

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

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BEFORE THE
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 13, 14, 1982

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SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES ¹

TUESDAY, JULY 13, 1982

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 o'clock p.m., in room H-405, the Capitol, Hon. Edward P. Boland (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Boland (presiding), Mazzoli, Mineta, Robinson, McClory, Whitehurst, and Young.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neill, chief counsel; Patrick G. Long, associate counsel; Herbert Romerstein, James O. Bush, Richard H. Giza, and Annette H. Smiley, professional staff members; and Sharon Leary, assistant clerk.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Chair will entertain a motion.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee hearings today and tomorrow be closed because of the nature of the material to be discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will call the roll.

Ms. LEARY. Mr. Boland.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Ms. LEARY. Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. Aye.

Ms. LEARY. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McCLORY. Aye.

Ms. LEARY. Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Aye.

Ms. LEARY. Mr. Chairman, four yeas.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is closed.

I would like to welcome John McMahon, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. This is the first time John has appeared before us since his confirmation. He was confirmed, as you know, unanimously, and we are delighted to have him with us today.

We are also delighted to have him joined by John Stein, the Deputy Director for Operations, and Martin Portman, of the CIA's Operations Directorate.

It is nice to have you.

James Freilach, also of the CIA's Operations Directorate.

Who else do you have?

Joanne, (Callahan) we are glad to have you.

¹ Edited in consultation with CIA and declassified.

In 1980 Mr. McMahon participated in a hearing before this committee on Soviet forgeries. Today's hearing will focus on the broader picture of Soviet active measures, which is the Soviet term for influence operations. This Soviet term has sometimes been defined as covert action. However, there are very significant differences between the Soviet term active measures and the CIA term covert action. While covert action refers to influence operations by CIA, active measures are carried out not only by the KGB but also by other elements of the Soviet apparatus. The KGB conducts the covert elements of Soviet influence operation while the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union uses the international Soviet fronts and foreign Communist Parties to carry out active measures.

Our colleague, Congressman Bill Young has requested these hearings to give us a better understanding of how hostile intelligence services operate. Today we will hear from CIA. Tomorrow morning's session will be devoted to the testimony of Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB major who defected to the United States in 1979. Tomorrow afternoon we will hear from the FBI on Soviet active measures in the United States.

I will be glad to yield to Mr. Robinson for any statement he might care to make.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to join you in congratulating John (McMahon) in his recent appointment, and I have no further opening.

Mr. McMAHON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the members of the committee for your willingness to conduct this hearing. There is growing evidence of Soviet "active measures" throughout the world. It is extremely important that we become as aware as we possibly can of just what it is that the Soviets are doing and what they intend to accomplish.

I appreciate very much the Agency being here and providing these witnesses for us today, as well as the Bureau, who we will hear tomorrow. I want to express my appreciation to all of you, and particularly to my old friend, John McMahon.

Mr. McMAHON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ROBINSON. I would like to endorse and support the committee's interest in publishing an unclassified transcript of these hearings because I think it would be very beneficial to meet the public interests and useful in exposing the methods employed by the Soviets in advancing their power and influence in world politics.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. We welcome that, and we will have it sanitized by the Central Intelligence Agency before proceeding on it.

I suppose one of the things we would like to know is how would you know about Soviet active measures, and how do you find out, and is there any area in which we have a deficiency in gleaning knowledge of Soviet active measures?

STATEMENT OF JOHN McMAHON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; AND JOHN STEIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY MARTIN C. PORTMAN OF CIA'S OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, AND JAMES FREILACH, OF CIA'S OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I think you will find from the testimony this afternoon and hopefully in response to questions that the committee has, that we have a fair insight into how the Soviets work their active measures program and the extensiveness of it.

I am certainly pleased with the opportunity which the committee has permitted us to inform you on the aims, scopes, and methods of the Soviet active measures against the United States and its interests abroad.

With me today, whom you have already cited, Mr. Chairman, are those that are most expert in this field and follow it on a day-to-day basis.

I would also like to introduce in the back Mr. Lane Crocker from the FBI, and as you noted, the FBI will be here tomorrow to testify.

Also, as requested by the committee, Mr. Stanislav Levchenko, a former major in the KGB who defected to the United States in 1979, will testify before the committee tomorrow. Mr. Levchenko was an active measures specialist serving in Tokyo under cover as a New Times correspondent at the time of his defection. He is the first Soviet active measures specialist to defect. The only other officer with related operational experience who defected was Mr. Ladislav Bittman, a former officer in the Czech intelligence service who defected over 14 years ago and has also testified before Congress on a number of occasions. Since Mr. Levchenko's defection, he has cooperated with the CIA by providing new information and validating established techniques for spotting Soviet active measures operations.

His Russian wife and son are in the Soviet Union where they have been persecuted because of his defection.

I might add here parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that Mrs. Levchenko is an architect, and the Soviets have refused to give her a job for over a year. She has had to borrow money from friends and relatives, and they have now permitted her to have a job as a cleaning woman for a few rubles a month. And their son is persecuted in school where he is forced to write letters on why his father was wrong and was a "traitor" to his country. In addition, Mr. Levchenko himself was tried in absentia in August 1981 where he was sentenced to death.

Mr. PORTMAN. We did a very thorough investigation of Mr. Levchenko after he defected, which included the polygraph. He gave us very extensive information not only on the Soviet system, but also on the activities of the KGB residency in Japan. He personally identified to us those agents and assets that he knew about. In many cases he did not know the names of these individuals, but by the identification that he provided us we have been able to identify a large number.

The information that he gave us we have been able to check out through various other means, and we are satisfied not only that he told

the truth, but also that the extent of information that he gave us was so damaging to the Soviet cause that it would be inconceivable that he might be under Soviet KGB control. Some of the most damaging information to the Soviet cause which he has provided concerns the detailed information about the KGB's operations and activities in the Japanese area.

As a result of the information that Major Levchenko has given the American Government, many agent assets or cooperative associates in Japan of the KGB residency have been identified. That indeed, from my own experience as a CIA operations officer who has served abroad, is devastating.

Mr. McMAHON. I have prepared a short opening statement which gives an overview of Soviet policy and practice in the field of propaganda and active measures. I am also providing the committee with two classified studies on the subject. One study, prepared by an Inter-agency Working Group and published in August 1981 as an Inter-agency Intelligence study, provides a detailed discussion of Soviet active measures. The second paper provides an updated account of various specific Soviet activities. The studies have been disseminated extensively among the executive agencies of the U.S. Government, and to this and other appropriate congressional committees, and in a condensed form to friendly foreign governments.

The studies have been well-received and the main study has been endorsed by the NATO Special Committee, which is the NATO body charged with responsibility for dealing with the counterintelligence aspects of Soviet active measures. In addition, we are providing for the record some more recent examples of Soviet forgeries and two short studies on Soviet agents-of-influence.

And I would like the chair's permission to enter all of these in the record.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter my entire statement, but today selectively glean the highlights from it so that the committee may spend a great deal of the time on questions and answers.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Mr. McMAHON. In my remarks today, I want to call attention to the key judgments of the Intelligence Memorandum and update the February 1980 CIA testimony before this committee with examples of recent Soviet active measures operations directed against the United States. However, I first want to review briefly the following points: the special role the Soviets assign to the propaganda and active measures, what we would call covert action, in their foreign policy; the structure of the Soviet policymaking system which facilitates the use of propaganda and active measures as foreign policy tools; and finally, the aims of Soviet policy and its focus on the United States as the primary target.

There is a tendency sometimes in the West to underestimate the significance of foreign propaganda and to cast doubt on the effectiveness of active measures as instruments of foreign policy. Soviet leaders, however, do not share such beliefs. They regard propaganda and active measures as important supplemental instruments in the conduct

of their foreign policy by conventional diplomatic, military and economic means. Indeed, to achieve what they perceive to be a major foreign policy objective, the Soviet leadership marshals all the relevant resources, conventional and unconventional. Additionally, Soviet tactics, what might be called the Party's line on the current situation, are well coordinated and integrated with Soviet strategy, the Party's long term general line.

Such coordination and integration tend to add to the effectiveness of both conventional and unconventional foreign policy instruments used by the USSR.

This Committee is well familiar with the active measures that the Soviets undertook against the INF, the intermediate—range nuclear forces, in Europe some years ago. That campaign, which began in 1979, continues unabated, and there is evidence that the Soviet Union is manipulating and financing activities by some elements of the so-called peace movement in Western Europe.

Let me hasten to add at this point, a word of caution is necessary. We all well know that not all opposition to NATO nuclear forces modernization is Soviet inspired. Many people are sincerely concerned about the potential danger of nuclear weapons. We do have good evidence, however, that the Soviets have sought to exploit and manipulate the movement, and we believe that the Soviet covert support has enabled it to grow beyond its own capabilities.

One of the studies I am providing for the record provides information on a Soviet agent-of-influence operation designed to exploit the so-called peace movement in a Scandinavian country.

The Soviet term "active measures" is used primarily in the intelligence context to distinguish influence operations from espionage and counterespionage, and tomorrow the FBI will go into extensive identification of the types of manipulation that they find here in the United States and what we have advised them happens overseas as well.

In the Soviet policymaking context, the ultimate approval for use of active measures, like all major decisions affecting Soviet foreign policy, rests with the highest level of the Soviet hierarchy, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The KGB is responsible for the implementation of most covert active measures operations. It closely coordinates its activities with two elements of the Soviet party bureaucracy, the International Department and the International Information Department. The extensive participation of these two powerful party components in active measures indicates both the importance attached to such activities by Soviet leaders and their appreciation of the policy implications of such activities.

The International Information Department of the CPSU is the directing center of the Soviet propaganda effort. It also cooperates with the KGB in the implementation of active measure operations. It was established in March 1978 as a direct result of the Central Committee decision to reorganize the entire foreign propaganda apparatus, improve its effectiveness, and carry on a propaganda offensive against the West.

The IID is headed by Leonid Zamyatin, former director of the Soviet news agency TASS, and a Brezhnev protege. Zamyatin is a full member of the CPSU Central Committee and like all Central Com-

mittee department heads is directly responsible to Brezhnev and the Politburo.

The CPSU International Department directs Western dialogue activities of Soviet organizations such as the USA-Canada Institute, is heavily involved in influencing Western Europeans on issues of peace and disarmament, maintains liaison with many foreign organizations that are frequently used to disseminate Soviet propaganda and views on international affairs as well as managing the front organizations which play such a troublesome role manipulating aspects of the European peace movement. Those organizations managed and motivated by the International Department include more than 70 pro-Soviet communist parties, the international front groups, and some national liberation movements.

The KGB provides a nonattributable adjunct to the overt Soviet propaganda network, as well as a highly developed political action mechanism. Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate plans, coordinates and supports operations which are designed to backstop overt Soviet propaganda. It utilizes forgeries, planted press articles, planted rumors, disinformation, and controlled information media.

Given the importance of propaganda and active measures in its foreign policy implementation, the USSR is willing to spend large sums of money on its program. The Soviets can draw upon the services of their East European allies and Cuba as well, to provide financial, technical, and operational support for the plans that are formulated in Moscow. The United States is the main target. The Soviet leadership sees active measures as an indispensable adjunct to the conduct of its foreign policy by traditional diplomatic, military and other means. The basic aims of active measure operations are to weaken the opponents of the USSR and to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow's views and international objectives worldwide.

Based on our own observations of Soviet behavior, we believe that the USSR's use of propaganda and covert action to advance its foreign policy goals in the international arena has increased rather than decreased or declined in recent years. The Soviets believe that their relations with the United States have entered a new phase of competition, even before the invasion of Afghanistan and the advent of the present administration, in which tougher tactics will be the order of the day.

In analyzing the increased use of propaganda and active measures, we must also take into account the importance Moscow attributes to the ideological struggle in world politics. The ideological struggle encompasses not only competition in propaganda, but also psychological warfare and subversion, including the full range of active measure activities.

I would now like to summarize for you the key findings of the study I mentioned in the beginning of my statement.

Active measures are in essence an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They contribute effectively to the strategic Soviet purpose, central to Soviet foreign policy, of extending Moscow's influence and power throughout the world.

The primary target of Soviet active measures is the United States, which the Soviet Union has long regarded as its main opponent and the principal obstacle to carrying out its policies.

The Soviet regime generously provides the necessary financial, technical, and personnel resources necessary to support active measures operations.

Political influence operations are the most important, ambiguous, but least visible of Soviet active measures. They range from the use of agents of influence, through the manipulation of private channels of communication, to the exploitation of unwitting contacts. These operations have a common aim: To insinuate Soviet policy views into foreign governmental, journalistic, business, labor, academic, and artistic opinion in a nonattributable fashion.

Soviet active measures are poorly understood and are infrequently countered systematically by Western and Third World governments. As a result, the Soviets have been able to go about their large scale active measures efforts quite freely, to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy interests abroad.

The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and its system of pervasive control and direction over all elements of its society give the Soviet leadership a capability at once impressive and effective, to draw on all elements of the party and government and on so-called private individuals and organizations in orchestrating active measures support for foreign policy positions.

Soviet active measures tactics may be adjusted to accommodate changes in the international situation, but the basic techniques and the strategic purpose remain the same.

In this regard, we see likely trends in future Soviet use of active measures: Greater attention to security, disarmament and peace issues; increased objectivity and reasonableness in the propaganda elements of active measures, and a tactical deemphasis of Communist ideology; greater operational sophistication in the manipulation of influence assets and in the production and use of documentary forgeries; greater willingness to work with religious groups and non-Communist political parties, as well as greater use of single-issue and ad hoc front groups instead of the older, larger, well-known Communist front organizations; continued use of allies, proxies and surrogates such as Cuba; continued opposition to Western instruments of social and economic influence in the Third World, and greater advocacy of the creation of new international institutions and organizations such as a Third World press service that promote Soviet influence.

We have had and continue to have a good understanding of Soviet active measures techniques and concepts and of the way in which they serve to advance Moscow's foreign policy interests. We therefore have confidence in our judgments and the evidence adduced to support them.

I would like now to focus briefly on recent developments in the Soviet use of forged documents. And as was noted in previous testimony before this committee, it is an established Soviet practice to employ forgeries in active measures and psychological warfare operations against the United States. Most forgeries have been fabrications of official-looking Government documents and communiques as well as alterations of real U.S. Government documents. The Soviets also have manufactured personal letters which were allegedly written by U.S. officials and which purport to contain information regarding official policy.

The practice of attributing forged documents to senior U.S. officials, including the President and Vice President of the United States, began during the previous administration and continues today. It is something the Soviets had refrained from doing in the past and suggests a certain degree of disdain and greater audacity on their part.

For a brief period in the mid-1970's, the Soviets had reduced and then curtailed altogether their production of anti-U.S. forgeries. In 1976, however, they resumed using forgeries as an integral part of their active measures program. In 1980 and 1981 at least five new forgeries that we believe were Soviet inspired appeared each year, and so far in 1982 we have noted seven more forgeries in this category. This represents a significant pickup in the Soviet forgery effort. Not only has the number of forgeries increased in recent years, but there also have been qualitative changes as well.

Moscow's intensified use of forgeries appears to be aimed mainly at the United States and U.S. security relations in Europe rather than at our allies per se. The Soviets are trying to play upon perceived differences between the United States and West Europeans, while at the same time trying to preserve their détente relationship with Western Europe. However, Europe is not the only target area. We have noted the appearance of recent forgeries which are directed against U.S. interests in Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southwest Asia. These forgeries all serve Soviet policy interests.

In summary, I would say that the use of forged documents continues to be a major weapon in the Soviet active measures arsenal used against the United States. Moreover, the pace appears to be quickening. We are now detecting new forgeries at a rate of one a month.

In April we learned that a Western embassy had received in the mail a forged State Department cable which purportedly acknowledged CIA links with the Polish Solidarity movement.

In May, a forged document purporting to be signed by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige appeared in Brussels when it was mailed to several foreign correspondents stationed there.

In June we detected two forgeries. One appeared in Zimbabwean, Tanzanian and Zambian media. It purported to be a copy of a letter from a U.S. business firm, which is in fact a legally constituted, chartered, and registered corporation, written to a general officer in the South African Air Force.

The second forgery last month was a fabricated Pentagon News Release dated May 5, 1982, providing alleged remarks by Secretary of Defense Weinberger regarding U.S. support to Great Britain in the Falkland crisis.

We are forced to react to such Soviet initiatives, and, we believe that defensive measures on our part are useful and reasonably effective and we expect to support efforts of this type in the future, that is, exposing these forgeries. The CIA is cooperating with other governmental departments to expose Soviet active measures and to increase the political costs of such operations to the Soviet Union.

In this connection, you probably noticed newspaper accounts last week concerning the State Department press backgrounder on suspected Soviet forgeries of U.S. documents in the past few months. Although this was a State initiative, it grew out of an interagency

concern over Soviet forgery activities. We support such efforts since public awareness that forgeries are circulating can be a good defense against them.

In closing, I would like to submit for the record some more detailed comments on two agents-of-influence cases and several recent forgeries. These forgeries all dovetail neatly with Soviet foreign policy objectives, and for most of them, the operational techniques closely follow those identified as characteristic of Soviet procedures. (See exhibits IV and IX, page 68f, and page 74f.)

One final comment: The totality of Soviet active measures undertaken against the United States involves a massive effort dangerous to our foreign policy interests. Tomorrow, when Stanislav Levchenko talks with you, you will see first hand the damage the Soviets have done in Japan and to United States interests there. The Interagency Intelligence Study and its update will also give you numerous examples of very harmful, disruptive actions of the Soviets. In this regard, I call your particular attention to Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures which I will submit for the record, which cite the vicious oral and written disinformation campaign against a U.S. Foreign Service Officer whom the Soviets came to dislike because of the forthright press briefings he had given on Soviet actions in Afghanistan. This Soviet-instigated slander campaign has continued, despite official U.S. protests, and as recently as July 2, at probable Soviet initiative, an Urdu language daily newspaper in Lahore published the totally unjustified charges that this individual was involved in the assassination of the former Bangladesh President, Mujibur Rahman in 1975.

That concludes, Mr. Chairman, my official statement.

(The monographs and documents discussed by Mr. McMahon appear as exhibits I to IX, page 31 to page 135.)

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. McMahon.

As I understand it, the International Department, International Information Department, and the KGB are responsible for most of these adverse operations.

Is that correct, these active measures?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir, they conduct them and/or manage them. The KGB usually carries out either active measure operations directly or through one of its front organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would you detail as being the most important active measures in which these departments are engaged?

Mr. McMAHON. I would cite two. First is the agent-of-influence operation, which capitalizes not only on recruited agents, but also on unwitting people who have a cause to advance.

The second is propaganda. The media being what it is today, it is easy to get information passed all around the world, and it is reprinted, and thereby you can reach a large cross section of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the evidence suggests, and your statement suggests that the Soviets apparently have a massive propaganda machine.

Any indication at all of how many people or persons are engaged in propaganda within the International Department and the International Information Department?

This is exclusive of the KGB. The KGB, as I understand it, is responsible for all covert activities, is that correct; in conjunction with others?

Mr. McMAHON. That is correct. Others implement it. They are responsible for the nonattribution of the covert action program.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the size of their propaganda effort body-wise, people-wise?

You may answer any time you want.

Mr. PORTMAN. I don't have detailed figures on all of them but in the KGB, which is Service A, which is the covert operative, there are probably close to 200 staff officers in the headquarters element, 100 of them in the service itself, and the rest spread out around Moscow. Fifty of them sit in a special section in the headquarters of the Novosti News Service, which you recall the Soviets continue to try to present to the world as an unofficial organ.

The International Information Department and the International Department, probably another couple of hundred staff, and a large consultant group.

If you start bringing in Radio Moscow, the newspapers, New Times, the press services, others, you are probably talking in terms of certainly another couple of thousand staff people, plus stringers.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you again, with respect to the International Department and the International Information Department, I presume that their specific responsibilities are as you have indicated, manipulation, control of the media, or misinformation, use of Communist party front organizations, clandestine radio broadcasting, and forgeries—I take it that these two particular departments are not actively engaged in military operations or economic activities, is that correct? Is there a split of authority between the KGB's operations and those which are specifically reserved for the International Department and the International Information Department?

Mr. PORTMAN. It is probably the level of staffing on it. There is no split in responsibilities as such. The International Department oversees certain elements of Soviet foreign policy on behalf of the Politburo and the Secretariat. Therefore, they are involved across the board, even in military or economic actions.

The International Information Department is more limited. They are strictly in the propaganda area, and thus they are not involved in economic or military actions.

The KGB can be involved in any part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that the propaganda effort has been increased substantially over the past few years, targeted probably to various kinds of propaganda, and specifically now to the peace movement and nuclear freeze in other areas that they seem to be enjoying some success with some of our European friends and neighbors.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir. They have also been very active in attempting to identify the United States with South Africa, to the detriment of black Africa.

And, of course, we have already seen them at work down in Central America, capitalizing on the problems down there, to accuse the United States of trying to export imperialism to Central America.

The CHAIRMAN. How significant are the forgeries that come your way or that creep into the press or the communications media in foreign countries?

Mr. McMAHON. Well, the impact can be dramatic. If we are not able to counter it right away, then that leaves a lasting impression. We have been fortunate to expose the forgeries for being what they are immediately to the host countries involved. That has permitted us to deflect the effectiveness as far as the country in which it was floated and the target against which it was floated, but the forgeries we find are becoming more and more professional, and by using real documents and just manipulating a little bit, there is a great appearance of authenticity given to the documents.

Mr. PORTMAN. Sir, in their regular propaganda campaign, if they run into problems, people won't believe the charges that are made. For instance, at the time in Afghanistan when the Soviets overthrew the previous governmental structure there and installed the current regime of Babrak Karmal, they charged that Amin, the previous President, was a CIA spy. Well, nobody believed that, universally. When something like that occurs and when they still want to go through with their charges, they will often haul out a forgery to try to provide the proof.

In this case, they give a forgery, one of those that are cited here, to an Afghan embassy in Asia, and they were supposed to float it out there as proof. You will recall that the U.S. embassy in Islamabad had been overrun and burned before that. The Soviets came up with a forgery that was partly burned and allegedly was a cable which was sent by the Ambassador in Islamabad to our Ambassador in Kabul. Well, we got our hands on that forgery and know who was supposed to float that forgery.

But this is an example of the way they try to use forgeries to buttress their propaganda activities.

Mr. FREILACH. Sir, if I may comment on the effectiveness. We cannot always be sure when we issue denials how many people will hear and believe those denials; and second, not all forgeries are designed to receive media publicity. We know of several cases where they did their damage privately, and unless we know about these forgeries, we cannot be sure exactly what they are doing.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, may I interject on that point?

Do we have any program to advise our friends, allies, and acquaintances in the world that these things are happening and that they should be on the lookout for something that appears suspicious?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir. Some of the papers we prepared on the trends and movements in Soviet active measures program we have disseminated to friendly governments around the world. We also have—

Mr. YOUNG. What about to media around the world, John?

Mr. PORTMAN. ICA put together a background pamphlet for use of all of our public affairs officers overseas which gives the criteria on how to assess forgeries in the field. It gives examples of the type of way the Soviets go about doing it. This kit is now available in all embassies and can be drawn on on an ad hoc basis before they can consult Washington if something breaks in a hurry so they can do something about it.

Now, ICA brought that out last year, and that was one step in this direction.

Mr. McMAHON. We also have an individual who appeared before this committee a couple of years ago and who is recognized throughout the United States as one of the leading forensic scientists, and he has been very successful in describing to those individuals who come upon the forgeries, or are the targets of the forgeries, that indeed they are forgeries, and he can show them why and how.

Mr. FREILACH. Sir, if I could add in that context, there is also an interagency working group chaired by the State Department. Representatives of the CIA, FBI, National Security Council, ICA, and Defense Department attend these weekly meetings, and this group aims to enhance public awareness of Soviet active measures through a variety of vehicles.

For example, the Department of State last fall initiated a new series of Foreign Affairs Notes.

One was on expulsions of Soviet diplomats, giving the basic details of each expulsion, and often these will involve active measures as well as espionage cases.

Another Foreign Affairs Note was on the World Peace Council, the largest and most important of the Soviet-controlled fronts. This happened to come out at a time when the World Peace Council was having a conference in Helsinki, and by distributing it to foreign journalists, some questioning was possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Do we have any perception of what proportion of the Soviet effort in this regard is overt versus covert?

Mr. PORTMAN. I would say there is a very large percentage if you count words or pounds or whatever you use in the overt propaganda area, and I would say assessing it from a value point of view, that probably the Soviets do us more damage by supporting that overt effort through very carefully constructed covert things like I was mentioning before, the Amin telegram and so forth, to highlight it and back it up.

So percentagewise, the Soviets probably spend more money and manpower on the overt side, but I would say that compared with what the U.S. Government puts out, the Soviets have a larger covert area as well.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. Robinson, you can never overestimate the impact of an agent of influence. If you have an individual who is an adviser to a minister or a president, or if you have a minister himself as your agent of influence, you can do a tremendous amount in a country as far as active measures are concerned. It is the most insidious, pernicious thing to deal with as far as a countermeasure is concerned. And you don't have to expend a lot of effort to do that. One only has to recruit that agent and tell him what to do, and he will go do it.

Mr. PORTMAN. In this regard, referred to before was the increase in the Soviet effort in the last few years. Part of this is their increased sophistication and effectiveness here.

Ten years ago, for instance, they were very prone only to want to deal with assets that they fully controlled and supported. So in inter-

national movements, they tried to get the World Peace Council elements, and so forth, out front.

Today the Soviets are willing to use people who fly under false colors. Parts of it are these agents of influence. Parts of it are these ad hoc groups.

So today they are perfectly willing to make common cause with some people they would not before, including religious elements or whatever, that will help their action. And in the process of that, many people get misled because a lot of these people that they then recruit as these clandestine agents of influence within the organizations are not overtly noticeable as such.

That is how effective they are.

Mr. ROBINSON. In addition to the forgeries of U.S. documents and other types of documents, you mentioned other forms.

Are there other examples other than the forgery effort that are increasing significantly?

Mr. McMAHON. The Soviets are trying to capitalize on the peace movement that is both here in the United States as well as overseas in Europe, and I think that Mr. O'Malley from the FBI tomorrow will speak to you about the efforts that we know the KGB are trying to conduct right here in the United States, seizing upon the peace movement here.

Mr. ROBINSON. What about the efforts they are exerting in other countries with regard to this nuclear freeze that has grown in such proportion.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, we see that that is very extensive and that they have alerted all of their residenturas to play the peace drum, to support the anti-INF program, and back in 1980 we had sized a hypothetical, comparable U.S. effort at \$100 million, and I don't know what they have put against that program of late. But money is no problem for them. Since it is an integral part of their foreign policy, they consider that just as they would a \$4 billion a year aid program to Cuba.

Mr. PORTMAN. It is not that they have increased use of one technique or another. The bag of tricks has been there for a long time. It is a question of how you use it, on what issues, and with what force. Forgeries have been used more now because the total effort has been increased considerably and I think forgeries are more noticeable to us because they come quickly to our attention. We see it and we can judge it as a reflection of the total effort. But the rest of the resources, the items they put in the foreign press, the use of agents to influence and all of these other things have a proportionate gain. So the amount of effort is increased. The themes are there. Almost every time an incident occurs, we can see a parallel active measures.

When they had their problems with "WHISKEY on the rocks," the submarine incident in Sweden, in order to get the pressure off—and I think the Bureau will go into some detail on this tomorrow, they tried to float some forged telegrams here in Washington to try to get the focus switched. That didn't work.

Mr. STEIN. If I may speculate, I think it is fair to speculate, that in an era of detente the use of a forgery which when all is said and done is a fairly crude, essentially a crude kind of active measure, is less acceptable than when the two sides are sort of not speaking, or speaking harshly to one another, when a forgery becomes somewhat more

acceptable as an art form. And I think that may be one reason why we are seeing more forgeries now than perhaps 5, 6, or 7 years ago.

Mr. ROBINSON. John, you called our attention to certain paragraphs in *Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures*, which referred to an FSO becoming a target for Soviet active measures. His name is Griffin.

Mr. McMAHON. George Griffin.

Mr. ROBINSON. Why did they zero in on him?

Mr. STEIN. Essentially because he told the truth about the Soviet move into Afghanistan, and they didn't like it.

Mr. ROBINSON. But certainly there were others who did the same thing. I just find it difficult that they make one individual a target and apparently have not done the same with regard to others.

Mr. PORTMAN. He was stationed—when he was stationed in Kabul, he came down to New Delhi once a week and briefed the foreign press—this was about 1½ years ago or so, and if you will remember, much of the information in the world press, including the American press, the details of what was going on in that struggle, were datelined New Delhi. And so in point of fact, he was one of the principal sources for the real information on the struggle in that country. And that was quite upsetting to the Soviets.

They did their best at first to try to get the Indian Government to refuse him a visa to enter the country, and so forth. Finally the State Department decided to have him assigned after his tour in Kabul to New Delhi as the chief of the political section in the Embassy. That is when the Soviets started this campaign to try to force the Indian Government to refuse agreement to his assignment there, which the Soviets succeeded in doing. He is serving elsewhere now, but apparently they have decided that it is an effective issue and have been riding him ever since. As you saw, we referred only to a few weeks ago when the last false charge came out, which, by the way, surfaced in Pakistan in an Urdu paper.

So again, it centers around the problems he caused the Soviets relative to Afghanistan, and they are still very sensitive.

Mr. STEIN. That is not without precedent. There have been other Embassy officers whom the Soviets have tracked for this kind of treatment around the world for many years.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mazzoli.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not sure I really have any active questions, but I would like to maybe just do a couple of things to start out with.

Somewhere in your statement, Mr. McMahon, I was rather intrigued because you describe at one point in there the likely trends in future Soviet use of active measures.

It was in your earlier statement. It says in this regard we see some likely trends in the future for the use of active measures. One is greater attention to security, disarmament, and peace issues. Another one is increased "objectivity" and "reasonableness" in the propaganda elements of active measures, and a tactical deemphasis on Communist ideology. And I see you report greater Soviet willingness to work with religious groups and non-Communist political parties, as well as greater use of single issue and ad hoc front groups. And, of course, continued use of allies, proxies and surrogates.

And I'm saying that sounds very much like a political campaign to me. Those are the things that we use in American political campaigns, if you just drop the communist part of it, I guess what that sort of keys me into thinking, throughout what you said today, and what I have been reading about to get a little feeling for this subject, is the fact that this is really—it is an effort to control public opinion or to influence public opinion, which is really what we do as a kind of part and parcel of our political activity in our own country.

Now, when I start doing something, if I do it at home, and I go too far or something, then my opponent jumps on me, and then he has his day, and if we are both wrong, the press jumps on us.

I am just wondering here, do we have the opportunities and do we seize them as well as we can to keep their feet to the fire? In other words, they are trying to influence public opinion here, and do we then follow suit and try to influence public opinion on their side, and if we do, do we do it as successfully apparently as they seem to?

Mr. McMAHON. We are late players to that game, Mr. Mazzoli. We certainly try to counter it, and I have noted some of the gestures—and that is all they are, are gestures—that are being taken through our embassies. But we are dealing with a \$3 billion to \$4 billion program that the Soviets have, and we are hitting it with a flyswatter when we ask the Ambassador to do something. Where the United States is trying to begin to counter this is to get out U.S. policy through our official organs such as ICA, and RFE, et cetera, but we still do not have the organization to impact the European media, so to speak, on the truth of INF. In fact, we have trouble doing that diplomatically, let alone coming out to the people. So we are behind the power curve in trying to counter that, and even though we are on the side of the angels, the bad guys are winning.

Mr. MAZZOLI. One thing, I was just glancing through my book here, I notice that tomorrow we get to hear from the FBI, and in the prepared testimony of the FBI gentlemen, he made reference to "whiskey on the rocks," about that submarine that went aground in Sweden. He details here a couple of pages of mailgrams which were sent, among others, to the U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, the Swedish mission to the United Nations, and the head of the U.S. National Security Council. The mailgrams were all similar in content, suggesting there was some kind of a deal between us and the Swedes to use this naval base. The senders were shown in various mailgrams as the Swedish Ambassador to the United States, two senior U.S. Department of State officials, and one senior U.S. Department of Defense official, all of whom deny they ever sent these telegrams.

It turned out an analysis of the mailgrams revealed they were almost certainly drafted by non-native-speaking persons since the language used several syntactical errors and unusual grammatical constructions.

I was just wondering how inexpert this was. They were sent to important officials who obviously would check out whether or not they were authentic. They were supposedly sent by officials in our Government, like a senior U.S. Department of Defense official, and a senior member of the State Department. Does that suggest that these Soviet operations are not very effective?

Mr. McMAHON. What we think may have happened there, Mr. Mazzoli, was that Kim Philby, who was probably the head of their

English department and grammar department, retired, and they now have someone doing it who doesn't have the idiomatic flavor of good English language, and as a result we do see the stilted style.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Is that what they are getting for \$4 billion, a guy who can't speak English?

Mr. McMAHON. Well, yes. You can see that the Soviets at times do not show sophistication, not even in their weapons systems.

Mr. MAZZOLI. How can they be effective if they use non-English-speaking people to draft English language telegrams?

Mr. PORTMAN. That was done in a hurry. Those telegrams came out within a couple of weeks, practically days after the incident. When they have time enough to work it up, they do a good job, but occasionally they get some crash programs.

Mr. McMAHON. In fact, we were envious of the turnaround time.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Young?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. McMahon, can you give us some examples of the manipulation, exploitation and financing of the peace movement on the part of the Soviet active measures groups?

Mr. McMAHON. We have information that some recruited Soviet agents in the peace movement were given instructions by the Soviets on actions to take. But, we were well aware that the peace movement in Europe did have a very native and genuine spawning. Yet the Soviets were able to capitalize on that and drive it much further than what the Europeans expected. We also have reporting which the Bureau will get into tomorrow, which shows that the Soviets tried to do the same thing in New York, when they knew there was going to be a very large "peace" demonstration up there. The Soviets came in and tried to acquire all of the information they could about who was who in the peace movement, what coalitions were getting together, who were the key players, in order that they could begin to pressure them in the direction the Soviets wanted to go.

Mr. PORTMAN. There is a wide variety, sir, of different ways they do it. We know of at least two Communist parties in Western Europe where we have solid information on the extent of funding that they have passed through individual members into the working level of some of these movements rather than on the higher level where it is more noticeable. We also have the example here in the testimony that we submitted of the gentleman in Denmark who was involved on the Soviets' behalf. He, for instance, got a large group of about 50 well-known Danish citizens to make a peace appeal. They published this appeal in Danish newspapers.

Well, the KGB gave him the funds to pay for the costs of running this advertisement in all the major newspapers. So there is a very wide variety of techniques used to work it in.

There is the Christian Peace Conference, an offshoot of the World Peace Council, which operates out of Prague but which uses cooperative Bloc clergymen as its nucleus. They have been involved again in infusing some funds into the non-Communist church elements in some of these movements in Western Europe. (See exhibit V, p. 67f.)

Mr. YOUNG. Would you expand on this, if you can, following financial transactions with any checks or vouchers or any hard evidence in that regard?

And the reason I don't ask you to do it now is because if we don't leave and vote, we are going to miss the vote.

Mr. McMAHON. I think you will also find from Mr. Levchenko tomorrow specifics to that end.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be right back.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. PORTMAN. What I was referring to in the Danish case, if you turn to exhibit IV, p. 64f, I could refer to some of the specific there.

Peterson was originally a Communist journalist in Denmark who then left overt contact with the party and functioned essentially in a more general freelance role. He was recruited by the Soviets to use as both an agent of influence and as journalistic placement asset, and he is the one that financed this particular advertisement that I am talking about. They also used him in other aspects which are illustrative of what we are talking about. They wrote for him the text of two books which he got and then rewrote in his own style so that it sounded like him instead of Moscow speaking.

One of those books, which came out in 1979, called the "Cold Warriors," gives a very biting attack against a number of figures, not only Margaret Thatcher but also Senators Henry Jackson and Barry Goldwater in the United States.

A second pamphlet which he put out the next year was a very vicious attack on Prime Minister Thatcher in Great Britain. (See exhibit IV-A, p. 64f.) Those are the types of contributions which are also made by Soviet assets in this effort at discrediting our policy and pushing their own.

Mr. McCLORY. Don't they just regard this as a legitimate intelligence or propaganda technique? Anything is fair as long as the objective that is being sought is consistent with their ends.

Mr. McMAHON. Whatever ends justify the means.

Mr. McCLORY. You mentioned just a moment ago about KGB agents infiltrating or infusing ideas into a peace movement or a church group. It would seem to me that for our intelligence agencies to publicize that fact, immediately, might cause this legitimate church group or peace group to become aware of what is going on, and they would want to refuse to be used.

We see here in the material before us, in your testimony, and in our own knowledge of the way the Soviet intelligence community operates that they just use any means they can, any group they can to attain their ends. And I think so many times, at least my impression is that we withhold information that we have. We don't make it public, and we sort of permit activities to go on despite solid information that we don't fully publicize.

Mr. McMAHON. You are right, Mr. McClory, and we probably have not capitalized on a great deal of information we have to expose situations such as that. We are often reticent to do that, either because we are concerned about protection of a source, or second, because there may be a longer term gain in seeing it through. One might lose the tactical advantage but gain the strategic end. We are constantly torn between exposing something like that and protecting either a source or a longer term interest.

Mr. McCLORY. Your testimony today indicated forgeries and disinformation were utilized generously by the KGB in order to try to

undermine our interests in Central and South America during the Falklands episode, a completely understandable position as far as the Soviets are concerned. I think there must be a general awareness that that is part of their objective, part of their policy.

Mr. McMAHON. Indeed, very understandable on their part.

Mr. PORTMAN. The problem, sir, is in recognizing it. I think we all feel philosophically we can understand how it is logical for them to do this. On the other hand, when you come up with a specific piece of information. You are a foreign journalist, for instance, and someone gives you a hot tip about something occurring, or did you realize that the U.S. Government has not only given the British the material that they have announced, but they have also given them a whole lot of new information that comes out of it. That journalist feels, well this is a logical type of thing and therefore tends to accept it and use it and not stop to think at that point that this might be Soviet disinformation.

Mr. McCLORY. I am very wary of the nuclear freeze movement, especially as it has developed in Western Europe, and I am sure that it has strong support from Eastern Europe, the Eastern Bloc countries. Yet I also have a feeling, and I think it is partly borne out by testimony we have received from the CIA, in the way of economic information, that the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc nations, are hurting economically. They are hurting economically as far as their domestic or their internal programs are concerned, and likewise, as far as where their military expenditures are concerned. They want to promote a strong peace movement in the West to help prepare the climate for some kind of mutual nuclear freeze or reduction or whatever.

Mr. McMAHON. It also gives them an advantage which they now enjoy. The SS-20 is a fairly sophisticated medium range system. They also have the SS-18 ICBM which has tremendous throw weight, and as Soviet sophistication comes along they can add more MIRV's. And so if you do have a freeze, you can see that just doubles their advantage right away.

Mr. McCLORY. I realize that, I realize that, but I cannot help but feel that there is strong motivation on the part of the Soviet Union for developing some kind of an arms control, nuclear arms control or nuclear arms reduction, I would assume that is because of the impossibility of maintaining that burden.

Mr. McMAHON. Well, the beauty of a Communist society, sir, is you just squeeze the civilian. You know, it doesn't go bankrupt, you just make the people eat less. That is exactly what you see happening in the Soviet Union. They are diverting resources out of the civil sector into their military establishment because they don't have sufficient growth to expand.

Mr. McCLORY. But aren't your findings—and we have had very sophisticated economic findings provided by the CIA, not only concerning the Soviet Union but also the Soviet Bloc nations, that there are threatening internal problems for the Soviet Union. These can get out of hand as they have in Poland. Except for the concessions that they have made in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, they would not be able to maintain the stability in the whole area.

Mr. McMAHON. It is certainly very difficult, and very difficult when compared to our standards, but I don't see the Soviet Union going

bankrupt. I think they can still weather a much larger storm than what is in front of them.

What you do see is that by all of the economic standards we have, their life gets worse, and that is indeed the case, but they are committed to putting an additional 4 percent of their equivalent gross national product into defense each year, even though the country is growing at less than 2 percent. And that means they take the difference out of the civil sector. They do not develop as much as they should. The people don't have enough meat to eat. They can't import all the grain they want because they can't pay for it. And this is why the pipeline emerges so critically important to the Soviets, because it is \$7 billion to \$8 billion a year in good, hard currency that they are going to end up getting which permits them to go into the western world to get some of the western benefits and technology that they cannot make themselves because they cannot plow the money into investment.

Mr. McCLORY. I don't know that you mentioned anything about forgeries or propaganda or disinformation in the Mid East crisis, especially operations by the KGB in Beirut with the elements that are involved in there.

Mr. McMAHON. What we have seen is the radio broadcasts, which carry the theme that the United States is the cause of all of it, the United States and the Israelis, certainly the Israelis with United States help, and of course, over the past couple of years we have seen the clandestine radio in southern Russia broadcasting into Iran.

Mr. McCLORY. The Soviets have been strongly anti-Israeli.

Mr. McMAHON. Very much so.

Mr. McCLORY. For a long, long time.

However, they seem to be rather noninvolved right now except for the United Nations as far as any participation in the events of Lebanon are concerned.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir. We don't see any evidence of Soviet involvement there. We do see that the Soviets have sent in some military supplies into Syria. We have seen the Syrians asking the Soviets for more and better equipment and leading us to say the Syrians were very miffed at the poor performance of the Soviet weapons systems compared to the U.S. weapons systems that the Israelis had, and they are demanding that the Soviets replace those 80 planes that were shot down in that turkey-shoot with better airplanes.

And we know the Soviets were being chastised by the Syrians for giving them the lousy equipment for billions of dollars in hard currency.

Mr. McCLORY. Is there a big Soviet embassy in Beirut, and are there a lot of KGB agents there?

Mr. McMAHON. There used to be a KGB residency in the Soviet Embassy in Beirut. We don't see any influence of the Soviets in Lebanon except as whatever support they gave the Palestinians. We see very large stores of arms that have been captured that are Soviet arms, but the Palestinians could have gotten that from the Libyans, the Syrians, indirectly from the Soviets.

Mr. STEIN. You can bet your bottom dollar that one of their active measures in the near future will be to convince the world that their arms are just as good as anybody else's.

Mr. PORTMAN. We haven't seen much evidence of it because of the pace of the activity, but there are some bits and pieces that we are seeing of an active measures adjunct to what is going on there, and there has been a Soviet effort to convince the PLO not to give in and move out of the western sector of Beirut. This has caused some backing and forthing between some Soviets and some others because when someone else then says, but doesn't that mean that the Israelis probably will go in and slaughter us, the answer is maybe that is in the end better for you and so forth.

They have been passing some commentary through influence assets here that we have seen some evidence of, and to supplement the rather quiet overt stand that they have had. So they are active, but most of the time in a crisis like this, we aren't talking to the same assets that they are, and so it takes us a while to learn about what they are exactly saying in cases like this, behind the scenes.

Mr. McCLORY. Is it hard for you to understand why they are not utilizing these incidents to undermine the Israelis and their interests and their credibility in the United States, in Lebanon and Beirut?

Mr. McMAHON. I don't think they have any way of doing much about it other than talk. If they want to really do something about it, then they have to get physically involved, and we see great reluctance on the part of the Soviets to confront the Israelis directly in a military way.

They will undoubtedly, if pressed. If the Israelis threaten Syria, we feel that the Soviets would indeed put troops into Syria to maintain defensive positions, the SAM sites and things like that. We don't see the Soviets attempting to move into Lebanon to support the Palestinians.

Mr. McCLORY. I assume there are a great many leaders in the Arab world that are helping to keep the Arab world either pro-American or neutral as far as the whole Mid East conflict.

Mr. McMAHON. Exactly right, the moderate Arab must feel exposed at the present moment by supporting the U.S. given the present situation. We are going to have to take some measures as a nation to continue to woo them and make them feel that they are not out on a limb all by themselves.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did proceed in your absence.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill, do you have some more?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our witness tomorrow, Mr. Levchenko, wasn't he a journalist?

Mr. McMAHON. He was a KGB officer under cover of a journalist from New Times.

Mr. YOUNG. Apparently he had talent as a journalist to maintain that cover.

Mr. McMAHON. They sent him to school for a long time, and he did practice his cover so to speak. So he could conduct himself as a journalist in Japan.

Mr. YOUNG. How often do we see journalists being used by the KGB or any of the Soviet agencies in their active measures programs, or someone using the cover of a journalist?

Mr. PORTMAN. Rather extensively. They use some more than others. They have used all types of journalistic cover. New Times, which is the

organization to which Mr. Levchenko was assigned, when he went out in the early 1970's, had 14 foreign correspondents, of which 12 were staff officers of the KGB. Today I believe, if my figures are right, they have 16 foreign correspondents, of which all but two also are staff officers of the KGB. Some of the other journalistic organizations have a much lower percentage, but traditionally, New Times and the Literary Gazette, two Soviet publications, have been used by the KGB's active measures service and the International Department as a mechanism available for this type of activity.

Today my equivalent in the KGB or the International Department can deal directly with those papers to get anything he wants published without having to go up to the chain of command and back down again. Now, if he is dealing with some other Soviet journalist, it is different. So they vary widely in use of some of the instruments they have.

Mr. YOUNG. Are you aware of any criticism on the part of the worldwide journalistic profession to object to the Soviet use of journalists in their active measures programs?

Mr. McMAHON. We haven't been exposed to that except to the extent that we have been accused of it.

Mr. YOUNG. When you are accused of it, I am quite aware of the criticism and the wrath that is heaped upon your heads, but what I am trying to find out is if the same thing happens to the Soviets. Do any of the people that criticize you criticize the Soviets?

Mr. McMAHON. No. In fact, we tried to do an anatomy of the peace movement in Europe to see why is it that many Europeans were making less of a public issue of the Soviet SS-20's directed against them than of our plans for putting in PERSHING II's to counter the Soviet missiles. The answer was that the Europeans who oppose nuclear weapons feel they have no influence on the Soviets, while they can have some influence on their governments and on us. That is probably the same rationale on the journalists.

