

DEPOSITORY
SOVIET COVERT ACTION
(THE FORGERY OFFENSIVE)

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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
OF THE
PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 6, 19, 1980

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SOVIET COVERT ACTION ¹

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room H-405, the Capitol, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland (chairman of the full committee), Ashbrook, Young, Whitehurst, and McClory.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Patrick G. Long, associate counsel; Jeannie McNally, clerk of the committee; and Herbert Romerstein and G. Elizabeth Keyes, professional staff members.

Mr. ASPIN. The purpose of today's hearings is to apprise the committee of the Soviet use of propaganda and covert action against the United States in the formation of foreign policy, and the particular focus of today's hearing is going to be on forgeries as part of the use of Soviet covert action machinery.

The witnesses today are Mr. John McMahan, the DDO, who is accompanied by Richard H. Ramsdale and Martin C. Portman. They are the three at the witness table.

We do need a vote to close the hearings.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, I will move that the meeting be closed pursuant to the rules.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Call the roll.

Ms. McNALLY. Mr. Aspin?

Mr. ASPIN. Aye.

Ms. McNALLY. Mr. Boland?

Mr. BOLAND. Aye.

Ms. McNALLY. Mr. Ashbrook?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Aye.

Ms. McNALLY. Three yeases, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Congressman Ashbrook, would you like to make a statement?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, really not a major statement, I would just like to join the chairman in welcoming John McMahan and his associates. I point out that in recent years we have heard much in the papers, Congress and elsewhere about CIA covert action, but rarely do we hear

¹ Edited by Central Intelligence Agency and declassified.

much about what the KGB is doing, and what is happening out there in the real world you gentlemen have to deal with. Mr. Aspin has called this hearing and we have worked it out with the idea in mind of giving you an opportunity to tell us a little bit about what goes on out there in the real world, about an adversary that is not constrained by congressional oversight or even the same kind of Western morality that most of us advocate.

So with that idea in mind, I am very interested in everything you have to tell us about Soviet covert action, and particularly Soviet forgeries.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, and I would like to thank Congressman Ashbrook for suggesting the hearings that we are going to have, this hearing and subsequent hearings that I anticipate will be along the same lines. I think that there are certain things that he is interested in, and I must say from talking to him and talking to his staff people, they do seem to be very good subjects and important subjects for the Subcommittee on Oversight to get into. I am interested in the subjects and would like to hear what you have to say on it.

So why don't you start, Mr. McMahan, and develop your presentation in any way you want.

STATEMENT OF JOHN McMAHON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD H. RAMSDALE, DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; MARTIN C. PORTMAN, DDO/CIA; JAMES R. BENJAMIN, DDO/CIA; DONALD PEEK, DDST/CIA; AND COLE BLACK, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. McMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to have this opportunity today to respond to the subcommittee's request and that of Mr. Ashbrook for the testimony by the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the aims, scope and methods of Soviet propaganda and covert action against the United States. I have brought with me some officers from the Agency who know this subject well. Mr. Ramsdale, who you know already, and Mr. Portman who is a specialist in Soviet covert action. I also have Mr. Benjamin who is a specialist on Soviet forgeries, and Mr. Peek is a technical specialist in forged documents. I have prepared a short opening statement which gives an overview of Soviet policy and practice in the field of propaganda and covert action. I am also providing the subcommittee with a detailed study of the subject I will be discussing today. That study contains actual case illustrations of Soviet policy in action which have been taken from our files in the CIA.

In July 1978, the Director of Central Intelligence provided this subcommittee with an unclassified study of Soviet foreign propaganda which was subsequently published by the subcommittee and made available to the general public. In my remarks today, I want to go beyond the 1978 report and discuss the role of both propaganda and covert action in Soviet foreign policy. In discussing Soviet policy and

practice, I will emphasize the following points: the special role the Soviets assign to propaganda and covert action in their foreign policy; the structure of the Soviet policymaking system which facilitates the use of propaganda and covert action as a foreign policy tool; the aims of Soviet policy and its focus on the United States as the primary target; the resources and assets available for implementing Soviet policy; and some of the standard methods and practices used in Soviet propaganda and covert action operations.

Role of propaganda and covert action in Soviet foreign policy. There is a tendency sometimes in the West to play down the significance of foreign propaganda and to cast doubt on the efficacy of covert action as instruments of foreign policy. Soviet leaders, however, do not share such beliefs. They regard propaganda and covert action as auxiliary instruments in the conduct of their foreign policy by conventional diplomatic, military, and economic means.

Soviet propaganda, for example, may be used to extol the virtues of communism and condemn the vices of capitalism, but it can be and usually is tailored to the specific objectives of the Soviet state's foreign and defense policy objectives.

As a case in point, I would cite the 1977-78 campaign by the Soviet Union and its allies against the United States enhanced radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, and the more recent propaganda assault on NATO's efforts to increase its long-range theater nuclear force, TNF, capabilities which began in late 1979.


We have here, Mr. Chairman, which I will make available to the committee, various posters which literally adorned every block and every wall in Western Europe as a part of the campaign against the TNF.



WORKERS WANT TO SEE PEACE IN EUROPE



World Federation of Trade Unions
Prague, October 1979



Covert political action and paramilitary activity are also regularly undertaken by Moscow. Clandestine interference in the affairs of a Third World government that brings a pro-Soviet Marxist regime to power, or arms delivered to a national liberation organization may be defended in Moscow on the grounds of promoting the U.S.S.R.'s revolutionary ideals, but the Kremlin also views such actions as contributing to the defeat of international imperialism and the enhancement of the Soviet state's power and influence. In fact, the very term which the Soviets use to describe covert action operations—active measures, Russian, *aktivnyye meropriyatiya*—denotes the essentially offensive purpose of such operations and is used to distinguish them from the more defensive objectives of regular intelligence collection and the counterintelligence functions of the Soviet Committee for State Security, KGB.

Active measures encompass a range of activities, the most important of which include the following: written and oral "disinformation"; forgeries, false rumors; "gray": unattributed; and "black": falsely attributed propaganda; manipulation and control of foreign media assets, manipulative political action and the use of "agents-of-influence" operations, clandestine radio stations, use of foreign Communist Parties and international front groups for pursuing Soviet foreign policy objectives, support for international revolutionary and terrorist organizations, the so-called national liberation movements, and even political blackmail and kidnaping.

Soviet policymaking: The enormous concentration of political power at the top of the Soviet hierarchy and the institutional arrangements that exist for formulating and implementing policy facilitate the use of propaganda and covert action as instruments of foreign affairs. Major policy decisions are made at the apex of the political system, in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The Politburo approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda and reviews potentially sensitive covert action operations. Under the Politburo's guidance, other party and government organizations play important operational and coordinating roles. These organizations include the Central Committee's International and International Information Departments, and the KGB. I have made available for hand-out a box chart of this policy organization under the Politburo which is available for you.

These organizations are supervised directly by the Politburo itself and are answerable only to the top leadership. General Secretary Brezhnev and senior Secretary Suslov, who sit on the Politburo, oversee the two Central Committee Departments. Boris Ponomarev, another party Secretary and a Candidate Member of the Politburo, has day-to-day responsibility for managing the International Department, and considerable influence over the other one. Yuriy Andropov, Chief of the KGB, is a full Member of the Politburo. This leadership structure enhances the Politburo's capability for integrating and coordinating foreign propaganda and covert action with the broader goals of Soviet foreign policy.

The International Information Department of the CPSU is the directing center of the Soviet propaganda effort. It was established in March 1978 as a direct result of a Central Committee decision to

reorganize the entire foreign propaganda apparatus, improve its effectiveness, and open a new propaganda offensive against the West. In effect, creation of this new organization signaled the top leadership's desire to place even greater emphasis on the role of propaganda in Soviet foreign policy and to increase centralized control and coordination over the entire Soviet propaganda network, insuring that the network is fully responsive to the demands of top policymakers and can be quickly mobilized to disseminate selected propaganda themes on a worldwide basis. The IID is headed by Leonid Zamyatin, former Director of the Soviet news agency Tass and a Brezhnev protege. Zamyatin is directly responsible to Brezhnev and the Politburo. The former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, Valentin Falin, is the First Deputy Chief of the IID.

The CPSU International Department maintains liaison with many foreign organizations that are frequently used to disseminate Soviet propaganda and views on international affairs. Those organizations include more than 70 pro-Soviet Communist Parties, international front groups, and "national liberation" movements.

The KGB provides a nonattributable adjunct to the overt Soviet propaganda network. Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate plans, coordinates and supports operations which are designed to back-stop overt Soviet propaganda using such devices of covert action as forgeries, planted press articles, planted rumors, disinformation, and controlled information media. In the early 1970's, this section of the KGB was upgraded from department to service status, an indication of its increased importance. Service A maintains liaison with its counterparts in the Cuban and East European services and coordinates its overall program with theirs.

Resources and assets for propaganda and covert action: Given the importance of propaganda and covert action in its foreign policy implementation, the U.S.S.R. is willing to spend large sums of money on its programs. Our rough estimate of \$3 billion per year is probably a conservative figure. Furthermore, the Soviets have established a worldwide network of agents, organizations and technical facilities to implement its programs. That network is second to none in comparison to the major world powers in its size and effectiveness.

The Soviets can also draw upon the services of their East European allies and Cuba to provide financial, technical and operational support for plans that are formulated by the Moscow Center. Reliable defector testimony as well as our own observations over the years confirm that in certain specialized areas of covert action such as the production of fabricated U.S. Government documents, some of the Soviet bloc intelligence services render invaluable aid to their senior partner in the Soviet Union.

The United States; the main target of Soviet propaganda and covert action: The United States has been the main target of Soviet propaganda and covert action since the early days of the postwar period, and nothing that has happened in recent years has changed that. Inside their own policymaking councils, the Soviets refer to us as the main enemy, in Russian, glavnyy protivnik. The content of Soviet propaganda and covert action targeted against the U.S. changes in accordance with

the issues of the day, but at all times reflects certain continuing objectives, among which we can list the following:

To influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military and political programs which are perceived as threatening the Soviet Union; to demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, colonialist and imperialist power; to isolate the United States from its allies and friends; to discredit those who cooperate with the United States; to demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world; to discredit and weaken Western intelligence services and expose their personnel; to confuse world opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet policies; to create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

Increased use of propaganda and covert action; Soviet forgeries: Based on our own observations of Soviet behavior, we believe that the USSR's use of propaganda and covert action to advance its foreign policy goals in the international arena has increased rather than declined in recent years. One reason for this is that the Soviets believe that detente in United States-Soviet relations, assuming for the moment that the term has not become an anachronism, creates new opportunities and a more favorable operational environment for such activities. The Soviets also believe that their relations with the United States have entered a new phase of competition, even before the invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting U.S. reaction, in which tougher tactics would be the order of the day. In analyzing the increased use of propaganda and covert action, we must also take into account the importance Moscow attributes to the "ideological struggle" in world politics, which encompasses not only competition in propaganda, but also psychological warfare and subversion. In the Soviet view, the role of the international ideological struggle increases rather than decreases in periods of detente. As one Soviet propagandist wrote recently:

Peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems not only does not mean peaceful ideological coexistence, but, on the contrary, presupposes the intensification of the struggle of ideas.

One of the major weapons the Soviets have chosen to use in intensifying ideological struggle and advance their foreign policy objectives at the same time is the use of forged documents. The increase of such forgeries in recent years is discussed in detail in the study I am submitting to the subcommittee, but I would like to summarize for you some of the findings of that study because of the scope and magnitude of the current forgeries effort, and because of the subcommittee's expressed interest in the subject.

It is an established Soviet practice to employ forgeries in covert action and psychological warfare operations against the United States. Of the some 150 anti-American forgeries produced by the Soviet Union and its East European allies in the postwar period, the most damaging ones have been fabrication of official-looking government documents and communiques. The Soviets also have manufactured personal letters which were allegedly written by U.S. officials and which purport to contain information regarding official policy. Previous studies prepared for the Congress by the Central Intelligence Agency documented 46 examples of Soviet and bloc forgeries which came to our attention from 1957 to 1965.

For a brief period in the mid-1970's, the Soviets reduced and then curtailed altogether their production of anti-U.S. forgeries. In 1976, however, they resumed using forgeries as an integral part of their covert action program, and major new forgeries have been appearing since then at a rate of four to five per year. Not only has the number of forgeries increased in recent years, but there also have been qualitative changes as well. The new spate of bogus documents includes high quality, technically sophisticated falsifications of a caliber which the Soviet and block intelligence services were evidently incapable of producing in the 1950's and even in the 1960's. The new forgeries are realistic enough to allow the Soviets to plant them in the western non-communist media with a reasonable expectation that they will be considered genuine by all but the most skeptical of recipients. These forgeries are intended to serve important strategic and tactical objectives of Soviet foreign policy, and they are designed to damage U.S. foreign and defense policies, often in very specific ways.

Furthermore, in two cases Soviet forgers directly attributed false and misleading statements to the President and Vice President of the United States, something they had refrained from doing in the past.

The suspected Soviet and bloc forgeries which have appeared since 1976 fall into three groups. A single forgery, a bogus U.S. Army field manual, has surfaced in more than 20 countries around the world and has received substantial media attention. Soviet propagandists have exploited it repeatedly to support unfounded allegations that the U.S. acts as the agent provocateur behind various foreign terrorists, in particular the Italian Red Brigades. A series of current forgeries, which now totals eight examples, has been aimed at compromising the United States in Western Europe and provoking discord in the NATO Alliance, especially in the context of the continuing Greek-Turkish dispute. Another current series of seven falsifications has been directed toward undermining our relations with Egypt and other countries in the Arab world.

Moscow's intensified use of forgeries appears to be aimed mainly at the United States and U.S. security relations in Europe rather than at our allies per se. We have no knowledge of forgeries being used, for example, against the interests of Western European governments outside the NATO context. The Soviets are probably trying to play upon perceived differences between the United States and the West Europeans while at the same time they wish to preserve the less damaged relations they have with the latter.

CONCLUSIONS

Overt propaganda and covert action are basic weapons in Moscow's foreign policy arsenal, and they are frequently employed in conjunction with traditional diplomatic methods to advance Soviet goals in the international arena. Those goals may be based primarily on ideological considerations, promoting "anti-imperialism", creating Soviet-style regimes, or on Soviet national security interests or some combination of the two, but ultimately they are intended to enhance the USSR's power and influence in world politics.

Policy decisions on major propaganda themes and campaigns are made, or at least approved, by the top Soviet leadership. When we

come across evidence of new propaganda initiatives, we can be reasonably certain that some lower-level echelon of the Soviet bureaucracy is not "doing its own thing" without the knowledge of the Politburo-level officials, and that key Soviet leaders regard such initiatives as an important element in their total foreign policy operations.

The scope and intensity of the Soviet propaganda activities have varied over time, but Moscow has been remarkably consistent in using time-tested techniques to shape foreign elite and public perceptions and to influence other countries' internal political processes. We believe that the ebb and flow results from temporary tactical adjustments and availability or lack of opportunities. We also believe that there is an upswing in the level of Soviet activity at the present time, reflecting Moscow's perception that it has entered a new phase of relations with Washington that requires sharper ideological conflict and tougher tactics.

Mr. McMAHON. With the committee's permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to place into the record the text of a study on Soviet covert action. The staff has this paper.

[See app. I, p. 59.]

Mr. ASPIN. OK, Mr. Ashbrook, do you have any questions?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, I have just had a chance to look for the first time at this outline of your presentation. It has many areas of particular interest, including the Soviet use of agents of influence.

Could we get the guidelines at the very outset? I think I have them in my mind, but so we will know what C.I.A. can and cannot do?

As it relates to Americans, you know, it goes without saying that if they, the Soviets, are doing all this, they are trying to influence and use Americans.

Is it the general position of CIA that you stop at the water's edge, and if there are questions about it, you can handle them, or what do you have as a position as it relates to the Soviet use of Americans to implement these goals and objectives?

Mr. McMAHON. Where we stop, sir, is at the edge of American persons. It is not the responsibility of the Agency.

Should we come to a situation where it is apparent that there is probable cause to suspect that a person is an agent of that foreign power, then we would flag that to the FBI for investigation.

Mr. ASHBROOK. In particular you mentioned the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the entity that maintains liaison with foreign Communist parties, international front groups, and then you referred to national liberation movements, which I guess I would more properly call in many cases international terrorist organizations. But whatever the euphemism we use, that is the general thrust of that group.

They do have an Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Communists Party in Cuba which plays the same role in the Western Hemisphere.

Can you tell us about that Americas Department?

Mr. PORTMAN. I will respond to that, Congressman. The Americas Department is now a part of the Cuban Communist Party. It formerly was an aspect of the intelligence and security complex. To a

large extent, the present organization was staffed with people from the former organization, and today it plays a role both in party relations and also in intelligence activities, particularly in covert action concerned with the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the United States.

I would say that probably in its current role it is closer to the model of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, which has both an intelligence function and professional relationships with foreign Communist Parties. The International Department of the Soviet Communist Party is almost exclusively a liaison body with foreign Communist parties, plus the manager of some of these front entities that we have talked about.

If you have some specific questions about the Americas Department, perhaps we could better focus on it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, that is why I wanted to ask that question at the beginning. Does the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party have anything to do with the United States as far as you know?

Mr. PORTMAN. The Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party is targeted on the United States as well as other parts of Latin America.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I guess that is kind of the thing that bothers me. It is targeted on us, but then you are not the people that can really tell us much about what they do, where they are successful, how they manifest their targeting. I think certainly it is not your fault and it is no problem you have. We talk about all this covert activity, forgeries, etc., but then we get to the place where we say how successful they are, who they are influencing, where they are coming from, but when we get to this country we draw a blank.

Mr. McMAHON. We don't draw a blank, sir. If the trail leads here, and it looks as if a person is an agent as opposed to an unwitting person who will often replay a story or a newspaperman will get a story.

Then we will do something about it. If it looks like a person in the United States is directly tied to a covert program, a covert action program by the Soviets or the American Department, then that would be the responsibility of the FBI, and we would alert them to it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. But you obviously don't sit there with a compartmentalized mind and say, all this is going on and I see what is going on until it gets to this country and then I say stop.

Mr. McMAHON. No, sir.

Mr. PORTMAN. We just aren't out primarily collecting information on what is going on in the United States; so most of the body of our information concerns their activities abroad.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, let's take a specific example and see where the trail leads and if it is a dead end. You identified the World Peace Council as the largest of the major Soviet front groups used in propaganda campaigns. Is that correct?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. All right. Does it or does it not have an American affiliate?

Mr. PORTMAN. It has an American affiliate.

Mr. ASHBROOK. The American affiliate is the U.S. Peace Council, is it not?

Mr. PORTMAN. Right.

Mr. ASHBROOK. The American affiliate of the World Peace Council, the U.S. Peace Council, had their founding convention just last fall. It was November 9 to 11 in Philadelphia, I guess that is why I raised the first point. You know, we are talking about action, we are talking about the largest of their front groups. They founded an American affiliate. They will obviously start the propaganda effort.

Now, is that important enough that you follow it or do you target that?

Mr. McMAHON. We would not target it, nor would we follow it, but the Bureau would be apprised and aware of any reporting we had to that end, and if they deem it is an illegal activity in the United States, then they would pursue it. I must point out that the Communist Party is a very legal institution in the United States.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes, and I followed what they did very carefully, looked at their agenda, and I doubt whether most of what they do is illegal but, the Supreme Court has found that the C.P.U.S.A. is controlled by the Soviet Union. As near as I could follow the speeches at the Philadelphia meeting, everything was done legal and above-board. But, we have this connection that very few, except the few of us in this room, probably know that here is an American affiliate of what you term the major Soviet international front organization in propaganda campaigns, and it goes on its merry way. I guess that is just a part of the problem we have in the west.

Mr. McMAHON. That is part of an open society, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I just wondered where you stopped insofar as your interest. And I just have one more quick question, and maybe I will take a second round because I would like to tell the chairman that I have not had time to review this, and I am sure he hasn't, and possibly sometime we will want to go through some of the contents, particularly some of these forgeries.

One forgery question I would have, and then I would relinquish my time, and I appreciate the members giving me a couple of extra minutes.

You provided us with a copy of a Soviet forgery, the U.S. Army field manual, at annex A-1, tab C. Are you aware that this forgery was published in the United States by Philip Agee in the January 1979 issue of Covert Action Information Bulletin?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir, we were.

Mr. ASHBROOK. You indicated both a Cuban and a Soviet role in the distribution of this forgery through a Spanish Communist who published the forgery in the magazine, *El Triunfo*. Could you tell us more about this.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes; the author of the *El Triunfo* article, Fernando Gonzalez, is a known member of the Spanish Communist Party who has been active in assorted Marxist causes, and continues to maintain a close contact with the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, particularly with Boris Grigoriyevich Karpov who has been involved with the KGB. Additionally, copies of the Gonzalez article were distributed to *El Triunfo* and various other Spanish publications by Luis Gonzalez Verdecia, a Cuban Embassy official and a known member of the Cuban Intelligence Service (DGI). The role of the Cuban DGI in the affair is consistent with Castro's actions on behalf of Soviet policy objectives regarding Spain.

Mr. ASHBROOK. And going back to the legal-illegal, this forgery being distributed in the United States would probably not be proscribed by any law. It is just something that can be done?

Mr. McMAHON. Not at the moment, it is not proscribed by any law that we know.

Mr. RAMSDALE. I would say, Congressman, that we did have a meeting with representatives of the Department of State, ICA, and the Department of Defense, and discussed the forgery offensive. We discussed in some detail FM-30-31B, called their attention to the existence of it as a forgery, gave them our analytical approach as to how we could prove it was a forgery, and in effect left to them the follow-up measures. But they were aware of what the situation was. I don't believe we had the FBI at that meeting.

Mr. PORTMAN. No.

Mr. RAMSDALE. But the information was disseminated in a formal study that we put together. The intelligence community was alerted to the forgery campaign.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I guess one of the things I wonder, and I will close on that, I subscribe to Covert Action Information Bulletin. I get it in Ohio. It comes through the U.S. mail. It would seem to me since we are involved in this confrontation, we ought to at least try to find some legal, constitutional ways to combat it. They clearly have the right to say what they wish under the first amendment. I am not sure that they would have the right to mail a forgery or things of that type.

Do people in the executive branch ever try to come up with legislation to combat our adversaries. Shouldn't we spend a little time and attention thinking of ways we could, without stifling free speech, prevent those people from sending that out?

Mr. McMAHON. It is apparent that our imagination has been dulled in the past few years, but I think you raise an excellent point, Mr. Ashbrook, and I guess what we need is to have aggressive support from those who would want to go after an article such as that. I think we are beginning to make headway in identities legislation and the different reliefs that we are now seeking from Congress and maybe the evolution to a curtailment of some of the material in the Covert Action Bulletin is very much in the offing.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, I just think all the other things that are banned from the mails, such as obscenity. As far as standing up and making a speech, I don't think there is any way you can prevent Agee from standing up and speaking or the World Peace Council through its affiliate from propagandizing this country, but do we have to sit back while they use the U.S. mail to send forgeries or things like that?

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If we are still around, I will take a second round of questions, but I have taken more than double my time. Thank You.

Mr. ASPIN. Not to worry.

Let me just ask a couple of questions, and then let me turn to the others.

Just, in your statement, Mr. McMahon—

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ASPIN. You said, for a brief period in the mid-1970's, the Soviets reduced and then curtailed altogether the production of anti-U.S. forgeries.

What was going on there?

Mr. McMAHON. Why don't I ask Mr. Benjamin. What was going on or what was not going on?

Mr. ASPIN. Why? Do we know?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Indirectly. We have some thoughts on this. In the early 1970's, the high point of detente, from the Soviet point of view, things were going good. Things went well until about the winter of 1975-76, when suspicions began to grow on both sides—on our side because of events in Portugal and Angola, on their side because of displeasure with the way arms control negotiations were going. So, we assumed that there was a reevaluation from the Soviet perspective in that period, that things weren't going their way and perhaps it was time for them to engage in more direct ideological conflict with the United States.

We also know that behind the scenes in the Soviet Union there were deliberations going on on how to increase the effectiveness of their foreign propaganda. Where forgeries, for example, come into this is that forgeries were often used to substantiate some of the more outlandish claims that are made in the official propaganda. We think that the increased use of forgeries may have been a stopgap measure, while the Soviets were planning to set up this new International Information Department to give their propaganda a slicker, more streamlined approach. There does seem to be correlation between their reevaluation of the general direction of Soviet-American relations and the sudden reappearances of these forgeries in particular.

Mr. ASPIN. Can you go back before the early 1970's, then? What has the history been of the use of forgeries before then, I mean, if there was a pause in that period and then an increase since. Fill me in from World War II. Basically what happened?

Mr. BENJAMIN. As a rule, or as sort of a gross number, we say there have been about 150 forgeries in the whole post-war period. They really began making forgeries in a very crude way in the late 1950's, and by crude I mean the forgeries were crude, the methods of surfacing them were crude. For example, they would manufacture false statements by Secretary of State Dulles, which would be written in German and then translated into poor English. The Soviets would then publish the English and German side by side in an East German newspaper. Well, that didn't fool anybody. Or they would use some rag in the Third World to surface these things.

Between the late 1950's and mid to late 1960's, we have been able to document about 50 documentary forgeries, not phony bank account statements and things like that, but documentary forgeries.

Soviet forgeries for the Third World is a whole different story. Things were going great guns there all through the 1960's. Most of this business was farmed out to the Czechs, for example, in Africa. They had specific purposes for compromising the Peace Corps, or they would be targeted on a particular Ambassador that the Soviets didn't like, that sort of thing. But as a rule this peters out. This peters out in the early 1970's, and for a period of from roughly 1972 to 1975 we have no example of a major new forgery. But there were one or two straws in the wind.

There is a precedent for the standdown during a period of high detente—we cite this in our study. I am not sure of the exact dates,

but in the months preceding the abortive Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit in Paris which blew up over the U-2 affair, there was clearly a standdown in a period which had otherwise been characterized by a high intensity use of forgeries. There was a clear standdown in the use of forgeries in the months preceding the summit, in May 1960, and after the summit the activity rose again to its previous high level.

Mr. ASPIN. Is it fair to say that the use of these things is a way of taking the temperature of detente on the Soviet side?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Precisely. These intelligence activities which occur in what we call the demimonde, which may be forgeries, harassing journalists in Moscow, things like that, they serve as a barometer of the general atmosphere of Soviet-American relations. From an analyst's point of view, that is their primary purpose.

Mr. PORTMAN. Of course, what we are talking about here, sir, is high level, politically directed forgeries. It is used constantly at the counterintelligence level, whether it is a period of detente or not. We are not talking about its use there. What we are talking about really are major forgeries that are aimed at influencing governmental foreign policy issues.

And also, I think you have to say that even though during this period in the mid-1970's when there weren't any major forgeries, most of the other types of covert action that we are talking about did go on. There was a selective standdown in an area that was or perhaps a higher risk from their point of view of interfering with the detente policies.

Mr. ASPIN. But if you were using items to take a measurement of Soviet detente as a barometer, you would say that these kinds of forgeries that you are talking about, plus harassment of journalists. What other things are you looking at?

Mr. PORTMAN. You are looking at practically this full range of things we are talking about here in this table of contents of our paper: The use of agents of influence, the passing of oral disinformation in the strategic or foreign policy areas and so forth. These actions impinge one on the other, and in one case the Soviets use a false document; in another case they will have a Soviet ambassador or a Soviet newsman or a third country agent pass a particular story or account.

Mr. McMAHON. I think it is important, Mr. Chairman, to keep in mind that, while you may have this ebb and flowing in forgeries or one particular type of covert action, we are dealing with a program in excess of \$3 billion, and the Soviet covert action program is relentless. It is on us 24 hours a day worldwide, and what we are talking about here are really the spikes in that system.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand.

Mr. RAMSDALE. I would also add one point. Mr. McMahan is absolutely right. That is, looking at Soviet doctrine, Marxist-Leninist doctrine: During times of detente you see no abatement of the ideological offensive, and on that basis you would not anticipate seeing a change in their covert action posture, at least most aspects of it. You might see a slowing down of paramilitary action, or you might see something else when there is a hot war aspect, but I don't think you would see the CA sword put back in the sheath.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just ask one more question, and then I will turn it over to Bill, and that has to do with—you are talking about here—

I have not looked at the stuff in the folder here, but you have here, for example, the forgeries which, since 1976, fall into three groups, and I am talking about that single forgery, the bogus U.S. Army field manual it says here, exploited repeatedly to support unfounded allegations that the United States acts as the agent-provocateur behind the various foreign terrorists, and particularly the Italian Red Brigades. I would have thought on the fact that that would be a tough thing to show. I mean, is that really what they are using the thing for? Are they convincing anybody of that?

Mr. PORTMAN. They are convincing a lot of people not only in the Third World but in some of the Western countries, too. Basically that forgery tries to show two things. It is a detailed field manual at a top secret level that General Westmoreland supposedly was to have assigned at the time that the Soviets put it out. One message states that the military and civilian security intelligence services of the United States, when they maintain liaisons abroad, use this as a cover to penetrate and manipulate the foreign governments. The second big message states that the United States establishes relationships with what appear to be leftist organizations and manipulates them in order to try to discredit communism and leftwing organizations. It is on this latter point that the Soviets then made accusations at the time that Aldo Moro was murdered in Italy—that the initial response of the Italian and the Western press was that it was the Red Brigades who murdered Moro, and the Red Brigades were far leftists who had ties with the Soviet Union. Stories circulated in Italy at the time that these Red Brigade members were trained in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets then, in reaction to this, among other things placed an article in the World Marxist Review, which is also called the Problems of Peace and Socialism, which is their international Communist journal. The Soviets wrote an article analyzing the situation in which they said that it was CIA that was secretly manipulating the Red Brigades who murdered Aldo Moro, the Soviets then cited the phony field manual as proof of this charge, because this field manual supposedly instructs CIA and the other services to get out and manipulate leftist organizations. So in this case the forgery was used to reinforce their allegation. The Soviet charge was picked up in some of the Italian press; a couple of the newspapers questioned it, but there were three or four of them that didn't.

Mr. McMAHON. Although the manual had some flaws in it, it was a very professional job and did have the forged signature of General Westmoreland, so the authenticity of the document was accepted on face value just because it looked real.

Mr. BENJAMIN. I raised the same question that you did once to an Italian lawyer I know, and I said, why would a man in Italy be convinced that the CIA might be behind the Red Brigades, because most people think if they are Red they are left. He said, you miss the point. He said, many people in Italy believe that the Red Brigades are black, that is Fascist, that they are controlled and manipulated by extreme rightwing groups that are supported and funded by CIA. For many people in Italy, it is a very logical connection between the two. It only remained for the Soviets to provide some kind of documentary basis for this.

Mr. RAMSDALE. Also, the rationale for us being interested in murdering Moro was that he was pushing the apertura a la siniestra, he was pushing the opening to the left. This is a very convoluted argument, but that was also woven in to some of the Soviet inspired propaganda.

Mr. ASPIN. What about the two other examples that you have got there? You don't say very much here in the statement, but the series of forgeries, which now totals eight, aimed at compromising the United States in Western Europe and provoking discord in the NATO Alliance, especially in the context of the Greek-Turkish dispute, what specifically are they doing there, and what is going on?

Mr. PORTMAN. This is not a Soviet campaign in and of itself. Forged documents are only used by the Soviets, as we have said, to in effect reinforce an aspect of other overt parts of their policy, diplomatic activity, propaganda and the rest of it. So we see during this period from, let's say, mid to late 1976 to the present, a series of forgeries appearing in Western Europe or around the NATO question, which are used to try to pick at the suspected weak points that we have.

I think if Jim reviews briefly the various documents here, you will see how they fit into the pattern.

Mr. BENJAMIN. There are too many, really, to go into any detail, but let me point out first of all, the field manual has been surfaced extensively by the Soviets in Western Europe, so it really fits into the NATO series as well.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, tell me just briefly, without going into each example, what is the thrust? I mean, I can't tell from what you have written here.

Mr. McMAHON. It demeaned the Greek government for not fulfilling its responsibility in NATO south.

Mr. RAMSDALE. Specifically, the most classic case was a mailing in December 1977. An anonymous mailing was made to several Greek publications of a U.S. Information Service handout, a bogus U.S. Information Service handout, of a speech attributed to President Carter. In the speech, the President was alleged to have made very negative references to the Greek government and its failure to meet its responsibilities in the NATO context.

So this was a very specific case in point, which was designed directly to strain United States-Greek relationships. In fact, it was published in several Greek papers.

Mr. McMAHON. The study which we have provided the Committee gives you this document, a copy of this document, this forgery.

Mr. RAMSDALE. There was another case. A phony State Department telegram was surfaced in 1976; a State Department telegram which spoke to the question of the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean. However, it overstated certain cases, understated others, misrepresented the U.S. position, and it was directly designed to exacerbate the perception of our policy with both Athens and Ankara. We also have that document in the study as one of the annexes.

Mr. PORTMAN. These individual forgeries are not coherent in and of themselves. I mean, all of them don't tie together. They hit different aspects.

One of the other ones that was in a series was a phony document that centered on a current question in Naples, Italy. There was a good

deal of controversy there about the risk of the storage of U.S. nuclear materials, in that area. The Soviets used one of these false documents to point out very obtusely that an epidemic situation then existing was related to the question of radiation, and so forth. The Soviets said that the radiation from U.S. weapons stored in the area would not affect the sea food that they were worried about growing there. In other words, this was an alleged letter by a U.S. official which appeared indirectly to confirm that the United States stored atomic weapons in the area. This was a point which the Italian Communist Party had been pushing in the Naples area.

The final forgery of this series, this last year was surfaced here in Washington. It was credited to the Chief of the U.S. Air Force Liaison Office, that handles foreign attaches here.

Mr. BENJAMIN. In this letter, this Air Force colonel allegedly confirmed that the United States dealt with Western allies in cooperation with the Chinese in supplying weapons in Zaire, in the Shaba Province bases. This was useful to the Soviets because it tied in with their propaganda allegations about China joining up with NATO, a collusion between the imperialists and the Maoists against Third World liberation movements.

This was an interesting forgery case in that this particular forgery was never publicly released. It was quietly handed to members of the Belgian Cabinet, I guess on the assumption that some Belgian politicians might be quite offended by this sort of thing and it would help them rethink their position in NATO.

Mr. ASPIN. Go ahead, Bill.

Mr. YOUNG. What do we do about a forgery like the "President's speech"? Whatever we do, do we do it surreptitiously? Do we call up the Prime Minister and tell him, or do we go public? What do we do? How do we handle that?

Mr. McMAHON. Well, there is no blanket answer, but what we usually do is go to the country or countries that the covert action is intended to influence and expose that document as a phony. In fact, Dr. Peek here has traveled worldwide doing just that, talking to heads of state and showing them the flaws in the document and why it is not valid.

Don, you might want to comment on that.

Mr. PEEK. We have two problems involved in the handling of these forgeries. The first problem is to establish that the document cannot be true, and the second problem is who actually did it.

The first problem is relatively easy to handle because it is very, very difficult to make a document absolutely perfect in every aspect. But it is relatively easy to hide your national identity, your personal identity, when you do this. So we can normally demonstrate to a foreign country or government that a document cannot be true, and then we cite evidence as to who actually did it.

We use different techniques in handling this. One of them is the forensic science approach, which is my basic field. Second is format analysis, where we find the faults in the format of the document. Third, we get into content analysis. We analyze the thrust of the document, who will benefit from it. Then we get to modus operandi analysis, and we have established the Soviet MO very thoroughly.

We use all of these here to establish the document cannot be authentic, and then who actually did it.

We present the evidence as we find it and let the evidence draw the conclusion as to who actually did it, and invariably, when hearing the evidence and the number of people involved, the potential players in this league, they come to the right conclusion, that it was a Soviet or Soviet bloc forgery.

Mr. YOUNG. But in the case of the "President's speech" that you said was published in several Greek journals, then did you go public with some type of a story in a similar publication?

Mr. PORTMAN. The embassy in Athens made a statement denying that it was authentic. I believe the departmental spokesman over in State also made a statement here.

The general approach we have is three-fold. One is defensive. We supply the embassies abroad with background studies on these things to try to explain to them what is going on, on the Soviet techniques, and the ways of recognizing these forgeries. If forgeries surface in a foreign newspaper, it is important to try to nail it right away for what it is. We rely on the embassies to try to make statements on it.

Second, we do the same thing at the Washington level. And then we do what John McMahan just pointed out. We try to get whatever information is necessary to the affected government, to convince it that a forgery is involved. This also often involves Don Peek going up to make a technical presentation to the affected government to try to cauterize the problem.

You can never catch up completely with a surfaced forged document, and the Soviets know that. That is one of the reasons why they keep floating them, even though they know we will deny it. These documents are real.

One other aspect that has come up recently, to get back to an earlier question from Representative Ashbrook. The Soviets have prompted some of their foreign news contacts—particularly this came up in the field manual where it appeared in so many countries—to contact some persons in the United States to get conflicting statements. Former Air Force Colonel Prouty, Agee himself, and a couple of others, were contacted by some foreign journalists. They were told that the U.S. Government has denied that this field manual is an authentic document; what do you think? These people then made statements saying: Well, I don't know specifically, but according to my experience the U.S. Government does this type of thing, and so forth.

So when the Covert Action Information Bulletin was previously cited, we should note that one of the issues published the field manual forgery. Another issue of that magazine also went through an analysis on why the U.S. denial of its authenticity was a fabrication in and of itself.

Mr. YOUNG. The fact that the Soviet forgery activity has increased considerably, what does that mean to you? Does that indicate anything at all, or are you still wondering what it means?

Mr. McMAHON. It comes back to our basic assessment of the Soviets. They are always after us. They are relentless. What we are saying about the forgeries is: Sometimes the Soviets use them and sometimes they don't, but when you look at the \$3.3 billion program of covert

action and propaganda targeted against the United States, the Soviets are constant. So, the forgeries are really not that significant in this context. And I really think the Soviets are seizing an opportunity. It is just like Radio Baku when Iran started to go to pieces and the Soviets started broadcasting. Radio Baku was bitter and vitriolic against the United States and inciting the Iranians against the United States. What the United States did was call in Dobrynin and asked that they cease. Well, they did. The radio tuned down somewhat right after that.

But, the important thing is that the Soviets seized upon that opportunity to immediately jump on it. I think what we see in the forgeries is that an opportunity presents itself. A country is considering something, and the Soviets take advantage of it.

Mr. YOUNG. It is very interesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTMAN. There's probably two parallel levels here. Each one of these forgeries, as we said, is a tactical move in a larger campaign, but at this particular time it would be useful to surface this particular forgery to reinforce what we—the Soviets—are trying to accomplish in this campaign.

One could also look at it from a different perspective and say that there have been a series of forgeries built up after that hiatus, in which they have been pushing the U.S. Government a little more aggressively, a little more aggressively. Also, not just in forgeries. You will see a good deal of step-up in some of these other covert action activities that we are talking about, too, the radio being one of them. I suppose the Soviets push until they reach a threshold.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, let me mention a though. When they invaded Afghanistan, I was convinced that this was sort of an announcement to the world that they were declaring their superiority, that they were no longer afraid of what our reaction would be because they did feel superior.

Does anybody in the intelligence community have any feeling like that, that maybe the Soviets have finally reached the point where they believe they are superior, and they could care less now what the rest of the world thinks about their expansions?

Mr. McMAHON. I think you will find many views. It was obvious that the Soviets did not think there would be the world reaction that there was. I think they just underestimated everyone's reaction, including ours.

Mr. PORTMAN. We have recently had a report of a Soviet official abroad making a statement to a non-American, which essentially was that the U.S. reaction, the Olympic boycott, the whole rest of the business, was all posturing, he felt, and that the United States just would have to recognize that it was a second class power now and live with it.

Now, this is a very provocative statement. I wouldn't go so far myself as to say that that was the reason they moved into Afghanistan. I think the reason has to do with their own security interests on their border and instability, which they can't tolerate there. But yes, they take advantage across the board, in various ways, of any of these things that occur.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, in your own statement here, which Mr. Aspin referred to, since 1976 their covert action forgeries have become an

integral part of the covert action campaign, and now you are getting four to five every year. That is not very much for \$3,300 million, is it?

Mr. McMAHON. No, not unless you choose your time and place for doing it, and often if you can get one vote or a parliament to pass over something or set it aside, you have achieved a tremendous objective. So that is all they needed.

Mr. PORTMAN. I would point out, of course, that while forgeries are attractive and an interesting part of the total program, just from the standpoint of money it represents a very small part of the total program. Much bigger items would be the clandestine radios, major support to the international Communist Parties and front organizations and this sort of thing.

Mr. BOLAND. I notice that listed on the expenditures of the \$3.3 billion, you have got Tass for \$550 million. You have got Pravda, \$250 million, and Izvestsia for \$200 million. I don't know whether or not they ought to be included. Should they? They are just propaganda papers anyhow for the Russian Government, aren't they?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, for the Soviet Government and Party, but you said the key point, they are propaganda and they are used to push the party line or to counter developments which the Soviets feel are inimical to their interests. We particularly are concerned with their propaganda value abroad.

Mr. BOLAND. All right. Of all the forgeries you have now, which was the most difficult to counter and which was the most successful, would you say, of the Soviet forgeries?

Mr. PEEK. I would say the field manual 30-31B was the most successful because they have replayed it in many different countries, in fact in practically every continent in the world, and it was played in the press. Some of their other campaigns went to governmental figures. Their campaign in the Mideast against President Sadat was probably counterproductive because the Egyptian Government is now fully aware of who is doing the forgeries, and when the last one appeared, they reacted immediately, saying this has to be a forgery.

Mr. BOLAND. What did the last one say? Was that the interview with Mondale?

Mr. PEEK. No, it is the third forgery using the name of Herman F. Eiles on it. This is a letter to Admiral Turner which was also surfaced in Damascus.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, the interview with Mondale wasn't very destructive, was it? He only, it seems to me as I try to read it here, part of it, it would seem to me the only significant part of it was a reference to the fact that Begin had a terminal illness and that Sadat, really had no control over Egypt.

Was that about the most significant part of that forgery?

Mr. RAMSDALE. That is true, why we highlighted it, aside from the simply quantitative analysis, was the fact that the Soviets had actually forged something saying it was by the Vice President. We thought that was an assault.

Mr. PORTMAN. But you are dealing here with two very large figures, both with Sadat and Begin, and when the Vice President of the United States makes nasty and derogatory comments about both their physical health and their ability to control their country, from the

Soviet point of view this was gaged to have considerable personal vendetta impact there, and therefore they were expecting, I believe, that these two figures would then very personally negatively react against the United States.

Many of the forgeries are aimed at this knife thrust on a personal level. The field manual was something that was big and was available to be used time and again to prove the United States did these nasty things, but a lot of the Soviet forgery operations are very stiletto like.

Mr. BOLAND. How quick is your reaction time to a forgery?

Mr. PEEK. It would be within 24 hours if we get notified promptly. We can react—if there is someone to react with, who will provide the document, give it to us and allow us to examine it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. When the Soviets produce a forgery or propaganda campaign, following up on my previous point, do you follow it when it blows back in the United States? Obviously Dr. Peek, or others, might go to the head of state or whoever is involved, but when it starts coming back to our country, aside from just the covert action, do you attempt to follow it as it filters back to our press?

Mr. RAMSDALE. I think in that case, as I mentioned earlier, when we are aware of the forgery, we will alert the concerned governmental agencies that a forgery has taken place.

Mr. ASHBROOK. That is the FBI.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, also the State Department, the Pentagon in the case of the manual, and I would assume they would follow it here in the United States if there was any need to.

Mr. RAMSDALE. In the case of the FM 30-31, the Department of Defense made a public statement.

Mr. McMAHON. But the answer is no, we would not follow it other than to alert the entities of government concerned here at the United States.

Mr. ASHBROOK. In what cases would you alert the FBI on something coming back to the United States of that type. Would there be such a case?

Mr. PORTMAN. There are two studies in our paper here on the anti-TNF campaign and the antineutron bomb campaign. Our studies here are entirely concerned with what the Soviets were doing in Europe and abroad. Certain things presumably were going on in the United States, too, and it is the responsibility of the Bureau to follow that. Within the context of these campaigns, when we have noticed a specific development, we have made an intelligence report to the Bureau and other people about it so that they are aware of it. But as far as following Soviet covert action into the States, no.

Mr. ASPIN. We are going to adjourn for a quick one down and vote. [A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Aspin asked that we continue in the interests of time. He is coming right back up. So I will continue with a couple of questions.

I noticed in particular on the peace conference in Philadelphia, that there were some members of the Communist Party from throughout the world who had come in.

Does that put it in a little bit different context?

Mr. McMAHON. No, sir, not as far as the covering of that conference. If we had such information, we would certainly report to the FBI

that we had information to that end, that these people were traveling to attend this conference, but as far as what they do while they are here, that is the Bureau's responsibility.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, for example, one of the main speakers was Mr. Chandra, who is president of the World Peace Council, which of course you have identified as the largest of the major Soviet front groups in propaganda campaigns. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India. The fact that he was coming in for the founding of the American affiliate, this organization, does that interest you? Or are you interested in what he says?

Mr. McMAHON. If comments made by him were published overtly, we would certainly follow it as far as whatever he said, but as far as covering his activities here or worrying about his activities, it would not be our responsibility.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, I guess that is what I wondered, how you handle this.

In your prepared statement you very clearly laid out what you called the objectives, the continuing objectives of the Soviet Union. No. 9 is the United States is the main target of Soviet propaganda and covert action. You went through about eight major points. If a speaker would come in and in effect what he said was a part of continuing that propaganda and action against what you referred to as the main enemy, this country, you just kind of drop off, you don't worry that much about it?

