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135 total results foundAuthor: Golunov, Sergey Title: Drug Trafficking as a Challenge for Russia's Security and Border Policies Summary: This report discusses issues of trans-boundary drug-trafficking through Russia's post-Soviet borders. Details: Budapest: International Policy Fellowship Program, Open Society Institute, 2006 Source: Year: 2006 Country: Russia Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 117288 |
Author: Vaisman, Alexey Title: Siberia's Black Gold: Harvest and Trade in Amur River Sturgeons in the Russian Federation Summary: This study reports on the population status of the Kaluga and Amur Sturgeon, evaluates legal fishing and illegal harvest of the sturgeons, and assesses efforts to prevent illegal sturgeon fishing in the Amur River basin. The study also investigates legal, and where possible, illegal trade in caviar and meat of Amur River sturgeons. Details: Brussels: TRAFFIC Europe, 2006. 31p. Source: N Year: 2006 Country: Russia Keywords: Caviar Shelf Number: 117679 |
Author: Turukanova, Elena Title: ODIHR Anti-Trafficking Programme: Identification, Assistance and Protection of Victims of Trafficking in the Russian Federation (Focusing on the Moscow Region) Summary: The OSCE/ODIHR, the human rights institution of the OSCE, focuses on the protection of international rights in responses to trafficking. In particular it has developed the concept of 'National Referral Mechanisms' (NRMs) a human-rights based approach to identifying and protecting trafficking victims, which places protection of trafficked persons rights' at the center of its concern. This review provides an overview of the steps already taken by Russia to implement its OSCE commitments on anti-trafficking, with particular consideration given to the measures it has taken to establish an NRM. Details: Vienna: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organisation for Security and Cooperation Europe, 2008. 53p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: Russia Keywords: Human Rights Shelf Number: 118710 |
Author: Research Centre for East European Studies' Solomon, Peter H., Jr. Title: Russia's Judicial Sytem Summary: This issue of the Russian Analytical Digest examines legal issues in Russia. Specifically, it considers problems related to the reform of the judicial system and the second trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Additionally, the issue examines the trial of murdered Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya and presents results of an opinion poll on the courts of Russia. Details: Bremen, Germany: Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen; Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2009. 16p. Source: Internet Resource; Russian Analytical Digest, No. 59 Year: 2009 Country: Russia Keywords: Courts (Russia) Shelf Number: 118786 |
Author: Jonsson, Anna Title: Russia's Police Reform - Medvedev's Test? Summary: President Dimitry Medvedev has made police reform in Russia one of his largest and most important reform projects. The police reform could be seen as a part of the larger anti-corruption program that he launched in 2008. These reforms are long overdue and badly needed; the Russian police force is one of the most notoriously corrupt state bodies in Russia. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2010. 3p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Policy Brief, No. 41: Accessed December 21, 2010 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_jonsson_russias-police-reform.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Russia Keywords: Police (Russia) Shelf Number: 120563 |
Author: Finckenauer, James O. Title: U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Combating Organied Crime Summary: In Russia, a number of criminal organizations that together make up organized crime are involved in a broad variety of crimes that range from both simple and sophisticated frauds to drug trafficking and murder. This wave of criminal activity serves as an incredibly destabilizing influence as Russia struggles to achieve economic and political reform. It chills foreign investment, widens the gap between rich and poor, and ultimately undermines confidence in the government. Given a strong joint interest in investigating and prosecuting these criminals on both sides of the Atlantic, the purposes of our modest effort here are as follows: • Review and describe the current status of U.S.-Russian cooperation on organized crime; Seek illustrative case examples of both problems and successes in this area; Review the pertinent legal and research literature; Interview key U.S. officials; Interview nongovernmental experts such as academics and journalists; and Formulate actionable policy recommendations. Details: Policy Brief from the the U.S.-Russia Experts Forum, 2008. Source: Year: 2008 Country: Russia Keywords: Organized Crime (Russia) Shelf Number: 120593 |
Author: Yanfang, Tian Title: China's Imports of Russian Timber: Chinese Actors in the Timber Commodity Chain and Their Risks of Involvement in Illegal Logging and the Resultant Trade Summary: Since the end of the 1990s, the Sino-Russian border regions have witnessed a dramatic, unprecedented increase in cross-border timber trade that has made Russia the largest log supplier for China’s expanding wood industry sector. Driving factors include: severe constraints in China’s domestic wood supplies, the availability of rich forest resources in the Russian Far East and Siberia, liberalised trade policies and demand from both domestic and European, Japanese and US markets for low cost Chinese wood products. This study provides a contextual description and analysis of the cross-border timber trade boom and the actors involved. It examines the current challenges faced by a largely inefficient Russian forestry sector and decentralised Russian forest administration in the context of illegal logging and unsustainable forestry practices, both widely viewed as having reached serious dimensions. This study focuses on the involvement and role of Chinese actors throughout the supply chain. Chinese companies have entered the Russian forestry sector, introduced greater efficiency and proved competitive. This involvement has also opened doors for Chinese actors to inadvertently or intentionally participate in illegal activities throughout the supply chain. In addition to timber harvesting, Chinese actors are involved as intermediaries in the commercial log depots and control the wholesale timber market in some parts of Russia. Chinese actors have also increasingly invested in wood processing in Russia, partly in response to the adjustment of the Russian export tax on logs. Most recently, there has been a trend towards vertical integration for Chinese companies, with intermediaries and wood importers attempting to extend their business to every node of the trading network. On the Chinese side of the border, preferential tax policies and infrastructure investment have spurred a rapid development of the timber processing industry with private sector processing mills replacing state-owned timber processing factories. To promote responsible timber trade within this context of commodity chain transformation, the study recommends the following measures: Establish inspection sites near the commercial depots; Enhance the effectiveness of administrative inspection through technical improvement, harmonisation of regulations and setting-up of an integrated monitoring system; Localise international forest certification schemes; Chinese and Russian government agencies to provide joint guidance on documentation that could be used by traders to establish a chain of custody for forest products; Establish a China-Russian multi-stakeholder working group to monitor the timber trade and exchange customs data in a timely manner; Chinese government to revise its procurement policy to favour legal and sustainable wood. Details: Kanagawa, Japan: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2008. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Forest Conservation, Livelihoods and Rights Project - Occasional Paper No. 2: Accessed February 14, 2011 at: http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/1569/attach/1569.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Russia Keywords: Illegal Logging Shelf Number: 120769 |
Author: LeGendre, Paul Title: Minorities Under Siege: Hate Crimes and Intolerance in the Russian Federation Summary: There has been no respite for Russias minorities in the past year from violent attacks motivated by bias, with any given week marred by serious assaults or racist murders. Although no official statistics are available, a leading Russian nongovernmental monitor of hate crimes documented 31 racist murders in 2005 and hate-based attacks on 413 individuals, while estimating that the real number of violent attacks is far higher. In the first four months of 2006, attacks appeared to escalate with 15 racist murders and hate-based attacks on 114 individuals. In April 2006 alone at least nine people were victims of racist murders. One nine-yearold girl suffered multiple stab wounds but survived. Those who are vulnerable to hate crimes include both foreigners and Russia nationals with a non-Slavic appearance. Non-Slavic people from the Russian Federations republics in the Caucasus who are Russian citizens are as much targets of racist violence as are recent immigrants from the now independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Particularly high levels of racist violence are directed toward people from the Caucasus, in part in response to the war in Chechnya and associated terrorist attacks in Russian towns and cities. Attacks motivated by racism sometimes have an overlay of religious hatred and intolerance: most people from the Caucasus are Muslims or of non-Orthodox Christian faiths. At the same time, reporting of attacks on people from these areas probably remains the least comprehensive, as these victims also tend to fear police abuse or arrest and are least likely to report racist attacks. Attacks on the Jewish community build on deeply rooted antisemitism that has found new voices, while Russias scattered Roma sometimes known as gypsies face violent attacks as part of longstanding patterns of discrimination and social marginalization by both the state and civil society. People of African origin have been the object of persistent and serious attacks, with African students in particular subject to everyday threats of violence. In addition to visible minorities, identified through their skin color, culture, or