Mr. YOUNG. The rules are so different for the two divergent viewpoints, aren't they?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir, we feel that very acutely.

Mr. YOUNG. I am sure you do.

Well, Martin mentioned the extensive use of journalists.

Do you have numbers and names? Can you provide us with specific examples of Soviet journalists or people operating under the cover of journalists that we could have for our records?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, indeed, yes, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. That would be very, very helpful to us, especially as we also encounter the type of criticisms that you come in contact with, of whether or not journalists should be used in intelligence operations, et cetera.

Mr. STEIN. May I clarify the question? Are you talking about Soviets who are journalists and KGB officers?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. I think the key is the Soviet staff intelligence officers using covers of journalists, but there have been cases of recruited agents who were non-Soviet journalists.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

Mr. STEIN. Fine.

(See exhibit VI, p. 68f.)

Mr. YOUNG. And our witness tomorrow, that is the role he played.

Mr. PORTMAN. The Soviets also, of course, use organized journalistic mechanisms which have foreigners in them which is what John was referring to. This causes a lot of problems and is not recognized in the same way that the Soviets are. The tension has been created even at the U.N. recently, in UNESCO, concerning Third World media organizations. The Soviets for years have been into a campaign to convince a number of Third World countries that are primarily serviced by Western news services like the AP, UPI, Reuters and so forth, that they are getting very biased, proimperialist news and so forth, and that they should have their own Third World news services.

There has been a major effort recently in Latin America to get a Latin American news service put together using a front figure who has a Communist Party background but who is not now an official of the party.

Mr. YOUNG. I wish you would do that as extensively as you can. Chairman Boland mentioned earlier the 1980 hearing we had with Mr. McMahon on Soviet forgeries. There was a great demand on what this committee published.

Mr. McMAHON. It still is a good seller.

Mr. YOUNG. It is out of print. We don't have enough copies to supply all the requests, and I have an idea that assuming we published a report based on this series of hearings, that it is also going to be a best seller. I think the American people would like to know about this. So be as extensive as you can.

Mr. STEIN. I think we could do it rather extensively in a nonsource sensitive way.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, we certainly don't want to compromise any sources or any thing of that nature, but we also want to have a tool here that will help all of us to do our jobs, and you know, Mr. Mazzoli is so right, that this is sort of like a political campaign. We are campaigning for the hearts and minds of the people of the world.

Mr. McMAHON. That is exactly right.

Mr. YOUNG. And we are not playing by the same rules, but at least we do have the advantage that we are free to discuss as much as we can without violating classification laws.

There are a lot of people, you know, in our business and the Congress that would like to have this knowledge, and we rely on you for the knowledge.

The question of the Christian Peace Conference was raised a few minutes ago. In 1981 Radomir Bogdanov was a major participant at a meeting of the Christian Peace Conference held in Kiev.

Can you tell us something about him, where he fits into the overall scheme.

Mr. PORTMAN. We would have to go back and get details, sir.

In general terms, if my memory serves me correctly, he is a KGB officer who has been working for some time in the U.S.A.-Canada Institute. That institute is a mechanism available primarily to the International Department of the Soviet Party, but it has a number of International Department officers and KGB officers who are involved both in a cover role and also even in internal real activities in the

Institute. I am not fully aware of his career sir, and I would have to research it.

Mr. YOUNG. OK. Would you provide additional information then for the record?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir; we will.

Mr. YOUNG. And dealing with the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to appears as exhibit VII and exhibit VIII, pg. 70 to pg. 74.]

Mr. YOUNG. This Christian Peace Conference, what could sound better than that, but if it is a vehicle for active measures, it is a vehicle that is being used against our own interests, we ought to know about that, too.

Mr. McMAHON. I will be happy to.

Mr. YOUNG. So anything you can provide there would be helpful.

Can you tell me something about the role of the KGB and any other active measures elements regarding supporting terrorism by the PLO, the African National Congress, or any other types of international terrorist groups?

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir, we have done an extensive study late last year on the role of the Soviet Union and its relation to terrorists. We concluded that the Soviets do not engage directly in terrorist activities. However, we find that they have camps in the Soviet Union where they have trained terrorists. We know that, for example, they support the Libyans considerably and give the Libyans weapons, who in turn provide those weapons to the terrorists. We know that the Soviet Union assured one Middle Eastern terrorist group that when they dealt with Nicaragua and Salvadoran insurgents, any equipment, any arms and ammunition and support that it provided to Nicaragua or the Salvadoran insurgents would in essence be reimbursed from the Soviet Union. We see the evidence of Soviet complicity and indirect support to those organizations which do engage in terrorism, and of course, we do see, as we have witnessed in Central America and also in Africa, how the Soviets do get directly involved in providing support to insurgencies. Often, those insurgencies will engage in terrorist acts, but we don't see the Soviet hand directly on the smoking gun. There is always someone in between.

Mr. YOUNG. Then, of course, they have so many other Bloc countries.

Mr. McMAHON. They have all the surrogates they need.

Mr. YOUNG. Sure.

How is the KGB residency set up?

Mr. McMAHON. You are an expert on that, John.

Mr. STEIN. It is set up as follows. It has a resident, who is the chief. It certainly has in it officers of the First Chief Directorate who concern themselves with collection. Probably, in fact, they would have a KR (counterintelligence) line officer who concerns himself with the security function both of that residency and the embassy as a whole, and then, depending on where they are located, they may well have two or three or four more officers working the active measures account, other officers working a political intelligence account, and in the Western world there will be several officers working the S&T collection account (line X), etc.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, in a KGB residency—well, go ahead.

Mr. McMAHON. I was just going to add, they also often will use what they call co-optees within the Embassy. They are not full fledged members of the KGB. They are not staffers; but they are foreign affairs officers who will do the bidding of what the KGB wants, and they are called co-optees.

Mr. STEIN. I might just say in that connection, because it comes up, when they use co-optees. They don't necessarily have to get the permission of the parent organization back in Moscow.

Mr. YOUNG. We are bound by different rules than they are bound.

Mr. STEIN. They don't have bureaucratic embarrassment because the KGB has more leeway than we do.

Mr. YOUNG. In a KGB residency, how do they provide their cover? What percentage of the individuals would be covered by official cover and what percentage by other types of covers?

Mr. STEIN. About 35 percent of the Soviet officials stationed around the world in official installations are KGB or GRU officers under cover. The number of illegals would vary from country to country.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I want to come back to the term "illegal," but first let me clear up this question of cover. You said about 35 percent.

Mr. STEIN. Well, you see, other than illegals, there is no cover for the Soviets other than official because even their businessmen work for a government organ. So in that sense no one is under nonofficial cover. No one is under cover other than official, except illegals, who assume a different identity.

Mr. YOUNG. What about diplomatic cover?

Mr. STEIN. Again, we are at 35 percent of the total diplomatic colony.

Mr. YOUNG. Thirty-five percent of the total diplomatic force?

Mr. STEIN. Yes.

Mr. YOUNG. My question is, of the KGB people, how many of them are traveling under this official or diplomatic cover?

Mr. PORTMAN. In a residency?

Mr. STEIN. In a residency?

Mr. YOUNG. All of them?

Mr. STEIN. All of them.

Mr. PORTMAN. Many of them are in the embassy itself, but there are usually a few in the TASS office or the New Times office or in the trade missions or something like that, on the KGB side. We also have GRU residencies, and it varies country by country. Tomorrow you will get an opportunity to ask Levchenko in great detail, and I think he will tell you how the residency in Tokyo which is one of the largest, was organized when he was there.

Now, percentages vary, but you I think will get a rather detailed picture by him on that one.

Mr. YOUNG. He was not diplomatic cover. Was he considered official cover?

Mr. PORTMAN. He had an official passport as a journalist, although he was, in our terminology here, comparing, he would be nonofficial cover, but there they don't have journalists who are not official.

Mr. McMAHON. It is the state. Everyone in the Soviet Union belongs to the state. So it is just like the airline, you know, the airline Aeroflot and that is true of New Time and everything else.

Mr. STEIN. I might say in connection with everything else, it is important you realize in terms of reciprocity, I have been in countries where that has in fact been put into practice by the local government, and we trim down our embassy and they trim down theirs, and then suddenly, an awful lot of business takes place between the Soviet Union and that country which cannot possibly be conducted except for this fellow from whatever state enterprise. Well, in effect, they are still Soviet officials traveling on diplomatic or official passports, and we are still stuck in the embassy.

So you have to be very careful when one talks about reciprocity, that it would extend, if you will, to that quasi-commercial presence out there.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, you mentioned Soviet "illegals."

Describe, tell us what a Soviet illegal is.

Mr. McMAHON. He can usually be a person that infiltrates into a country, whether he just walks across the border, gets off an airline or comes by ship as a seaman. He enters a country with a false identity and establishes himself in that country as someone acceptable. He can establish a business there and become a normal citizen. He is in that country illegally. He is not what he says he is, and yet he begins to develop a reputation based on his tenure in that country, and then he performs acts on behalf of the Soviet Union. But as far as the country is concerned, he really does not exist because he is not the person he says he is.

Mr. STEIN. The classic is Abel, who was a Soviet citizen who assumed another identity and another nationality and lived in New York under that nationality and identity when in reality he was a Soviet colonel.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, these illegals then do participate in active measures.

Mr. McMAHON. They may.

Usually they are engaged in espionage, they handle agents.

Mr. STEIN. They are very precious, and therefore you try not to burn them. They are usually, as John says, conducting straight espionage.

Mr. PORTMAN. If they are involved in one of these active measures, it would usually be in a new identity and a logical aspect of it, and usually not out front in a role which will call particular attention to them so that if the individual in fact is there as a graduate student at one phase of his activity, he might become involved in demonstrations or whatever, but he certainly isn't going to be out front as a leader which would call attention to him or whatever. He may well act behind the scenes as an influence asset, suggesting to some of the people who are leaders how to do one thing or another. But usually most of the active measures activity is done by official cover officers, sometimes done clandestinely with real agents as distinct from their overt contact, but normally they don't risk that type of thing with most of their illegals.

Mr. YOUNG. So even if the illegals are not even used in an active measures role, they are used in other types of espionage activities that are not in our best interests.

Mr. STEIN. Yes.

Mr. YOUNG. The Pathe case and the Peterson case which you describe in your exhibit IV indicate that western media are vulnerable to penetration.

Are you talking about ideological penetration or mercenary penetration or both?

Mr. PORTMAN. All types. They will take whatever they can get, however they can get it.

Again, as time has passed, the Soviets have come to rely less on the ideological straitjackets that caused some of the problems for them in the early days, and today the Soviets are quite prepared to take someone and work with him on one issue and have him be against them on some other issue providing they feel they can get enough out of that one issue.

So they will take whomever they can get in any way they can, full time or part time.

Mr. YOUNG. And develop him, hopefully, on their part.

Did the KGB manipulate Petersen's role in the Danish peace movement?

Mr. PORTMAN. He was fully responsive to controls. He had been recruited years before, was one of their trusted assets. They used him in various parts of their game plan, and he did their bidding fully, even when he got a lot of flak from his colleagues. He just took it.

Mr. McMAHON. He would receive the KGB draft and put it in his own words.

Mr. YOUNG. So I would emphasize he was fully controlled.

Mr. PORTMAN. Yes.

Mr. FREILACH. I might add, the police searched his home, and he had kept diaries with passages pertinent to his contacts with his KGB control officers and including entries that indicated he was fully aware of what he was doing.

Mr. YOUNG. Do the KGB officers sometimes use the international Soviet fronts for cover and to assess agents, potential agents, and to recruit potential agents?

Mr. PORTMAN. The KGB is not supposed to use a Communist Party mechanism without approval. As a general rule, they do not use foreign communist parties or international front mechanisms indiscriminately, such as a residency cannot go out and recruit a local communist or someone involved in the Japanese affiliate of the Peace Council or whatever it is without high level Moscow approval. Also on those few occasions, when the KGB uses Soviet international fronts to cover staff officers, CPSU Central Committee approval is necessary.

On occasion exceptions are made to that. For instance, in the case of the problems that the CPSU had with the Spanish Communist Party, they at one time opened that up for KGB operations and set up a competitive group under a former Central Committee member in that Party, Enrique Lister, who was at that stage when he came back to Spain and set up a counter-party, a fully controlled and run KGB active measures operation against Carillo, who had become dissident and a problem to the Soviets. But on the whole, they cannot, the KGB cannot use these mechanisms.

On the other hand, the International Department has jurisdiction over foreign Communist Parties, and in almost all the major campaigns in the active measures area, you have the International Depart-

ment, if you will, being the brains over in the party apparatus and the KGB being one of the executive agents, admittedly the largest executive agent, carrying out the largest number of covert active measures, but still under party control and direction. And so at the same time, the International Department is in fact regularly manipulating all of the front groups and foreign Communist Parties that they control for these purposes.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you for being so generous with the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you whether or not most of the nations of the world have accredited Russian journalists?

Mr. PORTMAN. Of one sort or another.

Mr. STEIN. I think it is fair to say yes, they do. They may not be resident in all countries, but they will travel in and out. It is usually a TASS correspondent who has a beat.

Mr. McMAHON. We can give you a specific on that, Mr. Chairman. There are countries in the world where Soviets are not allowed in.

The CHAIRMAN. But in those countries where they are allowed in, where they have Soviet journalists, would it be fair to say that the major part of them are KGB officers or undercover agents?

Mr. PORTMAN. I would say the majority are either KGB officers or co-opted. If you count all of the journalist organizations such as Tass, the various technical journals, Izvestiya, Pravda, and so forth, I would say the majority are not KGB or GRU staff officers.

The CHAIRMAN. And all countries should recognize that even when they are engaged in their journalistic endeavors, they are part and parcel of Soviet intelligence operations.

Mr. PORTMAN. In some cases, Moscow at the center has professional writers who write script for some KGB or GRU officers in the field under journalistic cover so that they can publish materials occasionally and thus appear to do journalistic work, but people like Levchenko also wrote regularly, and he carried on his overt activities in a manner that, for instance, convinced Japanese authorities—he was there for nearly 5 years—that he was a legitimate journalist.

The CHAIRMAN. That to me is rather surprising, that he was able to carry on for 5 years as a KGB officer.

Mr. PORTMAN. He was a journalist as well.

Mr. STEIN. Your question is, is not the whole world sensitized to the fact that they use—that these people are KGB officers and are co-opted? Yes, in principle they are, but a lot of these people are very personable and get along very well, and people forget and say things to them that one shouldn't say to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in a sense, isn't everybody in the Soviet Embassy out here on Wisconsin Avenue or 16th Street, aren't they all part of the apparatus?

Mr. STEIN. Yes.

Mr. PORTMAN. In Levchenko's case, the effectiveness of the individual officers plays a very significant role. He not only was accredited as a journalist by the Japanese Diet press office, but through an agent of influence that he had in the parliament, in the Diet, he was able to get accreditation to the Defense Group in the Japanese Diet. I don't remember the exact name of it, so that he was the only Bloc journalist who was regularly invited to private briefings where what we would

term classified information was discussed, backgrounders for the Japanese press and so forth. He was the only one, and he went in there speaking English, not Russian or Japanese, which he spoke very well, and to all the casual people that didn't really know him, he didn't appear to be a Russian journalist.

So to go back to the effectiveness, the individual officer can sometimes compensate for some of these things.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any difference between a media placement by the International Department of the CPSU and a media placement by KGB?

Mr. PORTMAN. In the Soviet Embassy abroad, there will be an official section similar to our ICA element. That official element in the Soviet Embassy normally will deal with communist and leftist journalists rather openly. The KGB's role, the residency's role in the journalistic placement business normally involves recruiting agents in a rightist or centrist press and using them to put material in that normally would not be put in and not identified as coming from the Soviets.

So, for instance, again you can discuss this with Levchenko tomorrow, some of his assets for instance, he had one who was a deputy editor of a prestigious conservative newspaper in Japan, and this man regularly put material in under guise, anti-Chinese material, for instance, very extensively, that was in the Soviet interests but in no way was overtly associated with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Is cover by those working for the Soviet Union, is that cover assigned to them by the KGB only, or is the cover assigned by the International Department. Is the cover the responsibility of the KGB?

Mr. STEIN. KGB.

Mr. McMAHON. A Central Committee department allots the cover slots and the KGB picks the individuals to fill them.

Mr. PORTMAN. As we said before, they cannot use party as such. They cannot cover an officer in the International Department, but they themselves determine what they want.

Mr. STEIN. Leaving aside the party organs and that sort of thing, if the KGB decides they need a certain cover to do a certain job, it does not take a great deal of negotiation with the other government departments to get it.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you say is the most significant or important type of cover used by KGB officers, particularly relative to active measures?

Mr. PORTMAN. Journalistic cover is probably most effective. A journalist can ask a question, can come up to you and ask you a question and you are liable to answer it, more likely than you would if someone came up to you and said he was from the British embassy or the French embassy or something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. What does KGB mean by "line PR"?

Mr. Young mentioned it.

Mr. PORTMAN. That is an abbreviation for the Russian words for political intelligence. For instance, in the Tokyo residency, it is the part of the residency that is responsible for penetrating the political part of the Japanese Government. There is a separate line that is to work the CI side, there is a separate line to work the S&T side. In some cases, there is a separate line to work the Americans.

Mr. McMAHON. And they come from the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. Their job is to go out and collect intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. So line PR officers are used in active measures, apparently.

Mr. PORTMAN. All of the personnel in the Soviet colony are potentially available, and few would refuse a call. Most of the activity, because the nature of it is political, is centered in the PR section of a KGB residency, but all of them are used. For instance, even occasionally the S&T people are used when you have some deception you want in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill, do you have any additional questions?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask three more questions, please.

What Soviet phoney stories have we seen surface regarding alleged CIA assassination plots?

Mr. PORTMAN. Well, the one I referred to earlier where we were accused of having Amin as an agent involved with assassination, but we weren't accused of being the assassin. We have been accused of murdering Aldo Moro, the former Prime Minister in Italy. That was done in the context of claiming that CIA secretly ran the Red Brigades behind the scenes, and although they appeared to be leftists and communist oriented, they in fact were Fascists.

Mr. STEIN. John reminds me, of course, of the Patrice Lumumba story which has been played and played and played.

Mr. YOUNG. Who provides the bulk of the funding for the International Soviet fronts?

Mr. PORTMAN. Well, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which means the Soviet people directly are bearing the brunt.

Mr. YOUNG. Are you able to track that to the point where you have no question about that?

Mr. PORTMAN. We have no question about the majority of the funding coming from the Soviets. We have enough examples in enough countries that we feel fully confident in our judgments. On the other hand, we cannot tell you how much they are spending and how they are passing it in every country.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, these examples that you are talking about, are they such that you could put them in our records so that we could take a look at them?

Mr. PORTMAN. Some of them come from rather sensitive sources, but we could certainly give you a picture of it.

Mr. YOUNG. It would be helpful if you could give us as much as you can for our record because, you know, oftentimes someone says to us, if we make that statement, well, prove it. You know, show us the canceled check.

Do the local Soviet controlled Communist Parties procure for the local affiliates of the International Soviet fronts?

Mr. PORTMAN. Would you repeat that?

Mr. YOUNG. Do the local Soviet-controlled Communist Parties provide the cadre for the local affiliates of the International Soviet fronts?

Mr. PORTMAN. Normally but not always. Again, going back to the lesson that the Soviets have learned years ago, the fronts would be stacked with either known members of the Communist Party, or if you want to call them that, fellow travelers. Today the Soviets work

clandestinely through agents of influence in some of the groups with assets that are not overtly known as Communist.

Mr. YOUNG. We haven't talked at all about the GRU today.

Are they involved in active measures in any way?

Mr. PORTMAN. Not directly in the same sense that the KGB is. If a particular active measure has to be implemented, they can be brought in.

Essentially the Soviets have a system that works like this:

They tend philosophically to build broad campaigns which will last over years and concentrate all elements of the Soviet community into the furtherance of that campaign, like the anti-TNF, anti-INF campaign, and in the process of that, if they feel that Soviet military or even Soviet military intelligence can play some role, they will be brought into it, but normally they aren't out in the front line as one of the major elements that is used in this type of thing.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for an extremely interesting hearing this afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, do we have sufficient personnel and does the Agency have sufficient money to counteract effectively the apparently herculean efforts that are put into the area of propaganda and intelligence collection by the Soviet Union?

Mr. McMAHON. I think that we have, through the good grace of this committee and the other oversight committee, authorization committee, have gone a long way in beginning to address this problem. We by no means, though, have the resources to do the job we see before us and we will continue—

The CHAIRMAN. When you are saying resources, are you saying bodies and money?

Mr. McMAHON. Both, yes, sir; we need the bodies, the officers to handle the programs, and the dollars to obtain the assets that are desired.

But we do need more money, sir, and we do need more people.

The CHAIRMAN. A \$4 billion figure was used here sometime this afternoon as the cost of running what?

Mr. McMAHON. If you look at the entire orchestration that the Soviet Union is able to bring to bear to carry out the messages throughout the world that they want to carry, whether it is through agents of influence, through controlled media assets, through TASS, through Izvestiya, through the front organizations, through all the mechanisms, we estimated several years ago that that was at \$3.363 billion. Even the price of just buying books these days has gone up over the years. And so we estimate that they still spend somewhere between \$3 billion and \$4 billion on their program.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously they spend a lot more than we do in this area.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes, sir, they do, considerably.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, John. You have been a very interesting witness, and you have, too, John Stein and Mr. Portman and Mr. Freilach. Thank you very much.

We look forward to an interesting session tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock with Stanislav Levchenko and with the FBI in the afternoon.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. McMAHON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. STEIN. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 o'clock a.m., Wednesday, June 14, 1982.]

EXHIBIT I

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE STUDY: SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Soviet term active measures¹ is used (primarily in an intelligence context) to distinguish influence operations from espionage and counterintelligence, but this term is not limited to intelligence alone. Rather, Soviet active measures involve activities by virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure and are regarded as a valuable, regular supplement to, and are closely coordinated with, traditional diplomacy. Soviet active measures include:

- Manipulation or control of the media.
- Written or oral disinformation.
- Use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations.
- Clandestine radiobroadcasting.
- Economic activities.
- Military operations.
- Other political influence operations.

Ultimate approval for the use of active measures, like all major decisions affecting Soviet foreign policy, rests with the highest level of the Soviet hierarchy, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Most decisions concerning implementation are carried out by the KGB in close coordination with two elements of the Soviet party bureaucracy, the International Department and the International Information Department. The extensive participation of these two powerful party components in active measures indicates both the importance attached to such activities by Soviet leaders and their appreciation of the policy implications of such activities.

Active measures are in essence an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They contribute effectively to the strategic Soviet purpose, central to that foreign policy, of extending Moscow's influence and power throughout the world. In tactical application, active measures are designed specifically to influence the policies of foreign governments in favor of the Soviet Union, and thwart opposition to Soviet policies by such means as disrupting relations between other states arrayed against the Soviet Union; undermining the leaders, institutions, and values of such states; and discrediting and vilifying opponents of the USSR.

Active measures remain a major element of Soviet foreign policy even during periods of reduced tension or detente.

The primary target of Soviet active measures is the United States, which the Soviet Union has long regarded as its main opponent and the principal obstacle to carrying out its policies. Soviet active measures constitute a policy instrument systematically employed to discredit, isolate, and weaken the United States. These ultimate objectives are a key factor in active measures, even in many instances when the active measures are immediately directed at other countries, organizations, or individuals.

The Soviet regime generously provides the necessary financial, technical, and personnel resources necessary to support active measures operations. We conclude that the Soviet active measures effort is well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy actions but that the impact, while frequently effective, varies depending on place and circumstance.

Political influence operations are the most important, ambiguous, but least visible of Soviet active measures. They range from the use of agents of influence, through the manipulation of private channels of communication, to the exploitation of unwitting contacts. These operations have a common aim: to insinuate Soviet policy views into foreign governmental, journalistic, business, labor, academic, and artistic opinion in a nonattributable fashion.

¹The use of the Soviet term active measures, rather than the more familiar term covert action, is intentional. Active measures comprise a broader concept than covert action and include a full range of overt, as well as covert, activities undertaken by the Soviets, which thus are a part of the discussion.

Soviet active measures are poorly understood and are infrequently countered systematically by Western and Third World governments. As a result, the Soviets have been able to go about their large-scale active measures effort quite freely—to the detriment of Western foreign policy interests.

The Soviets are willing to accept the risk of considerable political embarrassment as a consequence of active measures operations. They apparently believe that controversy caused by the exposure of active measures operations in the past has had no significant adverse impact on Soviet foreign policy programs.

The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and its system of pervasive control and direction over all elements of its society give the Soviet leadership a capability, at once impressive and effective, to draw on all elements of the party and government and on so-called private individuals and organizations in orchestrating active measures support for foreign policy positions. In the same fashion, the U.S.S.R. is in a position to call on its allies (and their party, state, and intelligence organs) for support in not only common, but on occasion purely Soviet, objectives. In effect, these allied organs become appendages to Moscow's own instruments.

Soviet active measures tactics may be adjusted to accommodate changes in the international situation, but the basic techniques and the strategic purpose remain the same. In this regard, we see some likely trends in future Soviet use of active measures:

Greater attention to security, disarmament, and "peace" issues.

Increased "objectivity" and "reasonableness" in propaganda elements of active measures, and a tactical deemphasis of Communist ideology.

Greater operational sophistication in the manipulation of influence assets and in the production and use of documentary forgeries.

Greater willingness to work with religious groups and non-Communist political parties, as well as greater use of single-issue and ad hoc front groups instead of the older and larger well-known Communist-front organizations.

Continued use of allies, proxies, and surrogates, such as Cuba.

Continued opposition to Western instruments of social and economic influence in the Third World, and greater advocacy of the creation of new international institutions and organizations—such as a Third World press "order"—that promote Soviet influence.

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Definition of active measures

1. The Soviets use the term active measures (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) primarily in an intelligence context. Within that context, the term is used to refer to active operations intended to provoke a policy effect, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. But the Soviets do not limit the concept of active measures to intelligence alone. Active measures are an unconventional adjunct to traditional diplomacy. They are quintessentially an offensive instrument of Soviet policy. Specifically, they are intended to influence the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, undermine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions, and discredit opponents. Active measures, thus, consist of a wide range of activities, both overt and covert, including:

Manipulation or control of the media.

Written or oral disinformation.

Use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations.

Manipulation of mass organizations.

Clandestine radiobroadcasting.

Economic activities.

Military operations.

Other political influence operations.

2. The range of activities included under active measures is broader than that covered by the U.S. term covert action. In American parlance, overt activities, such as officially sponsored propaganda, actions by accredited diplomatic and official representatives, and activities of friendship and cultural societies, are automatically excluded from the range of covert action.

3. The use of the term active measures throughout this study is intentional. By replacing the familiar but more limited intelligence term covert action with the

broader active measures, we intend both to avoid confusion and to make the full range of activities that the Soviets include under active measures a legitimate part of the discussion.

B. Purpose and scope of the study

4. This study discusses the types of active measures used by the Soviets through examples which illustrate recent active measures techniques and show the relation of active measures to other instruments of Soviet foreign policy implementation. The study is not intended to be a discussion of active measures in the abstract, nor is it an encyclopedic treatment of the subject. While this study focuses on Soviet active measures against the United States, in order to illustrate as broad a range of such activity as possible, it occasionally refers to active measures operations directed by the Soviets against non-U.S. targets.

II. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ACTIVE MEASURES

A. Main target: The United States

5. The Soviet leadership sees active measures as an indispensable adjunct to the conduct of foreign policy by traditional diplomatic, military, and other means. The basic aims of active measures operations are to weaken the opponents of the U.S.S.R. and to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow's views and international objectives worldwide. The United States, which the Kremlin has considered as the "main enemy"¹ of the Soviet Union since the early days of the post-World War II period, remains the main target of active measures. This situation has not changed in recent years despite a period of East-West detente.

6. Although tactics may change to correspond to changed circumstances over time, Soviet active measures tend to retain certain long-term strategic objectives:

To influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military, economic, and political programs which are perceived as threatening Soviet objectives.

To demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, "colonialist," and "imperialist" power.

To isolate the United States from its allies and friends and discredit those that cooperate with it.

To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world.

To discredit and weaken U.S. intelligence efforts—particularly those of the CIA—and expose U.S. intelligence personnel.

To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

To undermine the political resolve of the United States and other Western states to protect their interests against Soviet encroachments.

B. Continuity and change

7. Active measures go hand-in-hand with other foreign policy instruments. The same factors that influence Soviet foreign policy as a whole—changes in the international situation, domestic factors, and the availability of opportunities—also tend to influence active measures. Consequently, the scope and intensity of active measures have tended to vary somewhat over the years. The Soviets, however, have been consistent in using the same basic, time-tested techniques to shape foreign elite and popular perceptions about the United States and to influence other countries' internal political processes.

8. The changes in the East-West political climate in the 1970s did not result on the whole in a perceptible decline in the use of active measures. On the contrary, the Soviets believe that detente created new opportunities and a more favorable operational environment for active measures. In Moscow's view, the role of "ideological struggle" in world politics remains paramount.

9. The active measures effort never ceases, but its tactics and emphasis change in order to meet new situations. For instance, the Soviet use of Marxist-Leninist ideology as an appeal to foreign groups often has turned out to be an obstacle to the promotion of Soviet goals in some areas and now is being deemphasized, although not completely abandoned. At the same time, some religious themes, such as the claimed favorable situation of the Islamic religion in the U.S.S.R.,

¹ "Main enemy" is a widely used translation of the Russian term *glavnyy protivnik*, which is sometimes translated as "main opponent" or "main adversary."

have assumed added significance, particularly as a result of Moscow's courting of the Muslim countries of Africa and the Middle East. Likewise, while Soviet-dominated international front organizations still play an important role in Soviet active measures, Moscow has in recent years begun to pay greater attention to broadening its base of support by using more "ad hoc" fronts and single-interest groups to promote its goals in particular regions. As a part of this effort, the Soviets are now increasingly willing to include groups whose interests are only of marginal concern to the U.S.S.R. This "united front" approach is a notable aspect of the Soviet anti-NATO campaign in Western Europe; it is aided by the more "objective" presentation of Soviet propaganda aimed at foreign audiences, and by more "reasonable" diplomatic initiatives.

10. The increasing sophistication of the Soviet active measures effort in recent years also has been noticeable in the technical improvement of Soviet forgeries of U.S. Government documents surfaced in foreign countries. Some forgeries of recent vintage are so verisimilar to Western originals as to allow the Soviets to plant them in the Western non-Communist media with a reasonable expectation that they will be considered genuine by many recipients.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIVE MEASURES

A. Policy direction

11. In the Soviet system, ultimate decisions on all major policy matters, including active measures, are made at the party Politburo level. Without concerning itself necessarily with specific courses of action, the Politburo is believed to approve the general policies and themes of the major campaigns employing active measures. Certain high-risk measures probably require the attention of the entire Politburo, or at least the approval of a responsible Central Committee secretary. The outcome and effectiveness of all major active measures campaigns are reported back to the Politburo.

B. Agencies of implementation

12. Once a decision actively to promote a certain foreign policy is approved by the Politburo, active measures campaigns and operations are shaped to support these policies. The responsibility for carrying out those activities which must be carried out covertly belongs to Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate, which works in coordination with relevant elements of the top party bureaucracy—the International and International Information Departments of the CPSU Central Committee. The extensive participation of these two powerful departments in active measures indicates the great importance attached to them by the Kremlin leadership as a support element of Soviet foreign policy implementation. The total of Soviet resources devoted to active measures is uncertain. The scale of the Soviet effort can be gauged by analogy. We calculate that, if the U.S. Government were to undertake a campaign of the magnitude of the Soviet "neutron bomb campaign," it would cost over \$100 million. Reporting on individual operations, the worldwide scope of active measures, and the importance attached to them as foreign policy instruments lead us to the conclusion that active measures are being given the financial, technical, and personnel resources that are considered necessary to ensure success of any given campaign or operation.

13. International Department (ID). Since the mid-1950's, this department of the CPSU Central Committee has been under the guidance of Boris Ponomarev, a candidate Politburo member and Central Committee secretary and one of the leading foreign policy specialists in the Soviet leadership. The ID serves the party's top decisionmaking body, the Politburo, by coordinating and reviewing inputs on Soviet foreign policy matters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, the military establishment, and various think-tanks under the Soviet Academy of Sciences (in particular the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations). The ID is also known to operate and manipulate some of the semiofficial channels of communication between the top Soviet leadership and selected politicians and political parties in the West.

14. One of the purposes of the liaison the ID maintains with the majority of the nonruling Communist parties is to persuade those parties to carry out specific political action and propaganda campaigns on behalf of the U.S.S.R. and as a part of broader Soviet international campaigns. The ID also develops and exploits relations with non-Communist leftist political parties, including socialist or social democratic parties. For the purpose of interparty liaison, the ID posts

representatives in high-ranking positions at Soviet embassies in some major countries.

15. Another ID responsibility is the administration, funding, and coordination of international front organizations for political action and propaganda use. The major pro-Soviet international fronts include the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization.

16. One mechanism of Soviet control and channel of communication between the ID and foreign Communist parties and fronts is the Communist theoretical monthly journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism."² The journal has been used as a channel through which the ID finances publications of nonruling Communist parties in some countries.

17. Various scientific research institutes under the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences provide occasional indepth research in support of Soviet foreign policy and help identify issues for exploitation in Western countries, particularly the United States. These institutes are frequently utilized by the ID to establish professional contacts with and influence foreign intellectuals and institutions, either through individual meetings or through participation in conferences, seminars, and scientific gatherings.

18. International Information Department (IID). This department of the CPSU Central Committee is headed by Leonid Zamyatin, a Central Committee member and former director of the official Soviet news agency TASS. Established in March 1978, the IID is charged with improving the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda abroad and providing improved treatment of foreign affairs by the Soviet domestic propaganda network. The IID is also involved in the implementation of active measures abroad. In that capacity it cooperates with the KGB component in charge of active measures (Service A of the First Chief Directorate) in the formulation and dissemination of Soviet covert propaganda worldwide. In carrying out its primary function of supervising Soviet propaganda activities abroad, the IID orchestrates a wide variety of propaganda outlets, all of which to some extent are involved in Soviet active measures. With regard to active measures, these agencies sometimes serve the IID and sometimes the KGB's Service A. They include:

The Soviet news agencies TASS and Novosti (APN).

Some elements of the Soviet press, such as the literary weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*.

Propaganda publications in foreign languages, including the foreign affairs weekly *New Times* (published in 10 languages).

Radio Moscow (international broadcasts in over 60 languages).

Radio Peace and Progress, which allegedly represents Soviet mass organizations, is based in the Soviet Union, and uses the transmitters of Radio Moscow. Its purpose is to disseminate Soviet propaganda in foreign languages under the pretense of being "independent" of the Soviet Government view.

19. KGB's Service A. This Service³ (upgraded from "Department" in 1970) is part of the KGB's First (foreign intelligence) Chief Directorate. Service A is the main component of the KGB charged with the overall management of active measures operations throughout the world. Service A directs and supports specific active measures operations, including the surfacing of forgeries, carried out by KGB residencies abroad. In addition, it maintains liaison with counterparts in the East European and Cuban services and coordinates their activities with its own. It keeps track of disinformation programs originated by the KGB, maintains records of the activities of agents of influence, and evaluates all active measures. The Service reportedly prepares a top-secret daily bulletin on Soviet active measures worldwide, which is submitted to the Politburo through the Central Committee Secretariat. Service A works closely with the ID and IID of the Central Committee in formulating and coordinating its operations. On occasion the IID or the ID directs Service A to work on specific topics. In other instances Service A makes suggestions on its own accord. However, Service A is certainly subordinate to these Central Committee departments on foreign policy lines and is responsive to their wishes, even though Service A does not always give the ID or the IID details of how it will accomplish individual operations.

² *Problems of Peace and Socialism* is published in Prague and is disseminated in 36 languages worldwide. Its editorial board consists of representatives of 63 Communist parties.

³ Service A, or *Sluzhba A* in Russian, is an independent component within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, which, because of the nature of its mission, deals directly with other components of the Soviet party and government.

20. Operations Abroad. Active measures are executed by both official and quasi-official Soviet representatives, including those engaged in legitimate diplomatic or other overt functions in foreign countries. Although it is impossible to pinpoint all Soviets abroad who regularly or occasionally help carry out active measures, we believe that on occasion most of the personnel attached to Soviet missions, agencies, and other official and quasi-official representations abroad are involved in such activities. KGB staff officers and co-optees definitely are more involved in this kind of activity than non-KGB personnel. All Soviet field agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet active measures. They are:

Embassies.

KGB residencies.

Representatives of the International Department (engaged in liaison with selected foreign Communist parties and major pro-Soviet front organizations).

Specialized Soviet missions abroad (trade, scientific, cultural, etc.).

Soviets resident abroad (correspondents, scholars, students, Aeroflot and shipping representatives, etc.).

Soviet delegations visiting foreign countries.

C. BLOC AND CUBAN ACTIVE MEASURES OPERATIONS

21. All Communist countries allied with the USSR engage in anti-US active measures, although the level of activity varies from country to country. In spite of some variations in designation and exact organizational setup, the agencies in charge of implementing active measures tend to approximate those in the Soviet Union. The Central Committees of the individual ruling Communist parties are involved in overseeing the agencies that implement active measures. Although in the 1950s there was a limited division of labor between Moscow and its Communist allies, no such division in active measures activities has been apparent in recent years. The Soviet Union's East European allies have been known to carry out some active measures on their own behalf and on their own initiative; at the same time, they also serve as surrogates in the larger Soviet effort. Among Warsaw Pact nations today, the extent of activity undertaken on Moscow's behest appears highest in the East German and Czechoslovak cases. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland are also known to be involved in this sort of activity.

22. While the Cubans are known to carry out extensive active measures on their own initiative and for their own specific purposes, they also perform an important particular role as Soviet surrogates in the nonaligned world. Cuban active measures are directed by elements of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee's Secretariat which not only manage such traditional programs as guidance of front organizations, agents of influence, and covert as well as overt propaganda campaigns but also provide substantial covert support to a number of "national liberation movements" in various parts of the world, especially the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban agencies in charge of active measures maintain close liaison with the Soviets through the CPSU.

IV. TECHNIQUES FOR ACTIVE MEASURES

23. Despite the number of qualitative changes that have occurred in recent years, the Soviets continue to rely on a number of time-tested active measures techniques. For the purpose of this study, Soviet active measures techniques have been divided into two basic categories. (A) "Classic" Active Measures and (B) Political Influence Operations.

A. "Classic" active measures

24. *Press Placements.* The Soviet active measures structure continues to make frequent use of falsely attributed or nonattributed press material as a means of reinforcing its overt propaganda items placed in the foreign media. The clandestine press placements are Soviet authored or inspired articles placed in foreign publications over the name of a non-Soviet author or without any indication of their real source. The primary purposes of such press placements is to influence local public audiences. These press placements additionally are often replayed by other Soviet press assets and by the open Soviet and Bloc media in an effort to create the impression of genuine broad international support for Soviet policies.⁴

⁴ See paragraphs 63 and 64 for an example of a Soviet press placement operation.

25. In open societies covert press placements by the Soviets and their surrogates are frequently difficult to spot. On occasion, however, the topic of a given article may give a clue to a possible Soviet role. For example, critical commentaries on the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which are frequent targets of Soviet and East European propaganda, are not uncommon in the West European press. However, occasional articles attacking the two radio organizations seem out of place when they appear in Third World newspapers and can almost certainly be considered Soviet press placements in those countries.

26. In many cases the Soviet role of influencing the media is well-known. For example, the Indian magazine Blitz is a well-known outlet for anti-U.S. propaganda. Blitz has been used by the Soviets to surface forgeries, identify alleged CIA personnel or agents, and disseminate Soviet-inspired disinformation. Blitz has recently tried to implicate the CIA in disturbances in Indian Kashmir by alleging that the CIA has financed and armed antigovernment groups in the region.

27. In the 1970s, overt cultural and information activities by officers of the Soviet cultural center in a West African country were used to establish covert ties to local journalists. KGB officers working under diplomatic cover established a substantial degree of control over the content of the two major daily newspapers in this country. The Soviets made cash payments to key members of the newspapers' editorial staffs on the understanding that they would promote the publication of articles critical of, or detrimental to, the West. The articles were sometimes written by the Soviets, but were published under the bylines of notional local journalists. One of the editors was also used by the Soviets as a full-fledged agent of influence in the highest circles of the country's government.

28. Forgeries. Soviet forgeries may be fabricated out of whole cloth, or they may be altered versions of genuine documents. The Soviets have used both techniques in active measures campaigns in order to mislead foreign governments, media, and public opinion.

29. Since 1975-76 the number of forged documents known to have surfaced in foreign countries has increased from about three to four to a current count of more than twice that number per year. In some cases a Soviet role in manufacturing these documents may be uncovered by content and forensic analysis of the document, the method of surfacing, the relative level of sophistication of the forgery, or its quick replay by the Soviet media. This method of determining sponsorship of a forgery has been validated by a Soviet defector, a KGB active measures specialist who served under cover in Japan as a correspondent of the Soviet foreign affairs weekly New Times. In the following examples, the forged documents clearly serve Soviet foreign policy interests and provide grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. Among hostile intelligence services, only the KGB and possibly the Czechoslovak and East German services are believed to have the resources and ability to produce forgeries of such relatively high quality.

30. The above-cited Soviet defector confirmed the Soviet origin of the forgery known as U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B. The KGB residency in Tokyo received copies of the forged document from Moscow packaged in preaddressed envelopes for mailing to selected newspapers. Although the residency ultimately failed to surface the manual in Japan, the manual was successfully surfaced elsewhere as part of a concerted Soviet effort to link the United States with terrorist groups. It also accused the United States of trying to infiltrate friendly and allied governments.

31. The same defector confirmed that in 1976 the KGB forged the "last will and testament" of the late Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, an active measures operation directed against China. The forged "testament" alleged that the Cultural Revolution was a mistake, that China's economy should stress the expansion of heavy industry, and that there should be greater cooperation among all "democratic and socialist" forces to ensure world peace—implicitly including the U.S.S.R. The "testament" was intended to cause unrest in China and to create distrust toward China among the Japanese public. A KGB officer managed to surface the forgery in the Sankei Shimbun, one of the leading moderate (not leftist) Japanese daily newspapers, and subsequently in other Japanese publications. After the text was published in Japan, the Soviet news agency TASS picked it up and replayed it worldwide. According to the defector, KGB headquarters evaluated this active measures operation as "the most successful ever carried out" by the KGB.

32. The Soviets have even used forgeries in an effort to influence Communist governments. According to the same defector, in August 1979 the KGB residency in Tokyo received from Moscow a copy of a forged U.S. Department of State mem-

orandum dealing with the situation on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. policy regarding South Korea. The residency was directed to have it passed to the North Korean intelligence service in such a way that the North Koreans would not know that the Soviets had anything to do with the document. It was intended to create unease among those close to North Korean party chief Kim Il-song. It was passed to a North Korean living in Japan, who the Soviets knew was an agent of the North Koreans.

33. Since early 1980 the Soviets have been involved in the surfacing of a number of damaging forgeries in Western Europe aimed at aggravating relations between the United States and its allies, and undermining West European support for NATO's Theater Nuclear Force (TNF) modernization. For example, the Soviets were behind the surfacing of forged and altered U.S. war plans, all dating from the early 1960s. At least some of the documents which formed the basis for this operation (with respect to format and style, for example) were obtained from U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, who was eventually arrested and convicted as a KGB agent. These documents, which were originally surfaced in the mid-1960s, have recently reappeared, almost certainly at Soviet instigation, in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom in a pamphlet entitled *Top Secret Documents on U.S. Headquarters in Europe: Holocaust Again for Europe*. The pamphlet plays on European fears about nuclear weapons by claiming that the United States would use such weapons against the territory of its NATO allies. The purpose of the reissue is to encourage West European opposition to TNF modernization.

34. In December 1980 in Norway, a forged copy of a U.S. State Department cable surfaced immediately before the visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister to Moscow. The forged document had allegedly been sent originally by the U.S. State Department to certain U.S. Embassies in Europe. The forged cable touched on a number of controversial issues for the Norwegian Government and put the United States on the wrong side of each issue. The method of surfacing and the document's contents point to Soviet authorship.

35. Disinformation. In attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, governments, or certain policies, particularly those of the United States and its allies, the Soviets frequently use dezinformatsiya, or disinformation. In KGB parlance the term dezinformatsiya denotes a variety of techniques and activities to purvey false or misleading information, including rumors, insinuation, and altered facts. In its effort to carry out dezinformatsiya, the Soviet authorities have repeatedly used accredited diplomatic personnel abroad in a fashion not usually considered appropriate diplomatic practice.

36. In one example of oral disinformation, Soviet diplomats spread the rumor in late 1979 that the United States was behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca. In a related case, KGB officers and Soviet diplomats in Islamabad tried to convince third-country officials and even U.S. personnel that the Pakistani Army was involved in the burning of the U.S. Embassy, which took place shortly after the Mecca incident.

37. In another case, this one aimed at China and Japan, a KGB officer told a contact with access to the Japanese Foreign Ministry that a West European country was thinking of selling a nuclear reactor to the Chinese and that the sale was to remain secret. Japanese firms believed they had the inside track to get the contract. The false information circulated around the ministry, and Japanese military attaches in Europe were reportedly asked to try to check out the story. The Soviets considered the operation a success in irritating Japanese-Chinese relations.

38. Nonruling Communist Parties. Traditional Soviet active measures programs regularly use nonruling Communist parties, international and local front organizations, and friendship societies to help promote Soviet policies abroad. Pro-Moscow Communist parties, whether legal or banned in their respective countries, serve a variety of functions in the overall Soviet foreign policy scheme. They can, under Moscow's guidance, influence the domestic political situation in their own countries even when they are not included in the government. Communist parties in foreign countries are also used by the Soviets as intermediaries to influence other Communist parties on Moscow's behalf. The CPSU's International Department is in charge of liaison activities with nonruling Communist parties abroad. Currently there are more than 70 such parties that are considered pro-Soviet and are occasionally or permanently in touch with the Soviet Communist Party apparatus.