Mr. McMAHON. If there was not a public document which would permit us to hear or review what he said but the Bureau did cover it from their own concern about an agent of a foreign power, if there were foreign intelligence information in that document or in his statement, then the Bureau would disseminate that to us as foreign intelligence. But again, we would not pick that individual up until he was back overseas and follow his activities there.

But a great deal of the Soviet covert action and propaganda program is devoted to counter or lessen U.S. interests worldwide. The large preponderance of it is worldwide because that is where the Soviets want to influence people against the United States. We follow this.

As to the degree of Soviet influence within the United States, I would have to defer to the Bureau on that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, the one thing I was thinking, you are detecting the ebb and flow of their propaganda drive, their effort to influence world opinion. If at a U.S. Peace Council meeting like that, they had a number of representatives of Foreign Communist Parties, it would seem like what they say would be a barometer of whether it was that ebb period or that flow period, or an indication of a new all-out assault. They come in and say, one of the things we have to do is make sure the American people understand X, Y, Z. This may be a new propaganda drive.

I guess one of the first things that I expressed an interest in when I went on to this committee is how things seem to fall through the cracks in the floor and where one drops off, another picks up, sometimes it doesn't get picked up. It just seems to me there is a continuity of interest there that constitutionally and otherwise you might be in-

hibited from following, but I am just wondering, out in the real world how you really do these things without things falling through the cracks.

Mr. PORTMAN. Well, it works. For example, this last year there was a meeting of the World Peace Council Executive here in Washington, D.C., in which Boris Ponomarev came out—he came to the United States ostensibly as the chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Soviet Parliament and made an official visit here to this body, in fact, but that whole trip was engineered in order to allow him to be here with some of his colleagues in order to hold this meeting of the World Peace Council in Washington, something they had never done before.

Well, we knew what was being planned, what it was, and we disseminated that information to the State Department, to the White House, to the Bureau, to tell them what was coming up and what it was about, and what the idea was, and we got some afteraction reports on it and these reports were also disseminated to the pertinent parts of the U.S. Government. What the WPC actually did here, we read in the newspaper, plus what information we got from the Bureau concerning whatever they had been able to cover on it.

But our charter is not to keep following Boris Ponomarev and his friends into the States, and what they are exactly doing and saying while they are here. We keep track of their activities abroad; the FBI is concerned with their actions in the United States.

Mr. ASHBROOK. To the best of your knowledge, in your opinion as responsible people in this field that we are studying now, then, your answer, and I assume that of others, is that it has worked and you don't feel like you are unduly inhibited from keeping abreast of all of the developments of the Soviet effort to subvert and propaganda in this country?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. Ashbrook, I think that it is important that the CIA devote its energies to the foreign targets and our activities be confined to overseas. What foreign Communists do in the United States is a question of national security. And certainly it is a valid responsibility for the the FBI.

Now, we have good coordination and dialog with the FBI. There are not many things that are not covered between us.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, I would hope in future hearings we could some way or other have time devoted to the FBI's role, how they follow up on this matter of the Soviet effort to propagandize and influence within the United States.

That basically would be the questions I have. I would think it would be appropriate and interesting for the record if we would include the conference agenda of the U.S. Peace Council, along the lines we were talking about, and the Covert Action Information Bulletin that carried the forgery, as part of the record.

Mr. ASPIN. Without objection.

[The information referred to appears in appendix II, p. 176 and appendix III, pp. 186-189.]

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. McMahon, let me ask you a couple of questions.

It is still not clear to me—I am trying to get a fix on the relative magnitude of this, and I guess you have to say compared to what, but

in the \$3.3 billion covert action budget which the Soviets have, how is that broken down, and into what kind of things they spend their money on?

Mr. McMAHON. Well, as Mr. Boland mentioned, you have Izvestia, Pravda and the New Times, Novosti, Tass.

Mr. ASPIN. Are those paid for entirely out of these covert action propaganda accounts? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir. Tass is \$550 million, and you have Novosti, which is another \$500 million. Pravda we estimate takes about \$250 million a year. Izvestia takes \$200 million a year, New Times \$200 million a year.

Mr. ASPIN. So altogether we are talking about \$1.6 million, for propaganda?

Mr. McMAHON. Right, and then on top of that you have the Radio Moscow foreign service which runs, by our estimates, \$700 million a year.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Mr. McMAHON. Then you have a variety of smaller activities such as the KGB foreign residencies, we estimate \$100 million a year; the support to the national liberation fronts \$200 million a year; the special programs, such as for the anti-neutron bomb, we figured that the Soviets put \$100 million into that, and they put another \$100 million into their counter-TNF program.

Then they have the support to the two different international departments under the CPSU which runs about \$150 million. The press sections in the various Soviet embassies around the world spend, by our estimates, about \$50 million a year. And then their clandestine radios, such as Radio Baku, runs another \$100 million.

So all added up, we have them tapped for \$3.363 billion.

Mr. PORTMAN. These figures are not necessarily all that is spent, for instance, on Tass and Novosti. This is our best estimate; what is probably primarily devoted to foreign propaganda and related activities. Radio Moscow is a mammoth organization. They recently set up their world service. This does not take care of all of Radio Moscow. We are trying to approximate in dollar terms what they are doing.

You can look at it from other ways to try to get a picture of the totality. For instance, in their placement of articles in foreign newspapers, as Mr. McMahon mentioned, the activities of the press sections of the foreign embassies, when an important document comes up or an official makes a speech, the Soviets will make a news handout abroad.

Mr. ASPIN. Essentially, I guess, all this money is really propaganda related, isn't it?

Mr. McMAHON. It is what we would term a covert action program.

Mr. ASPIN. But it is propaganda as opposed to some other type.

Mr. PORTMAN. The first part of it is. When you get down to the KGB Service A, that is all covert action operations.

Mr. McMAHON. Agents of influence, the infrastructure associated with covert action.

Mr. PORTMAN. And the CA operations by KGB foreign residencies also would fit this category.

So, essentially what you are talking about it \$150 million on covert action type activities that are not really propaganda, although some of it may have to do with press placements and so forth. Then you are

talking in terms of front activities which again aren't propaganda always, but are organizations and meetings and all that type of thing.

So, I would say that probably you are talking in terms here of maybe \$3 billion primarily propaganda, and maybe \$363 million, just roughly breaking it down, as being more traditional covert action.

Mr. ASPIN. And I take it that the forgeries play a larger part in the role of this Soviet propaganda activity.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes; that is the case.

Mr. ASPIN. Were the Khrushchev memoirs authentic?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. You had nothing to do with them, no doctoring, no changes?

Mr. PORTMAN. No.

Mr. ASPIN. But in terms of the Khrushchev memoirs themselves were they genuine, did that baby really come out of Russia? Do you believe that came off the pen of Nikita Khrushchev?

Mr. PORTMAN. There is no question of CIA doctoring the memoirs.

Mr. McMAHON. We were not there.

Mr. PORTMAN. This came out through Victor Louis. Victor Louis is a witting collaborator of the KGB. He provided it. On the basis of the analysis which we did in the Agency, and on the basis of analysis which was done I believe at Colombia University by Time Magazine or one of these other firms that paid for it, it appears that in fact it is Khrushchev's voice on the recordings. As to whether the KGB or anyone else doctored some part of it, I can't say. All that I can assure you is that we in no way doctored it.

Mr. ASPIN. How about the Khrushchev speech denouncing Stalinism before the whatever Presidium that was?

Mr. PORTMAN. The Twentieth Party Congress.

Mr. ASPIN. The Twentieth Party Congress. I mean, the claim has been made in several places that Mr. Angleton added several paragraphs to Mr. Khrushchev's prose.

Mr. PORTMAN. The version which was made public was in fact the original version as we had it. It was not doctored.

Mr. ASPIN. The one that appeared in the New York Times.

Mr. PORTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. That was the original, undoctored.

Mr. PORTMAN. The speech was distributed by the Soviets to some of their own people and some of their allies and some foreign Communist Parties. So again, we can't be absolutely certain that every word in that speech was actually delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress, but the version that was made public was not amended or subtracted by the Agency.

Mr. ASPIN. How about the version that was distributed by us in Eastern Europe? The allegation was that we added a few paragraphs and distributed a slightly different version than that which appeared in the New York Times, and got that into circulation. Did we doctor that a little?

Mr. PORTMAN. No sir. There were various versions that were distributed by the Soviets in Eastern Europe which, from the copies that we saw appeared to be the same as the one that was made public here in the States.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I notice in your estimate, one interesting thing which follows the line of questioning I had earlier: Subsidies for foreign Communist Parties, \$50 million.

How much of that do you trace back to the United States?

Mr. PORTMAN. You mean subsidies to the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes; foreign Communist Parties. There was a time, I remember, in the Internal Security Committee, we have some testimony that the Soviet Union bought a number of thousands of copies of the Daily Worker which they paid for as an indirect subsidy. Those of us who watch the Soviets know those kinds of subsidies. But what do you trace, or can you trace as a subsidy with that \$50 million to the United States?

Mr. PORTMAN. We did not trace any of it in our study. In some cases we know how much subsidies are paid by the Soviets to some foreign Communist Parties. I am not going to identify which ones they are. And on the basis of the size and significance of those Communist Parties and the abilities of other Communist Parties to make their own ends meet as far as their own ability to get funds, we have estimated that we think worldwide the Soviets in direct subsidies are putting into other Communist Parties.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, again, that is one of those things that falls through the cracks that I was talking about earlier. If there is \$50 million spent, if you are right there, it stands to reason from what you said that we are their main enemy, that a certain amount of it would be spent here.

Now, after saying that, is there any interest in whether or not it really happens?

Mr. McMAHON. Probably not since the Communist Party functions openly in the United States, and I am sure it can receive funds from anybody as long as they duly report it, by law.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I hope that you do not accept the idea that the Communist party is a legitimate party. We have worked on this over a period of time and we know that they aren't. We have shown that they have direct money coming in from the Soviet Union, shown that they are really an instrument of Soviet policy. Even the Supreme Court pointed this out in the case of *Communist Party v. S.A.C.B.* I mean, you said we are in a real vital fight with these people. Has it ever occurred to us that if we ever put all the evidence together, another court would come to the same conclusion. But I suppose with the rules we play, we don't ever think about it, except people like me.

Mr. McMAHON. Well, again, I think your comment of talking to the Bureau on this point is the proper place to direct that question. We just cannot respond to it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. So your testimony, Mr. McMahon, is that you pay attention to none of that.

Mr. McMAHON. We do not trace any of it to the United States.

Mr. ASHBROOK. But from everything you have said in your testimony, we are the main enemy, it is an important facet of their economic, military propaganda, and so forth. It would take all the intelligence that it takes to get out of the way of a moving locomotive to know that part of the \$50 million finds its way here some way, I

would guess. That is what I mean by things that fall between the cracks. I mean, every time I follow something, it falls between the cracks. I guess that is what makes me wonder.

Mr. McMAHON. Well, I think you only have one player of a two-player game. We can get intelligence and we can pass it on to the Bureau. What the Bureau does with it here in the United States is far beyond our purview of our responsibility, legitimately.

Mr. ASHBROOK. There may not have been any of the followup by CIA with the FBI, or you don't know it.

Mr. McMAHON. We don't know. We turn it over to them and they have to react to it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. This would be one of those areas that I mentioned in the previous question, again you have to say, well, maybe in this area it didn't. You just don't know.

Mr. McMAHON. It may not. It is up to the Bureau to put the resources on what they feel are agents of foreign powers, and whether they are putting them on the KGB here, or on the Communist Party, or Cubans, or what have you, we just don't get in that loop. We are not privy to that kind of information.

Mr. ASHBROOK. OK. Well, that probably opened up as many questions in my mind as it solved, but maybe we can take those up at a later time.

Mr. Chairman, that would be the kind of questions I would have, with the caveat that I would like at some time after I look at this to maybe go through some of these things again. But thank you for the information.

Mr. McMAHON. We will be happy to do that.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask you a couple more questions.

On a couple of the areas of—I am thinking of recent things that the Soviets might have taken advantage of if they were really on their toes and really running a red-hot propaganda operation.

Is there any evidence that the Soviets had a hand in the perception, the misperception in the Islamic world that the United States was somehow behind the seizure of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the thing that caused the embassies to be sacked?

Mr. McMAHON. Right after that happened there were a series of reports that the United States was in back of that, and in fact we do know that on several occasions the United States was wrongfully accused of being anti-Islamic.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, I am asking for the Soviet connection to that. I mean, I know that the word was out and that caused the riots.

Mr. McMAHON. Radio Baku played that theme.

Mr. PORTMAN. If you shift to the attack on the Embassy at Islamabad, we can be more specific.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, I thought that was the followup from that.

But go ahead, talk about that.

Mr. PORTMAN. In the case of the attack on the Embassy in Islamabad, there is no conclusive evidence that I am aware of that the Soviets specifically fomented or directed the attack. There is a good deal of evidence that they tried to exploit the situation after it occurred, and we have a number of reliable reports that various Soviets, in particular known KGB officers, tried to get two messages across. One was

to convince American officials abroad, American diplomats primarily, that the attack on the Embassy was led by Pakistani Army personnel in civilian clothes; second, to tell us that Pakistan therefore was an unreliable ally and that we should realize this. The Soviets passed a somewhat similar story in personal contacts, and this gets into the oral disinformation sphere that we covered in the paper. They passed similar stories to third country diplomats concerning the false "facts" that the Pakistani Government really was aware of the attack and was involved in it, and that the Pakistani Government purposely did not come in time to the aid of our Embassy.

In each of these cases that I am aware of, we had a KGB officer passing these bits and pieces of comments. I would classify this as oral disinformation aimed at furthering Soviet interests in splitting the United States and Pakistan apart.

Mr. ASPIN. How about the specifics of trying to stir up the Muslim world against the United States on the ground that the United States was behind the seizure of the mosque at Mecca?

Mr. PORTMAN. As far as I know, that charge came out in the National Voice of Iran, which is a Soviet clandestine transmitter. There is no direct evidence that the Soviets were behind the attack on the mosque. Iranian spokesmen made some charges that the United States was responsible, but again, I am not aware of any direct evidence that the Soviets put the Iranians up to it. It appears as if the Libyans, the Iranians, and the Soviets all took the same line roughly, for their own reasons.

Mr. ASPIN. I would have thought that the Soviets might have tried to exploit the hostage situation in Iran.

Mr. PORTMAN. The Soviets have been careful, sir, as to what they have said and done openly on diplomatic hostage situations. They have their own embassies abroad which are somewhat vulnerable. With a lot of the terrorist attacks over the last few years, by various Arab groups and others, on diplomats, and aircraft hijackings, there is good reason to believe that the Soviets, particularly their field officers who feel themselves vulnerable, are not really moving into that area. I wouldn't say that they never engage in manipulation of terrorists, but the body of information is that they aren't moving in to exploit diplomatic terrorist situations, for obvious reasons.

Now, in the case of Afghanistan, we see all kinds of Soviet disinformation coming out. You see the stories that Amin was a CIA agent. A most recent example of Soviet disinformation occurred the other day when a Soviet Foreign Ministry official said that the DC-10 airliner that the Afghan airline bought a year ago was a gift from the U.S. Government. So there is plenty of disinformation.

Mr. McMAHON. This ties in with the Soviet claim of Amin being our agent, but the Soviets have also, you know, recently identified 45 alleged CIA employees in Athens. But I think what took the wind out of a lot of the Soviet sails was the U.S. restraint in Iran, and that had a muting effect, I think, throughout the Islamic world. As time went on they began to think, maybe the United States is trying to work this out.

Mr. ASPIN. It just seems—maybe I don't know a lot about these things, and this has been a very interesting session in terms of learn-

ing more, but it just seems to me that when you look at the Soviet effort, that there is a tendency on their part very often to try and sell a story which, if not implausible, is certainly a difficult one to sell, that the CIA is behind the Red Brigades, or that Amin is a CIA agent, and yet pass up something that seems to be very easy to sell, namely, that the United States is behind the seizure of the mosque at Mecca. And it seems to me——

Mr. McMAHON. You have got to remember the Saudis moved in quickly and disclaimed it. The Saudis identified who those people were.

Mr. ASPIN. But not until two of our embassies had gotten sacked before that happened.

Mr. McMAHON. But the Saudis made the statement early on that said that this is an internal Saudi problem. No other outside government is involved, and they literally sealed the country.

Mr. ASPIN. No; I wasn't thinking of playing it in Saudi Arabia, I was thinking of playing it in the rest of the Muslim world.

Mr. PORTMAN. One aspect of this that you have to take into consideration is the Soviet covert action system itself, which we have described as extremely centralized. Field officers are given very little leeway to take initiatives. Almost everything is considered at the center, in Moscow, and it is worked up in aspects of Soviet foreign security policy. So the Soviets are in a position to react and act quickly if it is something that is in their game plan. But if an event occurs out of the blue which doesn't automatically fit within the existing guidance game plan, there is no KGB chief of residency that is going to take an initiative, and it will take considerable time back in Moscow before the Soviets can go forward with something. In fact, that is one of the main reasons that this International Information Department was set up in 1978, when Zamyatin was taken out of Tass and brought in to head this new department, because the reaction time was too long and they weren't properly selling themselves abroad, they felt, and they weren't reacting properly to situations. As a result, the Politburo empowered Zamyatin and his first deputy Falin, who was for many years, Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, to make decisions on the spot. After that, you will recall, they had some press conferences with some American newsmen and some other ones in Moscow where they were prepared right on the spot to make decisions and comments, which was a situation which had not occurred that often before. But the Soviets haven't yet completely worked it out in the field, so that they can react equally well there.

So, if an attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca comes up, which wasn't part of what they had in their game plan, it would take the Soviets some time to react to it. On the other hand, in the case of the situation of the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, which I have talked about, the Soviets have a standard line in a case like this: Always attempt to push the United States and its allies or friends apart. The line that came out after the Islamabad attack aimed at trying to preclude the United States and Pakistan from working together in the future. That they could handle, but the Arabian business was different and more difficult.

Mr. ASPIN. Bill, do you have any questions?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I just want to ask a question.

Do you know Dimitri Simes?

Mr. BENJAMIN. We know who he is.

Mr. PORTMAN. Down at Ray Cline's institute downtown.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It was about 6 years ago when he came over here. His specific information that he gave to us, was that when he was at the U.S.A. Institute, he knew specific examples of subsidization of the American Communist Party by the Soviet Union. That is like one of those many things that falls through the cracks and never gets followed up on, and we all lean back and say we don't know anything about it. There was a specific person who could tell about it, told about it, and again, that was in a Republican administration. It just seems like the same thing happens.

Mr. ASPIN. I don't know, just keep voting those Democrats.

Herb, you have some questions no doubt.

Mr. ROMERSTEIN. Yes; thank you.

You have indicated that Soviet overt propaganda and their covert propaganda are tied very tightly together.

Why do they have such an ability to coordinate this?

Mr. PORTMAN. The way the Soviet system works, you have essentially a Politburo member who can act for the whole, who is responsible for overseeing an area, and when the Politburo wants to move on something, the designated Politburo member can move with file authority and cut through redtape, as Mr. McMahon was saying. If Boris Ponomarev, speaking in his role as the vice chairman of the Politburo's Commission on Foreign Policy—which is headed by Suslov, but Suslov is an old man and is nearly blind and doesn't take an active role on a day-to-day basis—if Boris Ponomarev wants something done, all he needs to do is call, let's say, the chief of service A in the KGB and say he wants something done. That man is only going to refer this back to Andropov if it is a matter of some internal problem. But otherwise, he knows that Boris Ponomarev speaks for the foreign policy line and he will salute and do it because of the authoritarian system they have.

Mr. ROMERSTEIN. In the international labor area, for example, a local Communist trade union would be subsidized by the WFTU and could have important Communist world trade union figures come in to help them. Is that right?

Mr. McMAHON. The Soviet Union spends \$63 million a year on a variety of international organizations, just sustaining them for the purpose of propaganda and covert action. Trade unions would fit in here.

Mr. ASHBROOK. What about the personnel situation in CIA? Are you getting good new people hired today?

Mr. McMAHON. To that end, Mr. Ashbrook, we are doing very well at bringing people on board. We are getting excellent career trainees, and it is interesting that they have an aura of patriotism about them that I haven't seen around the United States recently. I think the "me" generation is gone, but the young talent that we are getting on board are dedicated to the service of our country, and it is the most gratifying experience I have seen in years, and they are first rate, top flight people.

Mr. ASHBROOK. And then you have got all those regulations, guidelines and everything else.

Mr. McMAHON. And we trust the legislative branch will help us out on that end.

Mr. ASPIN. Any other questions now?

Thank you very much.

Mr. McMAHON. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

SOVIET FORGERIES AND DISINFORMATION

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:15 p.m., in room 2167, of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin, Ashbrook, Young, and Whitehurst.

Staff present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Patrick G. Long, associate counsel; Herbert Romerstein, Leon S. Fuerth, professional staff members; Michael Flannigan, Robin Hughes, staff members, and Jeannie McNally, clerk.

Mr. ASPIN. We will call our meeting to order here this afternoon.

Let me make a brief opening statement and then turn the microphone over to Congressman Ashbrook, the ranking minority member, who will also make a statement.

Our hearings here today are a continuation of hearings we began in closed session on February 6 with testimony from the CIA. That testimony had an opening statement which has been declassified. We are also looking to declassify the transcript of the questions and answers from that hearing and hope to have those available for the public record.

The hearings we are holding are really very important and very pertinent to what is going on today. Détente, or the United States-Soviet relationship, is often characterized as a pattern of mixed cooperation and competition. Frequently I think we lose sight of how tough the competition can be, in part because memories are short and in part because much of the toughest competition goes on out of sight, in the secret world of covert action, espionage, and counterespionage.

Today's hearings will lift the corner of the veil and will serve to remind us that if the Soviets do recognize any rules of the road for détente, they are rough rules, indeed.

Our witness today is Mr. Ladislav Bittman, who is the former deputy chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czech intelligence service. Dr. Bittman received a doctor of law degree from Charles University in Prague in 1954. He then served in the Czechoslovakian intelligence service until 1968 when he defected after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

We are happy to welcome him here today.

At this point, let me turn the microphone over to Congressman Ashbrook.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I echo what you have said. I personally consider today's hearings to be one of the most important our committee has held. If we are to do proper oversight of the CIA, it is vital we understand what is happening out here in the real world.

Just as you say, Congressman Aspin, there are aspects of détente at the cultural level and at various levels which are not so-called hot areas, but there are also areas in the covert world, the so-called grey world, I think we should know about.

The CIA report which we released today gives us some idea of the operations against the United States conducted by the Soviet KGB and the other intelligence services of the Communist bloc countries that are controlled by the KGB. The main topic of today's hearing is the forgery and disinformation campaign which has increased dramatically since 1976.

The CIA report also discusses agents of influence, paramilitary operations and economic warfare, as well as the use of international Communist fronts and the foreign Communist Parties.

Forgeries are of particular significance at this time. For over 3 months, forces hostile to the United States have held 50 Americans hostage in our Embassy in Tehran. Those hostile forces have available, in the embassy, letterheads, typewriters, rubber stamps, duplicating machines, all of the things you need to practice forgeries out there in the real world.

The possibility of new forgeries to be used against the United States or against the hostages is very possible. These hearings and the CIA report should help alert the Congress and the American people to the threat of the Soviet forgery offensive.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you very much, Congressman Ashbrook.

Dr. Bittman, would you begin? I guess you have an opening statement. Proceed any way you would like.

**STATEMENT BY LADISLAV BITTMAN, FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF
OF THE DISINFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE CZECHOSLO-
VAK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**

Mr. BITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to have this opportunity to testify about the latest series of Soviet covert actions and propaganda against the United States. I feel a moral obligation to share my experience and expertise with this committee, with the press and with the American public because for years I was one of those who conducted, who orchestrated and directed these operations against the United States and many other non-Communist countries.

My 14-year career in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, from 1954 till 1968, included 4 years as an analyst, 8 years as an operative directing and recruiting agents, and 2 years as a deputy chief of Department 8, Department for Active Measures, an elegant expression for activities called in plain English "dirty tricks."

The last 2 years of my espionage career I operated in Vienna, Austria under the diplomatic cover as a press attaché of the Czechoslovak

Diplomatic Mission, manipulating the press, and directing several prominent secret agents.

For a long time I was a devoted Communist Party member and a very disciplined officer, but I don't want to bother this committee with details about my political development from a doctrinaire Communist to an enemy of the Soviet bloc system.

Nevertheless, I have to mention at least one event that largely affected my decision to defect and at the same time is directly related to the subject of my testimony, namely, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The day of the invasion had a traumatic impact on my political thinking.

I realized that I had wasted 14 years of my life, working not for the interests of Czechoslovak people, for the security of my country, but for the invader, who crushed the dream of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia. Two weeks after the invasion I crossed the West German borders and asked the American authorities for political asylum.

The period of several months before, during and after the invasion is very interesting in connection with Soviet covert action and propaganda. During that period the KGB used disinformation, forgeries, influence agents, provocations, rumors and other covert action techniques against socialist Czechoslovakia. The Soviets don't hesitate to utilize "active measures" even against their own friend and ally, if they feel that he is becoming too independent.

Until the late 1950's the Soviet bloc covert action was designed and conducted by individual territorial, operational departments without a well-orchestrated effort and clearly designed long-term strategy. The situation changed when the KGB established the special department for active measures around 1959.

In the following years all satellite services followed the Soviet example. The Czechoslovak Department 8 for Disinformation, Active Measures, was created in February 1964 and I became the deputy commander with the rank of a major.

Many Americans probably think that a small country like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or East Germany cannot possibly maintain an intelligence service that could seriously challenge and hurt the American giant or the North Atlantic Alliance. The fact is that satellite countries operate huge intelligence apparatus that significantly contributes to the spreading of Soviet influence around the world.

For example, the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department, Department 8, alone, with a staff of around 20 to 25 experienced operatives, conducted in 1965 about 115 active measures around the world. About 50 to 60 percent of them were based on forgeries leaked either to the foreign press or foreign governments.

The development of the last 4 to 5 months in Iran reminds me of several operations conducted by the Czechoslovak service in developing countries during my tenure as a disinformation expert. The Czechoslovak service orchestrated, in 1964-1965, a long-term anti-American operation in Indonesia using a variety of disinformation techniques like forgeries, influence agents and manipulation of the press, that escalated existing anti-American feelings to the level of political hysteria.

At the end of August 1965, American-Indonesian relations reached their lowest point in history. This success, however, was only temporary. The Indonesian Communist Party, without knowing about the Soviet bloc involvement, decided to exploit the situation and launched a putsch that totally failed.

A half-million dead Communists and sympathizers were the result. This operation shows the great potential danger of every provocation. The perpetrator can escalate existing anti-American feelings, but he doesn't control all major factors in the game. At a certain point the provocation can backfire and hit the perpetrator, or it can even develop into a major military conflict.

I have followed very carefully the development of the Iranian crisis and detected many signals about the Soviet bloc involvement here. It would be premature to talk about the Iranian case today because of the delicate situation and continuing negotiations concerned with the hostages. If the committee wishes, I would be very glad to submit a case study analyzing the Soviet bloc covert action in Iran as soon as the crisis is over.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt at this point? I would certainly ask the chairman for the record that our witness be accorded that opportunity.

Mr. ASPIN. Certainly.

Mr. BITTMAN. The CIA study on Soviet covert action and propaganda is a realistic evaluation of the objectives, methods and techniques used by Soviet bloc intelligence against the United States. All 16 detected forgeries bear the typical signs of the Soviet forgery kitchen.

I want to emphasize, however, that these 16 cases represent only a fraction of the total volume of anti-American forgeries circulating around the world today. In the everyday flood of international messages, many forgeries remain undetected.

Out of the 16 forgeries presented in this report, a relatively large series is targeted at undermining American relations with the Egyptian Government and President Anwar Sadat personally. The fabrications suggest that American leaders do not trust Sadat's leadership ability and that they are preparing to cast him off as a friend in the Middle East.

In the 1960's President Nasser, Sadat's predecessor, was a target and victim of a similar disinformation game that affected his foreign policy. The Soviet, the Czechoslovak, and East German intelligence had deeply penetrated the Egyptian intelligence in Cairo as well as outside Egypt. Many reports reaching Nasser were actually pseudo-facts, disinformation formulated in Moscow or in Prague and leaked to the Egyptians, fabrications about the American policy toward Egypt, devious American plans to overthrow Nasser, anything that would undermine American positions in Egypt.

It was a far-reaching and successful operation that ended only when Nasser's successor, President Sadat, made the decision to break with Soviets and drastically purge his security agencies.

The new anti-American deception series, aimed at undermining American relations with Egypt, indicates that a more effective channel of disinformation, namely, influence agents within the Egyptian

security, is not available any more, and the Soviet bloc has to rely on forgeries to achieve the objective.

I am surprised that no forgeries have been registered in Central Africa, Latin America, and East Asia, traditionally the major areas where forgeries had been massively used in the past in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Pakistan, or Indonesia.

The detected 16 forgeries surfaced or circulated mainly in Egypt, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Syria. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these six countries are the most important targets for Soviet covert action. Forgeries are the easiest and cheapest form of disinformation.

The CIA report speaks about the use of influence agents without mentioning specific examples of this most dangerous covert action channel. Let me give you a few examples. In the mid 1960's Czechoslovak intelligence had several agents among the members of the British Parliament.

Occasionally they received instructions to initiate and influence parliamentary discussion on public issues the Soviets considered important for their official, diplomatic maneuvering against Britain. One of the commanding officers of the Austrian counterintelligence was a Czechoslovak agent with the cover name Sedmicka, which means No. 7.

Thanks to his reporting, the Soviet bloc espionage network in Austria was relatively safe, knowing ahead of time what the Austrians were doing and, what is even more important, engaging the Austrian counterintelligence in operations that were only wasting their time.

Mr. ASPIN. If we could ask you to wait for a moment, we must go over and vote. It is the final passage of a bill. It will be the last vote we have today. But if you could wait 10 minutes, we will be back.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. ASPIN. Dr. Bittman, if you could proceed.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes; I talked about the agents of influence.

Mr. ASPIN. Perhaps you could start at the beginning of the paragraph, if you would.

Mr. BITTMAN. During my tenure in the operative sector, I was in regular confidential contact with a man who was a director of a national television network in a West European country. The major objective behind this case was to recruit the man and use his managerial power for long-term propagandistic campaigns nobody would suspect originated in Eastern Europe.

And finally let me mention one more example. In 1974 the West German public was shocked when Gunther Guillaume, one of the top advisers to Chancellor Willy Brandt, a man in a position to influence the Chancellor's decisions on many important domestic issues, was arrested and later sentenced as an East German spy. That is why I am saying that agents of influence represent a much greater danger than forgeries or mass media campaigns.

The CIA report mentions the 1972-76 hiatus in Soviet forgeries and indicates it might have been influenced by the atmosphere of détente. I would say there is at least one more reason. The Watergate scandal and the following investigation of U.S. intelligence activities supplied the American as well as foreign mass media with such an enormous

volume of damaging information that forgeries were not necessary. As a matter of fact, a detected Communist forgery at the time could have paralyzed the natural flow of self-incriminating American reports.

I have missed in the CIA report signals of military disinformation against the United States, another major area of Communist deception games. I assume that it is the responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency to prepare analysis of this kind, but I would like this committee to be aware that Soviet bloc countries pay close attention to military disinformation with the objectives (a) of deceiving the West about the real strength of the Soviet bloc military forces, and (b) of weakening the defense system of the NATO alliance.

Is there a solution to the problem of Soviet covert action and propaganda against the United States? I don't have the magic formula, but I want to suggest a few ideas or recommendations that might be useful in fighting this menace.

First, effective protection against Communist provocations requires a large staff of highly qualified, experienced intelligence analysts capable of piecing together a mosaic of signals from many foreign and domestic sources. Most non-Communist countries have neither the funds nor the expertise to do the job, particularly the developing countries.

Thus, in some instances even the most crude and primitive forgeries are perceived as genuine proofs of devious American intrigues and plans.

From the CIA report I learned that in some cases, for example, the anti-American forgeries aimed at Egypt, the Egyptian Government asked the U.S. authorities for explanation and received the evidence of the fraudulent nature of these messages.

I think this is not enough. Providing the victimized countries ex post facto with explanation may still leave a suspicion the United States might have been involved and is only trying to muddy the water. It might be helpful to do more extensive prophylactic work and make studies and documents like this CIA report available not only to the U.S. press but also through proper official channels to the governments of developing countries and make them aware of the Soviet bloc deception danger.

Second, the CIA report on Soviet covert action and propaganda analyzes a series of recent anti-American forgeries and their impact around the world without mentioning operations conducted directly on American territory.

I understand that the CIA, according to its statute, is not allowed to operate at home. It is FBI territory. The fragmentation and compartmentalization of the analytical work is a certain handicap. Many anti-American forgeries and disinformation surface in Western Europe or in the Middle East, with the perpetrators expectation that they circulate and later reach the American public as the major target.

The point is that the CIA and the FBI should closely cooperate in researching and analyzing all Soviet bloc active measures, regardless of their surfacing in the United States or abroad. I think that the FBI and also other intelligence agencies like the National Security Agency, the State Department Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence

Agency, Military Intelligence, or even the Drug Enforcement Administration should closely cooperate with the CIA and participate in piecing together the fragments of disinformation they are able to detect.

This approach would be, I think, more effective in identifying the more sophisticated and dangerous deception games which may otherwise remain undetected. We are facing an enemy who has the advantage of a gigantic, well-orchestrated, secret apparatus around the world. Effective defense requires close cooperation among all American intelligence agencies.

Third, another way to make dissemination of anti-American disinformation and forgeries more difficult is to educate the press about these techniques.

There is a continuing incidence of leaking politically or even militarily sensitive documents to the press in this country. Who leaks them? Senators, Congressmen, their staff members, lawyers, Government bureaucrats, Army officers, even CIA staff members. Although the Government officially condemns leaking, unofficially, individual politicians or Government bureaucrats use the technique for their own purposes.

Many journalists, including those with a distinctively conservative profile, consider leaking a positive phenomenon. They call leaks the safety valve of democracy and they think that without leaking, the country would get only the official, controlled news.

This situation creates, of course, a great advantage for Soviet bloc intelligence. Their officers sent to the United States are always surprised by what they call political naivete and credulity of many Americans, politicians, and journalists included.

From the press or accidental contacts they are able to get information for which they would have to pay a high price in any West European country. In Europe the tradition of state secrets is deeply rooted while here in America it means very little. With few exceptions the press is willing to publish secret, politically sensitive documents regardless of possible negative consequences for the United States abroad.

It is difficult to make a realistic assessment of how many and what kind of documents have been leaked to the U.S. press by the Soviet bloc in recent years. Mass media would probably object to this kind of research study considering it an FBI or CIA attack against their rights and privileges.

I am convinced, however, that many secret American documents that the Soviet bloc intelligence is able to get here with the help of secret agents, after a while come back to the United States. The value of any document is limited in time, and when it loses its informational value for Soviet decisionmakers, it is used for bloc propaganda purposes.

The document is leaked to the press with the assumption that its publication will either hurt the administration's public image, widen the gap between the United States and their foreign allies, or hurt the country in some other way.

Is there a solution to the complicated and sensitive problem of leaking?

It would be a mistake to blame only the press for the situation. The first amendment guaranteeing freedom of the press assigns mass media the role of a watchdog. In the United States the press plays a more important role than in any other libertarian country. To deprive the press of its rights would deprive American democracy of one of the main pillars.

What bothers me, however, is the fact that only a few American journalists are aware of the tremendous potential of American press freedom being misused by the Soviet bloc intelligence here. Their black propaganda operations and disinformation hurt the country, violate the first amendment, and put American journalists into a position of being the unaware messengers of the big lie.

The press should be more cautious with anonymous leaks. Anonymity is a signal indicating that the Big Russian Bear might be involved. The Soviet or Czech intelligence would not endanger an important agent by giving him an order to leak a forged document and reveal his own identity as a source.

Despite the fact that leaking is a common practice here, in one way or another it could threaten the agent's security. That is why in most cases disinformation, forgeries, just like genuine incriminating documents, are leaked to the press by Soviet intelligence through anonymous channels.

There is another reason why journalists should know more about Communist intelligence methods. If somebody had at this moment the magic key that would open the Soviet bloc intelligence safes and looked into the files of secret agents operating in Western countries, he would be surprised.

A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. A journalist operating in Great Britain, West Germany, or in the United States is a great asset to Communist intelligence. He can be investigative, professionally curious. It is his job to get important and even highly sensitive information. This is particularly true in the United States with its tradition of an aggressive adversary press.

I hope this statement of mine will not be received as an effort to launch a new cold war witch hunt against American journalists. The only reason I am talking about it is to make the U.S. journalists aware that they are a highly sought after espionage commodity.

Finally, let me say a few words about the role of a strong, effective intelligence service in the defense system of this country. Several years ago the CIA was thoroughly and carefully investigated by the Congress as well as the mass media. Actually, no other intelligence service has ever been scrutinized more thoroughly than the CIA.

Sensitive information about the CIA operations around the world, for which the KGB used to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars, was suddenly available from the press. The secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington clipped the information from the New York Times or the Washington Post.

Many critics of the CIA argued at the time that the CIA should be involved only in collecting information abroad and abandon covert action. They said that the distasteful character of covert action is in conflict with American democratic traditions and violates the elementary rules of ethics.

To evaluate the CIA or any other intelligence service by using the criterion of morality is impossible. If the country wants to have an effective intelligence service it has to accept the fact that the service will systematically violate foreign countries' laws. That is not moral, of course, but it is inevitable.

Even if the CIA totally abandons covert action and limits its operation only to collecting information abroad, it will still have to use unethical methods. The most important element in the espionage process is an agent, a citizen of a foreign country with access to secret information.

In very few cases he is willing to risk imprisonment or death for political reasons or ideological sympathy with the enemy. In my 14-year espionage career I met many spies and truly none of them worked for the Czechoslovak intelligence for idealistic reasons.

Those who volunteered were, with very few exceptions, rejected as potential agents-provocateurs. Every intelligence service, the CIA included, is looking for individuals who occupy important positions in the enemy's government, press, military establishment, or scientific elite. These individuals are bought or blackmailed. Every intelligence service uses unethical methods. Even collecting secret information in a foreign country is unethical.

The congressional investigation of the American security agencies several years ago was certainly justified and necessary, but it was conducted in an atmosphere of political hysteria. Both the investigators and particularly the press measured the CIA activities of the 1950's and 1960's with the criteria of 1974 or 1975 without taking into consideration the important fact that the drastic CIA actions were a response to drastic methods and actions used by the Communist intelligence services.

The CIA doesn't operate in a political vacuum but in specific historical conditions. For several years the CIA was paralyzed. I think that many agents working for the Agency refused further cooperation because they were afraid that their names would be published in the press and they would be arrested.

I hope the committee understands my thinking. I am not advocating the creation of a new American intelligence monster totally out of control by the Congress or the Government. Effective control is necessary because the intelligence personnel are living and working in a special secretive environment and even the most idealistic and capable operatives may get, after a few years, out of touch with political reality.

But an intelligence agency simply cannot function when details about its operations and names of operatives are leaked to the press, when the operatives live in fear that they might be victimized not by the enemy but by American institutions and individuals.

The Soviet leadership has never abandoned the objective to bury democratic, parliamentary systems in the West. The latest CIA study is an illustration. In the terminology of the Soviet bloc intelligence, the United States is called the main enemy or enemy No. 1.

The basic principle of the Communist espionage imperium is to use and misuse every weakness of the opponent. In 1968 Mr. Brezhnev decided to invade Czechoslovakia because he knew that the NATO countries remain neutral. In December 1979 he made the decision to invade Afghanistan for the same reason.

After a few years the outrage surrounding the invasion will subside, the world will again accept the reality of the permanent Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and everything will be back to normal. And then, Iran, Yugoslavia, or Pakistan will become the next target and the situation will repeat itself.

I am advocating neither cold nor hot war. But as a former Communist intelligence officer and disinformation specialist responsible for many anti-American provocations, forgeries and active measures, I am convinced that if this country wants to stop the continuing Soviet expansion and survive, it needs a strong, effective defense which includes a strong, effective and reliable intelligence service.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Bittman.

John Ashbrook?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Doctor, what was the role of the Soviet KGB in coordinating the work of the Czech and the other bloc intelligence services referred to?

Mr. BITTMAN. Starting with the early 1950's, every East European Communist intelligence, satellite intelligence, had a large staff of Soviet advisers. In the 1950's, every department of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, for example, had its own Soviet adviser actually, a man who was a specialist in intelligence service problems and who saw every report, who knew the identity of every agent, who received everything that the service produced.

These people were called, officially, advisers, but in fact they were the managers, truly the managers of the whole service. The Czechoslovak Intelligence, for example, is a huge service operating all over the world, in many countries where Czechoslovakia has no direct economic interest or political interest.

But for the Soviet Union it is very important because in some cases, citizens in a country are very afraid to get in touch with Soviet diplomats because it is too much, but to maintain a contact with a Czech diplomat who is actually an intelligence officer, well, so what? What can small Czechoslovakia do to us?

So in many cases the the satellite intelligence services do the job for the Soviets. The role of the Soviet advisers is very important. I am absolutely sure that they are in Czechoslovakia today. They were in the Czechoslovak Service even during the political spring in 1968, during the democratization process.

Although the press did not report about it, they were still sitting there. They knew everything the Czechs did. And I am sure that now the number of Soviet advisers is even higher than it was 10 years ago.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I guess one of the things I am interested in, no matter what area we touch, there is always a Soviet school, training school and so forth. In Moscow, you have the Lumumba University. We were studying South Yemen a few weeks ago, and the dictator was a graduate of the higher party school in the Soviet Union. They bring their top people in and train them.

To what extent is this also true in intelligence? Are there training schools? Are there efforts to bring people in to coordinate them?

Mr. BITTMAN. It is true also for the intelligence. There is a special school in Moscow educating Czechoslovak intelligence officers. A similar school there is training Hungarian officers, another school Polish

officers or East German officers. It is not one school training all satellite intelligence officers because of the secrecy.

Anyhow, anyone who wants to achieve an important position within the Czechoslovak service has to have attended a Soviet intelligence school. The reason why I served as a disinformation expert for only 2 years, from 1964 until 1966, was that I refused to go to Moscow at that time, for a variety of reasons. I categorically refused to go there, and that was one of the reasons why I had to leave the position of a commanding officer of the disinformation department.

So the answer is yes, anyone who wants to occupy an important position in the hierarchy of the Czechoslovak service or East German service has to have Soviet intelligence school training.

Mr. ASHBROOK. There are so many interesting aspects I want to get into. The main thesis presented in the early part of your statement was that you were working in what you thought was the best interest of Czechoslovakia. To what extent do you think the Soviets go down two tracks at the same time: They will train Czechs, but also try to make them have their first loyalty to the Soviet Union, in effect trying to undermine the satellite countries?

Ostensibly they are training for worldwide communism, but at the same time they are trying to put the Soviet allegiance first, so that people in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other places will have their first allegiance to them and report back to them. Do you think that is an ongoing process?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes. Even the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service is a target for Soviet penetration. There are Soviet agents recruited among Czechoslovakian intelligence officers. Officially, the services are cooperating, in daily contact, but in spite of the official contact, in spite of the presence of Soviet "advisers," the Soviet intelligence also secretly recruits agents from among the staff members of the Czechoslovak intelligence, to influence the service in one way or another, particularly in case it would be necessary in the future.

Actually, the illustration is the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets used several people within the service, their own agents who helped them, really, to maintain total control of the Czechoslovak service during the democratization process in 1968.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Would this have been known to you at the time? Was it an operating fact of life which the satellite countries know? Or did this come as a revelation after you left?

Mr. BITTMAN. Well, there were rumors about it, but frankly, I didn't think about it too much in 1960 or 1958. It was only later, and particularly in 1968, that it came openly to my mind.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I want to ask one more question and I would like a second round later. What were the major goals of the Czech intelligence disinformation plan?

Mr. BITTMAN. Target No. 1 was the United States. According to a long-term plan prepared in 1965, in cooperation with the Soviet advisers, target No. 1 was the United States. The objective was to hurt the United States wherever and whenever it was possible, to weaken the positions of the United States and Western Europe, to create new rifts within the NATO Alliance, to weaken the position of the United States in developing countries, to cause new rifts between the United

States and developing countries, to disinform the United States and the Western allies about the military strength of the Soviet bloc countries.

I think this is a very important goal of disinformation. Not too much is included in the CIA report, and even I did not talk too much about it, but there is a long-term disinformation plan to deceive Western military specialists about the military strength of the Soviet bloc.

So, for example, in the midsixties our department—excuse me. When I am talking about the midsixties I had to use “we” because I belonged to them at that time. We closely cooperated with military intelligence in Prague and with Soviet military intelligence to deceive the West, for example, about the number of missile ramps in the Soviet bloc. So there were very many ramps built for disinformational purposes.

It was an operation which cost millions and millions of dollars, with the expectation that they would be detected by American intelligence and considered real missile ramps. This is only an illustration.

I want to emphasize that military disinformation is a very important aspect of disinformation. As such, I am not an expert in military disinformation. My area was mainly political disinformation. But it is extremely important for the defense of the United States to know something about it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

As I say, I would like a second round.

Mr. ASPIN. Dr. Bittman, let me ask you a couple of questions about some of the statements you have in your statement here, particularly about the recommendations you have here about what we can do. I am interested in your statement about the Soviet Union's leaking documents to the American press.

At one point you are talking, it seems, about actual documents that have fallen in the hands of the Soviet Union that they have used and then leaked to the press. At another point you seem to be talking about forgeries that have been leaked to the press, that the Soviet Union has dummied up.

