank you for `a very excellent state- ment. We are under some pressure for an early vote in the House. I do want to recognize Mr.' Wydler, `if `he has any questions or com- ments at this point before we recess. ` Mr. WYDLER. I just want to thank the `Congresswoman. `She~too'k some courageous action regarding the Board, at some personal ~ac- rifice. And I think this tended to dramatize the growing problem' with OTA. And `as a result, I think there has been a good shift in direction and I think the organization will be a better one as a i~esult of what she did. And I want to compliment you on yOur Courage3 " ` ` Ms. Hotp. Th'affk' you. ` Mr. WYDLER. I agree `with what `your statement says. Essentially, No. 1, we should let the director more or less run the administration of the organiz'ation' `and No. 2, we shouldget the Council `in the busi- ness for which, it was organized which is to give us what we lack: `sci- `entific view of the' `long-i~ange problem's facing our country. `That, I think, is why we put the Council there, because `we realized that `we would get plenty of input on the pressure's of each and every day from the Memb~rs of the Congress and the committee chairmen. ~What' we lacked wa~ a ~qurce of questions on what ~re were doiirg in areas we were not even thinking `about at the present time. And those are' the `things that `I think the scientific Lommunity, acting~ through the Coun- cil, can and should do~ `for the Bpard, give us an `insight into those problems so that we can direct some `of our "attention"and `the atten- tion of the Board to those problem's'as well. `" `Ms. HOUr. I thank the gentleman forMs kind words. ` Thank you, Mr. Chairman. , Mr. THORNTON. And we are in recess for 10 minutes.' [Recess.] ` ` ` ` Mr THORNTON The hearing will come to order At the time of the recess, we were just preparhtg to ask questions of our very distinOiflsbed witn~ss I would first l&e to say how much I appreciate the thoughtful and sOund suggestions?which are cOntained in `your"testhnony. `It shows PAGENO="0223" :219 a thorough analysis of the problems and the structure of OTA and the focus. of attention upon several of the matters which are of great mterest to this subcommittee. I think that the suggestion that it is. a faulty use of OTA simply to ~tssi'st various committees of Congr~ss in doing the work that is rou- trnely assigned to those committees is~ ,a very important suggestion. It seems to me that it would be far better for the Board formally to decide which public policy issue~ and areas are ~uit'abl'e for `a tech- nology `assessment and that the ]3oard should use its resources in pur- suing those broad and important national ~bjectives. Is that essen- tially what you are saying? Ms. flour. Yes, Mr. Cliairman. Two examples that come to mind that I remember hearing, one was a request for the study of demographic trends in education. That came from a `cOmmittee chairman who was "conce~ned about educa- tion and another was weather impacts on the Federal budget. This ëa'me from Budget Committee. They ha~e the Congressional 13udgOt Office. They have the Weather Bnre'au and the Census Bureau `at their disposal. I just do nOt see tha,t this is the kind of thing that we should be involving ourselves with. And we are going more and more in `that direction. The mandated studies that are contained' in legislation are' also `certainly letting the committee beg the issue of wh'at it `should be doing. Mr. `TIToRNPON. Of course that raises a `very serious and important question `because, like you, I think that the' office should be respon- sive to Congress and should pursue these broad policy objectives. And yet it is very difficult `for you' to know w'hat to do if you receive a legi'slative~ mandate to perform an assessment. i: ~an see, if you' suggest that this were to become widespread prac- tice, that you `~o'uld be `spending all of your time in `making `surveys `as `whethet or net you had the capability of giving proper attention to it. ` ` Ms. HOLT. Right. Mr. Chairman, and `at budget time you have no idea which stodies' are going to be mandated by the committees. ~So one possibility would be that if it is included in legislation, then that committee would have to bear the co'st of it, it would have to be in~ `eluded in the committee's budget rather than OTA's'budget. This `might discourage `them, because it. is gre'at to `say, well, I. `am going to send it over there and let them~ do the work. I feel that it has to be clarified, it has to be spelled out exactly who is going to pay for it, and the'guid'elines as to what will `be take'n up.. Mr. Tn:0RNT0N. I think that addresses the next point, and that is how do you go'about discouraging or `prohibiting the use of man~ate'd assessments and allocation of budget to the committee authorizing the legislation mightbe' such a means. .. , ,` ~Ms. HOLT. Well, I would think that you could spell out exactly what OTA was responsible `for. This would'preclude. anybody else dumping a `job on them as far as the budget is concerned. I do not. have the specifle `anCwers now. And I certainly did not come here as an expert.,' I came here~ to tell you about the problems and hope that you `will be able to think about' all these things and see if we. cannot coi~ up with a way to sOlve them. But I would believe that within the.act itself you eoiild' clearly `state what their guideihies are for ~tudies.'~A~4 the ~p- PAGENO="0224" 220 propriations Comithtte~ has certaiiily 1o~ked very c*th~fu1Iy at tIi~ budget, they are very ~aiiti~us about iriore~ashig it, and this would be a gooct point that I am sure they would like tokiio* about. Mr. THORN~tON. Cé~tainly I would ~ha~re, I thii±, with you the thought that the first task in ~eekmg a solution is to define the problem And you have been of great help tins ~norning in defining some of the problems of OTA. Ms. HOLT. Thank iou, Mr. Ohairman.. Mr. Thoni~o~. Mr. Brow±. Mr. Bnow~. Thank you, Mr. Ohairman. I want to join in your commendation. I think that the analysis niad~ by the witness is as helpful as any analysis we would possibly get. And. I am grateful for the work that! know it niust represent. As you know, Ms. Holt, I was inyseif greatly concerned about the point that you raise about defining technology assessment more pr~- cisely-not that I think we canever define it rigidiy, but our fa~lure to think about the limits of it has contributed t~ our problems as ~you so well pointed out in your own statement And I think, recognithi~ that probably we would get much disagreement about the exact defini- tion, we still ought to spend more of our time in tr~g to understand what it is that we are doing. if we do not understand~that we are going to get nowhere. And I think your own reaction has made this very clear. It leaves us floundering until we understand more precisely what we are doing. Ms. HOLT. I think the gentleman is absolutely rIght. And he i~ a vexy valuable member of the Board and certainly has pointed up many of those problems. I think one o~f the problems that we ran into is that we did not have anythmg to back up Our conCeri1s~ If we had had legislation or some statements by the initiating committee here, it would have strength- ened our backbone in trying to be able to call the shots on some o:f these things. But I certainly think that the gentleman from California has done a great job on the Board, and I know that he Is very cautious about approving the studies and does look at them very carefully. Mr. Bnow~. Ms. Holt, let me just take up one of the many points that you have covered so well here. When I first went on the Board, the question of this Board staff came ap. I was notfamiliar *ith. the rules atid practices at that time and did not undei~tand that there had been an informal agreement for each Board member to appoint a. I~oard staff and never availed myself of that opportunity, although I ~lid 1~nd most of the Senators and sothe of th~ 1{ot~se mernber~ wert3 doing that, in rea&ing the rule rather carefully, it seems to me that it actually provides for a Board staff :f~ the ~ankiuig Repubii~afl and Democrat of the house and the Senate The rest has len done outside of the rules arid as a concession to senior and respected members of the Bead ~c*~h~ n~edeti thIs eztit help. And it seems that we have never faced upto the problem that~ce are a~tlng without ber~eflt o1~ eier~y~ you ffiight say, in some of these loard staff sit~attonawlia~h really ~hotd4 b~x~te~t. Let me ask you t~L~ Eoi~ wouM yea react to abiding b~y the rule, ~ Board eta fo~ the rai~l~lt~g YIIbtiOaI~ anti Dei*o* PAGENO="0225" 221 House and the Senate which is four, and assigning specific responsibili- ties tothose four staff members so that they serve iii a lh~ison capacity with all of the Board members and briefing the Board member's staff and in other ways facilitating the work ot that Board member's office, but that we.notload~up the OTA budget with what could be a quarter of a million dollars expenditure or even more, depending on the salary level; fo~taff members attached to each Board~member who may work either in the' OTA office or in the~bardiuember'~ofi1~e'~' I d~ not even know what the pr~c'tice ison~that. Ms~ Hora~. I think that would be workable. It would be helpful to, have somebody whk was ncting as liais~n who' was available to all of the members. As you~ SO rightly pointed out, the rule is not completely understood, it has not been really clarified, there are a lot of questions about who appoints whom. We must exercise caution that OTA. em- p~Ioyees do not become so closely identified with a Board member and his legislative interests that it works to the detriment of the office. So it should be clarified, rule 12 should be looked at and spelled out more clearly. I think that we would abide by it more if we fully understood it. And that is the beauty of your having these hearings. All of these little practices are beginning to gr~w up now and I think if we just shake it up and get it squared away, that we will stop some of those problems before it does get out of hand, Mr. BROWN. I appreciate that comment. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Yeagcr. Mr. YEAGER. Mrs. I-Jolt has spoken here in considerable detail about the mandated studies. I think it might be appropriate at `this point to rnentio-n~ Mr. Chairman, that this has caused OTA a lot of administra~ tive difficulty, that there are legal problems connected with it, and that when Mr. DeSimone comes next week with the studies which have `been done' in this' direction, we will ask to incorporate those in the record at that point. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Ms. bit. Ms. boLT. `Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will stand in recess for 10 minutes. [Recess.] Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. I hardly know `how to' address our next witness whether as a dis- tinguished and esteemed former colleague instrumental in the develop- mentof `the legislation to esta'blis'h OTA or as former Vice Chairman of the Technology Assessment Board, or as our present Executive Director of the Science and Technology Committee Staff. But in all of those things, I would like to say that our next witness is a gentleman who has distinguished himself in his' knowledge and concern for science policy in the United States. And we are looking forward to your testimony. The Honorable Charles A. Mosher. CIIARLES ADAMS Mosusa "Retired" Member of Congress, now (for the 9~Sth Congress only) Ex- ecutive Director of the Science and Technology Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. 96-205-78-----15 PAGENO="0226" 222 Mosher was first elected to the Congress in 1960 from Ohio's 13th District and served eight consecutive terms (16 years), retiring voluntarily in January of 1977. He was for 14 years a very active me~nber of the Merchant Marine Commit- tee, ranking on the Oceanography Subcommittee. He was a member of the Stratton Commission (1967-69) which produced the major studies and recoin- mendations which have guided national policies for the oceans in recent years. A prime sponsor of the Office of Technology Assessment, Mosher served on the OTA Board for its first four years and as its first Vice Chairman in the 93rd Congress (1973-74). On September 1, Mosher returned to Capitol Hill full time, at the invitation of Chairman Olin E. Teague and by unanimous vote of the Science and Technol- ogy Committee, as that Committee's staff director for the remainder of this 95th Congress. Mosher is an Illinois native and graduate of Oberlin College, ci(m la'udo 1928. Until his election to Congress his professional career was in newspapers and commercial printing. STATEMENT 0]? CHARLES A. MOSHER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE STA]?]? Mr. MosliEn. `Those are very generous words, Mr. Chairman, and of course I appreciate that. You make me feel very self-conscious, however. In fact, I think that you and Mr. Brown now, as my new bosses, should know-I hesitate to reveal this to you, but I am a procrastinator. And up until about 9:30 this morning I was s~iIl scribbling these remarks and they are sort of hot off the Xerox machine. Mr. THORNTON. You have full authority to revise them even as you go. Mr. MosnEn. Well, I may do that. What I would like is permission to extend them for the record. Frankly, I had to quit before I finished what I would have liked to say. Mr. THORNTON. Without objection, your formal presentation to the committee will be made a part of the record with such amendments and additions as you feel appropriate. Mr. MOSHER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Brown, I continue to believe, enthusiastically, that the Office of Technology Assessment as originally conceived in this subcommittee was-and is-a concept which has extraordinary value. As I view it, there is an increasing, crucial need in our congressional decisionmaking for the services of an `OTA as originally conceived. In fact-as an aside-that crucial need exists well beyond the limits implied by the word "technology." I believe there is a much broader need for Members of Congress and for congressional committees to develop much more effective, systematic mechanisms than now now exist, to obtain, analyze, and present with clarity and impact the more adequate, significant information and expert advice required to identify and understand more clearly the options available to us and the probable consequences of our decisions. And that need is not at all limited to those congressional decisions which involve aspects of science and technology. I do recognize that your subcommittee at this point will not attempt to address that larger need; but nevertheless, I suggest it might be wise-while focusing on the OTA-~o be aware also that it could be and should be, if it succeeds, the precursor of an expanded arm of the Congress, to serve the larger need. PAGENO="0227" 223 From the beginning I have viewed the OTA as an important ex- periment, a worthy adventure-unprecedented-which would require a lot of difficult, persistent, trial-and-error learning experience. I hope this subcommittee is assessing the OTA's record to date, and its future, essentially in that perspective, as a most needed, potentially very val- uable learning experience which inevitably must evolve in something of a two-steps forward, one-step backward style, often a frustrating experience, but well worth adequate and persistent support. I often have referred publicly to the OTA as "groping and troubled," but I meant that in the sense that all of our national experience con- stantly is groping, and frequently troubled. I suspect that is an inher- ent mark of a free people, that necessarily we progress by pragmatic effort, by trial-and-error learning. The OTA is, I am convinced, a very extraordinary example of this congressional groping in the very best sense of that term, a very creative initiative born and nutured in this subcommittee. And it is completely appropriate that this committee now review very thoroughly the first 4 years of the OTA experiment. It is impera- tive that your review be much more than routine, because the OTA's own uniqueness deserves very special attention. I hope you will not hesitate to offer hard but constructive criticism, and to recommend specific fundamental changes on the OTA, if you determine they are needed. I believe the possibility of your proposing needed amendments to the basic act should be considered very real. You may have noted my earlier emphasis on the OTA concept as originally conceived and shaped by this committee. I do want to dis- tinguish that rather pristine proposal of 1970 from the OTA as it ac- tually came into being in 1973. Paraphrasing Broadway, I must say that a "funny thing" happened to our OTA bill on its way through the forum. After many months of very careful consideration and creative shaping in this committee, it then was cruelly ambushed-a not so very funny thing-on the floor of the House, and so seriously injured there that, in my view, it never has recovered fully. The OTA which ultimately came into bein~, compromised and flawed as the result of that trauma in the House, is essentially different from that which was proposed by this committee. Audit is my personal belief that you now should consider seriously the possibilities-including some very difficult political realities-of at- tempting again to reshape the OTA in some ways nearer to the likeness of this committee's original proposal. Our original bill was ambushed by a floor amendment which in effect would have made the OTA simply another House-Senate joint com- mittee operation. The House amendment specified that the OTA would be governed by a Board composed solely of `Congressmen and specifi- cally controlled by the majority party members. The purpose seem- ingly was to make the OTA largely an instrument of the majority party leadership. In sharp contrast, as the bill came out of this committee to the House floor-before that ambush-it provided for a mixed Board composed of two House Members and two Senators-one minority and one majority from each House-plus four members of the public, plus the Comptroller General, the Director of the Congressional Research Service, and the OTA Director, a total of 11 members, all eligible to PAGENO="0228" 224 vote. Earlier, as originally written, tue 1)111 had provided for 13 members, the other two being from the 1)UbliC. The original intent clearly was that the Board should have a very large degree of independence from the day-to-day congressional pull and haul. It would serve oniy the Coiigress but at a sort of arm's-length distance, a degree of autonomy which would encourage the OTA to be as objective as possible in all its efforts. In our thinking, there was a very great emphasis on the importance of "public members" who presumably would be exceptionally eminent citizens with long and successful experience and knowledge in the management of important science and technology activities. They were to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.. The intent was to avoid any semblance of an ordinary congressional joint committee operation. But as amended, the OTA bill went to the Senate. requiring that the Board would be. essentially a joint House-Senate Committee. No members would be appointed from outside. Then in the Senate and the conference committee, the bipartisan balance of the Board membership was regained, but all of the 13oard still would he Coiigressmen-.six Representatives, six Senators-as they are today. And in a rather desperat e effort to bring in some strong expertise. from the outside-as originally desired by your com- mittee-there was cre.ated by the act as finally approved the 10-member Advisory Council to be appointed by t.he. Board. Those compromises and accommodations, stemming directly from that surprise amendment voted by the. FToiise~ thus created a troika arrangement-consisting of the. Board, the Office of Technology As- sessment~ and the Advisory Council-a very uneasy troika arrange- ment which has produced unfortunate difficulties and frustrations for all concerned. None of those three elements ever has been able to establish a comfortable effective working relationship with the others in the triangle. I know it caiì be. argued that. the. statute spec~ficaliy defines the role of TAAC-the Council-as no more than advisory to the Board. But the fact is, we appoimited some exceptionally dlist.ingu~5hed a.nd strong members to the Council. The addressed their OTA responsi- bilities with enthusiasm and conviction. They have proved willing to sacrifice an amazing amount. of time and energy from personal sched- ules always crowded with other important responsjhiiit~es~ to be of service to OTA. And in the absence of any very clear or important mandate. in the statute, or from the Board, it. was inevitable that ti~e.se very hmowleclge.able, creative Council meml)eFS-flloSt of them far more exper~enced in science and technology policy diecisions, and un- doubtedly with a clearer perceptiomu than most Congressmen have of the meaning and potential of technology assessment-it was inevitable that these restless Council members would be willmg and anxious to make their efforts count, to be. a much more active~ innovat.lve group than either the Board or the OTA staff were ready or able to accommo- date. Personally, I salute with admiration and respect. the conscientious efforts of the TAAC members to help in so many important ways to shape. and st.reugthe~n our OTA experiment. I suspect it has been a frustrating experience for most. of them most of the time. PAGENO="0229" 22~ The Council's role still is not at all clearly defined. The Director, the staff, and the Board all are still groping uneasily and ineffectively to establish how they can best relate to the Advisory Council. There is good will among all concerned, a genuine but frustrated desire to work well with each other. But I suspect this troika is inherently a poor arrangement; and especially for any OTA Director, it will continue to be most difficult, a serious handicap. Therefore, I suggest that your committee give priority attention t~ those difficulties inherent in that troika, somehow to define much more precisely and wisely the respective roles and authorities of the Board, the Director, and the Council. I even will presume to suggest that you give very serious attention to the possibility of dissolving by statute both the Board and Council as they now exist, and creating instead one mixed body, the Board, composed of both congressional and public members, somewhat similar to the Board proposed in this committee's original OTA bill. But I assume the number of Board, members would then be more than 11., If that could be accomplished, then there would exist a less com- plicated and potentially much more productive relationship between the Board and the Director. I believe the OTA and the Congresa would benefit from such a change. The expertise of the outside public' members would be put to direct use within the Board, rather than being as now largely lost in the Council. Citizens of such eminence who are selected and willing to assist the OTA deserve *a direct, responsible, effective role-the Congress needs to use their services most efficiently. But whether or not the troika arrangement is ended or somehow effectively clarified, there is a need, as I believe several others have testified, to give the Director more autonomous authority in the man- agement of the OTA. I agree with those who say the Board has been involved too much in the management details. The Board should be more concerned with broad policy guidance hut entrust the imple- menting details to the Director and staff. And I also agree with Chair- man Teague's proposal that the Board name a small Executive Com- mittee which would handle much of the small detail decisions which may still be necessary. If the present Council and Board were combined into one body, a new Eoard of perhaps 19 members-suggestion: 4 from House, 4 from Senate, S public members, the Comptroller, the Director of ORS, the Director of CBO-the.n probably it would be wise for that body to use small subcommittees for specific limited tasks, and meet as a whole only three or,four times per year. I repeat, for emphasis, my strong belief that the Office of Technology Assessment, the Director and professional personnel, should have mor~ autonomy, should not seem so much in the role of staff for the Board, not so similar to the staff of a joint committee of the Congress. The OTA, to really fulfill its very important and different mission needs a greater degree of indepen&~nee, of instdat~ion from the immediate, short-term pressures of congressional politics, a greater opportunity to take the longer look. In that regard, I also agree with Chairman Tea~ue that rule 19 of the OTA 13oard~s rules of procedure probably should be voided. That rule, pIns the very explicit informal understanding within the Eoard PAGENO="0230" 226 which occurred, Mr. Brown, during the very first organizational meetings of the Board-when the rule was adopted, allows every mem- ber of the Board to place his or her own staff person on the OTA pay- roll. Several Board members have used that privilege and others have not, several have felt strongly that rule 12 is not wise. And I am one of those who feels that way. The results have been very spotty and complicating. Obviously, there is ever present the potential for divided loyalties and only partial use of limited OTA personnel funds. That rule 12 certainly deserves to be at least reconsidered very carefully and genuinely. At this point in my preparation, Mr. Chairman, I had to come in here. I was going to discuss some other matters and I appreciate your granting me the privilege to extend my remarks into some of these other areas. Conscious of the question that Mr. Brown asked of Ms. Holt, if rule 12 has to exist at all, I think it would be very wise, sir, to limit it in the way that you-Mr. Brown-suggested, and it might then be very useful. It is true that there is need for some very competent day- to-day liaison, some sort of arrangement between the Board and the Office, and that might be one way to do it, as you suggested. Mr. BROWN. Could I just followup on that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Yes, please proceed, Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. I raised that question because of my own experience both as an OTA member and as a subcommittee chairman. I have found that it is almost mandatory for the effective functioning of a subcommittee here in the 1-louse that the subcommittee staff devote a reasonable part of its time to close liaison with the staff of the mem- bers of the subcommittee but that the staff not be physically located or assigned to the members of the subcommittee, but serve as a strong subcommittee staff and recognize that a part of their function is that liaison. In my experience-and I am sure other members have shared that- I have served on subcommittees in which there was not that adequate liaison, in which the members were not well prepared by prior brief- ings as to the intent of subcommittee meetings or oversight iniIiatives or other things of that sort, and in which the subcommittee therefore did not function as well as it should. And we have difficulties, as you are well aware, in getting subcommittees to function effectively any- way, because of the multiplicity of demands upon the members. So, the model that I was searching for-and I am not sure that any model is perfect-is a small Board staff not more than explicitly set forth in rule 12, which would only call for four, whose function will be to create that effective liaison with the congressional Board members if we continue with the congressional Board and who would be physi- cally located in the OTA office and under the direction of the OTA Director, and not merely an additional adjunct to a particular mem- ber's staff. Mr. M0SHER. I think that is a very valuable suggestion. Mr. THORNTON. I would like to inquire, Mr. Mosher, what else you were planning to tell us. Mr. MOSH~R. I was going to emphasize some of the same things that others have emphasized. I think there is a need in OTA for better mech- anisms to insure quality control. Also there is a need to escape from PAGENO="0231" 227 the tendency to respond to too many short-term pressures, to do short-term assessements, a need for greater emphasis on long-range assessments. I have been impressed with the comments of Prof. Gene Skolmioff of MIT and I am sure you are aware of them, starting on page 55 of this Senate committee print, concerning the Commission on the op- eration of the Senate. I suggest that this is mandatory reading by all members pf your committee. Frankly, I think that this Senate report is of much greater value than the earlier critique by the House Committee on Information, if I may express that personal view. By the way, I suppose I should have said at the start, Mr. Chairman, that all of my coi-nments today are strictly personal views. I have to avoid any suggestion that this represents the position of any other member of this committee staff. I am in sort of an odd position.. Mr. THORNTON. We understand that. We are calling on you for your personal views based on your experience. And I understand that that is what you are giving us. Mr. MOSITER. One thing that I was goi]~g to emphasize is that I com- pletely agreed with the policy that we adopted in the Board and in the office of OTA at the very start, that we should take a low profile, that we should not make the mistake of exaggerated promises and unduly raising expectations of what OTA would accomplish. I think all of us agreed that if we. achieve any reputation, that it should be based on actual perform~ince, on the success of the OTA, in other words, that we should crawl before we walk and walk before we runs and the recognition that all this would take time. Mr. Skolnikoff emphasizes the extreme importance from now on that OTA develop a reputation, an earned reputation for substance and honesty and objectivity in the quality of its performance. I do not think these two points are inconsistent. I think we were wise to adopt a low profile from the start, but I think the building of a good reputation is a crucial need from now on, to be emphasized as we are anticipating the appointment of a new Director. And I hope in response to constructive suggestions from this committee. even the OTA statute might be changed to insure a more effective OTA and therefore an earned reptttation for quality performance. But there is a tremendous opportunity here for doing, as Skolni- koff emphasizes is to important, for achieving greater confidence in OTA within the Congress and more awareness within the Congress of what OTA can do and should do. Our profile has been really so low that an overwhelming majority of the Members of Congress as yet really do not understand, I think, what OTA is all about. And I guess it is time that that situation should be improved. I think for one thing we have to overcome is the understandable skepticism of the Appropriations Committee. That developed and was very apparent even when our OTA bill first came to the floor of the House. I was managing the bill on our side of the aisle and I was very conscious that all of a sudden the minority members of the Ap- propriations Committee realized that here mi~ht be created a sort PAGENO="0232" 228 of Frankenstein, an OTA creature that might grow so ra~pidly and require so much money that they were seared of it, So they then resisted it -on the floor, and `I think there has always been a residue~of that type -of skepticism and resistence as we approach the Appropriations Committee each year. It is very apparent in the fact that the appropriations -for OTA have been, I think, stridtly minimal, have not been adequate to do the larger job expected of us. ~Then finally, I was going to mention the obvious problem of the lack ~of adequate office space and meeting facilities. Tt has just been scandalous the fragmented and scattered way that the staff has been stuck around in various cubby holes and scandalous, I think, the crowded sort of hectic way that-the Board has bad to meet-over -there in -room E-100. There has to be created a much more favorable physical environ- ment in which the OTA can and should do the job expected Qf it. Mr. THORNTON. The structuring of an institution which is re- sponsive to Congress is a matter of great constitutional difficulty, as you well know. And several means have been ern~pioyed to try and accomplish that. -One means is, the joint `committee or committee made up of congressional representatives. The danger with this ap- proach -is that such an institution, unless it provides -for periodic change of membership, or other methods of assuring that the members are interested in the -programs of Congress as .a whole, that the in- stitutions' interest~ will follow the interest of several Board members ~rather than seeking the broad interest of Congress as a whole. Do you perceive this as a problem? Mr. MOSHER. I think OTA thus for has had difficulty -in escaping -that -danger. I think we all who have been close to OTA recognize -that early on, certainly in the first 2 or 3 years, the Board's identifica- tion of assessments to be accomplished was rather directly the result of individuals, particularly individual Senators, important, power- ful voices in the Senate, who insisted that their pet project should bea first priority of the Board. And 1 think that was a natural thing. But it is a danger that in- creasingly shou-ld be avoided with -a more independent Board. Mr. THORNTON. Is it -possible to ?have a breakdown of the assess- ments that the Board has approved `and that OTA has accomplished which would identify the assessments, not only by subject matter which `is obvious, hut by who has requested them and the result of them. Mr. MOSHER. Those of us who were earlier on the Board could, I am sure, in~ormally. At least-iand it might `be entharassing at ti-n~es----~- Mr. TaTOENTON. I am not talking -about identifying particularly individuals, I am talking about addressing subjeetmatters and seeing just exactly how this flowed. Mr. MosuE~. Phil Ycager and others could perform that type of stn~iy. Mr. THORNTON. I think that would be very useful information for our snbcommittee to have. Mr. MOSHER. I think you cannot--.-I don't think history should avoid the role that individuals play. Mr. THORNTON. I understand. PAGENO="0233" 229 Mr.. MOSHER... And.in the original OTA, in its early days, each mem- ber had his own. hobby horse and interest, and all. were very real and very sincere in their understanding, and I suppose in a way this was very needed and helpful in getting off the ground, in determining what the beginning priorities should be. And it is a fact also that each member of the original Board really was, given the anthority to sort of select personally one member of the Advisory Coun'eil~ that is the way the make up of the Advisory Council' came into being. I think the selections largely were superb, but you can identify each member on the Advisory Council witli~ that BOard member whose man he was looked., upon as being, at the start. Mr. TJrORNTON. Going on with the question of structuring an institu- tion which is' designed to be responsive to congressional' inquiry, other means have been employed. The other extreme and what I think is probably the most constitutional means of developing an agency which is both independent and yet responsive- to Congress, is that which was used in establishing the General'Accounting Office ;. namely, by provid- ing a longterm from which the head of that Olilcecould not be removed except by the legislative branch, with a salary that could not be changed and not eligible to succeed himself. This is to take- from. him those ele- ments which would cause his allegiance to flow from `someone. having power of appointment or changing circumstances, except the legisla- tive branch and; then. imposing certain checks audi reins of responsibility from the Congress to the organization. Mr. MOSHER. But at the same time giving him the authority he needed to run, the show. Mr. THORNTON. At the same time focusing in him the fnli authority to run the show and to be responsible for and accountable for the performance of the organization. And this troika arrangement which you describe would seem to compound' the difficulties which might be inherent by having. one board and another advisory council and then a director. Mr. M0SHER.. And that arrangement `was strictly an afterthought, of course, not seriously considered~,really-. It was not part of the think-' ing of this eommi~tee in the months and, really,. years that were dedi- cated to' shaping the original concept.. Mr. THORNTON. We could pursue the structure- at great length. I d& want to yield to other subcommittee members. Mr. Hollenbeck. Mr. IIQLLF~NBEC~. I will pass, Mr. Chairman, at this point and yield to Mr. ~rown, who has been here. Mr. THORNTON.. Mr; Brown. Mr. BROWN.. Mr. Mosher,, I would like- to explore a little bit one of the initial points that you made with regard to the larger need which is represented only in part by the Technology Assessment Board. I think that larger need to which' you refer as. ~.ou have described it, is sometimes designated as a policy planning function or strategic policy . aualysis,~ a heig~range policy planning and analysis function, a multitude of names Thai basioally it is a foresight kind of capability wch obviously the Congress has not enjOyed as fully as it should. More and. more the need. for that function is recognized by our im~ portant bureaucracies, both public and private, and most major cor- porations include that as part of their top management structure. PAGENO="0234" 230 Agencies such as the Defense Department have their Rand Corpora- tion or their other institution which engaoes in that sort of activity. And that is not the role for a Library of bongress which is a reposi~ tory for information or a General Accounting Office which is an analyst for an ongoing activity. And yet the OTA is not mandated to perform that way except in the limited sphere of technology. Tech- nology, of course, can be broadly or narrowly defined but rarely is it defined to encompass all political activities or all of the problems of society. Part of our problem in the Board has arisen from the fact that many members share with you the feeling that we need this capability, we recognize that the OTA is not structured, and probably would not have been created if it had been structured, to perform that broader role. It would not have been germane to this committee, for example, to report out legislation which provided for that broader role. I have frequently brought up the question of how do we circum- sáribe or define the technology assessment flow per se, partly because I knew we needed this broader role, an dl did not want to have a confusion exist between the narrower concept and the broader role, even though almost instinctively we tend to broaden the scope of an assessment as we perceive the problem that needs to be addressed. We have somewhat of that function in the Congressional Budget Office, but it again is a limited type of a thing. I sometimes think that we get better policy analysis, long-range planning studies out of institutions such as Brookings Institution, or something of that sort, than we do out of any other of our many instrumentalities. And that is not an arm of the Congress, nor is it particularly `responsive to our needs. Mr. Mosin~n. Could I interject right there? Mr. BROWN. I want you to interject. I am sort of trying to stimu- late you to interject. Mr. Mosher, I assume all members of the sub- committee probably are aware of a proposal `called the Institute for Congress which, as I understand it, is designed specifically to provide that service, that larger service which you and I `both are talking about and which you have just defined eloquently. I think the need is real. I have been inclined to be very favorably disposed toward that idea of the Institute for Congress. You know our former col- league, Martha Griffith of Michigan is chairman of the Board. And Alton Frey has been a prime promoter of it. And their efforts are to create a sort of a think tank, a Rand `Corporation to do what you are saying. But the only consumer of its services would be the Con- gress. It would be designed to serve only the Congress but funded at the start completely outside the Congress by voluntary contribu- tions from foundations. I have heard that they now have something like a million dollars contributed but they would need more than that to really go into, business. At the request of one of the foundatiOns, I examined that proposal rather carefully once and compared it wi:th' OTA. The similarities of the concepts are striking. And I felt, that if the Institute for the Congress ever actually came into being, inevitably at some point Congress would merge it with OTA and they would not have two such parallel institutions. PAGENO="0235" 231 But there were some aspects of the proposal that worried me. I felt it would become much more quickly a political instrument, sort of part of and completely compromised by the congressional process, more so than OTA has ever been. And I think OTA has done remarkably well to stay clear of becoming merely the instrument of the leadership, or of any other partisan force. As I understand it, at the very start of every year or of every Congress, the Institute for Congress as now con- ceived would have an agenda established by a congressional com- mittee made up of the speaker and of the chairman of certain com- mittees and I can see some difficulty in that. But I am merely trying to say that this committee probably should look at that concept as it exists on paper and consider some aspects of it. Mr. BROWN. I think that is a wise suggestion. I am not belaboring this broader role for the purpose of suggesting that OTA play that broader role, because, as I indicated, I think if we present legislation to achieve that to the Congress it would fail. Mr. MOSHER. Yes. Mr. BROWN. What I am trying to suggest is that we perceive that goal and see how it relates to the OTA so that we may sort of chart a path to ultimately achieve such need as it is perceived by the Congress. Mr. MosnEn. I suggested in my remarks, I think OTA can play a tremendous-has an opportunity to play a tremendous role in per- forming as a precursor to show the way~ Mr. BROWN. Precisely. Mr. MOSHER [continuing]. To what we are talking about. Mr. BROWN. If we can do the job which you and others have dis- cussed, over the longer range, policy studies which are legitimately within the science and technology area-and they are many and broad-I think it will become clear from the excellence of this work and its contribution to the needs of the Congress that we would benefit from having a broader role. I could give an example, perhaps, most easily in the defense area where we go through generations of policy, defense policy change, as we get new technologies. Billy Mitchell and the airplane, for example. The new strategy of deterrence based upon a nuclear triumvirate, the submarine, the bomber and the missile. This is military strategy that could not have been con- ceived `of a generation ago, stemming from a new technology that has developed. There are many areas in which basic policy changes, man- dated by technological developments must occur. And we must do those well in order to create the awareness that this is an important function. Mr. MOSHER. Much of my own thinking, much of my own present attitude on these matters is rooted in and inspired by the conviction I have come ito_and I think it is obvious to all of us-that really in our processes of self-government, representative government, even after 200 years, I think we are still at a rather rudimentary stage. I think we still are neophytes as decisionmakers in some ways, and particularly as related to policy for the uses of science and technology, because we really only got into that phase since World War II. But I think that-and this gives me hope and excites me-I think we are just on the threshold of a new century of revolutionary develop- ment in learning how to govern `ourselves. And I think it is, as all life is for me, a learning process. And I see that as really the essential ex- PAGENO="0236" 232 ?perience of the American people, a learning process, and we still are `at it. And I think we can just glory in that, it should excite us. And OTA was born in that type of excitement and should continue to ~thrive. in that. Mr. BROWN. That attitude explains why you have been such a good `member of Congress and of the OTA Board. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. Mr. Yeager, do you have any questions? Mr. YEAGER. I wanted to note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that, as `Senator Kennedy has indicated in his statement, OTA begins this month to move into new quarters. For the first time all its divisions will be together. Of course that does not solve the problem of the Board as to where it is going to meet. One other thing, Mr. Chairman, in line with the questions about as- sessments, the numbers of them where they caine from and the evalua- tion of them. We do have planned `staff work to look at the esteem in which they have been held by those who requested them. Also we hope for a substantive evaluation to be made by some expert outside group which has not as yet been determined. Mr. Mosi-IER. Could I make just one further comment, Mr. Chairman. ~1r. THORNTON. Go right, ahead. Mr. Mosi-IER. I definitely am not one of those who insists that we try to establish some narrow definition of the phrase "technology assess- ment," or even of a focused role for OTA. I fully recognize the point that Mr. Brown has made, that it is important to have some clear idea of the priorities, of what OTA is supposed to do. But I would like to steer clear of too much discussion about definitions, and how many angels can dance on the point of a pin, trying to say too precisely what OTA has to mean, or precisely what methodology is implied by the phrase "technology assessment." As I remember it, Mr. Yeager coined that phrase. And sometimes I think it was a mistake. I quite often resent `the limitations of that phrase. And the tendency, I think in some quarters, not here in the Congress but in some quarters around the world, is `to create a sort of "cult" ~clustering around that phrase, another sterile esoteric dialog over methodology and definitions and so forth. And I think it is terribly important that we in the Congress avoid any such "cultism" or in- ~sistence on narrow defini'tions and a narrow viewpoint of methodologies. Mr. THORNTON. I want to thank you for that observation. Obviously, the labeling of anything tends to cause the thing labeled to shape itself into the thing which the label describes, unless we are very careful. And I, personally, think that the words are about as good as any. But I doiiYt think we should get drawn into an overly technical discussion as to exactly what those words mean. Mr. MOSHER. I have not thought of a better phrase, I would say that. Mr. THORNTON. I was hoping that you might suggest one. Mr. MOSHER. No, that is dangerous business. Mr. TI-IORNTON. I want to thank you again for your excellent testi- mony and this hearing is now adjourned. [Whereupon at 11:50 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:10 a.m., Wednesday, October 12, 1977.] PAGENO="0237" REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT WEDNESflAY, OCTOBER 12, 1977 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGt, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee reconvened, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2316, Rayburn I-louse Office Building, Hon. Ray Thorn- ton, chairman of the subcommittee, and Hon. George E. Brown, Jr.. (acting chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Mr. ThoRNToN. The hearing will come to order. Today's hearings are designed principally to acquaint the subcom- mittee with the views of the agencies which, under the OTA statute, have a special liaison relationship with OTA: the ~ongressiona1 Re- search Service, the General Accounting Office and the National Science Foundation. An additional relationship exists with the Congressional Budget Office, provided by a different law. Two of our witnesses t.oday and tomorrow, the heads of CRS and GAO, are also members of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. I would like to introduce at this time Dr. Gilbert Gucle, ~vith ~hom I had the privilege of serving as a colleague in the house, a very dis- tinguished gentleman, bringing great leadership to his role as Director of the. Congressional Research Service. Mr. Gude, I would like to ask you tocome forward. We have received your excellent prepared statement, and without objection that statement will be made a part of the record verbatim.. I would like to ask you to summarize it at this time. You may proceed. [The. prepared statement and biographical sketch of Dr. Gilbcrt Gude follows:]. TESTIMONY BY GILBERT GUDE, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Mr. Chairman, it is with great pleasure that I accept this opportunity to ap~ar before this Subcommittee to testify concerning implementation of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972. It was just five years ago that the President signed Public Law 92-484 creating the OTA. As a Member of this body I had the priv- ilege of voting for tile I-louse bill leading to that Act. I followed Implementation of that Act in over four years as a Member of tile House; for the last nine months I have been more directly involved as Director of the Congressional Research Service and as a statutory member of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. Iii tile remarks that follow, I shall draw mainly on my observations and experience hi the latter two roles. I will focus on my activities and those of these two organizations to implement the Act, and not on the performance or products of the Office of Technology Assessment per se. (233) PAGENO="0238" 234 ronowing a brief review of the present status of CRS, I will present to you our understanding of the concepts and practices of policy analysis and technology assessment followed by some comparisons of the respective styles of the comple- mentary operations of CR5 and OTA. I will then discuss TAAC; comment on possible changes in the relationship among OTA, CBO, GAO, and CR5-which on the whole are really very good-; and then conclude with some ideas re- sulting from these combined experiences for you to consider for changes and Improvements in the Technology Assessment Act. From the way I state that, you can properly conclude that from the time of many of the preliminary activities leading to passage of the Act to today, I am a strong supporter of the concept of technology assessment as an essential ap- proach in improving the basis upon which the Congress can be informed and can make decisions about the increasingly complex and ever-changing issues involv- ing technology. Regardless of how one defines technology, its pervasiveness means that "technology" includes most of the issues corning before the Congress. I will not attempt here to define technology beyond noting two points. First, we subscribe to the definitions of technology issued by this Committee in its pub- lication "Science Policy: A Working Glossary"-after all, we worked with you in its preparation. Second, note that we use technology in a broad sense to in- clude the so-called "soft" and social technologies in addition to the more usual connotation involving physical objects and science and engineering matters. We believe this is in harmony not only with the foregoing mentioned definitions but also with the legislative interest and subsequent implementation of the Tech- nology Assessment Act which is the object of this hearing. CR5 TODAY First, as to CRS today-the Congressional Research Service is the only con- gressional support agency that provides analysis, research, and information to every element of the congressional community. We do this in virtually every area of public policy and subject interest and we work for every Member of Congress; we work for all Senate and House committees, most joint committees, most of the subcommittees of the two Houses, and the staffs of all these elements. CRS also serves the staffs of various other specialized groups of Congress and provides substantial support to three sister agencies: the General Accounting Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Congressional Budget Office. The Service regularly tailors its work to the specific need of a given Member or committee. In contrast to our three sister agencies, we work under deadlines in virtually everything we do to support the policy and legislative work of Congress. The Congressional Research Service is the department within the Library of Congress that works exclusively as a research arm for Members, committees, and their staffs. In addition to rendering a great diversity of reference services, CRS staff provide background reports, bill analyses, analyses of alternative legislative proposals, assistance in hearings and other phases of the legislative process, factual statements, bibliographs, graphics, translations, assistance with public opinion polls and other types of surveys and with identifying and assessing long-range goals and objectives, analysis of emerging issues, and trend data. The Service also sponsors and conducts workshops and seminars on public policy issues. For this fiscal year of 1978 we have a budget of $21,795,000 (including $600,500 for contracting) and 813 budgeted positions almost all of which are currently filled. The Service's research divisions are responsible for providing the bulk of CRS's policy analysis and legal research in response to congressional inquiries. In fiscal year 1977 the seven divisions responded to more than 76,800 such requests and accounted for approximately 80 percent of the research time expended by the Service in its support of Congress. Our research divisions include American Law, Economics, Education and Public Welfare, Environment and Natural Resources Policy, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Government, Science Policy Research, and Senior Specialists. In addition to projects that are undertaken by single Divisions, the Service is also asked to undertake projects that require multidisciplinary treatment and therefore require inter- divisional efforts which often include the leadership and/or participation of senior specialists. CRS interdivisional teams vary in size, organizational struc- ture and life span according to mission-our energy team, for example, numbers PAGENO="0239" 23~3 29 from 9 divisions while our team addressing congressional concerns in refer- ence to the Panama Canal numbers only five members from two divisions. Currently, 0115 has twelve permanent interdivisional teams, with the follow- ing number of research and other divisions represented: Civil Rights (s), Ex- ecutive Branch Reorganization (8), Federal-State Information Exchange (5), Food & AgrIculture (9), Futures (9), Energy (9), HOusing (7), Oceans (7), Regulatory Issues (9), Women's Issues (8), Taxation (5, and Information Poli- cies and Practices (7). Teams of some duration are the Futures Group, established four years ago to deal with futures research and forecasting aud a new interdivisional team On oceans represents our long-term commitment to several committees and mem- bers in 1~he important area of the complexity of problems associated with oceans and the law of the sea. In fiscal year 1977 we responded to more than 294,000 inquiries. That means an average of about 1,200 per day, 21/2 per minute, I every 24 seconds. The total in fiscal year 1977 was one percent more than the requests cleared the previous fis- cal year. But these numbers tell only part of the story. In every year since 1970, members and committees have asked CBS not only for more work, but also for more analytical work. That kind of a job is far more time-consuming than the average factual information request. We calcu- late that 13 percent of our inquiries involving analytical work tOok about 68 percent of our total research time in fiscal year 1977. In other words, the product of CRS has changed. We continue to maintain and sophisticate our fast information capability, but our capability to deliver in-depth research and policy analyses has been greatly enhanced due to the interest and concern of Congress in this area. Furthermore, while CBS's work for committees has gone up significantly in recent years, we still spend more time on Members' than on committees' re- quests. And at the same time the increased time devoted to committee service has in turn greatly enhanced our capability to supply both analysis and information to every Member of t~ie House and Senate, to all committees and subcommittees, to joint committees, and to a more limited degree to our sister congressional information agencies, CEO, GAO and OTA. As you well know, CBS has grown considerably since passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-510; 84 Stat. 1140, Oct. 26, 1970). The House Rules Committee report on the Act (House Report 91-1215) June 17, 1970, stated its expectation that "~ * * the CRS * * * triple it sstaff by 1975." A gradual build-up in resources was expected to accompany this expansion over the five-year period. Subsequent decisions restrained this growth somewhat so that from fiscal year 1971 through fiscal year 1975, the staff almost doubled (increased almost 94 percent) and our budget increased about 136 percent. A major part of this Increase was devoted by CRS to fulfilling its responsibil- ities to undertake objective, nonpartisan policy analysis for all elements of the Congress. Specifically, CBS was given responsibilities to assist committees "u * * in the analysfs, appraisal, and evaluation of legislative proposals * * * [by] (a) determining the advisability of enacting such proposals; (b) estimating the prob- able results of such proposals and alternatives thereto; and (e) evaluating alter- native methods for accomplishing those results * * *" (See Public Law 91-510, Sec. 321(d) (1)). Additional policy analysis and research responsibilities were embodied in language giving the Service responsibility for undertaking more self-initiated work, and for providing committees with lists of terminating programs and emerging issues. The Service uses as a rough gauge of its substantive work for Members and committees a count of "major projects." Twelve percent more major projects were underway this year than in fiscal year 1976. By source, 609 projects were in process at the request of committees and subcommittees, 159 at the request of Senators and Representatives, and 268 on an anticipatory basis. Major projects served 65 percent of all committees and 35 percent of all subcommittees. Of the 620 projects competed, 22 percent appeared in a committee print or other con- gressional document, 12 percent provided hearings and other legislative assist- ance, 17 percent resulted in CRS muitiliths, 44 percent provided analytical and background reports on a diversity of legislative issues, and 5 percent were de- voted to issue briefs. PAGENO="0240" 236 During 1~sca1 year W7Z the Servtee continued to develop ~nU u~ Innovative automated techuiqu~s to maintain timely and respox~sive seflice in the face o~ the myriad doinaii~ls on tts staff and resources X~ey accom~lshuients in Improving CR5 iufor~nation delivery through computer based files included con version to a computer.eupported photocomposition process for the production of the printed "Bfl.l I~igest," on-line integration of the Legislative Indexing Vocabulary with the automated legislative and `bibliographic dice, increased distribution of Issue briefs from the Major Issues System, and automated produc- tion in "Major Legislation of the P4th Congress." Other significant developments were creation of the Research Notification System, development of microfiche files to enable photocopies of cited articles to be provided more e~fflclentiy to subscribers, and an Increased utilization of audiovisual technologies and equip- mont in pr~aring synchronized soundslide briefings. I make these foregoing statements not to awe you with statistics but to highlight the changes that have been occurring In CR5 over a period only slightly longer than the sa~ae period since the passage of the Technology Assess- ment Act. `Tbese~changes are in a,sense reflected in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1G70 dir~ctive that the name Legislative Reference Service be changed to Congressional Research Service and the addition of policy ~analysis as a major function for Memher an4 committee service. The ability of CRS to serve Congress with the totality of its enpertise, which I have outlined, is due to a great extent to the fact that the many CRS disciplines and services complement and reinforce each other, the very nature and mission of the organization assure that its people are kept fully sensitive to the character and urgency of the multitude of congressional needs. Having brought you ~lP- to~date on status of CR5, permit me pext to turn to our view of policy analysis and technology assessment. DmFERENTTAT~ON OF FUNOFTONS As before, it Is not my intention to offer formal legalistic or bureaucratic definitions of congressional support functions. Instead, I will attempt to convey to you what these terms mean in actual practice in congressional and other pertinent activities. I hope to make you aware of a major theme underlying much of this testimony-the complementary nature of these activities and thus the complementary nature of the work of ORS and OTA. The Congress has made an attempt to create a balance among the functions performed by its four support agencies. However, the distinctions are not entirely clear. It is my belief that this Committee cannot fully answer questions about the need to revise the OTA enabling legislatiop `without addressing the Issue of clearly defining the major functions performed. I would like to address these distinctions, especially those between technology assessment and policy analysis, and then later I will go into specific detail about how the differences in processes required to perform these functions and other differences mandated by statutes further delineate the functions of the various support agencies. I will begin with the issue of policy analysis since the lack of a clear distinction between the policy analysis functions of these agencIes has proved to be the cause of some concern among our staffs and the several oversight committees. The Congress's principal function is to establish pOlicies to deal with major public policy issues and to select programs intended to `fulfill the desired policy objectives. Congress also has the function of overseeing existing `agency per- formance and programs to determine whether the programs are meeting the objectives attributed to them. 1. Evaluation and auditing.-The General Acconirting Office clearly Is the major congressional support agency to conduct Independently initiated and congression- ally mandated audits and assessments to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of existing Federal programs, GAO's statutory responsibilities are outlinefi in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Legislative `Reorganization Act of 1946, and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950. The legislation authorizes GAO to review Federal programs for: Compliance with applicable laws and regulations; Efficiency and economy; and Effectiveness in achieving desired results, The information gathered in such reviews is analyzed to facilitate making recommendations for greater economy and efficiency in public expenditures. PAGENO="0241" 237 Enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Public Law 93-344, assigned numerous additional responsibilities to the Comp- troller General in connection with its provisions for substantial changes in congressional procedures to consider the Federal budget. According to a GAO document: "Titles VII, VIII, and X and the Act's objective to assure effective congressional control over the budgetary process have resulted in increased efforts by GAO to assist the Congress in: "Review and evaluation of Government programs: Title VII of the Act strengthens our program evaluation role by requiring us to review and evaluate Government programs carried on under existing law, to develop and recommend methods for reviewing and evaluating Government pro- grams and activities, and to assist in developing statements of legislative objec- tives and goals and methods for assessing and reporting actuaj program performance. "Specification and fulfillment of congressional information needs; Title VIII of the Act clarifies and strengthens the extensive responsibilities con- cerning Federal fiscal, budgetary, and program-related data and information systems given to the Comptroller General in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of 0MB; and the Director of the CEO." 2. Estimating budget impaots.-This same Act also clearly defined the Con- gress's expectations for the Congressional Budget Office, the new Congressional Budget Committees, and others responsible for providing the Congress with in~ formation to treat the Federal budget as a rational whole highlighting the relationships among revenues, expenditures, debt, and fiscal policy. The CBO is directed by law to assist the Budget committees by providing information regard- ing fiscal affairs, policies, and trends, and to prepare a major annual report including "a discussion of national budget priorities, including alternative ways to allocate budget authority and budget outlays for a fiscal year among major programs or functional categories, taking Into account how such alternative allocations will meet major national needs and affect balanced growth and development of the Nation." GAO and CBO therefore, as we see it, are charged with providing the Congress with two specific types of policy analysis, GAO with information about the effectiveness and efficiency of existing Federal programs and agencies, and CEO with macro-economic information and analysis to help Congress develop fiscal policies dealing with revenue, expenditures, and debt, especially on behalf of its major clients, the congressional budget committees. 3. Policy analysi&-However, the Congress also has a need to assess the creation of new policies, preferred courses of action and new program Initiatives. Legislators use many different types of policy analysis in investigating the range of alternative options and choices open to them and their likely costs and benefits (in terms of values, dollars, use of resources, equity and distribution criteria). For instance, legislators engage in a form of policy analysis whenever they sift through the various types of Interest group and constituent views on a decision before them. However, policy analysis research is something different and far more complex. The scope of policy analysis has vexed experts for a long time. Let me venture a definition. Policy analysis is frequently defined by referring to its constituent analytical methods-that is according to the types of analysis done In policy analysis research. This Committee's Science Policy Glossary (previously men- tioned), contains a useful definition pointing out that: "Policy analysis includes such matters as the examination of the adjudication of laws, statements of leaders, agency documents, legislation and laws, and position papers from the private sector, for the purposes of evaluating goals, means, processes, objectives, achievements, and intentions; it seeks from this analysis to formulate guidance for management of government programs, use of resources, and control of human behavior. The analysis of policy encompasses: conflicts among policies, internal consistencies, impacts on society and Its environ- ment, political and organizational aspects, problems of coordination, determining of relative priorities, timetables for action in programming, and evaluation and overview requirements." An extract from an essay published by the House Select Comittee on Committees elaborated further as follows: "The methods of policy analysis are eclectic, broad and heuristic, and a~e much looser than for traditional academic research. Usually, PA requires a team 96-205-78-16 PAGENO="0242" 238 effort involving many disciplines and involving a mixture of very simple and perhaps, very sophisticated techniques . . . PA can be considered as a class of especially tailored, arrayed, or even "created" information that i~ now possible due to advances in a variety of disciplines. These include sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, mathematics, engineering, ecology, cybernetics, forecast- ing, futuristics, and of course, computer and information technology among others. "The policy analyst uses all of the traditional sources of information for Con- gress along with additional inputs from forecasts, futures, poiis, and colleague- networks. It is his task to relate it all in specific decision areas and hopefully in coherent form for Members and committee use." As I noted before, the policy analysis research functions Congress gave to the CR5 pursuant to the Legislative Reoragnization Act give use awesome respon- sibilities for undertaking comprehensive, synoptic analyses dealing with the historical evolution, current views, and future implications of policy in a variety of areas. Explicit policy analysis research responsibilities given to us in the Act include: determination of advisability of enacting proposals, estimating results, evaluating alternative methods of accomplishing results, and submission to committees of lists of terminating programs and of "subjects and policy areas which the com- mittee might profitably analyze in depth," (i.e., emerging issues), and purpose and effect memoranda. At the same time we were authorized to appoint senior specialists in a large variety of areas intended to delimit the scope of our subject responsibilities. Senior specialist in CRS have been authorized in: (1) agri- culture; (2) American government and public administration; (3) American public law; (4) conservation; (5) education; (6) engineering and public works; (7) housing; (8) industrial organization and corporation finance; (9) interna- tional affairs; (10) international trade and economic geography; (11) labor and employment; (12) mineral economics; (13) money and banking; (14) national defense; (15) price economics; (16) science; (17). social welfare; (18) taxa- tion and fiscal policy; (19) technology; (20) transportation and communica- tions; (21) urban affairs; (22) veterans' affairs; and (23) such other broad fields as the Director may consider appropriate. To give you another idea of some of our comprehensive integrating policy anal- ysis responsibilities let me list some of the major projects undertaken recently by several parts of CR8. Environment and Natural Resources I'olicy Division: Comprehensive studies on energy policy issues, such as oil pricing tech- nology, natural gas deregulation and its consequences, implications of the increased use of coal, and enumeration and evaluation of policy interrela- tionships between land use and energy requirements and resources; and Evaluation of the effects of climatic variations on agricultural production. Science Policy Research Division: Role of the Federal Government in nutrition research (outlining nutri- tional needs, research needs, and Federal organization and policy options); Issues in the science, technology and politics of chemical and biological warfare; and Issues relating to Federal organization and research support for synthetic fuels. Interdivisional Projects: Comprehensive studies to identify onshore environmental and socio-eco- nomic impacts of offshore oil and gas development on the coastal zone; and Reports on organization for, and processes and uses of long-range planning in the Federal Government. Futures Research Group: Seminars for Members and staff with noted experts to discuss: optimum future environments given certain economic constraints posed by patterns of economic growth and resource availability, emerging issues facing the Congress, national urban growth options, the future of nuclear energy, and issues relating to global interdependence in food and population; and Development of a Futures Information Retrieval System (FIRST) to house in CRS discrete data as well as comprehensive secondary source vol- umes dealing with anticipated futures in all public policy areas. 