39. Contacts between the CPSU and foreign Communist parties are usually overt and, at the leadership level, well-publicized. The degree of Soviet control or influence varies with the organizational strength, financial resources, and political maturity of the party concerned. Where the parties are illegal, or where the nature of the contact is such that its discovery would lead to prosecution or embarrassment, the KGB—because of its expertise in operating clandestinely—may participate in the communications arrangements. As a noteworthy example, KGB officers have accompanied representatives of the International Department in some instances when the Soviets have passed funds to Communist parties, even in countries where the party is legal.

40. The CPSU provides covert funding to some foreign Communist parties via the open payment of large commissions to local party-owned or affiliated firms or printing houses. The latter in turn pay part of the commission clandestinely to the party. For example, Communist-owned local travel agencies are allowed excessive profits by Intourist in buying package tours to the U.S.S.R. by overcharging costs. This excess profit is then "contributed" to the local Communist party. There have been instances of this activity in several West European countries. In some cases the Soviets use active measures to influence even other Communist parties, particularly when the target does not follow routine Soviet direction. For example, in 1981 Moscow was encouraging pro-Soviet elements in the Italian party to pull it back into the Soviet sphere; and the Soviets have repeatedly tried unilaterally to influence regional organizations of the PCI.

41. International and Local Front Organizations. Over the past 30 years the Soviets have created and supported a wide range of major international front organizations whose objective is to support Soviet policies abroad. The leaders of such groups are amenable to Soviet direction of their organizations. Many of the rank and file as well as much of the general public may not be aware of the Soviet influence in the front organizations. Because they pretend not to profess Communist ideological goals and are designed to attract members from a broad political spectrum, the front organizations are more effective than admittedly pro-Soviet groups. The four largest and most active front organizations are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. They claim millions of members and have qualified for official observer status with UN organizations, where they represent themselves as independent, nongovernment spokesmen.

42. The CPSU's control of the international front organizations is exercised through the International Social Organizations Sector of the Central Committee's International Department. This control runs from the sector through the Soviet affiliate of the front involved to a Soviet representative at the front's headquarters.

43. With its headquarters in Helsinki, the World Peace Council (WPC) is the largest international front group, with affiliates in approximately 130 countries. The CPSU's directives are routed through the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, a propaganda and liaison organization. One of the vice chairmen of the committee, Oleg Kharkhardin, is a functionary of the ID. The committee directs the activities of the WPC headquarters and makes arrangements for Soviet and East European financing of WPC activities. Soviet officials, such as Aleksandr Lebedev, who directed the WPC's administrative and financial activities until August 1979, help exercise direct Soviet control over WPC activities.

44. The WPC is one of Moscow's major instruments in reinforcing, and at times generating, opposition in Western Europe to NATO's TNE modernization. In spring 1981, the WPC was advised by the Soviets to focus its attention on current and planned activities on behalf of the anti-NATO campaign. The Soviets recommended that the WPC concentrate its efforts on broadening the publication of anti-NATO themes in the Western media and organize an international meeting of media representatives to discuss the role of the mass media in publicizing the dangers inherent in the arms buildup.

45. The Soviets proposed that the WPC coordinate a meeting of media specialists in Europe in 1981 to consider how disarmament is treated in the Western media. The Soviets also suggested that the WPC devote more attention to local government bodies throughout Western Europe as instruments of the disarmament campaign. To support this effort the Soviets recommended publicizing recent efforts by British local government bodies against deployment of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.

46. In recent years the effectiveness of the large well-established Communist international front organizations has been eroded in many areas because of their pronounced pro-Soviet bias on virtually every issue. To compensate for this development, as well as to take advantage of new situations that may have a more specific appeal, the Soviets and other Communist parties now make greater use of ad hoc front groups. These groups, which do not have an overt tradition of close association with Communist and Soviet causes, try to attract members from a broad cross section of the political spectrum. Nonetheless, they are dominated by pro-Soviet individuals and are, as a rule, covertly financed by the Soviet Union and various Communist parties and front groups. Their position on a given issue almost always supports Moscow's stand. Examples of such organizations include the Salvadoran solidarity committees; "Generals for Peace," recently established in Western Europe to oppose NATO's TNF modernization; the "Democratic Front Against Repression," which operates from Costa Rica and Mexico; and the "Association of Filipino Women Workers (SKMP)." The Soviets are also trying to exploit environmentalist and anti-nuclear-power groups in their anti-TNF effort by promoting the formation of still other local fronts with special interest groups which they influence but do not control.

47. Friendship Societies. Soviet "friendship" and cultural societies in various countries represent themselves as nonpolitical organizations intended to promote cultural and economic understanding between the countries involved and the Soviet Union. Unlike the situation of similar Western-sponsored organizations, the Soviets view these groups as political tools, and activities involving them are manipulated by the International Department. They are used as a bridge to people who may be reluctant to participate in organizations that are openly pro-Soviet or sponsored by the local Communist parties, and are also available to the local KGB residency as a spotting mechanism for potential active measures and espionage agents. The leadership of these societies is weighted in favor of the Soviets, and the local society's board of directors often includes KGB officers under diplomatic or "unofficial" cover.

48. For example, prior to mid-1981 the Soviets were in the process of promoting the establishment of a bilateral friendship association in an African capital. The proposed leadership was to be divided between local and Soviet officials. The local side was to fill the executive positions. The local members of the new committee were all considered friendly to the Soviet Union. The Soviet side was to provide the new association's secretary and treasurer—that is, the key functionaries in charge of administrative and financial matters.

49. Manipulation of Mass Organizations and Non-Communist Political Parties. This is one of the most aggressive—and sometimes the most effective—of the techniques the Soviets use for active measures abroad. It may be practiced either directly by Soviet representatives in foreign countries or through the agency of friendly pro-Moscow Communist parties, fronts, or other political parties or organizations already influenced by active measures programs. The techniques range from the encouragement of anti-government or anti-US protests and demonstrations aimed at promoting or opposing any given cause, to work with labor and student organizations and efforts to protest and overthrow the democratically elected leadership of targeted organizations by subsidizing and supporting leftist or pro-Soviet forces or candidates, or even non-Communist political parties.

50. As one example, before a recent election of the leading officials of an African confederation of trade unions, the campaign of the incumbent president was known to have been heavily financed by the Soviet Union. The financing was done through the World Federation of Trade Unions, which, in turn, channeled the money through individual unions within the confederation.

51. Clandestine Radio Stations. The Soviets maintain two clandestine radio stations: the National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broadcast on a regular basis from the Soviet Union to Iran and China. NVOI represents itself as a voice of unidentified "progressive" elements of the Iranian people. Radio Ba Yi poses as a Chinese station representing Chinese political dissidents, particularly among the Chinese military. Moscow has never publicly acknowledged its sponsorship of these stations. The broadcasts of both clandestine stations support Soviet foreign policy goals.

52. NVOI has been broadcasting from Soviet Azerbaijan since 1959. It has never admitted its true location. The station broadcasts in Farsi and Azeri to Iran for 75 minutes daily. The dual purpose of this station is to promote Soviet policies toward Iran and to offer indirect propaganda support to the Soviet-controlled

Iranian Communist Tudeh Party. Expatriate Tudeh Party members form at least part of the staff of the station. NVOI commentaries are couched in nationalistic and occasionally religious tones. Anti-U.S. propaganda has been the station's most important feature since its inception, but attacks against the United States have been especially strident since late 1978.

53. NVOI has had to tread a fine line in having to defend Soviet policies and at the same time pose as the voice of the Iranian people. These functions have not always been mutually compatible, and NVOI occasionally has been out of harmony either with official Soviet propaganda or with the mood in Tehran.

54. NVOI broadcasts were particularly inflammatory in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The station broadcasts endorsed the actions of the militants in seizing and holding the Embassy and its diplomatic personnel and encouraged other anti-U.S. acts. On 5 November 1979, NVOI declared:

"In Tehran, struggling and enthusiastic young people occupied the building of the U.S. Embassy, the center of corruption and anti-Iranian conspiracies, and in this way they reflected the anti-imperialist feelings of our homeland's people. The reason for the climax of these anti-American struggles in our country should be sought most of all in the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism directed against the Iranian nation and revolution. . . . The occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by struggling young people, regardless of its outward aspects, is in fact a decisive response to the overt and covert conspiracies of U.S. imperialism and to the U.S. Governments' hostile act of settling the deposed Shah in the United States."

On 10 November, NVOI stated:

"By occupying the espionage nest of the United States in Tehran and its branches in other cities and publishing a part of the secret documents and evidence existing in this nest of corruption and espionage, in fact they [the "struggling young people"] proved to the world the conspiracies and intrigues of U.S. officials [against Iran]."

Broadcasts such as these prompted strong protests by the U.S. Government to the Soviet Government. Although NVOI never departed from its anti-U.S. stance, the station did moderate its broadcasts to some extent after the protests. For example, on 20 November 1979, NVOI "welcomed with satisfaction" the release of some of the American hostages and declared that "the release of all these hostages is imperative. . . ."

55. Although not located on Soviet soil, two other clandestine radio stations broadcast in the Turkish language from East Germany for the Turkish populations of Turkey and Cyprus and Turkish workers in West Germany. "Our Radio" and the "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" indirectly promote Soviet policy goals and serve as extensions of the Soviet active measures effort.

56. *Economic Activities.* The Soviets frequently use a variety of covert economic maneuvers to achieve both economic and political goals. They apparently try to manipulate the operations to ensure that, if the political objective is not attained, at least the Soviet Union's economic interests are served.

57. For example, in 1979 one KGB residency was apparently under instructions to drive up the price of gold, which would increase foreign concern over the stability of the U.S. dollar and its value as a world standard. KGB officers passed out both true and false information to their assets, who in turn used the information with influential businessmen and government leaders. The information concerned the gold market and comparative values in various international marketplaces. The financial aspects of this operation were apparently not fully understood by the KGB residency, and the effort failed.

58. *Military Operations.* The emergence of "national liberation movements" since World War II and Moscow's greater confidence in its own ability to project power have led to a significant increase in Soviet involvement in both overt and covert military activities in the Third World. Covert operations, in which Cuba has played an important surrogate role in recent years, supplement the diplomatic, propaganda, and economic support Moscow frequently gives to "liberation movements." These activities reinforce the Soviet Union's "revolutionary" credentials. Moscow has, for example, gained considerable prestige in many Third World countries because of its support for "liberation movements" in Angola and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), even though in the latter case the group it backed did not "win." In both cases many aspects of the Soviet military assistance role—such as training and the provision of equipment—eventually became known, but others remain clandestine. The GRU (Soviet military intelligence) plays a

major role in paramilitary training of "liberation movements." The KGB is involved to a lesser degree. The political decision about which group to support is made by the CPSU's International Department under Politburo guidelines.⁵

59. The military aspect of active measures is a more limited concept than the paramilitary element of covert action as understood in the United States. In active measures the military operations are used to mislead or to create a false impression of a Soviet military threat to put pressure on a target country (or third parties such as the United States). The purely military aspects of such operations—even if clandestine—are controlled by the appropriate component of the General Staff; the KGB and other agencies involved in active measures may play a supporting role through the use of other active measures techniques.

60. Certain initial activities undertaken by the Soviet military in the "Northern Territories" of Japan have been characterized by a former KGB active measures officer, who served in Japan, as an example of military active measures. This source believed that the activities were designed at the time, prior to a genuine military buildup, to impress the Japanese with a change in the Soviet military deployment in the Soviet-occupied islands of the Kuril chain, which Tokyo would like to have returned to Japan. The early activity was supposed to create the false impression that Moscow wanted to make the islands an integral part of the Soviet defense perimeter. The short-lived operation, this source believed, was politically motivated to persuade the Japanese Government to sign the Japanese-Soviet peace treaty by implying that otherwise there was no hope for return of the islands. The Soviet leadership apparently calculated that the early deceptive military activity on the islands would be observed. This military active measures operation was paralleled by other classic active measures techniques, including press placements, all aimed at supporting the same deception.

B. Political influence operations

61. Political influence operations are the most important but least understood aspect of Soviet active measures. They are difficult to trace and to deal with because they fall in the gray area between a legitimate exchange of ideas and an active measures operation. Political influence operations range from the utilization of what the Soviets call "agents of influence," to the manipulation of private channels of communication, to the exploitation of unwitting contacts. These operations have a common aim: to insinuate the official voice of the Soviet Union into foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business, labor, artistic, and academic circles in a nonattributable or at least seemingly unofficial manner. The foreigners involved in political influence operations are not usually recruited agents in the strict sense of the term. The Soviets making the "unofficial" statements are acting out a part when they make these statements. They often falsely attribute the source of their statements and/or skew commentary and information from that passed "officially," so as to elicit the desired response and exploit the vulnerabilities of the target.

62. The KGB, which is actively involved in this type of activity, entrusts a variety of individuals (KGB officers as well as other Soviets) with developing strong personal relationships with political, economic, and media figures in the West and the Third World. Moscow thus tries to secure the active collaboration of these individuals on matters of mutual interest while the individuals retain their integrity on other issues. In return for collaboration, the KGB offers intangible rewards tailored to meet the specific requirements or vulnerabilities of the individuals involved. Such rewards have included publicity for the collaborators' accomplishments and promises of special communication channels to the Kremlin.

63. Agents of influence. In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalist, was convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. During his career as a Soviet agent, Pathe was handled by KGB officers who worked under the cover

⁵ There have been few military operations that fall clearly within the realm of active measures; however, there are many examples of Soviet clandestine military activities that, in U.S. parlance, would come under the rubric of covert action as a paramilitary operation—but which are not considered active measures by the Soviets:

In Angola, Soviet, East German, and Cuban advisers trained guerrillas from the South-West Africa People's Organization.

In 1967, Soviet pilots in North Yemen flew combat and supply missions in South Yemen-marked aircraft on behalf of republican forces putting down an insurrection by royalist supporters.

From April 1969 to August 1970, Soviet pilots in Egypt flew combat air defense and reconnaissance missions in aircraft with Egyptian markings. In July 1970 four of these Soviet pilots were shot down over Egypt by Israeli fighters.

either of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO or the Soviet Embassy in Paris. Early contacts between Pathe and his Soviet handlers were overt, faking place at receptions or restaurants; after 1962 all meetings were clandestine. His articles, sometimes written under the pseudonym Charles Morand, were published in a variety of French newspapers and journals, including *France-Observateur*, *Liberation*, and *Realites*. All of the articles subtly pushed the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues. The Soviets reviewed Pathe's articles and provided information that formed the basis of others. Pathe also published a private newsletter, *Synthesis*, with funds provided by the Soviets. He did not receive a regular agent salary from the Soviets, but he was paid for individual analyses of French and international political developments he provided to the Soviets.

64. His established reputation among journalists and political figures, many of whom took his information and views at face value, made Pathe a valuable asset. Pathe was well integrated into the political establishment.

65. In an Asian country the Soviet Embassy reportedly has several agents of influence in the pro-Soviet faction of the major opposition party, who are responsible for ensuring that the pro-Soviet members retain control of the party. Once, when it seemed that the moderate faction would gain control over the party, the Embassy expended a considerable amount of time and large amounts of money in an unsuccessful attempt to split the party.

66. Use of Academicians. Soviet academicians (including some with high positions in the Soviet party and government hierarchy) are frequently used in political influence operations because they are often accepted as legitimate counterparts of their non-Soviet colleagues. In fact, they frequently act on the basis of instructions from bodies which control and administer Soviet active measures—the KGB, the International Department, and the International Information Department—even when they are expressing allegedly private or personal opinions.

67. Academic conferences on current issues are a prime example of this method of active measures operation. The Soviets take part in such a conference to influence its participants and the political line taken by the conference in directions favorable to Soviet policy interests. Soviet delegates to conferences such as the Pugwash series, which normally deal with disarmament and other international issues, commonly receive guidance from the Central Committee's International Department. The International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generate ideas for Soviet papers to influence non-Soviet conference participants; the KGB and the ID play a role in the selection of delegates.

68. Use of Journalists. KGB officers frequently serve abroad under journalistic cover. Overtly, they function much as any other journalist would, but their real mission is covert and may involve espionage or active measures. One KGB officer, who later defected, served under cover as a *New Times* correspondent in Tokyo. During this time, he sometimes engaged in influence operations and he also used his cover to engage in passing forgeries, as well as publishing numerous propaganda articles aimed at influencing the Japanese media. Journalistic cover is frequently used by the KGB because journalists generally have better access to a wider range of influential individuals than diplomats or other officials.

69. Soviet journalists who are not KGB officers also play a major role in political influence operations on behalf of the KGB, the International Department, or the International Information Department. In such operations the technique and the affiliations of the Soviets are frequently more significant than the substance of their messages. The journalists used in these operations have usually lived abroad for some time and have managed to gain direct access to, and sometimes have developed close ties with influential political figures. Through frequent contacts over an extended period of time, they try to build rapport and gain the confidence of their contacts. In the process they try to influence the attitudes of their targets by claiming—sometimes falsely—to represent a private or unofficial channel of communication to the Soviet leadership. The aim is that their message, which frequently does not differ substantially from overt Soviet propaganda, would gain added weight and authority (and thus "influence") by implicit or explicit attribution to the Soviet leadership.

V. ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS

70. The case studies of Soviet active measures included in this chapter highlight the use of active measures campaigns to support Soviet foreign policy objectives. These objectives may be of long term (such as the propagation of the Soviet model of Communism) or medium term (SALT and disarmament), or designed to support a short-term goal (the anti-neutron-bomb campaign). In the

latter case, once the goal has been achieved the campaign may be considered completed and these particular foreign policy resources can be shifted toward another objective.

71. Global campaigns may be waged over issues that transcend regions or continents (Soviets support for Third World countries) or those that concern only one specific area (the leftist revolution in El Salvador). Active measures campaigns may be intended to support Soviet objectives in one country or a specific geographical region (Western Europe), although they may occasionally be a part of the global effort. In either case, the ultimate objective of the active measures campaign is to promote the image and policies of the USSR while simultaneously countering US policies, reducing US presence, or stirring up anti-U.S. sentiments.

72. Each of the case studies highlights the most relevant active measures technique employed by the Soviets, without necessarily discussing all the techniques used in the given campaign. The emphasis on active measures in these examples is not intended to imply that they were the primary or sole Soviet instruments used to achieve the objectives in the given area, or even that the active measures effort was necessarily the most important factor. Rather, the intention is to show how the Soviets are using active measures in concert with other foreign policy instruments to further specific foreign policy goals.

A. The anti-TNF campaign in Western Europe

Soviet foreign policy objective

73. The Soviets are trying through active measures and other means to exploit broad public concern in Europe about the dangers of nuclear war. A current short-term Soviet objective in Western Europe is to thwart—through both diplomacy and other overt as well as covert activities—NATO's decision to modernize its Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF).

Soviet active measures strategy to achieve the objective

74. Active measures play an important role in the Soviet effort to overturn the NATO decision, but they are only part of a multifaceted effort. As illustrated below, the covert campaign, which is designed to exploit domestic opposition and concern about the wisdom of the initial decision, utilizes forgeries, agents of influence, front groups, and coordinated activities by some European Communist parties. Similar activities were used to encourage opposition to the deployment of "enhanced radiation weapons" in the mid-1970s—the so-called anti-neutron-bomb campaign.

Active measures supporting Soviet policies

75. Influence Operations. The Soviets have been involved in a number of political influence operations intended to thwart implementation of the NATO decision on TNF modernization. They have used journalists, party officials, and academicians to try to influence the decisionmaking process in several West European countries. In some countries the Soviet effort has bordered on blackmail and bribery, and in other cases the Soviets appear to prefer an indirect approach through Communist or leftist parties.

76. During the early stages of the anti-TNF campaign the Soviets tried to use economic leverage and inducements for political purposes. In some cases we believe these were examples of Soviet active measures because of their timing and specificity, and the fact that they mesh so well with other aspects of the Soviet anti-TNF campaign. For example, in late 1979 the Soviet Ambassador in one NATO country suggested to his host government that if it opposed TNF modernization, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able to persuade the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable commercial terms.

77. Front Groups. Soviet front groups—e.g., the World Peace Council and its off-shoots such as the International Institute for Peace, and the International Liaison Forum for Peace, at Soviet direction have sponsored or exploited a number of conferences, symposiums, and demonstrations organized to oppose the NATO TNF decision. The Soviets are actively trying to broaden the bases of support of these fronts by attracting non-Communist participation in their activities. The fronts are also cultivating environmentalists, pacifists, and antinuclear groups for the same purpose. National Communist parties have set up their own front groups or are trying to exploit or infiltrate other organizations opposed to the NATO decision.

78. For example, the Belgian Communist Party (BCP) and the Dutch Communist Party (CPN), which have limited influence in their own right, have

managed to exert influence indirectly through front groups which oppose TNF. At Soviet suggestion, these parties have infiltrated their members into anti-TNF groups and have organized an umbrella organization for several peace and Soviet-sponsored organizations in Belgium. In the Netherlands the CPN has set up its own front group, "The Joint Committee, Stop the Neutron Bomb—Stop the Nuclear Arms Race."

79. The "Joint Committee" collaborated with the Dutch Communist Party in sponsoring an international forum in Amsterdam in November 1980, under the guidance of the CPSU's International Department. A group of Soviet journalists and Communist-dominated delegations from both East and West European countries attended and supported this Joint Committee activity. Prominent Dutch religious and political leaders and scientists were attracted to the forum, as were members of the Belgian parliament. The Dutch group, "Christians For Socialism," a known long-time Communist Party front, also supported the forum. The Amsterdam meeting was a major breakthrough for the Communists with regard to the extent of involvement of non-Communist political groups with similar goals.

80. The Amsterdam forum illustrated that the CPN had made a breakthrough to non-Communist political parties and peace movements with similar goals. Agreements are made among these parties and movements not to disturb each other's activities and, if possible, to support them. Such interaction between Communist and non-Communist groups enables them to engage in a broader range of activities than might otherwise be possible. The pattern of collaboration between the East European and some groups opposed to TNF, evidenced at the November forum, continues and takes many forms.

B. Soviet support for leftist insurgency in El Salvador

Soviet foreign policy objectives

81. Soviet support for the insurgency in El Salvador is motivated by a variety of objectives: to establish another Communist, or at least pro-Soviet leftist, government on the U.S. doorstep; to divert attention from the Soviet role in Afghanistan; and to damage the U.S. image in Western Europe and Latin America by distorting U.S. policy on El Salvador and linking the United States with objectionable aspects of the Salvadoran Government through a coordinated propaganda and disinformation campaign.

Soviet active measures strategy to achieve the objectives

82. The successful Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, the deteriorating situation in El Salvador, and the cooling in U.S.-Soviet relations appear to have contributed to Moscow's conclusion in late 1979 or early 1980 that the time was ripe for decisive action in El Salvador. In addition to overt diplomatic and propaganda support for the insurgents, and the covert supply of weapons, frequently through their East European allies, the Soviets launched an active measures campaign that involved the use of such classic techniques as forgeries, front groups, covert press placement, disinformation, and manipulation of mass organizations.

Active measures supporting Soviet policies

83. Political Front Groups. With Soviet and Cuban encouragement and participation, Salvadoran leftists in the spring of 1980 established the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), the political front that represents the insurgency abroad. In June 1980, Salvadoran leftists created the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the central political and military planning and tasking organization for the insurgents. These two organizations collaborate closely but not always openly with the Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans. Nevertheless, they represent themselves as indigenous, independent organizations in an effort to conceal the Soviet and Cuban role in planning and supporting their activities.

84. Solidarity Committees. The DRU called for the establishment of solidarity committees in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to serve as propaganda outlets, conduits for aid, and organizers of solidarity meetings and demonstrations. These committees were sometimes organized as part of a broader "Nicaragua-El Salvador Solidarity Committee," or "Guatemala-El Salvador Committees" or sometimes simply as "El Salvador Solidarity Committees." Such committees, in cooperation with local Communist parties and leftist groups, organized some 70 demonstrations and protests that took place between mid-January and mid-March 1981 in Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand. The Cubans and some other Communist parties provided significant support to this DRU effort and to some demonstrations.

85. Manipulation of International Organizations. Through front and solidarity groups, the Soviets and Cubans tried to assist the Salvadoran leftists in manipulating a range of international organizations to gain political legitimacy, support, and humanitarian aid for the insurgents. They specifically targeted the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the nonaligned movement (NAM), the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Catholic Relief Services. The DRU, through the socialist party in El Salvador, also tried to influence the socialist parties in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and other countries to exploit the Socialist International mechanisms as a means of waging a concerted campaign on behalf of the Salvadoran insurgency. The active measures campaign was buttressed by intense diplomatic activity on behalf of the insurgents.

86. Disinformation. To discredit the United States, Soviet media freely disseminated unfounded and false accusations about U.S. policies and actions in El Salvador:

On 30 December 1980, Pravda, the organ of the CPSU Central Committee, reported that U.S. military advisers in El Salvador were involved in punitive actions against noncombatants. The military operations allegedly involved the use of napalm, herbicides, tanks, and aircraft.

On 1 January 1981, Literaturnaya Gazeta, an active measures outlet, alleged that the U.S. military was preparing "to implement the so-called Centaur Plan." On 6 January 1981, an article in Izvestiya, organ of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, explained that "'Operation Centaur' . . . provides for the physical elimination of many thousands of Salvadorans." The article claimed that the "genocide policy" was already responsible for more than 10,000 deaths in El Salvador.

In January and February 1981, TASS, Pravda, and Moscow Radio repeatedly charged that the United States was preparing to intervene militarily in El Salvador.

C. Soviet active measures in Pakistan

Soviet foreign policy objectives

87. Soviet foreign policy objectives in Pakistan currently are strongly influenced by the struggle in Afghanistan and by Pakistani sympathy with the insurgency. In this context Moscow has sought to support political groups that seek to topple the government of President Zia, to deepen the distrust between New Delhi and Islamabad, and to neutralize Pakistan as an effective regional force and end its support for the Afghan insurgency.

Soviet active measures strategy to achieve the objectives

88. The Soviet campaign in Pakistan is designed to support leftist groups, individuals, and parties opposed to Zia both within and outside Pakistan. It also encourages separatist minority groups in Pakistan.

Active measures supporting Soviet policies

89. Opposition Parties and Groups. The underground Communist Party of Pakistan and other far-left splinter groups are so divided that they do not offer the Soviets viable vehicles for active measures in Pakistan; nevertheless, individual Communists frequently work as agents of influence within leftist groups and publications and various student and trade union organizations. Through the chief of Afghan intelligence, the Soviets have given financial and material support to the "al-Zulfikar group" (or Pakistan Liberation Army), which is led by Murtaza Bhutto in Afghanistan. The Soviets have maintained contacts with and have supported exiled members of Bhutto's Pakistani People's Party (PPP). The bulk of Soviet funding for Pakistani opposition groups is believed to be going to the PPP. Soviet propaganda has suggested that Moscow views Nusrat Bhutto, who has replaced her late husband as the leader of the PPP, as having the best chance of bringing down the Zia government. Moscow continues to encourage Baluchi and Pushtun separatists and other minority groups in conflict with Zia.

90. Direction of the Campaign. The Press and Information Department (PID) of the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad is a major center of Soviet propaganda in Pakistan. Another is the U.S.S.R. Friendship House in Karachi, which provides a free forum to leftist Pakistani speakers and holds cultural events that encourage minority separatism (such as a recent concert featuring Sindhi artists). The Soviet Pakistani Friendship Association engages in a major propaganda and influence program and maintains branches in the main cities. Its activity has lately been limited by a government crackdown on Soviet propaganda.

D. Soviet Effort To Disrupt U.S.-Egyptian Relations

Soviet foreign policy objective

91. One objective of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East is to undermine the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, prevent the establishment of a U.S. military presence in Egypt, undermine the Camp David Accords, and draw Egypt into the Soviet sphere of influence.

Soviet active measures strategy to achieve the objective

92. To achieve its objective, Moscow has consistently criticized and opposed the Camp David accords, and encouraged Arab opposition. Moscow has also tried to increase the cost of the U.S. relationship to Cairo by linking Egypt with any U.S. policy or action in the region that, at least in the Soviet view, is unpopular.

Active measures supporting Soviet policies

93. Soviet diplomatic efforts to undermine the U.S.-Egyptian relationship have been buttressed by an active measure effort that has made frequent use of forgeries of U.S. Government documents. Over the last several years, at least eight anti-U.S. forgeries have been surfaced by the Soviets.

94. The first in the current series surfaced in 1976. It purported to be a speech by a member of the U.S. administration. The speech was insulting to the Egyptians and called for "a total change of the government and the governmental system" in Egypt. Another document was allegedly prepared by the U.S. Secretary of State, or one of his close associates, for the President; its language was calculated to offend a number of Arab leaders, including Sadat and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. Three other forgeries, using facsimiles of the signature of the then U.S. Ambassador in Cairo, criticized Sadat's lack of leadership and political acuity. One noted that "Mr. Sadat may not be the most suitable person to put across our plans for Egypt and the Middle East." Another declared that if Sadat is not prepared to serve U.S. interests "then we must repudiate him and get rid of him without hesitation."

95. In 1977 the Egyptian Embassy in Belgrade received a forged dispatch, allegedly prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which suggested that the United States had acquiesced in plans by Iran and Saudi Arabia to overthrow Sadat. In May 1980 a number of governments in the Middle East received an alleged "Top Secret" U.S. report purportedly written by a senior American official. The report criticized U.S. policy regarding the Palestinians and proposed changing any regime in the area that caused difficulties for American interests.

96. The Muslim Brotherhood publication *Al Dawa* surfaced a forgery in January 1979 designed to cause concern in the Egyptian Government. The forgery, believed to have been produced either by the Soviets or the Libyans with Soviet assistance, purported to be a report from an American professor in Cairo who was (falsely) accused of being a CIA agent. The bogus report alleged that Israeli and Egyptian intelligence services agreed with a CIA estimate that Islamic groups, principally the Muslim Brotherhood, are the real barrier to an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The suggested tactics to negate the influence of these groups included:

A "resort to partial suppression. . . . There is no objection to the speedy elimination of some Islamic personalities in Saudi Arabia" (to cause loss of trust between the Brotherhood and the Saudi Arabian Government).

Sowing "the seed of doubt and dissension among the leadership" (of various Islamic groups).

"Deepen scholastic and sectarian differences" (between groups).

Countering "the new wave of abiding by the Islamic teachings . . . through the use of information and cultural media."

Surfaced in the context of the problems caused by Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, this forgery was widely disseminated and was taken at face value by many Egyptians. After its publication, some mullahs in Cairo delivered sermons in the mosques denouncing the U.S. Government and the CIA for interfering in Islamic affairs in Egypt. *Al Dawa* subsequently carried an article prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo which branded the document as a forgery; nonetheless, the forgery has been replayed elsewhere as an authentic document.

VI. AN EVALUATION OF ACTIVE MEASURES

A. Strengths and weaknesses

97. Soviet active measures activity has been both assisted and hindered by the nature of the political system that supports and directs it. Also, a variety of

conditions affect active measures, and a variable mixture of factors will promote or hamper the successful execution of specific Soviet active measures programs. Moreover, certain Soviet policies may be considered both strengths and weaknesses for active measures activity, depending on specific circumstances. Soviet support to "national liberation movements," for example, may give the Soviets added prestige in some countries, but it may also contribute to existing mistrust of Soviet designs in others.

98. We believe that, in most cases, the Soviets are well aware of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of their active measures programs and have tried to ameliorate them. In a number of Islamic countries, for example, the Soviets assign large numbers of Central Asians to their official and quasi-official representations in an effort to counter the "white" image of the U.S.S.R. and exert a favorable impact on the local Muslim populations.

Strengths of Soviet active measures

99. Resources. In resource allocation, Soviet active measures have some significant advantages over similar Western efforts. Because of the nature and tradition of the Soviet political system, the regime :

Is able and willing to devote the financial and personnel resources it deems necessary for the full implementation of active measures operations.

Has a unique capability to orchestrate the involvement of mass organizations, such as Soviet youth groups or religious bodies (the Russian Orthodox Church), on behalf of active measures.

Can quickly and easily create new domestic mass organizations or small prestigious groups, such as the recently established Soviet "Physicians for Preventing Nuclear War," that are specifically tailored to exploit and manipulate similar nongovernmental organizations in the West.

100. Lack of Restraints. The active measures effort is not hampered by the legal or domestic political factors that are important considerations in covert action undertaken by Western governments.

101. Command and Control. Command and control are centralized at senior levels of the party and governmental structure, and the energies of the entire party and state apparatus can be directed toward the achievement of a single objective. In the active measures arena, below the Politburo and Secretariat levels, the two concerned CPSU Central Committee departments and the KGB work closely together and have direct access to appropriate party and government components, which facilitates coordination of their efforts. With this high-level CPSU backing, the considerable resources of the state and party are harnessed as necessary to support active measures.

102. Audacity and Willingness To Take Risks. The Soviets are willing to accept the risk of considerable political embarrassment as a consequence of active measures operations. Further, a certain audacity, single-mindedness of purpose, and hard-driving quality are also apparent in many Soviet active measures. This Soviet approach to active measures can be seen, for example, in a willingness to attribute the putative authorship of the forged documents to the Vice President of the United States and to a former Secretary of State in his dealings with the President.

103. Vulnerability of Open Societies. The free exchange of ideas and the tolerance of opposing views characteristic of open societies make it easier for the Soviets to identify sentiments and groups that can be exploited and manipulated for the benefit of Soviet active measures.

104. Lack of Colonial Stigma. Notwithstanding their treatment of non-Russian peoples at home and their role in East European countries, the Soviets pride themselves on having no colonial tradition in the Western sense. Moscow tries to present itself as the defender of the "oppressed" nations and to present its political system as a modern alternative to Western-style capitalism. The Soviets have used this image to gain entree to anti-Western circles in the Third World and to manipulate them to Moscow's advantage.

105. Common Cause in the "Workers Movement." Because of the contention by the U.S.S.R. that it and the "Peoples Democracies" are worker-peasant states, and that the U.S.S.R. supports revolution and "national liberation movements," the Soviets have had some success in making common cause on many anti-American and anti-NATO issues with more Marxist-oriented socialists and other leftists and pacifists in Western Europe and the Third World.

106. Assistance by Surrogates. The collaboration of most East European countries and Cuba in the Soviet active measures effort provides additional resources at only minimal cost to the Soviet Union.

Weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Soviet active measures

107. **Superpower Image.** The image of the U.S.S.R. as a superpower and a white-dominated society has hindered Moscow's effectiveness in some developing countries. The traditional heavyhandedness of Soviet officials, mainly in dealing with Third World nationals, has in some cases limited the effectiveness of some Soviet active measures programs.

108. **Communist Ideology.** Most governments find Communist ideology alien and objectionable when applied to their countries. This factor is a particular problem for the Soviets in trying to work with non-Marxist social democrats in Europe, due to past hostilities in the period between the world wars. The use of local Communist parties as instruments of active measures, particularly when they are illegal, can be a liability.

109. **Atheism.** Many countries view the atheistic nature of the Soviet regime a threat to religious traditions and practices. In some areas, Soviet anti-Semitism has a similar effect.

110. **Lack of Credibility.** Many nonaligned countries distrust Soviet designs because of past Soviet actions in the Third World (such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and Soviet support to subversive regimes (such as Libya's). These factors tend to counter the image of goodwill, noninterference, and righteousness the Soviets seek to project abroad. Moreover, the failure of the Soviet economic model and the well-publicized repressive character of the regime at home further detract from the credibility of the Soviet message abroad.

111. **Technical Deficiencies.** In the past, Soviet forgeries tended to lack sophistication and were relatively easy to identify as of Soviet origin. Although even such poor-quality forgeries fulfilled their purpose to some extent, in recent years the Soviets have paid more attention to format in order to avoid easy exposure and have had more success in this line.

112. **Vulnerability to Exposure.** In some Third World countries, Soviet contacts—in many cases young intellectuals with Soviet education—are easily identifiable because of background, continued association with Soviets, or assumed affinity with Marxist ideals. Soviet press placements are sometimes easy to spot, and their origin is traceable to the Soviets by virtue of their anti-U.S. propaganda content and adherence to Soviet positions. In many nonaligned countries, the controlled media and censorship place strong limits on possibilities of Soviet manipulation of the local media outlets.

B. Impact and effectiveness

113. We believe that evaluations on the effectiveness of major active measures are reported directly to the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo, and that some active measures have been highly evaluated. In September 1979, Janos Berecz, chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, who may have been aware of the Soviet criteria, wrote that "the political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War II." Additionally, the Soviet Ambassador to the Netherlands received a decoration from the CPSU Central Committee in 1978 in recognition of his success in stimulating that campaign in the Netherlands.

114. Since active measures are carried out in concert with other foreign policy instruments supporting the same policy goals, the line between overt and covert activity is frequently indistinct. In their conduct of active measures abroad, the Soviets tend to capitalize on and manipulate existing sentiments that are parallel to or promote Soviet foreign policy objectives. Whenever a political movement supports policies that coincide with the goals or objectives of Soviet foreign policy, the exact contribution of Soviet active measures to that movement is difficult to determine objectively.

115. That overall effectiveness of active measures is shown by indirect evidence. The fact that the Soviet leadership continues to use active measures on a large scale and apparently funds them generously suggests a positive assessment of their value as a foreign policy instrument. We believe that all Soviet active measures techniques discussed in this study are effective in varying degrees, but, because they occur in tandem with other Soviet activities, it is difficult to judge the degree of effectiveness of any one of the available techniques in the abstract. We are more confident, however, in our ability to gauge the impact and effectiveness of some specific techniques and operations within individual active measures campaigns. In sum, what we have seen indicates that Soviet active measures are conducted on a worldwide scale, are well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy actions, and appear frequently to be effective.

C. Future trends

116. Continuity has been a basic feature of Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin years. There is no indication that a major change is likely under the present party leadership. The basic features and techniques that have characterized Soviet active measures in the past are likely to remain the same in the future, but refinements along the following lines are likely:

Trends toward increased "objectivity" and greater technical sophistication will continue.

Tactical deemphasis of Communist ideology will become more pronounced. Willingness to work with non-Communist political parties will increase.

International fronts will increasingly be supplemented by ad hoc and local fronts, including religious, environmentalist, and other single-issue groups.

Increased focus on activities of multinational and transnational corporations to exploit the real or imagined economic grievances of the Third World will characterize the substantive content of more active measures.

A larger role for proxies and surrogates, should Moscow be embarrassed by the exposure of its own operations, can be anticipated.

Tactical shifts in active measures techniques can be expected as U.S.-Soviet relations ebb and flow, but the strategic use of active measures probably will not diminish. In the near term, Soviet active measures will focus greater attention on disarmament, arms control, and "peace" themes.

17. Given the advanced age of the present membership of the Soviet Politburo, a change in the composition of that body is certain in the foreseeable future. We do not believe, however, that personnel changes will cause a major realignment in basic Soviet foreign policy objectives. The conservative nature of the Soviet system also suggests that the fundamental organizational outlines of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus (including its intelligence arm) will remain unaltered. Consequently, active measures are likely to remain one of the major instruments of Soviet foreign policy implementation.

EXHIBIT II

CIA STUDY: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES¹

INTRODUCTION

1. The Soviets use the term *active measures* (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) to refer to activities by virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure. Active measures are regarded as a valuable regular supplement to the conduct of foreign policy by more conventional diplomatic methods. They are quintessentially an offensive instrument of Soviet policy. Used in an intelligence context, the term itself denotes the distinction the Soviets draw between activities intended to produce a political effect abroad and the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.

2. The Soviets use active measures for a variety of purposes. Among other things, they use them to denote activity to influence or subvert the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other countries, undermine confidence in foreign governments and institutions, and discredit opponents of Soviet policy. The instruments used in Soviet active measures operations are many and varied. They include at least the following:

- foreign communist parties and international and national front organizations.
- written and oral disinformation, particularly forgeries.
- manipulation of foreign media through controlled assets and press placements.
- agents of influence.
- manipulation of mass organizations and demonstrations.
- covert political, financial, and arms support for insurgents, separatist movements, and opposition groups and parties.
- ad hoc political influence operations often involving elements of deception, blackmail, or intimidation.

3. The Soviet concept and practice of active measures are broader than the range of activities subsumed under the US intelligence term covert action. While

¹ Information available as of Mar. 31, 1982, was used in the preparation of this study. Declassified by CIA November 1982.

the Soviets employ all the same methods associated with covert action, many active measures include overt or semi-overt as well as clandestine elements. In the West, moreover, covert action is normally entrusted to the state's regular intelligence service and kept separate from other spheres of governmental or private activity. In the Soviet case, many active measures are planned and executed by intelligence operatives, but such measures are also conducted by party and government officials and by many nominally unofficial persons such as journalists, academics, and representatives of "public" organizations. The common thread that runs through all active measures is a high degree of manipulation and misrepresentation, whether to disguise Soviet involvement in a particular activity or to conceal the real purpose behind an activity in which a Soviet threat is overtly involved.

4. *Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures* is a status report on significant Soviet activities directed against the United States and its allies. It provides a selective summary of recent Soviet actions and does not presume to offer in-depth analytical treatment of the subject or a comprehensive survey of all Soviet activity. Its main purpose is to call attention to the scope and methods of current Soviet active measures.

I. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE WEST EUROPEAN "PEACE" MOVEMENT

5. *"Dialogue for Disarmament and Détente" in Vienna, Austria, January 29-February 2, 1982.* This international peace conference was organized by the International Liaison for Disarmament and Peace (ILFDP), an offshoot of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC). Romesh Chandra, a senior Indian communist who serves as president of both organizations, presided over the Vienna meeting. The Soviets presumably regarded this conference as less than successful, since it failed to stimulate new anti-US peace demonstrations in Europe or attract wide support for a WPC meeting scheduled to coincide with the second Special Session on Disarmament at the United Nations in June 1982. The Soviets, moreover, were probably disappointed at the poor turnout and their inability to get strong endorsement of their views, as well as being no doubt embarrassed by the attempt of some participants to criticize Soviet policies and the martial law regime in Poland.

6. *Soviet Pressure on Portuguese Communist Party to Hold Peace Rallies.* There is reason to believe that only Soviet pressure led the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) leadership to proceed with "peace" demonstrations in Lisbon and Porto in January 1982. The dominant PCP line of thought had been that few people would support such demonstrations in view of the situation in Poland. In fact the demonstrations were not very successful.

7. *Soviet Directives to a Moscow-Line West European Communist Party.* The Soviets instructed a West European communist party loyal to Moscow regarding peace movement activities in 1982. The Soviets emphasized the importance of mobilizing opposition to the planned deployment of U.S. intermediate range missiles in Western Europe and suggested promoting the theme of a "U.S. threat" to Western Europe. The Soviets urged the use of the Soviet pamphlet "Whence the Threat to Peace" as source material for anti-U.S. propaganda.

8. *Soviets Planning for World Peace Conference of Religious Workers.* Scheduled in Moscow for May 10-14, this conference was organized under the theme of "Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe." Russian Orthodox Patriarch Pimen, the nominal sponsor and an active member of the World Peace Council, succeeded in attracting fairly broad support for the conference among West European and American religious leaders and organizations. Some East European religious groups called on their counterparts in the West to attend the conference, claiming that it would promote East-West contacts and suggesting that they would not be permitted to attend a disarmament conference in Stockholm in September unless their co-religionists show up in Moscow. The leading Buddhist figure in the USSR urged Buddhists to attend the Moscow meeting.

9. The Soviets held several preparatory meetings for the conference, and it was evident that the procedural rules, agenda, and topics adopted for the conference practically guaranteed an anti-U.S. and anti-NATO propaganda fest. The final communique was written and cleared with Soviet authorities in advance of the conference.

10. *WPC Planning for Disarmament Propaganda in United States.* The WPC leadership devoted much attention to planning a propaganda show to coincide

with the second Special Session on Disarmament at the United Nations in June 1982. This planning was carried out at Soviet direction, and the WPC was told to stress anti-INF propaganda.

(See also Para. 40 for details of a Soviet agent of influence operation in Denmark involving covert financial and propaganda support to the peace movement.)

II. OTHER WORLD PEACE COUNCIL ACTIVITIES

11. *Funding for Travel of Latin American Leftists.* The WPC agreed to pay for the travel of representatives of communist and leftist organizations in a Latin American country who wanted to seek support in Europe for the insurgency movement in their country.

12. *Support for El Salvadoran Insurgents.* The "Third Conference for Peace and Sovereignty in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean," held in San Jose, Costa Rica during April 1-5, occurred after a WPC decision to organize a political action campaign to support the Faribundo Mari National Front (FMLN)'s "great military offensive." The FMLN had pressed for an international political action campaign in Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the United States to constrain U.S. material aid to the government in San Salvador.

13. *Worldwide Demonstrations Against US Policy in El Salvador.* Numerous and well-attended rallies protesting US policy toward El Salvador were held around the world on the eve of the Salvadoran national elections of March 28, 1982. The rallies were intended to discredit the elections themselves and US efforts to organize them. Demonstrations were reported in Berlin, Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Mexico City, Bern Stockholm, Luxembourg, Toronto, Calgary, London, San Paulo, and Tel Aviv. Demonstrators caused damage to US installations in Frankfurt and Rotterdam. Local groups calling themselves Committees for Solidarity with the Salvadoran People claimed credit for organizing the rallies.

The decidedly anti-US cast to these demonstrations, their timing, and their international scale suggest that the Soviet Union or one of its front groups was behind the protests. In this regard, it should be noted that the Soviet news agency TASS recently announced the formation of a permanent coordinating committee in Mexico City for the various national solidarity groups.

III. FORGERIES AND OTHER DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS

14. *CIA Map Operations.* The Soviets have added a new wrinkle to their disinformation operations in recent months by purchasing publicly available maps published by the Central Intelligence Agency and then using them as the basis for false and alarming stories about US policies. The first "map" operation occurred on September 20, 1981, when an article appeared in the Austrian Communist Party newspaper, "Volksstimme," alleging that a CIA map with the code number 77706/10-70 has been found in a "secret service building" in West Germany near the Austrian border. The article further alleged that the map depicted targets in Austria for US raids and sabotage as well as nuclear missile and neutron weapon assaults. (The author of the article, Julius Mader, in 1968 published a book entitled "Who's Who in the CIA," a compilation of names of alleged US intelligence officers that caused considerable trouble for US personnel overseas in subsequent years.)