Could you give us any examples of either of those cases?

Mr. BITTMAN. Both techniques are used. For example, in 1969 an American document was leaked to the West German and European press about the possible use of atomic weapons in Europe in case of a military conflict between NATO and the Soviet bloc.

It, I think, disturbed many journalists and politicians, particularly in Germany in Western Europe. It surfaced and circulated in 1969. Now, when the analysis was made, it was revealed that this was an old document, a genuine American document which was produced in 1960 or 1961.

Then, of course, over the years it lost its informational value. But the Soviets realized it could be propagandistically used or misused. Although it was not valid any more, although during the mid-1960's, the United States made different arrangements with the West European allies. They decided to use this genuine document for propagandistic purposes, and I think that they succeeded in creating certain illusions or certain dissatisfactions with American policies.

So that is an example of using a genuine document for propagandistic purposes.

Mr. ASPIN. How about examples where these were given in the American press? Can you give any examples of either forged documents that were leaked to the American press and carried in the American press, or genuine documents that had outlived their usefulness and had been leaked to the American press?

Mr. BITTMAN. You know, during my tenure as the disinformation expert in the mid-1960's, frankly, it was very difficult to leak a forged document to the American press. I am not quite sure why, but I assume it was because at that time the press was more careful when dealing with information leaked anonymously.

The early 1970's created a totally new atmosphere. The Watergate scandal and then what happened after that. The leaking of documents became an everyday practice here, and the press, I assume, in many cases accepted leaked information without checking whether it was true or not.

So, in the mid-1960's, we did not succeed in leaking something important to the American press and starting a campaign here in the United States based on forgeries, no. And I assume that now it is easier for the other side to do it.

But I would hesitate to say specifically that this or that recent case is typical of Soviet bloc manipulation of the American press.

Mr. ASPIN. So if it did occur, it has occurred since your particular experience, but you think the climate was such that it might have been possible?

Mr. BITTMAN. I think that since about 1976 or 1977, yes. It is possible to use this method and I am absolutely sure that the Soviets use it. You know, I mentioned to you my willingness to give this committee a case study dealing with the Iranian situation. Just now I am working on a study of Soviet bloc disinformation techniques covering the period of the 1970's. I am conducting a very broad research.

If this would help the committee I would be very glad to give the committee even further material with many more illustrations.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me tell you what would be very interesting to see. I can imagine, for example, that the Soviet Union might come across a genuine document which had used up its life to them and were able to leak that to the American press in some way, through some third party or in some way in which that might get out.

I would be very surprised and interested if you had any examples of a real bloc propaganda operation which was a forgery but was treated by the American press as the genuine article and somehow that was never corrected, that there wasn't some way in which there was some kind of self-correcting mechanism, either by the reporter checking with the government desk for their side of the story or the subsequent reports coming out.

But if you do have that, I would be very interested.

Mr. BITTMAN. It is a very sensitive area and I would like to present scholarly documentation without making any unfounded allegations or attacks, because this would only create chaos. It is a very sensitive thing, so I would rather wait and come with a very solid, serious, scholarly research study.

Mr. ASPIN. Please.

Mr. BITTMAN. But if I may, as far as the press is concerned I would make a few more comments. The Communist bloc pays great attention to the foreign press. There are many journalists who are agents. There are important newspapers around the world penetrated by Communist intelligence services. There are one or two journaists working for a particular paper who are agents and who receive from time to time instructions to publish this story or that story once a year or twice a year.

There are newspapers in the West which are owned by Communist intelligence services. The Czechoslovak service, for example, owns several newspapers in the Western bloc. There are publishing houses owned by the Communist intelligence services.

Please, again, I am not trying to start a new witch hunt against journalists. I am trying only to explain that journalists are one of the major targets and journalists play a very imporant role for Communist bloc intelligence. That is why they are a highly sought commodity.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

As you pointed out, the other thing I was going to ask about, where you did, as you say, come close to saying something, and I don't know whether you said it or not. And again, maybe we will do this in more detail in a written report. But you talk about a relatively high percentage of secret agents being journalists, and then journalists operating in Great Britain, Germany, or the United States as a great asset to the Communist intelligence.

I don't know whether you are saying or not that the Soviet KGB has penetrated the American journalistic community or not. Are you saying this?

Mr. BITTMAN. I have no direct evidence. This is my assumption. I can talk from my own experience about West Germany because for years I was a specialist in West Germany. And many agents in the Czechoslovak network in West Germany were at the time journalists. I personally was in contact with several agents. I was the case officer of several agents. And nearly all of them were journalists.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Young?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Dr. Bittman, in their campaign to embarrass the United States and separate us from our friends and allies, are there any standards which the Soviets followed? In other words, is there a point beyond which they will not go in their lies and forgeries?

Mr. BITTMAN. No, there is no limitation, no official limitation that the service can go only so far and not beyond that line, no. It depends, of course, on the political climate between the United States and the Soviet bloc or the Western allies and the Soviet bloc.

In certain situations in certain periods, the most drastic methods are not used. For example to my knowledge, no assassination was conducted or carried out by the Soviet bloc during the 1960's, as far as I know. Well, it is a very sensitive area. Maybe the Russians killed many people during the 1960's, but I don't know about it. And I don't know about one single case where Czechoslovak intelligence agents would assassinate someone during the 1960's because the climate was not good for that kind of operation.

In the 1950's, there were people who were assassinated for propagandistic purposes, in the name of Nazi organizations in Germany, for example. The Czechoslovak service created an organization called Kampfgruppe Fur Unabhangiges Deutschland, the Fighting Group for Independent Germany, supposedly a Nazi organization terrorizing American soldiers in Germany, American representatives in Germany, writing threatening letters to various West German politicians and so on.

It was a fictitious organization created in Prague. And in the mid-1950's, the Czechoslovak service assassinated a French official who was known for his anti-German or anti-Fascist feelings. He was assassinated in the name of this organization only to create an image of a new monster, a Nazi monster, in Germany. It was actually a deception game conducted by Communist intelligence.

Mr. YOUNG. From your experience, then, strictly in the area of forgeries, bloc propaganda, lies, there is no limit. No holds are barred.

Mr. BITTMAN. No, there is no limit.

Mr. YOUNG. Whatever they determine to be in their best interest.

Mr. BITTMAN. Limited only the imagination of the operatives.

Mr. YOUNG. Let me ask you several questions relative to Cuba and this part of the world. You mentioned that the Czech Information Service worked closely with the KGB and the Russian service, the schools in the Soviet Union, and different intelligence services would be involved in those schools.

Did you ever detect any evidence of Cuban involvement in any of those Soviet schools?

Mr. BITTMAN. As far as the Soviet schools are concerned, I do not know. But during the first few years after the Cuban Revolution, the Czech service played the role of adviser, because, you know, in 1959, 1960, and 1961, the Cubans, for one reason or another, did not want to have Russian advisers there.

So a few of my former colleagues were sent to Cuba to serve as advisers to Cuban intelligence. After that, I think after 1962, and the Cuban missile crisis, the situation changed and the Soviets took over completely and openly. But until then, Czechs did the job. I have no direct knowledge whether the Cuban officers also go to Moscow to study.

But knowing the mechanism of the Soviet bloc intelligence, I would say yes.

Mr. YOUNG. Now, the Czech involvement in Cuba immediately following the Cuban Revolution, that was an arrangement with the Soviet Union, was it not?

Mr. BITTMAN. Oh, yes, of course. That was done in Prague in close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Mr. YOUNG. Are you aware of any involvement today? I assume you follow this as closely as you can today, and from the remarks you have made, that is very obvious. Do you have any knowledge today of Soviet involvement with Cuba in the Latin American part of the world or through Cuba or through any other surrogate nation?

Mr. BITTMAN. Oh, yes. I have been able to detect very many signals. But at this stage, again, I am in a process of research and I don't want to make unsubstantiated statements. But the answer is definitely yes,

with my expertise I have been able to detect hundreds of signals about the involvement of the Cuban intelligence.

But I would like to come with solidly supported evidence.

Mr. YOUNG. Could you tell us something about the International Communist Front organizations, particularly those based in Prague? You know basically who they are.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes. Soviet bloc intelligence from time to time works with these organizations, I would say with individuals who are officials of these organizations. According to the party instructions, the Czechoslovak intelligence, and I assume this is also true about the KGB, is officially not allowed to recruit, for example, members of the Western Communist parties and to use them for intelligence purposes.

Again, this is the official rule. Unofficially in many cases it was done. But these front organizations you are talking about are mainly directed by the propaganda operators in the party. That is the responsibility of the party officials to instruct or manipulate international front organizations.

In a few cases, the intelligence is involved, but I think that is a minor role. These organizations are directed by party officials, the highest party officials.

Mr. YOUNG. I would like to ask you for an opinion. Summing up all of the things you have said today, is it your opinion that the United States is reacting strongly enough or protecting itself effectively enough against this propaganda campaign of the Soviet Union, their campaign of forgeries and lies? Are we doing enough, in your opinion, to protect ourselves against the effects of that campaign?

Mr. BITTMAN. I don't think so, no. I tried to suggest a few lines, a few measures. The United States, I think, should do much more than it does now, and it can more effectively paralyze the impact of disinformation games. As I mentioned, one of the reasons why it is not happening is the fragmentation and compartmentalization of the analytical work in the United States.

There are so many agencies involved and everyone tries to play with his own toy, and there is no close contact and cooperation, piecing together the signals from abroad and trying to decide what to do to stop this campaign or to paralyze that campaign.

I think one of the first steps should be a close cooperation among the intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies in the United States.

Mr. YOUNG. Just one more question, if you would, Dr. Bittman. During the time that you served in a very high position of importance with the Communist operation in Czechoslovakia, did you ever come across a man or information relative to a man named Lee Harvey Oswald, who was during some of those years in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BITTMAN. No, never, no. The answer is a clear no.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me ask a couple of questions, if I might, about your recommendations. You seem to recommend that the United States be involved in covert action, as I take it. Do you also believe the United States should be involved in forgeries?

Mr. BITTMAN. In this case I am very hesitant to recommend that as one of the channels of American covert action. I mentioned earlier

this is the easiest and cheapest form. The Soviet bloc is quite often successful in using this method because there is fertile soil in some countries.

There is a genuine anti-American sentiment, so many of these forgeries are actually parasiting on the existing anti-American feelings. You cannot stir up an anti-American hysteria in Britain by using a few journalists there or members of the government, or creating a few anti-American forgeries. It would be impossible because there is no genuine anti-American feeling.

And this country, for example, cannot use forgeries with the objective of manipulating the Soviet bloc press. The press is controlled so effectively that it is impossible to leak a forgery to the Soviet bloc press and expect that it would have some impact on domestic public opinion, no.

But this country has other resources and ways and weapons that can be effectively used. I don't want to speculate here about it, but certainly there are many other techniques of covert action the United States can use against the major opponent without reaching for the cheapest instrument, forgeries.

Mr. ASPIN. I can think of other countries, I agree, and I understand what you are saying, that forgeries would not work in a country where the government completely controls the press. But there are a lot of other governments where the press is not controlled so completely, where we would like to influence public opinion. Presumably, a forgery would work there.

Are you recommending that we not do forgeries there?

Mr. BITTMAN. This is a question whether it would work or not. For example, leaking a forgery to the German press or the French press or the British press, the perpetrator may deceive and hurt in some way or another Soviet interests there. But at the same time, it would deceive the West German public, deceive in one way or another the West German Government, and it could even hurt the interests of the United States. There is a danger in these games that the perpetrator cannot control all of the elements in the game and suddenly the situation can change and hit the perpetrator.

This, for example, is what happened to the Czechoslovak service in 1965. I don't want to bother you with the details of that huge, extremely successful operation in Indonesia, which was praised in August 1965 as an example of the great capabilities of the Czechoslovak service because the American-Indonesian relationship was hurt.

There was even a danger that the diplomatic relations would be interrupted. Then suddenly something happened. The Indonesian Communist Party, which didn't know anything about the involvement of the Soviet intelligence in Indonesia, thought this was the right situation to start a coup, to take over completely.

They attacked the establishment in Indonesia on the last day of September 1965 in a coup that totally failed. And the result of it was that about 500,000 Indonesian Communists were slaughtered. So 2 months after that, no one wanted to talk about the operation in Indonesia.

This only shows the potential danger of this kind of covert action.

Mr. ASPIN. Dr. Bittman, the two examples you use, and I do want to ask you about them, one example was Indonesia. Why was Czechoslo-

vakia doing that? What was the connection with Czechoslovakia and Indonesia? Why was the Czech service in a position to run that operation?

Mr. BITTMAN. It only illustrates what I said earlier. Czechoslovakia was really not too much interested in Indonesian affairs officially, but unofficially, yes. The Czechoslovak service, for example, had several very influential agents in the government bureaucracy of Indonesia. One of the Indonesian ambassadors in Europe was a Czechoslovak agent, and he was used as an influence agent.

President Sukarno received several pieces of disinformation. For example, disinformation that the CIA had prepared an assassination of Sukarno, and Sukarno sincerely believed this was true. He helped to stir-up public opinion in Indonesia against the United States. So this was one of the reasons why the Czechs were involved, because they had several influential agents.

Mr. ASPIN. They had some agents that could be used.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. I see. But eventually you say they overplayed their hand and it came apart. Also, I take it, that is what happened in Egypt, the other example that you used, they got too heavyhanded and overplayed their hand.

Mr. BITTMAN. This was a different situation. I think the Egyptian security forces were purged, in the early 1970's when President Sadat came to power. During the Nasser era, Czech, East German, and Soviet agents were sitting there doing the job. But, when Sadat decided to break with the Soviets and drastically purge the security forces, then I think the Soviets lost many influential agents there and decided, for example, to use forgeries again, the cheaper form of disinformation.

Mr. ASPIN. And is that why you think forgeries are not so good?

Mr. BITTMAN. No. It is one of the tools. Maybe I should mention one thing. Every operation is well orchestrated using a variety of channels and techniques. And in some cases, forgery is used as one of the channels, as one of the ways. But there are also influence agents in the game. There are also other ways to manipulate the press or decision-makers in the other country.

So it is one of the tools. There are very few operations which use only a forgery. There are such operations, yes. But we should not think that this is typical. It is one of the channels used. And most operations are well orchestrated and well designed so that a variety of techniques are used.

Mr. ASPIN. Can you tell us what, in your view, is the difference between the operations of Western intelligence operations running operations like this, and the Czech operation? I guess forgeries is one of them.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. And the Communist countries, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, have a greater reliance on forgeries than does the Western intelligence operations. What other differences would you notice?

Mr. BITTMAN. I would expect, and I am only speculating, I would expect that because this country is technologically on such a high level it can use its technology for deception games against the Soviet bloc countries, satellites and these kinds of tools.

Anyhow, modern technology is a fascinating area. Unfortunately, I am not an expert in this but I see great potential for various covert actions by the United States using these channels or techniques.

Mr. ASPIN. In what way? How do you use those channels or techniques?

Mr. BITTMAN. For example, deceiving the opponents about the military intentions of the United States.

Mr. ASPIN. Are there any other differences you notice between the way these kinds of propaganda operations are conducted in the West and in the East?

Mr. BITTMAN. If I may, by way of recommendation, I think this country should use much more than it does, its economic strength. This country can really paralyze Soviet bloc operations in many developing countries by providing more economic help to these countries, positive, official economic help. That would be the best argument for the United States.

That would very effectively paralyze forgeries and disinformation about the devious American plans to subvert these countries and overthrow the regimes. This is something that I think should be used more than it is—positive economic cooperation and help to developing countries.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Young?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have one more line of questions I would like to get into. It will be my final questioning.

Dr. Bittman, in 1964 the Czech intelligence service ran a propaganda operation against a Senator, Barry Goldwater, who was then a candidate for President of the United States. Was this done at the direction of the Soviets?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes, it was. The Czechoslovak service was at the time considering how to influence the election. Goldwater was considered a very dangerous opponent, a very strong adversary; and the Soviets were thinking about how to influence the election process.

Well, the operation conducted by the Czechoslovak intelligence was, considering the election process in this country, the tremendous amount of information flooding the American public, this operation was a drop into an ocean of anti-Goldwater feeling, genuine feelings in the United States. It was a booklet or leaflet produced by the Czech service.

In the text there were some genuine statements by Goldwater and then some statements which were manufactured indicating his racism. Mainly it was supposed racist policies or whatever, and this was then distributed in the United States and also abroad. It was sent to many journalists and politicians in developing countries. I think the result was much more successful in developing countries than here in the United States.

Mr. YOUNG. Knowing the Czech operation was at the direction of the Soviets, are you aware of any other Communist bloc nations who also took part in that type of anti-Goldwater propaganda campaign at the direction of the Soviets?

Mr. BITTMAN. No, I'm not. No.

Mr. YOUNG. Doctor, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask you, Dr. Bittman, about a couple of more things.

One is what do you make of that letter which appeared in Iran which was supposedly from Senator Kennedy which was in support of the ayatollah and his positions? What do you make of that?

Mr. BITTMAN. I have the feeling—and I emphasize now it is a feeling, because I want to analyze this very, very carefully, about the motives of the perpetrator.

I assume, I smell that Soviet disinformation specialists were involved, but I would hesitate to say just now exactly why and how it was done, because this will require more time to sit down and really spend some time on this individual case. And as I said, I will, after the crisis is over, be very glad to submit to this committee the whole case study dealing specifically with Iran.

But according to my knowledge of Soviet bloc disinformation techniques, I have the feeling that this forgery was initiated in Moscow for one reason or another. And as I say, I don't know yet exactly what is the reason behind it. But it has something to do not only with Iran but also probably with the fact that Kennedy is a Presidential candidate; so it may be another indication that the Soviets are involved in the present Presidential campaign.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you make of the fact that it was such a crude and obvious forgery? It certainly would not have fooled any Western observer.

Mr. BITTMAN. Maybe that was the purpose behind it.

Mr. ASPIN. I see. You would be saying that if they did that, they would be doing it with a purpose; that they are not naturally that crude.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. So this would be a forgery with a lot of twists to it if it were being done by the Soviet Union.

Mr. BITTMAN. That's right, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Or another theory is it was a forgery done by someone other than the Soviet Union who thought they were producing a seemingly genuine document but which was obviously seen to be a forgery.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes. There are also organizations abroad which are under control of the Soviet bloc intelligence, certain terrorist organizations, also radical organizations. I don't want to say that they are devoted Communist Soviet bloc agents. Most of them don't know that they're being manipulated for Soviet purposes. But the Soviet bloc intelligence has been inside these organizations, from time to time, directing the organization to do something that is in the interest of the Soviet bloc. And they sometimes come with initiatives that the Soviet intelligence cannot control, that is too primitive.

And so the Soviets may know about a forgery like this, but it was leaked by a radical organization or a terrorist organization and they can do nothing about it.

I am speculating. This is pure speculation. But as I say, I would rather wait and come with solid evidence rather than guessing.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Can you give any other examples or any other cases that are well known as examples of forgeries of documents. Does anything come

to mind in terms of famous documents that were forgeries or famous things?

Mr. BITTMAN. To leave for awhile the area of forgeries, I was involved in 1964 in an extremely successful operation in Germany, against West Germany which was called Operation Neptune.

Mr. ASPIN. Tell us about Operation Neptune. I have heard about that.

Mr. BITTMAN. It was shortly after the time the Czechoslovakian disinformation department was established, and we were looking for an idea to make this kind of operation attractive to most officers in the service. This is a very important point.

Not only were the lower level disinformation specialists involved. Every intelligence officer in the Czechoslovak or Soviet service is supposed to come with ideas every year, to submit at least one or two proposals for an anti-American or anti-West German operation; so there are many, many ideas coming from the whole apparatus, from many people.

At the time, Czechoslovak television was shooting a film about two lakes on the West German-Czechoslovak borders. One is called Devil's Lake and another, Black Lake. It was an interesting documentary about the rumors surrounding the lakes and so on. I was a member of the diving team, people who were supposed to go down and explore the bottom of the two lakes.

During the first exploration we discovered several boxes that were probably explosives, this was an exploratory dive. Then, the next day I came back to my office and talked to my colleagues and the commanding officer about my experience. And he said my god, this is a great opportunity. Why don't we make it a big propagandistic success? Why don't we put something into one of the lakes, boxes with top secret documents?

And that was the beginning of what I would say was a brilliant operation, a very successful operation. Anyway, several boxes were prepared that looked like old German boxes that were thrown into the lake during the last few days of the war, when many Nazi soldiers were escaping toward West Germany, and many of them dropped things and maybe even documents into the lake.

So we prepared four huge boxes, and one night I put them on the bottom of the lake. The chief of the service, Joseph Houska, was present when I did it. And then a few days after that the television came. I was a member of the diving team, so I was able to direct the divers to the place where these boxes were hidden. They were discovered, and it was the start of a huge propaganda campaign.

A few weeks after that, Minister of Interior Lubomir Strougal had a press conference and announced that very important Nazi documents were discovered in the lake and also lists of Nazi agents in Eastern Europe. That was an effective way to, to a degree, paralyze the activities of the West German intelligence organization, their gathering organization in Eastern Europe, because they worked with former Nazi agents, people in Eastern Europe who collaborated with the Nazi regime.

And when we said we have the list of agents working for Nazi intelligence, that meant Gehlen had to break contact with these people. And then we said we have so many documents that the statute of limitation

has to be extended, because it was supposed to end in 1965. And we will supply the West German Government with thousands of documents about Nazi war crimes.

And I think that this operation really contributed to the decision of the West German Government to extend the statute of limitations. And then in the following period we really gave the German Government many documents which came from Moscow, because we didn't have enough of these documents in Czechoslovak archives, so the Soviets had to supply us with these documents.

And then we sent them to the West German press, the French press, the Austrian press, the Italian press. It was a campaign which lasted for about 2 years—a campaign actually manipulated against the West German establishment.

There were very many former Nazis serving in the West German Government. So that is one of the very many operations the Czechoslovak service conducted in that period.

Mr. ASPIN. Bill, no more?

Mr. YOUNG. [Nods negatively.]

Mr. ASPIN. Just a couple of more odds and ends.

I cannot let you go without asking you a little bit more about the one thing here that you leave kind of in the air in your statement. In the mid-1960's Czechoslovak intelligence had several agents among members of the British Parliament. Do you know that for a fact?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes; I know for a fact. I cannot tell you the names because I don't know them, but our department conducted several operations, in which members of the Parliament were used for making certain statements, initiating certain discussions there, and creating a situation or atmosphere that official Soviet policy could use or misuse for maneuvering.

I cannot tell you either the names or the specific issues. I don't remember the issues any more, and I don't want to create any witch hunts for Britain. But I say this is a fact; the Czechoslovak service had at that time, in the mid-1960's, several agents among members of the British Parliament.

Mr. ASPIN. How did those agents operate? Were they being paid by the Czechoslovaks?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. And they were being run like an agent? They would have a control officer that would meet with them periodically?

Mr. BITTMAN. Well, I can give you a better example. The Czechoslovak service has also a few agents among the members of the West German Parliament, and one of them, for example—and I was the case officer of this man—was arrested in 1960 and sentenced to 17 years. This man was Alfred Frenzel, and he was a member of several parliamentary committees, including the Committee for Defense. So we knew exactly what the West Germans were discussing as far as the defense system of West Germany was concerned.

It is not quite clear even today how it happened, how this man was discovered by the West Germans as a Czech agent. Anyhow he was, and he received in 1960 a sentence of 17 years. That was the highest sentence passed after World War II in West Germany. He was used both for getting information about the West German defense system and also instructions to make certain decisions, if possible, in the interest of the Soviet bloc.

Mr. ASPIN. And in the case of the British Parliamentarians do you know what kind of information was coming from them?

Mr. BITTMAN. No. This was strictly top, top secret. Of course you usually hear something. You can get a signal that there is a highly placed agent in this country or that country, but I was never told names or even the number of these people; no.

Mr. ASPIN. And was it the kind of situation where they were so under the control of the Czechoslovaks that their control officer could give them a document, and they would give that as a speech?

Was there that much control, or was it an information-providing situation?

Mr. BITTMAN. I think it was mostly providing information. I think the Czech case officers were very careful in using these people for disinformation purposes because that was very dangerous naturally; so I am sure they are very, very careful.

But I know that in a few cases, yes, they are used. But unfortunately, I am not able to tell you exactly in what cases, what were the issues or what are the names of these people.

Mr. ASPIN. But they were at times used for propaganda as well as for information.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just follow up one more time on this forgery, the Senator Ted Kennedy forgery. If that is a Soviet forgery and if it is a forgery which is an obvious fake, and the Soviets did it as an obvious fake and put it out as an obvious fake, what kind of a twist do you think they might be working on here?

What is it? What is the game?

Mr. BITTMAN. I need more time for this. I am sorry. That I cannot answer now, here, immediately. I will provide the committee with an answer.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, just one question.

Mr. ASPIN. Sure.

Mr. YOUNG. Dr. Bittman, this is an open meeting. Are there other answers you might have given to some of the questions we have asked this afternoon that you would have been more free to respond to had it been an executive session, a closed session?

Mr. BITTMAN. No. I think there has been no difference, and the contrary, I think it is very useful that it is a public session, that the press is here and present.

I don't want to play the role of a teacher, but I think the press should know something about these techniques so that they can create certain defense instruments to paralyze the influence of Soviet deception.

Mr. YOUNG. You have certainly given us a lot to think about today, especially as it relates to the extreme activity on the part of the Soviet Union in attempting to impose their will upon the rest of the world through black propaganda, through forgeries, lies and deceit. It is quite an item.

I thank you very much.

Mr. ASPIN. Dr. Bittman, tell me, when you came from Czechoslovakia how much problem did it cause for the Czech service? Have they revamped everything since you have been there, do you know?

Have they had to change everything now because of what you knew about what was going on at the time?

Mr. BITTMAN. At that time I think it was a very severe blow for the service and for the Soviet bloc. Because, this was the first time the Western countries learned anything about Soviet covert actions, Soviet bloc disinformation from the inside. All previous defectors and officers of the Soviet intelligence were case officers dealing with a few cases, knowing several agents abroad.

But this was the first time I think the West learned something about the deception games, the Soviet bloc covert actions. And I am sure it created great confusion.

One of my former colleagues, Mr. Frolik, who defected a year after me, was in Prague, and he witnessed the situation there. According to his testimony, there was a plan in Prague to kidnap me in the United States, take me through Cuba, and then as soon as they had me in Prague, in prison, that they would film the interrogations and show it to every intelligence service officer in the Prague headquarters as a warning.

So it was a severe blow, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. And when you got here you went through a whole series, I guess, of meetings with people in this country, in the United States?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes, I was very thoroughly debriefed. I spent some time here in Washington being debriefed. I told the American officials who were involved in that process that I would tell them everything I knew, every bit of information I knew.

The only condition I had was when this was over I would like to be on my own and live a normal life in the United States. I don't want to get involved any more. I am sick and tired of the intelligence business.

It was a gentleman's agreement, and I was on my own. It was very difficult the first few years to adjust to the American environment and mentality, the struggle for survival. But I succeeded, and I am glad that it is over and that my espionage career is over, and I am on my own, living a totally different life.

Mr. ASPIN. What was made public in Czechoslovakia about your defection?

Mr. BITTMAN. I don't think anything was published there. As far as I know, I don't think anything was published about me.

Mr. ASPIN. So whatever they know about it would have come through word-of-mouth.

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Was the event which caused you to defect the Soviet invasion, and I guess the deceptions that you saw that the Soviet Union was putting on Czechoslovakia before and after the Czechoslovak invasion, in 1968, the data by the other members of the Czechoslovak?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Did it cause other defections?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes. I think judging from the press, because I have never received any report from the CIA how many of my former colleagues defected, but judging from the press I would say probably between 15 and 20 officers of the service defected.

Judging from the signals from the reports from the press I was able to detect and read. You know, there are very many people in the service thinking like me, but for some of them the door was closed forever.

I was lucky in a way. I was not asked in 1955 or 1956 to go to Germany and kill Mr. X or Z, because I would have done it at that time, and I would have been a murderer, and I wouldn't have been able to leave in 1968.

There are many people who were involved in these operations, and simply the door has closed forever for them. They are cynical, brutally cynical, trying to survive and enjoy whatever they can get from the regime. There is no way out. So in a way I was lucky.

MR. ASPIN. Have you some questions?

MR. ROMERSTEIN. Dr. Bittman, may I followup on the chairman's question about the British Parliament? Without mentioning the name of the individual, could you tell us, please, of an instance where an attempted recruitment was made and failed?

MR. BITTMAN. Not in Britain but in Germany. As I mentioned in my report, for 8 years I operated as a case officer working against West Germany, so as far as Britain is concerned I don't know any names in Britain of politicians or individuals working for the Czechoslovak service.

Speaking about Germany, the German Parliament and efforts to recruit Members of the German Parliament, yes, I personally was involved in several cases of others, not only the cases I mentioned, Alfred Frenzel, but several other Members of the Parliament.

One of them was an unsuccessful attempt to recruit a Member of the Parliament from southern Germany who was in contact with one of the Czechoslovak diplomats outside Germany, and who needed a document from Prague because supposedly he studied in Prague and finished his university studies there.

And when the service checked this, we found his name, that he enrolled, but there was nothing about his graduating from the university and that was immediately used, of course, as a weapon to blackmail him.

They gave him a forged document that he finished his studies in Prague, and then after a few months the case officer tried to recruit him. But this operation failed; he refused any other contact.

It was just at the time when Alfred Frenzel was arrested, and he became scared. He refused any other contact and sent the forged document back to the Czech diplomat, and that was over.

It is only an illustration. There is a systematic, orchestrated effort to recruit Members of the West German Parliament and members of the West German Government.

MR. ROMERSTEIN. The case I had in mind was one you told me about privately earlier where an attempt was made to blackmail a British Member of Parliament, and when they couldn't—

MR. BITTMAN. Oh, Mr. Anthony Courtney, yes. It is a case I learned about from the press. Anthony Courtney was a Conservative Member of the Parliament who visited the Soviet Union several times in the 1950's and early 1960's, and then he had a love affair in Moscow with a girl who was a KGB agent, and then they tried to blackmail him using the pictures, compromising pictures of him.

It failed. He refused to work for the KGB. But a few years later they decided to use this material against him and prepared a leaflet or booklet with the compromising pictures and distributed it to the

British press and many Members of the Parliament. So naturally the reputation of this Member was hurt, and he was not elected in the following election.

Actually it is a black propaganda operation, yes.

Mr. ROMERSTEIN. One more question. There is current discussion in the American Congress of a bill to protect the identity of agents, assets, and officers of our intelligence service. And some of those who have been attempting to identify those people often refer to a book called "Who's Who in the CIA" by Dr. Julius Mader.

Are you familiar with this book?

Mr. BITTMAN. Yes, I am very familiar with the book, because I am very sorry to admit that I am one of the coauthors of the book.

The book "Who's Who in the CIA" was prepared by the Czechoslovak intelligence service and the East German intelligence service in the midsixties. It took a few years to put it together. About half of the names listed in that book are real CIA operatives. The other half are people who were just American diplomats or various officials; and it was prepared with the expectation that naturally many, many Americans operating abroad, diplomats and so on, would be hurt because their names were exposed as CIA officials.

It was published under the name of Julius Mader. Many people here in this country, including many journalists, don't know that Julius Mader is actually an East German intelligence officer and author of several books dealing specifically with intelligence and propaganda.

The book circulated also in the United States. Actually I have the book at home. I bought it here in the United States.

Mr. ROMERSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Dr. Bittman.

[Thereupon, at 3:15 p.m. the session was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

CIA STUDY: SOVIET COVERT ACTION AND PROPAGANDA

Presented to the Oversight Subcommittee, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 6 February 1980, by the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. I am pleased to have this opportunity of responding to the request of this committee of the House of Representatives that the CIA provide testimony concerning the current extensive and far reaching propaganda and covert political action program of the Soviet Union. This Soviet effort is aimed at supporting the Soviet Union's domestic, national security, and foreign policies, as well as fomenting and supporting revolution and subversion abroad in the name of international Communism and national liberation. This Soviet activity has internal and foreign aspects. Today, I will restrict my comment to Soviet (and Soviet Bloc) foreign propaganda and covert action. I shall not discuss the use of these tools by the Soviet Communist Party and government to control its own people.

2. In July of 1978 the Director of Central Intelligence provided this Committee with an unclassified study of Soviet propaganda activities, which was published by the Committee.¹ Today, I will not repeat all of the comment in that study; however, in these introductory remarks, I wish to make certain summary statements concerning the scope and nature of Soviet propaganda aimed at foreign audiences, its relation to covert actions of the Soviet Government's intelligence service, the Committee on State Security (KGB), and Soviet foreign policies. I will then provide more detailed comment on one of the most reprehensible features of Soviet covert action—the use of forged U.S. Government documents. Thereafter, I will describe as examples of combined propaganda/covert action operations the current heavily orchestrated Soviet campaign against the modernization of theater nuclear weapons in NATO and the previous heavy campaign against the development of enhanced radiation weapons in NATO. In conclusion, I then will comment briefly on the types of activities and techniques used by the Soviets in covert action and propaganda.

3. The Soviet Union's willingness to conduct its foreign policy in accordance with the implicit rules-of-the-game that were observed by both sides during the first phase of East-West detente has steadily eroded in recent years. This erosion has been especially evident in the increased intensity of Soviet propaganda efforts and certain covert action operations designed to reinforce overt propaganda lines.

4. The Soviet leadership regards propaganda and covert action as indispensable adjuncts to the conduct of foreign policy by traditional diplomatic, military and other means. Moscow is willing to spend large sums on propaganda and covert

¹ "The CIA and the Media," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, First and Second Sessions (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1978), pp. 531-627.

action—our rough estimate of 3 billion dollars per year² is probably a conservative figure—and it has developed an extensive network of organizations, assets and technical means for preparing and disseminating propaganda materials. In the Soviet view, the “ideological struggle”, or the use of propaganda and psychological warfare techniques, is a vital element of state policy.³ Indeed, Soviet theoreticians have asserted openly that the battle of ideas intensifies during periods of “relaxation of tension” (detente) because the inevitable conflict between the Soviet Union and the West must be conducted by non-military means. The basic aims of Soviet foreign propaganda and covert action are (1) to weaken the opponents of the USSR and (2) to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow's views and international objectives.

5. The content of Soviet propaganda and covert action targeted against the U.S. changes in accordance with the issues of the day, but at all times reflects certain continuing objectives, among which we can list the following:

To influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military and political programs which are perceived as threatening the Soviet Union;

To demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, “colonialist” and “imperialist” power;

To isolate the United States from its allies and friends;

To discredit those who cooperate with the United States;

To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world;

To discredit and weaken Western intelligence services and expose their personnel;

To confuse world public opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet policies;

To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

² Our estimate of a Soviet expenditure of over 3 billion dollars per year for propaganda and covert action can be broken down as follows, if one only counts proportional costs for foreign and distinct from domestic propaganda and other activities, and if only the covert action activities of the KGB are considered. The indirect costs borne by foreign Communist organizations are not included:

	<i>Millions</i>
CPSU International Department-----	\$100
CPSU International Information Department-----	50
Tass-----	550
Novosti (APN)-----	500
Pravda-----	250
Izvestiya-----	200
New Times and other periodicals-----	200
Radio Moscow foreign service-----	700
Press sections in Soviet Embassies-----	50
Clandestine radios-----	100
International Communist Fronts-----	63
Subsidies to foreign Communist parties-----	50
KGB's Service "A"-----	50
CA Operations by KGB's foreign residencies-----	100
Support to National Liberation Fronts-----	200
Special campaigns in 1979, including anti-NATO TNF modernization campaign-----	200
Total-----	\$3,363

³ Soviet theoreticians have asserted:

For example, M. A. Suslov, CPSU Politburo Member, Secretary, and chief theoretician of the party said in an address in July 1975:

“Under conditions where the relaxation of international tension not only creates a new political situation in the world arena but actively influences the internal situation in the capitalist countries, the crisis of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism is being intensified and more favorable conditions are being created for the development of the workers and democratic movement. The principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, as is well known, has nothing in common with class peace between the exploiters and the exploited, the colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression, or between the oppressors and the oppressed.”

Suslov said the following in October 1979:

“In our ideological work we must consider, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, that ‘the positive advances in world politics and detente create favorable opportunities for the extensive dissemination of socialism's ideas. But, on the other hand, the ideological antagonism of the two systems is becoming more active and imperialism's propaganda is becoming more subtle.’” On the basis of the creative elaboration of present day problems of social development, our ideological workers are required to step up the struggle against bourgeois ideology and manifestations of right and left opportunism.”


General Secretary Brezhnev himself said at the 25th Party Congress:

“Detente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle.”

6. Policy decisions regarding the use of propaganda and covert action are made at the apex of the Soviet political system, in the Politburo. The Politburo approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda campaigns and the means used to implement them. Under the Politburo's general guidance, several party and governmental organizations play important operational and coordinating roles. The major institutional actors are: the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department (IID), International Department (ID) and the Committee for State Security (KGB).⁴

7. The International Information Department of the CPSU is the directing center of the Soviet propaganda effort. It was established in March 1978 as a direct result of a Central Committee decision to reorganize the entire foreign propaganda apparatus, improve its effectiveness and open a new propaganda offensive against the West. In effect, creation of this new organization signaled the top leadership's desire to place even greater emphasis on the role of propaganda in Soviet foreign policy and to increase centralized control and coordination over the entire Soviet propaganda network, ensuring that the network is fully responsive to the demands of top policymakers and can be quickly mobilized to disseminate selected propaganda themes on a world-wide basis. The IID is headed by Leonid Zamyatin, former director of the Soviet news agency TASS and a Brezhnev protege; Zamyatin is directly responsible to Brezhnev and the Politburo. The former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, Valentin Falin, is the First Deputy Chief of the IID.

SOVIET POLICY STRUCTURE FOR FOREIGN PROPAGANDA AND COVERT ACTION



Notes: Theoretically the KGB is a governmental and not a party organization, but in the present context it can be considered equivalent of a CPSU Department. Also, theoretically, organizations such as TASS and IZVESTIYA are governmental organs, but they receive direct policy-level guidance and supervision in matters of present concern directly from the IID.

8. The CPSU International Department maintains liaison with many foreign organizations which are frequently used to disseminate Soviet propaganda and views on international affairs. Those organizations include: more the 70 pro-Soviet Communist parties; international front groups; and national liberation movements.

9. The KGB provides a nonattributable adjunct to the overt Soviet propaganda network. Service A of the KGB's Foreign Intelligence Directorate plans, coordinates and supports operations which are designed to backstop overt Soviet propaganda using such devices of covert action as forgeries, planted press articles, planted rumors, and controlled information media. In particular, the number of Soviet forgeries has increased dramatically in recent years (see paragraph 27 below). In the early 1970s, this section of the KGB was upgraded from "department" to "service" status—an indication of its increased impor-

⁴ See chart below.

tance. Service A maintains liaison with its counterparts in the Cuban and East European services and coordinates its overall program with theirs.

II. SOVIET FORGERIES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

10. It is an established Soviet practice to employ forgeries in covert action and psychological warfare operations against the United States. Of about 150 anti-American forgeries produced by the Soviet Union and its East European allies in the postwar period the most damaging ones have been fabrications of official-looking U.S. government documents and communiques. Previous studies prepared for the Congress by the Central Intelligence Agency discussed 46 examples of Soviet and bloc documentary forgeries which came to our attention from 1957 to 1965.

11. Defector testimony and internal Soviet policy documents leave no doubt that the United States is designated as the "glavnyy protivnik" or "main enemy" for the purpose of operational planning. The overriding goal of the Soviet KGB and its East European allies is to isolate the United States politically and morally before world public opinion and to separate us from foreign friends and allies. Even though most Soviet Bloc covert action initiatives are carried out in Western Europe and in Asia, Latin America, and Africa such initiatives are subordinated to the primary aim of reducing American presence and influence in the international arena.

12. Anti-U.S. forgery operations including long-range plans are formulated and executed by the professional covert action staff of the KGB Service A of the First Chief Directorate which is in charge of foreign intelligence activities. Several former East European intelligence officers have testified that their most important covert action operations were ordered by the Moscow Center and carried out under its supervision. The Soviets not only use the satellite intelligence services to support and amplify their own forgery efforts but also force them to share the financial burdens and political and operational risks inherent in such undertakings.

13. The KGB exercises day-to-day operational responsibility for forgery efforts but its annual and 5-7 year work plans are approved by the highest levels of Soviet political authority, the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Sensitive operations which involve potentially embarrassing political repercussions must be vetted at the Politburo level.

14. The scope and magnitude of Soviet forgery operations are subject to tactical adjustments by the top leadership. In the past we have noticed definite downturns in the level of activity during periods of incipient détente in U.S.-Soviet relations but they have always been of short duration. The record of Soviet behavior indicates that Moscow does not see any basic incompatibility between its official policy of expanding bilateral relations with Washington and practicing dirty tricks.

15. The suspected Soviet and Bloc forgeries which have appeared since 1976 fall into three groups. A single forgery, a bogus U.S. Army field manual, has surfaced in more than 20 countries around the world and has received substantial media attention. Soviet propagandists have exploited it repeatedly to support unfounded allegations that the United States acts as an agent provocateur behind various foreign terrorists, in particular the Italian Red Brigades. A current series of forgeries, which now totals eight examples, has been aimed at compromising the United States in Western Europe and provoking discord in the NATO Alliance, especially in the context of the continuing Greek-Turkish dispute. Another current series of seven falsifications has been directed toward undermining our relations with Egypt and other countries in the Arab world. Copies of the forgeries appear after p. 86f.

THE PLACE OF FORGERIES IN SOVIET COVERT ACTION

16. The Soviet Union regularly uses covert political action and propaganda techniques hand-in-hand with conventional diplomatic, military and economic means to advance its official foreign policy and ideological goals in the international arena. The Soviets themselves subsume under the term "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) those activities which in the West are usually referred to as covert action operations. This term is used by the Soviets to ex-

press the difference between the regular intelligence collection and counterintelligence functions of the Soviet secret services and clandestine operations which are intended to produce a certain political or propaganda impact. Active measures include a range of practices such as written and oral "disinformation" (forgeries, false rumors), "gray" and "black" propaganda, manipulation or control of foreign media assets, political action and "agent of influence" operations, clandestine radio stations, semi-clandestine use of foreign communist parties and international front and special action organizations, staged or manipulated demonstrations and even, in the past, blackmail, and kidnapping.

17. While all of these forms of covert action have been or are being used by the Soviet Union to expand its power and influence in the world, my testimony today focuses on one particular method—the production and dissemination of anti-U.S. forgeries. U.S. intelligence analysts who study "questioned documents" estimate that in the postwar era the Soviet Union and its East European allies have produced around 150 anti-U.S. forgeries of various types. Some were bogus pamphlets and phony leaflets attributed to non-existent organizations, some consisted of fabricated bank statements and still others were reproductions of entire issues of the American news magazine *Newsweek*.⁵ But the most important type of forgery is the authentic-looking but false official U.S. Government document or communiqué.

18. Documentary forgeries, which contain false, misleading or incomplete information, may be fabricated out of whole cloth or they may be altered versions of genuine documents and official forms which have been obtained by Soviet espionage agents. In both cases, the Soviets use such forgeries in elaborate deception games with the governments, media, and people of their leading adversaries. Anti-U.S. Government forgeries always convey implicitly or explicitly a false or distorted message about U.S. foreign policy intentions and actions, and they are designed to influence their intended recipient ("the victim") to reach conclusions or take actions which the forger believes will serve his own interests while undermining those of his opponent ("the enemy"). Depending upon their content, documentary forgeries may have a political, military, economic or counterintelligence slant; in practice most of them—and all of those discussed today—have a political purpose.

19. Forgeries may also be classified according to their intended recipient or victim. One type is aimed at misleading foreign government leaders and opinion-makers, thereby warping the decisionmaking process in the target country. Technically speaking, this is the "disinformation"⁶ or misinformation type of forgery; it is normally surfaced by "agents of influence" with access to higher government circles in the target country and almost never receives public attention. A second type of forgery, which may be called the propaganda forgery, is directed at molding public opinion in the target country or countries. It is usually planted surreptitiously in the foreign media in such a way that the Soviet hand is not revealed. After it has received sufficient replay in the non-communist media, the forgery is then almost always exploited by Soviet propagandists to support unsubstantiated allegations made in the official media which would otherwise appear spurious and unconvincing without "documentary" evidence to back them up.

20. Documentary forgeries are a preferred weapon in the Soviet Union's arsenal of active measures. So-called "paper" operations receive priority because they do not involve a high degree of political risk, such as public exposure of the

⁵ *Newsweek* issues of Nov. 18, 1963, and Dec. 18, 1963. Although the covers were somewhat representative of the real magazine, the contents were pure Soviet propaganda and did not in any way look like the real thing. The KGB has come a long way from its work of this period. Copies of the *Newsweek* forgeries appear as app. IV p. 190f

⁶ Definition of disinformation from a KGB training manual:

"Strategic disinformation assists in the execution of State tasks, and is directed at misleading the enemy concerning the basic questions of the State policy, the military-economic status, and the scientific-technical achievement of the Soviet Union; the policy of certain imperialist states with respect to each other and to other countries; and the specific counterintelligence tasks of the organs of State Security."

"Tactical disinformation makes it possible to carry out the individual task of strategic disinformation and, in fact, comprises the principal disinformation work of the organs of State Security."