language, bias crimes target members of religions that are considered non-traditional, from Jehovahs Witnesses to Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Hare Krishnas. Those whose minority status is due to their sexual orientation also have become targets of bias-based violence. Victims of hate crimes have likewise included those who are taking action against racism and intolerance. Human rights and anti-racism campaigners, including young people who speak out against racism through music and groups that call themselves anti-Fascist, have engaged in growing protests against extremist violence and are increasingly themselves the victims. The perpetrators are drawn typically from ordinary citizens who are receptive to a pervasive message of hatred and fear of those who do not fit an ethnic Russian, Orthodox Christian ideal. Tens of thousands of mostly young people have been mobilized in a loosely organized movement of skinheads united by extreme nationalist ideology, sometimes in frank imitation of Germanys National Socialists. Whereas in the past skinheads were an important factor only in the larger cities, they are now often present in smaller cities and towns, and they also have become increasingly bold in their public presence. A recent eyewitness account told of a group of some 30 skinheads marching in formation through a central Moscow metro station shouting racist slogans. Such accounts are no longer a rarity. The violence is being perpetrated in an atmosphere in which the xenophobic and racist discourse is not limited to extremist groups, but has extended into the mainstream through political parties and the media. Such discourse is increasingly a part of mainstream politics as evidenced by the racist campaign rhetoric in last years Moscow Duma (Parliament) election, which led to the barring of one political party from the election race. Xenophobic statements by political leaders and media coverage have an influence on public opinion by exacerbating preexisting fears and prejudices and a recent survey shows high levels of xenophobic sentiment in the population at large. Russian laws today provide a basis for the investigation and prosecution of crimes motivated by racial, ethnic, or religious bias. The Russian Criminal Code contains a general penalty enhancement provision for the commission of crimes with a motive of national, racial, religious hate or enmity Several other articles of the Code provide specific enhanced punishments for particular crimes committed with these motivations. Russian law also contains provisions to punish incitement to hatred. Yet, despite the generally sound legal basis with which to address racist violence, those responsible for these crimes operate with relative impunity. Criminal laws to punish hate crimes do not appear to be systematically applied and bias motivations figure in prosecutions only in a fraction of such cases. Although prosecutions for the most serious crimes have increased in number, racist assaults are still often prosecuted as acts of hooliganism and many violent attacks causing injury fall outside of the criminal justice system altogether. Separate laws on combating extremism define extremism broadly, but have not been used effectively to counter the many extreme nationalist or neo-Nazi groups that openly espouse and engage in racist violence. Anti-extremism laws have, in contrast, been misused to target human rights advocates critical of the government who speak out against intolerance. No official statistics on the incidence of hate crimes and their prosecution are systematically collected and regularly reported. The continued absence of detailed and systematic monitoring and statistical reporting on hate crimes, including data distinguishing the groups targeted for violence, seriously limits the capacity of policy makers to understand the true nature of the problem and make corresponding policy decisions. It likewise hinders a better understanding of the weaknesses of the criminal justice system as concerns the prosecution of hate crimes. Nongovernmental organizations within Russia have somewhat compensated with their own collection of data on hate crimes. While they acknowledge that their coverage is limited in scope and no substitute for government collection and reporting, they coincide in reporting a steady increase in recent years in the level of discriminatory violence. Although several official bodies address the issue of hate crimes in some way, there is no specialized antidiscrimination body in Russia with a specific mandate to monitor and report on hate crimes. A result is an inadequate response by the Russian authorities to the growing problem of racist violence. Government officials have on occasion publicly spoken out against racist violence in general, and on individual cases of hate crimes, but with little apparent follow-through. Just as often, officials have sought to downplay the scale of the problem. Overall, the message coming from Russias civil society leaders is that the official reaction to hate-motivated crimes and what these crimes reveal about the plight of Russias minorities has been both intermittent and largely muted, falling far short of the visible, concrete, concerted action needed to combat racist violence and related hate crimes. A comprehensive approach to the problem of racist violence is sorely needed. President Putin should appoint a special commission with the mandate to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the problem of racist violence and related intolerance in Russia. Political leaders should react immediately in public statements to crimes of racist violence and other violent bias crimes. Russias criminal justice authorities should undertake to more systematically implement the laws in place dealing with hate crimes and should take steps to establish a system for the monitoring and collection of statistics on hate crimes and their prosecution and for the regular publication of this data. Finally, the Russian authorities should also provide a mandate and appropriate resources to an official antidiscrimination body, in line with Council of Europe recommendations, to drive the policy measures required in the longer-term to combat hate crimes. Details: New York: Human Rights First, 2006. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April, 15, 2012 at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/06623-discrim-Minorities-Under-Siege-Russia-web.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Russia Keywords: Crime Prevention Shelf Number: 124964 |
Author: Dronova, Natalia A. Title: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Pacific Salmon Fishing in Kamchatka Summary: Kamchatka is a large peninsula in the Northeast of Asia; it is connected to the mainland by an isthmus. As this territory is sur rounded by the cold and productive waters of the North Pacific, Kamchatka's economy historically depended on fishing and seafood processing. The fishing and processing of salmon played, and continue to play, a major role in the economy. At least ten species of salmon inhabit the waters of the penin sula, five of which (pink salmon, Oncorhynchus gorbucha; chum salmon, Oncorhynchus keta; sockeye salmon, Oncorhynchus nerka; coho salmon, Oncorhynchus kisutsch and chinook salmon, Oncorhynchus tschawytscha) are fished commercially. Salmon fishing has a long history in Kamchatka, and remains an important source of economic stability and external income. In addition, the industry supplies a significant portion of the entire country's seafood. Between 2000 and 2004, Pacific salmon comprised 6.17 % of the overall Russian catch, and 16.51% of total catch in Kamchatka's waters. Poaching has a significant negative impact on the Pacific salmon stock in Russian waters. Wellorganized illegal fishing undermines the management of the salmon stock, and in many cases leads to stock depletion. In addition, organized illegal fish ing contributes to corruption and criminalization of society, draws fishing income out of the region, and weakens incentives for eco nomic development of the region and sustainable fishing. In this report, the term "salmon poaching" implies the following: illegal and unrecorded commercial fishing (in excess of allocat ed quotas) in the seas and large rivers; illegal fishing for the purpose of roe extraction at the approach es to spawning grounds; and fishing by the local people, without permission, for personal consumption. The goal of this study was to analyze available information on various types of poaching, assess the scale of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and develop recommendations towards reducing the illegal catch. The report was prepared under the auspices of the Project for conservation of the Kamchatka salmon and its habitat. The proj ect was financed by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. Details: Moscos: Traffic Europe - Russia, 2008. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2012 at: www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_fish32.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Russia Keywords: Illegal Fishing (Russia) Shelf Number: 125271 |