15. The map itself was genuine; it probably had been purchased through the US Government Printing Office. The map that bore the number cited in the Mader article is unclassified. It provides only basic data. The article itself, which has no basis in fact, was intended to stimulate further support for the West European "peace" movement and document charges of the "U.S. threat" to European security.

16. On October 9, the gist of Mader's story was replayed in the Soviet press in an article in "Komsomolskaya Pravda" and date-lined Vienna.

17. The second operation to misrepresent a US Government map appeared in a November 11, 1981 story in the "Patriot," an Indian daily. ("Patriot" is a pro-Soviet publication that is used frequently for disinformation operations.) The map used in this operation was an unclassified map of Afghanistan that had been widely circulated and is available to the public.

18. "Patriot" claimed that a "specially guarded aeroplane (sic) airlifted these maps to Pakistan" for distribution to Afghan "terrorist group leaders" and that the maps display targets of sabotage selected by the CIA. The map was used to document allegations that the CIA is engaged in supporting Afghan rebels against the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.

19. The third and most recent map operation appeared in the "Ethiopian Herald," a daily published in Addis Ababa and frequently used by the Soviets for tententious articles that are subsequently replayed in the Soviet or foreign press. In this case, Julius Mader reprinted a genuine CIA map inset to support a story alleging that the Reagan Administration and the CIA are waging bacteriological warfare against Cuba. The map in question is a regular unclassified topographical map of Cuba with insets showing economic activities by region, sugar growing areas, population distribution, and land utilization. The immediate purpose of the Mader article was to provide support for charges of US bacteriological warfare against Cuba made by Fidel Castro and the Cuban media. The article implied that additional map operations may be forthcoming, since it referred to CIA maps of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina.

20. *Forged Letter from President Reagan to King Juan Carlos.* In early November 1981, several Spanish journalists and all delegations (except US) to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe received copies of a bogus letter allegedly sent by the US president to the Spanish king and a fabricated memorandum allegedly prepared by the Spanish foreign minister and other officials.

21. The forged presidential letter advised the King that several of his advisors and influential opposition groups are opposing Madrid's accession to NATO. To support this allegation, the letter cited "highly secret information" received from a "strictly confidential source"—a reference to the bogus memorandum. The forged letter urged the King to move against the opposition groups so that Spain could join NATO before the end of 1981, and it also hinted that the United States might be prepared to support Spanish efforts to regain control of Gibraltar from the British government.

22. This forgery was evidently intended to complicate US-Spanish relations by giving the appearance of US interference in Spain's internal affairs and to provoke Spanish opposition to NATO membership. The fact that this forgery was sent to CSCE delegations shortly before martial law was declared in Poland suggests that it may also have been intended to impede an anticipated discussion of Soviet responsibility for the Polish events at the Madrid conference by raising charges of US "interference" in Spanish politics.

23. *Forged State Department Letter and Study Regarding Greece.* In January 1982 two forged documents were surfaced as a pair in Greece and at the CSCE Conference in Madrid. One purported to be a September 23, 1981 letter from Under Secretary of State Clark to the US Ambassador to Greece, the other a State Department-sponsored analysis of the "current political situation" in Greece. The forged analytical piece, allegedly by an unspecified "research institute," suggested that the United States support a military coup in Greece in order to preserve the status of the US military bases there. The forged letter recommended that the US Ambassador make use of the attached analytical study in his diplomatic activity. This forgery operation was clearly designed to undermine US relations with the new Greek government elected in October 1981; it also sought to damage the reputations of several Greek politicians named in the alleged research institute study and to create suspicion about the political reliability of the Greek military. The thrust of the forgeries, which were very crudely done from a technical standpoint, thus served Soviet interests in undermining US-Greek relations, and the method of surfacing followed a frequently observed Soviet pattern.

24. *Forged NATO Document.* On October 19, 1981, a few days before the Spanish parliamentary vote on NATO membership, several Spanish journalists based in Brussels received an altered version of an official NATO Information Service publication. The forgery also contained a bogus map showing Spain as the sixteenth member of the Western alliance, and it was clearly intended to embarrass the proponents of NATO membership on the eve of the parliamentary vote in Spain. The method of surfacing the false document and the use of a forgery to influence the internal Spanish debate are consistent with previous Soviet modus operandi.

25. *Western Union Mailgrams an Alleged US-Swedish Intelligence Cooperation.* During November 8-11, 1981, at least twelve such mailgrams were sent to US and foreign journalists in the Washington area. The mailgrams offered to reveal information concerning an alleged US-Swedish agreement for using facilities at Karlskrona, Sweden in US satellite reconnaissance operations. The falsely-attributed mailgrams were signed with several names of USG officials and the Swedish Ambassador in Washington.

26. Karlskrona, it should be recalled, is where a Soviet submarine suspected of carrying nuclear-tipped torpedoes had run aground the previous month, causing substantial embarrassment to the Soviet government and dealing a blow to its "peace and disarmament" propaganda. On November 10, the Soviet news agency alleged that Sweden transmits US radio signal reconnaissance directed at the USSR. The bogus mailgrams may have been intended to buttress the TASS story.

27. The mailgrams were written in substandard English, and at least two of them were sent to a departed Soviet and a Polish journalist. Circumstantial evidence suggests, however, that this may have been a Soviet or a Soviet sponsored active measure aimed at limiting the impact of the Soviet submarine incident.

28. *Disinformation campaign to Link US Government to Coup Attempt in Seychelles.* Moscow Radio on November 27, 1981 charged that the United States was behind the previous day's unsuccessful coup attempt against Seychelles President France Albert Rene. The broadcast also claimed that Washington had cooperated with the Republic of South Africa in planning the coup as part of a broader effort to secure US bases in the Indian Ocean. TASS carried similar accusations in English language broadcasts on December 1 and 3, and the story was replayed in African and Indian media thereafter.

29. The Soviets have subsequently kept this active measure operation alive despite President's Rene's public statement on December 2nd, that he had no indication of foreign involvement except for South Africa.

30. *Soviet Accusations of U.S. Involvement in Dozier Kidnapping.* The January 8, 1982 edition of "Soviet Russia" carried an article alleging that the CIA and Army "secret services" were behind the kidnapping of US Army Brigadier General James Dozier on December 17, 1981 by the Italian Red Brigades. The article asserted that by manipulating the Red Brigades the United States hoped to undermine leftist opposition to NATO in Italy. This story was repeated several times in the Soviet media and received quite a bit of attention in the West European media. It is similar to an extensive effort the Soviets have made since 1978 to convince Italians and other West Europeans that the United States was behind the Red Brigades' murder of former Italian Premier Aldo Moro.

31. *Disinformation Ploys in Portuguese Newspapers.* In September 1981 the newspaper "Portugal Hoje" carried extracts from an alleged set of documents purportedly authored by Zairian Presidential Advisor Seti Yale. The extracts described efforts to coordinate activities between the US, Zaire, South Africa, Gabon, Morocco, China, and the Angolan insurgents in order to overthrow the MPLA government in Luanda and replace it with a government headed by Angolan insurgent leader Jonas Savimbi. The forged documents appeared in the midst of US efforts to promote negotiated solutions to Southern African problems and were clearly designed to undermine those efforts. The same newspaper, which is not usually anti-US, followed up this story with dispatches from Luanda suggesting US connivance in South African incursions into Namibia, US efforts to retard the Namibia independence process, and US efforts to guarantee South African interests in the area. These reports are believed to have been peddled to "Portugal Hoje" in a Soviet-inspired disinformation effort to set back progress toward a Namibia settlement.

32. The pro-Communist "Diario De Lisboa" has been the purveyor of several disinformation efforts aimed at linking the United States and other Western and African governments to intrigues against the Marxist regime in Angola. An article in mid-December charged that the United States was assisting the Military Council of Resistance (COMIRA), an Angola opposition group based in Zaire, in its preparations for overthrowing the present government. Another article claimed that US military advisors had been sent into southern Angola to assess the military requirements of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA opposition group, adding that US Secretary of State Haig had offered "large quantities of anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, and some military advisors if necessary" to Savimbi during talks he held in Washington.

33. The March 6, 1982 edition of the same newspaper continued the disinformation operation with an article alleging a wideranging conspiracy involving the United States, South Africa, Israel, Zaire and UNITA in a plan to overthrow the Angolan government. By drawing in South Africa and reports of secret US-South African efforts to use Namibia as a base of operations against Angola, this disinformation operation appeared to be intended to undermine both US-Angolan

negotiations on normalizing relations and efforts to reach an acceptable and non-violent resolution of the Namibian situation.

34. *Soviets Revive Disinformation Campaign Against US Foreign Service Officer.* On several occasions in 1981, Soviet media falsely charged that a senior US Foreign Service Officer, George Griffin, was a CIA officer and had been involved in covert operations in India and Afghanistan.

35. The Soviets renewed their attack on Griffin in 1982 in articles carried by TASS, "Literary Gazette," and "Izvestiya," Moscow Radio's World Service on February 24, for example, claimed that Griffin had recently entered India illegally after having been refused a visa (while he in fact, was elsewhere). It further claimed falsely that he was in charge of a covert operation code-named Khalistan aimed at aiding separatists in the Indian state of Punjab.

36. *False Soviet Charges Regarding US Bacteriological Warfare.* Beginning in early 1982, Soviet media made repeated charges that a research laboratory sponsored by the University of Maryland in Lahore, Pakistan is a bacteriological warfare facility. On February 16, for example, TASS deliberately distorted a statement made by the former director of the Lahore facility, who had stated that the facility was engaged only in disease research. The false TASS stories were picked up and carried in several Indian newspapers. The disinformation effort appears to have been part of a massive ongoing propaganda campaign to deflect US allegations of Soviet use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in South and Southwest Asia and to play on Indian concerns regarding US cooperation with neighboring Pakistan.

37. *Soviet Disinformation Campaign in Beijing.* The Soviets have engaged in a major disinformation effort in Beijing, spreading false and misleading stories aimed at fueling speculation regarding improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations. KGB and GRU officers work with their counterparts from East European embassies under a division of labor that allows them to target the large journalistic and diplomatic communities there.

38. This Soviet disinformation effort has centered on exploiting, as a possible irritant in Sino-U.S. relations, China's reluctance to criticize the Polish military's declaration of martial law.

—As one example, shortly after martial law was declared in December 1981, Soviet and East European diplomats spread the story that Beijing, in a show of support for the Polish regime, had agreed to sell Warsaw 50,000 tons of pork on highly favorable terms. (The Chinese had in fact made such an offer, but in October 1981, before martial law was imposed and in an effort to bolster Polish resistance to Soviet pressure).

—In another example, an East European official briefed foreign correspondents on the Sino-Polish trade agreement for 1982, claiming that the thirty percent increase in trade represented Chinese political support for the martial law regime and a slap at the U.S. policy of trade sanctions against Poland. The official did not point out that the increase only partially compensated for a large percent drop in trade the previous year and that Beijing has been seeking an expansion of trade with all the East European countries.

39. The Soviets also have sought to spread rumors concerning a possible improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. This effort appears to have been undertaken in Beijing in anticipation of Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov's call on February 23, 1982 for such an improvement in relations. For example, Soviet and East European officials claimed falsely that the visit of a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official and prominent Soviet sinologist to Beijing signalled progress in Sino-Soviet relations. The officials also encouraged local diplomats and journalists to believe that secret negotiations had taken place.

IV. AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

40. In October 1981, the Danish government expelled Vladimir Merkulov, a second secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, for engaging in activities inconsistent with his diplomatic status. The next month the Danes arrested Danish journalist Arne Herlov Petersen and charged him with carrying out illegal activities as Merkulov's agent. Petersen had been recruited several years earlier by another KGB officer. Petersen served the Soviets as an all-round agent of influence, publishing anti-NATO propaganda tracts, conveying funds to peace activities, and passing Soviet-prepared forgeries. With wide contacts among Danish journalists and artists, Petersen was a valuable Soviet asset for more than ten years.

41. An Asian academician associated with a political institute that organizes periodic seminars in which senior politicians participate has been convinced that Soviet purposes in East Asia are non-aggressive and plans to convey this view in discussions with politicians and in articles for various publications. The professor had received special treatment by the local Soviet Embassy and was impressed by his private talks with Soviet officials.

44. The Soviets approached a Third World professor during his tour of the U.S.S.R. and convinced him to help organize a youth-oriented front organization in his country. The educator tried, unsuccessfully, to implement the proposal.

V. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST SPAIN

47. In addition to the use of forgeries (see Section II), the Soviets have employed other active measures in their campaign to dissuade the Spanish government from joining NATO. For example,

48. The Soviets attempted to intimidate the Spanish by hurting their important tourist industry. In June 1981, two Spanish publications ran a story claiming that leakage from bacteriological weapons stored at a U.S. military facility at Torrejon were responsible for an outbreak of "atypical pneumonia." The story died after an official U.S. denial, but a few weeks later, TASS took pains to give the story new life. The story was replayed on the continent, especially in West Germany. As a result, many West German tourists who regularly vacation in Spain cancelled their summer trips.

VI. KGB IMPRESARIOS

50. For several years, Soviet cultural activities in a pro-West Third World capital have been handled exclusively by a succession of suspected KGB officers assigned to the local Soviet consulate as cultural affairs officers. The Soviets apparently value these cultural contacts as a means of gaining access to the small but influential segment of the intellectual and financial elite that is drawn to Soviet performances.

51. Soviet and East European artists and performers, are made available by the Soviets to the local government at bargain rates. The Soviets also provide low-cost cultural orientation tours of the USSR to local artists.

52. The Soviet intelligence services are believed to use these cultural contacts and exchanges primarily for essential propaganda and political influence rather than espionage opportunities.

VII. SOVIET EFFORTS TO ARRANGE AUTHORITATIVE INTERVIEW FOR A FOREIGN PUBLICATION

53. Prior to spring of 1982, the Soviets approached an influential Western publication with an offer of an exclusive interview with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov. Ustinov had never been interviewed in the Western press, so the Soviet offer would have been a journalistic prize for the publication. Recognizing the value of their offer, the Soviets asked that in return for the interview the publication agree to give more positive treatment to Soviet affairs. The publication evidently turned the offer down, as no such interview has ever appeared in its pages.

EXHIBIT III

SOVIET FUNDING OF THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT¹

1. Overt information available on Soviet funding of elements in the West European peace movement provides only fragmentary insight into this Soviet activity and should be evaluated in the context of a broad analysis of Moscow's multiple efforts to exploit the peace movement. The import of the Soviet financial assistance is difficult to assess, but the fact that Moscow continues to provide such assistance suggests a positive Soviet assessment of its results.

2. The following treatment of this Soviet funding activity offers both generalized analysis and specific examples, including two covert funding cases in Denmark.

¹ Declassified by CIA November 1982.

3. Soviet involvement in the Danish peace movement was publicly revealed in fall 1981, when the Danish Government expelled Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB officer serving under cover as a Second Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, and arrested his agent, a Danish citizen named Arne Herlov Petersen, on charges of illegal affiliation with a foreign intelligence service.

(a) In a 17 April 1982 public statement on the Merkulov-Peterson case, the Danish Ministry of Justice cited the following example of Petersen's Soviet-directed and funded efforts to influence Danish public opinion: "A single but illustrative case in point is the promise made by the Soviet Embassy in the summer of 1981 to partially finance the expenditure incurred in connection with the publication of a number of advertisements in which a number of Danish artists expressed support of an initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The collection of signatures was organized by Arne Herlov Petersen, who said in several telephone conversations that the Soviet Embassy was involved in the matter. The Soviet Embassy was also informed of the course of the collection campaign on several occasions."

(b) The same Danish Ministry of Justice statement noted that Petersen received not only gifts and free travel from the Soviet Embassy but also cash payments intended in part to cover the expenses of publishing Soviet-supplied documentary material, including "the costs of printing a pamphlet against the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, which was published at the initiative of the (Soviet) Embassy and contained a text supplied by the (Soviet) Embassy." (In 1980 Petersen had published "True Blues: The Thatcher That Couldn't Mend Her Own Roof," a pamphlet that attacked the current British Government's foreign and domestic policies. A year earlier, Petersen had published a work entitled "Cold Warriors"; this pamphlet, based on a KGB-supplied draft, contained brief but scathing attacks on several Western political figures: Margaret Thatcher, U.S. Senators Henry Jackson and Barry Goldwater, NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, and West German politician Franz Josef Strauss.)

(c) As revealed in the Danish press, Merkulov's activity was not confined to directing the operations of influence agents such as Petersen. Merkulov, and other members of the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, reportedly maintained frequent contact with the Copenhagen-based Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security, an umbrella organization for some fifty smaller peace groups. The Cooperation Committee has well-established ties to the major Soviet-dominated international front organization, the World Peace Council, a primary conduit for Soviet financial and other support to elements of the European peace movement.

4. Other information connecting the Soviets to the peace movement in Denmark has appeared in the Danish press. On 21 March 1982, Danish newspapers began reporting on the following case:

(a) While on an official visit with a delegation to Moscow in early March 1982, Ingmar Wagner, a member of the Danish Communist Party (DKP)'s executive and central committees, had his home burglarized by juvenile delinquents, who stole a moneybox containing 150,000 West German marks (\$63,200). The Danish police, during a routine drug-related raid in Copenhagen's Christiania Commune on 18 March, arrested a 16-year-old boy, who had a key to a locker at the central train station. Inside the locker, the police found 36,000 West German marks and a number of documents belonging to Wagner and the DKP, including receipts showing that at least part of that sum had been transferred from a Soviet Bloc country (not further identified) to Mr. Wagner's home address via the Danish-Soviet Friendship Association.

(b) Upon learning of the above-cited events, while Wagner was still in Moscow, the DKP claimed that the Danish police and/or the U.S. CIA had planted the funds allegedly belonging to Wagner. But when Wagner returned from Moscow on 22 March, to explain the circumstances under which he possessed the foreign currency, he said the money had been given to him by a "West European man," whose identity he refused to divulge. Wagner said the money had been collected by solidarity movements in several West European countries and then forwarded to him (Wagner) in his capacity as DKP "peace and solidarity secretary."

WORLD PEACE COUNCIL

5. The hand of the World Peace Council (WPC), the major Soviet-controlled international front organization with headquarters in Helsinki, is often apparent

in the planning and coordination of anti-nuclear "peace campaigns" in West Europe and elsewhere. The WPC receives over half of the total funds Moscow annually provides its thirteen major international fronts.² In 1980 this total was estimated at \$63 million. The WPC also receives contributions from other communist parties, particularly those in East Europe. WPC-affiliated national peace committees are publicized by the WPC as its major donors, but their contributions are minimal in relation to Soviet and other Bloc communist party subsidies.

6. When the WPC formulated and published its action plans for 1982, peace and disarmament issues remained the focus of WPC activities. The introduction to the WPC's public Programme of Action 1982 states: "It is to the vital task of strengthening the unity and increasing the striking power of the peace movement that this entire Programme is dedicated." And it also states: "The main emphasis in the Programme is on national activities which seek cooperation and unity with the widest range of political parties, trade unions, women and youth organizations, religious circles, social and cultural bodies and outstanding personalities in all fields."

Providing funds for peace movement activities is one important means of WPC involvement, but the WPC seeks to conceal this aspect of its support.

7. Moscow has not been completely silent in public on its own efforts to fund peace movements in West Europe and elsewhere. One such public reference appeared in the February 1982 issue of the Soviet journal Sputnik, a monthly digest of the Soviet press published in several European languages by the Novosti Press Agency. In the "Letters to the Editor" section, an Indian reader was cited as asking what the "Peace Fund in the USSR" is and what it does. The answer follows:

"After the end of the Second World War, on their own initiative Soviet citizens began to send in money and other voluntary contributions for the support of the international peace movement. The donations were considerable and they were sent to various addresses. The need to concentrate them led to the formation in 1961 of the Soviet Peace Fund (SPF). Soon its address, 10 Kropotkinskaya, Moscow, 119034, became widely known both in our country and abroad.

"The SPF gives financial support to organizations, movements and people struggling for the consolidation of peace, the development of friendship and cooperation between peoples, the banning of all types of nuclear weapons and other means of mass annihilation, and the achievement of universal and total disarmament. The fund promotes the development of ties and contacts between the Soviet public and those struggling for peace in other countries and allocates funds for the organization of international congresses, symposiums, festivals and exhibitions.

"Today the SPF has nearly 75 million regular voluntary contributors (almost every third citizen in our country provides material assistance to the cause of peace). The SPF receives personal contributions and the box-office receipts of specially organized concerts, stage productions, exhibitions and sports events.

"Not only Soviet citizens contribute to the Peace fund, but workers, scientists, figures in the arts in the U.S.A., Britain, Italy, France, etc., as well. Thus, the American D. Zubon willed his estate to the Fund, the veteran member of the Swiss Labour Party, V. Martin, who visited the USSR, made a large contribution, while the Canadian writer Dyson Carter donated a large collection of old coins.

"The Editors."

8. The first deputy chief of the CPSU International Department, Vadim Zagladin, in an interview with the Vienna Arbeiter Zeitung published 21 May 1982, provided additional details on the Soviet Peace Fund and its support to Western peace groups. After Zegladin asserted that on a Soviet holiday in May 1982, "several working brigades came to work and collected all the money they had earned for the Soviet Peace Fund," he was asked what happened to the money. Zegladin answered: "There are several peace committees for European security. They are printing newspapers, and all Soviet participants in peace demonstra-

² The WPC and the other major Soviet international fronts are discussed in "The CIA and the Media," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, First and Second Sessions (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1978), pp. 562-571. They are also discussed in "Soviet Covert Action," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, Second Session (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1960), pp. 79-81.

tions here in Vienna, Amsterdam or Brussels are being paid for the money from this fund. I think that we do not inform the public sufficiently about our movement"

9. The Soviet Peace Fund is a type of financial clearinghouse administered by the SCDP. It is organized on a nationwide scale with at least 1120 representatives scattered throughout the USSR. Like the Soviet national affiliate of the World Peace Council, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP), the Peace Fund is a "public" organization, allegedly operating without the involvement of official Soviet organs.

10. SCDP Chairman Yuriy Zhukov observed on Soviet television on 22 May 1982 that some 80 million Soviet citizens participate in "replenishment" of the Fund. "Donations" are mailed to SCDP headquarters or paid through the USSR Gosbank (State bank). The most common method of collecting money for the Fund is for individual factories, plants, and collective farms to hold a one-day "work shift for peace," similar to the activity of the "working brigades" Zagladin cited. Individuals participating in such work shifts then "donate" their day's wages to the Fund. Substantial sums of money are collected over time. According to 20th Century and Peace (December 1981), the Krasnoyarsk Peace Committee alone received 2 million rubles for the Fund in 1981. Actually, such "donations" usually represent levies imposed by the central authorities on the individual local affiliates.

11. Financing the WPC. According to the English-language weekly Moscow News (Nov. 19, 1981), the Soviet Peace Fund helps finance some of the WPC's "large public initiatives." Former Peace Fund chairman Boris Polevoi asserted that his clients included the "leaders of the international democratic organizations working for peace: the Fund regularly gives them assistance in organizing their undertakings" (20th Century and Peace, April 1980). Polevoi also acknowledged that the Fund worked closely with the SCDP, aiming to "render financial aid to the organizations, movements and personalities fighting for stronger peace, national independence and freedom."

12. Referring to the October 1973 World Congress of Peace Forces, an event organized jointly by the SCDP and the WPC, the November 1973 edition of the WPC's Peace Courier reported that "Soviet public organizations . . . covered all the delegates' maintenance expenses in Moscow." It went on to claim that "Soviet citizens donated to the Soviet Peace Fund—which covered the delegates' maintenance expenses—about \$200,000. Moscow's Patriarchate also donated 3 million rubles."

13. After money has been collected by the Soviet Peace Fund, it is channeled to WPC headquarters in Helsinki either through the International Department or through the SCDP. The various "peace committee" chapters affiliated with the WPC—the Austrian Peace Council, the Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace, the British Peace Assembly, the Norwegian Peace Committee, and 131 others throughout Europe and the rest of the world—are believed to receive Soviet assistance in turn via WPC headquarters or through local communist parties. Most of these national affiliates in any event generally coordinate their activities with those of the local party and include party members in their ranks.

14. Financing the ICESC. In addition to the WPC-linked "peace" groups, the USSR sponsors several "peace committees for European security" which are national affiliates of the so-called International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (ICESC). The latter committee was set up in Brussels in 1972 following a meeting of the WPC's decisionmaking Presidential Committee, purportedly to promote the work of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Its affiliates are located in 24 East and West European countries, as well as the U.S., USSR, Canada, and West Berlin. According to an ICESC brochure published in 1979, the purpose of the organization is to "inform large areas of the public" about "everything connected with the CSCE's cause, the process of detente and the extension of peaceful coexistence between states of Europe with different social and economic systems." To achieve this goal, the ICESC "coordinates the action of its own national committees, circles and forums, as well as other gatherings of public opinion. . . ."

15. Zagladin, himself a member of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation (SCESC), indicated in his Vienna interview that the Peace Fund provides financial assistance to ICESC affiliates. In addition, personal and institutional ties between the WPC and the ICESC appear to be intricate and strong. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, a deputy International Department chief, is believed to be responsible for liaison with North European communist parties, is a

member of the SCESC and serves simultaneously on the WPC's Helsinki-based Presidential Committee. Even more striking is the fact that at least 16 ICESC affiliates include members who belong simultaneously to their national WPC branches. These "dual membership" cases are found in Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Portugal.

16. When money from the Soviet Peace Fund is passed to these ICESC affiliates, the arrangement is believed to be similar to that for the WPC. The money provided by the Fund to WPC (and presumably ICESC) affiliates is used not only for "printing newspapers" as Zagladin suggested, but also for placing pro-Soviet propaganda in local newspapers and providing administrative, technical, and travel support for a variety of peace movement activities.

EXHIBIT IV

SOVIET POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

Political influence operations are the most important but least understood aspect of Soviet active measures. They are difficult to trace and to deal with because they fall in the gray area between a legitimate exchange of ideas and an active measures operation. Political influence operations range from the utilization of what the Soviets call "agents of influence," to the manipulation of private channels of communication, to the exploitation of unwitting contacts. These operations have a common aim: to insinuate Soviet policy views into foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business, labor, artistic, and academic circles in a nonattributable or at least seemingly unofficial manner. The foreigners involved in political influence operations are not usually recruited agents in the strict sense of the term. The Soviets making the "unofficial" statements are acting out a part when they make these statements. They often falsely attribute the source of their statements and/or skew commentary and information from that passed "officially," so as to elicit the desired response and exploit the vulnerabilities of the target.

The KGB, which is actively involved in this type of activity, entrusts a variety of individuals (KGB officers as well as other Soviets) with developing strong personal relationships with political, economic, and media figures in the West and the Third World. Moscow thus tries to secure the active collaboration of these individuals on matters of mutual interest while the individuals retain their integrity on other issues. In return for collaboration, the KGB offers intangible rewards tailored to meet the specific requirements or vulnerabilities of the individuals involved. Such rewards have included publicity for the collaborators' accomplishments and promises of special communication channels to the Kremlin.

It has been argued that sophisticated societies are immune to political influence operations, particularly those involving agents of influence. Consequently, it is worth stressing that the examples which follow are recent and that both took place in sophisticated European countries.

1. France—Pierre-Charles Pathé. In 1980 Pierre-Charles Pathé, a French journalist, was convicted of having acted as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. During his career as a Soviet agent, Pathé was controlled by a series of KGB officers who worked under cover of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO and the Soviet Embassy in Paris. Early contacts between Pathé and his Soviet handlers were overt, taking place at receptions or restaurants; after 1962 all meetings were clandestine. His articles, sometimes written under the pseudonym Charles Morand, were published in a variety of French newspapers and journals, including *France-Observateur*, *Liberation*, and *Realities*. All of the articles subtly pushed the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues. The Soviets reviewed Pathé's articles and provided information that formed the basis of others. Pathé also published a private newsletter, *Synthesis*, with funds provided by the Soviets. He did not receive a regular agent salary from the Soviets, but he was paid for individual analyses of French and international political developments he provided to the Soviets.

His established reputation among journalists and political figures, many of whom took his information and views at face value, made Pathé a valuable asset. Pathé was well integrated into the political establishment, as evidenced by his membership during the 1960s on the executive board of the New Boulevard St.

Germain Club, which had been organized at the instigation of Charles de Gaulle and was made up of influential French political figures who formed the Movement for European Independence. Pathé's newsletter had a small but influential list of recipients. 41 newspapers, 299 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 139 senators, 14 embassies, and seven private citizens. Pathé provided the Soviets with a list of his subscribers, and for years they used him to try to influence these subscribers and his other contacts which included high-ranking French officials and journalistic colleagues.

2. Denmark—Arne Herlov Petersen. In early November 1981 the Danish press reported that the government of Denmark had expelled Vladimir Merkulov, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, for activities inconsistent with his diplomatic status. It was also reported that a Danish citizen, Arne Herlov Petersen, had been arrested and charged for his activities as Merkulov's agent. This case is especially interesting for its revelation of the variety of ways in which an agent-of-influence can be used.

3. For several years, Petersen was in clandestine contact with a succession of three Soviet diplomats who with high certainty could be identified as KGB officers. Under the direction of these officers, of whom Merkulov was the last, Petersen functioned as a propagandist, (including author of articles, letters-to-the-editor, and other publications), an activist and clandestine conduct of funds to support Soviet-instigated "peace movement" activities, a source of information on "progressive" Danish journalists and other Danish citizens of interest to the KGB, and a purveyor of forgeries. His accomplishments included the following:

—In 1979, Petersen published a pamphlet entitled "Cold Warriors." The pamphlet, based on a KGB-supplied draft, contained brief but scathing attacks on major Western political figures: Margaret Thatcher, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator Barry Goldwater, Joseph Luns, and Franz Josef Strauss. The pamphlet was published in Dutch and English.

—In 1980, Petersen published "True Blues: The Thatcher that Couldn't Mend Her Own Roof." The pamphlet attacks the foreign, domestic, defense and economic policies of the current British government. The text of this pamphlet was in fact supplied to Petersen by the Soviet embassy via Merkulov.

—The 30-31 May 1981 issue of Information carried an appeal bearing the signatures of 150 Danish artists and endorsing Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. The Soviet Embassy is known to have promised Petersen it would finance at least part of the expenses for such newspaper appeals. Those who signed the appeals, a number of which were published, were apparently unaware of who paid for their publication.

—Petersen, who was actively involved in the Denmark-North Korea Friendship Society, was used by the Soviets to pass a forgery. Reportedly, the Soviets drafted a report dealing with alleged negotiations between the US and the People's Republic of China that were intended to discourage negotiations between the two Koreas. The Soviets apparently thought that if the North Koreans believed the Chinese were negotiating with the US over Korean issues, Pyongyang would feel threatened and seek closer ties with Moscow. Petersen was chosen to pass the report to the North Koreans, without revealing the Soviet role, because of his role in the friendship society.

In spring 1982 the Danish Ministry of Justice elected not to institute court proceedings against Petersen, explaining in a public statement on 17 April 1982 that, *infra alia*, it believed Danish interests had not been sufficiently damaged to warrant adjudication. The statement did, however, put on public record the main charges and evidence against Petersen. (A translated text of the statement is provided below.) The Danish foreign minister, in remarks on Danish TV two days later, challenged Petersen to sue for libel if the statement's charges were not true. Petersen decided not to sue.

* * * * *

(U.S.-Translated Text of Public Statement by the Danish Ministry of Justice Issued on 17 April 1982 follows:)

"THE ARNE HERLOV PETERSEN CASE

"A. The Ministry of Justice has scrutinized currently available results of the investigation effort in a concrete criminal case in which Authur Arne Herlov Petersen is charged with violation of section 108 of the Danish Penal Code Dealing with illegal affiliation with a foreign intelligence agency. It may be mentioned in this connection that a decision by the Ministry of Justice is required

to authorize court proceedings in cases concerning violation of chapter 12 of the Danish penal code (dealing with crimes against the national self-determination and security).

"Based on an assessment of all currently available facts in the case, the Ministry of Justice deems it justifiable to refrain from further investigation in the case and not to institute court proceedings against the person in question.

"The Ministry of Justice deems it to be of significant general interest to give a brief outline of the regulations governing the general activities of foreign intelligence agencies in Denmark and of some of the main points in the criminal case in question.

"B. Certain foreign intelligence agencies deploy considerable activity in Denmark as well as in other nations to secretly influence the public debate and, consequently, the formation of opinion in a direction which serves the political interests of those foreign countries, for instance in the field of foreign and security policy. A characteristic feature of this externally controlled influence of opinion is that the real source of the views expressed in the debate is concealed on the assumption that the exposure of the source would significantly weaken the persuasive force of the argumentation on broad segments of the Danish public. This type of influence of opinion makes use of a number of means to achieve its objective, for instance various methods of influencing press officers or other opinion-makers, exploitation or direct initiation of apparently nonpartisan or a political campaigns and initiatives, secret economic assistance and dissemination of untruthful information of apparent authenticity ("disinformation"). A combination of these methods is often used. The Danish intelligence agencies are aware that these types of influence of opinion are significant elements in the activities of several foreign intelligence agencies, and that the resources that the countries in question have earmarked for this type of activity have apparently increased in recent years.

"C. The actual investigation effort in the criminal case in question was initiated several years ago when the police became aware of remarkable contacts between Soviet diplomats in Denmark and Danish citizen Arne Herlov Petersen. The police were particularly struck by the fact that the foreign diplomats deployed considerable efforts to conceal their contact with the Dane by, for instance, preventing meetings from being observed and preempting the possible tapping of conversations. Thus, it may be mentioned that the Dane was told that telephone calls should not be made to the Soviet Embassy, and that the connection should be concealed. At one point a special procedure was laid down for the scheduling of meetings. The contact was maintained by three Soviet diplomats in succession. They could all with a high degree of certainty be identified as being in the service of the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB.

"A connection of this sort of course attracted the attention of the Danish police on the obvious assumption that the activities could potentially infringe on the provisions of the Danish penal code. Therefore the police have conducted an investigation, in which the police have obtained court warrants to tap the telephone and search the home of the suspect. The search in the home of the suspect took place in November 1981, and the suspect's diaries, which contain notes of significant importance to the case, were taken into custody.

"The investigation has provided information on the precise nature of the connection. Thus, the material available substantiates that in a number of instances the Soviet intelligence officers have used—or made attempts to use—Arne Herlov Petersen as a means of influencing the opinion of the Danish public in his capacity of author of various kinds of articles, letters to the editor and publications. A single, but illustrative, case in point is the promise made by the Soviet Embassy in the summer of 1981 to partially finance the expenditure incurred in connection with the publication of a number of advertisements in which a number of Danish artists expressed support of an initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The collection of signatures was organized by Arne Herlov Petersen, who said in several telephone conversations that the Soviet Embassy was involved in the matter. The Soviet Embassy was also informed of the course of the collection campaign on several occasions.

"The investigation has also showed that the Danish author in question has—

"—Transferred documents with allegations on foreign policy to the North Korean Embassy at the request of the Soviet Embassy and, in so doing, has misrepresented the source of the documents which were claimed to emanate from an American journalist with the apparent purpose of contribution to tension between North Korea and the People's Republic of China.

"—Transmitted information on several occasions to the Soviet Embassy on the Danish left wing and on so-called progressive journalists, who were not members of the Danish Communist Party, however.

"Arne Herlov Petersen has in the recent past received considerable quantities of alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and other gifts from the Soviet Embassy and also travels free of charge to the Soviet Union. Add to this cash amounts, which however, must be assumed to be intended for coverage of documented expenses to a certain extent. This applies to the costs of printing a pamphlet against the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, which was published at the initiative of the Embassy and contained a text supplied by the Embassy.

"The Embassy has told Arne Herlov Petersen that he should not join the Danish Communist Party, and that, if he did so, the Embassy would break its connection with him.

"Arne Herlov Petersen has said several times that the Embassy has pledged to evacuate him and his family to the Soviet Union in the case of imminent war.

"D. Section 18 of the Danish penal code prescribes penalty for the person who, provided that the offense does not fall under section 107 of the Danish penal code dealing with espionage against Danish interests, 'acts in a way enabling or assisting a foreign intelligence agency directly or indirectly to conduct activities within the territory of the Danish state.'

"As regards the propaganda activities which are part of the activities of the suspect in the case, it must be expected that the courts will make a concrete assessment of each individual count for an eventual overall assessment with the purpose of determining whether the activity—i.e., mode of cooperation, remuneration for services rendered, degree of dependence between the parties—has been performed with the clear overall purpose of enabling the foreign intelligence agency to pursue its aims, and whether the assistance is clearly distinguishable from what may reasonably be characterized as normal activity on the part of a journalist or an author in this country.

"It is also evident that the Ministry of Justice will exercise its prerogative to determine whether or not to institute court proceedings in cases like this with the utmost caution in part to protect the freedom of speech and in part because other steps are frequently quite adequate. The main argumentation is that, in a free society like the Danish society where all statements of opinion are permitted with only a few restrictions in pursuance of special statutory provisions, each individual citizen is normally the supreme judge of the merits—and the true background—of the views that are expressed in the public debate. The critical judgment of each individual citizen is tested, and it should not be otherwise in a democracy whose foundation is the free formation of opinion. But this does not exclude the possibility that it may be appropriate sometimes to react against particularly gross instances of an externally controlled influence of the public debate. In addition to the institution of court proceedings against individuals for their connection with a foreign intelligence agency, such a reaction may take place by diplomatic steps, by informing the population of the matter, or by a combination of these measures.

"E. Even though it may be assumed that Arne Herlov Petersen, has committed offences which in principle fall under the wording of section 108 of the Danish penal code, the Ministry of Justice believes after an overall assessment of all currently available facts that Danish interests have not been damaged to such an extent as to warrant the institution of court proceedings. In addition to the general considerations mentioned above, the Ministry of Justice has taken personal circumstances into consideration and the fact that the Soviet diplomats who must be considered principal characters in the case have already left Denmark, one of them as a direct result of this case.

"The ministry of Justice wishes to add in conclusion that the police were not only entitled but also under an obligation to undertake an investigation of the connection that was ascertained between Arne Herlov Petersen and the Soviet diplomats. An accurate clarification of the activities deployed is of course of vital importance of determining the decision by the public prosecutor, and the Ministry of Justice, on the question of court proceedings in cases of this sort. Therefore, it is a matter of course that the decision in this case does not in any way limit the possibilities of the police to undertake investigations within the framework of the administration of justice act under responsibility to the courts and the Ministry of Justice.

"Signed/Ole Espersen,
"The Ministry of Justice, April 17, 1982."

Excerpts from the pamphlet *True Blues* prepared by KGB follow :

ARNE HERLØV PETERSEN

TRUE BLUES

The Thatcher that couldn't mend her own roof

JOE HILL PRESS
1980

MS. THATCHER AND HER POLICIES

»Whatever you won't hear (about Thatcher) in casual conversations: A terrible ogress . . . I'm fond of her obstinacy . . . She has a nice hair-do. An energetic wench . . . A nasty woman . . . I'll never vote for a woman at the menopause age . . . I'll vote for her to annoy men . . . A charming, well-educated woman, but a Prime Minister? She is an impudent woman . . . We already have a woman at the head of the kingdom, that's enough«¹). That is how a correspondent of the impartial French daily *Le Monde* reported conflicting, ironic and even insulting remarks, which, he says, the Britons made about Margaret Thatcher when she was running for the job of the Prime Minister of Great Britain at the Parliamentary elections in May 1979.

This diversity of views, however, did not prevent Thatcher from coming to power. The Conservatives won an impressive victory, getting an absolute majority of 339 seats. The Labor won only 268 seats, that is, even with the support of all other parties that are not represented in the Government the Conservatives would still have a 43-seat majority.

Thus, the Parliamentary elections of May 1979 gave the Conservatives a sufficiently stable majority for the next five years, when Parliamentary elections are to be held in May 1984.

Although all political observers share this view, they are far from being unanimous in that the present Conservative leader – Margaret Thatcher – will be able to stay in power through this term. And not without reason.

First, many Britons associated Margaret Thatcher with the attractive

¹) Que n'entend-on pas au hasard des conversations: Terrible ogressse . . . Je l'aime pour son obstination . . . Elle est si bien coiffée . . . Une pouliche rapide . . . Une sale bonne femme . . . Je ne voterai jamais pour une femme qui a l'âge de la ménopause. Je voterai pour elle, rien que pour embêter les hommes . . . Une femme charmante, bien éduquée, mais premier ministre? Elle a du toupet . . . Nous avons déjà une femme à la tête du royaume, cela suffit«. (*Le Monde*, 24.4.79. page 5).

to the USSR of equipment to be used for building two methanol plants under the contracts signed by Davy International. These contracts indicate how Britain can be doubly hit by a declining trade with the Soviet Union. The orders which have not been fulfilled by the Davy company, exceed £ 300 million. The projects under the contracts signed by Davy have been distributed among subcontracting metal-processing firms located in the areas where unemployment has hit Britain most: in the North-Eastern coast, in the North of the Central counties of England, Lancashire, Yorkshire and in Scotland.

In an interview to *The Times* on March 25, 1979 Lord Carrington pointed out that much should be done in the field of contacts with East European countries. Most of the European countries and, of course, the French and the Germans, he said, has increased such contacts, but Britain, perhaps, had been slow. So, he added, Britain should make up for her losses since the contacts with Eastern Europe were an excellent thing.

However, the belligerent tone of some of the statements made by Thatcher harms the development of those relations and leads Europe back to the cold war. Here Thatcher once more plays into Carter's hand who would be glad to deprive Europe of an independent voice, to thrust on it his inconsequent and irresponsible policy line.

Carter and Thatcher are alike in many respects. The same trick of appealing to the average man and intimidating him with the »Soviet threat«, the same desire to dominate their partners, the same fountain of fantastic promises. Some observers believe that Thatcher, just like Carter did, will face the same failures, if she is to stay at least four more years at Downing Street.

For the time being it looks as though they are clearly out of step with each other. To be more exact, Thatcher is trying to march in the same shoes with Carter, but she is always at least one step behind. And this is the first and foremost peculiarity of their »special relationship« of inequality between a senior and a junior partner. It is always Carter who takes initiative. Carter wants Thatcher to follow him. He wants this not only from her personally, but from all the other West European leaders.

EXHIBIT V

THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE¹

1. Among the most potent forces in Soviet active measures operations is the network of ostensibly independent but in fact Soviet-dominated "front" organizations established to influence and manipulate non-communists who are ignorant of the fronts' hidden pro-Soviet political objectives. On peace and disarmament issues, the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) has long played the vanguard role in promoting pro-Soviet campaigns; but it has relied heavily on a major sister front, the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), which has given unqualified support to all WPC programs. The CPC has been, and remains, a classic example of Soviet exploitation of religious groups to further Soviet foreign policy.

2. The CPC, founded in 1957 and headquartered in Prague since that time, has functioned as a "transmission belt" conveying Soviet policy views to a variety of target audiences and in recent years has concentrated on promoting pro-Soviet positions in European and other peace campaigns. In the 1980's religious groups have played a leading role in stimulating public concern over the possibility and horror of nuclear warfare and in promoting policies alleged to advance the cause of peace and disarmament. In this context, there are few more useful instruments than an international, purportedly religious body that can with guile and deception advance Soviet disarmament policies.

3. From its origin to the present, the CPC has reserved its executive positions for persons believed by the Soviets to be of indisputable loyalty to the USSR. They range from Joseph Hrodmaka of Czechoslovakia, a Lenin Peace Prize recipient and first CPC president, and his pro-Soviet staff, to the current CPC officers who include a Hungarian CPC president who is also a member of the highest executive body of the WPC and a CPC vice-president from Madagascar who is also a WPC vice-president. Other CPC vice-presidents come from Cuba, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Vietnam, as well as India, the U.S., and Sri Lanka. Metropolitan Filaret, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, is chairman of the CPC Continuation Committee, which oversees the front's functions between sessions of its assemblies. In addition a full-time secretariat operating from the CPC's Prague office is directed by Soviet and Czechoslovakian church officials, aided by other personnel primarily from East Europe. A key position is held by Sergei Fomin of the USSR. He is a deputy secretary-general based in the CPC Prague headquarters, where he is able to oversee the day-to-day activities of the CPC.

4. Although non-Soviet Bloc personnel in the CPC and other front organizations hold some vice-presidential positions along with their communist colleagues, and although non-communists are included in governing bodies, this arrangement is intended merely to maintain the myth that the fronts are independent from the Soviet Union. In reality, all of the fronts are controlled and directed by the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Soviet domination is generally accomplished through a given front's secretary general (usually a communist), who is assisted by administrative and executive bodies of equally trusted communists. Officers are in reality selected by the CPSU International Department and only nominally confirmed by the front's congress or general assembly.

5. Since visible Soviet ties to front organizations are politically counter-productive, the USSR has adopted a generally low profile in the CPC and to a large extent has relied on trusted East Europeans to represent Soviet interests. Nevertheless, Russian Orthodox Church² participation in CPC activity has remained at a fairly constant level since the late 1960's, when three high-level Soviet church officials (Metropolitans Nikodim and Filaret and Aleksiy Buyevskiy, Nikodim's non-cleric senior assistant in the Russian Orthodox Church's Department of External Church Relations) were active on the CPC Working Committee, which is in charge of overseeing CPC functions.

¹ Declassified by CIA, November 1982.

² The Russian Orthodox Church, the largest and most influential religious body in the USSR, is under the leadership of Patriarch Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, who has held this position since 1971. Although he was "elected" to the position, there is little doubt that he was designated by the CPSU leadership, which approves appointments to hierarchies in charge of all religious denominations in the USSR. He is believed to be working for the KGB.