This same manual notes:

"Disinforming on strategic matters falls within the jurisdiction of the government, the appropriate ministries and committees, and the high command of the country's armed forces. The organs of State Security constantly render assistance to the other departments on this matter. . . ."

fabricator and retaliation by the target country, or a high degree of operational risk, such as the exposure of agents and techniques. Good forgeries will be accepted at face value by many people and some foreign government leaders even after they have been identified as forgeries and denounced by the victim governments' official spokesmen, and they can be surfaced anonymously through the mail or by second and third parties with clandestine connections with Soviet intelligence. At the same time, such operations tend to become stereotyped over time and their repeated use becomes apparent to western counterintelligence (see para, 39 below). For example, two studies prepared for Congress in 1961 and 1965 by the Central Intelligence Agency analyzed 46 cases of Soviet and Soviet bloc anti-U.S. documentary forgeries which occurred between 1957 and 1965.⁷

21. For the purpose of operational planning and execution of forgeries, the United States is designated as the "glavnyy "protivnik," or main enemy, by Soviet and Bloc intelligence services. Forgery operations, wherever they are carried out, have as their overriding goal the undermining of U.S. interests and prestige around the world. Ladislav Bittman, a former Czechoslovak intelligence officer, testified under the pseudonym Lawrence Britt in 1971 that:

"The major objectives of the Disinformation Department in the Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence services were summed up in a long-term plan of disinformation operations covering the period of 5 to 7 years.

"The Czechoslovak plan which was worked out in 1965 under the Soviet supervision characterized the United States as the enemy No. 1. The primary goal was to isolate the United States in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa morally and politically and to promote the withdrawal of American military from Europe.

"As far as priorities are concerned the NATO was the second most important target. The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service together with other Soviet Bloc intelligence services was supposed to work for disintegrating of the NATO countries partnership to the extent that the Atlantic Alliance wouldn't be renewed in 1969. As you know this didn't happen.

"German Federal Republic followed as the third most important target. According to the long-term plan, disinformation operations were to aim at weakening the alliance between West Germany and its Western partners presenting West Germany as a Nazi seedbed.

"The territory of developing countries represented the main battlefield in anti-American activities as the majority of operations was carried out there, and it was the territory where the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service registered greatest successes."⁸

Bittman's testimony was based on his personal experience, when he was the Deputy Chief of Department Eight (Active Measures) of the Czech Intelligence Service in the mid-1960's, but his main point still holds true today. The United States remains the top priority target of Soviet and Soviet Bloc forgery operations. This is reflected in internal Soviet policy planning documents and borne out by the appearance in recent years of a spate of major new anti-U.S. documentary forgeries.

22. Soviet forgery operations during the 1950s were carried out on an irregular, haphazard basis by the geographical subdivisions of the foreign intelligence (First) directorate of the Soviet Committee for State Security, the KGB. The early forgeries were of an uneven quality and enjoyed mixed success in deceiving western and third world government and public opinion. The 1960s, however, witnessed an expansion, institutionalization and professionalization of Soviet and Bloc covert action measures on an unprecedented scale. In 1959, a special section of the KGB's First Chief Directorate (for foreign intelligence), designated Department "D" after the Russian word "dezinformatsiya," was established and staffed with 40-50 covert action specialists. After it had received

⁷ See "Communist Forgeries," Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Testimony of Richard Helms, Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Agency, June 2, 1961 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1961) and "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign," Congressional Record, Sept. 28, 1965, pp. 25391-25393.

⁸ "Testimony of Lawrence Britt," Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, May 5, 1971 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1971), p. 14.

adverse publicity in the West during the 1960s, the latter component was re-named Department A. Then in the early 1970's, Department A was upgraded to the status of a special section (Service A), one of only two such sections within the First Chief Directorate. Today, Service A is staffed by approximately 50 professional covert action officers and is organized along both functional and geographical lines. By reorganizing, enlarging and regularizing the procedures of its covert action component, Moscow has been able to mount a larger number of more effective operations against the United States.

23. The Soviets receive a great deal of assistance from their East European allies in planning and implementing covert operations. In a report issued by a Senate committee in 1976,⁹ it was concluded that:

"KGB intelligence activities are supported and amplified the intelligence activities of all the other Soviet Bloc countries—so that we are, in effect, dealing with a single, unified anti-American and anti-free world intelligence operation—an operation far more massive, far more lavishly financed, and involving far more personnel than probably any intelligence operation previously mounted in history."

The sixties saw the beginnings of a new stage in the development of coordinated Soviet Bloc covert action operations, including the use of documentary forgeries. After setting up its own Department D in 1959, the KGB ordered the creation of similar departments in the East German, Czechoslovak and Hungarian services during 1963-64. A year later the Soviets introduced an important structural modification among the three Bloc services by permitting direct operational relations at the departmental level—something Moscow had never permitted in intelligence collection operations. With the KGB acting as chief coordinator, the executive staffs of the satellite covert action units began to exchange background material for their operations, work together on the production of forgeries and even help one another carry out operations abroad. It is estimated that the Soviet Union thus succeeded in augmenting its own covert action capabilities by at least 50 per cent and in mounting some 300-400 "special operations" per year.¹⁰ Furthermore, by pressing the East Europeans into its own service, the KGB was able to distribute the financial burdens as well as the political and operational risks among its allies and force them to engage in activities which had little bearing on their own national interests, but which involved them in Moscow's political warfare against the West.

24. The KGB exercises day-to-day operational responsibility for Soviet and Soviet Bloc covert action initiatives, but its annual and long-range (5-7 year) work plans are approved by the highest levels of Soviet political authority, the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Moreover, reliable defector testimony confirms that especially sensitive covert action operations which involve potentially embarrassing political repercussions must be vetted at the Politburo level. Thus, when we are confronted by a major new initiative in the covert action field, we can be reasonably certain that it has obtained the blessing of the Soviet leadership and does not represent an unguided action by a low-level KGB officer "doing his own thing."

25. KGB forgery operations are also subject to temporary adjustments dictated by shifts in the Soviet Union's general foreign policy line. For example, during the months that preceded the abortive May 1960 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Paris, the Soviet leadership ordered a reduction in such operations. From March 1959 through May 1960 only two new forgeries appeared, even though anti-U.S. falsifications had been appearing at the rate of about one per month. After the U-2 affair and the collapse of the summit and until the U.S. presidential election in 1961, the Soviets resumed producing and disseminating new forgeries at the previous rate of one per month.

26. In our judgment, a similar pattern emerged during the first stage of U.S.-Soviet detente in the mid-seventies. After the May 1972 Moscow summit and signing of the SALT I agreement, only two new forgeries surfaced, both in Africa, one in July and one in September. Those forgeries were probably in the

⁹ "Communist Bloc Intelligence Activities in the United States." Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, pt. 2 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1976), p. 65.

¹⁰ Iadislav Bittman, *The Deception Game* (Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syracuse: 1972), pp. 16-17. Bittman is a former Czechoslovak covert action specialist who defected to the West after the 1968 Soviet invasion of his homeland.

pipeline well before the summit. From late 1972 until late 1976, only one additional forgery that was believed to be of Soviet or Soviet Bloc origin appeared; it was circulated in several countries in the Middle East.

THE CURRENT INTENSIFIED SOVIET FORGERY CAMPAIGN

27. Beginning in late 1976, however, several new series of forgeries of U.S. Government documents and communiques began appearing. They have continued to appear since then at the rate of 4-5 per year. For a number of reasons based on political and technical analysis, we believe that these new forgeries were produced by the KGB or one or more of the East European intelligence services under Soviet control. (See para. 38-41 below and Annex B). Not only has the number of forgeries increased in recent years, but there also have been qualitative changes as well. The new spate of bogus documents includes high quality, technically sophisticated falsifications of a caliber which the Soviet and Bloc intelligence services were evidently incapable of producing in the 1950s and even in the 1960s. Some of the new forgeries are verisimilar enough to allow the Soviets to plant them in the western non-communist media with a reasonable expectation that they will be considered genuine by all but the most skeptical of recipients. These forgeries are intended to serve important strategic and tactical objectives of Soviet foreign policy, and they are designed to damage U.S. foreign and defense policies, often in very specific ways. Furthermore, in two cases Soviet forgers directly attributed false and misleading statements to the President and vice President of the United States—something they had refrained from doing in the past.

U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B

28. The first specific forgery I will discuss is that of U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B. (See Annex A-I p. 000-000.) This forgery deserves special attention, because it is a very sophisticated fabrication which the Soviets have exploited repeatedly in their overt and covert propaganda offensive against the United States. FM 30-31B contains a minimum number of errors in style, format and phraseology, and its authors used appropriate typewriters, paper, and military jargon. The signature of U.S. General William Westmoreland was forged in the bogus document which carries a "top secret" classification. In the last detail, however, Soviet forgers slipped up, since genuine U.S. Army field manuals have never been so highly classified. Small errors such as this give away the bogus nature of even the most carefully executed falsification.

29. FM 30-31B purports to contain operational guidance to U.S. military security services regarding measures for influencing the internal affairs of friendly countries where U.S. armed forces are stationed and which are confronted by internal security threats from leftist and Communist forces. Thus, one "message" which the documents' fabricators intended to convey to unwitting audiences is that the United States allegedly interferes in the domestic matters of governments whose internal stability is deemed important to U.S. national security interests. A special twist is given to the stability maintenance theme in a section of the fabrication which asserts that in some dire cases the United States envisions the use of extreme leftist organizations to convince allies of the need to adopt harsher internal security measures. It is this second "message" which Soviet propagandists have seized upon to support outlandishly false charges that the United States acts as an agent provocateur behind various terrorist groups.

30. Mention was first made of the field manual in late 1975 in an obscure left-wing Turkish newspaper, but a copy of the forgery did not surface until a year later, when a facsimile was left at the Embassy of the Philippines in Bangkok, Thailand. Thanks to timely exposure by the U.S. Government, the forgery was quickly put to rest. Then it suddenly reappeared two years later when a Cuban intelligence officer in Madrid began offering copies of the bogus document and a companion article based on it to Spanish publishers. The author of the article, Fernando Gonzalez, is a Spanish Communist who is known to have ties to both Soviet and Cuban intelligence officers. The forgery and the Gonzalez article were reprinted in the 18 September 1978 edition of *El Pais* and appeared again five days later in another Spanish periodical, *El Triunfo*.¹¹ The immediate motive

¹¹ *El Pais*: an independent, leftist publication, aspires to be the first national daily in Spain, poses as the vanguard of Spain's nascent political reform, influential with top policy makers and politicians who are left of center or centerist. It has close ties to the Spanish Communist Party but is not party controlled.

El Triunfo: a leftist, communist oriented weekly magazine. The Spanish Communist Party has considerable influence in the journal.

behind the 1978 revival of FM 30-31B was clear from the thesis of the Gonzalez article, since the author used the fabrication to support arguments that the U.S. is involved with various terrorist groups in Western Europe and in particular the Italian Red Brigades, which in March 1978 kidnapped and subsequently murdered Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro. Within days of the Moro kidnapping, the Soviet propaganda apparatus had begun a campaign of suggestion and innuendo to falsely link the U.S. to this murder, but Moscow had enjoyed little success without "proof" to support its allegations.

31. From the Soviets' point of view, the reappearance of FM 30-31B was an instant success. The *El Triunfo* article was quickly picked up and reported in the European press, especially in Italy where it could be expected to have maximum impact. Simultaneously Soviet propagandists launched a new campaign of accusations that the U.S. had secretly inspired the Red Brigades' murder of Moro, allegedly in retaliation for Moro's positive attitude toward Communist participation in the Italian government. This time around they cited FM 30-31B and the stories in the non-communist European press to argue that the Moro episode was a logical result of the policy guidelines set forth in the bogus document. A typical example of the Soviet use of one of their forgeries to support untrue allegations appeared in the December 1978 edition of "Problems of Peace and Socialism" ("World Marxist Review"). The Soviet-controlled journal of the international Communist movement, which said:

"Let us note what another Italian journal suggested: There arises the suspicion that the 'Red Brigades' (or those who manipulate them in Italy) are profascist organizations skillfully camouflaged as 'reds'. . . . The abduction and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro could, in the logic of things, have been the result of the CIA's realization that the policy pursued by that statement was dangerous. A few months later this was confirmed by a secret document which appeared in an October issue of the journal *L'Europeo*.¹² It bore the signature of US General Westmoreland and said that US special services should use 'leftist' outfits in 'friendly countries' to promote the interests of the United States."

Anti-U.S. forgeries in the NATO series

32. One entire series of new forgeries is aimed at undermining U.S. influence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and creating anti-American feelings in the governments and among the population of our West European allies. The first falsification in this current series appeared in late 1976. (See Annex A-II p. 000-000). It was an altered version of a genuine U.S. State Department airgram which apparently was obtained by Soviet agents and turned over to the KGB's Service A for its own disinformation purposes. The bona fide document tasked U.S. embassies in Western Europe with collecting publicly available economic, commercial and financial data. The altered version purported to outline requirements for information which could be used to bribe European officials and for plans to develop covert measures aimed at hindering or eliminating foreign trade competition.

33. Three of the seven forgeries in the NATO series seek to compromise U.S. foreign and defense policy in Western Europe by playing on the continuing difficulties in U.S.-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations. One of these, a totally fabricated speech attributed to President Carter (Annex A-III p. 117-121, make demeaning references to the Greek government in the context of its NATO role. Two other examples involved altered versions of genuine U.S. Government documents which had been tailored to suit Soviet objectives. One of these was an altered State Department telegram on Greek-Turkish relations which implied that U.S. policy favors Ankara at Athens' expense (Annex A-IV p. 122), and the other was a phony set of Defense Department intelligence collection requirements which instructs its recipients to spy on a large number of Greek political parties and organizations (Annex A-V p. 122-130).

34. In mid-1978, the Soviets succeeded in surfacing a bogus letter written on official NATO stationery and bearing the forged signature of Secretary General Joseph Luns (Annex A-VI p. 131-133). The letter purported to inform the U.S. Ambassador to NATO that the Belgian Defense Ministry had compiled a list of journalists opposed to deployment in Europe of the enhanced radiation weapon,

¹² *L'Europeo*: independent left-leaning magazine in Italy with national distribution. Has some appeal among radical intellectuals. Influential with some academic leaders. Frequently sharply critical of the United States.

popularly known as the "neutron bomb," as well as certain unidentified aspects of NATO and U.S. policy. The implication of the letter is that these journalists would somehow be penalized for their "negative" reporting. The letter was designed to dovetail with the massive Soviet propaganda campaign against the neutron weapon and to create additional opposition to it and to U.S. policy.

35. The two most recent forgeries in this series appeared in early 1979. In both cases, the KGB exploited its access to official U.S. Government stationery in fabricating bogus letters. One letter on a U.S. Air Force letterhead attempted to document Soviet propaganda claims that the U.S. and several other NATO members had cooperated with the People's Republic of China in suppressing disturbances in Zaire's Shaba province—disturbances actually incited by rebel forces operating from the neighboring state of Angola, a Soviet ally (Annex A-VII p. 134-135). The other letter, written on a U.S. Embassy, Rome letter head, purported to confirm rumors being circulated by Soviet agents in Italy to the effect that the U.S. stores chemical and biological warfare weapons at a NATO base near Naples (Annex A-VIII p. 136-137).

Anti-U.S. forgeries aimed at Egypt

36. A second series of new forgeries, which began appearing at almost the same time as the NATO series, is targeted at undermining U.S. relations with the Egyptian Government and President Anwar Sadat personally. Without exception, the fabrications in this group have attributed various anti-Sadat statements to U.S. foreign policy officials, suggesting that we do not really trust the Egyptian leader, that we question his leadership ability and political staying power and that we are preparing to cast him off as a friend in the Middle East because he is no longer "serving" our interests there. Some of these forgeries have taken swipes at other Arab governments and political forces, but on the whole they have consistently sought to poison the well of the U.S.-Egyptian relations.

37. One forgery in this series was a falsified interview purportedly given by Vice President Walter Mondale. The Vice President was alleged to have made derogatory statements about Sadat in the interview. Both the interview and the correspondent who allegedly conducted it were found to be fictitious (Annex A-XIV p. 161-165). Another forgery purported to be notes taken by an aide to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance from a confidential report prepared by the Secretary for President Carter. In the "notes," President Sadat along with Jordan's King Hussein, Syrian President Assad and the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti leadership was treated with considerable invective. Photocopies of the bogus notes were mailed anonymously to the Egyptian Embassy in Rome. There of the fabrications in this series bear the forged signature of Herman F. Eilts, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt (Annex A-X, p. 145-146, XII, p. 154-157, and XVI, p. 168-171). The latest in this series of letters bearing Eilts' forged signature and the latest in the anti-Sadat forgeries appeared in the 1 October 1979 edition of a Syrian newspaper, Al-ba'th.¹³ This letter takes the form of a private communication from Ambassador Eilts to the Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner. At one point, the letter has Eilts saying that if President Sadat refuses to advance U.S. policy interests in the Middle East, "then we must repudiate him and get rid of him without hesitation." And in another section, Eilts purportedly discusses U.S. efforts to bring about a shift in the policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization toward Israel, telling DCI Turner: "I know you possess the necessary capability and resources in this regard."

IDENTIFYING SOVIET BLOC FORGERIES

38. The analysis of anti-U.S. forgeries involves two tasks: (1) establishing that the documents are in fact forgeries and (2) determining their authorship. The first task is not difficult, and technical analysis plus consultations with the U.S. government offices, agencies and officials mentioned in the forgeries discussed above leave no doubt that the documents and communiques are indeed falsifications. Although direct evidence that most of these forgeries were prepared by the Soviet KGB or its East European allies is lacking, the combined weight of technical and political analysis and circumstantial evidence leads us to conclude that they can be confidently attributed to the Soviet Bloc.

39. Using previous cases of Soviet Bloc forgeries which were subsequently confirmed by East European defectors, our questioned documents specialists have

¹³ Al-ba'th: newspaper owned by Baath Party. Has national distribution. Organ that supports the government and is controlled by it. Generally anti-United States.

painstakingly assembled a typical pattern of Soviet bloc *modus operandi* in preparing, surfacing and, in most instances, exploiting documentary forgeries publicly for propaganda purposes (See Annex B, p. 171-175). Their conclusion, based on format, content, and forensic analysis as well as a *modus operandi* comparison of the surfacing of past and present forgeries leads us to the conclusion that the bogus documents which I am describing today are definitely of Soviet and/or East European origin.

40. The current spate of forgeries consists of technically well executed falsifications which are politically sophisticated in their content and apparent purpose. Unlike amateur efforts, they all contain a central core of reality around which are built various layers of logical and plausible, even if distorted and falsified, statements. To produce forgeries of this caliber and sophistication, a fabricator must have available examples of genuine classified documents and stationery, be familiar with U.S. Government procedures for handling and classifying such documents, and obtain the proper types of paper, ink, and printing machines. He must also be able to draw upon the talents of skilled analysts and observers of U.S. foreign policy formulation and implementation.

41. In our judgment, there are few intelligence services in the world which possess the requisite knowledge, materials, experience and covert action infrastructure necessary for mounting sophisticated forgery operations, and of those, the only ones with obvious malice toward the United States are located in Moscow and in the capitals of the Soviet Bloc countries. In addition, there is the accumulated evidence acquired from our own counterintelligence investigations and defector testimony, which confirms that the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc countries have an established record of using documentary forgeries in their anti-U.S. covert action operations. We have no evidence of sustained anti-U.S. forgery operations being carried out by any other country or countries hostile to us. There is solid, hard evidence that implicates the Soviets and their Cuban surrogates in the surfacing of the bogus army field manual in Madrid in September 1978 (see para. 30 above). We also observe the close fit between the apparent anti-U.S. objectives of these forgeries and the objectives of official Soviet foreign policy and propaganda. And, finally, it should be noted that the current forgeries, like those of the 1950's and 1980's, appear to be grouped around certain repeated themes and propaganda campaigns which have obvious counterparts in the official Soviet media.

WHY HAS MOSCOW STEPPED UP THE USE OF FORGERIES?

42. Greater use of anti-U.S. forgeries does not necessarily signify a basic change in Soviet commitment to expanded bilateral dealings with the U.S. or to specific agreements, such as SALT. It does reflect, however, a Soviet perception that a new phase of harder bargaining and sharper ideological conflict in U.S.-Soviet relations requires new tactics.

43. We do not know specifically why the Soviets resumed the use of forgeries after the 1972-76 hiatus. However, we do know that in 1973 and 1974 discussions were going on in the top levels of the leadership of the Soviet Union to get its message across to the world in general. It is probable that the debate pitted those who favored a more vigorous campaign against those who felt that more was to be gained by avoiding actions that might upset the detente process with the United States. However, by 1975 it is likely that the Soviet leadership began increasingly to discount the gains to be derived from the detente relationship. At the same time the growing Watergate scandal in the United States and criticism of U.S. intelligence activities including "exposes" by former intelligence officers must have been seen in Moscow as making target audiences around the world more receptive to and the United States more vulnerable to efforts to blacken our image.

44. We presume that, taken together, the concern for Soviet propaganda effectiveness, disenchantment with the fruits of detente and a perception of new opportunities swung the Soviet leadership consensus in favor of a tougher propaganda line and of reinstating the use of forgeries. To some extent this consensus has been reinforced by the belief among Soviet leaders that such U.S. actions as the human rights campaign and Sino-U.S. normalization constitute a heightening of U.S. activity against the USSR.

45. Moscow's harsher propaganda and intensified use of forgeries is aimed more at the United States than at our allies, because the Soviets see U.S. policy as having shifted unfavorably more than have West European policies. The Soviets also wish to preserve the less damaged political relationships they have

with the latter countries while trying, among other things, to play upon perceived differences of view between the United States and the West Europeans.

46. There is another possible factor in the Soviet calculus which should be considered. The Soviets may well believe that the revelations contained in the "Pentagon Papers" and those of Philip Agee have convinced important segments of the population in the Third World, and even in Western Europe, that the U.S. Government regularly engages in various kinds of deception and "dirty tricks" of the type frequently attributed to U.S. intelligence services by the Soviet forgeries. The Soviets also appear to believe that these audiences have been conditioned to discount U.S. protests of innocence and to reject our condemnation of forgeries as bogus documents.

III. THE SOVIET CONCERTED USE OF PROPAGANDA AND COVERT ACTION TECHNIQUES

THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO TNF MODERNIZATION

47. At this point, I would like to return to one of the major assertions of my opening remarks—to provide you with two examples of how the Soviet Government and Communist Party leadership concert and manage a large-scale campaign of coordinated diplomatic moves, overt propaganda, and covert political action. The current major Soviet campaign, now in full swing, is aimed at preventing NATO from modernizing its Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF). I will discuss it first; then turn to the campaign which reached its high point in 1977 but still goes on against the American proposal to introduce enhanced radiation weapons (the so-called neutron bomb) into the NATO forces.

48. You will recall that in late July, 1979 the U.S. Government consulted NATO allies on the modernization of Alliance long-range theater nuclear forces (TNF). Their discussions led to a decision in mid-December, to proceed with the production and deployment of a modernized TNF while pursuing grey-area systems negotiations with Moscow. A 12 December NATO agreement was reached in spite of a concerted Soviet effort to block Alliance modernization plans. The Soviets employed highly coordinated diplomatic, propaganda and covert action measures to influence elite and public opinions against NATO intentions. Collateral Soviet objectives were to cause disarray within NATO allies.

49. In addition to authoritative pronouncements by Soviet foreign policy officials, the Soviet Union continues to use public and diplomatic gestures, overt propaganda, covert press placements, the West European communist parties, international front groups and its intelligence officers in an effort to block, or at least delay, the NATO modernization decision and to influence West European and American attitudes on the subject. Soviet overt commentaries rely on one-sided arguments, tendentially selected facts, and misleading conclusions to stimulate opposition. Scare tactics are used. For example: the Soviet Union asserts that West Germany will acquire a role in nuclear strategic planning and a finger on NATO's nuclear trigger, which it does not now have. FRG leaders' statements to the contrary are ignored by Moscow. Soviet efforts, which peaked just prior to the December 1979 NATO Ministerial meeting in Belgium was to be held, concentrated on the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands. The campaign, however, also impacted on the non-NATO countries of Finland, Sweden, Spain, as well as on other NATO countries.

50. *Soviet Propaganda.*—Soviet and other communist propaganda points out that the U.S. TNF proposals impose a major nuclear threat to Europe and high costs on NATO members, and that they could serve as "vulgar political blackmail" in bilateral bargaining with the Soviet Union. Another tactic which the Soviets use to undermine the United States proposals is one of asserting (without evidence) that their own capabilities and modernization program do not pose a threat to Western Europe and do not justify a Western response.

51. These propaganda efforts are carried out through official Soviet statements. In addition, a world-wide network of Soviet press assets (overt and covert) are used. Since the 25 October 1979 declaration by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov threatening to complicate future disarmament talks and destabilize Soviet-U.S. relations, should Washington place new missiles in Europe, Moscow's propaganda line has followed general "carrot and stick" themes set forth by Brezhnev on 6 October. Brezhnev's latest comprehensive pronouncement, a 5 November release to Tass, only gives added impetus to the campaign. A Zhukov commentary in *Pravda* on 30 October warned that NATO still had time to avert a "possibly irreparable" decision on European missile modernization while, the next day,

General Resnitschenko¹⁴ hinted, in a *der Stern*¹⁵ interview, that, even if NATO modernized its theater forces the Soviet Union would be willing to negotiate. He added, however, that in such an event the USSR would be forced to develop its own weapons systems and that this would make conditions for negotiations more difficult. The Soviets have also begun to argue that NATO plans represent a circumvention of SALT II. General Chervov,¹⁶ in a *Trud*¹⁷ article, claimed that the transfer of cruise missile technology was prohibited under the protocol to the SALT II treaty, while Zagladin and Falin asserted, during October, that deployment of a modernized TNF would represent a circumvention of the SALT Treaty.


On 3 November, the Soviet Parliament appealed to legislators in the United States, Canada and West Europe to help stop the United States from deploying medium-range missiles in Europe. The appeal closely followed the working of Brezhnev's 6 October speech. Brezhnev's statement of 5 November to Tass announcing Soviet readiness to begin negotiations "without delay" on the basis of his month-old offer represented the latest Soviet-effort. He warned, however, that a NATO decision to produce and deploy a modernized TNF would undermine negotiations. He added, "It is important that no hasty action be taken which might complicate the situation or obstruct the attainment of positive results."

52. The magnitude of the Soviet propaganda effort is illustrated, in part, by a study of the broadcast commentary from Moscow between October and December 1979:

Soviet Propaganda

Percent of Total Prop Output:

Neutron Bomb Campaign, 1977




30 July
TASS denounces ERW in broad statement on US foreign policy.

1-7 August
Soviet media give attention to World Peace Council "Week of Action" against ERW

28 August
Pravda publishes appeal of 28 Communist parties against ERW

Anti-Long-Range Theater Nuclear Modernization Campaign, 1979



6 October
Brezhnev's proposals announced in Berlin

13 October
Brezhnev letter to NATO heads-of-state

25 October
Ustinov statement on US Soviet relations

5 November
Brezhnev interview in TASS

November 13-14
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting

23 November
Gromyko press conference

5 December
Gromyko statement from Berlin following Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting. Soviets begin troop and tank withdrawal with media event.

12-14 December
NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, Belgium.

¹⁴ General Vasily Gerasimovich Resnitschenko, Rector of the Soviet Frunse Military Academy.

¹⁵ *der Stern* is an influential weekly illustrated news and feature magazine of West Germany, which has a propensity for coverage of Soviet matters.

¹⁶ Lieutenant General Nikolay Chervov of the Soviet Army General Staff.

¹⁷ *Trud* is the newspaper of the Soviet central trade union organization.

This chart indicates that Soviet propaganda on European disarmament reached over 20 percent of all output in early October, while specific attacks on NATO intentions were over 12 percent during mid-November.

53. *Role of the CPSU.*—Orchestration for the anti-TNF modernization campaign takes place under direction of the Central Committee of the CPSU, specifically the International Department (ID) and International Information Departments (IID). Three prominent Central Committee officials—IID Chief Leonid ZAMYATI, his First Deputy Valentin FALIN (both Brezhnev proteges), and ID First Deputy Chief Vadim ZAGLADIN—were the primary expounders and interpreters of the 6 October Brezhnev proposals. Boris Ponomarev, Candidate Member of the CPSU Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee, also played an important role in contacts with West European Communist parties. Falin authored one of the first major critical articles on LRTNF, which appeared on 19 September. Falin and Zagladin both surfaced the theme that NATO plans were a circumvention of SALT II, while Zagladin stressed the threat to Berlin. Zamyatin was the author of many authoritative Moscow commentaries on European disarmament, Soviet initiatives and NATO Plans. In late October Zagladin participated as a member of the Soviet delegation at a major front group rally in Belgium, then met with Dutch parliamentarians in The Hague. In late November and early December he held interviews with *Pravda* and with the West Berlin Communist newspaper. He visited France and Luxembourg, appeared on Western European TV, and held interviews with *Le Monde* of France and *La Stampa* of Italy.²⁸

54. The CPSU replays Soviet themes through other channels. Portraying NATO plans as a "circumvention" of the protocol to SALT II, the Soviet Union leveled a special attack on the cruise missile. This was done by using diplomats, academicians with close ties to the party apparatus, as well as through the media. Soviet concern with the proposed ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) for NATO was first raised by Daniel Proektor, head of the "European Security" section of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO). Speaking before a prestigious foreign affairs group in Hamburg, Proektor singled out the GLCM as a particular problem for Moscow because the USSR had no similar weapons and possessed no defense against the GLCM. The anti-GLCM theme appeared publicly in an interview in *La Stampa* on 13 November by retired General M. A. Milshteyn,²⁹ a USA-Canada Institute member. Milshteyn asserted that the GLCM force "would inevitably multiply the risks of war . . . by giving superiority to the NATO arsenals." These private and public expressions of concern were reinforced in diplomatic channels by a Soviet foreign military official, who told a visiting U.S. official that the cruise missile was a qualitatively new system that was prohibited by the terms of SALT II.

55. *Role of Soviet international front organizations.*—Soviet international fronts—organizations which appear to be independent from the CPSU but are, in fact, funded and guided by Moscow—were and are active in issuing propaganda statements supporting Brezhnev's proposals, attacking NATO intentions and in organizing anti-TNF events. The fronts are used to give a false impression of larger and more representative public support for the Soviet disarmament initiatives than actually exists.

56. The World Peace Council (WPC), largest of the thirteen major Soviet front groups, has played a leading role in organizing demonstrations and in issuing formal condemnations of NATO plans. Its activities have been supported by the other fronts and have received worldwide press replay. Such other fronts as the World Federations of Trade Unions (WFTU), World Federations of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) were also used by the USSR to issue declarations of support and to organize demonstrations in support of Brezhnev's proposals on NATO activity. In late October 1979, the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a Soviet front established to provide popular support for governmental negotiations on the Conference for European Security, sponsored a meeting in Belgium, attended by a large Soviet delegation which included Central Committee officials

²⁸ *Le Monde*: influential French left of center newspaper; considered to be the most respected newspaper by most of the intelligencia in Europe.

La Stampa: respected, middle-of-the-road national newspaper in Italy.

²⁹ Retired Lieutenant General M. A. Mil'Shteyn is a former Professor at the Frunze Military Academy. He is the Chief of the Political-Military Department at the USA-Canada Institute and a frequent visitor to the West.

who steered its results toward support for Soviet positions on European disarmament.

57. *Soviet campaigns in The Netherlands.*—As the Dutch entered the final stages of considering TNF modernization plans, the Soviets became increasingly involved there. After the conclusion of the De Haan Conference sponsored by a Soviet front group (see paragraph 58 following), a Soviet entourage, led by CPSU ID First Deputy Chief Zagladin, lobbied against TNF with members of the Dutch lower house. Zagladin's demarche focused on the United States and the FRG as the "villians" of the TNF plan, stressing that a balance already existed and that Brezhnev's speech had not been well understood. In addition, Soviets and East Germans are exploiting their contracts with Dutch journalists. Soviet journalists have relayed articles with an anti-TNF theme back to Moscow for replay in communist media. The Dutch Communist Party, through its Dutch Christians for Socialism front group, has also stepped up its anti-TNF efforts. It has helped, along with the WPC, to organize European anti-militarist activities. The involvement of the anti-militarists in security questions, and their connection with the WPC are new, as the group heretofore focused primarily on social issues. There is also evidence of direct Soviet financial support to one of the Dutch anti-nuclear weapons campaigns. The Communist Party of The Netherlands (CPN) also has played a leading role in the Soviet campaign, particularly via joint work with the East German and Polish communist parties. A CPN delegation to Warsaw in early November 1979 issued a joint communique noting a unanimity of views between the CPN and the Polish communists on issues of peace and European security.

58. *Soviet campaigns in Belgium.*—Paralleling the scope of activities in The Netherlands, the Belgian Communist Party (BCP) worked with front groups to increase opposition to TNF plans and also maintained contacts with Communist party members from the Soviet Union and East Germany. In addition, from October 26–28, 1979, De Haan, Belgium was the scene of a disarmament conference held under the auspices of the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as noted above.

59. *Soviet campaigns in the Federal Republic of Germany.*—The Soviets and East Germans have kept up the pressure on Bonn by a combination of propaganda, diplomatic pressures and non-official representations. On November 1, GDR leader Honecker warned Bonn that approval of the NATO plan would not only cause a deterioration in East-West relations generally but would also pose a threat to the FRG and West Berlin in particular. The November 3 issue of Pravda attacked FRG Foreign Minister Genscher for using "pseudo-arguments" to justify NATO deployments. Other GDR, Soviet, and West Berlin communist media have had similar themes. A probable Soviet trial balloon on reunification, floated through the London Observer,²⁰ received a rapid and negative reaction from FRG leadership.

Soviet diplomatic pressure, exerted primarily at the Soviet foreign ministry level, has stressed that approximate parity now exists and that NATO should not seek to change the balance in its favor. The East Germans have also used positive gestures in their campaign, such as a late October agreement to drop certain longstanding road tolls on West German cars entering the East, in return for a lump sum payment by Bonn. Soviet non-official pressure has generally taken the form of exchanges between Bonn and Soviet correspondents who act as emissaries. One late Fall 1979 message sent by the Soviets via a Soviet correspondent in Bonn to a senior West German politician said that West German failure to respond positively to Brezhnev's proposals would lead to unfortunate consequences. The correspondent threatened the restart of a general arms race and said the West could forget about any positive results from the 1980 CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid if NATO proceeded with its plans.

60. *Soviet campaigns in Italy.*—The Italian Communist Party has, for the most part, resisted Soviet pressure for a direct, hard-line campaign against TNF modernization; however, the PCI has begun moves to sponsor a large scale "popular" campaign against basing the modernized force in Italy. PCI media organs have given considerable attention to pronouncements from Moscow on this issue. For example, pro-Communist Italian Senator N. Pasti has received widespread attention within Italy as a former NATO general who has become an outspoken proponent of the Soviet line; i.e., that a NATO-Warsaw Pact balance

²⁰ London Observer: independent, non-partisan, slightly left-of-center weekly newspaper of Britain. Influential with top policy makers.

exists and that NATO intentions were designed to upset the equilibrium and gain military superiority. Moscow arranged for an interview with Pasti along the aforementioned thematic lines to be published in the November 3 *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.²¹ Three days later this interview was reintroduced to the Italian public by the left-of-center *Corriere Della Sera*²² and over the Italian radio. On November 7 Prague's *Rude Pravo*²³ published another interview with Pasti that replayed virtually the same themes critical of NATO. Politicians such as Pasti are valuable tools used by the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

61. PCI Secretary General Berlinguer has demonstrated a posture of "soft opposition" despite heavy pressure from Moscow.

For Berlinguer, the dilemma of trying to support communist disarmament proposals while, at the same time, decreasing domestic Italian criticism of the PCI as a tool of Moscow, prevented the PCI from intervening more actively in the debate. The PCI's conception of limited opposition, however, still allowed its media organs to publish articles critical of NATO intentions, and to organize rallies against TNF. The PCI has shown every sign, in the wake of the NATO decision to modernize, of using the theater nuclear force issue to keep pressure on the Cossiga Government.

62. *Soviet campaigns elsewhere in Europe.*—In Spain, communist party (PCE) chief Carillo reportedly agreed to support Soviet propaganda and political action efforts against NATO modernization plans after having received a personal appeal from Brezhnev. The Austrian Communist Party (KPOE) and the West German Communist Party (DKP) were also urged by the Soviets to lobby against TNF.

Turkey's communist party (TCP) has become involved in broadcasts and demonstrations against NATO, run primarily through its clandestine radio in East Germany and its front group, the Turkish Peace Association (TPA). The TPA was also involved in a demonstration in Belgium scheduled just prior to the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. The Soviets show less interest in other members of the Alliance such as Denmark and Norway probably because basing nuclear weapons in these states was not considered. Moscow did, however, discuss the TNF issue with representatives of the Danish CP. The Finnish Government came under some pressure from a Soviet Government attempt to connect the TNF question to the mutual assistance provisions of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Kekkonen Government was able to sidestep the threat but has also recently stepped up its efforts to obtain security guarantees in international forums. The Finnish CP was active in issuing propaganda against NATO plans. With partial success, Moscow has used the KOMSOMOL²⁴ to pressure Finnish Communist youth groups to support the Soviet position.

More recently it appears that the Finnish Peace Council (affiliate of the WPC) will be used to spearhead a campaign in Scandinavia against TNF modernization. The purpose is allegedly to demonstrate that the NATO decision represents a grim threat to the Scandinavian people. The campaign will pressure Scandinavian Governments through petitions, meetings, demonstrations and parliamentary interpellations protesting the NATO TNF decision. The French Communist Party (PCF) entered the fray rather late. A 10 December PCF declaration urged the Giscard government to oppose TNF and to negotiate a treaty of mutual security with the Soviet Union, illustrating the PCF's continuing fidelity to the Soviet line on most foreign policy questions. The higher PCF profile on foreign policy issues coincides with a late November visit to Paris by CPSU ID First Deputy Chief Vadin Zagladin, who, as noted, played an important role in Soviet orchestration of the anti-LRTNF campaign.

63. *Soviet Use of Diplomatic Channels.*—The Soviet Union and Eastern European governments have applied pressures on NATO and peripheral governments through bilateral diplomatic contacts. To officials in the FRG government, Soviet Ambassador Semenov and Foreign Minister Gromyko have argued standard Soviet positions of the threat to detente and the need to recognize an existing balance, but also show signs of flexibility. Threats, such as attempts to intimi-

²¹ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*: official organ of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) Central Committee. Published in Moscow six times a week.

²² *Corriere Della Sera*: Italian center-left prestigious national daily. U.S. coverage generally unbiased.

²³ *Rude Pravo*: Official newspaper of the Czech Communist Party.

²⁴ *Komsomol*: Communist Youth League of the Soviet Union. Membership is about 37 million, ages 14–28. Structured along CPSU lines.

date Bonn by reviving a serious downturn in East-West relations, came more through non-official channels. Moscow took a different tack with Rome, hinting at economic benefits should Italy reject NATO plans.

64. *Soviet Effort to Influence the Vatican's Position.*—During late November 1979, the USSR—through the PCI—apparently tried to influence Prime Minister Cossiga's position on TNF by using media commentary to make it appear that the Vatican supported the PCI position on TNF. Ponomarev applied heavy pressure on the PCI during his November visit. The heightening of PCI efforts to mobilize left-Catholic groups against TNF, a series of leftist press articles alleging left-Catholic support for the PCI position, and the specific "Vatican angle" seem to date from the timeframe of the CPSU-PCI consultations. During the latter part of Ponomarev's visit the Italian press particularly *Il Messaggero* and *L'Unita* carried articles alleging that the Pope and the Vatican had intervened in the TNF debate by counseling Italy and West Germany against stationing new American missiles on their territory.²⁵

THE SOVIET ANTI-NEUTRON BOMB CAMPAIGN

65. In September 1979 the Chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Berecz, wrote that "the political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and most successful since World War Two." He went on to say: "... we have no reason to feel satisfied it was a good program that the European communist and workers' parties adopted in Berlin three years ago, but we think it is in our common interest to make greater efforts than so far for the implementation of this programme and for strengthening the anti-imperialist unity." The Soviet Ambassador to The Hague at that time was subsequently decorated by the CPSU in recognition of the success of the Dutch Communist Party, under his direction, in organizing the high point of the anti-neutron bomb campaign.

66. The Soviet Union during July 1977 initiated an intensive worldwide campaign against U.S. production of the "neutron bomb," which continues to this day. It has now been subsumed as a major element in the current Soviet anti-TNF modernization campaign. During the height of its intensity, the anti-neutron bomb campaign held center stage in Soviet media. It was mirrored equally in the East European press.

The Communist international front groups were mobilized:

Peace Councils in various East European states held protest meetings and passed resolutions.

In Istanbul, a Peace Committee demonstrated in front of the U.S. Consulate General.

An Accra group, described as completely out of local character, delivered a protest letter to the U.S. Embassy.

In Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf, front groups delivered notes to U.S. Consulates General. In Bonn, two Soviet journalists were observed at a demonstration at the American Embassy.

A front group in Lima, Peru, sent a protest to the United Nations.

In Tanzania, a WPC delegation sought propaganda assistance from President Nyerere.

Other major international front groups, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, participated in the "Week of Action."

The purpose of this front group activity was to maintain the campaign's momentum and to draw non-communists into the campaign, particularly in Western Europe. What had begun as manifestly a Soviet effort now appeared to many as a general public reaction to the alleged horrors of the "neutron bomb."

67. There were two types of adverse public attention for the "neutron bomb" which the Soviets hoped to generate in Western Europe and, in fact, did. The first might be called "hack comment" and came from the front groups and from publications of communist parties. Thus, there were articles in the Belgian CP newspaper, *Le Drapeau Rouge*,²⁶ (on ten different days), and the Austrian CP paper, *Volksstimme*, *L'Unita* in Italy, the Greek CP/Exterior newspaper, *Rhizospastis*, and so on. The second type of comment, and the far more important, was that of the non-communist press situated politically in the center or on the

²⁵ *Il Messaggero*: Leftist, occasionally sensationalistic daily of Italy. Favors the Italian Socialist Party. Influential. Strongly critical of the U.S.
L'Unita: official daily of the Italian Communist Party.

left. A segment of this press could be counted on to react almost automatically once the "neutron bomb" received enormous attention in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Others in this group could be expected to respond negatively on the bomb issue for various reasons: anti-Americanism; doubts on NATO's viability; hopes for maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union; or an honest distaste for the development of new weapons of mass destruction. For the Soviets, the real propaganda success lay in the broad, adverse editorial treatment given the "neutron bomb" by this second journalistic sector.

68. In late January 1978 every Western government announced that it had received a letter from Leonid Brezhnev warning that the production and deployment of the "neutron bomb" constituted a serious threat to détente. These announcements received heavy media coverage worldwide. Also, Western parliamentarians received similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet, and Soviet trade union officials sent letters to Western union organizations and leaders. It gradually became clear that the Soviets had decided to shift their propaganda attack away from the United States and direct it more at our NATO allies, who would have to make the decision in the immediate future as to whether to accept deployment of the bomb on their soil.

69. Even as Brezhnev's dramatic gesture brought home to West Europeans the weight of the "neutron bomb" issue, the Soviets were planning a series of conferences in Europe. The target of this new effort was the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), to be held in New York from 23 May to 28 June 1977. Three conferences were utilized to provide psychological momentum at the SSOD. The World Peace Council, through one of its sub-fronts, the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, organized a symposium in Vienna on "Nuclear Energy and the Arms Race" in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body.

A much larger meeting was staged in Geneva 27 February to 2 March under the aegis of an organizing group calling itself the "Special Non-Governmental Organizations Committee on Disarmament." In fact, the real organizer was the WPC aided by the Swiss Peace Movement and East Bloc representatives accredited to the United Nations in Geneva. The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) was the prime organizer of the "International Forum Against the Neutron Bomb," held 18 to 20 March in Amsterdam. The Soviets collaborated with the CPN in this extravaganza. Sympathizers from all over Europe were brought in for the meeting, which culminated on 19 March in a march of some 40,000 persons. Although the Soviet anti-neutron bomb campaign has peaked, it is not over. We estimate that, to date, over the past three years, the Soviets have put over \$100,000,000 into this campaign in the form of subsidies to West European Communist Parties and from groups for their activities and rallies, suborning of noncommunists, contributions to common cause type affairs as quid pro quos for cooperation front activities, direct advertisements, travel of Soviet and Bloc lobbyists to the West, and of Western groups to the USSR, where they can be "influence," etc.—all a very serious and conscientious effort, which, from the Soviet point of view, has paid off.

IV. EXAMPLES OF SOVIET COVERT ACTION TECHNIQUES

SOVIET USE OF PROPAGANDA

70. At this point I would like briefly to describe how the Soviet Union uses a wide variety of mechanisms in conducting its covert political action operations. But first, let me summarize the overt, unattributed, and black or covert propaganda activities of the Soviet Union. In my introductory remarks I cited the relationship of propaganda to covert action and commented on the CPSU's International Information Department, which supervises and controls the foreign propaganda activities of the various USSR organizations involved. I again refer you to more detailed comment on Soviet propaganda to be found in the paper the DCI provided you in July 1978, and which you have published in "The CIA and the Media," pp. 531-627.