Author: Newell, Josh Title: Plundering Russia's Far Eastern Taiga: Illegal Logging, Corruption and Trade Summary: In the past year, Russia has come under increased scrutiny for widespread corruption within its government and private sector. Capital flight, spotlighted by the 1999 scandal at the Bank of New York, has crippled Russia’s economic development. At the same time, Russia’s economic welfare – especially in the vast regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East – has been based on its exploitation of natural resources. Timber, fish, oil, and gold have been the backbone of Russia’s industrial development during the twentieth century. In the last decade, as Russia has struggled through economic reforms, “mafias” that control these resources in Siberia and the Russian Far East gained power and wealth, while Russia’s industrial sectors stagnated. Responding to a deepening economic crisis and the rules of the international market economy, regional governments across Siberia and the Russian Far East have facilitated large-scale extraction and export of natural resources in order to generate short-term, hard currency revenues. Private companies – both Russian and foreign – have moved quickly to obtain concessions of timber, minerals, and oil and gas at bargain prices. And the Russian President’s shocking decision (in May, 2000) to dissolve the Committee on Ecology and the Federal Forest Service, transfering their functions to the Ministry of Natural Resources, was the latest alarming demonstration of efforts by the industrial lobby to remove the last obstacles to uncontrolled, predatory exploitation of Russia’s forest resources. The Siberian taiga includes many of the world’s last forest frontiers – large, intact forest and wildland ecosystems that are under threat of exploitation. Representing more than half of the world’s coniferous forests, the Siberian taiga is vitally important for several reasons. Levels of biological diversity within the taiga are globally significant, and taiga forests store huge amounts of carbon which would otherwise exacerbate current levels of global warming. Despite growing interest worldwide in the conservation of Siberian and Russian Far Eastern forests, illegal logging and trade practices have also continued to increase. Responding to concerns about growing corruption in Russia and its relation to the exploitation of natural resources, the Vladivostok-based Bureau for Public Regional Campaigning, Tokyo-based Friends of the Earth – Japan, and California-based Pacific Environment undertook an investigation to show the extent of illegal logging and trade in the region. In the last stage, Greenpeace Russia took an active role in the work and provided substantial support to the authors and a significant amount of fresh information. This report provides the results of the investigation, along with specific recommendations for correcting those practices. Details: Vladivostok, Russia: Bureau for Regional Oriental Campaigns, Oakland, CA: Friends of the Earth–Japan, Tokyo, Japan and Pacific Environment & Resources Center,, 2000. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2012 at: http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/plundering.pdf Year: 2000 Country: Russia Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 125305 |
Author: Hartl, Jennifer Ann Title: Human Trafficking in the Russian Federation: An Examination of the Anti-Trafficking Efforts of the Federal Government, Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Organization for Migration Summary: The buying and selling of human beings for the purpose of exploiting their labor seems, to most people, a distant and archaic practice that disappeared in the mid–19th century. The trans-Atlantic slave trade and the infamous Middle Passage are phenomena studied in history courses, as though they were secured firmly in the past. To be sure, the ‘peculiar institution’ of the legal trade in human beings did end during the 19th century; the legal ownership of slaves in the United States ended when the Emancipation Proclamation was issued in 1863. Yet, the illegal trade in humans has continued and, today, illegal modern slavery exists on every continent in the world. It is sustained by global traffic of men, women, and children, which is financed and operated by international organized crime networks in some cases and unscrupulous individuals – including friends and family members of the enslaved – in others. The trafficking of human beings for the exploitation of their labor in the Russian Federation is the focus this paper. Specifically, this paper examines human trafficking operations in Russia and the efforts of the Russian government, non-governmental organizations, and the International Organization for Migration to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers, and provide assistance to survivors of trafficking. To put this into context, I first discuss the problem of human trafficking on a global scale, particularly focusing on the nature of human trafficking as a global issue as well explaining the differences between human trafficking and human smuggling. I then consider the root causes of human trafficking including both push and pull factors which sustain the business of trafficking in persons. I acknowledge the problem of conducting data and research on human trafficking, particularly methodological challenges, and the need for better data on human trafficking. My in-depth study of human trafficking in the Russian Federation includes discussions of the main forms of trafficking, health issues related to human trafficking, trafficking and the shadow economy, and the relationships between trafficking, corruption, and organized crime. I evaluate the anti-trafficking efforts in Russia by the Federal Government, non-governmental organizations, and the International Organization for Migration. Following and evaluation of anti-trafficking efforts in Russia, I will discuss recommendations for future anti-trafficking policy. Details: Iowa City: University of Iowa, 2010. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 26, 2012 at: http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1867&context=etd Year: 2010 Country: Russia Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 125407 |
Author: Markedonov, Sergey Title: The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia’s Volga Region Summary: In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Terrorist bombings and acts of sabotage in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya are perceived as somehow intrinsic to the region. But a recent tragedy in the Volga region suggests that this sort of violence—and the Islamist terrorists who perpetrate it—may not be confined to the Caucasus. On the morning of July 19, 2012, simultaneous terrorist attacks wounded the Tatarstan chief mufti, Ildis Faizov, and killed Valiulla Yakupov, the former deputy chairman of the Tatarstan Spiritual Board of Muslims (TSBM), a well-known Islamic theologian and public figure and one of the most consistent opponents of what Russian politicians and media refer to as Wahhabism. For the first time, official Islamic religious leaders from outside the North Caucasus became victims of Islamist terrorism. Three months later, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced it had prevented a large-scale terrorist attack in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, planned for the eve of the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. Two people killed in the counterterrorist operation had been suspected of the attacks on Faizov and Yakupov as well as other illegal activity. With these attacks and counterattacks, the problem of inter-Islamic tensions in the Volga region suddenly became real. To examine this increasingly serious situation, this report sheds light on the ideological sources and resources of radicalism in the Volga region, nonofficial Islamic movements’ support among the regional population, and opportunities for the potential growth of different forms of Islamist activities. It describes the origins of different nonofficial Islamic movements, as well as their post-Soviet development, ideology, and relationship with the authorities and official Muslim clergy. The report also offers practical approaches both for Russian domestic policy and for the U.S.-Russia security cooperation agenda. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Markedonov_RiseRadicalIslamicVolga_Web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Extremist Groups (Russia) Shelf Number: 127603 |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Russia: Illicit Financial Flows and the Role of the Underground Economy Summary: This study presents estimates of various types of capital flows to and from post-Soviet Russia. We argue that while netting out is a valid concept related to licit flows, illicit flows in both directions should be added in order to assess their adverse impact on the economy. Simultaneous equation modeling shows that total illicit flows both drive and are driven by underground economic activities. The latter is used as a proxy for the state of overall governance in Russia, which continues to be a serious issue. We suggest a range of domestic and international policy measures to curtail the cross-border transmission of illicit financial flows to and from Russia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2013. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 127632 |
Author: Pettengill, Julia Title: Russian Corruption: Domestic and international consequences How—and why—the U.K. should bolster anti-corruption efforts in the Russian Federation Summary: • The Russian Federation has made tremendous strides since the economic chaos of the post-Soviet 1990s. However, the country remains plagued by endemic corruption, suffusing a system in which the boundaries between the public and private sector are blurred. • This phenomenon has also gone hand-in-hand with the erosion of democratic development and return of authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin. It is used as a means of cementing the loyalty of the political elite, and flourishes in the absence of judicial independence and government transparency. • According to polls, corruption is one of the foremost causes of dissatisfaction amongst the Russian public, and was one of the issues which inspired the mass protests of 2011-2012. Anticorruption activism by individuals such as Alexey Navalny has highlighted the potential for this issue to be used as an impetus for political reform. • While the Russian government has integrated international anticorruption standards into its domestic legislation, those measures are selectively enforced, usually against political opponents. The government’s most recent anti-corruption measures are unlikely to prove successful, as they do not address the need for systemic reforms such as the introduction of political competition, judicial independence and breaking the government monopoly on the media. • Corruption in Russia is often tied, both directly and indirectly, to human rights abuses, by entrenching disrespect for individual rights in the political system. The case of the billionaire political prisoner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the wrongful imprisonment and death of the whistleblower attorney Sergei Magnitsky aptly demonstrate this connection. • Russian corruption undermines the economic prospects, civil liberties and fundamental dignity of the Russian population. However, the scale of this domestic problem also has significant ramifications in a globalised economy, as funds obtained through corruption are laundered and circulated throughout the world— often finding homes in global financial-centres such as London. Corrupt business practices exported into the international market undermine the stability and integrity of the international financial system. • The United Kingdom has one of the most sophisticated anti-corruption regulatory structures in the world, and is