4. Technology Assessment-Technology assessment is unequivocally a type ~of policy analysis, but in our opinion it deals with specific subjects (i.e., tech- PAGENO="0243" 239 nology), has the specific intended u'~e of providing information about impacts of technology-for long-range planning decision sequences-and uses specific analytical techniques. As such it may be considered a subset of the larger policy analysis responsibilities authorized by the Congress for its support agencies. Some experts believe that a statutory definition of technology assessment would be useful in helping to determine the scope of activities to be undertaken by the OTA; others believe such a definition ought to be avoided at present. Their rationale is that the concept of technology assessments is btill evolving, making an explicit definition difficult and hampering the evolutionary process if a con- gressiorial definition were to be set in concrete. By virtue of my membership in the Technology Assessment Advisory Council, I am aware of the fact that the Office of Technology Assessment defines tech- nology assessment to be what its Technology Assessment Board tells it to be. OTA' five years of experience have provided us with ample evidence that this definition, no matter how prestigiously invoked, does not always coincide with the statutory language creating the OTA or what the framers of the legislation desired. About a year and one-half ago we in CBS responded to an inquiry by your very able colleague Mr. Jack Brooks, chairman of the Joint Committee on Con- gressional Operations, asking us to provide an official interpretation of the word "technology assessment." In response we said, and I repeat: "Although technology assessment is not explicitly defined in the 1972 Act, the congressional findings and declaration of purpose contained in section 2 of the Act shed considerable light on the meaning intended for this term. It is clear from this section of the Act that technology assessment deals with the obtaining of information concerning the effects-'physical, biological, economic, social, and political'-of `technological applications.' These applications are found to be large and growing in scale' and `increasingly extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact, beneficial and adverse, on the natural and social environment,' and it is held essential that the consequences of these applications `be anticipated, understood, and considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems.'" Hence, it would appear to us that technology assessment deals primarily with the assessment of the various impacts of technological options. In summary, it appears to us that the responsibilities of CRS, OTA, and GAO in support of congressional technology assessment complement one another: CBS in providing policy analysis support to Congress and the OTA in the identification of issues to be assessed and in the determination of possible options for dealing with these issues; OTA in developing comprehensive assessments of the various possible long-term primary, secondary and tertiary impacts of these options; and GAO in evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation of those programmatic options actually selected for implementation by the Congress. In the preceding material I have done my best to distinguish clearly between policy analysis and technology assessment. I am sure that you conclude as I do that in the language of the statutes they are very similar iti nature. The most significant differences to note are those observed in practice: CBS in implement- ing its policy analysis mandate emphasizes broad options for decisionmaking. OTA's charter in turn emphasizes in-depth analyses of the social, other techno- `ogical, environmental, economic, and political impacts of selected choices. DIFFERENCES IN STYLE When we couple the functional missions of each agency with the unique char- acter and style which Congress has mandated for each one we see that they indeed serve an important and vital role in their respective services to Congress. So I would like now to discuss the ways in which they can be differentiated by style, and at the same time to point out a certain degree of useful comple- mentarity. Some of the significant distinctions between CRS and OTA include the following: (1) CRS performs confidential assignments for committees or Members. (2) CRS serves both committees and Members, while OTA serves only com- mittees (except under unusual circumstances). (3) CRS staff members often serve in a confidential advisory capacity, vir- tually as members of committee staff. (4) CR5 scope extends to legal counseling, assessment of the consequences and alternatives of proposed legislation. PAGENO="0244" 240 (5) ORS employees computerized data bases to serve Congress directly through bill digests, issue briefs, etc. (6) CRS maintains service offices in congressional buildings. (7) CR S gives instant responses to rush requests from Congress. (8) CRS responds to constituent requests. These differences in style can be illustrated by a few specific examples. 1. Contracting-The first example I would like to cite has to do with the fundamental difference that exists between the CRS and OTA approaches to contracting. OTA was conceived largely as a "contract operation." This concept is not stated explicitly in Public Law 92-484, which merely states that OTA may enter into contracts [Section 6. (a) (2)], although it is explicitly excluded from operating laboratories, pilot plants, or test facilities [Section 6. (cfl. However, the concept is clear from the legislative history of the Senate and House actions which culminated In the establishment of 0Th. Testimony frequently referred to the view that OTA would consist of a very small group of experts who would supervise assessments which would be `carried out largely through contracts with outside groups. In contrast with this approach, CR8 consists of a relatively large group of analysts who conduct their work mainly in-house. The Legislative Reorganiza- tion Act of 1~70 gave the CRS limited contract authority to hire consultants and purchase research services not available in-house, an authority first used during fiscal year 1973, to help assure that CRS can fulfill its more comprehensive and expanded functions under that Act. Nonetheless, contracting remains a sup- porting activity in that our subject analysts, who constitute over two-thirds of our staff, are able to provide, in-house, most of the research support we need to answer congressional requests. Contract authority Is used by ~RS primarily for two purposes: first, to supple- ment CRS personnel in periods of heavy workload; and second, to provide special expertise on an ad hoc basis-expertise which CRS does not need in its regul'ar year-round activities. A typical example of CRS contracting was the use of specialized computer models in estimating payments under the HEW Basic Education Opportunity Grants program. The amount of funds CRS has expended for Professional and consultant serv- ices is small, about 5 percent of our annual budget for the fiscal years 1977 and 1978 [an estimated $525,000 in the fiscal year 1977 and $725,500 in the fiscal year 1978]. OTA, in contrast, has extensive contracting authority to enable it to fulfill Its mandate. Even though it has been criticized for moving toward greater use of In-house staff in contrast to the expectation that such staff would remain small and act primarily as contract monitors and synthesizers, It still has made con- siderable use of contracted work and consultants during the last few years, totaling an estImated 33 percent of OTA's budget in the fiscal year 1976, 49 percent in the fiscal year 1977, and 36 percent in the fiscal year 1978. 2. Difference in ~ervices.-ORS `also conducts broad, comprehensive, in-depth analyses of specific issues, comparable In scope to OPA efforts, and largely for committees. Thus, for this kind of work, the scope and the clients are the same for both CR.S and OTA.. However, some crucial differences in product exist: CRS performs largely policy-analysis studies of specific issues, treating the issue in-depth, including a balanced, objective treatment of all pertinent asnects of the issue, and suggesting possible legislative approaches to solving problems. The purpose of the product is to provide the Congress with information that can he used first for educating legislators, and second, to form the basis for intelligent decision-making. Appropriately, the expertise for such analysis typically exists within the CR5 staff. OTA on the other hand, conducts largely "if . . . then" analyses to inform the Congress of the likely results of any course of action it decides to take, that is, of the potential results of its decision-making. Necessarily, the OTA product must contain-briefly, as a background-the policy analysis aspects that form the bulk of the CR8 product. The essential difference is that this CR8-like material (which could be provided OTA by CRS should represent only a small portion of the product. As we see it. the hulk of the OTA Product should represent an analvsis of impacts and consequences of proposed actions, rather than exhaustive studies of the kinds of actions possible. 3. Differcnce~ in ~taffing.-These differences in product renuire different ap- proaches to staffing. The CR5 staff orientation is toward the legislative process PAGENO="0245" 241 and the legislator, whereas OTA staff orientation is toward the experts, the industrial sector aiid academia. Whereas CRS staff are expected to maintain their expertise via secondary resources and the extensive bibliographic and support services provided by our support staff, the OTA Is expected to assist in tapping primary sources of new information and knowledge by communicating directly with the Nation's foremost experts in a technological or impact area. In contrast to CRS's permanent employment, OTA employs highly expert staff for the duration of an assessment, occasionally of very long duration. Staff are expected to be conversant with the intricacies of contract monitoring and to have the in-depth subject expertise required of the scientist or technologist developing new knowledge in cooperation with the most knowledgeable experts throughout the nation. OTA staff are not expected to interface continuously with and advise legislative staff and Members. Thus, the product provided by CR8 differs considerably from that provided by OTA, even for the same client. The primary strength of the OTA lies in its capacity to hire experts, to award and monitor contracts, and to solicit the views of panels of experts, including representatives of interest groups, affected par- ties, and the general public. The primary strength of CRS lies in its capacity to draw upon its enormous wealth of in-house expertise, as well as upon the vast resources of the other divisions of the Library of Congress. These strengths are complementary, permitting the full range of expertise, both in-house and outside, to be focused upon issues of congressional interest. COMPLEMENTARY ACTIVITIES OF CBS AND OTA In contrasting the legislative mandates of the Congressional Research Serv- ice and the Office of Technology Assessnient, there is a clear image that OTA's primary role is to conduct long-term impact assessments of technologies which may have their major impacts some years hence. CRS has the in-house resources of a range of expertise to dG thorough analyses on the basis of information and research in hand-the information and technology which comprise the second- ary body of knowledge available to the highly trained specialists and analysts of CRS-some of the finest professionals in their fields. Having established the complementary roles and stylistic differences of CRS and OTA I would add a caveat that, o~ course, a certain amount of duplication occurs. However, this can serve an important function for the Congress and the Nation. If done by compe- tent professionals It provides an opportunity for alternative, perhaps contrast- ing, cuts or analyses of an issue. Duplication also serves the committees or Mem- bers of the Congress who specifically and legitimately ask each of the support agencies to evaluate the same topic. However, we would all agree, I believe, that excessive duplication becomes costly and leads to inefficient use of resources. Any present or future duplication of effort evolves from the failure of the respective agencies to follow the man- dates of their charters as set forth by the Congress. Both the House Oomnmission on Information and Facilities, and the Commission on the Operation of the Senate reported on these points: "It is often highly desirable-even urgently necessary-that more that one person or organization at the same time look for the same thing, search for the answer to the same question, or try to solve the same problem, provided that they do so purposely, each knowing what the other Is doing, sharing resources and results, and in general acting in concert rather than in opposition or in needless duplication of effort. Repetition is not necessarily redundant. Duplication of attention is not necessarily needless or wasteful of effort; and it is not assumed by the survey team that the Report (No. 74-208) on the Legislative Branch Ap- propriation Bill for fiscal 1976 had lost sight of that fact in mentioning the committee's awareness `of a seeming duplication of effort and staffing for similar activities in * * * (CR5, GAO, and OTA)' and Its concern `that there will be an overlapping of responsibilities and effort by the three. * * s'" ("Organizational Effectiveness of the Congressional Research Service.") "The problems of duplication and overlap are felt by each of the support agencies. It can be argued In some cases that this duplication is healthy because it leads to competition, improved competence, and a better product. Since there is more than one side to a policy controversy, differing analyses-with differing emphasis, source material, and conclusions-are of great value in the accomn- modat Ion process by which policy issues are resolved. While analysis of the same PAGENO="0246" 242 issue by different agencies may produce contradictory results, this may nonethe- less prove valuable to the Senate as it works its will. "This argument, however, ignores the fact that duplication Is likely to involve waste. Good work is not used; good minds remain hidden and frustrated. Adequate ways of pinpointing overlap, gaps, and deficiencies are needed, as well as procedures to handle such problems." (`Toward a Modern Senate.") A problem of duplication then could be said to occur only when duplication becomes excessive, costly, and inefficient, from the point of view of duplicating information resource bases, not providing the Congress with different cuts at analysis, etc. My concern is that should the observed convergence of OTA efforts toward those of CRS continue, such as in producing short-term in-house products, excessive duplication may become a reality, and OTA could increasingly become a second ORS. The points I would make are these: (1) Instead of contract operation, OTA is increasingly a staff operation. (2) OTA has established its own "emerging issues" program (of issue identifica- tion) that appears to duplicate the CRS statutory function of "emerging issues identification" for each congressional committee required by the Legislative Reorganization Act. (3) Staff members of OTA are establishing close working relationships with congressional committee staffs, to invite smallscale assignments and tasks analogous to those performed by CRS. (4) Inadequate attention appears to be given to the need for selectivity of OTA tasks; thus the small, quick-response chores are becoming more numerous while the large tasks (initially thought to be the primary OTA function) are deferred for want of budget support. (5) The proposal is apparently being entertained or at least advocated, of establishing a permanent pool of In-house expertise on all subjects of potential interest to the Congress. If accomplished, this plan would bring OTA functionally very close to CR5. (6) The original concept of OTA as a bridge between technology and politics i~ disappearing as the office "engages in a wide range of policy studies and sociotech- nical analyses." (7) It is proposed that OTA should endeavor to stay on top of "legislative developments employing an OTA staff member for this purpose." These developments, clearly, are not in the best interests of optimum service to the Congress. Not only is there the possibility of unwarranted duplication and repetition but the Congress would lose the oportunity to apply these resources to the selected, in-depth impact analyses (technology assessments), which was the original congressionally mandated mission for the OTA. CO-EQUALITY OF FOUR SUPPORT AGENCIES Ideally all four congressional support agencies should have co-equal status. However, questions have been raised specifically with respect to the OTA en- abling legislation as to whether the existing act, in calling for the "utilization" by OTA of certain services of GAO and CRS, does not in effect place OTA in a position which could damage the ability of the other support agencies to fulfill their respective mandated functions. I believe there is no basis in fact for any such assertion. Section 8(a) of the Act authorizes the Librarian of Congress to make available to OTA the services specified in Section 8(b) "as appropriate and feasible." It is the Librarian, and not OTA, who shall make the determination as to what is appropriate and what is feasible, a determination that clearly assumes that CRS is not to decrease the quality or speed of its services to members and committees because of demamids for service from other support agencies. The critical element underlying the interrelationships of these four agencies as they fulfill their respective missions to Congress i~ that of coordination of efforts among equals. I will elaborate upon how I believe this consideration might be achieved later in my testimony. That the Congress intended this sort of Cdl- ordinated effort is clear from the language used in Public Law 93-344 in estab- lishing the OBO: "(e) Relationship to Other Agencies of Congress-in carrying out the duties and functions of the Office, and for the purpose of coordinating the operations of the Office with those of other congressional agencies with a view to utilizing most effectively, the information, services, and capabilities of all such agencies PAGENO="0247" 243 in carrying out the various responsibilities assigned to each, the Director is authorized to obtain information, data, estimates, and statistics developed by the General Accounting Office, the Library `of Congress, and the Office of Tech- nology i&ssessment, and (upon agreement with them) to utilize their services, facilities, and personnel with or without reimbursement. The Comptroller Gen- eral, the Librarian of Congress, and the Technology Assessment Board are authorized to provide the Office with the information, data, estimates, and sta- tistics, and the services, facilities, and personnel, referred to in the preceding sentence. (Emphasis added.) In discussing this provision of the Act, Senate Report 93-688 (on 5. 1541) contained the following statement: "In particular, the committee wishes to preserve a cooperative and balanced relationship between COB and the General Accounting Office, the Library of Congress, and the Office of Technology Assessment." (Emphasis added.) It is this "cooperative and balanced relationship" which I believe is the key to coordination between CR5 and OTA as congressional snppor~ agencies. I might add here that the specific areas in which CR5 was envisioned as coor- dinating with OTA were stated as follows in the original TA Act as passed by the House (H.R. 10243, 92d Congress) "1. maintaining a monitoring indicator system with respect to natural and social environments which might reveal early impacts of technological change, but any such system shall be coordinated with other assessment activities which may exist in the departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Government; "2. making surveys of ongoing and proposed programs of government with a high or novel technology content, together with timetables of applied science showing promising developments; "3. publishIng, from time to time, anticipatory reports and forecasts; "4. recording the activities and responsibilities of Federal agencies in affecting or being affected by technological change; "6. preparing background reports to aid in receiving and using the assessments; "7. providing staff assistance in preparing for or holding committee hearings to consider the findings of the assessments; "8. reviewing the findings of any assessment made by or for the Office; and "9. assisting the Office in the maintenance of liaison with executive `agencies In- volved in technology assessments." These areas were not explicitly stated as such ifl the Act as finally enacted into Public Law, and it may be useful to amend the existing Act to include them now. In addition, since the question of co-equal status in responsibility to Congress is being raised in responsible quarters, it may be prudent to amend P.L. 92-484 to make it clear beyond any doubt that the four agencies are indeed co-equal in performing their primary missions in direct support of Congress. The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that relationships are cur- rently either b'ad or uncoordinated, for they are neither. All tour agencies pool. all but their most confidential `major project information in the Research Noti- fication System, (ENS). This is a constantly updated list of new, ongoing and completed projects maintained by CRS and available throughout all four or- ganizations and beyond. Representatives of all four agencies meet periodically to discuss possible cooperative areas and to avoid unnecessary duplication and problems. Procedures within each agency require checking both the ENS lists and with other agencies when initiating projects. The RNS is effective enough to warrant its cost and continuance. We raise the question as to the desirability of formalizing an interagency- CBO + CRS ,+ GAO + OTA-Directors Council, perhaps with rotating chair~ manship. I put this in question form for it is clearly a matter to be discussed among the four of us and with the leadership of the appropriate oversight activi- ties. My point at this time Is only that such a tnove should be considered. COOPERATIVE PROJECTS-LEAD AGENCY ROLES Another way to `achieve this coordination Is via cooperation In specific subject areas with one agency taking the lead agency rOle, that is taking the initiative In promoting cooperation among the support agencies In specific subjects. CR8 has already taken the Initiative in forming such a group in theimportant area of materials and national materials policy. Such groups could be headed by high- PAGENO="0248" 244 level representatives from each agency, and have working sub-groups or com- mittees to represent each subject area. The materials coordinating group men- tioned above has selected a liaison member from each of the four agencies to meet regularly to plan activities for the group, and to explore possibilities of future cooperative programs by the agencies. A coordinating meeting held re- cently heard the presentations of the four institutional chairmen reflecting the differences in concepts of service. The CBO focus stressed budget and macro- economics, in which materials were a definite but subsidiary consideration. The GAO presentation focused on operational efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and adequacy of policy formation. The OTA presentation emphasized the protracted process by which topics (in materials, specifically) are selected and approved as "assessments." CRS stressed the great number and variety of ORS tasks on materials, all the way from instant responses to six-year projects, with materials as one of many fields of interest of at least four CR5 divisions. It would seem useful to explore the possibility of establishing similar groups in other subject areas, with the proviso that such groups be judged useful by the participants. A key element here is that coordinating groups should be needed and wanted, not forced, if they are to be useful and effective. The Congress needs to see that such cooperation is nurtured. So Mr. Chairman, I suggest an improved complementary definition of roles including the establishment of subject area groups with the appropriate agency in a leadership role; above all there should be a strengthening of the cooperative spirit among the agencies. These desirable ends can only come from the top leader- ship down. STRENGTHEN COORDINATION AMONG CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT AGENCIES If the foregoing suggestions making explicit the peer status of the four con- gressional analytical and informational support agencies, and if the lead agency responsibilities for selected areas are accepted, it would he necessary to strengthen the current informal coordination mechanisms among the four agencies. ADD DIRECTOR OF CR0 TO T,&AC Independent of the strengthening the coordination mechanisms among the four agencies, it would seem appropriate for the newest member of this group-the Director of CBO-to be added as a statutory member of the Technology Assess- ment Advisory Council. STATUTORT TAAC MEMBER ALTERNATES I enjoy and benefit from much of my activity as a statutory member of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. I feel that It is proper for the Director of CR5 to be part of that group along with the heads of the other congressional support agencies. But unlike the other members, we are not appointed to TAAC on the basis of our own personal or professional qualifications. We are there to represent our agencies. As I see it. one of my tasks is to bring to the attention of OTA, through TAAC, all that ORS can contribute and to bring back to CR5 that which will be useful. I dare not claim that we as officials reporting to the Congress are any more busy than our "civilian" ThAC colleagues but the con- current demands of managing large ongoing agencies and those of the Members and committees we serve place proper but severe burdens upon us. For both these "representative" and the often uncontrollable scheduling reasons, I feel that I could serve TAAO better if the statute (or rules as appropriate) were changed to permit my participation, as necessary, through a designated alternate. I would want such an alternate to be able to accompany me In all TAAC situations, including executive session. Operationally, it would be more desirable and effective for my designated alternate to be present at all TAAC functions in my absence. My position is that it is "ORS" that is represented on `PAAC and it should neither be excluded nor mute when I personally must be absent. COMMENTS ON TAAC TAA C's role could he continued but It should only play three roles: ~oliey leTel advice to the Board Including the Director as a member of the Board, peat 1to~ review of both general pattern and quality of selected outputs of the office, and PAGENO="0249" 245 two-way communication with experts and constituent groups. To preserve its Independence as an advisor and recognizing the pressures of time limitations on the professionals who comprise the Council, TAAC should not engage in any assessments or other operational activities for congressional clients. In spite of their sterling qualities, TAAC members should not be put in the position of advising or evaluating themselves. Nor should TAAC have direct relationships with congressional members or committee clients in parallel with, or even through, the office. The strengths of TAAC are first, the competence and independence of its representatives, and secondly,, its unique position to stay at the policy and external evaluation levels of operation. I share the feelings of several (but not all) of my colleagues that TAAO has become too involved in the ongoing affairs of the Office. Input from experts and representatives of constituent interests are essential to a viable technology assessment process, as are the reverse communications from TAAC members to their respective professional, industrial, and citizen colleagues to elicit feed-back. I have heard of suggestions to consider returning to the mixed Member and outside-expert Board as originally proposed to the House in H.R. 10243. I felt there was merit in that arrangement then and would think it advisable for the Subcommittee `to take another look at this alternative. * * * * * * * Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to contribute my thoughts. I feel technology assessment is a necessary and positive contribution to the needs of the Congress. I commend you and your associates for your efforts in seeking improvements in that process. You may count on me and all of us in CRS to assist you in any way we can. Gu~sxar Gunu A native Washingtonian, Gilbert Gude Is Director of the Congressional Re- search Service of the Library of Congress. He has enjoyed a distinguished career in public service spanning two decades. He served in the Maryland legislature, five terms as a Member of the United States House of Representatives, as official U.S. observer to a UN Conference on Sea Law, and was chairman of the 1976 Anglo North American Parliamentary Conference on Africa. His personal and legislative interests have always focused on environmental and educational matters. As a Congressman, Mr. Gude was particularly noted for his work on the en- vironment and on metropolitan Issues, serving on the House District Committee, the Select Committee on Professional Sports, and the Select Committee on Ag- ing. He was a key sponsor of successful bills creating the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Historical Park and protecting America's wild horses. He was also instrumental in transferring the Glen Echo Park to the National Park Service, introduced the legislation to consolidate the area's bus systems, and helped obtain funding for the Metro rapid transit system. He was a member of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Commission, and serves on the Board of Trustees of the Catholic University of America, the Board of Directors of the Rachel Carson Trust for the Living Environment, and the Board of Directors of the Appalachian Highlands Association. Mr. Gude received his education in the public schools of Washington and Rockvllle, Md. He attended the University of Maryland and in 1948 received his B.S. degree from Cornell University. lie also holds an M.A. degree in public administration from the George Washington University and an Honorary Doctor of Science degree from Georgetown University. During World War II he served in the Pacific theater with the U.S. Army Medical Department. Mr. Gude and his wife, the former Jane Wheeler Callaghan, reside in Bethesda, Maryland. They `have five children. STATEMENT OP RON. GILBERT DUDE, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OP OON~~RESS Mr. GUDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will only refer to parts of my statement. I appreciate your putting the entire statement in the record. PAGENO="0250" 246 It certainly is a great opportunity to appear before this subcom- mittee to testify concerning the implementation of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972. It was just 5 years ago that the President signed Public Law 92-484 creating the OTA. As a Member of this body, I had the privilege of voting for the House bill leading to that act. I followed the implementation of that act in over 4 years as a Member of the House. For the last 9 months I have been more directly involved as Director of CRS and as a statutory member of TAAC. In the remarks that follow, I shall draw mainly on my observations and experience in the latter two roles. I will focus on my activities and those of these two organizations to implement the act, and not on the performance or products of the Office of Technology Assessment per se. Following a brief review of the present status of CR5, I will pre- sent to you our understanding of the concepts and practices of policy analysis and technology assessment, followed by some comparisons of the respective styles of the complementary operations of CRS and OTA. I will then discuss TACC; comment on possible changes in the relationship among OTA, CBO, GAO, and CR5, which, on the whole, are really very good; and then conclude with some ideas resulting from these combined experiences for changes and improvements in the Technology Assessment Act. I am a strong supporter of the concept of technology assessment as an essential approach in improving the basis upon which the Congress can be informed and can make decisions about the increasingly com- plex and ever-changing issues involving technology. Regardless of how one defines technology, its pervasiveness means that technology in- cludes most of the issues coming before the Congress. First, as to CBS today: CRS is the only congressional support agency that provides analysis, research~ and information to every element of the congressional community. We do this in virtually every area of public policy and subject interest and we work for every Mem- ber of Congress; we work for all Senate and House committees, most joint committees, most of the subcommittees of the two Houses, and the staffs of all of these elements. CBS also serves the staffs of various other specialized groups of Congress and provides substantial sup- port to the three sister agencies. The Service regularly tailors its work to the specific needs of a given Member or committee. In contrast to our three sister agencies, we work under deadlines in virtually everything we do to support the policy and legislative work of Congress. The Service's research division are responsible for providing the bulk of CBS' policy analysis and legal research in response to con- gressional inquiries. In fiscal year 1977 the seven research divisions responded to more than 76,800 such requests and accounted for ap- proximately 80 percent of the research time expended by the Service in. its support of Congress. In addition to projects that are undertaken by single divisions, the Service is also asked to undertake projects that require multidisciplinary treatment and therefore require interdivi- sional efforts which often include the leadership and/or participation of senior specialists. CBS interdivisional teams vary in size, organ- izational structure and lifespan according to mission. Our energy team, PAGENO="0251" 247 for example, numbers 29 from 9 divisions, while our team addressing congressional concerns in reference to the Panama Canal numbers only five members from two divisions. Teams of some duration are the Futures Group, established 4 years ago to deal with futures research and forecasting and the new inter- divisional team on oceans which represents our long-term commit- ment to several committees and Members in the important area of the complexity of problems associated with oceans and the law of the sea. Mr. Chairman, I would like to draw your attention to a chart which we have made available, showing the number of active permanent in- terdivisional teams in CRS. I think the manner in which CRS oper- ates in this area is very significant to the consideration of its role in relationship to OTA and the other service agencies. You will notice that there are a number of representatives of the different divisions of CRS on the various teams set forth in the chart. Mr. THORNTON. Without objection, the chart will be reduced in size and made a part of the record at this point, Mr. Gude. Mr. GUDE. Let me say that this chart represents only the permanent, or relatively permanent, interdivisional teams. If we included all of the active interdivisional teams the chart would probably be three or four times the size of this. Mr. THORNTON. So this is illustrative of the measure of the permanent teams, and should be considered as such? Mr. GUDE. That's right. [The chart, "CRS Interdivisional Teams," follows:] PAGENO="0252" CRS_~~IT~Df~IUl~Ii~~IAI TEAMS - avit IUGHTS ENERGY EXECUTIVE BRANDI REORGANIZA1~ON FEDERAL~STATE INFORMA11ON EXCHANGE R)OO MD AG)HCULTURE RIRJRES HOUSING jj~LATthj~1IJ~ C.lsdt At Otadtt Osis At Dttd AtAttttt At Thttttt Ottb,t At Dsstd *Mstst Ad SAttCC Httts At Chsttss t,nd A PAd Dt*tstp 00 EhttbtCE YsditsAy OP Wttsttt AssEts CA ttAs.is Msfrty AS A.ttps Wstsst ~Wstst Dttttttt At Gtt~ge CAtCAIS At Dtt~tst Jtt~ At Dttstd t~ttst AC Dtt t~ks At HC,CEd Utptts At SttAE AttEst At Ftsttps GtitA At CitE Asdtst, PA Ctpdt MitA OS Abtsbtth Ysdtsskp OS City Spss SP DiCtA, OCtthtts OP DatA AstA OP WAdtt AstEt OP At Bus ~ OP DMA Mttto OP Asbuts ittssb.tp OP Matitu SAdt OPPsdAuthbstg OP tspdtst Ctst. OP A,tttd tAd. St AMA Apt.s SD Bust AtAttat PA Oytttts Atstss ct MttEs.t WststAsusi LSFsduSw ~ttsi~ Mte At Ast Meit At Rsytttd AttEst Ad AtAs Atkstttttt At Stttt dEbts At Attsd Atspt,tad FA ACitA tttsstttCt~ PA CApE WAft 0 Asty Gdstttte A Atdth P,t, 00 EAtsAsA Ysditstty OP Ottttttv SAss OP O5~d ~~tA CA Jottot Asys [S Ditty. 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PA WAiss WhAsut PA TTtdsdtt O~ 006tsAsts Yu~sAy OP Osty, bAts OS itsAst AsAt SD Aba Fstdt 55 Abut Asttdst,ty 55 At, Asuftut 55 ~ OS ityd SEAt CAPIICC.AACp [S Wtts' Sips, ~AsAA tisdA St Ftasts t$uddt. (&s.tt SO WiAst AsAt dust) At At~ls,td CAstE At Ditty. HtiAsy PA bEt, Ads PA Thstdtt DAdA PA Rubst Stdsy PAJs,is Wtttt.t ~ AIsA.ttt TsdEtsAy OP Wisdy Sutsst*t OPOAssO~ OP Asssttodts CAts. SF tist, Asissly 55 OuttIss Edits, FAA WWIts AtAts AS Josh Asssi CBS WsAt.std tICS ABS AA5stt5t Asm.y AtM' ETA tiP Mttubsgs ETA RACist V.m.s ~~FlstAAd thidWI At BuA.tt MAyt At tuts CAts At WAist. Pt,,. At Asissti Mit A Shy Wsdtstt 00 EtAbstA YsdEtsAy 55 thutt Fttstt)tt OP Ssttts DAtEs SF Jitss Mitts SS Ust Apt.* 55 Wits, Wish SStssMsysy $5 Mtttut StbussAtsiy 55 W.tss Vissstw PA ACistiCatCist OP ~ts CCitt At Ast.thitt Last (bEMAs PA Pstsipt AJfAs&apd IAtAsssj Bass. BAsisi OP Stisdsu, PsAty Mssusttb Assists ~0 CA Csttptsssuttst A.t,sttts tEsubsu 5 Oa,s.,t Ats~s SD Dss,t Spttiskt CuttAmatst At C,stts*tits AisAss AS AsAtty 5.hAs~ lAsiss CBS Cisptstibtssd Budptt dEft, Ad AAsttWtss .4 PtAts AC.d,s SiuAsss 06 AdA, ,d WI 600 6s,A Aiutthttstp At&t Edit Mtt0 As Atts,tst.tC ssd IksstA Pssusss.. SisAsss PA Mstsusss Assist s Sesist Sps~ ETA AttIss sC Ass.ss.,t SD) CD PAGENO="0253" 249 to committee service has in turn greatly enhanced our capability to supply both analysis and information to every Member of the House. aiid Senate. I have included the extensive records of CRS work in the pages of my printed testimony which I have not read Mr. Chairman, I in- clude this. information really not to awe you with statistics, but to highlight the changes that have been occurring in ~RS over a period only slightly longer than the same period since the passage of the Technology Assessment Act. The ability of CR.S to serve Congress with the totality of its cx- pert.ise, which I have outlined; is due to a great extent to the fact that the many CRS disciplines a.nd services complement and reinforce each other. Also the very nature and mission of the organization assure that its people are kept fully sensitive to the character and urgency of the multitude of congressional needs. Having brought you up t.o date on the status of CRS, permit me next to turn to our view of policy analysis and technology assessment. As before, it is not my contention to offer formal legalistic or bureau- cratic definitions on congressional support functions. Instead, I will attempt to convey to you what these terms mean in actual practice in congressioiial and other pertinent activities. I hope to make you aware of a major theme underlying much of this testimony, the com- plementary nature of these activities, and thus the complementary nature of the wrn.~k of CRS and OTA. rflie Congress has made an attempt to create a balance among the functions performe.d by its four support agencies. 1-lowever, the distinctions are not entirely clear. It is my belief that this committee cannot fully answer questions about the need to revise the OTA enabling legislation without addressing the issue of clearly defining the major functions performed. I would like t.o address these distinctions, especially those between technology assessment and policy analysis, and theii later I will go into specific detail about how the differences in processes required to perform these functions ~uid other differences, which are mandated by statutes, further delineate the functions of the various support agencies. I will begin with the issue of policy analysis, since the lack of a clear distinction between t.lie policy analysis functions of these ageiic.ies has proved to be the cause of some concern among our staffs and the several oversight committees. The Congress principal function is to establish policies to deal with major public policy issues and to select programs intended to fulfill the desired policy objectives. Congress also has the function of over- seeing existing agency performance and programs to determine whether the programs are meeting the objectives attributed to them. The General Accounting Office, nuder several acts, clearly is the major congressional support agency to conduct independently initi- ateci AIid con~rressionaliy mandated audits and assessments to (iet(~I~- mine the. efficiency and effectiveness of existing Federal programs. This is its share of the policy analysis miSSion given to the four anerici es. The Budget and Tmponnd.inent Control Act also clearly defined the Congress expectations for the Congressional Budget Office, the PAGENO="0254" 250 new Congressional Budget Committees, and others responsible for providing the Congress with information to treat the Federal budget as a rational whole, highlighting the relationships among revenues~ expenditures, debt, and fiscal policy. GAO and CBO therefore, as we see it, are charged with providing the Congress with two specific types of policy analysis: GAO with information about the effectiveness and efficiency of existing Federal programs and agencies, and CBO with macroeconomic information. and analysis to help Congress develop fiscal policies dealing with revenue, expenditures, and debt, especially on behalf of its major clients, the congressional budget committees. However, the Congress also has a need to assess the creation of new policies, preferred courses of action and new program initiatives. Legislators use many different types of policy analysis to assist them in investigating systematically the possible range of alternative op- tions and choices open to them and their likely costs and benefits, in terms of values, dollars, use of resources, equity and distribution criteria. The policy analysis and research functions that Congress gave to the `CRS pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act give us awesome responsibilities for undertaking comprehensive, synoptic analyses dealing with the historical evolution, current views, and future implications of policies in a variety of areas. Technology assessment, on the other hand, is unequivocally a type of policy analysis, but in our opinion it deals with specific subjects, has the primary intended use of providing information about impacts' of technology-for long-range planning decision sequences-and uses specific analytical techniques. As such, it may be considered a special- ized subset of the larger policy analysis responsibilities authorized by the Congress for its several support agencies. Technology assess- ment deals primarily with the assessment of the various impacts of technological options. It appears to us that the responsibilities of CBS, OTA, and GAO in support of congressional technology assessment complement one another: CBS, in providing policy analysis support to OTA in the identification of issues to be assessed and in the determination of pos- sible options for dealing with these issues; OTA, in developing com- prehensive assessments of the various possible long-term primary, secondary, and tertiary impacts of these options; and GAO, in evalu- ating the effectiveness of the implementation of those programmatic options actually selected for implementation by the Congress. In the preceding material I have done my best to distinguish clearly between policy analysis and technology assessment. I am sure that you conclude, as I do, that in the language of the statutes they are very similar in nature. The most significant differences to note are those observed in practice: CRS in implementing its policy analysis mandate emphaszes broad options for decisionmaking. OTA's char- ter, in turn, emphasizes indepth analyses of the social, other techno- logical, environmental, economic, and political impacts of selected choices. When we couple the functional missions of each agency with the unique character and style which Congress has mandated for each PAGENO="0255" 251 one we see that they indeed serve an important and vital role in their respective services to Congress. So I would like now to discuss the ways in which they can be differentiated by style, and at the same time to point out a certain degree of useful complementarity. Some of the si~iiflcant distinctions between CBS and OTA. include the following: 1. CRS performs confidential assignments for `committees or Members. 2. CRS serves both committees and Members, while OTA serves only committees, except under unusual circumstances. 3. CBS staff members often serve in a confidential advisory capa- city, virtually as members of committee staffs. 4. CR5 scope extends to legal counseling, assessment of the `conse- quences and alternatives of proposed legislation. 5. CR5 employs computerized data bases to serve Congress directly through bill digests, issue briefs, and otherwise. 6. CRS maintains service offices in congressional buildings. 7. CRS gives instant responses to rush requests from Congress. 8. CBS responds to constituent requests through members. These differences in style between CBS and OTA. can be illustrated best by a few specific examples: I would like to `cite contracting as one example. Since it exemplifies a fundamental difference that exist's between the CBS and OTA ap- proaches. OTA was conceived largely `as a contract operation. The concept is clear from the legislative history of the Senate and House actions which culminated in the establishment of OTA. Testimony frequently referred to the view that OTA would consist of a very small group of experts who would supervise assessments which would largely be carried out through contracts with outside groups. In contrast with this approach, CBS consists of a relatively large group of analysts who conduct their work mainly in~bouse. The Legis- lative Reorganization Act gave the CBS limited contract authority to hire consultants and purchase research services not available in-house. Contracting remains a supporting activity in that our subject analysts, who constitute over two-thirds of our staff, are able to provide most of the research support we need to answer congressional requests. Contract authority is used by CRS primarily for two purposes: First, to supplement CRS personnel in periods of heavy workload; and second, to provide special expertise on an ad hoc basis-expertise which CRS does not need in its regular year-round activities. A typical example of CRS contracting was the use of specialized computer models in estimating payments under the HEW basic educational opportunity grants program. The amount of funds CRS has ex- pended for professional and consultant services is small, averaging less than 10 percent of our annual budgets. OTA, in contrast, has extensive contracting authority to enable it to fulfill its mandate, averaging about 37 percent of its expenditures in recent years. Permit me to give another example of differences in style `between the two agencies. CR5 performs largely policy analysis studies of specific issues, treating the issue in-depth, including a balanced, ob- jective treatment of all pertinent aspects of the issue, and suggesting possible legislative approaches to solving problems. PAGENO="0256" 252 OTA, on the other hand, condi.icts largely "if * * * then" analyses to inform the Congress of the most likely results of any course 0± action it is considering or decides to take, that is, of the potential results of its decisiomnaking. Necessarily, the OTA product must contain-briefly, as a backg~ound-the policy analysis aspects that forin the bulk of the CRS product. As we see it, however, the bulk of the OTA product should represent an analysis of impacts and con- sequences of proposed actions, rather than exhaustive studies of the kinds of actions possible. Another difference in style is our differences in staffing. These dif- ferences in product require. different approaches to staffing. The CBS staff orientation is toward the legislative process and the legislator, whereas OTA staff orientation is toward the experts, the rndus- trial sector and academia. Whereas CRS staff are expected to main- tain t.heir expertise via secondary resources and the extensive bibho- graphic and support services Provided by our support staff, the 01 A is expected to assist in tapping primary sources of new information and knowledge by communicating directly with the Nation's fore- most experts in a technological impact area. And so, Mr. Chairman, as we see it the primary strength of the OTA lies in its capacity t.o hire experts, to award and monitor con- tracts, and to solicit the views of panels of experts, including repre- sentatives of interest groups. affected parties, and the general public. *The primary strength of the CBS, on the other hand, lies in its capac- ity to draw upon its enormou.s wealth of in-house expertise as well as upon the vast resources of the other departments of the Library of Congress and beyond. These strengths are complementary, permitting the full range of expertise, both in-house and outside, to be focused upon issues of congressional interest. Having established the complementary role and stylistic differ- ences of CBS and OTA, I would add a caveat that of course a certain amount of duplication occurs. However, this can serve an important function for the Congress and the Nation. If done by competent pro- fessionals, it provides an opportunity for alternative, perhaps con- trasting, cuts or analyses of an issue. Duplication also serves the corn- niittees or Members of the Congress who specifically and legitimately ask for each of the support agencies to evahiate the same topic. However, we would all agree, I believe, that excessive duplication becomes costly and leads to inefficient use of resources. Any present or future wasteful duplication of effort. evolves from the failure of the respective agencies to follow the mandates of their charters as set. forth 1:~y the Congress. Both the House Commission on Information and Facilities and the Commission on the Operation of the Senate in their reports agreed on both of these points which I have just made. My concern is that should the observed convergence of OTA efforts toward those of CBS continue, such as in producing short-term, in- house products, excessive duplication may become a reality, and OTA. could increasingly become a second CRS. The points I would like to make in summary are these, and I quote: Instead of a contract operation, OTA is increasingly a staff operation. OTA has established its OWfl "emerging issues" program-of issue identifi- cation-that appears to duplicate the CRS statutory function of "emerging PAGENO="0257" 253 issues identification" for each congressional committee required at CBS by the Legislative Reorganization Act. Staff members of OTA are establishing close working relationships with congressional committee staffs, to invite small-scale assignments and tasks analogous to those performed by CBS. Inadequate attention appears to be given to the need for selectivity of OPA tasks; thus, the small, quick-response chores are becoming more numerous while the large tasks-initially thought to be the primary OTA function-are deferred for want of budget support. The proposal is apparently being entertained, or at least advocated, of estab- lishing a permanent pool of in-house expertise on all subjects of potential iu~ terest to the Congress. The original concept of OTA as a bridge betweeu technology and polities is disappearing as the office "engages in a wide range of policy studieS and sociotechnical analyses." It is proposed that OTA should endeavor to stay on top of "legislative develop- ments employing an OTA staff member for this purpose." The trend of these developments which I have outlined, Mr. Chair- man, clearly are not in the best interests of optimum service to the Congress. Not only is there the possibility of unwarranted duplication and repetition but the Congress would lose the opportunity to apply these resources to the selected, indepth impact analyses-technology assessments-which was the original congressionally mandated mission for the OTA. Ideally, all four congressional support agencies should have coequal status. However, questions have been raised, specifically with respect to the OTA enabling legislation, as to whether the existing act, in calling for the "utilization" by OTA of certain services of GAO and CRS, does not in effect place OTA in a position which could damage the ability of the other support agencies to fulfill their respective man- dated functions. There is no basis in statute for any such assertion. The critical element underlying the interrelationships of these four agencies as they fulfill their respective missions to Congress is that of coordination of efforts among equals. I think that this is best pointed up as being the desire of Congress in the Senate report on Senate 1541, establishing the CBO, in which the Senate report highlighted the con- gressional intent, and I quote: The committee wishes to preserve a cooperative and balanced relationship between CBO and the General Accounting Office, the Library of Congress, and the Office of Technology Assessment. It is this "cooperative and balanced relationship" which I believe to be the key to coordination between CRS and OTA as congressional support agencies. I might add here that the specific areas in which CRS was envisioned as coordinating with OTA were stated in the original Technology Assessment Act as passed by the House, and in my pre- pared statement I have listed the nine items in the original bill as it passed the House. These are very important coordinative directions from Congress. They were not explicitly stated as such in the act as finally enacted into public law, and it may be useful to amend the existing act to include them now~ Since the question of coequal'status in responsibility to Congress is being raised in responsible quarters, it may be prudent also to amend Public Law 92-484 to make it clear beyond any doubt that the four agencies are coequal in performing their primary missions in direct support of Congress. The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that relationships are currently either bad or uncoordinated, for they are neither. All 96-205 0 - 78 - 17 PAGENO="0258" 254 four agencies pool all but their most confidential major project in- formation in the research notification system, RNS. Representatives of all four agencies meet periodically to discuss possible cooperative areas and to avoid unnecessary duplication and problems. Procedures within each agency require checking both the RNS lists and with other agencies when initiating projects. The RNS is effective enough to warrant its cost and continuance. We raise the question as to the desirability of formalizingan inter- agency-OBO plus CR5 plus GAO plus OTA-Directors Council, perhaps with rotating c'hairmanship. I put this in question form for it is clearly a matter to be discussed among the four of us and with the leadership of the appropriate oversight committees. Another way to achieve coordination is via cooperation in specific subject areas with one agency taking the lead agency role-that is taking the initiative in promoting cooperation among the support agencies jn specific subjects. CRS has already taken the initiative, for example, in forming such a group in the important area of materials and national materials policy. It would seem useful to explore the possibility of establishing similar groups in other subject areas, with the proviso that such groups be judged useful by the participants. A key element here is that coordinat- ing groups should be needed and wanted, not forced, if they are to be useful and effective. The Congress needs to see that such cooperation is nurtured. So, Mr. Chairman, I suggest an improved complementary definition of roles, including the establishment of subject area groups with the appropriate agency in a leadership role; above all there should be a strengthening of the cooperative spirit among the agencies. These desirable ends can come only from the .top leadership down. If the foregoing suggestions making explicit the peer status of the four congressional analytical and informational support agencies, and if the lead agency responsibilities for selected areas are accepted, it would be necessary to strengthen the current informal coordination mechanisms among the four agencies. Independent of the strengthening of the coordination mechanisms among the four agencies, it would seem appropriate for the newest member of this group-the Director of CBO-to be added as a statu- tory member of TAAC. I enjoy and benefit much from my activity as a statutory member of TAAC. I feel that it is proper for the Director of CRS to be part of that group along with the heads of the other congressional support agencies. But unlike the other members, we are not appointed to TAAC on the basis of our own personal or professional qualifications. We are there to represeiTt our agencies. As I see it, one of my tasks is to bring to the attention of OTA, through TAAC, all that CRS can contribute and to bring back to CRS that which will be useful. Because of the representative responsibilities and the often uncontrollable scheduling reasons which heads of congressional service agencies face, I feel that I could serve `T'AAC better if the statute-or rules as appropriate- were changed to permit my participation, as necessary, through a des- igitated alternate. TAAC's role could be continued, but it should only play three roles: policy level advice to the Board, including the Director as a member PAGENO="0259" 255 of the Board; post hoc review of both general pattern and quality of selected outputs of the office; and two-way communication with out- c~icle experts and constituent groups. To preserve its independence as an advisor and recognizing the pressures of time limitations on the professionals who comprise the Council, TAAC should not engage in any assessments or other op- erational activities for congressional clients. In spite of their sterl- ing qualities, TAAC members should not be put in the position of advising or evaluating themselves. Nor should TAAC have direct relationships with congressional members or committee clients in par- allel with, or even through, the Office. The strengths of TAAC are first, the competence and independence of its representatives, and sec- ond, its unique position to stay at the policy and external evaluation levels of operation. I share the feelings of several, but not all, of my colleagues that TAAC has become too involved in the ongoing affairs of the Office. Input from experts and representatives of constituent interests are essential to a viable technology assessment process, as are the reyerse communications from TAAC members to their respective professional, industrial and citizen colleagues. I have heard of suggestions to c.onsider returning to the mixed member and outside-expert Board as originally proposed to the House in H.R. 10243. I felt there was merit in that arrangement then, and would think it advisable for the subcommittee to take another look at this alternative. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to contrib- ute my thoughts. Technology assessment is a necessary and positive contribution to the needs of Congress. I certainly commend you and your associates for. your efforts in seeking improvements in that proc- ess. You can count on everyone in CRS to assist you in any way we can. Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gude. That is indeed an excellent encompassing statement, which covers a large part of the problems that this subcommittee is interested in exploring. We ap- preciate the thought and effort that went into it. Mr. Hollenbeck, do you have any questions? Mr. HOLLENBECK. Mr. Chairman, as I have done with all the wit- nesses so far, we would like to submit a series of written interroga- tories or questions, if Mr. Gude so consents. We're trying to prepare a basic interlocking set of questions for each witness so we can get a clearer picture of what's going on here. Mr. BROWN. I'm sure Mr. Gude would cooperate to the best of his ability in responding to written questions, and I commend you for following that systematic approach. Mr. BROWN. Just briefly, I wonder if we could discuss this prob- lem that you refer to rather casually on the last page of your testi- mony of the possibility of restructuring the OTA Board, or the Technology Assessment Board. Of the four congressional support agencies, the Technology As-. sessment function is reasonably unique in having this bipartisan, bi- cameral governing board, which was not the structure originally contemplated in this committee, as has been noted several times. You PAGENO="0260" 256 indicate that the possibility of going back to something closer to the original concept might be desirable. Could you elaborate on that a little bit? In your own analysis and review of organizational structure and your participation in such activities, what, if any, do you think would be an optimum kind of a governing board, or does it need a governing board? We have, of course, the Library, which functions with a librarian. Its governing board is the whole CongTess, not some subset. The General Account- ing Office is somewhat similar. Could the Technology Assessment Office function in that way? Mr. GUDE. I have to think exactly how I would like to phrase the answer to your question, Mr. Chairman. The concept of OTA, as I see it now, is that the several commit- tees of Congress that identify the need for in-depth technology as- sessments bring these to the attention of. the Board. The Board makes a decision, or at least this is the way it's set forth in the statute, and then OTA acts on those or makes an appropriate assessment accord- ing to the decision of the Board. I think that the original concept of bringing in representatives of various institutions and groups around the country, as the public members of TAB, and putting them with a group. of Congressmen, and forming a Board is a novel approach to making a decision on which assessments OTA should appropriately tackle. Certainly, neither OTA nor CR5 can do everything that Congress would like them to do because of limitations, so there has to be some sorting-out functions. I think the Board as originally envisioned was a very good vehicle. I believe that there has to be some type of intervening body between OTA and the overall Congress. Mr. BROWN. I think you are correct in stating that the function of the Board was to make the decisions which sort out the possible tech- nology assessment options, give them priorities, and to some degree set limits, It is quite obvious that a new type of policy analysis, such as tech- nology assessment, is going tq have, rather unclear limits that can expand almost without regard to budgetary considerations, for in- stance. Or each requesting committee chairman might have hi~ own ideas about priorities and extent of evaluations, and without some intervening policy body, such as a board, a Director would be placed in the position of responding to conflicting demands which he might be unable to meet. As isee it, that's probably the primary justification for having the Board. Mr. GUDE. The very nature of the work which CRS performs, in that it works on the problems which the Members and the committees are dealing with, is a self-regulator on the workload of CRS. A com- mittee and a Member can keep only so many projects up in the air, can only èonsider so many proposals at one time. So we do have that limiting factor. The nature of our work is different. So is the priority-setting concept of (JBO, since CBO uses somewhat the same approach as OTA through budget committees. Mr. BROWN. Yes. Does any of the staff have any questions they'd like to ask ~ PAGENO="0261" 257 Mr. YEAGER. Yes; if I might. Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Yeager. Mr. YEAGER. Mr. Gude, following up a little bit on what Mr. Brown was discussing, one of our witnesses, a former Vice Chairman of the Board, Mr. Mosher, in his testimony the other day suggested some- thing along the lines of the earlier formula for establishing the Board, suggesting it might be expanded somewhat to include more public mem- bers. The act, as sent to the House floor, contained only four plus four Members of congress, the Directors of CRS and GAO, and the Direc- tor of the Office, an 11-man board. He was suggesting that it might be enlarged to incorporate all of the Directors of the service agencies, all four of the ones you have mentioned, an enlarged Board with a number of public members in the startup phase, probably reduced somewhat in the number of congres- sional members, and meet on a less frequent basis. He was suggesting it primarily as something the committee should look at and study. I would like to ask if you would care either to comment or provide some supplementary comment after you have had some time for reflec- tion. No. 1, do you believe it would be worthwhile for this committee seriously to consider looking at that possibility again as a viable concept; No. 2, if the committee did so, should it also consider the p05- sibility whether that kind of Board might obviate the need for a Council, at least in its curreut form, as an independent entity, and whether that, in itself, would be a plus or a minus. I recognize those questions may require more time and study than you now have. But if you have any immediate thoughts, we would appreciate having those in the record. Mr. GuDE. As I indicated in my testimony, the Council certainly shoula be revised and should not operate as it presently operates. I hope that the subcommittee takes a good look at the original proposal and the subsequent creation of a separate Council. When this was done by Congress, it resulted in a structural system which I don't believe anyone envisioned at the time. Thus what we anticipate and what we get often are different things. Certainly the Council needs to be brought back on track, as I indicated. The ability of the other service agencies to have input formally through the Council to OTA management with respect to their com- plementary roles in the work of OTA is somewhat muted on the Council. Our direct representation, or serving as ex officio members on the Board, would give us an opportunity-"uS" being the representa- tives of GAO, CBO, CRS-to input into the type of decisions that the Board makes. For inAtance, the Board might decide which agency might appropriately take a lead in a particular project, or recommend that maybe OTA isn't appropriately the right agency in a particular situation. CBO, GAO, and CRS conceivably could be members of the Board without vote and give the benefit of the knowledge of our agency, while the question of representation in decisions on policy would come from the Members of Congress, who, of course, are elected; and from the public representatives, who further carry out another aspect of the representational function. In that sense we could be nonvoting members, and to the extent that there might be some acrimony with regard to the disposition of a PAGENO="0262" 258 particular project, I think it would be reduced by our not having a vote. You might consider this. Mr. YEAGER. I would take it from that, among other things, that it would be difficult to look at this problem effectively by considering only the structure and functions of the Board, or the structure and functions of the Council, or the structure and functions of the Direc- tor's Office in an isolated way. All three of them should be examined together and as the~y relate to each other. Mr. GUDE. Exactly. And I certainly would have no objection if the decision of the committee was to go back to the original concept of the Board, which I think is fairly close to what Mr. Mosher proposed. Mr. YEAOER. If I may follow up with just one other question for a moment. Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. Yes. Mr. YRAGER. On another topic, Mr. Gude, it's becoming apparent that one of the difficult issues that's going to face the committee is the question of the long-term and short-term responsibilities of OTA. This matter has been broached before. You have discussed it very thoroughly today, with more documentation, I think, all the way around than we've seen before. I suspect it will be addressed again. I do want to call attention to the fact that there are a number of dif- ferent views on this, and then wind up with a short question to you. In the supplementary material which he submitted for the record and which is now part of the record, Mr. Daddario pointed out that when the subcommittee in 1969, after several previous years of dis- cussion and study, went into hearings on technology assessment, sev- eral important actions surfaced out of these inquiries. He had already listed three or four which are not relevant here, but these two, I think, are: He said one of these was that the original idea of simple early warn- ing was not enough. In the technology assessment process consideration would have to be given to the plus side, that is, identification of areas of need, where currently applied or unknown technology is essential to the solution of contemporary problems. Second, with the rapid rise of technological issues requiring legislative consideration there would have to be in the technology assessment mechanism an ability to re- spond to the more immediate, short-range interests and demands of congressional committees. Equally important, the capacity to evaluate certain technologies as currently being used would be required. He then pointed out that in the act, as it was finally passed, pro- vision was specifically made for these, and it is in section 3 of the~ statute, which I won't elaborate on here. But what I would like to discuss a little further is how this dilemma, if it is a dilemma, has come about, how it's developed since in a way which seems to have put the Director's office somewhat in the middle. Mr. Teague noted this in his report of last year, when he commented that the House Commission on Information, which you cited, was somewhat unhappy with the short-range concept and was emphasizing the long range; at the same time, just a few months later, the con- ference report of the Appropriations Committee for the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1977 was equally unhappy with the long-range activities, which they felt to be nonproductive, or that was the im- plication, and was much more satisfied with some of the things which had been done on a short-range basis. PAGENO="0263" 259 Mr. Teague concluded-and I am quoting him here: It would be unfortunate indeed if OTA is caught In a bind between $uch impor- tant appraisals as those projected by the House Information Committee, pre- ferring emphasis on prognostic, long leadtime endeavors, and the prestigious viewpoints of the Appropriations Committees, which seem to regard OTA's lower- paced assessments as nonproductive or underproductive. What I am getting at here is simply to lay that on the record and to indicate to you that we have not had any real evaluation or estimate of what long-range activities are and what short-range activities are. What are the criteria to distinguish one from the other? Is it a mat- ter of time, for example, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months? Is it some other aspect, some other facet, of the problem which determines what's long range and what's short range? I would not ask for a complete comment here. I would be happy to have anything you have. But if you would care to, after having some r~lection, provide some comment as to how we should distinguish, or what criteria this involves; I think it would be very helpful. Mr. GTJDE. I believe that the Technology Assessment Board should look at the resources available among its service agencies, because I think the TAB should also look on GAO, CBO and CRS as other rele- vant service agencies. TAB shouldn't just have a paternalistic view that OTA is "its boy." When determining OTA's assessment priorities TAB members should decide, in looking at them: Do we have the ability to do these things in-house on the Hill? Maybe CBO can participate; maybe GAO can contribute something; or maybe CRS? Rather than just go to the question of long range or short range, let's look at what we can do in-house, and then if we need something on the outside that we don't have available, or if there may be some new ground to be broken, and OTA can break this ground by bringing panels together, contracting for research or consultant services that would be able to take a look at something that is new, something that's emerging very rapidly, that hasn't been examined by the social and scientific community at large, this would be an appropriate OTA study. Mr. YEAGER. This, then, could be an argument for a closer liaison between the Board itself, as such, and the heads of the service agencies, irrespective of the council setup? Mr. GTJDE. Exactly. Mr. YEAGER. It's an argument for having those heads of agencies on the Board itself, or at least be considered as a possibility. Mr. GUDE. CRS, as I mentioned in my testimony, has a statutory mandate to present to each committee at the beginning of each new Congress a list of emerging issues which the committee should appro- priately address, and there is no need to duplicate this elsewhere. Mr. YEAGER. Have you found a duplication, Mr. Gude, that was of significant degree with GAO or CBO or OTA for that matter? Do you care to elaborate on that any further? Mr. GUDE. I don't believe it's significant to warrant concern. As I mentioned, the coordination is good. But I see it certainly as a problem if things continue the way they have been evolving, and I think your meeting of this committee is at the right juncture to t.ake a look at where we're headed. PAGENO="0264" 260 Mr. YEAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gude. I will say again that your statement is an extremely good, compre- hensive analysis of some critical problems in the whole area of improved coordination of not only the service support agencies to Congress, but I think it could give some lessons in terms of better coordination of bureaucracies in general, and it will be very helpful to the committee. Thank you very much. Mr. GUDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BROWN. Our next witness this morning is Dr. Jack T. Sander- son, who is Assistant Director for Research Applications of the Na- tional Science Foundation. We're very pleased to have you with us, Dr. Sanderson. Without objection, the full text of your statement will be included in the record at this point, and you may proceed as you desire to present it. [The prepared statement and biographical sketch of Dr. Jack T. Sanderson follows:] DR. JACK T. SANDERSON Dr. Jack T. Sanderson was named Assistant Director for Research Applica- tions on September 1, 1977. In this capacity, he directs the Foundation's pro- gram of Research Applied to National Needs (RANN), which focuses scientific and technical research on selected problems of national importance with the objective of contributing to their practical solution. Emphasis in RANN has been placed on problems of productivity, environment, and energy and resources, and the role of universities, industry, and government has received special attention in mounting effective research to address these problems. Strengthening the capability of State and local governments to use science and technology more effectively In their decisionmaking process has been of particular importance in these undertakings. Since July of 1976, Dr. Sanderson had served as Director of the National Science Foundation's Office of Planning and Resources Management. The Office of Planning and Resources Management is responsible for the activities of six offices-Planning and Policy Analysis Office, Programming Office, Budget Office, Evaluation Office, Program Review Office, and the Audit Office. Dr. Sanderson had previously served as Deputy Director of the Office of Planning and Resources Management and Acting Deputy Assistant Director for Science Education. Before joining the Foundation in 1971, Dr. Sanderson had been lecturer, Director of the Cyclotron Laboratory, and Assistant Director of the Physics Laboratory at Harvard University. Dr. Sanderson was born in Russellville, Alabama. He received an A.B. cum laude in physics and chemistry at Harvard University in 1958, and was awarded a Master's and a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1967. He is a member of the American Physical Society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Cryogenic Society, and Sigma Xi. Dr. and Mrs. Sanderson and their two daughters, Caroline and Nicole, reside in Alexandria, Virginia. PAGENO="0265" 261 STATEMENT OF DR. JACk T. SANDERSON ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH APPLICATIONS NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 12, 1977 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to participate in the oversight hearings on OTA, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you the National Science Foundation's activities in technology assessment. In June 1976. Dr. Stever, then Director of NSF, reported to the Technology Assessment Board on NSF technology assessme~t activities ftom their Inception in 1971. During that period, NSF made 62 awards totaling $7.5 million in support of projects in technology assessment. In the 15 months since that repov~t, the Foundation has made 22 additional major awards totaling $1.7 million. These figures for the past 15 months correspond to an annual level of activity essentially the same as during the period 1971-1975 which Dr. Stever described. There has been, however, a recent shift in program emphasis. During the early years of NSF activities in technology assessment, the Foundation strategy was to learn how to do technology assessments by getting them done. Now, NSF program manager~ have received the results from those early activities and are moving through a phase of evaluation, program refinement, and increased focus on strengthening the methodology of technology assessment. PAGENO="0266" 262 The emphasis In this new phase may be seen In NSF's current allocation of funds between technology assessment on substantive topics and methodology research. The budget for methodology research Is doubled; the allocation for substantive projects is slightly decreased. I should emphasize that, In spite of this shift in recent awards, substantive projects in technology assessment remain the center of attention in the Foundation's program. In discussing technology assessment, NSF defines "technology" to encompass both engineering and scientific techniques and changes In Institutional and organizational arrangements resulting from introduction of new techniques. Consistent with this definition, an assessment of the conversion to the metric system in the United States has been supported asan assessment of a new technology. Information developed in NSF supported technology assessment projects Includes not only technical aspects but also economic, social, and political matters. The Foundation Is very much impressed with the need to improve the ability to deal with the assessment of the less-quantified, nontechnical aspects of technology, In order that they may be better understood by experts and nonexperts alike. Most of the methodological research recently Initiated Is concentrated upon this aspect of NSF activities In technology assessment. PAGENO="0267" 263 .3.. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the concept of technology assessment evolved from the deliberations of this subcommittee. I believe that the need for an early warning signal concerning the implications of Impending major decisions is still the principal justification for these activities. The NSF program is based on the belief that technology assessments can help meet the need to better inform decision- and policy-making processes, both for potential users of the technology and for the scientists and engineers responsible for the further development. It does not, however, provide specific directions about what to do and how to do it. On the contratry, the determination of what and how Is specifically reserved for the decisionmaking process; the focal question for technology assessment is: "What are the Implications if we do any one of a number of things?" The assessment describes a range of possible actions, Illuminates feasible ways of Implementing any action that might be selected, and articulates consequences if that action is taken. Although Jam optimistic about the progress being made, there are practical difficulties In making technology assessments serve the goals we have established. If we are to anticipate the consequences Of technical choices, the pertinent Information must be developed early. But efforts to do so are often defeated by political reality which generates urgent pressures to develop information perceived to be of immediate Importance, and Imposes a severe discount on information seen not to be currently needed. PAGENO="0268" 264 -4- Consequently, we face a dilemma: If we develop information in advance -- so that it may be used in a timely manner -- It may miss the mark or be discounted in relation to needs to provide data for what are seen as today's problems. If we wait until the problems become critical, in terms of time, it is easier to frame the issues but difficult to collect and use the information in the time available; indeed, some of the desirable options may have already been foreclosed. Given such difficulty, we must walk a fine line between our response to problems of the day and the charge to provide early warning of potentially irreversible and detrimental changes. It may be that part of the strategy should be the development of mcmitoring mechanisms and periodic examinations of basic assumptions, goals, priorities, and trends; perhaps public hearings such as thoseconducted by this Subcommittee could help fulfill that function. In any case, I believe this to be an area in which outside expertise can be most useful. We are now experimenting with a number of differing approaches In an effort to tap such expertise and to improve our.research strategies for technology assessment, At this point, Mr. Chairman, let me add a word or two concerning varying views of technology assessment expressed In the recent past. All too often the emphasis has seemed to be exclusively on the need to avoid negative consequences of new technology. I believe there Is an equally important role for technology assessment in the exploration of PAGENO="0269" 265 new, beneficial opportunities; potential ways to reap the benefits of new technologies may be overlooked as well as the detrimental effects. I would like to emphasize a point I made earlier. Proponents of technology assessment often present the concept as if it could provide instant solutions, and decisionmakers tend to want, if not to expect, these solutions. But technology assessment is not a decision process. It is an exploratory and analytical process. In its essentials, it is a contingency analysis. It focuses upon options. It is a process for illuminating, not for deciding, courses of action; although, if done properly, it should contribute to the decision process. Here again, to be of greatest use, technology assessment should be addressed to emerging issues rather than pressing problems of the present or past. The function of technology assessment is anticipitory rather than corrective or reactive. Its approach should enable policy makers to respond flexibly, to plan imaginatively, and to develop strategies for the handling of inherent uncertainties. Let me turn now to a consideration of some aspects of NSF policy regarding the support of technology assessment projects. In each of the projects, the principal investigator is required to set up and use an oversight committee. Such committees are composed of experts In the technical aspects of the assessments and stakeholders in the potential technological applications. There are two~ reasons for this strategy. First, NSF wants the benefits of critique by experts while the analysis is in progress; such PAGENO="0270" 266 critiques provide a type of validation to the study. Second, NSF wants a measure of participation by interested parties while the analysis is in process; this helps to identify potential users of the assessment and, when results are available, increases the likelihood that they will be used. I should emphasize that this strategy also has some problems. It is often difficult to get these two groups working together in a common frame of reference at the time their help is most needed. The question of potential conflict of interest is also a matter of concern. NSF seeks to address the latter problem in two manners: 1. The Foundation attempts to solicit assessments on emerging issues in ways that minimize the potential for committee members to have an unfair competitive advantage from their participation; the studies are to be completed well before actions are needed. 2. The principal investigators for each technology assessment are encouraged to enlist a variety of vierpoints on each committee. And the Foundation reviews the oversight committee selections to insure that a diversity of opinions is represented in each assessment. NSF's procedures for review of completed assessments are similar to the review of other applied research projects~ Program officers solicit reviews of the draft report ahd return comments to the principal investigators for consideration and appropriate action. Since the responsibilties for the analysis and findings are solely those of the principal investigators, NSF's review activities are necessarily considered to be advisory. PAGENO="0271" 267 Although the critique which NSF returns to the principal investigator Is advisory, NSF does further check the quality of the finished product. The Foundation recently put into effect a systematic evaluation process in which the final products are reviewed by several experts. The following criteria are used to evaluate the work: significance and potential impact; scientific merit, performance and credibility, and utility of the product. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I should mention that NSF is sensitive to the requirement that assessment products not only be of high ouality to be of use, but also must be responsive to the needs of potential users. The Foundation is supporting a project to explore carefully the needs of decision makers and to contrast such needs with the capabilities of technology assessors. Our purpose is to Identify mismatches between needs and capabilities. I believe this research will suggest improvements for the conduct of technology assessments so that the use of future assessments will be enhanced. Projects supported by NSF have dealt with a variety of topics, ranging from electronic funds transfer systems to life-extending technologies. In choosing topics, the Foundation relies on inputs from several sources: the research comunity, other governmental agencies, program staff, and staff from other divisions within NSF. In addition, the Foundation currently is supporting two studies designed to identify agendas for new topics In technology assessment. These projects are exploring two broad areas where it is likely that new technological initiatives will emerge: the man-made environment and materials sciences. PAGENO="0272" 268 -8- As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Technology Assessment and the National Science Foundation are authorized to engage in cooperative research undertakings where there is a common interest or where the work of NSF can be of direct benefit to OTA. I would like to touch briefly on one example of such cooperative effort how being carried forward by the two agencies: NSF is supporting a one-year study entitled, "Personal Transportation Modes: Use, Choice and Future Preferences.' We believe this study will serve the aims of NSF's technology assessment program by providing policymakers with a better understanding of the factors currently influencing public preferences for the automobile and alternate modes of transportation. NSF is particularly interested in an assessment of how these factors might operate under future social and economic conditions. At the same time, the results will contribute to a comprehensive technology assessment of automobile transportation being carried out by the Office of Technology Assessment. As I understanc! it, the general objective of the OTA effort is to assess the impacts of future changes in the characteristics and use of the automobile. The development of NSF's project has been closely coordinated with staff members of OTA's transportation group. In addition, the objectives and scope of the study were presented to the OTA automobile assessment advisory panel in July 1976, and the final research design was presented to the panel after the contract was awarded. A member of the OTA staff serves on the oversight committee which meets regularly to review study progress and interim products. PAGENO="0273" 269 -9- This cooperative project serves to illustrate another important problem of methodology that confronts technology assessment: the design and conduct of research to examine systematically the impact of alternate technologies in the context of future preferences of a society when the societal preferences themselves are uncertain. NSF is participating in this study because we are, and have been, interested in such research design problems which are central to the Foundation's effort in technology assessment. OTA staff, aware of this interest, invited NSF's participation in the study. In concluding, I might mention that methodology, as the term is used practice today, denotes two related concepts: (1) the specific techniques employed in tho conduct of assessments, and (2) the overall research strategies. The specific techniques and quantitative methods used in echnology assessment are drawn from related fields such as microeconomic analysis, operations research, systems analysis, survey research, and cost-benef It calculus. In my opinion, the contribution of technology assessment to the development of techniques such as these is, and has been, modest. It seems to me, however, that NSF may play a unique role .in the exploration of innovative research strategies. As you know, the Foundation deals with the needs of a broad class of potential users. Their requirements must be matched with the capabilities of the technology assessment process. The Foundation Is investigating several approaches to improve the 96-205 0 - 78 - 18 PAGENO="0274" 270 -10- compatibility of user requirements and research delivery. To put it another ~ay, NSF Is attempting to appraise the revelance and use of policy analysis in policy making~ I look forward to receiving results; the effort has been underway less than a year, and it is too early to report any findings. Mr. çhai~an, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be ~~eased to answer any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee ay have. PAGENO="0275" 271 STATEMENT OF DR. JACK T. SA.WDERSON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH APPLICATIONS, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. JOSHUA MENKES, DIVISION DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF EXPLORATORY RESEARCH AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Dr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you are aware, this is my first opportunity to appear before the committee in the role of Assistant Director for Research Applications. I have accompanying me here at the table Dr. Menkes, who has the immediate responsibility for the Foundation's program of technology assessment. Mr. BROWN. We welcome both of you~ and I'm sure you'll be at your most brilliant since this is your first appearance bef ore the committee. Dr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to participate in the oversight hearings on OTA, and I particularly welcome the opportunity to discuss with you the National Science Foundation's activities in technology assessment. In June 1976, Dr. Stever, then Director of NSF, and science adviser, reported to the Technology Assessment Board on NSF technology assessment activities from their `beginning in 1971 until 1976. During that period, NSF has made 62 awards, totaling about $7.5 million in support of projects in technology assessment. In the 15 months since that report, the Foundation has made 22 ad- ditional major awards totaling some $1.7 million. The figures for the past 15 months correspond to an annual level of activity essentially the same as during the earlier period, about which Dr. Stever reported. There has been, however, a recent shift in program emphasis. During the early years of NSF activities in technology assessment, the Foundation strategy was to learn how to do technology assess- ments by getting them done. We've now had a chance to receive the results from those early activities and are moving through a phase of evaluation, program refinement, and increased focus on strength- ening the methodology for doing technology assessments. The emphasis in this new phase can be seen in NSF's current allo- cation of funds between technology assessment on substantive topics and methodology research. The budget for methodology research is doubled; the allocation for substantive projects is slightly decreased. I should emphasize, however, that in spite of this shift in recent awards, substantive projects in technology assessment remain the cen- ter of attention.for the Foundation's program. In discussing technology assessment, NSF defines "technology" to encompass both the engineering and scientific techniques and the changes in institutional and organizational arrangements resulting from the introduction of new techniques. Consistent with this `defini- tion, an assessment of the conversion to the metric system in the United States has been supported by NSF as an assessment of a new technology. Information developed in NSF supported technology assessment projects includes not only technical aspects but also economic, social, and political matters. The Foundation is very much impressed with the need to improve our ability to deal with the assessment of these PAGENO="0276" 272 less-quantified, nontechnical aspects of technology, in order that they may be better understood and evaluated by experts and nonexperts alike. Most of the methodological research recently initiated is con- centrated upon this aspect of technology assessment. As you know, Mr. Chairman, and as Dr. Gude mentioned, the con- cept of technology assessment evolved to a great extent from the de- liberations of this subcommittee. I believe that the need for an early warning signal about the implications of impending decisions is still their principal justification. The NSF program is based on the belief that technology assessments can help meet the need to better inform decision- and policymaking processes, both for potential users of the technology and for the scien- tists and engineers responsible for the further development. It does not, however, provide specific directions about what to do and how to do it. On the contrary, the determination of what and how is specifi- cally reserved for the decisionmaking process. The focal question for technology assessment, as we see it, is: "What are the implications if we do any one of a number of things?" The assessment describes a range of possible actions, illuminates the feasible ways of implement- ing any action that the decisionmaker might select, `and articulates the consequences if that particular action is taken. Although I am optimistic about the progress that has been made in technology assessment, there are practical difficulties in making tech- nology assessments serve the goals we have established. If we are to anticipate the consequences of technical choices, the pertinent informa- tion must be developed early. But efforts to do so are often defeated by political reality which generates urgent pressures to develop informa- tion of immediate importance and imposes a severe discount on infor- mation seen not to be currently needed. Consequently, we face a dilemma: if we develop information in ad- vance-so that it is available in a timely manner-it may miss the mark or be discounted in relation to the need to provide data for what are seen as today's problems. If we wait until the problem becomes critical, in terms of time, it is easier to frame the issue but difficult to collect a'-id use the information in the time available; indeed, some of the desirable options may have already been foreclosed. Given such difficulty, we try to walk a fine line between our response to problems of the day and the charge to provide early warning of potentially irreversib'e and detrimental changes. It may be that part of the strategy should be the development of monitoring mechanisms and periodic examinations of basic assumptions, goals, priorities, and t.rends; perhaps more public hearings such as those conducted by this subcommittee couldhelp fulfill this latter function. In any case, I believe this to be an area in which outside expertise can be most valuable. We are now experimenting with a number of differing approaches in an effort to tap such expertise and to improve our research strategies for technology assessment. At this point, Mr. Chairman, let me add a word or two concerning varying views of technology assessment expressed in the recent past. AU too often the emphasis has been exclusively on the need to avoid negative consequences of new technology. I believe there is an equally important role for technology assessment in the exploration of new, beneficial opportunities; potential ways to reap the benefits of new PAGENO="0277" 273 technologies may be overlooked or missed as well as the detrimental effects. I would like to emphasize a point I made earlier. Proponents of technology assessment often present the concept as if it could provide instant solutions, and decisionmakers tend to want, if not to expect, these solutions. But technology assessment is not a decisionmaking process. It is an exploratory and analytical process. In its essentials, it is a contingency analysis. It focuses upon options. It is a process for illuminating, not for deciding, courses of action; although, if done properly with adequate time, it should contribute to the decision process. Here again, to be of greatest use, technology assessment should be addressed to emerging issues, rather than the pressing problems of the present, or past. `Phe function of technology assessment is anticipa- tory, rather than corrective or reactive. Its approach should be to enable policymakers to respond flexibly, to plan imaginatively, and to develop strategies for the handling of the inherent uncertainties which must remain. Let me turn now to a consideration of some aspects of NSF policy regarding the support of technology assessment projects. In each NSF project, the principal investigator is required to set up and use an oversight committee. Such committees are cqmposed of experts in the technical aspects of the technology assessments and stakeholders, po- tential interested parties, and the use of the technology being evaluated. There are two reasons for this strategy. First, NSF wants the ben- efits of critique by experts while the anlaysis is in progress; such critiques provide a type of validation to the study. Second, NSF wants a measure of participation by interested parties while the anal- ysis is in process; this helps to identify potential users of the assess- ment and, when results are available, increases the liklihood that they will be used. I should emphasize that this strategy also has some problems. It is often difficult to get these two groups working together, talking in a common frame of reference, at the time their help is most needed. The question of potential conflict of interest also is a matter of concern. NSF seeks to address the latter problem in two manners: First, the Foundation attempts to solicit assessments on emerging issues in ways that minimize the potential for committee members to have an unfair competitive advantage from their participation on the committee; the studies are scheduled to be completed well before any action is needed or taken. Second, the principal investigators for each technology assessment are encouraged to elicit a variety of viewpoints on the committee, and the Foundation reviews the oversight committee selections to insure that a diversity of opinions is represented in the committee for each assessment. NSF's procedures for review of completed assessments are similar to the review of other applied research projects. Program officers so- licit reviews of draft reports and return comments to the principal investigators for consideration and appropriate action. Since the re- sponsibilities for analysis and the findings are solely those of the prin- cipal investigators, NSF's review activities are necessarily considered to be advisory to the principal investigator. PAGENO="0278" 274 Although this is advisory, research applications does further check the quality of the finished products we support. We have recently put into effect a systematic evaluation process in which the final products are reviewed by several experts. The following criteria have been estab- lished to evaluate the work: The significance and potential impact, the scientific merit, the performance and credibility, and the utility of the product. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I should mention that NSF is sen- sitive to the requirement that assessment products not only be of high quality to be of use, but also must be responsive to the needs of the potential users. The Foundation is currently supporting a pro)ect to explore carefully the needs of decisionmakers and t.o contrast such needs with the capabilities of technology assessors. Our purpose is to try to identify mismatches between needs on the one hand and capa- bilities on the other. I believe this research will suggest improvements for the conduct of technology assessments so that the use of future technology assessments will be enhanced. Projects that have been supported by NSF in the area of technology assessment range over a variety of topics; including electronic funds transfer systems and life-extending technologi~s. In choosing topics, the Foundation relies on inputs from several sources: The research community, other governmental agencies, program staff, and staff from other divisions of NSF. In addition, the Foundation is currently supporting two studies de- signed to identify agendas for new topics in technology assessment. These projects are exploring two broad areas where it is likely that new technological initiatives will emerge: the manmade environment and materials scienôes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Technology Assessment and the National Science Found~,tion ar~ authorized to engage in cooperative research undertakings where there is a common interest or where the work of NSF can be of direct benefit to OTA. I would like to touch briefly on one example of such cooperative effort now being carried forward by the two organizations: NSF is supporting a 1- year study entitled "Personal Transportation Modes: Use, Choice and Future Preferences." We believe this study will serve the aims of NSF's program by pro- viding policymakers with a better understanding of the factors cur- rently influencing public preferences for automobiles and for alternate modes of transportation. NSF is particularly interested in an assess- ment of how these factors might operate under future social and economic conditions. At the same time, the results will contribute to a comprehensive technology assessment of automobile transportation being carried out by OTA. As I understand it, the general objective of the OTA effort is to assess the impacts of future changes in the characteristics and use of the automobile. The development of NSF's project has been closely coordinated with the staff members on OTA's transportation group. In addition, the objectives and scope of the study were presented to the OTA Automo- bile Assessment Advisory Panel in July 1976, and the final research design was presented to the panel after the contract was awarded. A member of the OTA staff serves on the oversight committee for this PAGENO="0279" 275 assessment. The committee meets regularly to review the study prog- ress and the interim products. This cooperative project does `serve to illustrate another important problem of methodology that confronts technology assessment; that is, the design and the conduct of research to examine systematically the impact of alternate technologies in the context of future prefer- ences of a society when the societal preferences are themselves un- certain. NSF is participating in this study in part because we are, and have been, interested in such research design prthlems which are central to the Foundation's effort in technology assessment. OTA staff, aware of this interest, invited NSF's participation in the study. In concluding, I might mention that methodology, as the term is used in practice today, denotes two related concepts: One is the spe- cific techniques employed in the conduct of assessments, and the sec- ond is the overall research strategies by which the study is related both to capability and to the needs of the users. The specific tech- niques and quantitative methods used in technology assessment are drawn from related fields, such as microeconomic analysis, operations research, systems analysis, survey research, and others. In my opinion, the contribution of technology assessment to the development of these techniques is, and has been, modest. It seems to me, however, that in its technology assessment program NSF may play a unique role in the erploration of innovative research strate~ries. As you know, the `Foundation deals with the needs of a very broad class of potential users. Their requirements must be matched with the capabilities of the technology assessment process. The Foundation is investipting several mechanisms to improve the compatibility of user requirements and research delvery. To put it another way, NSF is attempting to appraise the relevance and use of policy analysis in policy making. I look forward to receiving results;~ the effort, unfortunately, has been underway less than a year, and it is too early to report any finding. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions. Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Dr. Sanderson. One of the key problems, which your statement helps to illuminate, facing the Technology Assessment Board is how to `determine what is a technology assessment. If we are to serve a role, as Mr. Gude indicated, of being a screening agency for what we might expect to be a very large number of re- quests, and to set priorities for these requests, we need to have certain criteria by which we can exclude some topics as not appropriate for technology assessment and include others which obviously are, thei the additional step of deciding which are the most important, of course, has to take phice. Your activities at NSF should help to throw considerable light on that, I would assume. Dr. SANDRRSON. We hope we will be able to contribute substantially to this, as part of the studies I mention near the end of my statement, trying to evaluate the needs and capabilities. I might say, as Dr. Gude pointed out, there is a very diffuse line between technology assessment and policy assessment. I think, as Mr. PAGENO="0280" 276 Yeager pointed out also, there is a dimension of time, in terms of the appropriations of technology assessment as the suitable tool. I tried to point out in my testimony that NSF views technology assessment as being most valuable when looking at the question of emerging technoiogies or emerging opportunities. Here t~ie decision is on the methodology, the depth of the study that's generally re- quired; NSF concedes that technology assessment probably produces a time mismatch between an immediate decision and the ability to do the indepth technology assessment. Mr. BROWN. I think Mr. Gude indicated that he looked upon tech- nology assessment as a subset of policy analysis in general. I presume that you would generally concur with that? * Dr. SANDERSON. Iwould generally concur with that. I think I would also state that the part of that subset that's most relevant to technology assessment is the longer term emerging prob- lem area, rather than the more immediate policy analysis. * Mr. BROWN. You can't always draw a clear line between longer term and shorter term. Dr. SANDERSON. No. That's very difficult to do. You can point to the extremes fairly easily. But technology assessment, I view, like policy assessment, like systems analysis, in a more hardware oriented or more technical arena, as being one of a spectrum of tools in which there is no clear delineation between one and the other, and I would find it very difficult to state unequivocably a definition that could draw the line between policy analysis and technology assessment. Mr. BROWN. Is the Foundation supporting programs aimed at im- proving and defining policy research and policy analysis in general? Dr. SANDERSON. We have a number of policy analyses activities underway, primarily in another of the directorates of the Foundation, the directorate for Science, Technology and National Afflairs. The concentration in policy analysis at NSF is on policy analysis related to science. Mr. BROWN. Science policy analysis. Dr. SANDERSON. Science policy analysis, as opposed to major studies on applying the capabilities of science to sharpen the ability to do pol- icy analysis. We do support some policy analysis activities, both in my directorate and in the social sciences programs, at the Foundation. But they are generally aimed more at conducting a policy analysis of a spe- cific area of policy or a specific issue, rather than a systematic methodological development. Mr. BROWN. I presume you would have the same problem in differ- entiating science policy analysis from policy analysis as you do in difforentiatin~ technology assessment and policy analysis. Dr. SANDERSON. Right. It's a very fuzzy line. To some extent, it depends upon the technical or scientific content of the nolicy which is being reviewed. I think th~s could also be said for the question of technology assessment. When we conduct a technology assessment we are concerned not only with the technology but also with the social, economic areas, the areas which are more traditionally viewed as policy relevant, rather than technology. But we are in general driven in the direction of classifying them as technology assessments by a fairly high degree of technological content to the study. PAGENO="0281" 277 Mr. BROWN. You have listed electronic funds transfer as being one of the subjects of your technology assessments, and I presume that you see that as a technology assessment because it is dependent upon sophisticated electronic technology. Dr. SANDERSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The capability or the drive toward electronic funds transfer has been brought about by the massive growth in technological capability to miniaturize circuits, high relia- bility communications, and as a result we are viewing this as a tech- nological capability, the ability to handle large masses of data with high precision, and to do this with multiple input sources, in the ex- tremes, a cable going to every grocery store, and we are interested in what the impacts of this tech~nologica1 capability to handle data in this way could mean to the funds transfer. Another area that we're interested in now is the same thing: We're discussing, looking at the question of robotics, which is an area of technology assessment built on the ability to automate, to mechanize, to build on the capabilities of pattern recognition, computer control and automation techniques that we see as an emerging potential for a number of applications in society maybe 5, 10 years down the road. I believe the major impacts in this area will span our entire social- economic structure, the economy, labor patterns in a number of areas. But we're entering it because we see the potential for carrying out the activities originating from the discoveries in the scientific com- munity, the ability to wed these basic scientific capabilities. Mr. BROWN. What if you had been President in the 1930's and you saw an unhealthy concentration of people of one race in one region* of the country and you wanted to move them massively to other regions of the country, and you decided the only way to do that would be to develop a labor-saving device for harvesting cotton, would that be a technology assessment, or would that be a social policy assessment? Dr. SANDERSON. I think you probably generated the social policy answer in your statement that the oniy way to do it was to develop a device to harvest cotton automatically. While I'm `answering, obviously, off the top of my head, I would tend to view the question as you phrased it as a technology assessment, and that would be, as I mentioned in my statement, an attempt to reap one of the beneficial aspects of technology, to find a useful way to make technology do something that society wants done, and would label that as clearly a technology assessment. Mr. BROWN. The problem is, though, that the development of the technology took place motivated purely by the desire to harvest cotton at quite a less expensive cost. The sociological changes of massive migrations of blacks into the northern cities wasn't anticipated. I sup- pose it should have been part of a technology assessment at the time. But you made a point in your statement that the design and conduct of research to examine systematically the impact of alternate tech- nologies in the context of future preferences of a society when the societal preferences themselves are uncertain. I don't think that at that point you could have, in the 1930's, reached any consensus on the de- sirability `of migrating blacks into northern cities. Dr. SANDERSON. I don't think you could have placed any value, as you saicL on whether or not, it would be desirable to have the blacks PAGENO="0282" 278 migrate into the northern cities, but I think a technology assessment could well have said: "With the introduction of this mechanization the blacks will lose their source of income and therefore will be forced to migrate, or some alternate social mechanism will have to be devel- oped to provide them employment in their home." Mr. BROWN. Yes. We could have developed a policy at that point of labor intensive economic development in the Southern States to provide jobs for the displaced field workers, but we didn't do it that time, which is illustrative of part of the problem that exists in every technology assessment. Many of the alternatives for coping with the impact of a particular technology may either not be conceived of, or if conceived of are unacceptable. We didn't have too much of an economic development program, or too much in the way of economic development programs, at that time. As a matter of fact, we still don't have any that are very effective. That's not a question. You don't have to respond. Mr. THORNTON. Would the gentleman yield briefly? Mr. BROWN. I'll be happy to yield. * Mr. THORNTON. I'd like to suggest the possibility also that as a result of the technology which was developed-you ask the question whether it might have been foreseen-instead of growing cotton in those areas, which are by nature especially equipped to grow cotton, that the result would be greater crop knowledge brought into existence in arid states which did not have the population required to harvest it without the new technology. Dr. SANDERSON. I think if we'd been doing technology assessments then, and if we'd been clever enough, we probably would have seen sOme of the advantages, due to the large capital cost of the equipment, of moving to much larger-scale farms than were traditional in the southeastern part of the country. I think to some extent we are facing an interesting analogy to these questions now in some of the problems facing the underdeveloped countries, where we really have an opportunity to try to apply tech- nology assessment to the potential technologies that might be intro- duced in the LDC's and to estimate what is the most appropriate tech- nology. The words "appropriate technology" has become buzz words, which means different things to different people. But I think we do have a chance now to ask the question: Is it better, if you will, to introduce the automated cottonpicking machinery in some of these countries, or whether there are ways we could better serve their overall development? Mr. THORNTON. As a matter of fact, in many instances might it not be possible that the technology which needs to be exported might not be an automatic cotton.picker, or an airplane, but rather, a method of setting out the plants, still using what they have, which may be hand- worked, but doing so in a more effective way for the conditions in which they live? . . Dr. SANDERSON. I think we found that in some of our activities with the Peace Corps and in some of our other activities, that the effective and long-lasting changes we introduced were the ones that built on their local, or their indigenous, capability, rather than an infusion of highly automated energy intensive rather than labor intensive ca- PAGENO="0283" 279 pability, of a more economically developed country. I agree with you completely. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. Mr. BROWN. Do you care to follow up with any further questions? Mr. THORNTON. I want to thank you for the good testimony, which I did have an opportunity to read, and apologize for the necessity of my being absent for part of the hearing this morning, and to thank the gentleman from California for acting as the `chairman during that period of absence. Mr. BROWN. I just want to stress, or to bring out, one point, if I may, and that involves the relationship between the NSF and the. Office of Technology Assessment. From your statement I would conclude that there is a high degree of cooperation and that `any inputs that come into NSF with regard to improvement in the techniques of making technology assessments, or in other specific aspects, are readily transmitted automatically to OTA, and likewise if they develop methodological or other informa- tion, that it gets back to NSF in `a reasonable fashion. Is this correct? Dr. SANDERSON. Yes, Mr. Brown. We have a number of mechanisms for assisting the coordination between the two. Our Dr. Menkes and people on the OTA staff are in close communication. The Foundation also has an interagency `advisory group to assist the Foundation on its programs. We discuss our program plans, our activities, in some detail. That is primarily an Executive agency or- ganization. However, OTA does have an observer, or is invited to send an observer, to all of our meetings. We, in addition, as illustrated in the automobile case, when we have a technology assessment or a methodological development we believe is of interest to OTA we will discuss it in detail with the staff before we undertake the `activity. Our material is made available gen- erally both through NTIS and through distribution of documents. So we do believe we have a fairly effective mechanism in place to keep OTA informed of what we're doing and what our particular interests are. I think also there is fairly good communication when an OTA in- terest overlaps some of the things that they are aware that we're inter- ested in. There has been evidence of good cooperation between OTA staff and the Foundation staff in making us aware of what tl~eir in- terests and concerns are. Mr. BROWN. You indicated that you're supporting studies aimed at identifying the agendas for new topics in technology assessment, and, of course, OTA itself has a group devoted to emerging technologies, and the Library, the Legislative Reference Service, has a similar operation. Again, I ask if each of these separate investigation's is taking ad- vantage of the results of each of the others so that we may hope that there will evolve some sort of a reasonable consensus as to what the emerging technologies or technological issues are which are of the highest priority for assistance to the ~Jon~ress. Dr. SANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I don t have a detailed~ answer for that at hand. Perhaps Dr. Menkes does. I will say that we try to discuss our activities well in advance. PAGENO="0284" 280 I was not aware of the inforn~ation system referred to by Dr. Gude. I'm not sure whether Dr. Menkes was or not, which lists the ongoing interest activities of OT'A and CBS. We try to put out program announcements, or announcements in draft form, so that OTA is aware of our activities. I don't know whether you have anything you would like to `add. Dr. MENKES. No. Dr. SANDERSON. .1 will be glad to answer the specific question for the record if you would like. Mr. BROWN. Phil, do you have `any questions? Mr. YEAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On page 2 of your statement, Dr. Sanderson, you mention that the methodology research budget is doubled and that substantive projects are slightly decreased. Caii you provide us with the dollar figures for each? Dr. SANDERSON. I can provide you with a dollar breakdown for each category. At the moment, in terms of dollars, I think we are about two-thirds funding substantive assessments and `about one-third fund- ing `methodology. In fact, the methodology studies come less expen- sively in terms of the effort involved. They generally are not such massive undertakings. So in terms of actual activity, we are probably closer to half-and-half at this point. I can get the detailed breakdown for the record, if you would like. Mr. YEAGER. Mr. Chairman, I do h'ave three or four areas on which I would like to request some additional material for the record, but I can do that lathr, if I may have your permission. . Mr. BROWN. I assume that you would be willing to assist `with writ- ten responses to questions, Dr. Sanderson. Dr. SANDERSON. Certainly. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Hollenbeck m'ay have some also. I have no further questions myself. . I want to thank both of you gentlemen for being here this morning. You have been most helpful in clarifying the issues in this important area. Thank you. `The subcommittee will be adjourned. [Whereupon at 11: 50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned to reconvene at 10: 15 a.m., on Thursday, October 13, 1977.] PAGENO="0285" REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1977 HousE o~ RENRESENTATIVES, Co~&MITTE1~ ON SCIENCE AND TECITNQLOGY, StTBCOMMIrPEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, Wa$hMgton, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ray Thornton (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Also Present: Mr. Hollenbeck, Mr. Brown, Mr. Wydler, Mr. Fuqua, Mr. Clarence Miller; staff: Anthony Scoville, minority counsel; Philip 13. Yesger, counsel; Joseph Malmendier, John Hoimfeld. Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. This morning we continue the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology's hearings on OTA. Our first witness this morning, Mr. DeSimone, has been Deputy Di- rector of OTA to this date, and is currently the Acting Director of OTA. We appreciate your appearance last August, which provided us with extensive information on the organization and methods of operation. We're looking forward to your appearance today, which will supple- ment the previous one, and discuss some of the more immediate rela- tionships of the Office with congressional and legislative agencies. I would like to ask our ranking minority member, Mr. Hollenbeck, if he has any statement or comments to make, as we begin this session Mr. HOLLENSECK. I have nothing at this time, Mr. ChaIrman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you. Mr. DeSimone, we are pleased to have you with us. We have-we're looking forward to your testimony, and ask that you proceed. STATEMENT OP DANIEL DeSIMONE, DEPLtTY DIRECTO1~, O~TICE OP TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Mr. DESIMo~. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this oppor- tunity to appear again before this subcommittee, as it continues its hearings on the Office of Technology Assessment. I am confident that these hearings will result in constructive proposals that will have a salutary effect on the development of OTA. They come at a most propitious time, in my judgment, for OTA now has almost 4 years of experience and there are lessons to he drawn from all of this. We have reached the first major milestone. It is time to take stock. to assess this experience, and to measure it against the charter for OTA and the aspirations of this subcommittee, which con- (281) PAGENO="0286" 282 ceived of the institution and principles of technology assessment and brought them to reality in the legislative branch of Government. In my first appearance before this subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, I described the background and organization of OTA, outlined the proc- esses we follow in selecting and performing assessments, gave some basic statistics on our products and resources, and illustrated the ways in which our program capabilities have been developed. You have invited me to appear once again toward the end of these hearings next year to give you my overall reflections on the problems and opportunities posed by OTA'~ first 4 years of operations. I shall be pleased to do that. For now, however, you have asked that I build upon my earlier tes- timony by discussing the principles that guide us in our work. To what extent are we performing the early warning function? Do we consider the potential benefits of technology or are we preoccupied with negative effects? Would a better definition of technology assess- ment make OTA a more effective tool of the Congress? These are the kinds of questions that have been raised, Mr. Chair- man, and in this second appearance I would like to put them in proper perspective. It was in the middle of the last decade that this subcommittee is- sued the report that coined the expression "technology assessment." Until then, the general rule had been that technical invasions in- exorably established their beachheads and were then followed by patch- work social adjustments. Thus, we had technical faits accomplis, then social reaction. The subcommittee sought to turn that around. It conceived and laid out plans for the systematic assessment of technological innovation, so that rational choices could be made among the options for social ac- tion before all the impacts of technical initiatives had come home to roost. There were no illusions about the difficulties that would have to be overcome to make technology assessment a reality. It is easy to forget the changes in social attitudes that were then taking place. Until a generation or so ago, technological advance was regarded as a wondrous provider of new products, machines, and capa- bilities. Technology was a bountiful treasure house that poured out a seemingly endless stream Of wonders: computers that zipped through awesome computational tasks, drugs that devastated disease, synthetic fabrics and plastics of every description, jet planes and interplanetary rockets, and in the offing the promise of unlimited nuclear power. Ours was becoming a steadily more affluent society and, seemingly, a happier one. The view was simplistic, but it was seldom questioned-except by a handful of people, who were mainly regarded as cranks. Then the pendulum of opinion began to swing. Many people who ~clefliutcdy were not cranks warned us to stop and reconsider whether all progress was an undiluted blessing. They saw flaws in technology. Bacteria were developing resistance to those wonder drugs, as were insect pests to insecticides; giant excavation machines were seen to ravage the countryside: and, while nuelear-tipped missiles bristled at the ready, the peaceful uses of nuclear power were being challenged by the experts themselves. Social philosophers began to question PAGENO="0287" 283 whether people could cope with all of the noise, waste, foul air and water, and ciutt,er-and the intensity of life that seemed to go hand in hand with technological advance. It was at this time, in the mid-1960's, that this subcommittee began its congressional hearings on these questions. Meanwhile, the Con- gress was becoming concerned about the increasingly technological con- tent of the issues that were accumulating on the legislative calendar. For instance, never before was a deliberative body so deluged with facts and opinions as the Congress was in 1967, when it came to con- sider whether the U.S. should go ahead with the SST, the supersonic transport. The testimony of scores of experts, added to the formal reports, gave Congress more advice than anyone could digest. It was almost like handing someone a book in the form of a bushel basket full of unnumbered pages. The advocates of the SST failed to carry the burden of persuasion that they adequately understood the implications of the new airplane. Moreover, much of the information was flatly contradictory. As a result, the fate of the SST was settled by a debate of unusual acrimony, tinged with emotionalism. And the ~ST was just one ex- ample of an issue that Congress had to face with inadequate tools. Similar floods of unstorted, unevaluated, and irreconcilable asser- tions and opinions have handicapped Congress in appraising other highly technical matters. As technology continues to advance, many more such baffling decisions are in the offing. Now, how does OTA regard technology? OTA's task is to deter- mine the good that a developing technology can yield, as well as to anticipate difficulties that may arise from misapplication and excesses. Generally, OTA is asked th present Congress with a series of options, each evaluated as to its likely consequences. Technology assessment involves: Anticipating the consequences of technological change and examin- ing the many ways, expected and unexpected, in which tehnology af- fects people's lives; and Looking not just to the harmful, but also the beneficial, effects that could result. We must not forget that when OTA began its work in mid-1974, many industrialists and others in the scientific and technical commu- nity viewed it with strong misgivings. They feared it would be a brake on progress, and some referred to its scathingly as the Office of Tech- nology "Harassment." But the record shows that OTA has definitely remained impartial with respect to technology. For technology is neither saint nor sinner. It is a tool. A computer can guide a nuclear warhead from the depths of the oceans to this city, or it can pinpoint a tumor in a man's head. It is true that some of the most ingenious technologies can go awry. To some extent, OTA must serve as a watchdog or an early warning system. In this way it can help avert blunders that might otherwise be irreversible or too expensive to correct. It boils down to the old, commonsense adage that we should look before we leap. However, the concern for technological misapplications certainly goes too far when it becomes a crusade to turn off technology. PAGENO="0288" 284 For big technological developments have become a fact of life. There is no running away from that. The noted humanist and naturalist Joseph Wood Icrutch summed it up when he said: "Technologies made large populations possible," and conversely, "large populations now make technology indispensable." The implication is inescapable: the more thoughtfully we use existing technologies and those yet to come, the better for mankind now and in the future. Yet, as we have seen, the general view of technology has swung from one extreme to the other. An emotional public regard for engineerin and science has changed from uncritical enthusiasm to hostility, wit a fickleness that has made many national programs difficult to carry out. We need to find the middle ground. We want to rebuild and clean our cities; we want to increase the standard of living of the millions of urban and rural poor; we want to reduce the drudgery of the workaday world. We cannot do any of these things without technology. But practitioners of technology assessment must be neither reck- lessly enthusiastic about technology nor blindly opposed to it. If ever OTA becomes a crusader or advocate for any ideology or special in- terest group, no matter how nubile it may be,. it will sow the seeds for its own richly deserved destruction. If the Congress cannot rely on the dispassionate objectivity of OTA, then it does not need OTA. It has advocacy galore in every hearing on every controversial subject. * And so, if one were to point to the central lesson to be drawn from OTA's experience to date-indeed, the fundamental principle that guides its work-it is that a policy assessor must neither an advocate nor a naysayer be. Rather, one must be an impartial appraiser or ref- eree, who gathers and evaluates the facts and organizes information on the likely consequences of various courses of action. One must let the chips lie where they fall. To the extent that Congress guides applications of technology, tech- nology assessments will serve as foundation for good judgment. But no one should imagine that technology assessment is a magical tech- nique for resolving all problems. Only in extremely rare cases will it provide an indubitably right answer. Almost always it will produce, instead, a wide range of options, founded on solid analysis and seasoned by the thinking of experienced men and women who work with us. Each option will have its advan- tages and disa~v1ntages. The probable consequences will be laid out for the Congress to consider and choose. And so it would be irresponsible or naive to assert that technology assessments will always deliver answers, in simple form, that can be translated directly into Congressional action. Yet these assessments are helpful to the Congress, for they go beyond the claims, assertions and opinions that the committees of Congress~are usually confronted with. Some 20 years ago John von Neumann, the philosopher mathe~na- tician, said: "For progress there is no cure. Any attempt to find auto- matically safe channels for the present explosive variety of progress must lead to frustration. The only safety possible is relative, and it lies in an intelligent exercise of day-to-day judgment." PAGENO="0289" 285 That sums up what we can expect from technology assessment. It is not a magic formula and never will be Gne. It is not even an exact science, although it draws on all sciences. But it is a way of equipping the elected representatives of a democratic society with more reliable tools fordecision. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude with some observations on the definition of technology assessment. It is remarkable that the ex- pression "technology assessment" has developed a life of its own, as though it were the fundamental truth or religion from which all of the proper activities of the Office of Technology Assessment are to be deduced. And yet, this expression was not chiseled in stone and delivered to us from the Heavens. As I indicated earlier, it was coined by this sub- committee as a useful short-hand title for the kinds of analytic activi- ties specified in the statute that created OTA. The function of OTA is clearly stated in that statute. While observers may debate over what is and what is not technology assessment, there seems to be general agreement on the purpose of the. office. The Technology Assessment Act of 1972 spawned by this sub- committee simply states, "The basic function of the office shall be to provide early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse im- pacts of the applications of technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the Congress." [Emphasis added.] I am not minimizing the need to address and better understand OTA's evolving institutional role in the Congress. I share the belief and concern of others who feel that this is desirable and necessary. But I am not persuaded that this is best accomplished by groping for a more precise definition of "technology assessment." This is not a mere semantic exercise. An article I read just yesterday illustrates the problem, and I'd like to quote one paragraph: In fact, some of OTA's most widely praised studies have not been technology assesments, according to a strict definition of the term. OTA put together some quick analyses of the Ford ai~l Carter administrations' energy policies which have been credited with eliciting more funds for conservation technologies, for example. It has also produced reports on the bioequivalency of supposedly identical drugs made by different companies, a review of the research and development programs of the Environmental Protection Agency, and a study of computer policies in the Internal Revenue Service. All of those studies were es- sentially policy analyses but they were the kind of things that Congress was interested in. We should and must do the kinds of things that Congress is inter- ested in. I submit to you that it is more the process of induction than deduc~ tion that should guide us in determining the proper activities of OTA. What I am saying is rather than theoretically deducing from some nonstatutory definition of technology assessment what is proper for OTA to do, we should induce this primarily from the expressed needs of the committees of Congress that fall within the statutory criterion I quoted. Beyond these expressed needs, however-ones now on the congres- sional calendar-OTA must, on its own initiative, identify areas of assessment that concern issues of probable future interest to the Con- gress. OTA's assessment priorities should therefore constitute a bal- 96-205 0 - 78 - 19 PAGENO="0290" 286 ancing of short-range and long-range technological impacts and a balancing of issues judged politically important by the Congress with issues judged by OTA as likely candidates for future congressional attention. Mr. Chairman, that ends my prepared remarks, and I would be glad to discuss any questions that the subcommittee may have. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSimone, for that fine testimony. Continuing to explore the question of division of time and effort within OTA, as between long-range work and short-range work, yesterday we received information that such agencies as the Congres- sional Research Service were capable of advising on immediate re- search efforts. Is there a danger of duplication of activities? I'm asking what is the relationship, as you see it, proper relationship, between OTA and CRS and the Congressional Budget Office, and the General Accounting Office? Mr. DESIMONE. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, that there is so much to do on the part of all of the four agencies of the legislative branch with limited resources that we ought not to duplicate each other. There are occasions when this occurs, either inadvertently or in some cases by specific requests of committees o~ the Congress. We have, among the four agencies, established a high-level co- ordinating group which meets monthly-in fact, is going to meet today-and we are working very assiduously at this problem of co- ordination and avoidance of duplication. I think that it's inevitable as we evolve that there will be occasions when OTA will be doing perhap.s short-term work that would be more appropriately done by the CR5, and conversely, where one of the other sister agencies may be doing an assessment which would be more appropriately done by OTA. But we are working to minimize this. We had a very good meeting last month on this-the Comptroller General, Mr. Staats; Mr. Gude, the Director of the Congressional Re- search Service; Bob Levin, the Deputy Director of the Congressional Office; and myself-and we are determined to achieve a rational divi- sion of labor and avoid the problems that could occur if we were not to coordinate our n~tivit.ies. Mr. THORNTON. Could you give us any impression as to the ratio, ap- proximate ratio, of requests for assessments from congressional com- mittees as between short-range or long-range assessment programs? Mr. DESIMONE. Mr. Chairman, it's about 50-50. I don~t have the e~act figures, but I would be glad to provide those figures for the rec- ord by program, and specifically in terms of- Mr. THORNTON. In providing that information, would you give us some information as to how you distinguish between the two? I think in many instances the distinction will be obvious; in others, it may not be so obvious, which programs are long range and which are short range. And we would appreciate your providing- Mr. DESIMONE. We will do that, Mr. Chairman. In fact, the data could be misleading if they weren't categorized in the manner that you have suggested, because long term/short term can refer to the nature of the issue addressed, the length of time for performance, or some other arbitrary division. PAGENO="0291" 287 Mr. THORNTON. Good. We would like to have that. Can you tell us approximately how much time and effort is spent on an average assess- ment, or does that vary so widely as to require some definition. Mr. DESIM0NE. The average time, Mr. Chairman, is just a little over a year. We have assessments that have been as short as 1 month in dur- ation and others that take years. One in particular, the solar assess- ment project, took over 3 years to complete. Mr. THORNTON. Can you tell me what distinctions are made between the work that you do in-house and the work that you contract out, the ratio between the two, and how the judgment is made as to whether to proceed with work in-house or under a contract? Mr. DESIMONE. We have data on that, Mr. Chairman. The percent- age of our effort which is devoted to contractual work is approximately 30 percent of our budget, and the percentage devoted to in-house staff work is approximately 32 percent, plus about 10 percent for consult- ants who assist us in our work. In sum, approximately 30 percent for contracts, 32 percent for in-house staff, and approximately 10 percent for consultants. Mr. THORNTON. Is it your experience that the quality and cost of the assessments ~:5 comparable for-do you have any comments with regard to that, the efficacy of proceeding in one way or the other? Mr. DESIMONE. It varies, Mr. Chairman, We have been moving more toward contractual assessments in the past several months be- cause we are preparing ourselves for a lower staff level in this fiscal year. The contractual activity, when we began operations in 1974, was predominant, because we did not have the in-house staff capability. We had mixed experience with that It wasn't a question of incompe- tence on the part of contractors, or on the part of our in-house staff; it was just that we were groping for the right way of going about technology assessment. We were pioneers in that effort for the legislative branch. Some of the contractors that we retained early on were not acquainted with the congressional environment at all, did not see the difference between providing an assessment for a congressional committee and providing an assessment for an executive agency. An assessment for a congres- sional committee must be in the format and the style that match the needs of the committees-as you well know, as members of this sub- committee know well. So we had difficulty with that. And in addition we had difficulty with the biases and other subjec- tive material that crept into the assessment process because that was the way it was done in all other activities the contractor undertook. We've come a long way since then, and contractors are increasingly aware of the needs of committees. We don't serve as a conduit for contractors' reports. We have a mixture of resources to apply to any assessment project, and ultimately the project is the responsibility of the OTA staff. I think we've come to a pretty good understanding of how to use contractors in the best way for the committees' needs. Mr. THORNTON. In Senator Kennedy's proposed statement, which has been made a part of the record, he described a couple of programs, PAGENO="0292" 288 the emerging technologies and the R. & D. priorities programs, and suggested these would both involve long-rangegoals. Id' like to inquire as to how those programs came into existence. Do they result from requests by congressional committees, or was it some- thing that was generated within OTA, either by the Board or by the Advisory Council or by the Director? Can you tell me how those pro- grams came into being? Mr. DESIMONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The research and development policies and priorities program was established in response to requests from Senator Moss, chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, now defunct, and Senator Humphrey, in his ca- pacity as a member of the OTA Board. U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON AORXCULTTJRE AND FORESTRY, Washington, D.C., November 7, .1944. Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Chairman, Technology Assessment Board, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. DE~s~ MR. CHAIRMAN: Federal expenditures for R&D programs have been rising. The Science Advisor to the President has estimated that overall R&D expenditures wil amount to $19.6 billion in fiscal 1975 as' compared with $17.9 bililon in fiscal 1974. Current investment in R&D will determine to an important degree the future quality of life of all Americans, ag well as the security of the Nation. At present, roughly two-thirds of R&D investments are in defense and related areas, in.' eluding space, while only one-third is devoted to the needs of the civilian society. In the past year the absolute increase in civilian R&D was only slightly greater than that recommended for~ defense, $1.0 billion as compared with $0.9 billion. Over the past several years there have been significant Increases in par- ticular fields of civilian oriented research and development. Energy and cancer are notable ~xam.ples. In other fields, such as urban growth and development, education, or recreation, the change has been scarcely discernable. Meanwhile, there seems to have been a shift away from the universities as performe~ to private corporations of various kinds. These and other shifts have taken place without the development by the Executive Branch of even the most rudimentary form of a long-range R&D plan that could be examined as a whole by Congress. Indeed, the effort of the Science Advisor, after the fact, to explain the investment pattern is both superficial and filled with inconsistencies. Meanwhile, society continues along the path of hap- hazard growth and frequent environment, economic, and social crises. My view is that without vigorous and coherent long-range policies, large scale investment in R&D is as likely as not to aggravate such crises in the future. The Office of Technology Assessment is concerned with the intended and un- intended effects of new technology. No doubt the significance of particular tech- ILological advances may be substantial and therefore worth examining in detail. Much of the initial effort of OTA moves in this direction, and I support it. At the same time, I believe it is essential, on an urgent basis, for OTA to obtain a broader, longer term appreciation of the direction and composition of the federally supported R&D effort as a whole. The society continues along a path of increasing mobility, affluence, urbanization, and reliance on high technology. At the same time it faces interrelated problems that Include (1) the availability and use of nature resources, (2) fuel and energy shortages, (3) sound use of land, (4) growth and distribution of population and productive capacity, and (5) equitable distribution of income and opportunity. Large scale organizations, both public and private, are acquiring an increased capacity to intervene to change the living environment both natural and man-made. * In these circumstances an ability to comprehend the main thrust and clirec- tion of the Natiqn's R&D efforts is of critical importance. A shift In the nature of human society seems to be underway, no less fundamental, and infinitely more rapid, than that which occurred In the shift from hunting groups to agricultural PAGENO="0293" 289 villages several thousand years ago. Research and development is, of course, both a consequence and a key cause of this change. Strategic and critical choices, I believe, are involved in our R&D investment decisions. We need to learn a great deal more about both the short- and long- run implications of such decisions. But first it is essential to take stock of where* we are and from whence we've come as a result of past R&D decisions and of the processes by which they were made. For example, most of the initiative for R&D investments appears to lie with mission-oriented agencies. If not OTA, then who is to ask whether the fragmented mission perceptions of the future are compatible with a coherent and balanced view of the society of the future? Is the present division of R&D between defense and non-defense pur- poses a reasonable one? In the civilian sector is the emphasis on a technological rather than social R&D a reasonable one? Indeed, is it a fact? Will the present thrust of R&D push society in the direction of greater or less population con- centration in the future, more or less income inequity, increased or decreased dependence on other nations? Critical questions like these are not easy to address, and the answers will cer- tainly contain large elements of uncertainty. Yet, If Congress does not seek to obtain a comprehensive and strategic appreciation of the R&D effort, choices on individual items may In the longer view be little less than random. [f 0Th does not have some general sense of the composition and thrust of the R&D effort as a whole, choice of Individual items to assess, while useful in some short-run sense, may be wide of the mark in the longer term. In sum, I strongly recommend that OTA undertake an overall assessment of * the federally supported R&D effort (1) to determine its present composition, (2) to delineate the social objectives it is intended to serve, (3) to provide a context for specific technological assessment activities, and (4) to provide Con- gress a better Information base for particular R&D decisions. With every best wish. Sincerely, HUBERT H. HUMPHREY. U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, Washington, D.C., October11, 1974. Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Chairman, Technology Assessment Board, Russell E~1enate Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In the nearly two years that I have been ~Jhairman of this Committee, I have been consistently impressed with the high quality of R&D conducted and contracted for by NASA. I have also been impressed with the "fall-out" or "spin-offs" from these NASA efforts which are having an obvious benefit to the economy and to the betterment ofthe quality of life for our citizens. However, while these benefits seem tangible enough, there does not appear to be any generally accepted theory or data that would relate NASA's expenditures to the level of current or future benefits. Upon further reflection, it is clear that this Is not a problem regarding NASA only, but applies as well to all funds spent for research and the development of new technologies. What seems to be needed-and this, I would think, is quite relevant to OTA's basic mission-is better methodology whereby positive and negative assessments can be made. In essence, this assessment process is an analysis of the economic balance of the positive and negative impact of a projected technological development so that more rational criteria can be established to help determine priorities for expenditure of current research and development funds. Consequently, under the provisions of the "Technology Assessment Act of 1972" (Public Law 92-482, Sec. 3(d) (1)), I should like to request that the Office of Technology Assessment undertake a study to develop a technology assessment. methodology that Is broad and rigorous enough to be utilized as a more reliable means of determining R&D priorities. I have listed below some questions which might be considered In this con- nection: 1. Is there a relationship between technology and productivity; i.e., does technology stimulate economic growth? Can this be measured? What is the relationship to inflation, balance of payments, and other characteristics of economic growth? PAGENO="0294" 290 2. Can a distinction be made between "high" and "low" technology and if so, is this correlated in any way with the creation of increased wealth? 3. Is it possible to determine the length of the period between research and development and the time when the benefits of that R&D begin to flow back to society? 4. Would it be possible to develop an index of relative merit (or index of potential merit, or some other appropriate term) which would allow for a more rational method of determining spending priorities on current R&D projects? 5. Can a valid distinction be made between wealth producing and wealth consuming expenditures? 6. Is there any way to estimate how much of the Nation's total wealth (as measured, say, by the Gross National Product) should be expended annually on research and development? If so, would it be possible to distinguish between government vs. non-government levels? 7. Is it possible to take a specific budget request, such as that of NASA's, and analyze it in terms of predicted economic return to the society as com- pared with other kinds of federal expenditures or with other agency requests? I am sure that this is a difficult undertaking, but any progress at all along this line would be of great benefit to this Committee, to the Congress, and, I believe, to the OTA as well. Sincerely, FRANK E. Moss, Chairman. The program was assigned to the Advisory Council, which has served as an umbrella committee for the panels that were established for that particular assessment. It continues to be in that special relationship and arrangement with the Advisory Council. The emerging technologies program, so-called, is basically, by any other name, part of the long-range planning function of this agency. Among the first planning steps when OTA was created, was a series of meetings by the Advisory Council of experts and people interested in future technological issues all around the country. And they came up with a number of high-priority issues that concerned technological applications and developments. This helped us a great deal, in con- firming what the committees of the Congress had already indicated were priority areas, and determining other areas that might be initiated by OTA. As an intended foliowon to that, the emerging technology activity was started over 1 year ago in August 1976, and the Advisory Council is trying to forge that into something worth while. But we have not come to any clear understanding of what direction that program will take. Mr. THORNTON. Well, the point is that this is an effort which is being originated from within OTA to extend this long-range or radar- type long-range warning of developing problems. Has there been-cou1d you supply any further detail as to the or- ganization of it, where the Board has formalized the methods that you would use in looking for emerging technologies? Can you do that now, or could you supply that at a later time? Mr. DESIMONE. I would `be glad to comment on it briefly now, Mr. Chairman. The Board has not formalized this as a program, nor the manner in which emerging technologies should be flagged. I believe it needs a great deal of attention. It should be addressing the question that I mentioned in my prepared statement, about the necessity for OTA to be looking at assessment issues that will be of interest to the Congress in the future, but may not be at this time. PAGENO="0295" 291 I think we need to give a great deal more thought to this so-called emeriring technologies program. I would hope that the development~ of thrs becomes inherently a part of a long-range planning function 0± the Office, and not another make-work category off by itself. I think it has to be inherently a part of all of our programs. It's essential that the energy program, for example, consider new and emerging technologies and future issues of concern to the Con- gress, and they do that. So, too, the food, agriculture, and nutrition program, the £ransportation program, the oceans program, the health program, et cetera, across the board-all of our programs must be in- volved intimately with this long-range planning function. And we are therefore going to have to develop an emerging technologies capability i~itegra1 ly in all of OTA's programs. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you. I would like to acknowledge the presence in the hearing room of a distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr~ Clarence Miller, who is a member of the Technology Assessment Board, and welcome him into the hearings and invite him to share a seat up here if he would like to do so. Mr. Brown, do you have any questions? Mr. BROWN. I want to indicate in more than a pro forma way that I think you've made an excellent statement of the situation of OTA this morning, Mr. DeSimone. Mr. DESIM0NE. Thank you, Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. I think it's helping gradually to clarify all of our thrnK- ing about what we're trying to do with that organization. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the full text of the article, which is only one page, quoted by Mr. DeSimone, be inserted in the record. Mr. THORNTON. Without objection, that wiil be included- Mr. BROWN. It's an analysis of some of OTA's.problems. Mr. THORNTON [continuing]. At this point. [The article referred to above follows:] (Technology Review, October/November, 1977] O.T.A. CAUGHT IN PARTISAN Cnossrnui (By Oolin Norman) Cohn Norman is a Research Associate at Woridwatch Institute. He was Washington correspondent for Nature and is a regular con- tributor to Technology Review. The Office of Technology Assessment (O.T.A.) has endured a long, hot sim- mer, and the autumn may not bring much relief. Since it was established in 19~3 to provide Congress with analyses of technical issues, O.T.A. has been criticized for a variety of sins of omission and commission. But during the pat few months, the Office has been turned into a battleground for partisan politics. Though the dispute has been concerned more with the style of O.T.A.'s operation than with the quality of work, a few serious questions are being raised about the Office's future role and responsibilities. The trouble began when Emllio Q. Daddario, O.T.A.'s founder and for the past three and a half years its Director, announced his intention to resign. Dr. Dad- darlo had long said that he intended to stay at O.T.A. only long enough to get the Office under way, and his resignation should have evoked neither undue surprise nor cries of foul deeds. Nevertheless, a few days after the announcement Wi!- PAGENO="0296" 292 11am Saflre-a former speechwriter for Richard Nixon, now a conservative col- umnist for the New York Time8-wrote a column claiming that Dr. Daddario had been ousted by Senator Edward I~ennedy (D.-Mass.), Chairman of O.T.A.'s Congressional Governing Board. The move, said Mr. Saifre, was prelude to an attempt by Senator Kennedy to "take over" O.T.A. Mr. Safire said Senator Ken- nedy planned to install his own aide, Ellis Mottur, in the Director's chair and would then use O.T.A. as an extension of his personal staff. The source of those allegations, it turned out, was Representative Marjorie Hol't, a conservative Republican from Maryland who was Vice Chairman of O.T.A.'s Governing Board. Within a week of Dr. Daddario's resignation, Repre- sentative Holt also quit, firing off a letter to Senator Kennedy saying that she could no longer have any influence on O.P.A.'s policies because the Board was so dominated by Senator Kennedy and his allies. A week later, another member of O.T.A.'s Congressional Board, Senator Rich- ard Schweiker (R-Penn.), also resigned. Senator Schweiker said he was quitting simply because his other Senatorial duties had grown and he flU longer had time to attend to O.T.A. affairs. Though the move was not inspired by political differ- ences or by concern at the direction O.T.A. is taking, it is nevertheless telling. Senators and Congresspeople are not in the habit of resigning from committees which give them influence or political visibility, and Senator Schweiker evi- dently felt that the O.T.A. Board provides neither of those attributes. The third blow fell late in July, when a conference committee finally agreed on a budget bill for the Legislative Branch for fiscal year 1978. The bill in- cluded a cut of about $1.6 million in the budget requested for O.T.A., and a decree that the Office's staff should be pruned. O.T.A. will have a budget of just over $7 million next year, about the same as it received this year. The move indicates that O.T.A. has yet to establish its utility to the people who count most on Capitol Hi111-the appropriations committees. TIMID AND TRIVAL? The upsets followed critical reports on O.T.A. last year. The first, from the House Commission on Information and Facilities, said that O.T.A.'s internal man- agement was in a mess and there was a good deal of confusion about the Office's role. That was followed by the resignation of Harold Brown, now President Car- ter's Secretary of Defense, as Chairman of O.T.A.'s Advisory Council, an inde- pendent body which provides policy advice to the O.T.A. Board and Director. In his letter of resignation. Mr. Brown offered some words of praise for O.T.A., but suggested that it had become bogged down in trivial studies and bad neglected its primary role of providing Congress with an. early warning system on the po- tential side effects of new technology. In addition, there has been some carping from outside O.T.A. to the effect that `the Office has been too timid in its choice of issues and that it has really been providing policy analysis instead of technology assessment. Before examining those complaints, it is worth reviewing the origins of O.T.A. and its goals. O.T.A. sprang from discussions in the mld-1960s between Dr. D'addario, then a Congressman fron~ Connecticut and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology, and a number of scientists including Jerome Wiesner, President of M.I.T. The basic idea was that Congress lacked the technical ex- pertise to match the Executive Branch on technological issues, and a body to provide technical advice to legislative committees was badly needed. Dr. Daddario translated the idea Into legislation, and Congress eventually approved a~ bill establishing O.T.A. in 1973. By that time', Dr. Daddario bad left Congress to thake a bid for the Governorship of Connecticut, and he was named the first dji~ector of O.T.A. The legislation decreed that O.T.A. should be managed by a Congr~ssional Board consisting of six Senators and six Representatives, with equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats. Senator Kennedy was elected the Board's first Chairman; he was followed by Olin Teague, Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Technology, and the chairmanship reverted back to Senator Ken- nedy earlier this year. In addition, the legislation established an independent Advisory Council to provide policy advice for O.T.A. When Harold Brown re- signed from the Council last year, Dr. Weisner was elected Chairman. So much for the organizational arrangements. What was O.T.A. supposed to be doing? O.T.A. is a creature of the Congress; it was established to provide advice PAGENO="0297" 203 to Congressional' committees when asked, and it must tailor its product to fit the requirements of legislators. This immediately raises a problem, for Congress is usually concerned with immediate issues and requires quick answer while O.T.A. is supposed to take a long-term view. It is therefore not surprising that much of O.T.A.'s work has consisted of relatively straightforward policy analysis tied to specific pieces of legislation. - In fact, some of O.T.A.'s most widely praised studies have not been technology assessments, according to a strict definition of the term. O.T.A. put together some quick analyses of the Ford and Carter administrations energy policies which have been credited with eliciting more funds for conservation technologies, for example. It has also produced reports on the bioequivalency of supposedly iden- tical drugs made by different companies, a review of the research and develop- ment programs of the Environmental Protection 4~gency, and a study of com- puter policies in the Internal Revenue Service. All of those studies, were essen- tially policy analyses but they were the kind of thing that Congress was interested `in. Of the larger studies which conform more closely to technology assessment, only one is significant: a massive investigation of the consequences of expanding offshore oil production along the Atlantic coast, a study which involved consider- able public input, identified many potential problems and issues, and attracted a good deal of attention. POLITICAL SPATS So far, O.T.A. has produced more than 40 reports and, though the office has received a lot of criticism, nobody has taken a good look at the products to see whether they have been influential or of reasonable quality. Two such studies are about to be undertaken. First, O.T.A.'s Advisory Council is beginning an investigation of the Office's functions, its impact, and the quality of its work. The study, which was requested by the board at the instigation of Senator Kennedy, has been one of the irritants in the latest round of disputes concern- ing O.T.A. The second study `will be conducted by the House Committee on Science and Technology this fall. The Committee is planning a series of public hearings at which some of O.T.A.'s critics, including Representative Holt, are expected to testify. The objective, according to committee staff, is simply to review O.T.A.'s record so far, but it is likely to provide a public forum for some of O.T.A.'s critics. And that brings us to the latest charges that Senator Kennedy is trying to take over O.T.A. Way back in 1973, when O.T.A. was just organized, an article appeared in the WaU ~1treet Journal suggesting that Senator Kennedy was about to use O.T.A. to build up his power base for the 19~16 Presidential elec- tion. Should the latest accusations be given any more credence? Senator Kennedy certainly dominates O.T.A.'s Congressional Board. Hi~ views usually carry the day, and on the few occasions when there has been a vote on a major question, the majority has sided with Senator Kennedy while the dis- senters have been Representative Holt, her two fellow House Republicans, and Olin Teague. One reason why Senator Kennedy has been so influential is that he is perha~s the most active and interested member of O.T.A.'s Board (witness, for example, Senator Schweiker's statement that be no longer has time for O.T.A. affairs). But Senator Kennedy's critics charge that his influence stems chiefly from another source: he has some of his own staff aides working for O.T.A., and he has close connections with Dr. Wiesner. In fact, most of the Senate members of the O.T.A. Board have some of their own staff aides working for O.T.A., a situation which ha.s raised complaints from a few other O.T.A. officials, who see the political appointees as inconsistent with O.T.A.'s supposedly non-partisan role. As for the complaints about the link between Senator Kennedy and Dr. Wiesner, Dr. Wiesner was not appointed by Kennedy (contrary to some published accounts), but was elected by other council members. The election, moreover, took place when Representative Peague, not Senator Kennedy, was Chairman of O.T.A.'s Board. Another possible reason for the dispute over Senator Kennedy's role is pure partison politics. Senator Kennedy, a liberal Democrat, `is always a prime target for conservative Republicans, and `this case is no exception. RepresentatFve Holt's resignation followed three differences of opinion with Senator Kennedy on O.T.A.'s Board. The first concerned a vacancy on the Ad- visory Committee. J. Fred Bucy, an executive of Texas Instruments, was up for PAGENO="0298" 294 reappointment to the Council but Senator Kennedy objected, criticizing Mr. Bucy's record of attendance during his first term of office, Representative Holt charged that Senator Kennedy's objections stemmed from differences of opinion on several ma:tters of policy. The second Irritant was Senator Kennedy's proposal that the Advisory Council should conduct a review of O.T.A.'s operations, a review wilich Representative Holt believed would be biased because of the Council's alleged close links with Senator Kennedy. And third, Representative bit objected to Senator Kennedy's proposal that C.P.A. should do a quick study of the data which led to the pro- posed ban on saccharin~ Representative bolt said that the review would add nothing to the debate and charged that Senator Kennedy only wanted a study which would support his own position. Representative Holt was defeated on all three issues, and subsequently resigned from the Board. All of these spats mask the central question about O.T.A.: is it performing useful functions, and is It having any impact on congressional operations? O.T.A. staffers point to a stack of press clippings and comments from members of Con- gress raising its work, but there are few issues on which O.T.A. can claim to have had decisive influence. The reviews by the Advisory Council and the House Com- mittee on Science and Technology should, however, provide some real informa- tion on the quality and impact of 0.T.A.'s operations-though there Is also the danger that the House Committee hearings may degenerate to yet another ex- change of partisan rhetoric. Meanwhile, a replacement for Dr. Daddarlo as Director of O.T.A. Is being sought, and an appointment is expected soon. Mr. BROWN. Mr. DeSimone, I noticed that you put considerable emphasis on efforts to define the utility of the effective assessment. I concur in your feeling which, I think, you either state expressly or imply, that it may be somewhat futile to spend undue efforts to seek to find technologly assessments. On the other hand, I think that this effort is really a surrogate for trying to gain a sense of mission, more than anything else. And the easy way is to seek it by some simple definition. I thought we clearly understood technology assessment, but obvi- ously that's the mission of the. OTA to do-whatever we define tech- nological assessment to be.. I think that essentially this is the wrong way to approach it. However, I am concerned-and I have expressed it frequently-that we seek to clarify our mission, and distingiush the boundaries from the mission of other related service organizations. This came up in testi- mony from our former colleague, Mr. Gude, who-is now with the Con- ~ressional Research Service. He indicated that they had staff working in that legislative service which is at least exploring various areas which would be suitable for technology assessment, if I recall his testi- monty correctly. Now, you have already responded as to the degree of cooperation between OTA and the Library. But I want to gain even further as- surance that, to the extent that each of these organizations, plus the National Science Foundation, is engaged in activities which are seek- ing the same goal, that we are working with some sort of a common understanding of what the respective roles are. Are you confident that this is the situation, that you are utilizing the work that they are doing; likewise, the same for them, in connection with `these areas which perhaps overlap? Mr. DESIMONE. Mr. Brown, CRS has a clear responsibility for pro- viding future projections to the committees of Congress, and also to OTA under our sthtute. I don't think we have utilized them for this as much as we ought to. They have been extremely helpful to us. PAGENO="0299" 295 Indeed, when OTA `began operations, we looked to CRS for an indica- tion of issues that had been suggested to congressional committees as important `to the Congress commencing in January 1974. I think we need to do more of that. The Congressional Research Service has this emerging issues capability and we ought;to be able to work out an amalgamation of activities, including our Advisory Council, the CRS, our own staff, in developing what should be a re- search ao~enda for OTA. I see that also as a way of avoiding the kind of duplication that has g~ven some people concern; namely, OTA may purport to be the agency for informing committees of the Congress what items are of importance to them in the future activities of the committee. I read Mr. Gude's statement concerning this, and his point is well taken. CR5 has that responsibility, and we ought not to be involved in that. As an aid in developing our own research agenda, I think we ought to call upon the CRS perhaps more than we have. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Miller, would you like to have a chance to ques- tion Mr. DeSimone now? I will try and hold him here until you return. Mr. MILLER. Yes, if I may. I have a couple of questions. Perhaps some of them have already been answered. When it comes to evaluation of the programs, when you have had questions and answered those questions concerning the evaluation, there has been some discussion in the past as to how they are utilized, what feedback do we have from the various congressional committees, and the Congressmen themselves, as to how they have been able to utilize us. The mai.n purpose, as I see it, is to make the studies so the Congress- men would be able to understand better the various technolog~ies that we have today, and the ~rrowth in. and the extension of the technologies. So I'm wondering whether we have some me~chanism to feed back to the staff of OTA, the Board of OTA, the Council of OTA, some information as to how well the studies have been utilized. Mr. DESIMONE. Congressman Miller, that's a terribly important question, be'~ause it goes to the heart of quality control. As I indicated in my prepared statement, our reason for existence is to serve the committees of Congress. We do haveS a very close inter- action between our in-house staff and the staff of the committees. Most of the committees that we serve are steady customers, you might say. They've been back to 0Th more than once. That's an indi- cation of how they feel about our work But I do think that we need to establish perhaps a more formal survey system, as you've indicated in your question, Mr. Miller. And I also believe that the inquiry of this subcommittee, which will include toward the end of its series of hearings, as I understand, a querying of the committees of Congress that have been served by OTA, would also be helpful to us. It's obviously sort of a subjective thing, to inquire of one's own staff what the reaction of the committee staff is to the work of our own staff. I think it would be a lot more objective and perhaps more useful to us to have the independent inquiry which will be done by this subcom- mittee as to how the committees we have served view our work. PAGENO="0300" 296 Mr. MILLER. I know that we're going to have to vote, and if we do not move now we're not going to make it. So it would be up to you, George, as to whether-you like to live dangerously. Well, I will have to move. Mr. BROWN. Mr. DeSimone, I think the members would like to ask you some additional questions. I believe probably we'll need to recess for 5 minutes. Mr. Thornton should be back veiy shortly, and I'll be back as soon as I can, and Mr. Miller. I would ask your indulgence to remain here for a few minutes. Mr. DESIMONE. I'd be glad to, Mr. Brown. [Recess.] Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. While awaiting the return of Mr. Miller and Mr. Brown, who have left briefly for the purpose of voting on an issue on the floor of the House, I would like to call to your attention the testimony yesterday by Mr. Sanderson regarding NSF's attention to the areas of method- ological research, determining ways to accomplish that-given the objective-and to ask you to comment on how you see the relationship between OTA and programs such as those described by Mr. Sander- son, on the part of NSF? Mr. DESIMONE. We have continuous liaison with NSF, Mr. Chair- man, and keep abreast of all of their activities. And, indeed, our Board in a set of hearings chaired by Congressman Brown has established a very good basis for taking advantage of work they have done. I should say that the best form of transfer of knowledge and know- how, the best form of technology transfer, is the transfer of the person who possesses it. And we did the very best thing possible by obtaining from NSF their premier technology assessor, Mr. Joseph Coates, who is now a member of the OTA staff. We have in effect transferred the institutional memory and capability of NSF to OTA through that means. Mr. THORNTON. I find thftt a most interesting way of suggesting how technology transfer be accomplished. [Laughter.] I suppose there are limits upon its applicability. However, let me seriously ask whether any attention is being given to where expertise exists in the private sector, in Government, in various agencies, with a view to evaluating just what reservoirs of knowledge and experience might be available to be tapped. Is there an assessment of the Nation's resources, intellectual re- sourcesq in any formalized way? Do you know of any such assessment? Mr. DESr~oi~. I don't know of any, Mr. Chairman, other than the hearings that were conducted by the OTA Board under the chairman- ship of Congressman Brown. We published a report as a result of those hearings that identified various kinds of expertise and tech- nology asse~sment activities in the private sector and other Govern- ment agencies. It was very useful, and we have gotten a great deal of favorable comment and expressions of appreciation for that effort. Now, in addition to that, we have hundreds-literally hundreds- of outstancln~ men and women all around the country working on our panels, providing expert~se, insie~ht, points of view. The next w1tne~sq for example, who is a distinguished member of this community of PAGENO="0301" 297 technology assessors, has served on a number of OTA panels, and he exemplifies the kind of expertise we bring into our work, through this process of reaching out. Mr. THORNTON. Do you make an aggressive effort to identify issue areas where some kind of methodological research might be appropriate? Mr. DESn~oNL We have consciously, Mr. Chairman, chosen to learn by doing. The National Science Foundation does methodological research and we draw upon it. But we have learned mostly by doing, and I tend to feel that that's the best way of doing it in this kind of an environment, or any envi- ronment indeed, whether one is assessing techno1o~y in the executive branch, or in industry, or in the legislative branch.tLearning by doing is a very effective way of~cleve1oping the methodological tools that one needs. Mr. ThORNTON. Thank you, Mr. DeSimone. Mr. Brown? Mr. BROWN. Well, let me just try briefly to elicit more comments on the line I was proceeding with. I feel that the Congress and the Technology Assessment Board would concur that we're not so much interested in definitions as we are in sensitive issues. I'm interested in getting a response from you as to how do we establish that? It is not enough to say that OTA exists to serve the committees of Congress. Congressmen exist to serve the public, and frequently we do it very badly, and we get kicked out. And that could happen to the OTA, if it says merely that it exists to serve the com- mittees of Congress; and then it doesn't understand basically what the committees need, even though they may be doing what the corn- inittees asked. So, I'm interested in how we' can develop guidelines. Technology assessment is a form of policy analysis. What form of policy analysis? Where are the boundaries, and what distinguishes it from other forms of policy analysis? To what extent should it be oriented toward future problems rather than current prthlems-by current I mean within, say, the next year- to-5 years, rather than 5-to-20 years, or so on? `To what extent needs it be connected with technology, or with hard technologies versus soft technologies? You can't name a policy problem that I can't show you has some technology content. And if we don't clarify some guidelines we can explore the whole range of policy problems facing Congress. Now, the Library, the Congressional Research Service is charged with that through their analysis of foresight activities. OTA isn't charged with that. Is our effért in the emerging technologies group aimed at develop- ing these guidelines? Is the effort of the Board and the staff aimed at clarifying these questions? Or do you think that they're unimportant to clarify? Mr. DESIMONE. I think they're terribly important, Mr. Brown, and I believe this is something we have to give increasing attention to. I think that the office has been preoccupied with meeting the needs of committees of Congress during these 4 years. I think we were doing the right thing in that regard, because we had so many more requests PAGENO="0302" 2~8 than we could possibly perform with our resources. But over the course of this year we have been looking at the opportunities for bal- ancing more of our work with the longer term issues that you referred to. As a starter, I have recommended a new planning and programing strategy to the OTA Board and the Board has approved it. I don't know what tht right mix is. I tend to feeel that we ought to be doing something like 20, 25 percent of our work in the long-term area; 75, 80 percent of our work on the current needs of the Congress as they express them. We have done some outstanding work in the longer range category. The solar assessment project is one example. Our work on materials policies is another. But it's not enough to just give examples. I think wee need an ex- plicit Board policy on this. Our Board needs to think about the longer- term questions that should be Board-initiated, so that we have an appropriate balance with requests of the committees of Congress. I think that the other question you put, Mr. Brown, is equally impor- tant. If we were to take on all policy analysis, not just technologically driven assessments, but all kinds, there would not be enough money in all of the legislative agencies-CBO, OTA, GAO, and CRS-to do all of that. Therefore, we need to limit ourselves. And I agree with Congress- man Mosher's testimony, our distinguished ex-Vice Chairman of the OTA Board, that what we can do and what we ought to do is through technology assessment, become an exemplar for the kinds of broad, comprehensive policy analysis to which you refer. But we ought to home in on those questions that clearly concern technological applications. As you say, one can find a technological connection for any question. We don't have resources to cover all of the issues that concern genuine technological applications. We should stick to these questions and leave the others to CRS, GAO and CBO. Therefore, I agree with the implication in your question that we ought to focus our efforts in this category. Mr. BROWN. Thank you. That's a good response. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. Mr. Miller, would you like to ask some questions? Mr. MILLEn. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I have one other ques- tion. I did have an opportunity a few minutes ago to ask a question. Dan, you have been in the saddle, so to speak, as far as OTA is con- cerned, for the last several weeks. What kind of changes, specifically, would you like to see made at OTA over the next year or two? Can you give us some guidance as to how you look at the total problem, and what changes you would like to see made? Mr. DESIMONE. Mr\ Miller, I think that as we evolve and develop our capabilities, we're going to have opportunities-and we do have opportunities now-for streamlining our activities. We are, of course, constrained under our appropriations bill to re- duce our staff to 130, and therefore we will need new Board policies on staff. We will also need to increase our contractual activity. That's one direction we will take. I think that we have opportunities to develop the longer-term issue assessment capabilities that Congressman Brown referred to, and we ought to focus on that. PAGENO="0303" 299 I believe that we're going to have to develop a capability in a major new area that Congress has expressed a good deal of concern about and which has long-range implications for society: namely, telecommuni- cations, computers, and information policies. We have requests, some nine requests now, from committees of the Congress in this area. It is highly technological, there is no question about that. We have to develop that capability. I believe that there's going to be a great deal of improvement over the coming year; and, of course, as you well know, Mr. Miller, as a member of the OTA Board, the impetus for the kinds of staff and assessment policies that will make this possible must come from the Board, and I'm confident that the Board will provide that policy guidance. Mr. MILLER. With the budget being reduced, and as I now under- stand there are approximately 155 staff members and it will be neces- sary to reduce the staff to 130-who will suffer, what will suffer, what programs in the past that have been accomplished will not be accom- plished in the future? Will it just be a reduction of the evaluations? Do you have other ideas that you-as to how the Board even should be guided in helping you make the decision as to what studies and evalua- tions shouid he made with a reduced staff? Mr. DESIMONE. Mr. Miller, as you point out our current staff com- plement is approximately 155, and we are required by the appropria- tions act to reduce it to 130. We will do that fairly and equitably, assuring that the interests of the people involved are attended to. We hope to do that mostly by attrition. I'm confident that we can do this in a way that will not do injustice or cause undue discomfort to the people involved. That is of primary concern. We will have to rely increasingly on contractual assistance to aid us in our work. it's very clear in any case that the former Chairman of the OTA Board, Mr. Teague, was correct when he pointed out in his outgoing report, that OTA was created as a contractual agency pri- marily, and was sold on that basis to the Appropriations committees. They have made it very clear that they still feel that way. I think we can do our work with this adjusted mix of outside re- sources and in-house staff. On the inside, Board policies must assure that we have a highly competent staff after the reduction in force. On the outside, we have contractors who are much more capable of helping us now than when we began business. With the Board's help, I think we can do all these things, while assuring that there's fairness and equity to the staff that will have to be adjusted. Mr. MILLER. Just one other question, if I may, Mr. Chairman, and that is: On the list of evaluations requested by the various committees of Congress, I think it would be good to have for the record a list of the requests for evaluation, if you have that, so that we could take a look at each one. And I would like to be able to add something there of priority, as to how staff menibers, the Director, would look at the various programs, and in what priority they should be looked at. This would give us an idea of the volume that we have. But I believe when it comes to priority I should withdraw that, because I know that creates a problem, where it's very possible that PAGENO="0304" 300 it~ would be contradictory within the staff or with the Board right at the present time. My intent is not to get into that kind of a problem. So if we just had a list and could have it for the record, I'd appre- ciate it, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. DeSimone, can you provide the committee with that list? Mr. DESIMONE. Mr. Chairman, we would be pleased to provide that information. Mr. THORNTON. And, without objection, it will be made a part of the record. [Material referred to above is available from committee files.] Mr. THO1~NTO .r. Mr. Milb~r, if I may, I'm very interested in the sur- vey that you are undertaking to determine the evaluation of OTA by other members )f Congress. And we would very much like to ask that you share with us your thoughts and insight that you gained from this survey, either formally or informally, as you may choose to do so. Mr. MIlLER. Well, the survey is not completed at the present time. Mr. THORNTON. Your staff- Mr. MILLER. We do not have the end result. But I will be very happy to convey to the committee the results of the survey as we are able to tool it up. Mr. THORNTON. We would be very pleased to receive that informa- tion at such time as you might have it available for us. Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you. Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Dan. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Brown, do you have any further questions? Thank you very much, Mr. DeSimone- Mr. DESIMONE. It's been my pleasure. Mr. THORNTON [continuing]. For your excellent testimony. Our next witness this morning is Dr. Kash, who is former depart- ment chairman of the technology engineering policy program at Pur- due University, the first and only director of the science policy program at the University of Oklahoma. Dr. Don Kash served with special ad- visory groups to the National Academy of Sciences regarding tech- nology assessment, and is past chairman of the Committee on Science in Government of the AAAS. I imagine, Dr. Kash, that you completed more assessments in actual practice than anyone else I know about, and we're very pleased to have you with us, and would ask that you proceed at this time. Without objection, your formal testimony will be incorporated in the record verbatim at this point in the record, and you may proceed to summarize it as you choose. [The prepared statement and. a biographical sketch of Dr. Kash follows:] PAGENO="0305" 301 Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I want to express my appreciation for this opportunity to testify on the technology assessment concept and the charter of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). My interest and involvement in technology assessment dates from the hearings on TA held before this sub- committee in 1969. For the last seven years I have headed the Science and Public Policy Program at the University of Oklahoma. That program is an interdisciplinary research organization. It was established in 1970 for the express purpose of doing technol- ogy assessments. Its current personnel level is about 30 people with a budget of approximately $700,000. To date the program has carried out five major assessments; all of them have focused on energy technologies. The titles of those studies are as follows: 1. Kash, Don E., et al. Energy Under the Oceans:~~ Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. Norman, Okia.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973. 2. White, Irvin L., etal. North Sea Oil and Gas: I~lications for Future United States Development. Norman, Okla.: University of OkI~h~ma Press, 1973. 3. University of Oklahoma, Science and Public Policy Program. Energy~AlternativeS: A Comparative Ana~y~jR. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975. 4. Kash, Don E., etal. Our Energy Future: The Role of Research, Development, and Demonstration in Reaching a National Consensus on Energy Supply. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976. 5. White, Irvin L., etal.. Energy from the West: A Progress Report of a Technology Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development, 4 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S.., Environmental Protection Agency, 1977. 96.205 0 - 78 . 20 PAGENO="0306" 302 Conceptions of technology assessment vary. It, therefore, may be useful for me to Summarize my conception, since it is the basis for the views I will express concerning OTA. Tech'~ nology assessment is .a kind of policy study undertaken to: Cl) inform public and private policymakers and interested citizens about the likely consequences of a decision to develop and deploy a technology; and (2) identify, evaluate, and compare alternative policies and implementation strategies for dealing with problems and issues that either are perceived to arise or are likely to arise when a technology is deployed. To achieve the first objective, three questions must be answered: (1) are the anticipated consequences actually likely to Occur; (2) are there also likely to be unanticipated consequences; and (3) if either or both kinds of consequences occur, how serious will they be? TO achieve the second objective of a TA, the answers to these three questions must be related to the social and political context within which the technology will be developed and deployed. The questions to be answered in this case are: what alternative policies and implementation strategies can reasonably be used to maximize benefits and minimize costs and risks when the technology is developed and deployed; and how will these alternatives distribute costs, risks, and benefits throughout society? A more detailed description of the conception of technology assessment used in the Science and Public Policy Program is appended to this testimony and may be included in the written record should the subcommittee wish. PAGENO="0307" 303 Let me emphasize my belief that the need for technology assessment is as great or greater today than it was when the concept was first introduced by this subcommittee. In the remainder of my oral presentation I would like to focus more specifically on the Office of Technology Assessment. First, however, let me note that I believe 0Th has made very real progress in the last four years under Mr. Daddario. Several of the studies carried out by the two OTA programs with which I an best acquainted, oceans and energy, have been used extensively both by the Congress arid interested parties outside the.CongreSS. I believe OTA has demonstrated its very real value to the Congress. My following comments, then, are aimed at improving the quality and usefulness of OTA and its work. These comments fall into four categories moving from the more specific to the more general. They are: (1) the ádministrativePersonnel arrangements for OTA, (2) the relationship of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council (ThAC) to OTA, (3) the need for more long-term assessments in OTA, and (4) the need for building a base of external research organizations to support the OTA mission. Let me note, before going to the specific points, that the modifications I propose are doubtless available without amending OTAs organic Act. Rather, a clarification of the intent of the Act in the report of these hearings nay b.e a more appropriate way to respond. As regards the administrative-personnel arrangements of OTA, I believe the appointment and evaluation o,f the OTA staff must be the clear and sole responsibilitY of the DireCtor. Certainly PAGENO="0308" 304 this must be the case for those members of the staff who have either direct or support responsibilities for carrying out or managing the assessment studies. Similarly, the Director should have sole responsibility for and authority to appoint consultants. Much of the success of OTA programs is tied to the skill of program managers and research staff in selecting the best qualified and most useful consultants. It is frequently necessary to move with dispatch on such appointments and simple and direct procedures appear essential. it must be the Director's responsibility to assure that appropriate review of consultants has taken place. Long delays in approving appointments or processing. payments can be costly in getting continuing assistance from consultants. My experience in directing a TA research organization, however, leaves no doubt in my mind that the Director must have full control of the staff. Conducting successful TA's is a demanding task and responding to the pulls of split respon- sibility is both costly and debilitating. My second Set of comments concerns the appropriate role of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council (TAAC). My memory of the legislative history of OTA suggests that TAAC evolved through a process which started with the notion of a governing board composed in part of private citizens. In the end, the need to have input from distinguished members of the general public was reflected in the creation of TAAC. The content of the TAAC role, however, is not clear in the legislation and its role needs to be clarified. PAGENO="0309" 305 A distinguished council such as TAAC represents would appear to me to be particularly useful in playing two inter- related roles. The first is to review the overall programmatic mix of OTA as well as the adequacy of the content of the individual research programs. It should address such questions as: Are new programs needed? Should existing programs be eliminated? I emphasize program review and not project review. since it seems particularly wasteful of TAAC's talents to have them focus on reviewing specific studies. Linked to this first role is a second that I would see as central to 0Th. As I will discuss in more detail shortly, OTA should place more emphasis on long-term future sensing studies. This is one of the really unique roles of OTA. My view is that TAAC should both propose to OTA and review proposals from OTA for long-term future-oriented studies. That is, the focus ought to be. on ideatifying and defining technological activities that have a high likelihood of generating the need for congressional consideration in the future. My own research experience at Oklahoma convinces me that identifying and defining appropriate long-term studies is a demanding activity. The value of a council, with the quality, breadth, experience, and insight represented by the members of TAAC cannot be exaggerated in selecting and designing long-term assessments. My third category, long-term assessments, is an extension of this latter point. It is my view t.hat OTA should focus a~ larger portion of its resources on assessing the impacts of potential future technological applications. Clearly the PAGENO="0310" 306 pressures on OTA to focus on the technological issues of the moment are, and will continue to be, major. And such immediate issues must remain a major focus of OTA research. It is precisely because the demands of the moment are so great, however, that self-conscious budgetary and organizational actions must be taken to guarantee that a longer term focus is a part of the 0Th research effort. The necessary budgetary actions are relatively straightforward. That is, a portion of the budget needs to be set aside for longer term studies. The organizational response is much less straightforward. Clearly, some portion of the staff needs to have its time pro- tected for identifying and seeing that longer term assessments are carried out. How that should be done is not clear. My view is that it should not take the form of some distinct futures program component within 0Th which has qeneral responsibility for long-term studies. In most areas, technology moves incrementally, and future applications are being generated in the present developments in such areas as energy, biomedical technology, etc. For that reason the longer term assessments need to be tied to the substantive programs that exist within 0Th. How to keep the long-term focus from being consumed by the demands of the moment should be an imnediate and continuing focus of organizational attention within OTA. The le~islatIve history of' the OTA organic Act demands thati this anticipatory role be emphasized. This concern with the longer term also links with my comments on the' final categ~xry, external research organizations. Clearly, it was the expectation of this subcommittee at the time PAGENO="0311" 307 the OTA legislation was written that long-term assessments wotild be contracted for from research groups outside the OTA staff. Such outside groups are generally not subject to the same short- term interruptions and pressures as the in-house OTA researchers. In fact, OTA attempted to contract for such studies in its first year. This initial try at contracting for complete TA'S was a f~i1ure. The problem was not with OTA; it was that there were not and still &re not a set of research organizations skilled at doing technology assessments sensitive to the needs of the Congress. In truth, this inability to contract for quality TA's responsive to the needs of the Congress is one of the most serious problems OTA continues to face. My conclusion is that OTA, the Board, the Congress and this~ subcommittee specifically must address this lack of research capability outside OTA. Directly stated, OTA must be self- conscious in seeking to build a dependable base of outside research organizations capable of doing complete technology assess- ments. These assessments must be of high quality and responsive to the needs of the Congress. It is important to emphasize that the needs of the Congress are frequently different than the needs of the various mission oriented executive agencies. The clearest difference is the broader focus of assessments carried out for the Congress. * It is my view that one vehicle for building this base of research organizations is available *in Section 10 of the OTA organic Act. This is the section entitled `Coordination with the National Science Foundation." With the encouragement of this PAGENO="0312" 308 committee, the OTA and the NSF should undertake to develop a program aimed at building a base of technology assessment organ- izations, Such a program should insure that technology assess- ment capabilities are developed in a range of organizational settings: profit making, nonprofits, and universities. Such organizations should be geographically distributed. Such a prog~ani cannot succeed if it does not recognize the need, either explicitly or implicitly, for institutional support for some initial period. As the appended paper on the strategy Qf technology assess- ment procedures describes, TA has evolved to a point where it is possible to define strategies, approaches, procedures, and cate- gories. TA remains, however,, a kind of policy study that must be learned in part through experience. TA skills are cumulative and people and organizations require time to learn. OTA must assist outside research groups by insuring that they have the time to learn, if it is ever going to be able to confidently contract for complete, high quality, assessments. / PAGENO="0313" 309 PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS* Appendix to Testimony Given Before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology October 13, 1977 By Don E. Kash INTRODUCTION Technology assessments (TA) are a kind of applied policy analysis study undertaken to: (1) inform public and private policymakers and interested citizens about the likely conse- quences of a decision to develop and deploy a technology; and (2) identify, evaluate, and compare alternative policies and implementation strategies for dealing with problems and imple- mentation strategies for dealing with problems and issues that either are perceived or are actually likely to arise when a technology is deployed. To achieve the first objective, three questions must be answered: (1) are the anticipated conse- quences actually likely to occur; (2) are there also likely to be unanticipated consequences; and (3) if either or both kinds of consequences occur, how serious will they be? To achieve the second objective of a TA, the answers to these three questions must be related to the social and political context within which the technology will be developed and deployed. The questions to be answered in this case are: what alternative policies and implementation strategies can reasonably be used to maximize benefits and minimize costs and risks when the technology is developed and deployed; and how will these alternatives distrib- ute costs, risks, and benefits throughout society? In the following, we briefly describe our interpretation of TA as applied policy analysis, identify and describe the kinds of analyses that must be completed to achieve the two TA objec'- tives identified above. * The approach to technology assessment descrthed here has been developed by the Science and Public Policy Program, Univer- sity of Oklahoma. This description iS taken from: White, Irvin L., etal. Work_Plan for Completing a Technology Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development. Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, forthcoming. PAGENO="0314" 310 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AS APPLIED POLICY ANALYSIS Applied policy studies, including TA's generally involve two kinds of analyses: technical and policy.1 Technical analyses evaluate and compare technologies on the basis of objective and, to the extent possible, unbiased, scientific and technical criteria;2 policy analyses interpret the results of the technical analyses in the context of the social/political system within which the technology is developed and deployed. Technical Analysis Our conceptual framework for technology assessment assumes that impacts occur when the inputs and outputs of a technology interact with the conditions existing at the location where the technology is deployed (See Figure l).3 Therefore, we begin our evaluation and comparison of technologies with a description and comparison of inputs, outputs, and existing conditions. Coal technologies, for example, can be evaluated and compared in terms of inputs such as capital, labor, and land requirements and out- puts such as the quantities of electricity and sulfur dioxide produced. Existing conditions can be evaluated and compared on the basis of such factors as the availability of public services, sectors of economic activity, attitudes toward energy development, air dispersion potential, and water availability and quality. A variety of technical analyses can be used to attempt to determine what the impacts of developing and deploying a tech- nology will be. Impacts can be compared on the basis of such 1These two terms are not altogether satisfactory since both kinds of analysis are a part of policy analysis. The analyses described under the policy rubric in this section are those which emphasize the political aspects of the overall applied policy analysis. 2As used here the term technical analysis generally includes the use of analytical tools such as engineering analyses, systems analysis, operations research, simulation, mathematical modeling, operational modeling and gaming, and most quantitative analysis. In addition to providing a technical input, these tools are gen- erally useful in political analysis only to the extent that objectives can be precisely defined, relevant variables quantified, and alternatives comprehensively identified, evaluated, and compared. 3White, Irvin L., etal. First Year Work Plan for a Tech- nolo~y Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development. Was)ungton, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1976. (EPA-600/5-76-00l, NTIS Order #PB-252 034/AS) PAGENO="0315" FIGURE 1: A CONCEPTUAL FRANEWORK FOR ASSESSING PHYSICAL ThCHNOLOGIES PAGENO="0316" 312 IDENTIFY AND DEFINE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES * Define problems and issues already identified by participants in the system; *Define problems and issues identified by the interdisciplinary research team in its review of impact analysis results; and * Define problems and issues identified by the interdisc~iplinary research in the conduct of the policy analysis. FIGURE 2; POLICY ANALYSIS: STEP 1 PAGENO="0317" 313 things as changes in the ambient air concentration of sulfur dioxide, per unit energy costs, `and demand for public services such as water and sewage treatment. Impacts can also be compared in terms of their probability of occurrence and seriousness. In short, the descriptions of the technologies and loca- tions together with the results of the analyses of the inpacts likely to occur when they are interacted can be used to inform policymakers about the costs, risks, and benefits of various technology and siting options. However, the results of the technical analyses will always be incomplete, largely because of the limited explanatory power of existing theories and either the inadequacy or unavailability of data and analytical' tools. Even if it were possible to overcome these limitations, the results of the technical analyses would not be an adequate basis for policymaking. Policymakers need to know more than the costs, risks, and benefits of technological and siting alternatives evaluated and compared on the basis of objective criteria. They need to know how costs, risks, and benefits will be distributed, which interests and values will be promoted at the expense of which others, how to promote the interests and values they wish to promote, and how to avoid unwanted costs and risks. The policy analyses process described in the following is intended to produce results responsive to these needs. Policy Analysis A. The Three Steps in Policy Analysis The policy analyses in a TA are conducted in three steps: * An identification and definition of problems and issues; * A description of the social and political context of issues associated with the development and deployment of the technology; and * An identification, evaluation, and comparison of alternative policies and implementation strategies. 1. The IdentLfication and Definition of Problems and Issues.1 "S~me problems and issues associated with the development 1The terms problems and issues' are not synonomons. Problems such as those resulting because of the labor and capital inten- sity of a technology may or may not lead to an issue being raised. The key distinction is that issues involve conflict among com- peting interests and values. Not all problems produce conflicts and, to be precisely correct, both terms must often be used, This frequently is awkward and in this Chapter only the term problem or issue will ordinarily be used, problem when cOnflict is not involved or is not being emphasized, issue when it is. PAGENO="0318" 314 and deployment of a technology will be identified when the conditions existing at the time and location of deployment are described. That is, some problems and issues are anticipated independently of the technical analyses described in the previous section, perhaps on the basis of analysis, but often on the basis of past experience, analogy, and speculation. But some problems and issues nay not be anticipated; conseqtiently, as shown in Figure 1, a beginning step in policy analysis is for the inter- disciplinary research team systematically to review the results of the technical analyses to prevent otherwise unanticipated consequences from being overlooked. Others nay be added as a result of the policy analyses themselves. 2. The Desáription of the Development and Deployment Context. In the second policy analysis step, both anticipated and unanticipated problems and issues are related to the social and political context within which the development and deployment of the technology will take place. This requires that the relevant policy system or systems be identified and described in substantive erms. This "issue system" approach is based on the observation that political systems vary according to the sub- stance of the issue being processed.l The interests and values at stake, relevant institutional arrangements, applicable laws and regulations, governmental and nongovernmental participants, and intensity of involvement of various participants can vary on the basis of substance. ~or example, the substance of health care problems leads to the definition of a different issue system than does national security; and `the substance of nuclear energy problems leads to a different issue system than would oil and gas. For issues that the political system has dealt with in the past, the identification of the issue system begins with an examination of key elements in the historical development of the issue: when did the issue arise; which participants in the system perceived that it was an issue and what interests and values did they represent; `when did government respond; how did government respond and what policies were enacted; who administers these policies; and how have these policies affected the issue? This step also includes a more detailed identification and descrip- tion of the existing system for dealing with the issue: what are the relevant current public and private, formal and informal institutional arrangements; what interests and values are at stake, who represents them and what strategies and tactics are they employing; and are there situational or social and physical ~An issue system may focus on a single issue such as what the ambient concentration standard for sulfur dioxide should be or on a category of problems and issues such as air quality. PAGENO="0319" 315 environmental conditions and circumstances that either affect or could potentially affect whether and how the issue is processed?1 The procedural steps for describing the development and deployment context are outlined in Figure 2. 3. The Identification, Definition, Evaluation, and ~ç~parison of Alternative Policies and Implenentation Strategies. In the policy analysis step, of a TA, policy alternatives, and implementation strategies are identified., defined, evaluated, and compared. Alternatives and implementing strategies for dealing with issues already being processed by the system will have been identified in step 2 above. However, the interdisciplinary research tean also formulates alternatives itself, both for issues already being processed and for problems and issues likely to arise as a consequence of unanticipated impacts identified by the technical analyses. Drawing from both sources, the team reduces the number of alternatives and strategies to be evaluated and compared in detail to a manageable number. This is accom- plished by applying a number of filters to isolate those alter- natives and strategies that appear to be most significant and feasible.2 Since alte~natives distribute costs, risks, and benefits differently, the filtering of alternatives requires at least a preliminary assessment of what the distributive effects of each alternative would be. For example: (1) which individ- uals, groups, or organizations would benefit more than or at the expense of others; (2) which costs, risks, benefits would be transferred from some individuals, groups, or organizations to 1Not all of the items listed here apply to all problems and issues. Which do apply is determined by the stage of devel- opment of the problem or issue. *Some will be "well developed," and all of the listed items will apply; others will be just emerging or not yet anticipated independently of ~he technology assessment and few if amy of the listed items will apply. 2As the description of our interdisciplinary team approach indicates, the selection from among all possible alternatives (or all that team members can identify) is arbitrary. There are two major checks on this arbitrariness: first, the interdisci- plinary team reviews inputs from individual team members; and second, the team's products are subjected to extensive external reviews. Both internal and external review help to minimize bias, factual errors, and errors by oversight. See White, Irvin L., ~ First Year Work Plan for a Technology Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development. Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, 1976. (EPA-600/5-76-OOl, NTIS Order #PB-252 034/AS), and White, Irvin L. "Interdisciplinarity," pp. 87-96 in Arnstein, Sherry R., and Alexander N. Christakis, eds. ~~pectives on Technology Assessment. Jerusalem, Israel: Sdience and Technology Publishers, 1975, for a description of these procedures. PAGENO="0320" 316 DESCRIBE THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT CONTEXT * Describe the key elements in the historical development of the issue: -When did the issue arise? -Which participants in the system perceived it as an issue? -What interests and values did these participants represent? -When and how did government respond? -What policies were enacted or established? -What agency administered these policies? -How have these policies affected the issue? * Describe the existing system for dealing with the issue: * -What are the relevant, current public and private, formal and informal insti- tutional arrangements? * -What interest and values are at stake? -Who represents these interests and values and what strategies and tactics are they using? ~Are there situations `or social and physical environmental conditions and circumstances that either affect or could affect whether and how the issue is processed by the system? FIGURE 3: POLICY ANALYSIS: STEP 2 PAGENO="0321" 317 others; and (3) would existing regulations be modified, eliminated, or new regulations added to existing programs, or would new regulatory programs have to be established? A detailed evaluation and comparison of all possible alternatives is not feasible and is limited to the few alternatives which survive the internal amd external review processes mentioned earlier. (See Figure 3) Implementation strategies can also affect the distribution of costs, risks, and benefits. However, the first evaluation and comparison of implementation strategies is in terms of the relative ease or difficulty of implementing an alternative. That is, implemention is one of the several constraints or barriers used as a filter in determining the feasibility of an alternative.1 But the analysis of implementation strategies also includes identifying means for gaining acceptance of an alternative and achieving its objectives. Another key consideration in the evaluation and comparison of alternatives is utilization. An essential component of the interdisciplinary team approach is the participation of the potential users of the team's research products including repre- sentatives of the broad range of interests and values that are at stake. As noted above, this includes involving i~sers in the filtering of alternatives and implementation strategies. 4. Criteria for Evaluating and Comparing Alternatives. While the results of the policy analyses described above will seldom if ever eliminate the uncertainties that public and private policymakers face in making decisions to develop and deploy technologies, these results can help them to make better informed choices than they would otherwise be able to make. Results of policy analyses are useful in this regard to the extent that they systematically describe, evaluate, and compare using clearly specified criteria and appropriate qualitative and quantitative measures, indicate theoretical, data, and analytical tool limitations, and specify confidence levels. Despite many policymakers' desire to have a "bottom line," no single measure or evaluation criterion can provide an ade- quate summary of the costs, risks, and benefits or alternative policies and implementation strategies. The combination of measures and criteria to be used is determined both by what is 1. . White, Irvin L., etal. First Year Work Plan for a Tech nology Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development. Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, 1976. (EPA-600/5-76-ool, NTIS Order #PB-252 034/AS, $10.00) ~6.2O5 0 - 78 . 21 PAGENO="0322" 318 IDENTIFY, EVALUATE, AND COMPARE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES * Identify and describe alternative policies and implementing strategies already being proposed for dealing with existing problems and issues; * Describe alternative policies arid implementing strategies formulated by the interdisciplinary research team; * Reduce the number of alternative policies and implementing strategies to a minimal number by identifying those which are most signifi- cant and feasible: -Filter the complete list of alternative policies arid implementing strategies by conducting a preliminary evaluation of how they distribute costs, risks, and benefits; -Identify the barriers or constraints (e.g. legal, ethical, moral, difficulty of implementation, economic, etc.) to acceptance and implementation; -Submit the team's reduced list of alter- natives and strategies to external review. * Describe the costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative and implementation strategy: -Which individuals, groups, or organizations would benefit more than or at the expense of others? -Would existing regulations have to be modified, eliminated, or new regulations added to existing programs or would a new program have to be established? 