71. The Soviet Union has two new agencies fully under party and governmental control: the "official" Tass agency and the supposedly "unofficial" Novosti (also known as APN). Tass maintains bureaus and correspondents in about 100 countries. Novosti claims information exchanges with more than 100 international and national news agencies, more than 100 radio and TV stations, more than 7,000 of the world's newspapers and magazines, and with 120 publishing houses. The East European Bloc countries also have news agencies which

assist the Soviets. Pravda, the official newspaper of the CPSU, and Izvestiya, the official newspaper of the Soviet government, have their roles as mouthpieces for Soviet propaganda aimed abroad. They are supplemented by a number of other supposedly less official outlets, such as the Red Star of the Soviet military establishment, the Trud of the so-called Soviet trade union movement, and the centralized New Times. Each plays its role. There are close to 500 Soviet journalists stationed outside the Soviet Union. Most of them are employees of Tass, Novosti, Pravda, or Izvestiya. They perform a variety of functions in addition to their normal role as reporters. Novosti offices publish press bulletins from which many Third World newspapers extract material for publication. A large number of Soviet journalists abroad are KGB intelligence officers or double as part-time intelligence agents under KGB direction. Before dealing in more detail with clandestine Soviet press placements in the media of other countries, let us note a small sampling of the Soviet Union's overt propaganda.

Since mid-1978 the Soviet media has widely publicized allegations that the United States and the CIA in particular acted as the agent provocateur behind the Italian Red Brigades' murder of Aldo Moro.

Within hours of the May 1979 assassination in Iran of Ayatollah Motahhari, Moscow Radio's Persian-language service and TASS implied that the CIA was behind the terrorist organization which took credit for killing the religious leader. Eventually this implicit allegation was expanded to include the assassination ten days earlier of General Gharani. The most direct allegation was made by Tass later in May and was sourced to a Lebanese newspaper which asserted that the terrorist organization was operating on CIA orders. The Lebanese newspaper has been used before as a Soviet covert press placement outlet.

An occasional writer on international affairs for Izvestiya has participated also as a source of occasional disinformation to West German journalistic and political figures for at least the past 20 years. He has long been an important Soviet contact for some West German politicians of the three major parties. He has been identified at different times as a newsman and as a Soviet government official.

72. The Soviet propaganda/covert action structure also makes frequent use of unattributed propaganda to reinforce its overt press statements. In general, two techniques are used: the clandestine placement of media items in foreign newspapers and magazines, and the selective replay of Western media articles.

73. When the Soviet Union wishes to create an aura of authenticity surrounding an otherwise implausible position, it uses a system of press placements through non-Soviet journalists recruited to ensure that Soviet articles surface in the local foreign press. For example:

India: A September 1979 issue of Blitz contained an article claiming that the Bangladesh President was assassinated in 1975 by the CIA and that "their own man," was installed as President. He was, in turn, ousted and arrested, but pressure has now been exerted by the United States for his release with threats of stopping the supply of foodgrains to Bangladesh unless he and his men are released. (All false information, of course.)

In Cameroon: A June 1979 issue of the Cameroon Times carries a front page article which appears to be another Soviet-inspired effort to scar the CIA. It provides a wrap-up of the murder in Douala of a Cameroonian Gulf Oil Executive, his wife and son and suggests that although two Cameroonian suspects were taken into custody, it is obvious from their backgrounds that they lack the ability to plan a sophisticated and well-organized crime and that they "were mainly executors of a CIA-type murder."

74. The Soviets often quote statements by Western politicians and articles in well-known Western newspapers out of context and often in actually falsified fashion. They, thus, falsely attribute comment to Western sources. An illustrative example: In the Soviet exploitation of their forgery of the U.S. State Department Airgram A-8950, which I cited in paragraph 32 above, Tass claimed that the London Sunday Times on 7 November 1976 had carried the false airgram information as a straight news story and thus authenticated this forgery. In fact, this British paper had labeled the item a forgery, but this section of the article was not replayed by Tass.

75. The use of black propaganda is also a regular feature of overt Soviet media as well as a major activity undertaken by the KGB clandestinely abroad.

As noted in our discussion of Soviet forgeries of U.S. Government documents. This technique of falsification can be handled orally as well as in written form—

the passage of the whispered falsehood or the blatant oral transmission of disinformation. These latter uses are much more frequent than the appearance of documents, since there is no need for the difficult process of the authentic looking papers. I will cite some examples of the oral forgery when I cover other aspects of Soviet use of disinformation shortly.

SOVIET USE OF CLANDESTINE RADIOS

76. The Soviet Union operates a number of clandestine radio stations, which are located in the USSR or in Bloc countries but purported to be in the target countries. Two clandestine radios broadcast to Turkey: "Our Radio" and "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party."²⁶ They operate from Eastern Europe. Operating from the Baku area of the Soviet Union is the "National Voice of Iran." This radio has been a constant source of mendacious, inflammatory anti-U.S. propaganda and pro-Moscow commentary. It continues inciting the Iranian people to actions against the United States and our interests in the world.

77. As recently as the early 1970's, 11 clandestine radios located in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were broadcasting to Western Europe and the Near East.²⁷ Reasons for closing down eight of them vary, but in several instances political changes in their target countries resulting in the end of conservative governments and legalization of formerly underground domestic communist ties have made the radios redundant.

78. The broadcasts of the radios to Turkey have generally followed the Soviet line on the policies of NATO member Turkey in a calculated effort to discredit United States, NATO and Western policies. Their criticism of internal political forces has in some instances been inflammatory—in calling for the ouster of a Justice Party government, for example, or urging an end to the U.S. presence in Turkey. When speaking in the name of the illegal communist party, they have tried to project an aura of respectability with an eye to eventual acceptance of the party as a responsible political force.

79. The clandestine National Voice of Iran (NVOI) was first heard by U.S. monitors in 1959. By using the clandestine radio in tandem with its official propaganda, Moscow was able, before the Shah's fall, to pursue a two-track policy toward Tehran, appearing on one level to maintain at least tenuous ties to the throne while working on another level to undermine the Iranian monarch. The same still applies. On the official level, the Soviets are striving to restore good political and economic relations with Tehran but NVOI broadcasts indicate that the Soviets would like to move the Iranian revolution away from its "religious coloration" toward a "national democratic" and ultimately a communist revolution led by the Tudeh Party.

80. Between the Shah's departure and Khomeini's return, NVOI expanded its broadcast time and added a second daily program to its schedule. Anti-U.S. propaganda has been NVOI's stock-in-trade since the radio's inception. In October, 1979 NVOI attempted to link the CIA with the Forqan terrorist organization which has claimed responsibility for a number of assassinations of prominent Iranian political and religious figures and has lately revived allegations that the United States plans to kill Ayatollah Khomeini and members of his circle.

81. I will give you a recent example of NVOI propaganda broadcast on November 7 of last year. As the world learned about the seizure of hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the United States witnessed mob demonstrations in our country, NVOI was inciting Iranian mobs to further violence. It stated:

²⁶ "Our Radio" is located in Magdeburg, East Germany. "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" is also located in Magdeburg.

²⁷ Radio and location—First/last monitored:

Radio and location—First/last monitored:

"Radio Espana Independiente" to Spain—USSR, later Romania—1941/1975.

"Oggi in Italian" to Italy—Several East European countries—1950/1971.

"Deutscher Freiheitssender 904" to West Germany—East Germany—1956/1972.

"Radio Peyke-e Iran" to Iran—USSR, later Bulgaria—1957/1976.

"Our Radio" to Turkey and Cyprus—Romania, later East Germany—1958/Present.

"Voice of Truth" to Greece and Cyprus—Romania, later East Germany—1958/1975.

"National Voice of Iran" to Iran—USSR—1958/Present.

"Deutscher Soldatensender" to West Germany—East Germany—1960/1972.

"Voice of the Iraqi People" to Iraq—USSR—1963/1968.

"Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" to Turkey and West Germany—East Germany—1968/Present.

"Voice of the Italian Emigre" to West Germany—East Germany—1971/1978.

"In conditions where the United States conspires against the Iranian revolution, against Iran's independence and freedom, against the leaders of the revolution, particularly against Iman Khomeini, a number of the government's official sources, including the prime minister, consorted with the envoys of the brutal imperialism of the U.S. persons such as Brzezinski, this mad dog of imperialism and Zionism . . . let us remember that the security advisers of the Presidents of the United States had the greatest share in the massacre and slaughter of the Third World . . . At the same time that the delegation of the provisional government was holding talks with the conspirator Brzezinski, demonstrations by the Iranian people during the feast of sacrifice against the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism against the Iranian revolution were in process . . . We believe that the only decisive and necessary response to U.S. imperialism is the united struggle for the eradication of imperialism led by U.S. imperialism from our dear Iran. Our struggle along with the aware and heroic people of Iran in achieving this holy aim continues . . ."

SOVIET USE OF INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

82. Now let us examine how the Soviet Union uses Soviet front organizations to coordinate and further its overt and covert propaganda campaigns and as a political action tool in support of Soviet foreign policy goals and military strategy. Supporting the Soviets in political action and propaganda activities, and costing the Soviet Union an estimated \$63,000,000 per year²⁸ at the minimum, is a com-

²⁸ See following table:

Front	Staff	Salaries	Admin- istration	Travel	Publica- tions	Public meetings	In-house meetings	
World Peace Council..	45	\$600,000	\$150,000	\$230,000	\$11,000,000	\$31,400,000	\$6,000,000	
International Insti- tute for Peace.....	20	100,000	50,000	10,000	100,000	-----	-----	
World Federation Trade Unions.....	30	450,000	100,000	225,000	2,000,000	2,800,000	3,000,000	
International Union of Students.....	25	400,000	75,000	100,000	30,000	200,000	100,000	
World Federation of Democratic Youth..	30	450,000	100,000	75,000	100,000	500,000	350,000	
Women's International Democratic Federation.....	15	50,000	10,000	50,000	30,000	150,000	100,000	
International As- sociation of Demo- cratic Lawyers.....	10	50,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	
World Federation of Scientific Workers...	10	50,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	
International Orga- nization of Journalists.....	15	75,000	15,000	25,000	100,000	200,000	100,000	
International Federa- tion of Resistance Fighters.....	10	30,000	5,000	10,000	20,000	50,000	10,000	
Christian Peace Council.....	10	75,000	15,000	10,000	20,000	40,000	50,000	
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organi- zation.....	27	500,000	200,000	100,000	10,000	300,000	150,000	
International Radio and TV Organi- zation.....	5	15,000	10,000	10,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	
Total.....	253	2,845,000	745,000	865,000	13,345,000	35,365,000	9,885,000	
Grand total.....	-----							63,050,000

plex of 13 major interlocking communist front organizations.²⁰ These organizations profess non-communist goals and for that reason are, under certain circumstances, more operationally useful to the Soviet Union than groups of Communist sympathizers. To large segments of the United States and Western populations uninitiated to subversive methods employed by the USSR, the programs furthered by the fronts are highly appealing. They mirror, for example, Soviet campaign on disarmament, Soviet peace offensives, Soviet portrayal of Western imperialism and subjugation of Third World nations by the United States, and all employ similar propaganda techniques (such as mass assemblies and international festivals) to gain publicity. Their purpose is to spread Soviet propaganda themes and create a false impression of public support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

83. The four largest and most active of the fronts are the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). Each has reached a level of sophistication qualifying it for official status with United Nations organizations. This permits the presence in world-wide UN-sponsored meetings of front representatives who are accepted as independent, non-governmental spokesmen who use their platforms to simulate groundswells of support for Soviet objectives. What are typical covert action activities carried out by the front organizations?

²⁰ Communist International fronts:

World Peace Council (WPC), Helsinki.—Affiliates in more than 130 countries. Formed in 1949 to conduct worldwide campaigns for Soviet national defense and international military objectives, to support Soviet foreign policy abroad, and to coordinate activities of the other fronts.

International Institute for Peace (IIP), Vienna.—Member organizations in 9 countries of West and East Europe. Formed in 1958 to provide a legal cover mechanism for the WPC Secretariat to circumvent the WPC's expulsion from Austria for subversive activities in that country.

Afro-Asian Peoples' Organization (AAPSO), Cairo.—AAPSCO Committees exist in most African and Asian countries. Formed in 1957 as an offshoot from the WPC to provide Third World channels for propaganda, political action, and support (including arms and paramilitary training) to National Liberation Movements and various political entities in opposition to their own governments.

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), Prague.—Membership: 190 million but ca 90% from Communist countries. Formed in 1945 to consolidate trade unions throughout the world for the ultimate establishment of a worldwide trade union organization under Soviet control, to conduct or support strikes in non-communist nations and to serve as one of the USSR's major propaganda agencies.

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), Budapest.—Membership: 150 million in 110 countries. Formed in 1945 to support Soviet policy worldwide and to oppose activities of non-communist youth organizations, to promote Soviet disarmament in developed countries and gain local acceptance for Soviet policy in the Third World.

International Union of Students (IUS), Prague.—Membership: 118 member organizations with 10 million members. Formed to conduct among students similar activity to that of the WFDY. It works closely with the WFDY, co-sponsors events such as the World Youth Festivals, a Soviet propaganda extravaganza, and supports campaigns of the WPC.

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), East Berlin.—In 1966 claimed membership: "over 200 million." Formed in 1955 to support propaganda campaigns with special emphasis on women's and children's affairs.

International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), Prague.—Membership: over 150,000 in 112 countries. Formed in 1952 to "further revolutionary proletarian journalism, to act as arbiter and propagandist for the Soviet Union and to participate in the breakdown and overthrow of capitalism and to discredit international news agencies." (Feb. 74 IOJ publication).

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), Brussels.—Membership: ca 25,000 in 57 countries. Formed in 1946 to support Soviet propaganda and to issue "legal" statements and appeals on Soviet foreign policy priorities and to condemn non-communist causes.

Christian Peace Conference (CPC), Prague.—Membership: in 48 countries, totals not published. Formed in 1958 to appeal to religious leaders and communities in supporting Soviet propaganda and campaigns, meetings and statements and to publicize WPC and other front activity.

International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR), Vienna.—Membership: claims 5 million members in 22 countries. Formed in 1951 to support Soviet initiatives on disarmament and acts as an instrument of agitation and propaganda on behalf of the USSR. (With the exception of Israel, all member organizations are from Europe and consist mostly of communist groups).

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), Paris.—Membership: claims 400,000 members affiliated groups in 31 countries and corresponding members in a further 26 countries, mostly Communist. Formed in 1946 to organize scientific activities on behalf of the USSR, to exert influence in the UN and to support propaganda of the other Soviet front organizations, particularly against the neutron bomb and TNF modernization.

International Radio and TV Organization (IORT), Prague.—Formed in 1946 in Brussels by 28 radio organizations in Europe and Africa. Most non-communist countries have left this organization, but it still operates from Prague as a supposedly non-governmental organ aimed at influencing Third World countries to follow the Soviet-line.

84. Priority is given by the Soviet directors of the fronts to fomenting dissidence within the NATO armed forces. For this purpose, front organizations organize mass meetings. For example, in March 1979 a meeting in Malmo Sweden was attended by anti-militarist delegates from France, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Spain, Finland and U.S. forces in Germany. The keynote statement was delivered by a WPC member calling for anti-militarist participation in a People's Assembly for European Security under WPC sponsorship and for continued international organizational work among anti-militarist groups. A leader of the Dutch Christians for Socialism (CVS), which is a front organization of the Dutch Communist Party, and Dutch representative to the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference obtained CVS support for an international anti-militarist congress in The Netherlands in mid-1980. The Congress plans to discuss the subject of new Western nuclear missiles planned for Europe and also plans to support the anti-Neutron bomb and anti-nuclear weapons campaigns in which the World Peace Council has played a vanguard role in recent years.

85. A leader of the Mexican Peace Movement affiliated to the World Peace Council met recently with leaders of the North American Peace Movement (NAPM) in Los Angeles. They agreed (1) to denounce the U.S. and especially CIA attempts to impede the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, (2) to denounce the CIA as the main agitator behind U.S. pressure to force Mexico to sell its oil and gas to the U.S., (3) to protest U.S. repression against Mexican illegals and Chicanos, (4) to support the Puerto Rican independence movement and (5) to prepare for an open meeting of the Mexican Peace Movement, the NAPM, in Mexico City which would include Mexican Government support and participation.

86. At a meeting in February 1979 of WPC officials, a resolution was adopted to provide "uninterrupted support to the just struggle of the people of Chile, Guatemala, Uruguay, Haiti, Paraguay, El Salvador, Argentina and Brazil." Without resort to classified information, from this one may logically conclude that the named countries are the targets for Soviet subversion and national liberation struggles on a continuing basis. One may interrupt "uninterrupted support to the just struggle" to mean continuing financial and logistic support to insurrection movements.

87. Among the covert activities orchestrated by the KGB are the manipulation and subversion of religious groups for Soviet political action purposes. Through agents-of-influence, the KGB tries to maneuver such ostensibly apolitical religious bodies as the Christian Peace Conference into nearly consistent espousal of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

SOVIET USE OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES

88. We are all aware of the traditional uses by the Soviet Union of foreign communist parties to influence their nations' internal affairs for the purpose of participating in the government as a stage in ultimately achieving what the Soviets term a "socialistic society." We will not dwell on that aspect here. Let us look instead at Soviet use of communist parties in the context of the USSR's current foreign policy needs.

89. In the summer of 1979, leaders of Warsaw Pact communist parties were sent copies of new instructions from the CPSU's Central Committee requiring a strengthening of internal propaganda and ideological activity. They were told to harness their parties and governments in closer and more effective tandem with the campaigns of the CPSU for "peace and detente" in Europe, against imperialism, and for internal vigilance. Such calls are issued periodically, but this time took on more urgency as the Soviet Union wished to prepare for its campaign against NATO TNF modernization. Those Communist parties of Western Europe which regularly cooperate with the CPSU have also received special instructions recently.

90. The Belgian section of the World Peace Council (WPC), controlled by the Belgian Communist Party, was told to organize front activity on the disarmament issue. Three separate rallies or conferences were to be organized immediately.

Only a month's preparation time was allowed. The Belgian CP planned three meetings in October 1979, prepared the publication of a brochure on the theme "No missiles in Belgium", and held a mass demonstration for disarmament in December. The main objective, of course, was to organize a campaign against TNF modernization. A "Forum of Disarmament" was held in Belgium at the

initiative of the WPC and organized through the International Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a Soviet and West European Communist Party-dominated front group located in Brussels. In this instance, the Soviet Union required assistance from the Belgian Communist Party in the effort. It preferred, however, to keep the latter's participation in low key in order to attract maximum attendance by non-communists and thus used the Belgian Section of the WPC as the ostensible organizer.

91. In order to coerce Western European parties to use their influence in enlisting popular and governmental support for U.S. ratification of the SALT II treaty and to get ready for the SALT III round, CPSU representatives called leaders of selected West European Communist Parties to Moscow during the summer of 1979. Since the French and Italian Communist parties have not been fully responsive to Soviet entreaties in recent years, some of the more firmly controlled West European CP's were instructed to use their influence on these two recalcitrant parties, so that they came into line vis-a-vis Soviet West European policies.

92. Prior to the above round of briefing, the CPSU Central Committee had sent a delegation to visit one West European Communist Party, ostensibly to discuss travel by members of this party to the USSR for vacations and CPSU schooling. The actual reason was to provide the senior functionaries of this party with advance information and instructions regarding the Soviet position on SALT II and on the then projected Carter-Brezhnev Summit talks.

The CPSU representative in the local Soviet Embassy informed the local CP leaders that the information on Soviet disarmament and defense issues provided by the Soviet delegation should be used immediately in the local party's newspaper coverage of world and Soviet developments. The CPSU wished to ensure that this communist party's press appeared to be as well informed as the Western press and that it could argue effectively against Western press accounts of power struggles behind Brezhnev's increasing loss of control in the CPSU. Leaders of this same West European CP's youth organization and labor union factions, in turn, received an initial briefing shortly thereafter from key members of the local party's Central Committee regarding the Carter/Brezhnev Summit. They were told that the Soviet Union intended to carry out the Summit and to sign the SALT II Agreement and that all efforts were to be expended towards accomplishing this objective.

93. In October 1979 the Politburo of another West European Communist Party met to discuss the visit in September 79 of its delegation to Moscow to consult with officials of the CPSU. The purpose of the Moscow visit was to discuss a new Soviet propaganda and political action campaign to woo the political left in Western Europe away from NATO and the United States and garner their support for disarmament in Europe. In Moscow the delegation's members learned that Brezhnev's speech at the 30th Anniversary of the GDR was just the beginning in an offensive to gain support for general disarmament in Europe. The main target of this offensive was to be the left wing factions of the various Western European socialist parties, some of whom, such as the Dutch Workers' Party, had already taken a stand favoring a reduction of military spending. The Soviet Union hoped to culminate this offensive with an all-European disarmament conference to serve as a prelude to SALT III negotiations with the United States. This communist party was encouraged by the CPSU to open up a dialogue with the left wing of the local social democratic party on the subject of disarmament.

94. The Politburo of another West European Communist Party met in late summer 1979 to discuss labor activities, SALT II, and the recent visit of the party secretary general to the USSR. The party secretary general told his colleagues that the Politburo must agree to launch a propaganda campaign pointing out to workers the danger of a split in the labor movement caused by refusal to cooperate with it by other left-wing forces and also to mount an information campaign on the necessity to implement SALT II.

SOVIET USE OF "FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES"

95. Another mechanism used by the Soviet Union to supplement its propaganda and covert action activity is Soviet bi-national organizations in given countries. These are called Soviet Friendship and Cultural Societies, and they exist in approximately 80 nations throughout the world. According to their charter their purpose is "... to spread a thorough and reliable knowledge of the culture, history, societal structures and national law, the language and economy of the

Soviet Union and its significance for world peace . . . and to form and strengthen spiritual economic relations between (X country) and the Soviet Union . . .” These organizations are used as a bridge by the USSR to reach people abroad when they do not wish to do it as blatantly as would be the case if the Soviets used the local Communist Party. A look at the political and ideological background of the board of directors members of a friendship society will reveal that the board is at least heavily weighted in favor of the Soviet Union, if not actually controlled by communist party militants. In some cases the local society’s board of directors includes members of the Soviet Embassy as honorary or ex-officio members.

SOVIET USE OF AGENTS-OF-INFLUENCE

96. One of the covert action techniques used by the KGB’s Service A involves the exploitation of what the Soviets call agents-of-influence. Through them, the USSR develops its own disguised voices in foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business, labor, artistic, and academic circles. This is a complicated business that must be carefully handled. The KGB has numerous officers who are accomplished at developing strong personal friendships with political, economic, and media leaders in the West and Third World countries, which result in active collaboration with the Soviets on matters of mutual interest while the individual retains his integrity on other issues. In return for his services, the KGB may offer such a collaborator support for his undertakings, when they do not conflict with Soviet interests; international publicity for his accomplishments; or special communications channels to the Kremlin leadership. It appears that some agents-of-influence are employed by the Soviets because of their role as senior executives of institutions which comment in or publish material on domestic or foreign policy matters. Let us look at some typical Soviet controlled agents-of-influence.

97. *Use of academicians.*—A defense specialist of a West European social democratic party met recently in Western Europe with Soviet former General Milshteyn, now an “academician” of the Soviets “non-governmental” USA-Canada Institute, to arrange an agenda for the visit to Moscow of his party’s leader. This Western defense specialist had met shortly before in Moscow with a senior Soviet “academician” who expressed his eagerness to see results in the disarmament area. He said that the Soviet Government needed results to prove to its critics internally that there was sense in doing business with the West. The Soviets wanted this Western socialist to prepare his leader so that the upcoming discussions in Moscow would be fruitful. Milshteyn told his conversation partner he was there to help him save Europe from another world war.

98. *Use of journalists.*—A West European journalist arrested in 1979 had been introduced in 1960 to a Soviet employee of a United Nations organization who recruited him to act as a source of information and as an asset who could put Soviet propaganda material in the Western press. The Soviets gave him articles which he used as bases for preparing articles on his own for publication or for passing to other journalists. Ostensibly these originated directly from him. All of the articles were on international topics and included very subtly the Soviet line on everything from China to Latin America. He also was used to write articles to discredit the CIA. In publishing these articles the Soviet hand never showed. In 1967 contact with him was turned over from the KGB officer under UN cover to a KGB officer in the Cultural Section of the Soviet Embassy in his country of residence. The latter paid him and financially assisted him to continue one of his publications. Over the period from 1960–1979 he wrote over 100 articles which were Soviet-inspired, had his hand in several publications, and was also the editor of a newsletter, which was subscribed to by high-ranking political and industrial officials.

SOVIET USE OF DISINFORMATION TO MANIPULATE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

99. In attempts to manipulate or discredit individuals, institutions, governments and policies of the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union uses what it calls “dezinformatsiya,” or disinformation. Disinformation is a term which has special connotations for the KGB and has no direct counterpart in the parlance of non-communist intelligence services. It signifies a variety of techniques and activities applied to furthering Soviet foreign policy aims in the political, propaganda and economic fields. In carrying out disinformation, the Soviet Union has utilized inter alia Soviet ambassadors and its global network

of KGB residencies operating at all levels, including foreign intelligence and security services, to supplement its overt and official diplomacy. Let us look at some examples:

In May 1978, Soviet Ambassador to Zambia Solodovnikov warned Zambian President Kaunda that the Soviet intelligence service had information that the British and American intelligence services were plotting to overthrow him. Solodovnikov therefore advised Kaunda against making a planned trip to Great Britain and the United States, since it was during Kaunda's absence for this visit that the Americans and British planned the action. Solodovnikov claimed that the British and American plan was similar to the one they had used to overthrow Nkrumah of Ghana while he was making a similar foreign visit. It is interesting to note that Zambian newspapers carried a New York Times article on the day of Solodovnikov's meeting with Kaunda which alleged CIA involvement in the overthrow of Nkrumah. The story told by Solodovnikov, obviously, was false.

In late February 1979 an officer of the Soviet Embassy in a Latin American country told the Military Attache of another Latin American country that the Soviet Embassy had information that the government of their country of temporary residence had entered into a military agreement with the United States to allow the establishment of U.S. military bases in that country. The Soviet told the Military Attache that a January 1979 visit to that country of a U.S. general was connected with the establishment of these bases and asked him whether he had any information that would confirm this. The target attache replied that his embassy did not have such information, but that he was personally convinced that the Soviet information was true. The Soviet First Secretary, who has since departed the host country, is known to be an intelligence officer and the Military Attache also an intelligence officer. The information, obviously, was false.

SOVIET USE OF ECONOMIC "WARFARE"

100. As a tool in their covert action arsenal, the Soviets make use of economic "warfare," which by Western definition usually relates to things such as preemptive buying and selling of commodities. In some cases this is carried out for stockpiling purposes or for denying crucial products to the enemy. While engaging in such activity, the Soviet Union makes sure that it obtains the maximum economic advantages for itself as it, for example, periodically deals in gold and other scarce commodities. We will not dwell on that activity here, however. We are more concerned in this instance with Soviet manipulation of the international market process specifically as it relates to accomplishing particular political objectives at a given time. The following examples of Soviet manipulation of economic levers for political purposes in this context can be cited:

In early 1979 the Soviet Union offered to sell coal at a reduced price to certain West European countries. The Soviets offered to sell coal to a West European country, for example, below the European market price, explaining that this offer was being made in an attempt to foil a U.S. Government approved operation that would enable a U.S. consortium to gain control of Europe's coal supply for the next ten years. (An obvious piece of blatant disinformation.) In fact, the USSR was using this ploy to gain further political influence in that country at a time when, through frontmen, it was also acquiring financial control of a prominent local non-Communist newspaper.

In April 1979, Soviet representatives of a joint trading company in one European country tried to replace a number of local representatives on the board with others more amenable to Soviet desires. The trading firm representatives felt that the Soviet campaign for this purpose was to give the Soviets a freer hand in dealing with Third World areas where the Soviets have opportunities to carry out political action programs from the firm's commercial base. At present, the firm and its affiliates have commercial programs underway—or pending—in a total of 15 African and Latin American countries. It also hopes to expand even further.

In late 1978, the Soviet Ambassador to a Western country suggested to the managing director of a local corporation that its business with the USSR might suffer if it went ahead with its plans for technical and shipbuilding assistance to the PRC. (The firm is one of the largest employers in the concerned country, as well as the largest ship and marine engine manufacturer there. Ship sales have helped this firm maintain its construction capability even though rising

labor costs have caused the country's ship construction program to fall sharply in recent years, and in recent years the yard's work force has been drastically cut.) Another political aspect to the sales contact for one recent ship built for the Soviet Union is apparent when it is noted that the local communist party played a brokering role in this sale. A senior official of the local communist party, who also was a union official at the shipyard, and local communist party central committee member, urged the Soviets to give business to this firm to keep yard workers employed. The word was spread that the good offices of the communist party were responsible for this additional work.

Another example of Soviet use of economic manipulation may be seen in their covert use of major banks located outside the Soviet Union, such as the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, its branches in Beirut and Singapore, the Wozchod Handelsbank in Zurich, the Ost-West Handelsbank in Frankfurt, the Seligman Bank and the Commerical Bank for North Europe (BCEN), both located in Paris. Overtly these banks provide financial flexibility to Soviet foreign trade operations, help the USSR finance its trade with the Western world via export earnings, gold sales, and through Western credits, and increase USSR financial options via access, for example, to Eurocurrency markets. To presume that the Soviets have not exploited these banks to implement Soviet foreign policy, to engage in covert political action, to collect economic and political intelligence would amount to a serious underestimation of the KGB's resourcefulness. We do know that Soviet banks functioning outside the Soviet Union are used to provide funding channels for Soviet political action operations on a global basis.

The Soviet Union has given us a very recent example of the manipulation of economic instruments for political purposes in its support for the restrictions which Vietnam has placed on aid shipments to Cambodia. Vietnam has refused to allow entry into Cambodia of much of the humanitarian aid for starving Cambodians, such as the French hospital ship, and has used delaying tactics in insisting on the indirect routing of the aid it has allowed into Cambodia. Manipulation of aid shipments is indeed Soviet economic "warfare."

SOVIET PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

101. If one considers the types of political action which a government can undertake, from simple open propaganda on the one end of the spectrum through covert use of agents-of-influence and disinformation activities, one would have to place paramilitary operations at the other end of the spectrum—just short of open war and the acknowledged use of a country's armed forces. The Soviet Union has been much involved in various types of paramilitary operations ever since—and almost constantly since—its birth in the revolution of 1917.

102. During the post-Stalin era, the Soviet Union became aggressively active in providing military aid to the Third World. Through support to "national wars of liberation," it has provided overt and clandestine economic and military assistance, and through its control over or influence on national liberation movements with the help in recent years of its Cuban surrogates, it has concentrated on severing Third World ties to the West and furthering the growth of communist movements in developing countries. The Soviets then try to use this aid with the developing nation to unequivocally tie it to the political directions of Moscow, entangling target countries in a web of economic dependence on the USSR and thus making them more responsive to Soviet needs and objectives.

To illustrate recent examples of Soviet provision of arms and supplies to "national liberation movements," I cite the following: the Soviets promised to provide full military support to the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia, should the London negotiations fail. In October 1979 when the Patriotic Front had temporarily withdrawn from the negotiations over a Rhodesian settlement, the USSR informed the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that it was fully prepared to provide whatever amount of military aid was necessary to achieve a military victory in Rhodesia, if the Patriotic Front decided to withdraw from the London negotiations. The Soviets warned ZAPU that various front-line states might pressure ZAPU into accepting any form of agreement because of their own interests. However, the Soviets wished to assure ZAPU that they stood ready to help ZAPU achieve a military victory in Rhodesia if ZAPU rejected the British proposals. This was no idle boast of the Soviets. In early November officers from the main political directorate of the Soviet armed forces arrived in Lusaka to conduct a training course in covert political action for senior

Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army officers. The course was to include briefings on the recruitment of agent-of-influence able to subvert a legal balloting process, the recruitment of agitators, the use of money to disrupt opposition access to the polls, and other tactics to manipulate balloting. Another tactic of paramilitary operations involves the use of "advisors" serving with target country military forces. In Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion of 25 December there were about 5,000 Soviet advisors. Some of the advisors were operating with special anti-guerrilla units and were directly engaged in military operations. Soviet military advisors assumed an increasingly direct role in the Afghan armed forces following an April visit of a high-ranking Soviet military delegation there. Since the beginning of the crisis in Angola, the Soviet Union has utilized Russian and East German advisors there and in other areas of Africa.

103. Yet another tactic of paramilitary operations consist of the use of "volunteers." This ploy was used in explaining the appearance of Cuban troops in Angola—as it had been used by the Chinese during the Korean War. Another ploy, where clandestinity is more important, involves no direct participation of the Soviets (or their surrogates) on the ground, but rather the use of clandestine air drops of supplies. The Soviets have used this ploy recently with the Kurds in the Iran border areas.

V. CONCLUSIONS

104. Overt propaganda and covert action are basic weapons in Moscow's foreign policy arsenal, and they are frequently employed in conjunction with traditional diplomatic methods to advance Soviet goals in the international arena. Those goals may be based primarily on ideological considerations (promoting "anti-imperialism," creating Soviet-style regimes) or on Soviet national security interests or some combination of the two, but ultimately they are intended to enhance the USSR's power and influence in world politics. Policy decisions on major propaganda and covert action campaigns are made, or at least approved, by the top Soviet leadership. When we come across evidence of new propaganda initiatives or covert operations we can be reasonably certain that some lower-level echelon of the Soviet bureaucracy is not "doing its own thing" without the knowledge of Politburo-level officials, and that key Soviet leaders regard such initiatives as an important element in their total foreign policy operations. The scope and intensity of Soviet propaganda and covert action activities have varied over time, but Moscow has been remarkably consistent in using time-tested techniques to shape foreign elite and public perceptions and to influence other countries' internal political processes. We believe that the ebb and flow results from temporary tactical adjustments and availability or lack of opportunities. We also believe that there was an upswing in the level of Soviet activity even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reflecting Moscow's perception that it has entered a new phase of relations with Washington that requires sharper ideological conflict and tougher tactics.

ANNEX A-I

I. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL FM 30-31B

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—A Turkish newspaper, "Baris," mentioned a field manual FM 30-31 (which actually exists) in its 24 March 1975 edition, but did not reprint a facsimile of the document. In September 1976, a photocopy of the bogus FM 30-31B was left on the bulletin board of the Embassy of the Philippines in Bangkok, Thailand with a cover note from an anonymous "concerned citizen." This is a typical Soviet bloc practice. Surfacing attracted little attention. FM 30-31B reappeared in 1978 when it was reprinted in two Spanish publications, "El Pais" (18 September) and "El Triunfo" (23 September). This was the work of a Spanish communist and a Cuban intelligence officer. Since September 1978, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the world press in more than 20 countries, including the United States.

B. *Format.*—U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B, "Stability Operations-Intelligence," bearing forged signature of then Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland. Note: Genuine field manuals FM 30-31 and 30-31A exist, but FM 30-31B is a total fabrication.

C. *Content.*—Purports to give guidance to Army intelligence regarding interference in host country affairs, subversion of host country officials and military officers and asserts that the U.S. envisions "the use of extreme leftist organizations to safeguard the interests of the United States in friendly nations where communists appear close to entering the government."

D. *Purpose.*—To reduce U.S. foreign military presence abroad by raising host country suspicions regarding American interference in their internal affairs also used to suggest that CIA plays similar role as military intelligence.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—As noted, replay in both communist and non-communist media has been extensive. In particular, Soviet propagandists have exploited this forgery by claiming that it adds plausibility to allegations that the United States was involved in the March 1978 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Italian Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades. Several foreign governments have made inquiries.

F. *Comment.*—FM 30-31B will probably be around for some time. In summer 1979, the Soviets prepared Portuguese-language copies of the forgery and covertly circulated them among military officers in Lisbon.

September 14, 1976

PERSONAL

H.E. President Ferdinand E. Marcos

c/o H.E. Mamel T. Yan
Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines
760, Sukhumvit Road
BangkokHis Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Manila
Republic of the Philippines

Dear Mr. President:

In 1974 I sent to Mr. Kukrit Pramoj, who is well-known to you and whom I deeply respect, some secret American documents revealing the dangers for the countries concerned of having U.S. troops and advisers stationed on their territories. Recent developments in Thailand suggest that those documents were both timely and to the point for Mr. Kukrit Pramoj.

Now I am sending these documents to you in the hope that they will also be of use to your Government. I am doing this as one of an American group opposed to excessive U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest.

Respectfully,

Inclosure 2 to AR-5X-114-76

Personal/ConfidentialHis Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Manila
Republic of the Philippines

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FM 30-31B

Supplement B
to FM 30-31Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
10 March 1970STABILITY OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELDS

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FM 30-31B

Supplement B
to FM 30-31Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
12 March 1970STABILITY OPERATIONS
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FM 30-31B

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This TOP SECRET classified supplement FM 30-31B, owing to its specially sensitive nature, is not a standard issue in the FM series.

FM 30-31 provided guidance on doctrine, tactics and techniques for intelligence support of U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment. As it was intended for wide distribution, its contents were limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability.

FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence. It does not repeat the general intelligence guidance laid down in other documents, such as FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A. Its aim is limited to stressing the importance of HC agencies as a special field for intelligence operations and to indicating certain directions in which the procurement of information about the host country, in a manner more general than that required by straightforward counterinsurgency, may advance overall U.S. interests.

Operations in this special field are to be regarded as strictly clandestine, since the acknowledged involvement of the U.S. Army in HC affairs is restricted to the area of cooperation against insurgency or threats of insurgency. The fact that U.S. Army involvement goes deeper can in no circumstances be acknowledged.

The use of the term "HC agencies" in this supplement may be taken to mean, according to context:

- a. The HC organization for internal defense operations.
- b. The HC armed forces generally.
- c. HC agencies other than the armed forces, e.g. the police and other civilian security agencies, national and local administrative bodies, propaganda organizations.

In other words, U.S. Army intelligence has a wide-ranging role in assisting to integrate the internal counterinsurgency potential of the host country in all its aspects and the relation of that potential to U.S. policy. In pursuing its more specialized military objectives, it should not neglect the wider aspects of U.S. interests wherever opportunity offers to further them.

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Distribution of this supplement is strictly limited to the addressees shown on the Distribution list. Its substance may be transmitted further to those selected at the discretion of the addressee, as being well suited and well placed to contribute to the end in view. Whenever possible, detailed instructions issued on the basis of this supplement should be passed on verbally, with strong emphasis on the particular sensitivity of this whole field of action.

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FM 30-31B

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

1. General

As indicated in FM 30-31, most recent insurgencies have taken place in developing nations or in nations newly emerged from former colonies.

U.S. involvement in these less-developed nations threatened by insurgency is part of the world-wide U.S. involvement in the struggle against Communism. Insurgency may have other than Communist origins, in tribal, social, religious, or regional differences. Yet, wherever its source, the fact of insurgency offers opportunities for Communist infiltration which, in the absence of effective countermeasures, may culminate in a successful Communist take-over. Therefore, the criterion determining the nature and degree of U.S. involvement is the political stance of the HC government in relation to Communism on the one hand and to U.S. interests on the other.

2. Need for Political Flexibility

The U.S. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons:

- a. A government enjoying U.S. support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.
- b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.
- c. It may drift into extreme nationalist attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to U.S. interests.

Such factors may create a situation in which U.S. interests require ^{change} changes of government. Flexibility enabling the host country to obtain more constructive benefit from U.S. assistance and guidance.

While political counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the areas of freedom, justice, and democracy, the U.S. Government will retain a degree of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deeming it to be in our best interests.

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Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive or brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is neither satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least through a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be retained, subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, various attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure.

3. Characteristic Vulnerabilities of MC Regimes

In the light of the above considerations affecting U.S. policy, attention must be drawn to certain vulnerabilities inherent in the nature of most regimes in the less-developed nations:

a. In consequence of their backwardness or recent origin or both, the regimes against which insurgencies are directed usually suffer from weaknesses and instability. Their leading political figures are often inexperienced, mutually antagonistic, and corrupt. When leaders of exceptional stature emerge, their efforts are often frustrated by government machinery ill-adapted to meet conditions and hampered by inefficient and underpaid personnel.

b. These weaknesses give rise to a wide area of possible contacts between employees of government agencies and the insurgency. Having regard to the chronic instability of the regimes, the desire for reassurance among their supporters against possible total or partial victory for the insurgency is widespread.

c. In most cases of internal conflict in the less-developed nations, the sides claim a majority of nationalistic purity. But the often passing nature and relatively overt character of U.S. support gives the insurgency some psychological advantage by first the facts are open to charges of puppetry. The frequent consequence is a growth of anti-national feeling among both the public in general and members of the army including the armed forces. Whether the armed forces are subservient to the government or fortunate in, they usually reflect its nature and characteristics.

U.S. Army concern for the MC armed forces is not confined to a narrow warfare front. It is a wide and varied political aspect. In most of the less-developed nations, the armed forces play an important role in political life, and the significance of this role is enhanced whenever a regime is threatened by actual or potential internal or external countermeasures.

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CHAPTER 3

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS

4. Identification of Special Targets

U.S. Army intelligence is in a position to procure information over a wide range of HC government activity. But the special interests of the U.S. Army require that the major part of its intelligence effort be directed towards the HC army and related HC organizations for internal defense operations.

Special intelligence targets within the HC army include the well-placed personnel of:

- a. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence is in direct working contact.
- b. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence, usually through the medium of its working contacts, can establish productive contact outside the limits of normal Military activity.
- c. Local units with which U.S. Army intelligence is not in contact, directly or indirectly, and which for that reason may be particularly vulnerable to political contamination from local insurgent sources.
- d. Mobile units, such as Special Force units and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, which operate in areas under partial or intermittent insurgent control, and which therefore may also be vulnerable to such contamination.

In addition to the HC army and its organization for internal defense operations, attention must be paid to the organization of the police.

The police generally stand closer to the local population than the army, and for that reason may be at the same time better sources of information and greater security risks. The security risks may become acute when police are drafted into the army ranks and replaced by recruits of less experience, training and loyalty.

U.S. Army intelligence operations directed towards the special targets listed above are aimed at the following major objectives in view:

- a. To prevent any action against infiltration and influence from elements sympathetic to the insurgency or hostile to the United States.

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- b. To guard against the possibility of HC Army personnel reinforcing their own future by developing active or passive contacts with the insurgency.
- c. To reduce corruption and inefficiency within HC Army units to tolerable levels.
- d. To assist in the promotion of HC officers known to be loyal to the United States.
- e. To extend the same forms of protection to all HC agencies falling within the field of U.S. Army intelligence operations.

The achievement of these objectives calls for the timely recognition of vulnerabilities in HC agencies and fortifying counteraction by U.S. Army intelligence.

5. Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities

The symptoms of vulnerability among HC agencies calling for investigation, identification and action by U.S. Army intelligence include:

- a. Political unreliability, such as lukewarm attitudes towards the regime, sympathy with the insurgency, outright collaboration with the insurgency.
- b. Anti-Americanism arising from exposure to insurgent propaganda, free friction between employees of HC and U.S. organizations at the personal or working level or from the too obvious presence of American personnel in the role of senior partners.
- c. Blood relationships linking employees of the HC government with the insurgency. It is common practice for a family deliberately to split its loyalties between the regime and the insurgency, so that whichever wins ultimately the family will have a foot in the right camp. Blood ties are of special relevance to police units, members of which often serve in their own home districts and are therefore exposed to pressure from families and friends.
- d. Corruption, which erodes the individual to pressure from insurgent elements and, when it becomes general, undermines popular confidence in the regime and thus encourages the insurgency.
- e. Inefficiency reaching a level at which it impedes the smooth flow of operations and thus constitutes a form of direct assistance to the enemy. It may also hinder, thereby, the insurgency. It is a well-tried form of administrative sabotage, but, unfortunately, very to practice and relatively difficult to detect and identify as such.

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6. U.S. Army Intelligence Action

U.S. Army intelligence must be prepared to recommend appropriate action in the event of symptoms of vulnerability persisting long enough to become positively damaging. Such action may include measures taken against individuals, or more general measures designed to put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself.

It is desirable that U.S. Army intelligence should obtain the active cooperation of the appropriate HC authority in pursuing punitive measures against HC citizens. But there are areas where combined action is frustrated by divergent or conflicting aims and interests, and where U.S. Army intelligence must defend the U.S. position against contrary forces at work in the host country.

This area of divergence or conflict is often entered in the matter of punitive action against individuals who may be protected by a tangle of personal, political and bureaucratic complications.

Action designed to influence or pressure HC agencies or the government itself presupposes a situation in which U.S. interests are at stake. Measures appropriate to a given situation may be official or unofficial.

Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies.

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CHAPTER 4
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

7. General

The success of internal stability operations undertaken by U.S. Army intelligence in the framework of internal defense depends to a considerable extent on the degree of mutual understanding between American personnel and the personnel of agencies of the host country.

However, whatever the degree of mutual understanding between U.S. personnel and their HC opposite numbers, a more reliable basis for the solution of U.S. Army intelligence problems is the availability in HC agencies of individuals with whom U.S. Army intelligence maintains agent relationships.

Therefore, the recruitment of leading numbers of HC agencies in the capacity of long-term agents is an important requirement.

8. Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes

For the special purposes of U.S. Army intelligence, the most important field of recruiting activity is the officer corps of the HC army. In many less-developed nations, officers of the armed forces tend to be of privileged origin, conservative by virtue of family background and education, and therefore receptive to counterinsurgency doctrine. They are of special importance as long-term prospects because they not infrequently play a decisive role in determining the course of development in some of their respective countries.

The following categories require special attention with a view to long-term recruitment:

a. Officers from families with long-standing economic and cultural associations with the United States and its allies.

b. Officers known to have received favorable impressions of U.S. military training programs, especially those who have been trained in the United States itself.

c. Officers destined for assignment to posts within the HC intelligence structure. These require special though not exclusive attention.

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Standing directives to U.S. instructors at U.S. training establishments require the study of officers mentioned in sub-paragraph 2 (b) above from the point of view of political loyalty; of their immunity from Communist ideology and their devotion to the democratic ideals of the United States. The Secret Annex to the final training report on each MC officer passing through a U.S. training program contains an assessment of his prospects and possibilities as a long-term agent of U.S. Army intelligence.