6. Soviet church organizations are principal CPC sponsors, and the USSR uses groups, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church, to help direct CPC activities (and more recently to influence World Council of Churches (WCC) programs) in support of Soviet policies. Russian Orthodox Church affiliation with the WCC³ and "dialogues" with other religious groups outside the USSR are used to strengthen communist front activities.

7. The CPC, primarily if not exclusively representative of Protestant and Orthodox Christians, maintains close relations with a number of world religious organizations in addition to the WCC. These include the Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians based in East Germany (whose president is also represented on the WPC Presidential Committee), the Conference of European Churches located in Denmark, the All-Africa Conference of Churches, and the Pax Christi International. The CPC makes special efforts to participate in WCC activities, however, since doing so enhances its image as a non-communist religious body.

8. NATO's decision in December 1979 to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in response to deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles targeted at Western Europe has been the target of extensive Soviet active measures, including use of Soviet international front organizations such as the WPC and CPC. These fronts, while silent on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military deployments, have been heavily involved in campaigns to condemn and cancel NATO's INF decision and to promote Soviet arms control proposals. In this regard, guidelines from the WPC have served as the basis for many programs and activities by the CPC and other major Soviet front organizations. Statements by CPC leaders typically have endorsed or echoed the various arms control proposals by the Soviet leadership.

9. In 1982 the CPC cooperated with the WPC in several propaganda campaigns, such as preparations for the second UN Special Session on Disarmament in summer 1982. Like the WPC, the CPC has expanded its "peace offensive" in North America; and it has expressed satisfaction with successful campaigns in Central America and for solidarity with Cuba, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

10. Moscow's intention to exploit the legitimate peace concerns of Christians and other religious groups has been well summarized in a 1963 issue of the CPC's quarterly magazine: "The Christian Peace Conference, by taking up the work of study in a decisive position, overcomes the cold war that still burdens the world. It does so because it is the only church place where Christians that have adopted a left position, whose reason has led them to approve the way to socialism, are not met with a priori suspicion, but are taken seriously."

The CPC, an avowed vehicle for those who "approve the way to socialism" to advance their own political programs, has not changed since that time. It remains "Christian" in name only, and the "peace" which it has increasingly preached would be one implemented only on Soviet terms.

EXHIBIT VI

USE OF JOURNALISTS AND JOURNALISTIC COVER BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE¹

SUMMARY

For a great many years both the KGB and GRU have relied heavily on journalists and journalistic cover in the pursuit of their operational goals—the recruitment of foreign agents and the influencing of foreign opinion in the Soviet interest. Both services, but particularly the KGB, have for a great many years consistently placed staff operational personnel under journalistic cover; and have sought to recruit legitimate journalists, both Soviet and non-Soviet, as agents of the USSR.

1. HOW MANY CAREER SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE SERVING ABROAD AS JOURNALISTS?

At any given time there are hundreds of Soviet journalists serving abroad. Many of these journalists are KGB or GRU intelligence officers, mainly the for-

³ The Russian Orthodox Church became a member of the WCC in 1961, and Metropolitan Nikodim became the prime mover for Soviet activities in the WCC, as he had done in the CPC. One of his major objectives was to encourage the WCC to support the CPC's de facto pro-Soviet positions.

¹ Declassified by CIA, November 1982.

mer. Soviet intelligence officers use the position of journalists to acquire access to influential private and public individuals, to provide cover for clandestine agent meetings, to procure papers and documents of interest, to formulate covert propaganda, etc. Among the most successful of all Soviet intelligence officers was Richard Sorge, a GRU colonel who organized and ran a network of spies which succeeded in penetrating the highest levels of the Imperial Japanese Army and Cabinet before and during World War II. Sorge had succeeded in gaining employment with the most prestigious pro-Nazi newspaper in pre-World War II Germany, and was sent by the paper to Japan where he successfully posed as a *bona fide* German correspondent. Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB officer, also used his cover as a journalist to further Soviet interests until his defection to in October 1979. Naturally, numerous KGB and GRU staff officers are engaged at this time in similar activities worldwide.

2. HOW DOES THE KGB MAKE USE OF LEGITIMATE JOURNALISTS WHO ARE NOT CAREER SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS?

Both the KGB and GRU recruit and run legitimate Soviet and non-Soviet journalists to assist them in achieving their missions. Some examples of KGB and GRU use of legitimate journalists are as follows:

a. *Agents of Influence.*—In 1961, the KGB recruited Pierre-Charles Pathé, a well-known and respected French political writer and journalist in Paris, and ran him until early 1979 as an agent of influence for the Soviet government. Pathé, a highly educated man who moved in the most influential, leftist political circles in France, was a frequent contributor of political editorials and think-pieces to some of the more influential French newspapers and journals. Pathé also published a monthly confidential newsletter called *Synthesis*, which contained highly intellectual commentaries on many political subjects of the day. The KGB provided Pathé with pro-Soviet material in raw form which he then turned into highly readable and acceptable journalistic pieces. His work had considerable influence in the most significant French intellectual circles.

b. *Channels of Funds.*—In late 1981, security authorities in Denmark arrested a prominent Danish journalist, Arne Herlov Petersen, on charges of being a KGB agent. He was recruited in about 1970 by the KGB to serve as the channel through which the KGB-financed left-wing groups in Scandinavia are appealing for a "Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone." The Danish journalist was also in regular contact with "peace" groups in other parts of Europe, also on behalf of the KGB.

c. *Sources of Political or Industrial Information.*—In late 1974, an Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett, lost a libel suit which challenged allegations that he had been engaged in espionage activities for the USSR. During his long and controversial career as a foreign correspondent, the journalist was known as a confidant of former North Vietnamese premier Ho Chi Minh and former Chinese premier Chou En-Lai. He also wrote for a wide variety of newspapers and news agencies throughout the Western and Communist world. In May, 1974, a number of Tunisians were indicted in a KGB espionage case. Among them was a Tunisian journalist, Slaheddine Amri, who was charged with supplying the Soviets with valuable documents concerning all aspects of that country's national security. He was also charged with stealing a confidential document from his place of employment and for reporting on a large international meeting.

d. *Placements of Soviet-Inspired Propaganda.*—See the description of the Pathé case above.

3. WHICH MEDIA ELEMENTS DOES THE KGB USE FOR COVER PURPOSES

Both the KGB and the GRU use most if not all of those Soviet media elements which send representatives abroad for cover and have done so for a great many years.

TASS, Novosti, and New Times are the media organizations most frequently used for cover purposes by the KGB and GRU. We would estimate that well over half of the personnel from these organizations stationed abroad are intelligence officers.

Other press organizations are used less frequently. For instance, we believe that the Soviet intelligence services seldom use Pravda for cover purposes, apparently because it is the official organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU; the Soviets seem to want to avoid the embarrassment to the Party which could result from the exposure of an intelligence officer under Pravda cover.

4. ARE THERE ANY COUNTRIES THAT WILL NOT PERMIT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET JOURNALISTS?

Only those countries which do not have formal diplomatic relations with the USSR; e.g. Israel, Chile, Paraguay, South Africa, will not permit the presence of Soviet journalists. All other countries do, although most limit the total number and/or may refuse visas to individual Soviet journalists.

EXHIBIT VII

RADOMIR GEORGIYEVICH BOGDANOV (PHONETIC: BUGDAHNUF)¹

Deputy Director, Institute of the USA and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences (since at least June 1975).

Radomir Bogdanov serves as one of three deputies to Georgiy Arbatov, the Director of the Soviet Union's only research organization devoted exclusively to U.S. and Canadian affairs. He has a long history of affiliation with the Committee for State Security (KGB).

Bogdanov supervises the Institute's study of U.S. social, ideological and arms matters. His responsibilities also appear to include the collection of intelligence on the United States and occasional "disinformation" activities (i.e., spreading false information).

Bogdanov has participated in international meetings on disarmament and strategic arms limitation since 1975, and he does not hesitate to criticize U.S. policy. He has argued for example, that U.S. acquisition of MX, Trident, and cruise missile strategic weapon systems will destabilize the world power balance and has claimed that U.S. military strategy aims at attaining the capability to launch a successful first strike against the Soviet Union. He describes the continuous Soviet arms buildup, on the other hand, as merely modernization. Bogdanov attended the Christian Peace Conference Working Committee meeting which took place in Kiev, U.S.S.R., March 28 to April 1, 1981. He was identified as representing the U.S.A. and the Canada Studies Institute. On March 28th, the first day of the meeting, Bogdanov delivered one of the major reports on the "international political situation." He was identified as, "an expert from the U.S.S.R."

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

Born in Moscow on 26 November 1930, Bogdanov completed university studies in philology in 1949 and then entered the foreign service. Bogdanov was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw from 1954 to 1956. In 1957 he began a 10-year tour of duty at the Embassy in New Delhi, where he served as a senior KGB operations officer and is believed to have been the resident; while there, he advanced to the rank of counselor. He apparently was then assigned to the Foreign Policy Planning Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sometime after 1967, serving there until he assumed his current position.

EXHIBIT VIII

CIA STUDY: THE INSTITUTE OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA—U.S.S.R. POINT OF CONTACT FOR AMERICANS²

PREFACE

The importance and policymaking role of the USSR's Institute of the United States of America and Canada (IUSAC) have been subject to debate virtually since the founding of the institute in 1967. Because IUSAC staffers are the Soviet citizens most likely to have contact with Americans—and because they will speak to Americans when members of the Communist Party Central Committee (CPSU-CC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not—the role of the institute has frequently been overestimated.

¹ Declassified by CIA, November 1982.

² Information available as of 20 April 1982 has been used in preparing this report. Declassified by CIA, November 1982.

This report discusses the institute as it is—a research organization of prominent, skilled, and learned individuals. These people are to be taken seriously, but one should remember that:

—IUSAC and its staffers do not make policy.

—Institute staffers are sometimes used as spokesmen for government policies; but, with the exception of Director Georgiy Arbatov, they have no official position.

A visitor who meets with them will find that they are well informed about the United States and apparently more Westernized than most Soviet citizens. The visitor should remember that most of them are CPSU members and loyal to the party: they will say what the Soviet Government wants their interlocutors to hear, and they will tell it in a convincing way. The visitor who hopes to effect any change in Soviet policy through IUSAC contacts will almost certainly be disappointed.

IUSAC uses contacts between Americans and institute members to serve Soviet purposes. IUSAC funnels its staffers outward to a broad range of American contacts. Americans, on the other hand, are most often subjected to a reverse funnel effect, which usually limits their access only to institute members.

THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA

How the Institute is run

Structure.—IUSAC is organized on a hierarchical basis and in conformity with the rules of its parent organization, the USSR Academy of Sciences. It has a director and three deputy directors. The deputies divide responsibility for the six departments among themselves. The departments are broken down into *sektors* (subdepartments), each with its own chief.

The institute has three secretaries. The foreign relations executive secretary and the foreign relations scientific secretary are primarily public relations figures for visiting foreigners. The domestic affairs scientific secretary deals with administrative and personnel matters at the institute. About 350 people, half of them professionals, work at IUSAC.

Superimposed above this structure are the Scientific Council (a consultative and decisionmaking body) and its Presidium. The Scientific Council consists of the department chiefs, all doctoral degree holders, and the highest officials of the IUSAC Communist Party organizations. The council's highest authority is the Presidium, whose most important members are the director, his three deputies, and the officials of the CPSU organs: here de facto and de jure authorities are united.

CPSU Affiliations.—Membership in either the Komsomol (Young Communist League) or the CPSU is required for IUSAC professional employment. Among all institute employees, there were about 80-100 CPSU members and about 150-200 Komsomol members as of 1980. As part of their duties as members of these organizations, IUSAC staffers are required to pay monthly dues equal to 1.5 percent of their earnings. They are also required to volunteer time for social projects, such as participation in the IUSAC trade union, lecturing at farms or factories, or even aiding in the harvest.

The Institute Relationship With the KGB.—Every element of the Soviet bureaucracy is available to the Committee for State Security (KGB) to provide cover or ad hoc assistance to its personnel. IUSAC is no exception. There are staff members at the institute who have been affiliated with the KGB in the past. Some have retained these ties in one form or another. The number of identified KGB officers is believed to represent only a small percentage of institute personnel. It may be assumed that personality assessment information on Westerners with whom institute officials deal makes its way to the KGB.

A few institute members who work on military-related matters were officers in the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Ministry of Defense before they joined the institute.

Consumer tasking

In line with other Soviet institutions, IUSAC production is geared to annual and sometimes longer range plans, composed on department, *sektor*, and individual bases. In cooperation with its consumers, IUSAC coordinates and projects its work goals for the next year. Provisions are made for unexpected projects.

Individual IUSAC researchers are not, as a rule, aware of the identity of their consumers. Requests go first to Director Arbatov, who routes them down through channel to the responsible analyst. The prime taskers of the institute are:

- The CPSU Central Committee departments and Secretariat.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The KGB.

The analyst's report returns up the line, is edited by a deputy director or by Arbatov himself, and is forwarded to the requesting agency. Any feedback on the research effort goes to Arbatov.

There is no doubt that research information flows from IUSAC to its high-level consumers. The pertinent questions to ask on this matter are:

- How objective or innovative are the institute research efforts?
- Do the consumers take the IUSVAC effort seriously?

There are clear signals on both questions. If a research effort espouses an unconventional point of view, approval often becomes bogged down in interminable coordinations, changes, and arguments. For example, in the early 1970s IUSAC was part of a progressive group working on agricultural reform—a group that had the support of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The reformist ideas generated by this group did not ameliorate Soviet agricultural problems, however, and Arbatov resopded with increasing caution on the issue.

IUSAC research efforts are also subject to intradepartmental political pressure; personality problems within the institute can inhibit innovative research. A genuine appraisal can emerge from the institute, but it becomes only one input to the consensus. IUSAC leaders believe that the institute can suffer more from mistakes than it can benefit from timely accuracy. None of the institute members, except for Arbatov, has the clout to affect policy.

Arbatov's clout

Arbatov provides the Brezhnev brain trust:

- Ideas.
- Analysis.
- An effective writing style.

Brezhnev values Arbatov's opinions and writing skills and brings them to bear on specific foreign and domestic affairs. Arbatov does not advise the General Secretary; rather, he provides him with analytical reporting. In turn, the Brezhnev group provides Arbatov with access to selected information. He is informed of what he needs to know to fulfill a specific task.

A full member of the CPSU-CC, Arbatov is an articulate representative of Brezhnev's peacemaker program, and it is in this role that he is most familiar to Americans.

Brezhnev looks to Arbatov as an expert on American affairs; Arbatov has accompanied him to several high-level meetings. In 1973 he was a member of the entourage that came with Brezhnev to the United States, and in 1974 he accompanied Brezhnev to a meeting in Vladivostok with then President Gerald Ford. Arbatov did not attend the 1979 Vienna summit, but in June 1981 he sat with Brezhnev at the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Securities Issues Meeting; he also accompanied him to Bonn in November 1981.

Articles published under Arbatov's name may or may not be his—a few, actually written by Foreign Ministry or other officials, are a way for the government to make its position known semiofficially.

Deputy directors at IUSAC

At present no one at the institute rivals Arbatov's prominence. Vitaliy Zhurkin, Radomir Bogdanov, and Georgiy Skorov are loyal deputies, but they lack Arbatov's strong power base.

The deputies share jurisdiction over all research departments at the institute. Responsibilities toward consumers are divided among the institute leaders:

In Arbatov's absence, either Zhurkin or Bogdanov assumes his responsibilities.

Zhurkin.—The styles and roles of the three deputies are different. Zhurkin often participates in international conferences such as the December 1980 meeting of US and Soviet scholars on SALT and Asian security or the January 1982 informal US-Soviet discussions on arms control. He is also responsible for the day-to-day running of the institute.

Whatever the basis for Zhurkin's prestige within IUSAC (he apparently sees himself as Arbatov's successor), his abilities as a representative of the Soviet point of view to Westerners are unimpressive. He rarely deviates from the traditional party line.

Bogdanov.—In conduct and personality, Bogdanov is the most colorful of the three deputies. He is wont to deliver provocative comments to Americans. Many of his writings are oversimplified polemics comparing "honorable Soviet intentions" with "selfish American desires." Despite Bogdanov's predilection for disinformation, numerous Western observers have voiced respect for his intelligence and expertise. Bogdanov has at time been tapped to deliver messages from the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

Skorov.—Skorov is less vocal than the other two deputy directors. Although he speaks primarily with trade and business officials, he has sometimes dealt with visiting US politicians on US-Soviet relations, especially arms control matters. Skorov's special concern is the fate of bilateral trade relations in periods of political differences.

IUSAC staffers in general

Backgrounds.—The majority of IUSAC researchers who had career specialties before their association with the institute came from three fields:

- The media.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Other social science institutes.

A background in the media is the most common.

The other social science institutes and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have each contributed an equal number of IUSAC researchers. Of the current institute members, only Arbatov came directly from the Secretariat apparatus of the CPSU-CC. There is also a group of former military officers at IUSAC, but they are concentrated in the Political Military Department.

What distinguishes the IUSAC staffer?—IUSAC members seem to have left behind the old dowdy Soviet image and taken on a deliberately Westernized veneer. They dress well, they have a witty command of English, and they handle questions adroitly. The ability to present themselves rationally and attractively is a common feature of the staffers, who are expected either to have public relations expertise or to develop it. They make themselves available to the Western media, and they are willing hosts to prominent visitors.

Staff members visit the United States frequently to meet with academics, government officials, and businessmen; and they regularly attend bilateral and international peace and disarmament conferences. For many staffers, a knowledge of US affairs is secondary to skills of presentation. There are, however, some researchers of genuine scholarly ability at IUSAC: Trofimenko and Lukin have been credited with substantive expertise (although even their work is not totally devoid of propaganda).

Nepotism.—As with all prestigious Soviet institutes, the children of the Soviet elite dominate the IUSAC ranks. Maintenance of an institute position is also directly related to personal connections.

Sons of Politburo Members.—At various times IUSAC has employed sons of three Politburo members:

—From 1972 until 1974 Anatoliy Andreyevich Gromyko worked there as a senior research fellow.

—During 1974-75 Igor' Yur'yevich Andropov was a senior researcher at the institute.

—From 1976 until about 1978, the son of Petr Masherov, then first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, worked at IUSAC.

Additionally, Lyudmila Alekseyevna Gvishiani, daughter of Aleksey Kosygin, the late Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was a consultant to the institute during its early days.

Other Family Connections.—Many other IUSAC staffers are related to prominent Soviets.

—Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov, a junior researcher, is the son of cinematographer Aleksandr Karaganov.

—Georgiy Melorovich Sturua, a graduate student at the institute, is the son of *Izvestiya's* Washington bureau chief, Melor Sturua.

Yevgeniya Viktorovna Israelyan, a junior research fellow in the Canada Department, is the daughter of Ambassador Viktor Israelyan, chief of the Soviet delegation to the UN Committee on Disarmament.

Nikita Bantsekin, also a junior research fellow, is married to Aleksey Kosygin's granddaughter.

Sergey Medvedkov is the stepson of Nikolay Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

Political Connections.—Political connections also facilitate information transfer from the institute. When an IUSAC researcher has a close relationship with a counterpart in a policymaking organization, an informal exchange of research findings and analysis takes place. Such "friendship connections" are common. For example, Valentin Zorin, political observer, Central Television and All-Union Radio; Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department, CPSU-CC; and Aleksandr Bovin, political observer for Izvestiya, all have or have had ties to IUSAC.

IN SUMMARY

Westerners can learn a great deal through contacts with IUSAC staffers. These individuals provide insight and dialogue on U.S.-Soviet relations. Cultivating these relationships could aid in generating a freer flow of opinions, resulting in more enlightened perspectives on both sides. The relationship must be kept in perspective, however. IUSAC does not make policy—it is a point of contact for discussions with prominent Soviets, some with an intelligence background and all with an interest in promoting lines of thought that will serve Soviet policies.

EXHIBIT IX

CIA REPORT ON SOVIET FORGERIES

IXA: FORGED U.S. WARPLANS

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—This fabrication, in the form of a collection of documents, first appeared in 1967 in a Norwegian magazine called *Orientering* and has become one of the most extensively used Soviet documentary fabrications. During the period 1967–1971, some or all of the documents were sent to numerous newspapers and magazines in at least ten West European countries. The documents have begun to surface again over the last two years. The current series of surfacings began in London in June 1980, about the time the British government announced its decision on ground-launched cruise missile basing sites. The documents have since surfaced in numerous West European capitals; in almost every case, the pamphlet was mailed to the recipient from the London area with no return address. The documents now usually surface as a single pamphlet, entitled *Top Secret Documents on U.S. Forces Headquarters in Europe: Holocaust Again for Europe*. The pamphlet purports to have been published in England by an unidentified group.

B. Format.—The collection consists of a mixture of authentic and altered U.S. war plans that date from the early 1960s.

C. Content.—The introduction to the pamphlet declares that "What the documents show, when taken as a whole, is that U.S. thinking is still dominated by preparation for war . . ." It also alleges that the U.S. would sacrifice Western Europe to nuclear war to save the U.S. The introduction attempts to establish the authenticity of the entire collection of documents by claiming that ". . . any hopes that they might be a brilliant fake can no longer exist" and that—contrary to fact—"there are no grounds for believing them to be outdated."

D. Purpose.—This operation is designed to exploit European concern about nuclear weapons by fostering the impression that, among other things, the U.S. would use such weapons against the territory of its NATO allies. The re-emergence of these documents since summer 1980 suggests that they are part of the Soviet effort to encourage West European opposition to the modernization of NATO's nuclear forces and to raise European concerns about U.S. policies and intentions. The documents are intended to support repeated Soviet allegations that the threat to West European peace and security comes not from the U.S.S.R. and its allies but from the policies of the U.S.

E. Comment.—All the genuine documents are considered outdated by the U.S. The Soviets received at least some of the documents from an espionage agent, U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Lee Johnson, in the early 1960s. (Johnson was a member of the military courier service stationed in Paris at the time he provided the documents to the Soviets. In 1965 he was tried and convicted for espionage and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.) Given the scope of the operation, adherence to the Soviet pattern in forgery operations, Soviet access to some authentic documents on which to base the collection of documents, and past Soviet involvement in the surfacing of these documents, we conclude that the current series of surfacings is a Soviet operation.

The pamphlet bears the notation that it is "Information Books No. 1," suggesting that other fabrications of this type may appear in the future.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
DOCUMENTS



HOLOCAUST

AGAIN FOR EUROPE

TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS
ON US FORCE'S HEADQUARTERS
IN EUROPE

INFORMATION BOOKS No 1

INTRODUCTION

It's not every day that someone risks publishing a batch of Top Secret NATO plans. The risk of final war in Europe is, however, something that is always with us and the documents presented in this booklet are a blueprint for that war.

Timing their publication has been made horrifically simple: the Presidents and Premiers of the NATO bloc have effectively made that decision for us by vowing to step up their arms budgets and permit the stationing of new terror weapons in Europe. But are these NATO moves, particularly the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles, really in the best interests of western Europeans? Judging from the documents we now present, they are not.

NATO's modernization strategy turns essentially on two beliefs -- first that the Warsaw Pact has a superiority in the European theatre and, second, that it sees political objectives which could be secured by making use of that superiority.

Neither belief is valid. The essential balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe is a matter of record -- troop numbers are not significantly different, any technological superiority in western arms is balanced by greater standardization of Warsaw Pact equipment and so on and so forth.

Indeed, it may be possible to take the argument yet further and say that, in today's world, imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is impossible in theory as well as in practice. Given that the opposing blocs have roughly equivalent resources of human brain-power at their disposal and have developed their technology to a roughly equivalent level, then any imbalance must be corrected almost as soon as it develops.

To take an obvious example, if the Warsaw Pact has calculated nuclear yield requirements like the NATO ones revealed in this booklet, then you can bet your bottom dollar that a copy of the calculations is on someone's desk at the CIA's Langley, Virginia, headquarters.

NATO's leaders second belief, that the Warsaw Pact powers see a practical, political, advantage in launching aggression in Europe, is even more laughable than their supposed belief in Warsaw Pact military superiority.

It is laughable on both political and military grounds. Though one scenario outlined in the NATO documents which we now publish appears to envisage broad civilian support in eastern Europe for a nuclear strike against the area's towns and villages, no one in their right minds can seriously believe that any survivors of holocaust, in whichever part of Europe, will feel anything but hatred for those who have killed their friends and families.

Militarily, the political advantage theory collapses because it is based on the false premise that tactical nuclear strikes can comprise the sum total of a nuclear war. That concept, always considered doubtful, was finally demolished earlier this year by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, a British Government-linked body, which successfully demonstrated that tactical nuclear strikes would have to be followed quickly by strategic strikes if base communications facilities were not to be destroyed by the enemy.

With both the military superiority and the political advantage arguments out of the way -- and the absolute certainty that NATO no more believes in those arguments than do the publishers of this booklet -- what's left and, even more interestingly, why are apparently rational western leaders still mouthing what they know to be arrant nonsense?

The answer, as appears from documents reproduced in this booklet, is that, though there is no "Soviet threat", there is a very real American threat to Europe.

Now, at first reading, that view probably looks very much like Soviet propaganda, and pretty cheap propaganda to boot. Unfortunately for any of our readers who never [...]

has effectively decided also that all retaliatory tactical and strategic strikes will be aimed at western Europe, thus solving, for the United States, the defects of the tactical strike theory revealed by the Institute of Strategic Studies and mentioned earlier in this Introduction.

It is even quite possibly the case, as a growing number of experts believe, that United States' thinking looks on a nuclear war confined to Europe as no more than the ultimate extension of the "little wars" of the post World War II variety, "little wars" in which the US has played so notable a part.

After all, the Americans dropped more explosive on Vietnam than was dropped in the whole of World War II so nuclear obliteration of an entire continent is not so very drastic a step when weighed against the expected gain.

Final thought on this whole "scenario" must be this — what would happen if the Russians really did attack and capture, say, Frankfurt-am-Main? How does the whole concept of current NATO plans relate to that eventuality?

The answer must be the unthinkable, an American nuclear strike at, say, Stalingrad, followed by the inevitable counter-strike at San Francisco and, seconds to minutes later, goodbye everything and everybody. In other words, even if the Russians really were the potential aggressors that they're so often said to be, the current NATO strategy contains no credible element of European defence, only the preparations for US offence.

How does all this relate to the documents which we now present? The answer, unfortunately, is that it bears a very close connexion indeed, a connexion which has actually become closer in the course of recent days.

Our collection of Top Secret paperwork dates from early in the 1960s and last got a major airing in the west European press a decade and more ago. Newspaper legend has it that the documents were amongst those photographed by an American serviceman in NATO vaults near Paris and subsequently passed over by him to the Russians. True or false, the legend has never been seriously challenged in the

west, and neither has the authenticity of the documents.

Even though copies of the documents have been floating around for this comparatively long period of time, they have never been available in one batch and in convenient book form with the passing of time, those who have seen them have tended to think of them as out of date.

So far as specific nuclear yield requirements mentioned are concerned, this is almost certainly correct. Details of targets will have changed, up-dated technology will have had an effect on the precise figures given and, beyond all possible doubts, the list of targets will have got longer.

On the other hand, there are no grounds whatsoever for believing that the underlying concepts implicit in the documents will have altered to any material extent. Targets in West Germany and Austria will, for example, still be listed for the very good reason that the geographical limitations on possible Warsaw Pact military approach routes has not changed.

Earlier this year rumours were going the rounds in western Europe that some of the more drastic elements in the attack plans we now reveal had actually been dusted off in the Pentagon, and found ideal as the basis for a renewed "forward" strategy. Doubted at the time by most observers, including us, these rumours seem very much to be borne out by the "new" nuclear strategy put forward in Washington in August 1980.

Documents included in the present booklet include document 100-1 — a draft proposal for a treaty on the status of American forces in NATO countries in the event of an "emergency". Its essence lies in the stipulation that the American army command will become the supreme authority, in other words that America's allies will be under a martial law occupation.

The second document, 10-1, appeared in the west European press during the summer of 1969. It revealed the long-suspected fact that the US Army contains a special military formation dedicated to the waging of psychological and guerilla war in the case of an emergency. Nuclear, chemical

and germ weapons are to be used not only in the eastern bloc countries but also in neutral countries and even in countries of the NATO bloc.

Interestingly, Britain appears to get off very lightly in both these documents. This could well be because the British Visiting Forces Act, plus various agreements dating back to the late-1940s, effectively reproduce the terms of the draft agreement in document 100-1. Further, Britain alone appears to have the rather doubtful honour amongst NATO countries of providing units to the US psychological and guerilla war teams.

The third document reproduced, that on Nuclear Yield Requirements, saw the light of day in the west German news magazine "Stern" back in February 1970. This shows the wide range of targets considered suitable for nuclear attack -- a range unlikely to be very significantly reduced by the "new" strategy -- and the fact that these are sited in neutral and NATO countries as well as in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. 93 nuclear bombs would be used to destroy 47 targets in west Germany; 31 would wipe out 14 targets in Syria and a further 39 would destroy 17 targets in Iraq.

Perhaps most interesting of all those reproduced is a further document (Operation Plan 100-5 of the Supreme Commander, American Forces Europe), a copy of which we recently succeeded in acquiring.

This document has been the subject of discussion amongst the leading lights of western Europe in recent months, discussion at least partly caused by its use as a lever to secure compliance with US plans by the European NATO allies. It shows that the fate of existing governments in western Europe will depend on the extent of their willingness and ability to enlist effective support for US actions in the event of an emergency.

As things stand, the Americans would think themselves entitled to remove existing governments in Holland, Denmark, Norway and Belgium, all because these governments have opposed the missile deployment proposals. True, an "emergency" would be needed before governments' consent could [..]

well have appreciated that approach to global domination.

What the documents show, when taken as a whole, is that US thinking is still dominated by preparations for nuclear war and that, by permitting the Americans to instal 7,000 or more nuclear weapons on our soil and actively to contemplate the annihilation of Europe, the west Europeans are proving ourselves to be short-sighted and plain flabby.

As the American magazine, "Ramparts", said in October 1969, "The plan is clear evidence of the fact that the American attitude towards the allies corresponds to their motto, 'Better Dead Than Red', although the American chemical and nuclear weapons can cause the most terrible death".

In the course of the past decade and more, not one single US official has so much as attempted to challenge the documents' authenticity. For practical purposes, any hopes that they might be a brilliant fake can no longer exist. And, for the reasons already outlined and for one more, all-important, reason, there are no grounds for believing them to be out-dated.

Like all military plans, these are plans for the future. No one draws up a strategic programme for events intended to take place tomorrow or the next day and history recalls many a strategic plan which laid ready for far longer than 18 years. Imperial Germany did not wait until 1914 to draw up its plans for World War I.

The real clincher, however, is America's present-day attitude towards western Europe. They still consider our half of the continent as the most likely theatre for any war with Russia, as their very terminology proves.

Always they speak of the "European theatre of war". Where in their plans, in NATO's plans or, for that matter, in the Russians' plans has anyone ever heard it said that there is to be an "American theatre of war". The phrase itself sounds absurd, for the good reason that it is never used and never considered. No, the Americans' favoured "war scenario" features a war in Europe, with America unharmed and our continent a charnel house.

In all probability, more refined plans have been prepared

in the years since 1962. Even more probably, the details of current plans have been successfully kept secret from America's NATO allies. Beyond all possible doubt, the extent of nuclear discretion allowed to US army officers under current plans is at least as wide as that allowed under the 1962 plan. Development of "theatre nuclear weapons", including neutron weapons, in the subsequent years very likely means that the effective leeway given US officers has been much increased.

As for the much-vaunted "dual control" system, said to give the governments of the European NATO allies a veto over the use of US nuclear weaponry on their national territories, our documents — and any conceivable up-date — shows this to be meaningless.

The "dual control" procedures may sound very fine, but what can they possibly be worth in an actual "emergency" when the US army command (document 100-1) would hold supreme authority. In any event, the odds are that any west European NATO governments who might seem likely to seek to exercise their veto "rights" would have been toppled before the possibility of them doing so arose.

Effective control over the Americans' nuclear weaponry in western Europe will, in fact, rest with US officers in the field. Few, if any, of these will have the time, perhaps even the inclination, to obtain Presidential sanction first.

In short, no one should have any illusions that there is any reality in any aspect of all the talk of "checks and balances" carefully controlling the actual use of nuclear weaponry. The danger in nuclear illusions is that none of us will ever have the chance to suffer from them twice.

Worse and worse, the very fact that the Americans' power to determine the moment when a European-based nuclear war is effectively unbridled means that the chances of their using that power are greatly increased. They can do it, they believe they can escape the consequences and, most importantly, they believe they can reap all the possible benefits.

If you still don't believe that — and you will once you have studied the documents themselves — there remains the fact of nuclear "accidents".

Every reader will recall, most probably with a shudder, the computer errors of last autumn and this spring. The most important aspect of these in many ways is the acknowledged fact that American forces went on alert without the need for any authorization from President J. Carter or Defense Secretary Harold A. Browne.

Where were the "checks and balances" then — and will there be time to correct the consequences of computer error once medium-range missiles are installed on west European soil. Where will an accidentally-fired Cruise be "aborted" once it has crossed the North Sea from eastern England — a few hundred feet above Frankfurt or Copenhagen, perhaps?

The facts are clear. "Le Monde Diplomatique", the prestigious French newspaper, was right when it warned recently that the installation of the new medium-range missiles in Europe is a trap for the Europeans themselves, one from which only America can gain.

We shouldn't be in that trap and we ought to get out of it as quickly as possible. The Americans can dream of war with Russia if they want to, but not if their dreams include us being burnt, blasted and shocked out of existence in the process.

London, October 1980

PUBLISHERS' NOTE:

This booklet is published as a public service and as part of the growing campaigns against nuclear war and for freedom of information on important issues. We hope to extend this service in the future.

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN
USCINCEUR NR 100.5

(1) Conduct covert psychological warfare operations as directed by USCINCEUR and in support of special efforts in the USEUCOM area, including USMCINCEUR assigned. Endeavor to assure that activities planned and instructions placed to support and to exploit opportunities arising from the ground battle scheme of maneuver.

(2) Conduct intelligence activities in accordance with ACP 17, Intelligence.

f. Commander, Special Operations Task Force, Europe (COMSOTF)

(1) Execute Unconventional Warfare operations with emphasis on operations in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in coordination with the ground battle scheme of maneuver and as directed by USCINCEUR in other Soviet Bloc areas.

(2) Develop and expand Unconventional Warfare forces to carry out operations as directed by USCINCEUR and, in particular, to suppress the opposing forces in Northern Europe.

g. Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions.

(1) Serve as the implementing agency for wartime military aid for those countries to which assigned.

(2) Provide intelligence to USCINCEUR.

(3) Advise and assist host nations in the employment of their forces, as appropriate.

(4) Inform USCINCEUR of the political and military situations and trends in host countries.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Provide for the security of assigned forces with emphasis on survival in the environment of the pre-emption nuclear attack.

(2) Conduct preparations for action in such a manner that the enemy is not alerted to U. S. intentions.

(3) Establish liaison with and coordinate operations with other U. S. and allied commanders.

(4) Assume operational control of allied forces willing to accept U. S. leadership and provide combat support to the extent essential to the success of US Allied operations.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100.5

TOP SECRET

SECRET**Annex M to USCINCPAC OPLAN NR 109-1
CIVIL AFFAIRS**

1. An Emergency SOP for command will be concluded prior to the termination of hostilities in accordance with following country priorities:

- | | |
|------------------|----------------|
| 1. Italy. | 6 Italy. |
| 2. Greece. | 7 Netherlands. |
| 3. Turkey. | 8 Belgium. |
| 4. West Germany. | 9 Luxembourg. |
| 5. France. | 10 Denmark. |

3. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

- a. Command. Civil Affairs commands will follow military command.
- b. Signal. Civil Affairs units will rely upon normal military service.

J. P. MC CONNELL
General USAF
Deputy Commander in Chief

APPENDICES:

1. Organizations Available For Planning
2. Definitions
3. Status Of Forces Agreement
4. Civil Affairs Planning
5. Sample Proclamation
6. Commissions and Committees

AUTHENTICATION:

B. E. Spivy
B. E. SPIVY
Major General, US Army
Director, 3-3 Division

Change 3 to USCINCPAC OPLAN NR 109-1

IXb: CHOU EN-LAI TESTAMENT

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—In January 1976 the newspaper Sankei Shimbun, one of the most highly regarded and respected newspapers in Japan, published a totally fabricated political testament attributed to Chou En-lai, former premier of the People's Republic of China. A controlled Soviet asset, well placed in the newspaper's hierarchy, had received the testament from a KGB officer of the Tokyo Residency.

B. Format.—The document purports to be the political testament of Chou En-lai written before his death and subsequently distributed to members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China by his wife.

C. Content.—The Sankei Shimbun version of the forged testament covers economic, political, and domestic and foreign affairs. It alleges, inter alia, that the Chinese Cultural Revolution was a mistake, that China's economy should stress the expansion of heavy industry, and that there should be greater co-operation among all "democratic" and socialist forces to ensure world peace, which implicitly would include closer cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

D. Purpose.—The forged testament was intended to encourage political rivalries in China, support those elements who might favor improved relations with the U.S.S.R. and create distrust toward China among the Japanese public.

E. Comment.—There is no doubt that this was a Soviet operation. In the words of a former Soviet KGB officer who worked on active measures in Japan prior to his defection to the U.S., Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate wrote the forged testament "line by line, word for word" in Moscow. When the forgery was complete, it was sent to the KGB Residency in Tokyo for press placement, and the TASS office in Tokyo was alerted to be prepared for a major story the day before the article was published. Once the testament was published, TASS replayed articles about it worldwide citing Sankei Shimbun as the source, a standard practice in operations of this type. The forgery was well-conceived and the operation well-executed. It took the Chinese several days to denounce the "testament" as a fabrication. KGB headquarters in Moscow reportedly evaluated this operation as highly successful.

IXC: STATE TELEGRAM ISLAMABAD 1682

A. *Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.*—This forged State telegram came to the attention of U.S. officials in September 1980, when an attempt to surface it was unsuccessful. It is not known to have received any media publicity.

B. *Format.*—The document is a total fabrication. The legend for the bogus document was that it had been found following a fire at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. To strengthen that story, the original of the forgery had burn marks in the right hand margin of paragraph one.

C. *Content.*—The forged telegram reports that an alleged regular CIA courier to former President Amin has disappeared and requests that emergency contact procedures be activated.

D. *Purpose.*—After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet media frequently charged that former President Amin had been a CIA agent. The bogus telegram was intended to provide documentary evidence to substantiate that charge.

E. *Comment.*—The method by which this forgery was to have been surfaced publicly did not follow standard Soviet operating procedures. The Soviets in other cases have been known to use forgeries to substantiate charges made in Soviet and Soviet-controlled media, however, and this operation does fit that pattern. In May 1980 the Kabul New Times, greatly influenced if not actually controlled by Soviets, had reproduced a page written in English and allegedly taken from Amin's diary; this page also was designed to substantiate Soviet charges that Amin was a CIA agent, and the article accompanying the photo repeated that charge.

CN: 1682
151206Z NOV 79

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

FROM	AME, BASSY ISLAMABAD	CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TAGS: SUBJECT:	GDS PINR, AF Contact Incident		
ACTION:	Amembassy KABUL IMMEDIATE SECRET ISLAMABAD 1682		
INFO AMS M N MCHIA	<p>1. Reagan has told me of disturbing disappearance of one of his agent couriers to President Amin. Measures taken to locate man have produced no results. However, I am greatly concerned by the fact that Reagan seems to be waiting for something to happen and has not yet reported the incident to his Agency. If the agent courier has been kidnapped, the consequences are likely to be extremely grave.</p> <p>2. You are requested immediately to issue orders to activate an emergency contact, if necessary, try to use the President's own facilities for tracing operations. Itinerary of agent courier and other details will be transmitted to you in two hours.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">IMMEDIATE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">COMMENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVAL: [Signature]</p> <p>DATE: 11/12/79</p>		
FROM	AME: AM/In.mel	DATE	CLASSIFICATION

FORGERY

file

IXD: AUSTRIA—MISREPRESENTED USG MAP


A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—On 9 October 1981, the Soviet newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, official organ of the Soviet youth organization (the Komsomol), published an article by its Vienna correspondent which alleged that the U.S. Government has targeted several cities and numerous civilian and military facilities in Austria for nuclear destruction and sabotage. The article referred to an alleged U.S. "Document No. 77706/10-70" to substantiate its charge, and it claimed that copies of the map had been found at a special training site near the Austrian border in the Bavarian town of Oberammergau. A similar article, referring to the same "document," had appeared earlier in the newspaper of the Austrian Communist Party, Volksstimme, on 20 September 1981.

B. Format.—The two articles engaged in deliberate misrepresentation of an authentic unclassified U.S. Government map bearing the identification number 77706/10-70 and showing political subdivisions, major cities, some major airfields and selected geographic features. The map, and similar USG maps most countries of the world, are produced for public sale.

C. Content.—The Komsomolskaya Pravda article used the map to charge that the U.S. Government has targeted Austrian cities and facilities for nuclear destruction. It claimed that the "primary targets" are the Vienna-Linz gas pipeline, the cities of Ternitz, Leoben, and Danowitz, as well as principal bridges, tunnels, and highways. The article also alleged that the map is further evidence of the pentagon's plans for "mass destruction of the European peoples." The Volksstimme article, a front page feature by the East German disinformation specialist Julius Mader, similarly commented on an alleged CIA document-map showing 40 targets in Austria which would come under attack by U.S. nuclear weapons in event of war. Like the Komsomolskaya Pravda article, it referred to document number 77706/10-70 and claimed it had been found in a safe at "secret service building 605" at the Hawkins-Kasern complex in Oberammergau.

D. Purpose.—The articles and their distortions of this map's nature are part of the continuing Soviet disinformation effort to convince the European people that the U.S. is the real threat to peace and security and that the U.S. has plans to indiscriminately target nuclear weapons against civilian targets in Europe. This map operation is thus part of the Soviet campaign to encourage opposition to NATO's plans to modernize its nuclear forces. Over the long term, it supports Soviet efforts to create doubts about U.S. policies and intentions and to undermine U.S. relations with West Europe.

E. Comment.—Neither article was picked up for replay by the European press, and the effort lacked the sophistication of most other Soviet operations. The Soviet journalist, for example, did not even cite the earlier Mader Volksstimme article; although such citations are a fairly standard feature in Soviet disinformation operations of this type, since they allow the Soviets to claim they are merely reporting "news" already published elsewhere. Mader has been named an East German intelligence officer by the Czechoslovakian defector Ladislav Bittman, who was himself an active measures specialist and who collaborated in the production of Who's Who in CIA in the early 1960s, which was issued under Mader's name.



IXE: MAP OPERATION: AFGHANISTAN


A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—The 11 November 1981 edition of the Patriot, an Indian newspaper, carried an article which deliberately distorted the significance and importance of a CIA unclassified map of Afghanistan. The article alleged that a "specially guarded aeroplane airlifted these maps to Pakistan" for distribution among "terrorist group leaders" in the pay of the U.S.

B. Format.—The newspaper did not reprint the map but identified it as bearing "index number 500546-7-71." It alleged that the map was printed "under the auspices of the Government Security Officer in the printing office at North Capitol and H Street, N.W., Washington."

C. Content.—The article claims that the map not only provides "proof of the CIA's active involvement in the entire anti-Afghanistan operations but also indicates the targets of sabotage set forth by the CIA for the Afghan guerrillas." The alleged targets for sabotage include power stations, mines, cotton and food processing plants, and airfields. The article also claims that the map draws the attention of the "terrorists" to the area of the Soviet Union "south of Dushanbe (capitol of the Tadjik Republic in the U.S.S.R.) and Mary (in the Turkmen republic) just over the Afghan border where there are important railway lines."

D. Purpose.—The Patriot is a well-known pro-communist daily and a frequent purveyor of Soviet disinformation. The Patriot article and misrepresentation of the CIA map are part of the continuing Soviet effort to convince the world that the nationalists opposed to the Babrak Karmal regime are terrorists and bandits, interested in their own enrichment and in the pay of the U.S. and others opposed to "social progress."

E. Comment.—The alleged facts and their interpretation as cited in the article are false. A map bearing the number 500546-7-72 was in fact published by the CIA, but it is the standard unclassified CIA topographic map of Afghanistan. (An error in the identification number was discovered after the first printing, and subsequently the correct number 500545 was overprinted in red on all maps currently in circulation.) Thousands of these maps have been distributed to U.S. Government agencies, and they are also available to the public through the Government Printing Office. The map was printed in July 1972, as indicated by the numbers "7-72" in the identification number, more than nine years before the nationalists' opposition to the Babrak Karmal regime began. The map provides information on the topography, population density, ethnolinguistic groups, land use and economic activity, and political subdivisions of Afghanistan as well as the location of roads, railways, and airfields. It also provides some detail on areas bordering Afghanistan.



IXf: PRESIDENT REAGAN LETTER TO KING JUAN CARLOS OF SPAIN

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—A forged U.S. Presidential letter was mailed to Spanish journalists and all delegations (except the U.S.) to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in early November 1981. The forged document was delivered by mail, postmarked Madrid.

B. Format.—The forgery consists of two documents: One is a bogus letter from President Reagan to the King, and the other a forged memorandum to the King from alleged opponents of Spain's accession to NATO.

C. Content.—The forged Presidential letter advises the King that several of his close advisors oppose Spain's accession to NATO. It alleges that the opposition groups include representatives from the military, the government, political parties and the Catholic Church. To support this allegation, the letter cites "highly secret information" received from a "strictly confidential source." This is a reference to the bogus memorandum allegedly signed by the Spanish Foreign Minister and the head of Spain's CSCE delegation, among others. The memorandum outlines this group's alleged opposition to Spanish entry into NATO. The forged letter also urges the King to take steps to destroy the opposition so that Spain's entry can be completed before the end of 1981. In an effort to persuade the King to take such action, the letter implies that positive action by the King might induce the U.S. to support the return of Gibraltar to Spanish control.

