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Date: August 17, 2024 Sat
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Results for border security
247 results foundAuthor: Hite, Randolph C. Title: Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to address Testing and Performance Limitations that Place Key Technology Program at Risk Summary: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to deliver surveillance and decision-support technologies that create a virtual fence and situational awareness along the nation's borders with Mexico and Canada. This report examines the effectiveness of this program and makes recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security related to the content, review and approval of test planning documentation and the analysis, disclosure, and resolution of system problems. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office Source: Internet Resource; GAO-10-158 Year: 0 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 113577 Keywords: Border SecuritySurveillance |
Author: Latif, Nazia Title: Our Hidden Borders: The UK Border Agency's Powers of Detention Summary: This investigation report examines the international human rights standards relating to immigration and asylum. It then looks at legislation and policy on immigration and asylum in Northern Ireland and examines the extent to which this complies with the international standards. Details: Belfast: Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 2009. 98p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 117837 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Rights (Northern Ireland)Immigration |
Author: Stana, Richard M. Title: Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness Summary: This U.S. Border Patrol operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detention and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. This report assesses (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance, (2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint operations on nearby communities. The report recommends several actions to strengthen checkpoint design and staffing, and improve the measurement and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness, including community impact. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009. 138p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-09-824 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116244 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityContrabandIllegal Aliens |
Author: U.K. Border Agency Title: Protecting Our Border, Protecting the Public: The UK Border Agency's Five Year Strategy for Enforcing Our Immigration Rules and Addressing Immigration and Cross Border Crime Summary: This document both clarifies the extent of the UK Border Agency law enforcement activities and sets out a vision as to how, over the next five years, they will develop their capability to protect the public from the harm caused by illegal immigration and smuggling. It also sets out how the agency will support the work of its criminal justice partners in tackling non-immigration crime committed by foreign nationals in the UK. Details: London: UK Border Agency, 2010. 37p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118616 Keywords: Border CrimeBorder SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrationImmigrants |
Author: Willis, Henry H. Title: Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry Summary: "This report offers research and recommendations on ways to measure the overall efforts of the national border-security enterprise between ports of entry. To be meaningful, the set of measures for effectiveness of border security should be sound, reliable, useful, and general. Three Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions appear to currently be of special interest to DHS leadership because they are especially problematic: illegal drug control, counterterrorism, and illegal migration. The report recommends measuring performance of three fundamental functions that border-security efforts contribute to achieving national policy objectives: interdiction, deterrence, and exploiting networked intelligence. If the steps described here are taken, DHS and its components will be in a better position to discuss past performance and to provide reasoned justifications for future allocation of resources. Further, they will be able to relate their efforts to those of other agencies in pursuit of national objectives." Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. Source: Internet Resource; Technical Report Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119332 Keywords: Border SecurityCounterterrorismDrug ControlIllegal DrugsIllegal Immigration |
Author: Great Britain. HM Revenue and Customs Title: Tackling Tobacco Smuggling Together Summary: The Tackling Tobacco Smuggling strategy has been the foundation of the Government’s success in reducing the illicit tobacco market. A new partnership between HM Revenue & Customs and the UK Border Agency, drawing on the strengths of both organisations, will now take the strategy forward, ensuring that there is no let-up in the fight against tobacco smuggling. The strategic approach will focus on the following key objectives: 1) A broader collective understanding of the risks - through our combined risk and intelligence capability; 2) To make the most effective deployment of the combined resources; 3) By increasing the deterrent value of our activity – working collaboratively with other enforcement agencies at home and abroad; 4) By improving detection at the border; 5) By increasing the impact of inland enforcement activity; 6) By matking the most effective use of the combined powers and sanctions; 7) By strengthening international partnerships; and 8) By strengthening regional and local partnerhips. Details: Tackling Tobacco Smuggling Together: An Integrted Strategy for HM Revenue & Customs and the UK Border Agency Source: Internet Resource Year: 0 Country: Uruguay URL: Shelf Number: 119405 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal TradeTobacco Smuggling |
Author: Zhang, Sheldon Title: Get There Anyway You Can - Human Smuggling to the U.S. and the Policy Implications Summary: Human smuggling, although often sensationalized in the news media, is mostly a rather mundane business arrangement in which one assists or facilitates, often for a fee, the unauthorized entry of a foreign national into another country. In recent years, illegal immigration and the associated human smuggling activities have gone through discernible changes, some of which are brought about by the intensified debate on securing the nation’s borders and probably more are caused by the economic conditions and fundamental shifts in U.S. labor market. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 19p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Brief Series, No. 8. Accessed August 10, 2010 at http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php Shelf Number: 119583 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingIllegal AliensIllegal Immigration |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain Summary: Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. GAO was asked to review cruise ship security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at seven ports. GAO selected these locations based on factors such as the number of sailings from each port. Results of the visits provided additional information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the unified border security agency in DHS, conduct a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide passenger reservation data to CBP would benefit homeland security, and if found to be of substantial benefit, determine the appropriate mechanism to issue this requirement. DHS concurred with the recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf Shelf Number: 119650 Keywords: Border SecurityCruise Ships, SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorism, Prevention |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Better Usage of Electronic Passport Security Features Could Improve Fraud Detention Summary: In 2005, the Department of State (State) began issuing electronic passports (e-passports) with embedded computer chips that store information identical to that printed in the passport. By agreement with State, the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) produces blank e-passport books. Two foreign companies are used by GPO to produce e-passport covers, including the computer chips embedded in them. At U.S. ports of entry, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspects passports. GAO was asked to examine potential risks to national security posed by using foreign suppliers for U.S. e-passport computer chips. This report specifically examines the following two risks: (1) Can the computer chips used in U.S. e-passports be altered or forged to fraudulently enter the United States? (2) What risk could malicious code on the U.S. e-passport computer chip pose to national security? To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials at State, GPO, and DHS relating to the U.S. e-passport design and manufacturing and e-passport inspection systems and procedures. GAO recommends that DHS implement the systems needed to fully verify e-passport digital signatures at U.S. ports of entry, and in coordination with State, implement an approach to obtain the necessary data to validate the digital signatures on U.S. and other nations’ e-passports. DHS agreed with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 23, 2010 at: http://www.gpo.gov/pdfs/congressional/GAO_Rpt_BorderSecurity.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gpo.gov/pdfs/congressional/GAO_Rpt_BorderSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 117702 Keywords: Border SecurityFraudPassports |
Author: Kalacska, Margaret Title: Technological Integration As A Means of Enhancing Border Security and Reducing Transnational Crime Summary: “This report examines the porosity of the Canada-US border, focusing on the areas between ports-of-entry. Such locations have traditionally been perceived as low risk areas, but actually facilitate criminal activities that endanger the national security and economies of both countries. This analysis also considers the root causes of major illicit activities that flourish as transnational ventures in these border regions, and reiterates the need for increasing security without imposing further restrictions on legitimate travel and trade. This report makes eight recommendations to improve security between the major ports-of-entry: • Increase technological infrastructure for the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) and Coast Guard teams between the ports-of-entry. • Increase basic security and communications measures at the small and medium rural ports-of-entry. • Increase international interoperability and communication (such as real-time, integrated shared databases on criminal records, investigations in progress, and outstanding warrants) between the Canadian Border Services Agency, US Customs and Borders Protection, IBET and municipal, provincial, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Such a united, coordinated effort will be more successful at intercepting transnational crime and cross border insurgency. • Develop a mechanism to enable agents from one country to pursue fleeing suspects across the border to maintain visual surveillance on their whereabouts until authorities from the other country are able to respond. • Harmonize the sentences for smugglers and traffickers of narcotics, arms and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora-related products between Canada and the US without eligibility for early release for those convicted in Canada. • Remove the allowance of acquiring and possessing methamphetamine and methylene-dioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) chemical precursors that do not have any legitimate industrial use. • Increase the use of operationally proven technology to improve security in the areas between ports-of-entry to provide real-time information on threats to enforcement teams. • Increase the number of IBET teams: these teams should have the capability to respond to threats near real-time. Identifying the most likely between-ports-of-entry crossing points from actual data, and the field experiences of the officers on the ground, will increase the number of individuals apprehended for illegally crossing the border having significant impacts on illicit enterprises. If used correctly, appropriate technology will augment the effectiveness of the agents on the ground, especially when resources are limited.” Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Shelf Number: 119748 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsSmugglingTransnational Crime |
Author: Hale, Geoffrey Title: In Search of Effective Border Management Summary: Effective border security is compatible with the efficient management of border processes to allow the free flow of low-risk people and goods for purposes of mutual benefit between countries. Recent economic shocks have demonstrated that neither Americans nor Canadians can take their prosperity and economic security for granted. The risks of external and domestic terror attacks increasingly resemble long-term challenges to effective security and border management such as organized criminal activity and unregulated migration, rather than the crisis atmosphere which marked initial responses to 9/11. Failure to consider border security and facilitation issues in this context is likely to result in sub-optimal security and economic outcomes. Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: A Changing World: Canadian Foreign Policy Priorities, No. 3: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Shelf Number: 119750 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecuritySmugglingTerrorismTrafficking |
Author: Seniora, Jihan Title: Managing Land Borders and the Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons Summary: Border controls are an important dimension of the international efforts to combat the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition. Indeed, even if their relevance sometimes seems to be challenged by some changes (such as new technologies and globalization), borders remain the most visible sign of the sovereignty of a State on its territory. Borders management are crucial to a State’s involvement in the protection of its population. The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) across green borders is characterized by specific dynamics which must be taken into account in the actions to prevent it: a strong link between cross-border trafficking of SALW and other transnational crimes, the role of transborder communities and the fact that border areas can become a shelter for criminal groups, rebels or traffickers and finally the “ant trade”. Because these aspects have an impact on the demand in arms, the intensity and the direction of the traffics between neighbouring countries, they deserve particular attention in the efforts to strengthen border monitoring and control at checkpoints. For an effective border management several challenges must be highlighted. First, the flow of illicit SALW must be considered a separate issue when conceiving and organising the management. Second, controls at checkpoints must be optimised by clarifying the role of the agencies involved in border management and their human and technical needs according to realities on the ground. Controls at checkpoints must be reinforced by a careful and coordinated monitoring along the border. Measures also need to be taken upstream: national legislations, identification of the actors involved in trafficking by intelligence services, etc. A fourth issue is corruption which affects the very existence of border management. A stronger cooperation between agencies at intra- and inter-level as well as between populations in border areas and the political and administrative authorities can also contribute to a more effective border management. Finally, technology transfers and training, tailored to the needs of each State also prove of great importance. Details: Brussels: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la securite (GRIP), 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2010/2010-3_EN.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2010/2010-3_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 120011 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Southwest Border: More Timely Border Patrol Access and Training Could Improve Security Operations and Natural Resource Protection on Federal Lands Summary: When operating on federal lands, Border Patrol has responsibilities under several federal land management laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Wilderness Act, and Endangered Species Act. Border Patrol must obtain permission or a permit from federal land management agencies before its agents can maintain roads and install surveillance equipment on these lands. Because land management agencies are also responsible for ensuring compliance with land management laws, Border Patrol generally coordinates its responsibilities under these laws with land management agencies through national and local interagency agreements. The most comprehensive agreement is a 2006 memorandum of understanding intended to guide Border Patrol activities on federal lands. Border Patrol's access to portions of some federal lands along the southwestern border has been limited because of certain land management laws, according to patrol agents-in-charge for 17 of the 26 stations, resulting in delays and restrictions in agents' patrolling and monitoring these lands. Specifically, patrol agents-in-charge for 14 of the 17 stations reported that they have been unable to obtain a permit or permission to access certain areas in a timely manner because of how long it takes for land managers to conduct required environmental and historic property assessments. The 2006 memorandum of understanding directs the agencies to cooperate with one another to complete, in an expedited manner, all compliance required by applicable federal laws, but such cooperation has not always occurred. For example, Border Patrol requested permission to move surveillance equipment to an area, but by the time the land manager conducted a historic property assessment and granted permission--more than 4 months after the initial request--illegal traffic had shifted to other areas. Despite the access delays and restrictions, 22 of the 26 agents-in-charge reported that the overall security status of their jurisdiction is not affected by land management laws. Instead, factors such as the remoteness and ruggedness of the terrain have the greatest effect on their ability to achieve operational control. Although 4 agents-in-charge reported that delays and restrictions have affected their ability to achieve or maintain operational control, they either have not requested resources for increased or timelier access or have had their requests denied by senior Border Patrol officials, who said that other needs were more important. While federal land managers in the borderlands region rely on Border Patrol to collect data on the extent of cross-border illegal activities on their lands, the extent of the land managers' data collection efforts on the effects of these illegal activities has varied. Some land managers monitor areas on a routine basis, some document environmental damage on an ad hoc basis, and still others collect no such data. Where collected, land managers have used these data for several purposes, including restoring lands and providing Border Patrol agents with environmental awareness training. With regard to training, most agents-in-charge wanted more-frequent, area-specific training to be provided by land managers. GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take steps to help Border Patrol expedite access to portions of federal lands by more quickly initiating required assessments. In commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: 2010. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-38: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1138.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1138.pdf Shelf Number: 120023 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityOffenses Against the Environment |
Author: Wilson, Christopher E. Title: Immigration and Security: Does the New Immigration Law Protect the People of Arizona? Summary: On July 29, the first pieces of Arizona’s new immigration law, SB 1070, take effect without the most controversial parts of the legislation. The sections that mandated that Arizona police enforce federal immigration laws have been blocked by a federal judge pending further review. If fully implemented, the law would direct police to ascertain the immigration status of people they stop or detain while enforcing other laws, make it a state crime for immigrants to not have papers documenting legal status in their possession, and otherwise increase state pressure on unauthorized (some would say all) immigrants. Public opinion on the law is conflicted. Despite concerns by a majority of U.S. residents that the law may promote racial profiling or represent an unconstitutional usurpation of federal authority, the law enjoys broad popular support in Arizona and the nation. Recent polls have found that 60% of Americans and 55% of Arizonans are in favor of SB 1070. However, nationally 54% fear that the law will lead to racial profiling. While most of the current media attention is focusing on the legal challenges and potential effects of the law on civil rights, this analysis explores whether the law, intended address public security concerns in Arizona, would effectively achieve this goal. Too often, immigrants that enter the U.S. in search of economic opportunities are confused with the drug traffickers and organized crime groups that also illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border. To the extent that these two groups are conflated, effective policy regarding immigration and border security is much less likely to be implemented. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson INternational center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Immigration%20and%20Security%20in%20Arizona%207.28.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Immigration%20and%20Security%20in%20Arizona%207.28.pdf Shelf Number: 120158 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal AliensImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Aguiar, Jose Carlos Title: Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices and the Control of Illegality in South America Summary: The Tri-Border Region in South America spreads across the frontiers of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. It encompasses a trans-border urban conglomerate of about 600 thousands inhabitants in the three countries. Through the years, it has been a frontera porosa (porous border) where trafficking boomed after Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner declared Ciudad del Este a free-trade zone in the 1960s. The city soon became a shopping paradise for counterfeit cigarettes and spirits. Yet, since the 2000s there are signs of some reordering in the region. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government encouraged national states to control the flows of people and goods at the region. Allegedly, illegal activities are headed by international networks, which would finance religious extremism around the globe. The governments have accordingly launched a number of plans to improve surveillance, such as the Integrated System of Migration Registration (SICaM in Spanish) in Argentina in 2005 and the 'sacoleiro law' in 2009, an attempt to regulate smuggling in Brazil. Paraguay has also embarked in 2009 in the renewal of the customs office at the international bridge. These policies reveal programmes of increasing state intervention to halt trafficking in electronics, drugs, weapons and humans, and any kind of undocumented border crossing. This article poses the concept border synergy to capture the mobility of goods and values across boundaries, which entails a double connotation, that of the border as the national limit between countries, but also the one defining legal and illegal domains. This argument is based on ethnographic material gathered at the Tri-Border Region during a period of three years. Participant observations, interviews and visual recording were among the research techniques applied. The informants include local entrepreneurs and sellers, social workers, religious leaders, municipal and federal authorities, and smugglers. Polyphony guarantees here a dense ethnographic description. The results presented give evidence from an anthropological perspective on the trans-border smuggling across the national frontiers of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, and the extent economic agents manipulate borders in region. The policies implemented to 'regulate' smuggling and halt illegal practices at the Tri-Border Region raise relevant questions regarding the study of border cities, transnational trade and illegality. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices Series, No. 6: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/181_New_Voices_Series_6_-_Stretching_the_Border_-_Smuggling_Practices_and_the_Control_of_Illegality_in_South_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/181_New_Voices_Series_6_-_Stretching_the_Border_-_Smuggling_Practices_and_the_Control_of_Illegality_in_South_America.pdf Shelf Number: 120164 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingIllicit TradeSmuggling |
Author: Doucey, Marie Title: Gender and Human Security in the Haitian-Dominican Border Zone Summary: The border shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic (DR) is a North-South 391 km porous and neglected piece of land. Its vulnerability to various forms of traffcking and smuggling defnitely poses a risk to the safety of the area at a national, binational and regional level. Security in Haiti is a recurrent topic for researchers and policy analysts. The violence in Port-au-Prince's slums and the challenges faced by the security sector since the 1990's have been extensively studied. However, the border zone has rarely been explored from a security point of view, and, so far, there is no report1 that captures the dynamics and tensions related to gender and human security on either side of the Haitian-Dominican border. This research paper seeks to fill that gap and expose relevant findings that can help us understand a complex region, which since the earthquake has become an area of interest to many researchers and policy-makers. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices Series, No. 8: Accessed November 10, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/New%20Voices%20Series%208.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Haiti URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/New%20Voices%20Series%208.pdf Shelf Number: 120078 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman Trafficking (Haiti)Violence Against Women |