Questions of recruitment are treated in greater detail in FM 50-31A where the general doctrine governing agent intelligence (HUMINT) is stated and elaborated. The directives laid down there should be applied to recruiting operations envisaging MC government-agencies.

9. Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad

U.S. Army intelligence must take into account potential assistance from U.S. citizens working in the host countries, both as direct sources of information and as indicators of leads for the recruitment of MC citizens, official and otherwise, as long-term intelligence agents. Such U.S. citizens include officials working for agencies other than the U.S. Army, and U.S. businessmen, as well as representatives of the mass media, operating in the host countries.

10. Penetration of the Insurgent Movement

In FM 30-31 attention was drawn to the importance of MC agencies penetrating the insurgent movement by agent means with a view to successful counteraction. It was pointed out that there was a danger of insurgent agents penetrating MC base organizations, government agencies, police, and military intelligence units with a view to the collection of secret intelligence. Stress was also laid on the probability that lack of information from MC agencies about insurgent activities in various areas may give the enemy an opportunity to indicate that insurgent agents have successfully penetrated MC agencies and are therefore in a position to anticipate government moves.

In this connection, U.S. Army intelligence should pursue two main lines of action:

a. It should endeavor to identify agents infiltrated into the insurgency by MC agencies responsible for internal security with a view to establishing effective control by U.S. Army intelligence over the work of such agents. (Operational success in such cases will depend on the conditions prevailing in each country.)

b. It should endeavor to infiltrate reliable agents into the insurgent leadership, with special emphasis on the insurgent intelligence system directed at host MC agencies. It must be borne in mind that information from insurgent sources about

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the personnel of HC agencies might be of particular value in determining the proper conduct of U.S. Army intelligence and in suggesting timely measures to further U.S. interests.

11. Agents on Special Operations

There may be times when HC governments show passivity or indecision in face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in TM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency.

In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.

12. U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

In the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), U.S. Army personnel enjoy the advantage of working closely at many levels with their opposite numbers in the national intelligence structure of the host country. By virtue of their generally superior training, expertise and experience, they are well qualified to get the better of any exchange arising from such cooperation, even in dealing with HC personnel who outrank them. This close cooperation enables U.S. Army intelligence to build up a comprehensive and detailed picture of the national intelligence structure.

Mention has been made in TM 30-31 of the desirability of establishing National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (NIDCC) and Area Coordination Centers (ACC) to integrate intelligence operations, administration and logistics into a single approach to the problem of insurgency.

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This recommendation was designed to improve the effectiveness of the HC counterinsurgency effort. But it may also be used to facilitate U.S. Army intelligence penetration of the VC army as a whole. U.S. personnel attached to the NIDCC and ACC are well placed to spread their attention over the whole range of VC army organization, to embrace operations, administration and logistics as well as intelligence.

The establishment of joint central archives at the NIDCC should be used to assist the procurement of intelligence about the personnel of VC agencies, and the more selective archives kept at ACC level should serve the same purpose. Where the existence of separate VC archives not officially accessible to U.S. personnel is known or suspected, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of operations designed to gain the desired access.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

FRANK H. G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

W. C. WETTINGER, JR.,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution: See page 13.

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ANNEX A-II

II. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AIRGRAM A-8950

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—Sent by one "Robert Pont" (fictitious) to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns and several West European governments in late 1976.

B. *Format.*—Altered version of genuine Airgram A-8950, dated 3 December 1974.

C. *Content.*—Whereas the original A-8950 was simply a statement of economic, financial and commercial information requirements worldwide for fiscal year 1975, in the altered version, recipients were instructed to collect information on ways to bribe European officials and to develop other covert means by which to damage or eliminate foreign trade competition.

D. *Purpose.*—The forgery evidently sought to exploit the damage already done to the U.S. image following revelations concerning bribery practices by U.S. businesses abroad. The covering letter to which the altered airgram was attached reinforced the disinformation message by specifically directing the reader's attention to the ostensible CIA-State Department instructions to engage in espionage primarily against U.S. allies in NATO.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—On 7 November 1976, the London Sunday Times picked up the allegations but identified them as being based on a forgery. Subsequently, the Soviet news agency TASS reported the *Times* article but omitted any mention of the bogus nature of the airgram, thus extracting additional mileage from the deception.

F. *Comment.*—The A-8950 forgery is considered to have been a Soviet forgery success despite the numerous discrepancies in this document. These discrepancies included: the signature of a non-existent "Robert Pont" on the cover letter; use of titles such as "President," "Chancellor" and "Prime Minister" which were not capitalized; use of slash marks instead of parentheses to offset phrases and employment of photocopies of the forgery which were of the dim, and minimally legible variety favored in Soviet forgery efforts.

Paris, le 5 août 1976.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Je suis entré par hasard en possession d'un document de l'Ambassade des Etats Unis à Paris dont le contenu m'a, en tant que Français, profondément ému et indigné. Il s'agit en effet d'une instruction de la CIA et du Département d'Etat, transmise aux Ambassades et Consulats américains et instruisant comment les représentants des USA doivent pratiquer l'espionnage principalement contre les alliés des Etats Unis, membre de l'OTAN.

Je me permets de vous transmettre ce document avec l'urgente prière de le porter à la connaissance des membres du Conseil de l'OTAN et de vous demander de protester de la manière la plus catégorique envers le gouvernement des Etats Unis en exigeant qu'il cesse ce genre de pratiques révoltantes envers des Etats-amis.

Je transmets en même temps ce document à la connaissance de certaines personnalités françaises et d'autres pays-membres de l'Alliance Atlantique.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

Monsieur Joseph M.A.H. LUNS
Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN

1110 BRUXELLES

Robert Lüst

C O P Y

E M B A S S Y
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A I R G R A M

Handling:Classification:Message Reference No:

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TO: ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AND USOECD PARIS,
USEC BRUSSELS, USNATO BRUSSELS, US MISSION GENEVA,
USIAEA VIENNA, USUNIDO VIENNA, USUN NEW YORK

FROM: Department of State

RG52: GDS

TAGS: ECRP XX

SUBJECT: FY 1975 Coordinated Statement of Priority Economic, Financial,
and Commercial Intelligence Requirements Worldwide of the
Washington Economic Community

REF: Department of State Airgram A - 2251, 14 March 1973

The referenced Airgram, the first in this series, commenced with a statement that remains valid:

The Executive Branch's priority needs for economic intelligence on foreign countries are determined by important US interests and the strategies adopted to protect or advance them. These interests and strategies have a new importance resulting from the changed place of the US economy in the world. US economic intelligence needs center around the motivations and assessments of changes in the intentions, plans, and capabilities of other countries in the economic field.

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By:	Drafting date:	Phone No:	Contents and classification approved by:
ECFJ.FORD/A, SOKOLSKI	11/27/74	143-5577	EB/CBA: J.BILLER
Inccs: CIA/OER M.ERNST	EB/SA: R.COLD		SEE LAST PAGE FOR EIC MEMBER CLEARANCES
NIO R.SLINGTON	EB/OCA/REP: BEBYRON		
	EB/OCA: N.S.LAKAS		

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In particular, reporting is requested on how host-country domestic and international economic policies and programs are likely to support or conflict significantly with US policies and programs. The past is of interest to the extent that it illuminates these essential ingredients of US economic policy formulation.

In the intervening period, since March 1973, detailed guidance has been supplied triannually to eight regions of the world by the Economic Alert Lists (EALs). (The annual Economic Reporting Guides, after a poll of representative embassies, have been abolished.) The EALs are prepared by the US Intelligence Board's Economic Intelligence Committee and include inputs from the entire Washington economic community. They are disseminated by the Department as executive agent of the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP). The current update of the over-all statement (now on a fiscal year basis) places in context specific guidance provided subsequently by the Economic Alert Lists and is intended for all officers charged with responsibility bearing directly or indirectly on the broad economic/financial/commercial area.

The general priority subjects set forth below are to a varying degree applicable to all diplomatic and consular posts. They are the eight economic topics contained in the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) for FY 1975, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and are designed to be responsive to and to support the following substantive objective for the intelligence community: "Provide reliable, timely, and comprehensive information and assessments relevant to US international economic policy decisions and motivations."

These questions were formulated, it will be noted, in consultation with senior policy officers of the principal departments and entities concerned with international economic relations.

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Subsequently, they were ratified by the National Security Council Intelligence Committee which is chaired by Secretary Kissinger. The KIQA's are identified by number for reference purposes; the order of their listing should not be regarded as implying any internal priority. By definition, all Key Intelligence Questions are of major importance.

Washington continues to welcome suggestions as to how, to what extent, and in what manner the US Government efforts at the post or elsewhere can influence attitudes and positions in a manner beneficial to US economic objectives.

56. What are the changes in the measures of current performance and leading indicators of future performance of the economies of the major non-Communist industrial nations, especially Italy, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Canada, Norway and Sweden?

Include these governments' domestic and foreign economic policy responses to those changes, and the likely effect of these responses on the future performance of these economies and the US economy. Attention should be paid that the growing economic and industrial position of these countries /especially West Germany, France and Japan/ is likely to conflict significantly with important US policies, programs and interests. Detailed and timely collection and reporting is needed on how the competition of these major economic powers can be eliminated by the Executive Branch in all areas in which the United States has economic and financial interests.

The assessment of the current and likely future performance of the major economies and the effect of foreign economic events on the US economy is a task that is routinely performed by the economic community. The singling out of this task as a Key Intelligence Question for FY 1975 reflects the uncertainties inherent in the world-wide adjustment to the change in the price of oil. The simultaneous pressures of rapid inflation, low or negative rates of growth in output, and worsened balances of trade that now impinge on the

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governments of most of the major industrial nations could conceivably produce a series of mutually inconsistent and self-destructive policy decisions that would greatly accelerate existing recessionary forces and threaten to reverse the trend of world economic integration and political - economic cooperation.

The types of information on which continuous and timely reporting is required, particularly for the priority countries, are:

1. Detailed current measures of economic performance including statistics on the structure and distribution of national income, international trade and finance, wages and prices, the government's budget, tax receipts, domestic monetary and financial variables, employment and unemployment, excess productive capacity, and leading indicators of future performance such as advance export orders, planned capital construction, and surveys of consumer expectations.

2. Official and ^{or ~~unofficial~~} (confidential) forecasts of national income and product, the balance of trade and payments, wages and prices, and unemployment.

3. The likely content and timing of projected domestic and foreign economic-policy decisions by government or actions by major economic groups such as unions or producer associations, and the sources of uncertainty as to timing or content. [Current and forecast development of their trade with the USSR, China and other eastern countries and timely, detailed information on possibilities to counter their competition to protect important US commercial interests in this area.]

4. Estimates of the effect of current or projected policy decisions or events on the level, structure, and distribution of national income, the balance of trade and payments, wages and prices, and unemployment.

5. The nature of the economic policymaking process in government including:

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A-8956

a. The perceptions and objectives of individual economic policymakers and the institutional interests of bureaucratic elements that play a principal role in economic policymaking. [In particular, the perceptions and strategies intended to conflict with important US interests of the president of France, the chancellor of West Germany and the prime ministers / or other key policymakers / of the UK, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Canada, and detailed information relevant to their disloyalty to policies and objectives of the NATO alliance.]

b. The current and projected division of authority or influence over the major areas of economic policymaking.

c. The determinants of the distribution of influence over economic policymaking by individuals, bureaucratic elements, or outside groups. [Detailed reporting is needed on possibilities and ways to influence / financially and otherwise / by the Executive Branch and US companies individual ministers, lawmakers and other significant political and bureaucratic elements in these countries to adopt strategies and policies beneficial to US interests in all important areas.]

d. Shifts in demands of economic pressure groups such as labor unions and opposition political parties.

57. What are the principal objectives of the major economic powers especially France, West Germany, Japan, the UK, Italy, Canada and Japan in forthcoming multilateral trade (GATT) and financial negotiations (IMF)?

Include their possible negotiating tradeoffs and the electoral and intragovernmental factors that affect these objectives and tradeoffs. With respect to multilateral trade negotiations, appraise the consequences of alternative trade agreements to the US foreign trade balance.

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Report on potential issues in trade negotiations that may affect the availability to the United States of imported supplies of key commodities; government strategies for developing those industries, including agriculture, in which the United States has an export interest, particularly high-technology areas and those that could make heavy inroads into US domestic markets, such as shoes and textiles.

Report on indications of intended foreign actions relating to such international monetary questions as alternative exchange-rate regimes and margins of fluctuation, the numeraire of the monetary system, and the roles of Special Drawing Rights, gold, and reserve currencies; consolidation of reserve currency holdings; balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism, including criteria for adjustment; uses of capital and other balance-of-payments controls.

Report on efforts by private industry to influence governmental negotiating positions. Include also efforts to establish new non-tariff barriers, such as unreasonable product standards or safety specifications, made by private industry or trade associations.

For the priority countries especially, but to some extent for all countries, timely reporting is required on:

1. Prepared negotiation strategies including initial proposals and fallback positions (especially West Germany, France, the UK and Japan)
2. Pre-negotiation perceptions of and reactions to US negotiating strategy (confidential documents, assessments and motivations)
3. Perceptions of the progress of negotiations and changes in objectives and bargaining strategies during the course of negotiations.
4. The determining factors in the policymaking process including:

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a. The perceptions and objectives of individuals and the institutional interests of bureaucratic elements that play a major role in policymaking.

b. The division of authority or influence over policymaking between individuals and bureaucratic elements.

c. The content and relative influence of major pressure groups such as trade unions and opposition political parties.

58. What are the changes in composition and location of the foreign assets of the major oil exporting countries, and what are their policies with respect to channeling funds on longer terms than heretofore through multilateral institutions, the Eurodollar market, US financial markets and direct loans or grants to the LDCs?

Continual, recurrent reporting for the OPEC countries (in particular, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Libya, Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia) is needed on:

1. Accrued earnings from exports.
2. Payments received for exports or from foreign investments and the structure of time lags between accruals of earnings and receipt of payments for oil exports.
3. Current imports of goods and services and information relevant to estimation of future import levels.
4. Payments for imports and changes in the lags between time of import and time of import payment.
5. The composition of direct foreign investments made by these countries.
6. Loan or grant commitments to foreign governments or multilateral institutions and the timing of disbursement against these loans or grants.
7. The composition by location, denominated currency, and maturity of financial asset portfolios held by official or quasi-official institutions and current changes in the composition of these portfolios.

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8. Policies governing choice of location, denominated currency, and maturity of future purchases of financial assets by official or quasi-official institutions. [Timely reporting is needed on possibilities to influence (financially and otherwise) by the Executive Branch and US companies individual ministers, key policymakers and other significant political and bureaucratic elements in these countries.]

9. Policies with respect to further direct loans or grants to governments or multilateral organizations.

10. Indications of intentions to make large abrupt changes in the composition of financial portfolios (in particular, shifts to or from assets denominated in dollars).

59. What are the policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities of the major petroleum exporters with respect to the production, marketing of oil, and how are these policies affected by the prospects for development of non-OPEC energy sources?

Continuous and detailed reporting is needed on:

1. Current and forecasted production, export, and productive capacity of primary energy by type (oil, gas, coal, and elements of the nuclear fuel cycle) in both the OPEC countries and those non-OPEC countries that are major producers of primary energy.

2. Current and estimated future consumption of primary energy by type for those countries that are major consumers of energy.

3. The policies, plans, and negotiating strategies concerning production, price, and export of oil and gas of individual governments and associated institutions such as OPEC and OAPEC.

4. Policies of the major energy-consuming countries that affect their levels of imports and consumption of energy.

5. Bilateral arrangements between the OPEC countries and major energy-consuming countries concerning the supply and financing of exports of oil and gas.

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6. Information relevant to a situation of the future re. rev. and balance-of-payments position (in particular, plans concerning major investment projects and imports of military items) of each OPEC country and those countries such as Canada, Mexico, and Norway that might have potential to increase world energy supplies. (confidential documents, motivations and assessments.)

7. Perceptions of key policymakers and significant political and bureaucratic elements of each OPEC nation concerning:

- a. The oil marketing policies of their own nations and other OPEC nations.
- b. The reaction of the US and other governments of major oil-consuming nations to these policies.
- c. The vulnerability of these policies to actions by the oil-consuming nations and other OPEC nations.

8. The production, marketing, and investment policies of the major US and foreign oil companies and the status of negotiations between the companies and host governments.

9. What changes in production, control and pricing policies are being considered or taken by either government or the private sector in other countries to limit or regulate the quantity, price or state of processing of raw materials normally exported, particularly steps affecting US access to such materials, government attitudes toward and strategies for multilateral cooperation among exporters or between producers, exporters and importers in efforts to stabilize the market either when such commodities are in globally short supply or when they are trending toward oversupply.

Report on steps being considered or taken by either government or the private sector in other countries to limit or regulate the quantity, price or state of processing of raw materials normally exported, particularly steps affecting US access to such materials, government attitudes toward and strategies for multilateral cooperation among exporters or between producers, exporters and importers in efforts to stabilize the market either when such commodities are in globally short supply or when they are trending toward oversupply.

In particular, detailed and timely collection and reporting is needed on:

1. Current statistics on and forecasts of production, exports, inventories, productive capacity, prices, and consumption of important raw materials and primary products for the most countries.

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2. Inventory and stockpiling policies of producing and consuming national and international price support organizations.

3. Plans of producing governments to play a larger role in controlling or influencing production and price by unilateral or, especially, collective action.

4. Actual or planned shifts, whether or not stimulated by government policies, of emphasis varying from exporting basic raw materials to processing domestic raw materials and exporting them in a processed or further refined or fabricated form.

How have changes in the relative prices of imports and exports (petroleum, fertilizer and grain in particular) affected the food supply, foreign trade and prospects for economic growth and political stability in the major LDCs (especially India, Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, South Korea, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile)?

Report on attempts of the LDCs to attract foreign capital to ease balance-of-payments problems; government attitudes toward such grants, loans, or concessionary purchase arrangements to lessen the pressure of high import prices on their economies; measures taken or contemplated to reduce consumption of high cost imports or to develop export industries and new export markets.

In particular, detailed and timely reporting is needed on:

1. Current economic performance and population growth.
2. Estimated production and consumption of foodstuffs; estimated production and utilization of agricultural inputs.
3. The sources and potential magnitude of error in current official economic statistics.
4. Projected foreign-exchange earnings on current account.
5. Projected availability of net capital imports (concessional and commercial).
6. The composition of imports for alternative import levels; estimates of the effect of changes in the level of imports on growth prospects.

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7. The likely content and timing of future government economic-policy decisions /confidential documents and motivations/.

8. Estimates of the effect of government policy decisions in the net availability of foreign exchange, food import requirements, distribution of income, productivity of investment, and future population growth.

9. What is the likely demand /especially by the USSR, China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Bangladesh/ for imports of wheat, soybeans, rice, corn, and cotton, and what are the capabilities of countries other than the US /especially Canada, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Thailand/ for supplying these commodities to the world market?

Report of changes in government policies that affect agricultural productivity investments in the agricultural sector or in the infrastructure serving agriculture; changes in reserve stocks requirements; problems encountered in planting, harvesting, or transporting agricultural products; developments in foreign demand for or supply of raw materials or foodstuffs, especially grain, that may indicate possible world shortages such that external demand for US products could lead to shortages in the United States.

Also, detailed and timely reporting is needed on:

1. Current information on crop prospects in each of the main importing and exporting nations /including the EC as a group/.
2. Current information on importer and exporter stock levels /and, for the USSR, the condition of stocks/, and importer and views of their consumption and stock requirements.

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3. Current information on trade and expected trade in these commodities.

4. Information on future production plans to include changes in cropping patterns and investment.

5. Prospects for the modernization of agricultural production techniques / "The Green Revolution" /.

What actions are being taken or planned by foreign governments or private groups that could substantially affect the ability of American business to compete for foreign sales as to involve US interest in an important way?

Examples are sales of aircraft, nuclear power plants, enriched uranium and major construction programs such as the Suez pipeline.

Report on government anti-inflation or anti-pecession actions that serve to stimulate exports or protect home industries, including the fixing of export prices that do not fully reflect the domestic price level, preferential credit arrangements, tax incentives, export development programs, adjustment assistance programs, administrative barriers to imports, regulations influencing the import or export of industrial technology, trade agreements involving trade restraints or safeguards, and attempts to negotiate large contracts.

Also report on government measures affecting operations of US subsidiaries abroad or restricting US equity ownership or sectors of operations; intentions of governments to nationalize or expropriate US-owned property; changes in general economic, tax, tariff, and subsidy policies that impede or stimulate foreign direct investment; official and private attitudes toward US investments; and requirements for US subsidiaries overseas to reinvest profits within the foreign country.

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 ADMIRAL: B. BURNS
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 ADMIRAL: P. DICKERSON
 ADMIRAL: R. PAJAK
 ADMIRAL: R. BRYANT
 ADMIRAL: G. GOLDSTEIN
 ADMIRAL: ENR)

FORGERY

ANNEX A-III

III. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH FORGERY

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—Mailed anonymously to several Greek publications in Athens in late December 1977.

B. *Format.*—Bogus U.S. Information Service press release in the "American Perspective Series" of bogus speech attributed to President Jimmy Carter.

C. *Content.*—In the phony speech, the President allegedly made demeaning references to the Greek government and reproached Athens for not living up to its responsibilities to NATO.

D. *Purpose.*—To strain U.S.-Greek relations.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Published by two Athens newspapers, *To Vima* and *Rizospastis*.


F. *Comment.*—*Rizospastis* is the official organ of the Moscow wing of the Greek Communist Party (KKE-Exterior).

american PERSPECTIVE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE ATHENS

September 29, 1977

PRESIDENT CARTER ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

C. C. C.



PRESIDENT CARTER ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

After the signing of the base agreement between the United States and Greece, President Carter commented on several additional problems concerning this area:

The U.S. administration has undertaken a number of steps in order to justly and successfully resolve issues between allies on the southern flank of NATO, and to strengthen the alliance against the danger threatening the Free World in the face of the steadily increasing attempts of Warsaw Pact countries to attain military superiority over the West.

Both parties concerned - Greece and Turkey - must realize that it is their duty to wholeheartedly support these efforts of the United States since resolving this issue is their own concern as well.

The agreement on U.S. bases in Greece signed early in August must be viewed as the first step Greece had to take in an effort to improve its relations to the West. A further step, and the earlier taken the better, must be Greece's full return to NATO and making ensuing provisions. I disagree with statements of some prominent Greek politicians indicating that the accord with the U.S. does not mean Greece's rapprochement with NATO. Quite the contrary. For Greece, in much the same way as for the U.S., the interests of the NATO alliance must be the first and foremost consideration.

I would like to point out that NATO members have the obligation to fulfill their political and military commitments connected with NATO operations, not only in case of a direct communist aggression but also at the time of peace. This also pertains to Greece, which plays a specific role in the defense plans of the alliance, and such commitments are mandatory even for the Greek government.

During the recent NATO Council meeting in May, the necessity for increased efficiency and modernization of the NATO alliance were considered. The overwhelming majority of NATO members comprehended this necessity and agreed to increase their financial appropriations for this program. In this connection it is essential to emphasize that, in certain instances and if the situation demands the potential weakening of the alliance, the U.S. and other NATO countries are entitled to require from all members to fulfill their commitments even if they may not seem to be consonant with the program of the government concerned, and this applies to all countries without exception, including Greece.


We are aware that in recent years the policy of the United States and NATO has become the target of unwarranted criticism by several Greek political leaders, and certain walks of the population including the younger generation. I want to re-emphasize that this criticism is unwarranted and stems from purely individual and nationalist viewpoints. The Greek government as well as the Greek people should realize that the policy of the United States,

based upon the moral principles of the Free World, will never harm the interests of its faithful allies. This policy must, however, be uncompromisingly principial and ensure the protection of the interests of the Free World even at the cost of sacrifices and risks involved. If Greece desires to continue to enjoy the advantages and protection of the United States, it must be prepared to make these sacrifices.

I would like to point out that last July 3 years had elapsed since the beginning of a period of Greece's abnormal relations to its western allies and to our country. We and our allies have exhibited much patience in an effort to allow these problems to resolve themselves. For reasons of ensuring mutual security, to continue to wait however, is no longer feasible. It is necessary to be decisive, and I personally believe that at the very earliest the Greek government will take such measures which are our mutual interest.

During my meeting with the Greek Premier in London, I received with deep satisfaction Mr. Caramanlis' assurances that he would do his utmost to resolve the disputes between Greece and Turkey in accordance with the interests of the alliance and the U.S. This would enhance prospects for increased efficiency in the defense of NATO's southern flank, and a firm wall of defense of the Free World would be erected in this area.

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




9815



USIS-Athens
TO: VIMA
6, Christou Lada Str.
Athens



ANNEX A-IV

IV. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM *

A. Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.—On 17 March 1978, Greek opposition leader Andreas Papandreu tabled in the Greek Parliament a copy of what he alleged was a September 1976 State telegram entitled "Greek-Turkish Dispute in the Aegean." It is not known how Papandreu obtained the document.

B. Format.—State described this as a "gross alteration" of the original telegram.

C. Content.—Purported to outline U.S. policy toward the dispute as favoring Ankara over Athens.

D. Purpose.—To strain U.S. relations with Greece and undermine NATO.

E. Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.—None.

V. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

A. Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.—Greek newspaper, To Vima, acquired a copy of this forgery in early 1978, but it is not known how the newspaper obtained the bogus document.

B. Format.—Forgery appeared on a genuine DIA DD Form 1365, which was completed by the forger and given the title "Anti-U.S. Activities and Their Sponsors in Western Europe."

C. Content.—Purported to be instructions for U.S. spying on 43 Greek political parties and organizations.

D. Purpose.—To damage U.S.-Greek relations and embarrass U.S.

E. Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.—None. To Vima was convinced of document's bogus nature and did not publish it.

F. Comment.—No such intelligence collection requirement was ever prepared.

*Copy of forgery unavailable.

Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20301		CONFIDENTIAL		EXPIRATION DATES ALWAYS LAST DAY OF MONTH	
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT					
See Distribution List		3. A DIAM REFERENCE 100-100000-100000	4. EXPIRATION DATE 17 Oct 78	5. CONTROL NUMBER URGENT CORE NETHE	
SUBJECT: Anti-US Activities and Their Sponsors Western Europe (U)		6. DISPATCH DATE 31 Mar 76	7. PRIORITY 1A	8. COUNTY, CITY, STATE, ZIP PG, IT, (U), NO, PD, SP, ZIP	
COLLECTION ACTION See Distribution List		11. INFORMATION SOURCE NO SUCH PARAGRAPH 1-7 who subs changed in 1973(?) See Distribution List			
a. Requirements: Request information as follows on anti-US activities and their sponsors in the host country:					
(1) Identity of sponsoring and of participating organizations and political parties, areas of their activity, titles and details of official publications, names and political affiliations of leaders, locations of their offices and their home addresses, total number of participants, when feasible, furnish photographs and/or recognition characteristics of active participants in anti-US activities.					
(2) Plans, dates, time and sites of activities.					
(3) Interest displayed toward US military facilities, possible intentions to demonstrate at facilities, to distribute propaganda to US military personnel or in housing areas, to erect or to paint signs at facilities, to instigate incidents with personnel, to disrupt military operations or festival-type activity, and to destroy, damage or bespoil US government or US private property.					
(4) Main themes of public demonstrations, texts of banners, posters, leaflets and other literature (furnish samples), identity of speakers and themes of major speeches, nature of other attractions and identity of performers.					
(5) Details of incidents, involvement of US military personnel, activity of inter-demonstrators, public reactions.					
(6) Plans of HC security services and police to control anti-US organizations and their activities, means applied (both overt and covert), intervention in and prevention of incidents, confiscation of propaganda materials, overall effectiveness of police and counterintelligence measures.					
ATTACHMENTS Annexes A through M Listing of Anti-US Organizations		16. DISTRIBUTION		18. DISPATCH APPROVAL	
9. SECURITY MARKING GROUP-3, Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.					
10. DATE 1965		17. CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		19. VARIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JULY 1983	

THIS TYPE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN USED SINCE 1972/73

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT CONTINUATION SHEET

Anti-US Activities and Their Sponsors Western Europe (U)

COUNTRY: BE, CY, DA, GR, IC, IT, NE, NO, PO, SP, TU, U

b. Guidance: Required Classification of Paragraph Missing!

(1) Priority: Anti-US activities in Western Europe and their sponsors are a matter of command special interest. Anti-US activities in general and anti-US activities in the area of US military facilities in particular require continuous monitoring and timely reporting on an immediate precedence.

(2) Themes: In the past the basic theme of anti-US activities in Western Europe related to US involvement in SE Asia. Currently main targets for attacks by anti-US elements are presence of foreign military bases, military treaties, military draft laws, existing or alleged stocks of US chemical and nuclear weapons, threat of nuclear contamination, US deployment of new types of weapons systems, foreign arms sales, activities of US intelligence and security services. Secondary themes are alleged US support of Israel against Arabic countries and of military regime in Chile, racial and student strife in the US, alleged violations of human rights and civil liberties in the US, etc.

(3) Definition: Within the context of these requirements, the term "anti-US activities" includes the following:

- (a) Manifestations and riots.
- (b) Incidents, throwing of objects, defacing of buildings, window breaking, blockades, public burning of US flag.
- (c) Bombings, arson, bomb hoaxes, attempts to seize hostages or attempts against life or property of US citizens.
- (d) Street marches, motorcades.
- (e) Public meetings, theatrical and musical performances, film showings.
- (f) Propaganda displays, posting or painting of signs.
- (g) Slanted appeals, political statements, parliamentary speeches and inquiries, radio and television broadcasts, leaflet/pamphlet distributions, mail propaganda.
- (h) Fund collections.
- (i) "Sit-ins" and "watches".
- (j) Protest letters, signature collection.
- (k) Boycott or harassment of public events.

FORM 1365C

CLASSIFICATION

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PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT CONTINUATION SHEET

Anti-US Activities and Their Sponsors Western Europe (U)

GROUPS: BR, CY, DA, GE, GR, IC, IT, J, NE, NO, PO, SP, TU, UK

(4) Reporting: Although information may be fragmentary, advance notification of impending or planned anti-US activities will be reported by PRIORITY electrical message in accordance with letter of instruction. Subject: Intelligence Information Reports (IRs), DD Form 1396. All additional available information on anti-US activities and their instigators will be forwarded via PRIORITY message. Originators of information requested herein should also ensure expeditious dissemination to appropriate higher, lower and adjacent commands, to include commanders, community leaders, installation coordinators and provost marshals in areas affected by participants in anti-US activities.

(5) Activity Schedule: In Western Europe anti-US activities are held on almost any pretext at any time. Occasions for such activities in the past have included the following:

- (a) Easter March build-up, Jan-Feb-Mar.
- (b) Easter March, Mar or Apr.
- (c) International Labor Day, 1 May.
- (d) Anti Compulsory Military Service.
- (e) Host country-American Friendship Weeks, any time.
- (f) US Independence Day, 4th Jul.
- (g) US Forces carnivals, open houses.
- (h) Hiroshima Day, 6 Aug.
- (i) World Peace Day, Sep.
- (j) Days of Solidarity with Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile.
- (k) Human Rights Day, Dec.
- (l) Visits by Prominent Americans, any time.
- (m) Visits of US warships, any time.
- (n) Participants.
- (o) In recent years many known organizations have instigated anti-US activities Western Europe. New organizations are established regularly.

FORM 1396C

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT CONTINUATION SHEET

REF: Anti-US Activities and Their Sponsors Western Europe (U) COUNTRY BR, CV, DA, DE, GR, IC, IT, NE, NO, PO, SP, TH, US

(b) Lists of anti-US organizations (by country) are set forth in Annexes A through H.

(c) Information on the listed organizations and other anti-US organizations, with particular reference to subversive factions and groups within such organizations, should be obtained by all available means, going beyond the IC security services and police.

(7) Releasability: The contents of this ICR are NATO releasable for collection purposes only, in accordance with the provisions of CIAM 56-2 subject to DIA approval in each particular case. *never!*

paragraph missing

all ICR's HAVE a paragraph telling to which agency or subagency a direct copy of all IR's in response must be forwarded.

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FORM 1385c

CLASSIFICATION
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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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 USDAO Bern, Switzerland
 STATE/INR/OIG
 CIA/DDP

GREECE

1. 'Αντιφασιστική 'Αντι'Ιμπεριαλιστική Σπουδαστική Παρέα Ελλάδας (Anti-Fascist Anti-Imperialist Student Front of Greece) - AASF
2. 'Αντιδικτατορικών 'Εργατικών Μέτωπων (Anti-Dictatorship Workers' Front) - AEF
3. Γενική Συνομοσπονδία 'Εργατών Ελλάδος (General Workers' Confederation of Greece) - GSEF ✓
4. Δημοκρατική 'Αντιφασιστική Κίνηση (Democratic Anti-Fascist Movement) - DAK
5. Δημοκρατική Κίνηση Νέων (Democratic Youth Movement) - DKN
6. Δημοκρατική Πορεία (Democratic March)
7. Δημοκρατικός 'Αγών (Democratic Struggle)
8. 'Ελληνική 'Επιτροπή για τη Διεθνή 'Υφεση και Ειρήνη (Hellenic Committee for International Defeat and Peace)
9. 'Ελληνικό 'Επαναστατικό 'Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο (Hellenic Revolutionary Liberation Front) - ELAM
10. 'Ελληνικό Λενινιστικό 'Επαναστατικό Κίνημα (Hellenic Leninist Revolutionary Movement) - ELER
11. 'Ελληνικός Σύνδεσμος Δημοκρατικής Νεολαίας (Hellenic Association of Democratic Youth) - ESDN
12. 'Ενιαία Δημοκρατική 'Αριστερά (United Democratic Left) - EDA
13. 'Ενιαία Σοσιαλιστική 'Αντιδικτατορική Κίνηση (United Socialist Anti-Dictatorship Movement) - ESAK
14. 'Ενωτική Δημοκρατικού Κέντρου (Democratic Center Union) - EDIK ✓
15. 'Επαναστατικό Κομμουνιστικό Κίνημα Ελλάδας (Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece) - EKKE
16. 'Επιτροπές 'Αντιδικτατορικής Συνεργασίας (Anti-Dictatorship Cooperation Committees)
17. 'Επιτροπή Ειρήνης Θεσσαλονίκης (Salonika Peace Committee)
18. 'Επιτροπή Μεσογειακής 'Αλληλεγγύης (Mediterranean Solidarity Committee) - EMA

(Initiative Committee for Solidarity with Chinese People)

20. 'Εργατική Διεθνιστική Ένωση (Workers' Internationalist Union) - ΕΠΕ

21. Κεντρική Έπιτροπή Πολιτικών Προσφύγων Ελλάδας (Central Committee of Greek Political Emigrants) - ΚΕΠΠΕ

22. Κίνηση Δημοκρατικών Γυναικών (Movement of Democratic Women) - ΚΝΓ

23. Κίνηση Ελλήνων Εργαζομένων-Λενινιστών (Movement of Greek Marxist-Leninists) - ΕΕΛ

24. Κομμουνιστική Νεολαία Ελλάδας (Communist Youth of Greece) - ΚΝΕ

25. Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (Communist Party of Greece) - ΚΚΕ

26. Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας /Εσωτερικού/ (Greek Communist Party of the Interior) - ΚΚΕ/εσ/

27. Νεολαία ΠΑΣΟΚ (PASOK Youth)

28. Όμάς Γιάζου (Giazos Group)

29. Όμάς Ήλιοπούλου (Heliopoulos Group)

30. Όμάς Θεοδωράκη (Theodorakis Group)

31. 'Οργάνωση Κομμουνιστών-Διεθνιστών Ελλάδας (Organization of Communist-Internationalists of Greece) - ΟΚΔΕ

32. 'Οργάνωση Εργαζομένων-Λενινιστών Ελλάδας (Organization of Marxist-Leninists of Greece) - ΟΜΠΕ

33. 'Οργάνωση Νεολαίας Νέας Δημοκρατίας (New Democracy Youth Organization) - ΟΝΝΝ

34. Πανελλήνια 'Αγωνιστική Σπουδαστική Παράταξη (Pan-Hellenic Militant Students Front) - ΠΑΣΦ

35. Πανελλήνια Ένωση 'Αγωνιστών 'Εθνικής Αντίστασης (Pan-Hellenic Union of National Resistance Fighters) - ΠΕΑΝΑ

36. Πανελλήνια Ένωση Θυμάτων Γερμανικής Κατοχής /ΦΩΝΙΞ/ (Pan-Hellenic Union of Nazi Occupation Victims /Phoenix/)

37. Πανελλήνια 'Οργάνωση Νεολαίας - Ρήγας Φεραίου (Pan-Hellenic Youth Organization - Rigas Ferraios)

38. Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα /ΠΑΣΟΚ/ (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement /PASOK/)

39. Πανεποδασιακή Συνδικαλιστική Κίνηση (All-Student Syndicalist Movement) - ΠΣΚ

40. Σύνδεσμος Ελλήνων Δημοκρατικών Κοιτών (Association of Greek Democratic Lawyers) - SEDN

41. Σύνδεσμος Νέων διά τόν Πυρηνικό Αφοπλισμόν - Bertrand Russell (Youth Association for Nuclear Disarmament - Bertrand Russell)

42. Συντονιστική Επιτροπή Εργαζομένων Γυναίκων (Coordination Committee of Working Women) - SEEG

43. Σοσιαλιστική Επαναστατική Πάλη (Socialist Revolutionary Struggle) - SEP

63 772 306

FORGOTTEN

ANNEX A-VI

VI. LUNS LETTER

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—On or about 8 June 1978; photocopies anonymously sent to several Belgian newspapers.

B. *Format.*—Official letter on NATO letterhead from Secretary General Luns to U.S. Ambassador to NATO Bennett; a total fabrication.

C. *Content.*—Letter claimed that a list of journalists who opposed deployment of the U.S. "neutron bomb" and other aspects of U.S. defense policy had been turned over to the Belgian Defense Ministry, with implication that it would take measures against the journalists.

D. *Purpose.*—To embarrass the U.S. and stimulate ongoing Soviet propaganda campaign against the neutron weapon.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—NATO authorities immediately disclaimed the letter and publicly labeled it as a forgery. On 9 June 1978, Atlantic News printed an article which presented the NATO position on the Luns forgery. However, on 28 July the Belgian De Nieuwe published a copy of the Luns letter with an accompanying article but did not mention that the letter has been officially identified as a forgery. On 3 August, De Volkskrant replayed the De Nieuwe article for its Belgian readership.


Anonymous Cover Letter
1978 Forgery

Messieurs,

Moi, je suis un lecteur régulier de votre journal et l'estime que je vous porte me décide de vous écrire non sans avoir longtemps hésité. Je suis indigné des mesures prises par le Ministère de la Défense nationale contre les journalistes pour leur conscience éveillée et leur souci de la sauvegarde de la paix dans le monde.

La liberté de l'expression de la pensée est une des bases fondamentales de notre société démocratique. La violation de ce droit serait un grand pas vers le totalitarisme. En tant qu'étranger dans votre pays hospitalier j'éprouve de la honte à cause de l'activité d'autres étrangers tels que M. Luns et l'ambassadeur américain à l'OTAN M. Bennett qui me semble-t-il par leurs activités dont il est question dans cette lettre, passent la limite des pouvoirs que nos pays-membres leur ont accordés.

J'espère que vous vous rangerez à mon avis que sur de pareilles questions il est impossible de se taire.

Votre ami 

P. S. Je vous prie de vouloir bien me pardonner les fautes commises car le français n'est pas ma langue maternelle.



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

BRUSSELS, 15 February 1978

Dear Mr. Bennett,

I regret that owing to my official duties it will be hardly possible for us to see each other as we had agreed upon earlier. Today, as you know, I am saying my farewells to my countryman Ambassador Martens and on Friday, the same to Georg Leber in Bonn. Therefore, I am sending you this short note.

Going back to our previous talks I am willing to tell you that with the help of my friends from the Belgian Defence Ministry the listing of the journalists showing negative attitude to the neutron bomb and to certain aspects of the policy of the Alliance and of your country as well is under way. To avoid any complications, we agreed upon having all this carefully done. There are also some details to be reconsidered since, I am afraid, one of our Belgian friends is, I would say, overzealous in doing his job.

My friends promised to influence the local Foreign Ministry to take appropriate measures concerning the H-bomb too. In this respect it is worth-while considering what sort of material are we to offer to the loyal journalists and to those from the special category to interpret the Alliance's policy in our mutual interest.

To my opinion such a course of things will give better results than the ones we were hoping to get earlier.

Looking forward to seeing you,

(Dr. J. M. H. Luns)

63 772 309

ANNEX A—VII

VII. HEARD LETTER

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—Sent anonymously in late 1978 or early 1979 to selected members of the Belgian Cabinet.

B. *Format.*—A totally fabricated letter on U.S. Air Force letterhead allegedly sent by Colonel Allen P. Heard, Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, U.S. Department of the Air Force to a Belgian defense attache, Colonel Armand Troquet.

C. *Content.*—Letter acknowledged that the U.S. would render transport assistance in sending military advisers, light weapons and equipment from the People's Republic of China to Zaire and that additional weapons would be dispatched to Zaire from the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain.

D. *Purpose.*—To embarrass the U.S. and its NATO allies and to support Soviet propaganda allegations that Western "imperialism" is cooperating with China to suppress national liberation movements in Africa.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Government inquiry by Belgium.

F. *Comment.*—This fabrication was probably intended to be replayed in the media after the Belgian government had made it public, but this did not happen since the Belgians were immediately suspicious of the letter's origins.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



14 July 1978

Colonel Armand Troquet
Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Embassy of Belgium
3330 Garfield Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Colonel Troquet:

I have been authorized to inform you that the U.S. Air Force will render certain assistance with the transport of a limited number of military advisers, light weapons and equipment, from China to Zaire. This action will be implemented in accordance with an ad hoc agreement reached in Peking this year, and after final detailed negotiations between the governments of Zaire and China.

Further contingents of light weapons and equipment, under the same agreement, will be dispatched to Zaire from the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. Headquarters Command, USAF has assumed responsibility for safeguarding this mission, which is being carried out in congruity with our mutual interests in this region of Africa.

Sincerely,

Alan P. Heard
ALAN P. HEARD, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Foreign Liaison Division
Office of the Vice Chief of Staff



ANNEX A-VIII

VIII. GREEN LETTER

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—This bogus letter was mailed to several newspapers in Naples, Italy in April 1979.

B. *Format.*—A totally fabricated letter on official U.S. Embassy Rome letter-head with a reproduction of the signature of the U.S. Defense Attache in Rome, William C. Green.

C. *Content.*—The letter denied rumors that 80 infant deaths in Naples were attributable to chemical and bacteriological weapons stored at a nearby U.S. military base and that the destruction of oyster beds at Naples was caused by alleged spillage of chemical and bacteriological substances.

D. *Purpose.*—To "confirm" that the U.S. stores such weapons at the base—it does not—and to create pressure for the removal of the base. The forgery also sought to exploit concern over the infant mortalities, which was also being stirred up in handbills on the same subject that were being distributed anonymously.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Two newspapers, *Corriere Della Sea* and *Il Messaggero*, carried the forgery on 23 and 24 May 1979.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defense Attache Office
Rome, Italy

29 March 1979

Chief Editor of PRESENZA SOCIALDEMOCRATICA
Via Maddaloni 6,
80134 Naples

Dear Sir:

I wish to notify you officially that the rumors suggesting the death of the children in Naples could be due to chemicals or bacteriological substances stored at NATO, or rather American bases near Naples, are completely unwarranted. I think those rumors hinting that the containers which disappeared in December, 1977 held substances dangerous to human beings are especially harmful. Just as absurd is the idea that the oyster beds at Naples will have to be periodically destroyed if the substances spill into the sea.

There is no truth to the gossip that the Italian and foreign specialists investigating the matter are acting under duress and the influence of US military agencies.

U.S. officials believe the present Naples administration, which is incapable of handling the sanitation problem of the city, is solely and exclusively responsible for the regrettable epidemic among the children.

I hope your newspaper will inform the Italian public about the matter in line with the above. I am also taking this opportunity to convey my profound condolences to the parents of the dead children.

Sincerely,

W.C. Green
WILLIAM C. GREEN
Captain, U.S. Navy
U.S. Defense and Naval Attache

WCG/jdm

ANNEX A—IX

IX. YEO SPEECH

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—Received anonymously and published by an Egyptian magazine in December 1976; surfaced as a photocopy of "American Economics" with a cover letter.

B. *Format.*—A bogus speech purportedly delivered by U.S. Treasury Under Secretary Edwin Yeo.

C. *Content.*—Speech contained remarks insulting to the Egyptian people and called for President Anwar Sadat's ouster.

D. *Purpose.*—To create anti-American feelings in Egypt and embarrass Sadat.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Government inquiry by Egypt.

ECONOMICS

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE ATHENS

(116) / SA Form 176j

Monday, April 26, 1976

EDMIN YEO: THE US INVESTMENT
AND EGYPTIAN ECONOMY.

o o o o

FORGERS

RESTRICTED

EDWIN YEO: THE US INVESTMENT AND EGYPTIAN ECONOMY

WASHINGTON -- The following outlines the Egyptian economy and possibilities of U.S. private investments. It includes the address and questions during discussion, which was delivered by the US Undersecretary of Treasury, Mr. Edwin Yeo, in the Detroit Economic Club on March 24.

(Mr. Edwin Yeo accompanied Secretary of Treasury William Simon during his two-day consultations with Egyptian leaders).

// Allow me to briefly outline our meetings with President Sadat, our discussions with other Egyptian leaders, the results of our trip, and our impressions.