internationally respected for its judicial independence. However, the enforcement of these regulations, particularly by banks and by agencies charged with oversight of the importation of funds tied to corruption, has consistently been criticised as insufficient by the Financial Services Authority (F.S.A.) and other bodies. • The significant presence of Russian wealth and immigrants in the U.K. is a positive development. However, the likelihood of corrupt practices having been responsible for some Russian wealth should inform the assessment of funds brought into the country from Russia, as well as from other countries with reputations for corruption. • Improved domestic enforcement is crucial to any effort by the U.K. to bolster anti-corruption efforts abroad. Banks should be subjected to increased pressure to engage in more rigorous assessments of risk in relation to funds from Russia and other corrupt countries. Additionally, investment in the Serious Fraud Office should be increased. • The U.K. Parliament should undertake measures to enhance public scrutiny of corruption, including pushing forward libel reform. The current libel law regime aids those whose wealth is obtained through corruption by providing them with a significant weapon with which to forestall investigations and silence public criticism of their activities. • Parliament should pass a U.K. version of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, which was signed into law in the United States in December 2012, and imposes visa bans and asset freezes on the individuals implicated in the imprisonment and death of Magnitsky, as well as any other Russian citizen credibly suspected of human rights abuses. If the U.K. passed a similar measure, this would have direct consequences for the individuals who engage in rights abuses, often for personal benefit via corrupt practices, and chip away at the incentives for participating in this system. • The British government should increase its engagement with representative of Russia’s embattled, but burgeoning, civil society. This should extend to high-level meetings with ministers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.), as well as engagement with parliamentary forums such as relevant All-Party Parliamentary Groups (A.P.P.G.s). • The U.K. should robustly promote an anti-corruption agenda in international forums. In particular, the U.K. should use its G8 presidency this year to push for measurable benchmarks for Russia to undertake economic and political reforms relevant to a genuine systemic anti-corruption campaign. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2013 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/HJS-Russian-corruption-Report_Low-Res-Final-A5-4-Apr-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Corruption (Russia) Shelf Number: 128674 |
Author: Sukharenko, Alexander Title: Russian Organized Crime and its Impact on Foreign Economies Summary: According to Russia’s National Security Strategy (2009), criminalization of the economy is one of the long-term threats to internal security. In 2011, Russia’s shadow economy was probably worth 19 trillion rubles ($632 billion), or 35 percent of gross domestic product. While rising in absolute terms, the figure has fallen from 77 percent of GDP in 1994 and tumbled to as low as 28 percent in 2009-2010. This size is 3.5 times larger than corresponding G-7 economies like the U.S., France, and Canada (GFI, 2013). The World Economic Forum reports on global competiveness show that the level of harm of business caused by Russian organized crime is one of the highest, not only in Europe, but also in the whole world. In 2012, Russia ranks 114th out of 144 countries on this indicator (WEF, 2012). The lack of laws, lax regulation, corruption, and extreme forms of violence have enabled criminal organizations to make substantial inroads into lucrative economic sectors, including energy, metallurgy, construction, banking and retail. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (2012) estimated that some 1,000 different companies are controlled by organized crime. Organized crimes’ success can be attributed in part to the fact that many members of the elite, who are influential in economics and politics, are directly involved in illicit activities. Corrupt officials provide criminal front companies with licenses and quotas, customs exemptions, budgetary funds, municipal and state property. Further, law enforcement officials often help eliminate their competitors, and provide criminal bosses with protection from the law. A significant portion of criminal proceeds are transferred and laundered through offshore banks and shell companies. According to Global Financial Integrity, Russia is the fifth largest exporter of illicit capital over the past decade, behind China, Mexico, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, respectively (GFI, 2012). The Russian economy lost at least $211.5 billion in illicit financial outflows from 1994 to 2011 (or about US$11.8 billion per annum). These outflows represent the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion, and have serious negative consequences for the national economy (GFI, 2013). Some of this money has returned to Russia at favorable exchange rates, where it has been reinvested in other illicit schemes or used to purchase real estate, companies, and banks. As a result of this cycle, many criminal bosses made up a significant proportion of the new wealthy class. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2013. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 114, 2013: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-sukharenko-russian-organized-crime.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Money Laundering Shelf Number: 128775 |
Author: Salagaev, Alexander L. Title: Russian Youth Gangs Summary: It is almost impossible to say exactly when first youth gangs appeared in Russia. Difficulty in tracing back phenomenon of youth delinquency is connected to the fact that 20th century was one of the most difficult periods for the country. Organized youth gangs, being mostly the part of city culture, were not very evident in cities and towns of Tsarist Russia until industrialization process started in late 19th century. Nevertheless, massive appearance of youth gangs coincided with World Wat I and Russian Revolution of 1917, which was followed by widespread poverty, disorganization, violence. During the period 1917-1922 many youth gangs appeared in Russian cities which in fact were the first real example of union between adult criminals and so-called ‘besprizorniki’ (homeless and unattended children-youngsters) youth. Researchers of ‘besprizorniki’ gangs state, that during First World War and Civil War in Russia (1914-1920) new criminal youth subculture was formed. Youth gangs of that time had many characteristics of modern ones: structure, rules, special slang, traditions/folklore, etc. ‘Besprizorniki’ gang members, after growing up would participate in adult criminal groups and inveigle children into criminal activities, therefore giving way to reproduction of criminal youth subculture (Rudov 2002; Gizatullin 2008). In 1920-1940s Soviet authorities were partly able to counteract the problem of organized youth delinquency, though during World War II and the following years number of youngsters, engaged in organized criminal activities, once again increased rapidly. General stabilization of socio-economic situation in the USSR during 1950-1970 as well as efficient work of law-enforcement agencies diminished the scope of the problem so radically that Soviet officials even started to claim that organized delinquency was no longer a part of socialist society but could be witnessed solely in Capitalist West (Salagaev 2001). Things changed in late 1970s, when youth gangs started to appear in Russia once again. It should be noticed that most Russian researchers start contemporary youth gangs history from that very point since criminal youth groups which appeared in late 1970s are ‘forefathers’ of contemporary Russian youth gangs. Youth group violence, which came to existence in late 1970s evolved in the following years to become wide-spread phenomenon of organized youth delinquency of contemporary Russia. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2009(?). 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Draft version: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5039/Salagaev-Safin-Russian-Youth-Gangs.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Russia Keywords: Juvenile Delinquency Shelf Number: 129127 |
Author: Salagaev, Alexander Title: After-Effects of the Transition: Youth Criminal Careers in Russia Summary: The process of transition in Russia is characterized by contradictory values of different social groups. From one side the values of democracy and market economy are popularized, especially among youth, but from another, a lot of young people have been choosing alternative ‘criminal careers’. The proposed paper focuses on criminal life trajectories of young people, discusses norms, values, power resources, and behavioural patterns of members of juvenile delinquent gangs in the Volga area of Russia. The main conclusions drawn in the article are based on multi-method research study that includes 53 qualitative in-depth interviews with active gang members, expert interviews, and analysis of two criminal cases on gangs in Kazan city. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, (2003?). 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5039/Salagaev-Criminal-Careers.pdf Year: 2003 Country: Russia Keywords: Criminal Careers Shelf Number: 129129 |