Author: Larsen, Jacqueline Joudo Title: Migration and People Trafficking in Southeast Asia Summary: Although the number of identified cases of trafficking into Australia is relatively low, the hidden nature of this crime and reluctance of trafficked persons to report to authorities suggests that a number of cases may go unidentified and the problem may be more extensive than available data indicates. Much can be learned about the risks of exploitation, including trafficking, from an overview of undocumented movement throughout the region. The risk of people being trafficked to Australia is largely mitigated by well-protected borders and economic opportunities in more accessible regions. However, management of the risks of trafficking in the southeast Asian region is connected to strategies that aim to prevent trafficking at source countries and to the activities of Australians and Australian entities in those countries. Characteristics of migration in southeast Asia—such as the role of informal networks in facilitating movement and the exploitation of migrants for non-sex work as well as sex work—hold important implications for Australia’s response to people trafficking. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 401: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/8/6/%7BD868274B-2F97-45DB-BA32-3DBB7290A7C4%7Dtandi401.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/8/6/%7BD868274B-2F97-45DB-BA32-3DBB7290A7C4%7Dtandi401.pdf Shelf Number: 120302 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Trafficking (Australia)MigrantsMigrationSexual Exploitation |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in Federal Government's Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead federal agency responsible for inspecting travelers who seek to smuggle large volumes of cash--called bulk cash--when leaving the country through land ports of entry. It is estimated that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a year in bulk cash across the southwest border. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is responsible for reducing the risk of cross-border smuggling of funds through the use of devices called stored value, such as prepaid cards. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent of actions taken by CBP to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country and any challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps, if any, of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements of stored value, and (3) if gaps exist, the extent to which FinCEN has addressed them. To conduct its work, GAO observed outbound operations at five land ports of entry. GAO also reviewed statutes, rules, and other information for stored value. This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2010. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. In March 2009, CBP created an Outbound Enforcement Program aimed at stemming the flow of bulk cash leaving the country, but further actions could be taken to address program challenges. Under the program, CBP inspects travelers leaving the country at all 25 land ports of entry along the southwest border. On the Northern border, inspections are conducted at the discretion of the Port Director. From March 2009 through June 2010, CBP seized about $41 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the country at land ports of entry. Stemming the flow of bulk cash, however, is a difficult and challenging task. For example, CBP is unable to inspect every traveler leaving the country at land ports of entry and smugglers of illicit goods have opportunities to circumvent the inspection process. Other challenges involve limited technology, infrastructure, and procedures to support outbound operations. CBP is in the early phases of this program and has not yet taken some actions to gain a better understanding of how well the program is working, such as gathering data for measuring program costs and benefits. By gathering data for measuring expected program costs and benefits, CBP could be in a better position to weigh the costs of any proposed expansion of the outbound inspection program against likely outcomes. Regulatory gaps of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements exist with the use of stored value. For example, travelers must report transporting more than $10,000 in monetary instruments or currency at one time when leaving the country, but FinCEN does not have a similar requirement for travelers transporting stored value. Similarly, certain anti-money laundering regulations, such as reports on suspicious activities, do not apply to the entire stored value industry. The nature and extent of the use of stored value for cross-border currency smuggling and other illegal activities remains unknown, but federal law enforcement agencies are concerned about its use. FinCEN is developing regulations, as required by the Credit CARD Act of 2009, to address gaps in regulations related to the use of stored value for criminal purposes, but much work remains. FinCEN has not developed a management plan that includes, among other things, target dates for completing the regulations. Developing such a plan could help FinCEN better manage its rulemaking effort. When it issues the regulations, law enforcement agencies and FinCEN may be challenged in ensuring compliance by travelers and industry. For example, FinCEN will be responsible for numerous tasks including issuing guidance for compliance examiners, revising the way in which it tracks suspicious activities related to stored value, and addressing gaps in anti-money laundering regulations for off-shore entities that issue and sell stored value. GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, gather data on program costs and benefits and that FinCEN develop a plan, including target dates, to better manage its rulemaking process. CBP and FinCEN concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-73: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Shelf Number: 120339 Keywords: Border SecurityFinancial CrimesIllegalMoney LaunderingSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands Summary: Federal and tribal lands on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol)--is responsible for securing these lands, while the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) manage natural resources and protect the public. GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border security threats have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies operating on these lands have shared threat information and communications; and (3) federal agencies have coordinated budgets, resources, and strategies. GAO reviewed interagency agreements and threat assessments; analyzed enforcement data from 2007 through 2009; and interviewed officials at headquarters and two Border Patrol sectors selected due to high volume of illegal cross-border activity (Tucson) and limited ability to detect this activity (Spokane). GAO's observations cannot be generalized to all sectors but provide insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands. On the southwest border, the Tucson sector is the primary entry point for marijuana smugglers and illegal aliens, and over the last 3 years apprehensions on federal lands have not kept pace with Border Patrol estimates of the number of illegal entries, indicating that the threat to federal lands may be increasing. On the northern border, the Spokane sector is a primary entry point for air smugglers of high-potency marijuana, but technical challenges preclude fully assessing threats to these borderlands. In the Tucson sector, federal land managers said they would like additional guidance to determine when illegal cross-border activity poses a sufficient public safety risk for them to restrict or close access to federal lands. DOI and USDA efforts to determine whether additional guidance is needed--consistent with internal control standards for the federal government and in line with DHS contingency plans for southwest border violence--could help federal land managers more easily balance public safety and access to federal borderlands. Information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA have increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing interagency agreements. Agencies established forums and liaisons to exchange information; however, in the Tucson sector, agencies did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law enforcement officials maintained access to threat information and compatible secure radio communications for daily operations. Coordination in these areas could better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. There has been little interagency coordination to share intelligence assessments of border security threats to federal lands and develop budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these threats. Interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing agreements in these areas could better leverage law enforcement partner resources and knowledge for more effective border security operations on federal lands. GAO is recommending that DOI and USDA determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures, and that DHS, DOI, and USDA further implement interagency agreements. DHS, DOI, and USDA concurred with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-177: Accessed December 10, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11177.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11177.pdf Shelf Number: 120443 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecuritySmuggling |
Author: Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr. Title: Brick by Brick: A Half-Decade of Immigration Enforcement and the Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform Summary: The United States has undertaken a massive immigration enforcement initiative over the past five years. The report that follows, written by C. Stewart Verdery, assistant secretary for border and transportation security policy at the Department of Homeland Security from 2003-2005, catalogues the spectrum of measures and the breadth of enforcement resources that have been deployed during this period. The Center for American Progress believes that strong border enforcement and tough worksite enforcement on law-breaking employers are fundamental components of a rational immigration system. That does not mean, however, that we endorse all of the enforcement tactics that have been adopted over the past five years. Many of the initiatives that are detailed in this report reflect sensible steps to restore the rule of law. But CAP believes that others—the so-called “287g program,” for example—misallocate resources and have had a destructive effect on communities. From CAP’s perspective, initiatives like the expansion of expedited removal and mandatory detention policies also raise serious concerns of fairness, proportionality, and due process. Moreover, any massive enforcement apparatus struggles to maintain the integrity of established standards and operationalize leadership priorities. So even smartly designed enforcement policies can become deeply flawed when implemented, leading to widespread rights violations and other unintended consequences. Irrespective of where one comes down on the wisdom of specific enforcement measures, the unprecedented commitment of resources to border and interior enforcement is inarguable. Anti-immigration agitators and politicians who seek to use immigration as a wedge issue argue that we cannot reform our legal immigration system until we have secured the border. The findings contained in this report demonstrate the untenability of this “enforcement-first” line of argument. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/pdf/dhs_enforcement.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/pdf/dhs_enforcement.pdf Shelf Number: 120630 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Ipsos MORI Title: A Feasibility Study for a Survey of Migrants Summary: The Analysis, Research and Knowledge Management Directorate (ARK) in the UK Border Agency commissioned Ipsos MORI and the Institute of Education to undertake a feasibility study for a large-scale face-to-face survey of migrants in the UK. The purpose of the feasibility study was to inform the design of a survey of migrants, looking at how to design and interview a statistically robust sample and the appropriate questions to adopt in such a survey. The feasibility study involved: 1. workshops with the UK Border Agency and other stakeholders to identify survey requirements; 2. the development of a definition of ’migrant’ for use in the survey; 3. the development of a sample design; 4. testing fieldwork recruitment and data collection methods to be used; and 5. the development of a questionnaire, including cognitive testing in several languages. This report focuses on the sampling and field methods aspects of the feasibility study. A separate technical report provides details on other issues, including question development. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 57p.; Technical Report; Questionnaire Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 92: Accessed January 31, 2011 at: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs11/occ92.pdf Year: 0 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs11/occ92.pdf Shelf Number: 120637 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrationMigrants (U.K.)Minorities |
Author: Martin, David A. Title: Immigration Enforcement: Beyond the Border and the Workplace Summary: New immigration legislation must include changes to achieve effective and resolute enforcement of the immigration laws. Merely beefing up border policing (currently the most popular enforcement strategy) is insufficient. Over the last decade, the influx of unauthorized migrants has reached record levels even though border enforcement has greatly expanded, primarily because migrants know that getting past the border opens wide opportunities in the US job market, owing to the near absence of enforcement there. The most important reform is therefore well-crafted workplace screening. Because border and workplace enforcement have been addressed elsewhere, this policy brief offers suggestions for other key enforcement improvements that Congress and the executive branch should implement. Primarily, reform should: 1. Assure that removal orders are enforced by: • expanding the use of fugitive operations teams; • wider application of civil and criminal penalties to absconders, including legislative changes to facilitate civil levies; • more strategic use of detention, including in connection with supervised release programs modeled on a Vera Institute pilot project; • shortening hearing times while preserving due process, including testing the efficiency effects of government-provided counsel through a limited pilot project. 2. Build better protections against fraud into the systems leading to a grant of benefits, rather than relying on after-the-fact prosecutions or revocations 3. Mainstream immigration enforcement, including through carefully structured engagement of state and local officers, while assuring that the central roles are played by federal officers expert in immigration law. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, No. 19: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TF19_Martin.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TF19_Martin.pdf Shelf Number: 120651 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigrants |
Author: Ginsburg, Susan Title: Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy Summary: This report provides a blueprint for an integrated strategy to thwart terrorists by focusing on terrorist mobility. While all but the most recent government counterterrorism strategies since 9/11 omit mobility as a distinct element of terrorism requiring its own operational strategy, the report argues that terrorist mobility deserves comparable attention a nd resources to those devoted to terrorist finance and communications. She describes the elements of a terrorist mobility strategy that can use leads generated by terrorists' need to travel to counter their ability to enter, live in, or move within the United States and like-minded countries. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf Shelf Number: 120652 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland DefenseMigrationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Users' Views of the Points-Based System Summary: This report presents a summary of findings from research conducted with applicants, sponsors and UK Border Agency staff regarding their experiences of the new Points-Based System (PBS), which was introduced in February 2008. The PBS is described in more detail in section 1 of the main report. The aim of this research was to explore how the PBS was being received by those using it in its early stages and to identify potential areas for improvement. The UK Border Agency was keen to gather evidence from a range of different users, including Tier 1, 2 and 5 applicants who had applied to work in he UK, as well as their sponsors and representatives, and UK Border Agency staff. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 49: Accessed February 2, 2011 at: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs11/horr49c.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs11/horr49c.pdf Shelf Number: 120656 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrantsImmigration (U.K.) |
Author: Capps, Randy Title: Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement Summary: This report assesses the implementation and U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE) oversight of the nation's 72 active 287(g) programs, examining whether local enforcement matches up with ICE's articulated priorities. The study provides ICE data nationally and by jurisdiction on non-citizens referred for removal through 287(g) as well as the criminal offenses for which they were detained, and assesses the impact of enforcement on local communities. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf Shelf Number: 120724 Keywords: Border SecurityCustomsIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Marenin, Otwin Title: Challenges for Integrated Border Management in the European Union Summary: The expansion of the European Union has required a rethinking of how the external borders of the EU can best be protected against transnational crime, illegal immigration, trafficking in goods and people, non-legitimate asylum seekers and terrorist-related threats. The history, strategic logic, issues faced and current policies for securing the expanding external borders of the EU through the integrated border management (IBM) vision and strategy will be described and critically analysed. The paper is based on information in publicly available documents from EU institutions, scholarly writings on borders and the management of border controls, my own prior writings on border controls and police reforms, and a few interviews with participants involved in creating a new EU integrated border management system. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010. 161p. Source: Internet Resource: DCAF Occasional Paper - No. 17: Accessed February 14, 2011 at: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id=114407 Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id=114407 Shelf Number: 120756 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationTrafficking in GoodsTransnational Crime |
Author: Stana, Richard M. Title: Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that the nearly 2,000-mile U.S. border with Mexico is vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity. The Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol), within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is responsible for securing the border between U.S. ports of entry and has divided responsibility for southwest border miles among nine Border Patrol sectors. CBP reported spending about $3 billion on Border Patrol's southwest border efforts in fiscal year 2010, apprehending over 445,000 illegal entries. This testimony provides preliminary observations on (1) the extent to which DHS reported progress in achieving operational control--Border Patrol was able to detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity--of the southwest border; (2) the extent to which operational control reflects Border Patrol's ability to respond to illegal activity at the border or after entry into the United States; and (3) how DHS reports the transition to new border security measures will change oversight and resource requirements for securing the southwest border. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO analyzed DHS border security documents and data supporting border security measures reported by DHS for fiscal years 2005 through 2010, and interviewed DHS officials. DHS generally agreed with the information in this statement and provided clarifying language, which we incorporated. Border Patrol reported achieving varying levels of operational control for 873 of the nearly 2,000 southwest border miles at the end of fiscal year 2010, increasing an average of 126 miles each year from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under operational control using factors such as the numbers of illegal entries and apprehensions and relative risk. CBP attributed the increase to additional infrastructure, technology, and personnel. Yuma sector officials reported achieving operational control for all of its 126 border miles; however, the other eight southwest border sectors reported achieving operational control of 11 to 86 percent of their border miles. Border Patrol attributed the uneven progress across sectors to multiple factors, including prioritizing resource deployment to sectors deemed to have greater risk from illegal activity. Border Patrol reported that its levels of operational control for most border miles reflected its ability to respond to illegal activity after entry into the United States and not at the immediate border. Operational control encompassed two of the five levels used to classify the security level of each border mile. The two levels of control differed in the extent that Border Patrol resources were available to either deter or detect and apprehend illegal entries at the immediate border (controlled) versus a multi-tiered deployment of Border Patrol resources to deter, detect, and apprehend illegal entries after entry into the United States; sometimes 100 miles or more away (managed). GAO's preliminary analysis of the 873 border miles under operational control in 2010 showed that about 129 miles (15 percent) were classified as "controlled" and the remaining 85 percent were classified as "managed." Border Patrol stated that operational control does not require its agents to be able to detect and apprehend all illegal entries. Yuma sector reported operational control for all its miles although Border Patrol did not have the ability to detect and apprehend illegal entries that use ultra-light aircraft and tunnels. DHS is replacing its border security measures, which could temporarily reduce oversight, and reports it may reduce resources requested for securing the southwest border. Border Patrol had established border miles under effective control as a measure of border security. DHS plans to improve the quality of boarder security measures by developing new measures with a more quantitative methodology. CBP is developing a new methodology and measures for border security, which CBP expects to be in place by fiscal year 2012. In the meantime, the absence of border security outcome measures in DHS's Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report could reduce oversight. CBP does not have an estimate of the time and efforts needed to secure the border; however, DHS, CBP, and Border Patrol headquarters officials said that this new approach to border security is expected to be more flexible and cost-effective. As a result, Border Patrol headquarters officials expect that they will request fewer resources to secure the border. GAO will continue to assess this issue and report the final results later this year. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-374T: Accessed February 16, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11374t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11374t.pdf Shelf Number: 120806 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal Immigrants |
Author: Friesendorf, Cornelius, ed. Title: Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector Summary: Security sector personnel are well-placed to assist in the fight against human trafficking: by identifying victims; investigating networks; disrupting operations; and prosecuting traffickers. Moreover, trafficking, like many crimes, flourishes where the rule of law is weak, such as in post-conflict situations. Restoring security based on the rule of law can reduce vulnerability to human trafficking and other types of organised crime. Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector provides practical guidance on how practitioners in the security sector can take measures against modern-day slavery. Details: Vienna and Geneva: National Defence Academy and Australian Ministry of Defence and Sports, 2009. 514p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2011 at: http://www.acrath.org.au/multimedia/downld/var/Strategies_Against_Human_Trafficiking-The_Role_of_the_Security_Sector_Vienna&Geneva_Sep2009.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.acrath.org.au/multimedia/downld/var/Strategies_Against_Human_Trafficiking-The_Role_of_the_Security_Sector_Vienna&Geneva_Sep2009.pdf Shelf Number: 120807 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman TraffickingOrganized CrimeSecurity Personnel |
Author: Haddal, Chad C. Title: Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol Summary: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation’s first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency’s adoption of “Prevention Through Deterrence” as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In addition to a workforce of over 20,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border. In the course of discharging its duties, the USBP patrols 8,000 miles of American international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. However, there are significant geographic, political, and immigration-related differences between the northern border with Canada and the Southwest border with Mexico. Accordingly, the USBP deploys a different mix of personnel and resources along the two borders. Due to the fact that approximately 98.7% of unauthorized migrant apprehensions by the USBP occur along the Southwest border, the USBP deploys over 85% of its agents there to deter illegal immigration. The northern border is more than two times longer than the Southwest border, and features far lower numbers of aliens attempting to enter illegally, but may be more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. As a consequence of this, the USBP has focused its northern border efforts on deploying technology and cooperating closely with Canadian authorities through the creation of International Border Enforcement Teams. Some issues for Congress to consider could include the slow rate of integration between the USBP’s biometric database of illegal aliens and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) biometric database of criminals and terrorists; the number of unauthorized aliens who die attempting to enter the country each year; the increasing attacks on Border Patrol agents, and the threat posed by terrorists along the sparsely defended northern border as well as the more porous Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: RL32562: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Shelf Number: 121027 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityContrabandDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Nunez-Neto, Blas Title: Border Security: Apprehensions of “Other Than Mexican” Aliens Summary: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with securing our nation’s borders between official ports of entry (POE). As the USBP discharges its mission it encounters unauthorized aliens from around the world attempting to illegally enter the United States. In fiscal year (FY) 2004, USBP agents apprehended 1.16 million people attempting to enter the country illegally between official POE; 93% of these aliens were Mexican nationals. Because the vast majority of people apprehended each year by the USBP are Mexican nationals, the agency categorizes aliens as Mexicans or Other Than Mexicans (OTM). Over the past three years, OTM apprehensions have more than tripled nationwide and have been concentrated along the South Texas border. The reasons for this dramatic increase, and its geographical concentration in Texas, are not altogether clear. The number of people entering the country illegally between POE, and the concomitant proliferation of human and drug smuggling networks, can present risks to national security due to the ever-present threat of terrorism. Terrorists and terrorist organizations could leverage these illicit networks to smuggle a person or weapon of mass destruction into the United States, while the large number of aliens attempting to enter the country illegally could potentially provide cover for the terrorists. Additionally, the proceeds from these smuggling networks could potentially be used to finance terrorism. The issue of OTM apprehensions has received publicity recently for many of these reasons, which were highlighted during congressional testimony by DHS then-Deputy Secretary Admiral James Loy when he stated that Al-Qaeda is considering infiltrating the Southwest border due to a belief that “illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.” OTMs apprehended along the Southwest border by the USBP between official POE cannot be returned to Mexico because Mexico will not accept them. Instead, they must be returned to their countries of origin, or third countries that will accept them, by the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, DRO does not have enough detention beds to accommodate every OTM that is apprehended. As a result of this, the majority of OTMs apprehended by the USBP are released into the interior of the United States with notices to appear before an immigration judge. Most of these released OTMs fail to show up for their hearings and are not ultimately removed. In order to address the increasing number of OTMs being apprehended and circumvent the regular removal process, the USBP is currently expanding its Expedited Removal (ER) program. Issues for Congress include the potential for terrorist infiltration, the lack of detention bed-space that causes OTMs to be released into the interior of the country, and how best to deploy DHS resources to address the growing number of OTMs entering into the country illegally. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: RL33097: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf Shelf Number: 121028 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Tait, Sean Title: Cooperation and Accountability in the Cross-border Policing of Southern Africa Summary: This publication presents seven articles concerning aspects of cross-border police cooperation in the Southern African region, with an emphasis (in part) on the issue of police accountability. As the papers make clear, the policing of crimes and the attempt to further peace in the region by joint action of two or more national police forces has grown apace in recent years. There are now regular joint police operations in a number of the states comprising the South African Development Community (SADC). An institutional structure has likewise been formed that brings together heads of police forces in the region. Numerous international treaties and agreements help regulate this police cooperation, which takes place both on a formal and on an ad hoc informal basis. While the emerging system has many flaws, there have also been notable successes, as the contributions demonstrate. Establishing effective cross-border police cooperation has been a tricky business, complicated by the diversity among the police agencies in the region and their largely under-resourced nature. It is perhaps surprising that in a relatively short space of time it has proceeded so far. This publication examines some of the current events and the extent to which the issue of accountability of police personnel in cross-border activities has been embodied in policing policy and practice. Details: Cape Town, South Africa: African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, 2010. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 18, 2011 at: http://apcof.org.za/File_uploads/File/9781920355944-content.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South Africa URL: http://apcof.org.za/File_uploads/File/9781920355944-content.pdf Shelf Number: 121068 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityPolice AccountabilityPolicing (South Africa) |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General Title: Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry Summary: The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative requires citizens of the United States, Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico arriving at land ports of entry to present passports or other approved documents to enter the United States. Although the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative became effective at land ports on June 1, 2009, Customs and Border Protection is not fully enforcing the new document requirement. Customs and Border Protection is using informed compliance procedures to educate noncompliant travelers about the new document requirement. Customs and Border Protection is reporting an average compliance rate of 96% at its land border crossings. Our objective was to determine whether Customs and Border Protection is prepared to fully enforce the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative’s new document requirement at land ports of entry. Customs and Border Protection is not prepared to fully enforce the new document requirement at land ports of entry. Although Customs and Border Protection has acquired and deployed substantial technological tools to aid in inspecting travelers, Customs and Border Protection has not analyzed the impact that a substantial increase in secondary inspection workload will have on secondary inspection staffing and infrastructure during full enforcement. The reported Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative compliance rates during the initial eight-month informed compliance period indicate noncompliant travelers arriving at the agency’s 39 busiest land ports may increase the secondary inspection workloads at these ports by an average of 73% if all noncompliant travelers required secondary inspections. The agency has not finalized the operating procedures its officers will use to verify the identity and citizenship of noncompliant travelers. Customs and Border Protection officials told us other priorities have precluded them from completing the operating procedures. Until the new travel document requirement is fully enforced, the agency continues to incur risk that persons falsely claiming to be citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda may be admitted to the United States. We are making four recommendations to better prepare the agency to fully implement the new requirement at land ports of entry. CBP agreed with our proposed corrective actions and is in the process of implementation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: OIG-11-16: Accessed March 21, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_11-16_Nov10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_11-16_Nov10.pdf Shelf Number: 121081 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityHomeland Security |
Author: Council of the Baltic Sea States. Expert Group for Cooperation on Children at Risk Title: Baltic Sea Region – Information Management to Prevent Trafficking BSR IMPT Summary: This report is one of the results of a project implemented by the Expert Group for Cooperation on Children at Risk, EGCC, within the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Unaccompanied and trafficked children is one of the priority areas for the EGCC. The “Baltic Sea Region – Information Management to Prevent Trafficking” project, BSR IMPT, explores information structures on child trafficking with the ambition of mapping existing information and intelligence structures aiming to picture information streams. Trafficking in children may appear a relatively minor problem. The official numbers – cases brought to trial – are very low. However, there may or may not be a hidden number. In any event, as trafficking constitutes a phenomenon closely associated with exploitation, prevention and protection measures need to address the ‘wider pool’ of children at risk of exploitation and, possibly therefore, trafficking. This is emphasised in the report. The report is grounded on information obtained mainly from three expert seminars and around 60 interviews in nine countries within the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Information management, IM, is a complex area, where a number of factors in the end determine how information is managed in terms of stream and channels. This report starts from sectors or groups of professionals involved and the complexity was stressed by many of the professionals, who may not be in a position to see the full picture and therefore are often uncertain where to address suspicions and intelligence which may be vital for other professionals. Professionals retrieve information from various sources. They may read reports or participate in conferences and seminars, which along with a number of training sessions provide professionals with the opportunity to share information. A number of professionals also engage in networks with colleagues or at a multi-sector level. Information is categorised. One category is anecdotes and myths; single stories or incidents that may or may not be cases of trafficking of children. There are huge challenges associated with exploring, verifying and making such information available across sectors, i.e. to police, social authorities, NGOs and others. The same is true of the flow of information between national, regional and local levels or across borders. In many countries reporting mechanisms between the local and national levels seem weak. The report concludes that information flows are facilitated if there is a centralised national organ to manage and orchestrate compilation and dissemination, along with a number of networks feeding it information. Here Denmark, Norway and, to some extent, Finland are well positioned. Equally CBSS and the EGCC pursue a role of centralised structure, functioning at the regional level as a convenor and amplifier by facilitating information flows across borders between the countries in the Baltic Sea region. National Contact Points, NCPs, have a central position in assuring links with the national level. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: Council of the Baltic Sea States, The Children's Unit, 2010. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 23, 2011 at: http://www.childcentre.info/public/CBSS_IMPT_report_new.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.childcentre.info/public/CBSS_IMPT_report_new.pdf Shelf Number: 121111 Keywords: Border SecurityChild TraffickingHuman TraffickingSexual Exploitation |
Author: Jacques, Genevieve Title: United States - Mexico Walls, Abuses, and Deaths at the Borders Flagrant Violations of the Rights of Undocumented Migrants on their Way to the United States Summary: There are few places in the world where tensions, due to mass migration of population in the globalization era, are as outrageous as in the geographical area that extends from Central America to the south of The United States. This space, comprising Mexico and its southern and northern borders, is a customary route followed by poor people who walk and travel overland to get to the territory and labor market of the United States. This area also traces the breakpoint line between a rich and dominant America, in economic and political terms, and a poor America that is subject to the game rules established by its northern neighbor. The borders, intended to establish the limits of national sovereignty, are the place where the main contradictions between the logics of global liberal economy, one of the main migration causes, and national policies to handle this migration flows take place, almost in a caricature way. Beyond the hydraulic metaphors of migration flows or currents, we have to remember that we are talking about human beings who take part in survival strategies but who are also victims of contradictions, inconsistencies and injustices of the region’s migration policies in force. The price they have to pay, in economic terms but especially in terms of suffering, humiliation and violation of their human rights and dignity, are very high, at the level of the extreme tensions prevailing in this part of the world. The following three figures give an idea of the extension and seriousness of the phenomenon: - In 2006, Mexican authorities questioned and deported 179,000 foreigners in transit for the United States (94 percent from Central America); - During the same year, Border Patrols of the United States deported 858,000 foreigners to their home country, between which 514,000 Mexicans, and immigration services apprehended and deported about 50,000 migrants from other Central American countries. It is estimated that, during the last 12 years, over 4,000 migrants died crossing the “wall” (both physical and virtual) that separates Mexico from the United States, this is 15 times more the number of people who died crossing the Berlin Wall during the 28 years it existed. Since new border control measures were established by United States authorities in 2001, the number of deaths has increased dramatically and reached 473 in 2005, from which 260 occurred in Arizona’s desert. According to authorities and to most of the mass media, these migrants are “illegal”. We do not agree with the use of this term, which leads to saying that human beings are illegal. The “illegality” is created by migration policies that do not correspond with reality. Furthermore, this adjective entails a tendency to criminalize immigration, making migrants that enter national territories, without all their administrative papers in order, pass for “criminals”. This semantic transfer is often accompanied by a real amalgam between migrants, undocumented people and terrorists. This evolution, particularly obvious since the current United States’ administration assumed office, has severe consequences because it leads the public opinion to legitimize the most repressive measures in the name of national security and to divert its attention from the violations of this population’s main human rights. Details: Paris: FIDH, 2008. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2011 at: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/USAMexiquemigran488ang.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/USAMexiquemigran488ang.pdf Shelf Number: 121196 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHuman RightsIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Wuebbels, Mark Title: Demystifying Human Smuggling Operations Along the Arizona-Mexican Border Summary: The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and analysis of the problem of human smuggling along the U.S. - Mexican border. Using open source material, economic analysis, and experts’ opinions, the paper details the scope, methods, and associated negative externalities of human smuggling. In writing this report, careful attention was made to separate between incidents of trafficking and human smuggling. However, since many times media articles, especially in Spanish, use the term trafficking instead of smuggling, some of the citations and original sources will include the terms human trafficking. As such, to the greatest extent, information applicable only to human trafficking has been eliminated. This paper is split into two parts. The first part begins by defining human smuggling and its component crimes. To this end, it lays out the international, federal, and state legal definitions of human smuggling as well as the federal jurisdictions for human smuggling’s component crimes. After defining the problem, this paper discuses the logic behind the decision to migrate. It reflects the prevailing wisdom among migration experts as well as an alternative explanation of the decision making process. Next, the paper lays out the various estimates of the UDA population and extrapolates the potential flow of undocumented aliens (UDA) across U.S. borders. The paper then describes the UDA population in terms of nationality and socio-economic characteristics. Finally, the paper presents the necessary elements for smuggling operations. The second part is a primer on current smuggling operations in different states in Mexico. Using open source literature from Mexican and U.S. newspapers, it outlines human smuggling methods, the roads and transportation they use, and the path UDAs use to reach the United States. In general, the purpose is to show how the fundamental elements of human smuggling are expressed in reality. Details: Report prepared for the Arizona State Attorney General, 2005. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2011 at: http://policy-traccc.gmu.edu/resources/publications/wuebbe01.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://policy-traccc.gmu.edu/resources/publications/wuebbe01.pdf Shelf Number: 121216 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Earls, Michael Title: Mission Accomplished II: The Bush Record on Immigration Enforcement Summary: This study reveals that the enforcement of immigration laws during the first five years of the Bush Administration is down 30% from the last five years of the Clinton Administration, despite an increase in border personnel. Details: Washington, DC: Third Way, 2007. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/73/Third_Way_Report_-_Mission_Accomplished_II_-_The_Bush_Record_on_Immigration_Enforcement.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/73/Third_Way_Report_-_Mission_Accomplished_II_-_The_Bush_Record_on_Immigration_Enforcement.pdf Shelf Number: 121447 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration (U.S.) |
Author: Ford, Jess T. Title: Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide Summary: Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas. ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-315: Accessed April 22, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Shelf Number: 121478 Keywords: Border SecurityComputer SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigrationTerrorismVisa Security |
Author: Brown, Matthew M. Title: Engaging the Borderlands: Options for the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations Summary: The security of the U.S.-Mexican border is an issue of considerable interest for both countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement has created a web of symbiotic links between the two countries. Unfortunately, this has also presented opportunities for illegal transit. These opportunities are increasingly exploited by Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) whose actions are destabilizing Mexico and increasingly penetrating into the United States. Increasing levels of violence, intimidation, and influence have rapidly become intolerable, demanding a government response. While widespread use of the U.S. military remains an option, the costs both economic and operational, make the use an unviable one. Rather a mixed approach of U.S. and Mexican capacity building and economic assistance is a preferred alternative. The increased capacity of U.S. and Mexican security and law enforcement organizations will over time disrupt, then dismantle the Mexican DTOs. Simultaneously, economic assistance aimed at developing impoverished Mexican regions will both legitimize the Mexican government while marginalizing the influx of narco-dollars. This combined approach provides stability to the region, increases cooperation between neighboring governments, and fosters further legitimate economic growth in the region. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2011 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136619&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136619&coll=limited Shelf Number: 121487 Keywords: Border SecurityCartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime |
Author: Kubo, Koji Title: Smuggling and Import Duties in Myanmar Summary: This paper examines the effects of import duties on smuggling in Myanmar. Following Fisman and Wei (2004), the reporting discrepancies between Myanmar's imports records and corresponding exports recorded by trading partners are regarded as indicative of smuggling. The paper studies whether reporting discrepancies differ across trading partners as well as across time. Our main findings are first, that the hike in import duties in June 2004 helped to widen the reporting discrepancies, which suggests smuggling for tax evasion purposes and second, that reporting discrepancies differ considerably across trading partners: land borders appear to be particularly attractive venues for smugglers. Details: Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: IDE Discussion Paper No. 258: Accessed April 26, 2011 at: http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/920/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.258_kubo.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Burma URL: http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/920/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.258_kubo.pdf Shelf Number: 121495 Keywords: Border SecuritySmuggling (Myanmar, Burma)Tax Evasion |
Author: Papademetriou, Demetrios G. Title: A New Architecture for Border Management Summary: This report commissioned to inform the work of MPI’s Transatlantic Council on Migration for its meeting on “Restoring Trust in the Management of Migration and Borders” examines the emergence of a new border architecture resulting from the explosion in global travel and the dawning of the age of risk. This new border architecture must respond effectively to the seemingly competing demands of facilitating mobility while better managing the risks associated with cross-border travel (e.g. terrorism, the entry of unwanted migrants, and organized crime). The report examines the information-sharing agreements, technology innovations, and multilateral partnerships that have emerged as key components of the new architecture for border management, and discusses challenges and considerations for the future. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/borderarchitecture.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/borderarchitecture.pdf Shelf Number: 121571 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal AliensImmigrationOrganized CrimeTerrorism |
Author: Gounev, Philip Title: Better Management of EU Borders Through Cooperation Summary: Since the adoption of the concept of ‘integrated management system for external borders’ by the Laeken European Council in 2001, a number of policy documents have drawn attention to the need for increased inter-agency cooperation at the EU’s external borders. Following the Commission Communication of 7 May 2002 on integrated border management and the Feasibility study of 30 May 2002 on a European Border Police, the Seville European Council approved an ‘Action Plan on the Management of External Borders of the European Union’ (2002). Later, the 2005 Hague Programme built upon the Tampere Programme, setting out the objectives and mapping the development of a ‘second generation’ of measures designed to strengthen management of the external borders in general. Some of the achievements of putting into practice these policy visions and programmes included the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex); and the adoption of the EU Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (2006). In addition, the 2005 Community Customs Code (CCC) established a number of systems aiming at tightening security requirements for the movement of goods across international borders. Despite the extensive development of common standards in the management of the EU’s external borders, the forms and extent of cooperation between Customs and Border Guards has been left to the individual Member States. As a result, the forms and extent of cooperation differ greatly, as some countries either have very extensive and substantial cooperation, or have even merged institutions (as in the UK), while in others relations between the two agencies are characterised by a deep divide, competition, and lack of communication. The present report analyses, for the first time, the existing forms of cooperation between Customs and Border Guards, and the obstacles to effective cooperation between them. National, geographic, institutional and cultural factors determine the diversity in border management practices and inter-agency operational modes across the EU. Nevertheless, best practices need to be reviewed and applied, to improve the protection and management of the EU’s external borders. The purpose of this study is both to identify best practices and the obstacles to cooperation between the Border Guard (BG) and Customs agencies and to make recommendations to the Eureopean Commission (EC), the Member States (MSs) and BG and Customs administrations working at the external borders for improving their efficiency and effectiveness through enhanced cooperation. Best practices and obstacles to cooperation were identified based on the information collected from an electronic survey of BG and Customs officers in 26 MSs,8 230 interviews, and 25 site visits to 12 MSs. In addition to the analysis of the legal and operational aspects of cooperation, the underlying institutional, political and cultural contexts in which Customs and BG operate were examined. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011. 441p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2011 at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/docs/customs_bgs_final.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/docs/customs_bgs_final.pdf Shelf Number: 121893 Keywords: Border Control (Europe)Border Patrol121893Border SecurityCustoms Agencies |
Author: Finklea, Kristin M. Title: Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence Summary: There has been an increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. Currently, U.S. federal officials deny that the recent increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern. The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, and this threat is driven partly by U.S. demand for drugs. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the Southwest border (SWB). The nature of the conflict between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of these smuggling routes into the United States. Further, in an illegal marketplace — such as that of illicit drugs — where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes. When assessing the potential implications of the increased violence in Mexico, one of the central concerns for Congress is the potential for what has been termed “spillover” violence — an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities — excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence — other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the SWB and in the nation’s interior). Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to draw definitive claims about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41075_20110125.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41075_20110125.pdf Shelf Number: 121947 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDrug Trafficking (U.S. and Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Manuel, Kate M. Title: State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 Summary: On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted S.B. 1070, which is designed to discourage and deter the entry or presence of aliens who lack lawful status under federal immigration law. Potentially sweeping in effect, the measure requires state and local law enforcement officials to facilitate the detection of unauthorized aliens in their daily enforcement activities. The measure also establishes criminal penalties under state law, in addition to those already imposed under federal law, for alien smuggling offenses and failure to carry or complete alien registration documents. Further, it makes it a crime under Arizona law for an unauthorized alien to apply for or perform work in the state, either as an employee or an independent contractor. The enactment of S.B. 1070 has sparked significant legal and policy debate. Supporters argue that federal enforcement of immigration law has not adequately deterred the migration of unauthorized aliens into Arizona, and that state action is both necessary and appropriate to combat the negative effects of unauthorized immigration. Opponents argue, among other things, that S.B. 1070 will be expensive and disruptive, will be susceptible to uneven application, and can undermine community policing by discouraging cooperation with state and local law enforcement. In part to respond to these concerns, the Arizona State Legislature modified S.B. 1070 on April 30, 2010, through the approval of H.B. 2162. Whenever states enact laws or adopt policies to affect the entry or stay of noncitizens, including aliens present in the United States without legal authorization, questions can arise whether Congress has preempted their implementation. For instance, Congress may pass a law to preempt state law expressly. Further, especially in areas of strong federal interest, as evidenced by broad congressional regulation and direct federal enforcement, state law may be found to be preempted implicitly. Analyzing implicit preemption issues can often be difficult in the abstract. Prior to actual implementation, it might be hard to assess whether state law impermissibly frustrates federal regulation. Nevertheless, authority under S.B. 1070, as originally adopted, for law enforcement personnel to investigate the immigration status of any individual with whom they have “lawful contact,” upon reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence, could plausibly have been interpreted to call for an unprecedented level of state immigration enforcement as part of routine policing. H.B. 2162, however, has limited this investigative authority. Provisions in S.B. 1070 criminalizing certain immigration-related conduct also may be subject to preemption challenges. The legal vulnerability of these provisions may depend on their relationship to traditional state police powers and potential frustration of uniform national immigration policies, among other factors. In addition to preemption issues, S.B. 1070 arguably might raise other constitutional considerations, including issues associated with racial profiling. Assessing these potential legal issues may be difficult before there is evidence of how S.B. 1070, as modified, is implemented and applied in practice. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/science/immigcrs.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/science/immigcrs.pdf Shelf Number: 121948 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal Aliens (Arizona)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Collett, Elizabeth Title: Emerging Transatlantic Security Dilemmas in Border Management Summary: The sheer volume of global travel, which has risen exponentially since the 1960s, puts border management systems under constant pressure. Beyond that growth, border management systems have had to contend with additional risks associated with these movements. Mass-casualty terrorist attacks, rising illegal immigration, and human trafficking have exposed weaknesses in states’ ability to manage their borders effectively. This policy memo examines the infrastructure and policy developments – and challenges – that have occurred in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic, discussing the differing nature and prioritization of those policy challenges. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/securitydilemmas-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/securitydilemmas-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 122040 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationTerrorism |
Author: de Haas, Hein Title: The Myth of Invasion: Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union Summary: Media and dominant policy discourses convey an apocalyptic image of an increasingly massive exodus of desperate Africans fleeing poverty and war at home trying to enter the elusive European ‘El Dorado’ crammed in long-worn ships barely staying afloat. The migrants themselves are commonly depicted as victims recruited by “merciless” and “unscrupulous” traffickers and smugglers. Hence, the perceived policy solutions – which invariably boil down to curbing migration – focus on “fighting” or “combating” illegal migration through intensifying border controls and cracking down on trafficking and smuggling related crime. Although there has been an incontestable increase in regular and irregular West African migration to Europe over the past decade, available empirical evidence dispels most of these assumptions. First, trans-Saharan migration of West Africans to North Africa is not as new, massive and Europe - focused as is commonly suggested. While having much deeper historical roots in the trans-Saharan trade, migration of (former) nomads, traders and refugees to Mauritania, Algeria and Libya since the 1970s set the stage for contemporary trans-Saharan migration. Against the background of economic decline and warfare in West and Central Africa, Libya’s new ‘pan-African’ immigration policies are essential in understanding the major increase in trans-Saharan labour migration over the 1990s. Since 2000, a major anti-immigrant backlash in Libya probably contributed to a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes and the increasing presence of migrants in other Maghreb countries. Confronted with a persistent demand for irregular migrant labour in Europe, more and more sub-Saharan, mostly West Africans started to cross the Mediterranean. However, the public perception that irregular migration from Africa is massive and growing at an alarming rate is deceptive. Illegal crossings of the Mediterranean by North Africans have been a persistent phenomenon since Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in the early 1990s. The major change has been that, in particular since 2000, sub-Saharan Africans have started to join and have now overtaken North Africans as the largest category of irregular boat migrants. Recent West African migrants are increasingly settling in Spain and Italy, where they enter flourishing underground economies. Even when apprehended, many migrants are eventually released. Many have acquired residency through recurrent regularisations. It is a misconception that all or most migrants crossing the Sahara are “in transit” to Europe. In particular, Libya is an important destination country in its own right. There are probably more sub-Saharan Africans living in North Africa than in Europe. An estimated 65,000 to 120,000 sub-Saharan Africans enter the Maghreb yearly overland, of which only 20 to 38 percent are estimated to enter Europe. The total number of successful irregular crossings by sub-Saharan Africans should be counted in the order of several tens of thousands, according to our estimates 25,000 to 35,000 per year. The majority of migrants enter Europe legally and subsequently overstay their visas. The total annual increase since 2000 of the registered West African population in the EU has been around 100,000. This is still relatively modest compared to a total EU immigration of 2.6 million in 2004. There are an estimated 800,000 registered West African migrants in the main receiving countries compared to 2,600,000 North Africans. Common push-pull models viewing poverty as the main cause of African mass migration are inconsistent with evidence that the migrants are not among the poorest and that West African countries still have comparatively low inter-continental emigration rates. Analyses focusing on ‘African misery’ pushing migrants out of the continent tend to obscure migrants’ agency and the vital demand side of this migration. Rather than a desperate response to destitution, migration is generally a conscious choice by relatively well-off individuals and households to enhance their livelihoods. Likewise, the common portrayal of irregular African migrants as victims of traffickers and smugglers is inconsistent with evidence that the vast majority of migrants move on their own initiative. Trafficking is relatively rare, and smugglers are usually not part of international organised crime, but locally based passeurs operating alone or in small networks. Migrants typically travel in stages. Migrants often work in migration hubs to save enough money for their onward journey. Several end up settling along the way in Saharan boomtowns or major North African cities. Since the 1990s, European states intensified border controls and have attempted to ‘externalise’ these policies by pressuring North African countries to clamp down on irregular migration and to sign readmission agreements in exchange for aid, financial support and work permits. While failing to curb immigration, these policies have had a series of unintended side effects in the form of increasing violations of migrants’ and refugees’ rights in North Africa and a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes and attempted sea crossing points, which now cover large stretches of the African coastline from the Guinea to Libya. In practice, it seems almost impossible to seal off the long Saharan borders and coastlines, even if governments are genuinely willing to do so. What remains largely unspoken behind official discourses is that both European and African states have little genuine interest in stopping migration, because their economies have become dependent on migrant labour and remittances, respectively. Several structural factors explain why it is likely that sub-Saharan migration to the EU and Libya will continue. First, trans-Saharan migration is less unwanted than it seems. The demand for cheap immigrant labour in Europe and Libya is likely to persist. Second, the firm establishment of migration routes and migrant networks, as well as improvements in communication and trans-Saharan transportation infrastructure are likely to facilitate future migration. Apart from Libya, other North African countries may also evolve into transit and destination countries. Migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe often prefer to settle in North Africa as a ‘second best option’ than to return to their substantially poorer or unsafe origin countries. These trends might be reinforced by demographic change and the parallel segmentation of North African labour markets, which may increase the demand for immigrant labour. For all these reasons, it is likely that migration from West Africa to North Africa and Europe will continue. There is a growing discrepancy between restrictive migration policies and the demand for cheap migrant labour in Libya and Europe. This explains why, rather than a decline in migration, increasing border controls have led to the swift diversion of migration routes, increasing “illegality” and reliance on smuggling as well as an increase in the risks, costs, and suffering of the migrants involved. As long as no more legal channels for immigration are created to match the real demand for labour, and as long as large informal economies will exist, it is likely that a substantial proportion of this migration will remain irregular. Details: Oxford, UK: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2007. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2011 at: http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/Irregular%20migration%20from%20West%20Africa%20-%20Hein%20de%20Haas.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Europe URL: http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/Irregular%20migration%20from%20West%20Africa%20-%20Hein%20de%20Haas.pdf Shelf Number: 122046 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal Immigration |
Author: Issa, Darrell E. Title: The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents Summary: In the fall of 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) developed a risky new strategy to combat gun trafficking along the Southwest Border. The new strategy directed federal law enforcement to shift its focus away from seizing firearms from criminals as soon as possible — and to focus instead on identifying members of trafficking networks. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) implemented that strategy using a reckless investigative technique that street agents call “gunwalking.” ATF’s Phoenix Field Division began allowing suspects to walk away with illegally purchased guns. The purpose was to wait and watch, in the hope that law enforcement could identify other members of a trafficking network and build a large, complex conspiracy case. This shift in strategy was known and authorized at the highest levels of the Justice Department. Through both the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Arizona and “Main Justice,” headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Department closely monitored and supervised the activities of the ATF. The Phoenix Field Division established a Gun Trafficking group, called Group VII, to focus on firearms trafficking. Group VII initially began using the new gunwalking tactics in one of its investigations to further the Department’s strategy. The case was soon renamed “Operation Fast and Furious,” and expanded dramatically. It received approval for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) funding on January 26, 2010. ATF led a strike force comprised of agents from ATF, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The operation’s goal was to establish a nexus between straw purchasers of assault-style weapons in the United States and Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating on both sides of the United States-Mexico border. Straw purchasers are individuals who are legally entitled to purchase firearms for themselves, but who unlawfully purchase weapons with the intent to transfer them into the hands of DTOs or other criminals. Operation Fast and Furious was a response to increasing violence fostered by the DTOs in Mexico and their increasing need to purchase ever-growing numbers of more powerful weapons in the U.S. An integral component of Fast and Furious was to work with gun shop merchants, or “Federal Firearms Licensees” (FFLs) to track known straw purchasers through the unique serial number of each firearm sold. ATF agents entered the serial numbers of the weapons purchased into the agency’s Suspect Gun Database. These weapons bought by the straw purchasers included AK-47 variants, Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, and the FN Five-seveN. During Fast and Furious, ATF frequently monitored actual transactions between the FFLs and straw purchasers. After the purchases, ATF sometimes conducted surveillance of these weapons with assistance from local police departments. Such surveillance included following the vehicles of the straw purchasers. Frequently, the straw purchasers transferred the weapons they bought to stash houses. In other instances, they transferred the weapons to third parties. The volume, frequency, and circumstances of these transactions clearly established reasonable suspicion to stop and question the buyers. Agents are trained to use such interactions to develop probable cause to arrest the suspect or otherwise interdict the weapons and deter future illegal purchases. Operation Fast and Furious sought instead to allow the flow of guns from straw purchasers to the third parties. Instead of trying to interdict the weapons, ATF purposely avoided contact with known straw purchasers or curtailed surveillance, allowing guns to fall into the hands of criminals and bandits on both sides of the border. Though many line agents objected vociferously, ATF and DOJ leadership continued to prevent them from making every effort to interdict illegally purchased firearms. Instead, leadership’s focus was on trying to identify additional conspirators, as directed by the Department’s strategy for combating Mexican Drug Cartels. ATF and DOJ leadership were interested in seeing where these guns would ultimately end up. They hoped to establish a connection between the local straw buyers in Arizona and the Mexico-based DTOs. By entering serial numbers from suspicious transactions into the Suspect Gun Database, ATF would be quickly notified as each one was later recovered at crime scenes and traced, either in the United States or in Mexico. The Department’s leadership allowed the ATF to implement this flawed strategy, fully aware of what was taking place on the ground. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona encouraged and supported every single facet of Fast and Furious. Main Justice was involved in providing support and approving various aspects of the Operation, including wiretap applications that would necessarily include painstakingly detailed descriptions of what ATF knew about the straw buyers it was monitoring. This hapless plan allowed the guns in question to disappear out of the agency’s view. As a result, this chain of events inevitably placed the guns in the hands of violent criminals. ATF would only see these guns again after they turned up at a crime scene. Tragically, many of these recoveries involved loss of life. While leadership at ATF and DOJ no doubt regard these deaths as tragic, the deaths were a clearly foreseeable result of the strategy. Both line agents and gun dealers who cooperated with the ATF repeatedly expressed concerns about that risk, but ATF supervisors did not heed those warnings. Instead, they told agents to follow orders because this was sanctioned from above. They told gun dealers not to worry because they would make sure the guns didn’t fall into the wrong hands. Unfortunately, ATF never achieved the laudable goal of dismantling a drug cartel. In fact, ATF never even got close. After months and months of investigative work, Fast and Furious resulted only in indictments of 20 straw purchasers. Those indictments came only after the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. The indictments, filed January 19, 2011, focus mainly on what is known as “lying and buying.” Lying and buying involves a straw purchaser falsely filling out ATF Form 4473, which is to be completed truthfully in order to legally acquire a firearm. Even worse, ATF knew most of the indicted straw purchasers to be straw purchasers before Fast and Furious even began. In response to criticism, ATF and DOJ leadership denied allegations that gunwalking occurred in Fast and Furious by adopting an overly narrow definition of the term. They argue that gunwalking is limited to cases in which ATF itself supplied the guns directly. As field agents understood the term, however, gunwalking includes situations in which ATF had contemporaneous knowledge of illegal gun purchases and purposely decided not to attempt any interdiction. The agents also described situations in which ATF facilitated or approved transactions to known straw buyers. Both situations are even more disturbing in light of the ATF’s certain knowledge that weapons previously purchased by the same straw buyers had been trafficked into Mexico and may have reached the DTOs. When the full parameters of this program became clear to the agents assigned to Group VII, a rift formed among Group VII’s agents in Phoenix. Several agents blew the whistle on this reckless operation only to face punishment and retaliation from ATF leadership. Sadly, only the tragic murder of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry provided the necessary impetus for DOJ and ATF leadership to finally indict the straw buyers whose regular purchases they had monitored for 14 months. Even then, it was not until after whistleblowers later reported the issue to Congress that the Justice Department finally issued a policy directive that prohibited gunwalking. This report is the first in a series regarding Operation Fast and Furious. Possible future reports and hearings will likely focus on the actions of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona, the decisions faced by gun shop owners (FFLs) as a result of ATF’s actions, and the remarkably ill-fated decisions made by Justice Department officials in Washington, especially within the Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. This first installment focuses on ATF’s misguided approach of letting guns walk. The report describes the agents’ outrage about the use of gunwalking as an investigative technique and the continued denials and stonewalling by DOJ and ATF leadership. It provides some answers as to what went wrong with Operation Fast and Furious. Further questions for key ATF and DOJ decision makers remain unanswered. For example, what leadership failures within the Department of Justice allowed this program to thrive? Who will be held accountable and when? Details: Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2011. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Joint Staff Report: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/ATF-06-14-11-Joint-Issa-Grassley-report-on-agent-findings.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/ATF-06-14-11-Joint-Issa-Grassley-report-on-agent-findings.pdf Shelf Number: 122129 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsGun ControlGun ViolenceGuns (U.S.)Illegal GunsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weaspons |
Author: Campbell, David R. Title: Evaluating the Impact of Drug Trafficking Organizations on the Stability of the Mexican State Summary: Since 2007, when President Felipe Calderon declared his government’s war on the drug trafficking organizations operating in his country, the level of narcotics related violence has increased dramatically. The violence, which had been largely confined to factions of the cartels, now threatens every citizen and is devastating the economy of the border region. This thesis evaluates the impact of Mexican drug cartels on the stability of the Mexican State and on the security of the U.S. The primary conclusion drawn is that the Mexican state is unlikely to fail as state failure is defined, but the Mexican government is likely to return to a one party system under which drug trafficking and corruption are tolerated but the violence does not directly affect the average Mexican. While current U.S. efforts toward increased border security and assistance to Mexico in the form of the Merida Initiative have made positive impacts, it is only by decreasing U.S. demand for illegal narcotics and encouraging Mexican economic growth that both nations can make real progress in the drug war. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 22, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada524420.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada524420.pdf Shelf Number: 122143 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlDrugsMerida Initiative |
Author: Schaefer, Agnes Gereben Title: Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Policy Options Summary: The security structure in Mexico is characterized by shifting responsibilities, duplication of services, and general instability, along with a lack of coordination among federal, state, and local security forces. The backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in Mexico and change in administration in the United States demands a closer examination of potential priorities and policy options to guide future U.S.-Mexico relations. U.S. aid to Mexico has typically focused on a narrow set of outputs — improved technology, training, and equipment to prevent drug trafficking. Despite these efforts, Mexico's security situation continues to deteriorate. To help inform debate, this study examined a set of policy options for the United States (strategic partnership, status quo, and retrenchment), along with promising potential policy priorities (help Mexico streamline delivery of security services, bridge the gap between federal and local security, support Mexico's efforts to address domestic security concerns, and build trust in security institutions). Problems related to drug and human trafficking, corruption, weapon smuggling, and gang violence have spilled into the United States, reaching far beyond the border. For this and other reasons, the United States has a significant stake in the success or failure of Mexico's security reform measures. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG876.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG876.pdf Shelf Number: 122145 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)DrugsGang ViolenceGangs |
Author: Fitz, Marshall Title: Safer than Ever: A View from the U.S.–Mexico Border: Assessing the Past, Present, and Future Summary: A recent trip by this author and several colleagues to study the Arizona border was eye-opening. Not because we encountered scores of headless bodies, but because the border landscape has changed so dramatically in the last five years both literally and figuratively. Hundreds of miles of severe fencing, vehicle barriers, radio towers, flood lighting, and access roads have degraded the border’s aesthetics and environmental quality. But in conjunction with surges in manpower and technology, this added infrastructure has also undeniably and fundamentally enhanced the Border Patrol’s ability to prevent and intercept unauthorized migrants and smugglers. All the recent statistics tell us that illegal immigration flows at our southern border have slowed dramatically. Numbers tell us that we no longer have a border across which thousands of people traverse illegally every day without our knowledge. Instead we have a border where the vast majority of attempted entries are identified and a far larger percentage of entrants are apprehended than ever before. Moreover, recent reports persuasively demonstrate that violent crime rates along the U.S.-Mexico border have been falling for years and that border cities of all sizes have maintained crime rates below the national average. A first-hand view only emphasizes the point while begging an even bigger question: Why hasn’t the story of this transformation penetrated the national dialogue on immigration policy? Rather than acknowledge the remarkable advances that have occurred, immigration reform opponents level sensational — and often patently false — claims meant to scare the public about border violence and insecurity. Although everyone is entitled to their views, our policymakers should not be entitled to mislead the public about something as important as border security merely to advance an ideological policy agenda. This report rebuts these policymakers’ fallacious claims and argues that the changes on the ground at the border demand a change in the conversation in Washington. We first catalog the massive resource deployment and infrastructure buildup at the border since 1993. We then describe the profound impact that deployment has had on unlawful migration flows: Fewer attempted entries plus a greater rate of apprehension equals a steep decline in successful illegal entries. Next we detail a number of unintended negative consequences that have resulted from advancing this border buildup without enacting concomitant reforms. Finally, we argue that the circumstances on the ground present us with a unique opportunity to secure the gains in border control while negating the counterproductive byproducts of those gains. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2011. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 11, 2011 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/safer_than_ever_report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/safer_than_ever_report.pdf Shelf Number: 122358 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal Migration |
Author: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network Title: Calais, The Violence of the Border Summary: Having observed the migratory situation in Calais for many years prior to the destruction on 22 September 2009, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) in collaboration with the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the European Association for the Defense of Human Rights (AEDH) decided to send a fact-finding mission to Calais and the surrounding area in order to investigate impacts of the police clamp down on the situation of migrants and refugees rights in the region. The findings of the mission are that the destruction of “the Jungle” made the situation worse for the migrants, in terms of having their rights respected. In general, the closing down of unauthorised camps does not do away with people’s need to move. Instead, they worsen the human rights situation of those most in need of protection. Details: Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://www.euromedrights.org/en/publications-en/emhrn-publications/emhrn-puplications/9296.html Year: 2011 Country: France URL: http://www.euromedrights.org/en/publications-en/emhrn-publications/emhrn-puplications/9296.html Shelf Number: 122640 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman RightsIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsMigration (France) |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond Summary: Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security and governance in Mexico. According to Mexican government data, organized crime-related violence claimed more than 34,500 lives in Mexico between January 2007 and December 2010. That toll may now exceed 40,000. Escalating violence has increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations dominate the U.S. illicit drug market and are now considered the greatest organized crime threat facing the United States. In recent years, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central America that was first proposed in October 2007. Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico, with an early emphasis on training and equipping Mexican security forces engaged in counterdrug efforts. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its efforts against transnational criminal organizations and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. With funding for the original Mérida Initiative technically ending in FY2010 and new initiatives underway for Central America and the Caribbean, the Obama Administration worked with the Mexican government to develop a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. That strategy, adopted in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. The first two pillars largely build upon existing efforts, whereas pillars three and four broaden the scope of Mérida programs to include efforts to facilitate “secure flows” through the U.S.-Mexico border and to improve conditions in violence-prone border cities. Congress appropriated $143.0 million in Mérida assistance for Mexico for FY2011 in P.L. 112-10. The Administration requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012. As of August 1, 2011, a total of $473.8 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico. The 112th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative, as well as examining the degree to which the U.S. and Mexican governments are fulfilling their pledges to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region. Congress may also examine the degree to which the Administration’s new strategy for the Mérida Initiative complements other counterdrug and border security efforts as outlined in the 2011 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. Given current budget constraints, Congress may also debate how best to measure the impact of current and future Mérida Initiative programs. Another congressional interest is likely to focus on whether human rights conditions placed on Mérida Initiative funding are appropriate or sufficient. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: R41349: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Shelf Number: 122670 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug ControlDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Merida InitiativeOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Cavendish, Betsy Title: Chidlren at the Border: The Screening, Protection and Repatriation of Unaccompanied Mexican Minors Summary: The report documents substantial noncompliance with federal law regarding the treatment of Mexican children who are detained after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border when unaccompanied by a parent or guardian. "Children at the Border" also documents the failure of the Mexican government to ensure children's safety as they prioritize family reunification. Details: Washington, DC: Appleseed, 2011. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2011 at: http://www.appleseednetwork.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=8PM-o8WHN1Q%3D&tabid=157 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.appleseednetwork.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=8PM-o8WHN1Q%3D&tabid=157 Shelf Number: 122746 Keywords: Border SecurityChild ProtectionImmigration (Mexico) |