We recently returned from an informative trip, during which we had consultations in five countries in that area. Our delegation was headed by Secretary of Treasury W. Simon. Similar delegations had previously visited the Middle East. The interest of all of us who visited this "explosive area" was to secure peace in the Middle East, to divert some countries from communist influence, and to ensure the development of relations between the Free World and all Middle East countries.

Egypt was the last stop over of Mr. Simon during his five-country tour of the Middle East. In his address he asserted that economic prosperity is the best obstacle to war in that area, and can bring progress on the road to peace, which cannot be attained through diplomacy.

We took this stand, but I can assure you that we "keep our eyes open." At the very beginning, I must inform you that the Egyptian economy is suffering from a deep crisis, and is in such a deplorable state that no economic or financial injection can avert its disintegration and bankruptcy. Egyptian payment deficits are presently in excess of 5 billion dollars annually, and everything indicates that they will go on increasing. Its foreign indebtedness amounts to at least 10 billion dollars, if not more. There was nobody in Egypt who was capable of furnishing us with a more accurate figure.

The "open-door policy" proclaimed by Sadat has had no effect upon American investors. The obvious incapability of Egyptians at the highest levels to define and enforce acceptable laws and regula-

tions is the prime cause of this. On the other hand, Egyptian leaders assured us that they are determined to "clear the way," and remove obstacles impeding industrial progress. At the same time, however, they emphasized that they have "a long way to go."

The opinion of our group, however, is that the present Egyptian Administration is incapable of eliminating all the difficulties blocking free enterprise and foreign investments. My colleague, Gerald Parsky, was decidedly optimistic when, in November 1975, he believed that Goodyear and Ford factories could be built in Egypt. Not one iota of these plans has been realized to the present time. This situation also affects other countries, especially the rich Arab nations, and deters them from making capital investments in Egypt.

The distrust of private investors was caused by the incapability of Cairo to formulate specific standards for mutual USA - Egypt partnership, for the flow of profits, and for a realistic evaluation of Egyptian currency in comparison to the Dollar. There is strong criticism on the part of investors concerning tax limitations, tariffs and controls on the import of raw materials essential to production. Current Egyptian practice is to judge the problems of investors on an individual basis, and they make exceptions only when they consider the case to be to their advantage.

Consequently, it is quite clear that in such a situation, except for the large-scale oil exploration, there are no American investments in Egypt which could be classified as significant or major investments.

I am aware of approximately 40 US firms which have shown interest in building factories in Egypt. All of them, however, were repelled by the unending negotiations which, in not one single instance ever, resulted in government approval.

In Egypt, however, it does not only involve the aforementioned problems. I previously stated that we "kept our eyes open." We were in Cairo for only a brief period. But even a brief visit there, supplemented by parleys at the US Embassy, exposed the depth of disorder and incompetency. Egyptian leaders would like to make Cairo the main commercial and political center of the Arab world. They were pleased by the fighting in Beirut, where they sympathized with and supported one of the combatant groups. They hoped that the disorder in Beirut would bring about the prosperity of Cairo. But I will tell you that perhaps not only Beirut, but also Rome and Washington would have to burn down, for Cairo to prosper. Cairo is in fact a very ill-equipped city to be

capable of assuming the role of Beirut. Cairo is a degenerating municipality where millions are living in poverty. Countless numbers of people, and I believe there are hundreds of thousands of them, are unemployed. They eke out a bare existence by selling nuts, and ball-point pens on busy streets. The people of Cairo are faced with an unceasing fight for their mere existence. They even fight for a seat or a place to hang on the sides of streetcars. They fight for a place in lines waiting to buy food. Water supply is a crucial problem. It is not unusual that an apartment, with a rental of 1,000 dollars a month, is often for several days at a time without water or electricity. Telephone service is primitive. Adequate schools have a waiting list. In short, Cairo is not now, and for a long time in the future will not be prepared for a substantial trade or investment activity. There is a cheap Egyptian labor force, but without any degree of qualification. Egypt has perhaps thousands of engineers, but without any practical experience. For this reason, US investors will have to send not only capital to Egypt, but skilled workers as well, and that is excessively expensive.

Let us briefly recapitulate what I have stated, and compare it with the needs of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The removal of Russian influence from Egypt is an indisputable victory for American policy. President Sadat is gradually dissolving all ties with the Soviet Union. In the interest of the Free World, and the U.S. especially, it is necessary to utilize the "open door" and go into Egypt. Are we capable of this historic act? Government appropriations, loans, even grants, cannot solve Egypt's economic crisis. US private capital cannot operate under Egyptian conditions. It simply cannot - it would face bankruptcy. Rich Arab oil producing countries are in a similar situation, and in addition they have already elaborated their development programs. Who then, will be the "Solomon" to find the solution?

Q. Mr. Undersecretary, when President Sadat "opened the door," why didn't he also create the necessary conditions?

A. I have already stated that the Egyptian Administration has very little capability, and in Egypt there are no forces which could alter the administration. Even though Egyptian leaders promised us they would "clear the way," I don't place any hope in this.

Q. I believe the situation in Egypt is as Mr. Undersecretary has described it. If this is true, then the only solution that I see, is in a total change of the government, and the governmental system. That,

however, is not a question for us industrialists and financiers, but for Henry Kissinger and George Bush. Let them carry out their work in Egypt, and then we can go in.

A. I don't have anything I could add to this. It was quite clearly worded.

(60, (sic).

Q. We are selling Egypt six C-130's. There is information that Ford has decided to sell them additional arms. How will Cairo pay for them? Won't we finally end up like the Russians? Egypt is allegedly indebted to them for 6 billion dollars. To be sure, we are faced with the same danger.

A. That is a question for Ford and Kissinger. I assume that Saudi Arabia will pay for some of the arms sent to Egypt. What guarantees we have, if we have any at all, that we will not end up like the Russians, I do not know.

Q. The economic situation, as explained by Mr. Undersecretary, doesn't provide any guarantees that the regime of President Sadat will long endure. We will make investments, the government will provide aid, and finally a new "Masser," or even a bigger communist, will exploit the situation, take over power, and nationalize everything. Does the Ford Administration take this eventuality into consideration? What guarantees does he afford that the U.S. taxpayer will not "lose his shirt?" You, Mr. Undersecretary, ended with the question of how, or whether we should enter this "open door." I am for going in. The administration, however, should assure that initially the US Army will go in. I give precedence to the Army. My company invests in Israel, why shouldn't it invest in Egypt. But our investments in Israel are secured by the Israeli Army. The Egyptian Army will never be capable of this.

A. That again is a question for Henry Kissinger and G. Ford, ^{(60, (sic)} If, however, the questioner desires to hear my opinion - I agree with him in many ways.

Q. Western Europe is more dependent on Arab oil than the USA. The problem of investments in Egypt, therefore, should be primarily resolved by Western Europe. Can you tell us something about this problem?

A. Unofficial talks covering this problem were held with West European governments, as well as with European financiers. During

these talks we emphasized these very facts, as pointed out by the questioner. Up to the present time, however, there have been no results from these talks. West Europeans are perhaps better acquainted with the situation than we are. The majority of them emphasized that, until a stable, perspective government is installed in Cairo, Western Europe will continue to be cautious.

Q. From the reactions of West Europeans it is obvious that from us they expect active and effective measures, and intervention leading to the formation of a new and stable government in Cairo. We are aware, however, that our honored guest is not in a position to inform us of these steps. I would therefore like to request him, that he convey our opinions and recommendations at the appropriate levels for their serious consideration, since I consider them to be an effective solution of the problem.

A. I can assure you, that I will do so with pleasure.

Q. If we resolve the problems in Egypt in this manner, so that the interests of the USA will be secured, won't this damage Israel?

A. Certain Israeli circles have reached similar conclusions. I assume, however, that this is only "temporary jealousy," and perhaps misunderstanding. As soon as these circles comprehend that an anti-communist Egypt is in reality their ally, they will cease to be jealous. US political rapprochement with Egypt, as well as other free Arab nations, will not alter the role and standing of Israel in the Middle East. President Ford assured Premier Rabin and other Israeli leaders of this fact. The role of Israel is irreplaceable, and Israel will always remain a staunch ally. We will never allow her to be weakened. To protect the existence of the State of Israel, the United States is willing to go to the extreme. A clear indication of this was the decision of the President at the close of the 1973 War.

Q. I assume that one of the solutions of how to aid Egypt was through significant and mainly substantial - amounting to billions investments. U.S. private capital cannot provide them, [for reasons which have already been mentioned here.] Since this is a strategic question, the U.S. Administration should assume this burden. I am afraid, however, that some members of the Administration, to say nothing of Congress, do not understand the political and strategical significance of this considerable problem.

A. As one who is close to the Secretary of Treasury, I can assure you that we have sought a similar solution. Up to now, without results.

ANNEX A-X

X. EILTS LETTER

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—In mid-March 1977, prints from a film negative of a forged letter from U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Herman F. Eilts to his Saudi Arabian counterpart turned up at the Sudanese Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon ; no cover letter attached.

B. *Format.*—A totally fabricated letter bearing a forgery of Eilts' signature.

C. *Content.*—The bogus letter purported to outline a joint U.S.-Egyptian plot to gain influence in the Sudan.

D. *Purpose.*—To embarrass and isolate Sadat in the Arab world.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Government inquiry by Egypt.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Cairo, Egypt,
June 14, 1976.

Excellency:

After consultations with my Government, I would like to confirm to you its position regarding President Sadat's intentions towards the Sudan.

As the strongest Western nation, the United States has primary responsibility for maintaining stability and peace in the Middle East. In this respect, any disturbance of the balance of forces in the area would be considered dangerous by the United States. From the United States point of view President Sadat's intention to use the situation of instability in the Sudan to obtain prevalent influence there might have unpredictable aftereffects.

As I have already had the honor to inform you, the interests of our two countries in the Sudan could well be secured by establishing a really democratic government composed of influential personalities enjoying our confidence.

In these circumstances the United States has a vital need for additional information on the problem set out above, which we hope to obtain from your Government.

I hope this explanation of my Government's motives will prove useful to you.

Sincerely,

Bernann Frederick Eltz
Bernann Frederick Eltz
American Ambassador

His Excellency
Foad A. Nazir,
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia,
Cairo.

ANNEX A-XI

XI. VANCE REPORT

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—April 1977, photocopies delivered anonymously to the Egyptian Embassy in Rome; cover letter attached.

B. *Format.*—Forgery purported to be a copy of notes taken by an aid to U.S. Secretary of State Vance for a confidential report for President Carter.

C. *Content.*—The bogus notes attributed to the Secretary critical remarks made about Sadat, Jordan's King Hussein, Syria's President Assad and the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti leaderships.

D. *Purpose.*—To embarrass the U.S. in the eyes of these Arab world leaders and to undermine the U.S. Middle East Peace initiative.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Government inquiry by Egypt.

Friends:

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sent two reports on his Mideast tour to President Carter. I have not read the report written by Vance's aides who had accompanied him on his trip; the report was only signed by the Secretary of State. However, I had an opportunity to read the report written by Vance himself. It contains his impressions and views as well as the hints of U.S. policy and tactics in the Arab part of the world. As I consider it a plot, I have summarized the principal thoughts of the report and arranged for their large-scale dissemination.

It is impossible for me to publish them in the papers. My identity would be revealed and my life endangered. Therefore, I appeal to all the honest journalists to inform the whole world about this plot.

Excerpts from Vance's Report

Israel

- (1) The talks confirmed and elaborated Israel's standpoint which is well-known.
- (2) The present internal problems limit Israel's foreign policy moves.
- (3) Rabin is optimistic and confident. He has a good reason for his optimism and confidence.
- (4) We shall respect Rabin's outright refusal of the Palestinian participation in the talks. This attitude will serve as a proof that we have freed ourselves from the actions affecting our relations with our closest and most reliable allies in the past.

- (b) It turned out that our past approach had undermined Israel's confidence as far as sincerity of our actions is concerned. Our future steps have to be influenced by this fact so that the Israeli leaders may be able to see the difference between our strategy and tactics.
- (c) From our point of view, Israel is irreplaceable in the struggle against Communism and Russian infiltration in the region.
- (d) I underline Rabin's words: "...Most people living east of the Jordan River are Palestinians. Therefore, the problem may be reduced to the following question: where, in fact, should be Israel's eastern border? On the Jordan River. Consequently, the Palestinian homeland is east of the Israeli border." This idea was already voiced in the U.S. It could be promoted again and regarded as one of the possible solutions. Saudi Arabia and other countries would not oppose it.
- (e) Israel is strong enough, the Arabs are split. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent Israel from holding on to the occupied territories and dictating terms of negotiations in the future.
- (f) This can be accepted in spite of complications which will be caused even to us.

Egypt

- (a) The talks with Sadat proceeded as expected.
- (b) Sadat was eager to persuade us that we should consider him key personality among the Arabs.
- (c) Egypt, yes. Egypt is of the first importance. This does not apply to Sadat, however.
- (d) Sadat may even think that Egypt could take over Israel's role.
- (e) His concepts of what the U.S. should do in relation to Egypt are unrealistic, even absurd.

- (f) It is hardly possible for our Mideast policy to be too closely linked with Sadat.
- (g) I was under the impression that he paid more respect to Rabin than to Assad and Arafat.
- (h) As far as the Palestine problem is concerned, Sadat will go still further. In fact, he will not oppose our plans.
- (i) While in the U.S., he will be anxious to get economic and military assistance. He will be reluctant to see the logic of our arguments. There is no need to worry about it. Our refusal will not change his attitude toward us in the least. He has nowhere to return any longer.
- (j) Sadat's future is uncertain because of Egypt's economic plight. It is necessary to decide whether he continues to be a suitable partner. If the answer is affirmative it is necessary to give him financial assistance.
- (k) He is willing to give up a considerable part of the territory, provided that he is allowed to pass off this gesture as his own victory. I told him that Sharm el Sheikh was among the territories Israel was not prepared to leave. He was not surprised. He will connive at it.
- (l) We should induce the oil-rich Arab nations to solve Egypt's economic difficulties.

Jordan

- (a) The talks went on under the influence of the events which had preceded them.
- (b) The King was disgusted with the Washington Post article. He blames us for our contribution to the scandal. He says that the U.S. will be the only loser because of this indiscretion. He himself believes that it will not be too difficult for him to take care of the consequences of what was revealed.

- (c) I recommended him, without beating about the bush, to bring the Palestine Liberation Organization under control. I hinted that it was essential to prevent Syria from bringing the armed Palestinians under its influence. There should be only one Jordanian delegation at Geneva which should include the Palestinians - especially the West Bankers. The King agreed.
- (d) He opposed the annulment of the Rabat summit decisions.
- (e) I feel he is inclined to think that we intend to establish a Palestinian state even on the East Bank of the Jordan River. He is afraid that he could not be the ruler of such state.
- (f) King Hussein co-operates with Syria, but he is scared of it. He is working against Syria in quite a few directions. The Jordanians say: "We were warned not to co-operate with the Baathist regime in Syria. The result speaks for itself, however. The Baathist party has not grown strong enough in Jordan, but Syria's Baathist party is turning its back upon Russia."
- (g) King Hussein is the ruler of a small country. He knows he is in danger. But he relies on his ability to maneuver to get along with the Arabs as well as with the U.S. and Great Britain.

Saudi Arabia

- (a) Khaled's absence was a positive factor as far as the course of negotiations was concerned. Fahd was candid, matter-of-fact.
- (b) His view of the situation in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan confirms our conclusions. He agrees that particular attention should be paid to Assad who might be willing to settle the Palestine problems in accordance with our concept.

- (c) It was he who stressed that we must not allow Syria to gain control over the Palestinian armed movement. He knows that it would threaten Saudi Arabia, too.
- (d) He agrees that the Palestinian armed movement hinders implementation of our mutual policy.
- (e) He warned us not to exaggerate our trust in Sadat. He does not think Sadat's fall will lead to complications. (The Saudis may be doing something in this respect without telling us).
- (f) He agrees even to a radical step to change the whole Palestinian leadership.
- (g) He pointed out that the attention had to be focused on Iraq and Libya, that the two nations would have to be isolated at least.
- (h) The Saudis know that the Arabs are unable to unleash a victorious war at present. So they endeavor to reach a peaceful settlement.
- (i) Fahd endorsed the well-known interpretation of Saudi Arabia's oil policy. He assured us that there was no need to worry about oil embargo.

Syria

- (a) Generally, my impression was good.
- (b) Assad is also flexible, but he has a sense of reality.
- (c) Our intentions have turned out to be justified. Our actions inside the country should be intensified. Syria's necessities of life are one of the ways to achieve it.
- (d) Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries strive to liquidate Assad's regime. Contradictions between Syria and Iraq help to reach the same goal. The two countries are weakening one another. Assad is likely to know it but he cannot help it. This leads to softening of his policy - a possible cause of yet unpredictable reversals.

- d) Syria's involvement in Lebanon was very useful. Syria is unable to solve Lebanon's problems. Invasion of Lebanon weakened Assad's regime from political, economic and military point of view. For a long time, Assad thus eliminated deployment of the Syrian army in a conflict with Israel.
- e) Nowadays, Assad, too, is willing to agree to substantial territorial concessions in favor of Israel.

one

- a) Armed conflict is not imminent. So there is no need to reach a settlement in a hurry. The Geneva conference may be a subject of discussions leading to delays.
- b) Israel needs time to solve its internal problems. The time may be given.
- c) Time is also needed to reach solution and changes concerning the Palestinian movement.
- d) Saudi Arabia and other nations, too, need time to settle the problem of Assad and other Arab leaders of this kind.
- e) Postponement of the Geneva conference will neither create nor exacerbate the crisis, for the balance of forces shows Israel's superiority quite clearly. The Arabs are aware of it.
- f) Step by Step? This may still be the best thing for us and our allies.
- g) The question of time for both Saudi Arabia and Israel to settle the ~~Raxianx3118~~ questions is equally important.
Red Sea

ANNEX A-XII

XII. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—Photocopies of this forgery were mailed to ten Egyptian newspapers and magazines in June 1977; no cover letter.

B. *Format.*—A genuine "Operations Memorandum" form bearing the forged signature of Ambassador Eilts; the form itself was filled in, with errors, by the forger.

C. *Content.*—In this forgery, the Ambassador purportedly attacked Sadat for his lack of leadership, foresight and political acuity; a final paragraph alleged that the CIA Chief of Station in Cairo concurred with Eilts' assessment of Sadat.

D. *Purpose.*—To compromise Ambassador Eilts' working relationship with Sadat and embarrass the United States.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Government inquiry by Egypt.

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

Date: March 28, 1977

FROM: EMBASSY IN CAIRO

SUBJECT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

REF: W.O.-C-7985-H-77

With reference to my previous reports and the new guidelines discussed in Washington, I have paid close attention to political developments here with special emphasis on how the Sadat Government is tackling the problems posed by the January disturbances.

As time passes, it becomes clear that two major factors helped trigger the January riots: for the first time over a long period, President Sadat came up against the opposition of his advisers, and the Cabinet displayed a large degree of impotency.

President Sadat's attempts to blame the communists and Nasser followers for the January events failed miserably and was poorly conceived even as a propaganda ploy. The Government reshuffle was not carried out and nepotism is as bad as ever. Serious differences persist in the Government. The ministers of information and of welfare openly criticized the President's domestic policy and, in particular, his wife's activity and meddling in political matters.

Since January, there have been no signs of improvement in the posture of President Sadat and his Government. The country's economy is still in crisis. Aid received so far is insufficient for an intensive economic upturn since a good part goes down the drain of corruption. Unfortunately, the same can be said about the aid given by us which, some Egyptian friends say, is being dissipated by the Government. Business leaders in the Government do not have the conception to enable them to find a way out of the country's deplorable economic situation. According to Deputy

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Prime Minister Kaisuni, aid for this year was obtained only after intensive and protracted negotiations, and even then as the result of personal contacts. Additional loans from the gulf countries of Arab states will be harder to get in the future and Arab capital funds can be ruled out for the time being.

The Government also was unsuccessful in decreasing the chronic budget deficit. Kaisuni believes the only realistic way to do it is to drastically raise prices of industrial and agricultural products and consumer goods. He claims to have the agreement of President Sadat and Prime Minister Salem on this, although they are afraid of political repercussions similar to those in January.

Some Egyptian politicians view the stalemate on the Geneva Conference issue as a major reason for the difficulties, arguing it has undercut Egypt's stance which, in turn, discourages investment in Egypt.

Despite salary raises, purges and Mr. Gamassi's February tour, army morale has not improved. Not a single branch of service possesses adequate reserves or spare parts, and this is creating a hiatus in military matters. The country's economic situation and the political measures introduced prevent Gamassi from acting on the army's demands; consequently, his position in the army is being eroded, and weaponry modernization is also suffering. President Sadat's latest decision to station the army outside Cairo is not the most fortunate step. The army resents it as a sign of lack of confidence.

Discontent is burgeoning among all segments of the population. The fact that former Nasser politicians are resuming their activity, the incompetence of the Sadat leadership and the incredible economic and political corruption all indicate an explosive potential which may get out of our control.

63 772 332

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

The President's leadership style leaves much to be desired and this could be an obstacle to our plan for a settlement in the Middle East. Close associates of the President are shocked to see that recently he has displayed reluctance to read the reports, analyses and proposals prepared on the country's affairs or to devote proper attention to the country's problems.

I discussed the problem at length several times with Mr. Fees who was of the same opinion. The defects in President Sadat's style of leadership were described very well in a character study prepared by a friend of Mr. Fees. After reading the characterization, I am even more convinced that Mr. Sadat may not be the most suitable person to put across our plan for Egypt and the Middle East.

Norman J. Eitzen

FORGOTTEN

ANNEX A-XIII

XIII. U.S. EMBASSY TEHRAN DISPATCH

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—Photocopy received by mail at the Egyptian Embassy in Belgrade in August 1977; anonymous forwarding letter.

B. *Format.*—A forged dispatch allegedly prepared at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

C. *Content.*—This forgery suggested that Iran and Saudi Arabia were plotting to overthrow President Sadat with U.S. knowledge and tacit approval. The forwarding letter went further in claiming knowledge of an Israeli-Saudi-Iranian-U.S. master plan to overthrow Sadat and install conservative regimes throughout the Arab world.

D. *Purpose.*—To damage U.S. prestige and that of U.S. friends in the Red Sea/Persian Gulf region and to wreck our relations with Sadat.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—Government inquiry by Egypt.

Dear Sir,

Begin's cabinet doesn't act on behalf of the interests of the Israeli people and in collusion with Iran and Saudi Arabia the Carter-administration wants to raise pro-Likud governments to power in the combat - countries.

President Sadat will be the first has to leave.
Please, warn him of it.

Sincerely,

FORGERS

TOP SECRET (Security Classification)	DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
PRIORITY FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH	
FROM : US EMBASSY, WASHINGTON. CR 652-77	

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. 6 April, 1977
 REF : T-492 1-77 DATE

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT. IN OTHER	Spec. Asst. Officer of Security
	REC'D		Head of FOA

SUBJECT:

During the talks, General Nassiri, referring to recent information, broached launching the project elaborated for President Sadat's removal. In their opinion, Mr. Sadat's time is up, he has to step down either by way of a coup or something else. They see this as the only alternative considering common interests in the area and, he says, Prince Fahd completely agrees. Their final decision was underscored by Mr. Marwan's March report on the Egyptian situation and the President's attitude.

In accordance with the guidelines and in view of the sensitivity of the question, I did my best to be noncommittal. General Nassiri asks us to brief Mr. Fees: Mr. Ruzmara in Cairo has already received his instructions.

FORN

mm

TOP SECRET

INFORMATION COPY
 Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.

THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS APPLIES TO THE DEPARTMENT ONLY.
 THIS MAT. WITH SIGN'D YELLOW COPY, SHOULD BE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

ANNEX A-XIV

XIV. MONDALE INTERVIEW

A. *Date Place and Method of Surfacing.*—In July 1978, xerox copies of a bogus U.S. Embassy press release were mailed anonymously to newspaper and news service correspondents in Paris.

B. *Format.*—The forgery purported to be an interview with Vice President Walter F. Mondale conducted by one Karl Douglas, who turned out to be a fictitious person.

C. *Content.*—The interview falsely quoted the Vice President as saying that he did not consider either Prime Minister Begin of Israel or President Sadat as suitable for the task of conducting negotiations at Camp David on a Middle East peace settlement, that "everyone knows" Begin is suffering from a terminal illness and that Sadat cannot govern Egypt.

D. *Purpose.*—To compromise the Middle East peace process and embarrass the U.S. Administration in the eyes of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—None.

for the press

Vice President Mondale talks to Karl Douglas

July 11, 1978

Excerpts.

- Douglas. Mr. Vice President, first of all I want to thank you on behalf of my newspapers' readers for agreeing to see me...
- Mondale. Not at all, everyone here knows my door is open to all comers. I have time until 4 o'clock.
- Q. Then I'll come right to the point. Mr. Vice President, what is your opinion about the trend in American-Soviet relations and the present status of the SALT talks? When may we expect a SALT agreement?
- A. I guess you couldn't have found a more difficult question to lead off with, but I will sum up my opinion briefly on this composite question which has such vital importance for the whole world. American-Soviet relationships have deteriorated, in fact declined, during recent months. Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa, the strengthening of the aggressive potential of the Warsaw Pact forces and the stalling of the SALT discussions have created serious tensions in relations between the two countries.
- Q. A few months ago it seemed - and President Carter affirmed this several times in public - only certain unimportant points needed to be cleared up before signing the SALT II agreement.
- A. Yes, more than once it looked as if all serious hardles had been cleared and it was a matter of days or weeks and SALT II would be signed, yet nothing happened. At the last minute the Soviet Union either made another political move or came up with a new proposal which prevented the signing of the SALT II agreement we all are so anxious to see concluded.

- Q. What political moves do you have in mind?
- A. Measures of both domestic and foreign policy. Take the activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Shaba, or the political trials going on in the Soviet Union, not to speak of the Soviets presenting proposal after proposal while they steadily expand their arsenal of nuclear and conventional weaponry. For example there is the SS-20 ballistics missile which substantially increased the Soviet threat to military and civilian targets. I mention this merely to illustrate one of the many things which conflict with our goals. We are committed to the further reduction of nuclear weapons, to the stricter limitation of updating and new delivery systems, but we cannot do it alone. If the SALT II talks are to be successful the Soviet Union must display the same commitment.
- Q. From what you say, you believe the events in Africa are also having a broad negative impact on the SALT II talks...?
- A. Yes that is very true. In our opinion the reduction of tensions must not be confined to one or two continents. Not only Europe, but Africa also wants to benefit from reduced tensions, and this is understandable. Present Soviet policy in Africa has nothing in common with this noble goal. When can we expect a SALT II agreement? It is very difficult to give an unequivocal answer at this moment because so much could happen in the interim. In all events one thing is sure, we will not conclude an agreement at any price, we will wait patiently until the Soviet Union comes up with a proposal acceptable to us. Fully aware of the present status of the discussions, I would close the question by saying I have no hopes for a quick solution. I am confident though we will be able to wrap up a SALT II agreement if not in the near future then in the distant future.
- Q. I believe that and so do our readers. For long years now the Middle East has contained the danger of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. What do you think on this score now, especially after visiting Israel and Egypt?
- A. I think it is going too far to take such a gloomy and pessimistic view of the question since basically the Middle East problem must be solved by the countries directly involved, first of all by Israel and Egypt, and not by us and the Soviet Union. A big step forward was made toward settling the Middle East problem when Sadat recognized he holds one of the keys to it and began discussions with Israel.

Unfortunately, Sadat stopped short on the way to achieving this goal. We are continuing our efforts to get the talks moving again between Israel and Egypt, but to tell the truth - as was emphasized by the talks with Begin and Sadat - I do not consider either Begin or Sadat suitable for the task, especially because as everyone knows Begin has a terminal illness, and all Sadat's energy is pinned down by his domestic worries, and he probably won't be able to stand up long in the face of his internal opposition. So there is good reason to expect shifts in personalities in the two countries involved. Should changes of this nature occur, we would welcome at the head of both countries experienced and unbiased politicians able to pursue a realistic policy and willing to mutually and peacefully settle their differences. This would clear the way for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole.

- Q. By realistic politicians whom do you have in mind?
- A. You've got me there because at the moment it would be hard to mention a concrete name. Now how should I put it... in Egypt maybe it could mean a man like Fahmy.
- Q. You mentioned that basically it was not up to the United States to solve the Middle East problem. By that do you imply that the United States should play the role of a passive onlooker?
- A. Not at all, I didn't say that. As is clearly apparent, we also have military, political and economic interests in the area so any ideas we have for a settlement will take the interests of the oil producing countries and Israel into consideration.
- Q. Therefore, two opposite poles, or to be more precise oil and Israel or the Israeli lobby, play a large part in the United States plan for settlement?
- A. That's exactly it.
- Q. And to what extent is the process of settlement helped or hindered by America shipping arms to both sides?
- A. As to hindering, it does not hinder by any means; in fact I may say it helps, because our reason for sending weapons to both sides is to create a balance in the region which will assure a firm peace.
- Q. Asia has traditionally had an important role in U.S. foreign policy in the past. Is that still true today?
- A. Yes, of course. Asia continues to play an important part in our foreign policy. I am thinking first of all of Japan and China, but I would not want to give the impression I am belittling the importance of the other countries of Asia to our policy in Asia. We are committed to guaranteeing that this much-suffered region will become a symbol of the policy of peaceful coexistence. That is why we are making serious efforts to settle our relationships with Vietnam either this year or early next year. We must, of course, rely basically on Japan and China in achieving our policy in Asia. One major task in this region is to prevent the

Soviet Union from starting local wars to build up their influence, like they are doing in Africa. As a matter of fact, that is the guarantee of peace in Asia. China's leaders are of the same opinion and it is no accident we were able to find a common tone. We have common interests in several areas and will have to coordinate many aspects of our policy in the future.

- Q. Western Europe is contending with a rise in terrorism. What are your thoughts on terrorism?
- A. Yes, the spread of terrorism throughout Western Europe is a serious challenge to its governments. But I have confidence in international cooperation, I feel it is a barrier to this new wave of terrorism.
- Q. Many people believe these acts of terrorism are backed by certain intelligence agencies, including the CIA.
- A. Rubbish, sheer nonsense. After all, what interest could any country have in its intelligence agency undertaking a risk of that kind. Intelligence agencies do not exist to get some degenerates to kidnap and murder prominent officials.

ANNEX A-XV

XV. MITCHELL REPORT

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—In January 1979, Al-Dawa, the Cairo-based magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood, published what it claimed was the text of a "highly confidential" CIA document; the forgery was mailed anonymously from Jordan.

B. *Format.*—The forgery was in the form of a report allegedly prepared by a visiting American scholar and addressed to the "Secret Service Chief, U.S. CIA" in Cairo.

C. *Content.*—This bogus report, a total fabrication from start to finish, purported to outline ways in which members of Islamic religious organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who are opposed to the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement could be bribed, bought off and set against one another so as to neutralize their opposition to the peace settlement. The report was purportedly based on U.S. intelligence reports and reports from the Egyptian and Israeli services.

D. *Purpose.*—To stir up additional opposition to the peace agreement among fundamentalist Islamic groups, to suggest that the latter are being spied upon by U.S. Israeli and Egyptian intelligence and to cause problems for Sadat in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—After the January publication of the forgery, Al-Dawa in its February edition carried refutations prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and by the American professor to whom the report was attributed. The same forgery was subsequently reprinted in the May-June 1979 edition of Muslim Standard, which is published in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. The Al-Dawa article prompted an inquiry by the Egyptian government.

SUPPRESSION OF ISLAM

The width and depth of the United States opposition to, and suppression of Islamic Movements are forcibly brought home to us in the following report of the U.S. CIA. This report was first exposed in "AL-Da'wah" No. 406 - January 1979 appearing in Egypt.

THE REPORT Highly Confidential

From: Richard B. Mitchell

To: Secret Service Chief, U.S. CIA

According to your reference to the information accumulated from our agents and reports of Israeli and Egyptian CID stating that the real forces that may oppose the peace treaty to be signed between Egypt and Israel are the Islamic groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, in its different forms in the Arab World and its extensions in Europe and North America and according to the advice of the Israeli CID of the necessity of directing a strong blow to this association in Egypt prior to the signing of the treaty to safeguard its signature and its continuation, and in view of the partial implementation of this advice on the part of Mamdooh Salem's government by crushing only the "Takfir & Hijra" group, we have noticed that the means of suppression and terror applied during Nasser's regime have led to the inclination of Muslim masses and Muslim youth to sympathise with this group, thus leading to contrary results. For these reasons we suggest as an alternative the following methods:

- 1- To resort only to partial suppression, restricting it only to the leading personalities with whom the under mentioned methods are not suitable. We prefer getting rid of these personalities through seemingly natural ways. There is no objection to the speedy elimination of some Islamic personalities in Saudi Arabia because this would fulfil the aim of the partial suppression and causes the loss of trust between the Brotherhood and the Saudi Arabian government thus

achieving our aims in this juncture.

- 2- As regards the leading personalities to be got rid of we would advise of the following:
 - (a) To appoint such persons who would respond to temptation in higher posts, where they would be engaged in empty Islamic projects and other jobs which exhaust their efforts; and to reward them morally and materially, and to provide their relatives with many facilities. Thus they would be exhausted locally and isolated from their masses.
 - (b) To attract those who have commercial-economic tendencies to participate in joint Israeli-Egyptian projects that will be established in Egypt after the peace treaty.
 - (c) To find profitable job and business opportunities in Arab petroleum exporting countries which would alienate them from Islamic activities.
 - (d) As regards the active elements in Europe and America, we suggest the following:
 - 1- Exhausting their efforts with non-Muslims and then spoiling them through our institutions.
 - 2- Allowing them to exert their efforts in printing and publishing Islamic books while thwarting the results thereof.
 - 3- Sowing the seeds of doubt and dissension among their leadership which will engage them away from carrying out fruitful activity.
- 3- Concerning the youth we must concentrate on the following:
 - (a) To exhaust their enthusiastic energy in religious rites supervised by priestly leadership according to pre-planned policies.
 - (b) To deepen scholastic and sectarian differences and exaggerating them in their minds.

FACTS AND EVENTS

The following reports are evidence of the plan to eliminate Islamic Movements which are serious about the establishment of Islam as a complete way of life.

- 1) The New York Times' report published on 13 January 1954 by Robert Donny wherein he described the Muslim Brotherhood as prejudicial against the penetration of Western social, cultural and political values, calling the Muslims to return back to the interpretation of Islam on the basis of the original dogmatic teachings.

continued on pg. 5

- (c) To encourage the attack on Muhammadan Sunnah, raising doubts around it and in other Islamic sources.
- (d) To disintegrate Islamic groups and societies and to sow discord among them.
- (e) To confront the new wave of abiding by the Islamic teachings, especially the girls' wearing of the Islamic dress, through the use of information and cultural media.
- (f) To continue the siege made by educational institutions at all stages around Islamic groups, cornering them and restricting their activities.

These are our suggestions to solve the problem of Islamic groups at this critical juncture. In case you are convinced by them, kindly intimate your advice to the authorities concerned to implement them. Meanwhile, we are ready to undertake the required role in this respect.

Signature
Richard B. Mitchell

ANNEX A-XVI

XVI. EILTS LETTER

A. *Date, Place and Method of Surfacing.*—The 1 October 1979 edition of a Syrian newspaper, Al-Ba'th, published the text of a forged letter attributed to Ambassador Herman F. Eilts; it is not known how the newspaper obtained the letter or from whom.

B. *Format.*—This was the third fabrication in the Egyptian series which bore a forgery of Eilts' signature. It was in the form of a private letter from Eilts to Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence.

C. *Content.*—The bogus letter was a long and distorted reflection on U.S. policy in the Middle East, and its main message was aimed at Sadat and the Palestine Liberation Organization. At one point, Eilts purportedly wrote that if Sadat is not prepared to serve U.S. interests, "then we must repudiate him and get rid of him without hesitation." In another section, he is alleged to have said that the U.S. has plans for bringing about a shift in the PLO's attitude toward Israel and that "I know you (DCI Turner) possess the necessary capability and resources in this regard."

D. *Purpose.*—To create suspicions about U.S. friendship in Sadat's mind and to cause friction between the U.S. and the PLO.

E. *Media Replay and/or Government Inquiry.*—No additional press replay; no government inquiry.

[From Al-Ba'th, Monday, Oct. 1, 1979]

AL-BA'TH PUBLISHES SECRET REPORT FROM AMERICAN AMBASSADORS IN CAIRO TO DIRECTOR OF CIA

Al-Baath received a letter from an American friend. The letter is the text of a report sent by Herman Eilts, former American Amb in Cairo to the Director of CIA. In his report, the Amb set forth his conception of how to complete the Camp David design. The report reveals for the first time the intentions of CIA of getting rid of Sadat if he fails to drag new forces to serve the American interests, and in case he turns out to be a burden on the American policy.

We want to prove here that what has been laid down in the report about the stands of some Arab countries is but an exposed attempt to affect the stands of other Arab countries and to sow the seeds of dissent among the al-Baath had to omit some names and phrases contained in the message because of its firm belief that what the mention of these names and phrases are a mere American pedantry and striking with the sword of Arab contradiction.

To Editor-in-Chief of al-Ba'th paper.
Al-Brazil St.
Damascus
Syria

DEAR SIR: I enclose herewith a document that will be of interest to you. It shows the official American policy towards the Middle East crisis.

You will understand that the sensitivity of this matter makes it impossible for me to reveal my identity for the time being. I have been employed at the Company for many years, nevertheless, I back from time to time the progressive movements and countries in the way I like this. I have never accepted the dirty tricks carried out in the name of liberty, humanity and Western Civilization. I think that in pursuing our goals we must recognize the limits of our power and our wisdom, avoid a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values on others.

Sincerely Yours

AN AMERICAN.

Cairo . . . on April 20, 1979
To Admiral Stansfield Turner
CIA

I have studied carefully and taken note of your assessment to the problem of the region. I am in a position to appreciate the conclusions which you have reached particularly those relating to Iran. The loss of the regime—the regime of the Shah—has left its grave effect on the efficiency of our policy in the region.

True, our ability to influence the events and course of events in the world is limited, and this is also applied to a great extent to the Arab world too. This fact

has incarnated my own impressions about the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. We have spent a lot of time with Mr. Fez. He is the only person whose talk is meaningful. He thinks carefully of your own observations about who is for us and who is against us. We have reached the following conclusion namely: If the American Administration does not take a firm stand to put an end to the former CIA Agents and to preclude them from wasting everything the future will result in many surprises similar to that of Iran. What followed the issue of Jeddah which, in my opinion, was a grave irresponsible act, made the Saudi leadership to shun and fear us. Our efforts will be more efficient if the others manifested the same desire for cooperation instead of opposing and spoiling my work and making it more difficult by way of giving irresponsible promises and weak assessments of stands and trends.

It seems that we are reconsidering now the Egyptian-Israeli problem. In addition to the slight complications the matters are going on according to the set plan.

Naturally this does not mean that there are no problems and that the road has become paved for the separate peace. It should be taken into consideration sooner or later the personal results and factors in both cases. Here I think of Sadat in particular. Since the PLO has been relieved from the grip of Saudi influence and began to depend upon the Iranian support the Organization began to constitute a greater danger and became more self-important. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to work out everything with the Saudis through friends.

The basic and essential case in point is represented in the doubts and deeply-rooted hatred of both sides. Even the exchanged visits between Sadat and Begin did not affect these doubts. To make the matter worse, the idea of setting up the settlements was imposed on them at the same time, a matter which greatly affected the issue. The core and essence of the problem in the region is the Palestinian question in general and not recognition or non-recognition of the PLO. A large number of the PLO leaders understood the idea and perceived it fully. Accordingly, it is possible to begin discussion with them.

Now we must ask ourselves whether there are actually a Palestinian people? If it is so and the answer was "Yes", there is another question too, i.e. the Palestinian question. The Palestinians themselves must answer the question relating to their national identity. Yet, establishment of a Palestinian state in the west of the River Jordan must not be allowed. I hope that our Government would not support such a step. If the Palestinians want actually to establish a Palestinian state inside Jordan this is another matter. I believe that the Palestinians can exercise their rights completely and properly via a confederation consisting of a Jordanian-Palestinian state.

In fact, the countries which are having negotiations with us agree to this issue because the establishment of a Palestinian state at the moment is not in the interest of each of Sadat, King Husein and Saudi Arabia. My past experience during the past years has convinced me that those who actually want peace and actually desire for its achievement oppose the PLO and find its plans unacceptable.

The question being posed now is: "How can the problem be solved and settled?"

In my opinion, it is better and more suitable—a number of Israeli leaders can be convinced to approve this—if Israel hands over the West Bank and Gaza strip to Jordan. Here the Jordanians and the Palestinians can participate in determining their future and therefore such a decision and what will result from it will appear as if it were a domestic Arab decision. Whether there will be Palestinians or not, this is a question which must be left to the Palestinians to take their own decision on the matter. On the other hand, we have to accept their decision. Israel and Jordan have to decide the place in which the Palestinians will live. At the time in which we reach a decision about the Jordanian-Palestinian consideration we have to demarcate the borders in a manner accords to the security of Israel and the historical interests of Israel. We must not forget one thing, namely the question of the holy cities. At least we have to create delusion and deception that those cities have become open for all. I have recently submitted such ideas to Sadat and he approved it basically.

I have a feeling that Jordan will not be completely in disagreement and unsympathetic. There is no doubt that the confederation will form some perils on Jordan but this peril will not be less than the way of establishing an independent Palestinian state. A state of this kind will definitely constitute a challenge and continuous provocation to half of the population.

As for the disputes and differences which have been holding for dozens of years we cannot solve them over a night and create a new position. Success can

be achieved gradually and step by step. I reject the suggestion which says that there is not any possibility for settling matters and problems between Israel and Jordan. It was said if the dispute was confined to Jordan and Israel only there would actually be no problem. This a matter that does not differ much from the idea which says that it is a matter of absolute necessity to drag Syria into talks and to involve her in the negotiations. It is supposed that Syria, like Egypt, will not accept the Palestinian measures suggested and called for by the rejection front which spoil the new pure atmosphere which began to take shape in the Middle East.

As an example of this attitude, is the tolerant attitude of President Sadat who encouraged the conduct of negotiations with Israel about the issue of Sharm al-Sheikh. Egypt has evinced preparedness to declare the outskirts of Elat and Tiran straits as international waters. The USA or the Egyptian-Israeli troops will guarantee the security in these international waterways.

I want to assure that we must not despair with regard to the PLO. As for Begin we must ignore him about the matter. If it is possible for the PLO to frankly recognize the existence of Israel in the region. We must address our efforts towards this objective as a first step.

We have justification for optimism and pessimism too. In the next year or the next two years there are not any indications that the events will arrive to a similar position to the one prevailing before the Sadat visit to Jerusalem.

We have to build our future policy in the M.E. on one positive factor: There is an assessment in currency in the region that time is not working for the interest of both parties and that the present situation of events have become unbearable.

Sadat wants to develop Egypt into a modern state. This is in itself a great and fascinating task if we consider that economy was destroyed as a result of the status quo. If Sadat really desires this, the only road is the road of peace. This is the reason which prompts us to make this possible. After Egypt comes Jordan and other Arab countries. We must not forget that peace is usually charming and attractive. It must be clear that the idea of the greater Israel has never been the idea of the sweeping majority. It is an idea being adopted by a fanatically religious minority. The considerations of security were behind the policy of settlement. Therefore, I believe that most of the politicians of Tel Aviv are aware now that a country being larger in area does not mean larger and wider defence. The security problems of Israel cannot be separated from the facts. If Yemen and Ethiopia closed the entrance of the Red Sea such a matter will threaten all of us and this means that the question is twofold with regard to Israel since there is not way for preventing the attempt of getting her hungry by this way.

In settling the problems of the region in collaboration with Jordan we must follow up one policy. We must arm Jordan even if peace with Israel is achieved. This is because the Syrians will not give up the idea of the Great Syria, besides the Arab States which evinced opposition to the separate peace with Israel are subject to the least possible danger with the exception of Syria. We have to take this into consideration from the point of view of our policy. If we want to achieve our purpose we must give attention to everything and to every person. We must take advantage of the least changes.

The personality of Sadat is still constituting a big problem and became a source of worry. Sadat is a man of dual personality: one is emotional and is always ready to provide aid and assistance and the other is represented in despondency, quietness, moodiness and to much thinking. The question arises now is: What is the extent in which he can continue to support our policy and push it forward? If he cannot achieve this in future and if cannot recruit new force to these ends and if his personality became a stumbling block in front of the gains of other Arab leaders for achieving our objectives and purposes then we must shun him and get rid of him without any hesitation. If this happens we must replace him as soon as possible by one who can agree to our opinions and serve our interests.

After many years of extensive experience I must say that we have not to give a committed promise or a long-term promise to any Arab leader because the temporary interests and personality play an eminent role for them. It often happens that they soon change their previous outlook.

Before arriving at the end of my observations about the problems here I would like to get your support in general specially for the settlement of the Palestinian question, a matter which will definitely be in our interest. I know that you have the ability and the appropriate possibilities required in this con-

nection. I shall go ahead in my attempts to remove the Palestinians a little from this position despite the fact that this matter is rather difficult owing to the transient stand of Begin and his friends concerning the question of autonomy to the Palestinians and of the Jewish settlements. Begin has asserted again and again that they will have negotiations with Egypt only because they are full convinced that Sadat has become greatly committed. Such commitment will force him in the end to give up the support of the Palestinians. Unfortunately, this very point of view will not lead to any result. Therefore Sadat will find it difficult to move forward with regard to this issue. So we have to find a certain way for PLO so that we may be able to break the deadlock which prevailed the Camp David discussions. I am ready for adventure by way of handing over the little to PLO for the sake of deception, hoodwinking and distortion of facts and to adjust them later. I admit, and we have to assert this, that the PLO cannot remain away for good from the negotiations if it wants to maintain its influence in the West Bank and Strip.