Author: Kego, Walter Title: he Threat of Russian Criminal Money: Reassessing EU Anti-Money Laundering Policy Summary: Since the early 1990s, Russian criminal networks have plagued the European Union. The spread of organized crime groups from Russia, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, has brought with it increased violence and the rise of illicit networks. However, these organized crime groups thrive precisely because the Eastern European member states of the EU continue to allow the illicit money from these groups to pass through their financial institutions. Whether this is because of corruption or an institutional inability to counteract the problem, money laundering persists, which acts to undermine the EU as a whole. In 2005, the EU adopted the Third EU Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directive, which saw the ushering in of the new risk-based AML regulation strategy. The system has been lauded as a vast improvement to the bureaucratic and inflexible rule-based system utilized before. Nonetheless, eight years later it is necessary to assess the success and failures of the current system, and identify the need for increased government oversight in countries where money laundering continues to be a problem. Trends and evidence indicate that there are Eastern European banks actively involved in laundering illegal money from Russia into the rest of Europe. The Baltic States, for example, are often the first port of call for Russian and Ukrainian illicit and stolen capital. Numerous examples illustrate this continuing problem—the Vanagels Connection, for instance, a cross-border money laundering and offshore network that has concealed the origins of millions of illicit euros, has involved numerous Baltic banks. Governments of the Eastern European member states of the EU have begun to counteract money laundering, but their efforts are lethargic and remain mostly unsuccessful. To combat the continuing spread of money laundering in the EU, three steps must be taken. First, EU banks must do their part to increase compliance with anti-money laundering protocols and not engage in relationships with banks suspected of laundering illicit assets. Second, nations must take responsibility for their financial institutions that are harboring illicit funds. Through their financial intelligence units and justice system, they must ensure financial institutions are reporting money laundering cases, and confiscate illicit capital. Third, in order to ensure 6 Walter Kegö & Alexander Georgieff both of the former steps, the EU must take an active role in ensuring all EU countries not only comply, but also enforce money laundering laws. How these steps should be carried out will be covered in this paper. Russian organized crime continues to be a problem in Europe, and their power and reach will continue to grow if their financial channels are not dismantled. It is up to the EU to stop the rot and compel banks and governments to acknowledge that the long-term risk of being involved with the Russian criminal world is too high. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2013. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Stockholm Paper: Accessed July 9, 2013 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-kego-georgieff-russian-criminal-money.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Money Laundering Shelf Number: 129331 |
Author: Utkin, V.A. Title: Alternative Sanctions in Russia: Status, Problems and Prospects Summary: PRI's Moscow office has produced a new resource looking at the range of non-custodial sanctions available in Russia - how they developed, their application and impact in practice and how their effectiveness can be enhanced going forward. Details: Moscow: Penal Reform International, 2013. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2013 at: http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Alternative-sanctions-in-Russia_English.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Alternatives to Incarceration Shelf Number: 131606 |
Author: World Health Organization. Region Office for Europe Title: Interpersonal Violence and Alcohol in the Russian Federation Summary: Violent crime and alcohol consumption have increased considerably in the Russian Federation since the late 1980s with harmful health and social consequences for individuals, their families and friends and communities. Heavy alcohol consumption is closely associated with violent behaviour within the Russian Federation and internationally. The relationship between alcohol consumption and violent behaviour is complex, involving physiological, psychological, situational, social and cultural factors. Measures to control alcohol production and reduce consumption have reduced violent behaviour in the Russian Federation and elsewhere. However, round-the-clock sales, easy access to alcohol for minors and fierce economic competition between alcohol companies resulting in aggressive marketing techniques still need to be addressed in the Russian Federation. The multifaceted nature of alcohol-related violence highlights the need for a public health partnership involving health, social, education and criminal justice agencies. The Russian Federation is working closely with WHO to develop a public health approach to preventing violence. Details: Copenhagen: WHO, 2006. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Briefing: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/98804/E88757.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Russia Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, Disorder Shelf Number: 132151 |
Author: Kotelnikova, Zova Title: Consumption of Counterfeit Alcohol in Contemporary Russia: The Role of Cultural and Structural Factors Summary: The majority of Russians believe that counterfeit alcohol may cause death. Nevertheless, alcohol is a common target of counterfeiting in contemporary Russia as are branded clothes, accessories and audio products. This paper aims to reveal whether counterfeit alcohol consumers are distinctive in terms of structure and culture. It investigates the prevalence and structure of counterfeit alcohol purchasing and consumption; attitudes and beliefs about counterfeit alcohol; and predictors of counterfeit alcohol consumption. The research is based on the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE), an annual nationwide panel survey designed to monitor the health and economic welfare of households and individuals in the Russian Federation. The research findings demonstrate that cultural and structural factors contribute a lot to the consumption of counterfeit alcohol. Counterfeit alcohol consumption is associated with hazardous alcohol drinkers and homemade alcohol drinkers who tend to ignore trademarks and the taste of alcoholic beverages. Blur counterfeiting is a characteristic of hazardous alcohol drinkers and vodka-lovers who are inclined to be price sensitive and to ignore brands. Social networks play a significant role in consumption of counterfeit alcohol. Counterfeit alcohol consumers are highly likely to represent lower classes Details: Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 47/SOC/2014 : Accessed September 17, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2476856 Year: 2014 Country: Russia Keywords: Counterfeit Alcohol (Russia) Shelf Number: 133373 |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: License to Harm: Violence and Harassment against LGBT People and Activists in Russia Summary: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community has become the target of physical violence and everyday harassment. In the past two years there has been a surge of attacks by individuals and vigilante groups against LGBT people and activists. Russian law enforcement agencies appear to lack the will to take homophobic violence seriously and have done little to hold assailants accountable. This inaction has perpetuated the cycle of discrimination, harassment, and violence. In June 2013 Russia effectively entrenched legalized discrimination against LGBT people by adopting a federal law - the anti-LGBT "propaganda" law - banning distribution of information in the presence of children about LGBT relationships. License to Harm: Violence and Harassment against LGBT People and Activists in Russia documents the spread of homophobic and transphobic violence and everyday harassment against LGBT people and activists in the lead-up to and since the adoption of the 2013 anti-LGBT law. The report is based on dozens of interviews with LGBT people and activists from 16 cities and towns in Russia. Human Rights Watch deplores the wholly inadequate efforts by Russian law enforcement to effectively investigate anti-LGBT violence and curb its spread. Human Rights Watch urges Russian authorities to address the escalation of anti-LGBT violence in the country, prosecute homophobic attacks as hate crimes, and repeal the anti-LGBT "propaganda" law. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 15, 2015 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia1214_ForUpload_2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Russia Keywords: Bias-Motivated Crimes Shelf Number: 134404 |
Author: Smirnov, D.Y. (ed.) Title: Illegal Logging in the Russian Far East: Global Demand and Taiga Destruction Summary: Illegal logging of valuable temperate hardwoods has reached crisis proportions in the Russian Far East. Comparative analysis conducted by WWF Russia shows that from the period 2004-2011 the volume of Mongolian oak (the most valuable hardwood species) logged for export to China exceeded authorized logging volumes by 2-4 times. Much of this illegal logging takes place in the habitats of the Amur tiger and leads to their degradation. The materials included in this report are pertinent in the context of new legislation in the European Union, United States and other countries aimed at the exclusion of illegally sourced wood products, given that a significant proportion of the illegal timber logged in the Russian Far East enters such markets in the form of Chinese-manufactured furniture and flooring. This report is applicable for use by public forest agencies, forest industry, NGOs, students and academics and all those who are not indifferent to the fate of Russian forests. Details: Moscow: World Wildlife Fund, 2013. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 6, 2015 at: http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/565/files/original/WWF_Report_Illegal_Logging_in_the_Russian_Far_East_English.pdf?1366033508&_ga=1.195481708.1116613993.1430831295 Year: 2013 Country: Russia Keywords: Forests Shelf Number: 135511 |
Author: Lopina, Olga Title: Illegal Logging in Northwestern Russia and Export of Russian Forest Products to Sweden Summary: Illegal logging is one of key threats to forests worldwide. The trade of illegally harvested wood is a multi-million dollar industry going on in over 70 countries, in all types of forests, from Brazil to Canada, from Cameroon to Indonesia, and from Peru to Russia. Since illegal logging and trade activities tend to be concentrated in forests rich in plant and animal diversity, environmental costs are also high. Illegal logging became a big problem in the region, particularly in the past decade. The share of illegal wood in the export ranges from 25 to 30% and even to 50% by various estimates. Illegal logging is caused by both low level of control of logging operations from the government and lack of responsible approach of logging and wood trading companies, which do no not control the origin of wood. This results in severe overlogging in densely populated areas and overall changes of forest quality. Illegal logging has also significant social impact because it reduces income from forest resources. The latest estimates show that Russia loses approximately 1 milliard USD a year due to illegal logging and trade. Details: Moscow: World Wildlife Fund, 2003. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2015 at: www.wwf.ru Year: 2003 Country: Russia Keywords: Forests Shelf Number: 135512 |