Author: Kan, Paul Rexton Title: Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security Summary: Since 2006, when Mexican president Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels, there has been a rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States to escape the ongoing drug cartel violence in their home country. Political asylum cases in general are claimed by those who are targeted for their political beliefs or ethnicity in countries that are repressive or failing. Mexico is neither. Nonetheless, if the health of the Mexican state declines because criminal violence continues, increases, or spreads, U.S. communities will feel an even greater burden on their systems of public safety and public health from “narco-refugees.” Given the ever-increasing brutality of the cartels, the question is whether and how the United States Government should begin to prepare for what could be a new wave of migrants coming from Mexico. Allowing Mexicans to claim asylum could potentially open a floodgate of migrants to the United States during a time when there is a very contentious national debate over U.S. immigration laws pertaining to illegal immigrants. On the other hand, to deny the claims of asylum seekers and return them to Mexico, where they might very well be killed, strikes at the heart of American values of justice and humanitarianism. This monograph focuses on the asylum claims of Mexicans who unwillingly leave Mexico, rather than those who willingly enter the United States legally or illegally. To navigate wisely in this sea of complexity will require greater understanding and vigilance at all levels of the U.S. Government. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1083.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1083.pdf Shelf Number: 0 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Conley, Christopher J. Title: Interdicting Maritime Migrant Smuggling: Applying Some Concepts of Operational Art to Coast Guard Operations Summary: The issue of illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration in the maritime domain presents a challenge to the organizations charged with protecting the borders of the United States. As an agency responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary instrument for interdicting illegal maritime migration. Except in extreme circumstances of mass migration, the Coast Guard has relied on the principle of effective presence to accomplish its mission and done so with measurable success. However, with the growing transnational criminal nature of human trafficking and increased pressure on U.S. maritime borders due to tougher border enforcement, the Coast Guard should seek to expand its concept of operations for interdiction of human smuggling in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard could do this by inviting relevant agencies to participate in a Joint Interagency Task Force to bring a unified effort to counter maritime smuggling. Furthermore, the Coast Guard should apply the appropriate concepts of operational art consistent with joint doctrine in planning and executing its mission to ensure the most effective and efficient application of national resources. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2008. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484333.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484333.pdf Shelf Number: 123003 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal AliensMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityMigrantsU.S. Coast Guard |
Author: Roberts, Bryan Title: An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling Costs along the Southwest Border Summary: Border enforcement is intended to prevent and deter the illegal movement of goods and people across a country’s border. The intensification of border enforcement activities creates impediments to illegal entry that increase the costs incurred by migrants when crossing the border. Increased costs may include additional time investment, physical hardship, and higher fees charged by smugglers who assist migrants across the border. The impact of enforcement on illegal immigration depends on how enforcement affects migration costs and how migration costs affect the decision to migrate. Our goal in this paper is to estimate the impact that enforcement has on the price smugglers charge to bring illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy Directorate, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed November 1, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-wp.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-wp.pdf Shelf Number: 123203 Keywords: Alien SmugglingBorder PatrolBorder SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeHuman SmugglingIllegal ImmigrationMigrant Smuggling |
Author: Title: Moving Beyond Easy Wins: Colombia’s Borders Summary: Improved relations between Colombia and its neighbours have not alleviated the plight of border communities. For fifteen years, porous borders that offer strategic advantages to illegal armed groups and facilitate extensive illicit economies have exposed them to an intense armed conflict that is made worse by the widespread absence of public institutions. The warfare triggered a humanitarian emergency and worsened relations especially with Ecuador and Venezuela, the most affected neighbours. Spurring development in the periphery and reconstructing diplomatic ties are priorities for President Juan Manuel Santos. A little over a year into his term, his new policies have paid undoubted diplomatic and some security dividends. But the hard part is still ahead. Efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and build civilian state capacity must be scaled up, tasks that, amid what is again a partially worsening conflict, have been neglected. Otherwise, pacifying the troubled border regions will remain a chimera, and their dynamics will continue to fuel Colombia’s conflict. Border regions were drawn into the armed conflict by the mid-1990s, when they became main theatres of operations for illegal armed groups, often financed by drug trafficking. A crackdown under Álvaro Uribe, Santos’s predecessor, brought only elusive gains there. The illegal armed groups have been pushed deeper into the periphery but not defeated. Coca cultivation and drug trafficking remain significant. Violence has come down in most regions, but remains higher along the borders than in the nation as a whole, and security has begun to deteriorate in some zones, as New Illegal Armed Groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs) extend their operations, and guerrillas gain new strength. The Uribe approach also carried high diplomatic costs. Relations with the neighbours became toxic over a 2008 Colombian airstrike on a camp of the main rebel group, FARC, located just inside Ecuador and over allegations that Venezuela was harbouring guerrillas. Fixing the border problems has been a priority for Santos. He has moved quickly to restore diplomatic relations with Ecuador and Venezuela, and bilateral platforms are in an early stage of either being revived or created. There is a strong political commitment on all sides to preserve the restored friendships, despite the continuing presence of illegal armed groups in both neighbouring countries. Security cooperation is improving. The Colombian Congress has passed a constitutional reform to redistribute royalties from oil and mining concessions, a measure that should increase funds for public investment in many peripheral regions that currently do not benefit from that bonanza. In an effort to produce tangible results fast, the foreign ministry is leading implementation of projects aimed at boosting social and economic development in border municipalities. The Santos agenda represents a substantial policy shift, but as the conflict continues unabated in the border regions and has increasing repercussions on Venezuelan and Ecuadorian soil, problems remain. Three sets of issues need to be tackled. First, more must be done to increase the civilian state presence in the destitute border areas. Militarisation of the borders has failed to deliver durable security gains, and efforts by security forces to increase their standing with local communities continue to stumble over human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. With dynamics along their borders increasingly resembling the situation in Colombia, similar problems are fast emerging in Ecuador and Venezuela. The security forces of all three countries must play by the book and focus more on citizen security, and their civilian authorities must take the lead in providing services. Secondly, more effective responses to the severe humanitarian problems are needed. Colombia continues to struggle to attend to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other victims of the conflict, a large number of whom cross the borders in search of protection. But protecting them has not been a priority in Venezuela, leaving an estimated 200,000 highly vulnerable. This contrasts with the response in Ecuador, which has recognised and provided documentation to some 54,000 Colombian refugees. But Ecuador has tightened its policy since January 2011, exposing such individuals to new risks. Governments are hesitant to give more weight to a potentially divisive issue in bilateral relations, but looking the other way will only make matters worse over the long run. Thirdly, efficient forums to solve problems jointly and promote border development are still lacking. This partly reflects the neighbours’ reluctance to acknowledge any responsibility for a conflict they consider a domestic matter of Colombia but that in fact is sustained by transnational criminal networks and is increasingly creating victims on all sides of the borders. The high diplomatic volatility has also been damaging efforts to institutionalise cooperation that needs to be grounded in buy-in and participation of local authorities, civil society and the private sector. In a region where the next diplomatic crisis is often not far away, the current improved political climate offers the governments a chance to boost civilian state presence, improve the humanitarian situation and put relations on a more sustainable footing. They should seize it. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 40: Accessed November 4, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/40%20Moving%20Beyond%20Easy%20Wins%20---%20Colombias%20Borders.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/40%20Moving%20Beyond%20Easy%20Wins%20---%20Colombias%20Borders.pdf Shelf Number: 123224 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimesViolence (Colombia) |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform Summary: Violent drug-trafficking organizations (VDTOs) in Mexico produce, transship, and deliver into the United States tens of billions of dollars worth of narcotics annually, but their activities are not limited to drug trafficking. VDTOs have also engaged in human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, racketeering, and assassinations. In an effort to clarify the scope and details of the challenges posed by VDTOs, a RAND team conducted a Delphi expert elicitation exercise, the results of which offer an assessment of the contemporary security situation in Mexico through the lens of existing RAND research on related issues. The exercise centered around three strands of prior RAND research on urban instability and unrest, historical insurgencies, and defense-sector reform. Although this prior research was not designed specifically for the study of Mexico, all three areas offer applicable insights. Assessment scorecards from these projects were used to obtain input from the expert panel and to guide the resulting discussion. The goal was not to break significant new ground in understanding the dynamics of drug violence in Mexico or to offer a qualitative assessment of these dynamics, but rather to provide an empirically based platform for identifying key areas that merit further investigation. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 108p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html Shelf Number: 123414 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Illegal DrugsViolence |
Author: U.S. General Accounting Office Title: Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure That Officers Are Fully Trained Summary: Recent incidents involving potential terrorists attempting to enter the country highlight the need for a vigilant and well-trained workforce at the border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency in charge of inspecting travelers and goods for admission into the United States. About 20,000 CBP officers play a central role in ensuring that CBP accomplishes its mission of securing the border while also facilitating the movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which CBP has (1) revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with training standards and (2) identified and addressed the training needs of incumbent CBP officers. GAO analyzed data and documentation related to the agency’s training efforts, such as its covert test program and its training records. GAO also interviewed CBP officials and CBP officers. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. To improve CBP training efforts, GAO recommends that the CBP Commissioner evaluate the “Back to Basics” training course; analyze covert test results; establish a policy for training responsibilities, including oversight of training records; and, conduct a training needs assessment. CBP concurred with the recommendations and is taking steps to address them. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-269: Accessed January 10, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587314.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587314.pdf Shelf Number: 123548 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCustom EnforcementImmigrationTerrorismTerroristsTraining, Border Personnel |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2011 Seizure Statistics Summary: Theft of intellectual property is a serious crime, and in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) remained vigilant in their commitment to protect America by expanding their efforts to seize infringing goods. Counterfeit and pirated goods pose a serious threat to America’s economic vitality, the health and safety of American consumers, and our critical infrastructure and national security. Through coordinated efforts to interdict infringing merchandise, including joint operations, CBP and ICE enhanced intellectual property enforcement while facilitating the secure flow of legitimate trade and travel. • The number of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) seizures increased by 24% to 24,792 in FY 2011 from 19,959 in FY 2010. • The domestic value of IPR seizures decreased by 5% from $188.1 million to $178.9 million due to the following: • The number of high-volume but low-value seizures • The number of high-volume but low-value seizures, including express courier and consolidated shipments, increased significantly. • The average value of an IPR seizure dropped to $7,193 in FY 2011, the lowest average value for IPR seizures in the last 10 years. • The estimated Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) for all FY 2011 IPR seizures is $1.1 billion, a slight decline from FY 2010. • The value of consumer safety and critical technology seizures soared to more than $60 million due to an increase in pharmaceutical and perfume seizures. • The number of consumer safety and critical technology seizures increased by 44%, and the value of these seizures rose by 41% compared to FY 2010 totals. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2012 at: http://www.ice.gov/doclib/iprcenter/pdf/ipr-fy-2011-seizure-report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.ice.gov/doclib/iprcenter/pdf/ipr-fy-2011-seizure-report.pdf Shelf Number: 123639 Keywords: Border SecurityCounterfeit GoodsCustomsProperty TheftTheft of Intellectual Property |
Author: McCutcheon, Chuck Title: Securing Our Borders: Doing What Works to Ensure Immigration Reform Is Complete and Comprehensive Summary: A new report from Center for American Progress investigates the failures of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program and has found that there are "salvageable" parts of former attempts at boarder security reform and lessons to be learned from past mistakes. This paper details their findings and emphasizes that future efforts "must be accompanied by the enactment of comprehensive immigration reform, which would create orderly migration channels and allow the border patrol to focus on smuggling and other criminal enterprises. By restoring order to our nation's chaotic and broken immigration system, DHS' operational control of the Mexican border will be enhanced." As part of the Center for American Progress' 'Doing What Works' project, this paper concludes that while SBI's performance has been dismal, an advanced technology program can reach SBI's key goals if multiple corrective measures are taken. By upgrading human resources and procurement practices, harnessing new technology, and setting up transparent, evidence-based operations, DHS can restore confidence in the overall SBI program and produce budget savings. The study proposes 10 reforms for SBI, in general, and a sharply re-defined technology component." SBI, established in 2005, is "a comprehensive, multi-year plan to help secure America's borders." Its mission "is to lead the operational requirements support and documentation as well as the acquisition efforts to develop, deploy, and integrate technology and tactical infrastructure in support of CBP's efforts to gain and maintain effect control of U.S. land border areas." More information on SBI can be found at the Customs and Borders Protection website. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_borders.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_borders.pdf Shelf Number: 123743 Keywords: Border Control (United States)Border SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration Reform |
Author: Lanzante, Joseph A. Title: The Relationship between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human Smuggling Summary: This thesis sought to expand on the literature that has been written on the possibility and impact of a relationship forming between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. These entities could form a strategic alliance and leverage existing narcotics, weapons, and human smuggling corridors that exist south of the U.S./Mexico border to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S. thereby threatening U.S. interests and national security. The analysis of the scholarly literature, interview data, and case studies point to a relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations and the fact that they have worked together to smuggle terrorists into the U.S. Additionally, corruption efforts by these organizations places a weak link in U.S. border security that can be exploited for nefarious purposes. Enhanced information sharing between law enforcement entities may be the single best way to detect the relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations and prevent them from smuggling a terrorist operative into the U.S. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 14, 2012 at: http://www.thecre.com/ccsf/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Lanzante.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.thecre.com/ccsf/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Lanzante.pdf Shelf Number: 124131 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Trafficking (U.S.)Human SmugglingOrganized CrimeTerrorism |
Author: Morehouse, Christal Title: Irregular Migration in Europe Summary: Irregular migration frequently makes headlines, and in Europe, policymakers are under increasing public and political pressure to address both the flows and stocks of unauthorized migrants in each country. Within European Union (EU) Member States, national governments define, identify, and respond to irregular migration in very different ways. However, with the removal of internal borders within the Schengen area, European governments are collaborating intensively on the management of their external borders. They are doing this with the support of EU institutions, particularly the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, which coordinates Member States' joint border enforcement and return operations. This agency, better known as Frontex, has also led increased data collection and analysis on patterns of irregular migration to the European Union. The detected annual flow of irregular migration into Europe decreased from 2007 to 2012, although there was a notable quarterly surge in the summer of 2008. The estimated stock of irregular migrants in the EU-15 countries has declined on average for almost a decade since 2002. Yet due to increased entry at certain points along the EU external border, this trend has often been masked by localized surges. While detections along the EU's eastern border have remained traditionally low, the focus on unauthorized entry has shifted from the Southern Mediterranean (Spain and Italy), toward the Southeastern land border between Greece and Turkey. EU joint operations to combat illegal border crossing may merely displace, rather than reduce, the volume of unauthorized crossings, while the reduction in numbers may have more to do with reduced economic demand for foreign workers within the European Union itself. The total number of detected illegal entries to the European Union in 2010 remained stable with those in 2009. However, data for the third and fourth quarters showed a significant increase in detections compared to the same quarters the previous year. This was driven by a marked increase in the number detected illegal crossing of the European Union's external land borders, which was isolated to a single "hotspot" along the Greece-Turkey land border. The first quarter of 2011 saw a reversal of this trend. The data shows that during that period there were fewer detected illegal crossing of the European Union's external land borders than for any other quarter during the previous three years. This was attributed to a combination of poorer weather for migrants seeking to make the crossing along the Greece-Turkey border and an increase in operations to combat illegal crossings in the area. However, the first quarter of 2011 also witnessed a significant increase in the number of detected illegal crossings of the European Union's external sea borders, which had been in decline over the previous two years. This increase was almost exclusively due to higher rates of irregular migration from North Africa during the "Arab Spring," which led to the largest number of detected illegal border crossings into European Union of any first quarter in recent years. The deteced and estimated scope of irregular migration in the European Union has remained below the peak levels of summer 2008 in recent years. Yet combating irregular migration is likely to remain challenging as European economies recover from the recession and migratory flows begin to increase again. In comparison, irregular migration to the European Union is on a far smaller scale than that evidenced in the United States, despite the EU population being significantly larger than that of the United States (approximately 500 million and 300 million respectively). It is estimated that 1.9 million to 3.8 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the European Union in 2008, compared to over 11 million in the United States during that time. The reactive nature of EU irregular migration to border management operations and return policies suggest that continued and large-scale investments in border enforcement are likely to be needed alongside related policies that combat the root causes of such migration. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2012 at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCMirregularmigration.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCMirregularmigration.pdf Shelf Number: 124232 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal Immigration (Europe)Migration |
Author: Espach, Ralph Title: Criminal Organizations and Illicit Trafficking in Guatemala’s Border Communities Summary: Contraband routes in Guatemala traditionally controlled by local groups are coming ever more under the control of the Mexican cartels. Around half of the nation’s territory is believed to be under the control of criminal organizations. Local criminal organizations have long penetrated the Guatemalan police, army, courts and government, and Guatemala’s gangs are extremely violent. However, the Mexican cartels with their financial resources, military grade weapons, and reputation for indiscriminate killing and brutality have elevated these threats. Today Guatemala and its neighbors Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador, have homicide rates among the highest in the world. Guatemala’s murder rate is as high as those during the worst years of the civil wars in the 1980’s. Impunity for traffickers and murderers is the rule, not the exception. Drug trafficking networks operate most intensely in communities along or near smuggling routes, many of which are located in border regions. Guatemala has more than 800 miles of borders which cross forests and mountain ranges and are seldom monitored or even marked. The communities close to the borders tend to be rural and engaged in subsistence farming often with little or no government presence in the form of clinics, schools, or police. Without the presence of state institutions, these communities are left vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of criminal groups which use a variety of tactics, including not only threats and violence but also the distribution of money, public services, and other benefits to obtain compliance, acceptance, and even the support of local residents. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IPR%2015225.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IPR%2015225.pdf Shelf Number: 124277 Keywords: Border SecurityCounternarcoticsCriminal CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Guatemala; Latin America; Central |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Beyond the Border Buildup Security and Migrants Along the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Once relatively quiet and neglected, the U.S.-Mexico border zone is a very different place than it was twenty years ago, or even ten years ago. Today, border communities are separated by both security measures and security conditions. South of the borderline, a spiral of organized crime has made Mexico’s northern states one of the world’s most violent regions. North of the borderline, a “war on drugs,” a “war on terror,” and rising anti-immigrant sentiment have encouraged a flurry of fence-building and a multiplied presence of guards, spies, and soldiers. Together, both sides comprise one of the world’s principal corridors for the transshipment of illegal drugs and weapons. The population most affected by this sharp change in threats, vigilance, and attitudes is the hundreds of thousands of undocumented people who seek every year to migrate into the United States. Some come because of the promise of economic opportunity, or the lack of it in their countries of origin, mostly Mexico and Central America. Some come to escape violence or poor governance. A growing proportion comes to be reunited with loved ones already in the United States. The number of migrants is less than it used to be, for reasons that this report will explore. But after the changes of the past several years, migrants face a much greater risk of being kidnapped and extorted by criminals and corrupt officials in Mexico; finding themselves mired in the U.S. criminal justice system; or even dying in a desert wilderness. This report is the product of a yearlong study of border security policy and its impact on the migrant population. On the U.S. side, we visited three border regions and carried out extensive research in Washington. In Mexico, we conducted surveys of migrants, and met with Mexican officials and representatives of civil society and migrant shelters. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2012 at: http://justf.org/files/pubs/120419_WOLA_Beyond.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://justf.org/files/pubs/120419_WOLA_Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 125124 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal MigrationOrganized Crime |