0 Compare alternatives and strategies on the basis of explicit criteria using a variety of measures. FIGURE 4: POLICY ANALYSIS: STEP 3 PAGENO="0323" 319 being evaluated and the interest and values that are at stake. Although the measures and criteria that are used most frequently are economic, these are not always applicable and do not always provide an adequate basis for evaluation. For example, dollars are not an adequate measure of aesthetic values nor do they always provide the best indication of how equitably an alterna- tive may distribute costs, risks, arid benefits. And while it is possible to determine the dollar cost of environmental controls, the associated social costs often can not be deternined. By themselves, economic measures and criteria can be used to evaluate only one component of overall costs, risks, and benefits. Con- sequently, in the policy analyses discussed in the preceding section, a combination of measures and evaluation criteria appropriate to the issue being considered will be used. B. Integrating the Results of Policy Analyses The initial product of the policy analyses will be a series of papers focusing either on specific issues or categories of issues. To achieve the objectives of the TA, these must be integrated. This paper should integrate policy analyses findings on the basis of cross-cutting problem or issue categories such as inter- and intra-governmental relations, the adequacy or inade- quacy of existing formal and informal mechanisms for conflict resolution, and the adequacy or inadequacy of the structure of existing agency programs. A major integrating task is to identify what these cross-cutting categories should be. Overlap and Interaction on Technical and Policy Analysis Although the above abbreviated description of technical ~nd policy analysis may make it appear that the two are perfçrmed in sequence, they actually overlap and there are nun~erou~ interactions between the two. In fact, the two are mutually informing. For example, the initial decisions concerning what tebhnical analyses to undertake are informed by a preliminary policy analycis which identifies what problems and issues are likely to be dealt with; and the later, more detailed policy analyses will almost cer- tainly raise questions that will necessitate additional technical analyses. Over the duration of a technology assessment the emphasis shifts from technical to policy analyses. But technical analyses uninformed by the results of policy analysis are likely to be wasteful and inadequate to inform the final policy analyses; and policy analyses uninformed by the results of technical analysis do not provide a basis for well informed policymaking. Properly performed, the technology assessment process is iterative: the initial technical analyses are informed by preliminary policy analyses; the results of the technical analyses help to define the scope and focus of the policy analyses; the policy analyses raise questions which require that addftional technical analysis is performed; and so on. There is constant interaction between the two kinds Of analysis as the inter- disciplinary team learns during the course of a project. PAGENO="0324" 320 DON E. KASH Present Position: Director of the Science and Public Policy Program, Uni- versity of Oklahoma, Norman, Okia. Date of Birth: May 29, 1984. Place of Birth: Macedonia, Iowa. Marital: Married (Beverly), Two Children: Kelli and Jeffrey. Educational Background: B.A., University of Iowa, 1959; M.A., University of Iowa, 1960; Ph. D., University of Iowa, 1963. Field of Interest: Science and Public Policy. Academic Appointments: Texas Technological, Instructor, 1960-61; Arizona State University, Assistant Professor, 1963-65; University of Missouri at Kansas City, Assistant Professor, 1965-66; Purdue University, Associate Professor, 1966-. Administrative Experience: Director, Program in Science and Public Policy, Purdue; Purdue Coordinator, Joint Indiana University-Purdue; Project for Cur- riculum Development in the Study of Science and Society funded by the National Science Foundation; Director, Graduate Education Project in Science and Pub- lic Policy funded by the National Science Foundation; Co-Chairman of the Salt Creek Study (A proposed Systems Study of the Salt Creek Drainage Basin In West Chicago Metropolitan Area) Initial Work, being funded by the Argonne Universities Association. Committees: Member, Board Committee on Environmental Studies of the Argonne Universities Association (AUA is the university consortium that governs Argonne National Laboratory); Member, Executive Committee, Science and Pub- lic Policy Studies Group. Additional Activities: Visiting Professor, Advanced Program, University of Oklahoma, April, 1967. Visitln~ Associate Professor, Indiana University, 1st Semester 1969-70. Director, Grants Associates Seminar on Science and Public Policy, National Institutes of Health, June 4-9, 1967. Seminar Moderator, Seminar on Science and Public Policy for Senior Extra- mural Staff of the National Institutes of Health, October 7-10, 1968. Co-Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on the Study of Public Policy for Science and Technology, Sponsored by Indiana University and Purdue University with the Assistance of the National Science Foundation, Indiana Memorial Union, March, 20-22, 1968. Consultant: Council on Economic Growth, Technology and Public Policy of the Committee on Institutional Cooperation. Professional Meetings: Papers-McGill Conference on World Affairs., October, 1963; Southwest Social Science Association, March 1964; Institute of World Affairs, Pasadena, Novein- ber, 1965; Associated 1'4idwest University Argonne National Laboratory, Faculty- Student Conference, September, 1967; American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics-American Bar Association Coonference on the Impact of Aerospace Science and Technology on Law and Government, 1968; member of workshop on Science and Public Policy at AA4S meeting, 1968. Panel Member-Inter-thliverslty Faculty Seminar on Science, Technology and World' Affairs sponsored by the University of Denver and the United States Air Force Academy, October, 1965; American Political Science Association Meeting, September, 1967; Chairman of Panel at meeting International Studies Associa- tIon, 1969. Professional Associations: American Political Science Association. American Association for the Advancement of Science. American Association of University Professor. Book Reviews: American Political Science Review, Natural Resources Journal, Midwest Journal of Political Science. Publications: "United States Policy for Quemoy and Matsu," The Western Political Quar- terly, XVI (December, 1963), 912-23. "The Necessary Element of Research and Development," Public Affairs Bulletin Tempe: Arizona State University Bureau of Government Research, III, No.4 (1964). ""Is Good Science Good Politics?," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March, 1965), 84-86. "The Local Impact of Foreign Aid," Public Affairs Bulletin, Tempo: Arizona State University, Bureau of Government Research, IV, No. 3 (1965). PAGENO="0325" 321 "The Tyranny of Realism," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February, 1967) 16-20. The Politics of Space Cooperation, (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue, University Studies, 1967). "Public Demands on the University: The Pattern of the Future," A Study for The Council on Economic Growth, Technology, and Public Policy of the Com- mittee on Institutional Cooperation. (This is the Big Ten-University of Chicago Consortium) 40 pages typescript, 1968. "Research and Development at the University," Science, Vol. 160, No. 3834, (June 21, 1968), 1313-1318. "An Overview of Trends in Government Policy for Research and Develop- ment," Paper No. 68-914, (New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (1968)). "A Microcosm of Foreign Policy: 1~oreign Aid," Proceedings of the Forty-First Sessions of the Institute of World Affairs (1965). "Why Science and Public Policy," Science and Public Policy In the American University, Published by Department of Government, Indiana University, March 1, 1969, pp. 1-12. "Forces Affecting Science Policy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April, 1969, pp. 10-15. In Press: "Politics and Research," in Saad Z. Nagi and Ronald G. Corwin (Eds.), Research and Society: Social Science Perspectives on Research (Ilomewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, to be published in 1970), 48 pages, typescript. STATEMENT OP DON E. KASE, DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM, THE UNIVERSITY OP OKLAHOMA Mr. KASH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had my secretary put this testimony together late the night before I came to Washington, and I didn't realize that it was going to look like an advertisement for the studies we have done. As one looks at the first page, it looks like it's an advertisement document. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I'd like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to testify on te~hno1ogy assessment and the charter of the Office of Technology Assessment. My interest and involvement in technology assessment dates from the he.arings on technology assessment held before this subcommittee in 1969. For the last 7 years, I have headed the science and public policy program at the University of Oklahoma. That is an interdisciplinary research organization, kind of a mongrel in the university. It was established in 1970 for the express purpose of doing technology assess- ments. It currently has about 30 people and a budget of about $700,000. We have carried out five major assessments, and three, or four other studies that might be called assessments. Conceptions of technology assessment vary. It, therefore, may be useful for me to summarize my conception, since it's the basis for the views I will express regarding OTA. `Technology assessment is a kind of policy study undertaken to: (1) inform public and private `policymakers and interested citizens `about the likely consequences `of a decision to develop or deploy a technology; and (2) identify, evaluate, and compare alternative policies and im- plementation strategies for dealing with problems `and issues that either are perceived to arise or likely to arise when a technology is deployed. PAGENO="0326" 322 To achieve the first objective, three question must be answered: (1) Are the anticipated consequences actually likely to occur? (2) Are there also likely to be unanticipated consequences? (3) And if either or both kinds of consequences occur, how serious will they be? To achieve the second objective of a technology assessment, the an- swers to these questions must be related to the social and political con- text within which the technology will be developed and deployed. The questions to be answered in this case are: What alternative pol- icies and implementation strategies can reasonably be used to maximize benefits and minimize costs and risks when the technology is developed and deployed; and how will these alternatives distribute costs, risks, and benefits throughout society, among different interests? A more detailed description of the conception of technology assess- ment used in our program is appended to this testimony, and may be included. Mr. THORNTON. That will be included as part of your testimony. Dr. KASH. Let me emphasize my belief that the need for technology assessment is as great or greater today than it was when the concept was first introduced by this subcommittee. In the remainder of this oral presentation I would~ like to focus more specifically on OTA First, however, let me nQte that I believe OTA has made very real progress in the last 4 years under Mr. Dad- dario. Several of the studies carried out by the two OTA ~programs with which I am best acquainted, oceans and energy, have been used extensively both by the Congress and interested parties outside the Congress. I might comment, in connection with questions that were just ad- dressed to Mr. DeSimone, that if you'd like, add to your record, that we've made extensive, use of them, I believe OTA has demonstrated its very real value to the Congress. My following ,com~nents, then, are aimed at improving the qualit3r and usefnlness of OTA and its work. These comments fall into four' categories moving from the more specific to the more general. They are: (1) The administrative-personnel arrangements for OTA; (2) The relationship of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council to OTA; (3) The need for more long-term assessments in OTA; and (4) The need for building a base of external research organizations to support the OTA mission. Let me note, before going to the specific p&nts, that the modifica- tions I propose are doubtless available without amending OTA's Organic Act. Rather, a clarification of the intent of the act in the report of these hearings may be a more appropriate way to respond. As regards the administrative-personnel arrangements of OTA, I believe the appointment and evaluation of OTA's staff must be the clear and sole responsibility of the Director. `Certainly, this must be the case for those members of the staff who have either direct or s~ipport responsibilities for carrying out or managing the assessment studies. Similarly, the Director should have sole responsibility for and authority to appoint consultants. Much of the success of the OTA PAGENO="0327" 323 programs is tied to the skill of program managers and the research staff in selecting the best qualified and most useful consultants. It is frequently neeessary to move with dispatch on such appoint- ments and simple and direct procedures appear essential. It must b~i the Director's responsibility to assure that appropriate review of con- sultants has taken place. Long delays in approving appointm~ntS or processing payments can be costly in getting continuing assistance from consultants. My experience in directing a TA research organization, however, leaves no doubt in my mind that the Director must have full control of the staff. Conducting successful TA's is a demanding task and responding to the pulls of split responsibility is both costly and debilitating, and I think unacceptable. My second set of comments concerns the appropriate role of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. My memory of the legisla- tive history of OTA suggests that TAAC evolved through a process which started with the notion of a governing board composed in part of private citizens. In the end, the need to have input from distinguished members of the general public was reflected in the creation of TAAC. The content of the TAAC role, however, is not clear in the legislation, and that role needs to be clarified. A distinguished Council, such as TAAC represents, would appear to me to be particularly useful in playing two interrelated roles. The first is to review the overall programmatic mix of OTA as well as the adequacy of the content of the individual research pro- grams. It should address such questions as: Are new programs needed? Should the existing programs be eliminated? I emphas~ze program review and not project review since it seems particularly wasteful of TAAC's talents to have them focus on reviewing specific stud~es. Linked to this first role is a second that I would see as central to OTA. As I'll discuss in more detail shortly, OTA should place more emphasis on long-term future sensing studies. This is one of the really unique roles of OTA. My view is that TAAC should both propose to OTA and review proposals from OTA for long-term future-oriented studies. That is, the focus ought to be on identifying and defining technological activi- ties that have a high likelihood of generating the need for congres- sional consideration in the future. My own research experience at Oklahoma convinces me that identi- fy'ng and defining appropriate long-term studies is a demanding ac- tivity. I would emphasize the defining here. Just identifying a tech- nology is not enough by any means. The value of a Council with the quality, breadth, experience, and insight represented by the members o~ TAAC cannot be exaggerated in selecting and designing long-term assessments. My third category, long-term assessments, is an extension of this lat- ter point. It is my view that OTA should focus a larger portion of its resources on assessing the impacts of potential future technological applications. Clearly the pressures on OTA to focus on the technologi- cal issues of the moment are, and will continue to be, major. And such immediate issues must remain a major focus of OTA research. PAGENO="0328" 324 It is precisely because the demands of the moment are so great, however, that self-conscious budgetary and organizatonal act ons must be taken to guarantee that a longer term focus is a part of the OTA research effort. The necessary budgetary actions appear to me to be relatively straightforward. That is, a portion of the budget needs to be set aside for longer term studies. The organizational response is much less straightforward, in my view. Clearly, some portion of the staff needs to have its time pro- tected for identifying and seeing that longer term assessments are carried out. How that should be done is not clear. My view is that it should not take the form of some distinct futures program component within OTA which has general responsibility for long-term studies. In most areas, technology moves incrementally, and future applications are being generated in the present develop- ruents in such areas as energy, biomedical technology, et cetera. For that reason the longer term assessments need to be tied to the sub- stantive programs that exist within OTA. How to keep the long-term focus from being consumed by the demands of the moment should be an immediate and continuing focus of organizational attention within OTA. The legislative history of the OTA Organic Act demands in my view that this anticipatory role be emphasized. `This concern with the longer term also links with my comments on the final category, external research organizations. Clearly, it was the expectation of this subcommittee at the time the OTA legislation was written that long-term assessments would be contracted for from research groups outside the O.A staff. Such outside groups are gen- erally not subject to the same short-term interruptions and pressures as in-house researchers. In fact, OTA attempted to contract for such studies in its first year. This initial try at contracting for complete TA's was a failure. The problem was not with OTA; it was that there were not and still are not in my view a set of research organizations skilled at doing tech- nology assessments sensitive to the needs of the Congress. In truth, this inability to contract for quality TA's responsive to the needs of the Congress is one of the most serious problems OTA continues to face. My conclusion is that OTA, the Board, the Congress, and this sub- committee specifically must address this lack of research capability out- side OTA. Directly stated, OTA must be self-conscious in seeking to build a dependable base of outside research organizations capable of doing complete technology assessments. These assessments must be of high quality and responsive to the needs of the Congress. It is important to emphasize that the needs of the Congress are frequently different than the needs of the various mission-oriented executive agencies, which generally have created and supported these research organizations. The clearest difference is the broader focus of assessments carried out for the Congress. It is my view that one vehicle for building this base of research organizations is available in section 10 of the OTA Organic Act. This is the section entitled "Coordination With the National Science Foundation." With the encouragement of this committee, the OTA and PAGENO="0329" 325 the NSF should undertake to develop a program aimed at building a base of technology assessment organizations with a capability of focusing on the Congress' needs. Such programs should insure that technology assessment capabilities are developed in a range of organizational settings: profits, nonprofits, universities. Such organizations should be geographically distributed- they shouldn't be around the beltway out here. Such a program cannot succeed if it does not recognize the need, either explicitly or implicitly, for institutional support for some initial period. As the appended paper on the strategy of technology assessment procedures describes, TA has evolved to a point where it's possi,ble to define strategies, approaches, procedures, and categories.. TA remains, however, a kind of poliey study that must be learned in part through t~ perience. TA skills are cumulative, and people and organizations require time to learn. Now, I'd like to emphasize the organizations. TA's are not something where a researcher sits down and does it. It requires a team, and it requires an organization which can manage to put together the apples and oranges that physicists and political scientists represent. And that requires organizational learning. OTA must assist outside research groups by insuring that they have the time to learn, if it is ever going to be able to confidently contract for complete, high quality assessments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to respond to questions. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Kash. I want to just express personally my pleasure that my neighbor from Oklahoma has recognized the value of geographical distribution of research activities. Dr. KASH. I was sensitive to some interest in that in the Congress. Mr. THORNTON. I have a number of questions,. but we have a number of distinguished members of our panel here at this time, and I'm going to defer my questions until I've given them an opportunity to ask. Mr. Brown, do you have any to begin with? Mr. BROWN. Well, I want to defer to some of the other members. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Wydler? Mr. WYDLER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I'm fascinated by this proposal that, as I understand it, you're mak- ing, about OTA having this outside research organization. Of course, the first thing that pops into my mind is that this country is full of these organizations-maybe I'm wrong. But what exactly are you suggesting we do? Reading the words, I get the feeling you're suggesting we kind of give birth to a couple of new outside organizations which will be at our beck and call to do any kind of project that we feel they are capable of doing from time to time. Is that what you're suggesting? Dr. KASH. Absolutely not. Mr. WYDLER. Good. Please tell me what you are suggesting then. Dr. KASH. It seems to me that the approach that should be taken is to provide an initial period of sustaining support so that a number of the existing research organizations can develop within themselves research groups capable of doing assessments aimed at the Congress. PAGENO="0330" 326 The point that I would like to emphasize in this connection is that I do not intend to propose here that we go out and build another set of nonprofits, or profitmaking research organizations. But many of the organizations which have tried to do technology assessments were spawned by the Department of Defense. That is, they came out of defense strategy research after World War Il-the Rand's, and so forth. As increasing amounts of money are being spent on policy studies that are non-defense-related, these organizations have tried to move in and respond to the needs of the executive organizations, ranging from HUD and HEW on down the line. They've been only partially suc- cessful in doing that, in my judgment. They've not been very successful in integrating together the range of skills from engineering, the natural sciences, and the social sci- ences, which tend to be more important in domestic, non-defense- related research. They do, however, have one advantage in addressing the civilian-oriented executive agencies: They usually have some pretty clear boundaries with regard to the agency's mission. If you do environmental policy research for EPA, there's a set of environmental regulations which define the boundaries of the policy- management-enforcement system. It is my view that when one thinks about doing technology assess- ments for the Congress, these assessments ought to address the range of policy concerns which, if you will, varies from the problems of setting standards for valves to the possibility of need for additional or new legislation. It is my observation that that kind of organizational capability is not there. There's been a lot of discussion here about defining technology assessment-and I guess none of us can put together a definition which is acceptable to everyone else. Mr. WYDLER. I think you're going the other way, as far as my question is concerned. What I'm trying to focus on here is what you mean by institutional support for some initial period. A phrase like that~ to me it means- and, again, you can correct me-that sounds to me like it means we're going to go out and we're going to say to a group "we want you to do a study. If you put together a group to do this study we're going to give you so many dollars and you can be pretty sure you're going to get that amount of dollars for a number of years so you can keep this group together." If it doesn't mean that what does it mean? Dr. IcAsu. It does mean that, but it doesn't mean new organizations. I'm talking about groups within existing organizations. I'm proposing that if you're going to get successful assessments you've got to allow the group to try two or three serially, they have to have time enough to learn. And at that point you have to make a judgment as to whether the learning is in fact taking place. A single contract for a single assessment is not adequate. Mr. WYDn~R. I'd hate to cost out what this proposal strikes me as meaning, because you're trying to satisfy so many people and so many groups. You're already suggesting that this be done, not for on~ group, but for profitmaking, non-profit-making, and universities-I PAGENO="0331" 327 don't know how many that includes. You're in addition suggesting it be done on a geographical basis-I don't know if that means we have 50 of them, one for each State, or what. But we're getting into an awful lot of money almost immediately if you start thinking about what you're saying. To guatantee anybody a sum of money that you'd need to really put together a high-class group of, you know, scientists and technicians, and so on, and then do it in a number of different forms and different places-that would be an enormous financial undertaking. Dr. KASH. I think you could deal with all of those categories with four or five locations and not 50. My judgment on this is that you probably get different kinds of strengths from different kinds of organizations. Universities offer some advantages, but they have real difficulty in delivering on time. Mr. WTrDLER. Because they take so many vacations. [Laughter.] Dr. KASH. But I think one ought to try a mix. The way in which executive organizations have tried to do this in the past is not set up specific institutional support programs-that is, writing them in and guaranteeing them. But there has been an un- written understanding that we want you to develop this capability, and we're going to give you an opportunity to go through two or three assessments and see if in fact you can demonstrate an ability to provide assessments that are valuable to us. And that's why I said, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea has to do with the way in which you contract for these things. If you do it in each case by making a judgment solely within the confines of the individual proposal that is submitted for the assess- ment, that's not very responsive to developing this kind of capability. The range I'm thinking about is four or five organizational units, and some effort at providing sustaining support for 5 years. You see, I don't think that's impossible, given the amount of contr~ct1n~ that's already going on within OTA, and within the NSF. You've got a few million dollars here. This effort oan be undertaken with that amount of money. But it could not be undertakeh by OTA without agreement from the Board and without some support from this subcommittee as to what was being experimented with here. Mr. WThLER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Wydler. `I wonder if you `are relating this need to develop talent in some way to a possible e:xpansion of the NSF programs with regard to technol- ogy assessment that may be mixed in, at least to some degree, with assessment of national needs, RANN programs. Are you suggesting that some more attention needs to be paid to that kind of research, to develop some technology assessment compe- tence in connection with that kind of program ~ Dr. KASH. Congressman Thornton, you ask me a question that I have such a self-interest in that I have to be very careful about this. It is clearly my view that NSF should provide more support for technology assessment. It is the only executive agency where moneys of thi~ kiod are a,vailable, which `at the same time does not have some PAGENO="0332" 328 kind of a vested interest in the outcome, And that's a fairly important point, if technology assessment is to be a disinterested activity. It's sometimes very hard to convince users of an assessment paid for by the Department of Defense that that report will identify major failings in Department of Defense programs, or EPA programs, et cetera. And so there's some advantage, as far as I'm concerned, in hay- in~ NSF as a disinterested party fund some of these studies, and I think it should be a larger amount. I also think that the NSF effort would be more beneficial if it in fact had some more institution-building focus. Mr. THORNTON. Do you think that it might be appropriate for OTA to undertake at least a review of some of the areas of basic research which are funded by NSF, with the objective of trying to locate areas in which there might arisen need for technology assessment? Dr. KASH. You say OTA should review the- Mr. THORNTON. For OTA to look at the directions of research in this country, in order to take a real iong~range look at what kind of problems might be arising just to-it might be premature to do a complete `assessment on it-but to identify some areas in, which a technology assessme,nt~ might become useful. Dr. KASH. Well-P--- Mr. THORNTON. Is that too far down the stream? Dr. LtSH. First, it is my impression that something of that kind is taking place in connection with. the activities that are already going on in OTA. I think that this is perhaps oneof these questions that's a jurisdictional question between the Congressional Research Service, Science Policy Division and OTA. In general, I have some difficulty thinking about assessments of the overall R. & D. program for the long term. We're spending what, $25 billion a year at the present time, on R. & D. A single study of that total effort is a little hard for `me to get my head around. I would have to have something. that was more concrete before I'd be very enthusiastic about that, . Mr. THORNTON. How should OTA, go about identifying emerging issues?. I mean if this is a functjon of OTA, to act as a long-range warning system, in part, to alert .policy'makers to emerging issues, how does OTA discover what the issues are going to he? Dr. KASH. I think that one approaches that by looking at ~pecific areas of technology, rather than doing an assessment of R. & D. generally. . . `There are studies~ of R. & D. that one might do, lookuig at the bal- ance betwen basic research and applied research and deveiopment-~ and I'm not disapproving of that. I'm saying that I think the unique role of OTA is to take a look at the consequences of choosing to develop coal gasification, as op'po~ed to fluidized bed, or some mix of that kind. That is, `specific substantive areas of technology seem to me'to be the unique starting point of O'TA in looking at the policy implications of technologies. My own notion of this is to say that what technology assessment does is stand' on the hardware, it stands on the technology and looks out and tries to see what the consequences will be. It's hard to do that broadly for science and technology. PAGENO="0333" 320 The chances are somewhat better if you take a look at recombinant I)NA, or if you take a look at `contraceptives, if you take a look at particular kinds of energy technology. In those cases the substantive technological information at least provides a kind of integrating basis for doing the study. The thing that holds the diversity of the assessment team together is the substantive technology. Mr. THORNTON. I think perhaps we're back to the definition of what is basic research and what is applied research and what is directed. But the illustration I was going to give you next was in the area of research which might stem from recombinant DNA, namely the de- velopment of a nitrogen-fixing bacteria that could live symbiotically with cereal grain. That's not applying a technology-because we don't have that capability yet. We're still determining whether or not that can be done. Is it too early to begin to make studies as to what the effects would he if we were to develop a- Dr. KASH. I certainly do not think so. It seems to me that's the kind of thing that this society ought to be taking a look at. And so when I use the technology here, my definition is one that runs from science to technology; and I'm not able to draw a clear line between those two. But it's precisely in areas of that kind that it seems to Iiie one ought to focus attention. It still gives you some substance. This is something you can start with. We do have some information about `bacteria, and cereals, and one can take a look at that. There's some information. Mr. THORNTON. Yes, sir. Mr. Brown? Mr. BROWN. Dr. Kash, you started out your statement with regard to the administrative personnelarrangements with OTA in emphasizing the need for basing sole responsibility with the director for manage- ment of the staff. I'm sure you know that one of the problems that has existed has been the fact that we have a rather ambiguous situation with reoard to certain staff members who are placed in the organization by memi~ers of the Board. Would you like to take a chance on making a lot of enemies by commenting on that? Dr. KASH. Well, I think I might as well carry on with the pattern that I've established. [Laughter.] It is my impression-and what information I have on this is im- pressionistic-that there are at least three categories of staff members in OTA: Those people who are solely involved in carrying out the as- sessments or supporting `them; there are people who are liaison; and there are instances where people link with one of the members of the Board, and also work within OTA in a substantive sense. I know nothing about the specific individuals. I'm willing, however, to say that I cannot conceive of any organization where it makes sense to divide responsibility between a director and a governing board in that fashion. I know that I've had some experience with this in universities, and it has been universally disastrous. If one does it in just the simplest terms of who gets the time at any particular moment of an individual, it's a serious problem. PAGENO="0334" 330 But I suspect that it's even a more serious problem in terms of just morale and structure within the organization. It seems to me that any- one who directs an organization is at some point in time going to offend some of those who presumably are working for him. To have that offended individual have a clear-cut formal channe~1 to the board, which is presumably the group for whom the director is working, seems to me to be a situation that's just loaded with problems, and one that-well, I guess I've said enough. I think it just won't work. Mr. BROWN. Well, I should follow that up with a question about how you eliminate irrationalities of this kind within the Congress, but I pill spare you that. [Laughter.] Dr. KASH. I can assure you that I'm not courageous enough to address that. Mr. BROWN. You have again placed considerable emphasis on the need for long-range assessments and suggested the utility of an ad- visory council in pinpointing areas that might be fruitful in that regard. I suggested in earlier questioning of Mr. DeSimone the need to develop guidelines with regard to proper balance in that area. Dr. KAsi~. Yes. Mr. BROwN. Have you any suggestions as to what kind of guidelines we should have, understanding the difficulty of defining short- and long-range assessments, and the other pressures that exist? What would be, from your standpoint, some sort of a stable state situation, if we could ideally have that, with regard to a balance between the two types of assessments? Dr. KASH. This last question has to do with budget? Mr. BROWN. Well, I'm thinking of how much resources are devoted to one versus the other. Basically that's how we measure it. Dr. KASH. I would be inclined to go for about the same figures that Dan suggested, as a starting point. I think that it needs to be recog- nized that any long-term study is a very, very high-risk study, and that if OTA puts too large a portion-initially-of its budget into those clear-cut identifiable long-term studies, and they turn out to be less than successful-as I think many of them will-then when this review of OTA takes place 5 years from now, there's likely to be a very solid record of failure. There has to he, for practical reasons as well as the real needs of the committees of the Congress, some effort to continue to look at the shorter-term impacts and implications of technology. But I would go for 20, 25 percent as an initial cut. That's just an arbitrary figure. I would suspect that, with the cut in the budget of OTA for this year, one would have to evolve to some point after the commitments that are already underway have been taken care of. So it's in that range that I would think would be at least a reasonable kiud of test. Mr. BROWN. Have you ever given any thought to differentiating between these two different kinds of long-range studies, one the long- rage impacts, say 25 years from now, of an existing technology, such as electronic communications; second, the long-range impact of a nonexistent technology which might be expected to develop within 25 years? Can we make these kinds of distinctions? PAGENO="0335" 331 Dr. KASH. I'm really predisposed to think that OTA ought to look at the long-range consequences of technologies that are either available or, as in the case with nitrogen-fixing bacteria for cereals, where you have a substantial effort going on. I would not think it wise to look in great detail at technologies that we weren't spending money on, that's one of the boundaries that I would put on it. My sense of this is that when the Congress appropri- ates $25 billion a year for research and development, it's really putting up the design money for the future of this society. The technology is going to be the causal factor in the directions that we go, and a major purpose of technology assessment is to assist the Congress `in making choices about the technologies and the science that it supports. Therefore, until something is on the agenda in dollars and cents terms-I'd be skeptical about carrying out assessments-25-year as- sessments seem to me to be highly risky activities. That doesn't mean that you don't try to do any. But, a 10- or 15-year projection would be vastly better than anything wedonow. Mr. BROWN. It frequently amuses me the amount of money we're spending on things we don't expect to pay-off in 25 years. I can cite breeder reactors, for example; we're spending hundreds of `millions of dollars per year without expecting any substantial energy impact un- til after the year 2000. Fusion energy likewise; our budget is in the hundreds of millions per year for systems which we know can't pro- duce anything until `after the year 2000. The Space Shuttle; we're spending considerable on it, and yet in terms of major deployment it will have an effect after the year 2000, possibly allow us to build cities out in space, or something like that-some people talk about it. So we could easily identify a number of things that meet your cri- teria of substantial effort with no expectation that that effort will have a payback in 25 years. Dr. KASH. Very large portions of the R. & D. budget have at least a 25-year leadtime. My 15-year projection has to do with what follows, the point at which you try to utilize that technology. It seems to me that one can look at existing technologies and try to look far down the road at what the second-, third-, fourth-order consequences will be. You can look at developing technologies, and if you can just get some kind of handle on what some of the relatively immediate impacts of those technoloc~ies will be, technologies which won't be available for 20,25 years, you'll have gone a great distance down the road. Trying to take 25 years of development and then push it 100 years into the future is what I'm saying is beyond my capacity to get my head around. Mr. BROWN. Think what we could do for developing new science fic- tion writers. Dr. KASIT. Well, that's true. Perhaps OTA ought to have a section on science fiction. I have a poet friend who tells me that poets always see things before anyone else in society. and that he ought to be in our program because he really is better at it than any of the rest of us. Mr. BROWN. Going on to another point that you highlighted-and I think an import~ant point-the difference between the nature of the as- PAGENO="0336" 332 sessments that.are helpful to Congress and those that are helpful to the executive agencies. I wonder if you could elaborwte a little bit more on how you perceive these different needs, as between the Congress and the executive agency; or technology assessments done for other outside organiza- tions, the private corporations. What distinguishes the needs of Congress? Dr. KASH. The single word is breadth. Our experience in dealmg with executive agencies is that they not only do not encourage you to look at consequences and policy implications between their immedi- ate mission charge, but they have some desire to discourage you from doing that. They don't want to give you money to create an additional set of problems. They've got more than they can handle, in most instances. Now, the Congress in our experience is a very different place. The 500-and-some members are all in one sense or another potentially users of assessments, and they may use them for quite different purposes. The Congress in our experience is a place-I pay you the highest compli- ment I can pay you as an organization-it's a place which is strangely and uniquely interested in new ideas and new proposals. There's some- body sitting some place in Congress ready to pick up and look at and be interested in every new proposal and new idea that comes up. It's really an interesting kind of thing. In that connection I would say that, while the committees are clearly the direct utilizers of assessments, assessments ought never be done solely for the particular mission of a committee. That obviously has to be a driving but not the sole force. It's that willingness to look at new proposals, new approaches, which exists in the Congress in a way that it simply doesn't exist any place else in this society. If you do them for a corporation, they want to ask you what's the bottom line on it; the bottom line tends to be dollars and cents. / The agency wants to ktiow how it's going to help its regulatory role or get a congressional committee off its back, or get some other set of constituents off its back. I will make one additional point: Its been very interesting to me, in terms of our own work, that when we start out we are repeatedly asked "well, who's our constituents?" And we always feel this compulsion to identify a constituent or a constituency. In almost every case where we can demonstrate that our work has been used, the constituent has turned out to he other than the constituent we aimed it at. * We did a study some years ago of offshore oil and gas, and we have tried to track the use of that assessment, and some of the places where it's been use.d just come as total incomprehensible and complete shocks to us. We just had no notion that they would be users. So it seems to me that this is such a shifting group of people and changing sets of interests in the Congress. particularly if you look at lon«=r-term studies that you just can't predict what'~ going to happen. The study I mentioned of ours turned out to be very nice for us, be- cause 2 days after we completed it President Nixon went on tele- vision and announced a tripling of leasing of offshore oil and gas. That gave the study a lot of Attention. As a matter of fact, in that speech h~ announced that the Council on Environmental Quality had PAGENO="0337" 333 to do a year-long study of impacts. The CEQ people ~vere desperately hunting around for something they could use to get the study under- way. We just happened to have the document. Now, I'd like to claim that I was a prophet and I knew all this was going to happen `2 years earlier, when NSF gave us the money. But I can tell you that CEQ was not a central constituent for that study at the time when we started doing it. There's a lot of randomness and a lot of chance in this. It seems to me what one does is choose technologies which. if they go are going to have some obvious first-order impacts, and I think wherever you have those you're going to have a lot of second-order ones that follow on. That's the handle you grab hold of. I perhaps talked too long on this, but, it does seem to me that it must be terribly difficult for committees and committee staffs dealing with the immediate problems of the moment to identify long-range issues. Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Yeager? Mr. YEAGER. I don't want to get into problems of staff again, but I do want to clarify one point. OTA has one or two people, for example, who are assigned exclusively to the Advisory Council, and the same for the Board's Chairman. Now their functions are purely adminis- trative, and they are full time, and they're also overburdened, and that sort of thing. They handle the internal- Dr. KASH. Sure. Mr. YF.AGER [continuing]. The administrative problems of those two groups. I take it your concern is not for that type ~ Dr. KASH. That's true. Mr. YBAGER. But is for the ones who have responsibility in the sub- stantive area, as well as being at the beck and call, so to speak, of the individual Board niember for whatever he wishes to have done outside. Dr. KASH. That's correct. I would make just one point on that. It seems to me that those roles ought to be looked at and clarified and made explicit. But those are not an area of concern. Mr. YEAGER The other question I would like to ask you involves a distinction in your testimony between "programs" and "projects." One of the things that Mr. Teague had suggested was that the, Coun- cil might well become involved in helping to establish criteria for quality control of assessments. And, presumably, this would require some careful study and work with completed assessments, and evalu- ations of them, and the methods by which they were produced, and so on. Your commentary that the Council spends its time mainly with programs, rather than projects, would not necessarily preclude this type of activity. Dr. KASIT. Well, it would not preclude it. But there are just some practical factors that are involved. You have Jerry Wiesner and Ed Wenk, and a series of people, all whom to the best of my observation are terribly busy. And you turn out assessments `that are 400 pages long. Now, I don't read as rapidly as I did before I'got my bifocals, but a 300-page report to be reviewed with any degree of care by me is a 96-205 0 - 78 - 22 PAGENO="0338" 334 2-to-3-day a4~tivity. Now, I do not believe that that Council will do that. That is, I just think there's a practical problem. `The second thing is if you look at specificS studies, the people who need to review specific studies range from technical experts to stake- holders in that area, who may or may not have that expertise on tap. Now, I'm not precluding TAAC choosing a study and using it to sample the work of a program. It seems to me that that's perfectly apuropriate. t3tit the idea of using TAAC to be the quality control mechanism for a series of individual studies I just don't think is practically available. Mr. Yr~&GER. That was not the suggestion. It was that they help. by reviewing'them on an occasional basis- Dr. KASH. Yes. Mr. YEAOER [continuing]. Particular ones, in order to develop cri- teria which then could be cranked into the Director's operation to help in the- Dr. KASH. Sure. Mr. YEAGER [continuing]. Evolution of future assessments. Dr. KASH. Well, that seems- Mr. YEAGER. Not to evaluate each one. Dr. KASH. That seems to me to be very appropriate. There are a lot of things that might be done. If you take a look at the energy program in OTA, presumably there ought to be a balance between supply and demand considerations. Now, sometimes in developing a program, particularly where what you're doing is responding to specific requests from committees, you may get some imbalance. And TAAC offers a beautiful vehicle for saying that there's an area out there which, in the evolution of this, you haven't picked up on. Mr. YEAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much. Dr. Kash, I want to thank you very much for your good testimony and your responsive answers to our inquiries. This hearing will be adjourned to meet again at 2 p.m. [The subcommittee was adjourned at 12:20 p.m., to reconvene at 2 p.m.] AFTERNOON SESSION Mr: THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. `This afternoon we resume the subcommittee's hearings on the ques- tions and issues relating to OTA, and we are very privileged this afternoon in having as our witness a distinguished gentleman whom I've had the opportunity of knowing for some time, and whose testi- mony has always been tremendously valuable to any subcommitee on which I've been engaged, and also whose work has constituted a very high standard of excellence for all people in government. It's a real privilege to welcome you to our subcommittee, Mr. Staats, and we have received `the statemeiit which you have prepared for sub- mission. Without objection, I would like to make this statement a part of the record in its entirety, word for word, and then ask you to pro- ceed as you may see fit to highlight it. [The prepared statement and a biographical sketch of Mr. Elmer B. Staats follows:] PAGENO="0339" 335 United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY Expected at 2:00 p.m., EDT Thursday, October 13, 1977 STATEMENT OF ELMER B. STAATS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee because I have a very special interest in the subject of today's hearings. I participated in drafting and testified in support of the legislation establishing OTA. In my statutory role as a member of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council and also as head of the General Accounting Office, I have had the opportunity to watch OTA develop from its inception. I understand that the major thrust of the current hearings is to examine OTA's progress and development in PAGENO="0340" 336 relation to the technology assessment concept and the OTA charter as defined in Public Law 92-484 which established OTA in 1972. I shall present some observations about OTA's accomplishments, the uniqueness of its role, and the utilization of its resources. 0Th has developed some excellent resources and methods for performing technol- ogy assessments and has produced some very good and use- ful products. However, I have two reservations which will be discussed in detail. My first concern is that the pattern of OTA's resource utilization has digressed from the primary legislative intent. My second concern relates to the lack of a clear definition of the Council's role, which in turn I believe relates to the structure of the Board and the Council. I shall offer some suggestions for positive steps that could be taken to help resolve both of these concerns and to strengthen the OTA generally. To provide context for my suggestions i shall review a few salient aspects of the legislative history which in my view set forth quite clearly why a new legislative support agency was needed, the nature of its role, and the major emphasis intended for its support to the Congress. Finally, I shall respond to a question posed by the Subcommittee Counsel concerning coordination between and among the legislative agencies. PAGENO="0341" 337 OTA PERFORNANCE AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION A distillation of the deliberations leading to the establishment of OTA reveals that the primary need was for a special capability to examine emerging issues involving new or expanding tedhnologies and to assess potential impacts, together with analyses of alternative policies and strategies for Congress to consider before crises loomed or processes with undesirable consequences developed to an irreversible stage. A secondary need expressed was for the ability to marshall countervailing expertise to match the capabilities of the executive branch to cope with issues involving a strong science and technology comppnent. En my view 0Th was intended to be a unique resource dedicated entirely to fulfill these needs with particular emphasis on emerging issues and early warning. I shall cite a number of examples to illustrate the kinds of work which I believe are consonant with the legislative intent and which OTA appears to be doing very well; other tasks OTA has undertaken which I believe could be construed as not in keeping with the major emphasis intended and which certainly are within the capabilities of the other legislative agencies; and important emerging technological issues which in my view have not received adequate attention. PAGENO="0342" 338 There is little doubt that OTA has developed sub-' stantial expertise and methodology for performing technology assessments and has clearly demonstrated the value of using expert panels for performing mini-'assess- ments as well as for helping to plan and guide major assessments. OTA has turned out some excellent prod~- ucts and has made significant contributions in areas of concern to Congress, including pending legislation. Examples of such studies either completed or in progress are: -`-`The report on the Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Systems assessed the broad effects on the mid-Atlantic coast of three proposed technologies-'-. offshore oil and gas extraction systems, deepwater ports for oil tankers, and floatin.g nuclear power plants. The assessment of the three offshore technologies was augmented by an analysis of energy alternatives to these technologies. --The report on solar energy studied the range of technologies being developed for on-site energy utilization. The report assessed the economic, legal, PAGENO="0343" 339 regulatory, and institutional implica- tions of large-scale use of these on-site technologies. Additi~nally, the issues and policy op~9ns are identified and discussed. ~ --The report on automatic train control examined these new technologies as they are utilized in several recently completed rapid transit systems. This assessment included analysis of the safety, perform- ance, cost, and human factors associated with these systems. The study concluded with a section dealing with the policy and institutional factors. --The implications of the Computed Tomography Scanner were studied in the context of the many issues~for health policy raised by the sudden emergence of new medical tech- nologies. The report examined this tech- nology and ~its use, including distribution of costs ve$~sus benefits, efficacy and safety, and the broad impacts on medical care. The report analyzed Federal policies and incentives, and discussed the various policy options. PAGENO="0344" 340 Most of these completed tasks have been performed well and there is little question that they are the types of tasks that 0Th clearly was intended to do. Many GAO staff members have~ecome well acquainted witt~ the OTA staff and are familiar with their products. We generally have a high regard for the caliber and dedication of the OTA staff. On the other hand, OTA has accepted and performed a number of tasks which--however important they may be--could hardly be construed as unique and which could well have been performed by one of the other legislative agencies. The first Council Chairman, Harold Brown, in his year-end letter to Board Chairman Teague, in December 1975, stated: "1 have a real concern that OTA's limited resources have been less efficiently used than would ideally have been the case. As I have pointed out to the Board on a number of occasions, I believe it would be desir- able to respond negatively to mere of the requests that are made for technology assessments. Many such requests are in fact for technical feasibility studies, or reviews of existing programs, or literature searches, or economic studies. Most of those might appropriately be done by one of the other congressional offices to which I have referred, each of which has very much greater resources than OTA, or by the newly established Congressional Budget Office." I believe this is still substantially true. For example, I believe the following tasks which OTA has undertaken PAGENO="0345" 341 could more appropriately have been performed by one of the other legislative agencies, thus, freeing OTA resources to be used on other more appropriate assignments. ~-The report on the financial viability of ConRail examined the assumptions affecting ConRail's financial viability using background data developed by the United States Railway Association,~ the views of the key parties and independ ent analysis. This was basically an economic study with virtually no technological content. The review of alternative approaches to Federal funding of rail rehabilitation falls into the same category. ~-The evaluation of the automobile crash recorder program was a study of the need for and means to assemble detailed data on actual automobile collisions in order to develop realistic automobile design standards. The study evaluated crash recorders and the alternate approaches - to gathering collision data. This review was basically a technical PAGENO="0346" 342 feasibility study with some program evaluation characteristics. --The report on organizing and financ- ing basic research to increase food production describes and evaluates alternative organizations of basic research in the biological sciences. It also discusses alternative levels of increased funding for. basic research in three areas that possess opportunity for fundamental scientific discoveries and suggests alternative administrative structures for Federal support of basic research related to food production. This study deals primarily with the management and funding of food and agriculture research. --The report concerned with perspectives on Federal retail food grading pre- sented OTA's analysis of changes and * modifications in the present rood grading system which could facilitate consumer choice in buying food prod- ucts. This study has only a limited technological content. PAGENO="0347" 343 --The report on alternative stockpiling policies is an. analysis of the attributes and consequences of a national economic stockpile program to acquire, hold, and dispose of materials for various public purposes. This is primarily an economic study with little technological content. Another example of a task which I consider not the best use of OTA resources and capabilities has been requested recently. This request notes recent Senate actions endorsing extension of the loan guarantee feature to provide for all costs of converting utili- ties to coal from petroleum or natural gas. OTA is asked to make a judgment, based on its own examination and analysis of this program area, of any potential inflationary effects which might stem from this change in public policy. OTA is also asked to identify the degree of industrial capacity and lead-time needed to be responsive to this policy if it is adopted. In my view, these examples illustrate that the use of OTA as a special resource in accordance with the original legislative intent has been diluted. There are a number PAGENO="0348" 344 of important technology assessment areas and emerging issues relating to new and expanding technologies which I believe have not received adequate attention. Almost from the beginning, the Technology Assess- ment Advisory Council addressed the question of pri- orities for OTA efforts through both Council deliber- ations as a whole and through the work of a special Subcommittee dealing with this subject. The Council did not, attempt to advise specifically which particular tasks should be given priority but rather addressed the question of what crtteria should be used and the methodology for priority determination. 1~ecogriizing the special purpose intended for OTA and the limited resources available to it, the Council urged OTA to consider among other things whether or not particular requests from congressional committees could more appropriately be performedby one of the other leqislative agencies. The Council also recommended that 0Th consider whether related technology assessments were already being performed by executive agencies so that it need only to synthesize, review and critique those efforts rather than to initiate new assessments. The Council repeatedlyurged OTA to allocate some portion of its PAGENO="0349" 345 resources to longer range emerging technology or early warning issues. On March 18, 1976, following a Council meeting in which the subject of priorities was discussed at great length, I addressed a letter to Mr. Daddario in which I suggested some examples of future oriented technology assessments which I believed at that time warranted OTA's attention. This list included examining the potential impacts of --Long-term climatic changes caused by atmospheric pollution; e.g., aerosols, C02 concentration, automobile emissions, man-made heat sources, etc.; ---Artificially induced weather modification; --Alternative safeguards for nuclear reactors, fuel materials, and waste disposal; --Recombinant DNA research and genetic engineering; --Health, safety, and environmental factors associated with nuclear fusion power development; --Atmospheric noise pollution; and ---Low-energy catalytic processes employing microbes and enzymes on energy-intensive industrial methods and on the generation of feed stock from waste materials. These are only a few examples of future oriented issues that have been identified by a number of sources. Many of these potentially major impacts of emerging technologies have not yet been addressed comprehensively. PAGENO="0350" 346 Some of these are directly or indirectly related to vulnerabilities that are vital not only to the United States but also to other nations. Some of these issues nay be extremely difficult to analyze and assess and indeed may not be amenable to definitive answers. Nevertheless, the importance of the issues and the need for improved congressional understanding and public awareness of the uncertainties, probable impacts, and alternatives require not only early warning of potential threats but objective analyses of the range of options available for Government policy determination and prompt action to accelerate favorable innovations and prevent irreversible adverse future impacts of technology. During 1976, OTA initiated an effort to explore emerging issues but the effort is small and the orienta- tion is extremely broad. It also appears to me that OTA is not taking full advantage of resources available which could help to delineate a specific agenda for priority issues. At a Council meeting on.September 17, 1976, 0Th staff members presented their initial plans for this future oriented effort and invited comments from members of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. In response I addressed a letter to Mr. Daddario on PAGENO="0351" 347 October 14, 1976, offering a number of suggestions including the following: "Mature technologies and emerging tech- nologies that have reached the stage of substantial visibility and public awareness need not be included in this effort because the relevant issues most likely have been identi- fied and either have been or are being addressed by OTA or other institutions. "The potential issues associated with technologies just beginning to emerge from the research stage on the one hand, and potential needs and problems looming on the horizon on the other extreme, should be given preferential attention. "With respect to searching for candidate issues, I hardly think it necessary for OTA to conduct extensive surveys through seminars, workshops, inter- views, or questionnaires because there is a vast amount of resource material already available. For example, extensive lists of emerging issues have been developed by the National Science Foundation; the TAAC Priorities Subcommittee (May 1975 report); the Congressional Research Service; the Futures Group, Glastonberry, Connecticut; and others, including pro- fessional societies, private corpora- tions, and public interest groups. "CRS, under the leadership of its Futures Group, could be commissioned to summarize the candidate issues derived from a variety of studies, including in each case the state of knowledge, gaps in the knowlege requiring further research or assessment, identification and analysis of controversial evidence, and a bibli- ography of pertinent literature. CRS could also provide resource information and guidance on futures methodology. PAGENO="0352" 348 "Conctirrently, while CR5 is preparing this background information, the OPA staff, working with CR5 and the PAAC Priorities Subcommittee, could develop criteria for selection of candidates for in-depth assessment. S "The 0Th staff, with assistance from consultants or panels, could also begin immediately to perform mini-assessments on several emerging issues from which two or three might be selected for in- depth assessments. The first ones selected need not be the highest in priority or most urgent but should be representative test cases on which to gain experience on methodology. Several of the Council members have expressed agree- ment with most, if not all of these recommendations. For example, Dr. Fred Bucy, in a letter to Mr. Daddario dated November 8, 1976, strongly endorsed all except the last one, on which he offered no comment. In my letter I acknowledged that technology assess- ments of emerging issues would be difficult to perform and involved greater risks than dealing with more con- ventional issues; nevertheless, I urged OTA to come to grips with this problem and develop the expertise to keep the Congress apprised of longer-range issues that require early attention to avoid foreseeable situations that may become too complex or irreversible to deal with later. Mr. Chairman, I still hold these views and believe that 0Th should take full advantage of the CRS Futures PAGENO="0353" 349 Research Group and other sources for preliminary background studies to help identify emerging issues and to estab- lish priorities for OTA to consider as candidates for major impact analyses and the evaluation of policy implications and alternatives. ROLE OF THE ADVISORY cOUNCIL I received a letter dated June 17, 1977, from Congressman Clarence Miller requesting my views on Council operations and its interaction with the Board and the Office. It is my understanding that similar letters were addressed to each Council member. In response to his request, my views concerning the role of the Council and its interaction with the Board and the Office were summarized in a letter to Congressman Miller dated July 22, 1977. This portion of my statement is based on excerpts from that letter. I believe the contributions of the Council as a whole must be distinguished from those of individual TAAC members. Both have been documented in the year- end letters by Council Chairmen Brown and Wiesner to the Board Chairman. The participation of individual Council members as consultants and panelists for OTA on specific programs has been extremely helpful to the Office and I believe that this practice should be encouraged. 96-205 0 - 78 - 23 PAGENO="0354" 350 Such involvement also gives those Council members intimate knowlege of 0Th operations and programs, and thus enhances their perspective for serving on the Council. However, I believe the contributions of the Council as a whole have not been commensurate with its potential. This is true for a number of reasons, including the limited availability of the Council members who have other major commitments; difficulty in scheduling meetings when a majority of the Council can be present; insufficient lead time for the Council to study and react to assessment requests, program plans, draft reports, and other communications; and most important of all, lack of definition of the Council's role. With the present triad structure (Board, Office, and Council), it is my view that the Council as a whole should not be involved in OTA operations unless specifi~ cally asked to do so by the Board, as is the case in the Council's oversight of the R&D Policy and Priorities Study and the emerging technologies effort. Otherwise the Council should be concerned only with broad questions such as those involving policy, budget priorities, program plans, and suggesting resource people. Clarification of the Council's role as desired by the Board would be be helpful. PAGENO="0355" 351 I do not believe that the Council should exercise quality control and oversight of OTA's studies in an opera- tional sense. The Council should be concerned as to whether OTA maintains high standards of excellence and has established and maintains a good quality control system, but the perform- ance of this function should be the responsibility of the Office itself. The Council has probably offered its most effective reaction to planned assessments at the time of inception or during the early phases when OTA staff presentations have been made at Council meetings. During the past year, this situation has improved in that frequently assessment requests have been circulated for comment by Council members before the tasks have been approved by the Board. Although draft reports of completed tasks are circulated for comment, the reaction time is almost invariably too short to provide a meaningful response. There is little evidence to show the degree to which the Council may or may not have influenced or assisted the Board. Much needs to be done to improve communication between the Board and the Council. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Before considering suggestions for changing OTA Ibelieve it would be useful to review some aspects of its legislative history. According to the PAGENO="0356" 352 Congressional Research Service, the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development of the House Science and Astronautics Committee on October 17, 1966, published the first report which used the term "technology assessment" and concluded that "an early warning system for both the good and bad results of technology would be of great use to Congress." On March 7, 1967, Congressman Daddario introduced H.R. 6698 proposing that Congress create a Technology Assessment Board. Subsequently, a series of hearings were held to examine the rationale for establishing a new mechanism and to consider various models proposed as legislative alternatives. In the hearings much attention was directed to determining the specific nature of congressional needs for assessment of technological alternativesand poten-~ tial impacts and for special forms of scientific and technological assistance not provided or planned at that time by either GAO or the Legislative Reference Service (LRS) of the Library of Congress. To sharpen the focus an~ ascertain the major thrust of the new capability required examination of the resources and chanqing expertise of both GAO and LRS. Role of the GAO In testimony before the Subcommittee on December 4, PAGENO="0357" 353 1969, I presented a comprehensive statement describing the role of the General Accounting Office indicating what we could do, how we were changing, and what. our limitations were with respect to performing the func- tions intended by the proposed legislation. I stated at that time that many of the programs we were author- ized to review involved the promotion or control of technology, the application of technology to meet an existing problem or need, or the treatment of problems brought about by technological change or progress. I noted that we were increasing our emphasis on program evaluation and, in light of this effort, we were adding professional staff in disciplines such as economics, mathematics, engineering, and systems analysis, in order to more effectively perform this function. My overall view stated in 1969 was that GAO could and should `play an increasingly important role in the surveillance and monitoring of Federal programs where technological assessment is an important consideration." In 1970, when commenting on H.1~. 17046, a bill to establish an Office of Technology Assessment, I stated that "as program objectives become more concerned with and provide recognition of the impact of technological application our Office (GAO) will, in the ordinary course of its activities, automatically gear our review to PAGENO="0358" 354 include disclosures which show the impact of technology." We recommended enactment of this bill and stood ready to work in close cooperation with the proposed Office if it were established. Congressman Daddario, noting that GAO was expanding its expertise by hiring more professionals capable of dealing with technological issues, asked if this GAO expansion could include the technology assessment func- tions proposed in the legislation. I replied that our resources were already heavily committed to review- ing all Government programs that involve utilization of appropriated funds. We thereforedid not feel that GAO alone could dedicate sufficient resources to fulfill all that the legislative proposal intended to accomplish.. It was recognized, however, that GAO would undertake studies itt fields of technology, many of which might be defined as technology assessments. I stated that we could make our best contribution by participating with the proposed Office and to the extent that we could practically do so, we would make our studies available to the new Office. We would under- take studies which the Office might suggest we would have a particular competence to undertake and we would be.able to relate our forward working program as much as practical to its interests and needs. The model PAGENO="0359" 355 I envisioned at that time for OTA was quite similar to that of the former President's Science Advisory Committee,which commissioned panels of experts to deal with specific problems. Section 204 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-510) emphasized the responsibility of GAO for reviewing and analyzing the results of Government programs, including the making of cost-benefit studies. I might add that during OTA's first year of operation the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-~344, July 12, 1974) reemphasized GAO's broadening role in reviewing and evaluating the results of Government programs. Section 204 of the 1970 Act was amended in the Budget Act of 1974. Title VII of the act strengthens our program evaluation role by requiring us to review and evaluate Government programs carried on under existing law, to develop and recommend methods for reviewing and evaluating Government programs and activities, and to assist in developing statements of legislative objectives and goals and methods for assessing and reporting actual program performance. Role of LRS In the Subcommittee hearings in May of 1970, Dr. Lester Jayson, Director of the LRS, also endorsed H.R. 17046 and stated that PAGENO="0360" 356 "the Legislative Reference Service will provide information and research ~ervices to OTA as it now does to other congressional offices. But in addition, it will be responsible for maintaining a monitoring indi- cator system, in many respects similar to an early warning system so as to alert legislative committees and the OTA to the need for full- scale assessments. It will survey on-going and proposed governmental programs with technological content. It will report oppor- tunities for technology to solve problems and will signal situations reflecting technology's adverse implications. it will maintain liaison and will coordinate with executive branch agencies engaged in like activities and it will bring to the attention of Congress technology developments which bear watching." In response to a question from Mr. Daddario con- cerning the relationship between OTA and the Legislative Reference Service, Dr. Jayson replied, "The bill itself, indicates that the Office of OTA will undertake the major assessments. The LRS would have the basic function of sponsoring an early warning effort in support of the actual large-scale assessments, It would alert the PAGENO="0361" 357 Congress to the needs for and describe the areas for which assessments are necessary so as to identify the particular problems where further research and study are needed." The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 substan- tially broadened the role of LRS to provide a greater amount of research and analysis in its legislative assistance to Congress, and authorized LRS to develop expertise in almost two dozen broad fields, including science and technology. The office was additionally authorized to hire experts and consultants on a temporary basis. To better represent the role of the Office, the Legislative Reference Service was redesignated the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Mr. Chairman, in summary the decision to establish OTA was made in the full recognition that both GAO and CRS were developing broader expertise for coping with issues involving science and technology but short of fulfilling the unique role of technology assessment in accordance with the main thrust of the legislation. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT I have several suggestions to offer for mitigating some of the concerns and strengthening the OTA as it is currently structured. First, as a matter of policy, I believe the Board should generate clearer guidelines to emphasize the special PAGENO="0362" 358 role intended for OTA--to examine emerging issues involving new or expanding technologies and to assess potential impacts and provide an early warning. The Board should also establish criteria for allocation and utilization of OTA's resources. Such guidelines should be promulgated to all congressional committees ir~ an effort to inform them of OTA's capabilities and intended use. Second, my impression is that the Board has acted more like a joint Committee of the House and Senate, rather than an oversight board. I believe that the Board should become less operational and give serious consideration to concentrating its efforts on general oversight and policy matters such as budget guidance and review, general strategy guidance with respect to balance of short-tenn and long-term (emerging issues) assessments, and balance of in-house vs. contract per- formed work. This would permit delegation of essen- tially all aspects of executive management and day to day direction to the Director of OTA, including task selections, resource utilization, staffing, and make- or-buy decisions. If the Board were to concernitself only with policy matters and broad guidance, quarterly Board meetings may be of sufficient frequency unless major surprises or problems develop which could require occasional special meetings. PAGENO="0363" 359 Third, the appointment of individuals to the OTA staff under the procedure of Board rule number 12 should be discontinued. In my view, this practice presents a potential problem. Dual roles of staff members with divided allegiance pose a threat to the Director's authority and violate a fundamental precept of sound management structure. I believe all 0Th staff should be appointed by the Director. Any staff working directly for the Board should serve only in a liaison capacity. Fourth, I believe that efforts should be continued to have joint meetings in which a majority of both Council members and the Board can be present and exchange views on substantive matters. Through such meetings perhaps the role of the Council can be more clearly defined in relation to fulfilling the desires and needs of the Board. Fifth, I suggest that the statutory members of the Council, who are heads of the other legislative agencies, be authorized to appoint delegates to serve in their absence, including participation in the executive sessions. This recommendation is in recogni- tion of the fact that their Council roles constitute institutional representation, as distinguished from the other Council members who are appointed because of their individual stature and expertise. However, PAGENO="0364" 360 I would like to add that I expect to attend all Council meetings whenever possible. Sixth, I note that up to this time OTA has not undertaken assessments of defense technologies. I suggest that consideration be given to performing some work in this field--at least to examine the social and environmental impacts of military technology. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my suggestions with respect to OTA as it is presently constituted. How- ever, in the event that you,decide to explore the feasibility and desirability of restructuring the Office, I have in mind a model which incorporates features that could alleviate some of OTA's organiza.- tional difficulties. In this model, which is similar in concept to those incorporated in early legislative proposals for OTA, the Board and the Council would be merged into a single oversight and policy-making entity with a good mix and balance of expertise and bipartisanship. For example, the Board could be comprised of 17 members, as follows: 4 Senators-.-bipartisan, appointed by the leadership of the Senate--and 4 Representatives--bipartisan, appointed by the Speaker of the House (possibly also subject to confirmation by their respective legislative bodies); 5 citizens appointed by the same or a similar mechanism PAGENO="0365" 361 representing diverse interests, such as consumer/labor, physical science and technology (academia), social science, biomedicine, and industrial technology; the Director of OTA; the Comptroller General; the Director of CRS; and the Director of CBO. If desired, the total number of Board members could be increased or decreased provided the bipartisanship character and the odd number of total members are preserved. Also, the Board could draw upon expertise in the executive branch of the Government for briefings and discussion. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yeager, Subcommittee Counsel, asked me to comment on how cooperation and coordina- tion between GAO and OTA might be improved. Despite congressional concern about duplication of effort and lack of coordination among GAO, CRS, OTA and CBO, the results of three congressional studies show that no significant degree of undesirable duplication exists, although some problems of coordination, communication, and user education were identified. For instance, a recent staff study on GAO's services to the Congre~s by the Select Committee on Congressional Operations supports the same conclusions and recommenda- tions arising from the earlier studies. When discuss- ing external coordination, the draft staff study states PAGENO="0366" 362 the professional staff of OTA, as well as of the other support agencies, and, most especially GAO, were bending every effort toward voluntary and con- certed cooperation to be aware of and, indeed, to fully utilize any results emanating from studies of the others having any bearing on work that they were being requested to do or were otherwise considering. Not only was it in their own self-interest to know about and capitalize on each other's work, as is usually characteristic of professional research people, but they had become so sensitized to the concern about duplication of effort that most were bending over backward to avoid even the semblance of it." The staff study further notes that GAO appears to have been the first to issue internal instructions to its staff on duplication of effort. These internal instructions have been implemented and no additional coordination procedures were recommended by the study group. PAGENO="0367" 363 Mr. Chairman, we have made every effort to provide mechanisms to ensure adequate coordination with the other congressional agencies. These efforts include providing classroom instruction citing the importance and need for coordination as part of our professional staff training program; exchange briefings; providing the Monthly Listing of GAO Reports and a listing of planned assignments to OTA on a bimonthly basis. At this point, I cannot visualize what additional formal coordination procedures might be necessary. Of greater importance, in my view, are the informal continual contacts between the staffs of our agencies who are working in similar subject areas. Also top level officials of the four agencies meet monthly to discuss cooperation and coordination policy matters. I think our current system, considered in its totality, is working well. I believe CRS, OTA and CBO share this view. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I shall be pleased to answer any questions. PAGENO="0368" 364 ELMER B. STAATS COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES Elmer B. Staats was appointed by President Johnson as Comptroller General of the United States in 1966. Before his appointment as Comptroller General, he served the Federal Government as Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower and Truman and as Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council. Mr. Staats joined the Bureau of the Budget in 1939 serving in various capacities prior to his appointment by President Truman as Deputy Director in 1950. In 1953 Mr. Staats left Government service to accept a position as Research Director for Marshall Field & Company in Chicago. A year later he was appointed by President Eisenhower as Executive Officer of the newly established Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council. He was reappointed Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1959 and was continued in this position by President Kennedy and President Johnson. Mr. Staats is a native of Kansas and a graduate of McPherson College, McPherson, Kansas. He has an M.A. degree from the University of Kansas and Ph.D. degree from the University of Minnesota. He was a fellow of the Brookings Institution from 1938 to 1939, is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, an honorary member of Alpha Kappa Psi, and received the Rockefeller Public Service Award in 1961. Mr. Staats has received distinguished service awards from the University of Kansas (1966) and the University of Minnesota (1964). He holds honorary degrees from McPherson College (1966), The George Washington University (1971), The University of South Dakota (1973), Duke University (1975) and Nova University (1976). He is currently serving on the Board of Trustees of The American University in Washington and McPherson College in Kansas. Mr. Staats was National President of the American Society for Public Administration in 1961-62. He is a member of several organizations and serves on a number of boards and committees interested in the public service. (Revised August 1976) PAGENO="0369" 365 SUPPLEMENTAL BIOGRAPHICAL INFOPJ1ATION CONCERNING ELMER B. STMTS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL Mr. Staats' interest in science policy and organization dates back to World War II. He participated in the development of the legislation *which established the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Science Foundation, and later while Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, helped draft and testified in support of the legislation which estab- lished the Office of Science and Technology in 1962. He has given congressional testimony many times on issues involving science and technology, and most recently, in June 1976, he testified before the House Committee on Science and Technology on Federal policy, plans and organization for science and technology (H.R. 4461 The National Science Policy and Organization Act of 1976). `Mr. Staats also is a statutory member of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council to the Office of Technology Assessment. 96-205 0 - 70 - 24 PAGENO="0370" 366 STATEMENT OP ELMER B. STAATS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OP THE UNITED STATES Mr. STAATS. Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do appre- ciate particularly your taking me in the afternoon session. I have had a 2½-day meeting which I have had to chair, and this is my first opportunity to be available for this presentation. I do very much appreciate the invitation to present my views with respect to the subject of your hearing. I would like to introduce, first, my two colleagues here, Mr. Myers and Mr~ Fundingsland, who have been associated with me and are liaison and interested in the work of the OTA. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Myers and Mr. Fundingsland, you are welcome, and we are pleased to have you. Mr. STAATS. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I participated in the draft- ing and testified in support of the legislation which established the OTA. In my sta;tutory role as a member of the Advisory Council, and also as head of the GAO, I have had an opportunity to watch the OTA develop from its inception. I understand that the major thrust of the current hearings is to examine OTA's progress and development in relationship to the tech- nology assessment concept and the OTA charter as defined in Public Law 92-484, which established OTA in 1972. I'll present today some observations about OTA's accomplishments, the uniqueness of its role, and the utilization of its resources. OTA has developed some excellent resources and methods for performing tech- nology assessments and has produced some very good and useful products. However, I have two reservations which I'll discuss in greater detail. My first concern is that the pattern of OTA's resource utilization has çhgressed from the primary legislative intent. * My second concern relates to the lack of a clear definition of the Council's role, which, in turn, I believe relates to the structure of the Board and the Council. I shall offer some suggestions for positive steps that could be taken to help resolve both of these concerns and to strengthen the OTA gen- erally. To provide context for my suggestions, I shall review a few sahent aspects of the legislative history which, in my view, set forth quite clearly why a new legislative support agency was needed, the nature of its role, and the major emphasis intended for its support to the Congress. Finally, I shall respond to a question posed by the subcommittee counsel concerning coordination between and among the legislative agencies. A distillation of the deliberations leading to the establishment of OTA reveals that the primary need was for a special capability to examine emerging issues involving new or expanding technologies and to assess potential impacts, together with analyses of the alternative policies and strategies for Con~ress to consider before crises loomed or processes with undesirable consequences developed to an irreversible stage. PAGENO="0371" 367 A second need expressed was for the ability to marshall countervail- ing expertise to match capabilities of the executive branch to cope with issues involving a strong science and technology component. In my view OTA was intended to be a unique resource dedicated entirely to fulfill these needs, with particular emphasis on emerging issues and early warning. I shall cite a number of examples to illustrate the kinds of work which I believe are consonant with the legislative intent and which OTA appears to be doing very well; other tasks OTA has undertaken which I believe could be construed as not in keeping with the major em- phasis intended, and which certainly are within the capabilities of other legislative agencies and important emerging technological issues which in my view have not received adequate attention. There is little doubt that OTA has developed substantial expertise and methodology for performing technology assessments and has clearly demonstrated the value of using expert panels for performing miniassessments as well as for helping to plan and guide major assess- ments. OTA has turned out some excellent products and has made signifi- cant contributions in areas of concern to Congress, including pending legislation. Examples of such studies either completed or in progress are: The report on the coastal effects of offshore energy systems. A second I refer to here is the report on solar energy. Now I'll only list these. They are developed in my statement. The report on automatic train control. The implications of the computed tomography scanner. Now, most of these completed tasks have been performed well and there is little question that they are the types of tasks that OTA clearly was intended to do. Many GAO staff members have become well ac- quainted with the OTA staff and are familiar with their products. We generally have a high regard for the caliber and dedication of the OTA staff. I might say here that we have some additional illustrations, if we care to develop that in the question period. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. STAATS. On the other hand, OTA has accepted and performed a number of tasks which-however important they may be-could hardly be construed as unique and which could well have been per- formed by one of the other legislative agencies. The first Council Chairman, Harold Brown, in his year end letter to Board Chairman Teague, in December, 1975, stated: I have a real concern that OTA's limited resources have been less efficiently used than would ideally have been the case. As I have pointed out to the Board on a number of occasions, I believe It would be desirable to respond negatively to more of the rèque~ts that are made for technology assessments. Many such requests are in fact for technical feasibility studies, or reviews of existing pro- grams, or literature searches, or economic studies. Most of those might appro- priately be done by one of the other congressional offices to which I have referred, each of which has very much greater resources than OTA, or by the newly estab- lished Oongresslonal Budget Office. I believe this is still substantially true. For example, I believe the following tasks which OTA has undertaken `could more appropriately PAGENO="0372" 368 have been performed by one of the other legislative agencies, thus free- mg OTA resources to be used on other more appropriate, assignments. 1 list a few of these, and I have additional illustrations in my book here. The report on the financial viability of ConRail. This was basically an economic study with virtually no technological content. The review of alternative approaches to Federal funding of rail rehabilitation falls into the same category. That was a separate study. An evluation of the automobile crash recorder program. Now, this review was basically a technical feasibility study with some program evaluation characteristics. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Staats, with regard to that it might be appro- priate at this point in the record to mention the problem which arises because some programs are mandated by legislation. And in this in- stance this program was mandated by an appropriations conference committee. That brings up another significant problem that I am sure you will deal with later on, but I did think it might be useful to mention it at this point. Mr. STAAPS. It does raise a problem with respect to whether they could have responded negatively. You're quite correct. Mr. THORNTON. Yes, sir. Mr. STAATS. I'm trying to cite here, though, types of studies which did not seem to be appropriate for OTA. Mr. THORNTON. Yes, sir. Mr. STAATS. Another one is a report on organizing and financing basic research to increase food production. That study deals primarily with the management and funding of foOd and agriculture research. The report concerned with perspectives on Federal retail food grad- ing, which had only a very limited technological content. A report on alternative stockpiling policies which, again, was an economic study with very little technological content. Another example of a task which I consider not the best use of OTA resources and capabilities has been requested very recently. This re- quest notes recent Senate actions endorsing extension of the loan guarantee feature to provide for all costs of converting utilities to coal from petroleum or natural gas. OTA is asked to make a judg- ment, based on its Own examination and analysis of this program area, of any potential inflationary effects which might stem from this change in public policy. OTA is also asked to identify the degree of industrial capacity and leadtime needed to be responsive to this policy if it's adopted. Now, I have just recently-yesterday, in fact-received a note from the executive secretary of the advisory council, which is labeled "New Requests for Assessment," which again contains illustrations of as- sessments which I think fall in the same category of those which I have just listed here. In my view, these examples illustrate that the use of OTA as a special resource in accordance with the original legislative intent has been diluted. There are a number of important technology assessment areas and emerging issues relating to new and expanding technologies which I believe have not, however, received adequate attention. PAGENO="0373" 369 Almost from the beginning, the Technology Assessment Advisory Council addressed the question of priorities for OTA efforts through both Council deliberations as a whole and through the work of a special subcommittee dealing with this subject. TheY Council did not attempt to advise specifically which particular tasks should be given priority but, rather, `addressed the question of what criteria should be used and the methodology for priority `deter- mination. Recognizing the special purpose intended for OTA and the limited resources available to it, the Council urged OTA to consider among other things whether or not particular requests from congres- sional committees could more appropriately be performed by one of the other legislative agencies. The Council also recommended that OTA consider whether related technology assessments were already being performed by executive agencies so that it need only to synthesize, review, and critique those efforts rather than to initiate new assessments. And here I think there is a great potential for OTA, because it can never have enough staff to do original work on every area that the executive branch is engaged in. But it could do a great deal by evaluating how good those assess- ments are. The Council repeatedly urged OTA to allocate some portion of its resources to longer range emerging technology or early warning issues. On March 18, 1976, following a Council meeting in which the sub- ject of priorities was discussed at great length, I addressed a letter to Mr. Daddario in which I suggested some examples' of future oriented technology assessments which I believed at that time warranted OTA's attention. This list included examining the potential impacts of: Long-term climatic changes. caused by atmospheric pollution-for example, aerosols, CO2, concentration, automobile emissions, man- made heat sources, and so on; A second one, artificially induced weather modifications; A third, alternative safeguards for nuclear reactors, fuel materials, and waste disposal; A fourth, recombinant DNA research and genetic engineering; Another, health, safety, and environmental factors associated with nuclear fusion power development; Another, atmospheric noise pollution; and Finally, low-energy catalytic processes employing microbes and en- zymes on energy-intensive industrial methods and on the generation of feedstock from waste materials.' I asked our staff yesterday whether or not the OTA had undertaken work on any of these areas, and I am advised that the Board has not yet approved assessments on any of them. Now, these are on1y a few examples of future-oriented issues which have been identified by a number of sources. Many of these potentially major impacts of emerging technologies have not yet been addressed comprehensively. Some of these are directly or `indirectly related to vulnerabilities that are vital, not only to the TJnited States, but also to other nations. Some of these issues may be extremely difficult to analyze and assess and indeed may not be amenable to definitive answers. PAGENO="0374" 370 Nevertheless, the importance of the issues and the need for improved congressional understanding and public awareness of the uncertainties, probable impacts, and alternatives require not only warning of poten- tial threats but objective analyses of the range of options available for Government policy determination and prompt action to acceler- ate favorable innovations and prevent irreversible adverse future im- pacts of technology. During 1976, OTA initiated an effort to explore emerging issues, but the effort is small and the orientation is extremely broad. It also appears to me that OTA is not taking full advantage of resources available which could help to delineate a specific agenda for priority issues. At a Council meeting on September 17, 1976, OTA staff members presented their initial plans for this future-oriented effort and invited comments from members of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council. In response, I addressed a letter to Mr. Daddario on October 14, 1976, offering a number of suggestions including the following: Mature technologies and emerging technologies that have reached the stage of substantial visibility and public awareness need not be inciuded in this effort because the relevant issues most likely have been identified and either have been or are being addressed by OTA or other institutions. The potential issues associated, with technologies just beginning to emerge from the research stage on the one hand, and potential needs and problems loom- ing on the horizon on the other extreme, should be given preferential attention. With respect to searching for candidate issues, I hardly think it necessary for 0Th to conduct extensive surveys * * * because there is a vast amount of resource material already available * * CRS, under the leadership of Its Futures Group, could be commissioned to summarize the candidate issues derived from a variety of studies and develop per- tinent background information. CRS could also provide resource information and guidance on futures methodology. Concurrently, while CRS is preparing this background information, the 0Th staff, working with CR5 and the TAAC Priorities Subcommittee, could develop criteria for selection of candidates for in-depth assessment. The OTA staff, with assistance from consultants or panels, could also begin immediately to perform mini-assessments on several emerging issues from which two or three might be selected for in-depth assessments. The first ones selected need not be the highest in priority or most urgent, but should be representative test cases on which te gain experience on methodology. Several of the Council members have expressed agreement with most, if not all, of these recommendations. For example, Dr. Fred Bucy, in a letter to Mr. Daddario dated November 8, 1976, strongly endorsed all except the last one, on which he offered no comment. In my letter I acknowledged that technology assessments of emerg- ing issues would be difficult to perform and involved greater risks than dealing with the more conventional issues; nevertheless, I urged OTA to come to grips with this problem and develop the expertise to keep the Congress apprised of longer range issues that require early atten- tion to avoid foreseeable situations that may become too complex or irreversible to deal with later. Mr. Chairman, I still hold these views and believe that OTA should take full advantage of the CRS Futures Research Group and other sources for preliminary background studies to help identify emerging issues and to establish priorities for OTA to consider as candidates, for major impact analyses and the evaluation of policy implications and alternatives. PAGENO="0375" 371 I received a letter dated June 17, 1977, from Congressman Clarence Miller requesting my views on Council operations and its interaction with the Board and the Office. It is my understanding that similar letters were addressed to each Council member. In response to his request, my views concerning the role of the Coun- cil and its interaction with the Board and the Office were summarized in a letter to Congressman Miller dated July 22, 1977. This portion of my statement is based on excerpts from that letter. I believe the contributions of the Council as a whole must be distin- guished from those of individual TAAC members. Both have been documented in the yearend letters by Council Chairmen Brown and Wiesner to the Board Chairman. The participation of individual Coun- cil members as consultants and panelists for OTA on specific programs has been extremely helpful to the Office and I believe that this practice should be encouraged. Such involvement also gives those Council mem- bers intimate knowledge of OTA operations and J~rograms, and thus enhances their perspective for serving On the Council. However, I believe the contributions of the Council as a whole have not been commensurate with its potential. This is true for a number of reasons, including the limited availability of the Council members who have other major commitments; difficulty in scheduling meetings when a majority of the Council can be present; insufficient leadtime for the Council to study and react to assessment requests, program plans, draft reports, and other communications; and most important of all, the lack of a definition of the Council's role. With the present triad structure-the Board, Office, and Council- it is my view that the Council as a whole should not be involved in OTA operations unless specifically asked to do so by the Board, as is the case in the Council's oversight of the IR. & D. policy and priorities study and the emerging technologies effort. Otherwise, the Council should be concerned only with broad ques- tions such as those involving policy, budget priorities, program plans, and suggesting resource people. Clarification of the Council's role as desired by the Board would also be helpful. I do not believe that the Council should exercise quality control and oversight of OTA's studies in an operational sense. The Council should be concerned as to whether OTA maintains high standards of excel- lence and has established and maintains a good quality control system, but the performance of this function should be the responsibility of the Office itself. The Council has probably offered its most effective reaction to planned assessments at the time of inception or during the early phases when OTA staff presentations have been made at Council meetings. During the past year, this situation has improved in that frequently assessment requests have been circulated for comment by Council mem- bers before the tasks have been approved by the Board. Although draft reports of completed tasks are circulated for com- ment, the reaction time is almost invariably too short to provide a meaningful response. There is little evidence to show the degree to which the Council may or may not have influenced or assisted the Board. Much needs to be done to improve communication between the Board and the Council. PAGENO="0376" 372 Now, before considering suggestions for changing OTA, I believe it would be useful to review some aspects of its legislative history. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development of the House Science and Astronautics Committee on October 17, 1966, published the first re- port which used the term "technology assessment" and concluded that "an early warning system for both the good and bad results of tech- nology would be of great use. to Congress." On March 7, 1967, Congressman Daddario introduced H.R. 6698 proposing that Congress create a Technology Assessment Board. Sub- sequently, a series of hearings were held to examine the rationale for establishing a new mechanism and to consider various models pro- posed as legislative alternatives. In the hearings much attention. was directed to determining the specific nature of congressional needs for assessment of technological alternatives and potential impacts, and for special forms of scientific and techno'ogical assistance not provided or planned at that time by either GAO or the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. To sharpen the focus and ascertain the major thrust of the new capability iequired examination of the resources and changing exper- tise of both GAO and Legislative Reference Service. In testimony before the subcommittee on December 4, 1969, 1 pre- sented a comprehensive statement describing the role of the GAO, indicating what we could do, how we were changing, and what our limitations were with respect to performing the functions intended by the proposed legislation. I stated at that time that many of the programs we were authorized to review involved the promotion or control of technology, the appli- cation of technology to meet an existing problem or need, or the treat- ment of problems brought about by technological change or progress. I noted that we were increasing our emphasis on program evaluation and, in light of this effort, we were adding professional staff in disci- plines such as economics, mathematics, engineering, and systems analysis, in order to more effectively perform this function. My overall view stated in 1969 was that GAO could and should "play ati increasingly important role in the. surveillance and monitor- ing of Federal programs where technological assessment is an impor- tant consideration." In 1970, when commenting on H.R. 17046, a bill to establish an Office of Technology Assessment, I stated that "as program objectives become more concerned with and provide recognition of the impact of technological application, our Office will, in the ordinary course of its activities, automatically gear our review to include disclosures which show the impact of technology." We recommended enactment of this bill and stood ready to work in close cooperation with the pr.mos&l Offi'~e if it were established. Oongr~ssman Daddario, noting that GAO was expanding its exper- tise by hiring more profes&onals capable of dealing with technologi- cal issues, asked if this GAO expansion could include the technology assessment functions proposed in the legislation. PAGENO="0377" 373 I replied that our resources were already heavily committed to re- viewing all Government programs that involve utilization of appro- priated funds. We therefore did not feel that GAO alone could dedicate sufficient resources to fulfill all that the legislative proposal intended to accomplish. It was recognized, however, that GAO would undertake studies in fields of technology, many of which might be defined as technology assessments. I stated that we could make our best contribution by participating with the proposed Office; and to the extent that we could practically do so, we would make our studies available to the new Office. We would understake studies which the Office might suggest we would have a particular competence to undertake, and we would be able to relate our forward working program as much as practical to its interests and needs. The model I envisioned at that time for OTA was quite similar to that of the former President's Science Advisory Committee, which commissioned panels of experts to deal with specific problems. Section 204 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 empha- sized the responsibility of GAO for reviewing and analyzing the~ re- sults of Government programs, including the making of cost-benefit studies. I might add that during OTA's first year of operation, the Congres- sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 reemphasized GAO's broadening role in reviewing and evaluating the results of Government programs. Section 204 of the 1970 act was amended in the Budget Act of 1974. Title VII of the act strengthens our program evaluation role by re- quiring us to review and evaluate Government programs carried out under existing law, to develop and recommend methods for reviewing and evaluating Government programs and activities, and to assist in developing statements of legislative objectives and goals and methods for assessing and reporting actual program performance. In the subcommittee hearings in May of 1970, Dr. Lester Jayson, Director of the Legislative Research Service, also endorsed H.R. 17046 and stated the kind of relevant services that LRS could provide-and I will not take the time to quote all that he said. In response to a question from Mr. Daddario concerning the relation- ship between OTA and the Legislative Reference Service, Dr. Jayson replied: The bill itself indicates that the Office of OTA will undertake the major assess- ments. The LRS would have the basic function of sponsoring an early warning effort in support of the actual large-scale assessments. It would alert the Congress to the needs for and describe the areas for which assessments are necessary so as to identify the particular problems where further research and study are needed. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 substantially broadened the role of LRS to provide a greater amount of research and analysis in its legislative assistance to Congress, and authorized LRS to develop expertise in almost two dozen broad fields, including science and technology. PAGENO="0378" 3:74 The Office was additionally authorized to hire experts and consult- ants on a temporary basis. To better represent the role of the Ofitce, the LRS. was redesignated the Congressional Research Service. In summary, the decision to establish OTA was made in the full recognition that both GAO and CRS were developing broader exper- tise for coping with issues involving science and technology, but short of fulfilling the unique role of technology assessment in accordance with the main thrust of the legislation. I have several suggestions to offer for mitigating some of the con- cerns and strengthening the OTA as it is currently structured. First, as a matter of policy, I believe the Board should generate clearer guidelines to emphasize the special role intended for OTA-to examine emerging issues involving new or expanding technologies and to assess potential impacts and provide an early warning. The Board should also establish criteria for allocation and utilization of OTA's resources. Such guidelines should be promulgated to all congressional committees in an effort to inform them of OTA's capabilities and intended use. Second, my impression is that the Board has acted more like a joint committee of the House and Senate, rather than an oversight board. I believe that the Board should become less operational and give serious consideration to concentrating its efforts on general oversight and policy matters such as budget guidance and review, general strategy guidance with respect to balance of short-term and long-term assess- ments, the balance of in-house versus contract performance work, and so on. This would permit delegation of essentially all aspects of executive management and day-to-day direction to the Director of OTA, includ- ing task selections, resource utilization, staffing, and make-or-buy decisions. If the Board were to concern itself only with policy matters and broad guidance, quarterly Board meetings may be of sufficient fre- quency, unless major surprises or problems develop which could require occasional special meetings. Third, the appointment of individuals to the OTA staff under the procedure of Board rule No. 12 should be discontinued. In my view, this practice presents a potential problem. Dual roles of staff members with divided allegiance pose a threat to the Director's authority and violates a fundamental precept of sound management structure. I believe all OTA staff should be appointed by the Director. Any staff working directly for the Board should serve only in a liaison capacity. Fourth, I believe that efforts should be continued to have joint meetings in which a majority of both Council members and the Board can be present and exchange views on substantive matters. Through such meetings perhaps the role of the Council can be more clearly defined in relation to fulfilling the desires and the needs of the Board. Fifth, I suggest that the statutory members of the Council, who are heads of other legislative agencies, be authorized to appoint delegates to serve in their absence, including participation in the executive ses- sions. This recommendation is in recognition of the fact that their Council roles constitute institutional representation, as distinguished PAGENO="0379" 375 from the other Council members who are appointed because of their individual stature and expertise. However, I d like to add that I expect to attend all Council meetings whenever possible. Sixth, I note that up to this time OTA has not undertaken assess- ments of defense technologies. I suggest that consideration be given to performing some work in this field-at least to examine the social and environmental impacts of military technology. This concludes my suggestions with respect to OTA as it is pres- ently constituted. However, in the event that you decide to explore the feasibility and desirability of restructuring the Office, I have in mind a model which incorporates features that could alleviate some of OTA's organizational difficulties. In this model, which is similar in concept to those incorporated in the early legislative proposals for OTA, the Board and the Council would be merged into a single oversight and policymaking entity with a good mix ~nd balance of expertise and bipartisanship. For example, the Board could be composed or comprised of 17 members as follows: Four Senators-bipartisan, appointed by the leadership of the Sen- ate; and four Representatives-bipartisan, appointed by the Speaker of the House-possibly also subject to confirmation in both cases by their respective legislative bodies; five citizens appointed by the same or a similar mechanism representing diverse interests, such as con- sumer/labor, physical science and technology, social science, biomedi- cine, and industrial technology; and then the Director of OTA; the Comptroller General; the. Director of CRS; and the Director of CBO. If desired, the total number of Board members could be increased or decreased provided the bipartisan character and the odd number of total members were preserved. Also, the Board could draw upon the expertise in the executive branch of the Government for briefings and discussions. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yeager asked me to comment on how coopera- tion and coordination between the GAO and OTA might be improved. For the record, my statement includes a response to this question. I will not take the time to read it unless you would like to go into it in the question period. But in general, it has worked out quite well, and- Mr. THORNTON. We appreciate the response. We appreciate that respvnse, Mr. Staats. Mr. STAATS. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to add on this last) point that I've made that-I'm sure this is known to you-the bill that was reported out of this committee had the central feature which I'm al~ing about, which was a combined congressional membership with representations from the outside. It did provide for outside members by Presidential appointment-but that's a secondary matter. The same objective possibly could have been accomplished otherwise. But the thing which it seems to me has been lost here by the change that took place in the legislation was a mechanism by which you can bring scientific and technology leaders into a direct, informal inter- face relationship with the responsible committee chairmen; and that's been lost by virtue of the change that was made in the bill. I offer this perhaps as a possible model. You can see I still support) the orieinal concept that came out of this committee. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Staats, for a very excel- lent presentation. PAGENO="0380" 376 I would like to first ask that you provide for the record the addi- tional illustration which you indicated might be available, with regard to the types of studies which have been cited as excellent products of OTA. You mentioned that on page 6 of your testimony. And then on page 9 you mention that there were other examples of studies which probably were not properly within the scope of OTA reports. Mr. STAATS. I'll offer additional suggestions of both types. Mr. THORNTON. We would appreciate having that material provided. [Material referred to above follows:] PAGENO="0381" 377 ENCLOSURE 1 Examples of Appropriate Tasks Performed by OTA The report on automated guideway transit examined the present development and social and economic impacts of several proposed alternative transit systems. The three major categories of systems which the report dealt with were shuttle-loop transit, group rapid transit, and personal rapid transit. A very small number of these systems are presently in operation. This assessment identified the major policy issues and automated guideway transit program alterna- tives, and explored their implications. The study of nuclear proliferation provided an analysis of the risk of further spread of nuclear weapons and an assessment of the various proposals to stem this emerging problem. Policy implica- tions and options were discussed within the context of various nuclear fuel cycles and alternative energy perspectives. The ongoing study of automobile use and characteristics is a broad impact assessment of the present and future of this primary means of personal transportation. Some of the issues to be addressed are safety, energy, cost, personal mobility, materials, and environmental impact. The study is planned to include an analy- sis of alternative future scenarios, and the effects of various policy options. PAGENO="0382" 378 ENCLOSURE 2 Ex~mples of Inapproprtate Tasks Performed by OTA The analysis of the impacts of the projected natural gas curtailments for the winter of 1975-76 described the extent of the shortfall, assessed the impacts on major user industries, and delineated options for policy. Although this report assessed impacts, the technological content is tangential to the issue. The two ongoing efforts concerning mineral accessibility on Federal and non-Federal lands address the effects of federal and state laws and policies on the incentives and access to mineral resources. There is no significant technological content to either of these efforts. They are basically program evaluations and studies of legislative impacts. The analysis of the feasibility of separating exploration from production of oil and gas on the outer continental shelf examined present Federal leasing policies, identified alterna- tives for separate exploration and addressed the effects of these alternatives. This study was a program evaluation, with particular attention given to program alternatives. Techno- logical considerations were tangential to the study. PAGENO="0383" 379 ENCLOSURE 3 Examples of Recent Requests for Tasks Which Are Not Appropriate for OTA A letter dated September 19, 1977, requested OTA to conduct a study of the available technologies for detection of harmful agents in the work environment. This study would entail matching existing technologies to public policies. The request might better be accomplished as part of a programevaluation, particularly of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OTA was requested by letter dated September 12, 1977, to conduct an evaluation of the FBIs National Crime Information Center, as to its "benefits to users, accuracy of the data, speed, efficiency and reliability." Additionally, OTA was requested to review the proposals to modify this information system. This request calls for a program evaluation and a study of program alternatives. A letter dated March 30, 1977, requested OTA to conduct a study of health and medically related data policies of federal, state and local agencies. This request will require a blend of program evalua- tion and policy analysis, of which the technological content is only peripheral. OTA was requested on February 16, 1977, to perform an assessment of, "...conflicts between federal, state and local food regulations and where applicable conflicting jurisdictions over regulations between federal agencies." The requested study does not require an assessment of a technology. PAGENO="0384" 380 Mr. THORNTON. I would like to ask, with regard to the loss of direc- tion, which you highlight at the start of your paper `and voice concern about whether OTA's present structure can successfully focus upon emerging issues and early warning; is this an institutional problem with the structure, or is it just a lack of direction? Mr. STAATS. I think to some extent, Mr. Chairman, that it's a prod- uct of the fact that the bill in its present form defines `technology assess- ment in such broad terms that it would be almost impossible `to exclude anything technical from the jurisdiction of OTA. I think you `have to go back to the legislative history and to the House bill, and examine what was the primary objective, what was the primary purpose of adding another instrument to the legislative branch over and above what we already had in the Legislative Refer- ence Service and in the GAO-and that was priniarily to emphasize the need to have `the best of scientific and technological judgments that could be brought to bear on emerging problems. The SST issue probably, as much as anything else, highlighted this need and called it to the attention of Members of Congress. I `think the charter is part of the problem. I think there has not been enough recognition that the OTA itself should be in a position to go forward with a program of its own priorities, to deal with the prob- lems as they perceive `them. The statute doesn't give them very much discretion. Then, third, I suspect that there has been a situation where com- mittees, always looking for help, see the OTA as still another resource that they can call upon for help, and they really haven't paid too much attention to whether they were following the kind of definition that I'm making here, or whether it simply related to another staff capa- bility. I say that maybe a little bluntly, but I'm afraid that's the impression I have gotten. There hasn't been really much discrimination as to the specfic role which OTA was supposed to play. Mr. THORNTON. Of course, this problem is highlighted where you have a mandated assessment, where the- Mr. STAATS. That's right. Mr. THORNTON [continuing]. Congress makes the decision `as to a particular subject matter, that it is appropriate for OTA.- Mr. STAATS. But even in those cases, there's usually enough warning tha't those could be headed off in a large number of situations. Some advance notice of the fact of that provision has been either in the House bill or Senate bill-I don't say that critically. Mr. THORNTON. I understand. Mr. STAATS. But I don't think that's necessarily a complete road- block to accomplishing- Mr. THORNTON. I don't want to suggest that there may not be some instances in which a mandate might be appropriate. However, some suggestions have been made that if a mandate exists that the funding for that study should also flow with the mandate, so that the resources available for other assessments would not be reduced as a result of a particular mandated study. In that regard, you have suggested, with reference to both the dis- tinction between long-range, early warning type studies and short- range assessment, and with regard to the relationship of OTA with PAGENO="0385" 381 Congress, that the Board might adopt guidelines or rules which would outline the scope of its investigation, and which would be communi- cated to committee chairmen so that they would understand what the scope of OTA assessments might be. My inquiry is whether or not such a change in direction might be accomplished by statute, rather than by Board rulemaking authority. Mr. STAATS. I frankly would prefer to see it done by statute. That's my personal view about it, because I think if it were done by statute that that would create a greater awareness in the Congress of the more specific role and would not put the burden completely on the members of the Board. I don't really see it as a matter that should be terribly controversial in the Congress, certainly at this point in time, in light of the experi- ence we have had with the OTA and the TAB to date. Mr. THORNTON. In the arrangement which an earlier witness re- *ferred to as a troika arrangement, between the Board, the Council, and the Director, the functions of each of these three organizations is not free from doubt. And, with regard to the Council, do you believe that if the present structure continues, it should get involved in budgetary considerations, or is i~s role strictly to be advisory? Would you think any redefinition of roles between t.he three agencies might be useful? Mr. STAATS. Well, I think if you kept the present structure, that the role of the Council could be better defined by the Board itself. I have served on many advisory groups, and there~s a very human tendency for advisory people to want to operate, and they want to get themselves involved, and they want to set up subcommittees, and they want staff, and all of these things that create problems for the agency or the individual that they're advising. My own feeling is that if the present structure is retained, that the Board itse.lf could better define the role of the Council, and people who are appointed to the Council ought to understand the role they're going to play when they come on the Council. I think that's another problem, a separate problem. Some people take appointments to the Council and have a ~gre~ter expectation of what they're going to be doing than I perceive the more limited role that the Council can piay. But under the model that I'm suggesting here, and under the origi- nal House bill, where you had a Board set up, mad up-ofMenThei~ of Congress as well as leaders from the scientific and technological community, I don't think you would need a C~uncil. I would prefer to see that group then set up special panels of peo- ple from the outside to help them deal with specific assessments that they had undertaken. And there's no group of people on any Coun- cil that you can set up who are going to have all the expertise in every one of these fields. So it's essential that somehow that exper- tise be pulled together. So, under that model, I don't think that you would need a Council. And, of course, the House bill did not provide for such a Council. Mr. THORNTON. I tend to agree that we lost something in the change which occurred between the committee and the enactment of the law. And I appreciate your focussing on some of those problems. Mr. Hoilenbeck? Mr. HOLLENBECK. Yes; thank you, Mr. Chairman. 96-205 0 - 78 - 25 PAGENO="0386" 382 I want to thank you for some very-what I feel are very cogent remarks, and I think analysis of OTA that I'm beginning to agree with more and more. I note in your points-your six points-for improving OTA, you discuss the assessments of defense technology, and certainly with re- gard to the social and environmental aspects of military technology, I think this has been overlooked to a large extent. * With regard to doing that, to doing military assessments, how would you suggest that the security and classification problem be dealt with and handled? Mr. STAATS. I would expect they'd have to deal with it pretty much as we've had to deal with it in GAO; that is, to be sure that the peo- ple who are involved have the proper security clearances and they observe the security restrictions on information. And if that were done, of course, the recipient of the report would have to be responsible for maintaining the security and confidentiality of that report. We make many reports in GAO in the classified data area, but we observe all those restrictions, and it just never caused any particular problem.. Mr. HOLL~NBECK. Fine. Then you foresee no problem with that, because I think that's an important area? Mr. STAATS. I might just cite as an example here what seems to me is a rather anomalous situation. There has been tremendous controv- ersy over what the SST might do to pollute the upper `atmosphere- the ozone problem; but the military have a great many planes flying in the same area, but no one has really focused on what the impact of that would be. So I don't really understancl,wliy we make this dichotomy between civilian and military on some of these issues. M.r. HQJJLENBEOK. Fine. Thank you very, much. Mr. . TIIORNTON. Mr. Fuqua? Mr. FUQTJA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Staats, I apologize for being late, but so many meetings and things going on here-it's impossibleto get to,them all. But I've had a chance to review your statement. I think it's very good. I think you hit some very important parts about the original legislative intent being diluted, and going back and getting on some of the problems that were more current issues. And one of the points on .page 16-you mention the problem in the `OTA's operations, "unless specifically asked to do so by the Board." This is speaking of the Council-and I know that you have been on the Council since, its inception, and I'm sure that ~you can speak with more direct knowledge than someone who has not. So I appreciate your `evaluation of that. You also touch on that later on, about employees having dual loyalty to the Director as well as to the Council. I would sure hate to think what GAO would be if Congress had to approve every employee that you have, or even the Library of Congress or other agencies of Govern- ment. I think that is a very important part of some corrective surgery, Mr. Chairman, that we might be able to perform to better implement this. PAGENO="0387" 383 The "acting similar as a joint committee," referred to in No. 2 of your recommendations also I think is a very important part that needs to be looked at, to try and go back. It appears that the wisdom of the House in the original concept of this bill-and I was one of the co- sponsors *of it-that our original wisdom, that as the bill emerged through the legislative process, seems still to be valid)oclay, more than what finally emerged- Mr. SPAATS. Right. We feel that way, sir. Mr. FUQUA [continuing]. In the legislation. Mr. STAATS. Yes. Mr. FUQTJA. So I think from your van'tage point, you have pointed out some very good corrective measures that we could make this viable. It's a necessary arm of Congress, so it can perform much better. Mr. STAATS. I'd like to say on that' point that I've either attended every Council meeting or one of the two gentlemen to my right or left has been along at all `of the Council meetings, and have attended field hearings, and so we have actively involved ourselves in the Council and i'ts activities. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Miller, would you-do you have any questions, sir? Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Mr. Staats for answering the letter that I sent to him. He has in his testimony today some very pertinent remarks, and a couple that I would like to pursue a little further. `On page 17, you state- Mr. STAATS. Seventeen? Mr. MILLER. Page 17, yes; that you are circulating the drafts of studies that have been accomplished, and you say, quote: Although draft reports of completed tasks are circulated for comment, the reaction time is almost invariably too short to provide a meaningful response. Now, I understand that. That comes through loud and clear to me.' We receive a copy, `too, perhaps about the same time you do, but there is very little re'sponse time. I'm not sure whether you have given any thought as to how we could broaden this, how we could solve `that problem. Have you given that thought? Mr. STAATS. If I may, I'd like to call on my colleagues here to see if t'hey would want to respond. I do have one thought on it. I'd like to get `their reaction. `They've been following `this very closely. Do you want to? Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Myers. Mr. STAATS. Mr. Myers, yes. Mr. MYERS. `The council has two additional opportunities to deal with the assessment underway: Certainly, when it's being initiated an opportunity is available to comment on the scope and design; there are periodic reviews available to the council in presentations by O'TA from functional staff leaders; and the council offers comments and suggestions during those sessions. What occurs when the draft is at a stage where things are packaged and ready for circulation, they are usually running late, running head on into a Qommitment date. And I have never felt that they were PAGENO="0388" a84 doing anything less than their best as an organization. But they had a competing requirement. Mr. STAATS. One thought I would have in this respect would be that in many cases OTA gets comments from members of the council with- out waiting for a council meeting. They send out material in the mail and get comments back, either by telephone or by letter. I think, too, there's some value having the benefit of group discussion in a council meeting, because you're getting interplay which sometimes causes people to change their viewpoint. But we would like to see more o~ that done than has been done in the past. Give us more time to take a look at it, give a little more careful consideration to it than you can responding to a briefing by someone across the table from you. Mr. MILLER. Another item that concerns me is the decision that is made as to what studies will be undertaken. You mentioned on page 12 about during 1976 OTA initiated an effort to explore emerging issues, but the effort is small and the orientation is extremely broad. Now, you go on to say "it also appears to me that OTA is not taking full advantage of resources available which could help to delineat.e a specific agenda for priority issues." Could you elaborate a little on that, because this is something that has disturbed me a great deal-attempts to find out what are the high- priority issues? Mr. MYERS. Mr. Miller, on the next page of the testimony, page 13, what we had in mind was something that can also be traced back to the early hearings in 1969 and 1970, and that was basically the role of CRS in terms of identification of emerging issues through what is now known as its futures group. We understand that they have such a capability, and in fact would be willing to make that type of a contribution to the OTA, in identify- ing those assessments that would be appropriate for OTA to do major work on. Mr. MILLER. I heard that, and have read with interest those items. I wondered if you had any other specific way to determine what would be feasible-such as on page 14 you mentioned the "miniassessments." Does this seem to be a practical thing? Would it be advisable to move into the miniassessments, and then branch out from there to some high- priority assessments? Mr. MYERS. Yes. I could see where that could have a value for identification of major issues and areas warranting more indepth in- vestigation. They could be done more quickly. An example of that might be the bioequivalency study, headed by Dr. Berliner from Yale, one of OTA's first efforts, one of its early ef- forts, in a very short time frame. An expert panel was able to produce a document using the miniassessment mode. Mr. STAATS. I might say here that our own experience in the GAO-. very frequently, before we will launch a major study, and invest a lot of time and money into it, we would g~ through what we call a survey phase where we try to identify the principal issues. And frequently we will issue a report just based on that survey, but then go ahead and make a greater indepth review of the matter. I think we're talking about something here that's roughly parallel to that. PAGENO="0389" 385 Mr. MILLER. Referring to the long-range studies that have been made-it's terribly hard to put a cost/benefit ratio on the studies. And yet maybe it is practical to do such a thing. When we say cost it may not necessarily be dollars, but lives in some cases. Can you visualize a cost/benefit ratio being put on the various prob- lems that we have, so that we could place them in priority of one, two, and right on out? Mr. STAATS. You mean a cost/benefit analysis of the study itself? Mr. MILLER. Before we move into a study on the problem, this would guide us as to the studies that should be made. Mr. STAATS. I think you could make a good judgmental-if you can call it judgmental-cost/benefit analysis-yes, I think you can. But the more information you develop with respect to the issue, the more precise and the better that judgment's going to be. But, again, we have the same problem in the GAO, where we have to-where we identify issue's on our own that we're going into. And that's part of our basic charter, is to identify issues and then develop the facts and analysis and draw our conclusions and recommendations. We go through a process of very much that type. And I have a spe- cial group that is set up to look at these areas of the major studies and try to make a judgment with respect to the desirability of going into them, or whether we're doing too much or too little. Then they bring their recommendations to me. I think it can be done, but it has to be to a large degree a matter of judgment based on experience. Mr. MYERS. One way to view it, if I might, Congressman Miller, is to view it as research effort to determine potential payoff. And that would warrant a given level of effort which is decided judgmentally until more information is known or developed. Mr. MILLER. I believe this is an item that we need to pursue. It's very easy to get off on a tangent and study what might be a low-pri- ority item. We know that we have enough high-priority items today. Mr. STAATS. I think that's essentially the thrust of what we're say- ing here today, that we've got such a long list of high-priority items that it disturbs us to see the investment and the time diverted to what seems to us are lower-priority items or items that can be equally if not better dealt with someplace else in the legislative branch. Mr. MILLER. As I recall, Mr. Staats, you did make such a recom- mendation and had several items that you felt were high priority. You recommended to OTA that studies should be made, but as of-did I understand you-yesterday no action had been taken on those? Mr. STAATS. To the best of my knowledge. Mr. MILLER. I understand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller. Mr. Staats, I would like to say that I very definitely agree with your recommendation on page 24 that the Board should become less opera- tional and give serious consideration to concentrating efforts on the general oversight and policy matters, budget guidance, general strat- egy guidance, balancing short term and long term, emergihg issue `assessments, and the balance of in-house against contract-performed work. PAGENO="0390" 386 With regard to that, do you have any observations as to what that balance of in-house and contract-performed work might be? Mr. STAATS. Well, I can only express a personal opinion here, Mr. Chairman, but it's an opinion which has been heavily influenced by my own experience in the General Accounting Office. My own view is that contracting should be held to a very minimum, and in fact we do very, very little contracting in GAO. We have, however, made extensive use of panels of experts, and these are individuals who are appointed-and sometimes they serve only a few days-during the course of a particular review. But you have to have those. panels backed up with good professional people. But, by and large, we have found contracts really are not a very use- ful way to go about the kind of analyses that we make. We have, all kinds of problems of guaranteeing the quality of the people who are em- ployed to carry out those contracts. We have a problem of getting it in on time. There are just all kinds of problems with this kind of work * that we do. I don't believe that the OTA's work is all that much different from our own. I wouldn't rule them out, but I would certainly minimize the use of them. Mr. THORNTON. I would like to explore briefly the relationship be- tween the General Accounting Office and OTA. You mentioned on page 20 that it was recognized at the time this legislation was being passed that the General Accounting Office would * undertake studies in the field of technology, many of which might be defined as technology assessmer~ts. I think that is an entirely correct statement. How do you draw the line between those assessments which are ap- propriate for your agency to handle, and those which- Mr. STAATS. That's a very good question, and the honest answerS I guess has to be it is a very difficult line to draw. Under our charter, where we're called upon to make studies of the costs and benefits of programs, that carries with it the obligation to outline alternatives to the present way of carrying out a program which might be more cost-effective. In that context we do try to develop al- ternatives, and we are therefore looking to the future. It's not `possi- ble to do a cost/benefit study which deals only in the past. Mr. THORNTON. Right. Mr. STAATS. It has to be carried, forward in terms of what needs to * done to make that program more effective, and outline alternatives for that purpose. So that it is a difficult line to draw, and virtually every- thing that the Government does has a technological component to it. The distinction that we try to draw in our own minds is the tech- nology work at OTA as we've conceived it would be to try to be fu- turistic in a sense, of trying to look at emerging problems-and some of them are problems on which no definitive answers can be provided. But what you can provide is to bring before the legislators the best thinking available to date in the scientific and technological commu- nity on that issue, and particularly to examineS the range of viewpoints firsthand. , * It's in that area~ that we saw a need that we didn't think that we ought to try and fulfill. But in terms of the legislation that's finally PAGENO="0391" 387 emerged-as I indicated earlier-we lost it, and in its `present form that essential ingredient that I'm concerned about is missing, and I was disappointed. Mr. THORNTON. Well, you've mentioned the Legislative Research Service, which was renamed the Congressional Research Service, and now, has the obligation of identifying certain future problems. One thing that has concerned me is whether we are leaving the identifica- tion of these issues to one agency and then the assessment to another, and then- Mr. STAATS. I think that's a fair point. I think we cite this ~ecftuse it is there, and there does seem to be an interest, enthusiasm, to de- velop it there. But I don't think that we would argue that-I thini~ logically your point is a correct one, that as a part of an OTA respoxi- sibility for developing its own work program and laying out for the Board things which it regards as being of the highest priority in the futuristic sense, emerging technologies, that *the responsibility has probably got to be with the OTA staff. But they could draw on the Congressional Research Service. They could draw on the National Science Foundation. We'd be glad to give them the benefit of any advice, suggestions, we would have. I think there's a variety of places, in other words, that they could draw upon to put together a program of that type. Mr. THORNTON. You mentioned- Mr. STAATS. I don't like to keep talking about the GAO experience, but I think there are so many parallels. We do all of our work-vir- tually all of our work-programed around what we call-there are 34 national issues, and we set up priorities within each of these issue areas-energy, for example, is an issue area for purpOses of our initiat- ing work in GAO. / But we try to identify the highest-priority matters within the energy area that we're going to devote our resources to. I think you have some- what of a parallel situation here. You should have more responsibility for initiating the studies in the OTA itself, and less of this business of responding to a whole variety of requests from a whole set of com- mittees all over the Congress, and I think you have a much more pro- ductive operation. Mr. THORNTON. You do mention at page 13 that a number of orga- nizations have developed extensive lists of emerging issues. I take it that you're suggesting that those lists should be reviewed and- Mr. STAATS. Oh, yes, yes indeed. Mr. THORNTON [continuing]. And ranked according to priority? Mr. STAATS. Quite right. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Yeager? - Mr. YEAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had just several questions, Mr. Staats. With regard to the Council, have there been any instances where you and your ex officio counterpart, CR8, have not participated in Council activities, other than perhaps those that involved the recom- mendations of nominees for the Council or the T)irector? You have been active in all of the other pursuits? Mr. STAAPS. Well I haven't been able, as I indicated, to get to all the meetings. At some of the meetings I've gone to I had engagements and PAGENO="0392" 3g8 had to leave early. But one of these two gentlemen has been present and gave me a report on it. But I have tried to participate as much as I could. Mr. YEAGER. I am getting around to the panels which have been set up under the aegis of the Council in the R. & D. programs area, the three major ones which Dr. Wiesner has listed here in the OTA an- nual report. There's the. one headed by Dr. Brooks, Dr. Branscomb, and I think Dr. Yarmolinski. Now, would you consider the work that has been going on in those panels to be substantive in nature and re- sults, or is it advisory in nature? Mr. STAATS. Well, I would guess it would be fair to characterize them as being advisory, although we have not participated officially in these committees. We have thought it inappropriate for us to do so. But we have wanted to be there as observers and to offer suggestions, and whether we were members or not really is not terribly important. It's really a technical distinction. But as to whether or not these efforts are advisory or substantive, I think on balance I would say that they are advisory. I'm not sure about the Council standing subcommittees, though, that's been one of my disagreements within the Council. It seems to me if the OTA wants suggestions from the members of the Council as to what each member thinks is the highest-priority issues that they can concern themselves with, that can be done as a Council on an individual-by-individual member basis. They can all write in their memorandums on it. But I guess I've had a little disagreement with the need for subcommittees of the Council itself. Mr. YEAGER. One other question, please, on a different subject. You suggest that it might be time for the Board, either by policy decision or through a statutory change, to limit the kinds of assess- ments they would do, or define them more carefully, and promulgate this information to the ~Jongress as a guide to the kinds of things that are available for OTA to do. Mr. STAAPS. That's correct. Mr. YEAGEE. Might it be appropriate at the same time, by the same token, for the Board, by a policy decision, to determine a certain' per- centage of OTA resources which ought to be devoted to programs or pro3ects inaugurated by the Board and the Director, as opposed to those which are inaugurated by congressional committees? Mr. STAATS. Yes. I think that would be an additional constructive section. We did not include that in our presentation, but I agree that would be useful. Mr. YEAOER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Sta'ats, Mr. Yeager has reminded me that the decision by O'TA to contract out some of its work may be affected by the fact that they have such a small number of employes which is established by law, and that `it may be difficult for them to do their work in-house. Of course, they are limited to the employees `and the structure which they have. And I wanted to mention that with re- gard to'your response about contractor/in-house work. Mr. STAATS. Yes; I think the focus ought to be on the overall budget and not necessarily the numbers of people. I would agree with that. Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Staats, I just want to tell you `again how much I `appreciate your being here today. It's a privilege having the Comp- PAGENO="0393" 389 troller General of the United States appear before our subcommittee; and to thank you for your excellent testimony and responses to our questions. This hearing is adjourned. [The subcommittee was adjourned at 3 :2'T p.m., to reconvene at 10:20 a.m., Wednesday, October 19, 1977.] PAGENO="0394" PAGENO="0395" REVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1977 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 10:20 a.m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ray Thornton (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Present: Representatives Thornton (presiding) and Brown; Rep- resentative Winn of the full committee. Also present: Philip B. Yeager, counsel; John D. Hoimfield, science policy consultant, Anthony Scoville; and Joseph Malmendier. Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. This morning we continue our hearings on OTA review. And our witness this morning is Dr. Edward Wenk, Jr., who is the Vice Chair- man of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council, `and professor of engineering aiid public affairs `at the University of Washington. Dr. Wenk has had a distinguished career. And we are very pleased to have him appearing today `as a witness. Dr. Wenk, we have received your prepared statement consisting of some 19 pages. It is an excellent statement. And without objection this `statement will be made a part of the record verbatim at this point. And we would like to ask you to proceed to summarize or highligh,t the statement at this time. Please go ahead. [The prepared statement and a biographical sketch `of Dr. Edward Wenk, Jr., follow:] (391) PAGENO="0396" 392 Statement concerning The Office of Technology Assessment before the Subco,miittee on Science, Research and Technology House of Representatives / by Edward Wenk, Jr, Vice-Chairman, Technology Assessment Advisory Council Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcormnittee on Science, Research and Technology: Your invitation to testify at these hearings on the Office of Technology Assessment is indeed a high professional compliment, and I hope that in some small measure I may contribute to your inquiry. The invitation was extended, I believe, because of my role as Vice-Chairman of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council, a vantage point for observing operations of OTA at close hand. By circumstances of past history, however, I have been associated both with the concept and the implementation of OTA since its very beginnings. During the last year I have been working on a book concerned with the increasing difficulty in setting technology-intensive public policy to produce socially satisfactory outcomes, in particular the question of political limits in dealing with the future and steps which we must ponder to overcome the predicaments that arise and baffle us daily. One chapter is concerned with technology assessment and I shall try to extract from that study those insights and conclusions that may be of direct concern to this Subcommittee. In preparation for these hearings, Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed your August 3rd opening statement and your list of issues furnished for possible discussion at these hearings. These documents reveal a keen and sensitive grasp of the legislative history, the organic Act, the functions, operations and the track record of OTA. Put another way, it seems to me that these are PAGENO="0397" 393 very much the right questions, tndeed, I should like to congratulate the Subcommittee for its breadth of scope and objective tone in trying to uncover the problems that attend this congressional staff arm. So many different issues are raised that, for brevity, I should like to. focus my initial statement primarily on the broader overarching considerations of ~y technology assessment is essential to help the Congress with its decision processes, and on the salient operational issues on how to do it * better. Elaboration of details might thus await your subsequent questions of the witness. The comments which follow are thus developed in four stages; 1) A brief analysis of the Situation confronting this nation and peoples everywhere in a complex technological world that makes urgent some improvement in our ability to cope with.the future, 2) The political history of the Office of Technology Assessment, 3) A brief on the shortfall in performance of OTA and some of Its causes, and finally 4) Some suggestions as to remedies. - The Situation: Technology and Society - Over the nearly two decades of its busy life and legislative initiatives, this Committee has heard from numerous witnesses and asserted its own views on the role which technology plays in modern society. It almost goes without dispute that technology has become int4mately entwined with advances in civilization, that technology has demonstrated a powerful capacity to generate economic wealth, to enhance material standards of living, to increase the number of personal options to those of us fortunate enough to live in the West, and indeed to contribute to the goals of our nation set forth in the Declaration * of Independence, whose bicentennial we celebrated just recently. * You have also heard that technology has in some respects failed to meet Its promise, that we find technological initiatives have the capacity to Induce unexpected and unwanted side-effects potentially damaging to both the human habitat and spirit. Indeed, technical prowess may exceed social wisdom. PAGENO="0398" 394 As pointed out in a major study by the National Academy of Engineering on Research Applicable to National Needs, more important than developing new knowledge is facing malfunctions in our human institutions, especially in our ability to anticipate the longer run and less obvious consequences, and to take necessary crisis avoidance measures. When I allude to technology, incidentally, I employ the definition contained in the standard Webster dictionary. Webster states that technology is far more than technique, more than research and development, more than science and engineering. Rather, it represents the totality of specialized knowledge, ways and means employed to provide objects or services necessary for human sustenance and comfort. Technology thus embraces software as well as hardware,of a tangled network of social, economic, legal, political and cultural processes. It has become generally popular in dealing with the set of issues related to your hearings to refer to the impacts of technology on society, and in fact to regard technology assessment, whose definition we will discus~ later, as a form of Impact analysis, Given both the benign and the adverse effects of technology, that approach suggests that we have some confidence to bring about the results we want by taming and by tuning technology to fulfill human purposes, mainly to step technology up or to turn it down. That may be the wrong approach. My own views are that we should focus on the opposite side of this technology-society couplet, that the more important issue is the impact that society has on technology. In other words, not only is It specialized scientific knowledge and engineering applications that govern whether technology produces socially satisfactory outcomes. Rather, it is the cultural backdrop of our society, the structure and the procession of human affairs, institutional behavior or misbehavior, that have the most critical influence on the. applica- tions of technology, that is, on selecting goals to which it is directed, the resources that are invested for research and for implementation, on the selection of benefits, and on the selection of beneficiaries. What brings this other side of the picture more sharply to mind can be explained when we think of technology as an amplifier. By the lever and the wheel and then the steam engine, technology became an amplifier of human muscle. By the computer, it became an amplifier of the human mind. Now we discover that technology is an amplifier of social appetites, of social conflict and PAGENO="0399" 395 stress, an amplifier of the role of government, and an amplifier of defects In our social institutions, In some societies, It Is an amplifier of political control. It is also evident that technological decision-making has become more political. Let me explain. Technology tends to concentrate power, wealth and benefits. In an uncritical exploitation of natural resources, technology has also triggered an unexpected era of scarcity and widened rather than narrowed the diversity of the human condition. The question of who wins and who loses becomes more strenuous. Because the selection of ends and means is a matter of political choice, because publicly funded technology has become larger in scale with economically more at stake, and because government has been increasingly obliged in the public Interest to regulate operations of private enterprise, the social management of technology is inevitably more p01 itical * Other factors bolster that tendency. Technology generates more options, as for example, in the energy field the alternatives of water power, coal, gas, nuclear, wind, solar, and geothermal sources. More choices have to be made and thus more attention gets riveted on the decision event. In most cases today, the choice is not left'to the classical decentralized, Invisible hand of the marketplace. Rather, decisions are driven by circumstances, abetted by television to new levels of public visibility and pinpointed decision locales. In short, decisions on technology-intensive public policy are growing more political in the sense that whatever technical, economic, social or legal implications are involved, more decisions are explicitly boosted to the highest levels of political authority. This means the White House and it means the Congress. In highlighting the Increasing role of government, may I point out that In my own view, no technology today is either purely public or purely private. The government is involved with every technology, either through Its intent to facilitate private enterprise through subsidies, grants, tax write-offs as Incentives, or through regulation, as for example, the quality of the environ- ment, or through anti-monopoly measures. Third, thegovernment is involved In defraying: social overhead for the development of technology by, for example, PAGENO="0400" 396 the'funding of research and development and higher education, or n assisting American business abroad. And fourth, the government itself is a major customer of technology, in defense aM. elsewhere, All this adds up to the fact that modern government defines the political space in which key technological acts occur. Thus, it is no accident that from my own perspective, when we ask questions about whether or not technology is producing socially satisfactory outcomes, we put a spotlight first on the functioning or malfunctioning of our major institutions; first among these is the federal government. Of course, the federal government is not the only actor in this enterprise. Universities and research labs are involved to generate new knowledge. Our industrial operations and private banking are vitally concerned with the utilization of that knowledge and mobilization of fiscal, human and natural resources to produce goods and services to meet the market demand. If we were to map any single technology, we might be surprised at the number of different functions that have to be interconnected in order to produce a satisfactory technology, whether it be food production or supply of water or health care. All of these institutions have goals of their own. Indeed, they have such Individual aspirations as to become more and more self-centered, coasting on the momentum of past choice, intent on achieving their own narrow objectives and frequently indifferent to costs borne by others in the system. It is also a fact that communication linkages among these institutions, public and private, have become more complex and demanding so that everything seems connected to everything else. New Challenges to Decision-Making - We thus find that the one single activity of our society that has some chance of providing coherence is the role of public policy. To me it is examination of these guidance signals by which separate interests and institutions cai steer individually toward collectively agreed upon goals that is crucial to your inquiry on OTA. The reason for thisemphasis is that the list of technology- related dilemmas seems to be growing much faster than thesolutions. The entire decision system appears more highly stretched in terms of resources, exhausted and stressed by adversarial politics. Steering of the disjointed soclo-technical PAGENO="0401" 397 system is obviously becoming all the more demanding, yet comprehension seems fuzzy as to how society and technology interact, With growing uncertainty, the political leaders of our nation and world-wide seem increasingly frustrated. And citizens are increasingly alienated. Indeed, a paradox arises because people are demanding stronger g3vernmental intervention to assure atten- tion to public purposes, while at the same time the public's sense of access to and accountability of the government declines. The key point is that as we bump along from crisis to crisis we focus more intently on the short-run issues, neglect balanced consideration of the longer term, and even consideration of future repercussions of present decisions. In this preoccupation with daily crises, little energy and inclination remain to examine what are in my mind massive threats to survival. Curiously enough, our bewilderment in techno- logically advanced societies replete with material abundance is as great or greater than that in developing nations. So while our threats to survival multiply, our response virtuosity languishes. What is worse, in my view, the p~olicy apparatus acts as though it were deaf to signals about the future. This places a very heavy emphasis on the role of decision-making and the burden on decision-makers. In the setting that I just described, let me restate a proposition that decision aptitudes are increasingly challenged because the decision theatre is enlarged: the range of alternatives is greater, the conse- quences of error more lethal, the underlying scientific facts more difficult to comprehend because of their sophistication and specialized jargon. Second, the decision-maker is confronted with a loss in understanding because the past is no longer a guide to the future: triggered by fluctuating social trends, by complexity, by uncertainty, by institutional tribalism, by a heightened pace of change, by new conflicts arising from enhanced citizen awareness, by a mismatch of resources with rising aspirations, and by discontinuities in being able to utilize past experience because the system has changed. With decisions so crucial, with the decision system itself so highly stressed, and with government playing such a crucial role in technology, the focus of our attention is or~ the role of information and analysis as aids to better decision-making. What makes this steering function ever more demanding is the recognized uncertainty that any technological initiative will achieve the goal intended. 96205 0 - 78 - 26 PAGENO="0402" 398 More than that, technology exhibits this property of inducing the unexpected second-order effects that may be unwanted, To explain, technologies are usually conceived with a narrow and explicit purpose, implemented with strategies and tactics directed to these narrow goals with at best a benign neglect of the side effects. But these instrumentalities do not operate in isolation and generate powerful externalities. Some are highly undesirable. Others may impose inequitable burdens of social or economic costs or inflame conflict between communities holding different cultural values. Some of these impacts may simply be nuisances, but others may be more virulent, We have seen example afteP example of this. Pesticides intended to enhance agricultural productivity also threaten human health; highways introduced to facilitate traffic flow have spilled automobiles into central cities with not only resulting congestion, but loss In a sense of community that Induces people who can afford It to get out; airports located near cities as a convenience to these travellers are accompanied by jet noise. My greatest concern, Mr. Chairman, is for those effects that are potent threats to survival, survival of the human race. In my book. I have collected an inventory of these perils nominated by others, and it leads one quickly to recognize that man Is an endangered species. All of these hazards have some common properties. All involve technology. All are subject to deliberate hurian ignition. All entail hazards swiftly affecting far greater numbers of people than ever before, most as inpocent victims. Not only is the scale geographically extended laterally, the risks also become a longitudinally projected endowment to progeny. Other features of these risks entail their novelty and speed of injection. In fact, never in human history have so many and so virulent potential hazards made their appearance simultaneously. Clearly they outpace the alacrity of response. What becomes all the more a paradox is that in every case the government has been alerted to these hazards. But our sense of reality tells us that measures of intervention have been weak and ineffective, sometimes counter- productive. The public is lulled to nonchalance on grounds that alarms are exaggerated, that progress Is being made, that other more immediate issues require priority, and that humankind, having survived through a continuous PAGENO="0403" 399 exposure to perils, will ultimately find some solution, Mr. Chairman, to me this Is what technology assessment Is all about. It is a technique of posting sentries, of increasing levels of vigilance, of dealing with the future by making certain there is a future. Parenthetically, It is against this backdrop. that we examine studies undertaken by the OTA in the past three years and discover that almost the entire thrust of activity has been on quick response to the immediate and already politicized issues. - Technology Assessmert It thus becomes very clear that we are obliged to change our ways, not in altering our goals but in our methods of coming to grips with these challenges. First, we must look more intently sideways at these effects which cross boundaries of the usual technological transaction. Second, we must consider more self-consciously the future consequences of present action and parti- cularly the possibility of surprise. And third, we must look more intently at portents of danger, and act before rather than after crisis provokes political response. We should ask two sets of questions with regard to each of our major concerns. The first is, "What will happen, if?", and the second is, "What~wil.l happen, unless?" By endeavoring to trace such consequences in the first instance, we might head off sins of commission. By endeavoring to look ahead at the storm signals and estimate consequences Of inaction, we might correspondingly reduce the sins of omission. The melancholy consequences of failing to look sideways or failing to look ahead were perceived at least three decades ago by Stewart Chase. He proposed at that time a super-national Bureau of Standards type of organization "to evaluate and screen consequences of large technological innovations before they go into mass production, seriously to affect the culture." Dr. Brzezinski as far back as 1967 and in his book published in 1970 noted that "our existing post-crisis management institutions will probably be increasingly supplanted by pre-crisis management institutions, the task of which will be to identify in advance likely social crisis and to develop programs to cope with them," Alvin Toffler in "Future Shock" called for a technology ombudsman in an anticipatory democracy. The authors of "Limits to Growth" called for long- term assessments as a standard procedure, joseph Califano In a recent book PAGENO="0404" 400 proposed a presidential powers impact statement to elucidate the consequences of all major new legislation. The concept of technology assessment is thus neither entirely new, nor exclusively a congressional Interest. Nevertheless, it may be worth tracing the development of that concept by the U.S. Congress because only the Congress has moved to do something about these concerns, a matter in which this body should take justifiable pride. Beginning in the mid 60's, based on propositions developed by the Congressional Research Service, Emilio Q. Daddario, then Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, introduced a series of bills,.conducted hearings, and inaugurated consultative studies that led to the signing into law on October 13, 1972 of the Technology Assessment Act, PL 92-484. The core of its purpose is stated in Section 2b, "that to the fullest extent possible, the consequences of technological applications be anticipated, understood and considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems." The basic concept was of an early warning system, a systematic form of policy research to `look before you leap'. It was visualized as an aid to decision-making by a comprehensive inventory of all technical and social alternatives that could be conceived to meet a particular policy objective. It would draw on a blend of technical fact and of social values, and it was expected to furnish a more rational basis for choice by laying out all conceivable consequences of each. Technology assessment could thus dissolve the widely-recognized myopia in the decision theater, to compensate for inadequacies of political process that often ignores implications for the unrepresented, because political bargaining minimizes costs only to the parties at interest. By a timely and open publication of assessments, issues and options could be examined by all having a stake, shortening the lag in public information and perceptions, and possibly altering the political response. Thus, those affected by the output of a technological initiative could have some say with the Input, Froth the outset, technology assessment was viewed as an element In the legal and political process i~ its potential to illuminate who wins and who PAGENO="0405" 401 loses and how much. Thus, far more than an elegant planning device, its value was felt to be in making explicit a variety of considerations which either are subtle and implicit, or fully neglected, tt could reduce the range of uncertainty and the vagueness of risk, and conceivably could limit the penalties of narrott choice. A number of well-known methodologies were available to those preparing assessments, derived from economic cost-benefit studies, from engineering systems analysis, frompolling and other social science research techniques. Most scholars in the field contended that a base of quantitative fact was necessary but not sufficient. A fertile imagination was essential to generate the potential vectors of action and their consequences with a holistic multi- disciplinary approach, possibly more qualitative than quantitative. Finally, given the inevitable gaps and uncertainties in analysis, an assessment should be candid in identifying what we do know, but also what we do not know. An assessment could also identify what we could know and should know if indeed additional research were conducted promptly to reduce uncertainty. This, incidentally, would provide a twist on the usual nominations of research topics by scientists based largely on gaps in the state of knowledge at disciplinary frontiers. Thisgeneral concept found its way into legislative language in Section 3c of the Technology Assessment Act. Functions that are there spelled out for OTA comprised then and still a compact and useful definition of technology assessment itself. Thus, I do not agree with those who cite the absence of a definition of TA as a major cause of disappointment with OTA. Technology assessment is not a cook book procedure. It is simply a better, eclectic and more holistic way of looking at the situation today and imaging the future. - Origins of OTA - It turns out that the political history of OTA does not reveal a direct correspondence to this conceptual backdrop. For one thing, motivation of the first bill was to apply this mode of policy research primarily to ferret out and promote underutilized technology and technological resources that in the middle 1960's were being freed by tapering off of the United States space PAGENO="0406" 402 program. Subsequently, this political orientation was sharply altered as public awareness grew on adverse environmental impacts of technology that attracted substantial public attention. Indeed, the concept of an environ- mental assessment grew out of this TA concept and was siphoned off In 1969 to become a prominent and provocative Section l02(2)c of the National Environ- mental Policy Act. By then, social and economic repercussions as well as environmental began to capture public attention, spearheaded by Ralph Nader. It was in that atmosphere that the final legislation was passed. Nevertheless, It has to be said that the legislation failed to generate widespread general congressional interest, much less understanding. It found few champions. It aroused legislator's passions largely over jurisdictional conflicts within the House, over routine House-Senate wrangling, and over questions of separation of powers with the President as to appointment procedures of the Advisory Council Members. Handicapped by lack of general public understanding and support, the creation of OTA had to be conducted with a number of political compromises and maneuvers that conditioned passage. But while OTA was created in 1972, it was not fully funded for another year, a further reflection of the low level of congressional interest and the political bargaining that was found necessary at the time to assure gas in the fuel tank. - Performance of OTA - As to the track record, I think we have to admit in the first instance that technology assessment is such a new and untried concept that any new enterprise dedicated to early warning begins with a serious handicap. Nevertheless, under its first director, with diligence and dedication of hard-working staff, and with a sensitive concern for the client, OTA has during its first three years generated a number of major studies. A few have had conspicuous impact on the legislative process. Additionally, the organization has reached outbeyond itS full-time staff capabilities to engage contractors and part-time consultants and has thus endeavored to pick brains throughout the country. At the same time, there has been crIticism, Indeed, some five different coimientaries or studies have been somewhat unprecedented In the burden of PAGENO="0407" 403 questions that they have raised on this youthful enterprise. Your Subcommittee I know has reviewed their contentions, and your issue list reflects your concerns. - As a partial summary~ management of 0Th is said to be weak; duplication has appeared In functtons with sister agencies, OAO and CRS; the independence and objectivity of studies were uncertain, By comparison with other similar agencies, some staff were said to be overpaid and underqualified. None have tenure, and thus none are protected from intimidation for being candid on controversial issues. Tndeef some staff have depended for their appointment upon political allegiances to individual members of Congress. These ambiguous loyalties have been a problem for the staff and a serious source of uneasiness on the part of members of Cpngress. Assessments in disproportionate numbers appeared to originate from TAB members. Moreover, these focus almost entirely on immediate rather than long-term issues, framed in the form of general policy studies rather than technology assessments. Few, if any, lay out alternatives, identify impacted parties, trace consequences, analyze cause and effect and pinpoint research to lower uncartainty--all measures called for in the legislation. Finally, recommendations for correctives have been offered by the Advisory Council, but have generally been turned aside to the point that, according to one congressional study, the entire Council effectiveness appears to have vanished. In my view, as things stood, if the Council were abandoned. no one would miss it. Outside the Congress, OTA has generally been regarded by academics as disappointing in its intellectual horsepower, oversold and underperformed. The entire OTA enterprise has thus far not earned recognition nor respect from its broad congressional clientele, from the professions or from the scholarly community for vision, skill in selecting key issues, leadership in applying powerful analytical techniques and imagination, objectivity, and independence. The Technology Assessment board has not become the early warning arm of the U.S. Congress. The Technology Assessment Advisory Council, which is the first continuing advisory unit ever constituted by the U.S. Congress, has made remarkably limited contributions to the operations, In short, it seems to me that OTA is at a crossroads wherein the next steps will not only be of critical Importance wtth regard to the very survival PAGENO="0408" 404. of this unit, but bear crucially on whether or nQt the legislative arm of our government will fulfill its mandated role by the U.S, Constitution in dealing with the future. There is a major question as to whether these difficulties are simply those attending the startup of any new enterpri~e, or whether there are fundamental systemic handicaps which can, unless remedied, impede the success of OTA in the long run. I am of the personal view that there is such~ serious shortcoming. - Diagnosis and Remedy - The Technology Assessment Act of 1972 created a three-legged enterprise, the TAB, the OTA office itself, and the TAAC. In m~ view, these three elements were warranted then and continue to be, so that my propositions for change anticipate all three continuing. When the organic legislation was passed, it was sufficiently broad that two differeflt modes of implementation were possible. One was to cast the operation in the style of a new joint committee of the Congress, with OTA functioning somewhat as committee staff. A secondpossibility, however, was to emulate the style of GAO and CRS, serving all members of Congress equitably, sensitively avoiding any political ties, and building staff that were selected on the basis of competence and integrity, and devoid of loyalties to individual members. Perhaps i,lfluenced by the political history and encouraged by discussions with TAB, the first director opted for the first mode. I am sure he held a sincere conviction that only by such identity could the office elicit the necessary support from the Congress. In my view, the only hope for the future lies in going the second route. In that context, the Technology Assessment Board should still be thought of as a joint committee of the Congress, Its function, however, would be quite different. For one thing, It would not serve a specialized constituency or specialized function; if there be a constituency for TAB, it Is the unborn generations. The function that I see, however, Is one of endeavoring to PAGENO="0409" 405 to puncture an overwhelming cultural trend toward dealing with immediate crisis-oriented issues of the short run that other committees are obliged to deal with. In other words, I see the TAB as Involving itself with the most salle1~t and overarching issues of survival, examining technological threats to life but also to freedom. Thus, TAB could assist the leadership of both Houses in determining which of the issues of the immediate agenda have the most serious portents for the future, to help sort out priorities so that among other things the Congress can devote attention to issues in some proportion to the seriousness of the consequences, rather than in proportion to the level of rhetoric and conflict that may exist at some particular moment in time. Toward this end I believe that the Technology Assessment Advisory Council can be of primary assistance. They can do this in two ways. First, in nominating issues for attention by TAB, and secondly In serving as a review panel for all reports coming from the OTA that deal with the future. I realize in making this latter proposal that some members of the Council have not seen this as their role. One reason for the Council's reluctance to serve in a reviewing role is because of the concern that their review process, If thoughtful and penetrating, would take time and thus delay the release of reports prepared by the OTA office. As long as the OTA devotes itself to the shorter-run issues with a drumbeat of deadlines because of pending~ congressional business, the Council cannot function as a reviewing body. On the other hand, If the major reports coming from OTA to the Board are of a far longer-run nature, not yet having hit the political frying pan, it seems to me that this would be one way the Council could bring to bear its powerful intellectual tools that are Implicit in qualification for membership on the Council. Moreover, since the Council represents a wide range of life experiences and values, as well as technical disciplines, the Council could provide a perspective well beyond the narrow limits of the technical competences implicit, in OTA office study. This In effect is the technique by which I believe the Advisory Council could .exert quality control. As far as the OTA office itself is concerned, jt would be my view that Its management should be entirely the responsibility of jts director, not PAGENO="0410" 406 subject to. issu&by-issue or day-to-day review by the Board. The Office, not the Board, would be entirely responsible for the quality and validity of the reports published. OTA should hold the political mill at arm's length and build staff as CRS and GAO have done, requiring exceptional competenceand granting tenure. With these major changes, I can visualize the TAB using the reports from OTA, along with commentary by the Advisory Counctl, as the basis for major hearings in which a wide range of distinguished witnesses could be called upon to discuss these reports and elaborate their interpretation of the Issues as they may require legislative action; pre-crisis action. At the same time, I feel It essential to call to this Subcommittee's attention that under any circumstances making OTA work is exceedingly difficult. Almost everyone dealing with technology assessment has cautioned about the primitive nature of the decision aid, the need for modesty in conclusions, the inevitability of uncertainty. But I think we must be candid in recognizing that investigating the consequences of technology is inherently political and vulnerable to political bias. Technology has political impacts. Indeed, Section 2d 1 of the Act, states that it is necessary for the Congress to "equip itself with new and effective means for securing competent, unbiased information concerning the physical, biological, economic, social and political effects of applications." OTA has circumspectly dodged the sensitive question of political effects in all studies that it has conducted. Someone has to do this. Some of you may be aware of my own cautions about whether technology assessment can succeed either in the Executive or Legislative Branches of the United States Government, leading me to propo~e some eight years ago the notion of an independent assessment body. In congressional hearings in 1970, these were dubbed proposals for a fourth branch of government. In light of what problems have occurred in the Congress, I believe there Is reason to look at the role of an Independent assessment body. But at the same time, I would unequivocally state that any support for such a development be in addition to, not instead of OTA. You will alsp find my recommendation In congressional testimony, year after year, that the Executive Branch should undertake far PAGENO="0411" 407 more In the way of early warning assessments for the President in the new Office of Science and Technology Policy. Once again, I would urge Congress to examine Implementation of PL 94-282. Two concluding comments on operating details, with regard to stAffing and with regard to the relationship of OTA to the National Science Foundation. First, belIeve that both TAB and the Advisory Council should be provided with Independent staff, In no ways would these be competing with the staff of the OTA office itself. Indeed, it seems to me that the functions of these three organizations are not only compatible, but collaborative. Nevertheless, each should have access to sufficient staff resources that they could fulfill their separate functions without the problems that have existed in the past, of the confusion as to loyalties of staff to individual members of Congress vs. loyalty to the OTA operation which is to serve the Congress as a whole. Moreover, it has ~been my considered judgment that one of the major reasons that the Advisory Council has failed to fulfill its function, is its lack of adequate staff resources. Throughout its history, OTAs allocation of sta.ff to the Council has been on the average of 2% of the total. This has never been sufficient to gain the best contributions from part-time advisors. That is not sufficient for the future. It was pointed out earlier that this entire enterprise is based on the notion of looking ahead, an activity that has a very inadequate intellectual base. Reinforcement of the OTA capability, therefore, must extend far beyond the Office and its own staff to include capabilities throughout the country. In my view, it is the function of the National Science Foundation to buttress that capability. Thus far in terms of its unsteady commitment and low level of fiscal support, this has been inadequate.. Moreover, the relationships between OTA and the NSF have been so tenuous and unsteady ~that neither has had the benefit of the collaboration that I believe the Congress intended with the original legislation. OTA has operated in intellectual isolation,'outgrowing the sparse roots of practice that have been undernourished. by NSF. Thus, I believe that TAB should give attention to the untapped and undeveloped national resources that exist throughout the count~y in the universities, the non-profit research institutes, and the professional societies. That could help broaden the understanding of technology assessment Itself and slrengthen capabilities PAGENO="0412" 408 that could be drawn upon not only by the Congress through a new model of OTA, but also the Executive Branch and other interests in the country in industry and among public interest groups that should be devoting an increased fraction of their activities to the longer run issues, At the outset, the function of OTA was clearly and unambiguously assumed as an aid to congressional decision-making, This suggests that the primary client of OTA studies is the Congress. The Congress would be the first to say, however, that it does not operate as an independent entity without ties to and sensitivity for public opinion. Indeed, I believe it has always been the intent that the legislative body both provide a focus for the different points of view which are found in our society and inevitably in conflict, and an opportunity for leadership to point out to the citizen those issues that warrant priority attention and the options that are available. It is in this role the Congress as teacher that I particularly find the role of technology assessment and especially that of TAB to be of great portent for the future. The indi- vidual reports developed by OTA therefore should warrant widespread publicity. In addition, I believe that the Annual Report which the Congress thoughtfully provided for in the organic Act, also furnishes the TAB with a major occasion each year to share with congressional colleagues and with the public a view of the way ahead. For it is only by this wider and deeper understanding of the issues that the Congress itself will be able to extract the political decision from the vise of crisis, and deal in an anticipatory mode. Indeed, borrowing the title of a valuable book that bears on this subject, technology assessment Is the art of anticipation. Stripped to essentials, the propositions advanced so far go like this. Today, everyone on the planet lives in greater jeopardy of servitude or extermination than at any recent time in history. More people are simultaneously exposed to common dangers, and a larger number of different perils are occurring In tandem. Most of these hazards evolve from inadvertent effects of technology; not so much from the presence of scientific knowledge and only somewhat from evil intent, but rather from ignorance, human error and lack of imagination. Because technology is symbiotically and Intricately interwoven with human culture, institutions and social processes, intervention to deal with these predicaments is the responsibility of the salient organizations that synthesize PAGENO="0413" 409 and represent collective social choice--the national governments. Indeed, the major choices involving technology are already made by government as to both ends and means. But in the heat of social action to deal with day-to-day issues, the policy apparatus appears deaf to signals about the future. Criteria employed in decisions largely favor the short term, without sensitive balance with the long. Both information and disposition seem lacking to examine crucial survival questions of uwhat will happen, if?" in those Issues already commanding attention, and to examine questions of "what may happen, unless?" in those issues ignored. Our situation has reached a critical stage such that neglect of future consequences could entail a penalty for decision error so economically expensive, so politically strenuous, so environmentally disastrous or so Inimical to the human spirit that whatever the immediate cost or inconvenience, certain trade-offs by deferring short-term gratification are deemed worthwhile. Some change in steering behavior is thus critically required in our political institutions, leaders and processes of choice. Although it would appear simple to identify the key leaders who must deal with such overarching dilemmas and to exhort them to do better, the conditions of decision-making in representative governments are such that circumstances may, in effect, be beyond their leaders' control. The "system" is so complex and involves so many inter- actions among participants, and the processes emanating from the grass roots cultural set are so predisposed toward instant gratification that engenders political expediency, as to create a vise of psychological as well as opera- tional constraints in dealing with the future, a form of social paralysis. Hell may indeed be paved with good (short-term) intentions. Impulses for self-preservation, at societal as well as individual levels, involve `three stages of detecting signals of alarm, matching these to images of hazard, then acting. Weaknesses in social techniques of collective security may arise from weak or confused signals, from inadequate images, Inadequate analysis or from debilitated capacity to act. All four deserve consideration In the context of examining the future In terms of political decisions about the future, PAGENO="0414" 410 The need to exercise tradeoffs between pressures of the short run and recognition of perils from neglect of the long generates high levels of stress in the decision process. Under psychological stress, we know from widespread observations of human behavior that, the short run always claims priority. Choices for reasons of expediency beco~ie pathological~ Indeed, the entire metabolic process in healthy social choice ts disabled, Confidence in governance as the art of the steersman is undermined, In sunaaary, I believe this notion of dealing with the broader longer.. range issues is fundamental to survival of our nation and its way of life. I strongly urge the Congress through these hearings and its other activities to address the role of OTA toward that end, to consider major changes in its style, if not in purpose and substance, and that the Congress consider this a prlorfty mission and fulfill these tasks soon. PAGENO="0415" 411 DR. EDWARD WENK, Ju. Place of Birth: Baltimore, Maryland. Date of Birth: January 24, 1920.. Education: Johns Hopkins, B.E., 1940, with honors; Harvard, M.Se., 1947; Johns Hopkins, Dr.Eng., 1950. Brief Career Summary: .1976-77; Sabbatical: Harvard University; Woods Hole Oceanographic. Insti- tution; Oceanographic Institute, Monaco; Rockefeller Study Center, Bellagio; University of Sussex. 1973-; Director, Program in Social Management of Technology, University of Washington, Seattle. 1970-; Professor of Engineering and Public Affairs, University of Washington, Seattle. 1966-70; Executive Secretary, National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. (Appointed by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon). 1964-66; Chief, Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Serv- ice, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 1961-64; Technical Assistant to President's Science Advisor, White House, Washington, D.C.; Executive Secretary, Federal Cou.ncil on Science and Technology. 1959-61; Sr. Specialist, Science and Technology, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (First Congressional Science Advisor). 1956-59; Chairman, Department of Engineering Mechanics, Southwest Re- search Institute, San Antonio. 1942-56; Head; Structures Division, David Taylor Model Basin, U.S.N., Wash- ington, D.C.; Navy specialist on submarine strength. Professional Activities: U.S. Congress' Technology Assessment Advisory Coun- cil (1973-), Vice Chairman (1973-); Committee on Public Engineering Policy, National Academy of Engineering (1970-76); Chairman (1970-75); and Chair- man. Study of Priorities for NS1~'/RANN (1972-73). President's Nationai Ad- visory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (1971-72). Assembly of Engii~eer- Ing of the National Research Council, Executive Qommittee . (1974-). Advisory Board, The Cousteau Society (1975-). Visiting Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Inter- national Center for Scholars (1970-72). Consultant to White House, United Na- tions Secretariat, National Science Foundation, Congressional Committee, State of Washington, and industrial organizations. Consulting Editor, Rainbird Pub- lishing Group,. Ltd., U.K. Board of Directors, URS Corporation. Visiting Commit- t~e for the School of Engineering, Washington University, St. Louis (1976-). Elector, The Hall of Fame for Great Americans (1976-). Other Professional Affiliations: National PresidOnt, Society for Experimental Stress Analysis, 1957. American Society for Public Administration, Committee on Science and Technology in Government, Chairman (1974-). American Society of Civil Engineers. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. National Society of Professional Engineers. Pressure Vessel Research Committee. AAAS. Cosmos Club. Previously Reviewing Editor of journals, Engineering Mechanics and Ex- perimental Mechanics. ,Editorial Board, Ocean Management Registered Profes- sional Engineer. Vice President, Marine Technology Society (1977-). Awards: Tau Beta P1, Sigma Xi. Chi Epsilon. Sigma Xi and Wm. M. Murray Lecturer. University of Rhode Island, Dr. Sc. (Hon.), 1968. National Academy of Engineerln~. Ford Foundation Fellow, 170. Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award, 1946. Governor's Award to Washington State Authors, 1973. American Society of Mechanical Engineers Fellow, 1974. Noteworthy Special Work: Publications and lectures in fields of engineering mechanics, submarine analysis and design, national science policy, government organization for science and technology, roles of the engineering profession, marine affairs, environmental affairs, technology assessment and public decision pvocesses. Author~ of criteria for design of submarines, of concepts for deeper running, and designer of ALUMINAUT, 1959. Patents in experimental stress analysis. Author of The Politics of the Ocean, 1972. PAGENO="0416" 412 STATEMENT OP DR. EDWARD WENK, 1R., VICE CHAIRMAN, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, AND PROPESSOB OP ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC APPAIRS, UNIVERSITY OP WASHINGTON Dr. WENK. Thank you, Mr. `Chairman and members of the Sub- committee on Science, Research, and Technology. Following your advice, what I would propose to do is read certain sections of the statement where I think the sequence of the ideas will be more con- cise then if I did it all extemporaneously. Mr. THORNTON. You may proceed as you see fit. Dr. WENK. And there are other parts that I shall summarize. Mr. THORNTON. If you will go ahead in that manner, that will be fine. Dr. WENK. Your invitation' to testify at these hearings on OTA is indeed a high professional privilege, and I hope that in some small measure `I may contribute to your inquiry. The invitation was extended, I believe, because of my role as Vice Chairman of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council, which has been an unusually good vantage `point for observing operations of OTA at first hand. By circumstances of past history, however, I have been associated both with the concept and the implementation of OTA since its very beginnings. And during the last year I have been working on a book concerned with the increasing difficulty in setting technology-intensive public policy to produce socially satisfactory outcomes; in particular, the question of political limits in dealing with the future `ai~d steps which we must ponder to overcome the predicaments that arise and baffle us daily. One chapter in fact is concerned with technology assessment and I will try. to summarize from that study those insights and con- clusions that I think are of direct concern. Mr. Chairman, in preparation for these hearings I have reviewed your August 3 opening statement and list of issues, and I find these enormously helpful. Indeed, my feeling is that these are exactly the right questions. And I would like to congratulate the subcommittee for both the breadth of scope and the objective tone in tryin~g to un- cover problems that seem to be arising with this congressional staff arm. So many different issues have been raised, however, that I thought it might be best if I confined these remarks, at least in written testi- inony, to the broader overarching considerations as to why technology assessment is essential to help the Congress with its decision processes and also on certain salient issues on how to do it. The testimony there- fore is developed in four parts. The first, a brief analysis of the situation confronting this Nation and peoples everywhere in a complex technological world that makes urgent some improvement in our ability to cope with the future. Second, the political history of OTA, which is somewhat different from the legislative history. Third, a brief on the shortfall in performance of OPAL And finally, some diagnoses and recommendations. PAGENO="0417" 413.. This committee, through the two decade~ of its busy. life, has heard from numerous witnesses and asserted its owuviews on the role which technology plays in modern society. I, will not duplicate.~ziy of that testimony.. You have heard about two opposite sides of the situation; That technology has contributed benefits to our civilization, 1~o our capacity to generate economic wealth, and hence standard Qf living, and in fact increased options for all individuals, especially those living in the West. But you have also heard that technology ~ias in some respects failed to meet ~ts promise, and that indeed technical prowess may exceed social, wisdom. . It' has been generally popul~r in 4eaiing with the issues .~`eievant to these hearings., to refer to the impact of technology on soelety... In fact, technology assessment, whose definition we will discuas ~ little. later, is often thnught of as an impact analysis. . My own views are that we should focus on the opposite side of this couplet, namely, the impact that society has on technology. In other words, not only is it the specialized scientific knowledge and engineer ing development that govern whether technology produces socially satisfactory outcomes It is also the cultural backdrop of our society, the structure and the procession of hmi)an affairs, the institutional behavior or inishebaviQr, that have the most critical. influence on selecting goals and directing resources for research and for imple- mentation,. and on the selection ~f benefits and the selection of beneficiaries. What brings this other side of the picture sharply to mind can be explained when we think of technology as an amplifier. By the leyer and the wheel and then the steam engine, technology became the amplifier of the human muscle. Then with the oo~ipu$r, it became an amplifier `of the human, mind. Now we discover that teehi~ology is an amplifier of social appetites, social conflict, and an ampl~f1er of the role of government, and also an amplifier of defects in our institutions. It also has become' evident that technological lecision-making `has become more political. Let me explain. Technoio~y tends to concen- trate power, wealth, and benefits. In an uncri'tLcal ezpl~itation of natural resources, technology has also triggered an unexpected era of scarcity, and it has widened rather than narrowed the diversity of the human condition. The question of who wins and who loses, there- fore, becomes more strenuous. Because the selection of ends and means is a matter of political choice, because publicly funded technology has become larger in scale with economically more at stake, and because the Government `has been increasingly-obliged in the public interest to regulate operations o~f private' enterprise, in my view the social management of technology is more political. In addition, we, have come to recognize that the decision event has been escalated to higher and `higher levels, to the congress and to the White House. Thus the choice is no longer left to the invisible, decen~ tralized hand of the economic marketplace. These decisions are driven' by the circumstances I mentioned earlier, but they are, aided and abetted by the high visibility given the decision event by television, and the pinpointed decision locale It is the sort of thing where the White House press corps expects a new revelation every day, almost demands 96-205-78-27 PAGENO="0418" 414 It. ~ incidentally, the~ always expect the decisionmakers to make d~c~sions ~vhile keeping their cool. In highltghting this increasing role of Government, Mr. Chairman, let me suggest that today technology, is neither public or private. In my view it is a co~nbination of both. And therefore the concept thathas existed for a long time of separating public versus private deeision~ making and activit~s in the same fashion as the separation of church and state no longer holds The O~ernmeiit is invöhr~d with~ technology today either thr~ugh its intent to facilitate the private sector through subsidies andt taz ~rft~-ofts, or to re~uiáte the output of private enterprise in terms ofthe cjiiaiity of th~ ~i~o~iment~ orthróugh antitr~ist measures.Aud~third~ the GOvernthent is inv~Ived in funding the social overhead for tech- nology, that is research and development which is of mterest to this siibcomrnittOé. And finally, `the Government is. a customer of technoiop. All this adds up to the fact that modern government defines, the political space in which key technological acts occur.. It is forthat reason that I choose here to put the spotlight on the functioning or malfunctioning of our major institutions There is~nO Onei single activity in our Government, however, that is involved, becat~se in addition to Government, all of us recognize the role of the pri~vate sectol's, of the universitiess of public interest groups, or lobbies, and of the citizen who is the ultimate consumer, And there- fore gWen that diversity of interests in technology, and particularly in the outcomes from technology, the one single activity of our society that has ~ smidgen of a chance of providing coherence is public policy. To meit is these guidance signals which can bring about some mutually cOllaborative effOrt among the otherwise diverse institutions of our society. This beconies all the more important when today we find that institu- tio~s `have becqme more se1f.c~ntered, coasting on the momentum of past choice, intent on achieving narrow objectives,, and frequently in- different to the costs borne by others This, therefore, puts a heavy de maud onthe decision system. : As ~e bump along from crisis to crisis under this stress, we find we are focusing more and more on the short~run issues and neglecting balanced consideration of the longer `term. In `this preoccupation with daily crisis, little energy and inclination remain to examine what are iii my mind threats to survival. And indeed while these:threats multi- ply, our response virtuosity languishes. In my view, the policy appara- tus acts generally as though it were deaf to these, signals about the future, This places a very heavy emphasis on the role of decisionmaking and a burden on the decisionmakers. Let me restate a proposition that decision aptitudes are increasingly challenged because this decision theater is enlarged and more complex. The range of alternatives is greater, the consequences of error more lethal, the underlying scientific facts more difficult to comprehend be- cause of their sophisticati9n and specialized jargon. But, second, the decjs~onmaker$ are confronted with difficulty in un- derstanding what is going on because the past is no longer a guide to the future. We have fluctuating sOcial trends, increased complexity, PAGENO="0419" uncertainty, institutional tribalism, a heightened pace of change, new conflicts arising from enhanced citizen awareness, a mismatch of re- sources with rising expectations, and discontmuities in the road ahead. What makes this steering function all the more important is that we are finding, with regard th technology, that there is increasing un- certainty as to whether any technological initiative will do what is intend&1. But more than that, technology increasingly exhibits a property of inducing, second-order unexpected effects. This is some- thing f~mi1iar to this subcommittee, and has been elaborated upon by other witnesses, so that I will summarize here by simply noting that my greatest concern is for those effects that are potent threats to sur- vival, indeed survival of the human race. What I emphasize here is that man may bean endangered species. In dealing with these threats, we note that Government has already alerted. But our sense of reality tells us that measures ok intervention have been weak and ineffective and sometimes counterproductive. The public is lulled to nonchalance on grounds that alarms are exag- gerated, that progress is being made, that other more urgent issues require priority, and `that humankind, having survived through a con- tinuous exposure to perils, will ultimately find some solution, Mr. Chairman, to me this is what technology assessment is all about. It is a technique of posting sentries, of increasing levels of vigilance in dealing with `the future by in the first instance making certain there is a future. And parenthetically, it is against this backdrop that we can examine studies undertaken by OTA in the past 3 years and discover that almost the entire thrust of activity has been on quick response to the immediate and already publicized issues. So it becomes clear, we may be obliged to change our ways. We. may have to examine more strongly the question of "what will happen if," in cases where we haven't thought enough ahead, or in cases where we haven't thought at all ahead~ "what will happen unless." It is interesting that the melancholy consequences of failing to look sideways, or failing to look ahead, were perceived at least three decades ago by Stewart Chase, who proposed a new agency of the Government "to evaluate and screen consequences of large technological innova- tions before they go into mass production, seriously to affect the culture." Dr. Brzezinski, now the President's adviser, as far back as 1967, and in his book published in 1970, noted that our- * * * existing post-crisis management institutions will probably be iner~as- ingly supplanted by precrisis management institutions, the task of which will be to identify in advance likely social crisis and develop programs to cope with them. So the concept of technology assessment is not entirely new. Never- theless, it might be worth tracing the development of that concept by the U.S. Congress because it is only the Congress that moved to do something about these concerns. In my view, that is a matter in which this body should take justifiable pride. We all recall the history of the Technology Assessment Act. With the initiative by then Congressman Emihio Q. Daddario, with his lead- PAGENO="0420" 416 ership ~d ~tüb1~orn commitment to. getting this through the Congress took defi~iitive action in October 1972. krhe basic concept ~as of an early warning system, a systematic form of policy research, to look before you leap. Interestingly enough, from theoutset technology as~essinent was viewed as an element in the legal, political process, in its potential to identirfy who wins and who loses and how much. Thus, lar more than elegant planning devioe, its value was~ felt in making explicit a variety of considerations which either are subtle and implicit or fully neglected. It could reduc~ the range of uncer- taint3r, the vagnene~s of risk, and conceivably limit: the penalties of narrow choice. Finally, given the inevitable ga~p~ and uncertainties in analysis, an assessment should be candid in identif3r~ng what we do kno~v, but also what we do net know, finally, it should identify what we could know and `what we should know, that is, if additional research were e~rrducted promptly to reduce uncert'a~nty. This, incidentally, would provide a twist on the usual nominations of research by scientists, based àn'tT~heit curiositythid ~he gaps iiowledge. This would involve a `statement of `rese~ch needed by you `and the Oongress and the ~residcnt. In any `events the gener&l oohcept found its way into legislative lan- guage in section ~ Functions that are spelled out for OTA com- prised then, and still do to me, an exact and useful definition of tech- nology assessment itself Therefore, Mr Chairman, I do not agree with those who cite the absence of a definition as the major cause of disap- pointh~ien~t with OTA Tech~tioIogy assessment is not a cookbook pro- ~ediire, ~t is simply a better, eclectic, and more holistic way of looking at the situ'ition today, and imaging the future I ~arn `going ~to `~1d~ for brevity, Mv. Chairman, see of the detailed discussion of the:'~rigins of OTA for they are in the ~record and skip tothe~'uestion of performance. As to the track record, we have to admit in the first instance that technoiogy assessmer~t is such a new and untried concept `that any new enterprise dedicated to early ~warnin'g begins with a serious handicap. ~evertheless, under the first Director with the diligence and dedica- tion of hard ~o~kh~g staff and with `a sensitive concern for the ëlient, OTA has durit~g its fret ~ years generated a numberof major studies. A few had conspicuous impact on the legislative process Additionally, the organization has reached out beyond its full-time staff capability to engage contractors and `~onsultants and thus endeavored to pick brains throughout the country. At `the same time, there has been criticism. Indeed some five di~erent commentaries or studies have been somewhat unprecedented in the burden of questions that they have raised on this youthful enterprise. Your subcommittee has, I know, reviewed `these critiques, since they are nLentioned in your issue list. * As a partial summary, management of OTA is said `to be weak. Duplication has appeared in funotipus with sister agencies GAO and The independep~e and objective of studies were uncertain. By com- parison with other agencies, soi~ie ètaff `were said to be overpaid and PAGENO="0421" 417 underqualified. None have tenure, and thus none. are protected fiom ii~timidation for being cai~tdid on key issues~ ~ Indeed, some staff have depended upon political al1e~1a41ces, to m~ drvidual Members of Congress and the~c legitimate loyalties, ~tr Chairman, have been a problem for the sta~ themselves, as well as a serious source of uneasiness by Members of Congress Assessments in disproportional numbers appear to originate from the PAE members. Importantly to me, these focused almost entirely c~ the immediate rather than the long~term important issues. The products that have been produced by OTA have been framed in the context of general policy studies rather than technology assessments. They do not ia. out the alternatives, pinpoint research to lower uncertainty that referred to earlier, analyze cause and effect nor trace consequences. All of these ingredients of an assessment are called for in that sec- tion 3(d). Finally, recommendations for correctives have been offei~ed by the Advisory Council but generally turr~ed aside to the pQint that, ác- cording to one congressiolial study, the entire council effectiveness a~ pears to have vanished. I agree with that statement. As things stoo4~ if the Council wer' abandoned today, no one would miss it. I say that, Mi'. Chairman, as Vice Chairman. Outside the Congress, OTA has generally been~- Mr TnonwToN I hope that observation is not correct pr is over drawn. Dr WENK Well, rather than leave that bomb lit on the floor, I have some suggestion on what to do about it But outside the Congress, Mr Chairman, OTA has generally been regarded by academics as disap pointing in its intellectual horsepower, oversold and uude~'perforined~ The entire OA enterprise has not earned recognition or respect frOm its broad congressional clientele, from the professions, or fro~n the, scholarly community for vision, skill in selecting key issues, lead- stship in applying powerful analytical teehuiquesaud management or for objectivity. I am somewhat timid about the next statement but I think it has to be said, that the Technology Assessment Beard has not become the early *arning arth of the Congress. Finally the Technology Assessment Adviso~ey Council, which iS dis~ tinguished as being the first continuing advisory unit ever constituted by the U S Congress by Its own legislation, has made remai~kably limited contributions. In short, it seems to inc that OTA is at a cros~ro~d where the next steps will not only ~ of critical importance to the survival of OTA but bear crucially on, whether or not the legislative arm of our Gov- eñinient will fulfill its mandated role by the Constitution which I tead, as dealing with the future. There is a major question as to whether theSe diffieultie~ are simply those attending the Startup of ai~y new enterprise, or whethe~ there are fundamental systemic handicaps, diseases which can, unless rem edied~ impede the success of the OTAin the long rhu. I am of the per- sonal view that there is suèh a systemic weakness. The Technology Assessment Act of 1972 created a three-lege~ed enter- prise, the TAB, ~he OTA Offices, and the 4dvisory Council. In my PAGENO="0422" 418 view, these three were warranted and continue to be so. Thus, all the propositions for change that I suggest in what follows anticipate all three continuing. When the organic legislation was passed, it was sufficiently broad that two different modes of implementation were possible. One was to cast the operation in the style of a new joint conmuttee of the Con- gress, with OTA functioning somewhat as committee staff. A second possibility, however, was to emulate the style of GAO and CRS, serving all Members of Congress equitably, sensitively avoid- ing any political ties and building staff that were selected on the basis of competence, integrity, and devoid of loyalties to any individual Membei~s. The choice of style was perhaps inthienced by the political history of this body and the difficulty it had getting started. Let me recall that it took 1 year for any funding, after the legislation was passed, symp- tomatic of the low level of congressional interest at that time. So one can readily understand why the Director opted for the first mode in what I think was a sincere. conviction on his part that only by that mode could the office elicit the necessary support from the ~iongress. But having said that, Mr. Chairman; in. my view, the only hope for the future lies in going the second route. In that context, the Technology Assessment Board should still be thought of as a joint committee of the Congress. its function~ however, would be very different from most rommit- tees. For one tl~ing, ~ would not serve a specinlized con~tituenc~ or speciaiized function. If there be a constituency for TAB, it is the un- born generations. The function that I see is one of endeavoring to puncture an over- whelming cultural: trend toward dealing with 1mthediate~ cri~ls- oriented issues of the shortrun' that other corn~nittées of the Congress are oblige~ to deal with. In otiter words, I see TAB as involving itself with the most salient, the most serious overarching issues of survival, exñ.mining techi~o1ogicai threats to life but alsotó freedom. Po me survi~a1 is morè than a biological matter. In faot, 1 d~ ~riot know of any better way to exp~'ess it than in the Deëlaration of inde- pendepce~ A~patt from life, survival involves liberty and the pursuit of happiness. . . TAB could thu.s assist the lead~rship of both Houses in determin- ing which of the issues on the immediate agenda have the most seri- otis portent for the future, to help sort out priorities so that `a~mong other things Congress can devote attention to issues in Some propor- tion to seriousness of the consequences, rather than in proportion to the level of rhetoric ani conflict that may exist at that moment in time. Towi~rd this end, I believe that the Teehnilogy Assessment Ad- visorv Council can he of primary ~sistance. And in two ways. Fir~t, in nominating issues for attention by TAB: ~nd seconds in serving as a revmw panel for till reports coming to OTA that deal with the future. I realize in making this latter proposal that some members of the advisory council have not seen this as their role. One reason foi' their reluctance to serve in a reviewing role is because of the concern that PAGENO="0423" 419 the review process, if thoughtful and penetrating, would take time and delay the release of reports prepared by the OTA. As long as OTA devotes itself to the shorter-run issues with a drum- beat of deadlines because of pending congressional business, the coun- cil cannot perform as a reviewing body. On. the other hand, if the major reports coming from OTA to the board are of a far longer run nature, not yet having hit the political frying pan, it seems to me that this is one way the council could bring to bear its powerful intellectual tools that arc implicit in qualification for membership on that council. Moreover, since the council represents a wide range of life experi- ences and of different values, as well as of technical disciplines, the council could provide a perspective well beyond the inevitably nar- row limits of technical competences implicit in OTA office itself. This, in effect, is the technique by which I believe the advisory coun- cil could exert some quality control with attention to the output rather than the input. Now, as far as the OTA office itself is concerned, it would be my view that its management should be entirely the responsibility of its director, not subject to issue by issue or day-to-day review by the board. The office, not the board would be entire]y responsible for the quality and validity of the reports published. OTA should thus hold the political mill at arm's length and build staff as CRS and GAO have done, requiring exceptional competence an(l in return granting tenure. With these major changes I am able to visualize TAB using re- ports from OTA~ along with commentary by the advisory council, as the basis for major hearings. In such hearings by the technology as- sessment board. a wide range of distinguished witnesses conldbe called upon to discuss these i~eports and elaborate their interpretation of the issues. that :may require subsequent legislative action. A.t the same time I think it is essential to call to this subcommittee's attention that irnder. any circumstances, making OTA work is ekceed- mgly difficult. Everyone dealing with it has cautioned about the primi- tive nature of this decision aid, the;need for modesty in ~onchi~ions, the inevitability of uncért~tinty. Also, we must be candid in recognizing that investigating the don- sequences of technology is inherently political and vulnerable to pout- ical bias. Technology has political impacts. Indeed, section 2(d) (1) of the act. stat~s that it is necessary for the Congress to "equip itself with new and effective me~aus for securing competent, unbiased information concerning the physical, biological eèonomic, social and political effects of applications." OTA has circumspectly dodge the sensitive question of political effects in all studies that it has conducted. Someone has to do this. Some of you may recall my own cautions about whether technology assessment could succeed iii either the executive or legislative branches of the U.S. Government~ leading me to propose some 7 years ago in tins hearing room, Mr. Chairman, to propose the. nqtion of an hide- pendent assessment bod~. In those congressional hearings, the gentle- man who tl~en occupied the chair accused me of proposing a fourth branch of Government. PAGENO="0424" ~4~o : ~ must say that sI~9~k the witness. ~v6ttheiess, in the light of past experience, I believe there is re~ason to kok at the need for an rn~ ~ d~pende~it aSSessment body. But I tinequivocally would state tha~t in any slxppott for it that it should be in addition to OTA for the Con- gress, not instead. You will aisô find my recommendations in congressional testimony year after year that the notion of early warning is a matter that should be institutionalized to help the Presideht of the United States. That view was happily embodied, partly as, a result of initiative by this Committee, in recent legislation, Public LaW ~4-282, that reestablished the Office of Sei~nce and Techi~ology Policy. 