Author: Goncharov, Max Title: Russian Underground 101 Summary: This research paper intends to provide a brief summary of the cybercriminal underground and shed light on the basic types of hacker activity in Russia. The bulk of the information in this paper was based on data gathered from online forums and services used by Russian cybercriminals. We also relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums' shopping sites. Online fraud has long since moved from being a mere hobby to a means for cybercriminals to earn a living. This paper examines what is being sold on the most popular cybercrime forums like antichat.ru, xeka.ru, and cardingcc.com; which items are in demand; and what services professional fraudsters offer. The fraudsters consider the Internet a playing field. It has many vulnerable sites and a great deal of unprotected data. While "protected" data do exist, the places they are stored in can still be hacked. Some cybercriminals shared their experience in hacking; generating traffic; and writing code for Trojans, exploits, and other malware via online articles. This paper discusses fundamental concepts that Russian hackers follow and the information they share with their peers. It also examines prices charged for various types of services, along with how prevalent the given services are in advertisements. The primary features of each type of activity and examples of associated service offerings are discussed as well. Each section of this paper focuses on a specific type of criminal activity, good, or service in the Russian underground market. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Russia Keywords: Computer Crime Shelf Number: 135689 |
Author: Goncharov, Max Title: Russian Underground Revisited Summary: In 2012, we published "Russian Underground 101," which provided a brief summary of the cybercriminal underground and shed light on the basic types of hacker activity in the region. This year, we revisited the Russian cybercriminal underground market to update the information we provided then. As in the 2012 paper, the bulk of the information in this paper was based on data gathered from online forums and services used by cybercriminals in the region. We also relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums' shopping sites. It also discusses fundamental concepts that hackers follow and the information they share with their peers and compares product and service prices from 2011 to 2013. Primary features of each product or service and examples are also provided. This paper is divided into five main sections - introduction, what characterizes the Russian underground market unique, products, services, and cybercriminal ware offerings in the market. This section discusses how we gathered data, normalized prices, and classified an offering as either a product or a service to answer questions we received when we published the 2012 paper. The second section characterizes the Russian underground market. It differentiates the region's underground market from others. The third and fourth sections, meanwhile, provide detailed descriptions of the most common products and services, respectively, offered in the Russian underground market. The last section provides pricing information on the products and services sold in the market. The cybercriminal underground economy, much like any other type of business economy, experiences pricing highs and lows, depending on demand and supply. In the Russian cybercriminal underground market's case, the huge demand for credit card credentials drives prices up. Then again, incidents such as the massive breaches involving popular retailers a few months ago, which increased the supply of such credentials, drive prices down. Unlike legitimate businesspeople, however, cybercriminals need to keep their identities secret and, as much as possible, hide all traces of their "business" transactions. Factors like this make real-time transactions almost impossible to do in the underground market. That said, business dealings in cybercriminal underground markets are much slower than in the legitimate business world. Even though the prices of most products and services sold in the Russian underground market have been decreasing, that does not mean that business is not doing well for cybercriminals. It can even mean that the market is growing, as we see more and more product and service offerings as time passes. Cybercriminals, like legitimate businesspeople, are also automating processes, resulting in lower product and service prices. Of course, "boutique" products and services remain expensive because these involve specialized knowledge and skills to develop that only a few bad guys have. What we all need to keep in mind is that as long as profit can be made, cybercriminals will continue to offer products and services that can make life easier for themselves and their peers. And as long as customers exist, the cybercriminal underground will thrive. As users and potential victims, we all need to keep an eye out for the latest misdeeds to stay safe from all kinds of digital threats. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-revisited.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Russia Keywords: Computer Crime Shelf Number: 135690 |
Author: Fainberg, Alisa Title: Spread the Word: Russia Social Media on the Service of Jihad Summary: The phenomenon of terrorists using the Internet for their purposes is not new: online activity of terrorist groups and terrorist individuals is registered since the late 1990s and thereafter underwent essential changes. Such an interest is caused first of all by those apparent advantages terrorists gained from the Internet: freedom from traditional media limitations, decentralization and safety, access to wider audience, etc. The engagement with cyberspace also changed the basic principles of communication within terrorist groups: from chain network to "all to all" communication, which in turn influenced many aspects of terrorist activity, such as propaganda, fundraising, etc. At the beginning, terrorist groups dealt with websites, and later on expanded their presence to forums and chatrooms, which, despite their effectiveness, still remained limited in reaching wide audiences, since were not highly publicized, and on the contrary, were frequently password-protected and used for inner communication. Nevertheless, there are online communication tools which were (and are) used by Al-Qaeda while planning the 9/11 terror attack and others. Also, Ayman al-Zawahiri, a successor of Osama bin Laden, places high emphasis on electronic warfare and "jihad of the bayan" (message). Today, due to such factors such as technological development and radical changes in the core of online communications, one can observe two main trends in terrorist online activity: grasping of popular social media networks and the dark web. While the dark web (as well as password-protected websites and forums) are used by terrorists mainly as a safe haven and for inner communication, mainstream websites and social media networks allow terrorist groups and individuals to turn their activities into borderless and cosmopolitan ones within the cyberspace and to get unparalleled tools for reaching out to as wide an audience as possible. Communication technologies used for planning and coordinating jihadists' actions, form the basis for a transition to a less organized structures and enhance the capacity of small terrorist groups, which are able to carry out their operations in a decentralized manner. Social media networks have become an integral part of jihadi groups' modus operandi and are used for the following purposes: offensive activities (gathering information on potential targets, threats of attacks, cyber attacks, etc.) operational uses (inner and outer communication, propaganda, radicalization, recruitment, fundraising, etc.) Despite the fact that the Islamic State group (ISIS) was obviously not the first terror organization to employ social media networks, the rise of ISIS has definitely highlighted the phenomenon, and tens (if not hundreds) of academic and media analytic papers were written on this subject. Indeed, without any doubts one may claim that it was the Islamic State (ISIS) group, who made the quantum leap and propelled jihadi involvement in online communication to the next level. Not least thanks to using internet technologies, ISIS has changed the very patterns of jihadi propaganda, and the full impact of these changes is still to be assessed. The group had developed a multidivisional media empire, which includes various divisions with certain specializations, such as al-Furkan Foundation, al-Hayat Media Center, al-Bayan Radio, etc., as well as smaller media groups targeting specific audiences in local languages. Social media networks became an essential part of that empire. Among other features characterizing ISIS' propaganda are wide coverage of audience, high diversity of propaganda materials, and active use of the most popular social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., which led to unprecedented ISIS expansion in the virtual world. For example, in just one month, from 17 September 2014 to 17 October 2014, the acronym "ISIS" was mentioned in Twitter about 4,000,000 times. Advantages terrorist groups gain from social media networks stem from their very nature. Each network is used according its general dedication: YouTube for uploading video materials (statements, footage, video games announcements, etc.), Twitter for real time updating, hashtags, and, for instance, for targeting Western news media in order to receive from them immediate reaction, etc. Moreover, democratic and dialogue-oriented, social media not just pushed the limits of propaganda distribution, but contributed to creation of a new form of jihadi propaganda - a public one, which is created, developed and distributed not by the official media centers of a particular terrorist group, but by its remote followers and supporters, who act at their own discretions. Seeking to expand their presence in social media for further advantages, ISIS media centers started to search for additional local social media platforms, and in 2013 put their attention to popular Russian social media networks: VKontakte (In Contact) and Odnoklassniki (Classmates), and for a relatively short period (compared to its presence on Facebook and Twitter) "occupied" these two with its propaganda activities. There are a number of pull factors which could explain such an attention of ISIS to the Runet (the Russian segment of Internet). First of all, Russian foreign fighters comprise a significant part of jihadists combating in Syria, and consequently are significant targets of ISIS propaganda. Secondly, until a certain point in 2014, Russian social media were hardly censored and security services did not initiate any measures against jihadi online activity in Vkontakte (VK) and Odnoklassniki (OK), which became another pulling factor for ISIS to turn its attention towards the Russian internet. This paper will examine the development of jihadist usage of Russian social media in the context of the branched system of ISIS' Russian-language media, the specifics of the message oriented toward Russian-speaking audience and translated through the platforms, as well as countering actions made by both government and private companies for a better understanding of the phenomenon. Details: Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1987/russia-social-media-on-the-service-of-jihad Year: 2017 Country: Russia Keywords: Islamist State Shelf Number: 146266 |