D. Purpose.—This forgery operation was clearly intended to complicate U.S.-Spanish relations by making it appear that the U.S. was interfering in Spain's internal affairs, to fuel opposition to Spanish entry into NATO, and to damage the King's domestic position. The Presidential letter was also drafted so that it might be used in other areas to damage U.S. interests. This possibility is suggested by a derogatory reference to France, by a reference to "over-sensitive North African states," and by an implication that the U.S. would change its position on Gibraltar.

E. Comment.—The forgery had no noticeable impact in Spain or on U.S. relations with Spain. Press commentary in Spain noted that the documents were bogus, and several journalists speculated that this forgery operation was Soviet-instigated. It is not certain who perpetrated the forgery, but the operation followed standard Soviet modus operandi and in effect supported Soviet opposition to Spain's entry into NATO. Moreover, this type of forgery operation is not characteristic of the methods used by legitimate domestic opponents to Spain's entry into NATO. We therefore conclude that it was a Soviet operation.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1981

His Majesty
The King of Spain
Madrid

Your Majesty:

Permit me to bring to your attention a delicate and confidential matter which, I deeply believe, is highly important for both of our countries.

After our private talks, I learned that several persons close to you oppose Spain's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and have posed new conditions for the membership of Spain. The highly secret information I have received indicates that members of this group come from Spain's armed forces, political parties, the government, and even the Catholic Church. It is my good fortune to be able to enclose the draft text of a memorandum the group prepared for you, which I was given by a strictly confidential source.

I believe Your Majesty agrees that it is vitally important to the United States for Spain to enter NATO without delay, in fact, in 1981. Spain, after all, faces major tasks in this context: Suffice it to mention the role of the Canary Islands after the NATO Southern Command is set up. So, it is understandable that the United States is concerned about these doubts coming from influential and reliable individuals we regard as our friends. I believe I share my conviction. We cannot permit another objectionable posture like the attitude of the French, which constantly creates problems for NATO in elaborating its new conceptions with reference to Latin America, Africa and the Mediterranean area. I have always believed Spain's absence from the Western system of defense to be a mistaken step, because your esteemed country would hardly feel at home among the self-styled "non-aligned" nations.


I respectfully ask Your Majesty to help disperse the uncertainty regarding Spain's NATO membership, created by the group influenced by the OPUS DEI pacifists. I believe it would help by granting those demands which do not directly conflict with NATO interests. For instance, my advisers inform me there are good grounds for destroying the left-wing opposition. In that event, the friendly relations between our two countries would improve. It would also neutralize the efforts aimed at creating difficulties for Spain's entry into NATO.

In such an instance, Your Majesty, I believe it imaginable that America might consider the final solution to Gibraltar in favor of Spain.

If necessary, the United States would undertake to dispel any anxiety in connection with Spain's new role which may arise, on the one hand, for the Mediterranean powers, and, on the other, on the part of the over-sensitive North African states with reference to Spanish territories in Africa and the Canary Islands.

I hope this message will strengthen Your Majesty's belief that Spain will benefit immensely by joining NATO. Such an act would enable Spain to once again assume the place she merits in history among the major World Powers. I urge Your Majesty to act, therefore, with dispatch to remove the forces obstructing Spain's entry into the NATO.

Yours truly,


Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan

A Su Majestad
 Don Juan Carlos I.
 Rey de España
Presente

¡Majestad!

Nos dirigimos a Vuestra Alteza en nombre de aquellos que en las difíciles horas de la nación española siempre han sabido dónde hallar su lugar; en nombre de aquellos hombres en quienes han podido siempre apoyarse confiados, en los años cruciales del pasado y del presente, los guías de nuestro pueblo, los gloriosos antepasados de Vuestra Majestad, al igual que Vuestra Alteza misma, digno continuador de la herencia que os legaran los antecesores. Nosotros, humildes servidores de Vuestra Majestad, dispuestos siempre a servirlos fielmente, sentimos que nuestra Nación se encuentra ante una difícil encrucijada, siendo nuestra sagrada obligación hacia la Corona, hacia la Nación Española dejar oír nuestra palabra, ayudar y contribuir a esta decisión. Es por ello que no podemos dejar de presentar a los pies de nuestro Soberano las preocupaciones, las dudas que sentimos por la suerte de nuestra Nación española, de tan heroico pasado histórico, que vive el sufrido presente, pero ante la cual se abre un indudablemente brillante futuro. Es al mismo tiempo empeño nuestro descubrir el camino que conduce hacia el feliz desenlace de esta actual difícil situación a fin que España, guiada por Vuestra Majestad, vuelva a ser nuevamente una, grande, libre y soberana.

Los actuales guías de nuestra Patria se encuentran ante una compleja situación: decidir si deben o no convertir España en miembro de la Organización del Tratado Nor-Atlántico. ¡Acaso es interés nuestro adherirnos a la misma, puesto que

hace peligrar nuestra independencia y libertad de acción, nuestros intereses especiales disfrutados hasta ahora?

La mayoría de los países de la OTAN se ven amenazados directamente por la agresión militar del Pacto de Varsovia. Nuestra tradicional política, resultado de la cual hemos permanecido siempre alejados de los grandes conflictos que asotaron al mundo, nos obliga ahora a no permitir convertirnos tampoco en el futuro en participantes voluntarios de una posible próxima hecatombe europea. La amenaza recae solamente en los países geográficamente próximos al comunismo. Estos países de ninguna manera podrán evitar su suerte, consecuencia directa del sometimiento al extranjero de sus intereses nacionales y del haber permitido que ideas subversivas subversivas desorganizaran su unidad nacional. Mas una España fuerte e independiente, poseedora de antiguos y probados aliados, no debe subumbrir junto a ellos.

Los intereses de nuestra Patria exigen que, en lugar de integrarnos al sistema de alianza del Nor-Atlántico, centremos toda nuestra atención en restituir y reforzar las zonas de nuestra tradicional influencia, no permitir que los intereses españoles sigan recibiendo nuevas heridas en el África y en el Atlántico.

No podemos permitir que nuestras Fuerzas Armadas, siempre garantía de la grandeza y de la independencia españolas, tan queridas también por Vuestra Alteza, pierdan su libertad de acción, su carácter forjado en la lucha por lograr la unidad nacional, como consecuencia de una inevitable reorganización en caso de adhesión a la OTAN. ¿Cómo el Ejército de Tierra, la Marina, el Ejército del Aire, la tan indignamente blasfemiada Guardia Civil serían capaces de cumplir las misiones que les han sido encomendadas en la lucha contra el enemigo exterior e interior si se convierten en parte autómata?

tica de un mecanismo militar gigantesco, tan extraño a los intereses nacionales españoles? ¿Es que seríamos capaces - y sobre todo - tendría razón de ser el contraer sacrificios materiales por encima de nuestras propias fuerzas en interés de que todo esto suceda?

En el decursar de nuestra gloriosa historia, los preciados antepasados de Vuestra Majestad han sostenido una lucha de vida o muerte, en defensa de la integridad de la Real Corona, contra aquellos estados europeos de los cuales ahora deberíamos ser aliados. Los que nos robaron Gibraltar, los que defienden a los asesinos terroristas vascos, ¿que incluso estarían dispuestos a aceptar un gobierno de izquierda, ¿puedan, acaso, ser alguna vez amigos sinceros nuestros?

¡Majestad!

Al exponer ante Vuestra Alta Gracia éstas, nuestras sinceras preocupaciones, nos sentimos plenamente conocedores de los problemas de extrema gravedad que surgen de nuestro pertinaz distanciamiento de la OTAN. Si la sabia inteligencia de nuestro Monarca nos dicta integrar dicha alianza, así lo haremos! Pero entonces hagámonos pagar a buen precio nuestra cooperación!

Exijamos a los países miembros de la OTAN que Gran Bretaña reponga, sin pérdida de tiempo, la soberanía de la Corona española sobre el Peñón de Gibraltar! Que la OTAN garantice para siempre la posesión española de las Islas Canarias y participe en su defensa frente a cualquiera! En ello cabe jugar un papel importantee a la base aéreo-naval a instalarse en las mismas, que debe construirse sin dilación y funcionar bajo mando exclusivo español. Deben permanecer intocables la estructura y los efectivos de nuestras Fuerzas Armadas, que deberán resguardar su total libertad de acción, proceder a su desarrollo respetándose rigurosamente nuestros propios intereses nacionales, para lo cual la OTAN debe ofrecer su cuantiosa ayuda material y técnica. Debe evitarse que la Reunión de Madrid pueda dar como resultado una solución que permita a potencias foráneas posibilidades de control mayores que las existentes hasta el presente,

atendiéndose particularmente a los preparativos de maniobras inevitablemente necesarias fuera de Europa. La falta de todos estos requisitos, España no deberá firmar el documento final en dicha reunión. La OTAN debe presionar sobre Francia a fin de que ésta erradique totalmente de su propio territorio el terrorismo vasco. Nuestros indeseados aliados deben prestarnos ayuda en la lucha contra los enemigos de nuestra Nación, contra las fuerzas que se autodenominan "democráticas" y no deben crear obstáculos o falsos pretextos de "la libertad y los derechos del Hombre" cuando llegue la hora de ajustar las cuentas.

Nuestra Iglesia, las Fuerzas Armadas, los representantes de la vida política y social de nuestra Patria, los sinceros y comprometidos patriotas de España os ruegan a Vos, Majestad, que en esta crucial hora procedáis en interés de la Nación y la Corona. Vuestra Majestad podrá contar siempre con nosotros, quienes en nombre del pueblo español, estampamos nuestra firma en el presente Memorandum, hasta tanto tengamos la plena seguridad de que Vuestra Alteza Real de España mantenga en alto la sagrada bandera de nuestra independencia nacional, de nuestras tradiciones sociales, de nuestra moral existiana cristiana!

¡Que Dios bendiga a Vuestra Majestad!

M. A. Triest

18. P. Ara.

Manuel Rey *Holundz*

D. Juan *A. Reyferran*

IXG: SPAIN-NATO FORGERY

A. *Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.*—A forged NATO document was mailed on 19 October 1981 to a number of Spanish journalists based in Brussels. Articles based on the forgery were published in at least two Spanish newspapers: *El Pais* on 21 October and *Diario* on 23 October. Both publications treated the document as a forgery and linked it to Soviet opposition to Spanish accession to NATO.

B. *Format and Content.*—The forgery consisted of a brief covering note attributed to the NATO Information Service and an informational device showing Spain as already the 16th member of NATO.

C. *Purpose.*—The forgery was clearly designed to anger the Spanish by implying that NATO was taking Spain's accession to NATO for granted in advance of consideration of the issue by the Spanish Parliament.

D. *Comment.*—The covering letter was marked "NATO Unclassified," but NATO does not mark letters in this fashion. There are also linguistic and grammatical errors in the covering letter that would not be expected in a NATO Information Service release. From a technical point the forgery was otherwise well done.

The perpetrators of this operation have not been positively identified. Available information indicates that other groups, including domestic Spanish opponents opposed to Spanish accession to NATO, are not believed to be capable of accomplishing this forgery operation. Moreover, they do not have a history of using forgeries for political purposes. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, does have a record for using forgeries for such purposes; and since it reestablished diplomatic relations with Spain in 1977, Moscow has consistently opposed Spain's entry into NATO. In addition to the fact that this forgery dovetails with Moscow's opposition, it should also be noted that the technique used to surface the forgery was consistent with many identified Soviet forgeries. It thus appears that this probably was a Soviet forgery.



ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
 1110-BRUXELLES TEL 241 00 40 241 44 00 241 44 90 TELEFAX 22 267

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

16th October 1982

Sir/Madam,


Please find enclosed the draft propaganda material of the NATO Information Service on the general structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the most important statistical data of the member countries to be issued in 1982.

We call your attention to Spain mentioned as a member country and that minor alterations are made on the lay-out as a consequence of it.

In case of any notice or/and suggestion please do not hesitate inform us. We also welcome your orders in advance.

ADDRESS: NATO Information Service
 1110 Brussels
 B E L G I U M

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D



L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE

FORGERIA

SUPERFICIE [504.782] KM2

POPULATION [270] MILLIONS
 DÉPENS DE DÉFENSE EN
 POURCENTAGE DU PNB
 2,5

NIVEAU DE FORCES ARMÉES
 240.000 ARMÉE
 41.000 MARINE
 41.000 AVIATION

PNB PAR TÊTE EN
 DOLLARS E. U. 3.526

POURCENTAGES D'EMPLOI
 10 AGRICULTURE
 50 INDUSTRIE
 30 AUTRES

PAYS MEMBRE [16]

CAPITALE
 MADRID

ESPAGNE
 PAYS

16 NATIONS

IXh: UNITED STATES-SWEDEN: FALSELY ATTRIBUTED MAILGRAMS

A. *Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.*—Between 8 and 11 November 1981 at least 11 falsely-attributed Western Union Mailgrams circulated in the Washington area. The Mailgrams were sent to U.S. and foreign journalists, including one TASS correspondent and one Polish journalist.

B. *Format.*—The format in each case was authentic; however, each alleged sender denied having sent such a Mailgram.

C. *Content.*—The Mailgrams offered to reveal information about an alleged U.S.-Swedish agreement providing for U.S. use of Swedish facilities at Karlskrona (where a Soviet submarine had recently run aground) for reconnaissance purposes.

D. *Purpose.*—The purpose of the Mailgrams was to create tensions to U.S.-Swedish relations, raise questions about Swedish neutrality, and probably to distract world attention from the recent violation of Swedish territorial waters by a nuclear-armed Soviet submarine.

E. *Comment.*—It is unlikely the Mailgrams were the work of an amateur or crank. The Mailgrams reveal some knowledge of the way U.S. photo-reconnaissance satellites operate, and it is unlikely that an amateur would have attributed Mailgrams to individuals who are knowledgeable about Soviet affairs but are not public figures. The language in the Mailgrams, however, is substandard, suggesting that they were drafted by a non-native English speaker.

At this time the perpetrators of this operation have not been positively identified. However, it is clearly within the capabilities of the Soviets, and it has some similarities to frequently-observed Soviet operating procedures. Moreover, the basic theme of the Mailgrams—that the U.S. and Sweden have an agreement allowing U.S. use of Swedish facilities—seemed designed to raise questions about Swedish neutrality and probably to divert attention from the recent violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine. At about the time the Mailgrams circulated in Washington, the Soviet news agency TASS, on 10 November 1981, alleging that Sweden carries out radio-signal reconnaissance directed against the Soviet Union on behalf of NATO. It is possible that the TASS allegations were to be buttressed by the surfacing of the bogus Mailgrams in Washington, which TASS could then cite as proof of its charges. Furthermore, a TASS correspondent who had already left the U.S. was the addressee of one of the Mailgrams. His inclusion could have been aimed at deflecting suspicion from the Soviets as originators of the Mailgrams, and the choice of a departed TASS correspondent would incur the Mailgram was turned over to a security officer, who could remove it into KGB channels. Circumstantial evidence thus suggests that this was a Soviet operation.

MAILGRAM SERVICE CENTER
MIDDLETOWN, VA. 22645



4-052248S315002 11/11/81 ICS IPHMTZZ CSP *SM6
1 2022983500 MGH TDMT WASHINGTON DC 11-11 1003P EST

WILHELM WACHTMEISTER SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO
THE UNITED STATES
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON DC 20037

FORGERY

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

2022983500 TDMT WASHINGTON DC 75 11-11 1003P EST
PMS MORST SCHREITTER, FRANKFURT RUNDSCHAU RPT DLY MGH, FONE 202331
FIRST, DLR
4523 Q LN
WASHINGTON DC 20007
THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APOLOGIES TO THE PEOPLE
OF POLAND I HAVE JUST SAW TODAY AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN MY COUNTRY &
THE UNITED STATES WHICH IS ALLOWING A SATELLITE MONITORING FACILI
ON KARLSKRONA NAVAL BASE SWEDEN WITHOUT THIS SPECIFIC STATION THE
PHOTOGRAPHING BY U.S. SATELLITE OF POLAND WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE I
DISASSOCIATE MYSELF FROM MY GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AND ITS VIOLATIO
OUR NEUTRALITY PLEASE RESPOND BY TELEPHONE AT 202-298-3500
WILHELM WACHTMEISTER SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON DC 20037

22:06 EST

MGHCUPP

MAILGRAM SERVICE CENTER
MIDDLETOWN, VA. 22645



#-0526495315002 11/11/81 ICS IPHMTZZ CSP KSM6
1 2022983500 MGM TDMT WASHINGTON DC 11-11 1025P EST

WILHELM WACHTMEISTER SWEDEN EMBASSADOR TO THE
U S
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE
WASHINGTON DC 20037

MAILGRAM

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMED COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

2022983500 TDMT WASHINGTON DC 11-11 1025P EST
FMS JACK ANDERSON RPT DLY 11/11/81 2024831440 AND DLR, DLR
1801 16 ST NORTH-EAST
WASHINGTON DC

THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APOLOGY TO THE PEOPLE OF
POLAND I HAVE JUST SAW TODAY AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN MY COUNTRY AND THE
UNITED STATES WHICH IS ALLOWING A SATELITE MONITORING FACILITY ON
KARLSKRONA NAVY BASE SWEDEN WITHOUT THIS SPECIFIC STATION THE
PHOTOGRAPHING BY U S SATELITE OF POLAND WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE I
DISASSOCIATE MYSELF FROM MY GOVERNMENT ACTION IN ITS VIOLATION OF OUR
HOSPITALITY PLEASE RESPOND TO ME BY MY PHONE NUMBER WHICH IS
2022983500

WILHELM WACHTMEISTER SWEDEN EMBASSADOR TO THE U S
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE
WASHINGTON DC 20037

22:26 EST

MGMCCIP

Send And to Jack Anderson

MIDDLETOWN, VA, 22645



4-0157575312002 11/08/81 ICS IPHMTZZ CSP WSHB
 1 3019510176 MGM TDMT BETHESDA MD 11-08 1026P EST

3

FRED C IKLE
 7010 GLENBROOK RD
 BETHESDA MD 20014

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

3019510176 TDMT BETHESDA MD 11-08 1026P EST

PMS TASS NEWS AGENCY, DL
 883 NATIONAL PRESS BLDG
 WASHINGTON DC 20045

ATTN ALBERT N. BOBIKOV,

WILL ENTERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS FOR OFFICIAL COPY OF U.S. SWEDISH
 AGREEMENT ON USE OF KARLSKRONA NAVAL BASE SWEDEN FOR U.S. SATELLITE
 RECONNAISSANCE MONITORING OF POLAND FROM RELAY STATION WHICH SENDS UP
 CODED SIGNALS TO SATELLITE GIVING IT COMMANDS TO PHOTOGRAPH POLAND
 FROM KARLSKRONA WITHOUT SUCH A FACILITY ON KARLSKRONA SATELLITE
 MONITORING OF POLAND IMPOSSIBLE BY U.S. SATELLITE. PLEASE REPLY IF
 INTERESTED IN COPY OF SWEDISH U.S. AGREEMENT OF SUCH I FOUND MYSELF
 COMPLETELY DISGUSTED WITH MY GOVERNMENT AND ITS KNOWLEDGE OF SWEDISH
 NEUTRALITY BY THE U.S. REPLY BUSINESS PHONE 202-697-7200

FRED C IKLE

22:30 EST

MGMCOMP

Ull to TASS

TO REPLY BY MAILGRAM, SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR WESTERN UNION'S TOLL-FREE PHONE NUMBERS

MAILGRAM SERVICE CENTER
 FALSBLETTOWN, VA. 22645



4-066970S313002 11/09/81 ICS IPMMTZZ CSP FCHC
 1 7037594231 MGM TDMT GREAT FALLS VA 11-09 1040P EST

RAYMOND SEITZ
 10300 GEORGETOWN PIKE
 GREAT FALLS VA 22066

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

7037594231 TDMT GREAT FALLS VA 11-09 1040P EST
 PMS MILTON COLEMAN RPT DLY MGM, DLR AND PHONE 5751388
 3174 WESTOVER DR SOUTHEAST
 WASHINGTON DC 20020

HAVE OFFICIAL COPY OF US SWEDISH AGREEMENT ON US PRESENCE ON
 KARLSKRONA NAVY BASE SWEDEN THE REQUIRED INSTALLATION OF A TECHNICAL
 US FACILITY STATION ENABLING US TO PHOTOGRAPH POLAND I AM
 REPRESENTING RICHARD V ALLEN AND BOBBY INMAN WITH SWEDEN IN A POWER
 PLAY HAVE NEWS STORY FOR YOU RETURN CALL MY BUSINESS PHONE IN
 WASHINGTON DC AT 202-632-0954

RAYMOND SEITZ
 10300 GEORGETOWN PIKE
 GREAT FALLS VA 22066

2247 EST

MGMCOMP MGM

TO REPLY BY MAILGRAM, SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR WESTERN UNION'S TOLL - FREE PHONE NUMBERS

TELEGRAM SERVICE CENTER
ARLINGTON, VA, 22245

4-0140245312002 11/09/61 105 IPMXTZZ CSP 104E
1 2024329194 NBM TDMT WASHINGTON DC 11-09 0230P EST

ROBERT W PARAZ
309 NORTH QUINCY RD
ARLINGTON VA 22203

FORGERY

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

2024329194 TDMT WASHINGTON DC 11-09 0230P EST
FROM 2021935195
FRANK TAYLOR CARE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH RPT DLY NBM COPY MESSAGE, FROM
5AM GMT
1256 NATIONAL PRESS BLDG
WASHINGTON DC 20045

WILL ENTERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS FOR OFFICAL COPY OF U.S. SWEDISH
AGREEMENT ON USE OF KARLSKRONA NAVAL BASE SWEDEN FOR U.S. SATELLITE
RECONNAISSANCE MONITORING OF POLAND FROM RELAY STATION WHICH SENDS UP
CODED SIGNALS TO THE SATELLITE GIVING IT COMMANDS TO PHOTOGRAPH
POLAND FROM KARLSKRONA

WITHOUT SUCH A FACILITY ON KARLSKRONA SATELLITE MONITORING OF POLAND
IMPOSSIBLE BY U.S. SATELLITE. PLEASE REPLY IF INTERESTED IN COPY OF
SWEDISH U.S. AGREEMENT OF SUCH. I FOUND MYSELF COMPLETELY DISGUSTED
WITH MY GOVERNMENT AND ITS VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY BY THE U.S. REPLY
202-432-5194

ROBERT W PARAZ
309 NORTH QUINCY RD
ARLINGTON VA 22203

2037 EST

NBMCOYP NBM

Frank Taylor

TO TELE BY MAILGRAM SEE YELLOW SIDE FOR WESTERN UNION'S TOLL-FREE PHONE NUMBERS

IXI: PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM FORGERY

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—The first confirmed surfacing of this forgery was on 12 September 1980, when it was hand-delivered by an unknown individual to a radio station in the Washington, D.C. area; four days later, a journalist in New York gave a copy of the forged memorandum to a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. Articles citing the forced memorandum have appears in Soviet publications, including Red Star and Moscow News as well as in a TASS item, and also in Zambian and Mozambican media. The memorandum has also circulated in South Africa. In late November 1981, Volkskrant, a leftist paper in the Netherlands published an article based on the forged memorandum, without noting that the memorandum had been denounced by the Presidential press secretary on 17 December 1980 as a forgery. The Volkskrant article was the last known appearance of the forgery.

B. Format.—The bogus document purports to be "Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 46" and an NBC study on Black Africa and the United States Black Movement, dated March 17, 1978. (There was an authentic Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 46; but it was dated May 4, 1979, dealt with U.S. policies toward Central America and differed in format.)

C. Content.—The document calls for American support for South Africa and surveillance of black leaders in the U.S. It also suggests that steps be taken to prevent "coordinated activity of the black nationalist movement in Africa and the black movement in the United States." It advises that American intelligence agencies monitor the activities of "black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa."

D. Purpose.—The document is clearly intended to undercut U.S. effort to improve relations with African states, to support accusations that U.S. domestic and foreign policy is racist, and to put the U.S. on the defensive internationally on human rights issues. These are all charges made frequently by the Soviets publicly and privately; the document could thus be used to "substantiate" Soviet propaganda.

E. Comment.—The perpetrators of this forgery operation have not been conclusively established, but the contents of the document are useful as support for Soviet propaganda efforts against the U.S., particularly in Africa, and Soviet media have commented on the document without noting that the U.S. Government had publicly denounced it as a forgery. In addition, at least one of the individuals responsible for surfacing the document in the U.S. has been identified as a former member of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. and is now affiliated with the World Peace Council, a major Soviet front organization. These facts all imply Soviet involvement, although the method of surfacing the document differed from past Soviet procedures.

March 17, 1976

SECRETPresidential Review Memorandum/NSC-46

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

The President has directed that a comprehensive review be made of current developments in black Africa from the point of view of their possible impact on the black movement in the United States.

The review should consider:

1. Long-term tendencies of social and political development, and the degree to which they are consistent with our national interest.
2. Prospects for durable contacts between radical African leaders and leftist leaders of the U.S. black community.
3. Appropriate steps to be taken inside and outside the country in order to inhibit any pressure by radical African leaders and organizations on the U.S. black community for the latter to exert influence on the policy of the Administration toward Africa.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa perform this review.

The review should be forwarded to the NSC Political Analysis Committee by April 20th.

W. R. ...
Z. L. ...

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

objectives of our policy toward black Africa is to prevent ³
social upheavals which could radically change the political
situation throughout the area. On the success or failure of
our policy in the region depends the solution of international
and internal issues of importance for the United States in
on the increase.

SECRET

SECRET

II. A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BLACK AFRICA

A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa. The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows:

1. Political

If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national interest, our policy toward the white regimes, which is a key element in our relations with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great pressure for fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa which are vital for our defense needs as well as of losing control over the Cape sea routes by which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to Western Europe.

Moreover, such a development may bring about internal political difficulties by intensifying the activity of the black movement in the United States itself.

It should also be borne in mind that black Africa is an integral part of a continent where tribal and regional discord, economic backwardness, inadequate infrastructures, drought and famine are constant features of the scene. In conjunction with the artificial borders imposed by the former colonial powers, guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia and widespread indignation against apartheid in South Africa, the above factors provide the context

states with ample opportunities for furthering their aims. This must necessarily redound to the detriment of U.S. political interests.

2. Economic

Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and investment. The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value for the normal functioning of industry in the United States and allied countries. In 1977, U.S. direct investment in black Africa totaled about \$ 1.8 billion and exports \$ 2.2 billion. New prospects of substantial profit would continue to be realized in the areas concerned.

SECRETIV. BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT

Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far-reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result would be likely if Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique.

A recurrence of the events of 1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige, especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human rights issues. Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to stabilize the situation. Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and outside the United States.

In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests, it would appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.

1. Possibility of Joint Action by U.S. Blacks and African Nationalist Movement

In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be given to the fact that there are 25 million American blacks whose roots are African and who consciously or subconsciously sympathize with African nationalism.

The living conditions of the black population should also be taken into account. Immense advances in the social field are

SECRET

national security. In the present case emphasis is laid on the importance of black Africa for U.S. political, economic and military interests.

Recommendations

In weighing the range of U.S. interests in black Africa, basic recommendations, arranged without intent to imply priorities are:

1. Specific steps should be taken with the help of appropriate government agencies to inhibit coordinated activity of the black nationalist movement in Africa and the black movement in the United States.

2. Special clandestine operations should be launched by the CIA to generate mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity of the two forces, and to cause division among black African radical nationalist groups and their leaders.

3. U.S. Embassies to black African countries specially interested in southern Africa must be highly circumspect in view of the activity of certain political circles and influential individuals opposing the objectives and methods of U.S. policy toward South Africa. It must be kept in mind that the failure of U.S. strategy in South Africa would adversely affect American standing throughout the world. In addition, this would mean a significant diminution of U.S. influence in Africa and the emergence of new difficulties in our internal situation due to worsening economic prospects.

SECRET

SECRET

4. The FBI should mount surveillance operations against black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the UN, who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The information should include facts on their links with the leaders of the black movement in the United States, thus making possible at least partial neutralization of the adverse effects of their activity.

IXJ: GREECE: STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER AND STUDY

A. *Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.*—The two documents involved in this operation surfaced as a pair in January 1982. They were mailed from Athens to several Athens and provincial Greek newspapers.

B. *Format.*—One of the two documents purports to be a covering letter, dated 23 September 1981, from then-Undersecretary of State William Clark to the U.S. Ambassador in Greece, Monteagle Stearns. The second document is an alleged State Department-sponsored analysis of the "current political situation" in Greece.

C. *Content.*—The bogus study, by an unspecified "research institute," suggests that the United States support a military coup in Greece in order to preserve U.S. military bases there. The forged letter calls Ambassador Stearns' attention to the attached study, endorses the study's contents, and recommends that the Ambassador make use of the study in his "diplomatic activities."

D. *Purpose.*—This forgery operation was clearly designed to undermine U.S. relations with the new Greek government elected in October 1981. It also sought to damage the reputations of pro-U.S. Greek politicians alluded to in the alleged study and to raise doubts about the political reliability of the Greek military.

E. *Comment.*—These forgeries were crudely done from a technical standpoint. The language was often ungrammatical and the structure awkward; the stationery used for the covering letter was not in use by the Department of State at that time, and the letter's Washington, D.C., return address was incorrect. There is no direct evidence of Soviet authorship of these forgeries; but they served Soviet interests in seeking to undermine U.S.-Greek relations, and the method of surfacing them followed a frequently observed Soviet pattern.

FOR OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1981

Dear Ambassador

enclosed you can find an excerpt from an analysis dealing with the current political situation in Greece prepared by a research institute within the framework of the State Department's programmed studies.

Please, give your attention to the ideas of the excerpt's conclusions and consider them to be correct. I should like to recommend you to use the excerpt in your diplomatic activity.

Yours truly,

William Clark

William P. Clark

Ambassador Monteagle Steurns
Athens

Greece (1981)

In the long term interest of the U.S. Foreign Policy we have to support the New Democracy Party in Greece, especially the incumbent Minister of Defense, Mr. Evangelos Averoff Tositsas, who belongs to the true friends of the United States and really understands what are the United States needs in the South-East wings of the N.A.T.O.

However, if the Panhellenic Socialist Movement's victory in the October 1981 election could not be prevented, it would be for us an imperative to re-consider the question of supporting some liberal groups within the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, including Mr. Georgios Mavros who, as we have found out, promised to join this socialist party together with his well-known group. Furthermore, it could be indispensable to enhance the influence of the New Democracy Party in order to block any new attempt of the upcoming Greek government's initiatives that might harm our plans in upholding of U.S. bases in Greece.

In view of the fact that the future political situation in Greece may become once again unstable, it would have been impossible to exclude even the preparation for an action to be carried out by the reliable army officers who would be able to take a decisive step that could at the most convenient moment counterbalance the expected political attitudes of the East block in the crisis areas.

The main task will be to devote the attention of the use of the Greek army for the overthrow of the regime. We evaluate it in practical terms including consequences of such action from global, political and military point of view. Closer contacts with choosed military persons should be established, and we should proceed in this direction so as to keep our initiatives concealed.

We should like to point out to the possibility to utilize the recent example of Turkey, whose military Government was recognized by the international public including our allies without substantial reservation. This fact notwithstanding, leads us to the conclusion that an eventual military action in Greece should be combined with positive gestures by the friendly Governments. Thus the action itself would not be presented like a pure military coup.

Special attention should be also paid to the U.S. - Greek agreement on military co-operation. What is the most important fact in this respect is the status of our military bases in Greece. Any delays in this field are undesirable; they impair U.S. credibility in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time they also complicate our noble efforts to form a wide front to counter the Soviet threat.

IXK: HAIG-LUNS LETTER

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—This forged document surfaced in a Belgian leftist weekly, *De Nieuwe*, in April 1982. It appeared again in May 1982 in the Luxembourg communist party newspaper *Zeitung*, even though the document had been publicly denounced as a forgery in April by NATO and U.S. officials.

B. Format.—The document purports to be a copy of a two-page letter, dated 26 June 1976, allegedly sent to NATO Secretary General Luns by then-Supreme Allied Commander Haig. The document carries the letterhead, "Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe" and is stamped "NATO SECRET."

C. Content.—The alleged letter is in the nature of a farewell to Luns from the departing NATO commander. It outlines "aspects of alleged NATO strategy that demand our further attention and effort," claiming that one desideratum is speedy implementation of "current projects for the limited use of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe in an emergency" this strategy will be more effective, the letter continues, if Allied "tactical nuclear forces" are modernized. Looking ahead to the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1979, the letter urged countering "any hesitation or vacillation among the allied nations during decision-making meetings." Should argumentation fail, the letter foresaw a need for "action of a sensitive nature" to "jolt the faint-hearted."

D. Purpose.—This document was intended to support and stimulate European opposition to NATO's modernization of its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). It tried to accomplish this in part by distorting NATO strategy and playing on European anxieties over the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe. The letter's references to NATO nuclear forces as "tactical" and to NATO's possibly being "forced to make first use of nuclear weapons" were clearly designed to heighten these anxieties. In addition, the NATO decision on INF modernization in December 1979 is depicted as having been state-managed by Haig and Luns, who allegedly pressured various NATO member states into accepting INF modernization. Behind-the-scenes collusion between Haig and Luns is further insinuated through the use of such expressions as "our joint plans" and "action of a sensitive nature which we have frequently discussed." The forgery also foretells continued collusion between Luns and Haig after the letter was to become Secretary of State; this is brought out in a passage in which Haig allegedly says he will continue to monitor the European situation from the United States "in any role I may be called upon to play."

E. Comment.—This document is the latest in a series of forgeries in recent years involving NATO, Luns, and Haig. It was well done from a linguistic point of view, having incorporated several expressions that the public has been conditioned to expect in bureaucratic correspondence, such as "finalize current projects" and "activizing our collaboration." It was, however, less accomplished in format: the letterhead stationery was inappropriate to General Haig's personal letters in 1979.

NATO SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
 GRAND QUARTIER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROPE
 BELGIUM

26 Jun 1979

His Excellency Joseph M.A.H. Luns
 The Secretary General
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Brussels/Zaventem Auroours
 B-1110 Brussels, Belgium

Dear Joseph,

Thank you for your letter of June 25 setting out certain results of our joint work which have had, I believe, a direct and lasting effect on the formulation and realization of the allied defense program. For my part, I highly appreciate your cooperation and hope that you are equally satisfied.

On leaving the post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, I feel it my duty to stress once again certain aspects of allied strategy which demand our further attention and effort.

As you know, one of our presuppositions in nuclear planning is that, under certain circumstances likely to develop in Europe, we may be forced to make first use of nuclear weapons. This obviously requires that the allied nuclear deterrent should be strengthened and its links with major U.S. strategic systems tightened. Moreover, it is vital to speed up and finalize current projects for the limited use of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe and for other military measures at our disposal for a possible emergency. This strategy will be more realistic and effective if a decision on the modernization of allied tactical nuclear forces is taken.

With your help, a great deal of progress has been made recently toward strengthening the Alliance. Yet, in my view, planning for the deployment and use of modernized nuclear forces in Europe can be adequately accomplished only if full understanding and cooperation are achieved. It is therefore necessary to prepare, systematically and persistently, a basis for making a success of the NATO Council meeting in December, bearing in mind primarily the crisis inside the Alliance over neutron weapons deployment. Every effort should be made to counter any hesitation or vacillation among the allied nations during decision-making meetings.

NATO SECRET


His Excellency Joseph M.A.H. Luns

We will never be able to put into effect our joint plans in this vital area unless quite exceptional efforts are made to check European tendencies toward neutralism, pacifism and unilateralism. To achieve this, it is necessary, I feel, to emphasize the theme that the nuclear weapons balance, particularly in the European theater, has changed sharply in favor of the East. We should constantly bear in mind the necessity of continuously directing attention to the Soviet military threat and of further activating our collaboration with the mass media.

If argument, persuasion and impacting the media fail, we are left with no alternative but to jolt the faint-hearted in Europe through the creation of situations country by country as deemed necessary, to convince them where their interests lie. This would call for appropriate and effective action of a sensitive nature which we have frequently discussed and I have been greatly encouraged by the absence of disagreement between us regarding priorities. Back in the States, I shall not cease to monitor the European situation in any role I may be called upon to play and hope to continue our hitherto fruitful exchange of views. The courses of action which we have in mind may become the only sure means of securing the interests of the West.

To this end, your authority and your active assistance, especially in the Netherlands, can hardly be overestimated. I am aware that the work of coordination will place additional burdens on you. Yet I am sure that your devotion to allied objectives and ideals will enable you to shoulder this difficult task.

Sincerely,


 ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
 General, United States Army
 Supreme Allied Commander

IXI: MAP OPERATION: CUBA/LATIN AMERICA


A. *Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.*—On 12 March 1982 The Ethiopian Herald, published by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance in Addis Ababa, carried a lengthy article by Dr. Julius Mader which alleged that the U.S. CIA is waging chemical, bacteriological, and meteorological warfare against Cuba. To substantiate the charge, the article referred to an alleged "U.S. Document No. 502988/1-77: Basis for bacteriological attacks in the Caribbean/Neutron warheads against Europeans, and viruses against Latin America." The article reproduced one of the "partial maps" from this alleged CIA document; the map was described as related to the CBW objective of "agriculture-epidemics." A highly similar article, also by Mader, appeared in the pro-communist Lisbon daily, *Diario de Lisboa*, on 13 April 1982 under a different title.

B. *Format.*—The articles are a deliberate misrepresentation of an authentic CIA-produced unclassified map bearing the number 502988 1-77. The genuine map shows the island of Cuba from seven vantage points, including population, land utilization, and economic activity. The Ethiopian Herald article reproduced the economic activity map, without alteration, but distorted its nature. The genuine map is on public sale through the U.S. Government Printing Office, and is one of a series done on numerous countries throughout the world.

C. *Content.*—Both articles refer to the map to substantiate charges that the CIA has been engaged in chemical and biological warfare against Cuba. They claim that the map provides "all the necessary key data" for waging CBW and that a companion map shows sugarcane areas "as a basis for large-scale acts of sabotage." The other companion maps shown on the alleged "Document No. 502988/1-77" are described as showing population density—said to be "primary planning indices" for CBW—and targets for economic-industrial sabotage. The articles claim that Cuba is only a "testing ground" and that there are "great potential dangers" for other Latin American countries in light of the existence of similar CIA maps for Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina.

D. *Purpose.*—The articles are in part an attempt to provide tangible evidence to back up Cuban charges that the U.S. has been engaging in CBW against Cuba for at least two years, during which Cuba has suffered, according to Fidel Castro, five major epidemics affecting plants, animals, and humans. More broadly, the articles are part of a continuing Soviet campaign in recent months to deflect attention from U.S. charges of Soviet use of CBW in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and to claim that it is the U.S. that is engaging in CBW. The articles alleging U.S. CBW activities in Latin America.

E. *Comment.*—Julius Mader was involved in an earlier disinformation operation in September 1981 involving an unclassified CIA-produced map of Austria.



XIII: SECRETARY OF COMMERCE MEMORANDUM

A. *Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.*—In May 1982 a forged document purporting to be signed by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige appeared in Brussels when it was mailed locally and anonymously to a number of foreign correspondents stationed there. The document is not known to have received any media publicity.

B. *Format.*—The document was prepared as a three-page "Secret" internal Commerce Department memorandum signed by Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and purporting to convey recommendations of an interagency "Special Presidential Working Group on Strategic Economic Policy." The document is a total fabrication.

C. *Purpose.*—The text of the forgery distorts U.S. economic policy in a manner calculated to aggravate U.S. relations with its European trading partners. The timing of this forgery, on the eve of President Reagan's visit to Europe for economic summit discussions, was almost certainly deliberate.

D. *Content.*—The document recommends undertaking actions "whose objective would be the definite severance of the gas pipeline" between the U.S.S.R. and Western Europe, and it cites certain benefits to the United States, at West European expense of achieving this objective. For example, it recommends preparing "an anti-dumping suit" against West European steel suppliers, which the memorandum predicts will help the U.S. overcome its "steel crises" (sic) and at the same time "will deepen the crises (six) within the exported states." The document estimates that this in turn will have political consequences even "the possibility of cabinet crises," which would open the door to U.S. influence on these cabinets concerning "anti-nuclear and other campaigns." Another tactic recommended is to export coal "at give-away prices" to corner the West European coal market.

E. *Comments.*—Several errors were made in technical format that would distinguish this document from a legitimate Secretary of Commerce memorandum, and the name of the Secretary of Commerce himself was misspelled "Baldrige," instead of "BALdrige," in a list of the alleged Working Group members. In addition, the list of specialists included a former head of CIA's Office of Economic Research, but the perpetrators apparently did not know that this office had been reconfigured and renamed well prior to the 18 February 1982 date on the bogus memorandum. Despite such shortcomings, the format appears official and bureaucratic, including use of the Department of Commerce letterhead and could probably deceive someone unfamiliar with actual Secretary of Commerce memoranda. Linguistically, the document uses generally grammatical language appropriate to the subject. An educated native speaker of English would not make several of the idiomatic and structural mistakes that are in the text, but the document would probably impress most others as bureaucratic American English. This is thus a fairly sophisticated forgery, whose exact perpetrators are unknown. We suspect it was Soviet instigated, based on the Soviet forgery pattern in the past and Soviet political motivation; but we have no direct evidence to prove this suspicion.



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

NAME SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP
ON STRATEGIC ECONOMIC POLICY

SECRET

DATE February 18, 1982

Recommendations of the Special Presidential Working Group on Strategic Economic Policy. Membership as follows:

Department of Commerce

Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce
Lionel H. Omer, Under Secretary for
International Trade
Robert G. Dederick, Assistant Secretary
Raymond J. Waldman, Assistant Secretary
Thomas Collamore, Confidential Assistant
to the Secretary
Eugene K. Lawson, Deputy Assistant
Secretary

Central Intelligence Agency

Maurice Ernst, Director, Office of
Economic Research
Martin Kohn, Deputy Director, Office
of Economic Research

Department of State

Ernest B. Johnston, Deputy Assistant
Secretary
Nicholas Sr. Platt, Deputy Assistant
Secretary
Gordon L. Streeb, Deputy Assistant
Secretary
William B. Milam, Director, Department
of International Finance and Development

Department of Treasury

Marc E. Leland, Assistant Secretary
William E. Escube, Director, Office of
East-West Economic Policy

In order to carry out the strategic objectives of our global policy we view as desirable to submit for the approval of the President, the following concept of our economic policy:

Within the sanctions imposed upon the Soviet Union by the United States and consequently by our Western European Allies, we propose undertaking actions, whose objective would be the definite severance of the gas pipeline contract between the Soviet Union and some of our Western



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European partners.

Positive effects for the United States of severing the contract.

1. The Department of Commerce is preparing an anti-dumping suit against Western European suppliers of steel products to the United States. As a result there must follow a very serious reduction of shipments of steel products to our country from the European Community. On the one hand, this will enable us to surmount our own steel crises, and on the other hand will deepen the crises within the exporter states, which - lacking major markets - will be forced to limit production. This will lead to repercussions, not only economic, but social and political as well. We even do not exclude the possibility of cabinet crises. This will enable us to influence these "crises" cabinets in a desirable direction, for example, blocking anti-nuclear and other campaigns, not advantageous to our interests in Europe.
2. Decreasing the dependence of Western European countries upon energy from the Soviet Union and possibly cornering by the United States (thanks to the resulting gap) of the Western European coal market by way of our coal exports - especially during the current fiscal year - at give-away prices.

Administration agencies will allay fears about rising unemployment levels and will point out ways of discretely financing coal producers. At the same time mistakes made by the Carter administration should be avoided. The previous administration excessively burdened the federal budget, subsidizing farmers during the grain embargo.

Negative aspects for Western Europe of severing the contract.

1. Depriving the European Community of Soviet gas supplies, and thus making Western Europe dependent on our energy shipments or those from regions controlled by our concerns.
2. Depriving the European Community of the possibility of establishing a perspective market for large diameter pipes.

Positive effects for the United States of eliminating Eastern European countries, especially the Soviet Union, from the Western European natural resources market.

1. Bringing about a deepening of the economic crises in the Soviet Union



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and other Eastern European countries. This would be used to foment social unrest and increase disapproval of the mechanisms of Communist economies and weaken the "faith and conviction" - especially in Poland and Rumania - of the populace of these countries in the future of states forced to accept a Communist way of development.

2. By blocking exports of energy to the European Community, we will make it impossible for Eastern European countries, for a considerable length of time, to obtain hard currency in order to meet their debt payments in the West. This will enable us and our Allies in Europe to control Eastern European economies for many years and simultaneously to influence their foreign and domestic policies.

Note: Our working Group will assemble a team, which shall prepare a set of arguments in order to convince our Allies about the merits of the presented concept. The arguments could be utilized in the nearest future by the President in his official meetings with leaders of the European Community in case they would negate our position in the context of disturbing the equilibrium in East-West trade, fearing, that the directions of economic policy proposed by us will lead to a deep crises in the European economy.

We propose not to alleviate in the nearest six months our sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland (certainly the reasons for their introduction shall not cease) and not to reduce our pressure on the European Community to uphold their own sanctions in order to definitely force out Eastern Europe first of all from the Western European and Japanese energy markets and in the meantime to consolidate our own presence on these markets.

We are convinced, that we can additionally supplement our arguments in that our plan serves first of all the political, military and economic interests of the West as a whole and eliminating the dependence of NATO states on oil, gas and coal from the Soviet bloc.

Walter Belding
Secretary of Commerce

IX: U.S. BUSINESS FIRM'S CORRESPONDENCE

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—A newspaper article appeared in the Harare (Salisbury) Herald on 5 June 1982 which alleged that a New Orleans-based U.S. firm, Aviation Personnel International (API), has been contracting to recruit mercenary helicopter pilots for the South African Government. Similar allegations subsequently appeared in Tanzanian and Zambian media, and the Soviet news agency TASS replayed the charges.

B. Format.—The allegations concerning API were based on a letter allegedly written by API to a South African general. The fabricated letter used letterhead stationery generally resembling that used by API, although a logotype was incorrectly reproduced. The letter is written in generally acceptable business English and format.

C. Content.—The forged API letter refers to an alleged secret agreement by API to supply South Africa with mercenary helicopter pilots trained in jungle warfare. It alludes to alleged previous API of the South African Air Force, and with other unspecified parties. The document also claims that API is functioning in this regard as a go-between for unspecified "competent bodies of the U.S. Government." The letter contains a vague reference to the abortive coup attempt in the Seychelles in November 1981 and insinuates that South Africa, API, and the U.S. Government played a joint role in it.