The coalition opposing Sadat is shaky and weak from the very beginning. It is not in a position basically to draw up a vivid political program and therefore any attention to it will be a secondary attention.

This means that the Arabs without Egypt cannot have a strategy for resistance and a program against Israel. If the rejection front wants actually to display its muscles it will need the gulf oil countries which have always been aligned to Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that the Saudis supported and backed the Front it is doubtful that they will continue to do so.

In conclusion, such a letter cannot contain all details, but this is not my intention. I have wanted only to direct your attention to some of the problems and difficulties which will definitely face my successor who may adopt more rigid stand towards Sadat. Such difficulties also comprise the cooperation with you. It was these problems which in addition to the stupidity of the American Govt. prompted me to make any two decisions and caused me to withdraw from the diplomatic service and I do not have any desire in working in any similar field in future. I feel bitterly sorry for departing Egypt, my tenure of office there was full of vitality and activity but it was satisfactory period. I am tired and worn out. I do not believe that one can continue for ever in such a task.

Yours Sincerely,

HERMAN F. EILTS.

ANNEX B

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF FORGERIES

INTRODUCTION

1. In 1961 the characteristic features of suspected Soviet and Soviet Bloc political forgeries were detailed in testimony by the then Assistant Director of the Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, before a Subcommittee of the Senate.¹ The conclusions we reached at that time were confirmed in a restudy by the CIA of the forensic and substantive methodology in 1971. Through a study of recent anti-U.S. Government forgeries and data related thereto, we have reexamined the problem anew in 1979. We have posed the question:

Are the techniques described in 1961 for identifying Soviet and Soviet Bloc disinformation still valid? Are there additional techniques which have been developed since then, and if so, what are they?

Over the last twenty-three years, there have been over one hundred and forty disinformation operations targeted at U.S. Government interests which have been assessed by Agency and State Department analysts as being of Soviet Bloc origin. A definite modus operandi has been adduced from all these cases and has been compared with the latest examples of anti-U.S. Government forgeries, all having appeared since 1976. It was concluded that the basic elements of the Soviet m.o. have not changed since they were detailed in 1961 and that the post-1976 cases are probably Soviet/Soviet Bloc products.

¹ See "Communist Forgeries," Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Testimony of Richard Helms, Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Agency, June 2, 1961 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1961).

BACKGROUND

2. The use of forged documents and communiques by one country to mislead persons in a second country regarding the policies, attitudes, or activities of a third country, is one of the methods used to implement foreign policy. It is a standard weapon in the arsenal of the Soviet covert action weapons. The staff of Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB is responsible for the production of disinformation materials in the Soviet Union. KGB advisors work with Department 8 (Department of Active Measures and Disinformation) of the Czech Intelligence Service, with Department D of the Hungarian Intelligence Service and the disinformation unit in the East German intelligence service in planning and implementing forgery operations. Among the other Bloc services, the Polish service and the Cuban DGB are also known to engage in such operations, but to a lesser degree. The mingling of talent and the division of labor are such that it is not often possible to distinguish between KGB operations and the operations of the Bloc countries known to be active in the use of misinformation practices.

3. Soviet Bloc deception operations are structured with political goals in mind. True disinformation can usually be differentiated from the work of dedicated amateurs by analyzing the mode of surfacing, the nature of the "information" conveyed in the document, and whether there is a request for payment for the documents. The amateur forger of documents who claims to have information on plots, coups, invasions, etc., usually attempts to defraud unsophisticated governments, but can sometimes cause as much trouble for U.S. interests as the true political disinformation specialists. Amateur forgeries usually contain information of a specific plot, coup, etc., which the perpetrator has invented and which he supports with a sheaf of documents claiming to be coded messages, war maps, etc. The documents are usually sold for cash in a face-to-face negotiation. The fabricator of the documents usually gives a name and place where he can be contacted during the period of negotiations. True political disinformation has a distinctly different style, as will be evident in the discussion of m.o. in a later section of this report.

4. Combatting disinformation involves two separate tasks: (a) proving that a document is a forgery and (b) determining the authorship of the document. It is very difficult even for a major government to produce documents that are absolutely authentic in every detail, but it is relatively easy to cover up traces of personal identity or national origin in producing forgeries. In the analysis of Soviet forgeries, the corollary of this axiom usually holds true, i.e., normally it is relatively easy to prove that the documents produced are not authentic, because of the presence of mistakes, but it is difficult to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that the documents were in fact produced by the KGB or one of the Bloc intelligence services. It should be noted that in cases of political disinformation by major powers, not by amateurs, there are very few governments that mount anti-U.S. campaigns. The Soviet Bloc has consistently surfaced forgeries inimical to U.S. interests and tops a very short list of governments engaged in forgery for political gain.

ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

5. In the analysis of forged documents the following techniques are utilized:

A. *Format analysis.*—A detailed study of the format used to simulate an official U.S. document or communique that has an established form with regulations controlling the serialization, listing, and nomenclature of data entered therein. Mistakes are frequently found in format, providing conclusively that a document could not be authentic because of crucial errors in nomenclature, etc. Extensive files of similar authentic documents, of current date are needed by the perpetrator to attempt to simulate official documents.

B. *Content analysis.*—The basic thrust of a document is difficult to hide. Assuming that the data in a forged document are correct for a moment, the analyst must determine who would derive political benefit from this item becoming public or being handed over to another government. Hiding the basic political thrust is extremely difficult, because political disinformation normally has an intended target or "enemy."

C. *Forensic analysis.*—The use of crime laboratory technology to determine make and model of typewriter used, the presence or absence of a forged signature, the use of the montage technique to simulate an official document, etc., are all needed to establish that some element of a document can be proven

to be false. On occasion, comparison of typewriting, handwriting, etc. can show common origin of two items which should be dissimilar.

D. *Modus operandi comparison.*—The essential style of the various amateur forgers offering political documents is reasonably well known at this time. Their individual m.o.'s vary considerably from the standard m.o. of the Soviet Bloc, the subject of this paper. Modus operandi, after being established as a consequence of successful operations, usually stays standard until changed by external events. For any known forger or forgery unit, an m.o. can ultimately be established.

E. *Replay analysis.*—While the amateur has no desire for press replay of a forgery, it is often (but not always) the goal of Soviet forgeries that a false story be repeated by the media in country after country both to increase the forgery's impact and to blur the origin of the story. A study of the specific replay mechanism in a disinformation case can sometimes reveal the use of specific Soviet media assets previously pin pointed.

F. The results gained from these five modes of examination can be tested, in some cases, with data derived from defector debriefings to determine definitely Soviet complicity in a disinformation effort. Soviet, Czechoslovak and Hungarian defectors have all confirmed specific activity of their respective governments in the field of disinformation and the cases of which they were aware. The one common thread through all the reporting by defectors is the fact that the Soviet Bloc regards disinformation as a valuable tool in the conduct of foreign policy.

G. As noted previously, some Soviet Bloc forgeries are not intended for public exposure and propaganda replay, but are delivered anonymously to foreign governments and political leaders. They too can be distinguished from the work of amateurs because no payment is requested by the forger.

MODUS OPERANDI

6. CIA first delineated the key elements of the Soviet modus operandi in forgery operations in 1961. These elements were later confirmed by a Defense Department study in 1971. Refining prior observations with data made available since that time, we can now reduce the Soviet Bloc modus operandi to nine typical elements:

- A. Use of security classifications.
- B. Use of official letterheads.
- C. Surface as copies, not as originals.
- D. Key document not in sharp focus or full size.
- E. Accompanying cover letter.
- F. Use of logical plots.
- G. Documents given gratis.
- H. Designed for media replay.
- I. Aimed at foreign government or leaders.

7. Invariably, most, if not all of the above listed elements will be found in each operation. Naturally, variations on the basic themes do occur. The variations could be the result of individual preference by the person designing operation and/or intentional variation required to avoid stereotyping. Soviet forgeries are never perfect in all details, but they are usually realistic enough to gain credence for the period of time needed to accomplish the objectives of the operation. Perfection in format is apparently less important than the correct assessment of the target and the timeliness of the operation. The key characteristics of the modus operandi are:

A. *Use of Security Classification.*—Because "classified" documents seem to attract more attention from the general public than unclassified documents, classifications are used on forged documents wherever possible to stimulate interest. On occasion, the wrong classification is used, such as "Restricted" on a USIS handout, or "Top Secret" on a State Department Operations Memorandum. While it is easy to demonstrate that a classification is incorrect for a specific document, the fact is likely to be lost upon the target audience which is unaware of the nuances of document classification. In some cases in which the bogus documents are passed off as private notes or personal letters, classifications would be inappropriate and are not used. The highly personal nature of alleged correspondence of high visibility personages would carry enough impact without a security classification.

B. Use of official letterhead.—An official letterhead or government form lends an aura of verisimilitude to a deception operation. It is the Soviet practice to use real organizations rather than to invent national organizations. Letterheads can be obtained in a variety of ways. It is known that the Soviet Bloc assiduously collects U.S. forms, letters, official signatures, etc., to serve as models. The U.S. agencies victimized to date by the Soviet Bloc include the State Department, the U.S.I.S., the Peace Corps, the Defense Department, the FBI and the CIA. Blank or used letterheads and forms obtained surreptitiously or officially are copied by photo-offset. The well known montage technique of combining an innocent letterhead with a sinister text works well if a multi-generation photocopy is used to disseminate the altered message. The lines indicating a splicing or montage operation tend to drop out in multi-generation photocopies.

C. Surface as copies, not as originals.—In earlier years photographic enlargements were used in the production of forgeries, but the photocopy machine has now taken over. With the changing styles in commercial reproduction over the years, there has been a parallel development in the disinformation field. Photostats have given way to thermographic copiers and then to the current electrostatic copiers using plain paper of zinc oxide coated paper. The use of photocopies in surfacing the key document or "incriminating" document, allows for extra copies for multiple targeting and inhibits technical examination.

D. Key document not in sharp focus or full size.—The surfacing of less than sharp duplicates of a forged document is done to frustrate analysis by a forensic scientist. By using photocopies, paper and ink analysis of the original is precluded. If the photocopy is too dark or too light, or multi-generational, it is difficult to conduct typewriting and handwriting examinations. The ideal graphics situation from the point of view of the disinformation specialist is to produce something which, although dim, can still be analyzed in a forensic laboratory.

E. Accompanying cover letter.—In order to convey the key document to the target group or individual, where there is no contact between the source and the recipient, an accompanying cover letter has been used in numerous operations since 1960. The cover letter, which is usually an original document, in contrast to the photocopy key document, explains why the recipient is getting the key document. The cover letter could be without signature, with a notional signature, or with a forged signature of a real individual. An alternative could be "A Concerned Citizen" or "A Fellow Arab" which might evoke a positive response from the recipient of the documents. The cover letters are either typed or handwritten in the language of the mailing area.

F. Use of logical plots.—Rather than fanciful scenarios about specific plots or coups, Soviet Soviet forgeries tend to contain a more generalized matter which tends to exacerbate negative feelings about the American presence or American intentions in the target country. Vague charges about spying by the Peace Corps, anti-host government intrigue by the U.S. Government, or anti-host country attitudes by key U.S. officials are easy to believe and very difficult to disprove. Allegations which can be checked are never made, and so denials may fall flat. Soviet Bloc attacks usually capitalize on some of the local prejudices and latent anti-U.S. feelings, hence become believable to unsophisticated audiences.

G. Documents given gratis.—In contrast to amateur-generated forgeries which are invariably sold to the recipient in a face to face situation, the standard Soviet disinformation document is sent by mail, for free, to the recipient. There is no personal between the person offering the documents and the recipient, nor any chance to ask questions, etc. The documents are proffered for "idealistic" reasons, typically containing phrases like, "because I am a concerned citizen, I feel. . . ."

H. Designed for media replay.—In the 1950's, the Soviets used to publish forgeries in their own controlled press. While they had automatic access to the publication, the effect was very limited since the Bloc press is not widely read in the West or the Third World and is considered a biased source. In the 1960s, Soviet disinformation was targeted against the non-communist press and political/governmental figures with the objective of influencing attitudes and policies without there being any obvious Bloc connection. Clandestinely owned or subsidized publications or reporters are used as well as publications known to accept sensational material without checking closely into the veracity of the material.

I. Another technique is to send a forgery to a foreign government or a political personage, one who is likely to raise the issue as a "Question in Parliament" or a

governmental inquiry. This technique is equally as effective as media splashes in making a political point. The apparent objective of many disinformation operations is a replay of the issues so that the original source of the political issue becomes obscured and the topic acquires a life of itself, independent of the original surfacing. Stories in the press of a second country quoting an article in the country of surfacing can be picked up and replayed ad infinitum giving new impetus to a disinformation operation. If an alleged American attitude or intention becomes the subject of a governmental investigation, the paper generated by the inquiry carries the deception operation forward. After a disinformation effort has been launched, if it gets into replay it can be manipulated for long periods of time using assets in other areas and be revived at will.

8. These features of the standard Soviet m.o. are normally found in each disinformation case, with allowance made for variation and inappropriateness in operations which are at variance with the norm. Although these criteria may suggest it was the Soviets or a Bloc country who perpetrated a forgery, courtroom proof of complicity is rarely possible. Also, mistakes in format, mistakes in choice of materials, re-use of physical items such as typewriters, or re-use of assets in media replay often serve both to finger a document as Soviet in origin and to help to defeat its effectiveness.

APPENDIX II

Number 3 • January 1979 • By Subscription*

Exclusive:**Top Secret U.S. Army Memo on Infiltrating
and Subverting Allies.**

Covert Action

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REPLY

CONTENTS:**CIA Station for Congress—
Attacking the Bulletin
The Mysterious Supplement B—
Sticking It To the "Host Country"
News Notes
Naming Names
Publications of Interest**

*The Covert Action Information Bulletin is available at selected bookstores around the world at \$2.00 per copy, in the U.S.; \$2.25 overseas.

THE MYSTERIOUS SUPPLEMENT B; STICKING IT TO THE "HOST COUNTRY"

In April 1975 a Turkish newspaper, *Baris*, carried an article about an arcane, but unclassified United States Army Field Manual: "FM 30-31, Stability Operations-Intelligence," dated January 1970. The article mentioned a mysterious Supplement B to this Manual, and hinted that future articles would discuss that Supplement. Not another word about the Manual or the Supplement appeared in *Baris*; the reporter who had written the article disappeared, and no one would talk about it.

Over the next year or two, it is alleged, Supplement B appeared in several North African capitals, a copy eventually arriving in Spain. How and why it worked its way across the Mediterranean is unclear, though its origin in Istanbul is reasonable. Through the mid-1970s Turkey was not only a major CIA communication post, but was also headquarters for eastern European NSA activities and military intelligence units of all the services. (After the overthrow of the Greek junta and the subsequent Turkish arms embargo following the *de facto* partition of Cyprus, U.S. intelligence activities in both Greece and Turkey were scaled down, but not, to be sure, eliminated. Efforts to rebuild to the earlier levels of operations have never ceased, and appear to be gaining at this time.)

In September 1978, the Madrid magazine *Triunfo* published, in Spanish, the full text of Supplement B. There was no comment from the U.S. Embassy. Shortly thereafter, articles about and excerpts from Supplement B appeared in Italy and the Netherlands. Before the first article appeared in the well-known Milan-based weekly *L'Europeo*, its respected publisher, Giovanni Valentini, received a call from a high official of the U.S. Embassy in Rome, who stated that publication of the document would be "inopportune." When *L'Europeo* was undeterred, the Embassy wrote the magazine stating that the document was a forgery, and it was hoped the magazine would "be spared the embarrassment" of publishing a document whose authenticity had been officially denied. The letter stated: "The article published in *Triunfo* assumed the existence of a 'supplement' to U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31, an unclassified publication. Such a supplement has never existed." The denial is significant because the Army admits the existence of a secret Supplement A.

A copy of the original, English-language Supplement B has been obtained by *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, and is published in full below. In order to understand and analyze it, one must understand a bit about FM 30-31 itself. The Manual, which can be found at most military libraries, is an enlightening guide to imperialist military operations. It describes in minute detail the methods of liaison with intelligence services in foreign countries where U.S. troops are stationed, so-called "host countries" (HC).

It is based on the premise that host countries are friendly to U.S. interests and must be kept that way. The greatest threat to that friendship—short of external war—is "instability," and one of the greatest causes of instability is "insurgency." Consequently, the Manual describes insurgencies, how they develop and how they grow; it assesses the vulnerabilities of insurgencies, and explains how Army intelligence operations, working with the host country intelligence agencies, can counteract those insurgencies and promote "stability," i.e., continued support for U.S. interests.

D A N I S

kap den bu baski-krisk-keski-kriska-kin, ino nazivet du salt en, bir sat

le

ter me ma du du pul sal ter gel rin ka ler gur no dig ca ri da les ye ki

Amerika dünyayı nasıl kontrol ediyor ?



CIA-FBI ve Pentagon'un Türkiye ve dünyada izledikleri yöntemleri ilkinin gizli belgeleri açıklıyoruz.

misir. Bu tür ülkelerin iç işlerinin korunması ve kalkınmalarının temini konusunda, ABD'in ve

The first paragraph of the 132-page Field Manual states: "This manual, together with its SECRET NOFORN classified supplement FM 30-31A, provides guidance on doctrine tactics, and techniques for intelligence support to U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment." This is what makes the Rome Embassy denial seem so knee-jerk; to deny the existence of "a" supplement when the Army admits in a public document that there is, at least, one classified supplement, seems rather unthinking. ("NOFORN" means not for dissemination to foreigners.)

The Manual describes insurgent capabilities and vulnerabilities, and outlines intelligence requirements regarding such movements. It discusses how to work with host country intelligence services, how to plan, collect, process and disseminate

intelligence information. It also discusses intelligence training, gives examples, complete with filled-in sample notes and forms, of intelligence collection, and gives the course outline for a model intelligence training program. A good example of typical military thoroughness is the Appendix on "Insurgent Activity Indicators." Nearly a thousand separate indicators are listed, ranging from "murder and kidnapping of local government officials," (a rather good indicator that some trouble is brewing) to "increases in purchase and use of radios" (a bit less conclusive), to "appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system" and "increase in bank robberies."

Much of the Manual is subject to ridicule as representing stereotyped cold-war paranoia. The description of "the typical Communist insurgent organization," is absurd in its precision. Party structure is "cellular." Party members belong to a "Party cell" and to a "functional cell." Party cells contain from three to seven members, one of whom is designated "cell captain." The charts are mind-boggling. They rival some of the publications of the extreme right National Caucus of Labor Committees.

But there is a falsely harmless tone to much of the Manual. It notes that "a fundamental premise of U.S. internal defense policy is that U.S. assistance will be channeled primarily through the HC structure." This is the premise which Supplement B belies. Supplement B makes abundantly clear that it is U.S. policy to work behind the backs of the host country military and intelligence agencies, indeed of prime importance to infiltrate them. The introduction notes that FM 30-31 was "limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability." It continues, "FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence."

And that is the special charm of this "Top Secret" document: while the Field Manual sets forth procedures for cooperating with host country agencies in a mutual effort to counteract local insurgencies and maintain stable regimes, the secret supplement explains that all the while the U.S. Army will be actively attempting to infiltrate the agencies they are supposedly assisting.



The candor of the supplement is refreshing: "The U.S. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons."

And this most chilling appraisal: "While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the names of freedom, justice and democracy, the U.S. Government allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support. . . . U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if

regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy these requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure."

So much for the noble American commitment to democracy. Chapter 3 explains just how U.S. intelligence interests should focus on host country military and police organizations, and how they should be prepared to "put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself," if any aspect of the host government appears "vulnerable." And, as the Supplement explains, "Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies."

Chapter 4 pinpoints the best recruitment and infiltration targets—particularly military officers. That the recruitment of agents within host government agencies of all kinds is a task of U.S. Army intelligence is one of the shocking revelations of the Supplement. That it might assist the CIA is one thing; that it might give its opinion on likely recruits is one thing. But that it engages in this activity on its own is something else. In addition, it is in this chapter that reference to Supplement A is found. That document, it appears, provides general doctrine, guidance and directives for the recruitment of agents in general.

And recruitment and infiltration are not where it ends. Section 11 speaks of "special operations." When the host country government does not react with adequate "vigor" to the threat of subversion, U.S. Army intelligence "will convince HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger" by using their infiltrators to "launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case." Where there is insufficient infiltration of the insurgent group, "it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations." The actions contemplated, "those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency," include terrorism and outright warfare.

The irony in this sanctioning of *agents provocateur* is that the host government is to be "convinced" of the "reality" by resort to false provocations. This, as we know, has been a favorite tactic of the CIA; there is no reason that military intelligence, if also in the dirty tricks business, would not use the same practices.

The last paragraph indicates the importance ascribed to archives. If HC archives are not legally accessible, "operations" to gain access are suggested.

Is The Document Genuine?

When the document was referred to in Turkey, there was no response from the U.S. When it was published in full in Spain, there was no response. When the Embassy heard that it was to be published in Italy, they informed the publisher

of a major magazine that it would be "inopportune" to do so, and when it appeared that it would nevertheless be published, the Embassy announced that the document was a forgery—in a letter which said there was "no" supplement to FM 30-31, a statement which was itself untrue.

It is hard to imagine that the document is not genuine. The format, style and classification stampings appear consistent with other military supplements, and the document is filled with authentic military phraseology. If it is a forgery, why did it not come out in 1975? If it is a forgery, why did a high Embassy official describe its publication as "inopportune?" Military intelligence veterans who have, at *CovertAction's* request, looked at the copy of the document, all say that it appears genuine. Of course, the government could declassify Supplement A. If it has nothing to do with the recruitment of agents, then the document is surely a forgery; but if it does? Regardless of the dispute, we believe, as do publishers in several other countries already, that the document is real, and that in any event our readers should see it and decide for themselves.

— WS

In the unedited document that follows we have eliminated the table of contents, and, at the bottom of each page, "Group 1, Excluded from Automatic Declassification."

TOP SECRET

STABILITY OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE—SPECIAL FIELDS

Supplement B
to FM 30-31


Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
18 March 1970

Chapter 1 Introduction

This TOP SECRET classified supplement FM 30-31B, owing to its specially sensitive nature, is not a standard issue in the FM series.

FM 30-31 provided guidance on doctrine, tactics and techniques for intelligence support of U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment. As it was intended for wide distribution, its contents were limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability.

FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence. It does not



Drawing/Paul Spina/LNS.

TOP SECRET

repeat the general intelligence guidance laid down in other documents, such as FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A. Its aim is limited to stressing the importance of HC agencies as a special field for intelligence operations and to indicating certain directions in which the procurement of information about the host country, in a manner more general than that required by straightforward counterinsurgency, may advance overall U.S. interests.

Operations in this special field are to be regarded as strictly clandestine, since the acknowledged involvement of the U.S. Army in HC affairs is restricted to the area of co-operation against insurgency or threats of insurgency. The fact that U.S. Army involvement goes deeper can in no circumstances be acknowledged.

The use of the term "HC agencies" in this supplement may be taken to mean, according to context:

- a. The HC organization for internal defense operations.
- b. The HC armed forces generally.
- c. HC agencies other than the armed forces, e.g., the police and other civilian security agencies, national and local administrative bodies, propaganda organizations.

In other words, U.S. Army intelligence has a wide-ranging role in assisting to determine the precise counterinsurgency potential of the host country in all its aspects and the relation of that potential to U.S. policy. In pursuing its more specialist military objectives, it should not neglect the wider aspects of U.S. interests wherever opportunity offers to further them.

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Chapter 2 Background

1. General

As indicated in FM 30-31, most recent insurgencies have taken place in developing nations or in nations newly emerged from former colonies.

U.S. involvement in these less-developed nations threatened by insurgency is part of the world-wide U.S. involvement in the struggle against Communism. Insurgency may have other than Communist origins, in tribal, racial, religious, or regional differences. But, whatever its source, the fact of insurgency offers opportunities for Communist infiltration which, in the absence of effective countermeasures, may

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
culminate in a successful Communist take-over. Therefore, the criterion determining the nature and degree of U.S. involvement is the political stance of the HC government in relation to Communism on the one hand and to U.S. interests on the other.

2. Need for Political Flexibility

The U.S. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons:

- a. A government enjoying U.S. support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.
- b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.
- c. It may drift into extreme nationalistic attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to U.S. interests.

Such factors may create a situation in which U.S. interests require changes of governmental direction enabling the host country to obtain more constructive benefit from U.S. assistance and guidance.



While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the names of freedom, justice, and democracy, the U.S. Government allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support.

Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive or brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure.

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3. Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes

In the light of the above considerations affecting U.S. policy, attention must be drawn to certain vulnerabilities inherent in the nature of most regimes in the less-developed nations:

a. In consequence of their backwardness or recent origin

or both, the regimes against which insurgencies are directed usually suffer from restlessness and instability. Their leading political figures are often inexperienced, mutually antagonistic, and corrupt. When leaders of exceptional stature emerge, their efforts are often frustrated by government machinery ill-adapted to modern conditions and manned by inefficient and underpaid personnel.

b. These weaknesses give rise to a wide area of possible contacts between employees of government agencies and the insurgency. Having regard to the chronic instability of the regimes, the desire for reinsurance among their supporters against possible total or partial victory for the insurgency is widespread.

c. In most cases of internal conflict in the less-developed nations, both sides claim a monopoly of nationalistic purity. But the often massive scale and relatively overt character of U.S. support gives the insurgency some psychological advantage by laying the regime open to charges of puppetry. The frequent consequence is a growth of anti-American feeling among both the public in general and employees of the regime including the armed forces. Whether the armed forces are subservient to the regime or dominate it, they usually reflect its nature and share its vulnerabilities.

U.S. Army interest in the HC armed forces is not confined to a narrow professionalism; it has a much wider political import. In most new and developing nations, the armed forces play an important role in political life, and the significance of that role is enhanced whenever a regime is confronted by armed insurgency calling for military countermeasures.


PH 30-31

B-3. The Party Committee System

Although all authority within a Communist insurgency movement stems from the hard core Party cellular organization, functional committees, composed of both Party and non-Party members, are required to carry out the Party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the Party Executive Committee, commonly referred to in lines of insurgency as the Party Revolutionary Committee. Like the Party's cellular organization, these committees normally exist at national, interprovincial, provincial, and district levels. Below district level, clusters of cells perform their daily functional tasks under the direction of local village committees. At

national level, control is exercised by the Secretariat of Central Committee.

The Revolutionary Committee may develop into a highly sophisticated structure under the direction of a secretary, his assistant, and executive officer. Under these officials will function a Permanent Standing Committee, composed of perhaps four to ten persons including the secretary and his two principal officers. Subordinate to this body a number of subcommittees or sections will function, employing 20 or more individuals each, of whom may be in positions of limited responsibility. This committee system, together with its specialized elements, may be conceived as the "directing organ" of the insurgency.



Chapter 3 U.S. Army Intelligence Tasks

4. Identification of Special Targets

U.S. Army intelligence is in a position to procure information over a wide range of HC government activity. But the specialist interests of the U.S. Army require that the major part of its intelligence effort be directed towards the HC army and related HC organizations for internal defense operations.

Special intelligence targets within the HC army include the well-placed personnel of:

- a. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence is in direct working contact.
- b. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence, usually through the medium of its working contacts, can establish productive contact outside the limits of normal military activity.
- c. Local units with which U.S. Army intelligence is not in contact, directly or indirectly, and which for that reason may

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be particularly vulnerable to political contamination from local insurgent sources.

d. Mobile units, such as Special Force units and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, which operate in areas under partial or intermittent insurgent control, and which therefore may also be vulnerable to such contamination.

In addition to the HC army and its organization for internal defense operations, attention must be paid to the organization of the police.

The police generally stand closer to the local population than the army, and for that reason may be at the same time better sources of information and greater security risks. The security risks may become acute when police are drafted into the armed forces and replaced by recruits of less experience, training and ability.

U.S. Army intelligence operations directed towards the special targets listed above have several major objectives in view:

a. To guard HC army units against infiltration and influence from elements sympathetic to the insurgency or hostile to the United States.

b. To guard against the possibility of HC army personnel reinsuring their own future by developing active or passive contacts with the insurgency.

c. To reduce corruption and inefficiency with the HC army units to tolerable levels.

d. To assist in the promotion of HC officers known to be loyal to the United States.

e. To extend the same forms of protection to all HC agencies falling within the field of U.S. Army intelligence operations.

The achievement of these objectives calls for the timely recognition of vulnerabilities in HC agencies and for timely counteraction by U.S. Army intelligence.

5. Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities

The symptoms of vulnerability among HC agencies calling for investigation, identification and action by U.S. Army intelligence include:

a. Political unreliability, such as lukewarm attitudes towards the regime, sympathy with the insurgency, outright collaboration with the insurgency.

b. Anti-Americanism arising from exposure to insurgent propaganda, from friction between employees of HC and U.S. organizations at the personal or working level, or from the too obvious presence of American personnel in the role of senior partners.

c. Blood relationships linking employees of the HC gov-

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
ernment with the insurgency. It is common practice for a family deliberately to split its loyalties between the regime and the insurgency, so that whichever wins, ultimately the family will have a foot in the right camp. Blood ties are of special relevance to police units, members of which often serve in their own home districts and are therefore exposed to pressure from families and friends.

d. Corruption, which exposes the individual to pressure from insurgent elements and, when it becomes general, undermines popular confidence in the regime thus encouraging the spread of insurgency.

e. Inefficiency reaching a level at which it impedes the smooth flow of operations and thus constitutes a form of direct assistance to the enemy. It may also conceal sympathy for the insurgency; it is a well-tried form of administrative sabotage, being relatively easy to practice and relatively difficult to detect or identify as such.

6. U.S. Army Intelligence Action

U.S. Army intelligence must be prepared to recommend appropriate action in the event of symptoms of vulnerability persisting long enough to become positively damaging. Such action may include measures taken against individuals, or more general measures designed to put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself.



It is desirable that U.S. Army intelligence should obtain the active cooperation of the appropriate HC authority in pursuing punitive measures against HC citizens. But there are areas where combined action is frustrated by divergent or conflicting aims and interests, and where U.S. Army intelligence must defend the U.S. position against contrary forces at work in the host country.

This area of divergence or conflict is often entered in the matter of punitive action against individuals who may be protected by a tangle of personal, political and bureaucratic complications.

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Action designed to influence or pressurize HC agencies or the government itself presupposes a situation in which U.S. interests are at stake. Measures appropriate to a given situation may be official or unofficial.

Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies.

Chapter 4 Intelligence Guidance

7. General

The success of internal stability operations undertaken by U.S. Army intelligence in the framework of internal defense depends to a considerable extent on the degree of mutual understanding between American personnel and the personnel of agencies of the host country.

However, whatever the degree of mutual understanding between U.S. personnel and their HC opposite numbers, a more reliable basis for the solution of U.S. Army intelligence problems is the availability in HC agencies of individuals with whom U.S. Army intelligence maintains agent relationships.

Therefore, the recruitment of leading members of HC agencies in the capacity of long-term agents is an important requirement.

8. Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes

For the special purposes of U.S. Army intelligence, the most important field of recruiting activity is the officer corps of the HC army. In many less-developed nations, officers of the armed forces tend to be of propertied origin, conservative by virtue of family background and education, and therefore receptive to counterinsurgency doctrine. They are of special importance as long-term prospects because they not infrequently play a decisive role in determining the course of development in some of their respective countries.

The following categories require special attention with a view to long-term recruitment:

- a. Officers from families with long-standing economic and cultural associations with the United States and its allies.
- b. Officers known to have received favorable impressions of U.S. military training programs, especially those who have been trained in the United States itself.
- c. Officers destined for assignment to posts within the HC intelligence structure. These require special though not exclusive attention.

Standing directives to U.S. instructors at U.S. training

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establishments require the study of officers mentioned in sub-paragraph 2 (b) above from the point of view of political loyalty; of their immunity from Communist ideology and their devotion to the democratic ideals of the United States. The Secret Annex to the final training report on each HC officer passing through a U.S. training program contains an assessment of his prospects and possibilities as a long-term agent of U.S. Army intelligence.

Questions of recruitment are treated in greater detail in FM 30-31A where the general doctrine governing agent intelligence (HUMINT) is stated and elaborated. The directives laid down there should be applied to recruiting operations envisaging HC government agencies.

9. Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad

U.S. Army intelligence must take into account potential assistance from U.S. citizens working in the host countries, both as direct sources of information and as indicators of leads for the recruitment of HC citizens, official and otherwise, as long-term intelligence agents. Such U.S. citizens include officials working for agencies other than the U.S. Army, and U.S. businessmen, as well as representatives of the mass media, operating in the host countries.

10. Penetration of the Insurgent Movement

In FM 30-31 attention was drawn to the importance of HC agencies penetrating the insurgent movement by agent means with a view to successful counteraction. It was pointed out that there was a danger of insurgent agents penetrating HC mass organizations, government agencies, police, and military intelligence units with a view to the collection of secret intelligence. Stress was also laid on the probability that lack of information from HC agencies about insurgent activities in spheres where they are known to exist may indicate that insurgent agents have successfully penetrated HC agencies and are therefore in a position to anticipate government moves.

In this connection, U.S. Army intelligence should pursue two main lines of action:

- a. It should endeavor to identify agents infiltrated into the insurgency by HC agencies responsible for internal security with a view to establishing clandestine control by U.S. Army intelligence over the work of such agents. (Operational methods in such cases will depend on the conditions prevailing in each country.)
- b. It should endeavor to infiltrate reliable agents into the insurgent leadership, with special emphasis on the insurgent intelligence system directed against HC agencies. It must be borne in mind that information from insurgent sources about the personnel of HC agencies might be of particular value in determining the proper conduct of U.S. Army intelligence and in suggesting timely measures to further U.S. interests.

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There may be times when HC governments show passivity or indecision in face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince the HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency.

In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.

12. U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

In the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), U.S. Army personnel enjoy the advantage of working closely at many levels with their opposite numbers in the national intelligence structure of the host country. By virtue of their generally superior training, expertise and experience, they are well qualified to get the better of any exchange arising from

such cooperation, even in dealing with HC personnel who outrank them. This close cooperation enables U.S. Army intelligence to build up a comprehensive and detailed picture of the national intelligence structure.

Mention has been made in FM 30-31 of the desirability of establishing National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (NIDCC) and Area Coordination Centers (ACC) to integrate intelligence operations, administration and logistics into a single approach to the problem of insurgency.

This recommendation was designed to improve the effectiveness of the HC counterinsurgency effort. But it may also be used to facilitate U.S. Army intelligence penetration of the HC army as a whole. U.S. personnel attached to the NIDCC and ACC are well placed to spread their attention over the whole range of HC army organization, to embrace operations, administration and logistics as well as intelligence.

The establishment of joint central archives at the NIDCC should be used to assist the procurement of intelligence about the personnel of HC agencies, and the more selective archives kept at ACC level should serve the same purpose. Where the existence of separate HC archives not officially accessible to U.S. personnel is known or suspected, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of operations to gain the desired access.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W.C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

FM 30-31B

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Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive or brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the essential test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. If it does not satisfy those requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modifications of the structure.

From F.M. 30-31 B

NEWS NOTES

Was It Really Paisley?

When the body of former CIA analyst, and present CIA "consultant" John A. Paisley was found in Chesapeake Bay October 1, with a bullet wound in his head, the questions which circulated centered on one issue: was he murdered or did he commit suicide? It now appears that the mystery is more fundamental: was it Paisley?

Nearly two months after the recovery of the body, the widow, Maryann Paisley, has retained a private investigator, and Washington attorney Bernard Fensterwald, to pursue her astonishing assertion that the body found was not her husband's. Mrs. Paisley confided that the CIA had persuaded her, right after the body was found, to have it cremated. She and her attorney now assert that the body found in the bay did not match her husband's height or weight or measurements. They also claim that various death records of the Maryland authorities have been altered to cover-up evidence of the discrepancies in vital statistics.

A.I.D. Studies Carolina Town

Thanks to a North Carolina subscriber, we have been shown one of the more bizarre aspects of A.I.D. operations. According to the November 27, 1978, *Laurinburg Exchange*, the Agency for International Development has announced that it is going to study Scotland County, North Carolina, "to learn from Scotland so that they might copy its successes overseas." A 25-member team of A.I.D. specialists will spend twelve weeks at the job. What is so ironic is that Scotland County is the poorest county in North Carolina. What is more understandable is that the county is almost entirely unorganized, and has a history of some of the more "imagin-

ative" anti-union activities in this most anti-union state. The Chamber of Commerce Newsletter had to be taken to court for publishing a list of car descriptions and license plate numbers of union organizers. As one of the A.I.D. specialists put it, "I think Scotland has a story to share and I think it is worth spending time to learn."

Considering the form in which A.I.D. imparts U.S. repressive technology to other nations, they might well study the system of criminal justice in North Carolina, probably the worst in the United States. Many of A.I.D.'s client governments have their own Wilmington Tens and their own Rev. Ben Chavises languishing in their jails.

Deputy Director on Assassinations

CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci recently testified on capital punishment for presidential assassinations. In the course of his testimony he ranged from the fatuous to the unintentionally ironic. As reported in the December 12 *Washington Post*, he said that "by far the most important thing CIA can do in the sordid business of assassinations is to help prevent them." He said he could not go into details, but he assured the committee that "there are public figures alive in this world today who have CIA to thank for it."

Indeed. Like the Shah of Iran and General Pinochet. Carlucci neglects to point out that there are far more public figures dead today who have the CIA to thank for it.

(Continued on page 19)

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Washington, DC 20004

APPENDIX III

U.S. PEACE COUNCIL FOUNDING CONFERENCE
 NOVEMBER 9-11, 1979
 PHILADELPHIA

CONFERENCE AGENDA *

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10

9:00 am

Open Plenary

Welcoming Remarks

Jack Hart - Delaware Valley Peace Council

Rep. John Conyers

Keynote Address

Michael Myerson - Interim Executive Director,
 U.S. Peace Council

Greetings

Isabel Letellier - President, Chile Committee for Human Rights; Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies.

Cudinh Ba - Counselor, Permanent Mission to the U.N. of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

12:00 noon - 1:00 pm

Lunch

1:00 - 3:00 pm

Workshops, Set AWorkshopLeaders

SALT II

- James Johnson, Washinton Heights-Inwood Citizens for Peace and Human Needs.
- Mark Shanahand, Coalition for New Foreign & Military Policy
- Sarah Staggs, Chicago Peace Council

Economic Conversion

- Rep. Irving Stolberg, State Representative Connecticut
- Delores Bates, Washington D.C. Peace Council
- David Cortright, SANE

New Weapons

- James Jackson, Member of Presidential Committee; World Peace Council
- William Hogan, Chicago Clergy & Laity Concerned; Chicago Peace Council
- Terry Provance, American Friends Service Committee

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WorkshopLeaderTransfer Amendment
and Reversing
Priorities

- Rep. Saura Graham; State Representative, Massachusetts
- Erica Foldy, Coalition for a New Foreign & Military Policy
- Kate Abell, New York Trade Union Committee for the Transfer Amendment

Stopping the Draft

- Frank Jackalone, United States Student Association
- Duane Shanks, Committee Against Registration and the Draft
- Mario Vasquez, Los Angeles Peace Council

Nuclear Weapons
and Nuclear Power

- Miriam Friedlander, New York City Council-woman
- Betsy Sweet, Women's International League For Peace And Freedom
- Peter Bower, New York Peace Council

3:00 Pm

Break

3:30 - 5:30 pm

Workshops. Set BWorkshopLeadersThe Struggle Against
Racism and National
Oppression and the
Peace Movement

- Frank Chapman, American Friends Service Committee
- Judy Hand, Southern Organizing Committee
- Rep. Dave Richardson, State Representative, Pennsylvania

The Non-Aligned Move-
ment and the New In-
ternational Economic
Order

- Prof. Robert Cole-Amherst, Mass.
- Prof. Archie Singham, Brooklyn College, CUNY

Asia

- Terry Cannon, Daily World
- Severina Rivera Drew, Friends of the Filipino People
- Hope Stevens, National Conference of Black Lawyers

Latin America

- Susan Borenstein, National Chile Center
- Robert Cohen, National Network in Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua
- Lally Lopez, Puerto Rico Solidarity Committee
- Jackie Ramos, Venceremos Brigade
- Juan Ramos, Puerto Rican Alliance

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<u>Workshop</u>	<u>Leader</u>
Southern Africa	- Lauren Anderson, National Conference of Black Lawyers - Angie Dickerson, National Coalition of Negro Businesswoman - Tony Monteiro, National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation
Middle East	- Hassan Nawash, Detroit Peace Council - Rob Prince, Denver Peace Council

5:30-7:00 pm

Dinner

7:00 - 9:00 pm

International Solidarity Rally

Romesh Chandra - President, World Peace Council

H. E. Victor Tinoco, U.N. Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua.

Eneida Vasquez, Puerto Rican Peace Council

Mr. Mapiév, Soviet Peace Committee

Representative, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe

Representative, Mexican Peace Council

9:00 pm

PartySUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11

9:00 am

Plenary Session

- Reports from workshops
- Balloting for U.S. Peace Council Officers and Executive Board
- Greetings
 - Representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization
 - Jesus Reyes, Cuban Movement for Peace & Sovereignty of the Peoples.

12:00 noon - 1:00

Lunch

Agenda page 4

1:00 - 4:30 pm.

Final Plenary

- Final Resolutions
- Workshop of the Whole on Organizing the U.S. Peace Council
- Concluding Remarks

4:30 pm

Adjourn

* Subject to last minute alterations.

Organizations of workshop leaders listed for identification purposes only.

APPENDIX IV



Newsweek

DECEMBER 18, 1963

SPECIAL ISSUE

J.F. Kennedy

CIRCULATION	
Austria	150,000
Belgium	100,000
Canada	1,000,000
France	1,500,000
Germany	1,200,000
Italy	1,000,000
Japan	1,000,000
Netherlands	1,000,000
Sweden	1,000,000
Switzerland	1,000,000
U.S.A.	1,000,000
U.K.	1,000,000
Other	1,000,000
Total	10,000,000

IN CONGRESS, JULY 4, 1776.

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, the people have the right to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such a form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new

guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies, and it is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former system of government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the annihilation of the British constitution, established among these states, for the sole end of their absolute Tyranny over this continent.

That the Declaration of Emancipation He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his governors to pass such immediate and pressing measures as the exigencies of the situation might require, and when a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was attempted, he refused to assent to that measure, and then he endeavored to pass other laws for the accommodation of the districts of the north, which would have taken away the representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measure.

He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused, for a long time after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected, whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their

WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL THAT THEY ARE ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN UNALIENABLE RIGHTS THAT AMONG THESE ARE LIFE LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

NOUS PROFESSONS LA VERTÉ BIEN ENFENDIE QUE TOUS LES HOMMES SONT ÉGAUX QUE LE CRÉATEUR DONNE À CHAQUE INDIVIDU DES DROITS À LA LIBERTÉ À LA BONHEUR HUMAIN ET À LA POURSUITE DU BIEN-ÊTRE


Abraham Lincoln became President of the United States of America in 1860. Lincoln, who demanded the liberation of the Negroes from slavery was elected President with the votes of the citizens and farmers of the North against the will of the slave-masters of the South.

The Civil War broke out during his Presidency which brought victory for the industrial North and ended slavery for good. On January 1, 1863 Lincoln had the Decree of Independence declared which liberated the 3 Million Negroes of the United States from slavery.

Abraham Lincoln fut devenu président des États-Unis en 1860. Lincoln, exigeant l'affranchissement des Noirs de l'esclavage, fut élu président à l'aide des bourgeois et des fermiers du Nord contre la volonté des esclavagistes du Sud.

Au cours de sa présidence éclata la guerre de Sécession, apportant la victoire du Nord bourgeois et la fin de l'esclavage.

Le 1^{er} janvier 1863 Lincoln fit publier le décret de l'indépendance qui apporta aux 3 millions de Noirs des États-Unis l'affranchissement de l'esclavage.




On April 14, 1865 Abraham Lincoln was killed in Washington in a theatre by an agent of the Southern slave-masters.

Le 14 avril 1865, au cours d'une représentation théâtrale à Washington, Lincoln fut assassiné par un agent des esclavagistes du Sud.

Surely, in 1963, 100 years after Emancipation, it should not be necessary for an American citizen to demonstrate in the streets for the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat a lunch counter in the very department store in which he is shopping, or to enter a motion-picture house, on the same terms as any other customer.

(In Kennedy's speech of 19th June 1963)




After 100 Years—the Completion? — Après 100 ans — l'achèvement?

En 1963, 100 ans après l'obtention de l'égalité des droits, il ne faudrait pas qu'un citoyen américain manifeste dans la rue pour pouvoir loger dans un hôtel où manger au restaurant du magasin où il vient de faire ses achats, ou entrer dans un cinéma, parmi les mêmes conditions que les autres.

(Du message de Kennedy du 19 Juin 1963)





Inciting and spreading racial discrimination is a crime against mankind.
C'est pécher contre l'humanité que fomenter et propager l'opposition et la haine des races.




The American Nazi Party. Hitler is their idol.
 Le parti nazi américain. Ceux dont Hitler est l'exemple.

A victim of racial hate: a lynched Negro.
 Victime du racisme: un Noir lynché.

The Ku-Klux-Klan is the ally of the American Nazi Party.
 Le Ku-Klux-Klan allié du parti nazi américain



Senator Barry Goldwater.



„No one has the right to impose their ideas
on the southerners”
(Goldwater)

„Personne n'a le droit d'imposer ses idées au
Sud”
(Goldwater)