Author: Winter, Brian Title: Brazil's 'Gringo' Problem: Its Borders Summary: For the first 500 years of Brazil's history, pretty much anything that wanted to cross its borders could do so in relative peace, whether cattle, Indians or intrepid explorers. That era is now drawing to a close. Brazil's economic rise is forcing it to deal with a problem it long regarded as the sole concern of rich countries like the United States: the need to secure its borders and slow down a flood of drugs, illegal immigrants and other contraband. Brazil's prosperity has created a new consumer class of tens of millions of people who happen to live right next to the world's three biggest producers of cocaine: Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Brazil is now the world's No. 2 cocaine consumer, behind only the United States, according to U.S. government data. It is also a booming consumer of marijuana, ecstasy, and other narcotics. Details: New York: Thomson Reuters, 2012. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2012 at: http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/04/BrazilBorders.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/04/BrazilBorders.pdf Shelf Number: 125150 Keywords: Border SecurityCocaineDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (Brazil)Immigration |
Author: Haas, Hein de Title: Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends Summary: Media and dominant policy discourses convey an apocalyptic image of an increasingly massive exodus of desperate Africans fleeing poverty and war at home trying to enter the elusive European “El Dorado” crammed in long-worn ships barely staying afloat (Pastore et al., 2006). The migrants themselves are commonly depicted as victims recruited by “merciless” and “unscrupulous” traffickers and smugglers. Hence, the perceived policy solutions—which invariably boil down to curbing migration—focus on “fighting” or “combating” illegal migration through intensifying border controls and cracking down trafficking and smuggling-related crime. Although there has been an incontestable increase in regular and irregular West African migration to Europe over the past decade, available empirical evidence dispels most of these assumptions. First, irregular migration from Africa to Europe is not as new as is commonly suggested. Illegal sea crossings of the Mediterranean by North Africans have in fact been a persistent phenomenon since Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in the early 1990s. The major change has been that, in particular, since 2000, sub-Saharan Africans have started to join and have now overtaken North Africans as the largest category of irregular boat migrants. Second, it is a misconception that all or most migrants crossing the Sahara are “in transit” to Europe. There are possibly more sub-Saharan Africans living in the Maghreb than in Europe. An estimated 65,000 and 120,000 sub-Saharan Africans enter the Maghreb yearly overland, of which only 20 to 38 per cent are estimated to enter Europe. While Libya is an important destination country in its own right, many migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe prefer to stay in North Africa as a second-best option. Third, the majority of West Africans enter Europe legally. In recent years, the total annual increase of the registered West African population in the EU has been around 100,000. The total number of successful irregular crossings by sub-Saharan Africans should be counted in the order of several tens of thousands, according to our estimates 25,000 to 35,000 per year, which is only a fraction of total EU immigration of 2.6 million in 2004. The majority of migrants enter Europe legally and subsequently overstay their visas. Fourth, despite a recent increase, West African migration to the EU is still relatively modest in comparison with migration from North Africa and Eastern Europe. There are an estimated 800,000 registered West African migrants in the main European receiving countries compared to 2,600,000 North Africans. Moroccan immigrants alone outnumber all West African immigrants in Europe. Rather than a desperate response to destitution, migration is generally a conscious choice by relatively well-off individuals and households to enhance their livelihoods. Likewise, the common portrayal of irregular African migrants as victims of traffickers and smugglers is inconsistent with evidence that the vast majority of migrants move on their own initiative. Trafficking is relatively rare, and smugglers are usually not part of international organized crime but locally based passeurs operating alone or in small networks. Since the 1990s, European states intensified border controls and have attempted to “externalize” these policies by pressuring certain North African countries to clamp down on irregular migration and to sign readmission agreements in exchange for aid, financial support, and work permits. While failing to curb immigration, these policies have had a series of unintended side effects in the form of increasing violations of migrants’ rights and a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes and attempted sea crossing points. In practice, it seems almost impossible to seal off the long Saharan borders and the African and European coastlines, if European and African governments are willing to do so. Notwithstanding public discourses stressing the need to “combat illegal immigration”, European and African states seem to have little genuine interest in stopping migration because their economies have become dependent on migrant labour and remittances, respectively. In fact, there is a growing discrepancy between restrictive migration policies and the demand for cheap migrant labour in Europe and Libya. Unless exceptional circumstance arise, it is therefore likely that migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and Europe will continue. This explains why increasing border controls have rather led to the swift diversion of migration routes and an increase in the risks, costs, and suffering of the migrants involved rather than a decline in migration. As long as no more legal channels for immigration are created to match the real demand for labour, and as long as large informal economies will exist, it is likely that a substantial proportion of this migration will remain irregular. Details: Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: IOM Migration Research Series, No. 32: Accessed May 4, 2012 at: http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/MRS-32_EN.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/MRS-32_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 125157 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal Immigrants (West Africa and Europe)Immigration |
Author: Meyers, Deborah W. Title: Room for Progress: Reinventing Euro-atlantic Borders for a New Strategic Environment Summary: a new MPI report by Deborah W. Meyers, Rey Koslowski and Susan Ginsburg, describes the latest developments in three elements of U.S. and E.U. border management: the recently established enforcement agencies, benefits and limitations of new information technology, and contentious developments surrounding visa-free travel policy. Highlights of ways in which U.S. and E.U. border control converge and diverge include: Whereas in 2006, the United States signed a $2.5 billion contract for the Secure Border Initiative to create a “virtual fence” to complement hundreds of miles of physical fencing, European border authorities tend to focus more on interior enforcement (e.g., at workplaces and points of contact with government agencies). There is increased convergence in strategies, though, with new Department of Homeland Security attempts to step up enforcement in the interior (e.g., at workplaces); In terms of tracking the entry of foreign nationals, both the United States and Europe have made strides. The US-VISIT program processed the entry of more than 76 million foreign visitors to the United States by January 2007. The European Schengen Information System and a secondary databases known as “SIS I+” and “SISone4all,” designed to bolster external border controls so internal border controls can be removed, will enable most of the new EU Member States to lift controls at land borders by January 2008 and at airports in March 2008; Meanwhile, US-VISIT exit controls are not yet in place. Similarly, international travelers leaving the European Union are subject to passport controls at airports and land borders, but SIS is used only for watch-list checks, and Member States have yet to link entry and exit controls; U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s fiscal year 2007 budget totals over $7.8 billion, while FRONTEX’s 2007 budget is €35 million (nearly triple its 2006 budget, but much less than that spent by Member States, which retain responsibility for policing their borders); While U.S. border enforcement agencies seek more staff, soon some E.U. Member States may need less. The United States is having trouble recruiting, training and retaining the border personnel necessary for rapid growth. If CBP reaches 18,000 agents by the end of 2008 as planned, it will have added as many agents in two years as were added in the previous ten. Meanwhile, the Schengen Agreement establishes a single external border for nearly all E.U. Member States, increasingly eliminating the need for border guards at interior borders; The European Union and the United States are both increasingly turning to information technology to screen flows of people in a manner that balances travel facilitation with border security. Halting illegal migration is a principal motivating force behind increasing expenditures on IT systems in Europe and the United States; While the United States has required travelers from Visa Waiver Program countries to carry electronic passports, or “e-passports,” with facial biometric data, U.S. citizens’ passports currently do not all meet this requirement. E.U. Member States have agreed on a requirement their e-passports include fingerprints as well as facial biometrics; In recent years, visa-free travel programs that waive short-term business or tourist visa requirements for nationals of select countries have become increasingly contentious amid heightened security concerns about terrorists who may enter through these programs and fears of increased illegal immigration by people overstaying their visas; and Because all E.U. Member States, except for the United Kingdom and Ireland, belong to the Schengen Area and are treated essentially as a single entity for internal travel, the E.U. claims that visa-waiver status granted to one Member State should apply to all. The United States has engaged in a “consultative process” about Member States’ status, which has not led to clear resolutions. A new U.S. law requires travelers to electronically file travel authorization requests with DHS prior to their departure and gives the Secretary of Homeland Security increased flexibility in setting and administering overstay standards. Ultimately, the authors suggest that U.S. and E.U. policymakers must engage in greater dialogue on the new security systems and structures they are developing, as well as enhance international cooperation on border management, specifically institutional, technological and visa arrangements, if they are to realize their shared goal of securing national and regional borders. Details: Migration Policy Institute, 2007. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EuroAtlanticBorders103107.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EuroAtlanticBorders103107.pdf Shelf Number: 125218 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityImmigrationland SecurityMigrationVisa Security |
Author: Jimenez, Maria Title: Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S. – Mexico Border Summary: TAmerican Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties (ACLU) and Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights have been resolute in the protection and defense of the fundamental human rights of international migrants. Of all entitlements, the right to life is perhaps the most important. It is essential to the exercise of every other basic freedom and civil liberty. Under international law, the right to life has to be guaranteed at all times and under all circumstances. This right is violated not only when a life is deprived due to the arbitrary actions of a State, but also when actions are not taken to protect life. In enacting border and immigration policies, nations have the sovereign prerogative to protect their territorial integrity and defend their citizenry. That power, however, is restricted and constrained by international obligations to respect fundamental human rights. Unfortunately, these restraints have not precluded the U.S. government from deploying deadly border enforcement policies and practices that, by design and by default, lead to at least one death every day of a migrant crossing the border. This report is the sounding of an alarm for a humanitarian crisis that has led to the death of more than 5,000 human beings. It is part of a larger effort of human rights organizations throughout the border region to call attention to the most significant, ongoing violations of human rights occurring today. The report analyzes border security policies and practices that have contributed to the suffering and death of unauthorized border crossers. It reviews the impact of migrant fatalities and injuries to individuals, families and communities. It examines government and civil society responses to preserve and protect human life moving through hostile terrain and severe climates. It explores relevant international human rights laws and principles. Finally, the report offers recommendations to end this humanitarian crisis. Details: San Diego: American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties and Mexico's National Commission of Human Rights, 2009. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2012 at: http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/humanitariancrisisreport.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/humanitariancrisisreport.pdf Shelf Number: 125239 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman RightsIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration PoliciesMigrant Deaths |
Author: Good, Beverly Title: Preventing Bulk Cash and Weapons Smuggling into Mexico: Establishing an Outbound Policy for the Southwest Border for Customs and Border Protection Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for securing the borders of the United States from those people and things that would do the United States harm. The Office of Field Operations (OFO) is the office responsible for securing the Ports of Entry (POEs). CBP/OFO has dedicated personnel, technology, infrastructure and resources assigned to the inbound inspections for processing those travelers and inbound processing has been a national priority of CBP since its inception in 2003. Although CBP/OFO has the authority to conduct outbound inspections, there is little infrastructure, intelligence sharing or technology at the POEs for conducting outbound operations. Some POEs are conducting outbound operations with officers that have been taken from the inbound staffing models. However, at the time of writing this thesis, CBP does not have a national policy mandating POEs conduct outbound operations. On the Southwest Border (SWB), the Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are continuing to smuggle bulk cash and weapons into Mexico and border violence continues to increase. This thesis makes a recommendation of what the best policy option for outbound operations would be to implement on the SWB. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 26, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11533 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11533 Shelf Number: 125403 Keywords: Border SecurityOrganized CrimeSmuggling (U.S.)Weapons Smuggling |
Author: Das, Pushpita Title: Drug Trafficking in India: A Case for Border Security Summary: Proximity to the largest producers of heroin and hashish-the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent [Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran] - has made India's Pborder vulnerable to drug trafficking. Indigenous production of low grade heroin as well as various psychotropic and prescription drugs and their growing demand in the neighbouring countries and international market have added a new dimension to the problem of drug trafficking. Trends and patterns of drug trafficking in the country demonstrate that there is a gradual shift from traditional/natural drugs towards synthetic drugs that are being trafficked. Trafficking of drugs takes place overwhelmingly through land borders followed by sea and air routes. Given the vulnerability of the borders to drug trafficking, India has tried to tackle the problem through the strategy of drug supply and demand reduction, which involves enacting laws, co-operating with voluntary organisations, securing its borders and coasts by increasing surveillance, as well as seeking the active cooperation of its neighbours and the international community. Details: New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2012. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: IDSA Occasional Paper No. 24: Accessed June 27, 2012 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/IDSA_ACaseforBorderSecurity.pdf Year: 2012 Country: India URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/IDSA_ACaseforBorderSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 125412 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Trafficking (India)Drug Trafficking Control |
Author: Rodriguez Cuevas, Jose A. Title: The Balloon Effect and Mexican Homeland Security: What it Means to be the Weakest Link in the Americas’ Security Chain Summary: The sudden increase in crime and violence in some Mexican cities and regions has raised security concerns not only in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon categorized these crimes as a threat to Mexican society, but also in the United States, where Department of Homeland Secretary head Janet Napolitano referred to stemming the violence as “vital to core U.S. national interests.” Mexico is concerned with the latent threat of violence spreading all over the nation, while the U.S. is trying to guard against spillover. Both governments are concerned by the increased violence and its impact on communities along the U.S.–Mexican border. Because of its geopolitical location along the southern U.S. border, Mexico is susceptible to possible undesired effects of U.S. strategies. These unintended, second-degree consequences are known as “balloon effects,” after the airflow inside a balloon when constriction applied to one area sends pressure to another area in the balloon, thinning and weakening its wall. Since 2006, Mexico’s strategy for countering transnational organized crime and related activities has sent the balloon effect in two directions: first, inside Mexico, where government actions have unbalanced the criminal structure, creating balloon effects inside Mexican territory; and second, within the U.S. while asking to escalate the Mexican effort to improve its anti-crime strategy with U.S. assistance has escalated conflict and led to a holistic strategy against transnational organized crime and related activities in the Americas. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 85p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Thesis: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Shelf Number: 125464 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceHomeland SecurityOrganized Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Wise Strategic Communication Title: Afghanistan Counter People Smuggling Scoping Study Summary: This study aims to identify the level of situational awareness and both formal and informal communication channels to reach out Hazara population to inform them of the risks associated with illegal immigration to Australia via people-smuggling networks. Details: Canberra: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/FinalReport-WiseStrategicCommunicatoin.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/FinalReport-WiseStrategicCommunicatoin.pdf Shelf Number: 125660 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Trafficking (Australia)Illegal ImmigrantsPeople-Smuggling |
Author: Hiemstra, Nancy Ann Title: The View From Ecuador: Security, Insecurity, and Chaotic Geographies of U.S. Migrant Detention and Deportation Summary: The central argument of this dissertation is that while the immigration enforcement policies of detention and deportation are politically positioned as critical strategies for protecting U.S. homeland security, these policies actually create insecurity at multiple scales. The project, grounded in both critical geopolitics and feminist political geography, endeavors to interrogate the ‗master narratives‘ behind these restrictive policies. First, the dissertation explores the historical, political, and cultural factors behind the United States‘ increased use of detention and deportation, as well as the deepseated structural factors driving Ecuadorian migration to the United States. Then, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Ecuador with deportees and family members of detained migrants, the study seeks to understand ways in which these policies are embodied both within and outside U.S. borders. It is suggested that the detention and deportation system engenders chaos – or the appearance of chaos – in numerous spaces and for various groups of individuals. Three ‗chaotic geographies‘ of the system are explored in order to scrutinize the enactment of immigration policy: the operation of the system itself, detainees‘ experiences, and reverberations of detention and deportation in Ecuador. Data show that inside U.S. borders, these enforcement policies interact recursively with processes of racialization and criminalization to generate insecurity for detained migrants and discipline employees to behave in particular ways. In addition, due to its inherent disorder and confusion, the detention and deportation system projects a cloak of impenetrability that hides the powerful actors behind its expansion, faults, and abuses. The dissertation then investigates how the chaos of detention and deportation extends transnationally to countries of migrant origin to produce insecurity precisely at the scale of the home for migrants‘ families, communities, and for returned migrants. In Ecuador, detention and deportation increase economic and ontological insecurity for family members and returned migrants in ways that spread throughout communities. Moreover, data from Ecuador illustrate that policymakers‘ objectives of deterrence do not play out as anticipated. In this project, the author joins critical scholars in calling for an expanded understanding of the concept of security, one which incorporates multiple scales and operates across political borders. Details: Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 2011. 328p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 19, 2012 at: http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=geo_etd&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%2522the%2520view%2520from%2520ecuador%253A%2520security%2522%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D2%26ved%3D0CFMQFjAB%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fsurface.syr.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1068%2526context%253Dgeo_etd%26ei%3DvwsIUOjYOsTr0QGY45XZAw%26usg%3DAFQjCNEdrVc4H0guG5jVeq8-VDDaxJvmQA#search=%22view%20from%20ecuador%3A%20security%22 Year: 2011 Country: Ecuador URL: http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=geo_etd&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%2522the%2520view%2520from%2520ecuador%253A%2520security%2522%26source%3Dw Shelf Number: 125676 Keywords: Border SecurityDeportationIllegal AliensImmigrant DetentionImmigrantsImmigration (Ecuador) |
Author: Issa, Darrell Title: Memorandum: Update of Operation Fast and Furious Summary: Since February 2011, the House Oversight and Government and Government Reform Committee has been conducting a joint investigation with Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-IA) of reckless conduct in the Justice Department’s Operation Fast and Furious. The committee has held three hearings, conducted twenty-four transcribed interviews with fact witnesses, sent the Department of Justice over fifty letters, and issued the Department of Justice two subpoenas for documents. The Justice Department, however, continues to withhold documents critical to understanding decision making and responsibility in Operation Fast and Furious. This memo explains key events and facts in Operation Fast and Furious that have been uncovered during the congressional investigation; remaining questions that the Justice Department refused to cooperate in helping the Committee answer; the ongoing relevance of these questions; and the extent of the harm created by both Operation Fast and Furious and the Department’s refusal to fully cooperate. The memo also explains issues for Committee Members to consider in making a decision about holding Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt of Congress for his Department’s refusal to provide subpoenaed documents. Attached to this memo for review and discussion is a draft version of a contempt report that the Committee may consider at an upcoming business meeting. Details: Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2012. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2012 at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Update-on-Fast-and-Furious-with-attachment-FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Update-on-Fast-and-Furious-with-attachment-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 126084 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsGun ControlGun ViolenceGuns (U.S.)Illegal GunsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weaspons |