1 should like to urge that this Committee and perhaps TAB e~amin~ whether or not the leg- islation has been implemented with that objective in mind. Two `concluding com1n~nts on operating details, first with regard to staffing' and ~econd with regai~d to" the relationship of OTA to the National' Sbience Foundation. First, ~I believe that TAB a~id the advisory coi~ncil should' be pro- v~dëd withlhidependent staff. In no way can I see that'.these are `corn- pethig with",thë staff of 0Th. They would not only b,e compatible, but collabo±atii~e. For TAB and TAAC to fulfill their responsibilities, they should have access `to `sufficient staff resources to perform their sep- ,arate functions without the problems that have existed previously `with tega~d to this confusion of `loyalty. Moreover, it is my consid- eréd judgment that one of'the major reasons the advisory council has failed .to fulfill its assignments is the lack of adequate staff resources. Throughout its history, O'TA's allocation of staff to the Council has been on an average of 2 percent of the total OTA staff, and this has never leeu sufficient to gain the best contributions from part time ,advisers.It is'not suffic~ent'for the future. It was pointed Out earlier that `this entire enterprise is based on the notion of looking ahead, an activity that has a very inadequate in- teilectual bash. `Rei~iforcenient of that OTA capabi~ity therefore must extend beyond the office, `itself audits own `staff to include capabilities throughout `the country. In my view it is a function of the National Science' `FouOd~tión to btitttess that capability. Nevertheless, in terms of its commitment to technology assessment reflOcted by its very low level of support, NSF'S involvement has been inadequate.' Moreover, the relationships between OTA and NSF have been so unsteady that neither has had the benefit of collaboration that I believe ,th~t'Coiigress intended in the,orighiai legislation. OTA has opei~ated in' intellectual isolation because it has outgrown the sparse roots of practice that existed when it began, and that ac- *tivity has been undernoirished by NSF. Thus, I believe:TAB should give' ~ftentiOn to the imtapped `and' undeveloped national resources that `exiSt throughout the Vnited States because they could help broaden the' understanding of technology assessment and also strengthen the capabibties not only to be drawn up by the Congress, but also by the executive branch by public interest groups, and by American industry All of these parties involved in and impacted by technology needs to look ahead better At `the outset, the function of OTA waS clearly grid unambiguously assumed as an aid to congressional decisionmaking This suggests that the primary client of OTA is the Congress. The Congress, however, PAGENO="0425" woi;ilci 1~ t1~e ~ to ~y that it ~ ~Qt; Qp~I~ ~ 4~ ns t~ ~ i~4~p~i~ent entit~y WithOUt tacs tQ qr s tavi~ty f~r pi~b1~o op~uoi~ Ii~d~e4, I be- lieve it has always been the i~4~e~it that the Legislative l?ocjy provide a focus fokr the different poiuts of view ~hjch are f~wuj i~ o~a~ ~fr ciety auci which are inevitably in conflit. But mo~'e.th~n simply Q~~'- atmg as a referee, the Congress has an opportunity for le~hip, to pO~t o~t to f~l~e ettizen those ~s~p~e the~t warrant priority ~tttaon and the options th~t are av*iiabl. And it is in thi5 role of ti'e Congress ~ ~acher that I particularly find technology assess~ients ~n4 that of T4B to be of great portent for the future. The individual reports by 0Th warrant widespread publicity. Mor~r over, I believe that the annual report which the Congress thought- fully provided for in the Organic Act also furnishes TAB with a occasion each year to share with congressional colleagues and `aJso with the public, a view of the way ahead, For it i~ only by this wider and deeper understanding of the issues that the Congress it~elf will be able to extract political decisions from.pressure and crisis, and ~deal with issues in an anticipatory mode Indeed borrowing the title of a valuable book that bears on this subject, technology assessment is the art of anticipation. Stripped to essentials, my propositions go like this Today every one on the planet lives in greater jeopardy of servitude ~r extermination than at any recent time in history. More people are simultaneously exposed to common dangers, and a larger number of different perils are occurring in tandem. Most of these hazards evolve from inadvertent effects of technolQgy; not so much from the p~es~nce of scientific knowledge and only some- what from evil intent, but rather from ignorance, human error and lack of imagination. Because technology is symbiotically and intricately interwoven with human culture, institutions and social processes, intervention to deal with these predicaments is the responsibility of the key orgatuzatioxis that synthesize and represent collective social choice-the national governments. Nevertheless, in the heat of social action to deal with day to day issues,, the policy apparatus appears to be deaf to these signals abont the future. In my view the situation has reached such a critical stage that this neglect of the future could entail a penalty for decision error s~ ceo nomically expensive, so politically strenuous, so environmentally dis' astrous or so inurneal to the human spirit that whatever the immedi- ate cost or inconvenience certain tradeoffs by deferring short term gratification are deemed worthwhile. What we are suggesting here is a change in steering behavior It would be easy to exhort key leaders of our nation to do better. M view, *how~ver. is that the system is so complex and the interactions of van- oiis participants so intricate, that the political leader is in a vise ~ by what people want. What we are talking about, therefore, is s~znè~ how or other aierting.citizens to reward political attention to the long run a~ well as the short run. Hell, indeed, may `be paved with good short~term intenttöus. PAGENO="0426" 422 * This need, incidentally to exercise tradeoffs between the short run and the long run inevitably generates high stress in the decision proc~ ess. Under stress, we know from psychological research, the short run always claims, priority. But the choices: made only for reasons. of ex- pediency,' lead to: a situation where the whole decision process is disabled: * i~ summary, I believe this notion' of dealing with the broader, long- range issues is fundamental to the collective security of our natioi~, of our people and of peoples everywhere on this planet And I should' like to urge the Congress through these hearings, Mr. Chairman, and its other activities, to address this role o~ OTAto that eiid, to consider major' changes in style, if not in purpose and sub- stance, and that'thc Congress consider this a priority mission and ful- fill these tasks soon. *:Tha~t* you. `Mr. "ThoRNTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Wenk, for a statement which is very thoughtful and in some parts provocative `of further ex~ioration and reflection. And I do have a number of questions. I am going to ask a couple and then defer to other members of the committee. Dr. Wenk; I would first like to zero in on the concern which you express that OTA ha's been disappointing in its intellectual horse- power, has been oversold and has underperformed and that it has generally been reo'arded in that light. The purpose o~ these hearings, as you know, is to explore whether that is the case. That is one of the purposes. Another purpose is to try to determine how to insure that is not the case. Can you give, me som~ citations or any specifics as to that statement? Is it just a general sense in `the academic community that OTA is not altogether well, or is it documentable? Or are there institutions which have made such statements publicly? If so, we might want to get them and find out the ~basis `for them. ` , Dr. WEN~.. Mr.,. Chairman, Ido not think I can answer with a direct citation but let m~ speak ~vith regard to whether this view of winehas been widely `shared. I will try to be as specific as I can.: The Engineers Joint Council, which is an organization to permit collaboration by the major professional societies-~electri~al engineers, mechanical engineers, civil engineers, and so on-.--recogni~ed that tech- nology j~sse'ssment i~ an important part of engineering practice.~ They took an interest in OTA when it was formed, and created a panel on technology assessment, they asked me to serve as a member The panel h~e met frequently.... ` , ` To the best of. my knowledge,. it~ offer. to be of direct assistai~ce'to 0Th has not `been accepted but that is not my key point. In their dis- cussions about how OTA is performing-Qne ,could track-~his as a temperature chart., Tn the first year, there was a rising temperature of hope and `confidence; a leveling off after the first year; but a very sharp decline, bottoming out, over the past year. Incidentally, mem- bers of this panel come `as much from industry as they do from the academia But this is the widespread concern Second, sonie of us in the academic world are concerned with teach- ing and research in technology intensive public pc~hcy There are these regular occasions when we touch base with each other at prop fessional meêt~n s9ri?y.n1ailorivhatev~r. ~ `. , .* , *` .` PAGENO="0427" 423 ~ ~Phei~ are . probthly some 0 i~r~ so.major institutions in the coun- try, and maybe * anothcr 50 others,cornmitted to this sore of activi~y~ Without exception, they are supporters of the notion of technology assessment. Moreove~', they felt thatthcy had a stake in OTA for two reasons. One was that the notion itself was intellectually or academ- ically so new that it was hard to get new courses that were needed in professional school curricula~because no one had ever heard that phrase before. Quite candidly, it was helpful to me when we started teaching tech- nological assessment at the University of Washington to have Public Law 92-484 in hand demonstrating that the Congress of the United States was concerned with this mode of policy planning. Every one of these institutions has done the same thing. The point, however, is this. We met together and talked together. Our eoncer~s went through the same curve as EJC and we came to recogniz~ cer- tain things that disturbed us. First of all, this intellectual base that I referred to is very thin. There are some well-known techni4ues'that one can draw upon, meth~ odologies, cost benefit analysis, system. analysis, and in the social sciences, polling techniques and so on. Nevertheless, this notion of looking ahead systematically has not had the benefit of a strong base of scholarly research. What they saw was that there was even less recognition of this condition among the practitioners in OTA. In that situation, demands on staff are~ increased. Yet, while staff were added who were brought to the office with many good and even out- standing qualifications, many lacked two iequisites to engage in or guide contract studies in TA. They were lacking in qualifications to deal with the complexities of public policy decision process which is the backdrop for technology assessment. Or they were lacking in tech- nical specialities that underpin assessments. Few had outstanding records of a special technical competence. This defieiency cannot be compensated simply by convening outside part-time experts. It is wrong to generalize about any of thes thatters, and especially about staff. The point, howe~ el, in response to your question is that conceins about the Office were developed from shortcoriungs perceived in the final products Few constituted technology assessment And few prod tit.,ts included authoritative, complete and relevant technical docu mentation for Some particular project, that also reflected limits to J~now'ledge and measures of risk oruncertaiâty. Mr. THORNTON. You suggest that there was a' conscious deei~ioi~. to operate OTA as a joint committee or committee structure fc~r short- term puiposes as opposed to its role as a long distant warning system and future assessment program We have not been advised of any formal decision to cast it in that direction and, if indeed it has moved in that direction, is that not a responsibility of the Board rather than of the Director Dr WBN1~ There are two separate points I would like to touch on here With regard to a specific time or occasion when this happened, I have to agree with you completeF~r It was not a. deliberate decision at a clear branch in the road and a choice to go one way versus anothev~ I never sensed that But, having served o~ the Technology Assessment Advisory Council which began it~ meetings in JaMmary 1~74 `and~thet PAGENO="0428" 424 fairly regularly, it was evident at the very infant stage of OTA~ that the style that I referred to began to emerge. Some of us as Counoil m~mbers immediately began to raise storm signals~ I think you can find in the transcripts of those meetings that we began to sense what was happening and raise questions, not as though we had some great wisdom about which was the right road. The trend was, I think, visible by the first year. But it was not an instantaneous decision; you are absolutely right in that regard. Mr. THORNTON. One further question with regard to the staffing. You draw a contrast between OTA staffing and the staffing of CRS and GAO and by that do you mean to suggest that these organizations give better performance, better work product than OTA? Dr. WENK. I will try to answer that question directly. I have to say that I really have not sat down with some grading system to com- pare the three, but I will try to draw two distinctions. And incidentally. Mr. Chairman, I had the benefit of being a mem- ber of the staff of CRS at one point in history- Mr. THORNTON. If I may digress just a moment there, you make an observation somewhere in here that the idea of OTA may have started with OilS. Did I misread that? Dr. WENK. No, sir, in my view that is where the original idea began as far as an introduction o-f the. concept. to this committee is concerned Mr. THORNTON. If I may explore tbftt, how does it happen that CRS initiated idea,s-I thought they acted in response to inquiry. Dr. WENK. Well, in my view the response to an inquiry can either be to draw on the archives or to be creative; in this case it was to be cre~tive. Mr. THORNTON. OK. But was there an inquiry? Dr. WENK. Yes, but it was a broad one. The question came from- Mr. THORNTON. I guess this may be chicken or egg, but if there was not an inquiry from the Congress addressed to CRS-you do not mean to suggest that ORS, one day sitting over there. without any inquiry, somebody had a light bulb turned on and said, "We need to develop a technology assessment program" and started looking arQund for some~ one to adc~ress the issue, do you? Dr. W~K. rirst of all, l~t me ~ay that some ideks do originate like that. ~4oreover, I am hopeful that the Congress appreciates such cre- atFve inputs to the legislative process. In my view, the people over there should not just sit and answer inquiries; they also ought to be helpful to the Congress by taking initiatives based on their exposure to a broad range of literature ideas from other policy analysis. They should help their congressional clients ask the salient questions. Mr. THORNTON. I agree. Dr. WENK. This is one such example. Mr. Ycager. incidentally, was an important member of this activity at the time he may be able to refresh my own memory, becatise this goes back some years. The situation, as I recall, was the following. A new subcommittee had been formed from which there. w~s a request to (TRS for continu- mg assistance of a. general nature. That is a little different than re- sponding to specific assignment. r1~he. continuhuz assistance involved identifying key issues that this committee should work on, developing an agenda of studies that ought to be undertaken to buttress those PAGENO="0429" is~ucs, and tbei~ to be helpful as the subcommittee proceeds. This is a legitimate form Of assistance; in fact it is a compliment to the ORS to be. asked to do this. The people who, do this act as staff in complete anonymity. Thus, I am sharing this with you this morning with some reluctance because the general style `of CR5 has been properly characterized by `ano- nymity. Without going into details-and it has to be `based entirely on memory-a ~rery valuable staft assistant of mine, Richard Carpenter, whose name I think is known to you, was working on an assignment for a member of the Senate on `ô. specific incident havihg to do with the, fish kill in the Mississippi River. It was attributed to dicidrin. The question we raised with that Senator and his staff was, having gotten those facts, why not look into this as an example o'f a more general issue in terms of hazards which exist for which we should have some better early warning system, not waiting just for fish to be killed, but where the consequences of a technological' project `may be far more. serious. Thank you, the Senator said, but no thanks. We have a very busy agenda. ` `It was at that point that while an early warning system had not been invented, the notion of looking ahead in a systematic way to' the pOe. sible adverse effects of technology was then put On `the agenda, and suggested to the subcommittee as a major topic to look at. Mr. THORNTON. The phrase "early warning system" had been in- vented, although not applied to this subject matter, because I was familiar with ~t in the military. Dr. WENi~. The DEW `line, yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I am sure that is where the phrase was plagiarized from. Mr. T1Toiu~To~. I am sure that is whe~e the phrase came from. Dr. WRi~. in applying that concert to social' and ecOnomic im- pacts, the notion evolved of being more systematic about looking ahead at the consequence's Of technology. It was Mr. Yeager, I think, who invented the exact phraseology, technology assessment, at least I have attributed it to him. Mr. THoRNToN. Mr. Yeager, do you have any comments? Mr. YDAGER. 4s far as I know the term first appeared in a 1906 report, a forecasting report of the subcommittee My only comment on this, Mt ~ihairinan, about the input we have pist had, is that there were many inpizts ;&om people having to do with the emerging prob~ lems of di loultiec with the applications of technology The crystalli zation of all those inputs into the ide~ of a technology assessment appa ratu~ which would deal not only with early earnrng, but with benefits, the need to apply technology beneficially as well as to look at its ne~rative side, and to consider both short- and long-range terms-that crystallization, I think, occurred about the time of 1966 nit the sub committee The input Dr Wenk is talking about, I think, is one of many that were happening at that time. I might cite another one which was quite interesting which Dr Wenk attended He and I and Mr Dadclario and Charles Lindbergh sat down in Mr. Daddario's office in 1964~. We discussed some, of thc same things But at that time the issue was cast only in the guise or in the `role of trying to anticipate the bad side of advances in technology. PAGENO="0430" 426 Mr. THORNTON. Thank you very much. I think it might be inap- propriate to go further into the development by which the numbers ~f threads were woven into the idea of an OTA, because~ that weaving process is presumably still going on. And we are still looking at it. But to get `back to the question, which was as to the `differences in staffing, on that point I do have a philosophical question and that is that you suggest that early warning and appreciation of what the major issues are, and what they are going to be, is by the nature of our complex society becoming more political, that the social decisions are increasingly being made as a political decision. We operate in a political system in which those people who serve in the political structure are not very secure in their service, they are replaced quite frequently, and sometimes for reasons which may or may not be apparent or obvious. Now, the question that I have is whether and to what degree should the study of the issues and the designation of what issues are impor- tant be isolated from the people who are charged with formulating public policy? The reason for my question is that I have seen many instances in which an agency or institution has been taken out of politics" and given autonomy, no accountthility to anyone, really, which is directly traceable to performance. Usually what happens is that instead of taking that institution out of politics, you develop a different kind of politics within the institution, rather than isolating it. So, I would like you to address that as well as the question about the CRS. Dr. WENK. Right off the bat, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to distinguish between isolation and independence. I have to agree absolutely with what you said about the hazards of isolation. Coming as I do from the academic community, I will be the first to say that it is too isolated, itself. I am amazed at some of the things that are taught on the college campus in isolation from the real world. From the point of view of serving the Congress, isolation of a staff arm would be quite wrong. What I was really referring to was inde- pendence. The Congress gets a lot of information from a lot of differ- ent sources. We referred to CRS and GAO and so on. But you people know far better than I how much you get from the daily newspaper, from the TV, from all the visitors that come into your office, and from your constituents at home, and the ones that you seek advice from at home. So OTA is only a part of the picture. What distinguishes this advice, it seems to me, is whether or not the people offering it have a stake in the outcome. My guess is that most of the information you get may come from people who do have a stake in the outcome. It is very clear to observers of the scene from the outside that you are aware of this, and therefore it is not someone pulling the wool over the Con- gress eyes at all. The question is, where can you get information and advice that. is not modulated, stored, conditioned by the source? That is where it seems to me that the Congress has very thoughtfully invented some staff arms that are independent in that sense, and I believe CRS and GAO have earned the respect of these bodies. You took, incidentally, the precaution of establishing the post of Comptroller General of GAO l~y providing a very long term that PAGENO="0431" 427 would protect him from intimidation presumably of a poiiticai nature by a threat on his job and thus afforded him security to assur~inde~ pendence. The point is that OTA needs the same type, of protection. Otherwise several thmgs can happen First of all, it will be responsive to a selected set of issues from the few Members of Congr~ss who have direct access and therefore. may not be serving the Congress as a whole. But secondly, the individuals who are working on these issues should be thought of by the client, yourself, not.only as having no axto grind themselves, but are also not directly serving some Member of Congress who is an advocate. In the pulling and hauling of political life, one comes to recognize that a member's staff does have and should have allegiance to their principal. But, if you are meetlng with a staff mem~ ber who served a member of the Congress one day and th~ next day was wearing the hat of OTA, it is `very easy to have a question on whether he is representing a Member in what he says or is it a com~ pletely independent analysis That is the kind of independence that I am suggesting. , . ~. Ti~ORNTON, Thank you, Dr. Wenk. Mr. Winu. Mr. WINN. Thank you., Mr. Chairman. I believe Mr. Brown is a member of the subcommittee. Mr THORNTON I was trying to be very nonpartisan in recogmzmg you in that. Order. . Mr WINN I appreciate that, Mr Chairman, and that is not always true of other subcommittee chairmen But I would yield to Mr Brown, and then I would be glad to take my turn. Mr. THORNTON. Thank you. . Mr. Brown. Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wenk, I want, to pay tribute to your statement first, I think it is one of those exceptionally fine statements that we do not receive too often and I think it makes a major contribution to these hearings. I appreciate it. Dr. WRNK. Thank you, sir. Mr BROWN In fact, it leads me to feel that I should like to get a hold of your book and if you can advise me as to how to do that, I would appreciate it. I think I would find myself in general agreement' with the posture you take with regard to the technology assessment function But I havO major qtiestions as to `how we can achieve the kind of a role that you are suggesting for it. For example, this ,is the kind of problem that I perceive. You are suggesting that technology `a:ssessqient should be a means of providing alternatives `for meeting certain policy ob- jectives and the question immediately arises, how do we select policy objectives'? That is the whole function of the Congress, you know. In a sort of a trial by fire we determine what the pbjectives are, we do not pursue objectives and then examine the alternatives, we sort of fight these out' in sometimes rather `bitter battles ..tod&terniiné what the obiectives are and the technology assessment function is con fronted with situations in which there are a range of obje~tive~ prob- ably as broad as the members of the Board, or maybe even' broader than that. We have to ex~mine'the alternatives. H~w do you s~e the, PAGENO="0432" question of delineating policy objeeth~es aro~nd wh!eh *e eeii then te~native pottiohs of aCtiOns beh~g .detei4nii~ed. Dr W~r~ Let me respond by initially separating the iSSUes into two categories. Earlier, I did not take the time to etplairi this, but it is related to the type of questions you ~ asking. One sOt is what happens, if? This group suggests that there is a coti~se of action al- ready in sight and one want's to trace the `consequences. But the Sec- ond set of questions fasten on, what happens unless? I would like to `focus `attention on that second set of issues, because these are the one's for which there are already storm signals over the hOrizon. Here, we must tackle th~ issue from the point of view of thrent, threat ánaly- sis, situation analysis `an'd response. I realize that that sounds like military language.. But I think We have got to apply some of this type of rn~elleetual approach to the nonmilitary as we have ih the military, iitdhi'diug the whole notiôir of intelligence. The question of what happens unless, relates to these `threatC that I ha~re mentioned- which, incidentally, other people and the literature have all recited In the bodk, Mr. Brown, I s~y I have not ihvented kny nOw species of hell. Enough have, been outlined by others. But these threats begin with nuclear terroi~ and o~o through `a whole series o.f other `dangers that relate to world disor~er, to resource depletion, urban bankruptcy, and'to loss of freedom, indeed, the thrOat to freedom evOn in the United States. This ~ a. little digression-but the fact is that technology it- self' hac made' it `more possible thali ever before to create mischief, to threaten Some of our basic liberties. The point, however, is that: the ahalysis of these potentially lethal threats does not begin with the policy `as you `are `suggesting; it begins with the problem. Then, there is the opportunity to look at all implica- tjox~'s `and alternatives and their estimated consequences. This i's also a characteristic of precrisis management. Before the issues have be- come polarized `and politicized, there is a good deal more flexibility in being able to think through the policy options then at the stage of actual crisis or heated controversy. By tackling t'he problem sooner, we `can avoid being trapped `in a groove that we have machined `from past decisions, requiring us to spend half of our energy defending the past, which is one of the characteristics of our society~ OTA has spent very little time on that type of issue and this is e'ssentiall~ am'ajot'shi'ft in direction that lain suggesting. I am realistic enough to know that no institution in'akes changes overnight or, as a matter of `fact, should. Therefore, there is a tran- sition strategy that I think is required. I do not foresee the time when OTA would completely give up its other type of analysis. But I think it is `a mix that is at stake. sow, it i's 95 percent.wh'at happens, if; and maybe not even 5 percent what happens, unless. I see the preferred mix being in'aybe'~O-3O or 75-~25 or something of that sort. That transition will take some months to do, but I `believe that change could put on the agenda of the Congress the issues that I really believe deserve at- tention-the important issues, rather than simply urgent. Let me underscore this proposition from another point of view. I alluded in the testimony to the help `TAB could give other `committees and particularly the leadership, on budgeting legislative time. PAGENO="0433" 42~ N~w, again it is pa~esu1nptuous of uny witnes~ to Come and talk about how the Congress can improve itself, Mr. Chairman. I have thought long and hard about this- Mr. THORNTON. We will accept all suggestions. Dr. WENK [continuing]. There is a problem that each of us has in our daily lives of budgeting time. The problem of budgeting time that I see here is in budgeting time for policy deliberation in proportion to the seriousness of the consequences of legislation that is being pro- posed. Some of us from the outside do not see that as having been thought through. Some of the less significant issues that happen to be in the heat of battle at the moment gaih n gOod deal more attention than the far more salient issues. Tha~t dilemma is a difficult thing for an individual Member or an individual committee to deal with. But I can imagine TAB being of some assistance to the ibadership; quite bëhhid the scenes. This is not necessarily advice that has to be offered on the floor, but rather more informàJly. But it is a matter of trying ~to help Congress meet these problems Of the future. I don't know whether thiS answers the question. You may wantto follow it up by other questions. Mr. BROWN. I see the role you are trying to construct. And ~s I say, I am heartily in `agreement with this function. I think underlying the concern of many people in the process of developing TAB was a con- cern `for the strategic policy analysis function which is a definite lack for the Congress `as a whole. We perceive that technology `assessment, at least within a certain rather unclear area, might be helpful in meeting this need, the need to clarify policy operations and the Con- gress of following alternatives to reach those policy options. Exactly how we define those policy options, which presumably have a technological content, and distinguish them from those having `a non- technology content might be difficult. But as you correctly point out, we have tended to concentate on a series of short range-I would not say trivial-but of lesser important kinds of policy issues, instead of trying to examine in the broad context the `highest priority problems. I am trying to understand the process by which we could gradually shift to the highest priority. I like your suggestion about a series of Board hearings to produce input and to clarify this. I have suggested this myself, as a matter of fact, and received very little support, basi- cally because I think that `the Boatd, in the way that it functions, is not structured to put a great deal of effort into this process of delineat- ing priority policy options or priority objectives we would like to analyze. Mr. Chairman, the next question is: What do you `want to do about the two bells which' have rung? Mr. THOR~PON. I think it would be appropriate to recess about the time the second two befl~ come for `about 10 or 15 minutes and return, if you would like to do so, or if you would like to continue your line of questioning, you may do so. Mr. BROWN. I would like to return and have Mr. Winn have a chance to ask some questions. Mr. THORNTON. Fine. We will proceed in that manner, Mr. Winn. Dr. Wenk, we want to thank you f~r your patience and we ask that you 96-205-78-28 PAGENO="0434" 430 remain aboard and we will be in~ recess ~or a period of about: 10. minutes. . Dr. WENK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Recess.] Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. Mr. Brown, would you like to continueyour questions? Mr. BROWN. Yes, I just have a couple of points more that I would like to elicit a reaction from Dr. Wenk. Dr. Wenk, in order to make an effort to get at several of the prob- lems that you suggest including making better use of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council and focusing more on the longer range policy objectives, I think you are suggesting that `we . can do ~his through a process that involves getting the Mvisory Council to help us with an agenda of policy ~bjeotives-or important policy issues, however we want to" phrase it-and ultilizing' the mechanism of hear- ings. Hearings conducted by the Board, the staff, the, Council or some combination of them which would provide for input in helping to define a set of priority, areas where we could begin to structure some alternatives. , . . Am I correct in this? Do you think we could set up this sort of .a mechanism that would involve the Council and the Board, and that we could better define our goals througl~ this. sort of a hearing process? Do you see it workingin that way? Dr. WENK. Mr. Brown, I do indeed and I will say that unequivocally. First, may I underscore again `the important role I see for TAB. Mr~ Thornton, it comes back to this question you were asking about isola~. tion and independence. It seems to me that keeping TAB in the pic- ture firmly is a way to keep this whole enterprise from becoming isolated. I do not believe it can be done only with the Office and even advisors, with all due respect for our Council. I think this engagement of OTA with Oongress has to b~ done by the Members of Congress, themselves through a. clear role for TAB by its initiative and leader- ship for the whole Congress. No*, the question Mr. Brown raises is, what would that agenda be? The notion of trying to help with nominations is not new to the Couri- cii. I think the record will show that one of us made a suggestion early, in the life of the Oouncilio go on such an expedition. for' the key issues. That proposal was translated ,~into five regional meetings where nominations for those key issues were invited from a wide-range of citizens. These were small, hastily put-together meetings, but in my view valuable ones. A report with regard to that initial list was pt~e- pared by `TAAC, but as far as I can tell, it was never read, it was never utilized by anyoiie,.,I am not proposing going back and doing that all oyer again. All I am suggesting is that, indirect answer to your qué~s.~ tion yes, I thrnk the Council could be helpful It is a matter, though, of the Council being only advisory I believe the )udgment of the TAfl is the ultimate test, ` ` `. . ` Again let me emphasize-TAB and the leadership-that TAB ~ot itself operate in isolation. By that I mean, if indeed there is any validity to the earlier suggestion that it be a joint committee, it would still be unlike most committees. It would not serve an `explicit `and usually narrow constituency, or, narrow set of issues. Its effectiveness depends critically upon some understanding of its role and strong sup- PAGENO="0435" 431 port by the leadership of both Houses. It is my view that at this stage in history of this whole enterprise, the future of OTA and TAB for that matter, might deserve some consultation and discussion with the leadership, to help the leadership understand a future-oriented role that TAB could play to help the whole Congress on these issues. To return to the question of procedures, once the specific issues are isolated, identified and brought to the Congress and the public's atten- tion, this will no longer be an abstract exercise. Then you will be dealmg with questions of arms control. You will be dealing with inadverent climate modifications. You will be dealing with the question of carcinogenic substances in the environment. You will be dealing With the Third World problems. You will be dealing with-again I emphasize this-threats to freedom. Incidentally, I have never seen an assessment undertaken on technological threats to freedom. The Con- gress already comes at this issue from the point of view of invasion of privacy, but I think there is something even more fundamental at stake. Mr. BRowN. Let me try and refine this. We are moving in the same direction. But how do we structure this process to produce manageable rules? For example, I am sure that one of the results of the advisory council hearings would be the settling, we will say, of the energy problem as a high priority issue for the Nation and for technology assessment. So what could that do to help us? What part of the energy problem do we grasp? How do we phrase the energy problem? We have got. 40 members of Congress sitting as a conference committee right now try- ing to resolve diametrically opposed policy positions on whether we should provide tax benefits or extra taxes as a means of conserving energy-assuming that they agree that conserving energy is a good idea which they probably do. But the point is, how, out of this maze of policy issues, do we structure something that is manageable for the technology assessment process to work on? Or to take an example which I gather is in your book, nuclear terrorism? This has been a concern of the Congress, a growing concern now for some time. I understand that it is at the root of the President's policy recommendations with regard to the pace at which we proceed with broader reactors. How do we structure this for a technology assessment? Do we postulate a plutonium economy 25 years from now, and look at the possibilities for diversion and the means, the technological means for containing it? I am groping really to know how we use very limited resources to attack these major policy areas. Dr. WENK. First of all, I have to add this caveat in terms of being helpful in responding to your question. Having written a hook and having concentrated my attention on this question for a substantial perioI'of time, I have to tell you that I do not have myself clear, simple answers, nor the prospect of a miracle change- Mr. BROWN. That statement makes me feel that you know what you are talking about. Dr. WENK. Well, I feel my own inadequacy. But I do want to respond with some specifics. You mentioned this question of energy. If you examine the type of issue that arouses not just congressional passions, but repertorial interests, and presumably citizens' passions, PAGENO="0436" 432 it is wbether or two ~e goiflg to have enough ~rat~r~l g.~ for' .~this wihter I dan uAdm~stan4 that questicr~ But it seems to me that in this balance between Iths long- and the short-run there are some other crucial t~uestions tb~t ought to be getting th~ same amount of attention and publicity'with regard to energy. This gets down to such questions- and you hinted at this yourself-in terms of a scenario for, the year 2000, which is not that far away, when annual production of oil may decline at the sam.e time more nations will be competing for the, supply.. Some of the decisions you are going to make this year are not even going to bear, fruit until the year 2000., At least you will not know until then whether current decisions do what you want them to ~o. The year ~00~ is not so far. What `I am, suggesting is a different perspective in which to see the energy question. That means eloiigating the time span over which one can think through consequences. There- fore, We are talking about a way of thinking about the question r.Ore than something explicit. The future will always be basically unnoticed. Anyone who has been close to `this' field who ptOmi5Os to tell you exactly what is going to happen, I think will be suspect. All we can do is deal with some of the possibilities, maybe probabilities, and to be clear about the' uncertainties. Let me give you an example of a case in point: The. SST decision which t'he Congress made about 6-years'ago. It tUrns out that some of us believe that if a technology assessment `had been started back at the time that President Kennedy gave `the green light to proceed, and especially when a contractor was selected, some of the uncertainties of the issue Would have been resolved. There were two key issues that were never really brought into the forefront, both of which are very ap- parent now. I believe looking ahead would `have made them clear. The first has to do with the fuel consumption. At that time, the economic break~ven point for a fleet of SST's was 300 planes. I cannot find any- where in the testimOny a fact which is known today, that a fleet of 30~ SST would consuthe petroleum equal' to 20' percent of the national consumption. ` ` ` ` ` The seQolid point has to `do with supersonic noise- .1 am sorry, land- ing noise, not the superson'io noise. The main focus was'On the question of the shock wave. There were even some experiments run by usino- military aircraft to determine `ho* serious this was. Digging back, I hate discovered' that a perceptive engineer at Boeing back in 167 when they got the contract proposed that studies be made of engine noise reduction which at that time could have affected the design of thè engines. it was rejected by the ,~ederal `Government putting' up the money. In my view, incidentally, Congress made the right decision, even though, these `two issues were not addressed~ But nevertheless,, the' "decisionmaking was badly hampered by the lack "of information. Thi.~ `example points ñp that this notion of looking~ ahead involved not oniy what we did know or did ,ndt know, but also `~hat we could know if we did some timely research, before the political decision had to be made-to fill in some of the key gaps `of information that you people needed in order to make better'decisions. ` . We do not do that until too late. PAGENO="0437" 43~ Mr. BRowN. All right, 1 will defer fu~rther ~jaeØons. Except that you i~ever did ~nswer m~ ~uestim~abou~ when. your book had been published. Dr. W~a. There is a reason forthat. I do not have a publisher yet. Mr. Buoww. I see. All right. Mr. THORTON. Thank you, Mr. Brown, Mr. Winn. Mr. WINN. Thank you,. Mr. Ch~lrman. Doctor, I want to congratulate you o~ a very fine statement. It is thought provoking It is s~mei~hat disturbing It makes me feel like wehave had a team on the field that has failed, and po~MbIy you may be quite right. If I may go down through several statements that you made and ask you for some clarification or bring up some additional subjects, I notice that on page 1~ you mentioned that recommendations for correctives have been offered by the Advisory Ooundil, but have generally been turned aside. Could you enlighten us on that and cite some specific recommenda~tions? Dr. Wu~rK. I think I can, Mr. Winn. First, the Advisory Council was aware soon after OTA began of this balance between short- and long-term issues. I feel quite certain in my own mind that the question was raised early-and it was recommended that a more disciplined approach be taken to this selection of issues. Second, there was the question of staff assistance to the Council, itself in order to do its assigned job. Some of us repeatedly pointed out that part-time advisers do best, that is, contribute most, when there is full-time staff-frankly, to hold our feet to the fire. If there is not enough of that staff who will take that initiative, with phone calls, with letters and so on, to get action, that advisory body will 1~ ineffective. There was a very heated debate on this question of such staf~iag, and ui my view those advocating more-one of us even advocating an independent staff-lost that battle. That, I think, is also a matter of record. Third, there was a. cp~estion with regard to the ln~iouse versns ont~' of-house conduct of activities that was subject to recomn~endation and in tni,r view brushed asjde. I have not thought through a whole list of pMbleths of this kind. But incidentally, this repeatedly raised the question of who we were n~aking recommendations to, Ununately, J th4nk the atmosphere was s~t as though we were making re mei4datiens o~i*,r tø th~ OTA Director In point of fact, the legislatiQn provides for the Council to report to the Board. And it was really the Board to whom these should haye been made more directly, strongly and persistently. Mr. WINN. All of the recommendations tl~at you have referred to there in your examples are still being considered by the Board. It is just that we have not been able to ascertain the exa~ct parts that the Board and the Council should play in the short and long term. And now we are going through the process of interviewiiig some people for the new Director's job, and in their responses they, are certainly all over the place So there is no united agreeme~1t as to whether the OTA should be strictly long term or should be strictly short term or should PAGENO="0438" "434 be flexible .enou.gh~ to cover :first the crisis `that comes up~, frequently through Congress and some city. .. And so I do not think that we could say that they have been turned aside yet, because they are still being: considered, and' tbey are still being discussed. As far as the staff is concerned, we hsveafunding problem. We. have a problem of trying to' get, No. 1, enough interest in Congressto make Members `aware of what. we were tr~ing to accomplish. And you. are exactly right, we have not done a good job'of selling our colleagues in Congress on' what OTA is trying to accomplish and some do not even know what OTA j~. I have found out" in the last 6 or .7 months that the leadership of neither party knows what it is; generally `they do- but `they are not fully aware of it, , But going to the staff, it might be a little hard for us `to, go to the Appropriations Coinmittee'and ask fo'r full time `staffing for the Cóün- cil. We would have to pay for that. I do not know where else we would get the money to pay for it. That `would be a problem. And. I would like to delve into that a little bit more. `What'types'of' staff are you talk- ihg about 9 What type of staffing would you recommend 9 Dr. Wi~NE. You have raised' some very key questions here, and I would like to come back to an early one when you pointed out that TAB is debating some of these questions now, and has been, `maybe, fOr 3 years. One reason that there is a difficulty in resolving these issues is that what TAB needs is to adopt a basic concept. The fact that different people' have differOnt concept's with regard to OTA needs to be re- sohred first It seems to me that a lot of these operational questions flow from that fundamental iecision as to what OTA `is all about. Now, I can n~derstand the `sensitivity of dealing with this but, Mr Winn~ I strongly urge for another reason I am ooing to mention rn a second, that the concept be nailed' down~ This o&ér reason has to do with this recruitment of the new Director. Back in June when this question was discussed at the TAAC meeting,"I made a point at the open meetiitg that while the Council had been asked `to filter through the initial nominations,' that was only part of the job. `The question was certain to be asked by any good ëandidatø, "what is my job 2" I did not feel then, and I said this publicly, that TAB was prepared to give h~m an explicit answer a~ to what the job wa~ I feel that that was an essential functiOn for TAB to undertake and to resolve for the sake of attracting the highest possible talent that is available in this country to serve as thrector `I did not think, `whoever TAB uilght select, that he would be as responsive to the `need for new leadership as you~would hope fox~ unless you were able to lay out for him what i~ expected. That, to me, was the reason at that point in' history of trying to do that. I think the other questions you are raising flow from this first ques ti~n that has to be appioached, and decided, on what kind of an ani n~al is OTA. ~ We know that there is vast disagreement ofl this question, and as long as that 4isagreement pefsists, you will not have an effective operation Mr WTN~ I think you are exactly right oii the fact that ther& are different concepts. As a matter of faet, in inquiring and interviewing PAGENO="0439" 435 the possible directors, we have turned~ that right around on them; We are asking them, we are. trying to pick their brains as to what their concept should be of.OTA, rather than our saying, here it is, how are yon going to augment it, and what. woubJ you do as a director with so- and-so staff? . Dr. Wi~n~. Sooner or later, if you boil down that list of candidates tO one.~ you may ask him what does he think, but heis going to ask you, "what is my. job?" ithink that TAB has got to be in a better pothtion than it has been to answer. I add, to that, sir, the additional factor that this widespread uneasiness about OTA's past performance is a matter of public record. Therefore, a candidate approaches this Qifer `with some serious questions in his mind. It seems to me; therefore, that there is all the more reason for TAB to be clear in their minds as to whether it is going to be any different or not, Mr. WINE, I think iii the list which was recommended, which was over 200, it was obvious that some of them did not know what the job entailed, and maybe the fact that the concept was vague did not encourage them enough to make application. We had a list of Council recommendations, but a lot of them did not chooseto `be interviewed or were not interested for various reasons. Let us get back to page 12, the next to the last paragraph, where you talk about the Technology. Assessment Board has not become the early warning arm of the U.S. Congress, and you hit on that pretty strongly. I do not know that as much time has been spent on thinking about the early warning point as has been the fact that OTA is an arm of Congress Ever since I heard about OTA, all I have heard basically is that it is a service arm of Congress. ` That is the philosophy that most of us feel, those of us who have served on the Board., You talk about the Technology Assessment Board on precrisis decisions Now, that sounds good and I do not disagree with you. But it would make everybody in the world marvel that this was something magi'c-if we could forecast.,all the crises that are going t. come up through Government or from the peopleto the.Governnieflt. What did you mean by the crisis decisions ~ Dr. WENK. First of all, again; I hope that I will not ,l?e thought of as disr~spectful to the TAB-, ` ` Mr WINN No, we are big boys Dr WENK [continuing] Because I really do understand the time and energy that has been invested here But if you examine the agenda of a TAB meeting, in my view you will find that most of the energy is invested on internal operations rather than external considerations So what I am suggesting here is a major shift in `focu&-with TA~ again as a teacher, as a navigator for `the Congress, as sonieone who sees the storms'on the horizon, who seesthe rocks and shoals and who may with help from OTA. and maybe the Council, have better chart of these bazard~.. .. `` The horizon is only so far out Nobody knows what is beyond that and nobody ever will But some of those storm signals are so manifestly clear today that there is not any doubt that they deserve more attention I mentioned earlier' of an inventory I had occasion to prepare in ~ihat some of these perils are, beginning with nuclear terror and going through climate mo&flcations and so °`~* , .. .~,. PAGENO="0440" 436 ~ *. ~1~L But don~t you geb baak to &iffe~ei~t conc~ts~ d:~whei~ you S~4~ Wyhcig t~o flg~ti~ out wha1~ p~recrisis pv~b1ems ~ ~u4 t~'y~ng to make pe~ns1s cislons? Phere Is a lot of di~fl~erei~ce there -M~~n't you getth~g into a variation of'the'concept, so that we az'e right bach to where we started? Dr. ~ We are talking, incidontally `about a complicated aeci- sion process. It. involves 55 people, Members of the Co~igres~, plus the varied interests of constituents out there and'their decisLon process is very oomp'ii~ated. Given that plurality ofiiiteresththat are always going to be in o fliot, c~tn you hope to resolve these w~ith~ut the interminable a4vema~ry proceeding which j~u~t goes on and on. Much as I respect it in courts of law, I do not think this is the only way to deal with tlu~ diversity. Yet, that is what we have got' throughout our whole so'*~iet~. When our society has been under a common threat, only widely perceived, we have been able to mobilize to do something about it in our collective interest. These threats have almost always been military.'But it is very clear that we have a difficulty when the threat is partly artificial and `drummed up as propaganda. People see through that. That' is one of the things that has happened in recent years that has made people lose confidence in their government. But the fact is that when there has been a clear, manifest threat, we have responded. I do not believe the citizen understands what is going on. Until the citizen does, the Members of the Congress will have great difficulty dealing with these dilemmas like energy, because the citizen will flood you with the short term problems that are in his back door every morn- ing. I do not know what percentages of your mail deals with the long term issues? Mr. WIWN. Practically none. Dr Wi~K But my guess is that- `Mr. Wn~w. A lot of us thought we were going to be elected to solve lcrn~ range problems But basically, in my 11 years it has been just one orisi~ after another' .. . .`` . Dr WnNK I think that is common e~perienee And incidentally, I hope you can tell from the tone. of my testimony that I feel that `the Congress is seriously constrained by what is going on in ~ur society. It is not a situation where you can point your finger and allocate blame at all. As lone as people want instant gratification-and I think there is a lot of social commentary on this quality in our society-the Con- gress is going to have a very difficult. job countering this tren4 in order to focus on the longer run, key ISSUCS.' Last year, there was a change of national leadership And this is the thing that I emphasize here. There is an opportunity for' that leader~ ship in the White House to deal with the future l3ut the Congress has a role here, too, not in an alarmist mode, not in a doomsday mode, but in a mode of-as, one of the authors said that I so greatly respe~t, Sir Geifrey Vick~rs, of-"appreciating the situation" No one in the Con gress, or in committees with the *ay the Congress is organized', can devote any time' to that, because of the point you made. Mr. WINN. I would agree with that. ` ` Let me ask you, let us say if you were the T,.irector and you were on the Technology Assessment Board,' and you. ~wantcd to spell out the PAGENO="0441" 43~7 concept and differentiate between the long term and ~ho1't term, how would you s~t up the Oflce of Technolog~i Assessment, and how ~vèld you rate the staff? Somebody talked about staff rating. I do uot know ~rh~ther they were being facetious or not. Dr. WENK. This committee asks very difficult questions. Se~iarating short term from the long term problems is so. difficult that I am not sure one could do it except at `the extreme eths of the spectrum, cintrasting something that has to be done tomorrow versus something that is very long term. In other words, the issues do nOt ha~~e a breakpoint between, short and long, they vary continuGusly through the spectrum. It seems to me that there will be a concentration down at the short- run end on the basis of issues that have already reached the stage of scheduled hearings, pending legislation, which have instant deadlines2 that is where you know the whole schedule of events through most of that session `o~"Cougress. And I think that characterizes one set of issues. Mr Wx~ Yes, but that is where politics comes in I do not mean Republican and Democratic politics, I à.m talking about the political society that we live hi and the faic~t that we arc elected as a part of 4 political process Then politics comes in and somebody gets the anti of a chairman or director or whatever effort they use, and they say, here is my baby, and this may help you in reelection or something like that, and politics comes in. Dr. W~K. I' would not want to divorce any notion of. looking ahead from those political realities. Let me be clear about this. In my testimony, reference is made to a point that Joseph Calif a~no advances in his book that an impact statement he prepared on all legislative proposals. -The whole notion behind this is what ~ are talking abOut, namely, what are. the long term consequences Qf every major legis- lative proposal. In my view, tracing such consequences, is necessary even with the legislation that is on the congressional', agenda this week. In- every sense, the future began today. That is, since ~ou -are casting a shadow ahead by today's decisions, you ought to know what the `im~licatiOns' are. -- - `` -, " ` Let me give you a specific example This is not an issue before the Congress yet, but it will be soon It has to do with the Law of the Sea You have read of long 8 or 4 year activities lxi the tTn'tect Nations In my view, it is very disturbing to find that nowhere in our Govern meiit, so far as I know of in any government, can one find an analysis of the long term consequences of that proposed tre'ity Yet if it is adopted, it is presumably going to be a long tune before amendment, 20, or 30, or 40' years. , - . . - -` -VAt an international meeting 2 years ago, T ran what' we call a-thini- technological assessment on this -very question. This i-s the kind of thing `you try `tO do' in about 4 hours, to get at the heart of -an issue rather than with an elaborate study taking a long time, and spend- ing a lot' of money `and using a lot of pages `with an international audience, and with c~timism then `existing of settling the treaty' at the next L~iw of the Sea meeting, which did not happen, wC put a little ch'irt on the blackboar4 in terms of proiected impacts of the pendrng'Law ,~f the Sea. We' exauiined `economic impacts, impa~ts on PAGENO="0442" 438 preservation of fishery stock, for example, impacts on the world oil situation and a world order, economic viability of LDC's et cetera. And then we listed t.he impacted parties-135 nations-developed nations, developing nations, multinational corporations. And then we consid~ ered as impacted parties the future generations. Next in this exercise, we invited the group to nominate beneficial or adverse impacts by a plus or minus. That is, an impact was con- siclered in terms of whether it will have a good effect on each party, or whether it will have an adverse effect. Mr. Winn, what we discov- ered was, in that column for future generations, every impact was negative. This is the unhappy prospect for that treaty. This was an ad hoc exercise run in a short time without good, or good enough, statistical information. Nevertheless, this was the in- stinctive reaction of people from 12 countries, that the way that treaty was written, all the portents for the future were negative. Now, it seems to me that this is the kind of thing that we need to do on a systematic basis. This is the kind of role I see for OTA with regard to some of these issues that were thought of as short-term issues. Not all the short- term questions have these long-term or long-range, consequences, but there are some that have very serious long-range consequences and those are the ones that are eligible for this type of study.. Mr. WINN. If you get this staff set up, if all the Council members had staff, No. 1, are you talking about clerical types of staff, which take notes~ shorthand, or are you, talking about true professional staff? ~ WENK. I am talking abol4t true professional staff. Mr. WIWN. You are talking about an expensive move. J)r. WENK. First of all, you indicated the possibility of a staff per. son for each member of the TAB and this is not what I have in mind. Mr~ .W~NN. Then. I misread you. . Dr4 WENK. What I had in mind was a small staff that is- Mr. WINN. For everybody. S Dr. WENK. For everybody on TAB, but not really one per person. I do not'beiieve that is quite jn.~tifled. Mr. WINN. That is probably more practical from a funding standpoint4 . . . . S Dr. WENK. `But. you see, I can visualize the people who are. in that TAB s1~a1T havingxnuch. more sensitivity to the day-to-day political climate, to `have an outreach into the Congress as an early, warning- a different type of early warning system for TAB and relationships with other committe~~s.. S S , Mr.. WINN. Bttt there comes politics, the expenses-either Members of Congress would be making recommendations or trying to put their staff people over there, or the Advisory Council members would be using their contacts to try to get their staff people hired by the committee. S Dr. WENK. Well, if the latter is ;done~-' . `,, S Mr. WIWN. .1 am not saying it is bad, but I can see what will happen. Dr. WENK. Well, I am willing to say it is bad. I' think that later possibility you mentioned is really unfortunate. It seems to me that m~mbers.of'the.Council should go out of their way "not to abuse their appointment to that Council by that sort of operation. I don't `know of such a case, but if you do, all I can say in the abstract- PAGENO="0443" 430 ~ Mr. WiNN. I ~ am not saying that is trtte, but It is ~ertain1y very possible or probable. ~ ~ ~ ~ . : Pr; W~INK. Well, it is certainly possible, but `I think it is unfortu~ nafi~ Members of the Council should have special s4f-discipline in every respect with regard to pushing appointments to staff. ~ B~it coming back to the sep~ti~te staffs for TAB and TAAC, I be~ lieve that they could be separate so that their `loyalties-which, ill- cidentally, I believe, are important-are clear. The TAB staff should report to the members of TAB and be directed to the activities of TAB. I believe they Can be separate, but complementary to the other staffs. When thiswas proposed, time and time again by your witness to the Council, it was said that a separate TAAC staff will be corn- peting, arid will underrnine the operation. `I will hav~ to say, I never wonthat battle. So the staff who have served the Council have been put in a very awkward position, because while they are assigned to the'Oouncil; they are paid as OTA office staff. You canuot have two bosses. Mr. Wn~. Let me `sWitth around just a little bit, `Mr;';Chairrnan, if I tni~ht. ` And I might point out, too, thatMr. Miller, a member bf the Board, was here in `the back of the room' and ~as very interested in the eom~ ments. I do not kn~w if he' is coming back `to ask questions. And Mr. Bro*n, Of cOurse, serves on the' `Board. ` uet n~e say" that' ~e have got `some type `of" dethulte concept set up, going oil the road in the future, and looking at those horizons, and we are looking at'the long-range probierna that face theworid. An~d eve!ry- body is set up, we are all geared that way, we are all iii agreenient These arean `awful lot Of `ifs. But it is' not impossible that' w~ could reaCh that pOinVand then `th~re coineC a erisi~, whetherit beenergy or whatever it might be. Then do we say, wait anlinute, ~come on,weneed half of you to come' ove~ here, be `fie~ibie enough, beeattse you~re `spe- cialists in this field, or you have input that ~c~e need in this crisis~ So just' let the ioag~range'plan go tO pot and take care of tbe'imiilediate crisis-staffwise I am talking aboilt~t' the `direction of the Ebar~ or `Council. ~ ` ` ;` ` ~` ` **` ` ``**~ ` Dr WENK Understood And you are being realistic when ~ raise that ~juestion, Mr Wrnn~ because I do know that happens A! couple of pointa No 1, OTA is only one of several staff arms ava4labie "to haip' the Congress. PI'here isCBO~ which I' ha!not rnentioued~b~t:shouhiiit the same context as CR5 and GAO. GflS in particular has a long history and style of being" reeponsive `to Con~ gree'iol~al emergencies~ and'aregearednp to respon&~Their `size ~and flexibility, i'think,':is an as'set to them:. GAO ha~ als~'been'know~ to respoiud:to urgent congressional requests. ` `` ` ` ` ~Mr. Wn~ More sO all the time. ` ` `` Dr. Wi~NK. And more so all the time. I will have to confess to not knowing enough about CBO' toknow whether this is in therr charter. But nevertheless there are those capabilities I do nOt think OTA shoüldbe inutnine tO being'pulied off by an emergency~Ia other words, I do not believe that one should have an impenetrable gate that says note nrgent assignments, but I ;beiie~rc this is' aqiiestion:of'~using(Y1'A as a last resort PAGENO="0444" *440 Mr. Wi~. Well, that is ~né of the very strong philosophies that prevails among certain members of the Board : We should not call on them if we do long term plt~nmng, except as a last resort Others say, if it is not long-range planning, it is not a true arm of the Congress if you do not reflect that. Dr. WENK. Let me underscore again the response I made to one of your earlier questions-that the long-term issues are not only those that ~re fluttering on the horizon, they are also the issues of examining better these long-term consequences of today's decisions. And examin- ing con.~equences of alternatives. We still need to deal with those. Not all of the decisions of the Congress or issues before the Congress have that long-range quality to them, but there are those that do. In sorting out tho~e that do~ It seems to me, is the first order of busi ness Those that have the most salient consequences are the ones that should be in your hthid~, the Members of the Congress, information on the long-term eons&~ucxices. Then, you are going to make the political judgment of the tradeoffs. At least you ought to have the information. Mr. WI~N. That is a good poiht.. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr BROIVN Ipresidingj Mr Yeager, do you have any questions ~ Mr. YEAGER.Thank you, Mr. Brown, Dr. Wenk, .1 would like to ha~re yOur views on, the OTA-.~ha~ an R. & D. priority program which began early in 1975. Sometime eubsequent to that, as far as I can tell, the responeibility for this i~'as pretty much assigned. to th~ Council. What I am tr~iug. to get at is whether that function is ~ii advisory fnnetion.~ ~f is the Council in fact taking ever the management and operation of, a substantive program by the estab- li~hment of the three special pahels on th.e health of science on applioa- tions and on decisionmaking I think for a time you served as chaitman of one of those My question to you is, in your Opinion, is that a man- agement and operational function that is being conduc~ted under the aegis of the Council and if so, i~ it an appropriate utilization of the ~Cottncil.? . .. I~r~ WENk This i~ one of the saddet episodes mOTA life and in my experience with OTA. I will try to be specific~ in answering yo11r~~ues- tion, but first I want to make a point of a principle that I would urge be considered,' I do ~no~t beiieire,that niembers of the Council should g~t into, the da~-to.~day operations of any kinds It seems to me that .whe~i they serve in a direct ath'~isory role on some of thdse specialized panels or when, as you correctly pointed out, they sei~ve ae chairmen of the Pariel~-whieh, ineidentall~, I tarijed down twice because I tried to subscribe to my own principle but then yielded-a--but when the Council does this~ they can no longer be a ~tidge of what i~ being done, That is, the Council has a role to judge products of studies which they cannot do properly if they are participants. In that. conflicting situation, Council members defer to eachother. That is, if a CounCil member is on a particular panel ahd comes into the Council meeting enthusiastic about that report, I do hot find any inclination of. n~embers of the Council to disagree. In other words, I think the Council's utility is lost when that hap- pens. Sd basically, on the first poiht~ I do not believe members of the Council should be involved in those day-to-day perations of any kind. PAGENO="0445" 441 Now with regard tb that p~irti ilar set of panels, the Council did agree t~ take on an oversight reep~nsib~lit3r, which it It~d difficulty ~fu1 filling; before long in my judginerit, it vaidsha& That B. & D. panel became an OTA etaff operation that was not subject to th~nght kind of continuous TAAC monitoring, review and advice that was mtended. I have lost track of it because, as you know, I was on professional leave for a while. But I believe there was a serious loss in that abdication of responsibility and I do not know where it is now. The issues on R. & D., however, are really quite important. With my statement on the importance of dealing with the long-term issues, I do not believe that that B. & D. project is now cast in these dimensions at all; it could have been but it was not. Mr. YDAGER. I did not mean by the question to suggest anything pej- orative as far as the Council was concerned. I think they were asked to do that job by the Board. One other question if I may, Mi'. Chairman. Mr. BROWN. Certainly. Mr. YRAGER. We have had two or three, maybe four prior witnesses including former members of the Board and current members and ex officio members of the Council, who have suggested the committee con- sider looking at the original structure of the Board, which I know you are familiar with. One witness suggested that, in fact, it would be worthwhile to amend the statute to go back to that arrangement. Another has provided a model which would be an expanded version of the original but would contain a much larger number of public members on the Council, in addition to Members of Congress and to the heads of the legislative agencies. And one has indicated that if that occurred, it might be possible to do away with the Council in its current form. Would you have any comment in those areas? Dr. WENK. I do recall the initial legislative proposals. And what I have to comment on now is based more on what has happened since then in terms of experience, but also need. lam of the view-and it really bears on the point that the chairman was raising earlier of isolation-I believe that to keep this entire OTA activity from being isolated, it should be clearly a property of the Congress. And the only way I see that sharply defined is if TAB is made up only of Members of Congress and not of outsiders. I do not believe this denies them access to outside `advice. I am not persuaded that having outsiders on it would change its mode of operation to whatever people expect in the benefits of having outsiders on it I feel strongly that OTA is a creature of the Congress and that the respbn- sibihty for making it work should devolve entirely on Members of Congress. So therefore I would be, in my personal view, uneqivocal in saying `that 1 think TAB should be composed only of Members of the Congress. Mr. YRAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BROWN. Well, we have kept you here for quite a while this morn- ing, Dr. Wenk, and it has been extremely helpful to all of the members of the subcommittee. We appreciate your advice and hope. we can hon- tinue to maintain a close relationship with you for any future help you may give. PAGENO="0446" 442 Dr. WENK. Mr. Chairman, it has been a privi1e~e for me, and may 1 also say there have been some pretty tough questions asked. Mr. BROWN. The subcommittee will be adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon- vene at 10:05 a.m., Thursday, October 20, 1977.] PAGENO="0447" ItEVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT THURSDAY, 0CT0B~R 20, 1977 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMrrFEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SuBCoMMIrr~E ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, Wa8Mngton, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ray Thornton (chairman of the subcommittee) ,.presiding. Also present: Mr. Brown. Staff: Mr. Holmfeld, Mr. Yeager, Mr. Scoville, and Mr. Malmendier. Mr. THORNTON. The hearing will come to order. This morning the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Tech- nology is privileged to hear from Dr. Jerome Wiesner, who is chair- man of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council and president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a university which is in a strong leadership' role in the formulation of American science policy. Dr. Wiesner, we appreciate your appearance before our subcommit- tee, and we're looking forward to the opportunity of discussing with you the strong and positive statement which you have prepared and submitted. Without objection, that statement will be made a part of the record verbatim. I would like to ask you at this time to proceed as you may chose, to highlight it or to give us the benefit of the statement. STATEMENT OP `JEROME B. WIESNER, CHAIRMAN, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, PRESIDENT, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OP TECHNOLOGY Dr. WIESNER. Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure to be here, I've had many pleasant opportunities to appear before this group. I always find it very challenging and stimulating and productive. So I'm pleased to be back. If youhave no objection, sir, I will read my statement. Mr. THORNTON. That will be fine. Dr. WI~SNER. The ideas in the paper are the ones that I would like to highlight this morning. I might say that I share everyone else's confusion of appropriate courses of action with regard to an appropriate course of action and this leads us directly to the purposes of OTA. I would like to sketch out my view of OTA's purposes and its possible development, and then consider how the Technology Assessment Advisory Council fits into that picture, and what its future role might be. (443) PAGENO="0448" 444 Along the way, I will touch upon many issues of importance to this committee, such as the governance of OTA by the Technology Assess- ment Board and the Director, relations between the Board, the Direc- tor, and the Advisory Council, the managerial problems of. getting. a new agency such as OTA started, and the wider view of the needs of Congress for technological assessment I'll draw upon my experience with the development of the concept of technology assessment, and the development of OTA itself, in order.to suggest a few significant ways the Office and the Advisory Council might improve their operations. First, the ideas which helped föñrulate ~Iid provide impetus for the establishment of OTA came largely from a loose consortium of public-minded sôientists, Congressmen, and citizen group representa- tives, and I think I was among the ~rst iii that group. We were pri- marily coxiceri~ed that Our `Natio~i and `the ILS. Góv~ernnien~i~i par- ticular, had' no' effective way of dealing with impact and important social, economic, and environmental impiie~tAon~ of tee no~iogica! pro- grams. . , In varying degrees and with qnit~ v~ried viewpoints,. many of us also wished to explore the ways in which the legislative branch might correct the imbalance of expertise between executh~e agencies and Congress Some of us hoped that an agency such as OTA could help correct these deficiencies by aiding Qongress in antieip'~ti* and miti- gating such possible effects of teshn