D. Purpose.—The forged letter is clearly designed to substantiate charges, common in Soviet propaganda, that the U.S. Government has secret military-related agreements with the South African Government; such charges are calculated to damage U.S. relations with other African states, especially those located close to South Africa and in conflict with it. The letter also is intended to lend credence to charges, also common in Soviet propaganda, that the CIA was involved in the Seychelles coup attempt last fall.

E. Comment.—The API letter is a total fabrication, and its contents have no factual basis whatever. API is a legally constituted, chartered, and registered Louisiana corporation, but presumably not itself the target of this forgery operation. The actual perpetrators are unknown, but the surfacing of the letter's contents in several black African states at roughly the same time, the apparent political motivation behind the forgery, and Soviet forgery practice all suggest Soviet involvement.



Aviation Personnel International

P. O. BOX 50044 • NEW ORLEANS, LA 70150 • (504) 392-3456

April 6, 1982

Lt.-Gen. A. M. Muller
 South African Air Force
 Nedbank Centre, cnr Church and Chabane St.
 Priv. Bag X199
 0001 Pretoria, SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Sir,

Based on our agreement of 12 December 1981 in which you request a continual supply of incoming pilots who are capable of working inside the SASCAF, we now forward the personal data of pilots who - according to our evaluation - meet standards stipulated by you. Said pilots are qualified to operate Type YAH-64 combat helicopters and are well-trained in jungle warfare.

We repeatedly wish to direct your attention to the fact that we only recruit and recommend the pilots and the engagement procedures are the responsibility of your representatives. On instructions received from the competent bodies of the U.S. Government and because of political factors, this goes between activity of our organization calls for top secrecy from your side in full accordance with earlier guarantees. This is especially justified by circumstances that emerged as a result of the Seychelles action. We do not desire to undertake another similar risk that stems from the lack of careful judgement of given circumstances.

We believe you will understand our motives and can be mutually satisfied with how our business relations are shaping-up. We completely understand your position so we shall continue to seek out comrades-in-arms who are trustworthy in every respect.

Sincerely yours,

Michelle Lang
 Michelle Lang
 Assistant Registrar

ML/td
 Enclosures: 2

FORGERY

IXO: PENTAGON "NEWS RELEASE" ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

A. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing.—In late June 1982 it was learned that the Argentinian ambassador in Washington had received a fabricated Pentagon "News Release," dated 5 May 1982, which purported to provide remarks by Secretary of Defense Weinberger regarding U.S. support to Great Britain in the Falklands crisis. The forgery also circulated among Argentinian officials in Buenos Aires. The forgery did not receive media publicity, as far as can be determined. The Pentagon public affairs office denounced the document as a forgery at a press conference on 29 June 1982.

B. Format.—The general appearance of the forged document is similar to that of a genuine document in the Pentagon's "News release" series, known informally as "blue-toppers" because of a wide blue stripe in the heading. However, several technical errors were made, including the use of the wrong shade of blue printing ink and the wrong type of paper. Linguistically, the forgery was very clumsily done. The text was in understandable English but contained diction and structures in appropriate for a native English speaker. Moreover, the forged News Release document number had already been used on a different topic.

C. Content.—The forgery text grossly overstates the nature and extent of U.S. support for the British in the Falkland Islands crisis, saying in part that Secretary Weinberger had "defended to give (sic) all our military assistance and other support to our British ally." The document also refers to the sharing with Britain of U.S. intelligence information on the Falklands military situation and alludes to alleged U.S.-British operational combat planning. The document also contains insulting references to Argentina, such as its alleged "stubborn and selfish attitude for one-sided solution of the conflict" (sic).

D. Purpose.—This forgery was clearly designed to damage U.S.-Argentinian relations. References to alleged U.S. assistance to Great Britain in the areas of joint combat planning and provision of military intelligence were intended to exploit the issue of Argentina's combat losses and assign some direct responsibility for them to the U.S. Government.

E. Comment.—This was an unusually crude forgery from a linguistic point of view, perhaps reflecting haste and carelessness in its preparation. Certain features of the text point to a Slavic-language speaker's having prepared it, including numerous errors in the use of definite and indefinite article and the use of "Brazilia" is in fact the Russian word for Brazil. The apparent lack of effort to generate media publicity for the forgery suggests that the perpetrators intended the forgery to do its damage privately, calculating that the recipients would not detect any technical errors.



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 5, 1982

NO. 217-82
697-3189 (Copies)
695-0192 (Info.)

COMMENTS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. BERGER
ON SUPPORT TO GREAT BRITAIN

The time has come when Washington cannot regard current Britain-Argentina conflict as a second performance of a 19th century comical opera any longer. The U.S. has found itself in an unenviable, but not incapable to solve this complicated situation. We are facing the problem to comply with our allied obligations towards Great Britain within the NATO as well as towards Argentina within the O.A.S.

From the very beginning of the shuttle diplomacy of the State Secretary Mr. A. Haig I was in a position that this mission cannot contribute to a settlement of the conflict by diplomatic means in keeping with our policy. In accordance with my opinion the Britain-Argentina conflict might have a negative impact on the role of the U.S. as the leading NATO power and we are well aware of that. From that point of view I defended to give all our military assistance and other support to our British ally.

Should the Premier Mrs. Thatcher's Falkland policy break down, for Washington would be evident to face the possibility of a future Labour Government in Great Britain. According to our recent analysis on Great Britain we have come to a conclusion that the Labour Party tends to oppose the nuclear rearmament in Europe coming into consideration in 1983. We are strongly opposed to Labour Party power in Great Britain. For our policy it is much more important to strengthen our influence in Western Europe than fully compliance with the 1947 Rio de Janeiro Treaty. Every U.S. politician prefers the unity of NATO allies to the second grade dispute initiated by the Argentina's Government. If we bear in mind General Galtieri's pro-American approach, we may well presume that the loss of our positions in Argentina will not be so severe after the end of the conflict.

Under the pretext of Argentina's stubborn and selfish attitude for one-sided solution of the conflict President Reagan has suspended all military exports to Argentina as well as all U.S. EXPORT AND IMPORT BANK credits. From our side we created all conditions for an open and all-out support to Great Britain.

The intelligence information we are delivering is also appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet as a very efficient means of valuable assistance. The fact that this information is taken advantage of is demonstrated by many attacks of British forces to Falklands, especially to Puerto Argentino. British forces are given very great importance to the information on the Argentina ground and air forces movements which will affect in a decisive manner the outcome of the third and final stage of the conflict provided the plan of combat operations is not altered.

I am not going to elaborate on our military support to our British ally which is typical for the second stage of the conflict now under way. Yet I am not revealing any secret if I refer to our plans to grant Great Britain several AWACS radar planes. Not quite negligible are also our deliveries of fuel, foodstuffs and other material and technical assistance.

At this stage it will be important for the British Navy to create conditions for building up land bases for the Harrier interceptors which in the present state of things must operate from the Hermes and Invincible carriers. The interceptors are thus not taken full use of and therefore we will accept the British demand for granting them some KC 135 air-refueled airplanes.

Though the occupation of South Georgia island has not posed any special problems to the British task force, the landing on the Falklands must be supposed to be a much more challenging task due to the fact that there are six Argentine battalions of 5,000 men operating there. Four of those battalions are stationed around the Falklands' capital of Port Stanley.

Based on the preliminary talks with the British side we have jointly arrived to the conclusion that the islands could be held against the Argentinians only under the condition of a strong British fleet operating there. At present, however, we cannot afford the NATO positions to be impaired by stubborn policy of Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Brazilia. U.S. support to Great Britain will bring us the future military presence on the Falklands which will assert our control of the whole of Latin America continent.



SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES ¹

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1982

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 o'clock a.m., in room H-405, the Capitol, the Honorable Edward P. Boland (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Boland [presiding], Mazzoli, Mineta, Stump, McClory, Whitehurst, and Young.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Patrick G. Long, associate counsel; Sharon Leary, assistant clerk of the committee; and Herbert Romerstein, Richard H. Giza, G. Elizabeth Keyes, Annette H. Smiley, and Diane E. La Voy, professional staff members; and Ira H. Goldman, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are delighted to have with us this morning and we welcome Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB Major who defected to the United States in 1979.

Our understanding of Mr. Levchenko's background as supplied by himself and also by those who are with the CIA, is that he is one of the most knowledgeable people in the West on Soviet active measures. In fact, only Major Levchenko and Ladislav Bittman, who testified before this committee in 1980, have had actual experience in running active measures and are available to this committee and to the intelligence community.

For the information of Mr. Levchenko, this committee is split into a number of subcommittees, one of them being the Subcommittee on Oversight. We held hearings on Soviet use of propaganda and covert action against the United States 2 years ago; and those hearings concentrated on Soviet propaganda and forgeries which apparently, according to at least one recent press item, seem to be increasing. I am sure that you will have additional knowledge that you can expand on for the committee.

It is an area that we think is terribly important for the security of the United States, and yesterday we opened these hearings and had Mr. John McMahon, who is the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and John Stein, the Deputy Director for Operations. They were accompanied by Martin Portman.

It was the kind of a meeting where we wanted to get some information on the extent of Soviet propaganda all around the world, how effective it is, and how to counteract that kind of propaganda.

¹ Sanitized and released, November 1982.

I have read most of your prepared statement. I think it is a fine statement, and the clear indication, of course, is that you have considerable knowledge on Soviet propaganda around the world and the kind of infrastructure that is built into this operation by the Soviet Union.

So, we welcome you as a very knowledgeable witness to these hearings, and we are delighted to have you.

Mr. Young?

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I would like also to welcome Major Levchenko to our hearing today. Maybe it is a coincidence, but I think it is appropriate that he be here today to testify on Bastille Day. Bastille Day, of course, is the day that symbolizes the fight for freedom that Major Levchenko continues to wage here in the United States. He has shown great courage in his defection from the KGB. He has been of significant help to our Government in our efforts to understand the KGB threat, particularly active measures.

I welcome Major Levchenko to our committee, also to the fellowship of free men, and hopefully, in the future, as a fellow American.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We would have held the hearings on your birthday, which will be on July 28, but that is too far away. So we decided on today.

You are a relatively young man at the age of 41. You have had as much experience, I guess, in the field in which you operate as any particular person that we have knowledge of, and that of course gives us great confidence in your ability and in your knowledge.

Are there any other statements by any of the members?

So why don't you proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF STANISLAV LEVCHENKO, FORMER KGB MAJOR

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have the prepared text of my testimony which I, with your permission, would read. It is typewritten, but I as well have the original of this statement which I would like to be put in the record.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, it is a great honor for me to testify to the representatives of the legislative body of the leading country of the free world. I would like to begin my testimony by first introducing myself with a summary of my life and my career. I would like also to point out the motives which brought me to resentment of the Soviet Socialist system.

I will be happy to answer afterward all of your questions on the matters I personally witnessed during my career within the Soviet hierarchy.

My name is Stanislav Levchenko. I was born on July 28, 1941 in Moscow, U.S.S.R. My father was a major general and department chief in one of the Soviet military research institutes. By profession he was a chemical engineer. My mother died when I was 3 years old. Within a few years my father remarried. My stepmother was a pediatric surgeon.

In 1958 I graduated from the special high school No. 1 of the Sokolniki district of Moscow. Some of the subjects in this school were taught in the English language. That same year I became a student of the Institute of Asia and Africa affiliated with the Moscow University. For 6 years I studied Japanese language, history, economics, and literature.

After graduating from Moscow University, I was assigned to work for the Institute of Maritime Fishery as a junior researcher. In 1965 I was called to the International Department of the Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union, and was proposed to work as a secretary-interpreter for the Moscow correspondent of the Japanese Communist newspaper *Akahata*. Formally, I was supposed to be on the payroll of the Soviet Red Cross, which according to the directive of the Soviet Communist Party leadership, is paying monthly stipends to most foreign Communist newspapers' journalists assigned to Moscow. But, actually, I was to spy on a Japanese Communist journalist and to report his activities to the Japanese Sector of the International Department on a daily basis. I did not want that kind of job, and rejected it. I used the excuse that I already was passing exams to become a postgraduate student at the Institute of Peoples of Asia and Africa of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

In November 1965 I was formally admitted to postgraduate study and started to write my master's degree thesis on the history of the Japanese peace movement. The above-mentioned institute is actually guided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Soviet Union, and provides it with studies of political, economic and military situations in most of the Third World countries. I also had to take part in several of such studies.

While being a postgraduate student in 1965-67, I was working as a part-time consultant for the Soviet Peace Committee, which is an active tool of the International Department of the Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union, in manipulating one of the major Soviet front organizations, the World Peace Council (WPC). I was assigned to work as an interpreter to most of the delegations of the Japanese peace movement which had visited the U.S.S.R. During these years, I had to collect information on the current situation in numerous Japanese leftist public organizations and to submit it to International Department.

In April 1966 I visited Japan for the first time as an interpreter of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation. But actually under orders of the Sector for Japan of the Communist Party Soviet Union's International Department, I had to meet with several leading figures in the Japanese peace movement and to collect information on the latest developments in it and to report this information to the International Department. Since then, and before I was assigned to Japan as a KGB officer, I visited Japan about 12 times as a member of different delegations of the so-called Soviet public organizations, all of which are closely affiliated with the International or other departments of the Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union.

In 1966 I started to work full time for the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which manipulates the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, headquarters located in Cairo, as a referent.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, under the close guidance of the International Department, is involved in political, financial and, to an extent, military support of the so-called national liberation movements in the Third World countries and maintains unofficial, sometimes confidential, contacts with the pro-Soviet leaders of the political parties in countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This committee also organizes worldwide campaigns aimed at the weakening of the influence of the United States and other free world countries in the Third World. I can give the following examples of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee's activities in the 1960's.

Under the directives of the Soviet Politburo, it was a key front organization responsible for running the anti-Vietnam war campaign on a worldwide basis.

The Soviet Vietnam Support Committee, actually a department of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in close cooperation with the KGB, politically exploited deserters from the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam who had been smuggled from Japan into the Soviet Union and finally immigrated to Sweden. The deserters had been forced to give anti-American interviews to the Soviet journalists which afterward had been replayed in most countries of the world.

KGB and the general staff of the Soviet Army are accepting soldiers and officers of such terrorist organizations as the PLO for guerrilla-type training in the U.S.S.R., according to the lists which the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee obtained from the leaders of the PLO.

For many years before the PLO opened its official representation in Moscow, the Soviet Solidarity Committee had been responsible for maintaining relations personally with the PLO leader Yassir Arafat.

In 1966-67, being an army reserve officer, I underwent 3 months of training as an intelligence operative-illegal. In the case of development of a preworld war situation, I was trained for a mission where I was to be brought to the territory of Great Britain to detect and report to the GRU the state of readiness of British nuclear strike forces located in the area of one of their major seaports.

By 1970 I became one of the spokesmen of Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, taking part in the organization of several international conferences of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, including the Cairo Conference in January 1971.

In the same year, I was approached by a senior officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB (External Intelligence), and was asked to join the First Chief Directorate as a case officer. In 1972, I graduated from the 1-year intelligence school of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, a very sophisticated training facility where the future intelligence officers are taught the basics of spy tradecraft, structure and methods of operation of the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services, use of electronic eavesdropping devices, as well as a variety of other subjects of the intelligence gathering profession.

By the fall of 1972 I had been assigned as a case officer to the Japanese Desk of the 7th Department of the First Chief Directorate of KGB. At that time I had a military rank of senior lieutenant. I had to handle about 20 files on agents belonging to virtually all strata of the Japanese society, on the Socialist Party of Japan, and on methods of operations of the Japanese intelligence community.

In 1974, after finishing the course of on the job training, I was told that the First Chief Directorate was going to assign me to Japan as a field case officer to collect political intelligence. On the final stage of preparation for this assignment, I was sent to work for almost 1 year for the Soviet international magazine *New Times*. I had to improve my journalistic skills—I had been writing for Radio Moscow while working for the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee—and to study the mechanism of editorial work and to publish several long articles in the magazine. After arriving in Japan I was supposed to use the position of Tokyo correspondent of *New Times* as a cover for my intelligence activities. To be able to dissolve into the international journalistic community in Tokyo and in order to hide the real purpose of my assignment to Tokyo from Japanese counterintelligence, I had to have real journalistic experience.

New Times magazine, which is published in Russian, English, Spanish, Arabic, Czech, Polish, and German languages, formally belonged to the Soviet Trade Unions, but actually it is a propaganda hand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union International Department and of the Active Measures Service of the First Chief Directorate, KGB. It is also used by the KGB as a cover for its operatives stationed abroad. When I was going through the onjob training in the *New Times*, the magazine had 12 foreign correspondents. Ten of them were KGB operatives.

In February 1975, with my family, I arrived in Tokyo and started to work as a case officer for the Tokyo residency of the KGB, line PR, political intelligence.

One or two times a month I sent articles to *New Times* magazine. Two weeks after I arrived, my predecessor turned a developing contact over to me, a prominent figure in the main opposition party of Japan, the Socialist Party. In several months I started to handle several agents of the KGB's network in Japan, and during the next 4 years I had recruited four agents. By 1979 I was handling ten agents and developmental contacts with whom I had from 20 to 25 clandestine meetings a month.

Four of the agents I handled were prominent Japanese journalists. Having high level contacts in the ruling liberal democratic party or contacts with high level government officials, including members of the cabinet of ministers, these agents were providing the Soviets secret oral information and documents on the Japanese Government's plans in internal and external politics. One of the agents was a close confidant of the owner of a major Japanese newspaper with daily circulation of more than 3 million copies. He had been used by the Soviets to implement a variety of active measures through this newspaper.

Shortly before he was turned over to me, he published the so-called "Will of Chou En-lai," which was one of the most successful Soviet forgeries in the 1970's. This will was fabricated by specialists in the active measures service of the KGB's First Chief Directorate and was intended to show that the leadership of the PRC had been deeply divided on the major political issues in the period before the death of Mao Tse-tung. The forged will then was replayed in the mass media of most of the countries in the world. (See exhibit IX b, pg 88)

(One of the other agent-journalists had access to confidential docu-

ments issued by the Japanese intelligence and had been providing information from them to the KGB.

Another agent is a high ranking member of the Japanese Socialist Party. He was used mainly for implementing active measures in his party responsive to interests of the Soviet Union, to prevent its shifting to the right or to closer relations with the PRC.

During the years I had been assigned to Japan, the KGB had a network of recruited agents in that country numbering more than 200. They were utilized by political intelligence, external counterintelligence and scientific and technological intelligence of the First Chief Directorate.

Among the most effective agents were a former member of the cabinet of ministers, head of a major parliamentary public organization; several senior officials of the Japanese Socialist Party; one of the most prominent scholars on the PRC who had close contacts with government officials; several members of the Japanese parliament.

More than 50 percent of my time I had to spend on implementing the great variety of Soviet active measures in Japan. The major objectives of Soviet active measures in Japan were:

First, to prevent further deepening of political and military cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Second, to provoke distrust between Japan and the United States in political, economic, and military circles.

Third, to prevent further development of relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China, especially in political and economic fields.

Fourth, by any means to eliminate the possibility of the creation of an anti-Soviet so-called triangle, Washington-Beijing-Tokyo.

Fifth, to create a new pro-Soviet lobby among prominent Japanese politicians, first of all, in the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Socialist Party, which would be consistent in its activities of developing close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union.

Sixth, to convince the leaders of the Japanese Government of the necessity of drastic broadening of economic ties with the U.S.S.R. through high-ranking agents of influence, prominent business leaders, mass media.

Seventh, to organize in Japanese political circles the movement for signing the friendship and neighborly relations treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

Eighth, to penetrate deeply the main opposition parties, first of all, Japanese Socialist Party, to influence their political platforms in order to prevent the Liberal Democratic Party from creating its political monopoly in the Japanese parliament.

Ninth, at the same time, to discourage the leaders of opposition parties from creating a coalition government, the Soviets need a politically stable Japan.

Tenth, to maintain a high level of activity in implementing operation KORYAK, which Moscow intended as a means of affecting the Japanese perception of Soviet intentions by sending military contingents to the Kuril Islands, by construction of new housing complexes on Northern Territories, et cetera, and thus to show the Japanese Government the uselessness of disputing Soviet control on these territories.

Let me give you more examples of active measures implemented in Japan while I had been there and in most of which I personally had to take part.

In the 1970's an agent of the KGB who was a high ranking member of a Japanese political party and a member of parliament, under instructions of the Tokyo residency, organized a parliamentary association for Japanese-Soviet cooperation. The Soviets started an intensive exchange of delegations between the group and the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Every chance was used to persuade the Japanese parliamentarians to influence their government to deepen political and economic relations with Moscow. The head of the group received from the KGB substantial amounts of money to pay the salaries of the staff workers of the group and for publishing a monthly magazine.

The KGB in the 1970's had been able to effectively control the political platform of the Japanese Socialist Party, having recruited more than 10 of its high-ranking leaders as agents of influence.

On direct instructions from Moscow, I told an agent with close access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Italians were thinking of selling a nuclear reactor to the People's Republic of China and that this sale was to remain a secret. The information circulated around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese military attaches in Europe were reportedly asked to check out the story. This active measure was considered a success in that it served Soviet policy objectives by providing an irritant to Japanese-Chinese relations.

I had some KGB assets in Japan pass the following story orally to influential Japanese Government officials. According to "top secret" information, just before the People's Republic of China attacked Vietnam, there was a meeting which considered the question of whether to attack at all. Hua Guofeng and some others were against it, but Deng Xiaoping was for it and Deng won out. If the attack failed, Deng will fall from power. The objective of this operation was to discourage the Japanese from developing too close ties with China and to make them uneasy over the course of their relations with the PRC government. The operation was considered successful since the KGB believed that it would lead the Japanese leadership to continue to have doubts about the stability of Deng's control.

In support of the worldwide Soviet ban-the-neutron-bomb campaign, the KGB residency in Tokyo was told to get President Carter labeled publicly as "neutron Carter." KGB headquarters told the residency that its effort was part of a global campaign. They were to go ahead and get the words "neutron Carter" in the Japanese press so that they could be replayed in other free world countries.

The above-mentioned active measures operations in Japan constitute only a part of Soviet operations of this type in Japan. The Tokyo residency of the KGB receives daily three to five directives on all kinds of active measures. This means that the total number of active measures directives in Japan alone is several hundred a year. It does not mean that the residency is able to implement all of them, but it would be proper to say that one-third of this number is implemented with various degrees of success.

In early 1979, I was promoted to the military rank of major and was appointed to the position of the acting chief of the active measures group of the Tokyo residency of the KGB, which consisted of five case officers operating about 25 agents. However, any other asset of the KGB in Japan also could be used for implementing active measures.

My career in the KGB was developing successfully, and it promised to be even better in the future. But my KGB and party superiors did not know that for many years I was developing dissatisfaction with and finally total resentment of the Soviet socialist system. When I was a university student I had the chance to learn about the nightmarish cruelty and atrocities of the Stalin regime which slaughtered up to 20 million Soviet citizens. After graduating from the university and being transferred from one Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union-affiliated organization to another, I witnessed firsthand the fact that the Soviet socialist system was not working for the good of its citizens. I came to the understanding that it is a totally corrupt dictatorship-type regime with rotten moral standards. Most of the slogans put forward by the Kremlin leaders I came to understand are aimed at deceiving peoples of the U.S.S.R. and of the world. And I clearly understand that Marxism-Leninism is actually a perverted type of religion imposed on millions of people.

I turned to God and secretly started to visit church—secretly, because if my former colleagues would know about it, I would be persecuted by the Soviet authorities. My career in the Soviet Union was successful not because I believed that it was proper to do what I had been doing. I was working as a high performance robot, sinking my frustrations in long hours of work. I agreed to become a military reserve officer and then a KGB intelligence officer because that kind of job at least was challenging and risky. I thought that this type of activity would serve the interest of my people.

But fairly quickly I understood that the Soviet intelligence community is just another tool in the hands of the Politburo, and that it has all and even more disgusting features than any other part of the Soviet socialist machinery.

I could not, however, fight the Kremlin inside the country as an officer of the KGB. If I had taken such actions, I would have ended up in one of the Siberian concentration camps or, most likely, in a mental asylum for the rest of my life.

So I came to the decision to defect to the leading country of the free world, the United States of America, and fight the agonizing but still very powerful and dangerous Soviet regime from the outside. It was not easy to come to the decision to defect. I had my wife with me in Tokyo and a son who was attending school in Moscow. The decision to defect was not discussed with my wife who at that time did not share all my political views. She also could not make the same decision because of attachment to our son and her relatives in the Soviet Union.

In October 1979, I contacted a U.S. official in Japan and was immediately granted political asylum. The kind response toward me by the American Government will never be forgotten. I felt free for the first time in my life, being then already 38. I have provided the Central Intelligence Agency with the information I had. I hope this informa-

tion will help the cause of defending the free world against the menace of Soviet expansionism and aggression.

I am proud to say that now I have the absolutely morally satisfying opportunities which give me excellent chances to use all my talents to fight the Kremlin's policy. It is also an honor for me to meet such highly professional, highly motivated, and determined officers whom I have met from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Several months ago I learned that in August 1981 I had been sentenced by the Soviet military tribunal, after a secret trial, to death in absentia. I consider this to be an honor for me because the Soviet leaders showed that they recognize that I am a dangerous enemy of theirs. They are right in this sense. It is my intention to maintain the fight against their system by all available means for the rest of my days. And I am not afraid of the hired assassins whom they possibly will send to try to kill me. Now for the first time in my life I have a God-given chance to do what is proper to do for the cause of freedom of my oppressed people. And it is better for a man to be killed in action rather than hiding in a hole.

After my defection, the Soviet authorities, primarily the KGB, had begun to implement savage and revengeful actions against my family. Over the past 3 years the Soviet authorities are progressively using all ruthlessness and, even by Soviet law, illegal means to force and blackmail my family to cooperate with them. The main reason for the indescribable torture of my family by the Soviet authorities is that the KGB is obviously under pressure to present the Soviet Politburo with "proof" that the reasons for my defection to the United States was not political. They cannot admit that a major in Soviet intelligence could possibly be a hidden dissident. It is my hope that I will gain assistance in the noble cause of saving my wife and son from the brutal prosecution by Soviet authorities. I have requested assistance from the State Department in this regard.

I declare, gentlemen, that there are honest people in the Soviet Union belonging to different nationalities who, in spite of persecutions and prosecutions by the Soviet regime, do not accept the devilish character of the system imposed on them and are considering the freedom, of which they are deprived, to be God's blessed gift to the peoples of the free world and to the truly democratic society of the United States of America. And I am happy to be a part of this society.

Thank you for your attention, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Levchenko, thank you very much for a very moving and a very courageous statement, and I think that reflects the opinion of all the members of this committee. The statement, of course, shows that you have considerable knowledge on the operations of the active measures that the KGB has been involved in.

Let me ask you, with reference to the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, how large a contingent is there in that Embassy of KGB personnel and also the total number of Russian employees in the Embassy in Japan.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Mr. Chairman, the number of the Soviet people with diplomatic rank is somewhere around 50.

The CHAIRMAN. Around 50.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. But the Soviet colony overall was quite large in Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that the KGB have 5 active measure officers with some, did you say—with 25 agents under their jurisdiction?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, roughly this number.

The CHAIRMAN. Five active measures case officers.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The KGB has.

Is that five the only number of KGB officials in Japan?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No. Mr. Chairman, in my statement I was mentioning that period of my activities in Japan when I was nominated to be an acting chief of the Active Measures group in the residency. It is a part of the political line, so-called Line PR, which is quite a large outfit within the Tokyo residency. The political intelligence line consists of the Active Measures group of the so-called Main Enemy group which is United States, and Chinese group. So the Active Measures group is just a part, and it consists roughly of five case officers.

But the KGB residency also consists of a CI group, which is external counterintelligence, and a very large S&T group, which collects scientific and technological intelligence. So the overall number of officers of the KGB in the Tokyo residency is probably between 50 and 60 officers.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of cover is assigned to the KGB officers in Japan? Are they all journalists or are other kinds of cover designated for some of the KGB operatives?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Quite a few of them, Mr. Chairman, are using diplomatic covers. Many of them are using journalistic covers. Some covers they have in the trade mission. Some covers in the Aeroflot representation, which in Tokyo is fairly large. It has about 20 employees. Roughly half of the Aeroflot office are KGB, mainly scientific and technological intelligence officers.

Then there is quite a group of KGB officers who are using so-called short-term temporary duty cover. They are visiting Japan to work with certain Japanese private business companies to buy certain equipment and things like that, and they spend sometimes 6 months over there, 1 year, but still many of them are KGB officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Russian journalists that are assigned outside of Russia to various countries around the world, are all of those journalists KGB officers?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not.

But a lot of the KGB officers use newspaper reporting as cover for their activities.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, that is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McCLORY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You as a journalist, or posing as a journalist in Tokyo, had many contacts with other journalists, did you not?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. McCLORY. And then as a person who is securing other assets to work with the KGB, you had contacts with other journalists from other countries than you?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir.

Mr. McCLORY. And did any of the other journalists undertake to cooperate with you in the KGB line that you were advancing in Tokyo?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. You mean some other Soviet journalists or foreign journalists?

Mr. McCLORY. Foreign journalists.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The foreign journalistic community in any country of the free world is continuously targeted by KGB. In Japan they did have certain successes in recruiting foreign journalists in other countries.

Mr. McCLORY. Were you personally able to line up other persons to work with you? What agents did you recruit? You mentioned several members of the Japanese parliament.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. McCLORY. And how about foreign journalists?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Few of them. I know for sure, for instance, about one Yugoslavian journalist who, although not recruited by 1979, was developed to the point that relations with him were almost operational already. I knew about approaches to certain journalists from Philip-pines, and I have knowledge on certain approaches to some British journalists.

Mr. McCLORY. You have made mention of a parliamentary group, the Japanese-Soviet parliamentary group.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Speaking about that parliamentary association on Japan-USSR Friendship, we are talking about the public organization within two chambers of the Japanese Diet consisting of about 500 members of Parliament. It does not mean that all of them or even a majority, or even a minority of them are Soviet agents, but several of them are, and they are manipulated by the Soviets.

Mr. McCLORY. Do you still have your wife and son in the Soviet Union? Do they want to get out?—

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, they do want to get out, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the family, let me ask whether or not there are any other known instances of where the Soviet government has freed the wife and children of people in the same position as you.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, there is no such record. The major thing which probably can be done is to show the Soviet authorities that that type of persecution which they are implementing against those two absolutely innocent people is a very terrible and immoral thing.

Speaking about the position of the Soviet Government, sometimes they are very unpredictable and they do change. For instance, the family of the famous chess player, Mr. Korchnoi, chess master, was let out of the Soviet Union. It happened 2 months ago. This is a sort of precedent.

So bearing in mind that the Soviet Politburo sometimes really can make any kind of unpredictable movements, you know, hope can exist.

Mr. McCLORY. If the Chairman will yield, the Helsinki Charter actually covers this, so under the Helsinki Charter, the USSR should release your family if they want to leave the Soviet Union.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

I have gone through the formality with the Soviet Embassy required for that. I have filled out the affidavits necessary to provide statements

of support, to provide an invitation and all of the rest of the requirements which apparently the Soviets have completely disregarded. And the Soviet Embassy in Washington did lie to me, Mr. Chairman, because in the presence of several senior Department of State officials, the Soviets told me that they will deliver those invitations—they call those papers invitations—to my family, which they never did.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you felt any harassment at all since 1979, since October of 1979 when you defected or indicated to the U.S. officials in Japan that you wanted to defect? Has there been any harassment at all from the Soviet Union? Have you felt any pressure from them, have you felt any concern about your own life?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Mr. Chairman, actually I had three confrontations with Soviet officials in the Department of State. I renounced my Soviet citizenship, and during the third confrontation I told them that I am declaring my personal war against them. So our relations in that field are absolutely clear on both sides. I don't think that they have any doubts left.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mazzoli.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Levchenko, we appreciate your coming forward today. It is very unusual for us to be in the presence of one who has risen to that high rank in the intelligence agency of a foreign country. The CIA has assured us of your reliability, but I just wonder what one or two things could you tell us today to assure us on this point.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I just know I trust people myself and I hope to get the same thing back from this committee. My life is absolutely clear, now, like the open page of a book, so I don't think that anybody can have any false ideas in that field. On top of other things, I underwent thorough checking by the CIA, and this checking proves that I am an honest man.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Chairman, one last question, if I might.

Mr. Levchenko, you talked about Soviet lobbying?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. This is right, sir.

Mr. MAZZOLI. And the contact between the Japanese parliamentarians and the Russian parliamentarians—

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Soviet parliamentarians, yes, sir.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Soviet parliamentarians, and the way the KGB was able to more or less manipulate a lot of members.

Are you aware, to your knowledge, of the extent that the KGB has either infiltrated or has influenced other international parliamentary groups, and if you have any knowledge, can you tell me if such other groups are being influenced?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. You mean, sir, relative to this country?

Mr. MAZZOLI. Involving U.S. parliamentarians.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I do not have any knowledge in that field about any cases involving U.S. parliamentarians.

But whenever the KGB has a chance to study certain targets, they usually won't lose this chance.

Mr. MAZZOLI. So that you think that they probably do use inter-parliamentary meetings as opportunities to gain information?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The KGB would use such meetings as an opportunity to study people. Whether they can recruit certain individuals or groups of individuals, it depends upon many other things.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. With the Japanese group they were fairly successful, but I don't have any knowledge on the American group.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Whitehurst.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In your testimony you made a reference to the Soviet military occupation of the Kuril Islands and at the same time, I got the impression that there was an inconsistency on the part of Soviet policy. Here on the one hand Moscow is suggesting to you various moves to bring about friendly relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the stationing of military forces in the Kurils demonstrates that it is fruitless for Japan to do otherwise but to make an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

It seems to be a peculiarly Russian technique or attitude which flies in the face of logic because the Japanese resent very strongly this action, and it would have seemed to have been more consistent to have extended the full olive branch and not a little bit of an olive branch while at the same time coming in with a mailed fist.

Did this inconsistency never appear to your superiors in the KGB?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Let me try to answer your question, sir, by stating that Soviet policy appears sometimes inconsistent—different policies apply to different target audiences.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Given the nature of Soviet society, I realize it would be difficult, but did you ever notice among any of your associates, or perhaps even friends, in the KGB people who shared the same reservations that you did about the Soviet system?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. It is very difficult, sir, to openly find some other person like myself because understandably people like myself and some other people, they would rather be silent.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Yes.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I assume, however, that there is a group of officers in KGB and in GRU who in their personal political attitudes came to practically total resentment of the Soviet system, and I do think that after my defection some other defections will follow. That is probably the only way to know how many people are left over there who thought like I did.

And that is one of the reasons why I am trying to fight the Soviet regime in every way I can, and to show that I did not come here to the United States just to live the rest of my life in some nice looking area. The KGB internal propaganda tries to show that any defector would be punished by death. The Soviets will try to kill me at some point. Before this attempt will be made, however, they will torture families morally, financially, and by other means. They don't publish mistreatment of families in the newspaper, but believe me, all KGB officers and GRU officers know about that thing.

So that is why I think that my responsibility is even more than probably can appear from first sight, because I have to think that some other people probably will come here, and I am sure that they will come here in a while, if they realize why I defected and how I am living now.

Mr. WHITEHURST. How did you know that you were sentenced to death in absentia?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Through a few messages received from my wife and son and through others who have talked to them. But virtually all the contacts with my family have been cut off by the KGB, correspondence, anything. Nothing reaches them, and there is not any correspondence traffic back and forth. The KGB is very vicious in that thing, and they have huge manpower available. They stop everything except that they didn't cut off the telephone line. So once in a while, I have had a phone conversation which, of course, must have been monitored by the KGB.

Mr. WHITEHURST. You have been able to call.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I had the chance to call, and my wife told me that they wanted to subpoena her to say something derogatory about me. She flatly rejected cooperation with the KGB. But, it is not only the death sentence which I received; the verdict went further: The confiscation of all her property as well as joint property and my own was ordered. There is supposed to be a certain legal system in the Soviet Union; so by law they had to notify her what happened. And, that is why she has knowledge about the sentence, because they sent her official notice that I am sentenced to death and all property confiscated.

Mr. WHITEHURST. What is the KGB opinion of the CIA?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I think professionally they regard the CIA as a very sophisticated and very capable intelligence service.

Mr. WHITEHURST. It is not a topic of much discussion among your associates or your superiors?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, there have been quite a few discussions. Most of those discussions, sir, were a sort of professional assessment of—

Mr. WHITEHURST. Right, that is what I was seeking.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right. The KGB's professional assessment is they regard the CIA very highly, as a very capable and able intelligence service.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mineta?

Mr. MINETA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again I want to thank you, Mr. Levchenko, for your very fine statement and your appearance here today.

In your testimony you also talked about the general staff and KGB training of the PLO terrorists.

Do you have knowledge of any other training, or training of any other terrorists by the general staff or the KGB?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. To my knowledge, when I was working with the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, they provided certain training to some cadres of the late Augustinio Neto's MPLA, the organization for the liberation of Angola, the so-called national liberation movement in Angola, before they took power in that country.

As well, they were providing training for certain other so-called national liberation movements.

I know that the training was done by the KGB and GRU because one of the facilities, about 20 miles away from Moscow, belongs to KGB and is run by KGB. The other facility in the Crimea is about 1,000 miles south of Moscow, belongs to the General Staff of the Soviet Army, where they provide guerrilla-type training.

Mr. MINETA. And to whom are the Soviet authorities directing those efforts, or who is being trained, let's say, in the Crimean site?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Mainly officers and warrant officers, some soldiers of PLO affiliated organizations and some national liberation movements.

Mr. MINETA. Of which countries?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I knew for certain about Angola and the PLO.

Mr. MINETA. So it is not only the GRU officers who would become agents in those countries, but also people from those countries who would also be trained, who are being trained in the Crimean or this other site not too far from Moscow.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Those facilities, sir, are maintained just for training of foreign people.

Mr. MINETA. I see.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. It is not where GRU or KGB officers are also going through training. Those two facilities are special facilities just for that purpose of training foreigners.

Mr. MINETA. I see.

Now, you mention also in your statement about the deserters from Vietnam who eventually immigrated to Sweden.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. MINETA. And could you tell us in any more detail about what you know about the Soviet exploitation of those U.S. deserters from the Vietnam war?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, sir, by the Vietnam Support Committee, which I stated in the statement was an independent public organization just on paper, but actually it was Department of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. That is really the same committee to which I was assigned to work with all American deserters, except for the first four who deserted from the aircraft carrier. They were handled by the Soviet Peace Committee. All others were handled by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. So I knew all of them, and I had to be with them throughout the whole period of time they spent in the Soviet Union.

The main assistance, if you can call it that, which the KGB provided to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee was the establishing of a route of escape from Japan to the Soviet Union. The KGB hired a couple of Japanese fishing boats and recruited their captains indirectly through a Japanese organization. The organization does not exist anymore now, but in those years it was called the Vietnam Peace Committee. It was a very active organization which consisted of mainly intellectuals, very liberal or very radical minded. The KGB recruited one of the key leaders of that organization, and through him they established that channel, those fishing boats. The fishing boats would go close to Soviet territorial waters, and then Soviet patrol boats picked up the next group of deserters and smuggled them into the Soviet Union.

Then when on the territory of the Soviet Union, officers from the KGB and GRU routinely questioned them. We are talking about GI's who can provide low-level information, such as who his platoon commander is and his battalion commander and probably brigade commander. and what kind of rifle he was using—not that much.

But the KGB and GRU were extracting even this information. although this collection activity was not the main thing for the KGB or the GRU. The Politburo, as the main effort, decided to utilize that

chance in active measures, as a propaganda showcase, and that is why the Soviets extracted from all of these GI deserters very long statements or interviews denouncing the role of the United States in the Vietnam war and related issues, which the Soviets played and replayed all over the world.

The KGB and GRU did not directly try to recruit them, let's say, because again we are talking about 18-, 19-year-old GI's: The main things they wanted to do with those deserters concerned propaganda because they deserted exactly at the very critical moment of the Vietnam war, when the Soviets were already staging a worldwide campaign.

Mr. MINETA. You first visited Japan in April of 1966 as an interpreter of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. MINETA. Were you at that point a referant of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, not yet. I was still within postgraduateship and I was still with the Soviet Peace Committee.

Mr. MINETA. And this is after the time you were in training as an illegal intelligence operative?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir.

Mr. MINETA. Around the 1966-67 timeframe.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir.

Mr. MINETA. And then you were in Cairo, is that correct?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, that is right, in January 1971.

Mr. MINETA. Why would they smuggle them into Japan for transit to the Soviet Union if these were defectors or deserters from Army units in Vietnam?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. All of them—

Mr. MINETA. Would there not be more direct ways to get them into the Soviet Union?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, those deserters were trying their best to save their lives and to feel themselves secure, so that is why certain radical lawyers provided them very comprehensive consultation in that matter because if they would desert directly from Vietnam to some third country, they would be court-martialed because it is cowardness on battlefield and things like that. They can end up with very bad, very long, at least, term in jail. So some smart radical type lawyers advised them, especially bearing in mind that all of them had been wounded in action and Japan was like a huge hospital at that time, and they were brought to Japan, and following advice of those lawyers, they defected from Japan because it was not a country where the combat was going on.

Mr. MINETA. I see.

So these military people had not defected in Vietnam?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, not in Vietnam.

Mr. MINETA. They had come back to a base hospital or something of this nature, and then from there they—

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir. Let's put it in this way, that they defected from the Vietnam war but not from the territory of Vietnam.

Mr. MINETA. I see.

Now, was your time in Japan mostly as a cover as a journalist?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. MINETA. Now, given the facts that you felt that there were at least, did you say 50 KGB officers in Tokyo?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. At least. I think probably more than that.

Mr. MINETA. And then there was some reference in answer to Chairman Boland's question, to the figure 200. The 200 is in reference to what?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, 200, it is the figure from my statement saying about the approximate number, yes, approximate number of Soviet assets recruited, agents in Japan. The Soviet colony in Japan is somewhere around 300 people probably, the Soviet physical presence in Japan. The Embassy relatively is not large. It has about 50 diplomatic officers. I don't count some support officers, technical staff, and things like that, 50 diplomats. But the Trade Mission is fairly large. It probably has over 50 people. Aeroflot has about 20 people. The Novosti Press Agency has about six people, or seven now, probably. And the Tass wire agency is another six or seven people. Then so-called short-term TDY'ers continuously there from probably 20 to 50 people. So the whole Soviet presence is relatively large over there, and approximately 50 percent of it are either KGB or GRU officers.

Mr. MINETA. So of the, let's say, the KGB in Japan was receiving three to five directives on active measures a day?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. MINETA. And if that kind of effort is being directed in Tokyo, would you have any idea of what kind of activity along that line would be directed in a place like Washington, D.C.?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I wanted to remind you, sir, that we were talking about the cable traffic, so there were from three to five incoming directives on active measures. It does not mean that every cable was dealing with one active measure. Some of them were followup cables, some of them were backup cables, but the overall number of actions probably ran up to 100. I mean actions which had been taken one way or other with different degrees of success. That figure is for 1 year.

Some active measures are of large scale. Some of them are small things. They will ask some agent to go to some Member of Parliament and tell him just some small thing, but still this will help the Soviets to achieve certain goals or will hurt feelings of a certain group in the Liberal Democratic Party on certain political issues, things like that.

Japan is considered by the KGB to be the easiest country in which to run active measures operations because of the legal situation and, because of very easy contacts by Soviets with Japanese journalists, who are very friendly. The Japanese are very sincere, open people, and sometimes, you know, the KGB is very tricky and misleads serious people by talking them into serving Soviet ends sometimes, while their contacts even don't understand whom they are doing the thing for.

The same thing I would say even is true even with many people in the Japanese Diet. Some are very easily accessible, and the Soviets are very active there. They are continuously targeting many of them and continuously pushing all kinds of ideas. Some ideas they push not only through their trusted agents. They just go to some member of the Diet. They will start certain political conversation, and they will insert

in this conversation certain ideas which they want to push through, and in many cases even that type of semiovert operation will work.

So, the number of the active measures actions in Japan, I think is probably the largest in the world because it goes relatively easy. It is hard for me to say how many operations they run in the United States. I assume that in the United States, it is my personal opinion, that the Soviets would rather prefer to be involved in semiovert type of activities, visiting different figures in the U.S. academic world, some people on Capitol Hill, some other political figures, and trying to have certain discussions, and insert in those discussions ideas which they want to push through, which for a professional intelligence officer in that field, basically it is not that difficult a thing to do.

Mr. MINETA. Besides the Embassy in Tokyo, how many other consulates or other kinds of offices do the Soviets have in Japan?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. They have the Embassy in Tokyo and a very large trade mission. We already discussed Aeroflot and other outfits. They have consulates, fairly large consulates—in Sapporo on Hokkaido and an even larger newly built consulate in Osaka.

Mr. MINETA. Do they come under any kind of travel restrictions as we might place on Soviet diplomats here in the United States?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir. People with diplomatic covers, Soviets with diplomatic covers, they are restricted in traveling around the country.

Speaking about journalists, Soviet journalists can travel in any part of Japan without any notification to the press department, the press bureau, or the Japanese Foreign Office.

I personally had the experience of visiting Okinawa, which is fairly far away from Tokyo. Twice, I have been to northern Japan, and was never stopped—there is no such regulation to notify anybody about press travel. That is why the journalistic cover is liked so much by the KGB, not only in Japan but elsewhere.

For some diplomat, sometimes it is rather difficult to walk into the office of a Member of the Japanese Diet because it already puts this meeting sort of in a very formal way, because it is a foreign diplomat and a Member of Parliament. Sometimes it can lead to sad happenings, but it is very positive that Japanese parliamentarians are very much like journalists, and they are very easy to gain access to. If you call any Japanese Member of Parliament, you will get an appointment let's say 2 or 3 days after the phone call. Sometimes it would be the next day, sometimes it would be the same day. And they are very open and sincere with foreign journalists. So they don't feel themselves under stress or whatever, which naturally people feel while talking to official representatives of the Embassy.