Author: Australia. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Title: Inquiry Into the Adequacy of Aviation and Maritime Security Measures to Combat Serious and Organised Crime Summary: On 14 September 2009, the then Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission (PJC-ACC) initiated an inquiry into the adequacy of aviation and maritime security measures to combat serious and organised crime. The terms of reference required the committee to examine the effectiveness of current administrative and law enforcement arrangements to protect Australia's borders from serious and organised criminal activity. In particular the committee examined: (a) the methods used by serious and organised criminal groups to infiltrate Australia's airports and ports, and the extent of infiltration; (b) the range of criminal activity currently occurring at Australia's airports and ports, including but not limited to: •the importation of illicit drugs, firearms, and prohibited items; •tariff avoidance; •people trafficking and people smuggling; •money laundering; and •air cargo and maritime cargo theft; (c) the effectiveness of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC)and Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) schemes; includingthe process of issuing ASICs and MSICs, the monitoring of cards issuedand the storage of, and sharing of, ASIC and MSIC information between appropriate law enforcement agencies; (d) the current administrative and law enforcement arrangements and information and intelligence sharing measures to manage the risk of serious and organised criminal activity at Australia's airports and ports; and (e) the findings of the Australian Crime Commission's special intelligence operations into Crime in the Transport Sector and Illegal Maritime Importation and Movement Methodologies. Details: Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Cmomittee on Law Enforcement, 2011. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2012 at: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/aviation_maritime/report/index.htm Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/aviation_maritime/report/index.htm Shelf Number: 126228 Keywords: AirportsAviation SecurityBorder SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Crime (Australia)Organized Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: State Could Enhance Visa Fraud Prevention by Strategically Using Resources and Training Summary: Foreign nationals may apply for entry into the United States under dozens of different visa categories, depending on circumstances. State’s Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security share responsibility for the prevention of visa fraud, which is a serious problem that threatens the integrity of the process. Some documents through illegal means, such as using counterfeit identity documents or making false claims to an adjudicating officer. Visa fraud may facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence, human trafficking, and terrorism. This report examines (1) countries and visa categories that are subject to the most fraud; (2) State's use of technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention. GAO examined State's reports and data on fraud trends and statistics, examined resources and technologies to counter fraud, and observed visa operations and fraud prevention efforts overseas and domestically. Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate. Fraud is also perpetrated for immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas and student visas. In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time. State has a variety of technological tools and resources to assist consular officers in combating fraud, but does not have a policy for their systematic use. For example, State recently implemented fraud prevention technologies such as a fraud case management system that establishes connections among multiple visa applications, calling attention to potentially fraudulent activity. Overseas posts have Fraud Prevention Units that consist of a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and locally employed staff who analyze individual fraud cases. In 2011, the ratio of Fraud Prevention Unit staff to fraud cases varied widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) is a domestic resource available to posts that verifies information on certain visa applications. However, KCC services are only provided on an ad-hoc basis, and State does not have a policy for posts to systematically utilize its resources. For example, an FPM at a high fraud post told GAO that the post would like to utilize KCC anti-fraud services for screening certain visa categories, but did not know how to request KCC assistance. Although State offers anti-fraud training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and online, it does not require FPMs to take them and does not track FPMs’ enrollment. Consular officers receive limited fraud training as part of the initial consular course, and FPMs are not required to take advanced fraud training in new technologies. In addition, GAO found that 81 percent of FPM positions were filled by entry-level officers and 84 percent of FPM positions were designated as either part-time or rotational. Between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up about 21 percent of the total students who registered for a course on detecting fraudulent documents, and State could not guarantee that FPMs were among them. Four out of the five FPMs with whom GAO spoke had not been trained in State's new fraud case management system. GAO recommends that State (1) formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources available at KCC, based on post workload and fraud trends, as determined by the Department and (2) establish requirements for FPM training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to track the extent to which requirements are met. State concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 51p. Source: GAO-12-888 Report to Congressional Requesters: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2012 at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647871.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647871.pdf Shelf Number: 126341 Keywords: Border SecurityCrime PreventionImmigrationVisa SecurityVisas, Fraud |
Author: Kohli, Aarti Title: Borders, Jails, and Jobsites: An Overview Of Federal Immigration Enforcement Programs in the U.S. Summary: This report provides an overview of the current state of immigration enforcement in the United States in order to encourage and facilitate a productive discussion towards reform. The paper summarizes available background information and the latest research on the key components of the enforcement system. It describes the primary actors and programs, presents specific concerns identified by scholars, advocates and researchers, and offers preliminary recommendations. Details: Berkeley, CA: The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, University of California, Berkeley Law School, 2011. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2012 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WI_Enforcement_Paper_final_web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WI_Enforcement_Paper_final_web.pdf Shelf Number: 126372 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrantsImmigration (U.S.) |
Author: Graybill, Lisa Title: Border Patrol Agents as Interpreters Along the Northern Border: Unwise Policy, Illegal Practice Summary: Advocates along the Northern Border report a recent, sharp increase in the use of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents to provide interpretation services to state and local law enforcement officers and emergency responders. This most often occurs when an officer or responder encounters an individual who does not speak English and proactively reaches out to USBP for assistance. But it has also occurred when USBP agents respond to an incident report in lieu of, or in addition to, local law enforcement officers. In other cases, USBP agents have reportedly begun responding to 911 emergency assistance calls, especially if the caller is known or perceived not to speak English. Much of this activity appears to have been precipitated by the fact that the U.S.-Canada border has undergone a dramatic transformation, including an influx of newly assigned USBP agents. Immigrants, their advocates, and community members are reporting—and official statistics confirm—that there are simply too many USBP agents on the ground, apparently with too much time on their hands, who lack adherence to stated priorities. This special report by Lisa Graybill for the Immigration Policy Center lays out the problems with border patrol agents serving as translators and make recommendations intended to promote Title VI compliance, maintain the integrity of the USBP mission on the Northern Border, and protect the rights of immigrants and their families who call the Northern Border home. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, Immigration Policy Center, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2012 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/borderpatrolagentsasinterpreters.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/borderpatrolagentsasinterpreters.pdf Shelf Number: 126466 Keywords: Border Control Agents (U.S.)Border SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationLanguage BarriersUse of Interpreters |
Author: Guttin, Andrea Title: The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration Enforcement in Travis County, Texas Summary: The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) is a program administered by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that screens inmates in prisons and jails, identifies deportable non-citizens, and places them into deportation proceedings. In this Special Report, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration Enforcement in Travis County, Texas, provides a brief history and background on the CAP program. It includes a case study of CAP implementation in Travis County, Texas, which finds that the program has a negative impact on communities because it increases the community’s fear of reporting crime to police, is costly, and may encourage racial profiling. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Council, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2012 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_Program_021710.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_Program_021710.pdf Shelf Number: 126497 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityDeportationIllegal AliensImmigrantsImmigration (U.S.) |
Author: Buentello, Tara Title: Operation Streamline: Drowning Justice and Draining Dollars along the Rio Grande Summary: Operation Streamline, a policy begun in 2005 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in conjunction with the Department of Justice (DOJ), mandates that nearly all undocumented immigrants apprehended near the southern border in designated areas be detained and prosecuted through the federal criminal justice system, a dramatic departure from previous practices when most immigration cases were handled exclusively within the civil immigration system. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Operation Streamline press release: “Those aliens who are not released due to humanitarian reasons will face prosecution for illegal entry. The maximum penalty for violation of this law is 180 days incarceration. While the alien is undergoing criminal proceedings, the individual will also be processed for removal from the United States.” Operation Streamline’s key component is that it mandates that immigrants crossing the border in designated areas be arrested, detained while awaiting trial, prosecuted with a misdemeanor or felony charge, incarcerated in the federal justice system, and finally deported. On December 16, 2005, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched Operation Streamline along a section of the Texas-Mexico border near Del Rio, Texas, spanning a total of 210 miles. Operation Streamline has spread to other areas along the U.S.-Mexico border, including much of Arizona and Texas. Operation Streamline has exposed undocumented immigrants crossing the southern border to unprecedented rates of incarceration; overburdened the federal criminal justice system in the districts where it has been implemented; and added enormous costs to the American taxpayer while providing a boon to the for-profit private prison industry. The extent of the program is so sweeping that by 2009, 54% of all federal prosecutions nationwide were for immigration offenses. The effect is more pronounced in border districts. In April 2010, prosecutions of 1325 and 1326 alone accounted for 84% of all prosecutions in the Southern District of Texas, which includes Houston. Since Operation Streamline began in 2005, there has been a 136% in prosecutions for unauthorized entry and an 85% increase in prosecutions for unauthorized re-entry in the Western and Southern Districts of Texas. More than 135,000 migrants have been criminally prosecuted in these two border districts since 2005 under the two sections of the federal code that make unauthorized entry and re-entry a crime. Operation Streamline has funneled more than $1.2 billion into the largely for-profit detention system in Texas, driving the expansion of private prisons along the border. Operation Streamline has significantly increased the caseload of public defenders and federal judges while radically increasing the number of individuals incarcerated for petty immigration violations in for-profit private prisons and county jails throughout Texas. Data in this report show an increase in criminal prosecutions of undocumented border-crossers even as the estimated number of migrants to the United States has dropped. In 2009, two border districts in Texas prosecuted 46,470 immigrants, representing approximately 186 entry and re-entry prosecutions a day for federal courts along the border. Proponents of Operation Streamline argue that it has deterred illegal entry. However, research conducted amongst migrants in the United States indicates that the decreased migration has largely been caused by the economic downturn, while the ironic impact of beefed-up border enforcement has been to deter migrants from returning to their countries of origin during the recession. Operation Streamline: Drowning Justice and Draining Dollars along the Rio Grande presents facts, figures, and testimony highlighting the human and financial costs Operation Streamline exacts on migrants, the federal judiciary, and the detention system in Texas. The recommends report recommends the repeal of Operation Streamline. Successor policies to Operation Streamline addressing undocumented border crossers should return jurisdiction over immigration violations to civil immigration authorities, reduce the use of detention for border crossing violations, and promote and promote a pathway for legal and reasonable means for immigrants to obtain legal status in the United States. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Green Paper: Accessed October 1, 2012 at: Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126536 Keywords: Border SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigrant DetentionImmigration Policy |
Author: Robertson, Alistair Graham Title: Operation Streamline: Costs and Consequences Summary: In 2005, the Del Rio sector of the Border Patrol, an agency within the federal Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, faced a peculiar issue. With civil detention facilities at capacity and voluntary return to Mexico available only to Mexican citizens, non-Mexican migrants were given a notice to appear in front of an immigration judge and released in the United States.” In 2004, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 10,000 non-Mexican migrants in the Del Rio sector; just one year later, the figure spiked to 15,000. The solution to this enforcement issue, Border Patrol decided, was to circumvent the civil immigration system by turning non-Mexican migrants over for criminal prosecution, a practice until then relegated almost exclusively to cases of violent criminal history or numerous reentries. Upon considering the proposition, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas responded with one caveat: in order to avoid an equal protection violation, the courts would have to criminally prosecute all migrants within a designated area, not just those from countries other than Mexico. With the signature of Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, it was decided to do just that. Starting in December of 2005, “Operation Streamline” required all undocumented border-crossers in the Eagle Pass area of the Del Rio Border Patrol sector to be funneled into the criminal justice system and charged with unlawful entry or re-entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325 or 1326). Those charged with improper entry usually face a sentence of up to 180 days, and a judge may impose a sentence of over ten years dependent upon criminal history. Re-entry offenders also face tough sentences, including a felony charge that places up to a ten-year bar on legal immigration. The Department of Homeland Security since has drastically expanded the criminal referral model through similar programs in the Yuma sector in 2006, the Laredo sector in 2007, and the Tucson sector in 2008. By 2010, every U.S.-Mexico border sector except California had implemented a “zero-tolerance” program of some sort, the whole of which are commonly referred to by the moniker of the original program— Operation Streamline. Depending upon the sector, the degree of implementation may vary significantly. For example, according to Federal Public Defenders in the Yuma and Del Rio sectors, Border Patrol refers nearly 100% of apprehended immigrants in those areas for criminal prosecution. In the Tucson sector, where greater migrant volume renders such high referral rates logistically unfeasible, the percentage on immigrants “Streamlined” may be closer to 10%, or about 70 of the 800 migrants apprehended each day. The resulting prisoner volume has led the Bureau of Prisons in the Department of Justice to depend upon private prison corporations like Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group. Through increased facility use and contracts for other services, CCA and GEO have enjoyed a combined $780 million increase in annual federal revenues since 2005. In FY2011, the federal government paid immense sums of taxpayer money to private prison companies, $744 million and $640 million to CCA and GEO Group, respectively. Much of this revenue derives from contracts for Criminal Alien Requirement (CAR) prisons, where federal immigrant prisoners are segregated in privately owned, privately operated prisons contracted by the Bureau of Prisons. The terms of CAR contracts include incentives (and sometimes guarantees) to fill facilities near capacity with immigrant prisoners. Each year, these companies dedicate millions of dollars to lobbying and campaign contributions. The federal dollars behind immigrant incarceration come at a significant cost to the taxpayer, climbing in 2011 to an estimated $1.02 billion annually. Before the announcement of Operation Streamline in 2005, the federal government annually committed about 58% of that total, or $591 million toward incarcerating immigrants. In 1994, the amount was about $72 million, 7% of its current level. Recent budget proposals indicate that federal spending on 2 Operation Streamline: Costs and Consquences prosecution and incarceration will likely increase, as Congress recently stated an ambition to “expand Operation Streamline to additional Border Patrol sectors” alongside a record-setting DHS budget request of $45.2 billion. The sheer volume of immigration cases has also severely burdened the courts in border districts, which have been forced to handle a near 350% increase of petty immigration cases from 12,411 in 2002 to 55,604 in 2010. In Tucson, courts may see as many as 200 immigrants lined up for prosecution in a single morning. To handle the expanded caseload, the Department of Justice has pursued a combination of resource-intensive options, including privately contracting with defense attorneys, deputizing Border Patrol agents as special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and bringing several magistrate judges out of retirement. Furthermore, Operation Streamline strips Assistant U.S. Attorneys of the power to prosecute the crimes they deem pressing. Immigration cases made up 36% of all criminal prosecutions nationwide in 2011, surpassing drug and fraud prosecutions combined. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2012. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed october 1, 2012 at: http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf Shelf Number: 126537 Keywords: Border SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrationOperation Streamline (U.S.)Private Prisons |
Author: Lydgate, Joanna Title: Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline Summary: The current administration is committed to combating the drug and weapon trafficking and human smuggling at the root of violence along the U.S.-Mexico border. But a Bush-era immigration enforcement program called Operation Streamline threatens to undermine that effort. Operation Streamline requires the federal criminal prosecution and imprisonment of all unlawful border crossers. The program, which mainly targets migrant workers with no criminal history, has caused skyrocketing caseloads in many federal district courts along the border. This Warren Institute study demonstrates that Operation Streamline diverts crucial law enforcement resources away from fighting violent crime along the border, fails to effectively reduce undocumented immigration, and violates the U.S. Constitution. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began implementing Operation Streamline along the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005. The program has fundamentally transformed DHS’s border enforcement practices. Before Operation Streamline began, DHS Border Patrol agents voluntarily returned first-time border crossers to their home countries or detained them and formally removed them from the United States through the civil immigration system. The U.S. Attorney’s Office reserved criminal prosecution for migrants with criminal records and for those who made repeated attempts to cross the border. Operation Streamline removed that prosecutorial discretion, requiring the criminal prosecution of all undocumented border crossers, regardless of their history. Operation Streamline has generated unprecedented caseloads in eight of the eleven federal district courts along the border, straining the resources of judges, U.S. attorneys, defense attorneys, U.S. Marshals, and court personnel. The program’s voluminous prosecutions have forced many courts to cut procedural corners. Magistrate judges conduct en masse hearings, during which as many as 80 defendants plead guilty at a time, depriving migrants of due process. Indeed, in December 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Operation Streamline’s en masse plea hearings in Tucson, Arizona violate federal law. By focusing court and law enforcement resources on the prosecution of first-time entrants, Operation Streamline also diverts attention away from fighting drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other crimes that create border violence. To examine Operation Streamline’s effects, the Warren Institute observed Operation Streamline court proceedings and conducted interviews with judges, U.S. attorneys, defense attorneys, Border Patrol representatives, and immigration lawyers in four border cities in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. This report outlines the Warren Institute’s findings. It concludes that Operation Streamline is not an effective means of improving border security or reducing undocumented immigration. Furthermore, Operation Streamline has unacceptable consequences for the agencies tasked with implementing the program, for the migrants it targets, and for the rule of law in this country. The administration should therefore eliminate Operation Streamline and restore U.S. attorneys’ discretion to prosecute serious crimes along the border. If the administration seeks to punish first-time border crossers, it need look no further than the civil system. Details: Berkeley, CA: Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, University of California, Berkeley Law School, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed October 1, 2012 at: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf Shelf Number: 126538 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigrant DetentionImmigration PolicyOperation StreamlinePrison Prisons |
Author: Gounev, Philip Title: Anti-Corruption Measures in EU Border Control Summary: The present study, commissioned by FRONTEX, provides academic and policy perspectives, as well as empirical data on corruption and anti-corruption measures observed in border guard institutions across the 27 Member States of the European Union. The report compares and analyses anti-corruption measures in EU Member States’ border guard services, as well as the strategies and instruments used in corruption investigations of border guards. The purpose of this study was to provide border guards with a general overview of the relevant academic and policy research available on the subject of corruption, as well as to review and analyse mechanisms of corruption and the principal anti-corruption measures targeting them. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2012. 165p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2012 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=16109 Year: 2012 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=16109 Shelf Number: 126792 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCorruption (Bulgaria) |
Author: Cavendish, Betsy Title: Children at the Border: The Screening, Protection and Repatriation of Unaccompanied Mexican Minors Summary: “Children at the Border” shows that the 2008 federal Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”)—which was intended to prevent human trafficking and exploitation—has not been fully implemented. Unaccompanied Mexican children who merit protection, either in the U.S. or México, are often quickly shuttled back across the border without sufficient care, leading many to attempt the dangerous journey yet again. Thousands of children are needlessly exposed to human trafficking by drug cartels and criminal gangs, or sent back to potentially abusive and dangerous situations without having a reasonable chance to assert their rights to protection. The roughly 15,000 unaccompanied Mexican minors who are apprehended by the U.S. border patrol each year will benefit from the better screening proposed in the report. Children in México who are either returned to shelters or are in transit through México without a parent will also benefit from these recommendations. The report and recommendations follow two years of research by a pro bono team of 32 lawyers as well as AG Design. The project involved site visits at 14 different locations on both sides of the U.S.-México border. México Appleseed and Appleseed collaborated with pro bono legal counsel from four leading law firms: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, DLA Piper and Mayer Brown in the U.S.; and Jáuregui y Navarrete in México. Details: Washington, DC: Appleseed; Mexico: Appleseed Mexico, 2011. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Children-At-The-Border1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Children-At-The-Border1.pdf Shelf Number: 126805 Keywords: Border SecurityChild ProtectionChild TraffickingHuman TraffickingUnaccompanied Children (U.S., Mexico)Undocumented Minors |