Author: Lain, Sarah Title: Corporate Raiding in Russia: Tackling the Legal, Semi-Legal and Illegal Practices that Constitute Reiderstvo Tactics Summary: This paper explores Russian corporate raiding (reiderstvo) tactics, which are used to pressure and/or steal businesses, often with the complicity of corrupt state authorities. Due to its complexity, defining reiderstvo in a way that is helpful can be challenging, but looking at the tactics involved in the practice, rather than the final result - the stealing of the business - can help to focus attention on some of the threats facing business in Russia and the damage done to the country's investment climate. Russian reiderstvo can be a complex process and defining it can be challenging. Indeed, the author found that experts disagree about whether supposedly modern-day examples of reiderstvo - such as the cases of the oil company Bashneft, the chemical producer Togliattiazot and Domodedovo airport - can be labelled as such. In their detailed analysis of how reiderstvo works, Louise Shelley and Judy Deane describe the practice as the use of a "host of illegal tactics ranging from bribery, forgery, corruption, intimidation, and violence employed by raiders to steal companies from their owners, making massive and rapid profits by selling off assets and laundering the proceeds'. This definition certainly holds true for many historical cases, where detailed analysis has revealed a fuller picture of the details and motivations. However, to understand problems associated with reiderstvo today, this definition narrows the focus too much. In reality, the definition is broader. Reiderstvo is not necessarily a single crime aimed at the theft of a business. Reiderstvo tactics are used as a means to achieve multiple and often contrasting ends. This makes the term itself somewhat misleading and at times unhelpful. Although corruption is usually involved, those using reiderstvo tactics do not exclusively rely on illegal practices; indeed, they blur the lines between legal, semi-legal and illegal practices. Often reiderstvo tactics are used as a way to pressure businesses to comply with corrupt requests for personal gain, rather than being used to steal a business outright. Studying the tactics used to pressure businesses as part of a broader view of reiderstvo, rather than concentrating conceptually on reiderstvo, can help to better focus attention on some of the significant threats facing business in Russia and the damage done by reiderstvo to the country's investment climate. Taking this view will assist in better articulating specific measures that need to be taken to combat the various tactics used by those engaged in the practice. This paper, therefore, mostly refers to 'reiderstvo tactics', rather than just 'reiderstvo', in an attempt to capture the wide range of ways that businesses are put under pressure in Russia. Reiderstvo tactics continue to be a concern for businesses in Russia, despite the issue having a lower public profile than during the 1990s and late 2000s. It is difficult to accurately measure the full extent of reiderstvo in Russia, in part because they are often included within broader legislative definitions, such as 'economic crimes', which do not cover or differentiate between the various tactics. It is also difficult because the state agencies tasked with investigating and enforcing against corporate crime are the very agencies that are frequently involved in reiderstvo tactics. These include the tax authorities, security services, courts and legal system, regulatory control agencies, local and regional administrations and law enforcement. Moreover, false accusations of reiderstvo can also be used by state authorities or corporate competitors to falsify criminal cases or pressure business. A key issue is the apparent lack of strong political will to implement comprehensive and consistent measures to protect businesses, despite rhetoric from President Vladimir Putin. The research for this paper - which included an in-depth review of the relevant academic literature and legislation, and interviews with business people, consultants and academic experts - revealed that - apart from a few high-level public cases - reiderstvo tactics are often used at the local level in Russia, frequently involving local political corruption. Initiatives such as the business ombudsman have raised awareness of the need for business protection, but the office is still limited politically in how far it can intervene, and structural issues remain at various levels of government that enable the abuse of power. The paper does not seek to duplicate previous work on reiderstvo, and it is by no means a comprehensive analysis of past and present reiderstvo cases. Instead, this paper seeks to address some of the assumptions surrounding reiderstvo, suggesting that it is more useful to refocus attention on the array of individual legal, semi-legal and illegal means used to pressure businesses. The sum is arguably less important than the parts in understanding how reiderstvo has evolved. By concentrating on reiderstvo tactics rather than the end result, this paper provides a new and improved framework through which Russian business associations and authorities could and should target initiatives to protect business rights. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper: Accessed September 2, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201707_rusi_corporate_raiding_in_russia_lain.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Russia Keywords: Corporate Crime Shelf Number: 147009 |
Author: Shelley Louise I. Title: The Rise of Reiderstvo: Implications for Russia and the West Summary: The Rise of Reiderstvo: Implications for Russia and the West by Dr. Louise Shelley and Ms. Judy Deane analyzes the evolution of business raiding and asset grabbing in Russia. It identifies the methodical tools and tactics used by business raiders and provides concrete examples of heretofore unexamined cases inside Russia, documenting the "playbook" for systematizing asset grabbing. Details: s.l.: Reiderstvo, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2017 at: http://reiderstvo.org/sites/default/files/The_Rise_of_Reiderstvo.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Russia Keywords: Crimes Against Businesses Shelf Number: 147174 |
Author: Hanson, Philip Title: Reiderstvo: Asset-Grabbing in Russia Summary: SUMMARY POINTS - The illicit acquisition of a business or part of a business in Russia (known as reiderstvo or asset-grabbing) is widespread and one of the risks of doing business there. - The common ingredients of reiderstvo are the complicity of any or all of the tax, security, law-enforcement and judicial authorities, and the use of charges that are either freely invented or examples of the highly selective use of accusations that could have been levelled at many other business people but were not. - Reiderstvo is made possible by corruption and contributes to market-entry barriers and the insufficient restructuring of incumbent firms. - The lack of protection of property rights that makes reiderstvo possible is one of the risks that make investment in Russia less attractive than it would otherwise be. This contributes to the modest level of fixed investment as a share of GDP, to the net outflow of private capital in all post-Soviet years except in 2005-07 and to the weakness of competition. The disincentives to invest apply to foreign as well as Russian firms. - Since early 2012 the phenomenon of asset-grabbing has been widely publicized in the Russian media, and calls to reform law enforcement and the courts, and to protect property rights have become commonplace. - Reiderstvo has elicited significant civil resistance. Business associations have played a role in launching counter-measures. The state has intervened to try and guide the campaign against reiderstvo but it does not monopolise that campaign as it does the broader, official 'anti-corruption campaign'. - At the same time, developments over the amnesty for economic crimes, the role of commercial courts and the management of tax charges show just how powerful the forces ranged in favour of the status quo can be. Details: London: Chatham House, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2017 at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140300AssetGrabbingRussiaHanson1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Russia Keywords: Crime Against Businesses Shelf Number: 147460 |