So, the number of topics for free, easygoing discussion for journalists is basically enormous, and the point is that if a professional intelligence officer who is using journalism as a cover for his main activities takes part in a conversation, sometimes he can influence certain politicians. By utilizing different techniques. Sometimes he can take his subject on an ego trip, sometimes encourage arrogance, sometimes encourage dissatisfaction with the policy of the Government. For example: as you know, when Japan and China had signed their treaty for peace and friendship, many politicians, especially very conserva-

tive politicians, were against the treaty. They were very unhappy. And some of them during that period of time, basically in an overt way, disclosed a lot to the Soviets. They had been outraged. They wanted to hurt that treaty. The Soviets had many chances, basically through journalists, to insert into the minds of those gentlemen some ideas, which were prefabricated by Service A of the First Chief Directorate, which is professionally very smart in creating a small story that will be exciting and which some Member of Parliament won't forget. He will go to his friends, or even to the leadership of his party, and he will convey his story. I simplify the process, but that is how it works.

Mr. MINETA. You say roughly six KGB officers were journalists under cover?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. In the Tokyo residency?

Mr. MINETA. In Tokyo with the *New Times*. You were a journalist with the *New Times*.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. MINETA. And you just mentioned the figure six journalists in Japan as part of the colony?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, no.

I mentioned just 6 working for Novosti Press Agency, another 6 working for TASS telegraph agency, which makes 12 overall. Then there are so-called independent journalists, if you can call Soviet journalists independent: radio, television, *New Times*, *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and *Trud*—the labor union newspaper—presented in Japan, and some others, so the overall number would be I think 18 Soviet journalists that were working there.

Mr. MINETA. But in 1975 you say only two were not KGB.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I was saying, sir, that about *New Times* magazine in the whole world not just Japan.

New Times magazine that year had 12 foreign correspondents. Now, if I am not mistaken, they have 14. That year they had 12 correspondents scattered all over the world, but 10 of them were KGB officers, and 2 of them were so-called clean. But those two so-called clean journalists, at least one of them was a very active person doing quite a variety of things for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Levchenko.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stump?

Mr. STUMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Levchenko, let me commend you for your courage.

To what extent was there any public statement made of your defection?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. When I came to the United States, there was no public statement other than that I was granted political asylum by the United States.

Mr. STUMP. Was there ever any acknowledgement, particularly in the Soviet Union, of your defection?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. After I came here, in probably 2 days, the *New York Times* published a very tiny item with a very tiny photo of mine

saying that *New Times* magazine Tokyo correspondent Levchenko, age 38, defected to United States; nothing else.

I myself started to make some public statements when I started to know what the KGB was doing with my family over there. I published one article in the Russian language newspaper which is published in New York, a very fine newspaper that is published by emigrees. My article was called I Declare War, in which I reminded the Soviets about my confrontation with them in the Department of State and I sort of invited them to look into this problem really, to take this problem seriously, that it was not just words, that I am going to fight them, seriously. It was a long article.

Then another article was published in one of the major West European newspapers, also basically saying the same thing.

Speaking about the Soviet Union, they have a problem, because my file in the KGB does not lead them to find anything bad about me because there is nothing—it is impossible for them. It is against the Soviet Communist nature to admit that a KGB major defected for political reasons. It just cannot happen by their ideas—they know that it can, but they cannot tell that to the Politburo or the Russian people.

The KGB also probably doctored the damage report because they probably didn't want to show the Politburo extent of what I knew.

Then for quite a period of time they were trying to dig up anything bad on me because that's the only way they can. They started to interrogate my wife and my son on a weekly basis for more than 2 years. They couldn't extract anything from them, and they wanted to—they tried to force her to make TV appearances or an interview for some seven newspapers denouncing me. They couldn't force me to do this thing.

So that's why they are silent. And finally they arranged the secret trial.

Mr. STUMP. What are these so-called confrontations that you had? Where and how did they happen?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. They were organized in a very professional way by officers of the Department of State. From five to eight Department of State officers were present on one side of the table. I sat with the State Department officials on the other side, the opposite side of the table, usually two or three high ranking Soviet Embassy officials sat.

Mr. STUMP. That was here.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, yes. They made a transcript of the whole thing, and I could leave at any moment because at times like that graciousness carries nobody.

The last time I did leave because the Soviets started to try to embarrass me, so I just left that meeting.

Mr. STUMP. What means did you use, or what was your most successful tool in your recruitment of agents? Was it monetary compensation, or one of philosophy, or what when you approached these people?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. You mean—

Mr. STUMP. When you recruited—

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The methods of the KGB or my personal methods?

Mr. STUMP. Well, both.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The ideological method of recruitment gradually loses its priority now because even in many countries with fairly powerful Communist Parties, still people don't like the Soviet Union for one reason or other reason, things like that. So there are only a few really devoted, absolutely pro-Soviet Communists or Marxists and people of that sort in the Free World. But the KGB uses an ideological basis in a little bit different way. For instance, the way they recruit many politicians, they are looking for politicians who are very upset about the present government or about a certain issue—an internal or external issue—in the government which makes them unhappy to the point that they want to fight against this thing by all their means, and usually they need some sort of good advice, outlet, at least, for their outrage and things like that. And sometimes that outlet can happen to be a Soviet journalist or, you know, a neatly dressed nice looking Soviet diplomat who will understand everything and who, being a professional intelligence officer, will never forget in a very suave way to ask quite a few sympathetic followup questions.

And that's how he will start to study that individual. And if that individual will show any other kind of vulnerability the KGB will try to recruit him. If, while studying him, they will find out that he just bought a townhouse or some other piece of property elsewhere, and he wanted it very much, but he didn't think that much about his financial situation, and he now finds himself in deep trouble; if he has such vulnerability, the KGB will try to give him money.

So it is a sort of diversified approach.

Sometimes, you won't believe it, but you know, sometimes the KGB will recruit agents on personal basis, on the basis of personal friendship because Soviets sometimes are very patient in the recruitment process. Sometimes they will spend weeks or even months just on nice discussions of certain problems. They won't be even that nosy, because they are professionals. They are studying. They know how to read the person, plus they utilize that time as a time out for checking that individual through other assets or through other means available. And only in the long run when they understand all the target's vulnerabilities, how they can cope with the person, will they recruit him.

At the same time, I want to say, sir, that in the 1950's, the KGB was involved in that Stalinist, goofy type of recruitment, professionally goofy type of thing; when they know that somebody can be blackmailed, he is ripe for recruiting whether he is an ideological friend or whatever, the KGB then produces in some restaurant while drinking coffee or whatever, a piece of paper, and they will tell that poor individual to write them a sworn statement that from now on he conscientiously will work as a secret agent of KGB.

Today they don't use this method often because only a few individuals will sign a statement like that and will be able to sleep nights thereafter.

Many of the Soviet agents abroad, of KGB agents abroad, do not know that they are working for the KGB, because KGB officers are developing all kinds of covers or professionally speaking "flags." They will, for instance—I can tell you a personal example: one agent whom I recruited assumed that he was working for the *New Times* magazine; I told him that *New Times* was very influential; that it published a

confidential news letter for the top Soviet leaders, where names of the sources were not quoted so everything is secure, and on top of other things, money is paid for writing articles. So that person was working for something which never existed, ever. But he couldn't check it because it is confidential.

So many of the Soviet agents are working for the Soviet Union, but for all kinds of weird things which don't really exist, because the KGB understands that psychologically many people like prominent journalists or politicians or whoever want a fig leaf. If somebody would rudely tell them that from now on you will be on the payroll of KGB. I bet with most of them it would be last conversation. That person will never, ever meet the KGB officer again. That is why they create all kinds of cover stories.

I would term these tactics a highly professional but devious tactic for recruitment of agents. Some agents they will just buy. It depends.

Mr. STUMP. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to yield the remainder of the time to Mr. Young who has evinced considerable concern over the worldwide propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union, and particularly some of the peace organizations and the activities of the International Department and the International Information Department of the CPSU, on the kind of propaganda and the effectiveness of that propaganda throughout the world, and we will wind this up at 5 minutes to 12.

Is that satisfactory to you, Bill? You have the remaining time.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, that is fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Levchenko, as the member of this committee who had requested these hearings, I would like to ask several questions before I get into the general subject.

Are you here willingly?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes. I was looking forward to this day for, let's say, 3 years almost.

Mr. YOUNG. And you are under no duress of any kind to be here.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Not at all.

Mr. YOUNG. As you presented your oral statement, I followed it with a handwritten statement, and I show that to you.

Is that your handwriting?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, that is my handwriting.

Mr. YOUNG. In the preparation of that statement, did you do this on your own or did someone dictate it to you?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Not at all.

Mr. YOUNG. It is totally your product.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Absolutely. It was written in my house personally by myself, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, frankly, I can read your handwriting easier than I can read my own. But I wanted to establish that fact, that you are here as Stanislav Levchenko because you have a mission, as you stated in your own statement, your own personal war that you have declared against the Soviets.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. If nothing else comes of this hearing, it appears to me, then, that this statement which is your statement has to be considered a valuable weapon for us in the fight for freedom because it certainly

establishes the fact that the Soviets are doing and will continue to do certain types of things that some naive people here in our country refuse to recognize.

In a meeting that you and I had some time ago, we discuss the question of some folks being a little naive on this subject.

I wonder if you would have any comments about your experience in finding people who really don't believe that the Soviets would do something like this.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I didn't have that many experiences in that field, but once in a while, I do lecture to certain audiences, and I just love these audiences because people ask you any kind of question, sir, and your mind is working and you feel yourself happy because it is creative. But, some questions are—I won't call them exactly naive, but I would say they show the lack of knowledge of why the Soviet Union is really dangerous, to that extent, why it is using active measures actions and operations as a totally offensive political weapon against the free world. That kind of experience I did have. Usually you have to spend quite a lot of time to explain to people what this whole thing is about.

But I consider it a great honor for me to proceed with those lecturing activities and things like that, to talk to people and to explain to them details of Soviet active measure.

Mr. YOUNG. I want to go to page 4 of your handwritten statement, and I acknowledge that the page numbers don't coincide with your typed statement, but on page 4 of the handwritten statement you say the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, under the close guidance of the International Department Central Committee Communist Party Soviet Union, is involved in political, financial, and to an extent military support of the so-called national liberation movements in the Third World countries and maintains unofficial, sometimes confidential contacts with the pro-Soviet leaders of the political parties in countries of Middle East, Africa and Asia.

This Soviet committee also organizes worldwide campaigns aimed at the weakening of the influence of the United States and other free world countries in the Third World.

That is quite an objective for this Soviet committee.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. And the Communist Party, Soviet Union.

How much detail can you provide us on financial support that is provided by the Soviet Union either through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee or through the KGB or any of the other organizations that they operate?

How much detail can you give us on their financial support of these various efforts throughout the world?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, sir.

If you don't mind, let me give you, sir, one example. You know some radical elements in this country still are wearing a sort of ski hat, sort of a flat ski hat, woolen, knit. That hat created a fashion, which came to the United States because exactly those types of hats had been worn by the MPLA guerrillas in Angola, and all of them were Soviet made and provided en masse, just like 100,000 of them.

Clothing, uniforms, it is not just directly money, but products like the hats that cost money, which adds up because you are talking about providing things like uniforms to sometimes tens of thousands of people.

Then, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, through the International Department, makes arrangements with the General Staff of the Soviet Army to provide such so-called national liberation movements with arms, including tanks and other heavy weapons.

So that is why I have said what I have in my statement. For instance, weaponry is not shipped directly from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, but the committee takes a very active part in these negotiations. It would be Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization officers which would get the list of all needs of those so-called national liberation movements, then provide it to the Central Committee, Communist Party, of the Soviet Union. The Secretariat or Politburo would then make a decision, for instance, that they are going to spend \$20 million, \$30 million, \$50 million on some project, and then action would be taken. And, if it is weaponry, then the Soviet Army will provide the weaponry.

In the Soviet Union, all organizations like the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which is affiliated to the International Department, all of them are co-related, and they are coordinating their activity on literally a daily basis.

Another way of providing financial support by the CPSU can be seen when, for example, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee organizes lots of congresses on the territory of the Soviet Union or abroad. All the expenses, including air tickets, for those conferences are paid for by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the cynicism of this situation is that the money in rubles, in Soviet currency basically does not come directly from the Soviet Government; so, if some gentleman like Mr. Arbatov will say that the government has nothing to go with it, in a way it would be true, because the CPSU has the so-called peace fund, the peace foundation, which is a type of public organization. But the peace fund too comes under the guidance again of the International Department, which ensures that the Soviet Peace Fund spends its money for the right causes. Every member of the Soviet society is like a soldier, especially if you are a party member.

So the party, for example, will tell you, you have got a Nobel prize, like two Soviet academicians who got them, and the funds granted with those Nobel prizes, the party forces the recipients to give away to the Soviet Peace Fund. Then the case of Soviet football teams, which are fairly good, because they are professionals while they are saying that they are amateurs. The party says to them that proceeds from today's game will go to the peace fund.

Then, in huge factories some workers will spend a full working day in which they "donate" their wages to the peace fund. They are working for free, so that that money will go into Soviet peace fund.

And then all this type of money—again I repeat the name of the organization, it is Soviet peace fund—is utilized by the World Peace Council which talks about peace, and by Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which provides everything including the military uniform and arms to the so-called national liberation movements.

Mr. YOUNG. They do make an effort to cover their tracks so that it can't be traced directly back to the official Soviet Government.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir, but in certain cases they even do this thing openly.

Mr. YOUNG. This Mr. Arbatov you mentioned, is he the gentleman associated with the Canada-U.S.A. Institute?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right. He is Director, to my knowledge, of that research institute.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, again, back to that part of your statement that I read when you said that the committee organizes campaigns aimed at the weakening of the influence of the United States and other free world countries, et cetera, of course, here we are talking about the active measures, here we are talking about the propaganda, we are talking about the forgeries which we are seeing more and more of all the time.

What other types of things are you talking about that they would use in that campaign?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Are you talking, sir, about the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee is not involved in forgeries or in professional-type KGB-type active measures. They are involved in active measures of the International Department type. Most of them are overt.

What do they do anyway. There is a presidential council of the people's Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, which had its headquarters in Cairo. All of the members, almost all of—it would be wrong to say all—the majority of these members of the presiding council of the solidarity organization with headquarters in Cairo are continuously used, influenced or manipulated by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, for which you can read "International Department of the Central Committee." Whatever conference they have on whatever topic, you know, freedom to people in Fiji Islands or whatever. (Sometimes they have very unpredictable conferences and congresses)—the Soviets know the results, the outcome of this congress or that congress beforehand because everything is prepared ahead of time, all papers, and everybody is prepared. The Soviet managers already had very lengthy discussions with potential speakers, and things like that.

Mr. YOUNG. So there is no question as to the outcome? —

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Sure, because you know, sir, you know, it is sort of instinctive, it is in the blood of the Soviet leaders, rubber stamp voting, and they cannot afford to have a mistake in any kind of international conferences or congresses.

Sometimes they do have minor troubles because sometimes a certain individual will go out of control. We are not saying that everybody, 100 percent, is manipulated, but the majority is. There is no question about that, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I am going to stick to this line of questioning dealing with the attempt to weaken the influence of the United States, and related to all of these committees, and including the KGB, and that is where you were specifically involved.

When they—and this is any of them—when they do whatever it is they are going to do to try to weaken the influence of the United States or whatever else their objectives might be, what kind of restrictions do they operate under? For example, let me give you an example of what I am asking.

The subject of the use of journalism as a cover, as a front has been discussed throughout the whole hearing this morning. If the CIA were to attempt to use journalists as cover, there would be such an outcry from certain areas in the United States that we would really have more political problems than we could handle. That would be a restriction on the way that our intelligence community functions.

What about the KGB? Are there any restrictions at all as to who the KGB is allowed to recruit or to work with or to use as agents of influence or planting propaganda or forgeries or anything like that?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Sir, speaking about the way the KGB uses all kinds of covers for their officers, they have the whole variety, but you mentioned journalism. Practically every Soviet newspaper or magazine has some KGB officers using that certain publication as a cover. *New Times* magazine is really, I would say an astonishing example, because we are talking about 12 foreign correspondents, 10 of which are KGB officers.

Novosti Press Agency usually in large countries has up to six journalists stationed. They have bureaus in large countries. You can be sure that out of the six, three will be KGB and one or two will be GRU.

So in some countries, the Novosti Press Agency bureau has only one so-called clean person who usually will be chief of the bureau, a very hard working person because all the other crowd doesn't bother itself to do something for that poor Novosti Press Agency; all of them are working in the intelligence field.

The TASS wire agency, telegraph agency, which is the official Soviet telegraph agency, the same thing. In Japan, for instance, they had, yes, six I think, three of them KGB and one GRU, two clean.

New Times magazine we have already discussed.

Then *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, which is the Young Communist league publication, its daily newspaper with a large circulation in the Russian language—their correspondent in Tokyo is also an officer of the KGB political line, political intelligence, and as he told me, in most countries, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* journalists are also in fact KGB operatives.

Izvestiya in some countries has KGB operatives using its cover but not in every country.

The only newspaper with which KGB has certain difficulties to use as a cover is *Pravda* because it is the official Communist Party newspaper, but I know for sure of one example. *Pravda* had four of them here in United States, (two I think in Washington and two in New York) one of them until he left recently was a high-ranking KGB officer. So even *Pravda* sometimes has KGB officers as their correspondents.

Mr. YOUNG. What about the academic community? Are there any restrictions on the KGB preventing them from using academics, the academic community, professors, students?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Sir, there is an Academy of Sciences in the Soviet Union, and its executive body is the so-called Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and they have a bureau or department of international relations in that executive body, which is responsible for the whole exchange of Soviet scientists and foreign scientists, who are going here and there. The first deputy chief of this department in the Academy of Sciences is a KGB colonel. So none of the Soviet more or less high ranking researchers or members of the academy of sciences can go abroad without the knowledge of that KGB colonel.

This does not mean that every Soviet academician is spying wherever he goes, not all of them, you know. Some of them, sure, are going for a real exchange in some certain scientific research field or whatever. But again, we are talking about the Soviet system, where potentially the KGB can recruit practically anybody they want. And it is very hard to answer this question, for instance, how many Soviet scientists are cooperating or so-called co-optees of the KGB? Many of them are. Many of them are KGB co-optees on a regular basis. Many of them are not on regular basis, but they are approached by a very high ranking KGB official, who will ask them just to do one thing at a time, and probably he will never ask them again, but one way or another, a majority of Soviet scientists can be used by the KGB for gathering intelligence information.

But speaking about the use of such institutes as a cover, the KGB does use such institutes as a cover, but we are talking about not that many KGB officers working there, because if you are going to pretend to be a professor you have got to be a professor, but this is a technicality.

Mr. YOUNG. But the point is, with the Soviet system there are no restrictions against who they can recruit or who they can use, right?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Not at all except for former Soviet illegals and former KGB officers after they are retired.

Mr. YOUNG. I see.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is the only group of people whom they cannot rehire.

Mr. YOUNG. As a KGB officer, were you aware of many of the restrictions that your U.S. counterparts had to work under?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I did have knowledge, but not comprehensive, because the United States was never my specialty, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I understand that, but I just wondered if it was one of the little jokes that—

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, I knew, and there have been certain jokes. For instance, in Tokyo there is the largest foreign journalistic community in the world, about 1,000 foreign journalists are continuously residing in Tokyo, and the KGB knew for sure that none of the American journalists belonged to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. YOUNG. As the KGB prepares its officers, are the training facilities extensive or adequate or inadequate? How would you describe the training facilities?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Training facilities are very adequate. The KGB has nice, spacious buildings with gymnasiums, with swimming pools and everything, good cafeterias, auditoriums are fairly modernly equipped.

Mr. YOUNG. Is there enough of the equipment, for example? Is there a shortage of equipment or do they have whatever they need?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. They never experience any shortage of equipment because usually in the Soviet budget system, the KGB and the military have the highest priority in getting whatever money they want.

There could be some very temporary shortage in something like, for instance, instead of 100 chairs in the auditorium they get only 70; so it would take them a couple of weeks to write letters and to buy them, but not serious things.

Mr. YOUNG. But they don't have to make do with someone's leftovers or improvise something to be something other than what it was intended to be. They have basically what they need for these training programs.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, the KGB has what it needs for training purposes, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. We talked earlier about Mr. Arbatov. There is a gentleman named Radomir Bagdanov who also works with Arbatov.

Do you know anything about him, or did you while you were in the KGB know Bagdanov?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That name is familiar to me, sir; and I did know that he is one of the deputies of Mr. Arbatov. I knew that one of his deputies is a high ranking KGB colonel. I personally suspected Mr. Bagdanov to be the KGB colonel.

Mr. YOUNG. As the Soviets pursue their objective of weakening the influence of the United States and expanding the influence of the Soviet Union, they use a lot of organizations, and we have talked about many of them.

Can you comment on the role of some of the international Soviet fronts in the active measures program?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. First of all, sir, I will say again that primary are the Soviet Peace Committee and the World Peace Council. The World Peace Council probably is the most active in that field. It exists since 1949, and the Soviets developed the whole machinery. They have a lot of expertise in that field. They know how to manipulate other countries' movements and things like that.

Then I would say the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee goes high up on the list with all its experience in active measures around the Vietnam war time.

The Soviet Women's Committee is also very active abroad. They send all kinds of delegations and organizations abroad. The Soviets have lawyers' organizations, they have organizations of international democratic journalists and quite many fronts like that, and all of them are doing their thing under directives of the International Department. There is a section in that department which deals with so-called international public organizations. So they guide them, and if, for instance, they are after one major goal, all of those fronts are doing basically the same thing but from different angles. That is why unfortunately sometimes when they are involved in certain global type actions, the Soviets can mobilize really large crowds of people.

Mr. YOUNG. Is it the International Department that provided guidance for all these international fronts, or is there some other organization in the Soviet system that also fills that role?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The Soviet Politburo, sir, first of all, because the Soviet Politburo develops long-range plans. For instance, they would say that we want an antineutron bomb campaign. Members of the Politburo, sure, many of them do not know how to run the actual campaign. Then specialists will write appropriate papers, and then the campaign would be implemented by a directive which is a party directive which is the same as a law in the Soviet Union. And those directives will go to Soviet Peace Committee, Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Women's Committee, and then these committees will start guiding the so-called international front organizations related to those committees.

Mr. YOUNG. Are you familiar with an organization called the African National Congress?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes, I've heard about this organization, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Do you know whether the Soviet provided any support of any type for this organization?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I don't have information on that, sir, but years before when I was working for the Soviet Peace Committee and Soviet Afro-Asian Committee, I do know that a few leaders of this organization—and if I am not mistaken, the name of one of them is John Marks—have been visiting the Soviet Union on a very regular basis and have been involved in very confidential conversations of a political nature.

But personally, because I was specializing on Far Eastern problems, I personally did not take part in those meetings, so I was not a witness in detail of that.

Mr. YOUNG. Sure, I understand that.

In the area where you were assigned, what can you tell us about Soviet subsidies to organizations in Japan?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The Communist Party of Japan is not subsidized by the Soviet Union because it has a rather profound financial basis itself. It is a large and strong party. The Socialist Party, which is the main opposition party in Japan, indirectly is supported by the Soviets.

Mr. YOUNG. When you say indirectly, what is the route by which that indirect support occurs?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. It means, sir, that money is not directly brought into the headquarters of the party in cash. It means that Soviets are providing that kind of support through so-called friendly trading organizations. By friendly trading organizations they mean medium or small-sized businesses which are mostly involved in trade with the Soviet Union, and usually they have secret or confidential, whatever you call it, clause in the agreement with the Soviet trading organization. Sometimes it will be written, sometimes it would be oral, but that secret clause will say that that company is supposed to give, let's say 15 or 20 percent of the net profit to a certain group or faction of the Socialist Party of Japan, and there are quite a few companies like that. So that is why, sir, I called it sort of indirect. It does not mean that Soviets generally are bringing the money directly.

But the Soviets are supporting directly one group, at least one group in Japan. It is a small, splinter Communist Party guided by very old man. Shiga Yoshio. His party has about 2,000 or 3,000 members, and the Soviet International Department through KGB officers delivers directly to him money in cash.

Mr. YOUNG. Is that rubles or is that yen?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. It would be yen, but the Soviets basically don't have trouble in choosing the foreign currencies.

Mr. YOUNG. So this is a direct—the Shiga group is directly funded then by the Soviets.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Do the Soviets also direct the group in its activities?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Excuse me, sir, the Shiga group is not directed by the Soviets now, because their influence is practically zero. And that is the major issue in relations of the Soviet Communist Party with the large Miyamoto Communist Party of Japan, but since Suslov's times, the Soviets have assumed a sort of moral responsibility for that old man Yoshio Shiga, and they don't want just to leave him alone, and they are paying him money.

But on the territory of Japan, I witnessed personally, it was the years when I was there, that the Soviets were delivering money, again, International Department using KGB officers, was delivering money to the illegal Communist Party of Philippines in bags with two bottoms, everything just like in spy movies.

Mr. YOUNG. Let me make sure I understand now, who delivered this case? Does the KGB provide the delivery?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Yes; people in—officers in International Department are not intelligence officers, and they do not undergo professional spy tradecraft-type training, so that is why the KGB is used. The International Department is the hand of the Politburo and KGB is also just another hand of the Politburo, and if Politburo wants to deliver money to somebody, they will use a specialist. I am talking about this business sir, because I personally witnessed how it works. I had to go to the Communist Party headquarters in Moscow, and there was an accountant who brought a sack with money, and it was put in a special suitcase, and I had to give him a receipt, and then this money went to Japan, was special couriered, and in Japan, a KGB officer who knows all those things in spy tradecraft technique went to another city of that country and delivered that money to Mr. Yoshio Shiga.

Mr. YOUNG. Does this happen in other countries as well as Japan, or is it just limited strictly to Japan?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I cannot give you many examples of that, sir, but I am sure that it is a fairly routinely typical procedure which they utilize for cases like that.

Mr. YOUNG. And in the case of Japan you personally have witnessed this?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right, sir. I personally was receiving that money and then I knew the officer who went to Osaka to deliver this money.

Mr. YOUNG. Can you tell us anything about the Communist Party of the Philippines?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Unfortunately, sir, I don't know anything about Communist Party of Philippines except that their messenger visited Tokyo during those years, was visiting Tokyo on a more-or-less regular basis to get money from the KGB, through the KGB. let's put it this way. I witnessed this personally. I had to help that KGB case officer to clear his way, if we may use professional terminology, to be

sure that Japanese counterintelligence was not surveilling the whole operation. So, I was driving the car to a hotel, and that KGB case officer disappeared from the car with a heavy bag of money and went back without anything in his hands.

Mr. YOUNG. Are you familiar with a publication that purported to identify CIA assets in the world media and was distributed from Switzerland?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is right. I am familiar with it.

Mr. YOUNG. Can you tell us something about that?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I read that public brochure while being with the Tokyo Residency of KGB, and to my knowledge it is a product of the CI, counterintelligence service, of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, with the help of the Service Active Measures of the KGB, and according to my knowledge, even the KGB at that time was not that happy about that product because, for instance, when officers in the Tokyo Residency looked through the list of Japanese names they didn't like it at all because at least one of them was targeted by the Tokyo Residency and had nothing to do with the American intelligence service.

So some parts of the KGB didn't consider that publication to be a big success.

Mr. YOUNG. A copy of the publication referred to—CIA Insider—is available. (See exhibit X, p. 170f.)

I want to go back to a subject that all of us have talked to you about today, and I have already and I want to again dealing with media, journalists, publishers.

Do you know anything about Soviet funding of western press, media, publishers, et cetera?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I do not have knowledge of direct involvement of KGB in this field, not because I know that they are not involved in that kind of activity except I was not involved, so I did not witness this thing.

My logic says that yes, they do support quite a few publications. As a matter of fact, sir, we were talking earlier today about the parliamentarian group on Japan-U.S.S.R. friendship in Japanese parliament. They publish a magazine. You can say that that magazine is published 100 percent by Soviet money. That I know for sure.

Mr. YOUNG. Did you by any chance deliver the money?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. No, I did not. I had the personal experience of helping one KGB agent to start his publication which appeared to be more or less stillborn thing, I delivered—I don't remember, I'm sorry, exactly, either 1 million or 1½ million yen to that Japanese politician, as well later I had to help him with money for an election campaign.

Mr. YOUNG. Obviously we are all curious about the media and publications and journalists because they certainly get to a lot of people and they are oftentimes very influential.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. That is true, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. You mentioned that it was somewhat of a joke, but at least it was commonly known in Japan with the group that you worked with and your fellow KGB officers that U.S. journalists there in Japan would not be assets of or agents of the CIA.

You just knew that.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I knew that, yes, sir, that American journalists stationed in Tokyo are not working for CIA.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. Now, my followup question on that is did you or are you aware of any other KGB officers who might have approached and attempted to recruit or successfully recruited an American journalist in Japan?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I know about several approaches, sir. I knew about two cases, and in both cases the American journalists appeared to be honest people and obviously they reported to somebody about this approach, possibly to the security officer in the Embassy. Anyway, they reported to some Government official definitely because the next meeting after the first approach they started to ask the KGB case officer lots of questions about his background and things like that, which shows that they were already prepared by some counterintelligence officer on how to handle that.

Mr. YOUNG. On the subject of age and when a person gets to the point that he is really no longer, because of advanced age, is no longer useful in ongoing projects, what does the KGB do? Do they retire him, take him off the books?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. The KGB is very ruthless toward their agents and they don't have anything like, you know, retirement pay for agents who have been working for them for many years. To begin with, usually they sort of underpay their agents. Their agents are not paid much at all except for kinds of real important agents who are bought literally. That type of person gets a lot of money.

But when some agent loses his source of information, and if he is not old yet and he is still in working condition, the first thing they will try to do is either use him as a support agent to check addresses, directories, to put some forgeries in mailboxes and things like that. Or, some of them would be rerecruited by that terrible Department V for possible sabotage activities because I know—and I witnessed that thing—that before you give to archives any case, any file on any agent, you cannot do this before this transfer to archives would be approved by a high ranking representative of Department V. So they are trying to think of utilizing them anyway. But if the agent really becomes sort of elderly, advanced age, disabled, the KGB just forgets about him, and that's it.

Mr. YOUNG. What is this Department V? Now, this is the first time we've heard that mentioned today.

Mr. LEVCHENKO. Department V is an outfit now belonging to the Illegal Service of the First Chief Directorate of KGB. Previously it was an independent department in the First Chief Directorate. Its main activity is recruiting foreigners as agents for sabotage, assassinations and all kinds of things like that, primarily in case of very serious aggravation of the international situation. This department also sends its own illegals abroad to sit and wait and recruit some mobster type individuals who would be ready to blow up a certain bridge or telecommunications system and things like that.

Mr. YOUNG. Do you have any closing statement that you would like to make before we recess the morning hearing, any summary of what we talked about and anything we left out or forgot to ask you?

Mr. LEVCHENKO. I wanted, sir, to repeat that it was a great honor for me to be here and I was looking forward to this day for the last 3 years, basically since the first day I came here. It was a great honor for me to answer questions of such distinguished representatives of the U.S. Congress, and I just want to assure you that all my activity here from now on will be devoted to the noble task of mine which means to fight Soviets in the most clever, smart, calculated way which my talents permit me, and I would like to be helpful to the Government of this country for the rest of my life.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I would like to thank you very much for those comments. Certainly that is—I think my greatest motivation is the security of the way of life that we enjoy in the United States, and I want to thank you very much for being willing to be here today, for your very frank statement, and your willingness to respond very openly to every question that was asked of you.

And on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you.

At this point, the committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon when our witnesses will be from the FBI.


Mr. LEVCHENKO. Thank you very much, sir.

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

[The KGB produced pamphlet *C.I.A. Insider* follows:]

CIA No.1 in 1978
INSIDER

News of facts from the Agency files



CIA
INTERPRESS

CIA INTERPRESS has been compiled by 7 journalists-volunteers, seeking no royalties, who think their duty is to put an end to perverted abuse by the CIA of press and information freedom.

The information below is a small part of facts from the Agency files. The authors express a hope that this publication would escape the fate of other innumerable documents which disappeared forever due to efforts of some high-ranking CIA officials.

That is also the reason why the authors have preferred to avoid their own comments and limited themselves to hard facts in the contents and in the use, to the smallest degree, of press excerpts.

We wish to thank all present and former members of the relevant official US agencies, who, sharing the authors' views, have made it possible for them to have access to CIA documents and materials, without which it would not have been possible to compile this book.

The authors feel, however, that their task is by no means completed. Throughout the world scores of other intelligence services, among which the Soviet KGB, the British SIS, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst and even the South Korean CIA, continue their activities. That is why we would welcome cooperation with all those whom we intend to approach in the noble cause of defending the freedom of the press and information.

"They are part of a network of several hundred individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets."

Report of the Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities

PAID CIA AGENTS, SOURCES OF INFORMATION OR ASSISTANCE IN THE WORLD MASS MEDIA

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BHATT V.R.
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LEVI ARIGO
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TEDESCHI MARIO
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GOSUKE UCHIMURA
observer

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Sankei Shimbun, editor

HIDEO MATSUOKA
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KEISUKE SHIMIZU
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MASAO SASAE
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NOBORU SATO
Shogun, observer

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ABOU DJAUDA MICHAEL
An Nahar, staff member

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L I B Y A

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SHATER ABDURRAHMAN
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HOOGENDIJK FERRY
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LOON VAN
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MUNNINGKOF ALEXANDER
Haagsche Courant, correspondent

van HET REVE KAREL
Het Parool, correspondent

SUASSO de LIMA de PRADO
NRC Handelsblad, correspondent

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van VLUMEN LEO
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Expressen, reporter

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KOCH CATHERINE
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DEED CHRISTOPHER
Guardian, correspondent

S I E R R A L E O N E

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S I N G A P O R E

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Hindu, correspondent

WILSON BRUCE
Melbourne Herald, corres-
pondent

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Arriba, reporter

ASSIA AUGUSTO
Ya, reporter

EGUIGARAY FRANCISCO
EFE, correspondent

ACOCA MIGUEL
Washington Post, correspon-
dent

GALLEGO VICENTE
free-lance journalist

GOMER-SALOME JOSE MARIA
Ya, reporter

MOZTAZA BARTOLOME
Ya, reporter

MARIN PASCUAL
Arriba, reporter

PEDROS RAMON
ABC, correspondent

S R I L A N K A

ARIYADASA EDWIN
Dinamina, editor

NANAYAKARRA SARATH
Ceylon Observer, chief corres-
pondent

SEGERA GOE
Sunday Observer, reporter

de SILVA MANIK
Ceylon Observer, political
correspondent

de SILVA REX
Honey, editor

S U D A N

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El Ayyam, editor-in-chief &
chairman of the Board of Directors

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Sudan Standart, correspondent

EL-SIV HASSAN
El Ayyam, deputy editor-in-chief

FADLALA MOHAMED
El Sahafa, editor

MUSA EL-MUBARAK
El Sahafa, editor-in-chief

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MEN, correspondent

MOHAMED EL-FATIH
Reuters, correspondent

OMER KARAR
AP, correspondent

S W E D E N

de GAALITZE JAMES
free-lance journalist

KAYFETZ VICTOR
Reuters, chief bureau corres-
pondent

SIMON ALAN
NBC, reporter

UDGAARD NILS MORTEN
Svenska Dagbladet, corres-
pondent

WAHLOO INGER BARBRO
Expressen, reporter

S W I T Z E R L A N D

AUDEMARS JASMINE
Journal de Geneve, reporter

BERNARD NICOLAS
AFP, reporter

CEVEY JEAN-JAQUES
Vingt quatre heures, reporter

DANES IOHANN-GEORG
radio-correspondent

DESHUSSES HENRI-PAUL
La Suisse, reporter

KILIAN RICHARD
New York Daily News, correspon-
dent

KUX ERNST
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, editor

ROY PHILIPPE
La Suisse, reporter

RYNIKER JEAN
La Tribune de Geneve, reporter

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free-lance journalist

AL-MALLAH ABDEL ILLAH
Al-Baath, editor

CSOUBHI MOHIED-DIN
free-lance journalist

FARES LOUIS
AP, correspondent

JANALI HAFEZ
free-lance journalist

KHEIR CHAWKI ALLAH
As-Saura, correspondent

KHLEIF EDMOND
Reuters, correspondent

NASSER DJABR
AFP, correspondent

USTUVANI SELVA
UPI, correspondent

T A N Z A N I A

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Daily News, chief reporter

PENZA JUMA
Shihata News Agency, correspondent

T H A I L A N D

ROLNIC HARRY
Bangkok Post, reporter

SIMONS M. LEWIS
Washington Post, correspondent

T U N E S I A

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La Presse de Tunisie, correspon-
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L'Action, editor

TABKA NUREDDINE
La Presse de Tunisie, editor-in-
chief

VENTURA FLAVLO
La Presse de Tunisie, deputy
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Son Havadis, correspondent

ILHAN CHEVICK
Turkish Daily News, owner &
publisher

KABAKLI AHMET
Tercüman, correspondent

METIN TOKER
political observer

SHABAN KARATASH
TV & Radio, general director

TEKIN ERER
Son Havadis, observer

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Radio Sarandi, chief of section

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La Manana, staff member

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El Pais, editor

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Radio Rural, owner & political
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Mundo Color, editor

HINS EUGENIO
Times and El Pais, correspon-
dent

PEREZ GUILLERMO
El Pais, chief of information
section

SAFI JULIAN
El Dario, managing editor

TUANA LEONEL
Press officer of the President

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New York Times, correspondent

ANDERSON JACK
Syndicated columnist

ARNOLD MARTIA
New York Times, correspondent

BACHHAUSEN MAX
U.S. News and World Report,
correspondent

BENHAUM JOSEPH
U.S. News and World Report,
correspondent

BERLIN MICHAEL
New York Post, UN correspondent

BINDER DAVID
New York Times, correspondent

BOROWIEC ANDREW
Evening Star, correspondent

BOURNE ERIC EZRA
Washington Post, correspondent

BREASTED DAVID
Daily News, correspondent

BROWNE MALCOLM
New York Times, correspondent

BYRON CHRISTOPHER
Time, correspondent

CARTER STAN
Daily News, correspondent

CLARK EVERET
Newsweek, editor

DODER DUSKO
UPI, correspondent

DORNBERG JOHN
Evening Star, correspondent

FRANKLIN BENJAMIN
New York Times, correspondent

FREUND LAWRENCE SAMUEL
Voice of America, correspondent

FRIED JOSEPH
Daily News, correspondent

FRIENDLY ALFRED
Newsweek, correspondent

FRITCHEY CLAYTON
Los Angeles Times, editor

GREENE JERRY
Daily News, correspondent

GROSS RICHARD
UPI, correspondent

HARTZENBUSCH HEINRICH JOHANNES
AP, correspondent

HANGAN JIM
Harper's Magazine, correspondent

HARSH SEYMOUR
New York Times, correspondent

HOPPKINS MARK
Voice of America, correspondent

JACKSON JAMES
Chicago Tribune, correspondent

JOHNSON OSWALD
Star News, editor

KAMM HENRY
New York Times, correspondent

KARNOW STANLEY
Newsweek, editor

KOCH ROY
Newsweek, correspondent

KRAFT JOSEPH
Washington Post, observer

KRAUSE AKSEL
McGrow Hill, correspondent

KRIMSKI GEORGE
AP, correspondent

KUBIC MILAN
Newsweek, correspondent

LANG JOHN
New York Post, editor

LEWIS FLORA
New York Times, correspondent

LYONS RICHARD
New York Times, correspondent

MCCARTNEY JAMES
Knight Newspaper Weiter, correspondent

MITGANG HERBERT
New York Times, correspondent

MULLANEY THOMAS
Business and Finance, correspondent

NAUGHTON JAMES
New York Times, correspondent

OATIS WILLIAM
AP, correspondent

OSNOS PETER
Washington Post, correspondent

PINCK DAN
Globe, correspondent

RANDAL JANATHAN
Washington Post, correspondent

RIGG BANNY
Skipper, editor

ROSENBAUM DAVID
New York Times, correspondent

ROSENFELD STEVE
Washington Post, correspondent

ROSS THOMAS
Chicago Sun-Times, Washington
bureau chief

RUBIN TRUDY
Atlantic magazine, correspondent

SALISBURY HARRISON E.
free-lance journalist and
writer

SALTUS NICHOLAS
AP, correspondent

SHERRILL
Nation, editor

SMITH ROBERT
New York Times, correspondent

STARNER FRANCES
Far Eastern Economic Review,
correspondent

STERN LAURENCE
Washington Post, editor

STRINGER WILLIAM
Christian Science Monitor,
correspondent

SULZBERGER
Cyrus Leo - New York Times,
author and columnist

SZULC TAD
Christian Science Monitor,
correspondent

TOTH ROBERT
Los Angeles Times, corres-
pondent

TREWHITT HENRY
Newsweek, diplomatic corres-
pondent

VAN VOORST BRUCE
Newsweek, editor

VOGLE PAUL
UPI, correspondent

WEINRAUB BERNARD
New York Times, correspondent

WREN CHRISTOPHER
New York Times, correspondent

ZORZA VICTOR
columnist

U S S R

CAPUTO PHILIPP
Chicago Tribune, correspondent

COLEMAN FREDERIC WILLIAM
Newsweek, correspondent

HUNN PETER JOHN
Mc Grow-Hill, correspondent

OSNOS PETER
Washington Post, correspondent

SHIPPLER DAVID
New York Times, correspondent

SUTTER DAVID
Financial Times, correspondent

TOTH ROBERT CHARLES
Los Angeles Times, correspondent

WREN CHRISTOPHER
New York Times, correspondent

V E N E Z U E L A

BORREGALES GERMAN
Ultimas Noticias, observer

BRAVO MATUTO
Ultimas Noticias, observer

IMBER SOFIA
free-lance journalist

OLAVARRIA JORGE
Resumen, general director

POLEO RAFAEL
La Zeta, director & columnist

RANGEL CARLOS
TV, commentator

SUAREZ FELIX MARTINEZ
Ultimas Noticias, observer

Y O U G O S L A V I A

ANDERSON RAYMOND
New York Times, correspondent

BROWN MALCOLM
New York Times, correspondent

FREUND LAWRENCE
Voice of America, correspondent

GROSS RICHARD
UPI, regional correspondent

GUTMAN ROY
Reuters, regional correspon-
dent

TALBOTT NELSON STROBE
Times, correspondent

Z A M B I A

MIJONI VINCENT
Zambia Daily News, editor

SAIDI WILLIAM
Times of Zambia, deputy editor-
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THE BANGLADESH TIMES
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Rio de Janeiro

EXPRESSO
Rio de Janeiro

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Brasilia, D. F.

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THE TOTONTO STAR
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THE TORONTO SUN
Toronto

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EL CRONISTA
Santiago

EL MERCURIO
Santiago

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QUE PASA
Santiago

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EL ESPECTADOR
Bogota

EL TIEMPO
Bogota

TELEDIARIO
Bogota

TV SIGLO XX
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THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
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APOGEVMATINI
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Athens

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VISIR
Reykjavik

I N D I A

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Madras

THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
New Delhi

INDIA NEWS AND FEATURE ALLIANCE
New Delhi

THE INDIAN EXPRESS
New Delhi

NEW DAY
New Delhi

NAV BHARAT TIMES
New Delhi

THE SPOKESMAN
New Delhi

THE STATESMAN
New Delhi

THE TIMES OF INDIA
New Delhi

THE TRIBUNE
Chandigarh

YOUNG INDIA
New Delhi

I N D O N E S I A

ANGKATAN BERSENJATA
Djakarta

BERITA JUDHA
Djakarta

THE INDONESIA TIMES
Djakarta

I R A N

KAYHAN
Teheran

PARS NEWS AGENCY
Teheran

THE TEHRAN JOURNAL
Teheran

I R E L A N D

THE IRISH INDEPENDENT
Dublin

THE IRISH PRESS
Dublin

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IL POPOLO
Roma

RAI RADIOTELEVISIONE ITALIANA
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LA STAMPA
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ASAHI SHIMBUN
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CHUO KORON
Tokyo

JAPAN TIMES
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Tokyo

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Tokyo

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Catmandu

NEPAL RADIO
Catmandu

THE NEW HERALD
Catmandu

RASTRIYA SAMAGHA SAMITY
Catmandu

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P A K I S T A N

DAILY NEWS
Karachi

NAWA-I-WAQT
Lahore

PAKISTAN TIMES
Lahore

TA' MEER
Rawalpindi

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T A N Z A N I A

THE DAILY NEWS
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SHIHATA NEWS AGENCY
Dar es Salam

T H A I L A N D

THE BANGKOK POST
Bangkok

THE BANGKOK WORLD
Bangkok

T U N I S I A

L'ACTION
Tunis

LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE
Tunis

T U R K E Y

SON HAYADIS
Istanbul

TERCÜMAN
Istanbul

THE TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Ankara

TRT TURKISH TV AND RADIO
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Boston, Mass.

THE BOSTON GLOBE
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Chicago, Ill.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
Chicago, Ill.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Boston, Mass.

THE DAILY NEWS
Chicago, Ill.

FOREIGN NEWS SERVICE
New York, N.Y.

HAPER'S MAGAZINE
New York, N.Y.

KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS
Detroit, Mich.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
Los Angeles Calif.

McGROW-HILL
New York, N.Y.

THE NEWSWEEK
New York, N.Y.

NEW YORK POST
New York, N.Y.

NEW YORK TIMES
New York, N.Y.

RADIO FREE EUROPE
Munich, Germany

RADIO LIBERTY
Munich, Germany

THE SKIPPER
Annapolis, md.

THE STAR NEWS
Washington, D.C.

THE TIME
New York, N.Y.

UPI UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
New York, N.Y.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
Washington, D.C.

VOICE OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

THE WASHINGTON POST
Washington, D.C.

U R U G U A Y

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Montevideo

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V E N E Z U E L A

RESUMEN
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