Author: Volkov, Vadim Title: The Prosecutor Effects in Trials for Petty Violent Offences in Russia Summary: The Russian Criminal Procedure Code specifies two possible types of trial for petty violent offences. The normal procedure is referred to as private prosecution. The victim initiates the case by submitting the claim directly to the court and acts as prosecutor. The second possible trial type for the same category of offences includes preliminary investigation by the police and the participation of the public prosecutor in court hearings on behalf of the victim. In practice both procedures are used with comparable frequency. The paper utilizes this duality of procedure and employs the quasi-experimental nonequivalent control group design to compare trial outcomes in the two types of trial and examine the effects associated with the participation of the public prosecutor in court. It uses two datasets: (a) that includes information on the entire population of defendants tried for offences in question between 2009 and 2013 and, (b) that resulted from the one-to-one merger of (a) with the dataset generated from court verdict texts available online. Controlling for the selection of cases into the public prosecutor track as well as for legal and extralegal characteristics of offence and offender, the analysis establishes that the participation of the public prosecutor in trials reduces the probability of acquittal and increases the probability of reconciliation of parties and case dismissal (conditional upon the admission of guilt). Another dimension of the public prosecutor effect is the mitigation of disparities in the likelihood of acquittal associated with the occupational status of defendant, save for the law enforcement employees. The latter are more likely to be acquitted than defendants with other occupational status and are less probable to reconcile with the victim. Details: Unpublished paper, 2018. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3130646 Year: 2018 Country: Russia Keywords: Criminal Procedure Shelf Number: 150243 |
Author: Willingham, Kelsey J.V. Title: Corruption, Capitalists, and the Crime-State Nexus: Criminal Infiltration of the Russian Economy and Implications for the Future Summary: At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russian organized crime has established itself as a major force in the economy of the Russian Federation, blurring the lines between legal and illegal economic activities. As early as 2001, it was estimated that organized crime controlled more than forty percent of the total economy of the Russian Federation. The Russian Interior Ministry has estimated that "two-thirds of the Russian economy is under the sway of organized crime, including 40 percent of private businesses, 60 percent of state-owned enterprises, and more than half of the 1,740 banks." In the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation ranked the Russian Federation 146th in the world, with significant concerns regarding fiscal freedom, property rights, and freedom from corruption. The World Bank has declared corruption the "single greatest threat to economic and social development." The continued influence of Russian organized crime over the Russian economy represents a direct threat to the future of the Russian Federation. This paper examines the evolution of organized crime and corruption in relation to the Russian economy. A historical perspective of Russian organized crime's economic role during the Soviet Union is provided, followed by an examination of the factors that enabled unprecedented economic infiltration during the transition period and privatization. Next is an assessment of organized criminal influence in three crucial sectors of the Russian economy: banking, mineral-industrial, and energy. Finally, this paper examines current policies and their shortcomings, and provides a series of policy recommendations for lessening the economic influence of organized crime and ensuring the development of a properly functioning market economy in the Russian Federation. Details: George Mason University, School of Public Policy, 2010. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices in Public policy, V. IV: Accessed September 13, 2018 at: https://journals.gmu.edu/newvoices/article/view/18 Year: 2010 Country: Russia Keywords: Economics and Crime Shelf Number: 151510 |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me": Weak State Response to Domestic Violence in Russia Summary: In Russia, like elsewhere, domestic violence affects all people, regardless of class, age, ethnicity, or other attributes, yet it is still viewed as a private, "family" matter. Based on interviews with domestic violence survivors, practicing lawyers, women's rights advocates, service providers, government officials and academics, "I Could Kill You and No One Will Stop Me" finds that Russia's law enforcement, judicial and social systems do not adequately protect or support women who face physical violence and other abuse at the hands of their partners. There is no law on domestic violence. Police often treat domestic violence survivors with hostility, refusing to register or investigate their complaints of abuse. They also funnel victims who wish to prosecute into the unfair and burdensome process of private prosecution, for which the victim must gather all necessary evidence and bear all costs. Russian state services fail to ensure support for many survivors of domestic violence, and the law does not provide for protection orders. Legislative amendments adopted in 2017 decriminalizing first battery offenses among family made it harder for women to seek prosecution of their abusers and weakened protections for victims. Human Rights Watch calls on the Russian parliament to adopt a law that treats domestic violence as a stand-alone criminal offense to be investigated and prosecuted by the state. It should also adopt legal provisions creating both immediate and longer-term protection orders. Russian authorities should ensure that police respond effectively to reports of domestic violence and that women facing domestic violence, including in rural areas, have effective access to support services, including, if needed, emergency temporary shelter Details: New York: HRW, 2018. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2018 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/russia1018_web3.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Russia Keywords: Abusive Men Shelf Number: 153237 |
Author: Strohmeyer, Taryn Title: "Great Laws, Bad Implementation": Criminal Justice Reform in Russia Since the Fall of the Soviet Union Summary: INTRODUCTION "We have a completely new code the best in the world, but with the worst implementation." This is the way eminent criminal defense attorney Murad Musaev of the law firm Musaev & Partners in Moscow described the situation in Russia since the implementation of post-Soviet reforms to the criminal justice system. This was not the first or the last time I would hear about this notion of the Russian criminal justice during my trip to Russia with The University of Chicago Law School International Immersion Program, during which a group of eleven University of Chicago Law students and myself travelled to Moscow and St. Petersburg, learning over the course of ten days about the legal regime, political landscape, history, and culture of Russia through coordinated meetings, talks, lunches, dinners, and events with lawyers, UChicago alums, professors, and advocates. Over and over again, my classmates and I heard the same notion regarding Russias post-Soviet transition, which began in the early 90s with a new constitution and led to the adoption of a new criminal code. The students, lawyers, and scholars we met in both Moscow and St. Petersburg all seemed to echo the same belief that Russia has "great laws" but simply suffers from "bad implementation." This paper will investigate this claim, analyzing what is meant by the idea that Russia has "great laws, bad implementation," laying out some of the issues with the Russian criminal justice transition and considering a few of the factors that might cause this impression or phenomenon. In the first section, this paper will provide general background on Russia's transition from communism to democracy, including the adoption of a new constitution and implementation of a new criminal code. The second section of this paper will describe the problems and failings of the Russian criminal justice system that lead scholars and lawyers to decry the codes "bad implementation." Then finally, the third section outlines some of the potential contributing factors and causes of the problems described in section two. Details: Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Law School, International Immersion Program Paper, 2017. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2019 at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=international_immersion_program_papers Year: 2017 Country: Russia Keywords: Communism Shelf Number: 154274 |
Author: Ryazantsev, Sergey Title: Trafficking in Human Beings for Labour Exploitation and Irregular Labour Migration in the Russian Federation: Forms, Trends and Countermeasures Summary: The aim of this research is to identify trends and patterns in human trafficking for labour exploitation as well as related irregular labour migration in the Russian Federation under the current socio-economic conditions and to formulate recommendations to combat these adverse phenomena. In this research trafficking for labour exploitation is considered from a broad perspective, not only focusing on the legal definition of trafficking for forced labour but also on less legally severe cases of labour exploitation that constitute and facilitate the context in which a trafficking situation can occur. Details: Moscow/Stockholm: ADSTRINGO, 2014. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2019 at: http://www.cbss.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/russian_eng_REPORT_PDF.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Russia Keywords: Forced Labor Shelf Number: 154783 |
Author: Travova, Ekaterina Title: Under Pressure? Performance Evaluation of police Officers as an Incentive to Cheat: Evidence from Drug Crimes in Russia Summary: This paper provides an empirical analysis of possible manipulations of amounts of seized drugs, based on a unique dataset that contains full information on drug crimes in Russia reported during 2013-2014. First, using a standard bunching estimator, I investigate the incentives for police officers to manipulate and find that the motivation most likely arises from the officers' performance evaluation system. Second, applying a novel bunching technique, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug amounts seized from repeat offenders. The overall effect of manipulation is an additional year of incarceration, and this is not dependent on a guilty plea. Details: Prague: Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, 2019. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series No. 637: Accessed June 26, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3396357 Year: 2019 Country: Russia Keywords: Drug Offenses Shelf Number: 156634 |