Author: Amnesty International Title: In Hostile Terrain: Human Rights Violations in Immigration Enforcement in the US Southwest Summary: The report examines the human rights violations associated with immigration enforcement at the border and in the interior of the United States. While the development and implementation of immigration policies are a matter for individual governments, such policies must be compatible with international human rights law and standards. All immigrants, irrespective of their legal status, have human rights. This report shows that the USA is failing in its obligations under international law to ensure these rights. Among its findings are: • Recent immigration policy in certain border areas has pushed undocumented immigrants into using dangerous routes through the US desert; hundreds of people die each year as a result. • Immigration enforcement in the USA is a federal responsibility. Federal immigration officials are increasingly working in collaboration with state and local law enforcement agencies but improper oversight of state and local law enforcement has led to increased racial profiling. • Increasingly, state laws and local policies are creating barriers to immigrants accessing their basic human rights, including rights to education and essential health care services. While these laws are targeting non-citizens, these policies are also impacting US citizen children. • Recent legislation enacted or proposed in several states targets immigrant communities and places them, Indigenous communities and other minority communities at risk of discrimination. • Immigrant communities also face a range of barriers to justice when they are victims of crime such as human trafficking, domestic violence or bias crimes. The implementation of immigration enforcement measures along the border has also impacted the rights of Indigenous communities, whose traditional lands lie on both sides of the US-Mexico border. Details: New York: Amnesty International USA, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2012 at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/usa-in-hostile-terrain-human-rights-violations-in-immigration-enforcement-in-the-us-southwest Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/usa-in-hostile-terrain-human-rights-violations-in-immigration-enforcement-in-the-us-southwest Shelf Number: 127021 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman RightsIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)ImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Whitfield, Nathan S. Title: Traveling the Terror Highway: Infiltration of Terror Operatives across the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, border security and immigration have received increased attention. Public and political scrutiny have elevated and changed the priority of border security and immigration enforcement; from migrant workers seeking employment to counter-terrorism. However, the question remains: if United States law enforcement and security agencies are unable to stop the smuggling of drugs and illegal migrants across the southwestern border between the U.S. and Mexico, is it possible to prevent terrorists from gaining unauthorized and unaccountable entry into the heartland of the U.S.? A corollary question is: given attempts to restructure the immigration enforcement policy and infrastructure to deter illegal entry of terrorists, will it still be possible and lucrative for terrorists to attempt to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border? This research seeks to explore existing conditions that may facilitate or increase the likelihood that terrorists would seek to infiltrate personnel across the U.S.-Mexico border. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127037 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration (U.S. - Mexico)TerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Lee, Erik: North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State University Title: Binational, Multi-state Survey on Human Trafficking Legislation and Collaboration Summary: In 2010-2011 NACTS conducted a multi-state survey on binational human trafficking legislation, law enforcement agency initiatives, and additional, community-level efforts. Human trafficking is an exploitation‐based crime that is distinct from human smuggling, which involves transporting people who have given their consent to be moved. A growing global awareness of this problem during the 1990s culminated in the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish the Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000. Human trafficking is an exceedingly difficult crime to define, detect, prosecute, prevent and quantify. The precise quantification of and data collection with respect to the human trafficking problem is an additional ongoing global challenge. Trafficking estimates for the U.S. and Mexico vary widely but are generally estimated to be in the tens of thousands annually. The report contains an executive summary and sections on background, current legislation, jurisdictional issues and key conclusions and recommendations. Details: Phoenix, AZ: National American center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State University, 2011. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2012 at: http://nacts.asu.edu/sites/default/files/Draft%20Full%20Report%20-%20English.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://nacts.asu.edu/sites/default/files/Draft%20Full%20Report%20-%20English.pdf Shelf Number: 127092 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Trafficking (U.S.)Sexual Exploitation |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Reinstating the Duty-Free Trade at Bulgarian Land Borders: Potential Setback in the Fight Against Organized Crime and Corruption Summary: Since the early 1990s the duty-free shops along Bulgaria’s land-border crossings were used as a channel for illegal import of excise goods (cigarettes, alcohol and petrol). With the increase of excise and VAT taxes in the second-half of the 1990s, the risk of alcohol and cigarettes smuggling increased rapidly. The duty-free shops gradually evolved into one of the main channels for the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, and fuel. At that period, duty free operators existed without a legal regulation but only with a licensing permit from the Minister of Finance. The smuggling was tacitly tolerated from the highest political level. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2012. 4p. Source: CSD Policy Brief No. 32: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2012 at http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=20861 Year: 2012 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=20861 Shelf Number: 127105 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityCorruptionOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Title: A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border. A Majority Report Summary: The first edition of A Line in the Sand, released in 2006, (hereafter “first edition”) exposed the rising threat of Mexican drug cartels and the vulnerabilities of our porous Southwest border. The horrific violence perpetrated by Mexican drug cartels continues to grow and, in many cases documented in this report, spills into the United States. The cartels now have a presence in more than 1,000 U.S. cities and dominate the wholesale illicit drug trade by controlling the movement of most of the foreign-produced drug supply across the Southwest border. This report documents the increased operational control of the cartels inside the United States, their strategy to move illegal drugs, and the bloody turf wars that have taken place between rival cartels, as they struggle to control valuable trafficking corridors. Collectively, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) maintain firm control of drug and human smuggling routes across the U.S.- Mexico border creating safe entry for anyone willing to pay the price. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in its most recent assessment, asserts it can control only 44 percent of our border with Mexico. Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations. The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter. One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2012. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Shelf Number: 127109 Keywords: Border SecurityDomestic TerrorismDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico-U.S)Homeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Akee, Randall Title: Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective Summary: We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market - the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6226: Accessed December 4, 2012 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6226.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6226.pdf Shelf Number: 127122 Keywords: Border SecurityEconomics of CrimeHuman TraffickingOffender Mobility |
Author: California. Office of the Attorney General Title: The State of Human Trafficking in California 2012 Summary: On September 22, 2012, our nation celebrated the 150th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation. While slavery has been outlawed in this country since 1865, the promise of freedom still eludes thousands of men, women, and children who are forced into labor and prostitution in the United States today. Forced labor and sex trafficking are not just brutal relics of history or crimes that take place in faraway places. They comprise the world’s fastest growing criminal enterprise, and they are flourishing right here in California. Human trafficking is an estimated $32 billion-a-year global industry. After drug trafficking, human trafficking is the world’s second most profitable criminal enterprise, a status it shares with illegal arms trafficking. Like drug and arms trafficking, the United States is one of the top destination countries for trafficking in persons. California – a populous border state with a significant immigrant population and the world’s ninth largest economy – is one of the nation’s top four destination states for trafficking human beings. As part of the state’s first anti-trafficking law (AB 22, Lieber), the California Alliance to Combat Trafficking and Slavery Task Force reviewed California’s response to human trafficking and offered findings and recommendations in a 2007 report to the Governor, Attorney General, and Legislature. California has made tremendous progress in combating human trafficking since the Task Force released the Human Trafficking in California report, but significant new challenges in combating this crime have emerged in the last five years. First, criminal organizations and street gangs have increasingly turned to trafficking in persons. The prevailing wisdom among these criminals is that human trafficking is more profitable and has a lower risk of being detected than drug trafficking. Second, new innovations in technology make it possible for traffickers to recruit victims and perpetrate their crimes online. It is critical that law enforcement have the tools and training to police online trafficking. Third, the Internet, social media, and mobile devices provide new avenues for outreach to victims and raising public awareness about this atrocious crime. In January 2012, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris created a Human Trafficking Work Group to examine the nature and scope of human trafficking in California in 2012; to evaluate California’s progress since 2007 in combating human trafficking; and to identify challenges and opportunities in protecting and assisting victims and bringing traffickers to justice. The Work Group included more than 100 representatives of state, local and federal law enforcement, state government agencies, victim service providers, nonprofit groups, technology companies, and educational institutions. This report reflects the Work Group discussions held during three day-long meetings in Sacramento, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, as well as supplemental research and investigation by the California Department of Justice. Details: Sacramento, CA: Office of the Attorney General, 2012. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2012 at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/ht/human-trafficking-2012.pdf? Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/ht/human-trafficking-2012.pdf? Shelf Number: 127213 Keywords: Border SecurityCrime TrendsHuman Trafficking (California)Labor Trafficking (California)Sex Trafficking (California)Transnational Crime |
Author: National Immigration Forum Title: Misbehavior at the Border: Are Those Who Control Immigration Out of Control Themselves? Summary: This paper looks at corruption and misconduct documented within the Border Patrol and its parent agency, Customs and Border Protection. With rapid growth, high turnover and a high new agent to experienced agent ration, there are questions about the adequacy of training and supervision. Another problem stems from the fact that the Inspector General’s office, which investigates many complaints against CBP agents, has not been properly resourced to keep pace with its workload. Details: Washington, DC: National Immigration Forum, 2012. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2012/CBP_Misconduct.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2012/CBP_Misconduct.pdf Shelf Number: 127270 Keywords: Border SecurityCorruptionCustoms AgenciesImmigration EnforcementPolice Misconduct |
Author: Meissner, Doris Title: Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery Summary: The US government spends more on federal immigration enforcement than on all other principal federal criminal law enforcement agencies combined, and has allocated nearly $187 billion for immigration enforcement since 1986. Deportations have reached record highs, border apprehensions 40-year lows, and more noncitizens than ever before are in immigration detention. The report traces the evolution of the immigration enforcement system, particularly in the post-9/11 era, in terms of budgets, personnel, enforcement actions, and technology – analyzing how individual programs and policies have resulted in a complex, interconnected, cross-agency system. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013. 182p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2013 at: http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Image_Galleries/immigration_enforcement_in__us_MPI_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Image_Galleries/immigration_enforcement_in__us_MPI_report.pdf Shelf Number: 127284 Keywords: Border SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigration (U.S.)Immigration Enforcement |
Author: Yong-an, Zhang Title: Asia, International Drug Trafficking, and U.S.-China Counternarcotics Cooperation Summary: The end of the Cold War may have heralded an end to certain tensions, but among other unforeseen effects it also precipitated a significant increase in the flow of illegal drugs across traditional national boundaries. International travel has become easier in an increasingly borderless world, and―although international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have never respected national boundaries―newly globalized markets for drug production and exportation, along with changing patterns of consumption in some societies, have had an enormous impact on drug trafficking. In short, the global market for illicit drugs, and the capacity of providers to deliver to this market, is expanding inexorably around the world. What was once called “the American disease” has become a global one. The international community first took an interest in the Asian drug trade at the beginning of the 20th century. The Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 was the first attempt at regulating drug trade in the region, as countries including the United States, Great Britain, China, Japan, and Russia convened to discuss the growing trafficking of opium. Since then, numerous measures have been adopted by individual countries and collectively to curb the illegal drug trade. This has been especially true since the launch of the “war on drugs.” In spite of these enhanced efforts, the global opiate market has nevertheless exhibited increased growth since 1980. Data gathered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate global opium production increased by close to 80 percent between 1998 and 2009. The UNODC reports that nearly all of the world’s illicit opium and heroin production is concentrated in “Afghanistan, South-East Asia (mostly Myanmar) and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia). Afghanistan stands out among this group, accounting for around 90 percent of global illicit opium production in recent years.” Upwards of 90 percent of the global heroin and morphine production is provided by Afghanistan and Myanmar. Clearly, the global opiate market has neither been eliminated nor significantly reduced since 1998. Asian drug trafficking remains a serious threat to both China and the United States. In order to confront this common threat, since 1985 China and the United States have taken numerous steps to cooperate in the interdiction of cross-border drug trafficking. Together, they have made outstanding achievements in the prevention of Asian drug trafficking and in the eradication of opium poppy cultivation in the Golden Triangle region that comprises parts of Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Bilateral cooperation, however, has not been wholly successful, and Beijing and Washington face a daunting set of challenges regarding cross-border drug trafficking. The two nations must reconsider both new and old challenges in both regional and global contexts in their efforts to promote counternarcotics cooperation. This paper will assess the various threats and challenges that China and the United States face from international Asian drug trafficking. It will examine the historical roots of counternarcotics cooperation between China and the United States, will analyze the limits of this bilateral cooperation, and will provide policy recommendations for the two governments on how to better confront these threats. Details: Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution 2012. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/drug%20trafficking%20zhang/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_paper.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/drug%20trafficking%20zhang/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 127442 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Abuse and Crime (Asia)Drug TraffickingOpium |
Author: Schoenfelder, Anna Title: Uncovering USBP: Bonus Programs for United States Border patrol Agents and the Arrest of Lawfully Present Individuals Summary: For almost four years, Families for Freedom (FFF) has been seeking information about the policies, practices and consequences of United States Border Patrol’s (USBP) operation in which they demand to see “papers” from persons traveling and living in Northern New York. In our last report, co‐authored by the New York Civil Liberties Union, we showed that of the thousands of individuals placed in removal proceedings after being questioned by USBP agents on trains and buses, only a miniscule percentage were recent entrants to the United States. But that report relied solely on the information that USBP released early in litigation about USBP practices. This report now adds crucial information about USBP’s aggressive internal enforcement practices. Using information gathered from depositions of senior officials, and data and documents released after years of litigation, this report shows the following: • USBP uses three different bonus programs to reward its agents. The programs include cash bonuses, vacation awards and distribution of gift cards of up to $100. As part of the settlement of our case, CBP gave us tallies for each of these for the Buffalo Sector (which covers northern New York). We also obtained the documents for approving the cash and time off awards, which provide no justification for which agents are awarded year‐end bonuses of up to $2,500 or 40 hours of vacation time. The sums spent on these programs in the Buffalo Sector alone amount to over $200,000 a year. The gift card program, which was not funded in 2009, resumed in 2010. • USBP has adopted a protocol for documenting arrests of individuals who are later determined to have legal status. Through FFF’s lawsuit, we obtained copies of forms – called “I‐44” forms – for persons arrested by agents at the Rochester Station. An analysis of those forms shows that the vast majority of those wrongfully arrested were from South Asian, East Asian, African, and Caribbean backgrounds. In just one program (train and bus arrests) in one station, almost 300 persons who had a form of legal status were arrested and transported to USBP offices prior to being released. The actual number is probably far higher because CBP did not formally instruct its agents to document these arrests until June 2010. These legally present individuals include 12 U.S. citizens, 52 Legal Permanent Residents, 28 tourist visa holders, 37 student visa holders, 39 work visa holders, 51 individuals in immigration proceedings, 26 with pending immigration applications, and 32 individuals that had been granted asylum, withholding or temporary protective status. Eleven individuals had other forms of status, including diplomatic visas, special visas for victims of domestic violence, and special status provided to the citizens of former US territories. Many of these people were arrested because of USBP database errors. The report includes stories about the experiences of these people, including those who are arrested in the middle of the night, and many who are forced to depend on family or employers to fax documents to USBP in order to be released. • Contrary to sworn statements submitted in the federal district court stating that the agency did not maintain an array of arrest statistics, including annual totals for the Rochester Station, the depositions ordered by the Court revealed that arrest statistics are the primary measure employed by local USBP stations and their Sector supervisors in the Buffalo Sector. The Agent in Charge in Rochester testified that recording the station’s daily arrest statistics and sending them to the Sector is the last job of the supervisor at the end of the day. The next morning, the Buffalo Sector office sends summary arrest statistics out to each station in time for each Patrol Agent in Charge to review when he first opens his e‐mail in the morning. Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of USBP testified that the national office of USBP tracks arrest statistics and distributes reports through mass emails on a twice daily basis. The Agent in Charge for the Rochester Station, which is the subject of much of the data in this report, stated that the Station does not keep any other regular measure of performance. • The documents show that USBP agents act on the assumption that no matter where they operate within the United States, they may arrest any noncitizen—whether a tourist or a long‐term legal resident with a driver’s license—whenever that person is not carrying detailed documentation that provides proof of status. But USBP’s records also show that the agents are not genuinely interested in what documents the law might require noncitizens to carry. Instead, USBP’s demand for “papers” is universal, resulting in an enforcement culture that maximizes arrest rates. Altogether, the documents show that USBP’s policies send a message to the foreign born that is ugly and untenable. This is especially so in New York State, where more than one in five persons was born abroad, and one in ten is a foreign‐born U.S. citizen. The remedy is clear: it is time for USBP to leave its unjustified mission of policing the interior of the United States and to end its unregulated bonus programs. USBP should not be allowed to transform the areas of the United States that are adjacent to the border into a police state in which persons are forced to carry papers at all times to be ready for a demand by a USBP agent to “show me your papers.” Otherwise, as the data shows, USBP will continue to arrest US citizens, lawful permanent residents and countless others who should not live in fear of traveling or living near the border. Details: New York: Families for Freedom; New York University School of Law, Immigrant Rights Clinic, 2013. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2013: http://familiesforfreedom.org/sites/default/files/resources/Uncovering%20USBP-FFF%20Report%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://familiesforfreedom.org/sites/default/files/resources/Uncovering%20USBP-FFF%20Report%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 127465 Keywords: Border Control AgentsBorder PatrolBorder SecurityImmigrantsImmigration (U.S. - Canada) |
Author: Mehlman-Orozco, K. Title: Smuggling and the Likelihood of Detention: An Exploratory Study of Undocumented Migrants in Northern Virginia Summary: Current political and security realties have focused attention on the mechanisms of undocumented migration at the US southern border. Although data show that the incidence of human smuggling has increased, it is unclear whether smuggled undocumented migrants evade detention more often than non-smuggled undocumented migrants. Do smuggled undocumented migrants evade detention more than undocumented migrants who cross without the help of smugglers? This study uses survey data collected from a convenience sample of day laborers in Northern Virginia to provide an exploratory answer to this question. Bivariate analyses of undocumented migrant entry and detention in the United States provides statistically significant evidence that smuggled undocumented migrants are less likely to be detained than undocumented migrants who traveled individually. This evidence suggests that smuggled undocumented migrants may be continuing to evade border security at a greater rate than individual migrants. Details: Alexandria, VA: Justitia Institute, 2012. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://www.justitiainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/TJISmugglingReport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.justitiainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/TJISmugglingReport.pdf Shelf Number: 127597 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigration |
Author: Wasem, Ruth Ellen Title: Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986 Summary: Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population (commonly referred to as illegal aliens) rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to 12.4 million in 2007, before leveling off at 11.1 million in 2011. The estimated number of unauthorized aliens had dropped to 1.9 million in 1988 following passage of a 1986 law that legalized several million unauthorized aliens. Jeffrey Passel, a demographer with the Pew Hispanic Research Center, has been involved in making these estimations since he worked at the U.S. Bureau of the Census in the 1980s. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) reported an estimated 11.5 million unauthorized alien residents as of January 2011, up from 8.5 million in January 2000. The OIS estimated that the unauthorized resident alien population in the United States increased by 37% over the period 2000 to 2008, before leveling off since 2009. The OIS estimated that 6.8 million of the unauthorized alien residents in 2011 were from Mexico. About 33% of unauthorized residents in 2011 were estimated to have entered the United States since 2000, but the rate of illegal entry appears to be slowing. The OIS based its estimates on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. Although increased border security, a record number of alien removals, and high unemployment, among other factors, have depressed the levels of illegal migration in recent years, the number of unauthorized aliens residing in the United States remains sizeable. Research suggests that various factors have contributed to the ebb and flow of unauthorized resident aliens, and that the increase is often attributed to the “push-pull” of prosperity-fueled job opportunities in the United States in contrast to limited job opportunities in the sending countries. Accordingly, the economic recession that began in December 2007 may have curbed the migration of unauthorized aliens, particularly because sectors that traditionally rely on unauthorized aliens, such as construction, services, and hospitality, have been especially hard hit. Some researchers also suggest that the increased size of the unauthorized resident population during the late 1990s and early 2000s is an inadvertent consequence of border enforcement and immigration control policies. They posit that strengthened border security curbed the fluid movement of seasonal workers. This interpretation, generally referred to as a caging effect, argues that these policies raised the stakes in crossing the border illegally and created an incentive for those who succeed in entering the United States to stay. More recently, some maintain that strengthened border security measures, such as “enforcement with consequences,” coordinated efforts with Mexico to reduce illegal migrant recidivism, and increased border patrol agents, may be part of a constellation of factors holding down the flow. The current system of legal immigration is cited as another factor contributing to unauthorized migration. The statutory ceilings that limit the type and number of immigrant visas issued each year create long waits for visas. According to this interpretation, many foreign nationals who have family in the United States resort to illegal avenues in frustration over the delays. Some researchers speculate that record number of alien removals (e.g., reaching almost 400,000 annually since FY2009) may cause a chilling effect on family members weighing unauthorized residence. Some observers point to more elusive factors when assessing the ebb and flow of unauthorized resident aliens—such as shifts in immigration enforcement priorities away from illegal entry to removing suspected terrorists and criminal aliens, or well-publicized discussions of possible “amnesty” legislation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2012. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: RL33874: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33874.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33874.pdf Shelf Number: 127607 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration Policies (U.S.) |
Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: Is More Getting Us Less? Real Solutions for Securing Our Border Summary: Ongoing reports about Mexico’s bloody conflict with organized crime have raised again the question of whether the United States should do more to prevent such violence from “spilling over” into the country. While officials have documented few cases of actual “spill over,” fears of exploding violence in Mexico and concerns about illegal migration are driving a policy debate that is centered on “securing the border.” To whit, President Barack Obama announced last May the deployment of 1,200 more National Guard troops to enhance border security, and requested an additional $500 million from Congress to further modernize southwestern border security. In August, the U.S. Congress approved a $600 million “Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010” in near record time. The question is whether such policy actions are effective. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Shelf Number: 127619 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal CartelsOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Danielson, Michael S. Title: Documented Failures: the Consequences of Immigration Policy on the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: This report presents systematic documentation of the experiences of migrant women, men and children repatriated from the United States to cities along Mexico's northern border, with particular emphasis on the Nogales, Arizona/Nogales, Sonora, Mexico area. The report addresses five common problems experienced by Mexican and Central American migrants before and during migration and upon apprehension, detention and deportation by U.S. migration authorities. The areas of investigation are: 1. The separation of migrants from family members they were traveling with when apprehended and deported by the U.S. Border Patrol. Migrants are often separated from their families, friends and loved ones during the process of deportation. This separation places migrants—the great majority of whom are from parts of Mexico very far from the northern border or Central American countries—in situations of unwarranted vulnerability in an increasingly dangerous region of Mexico. 2. Family separation as a driver of migration and a continuing complication for families of mixed-legal status. As the number of mixed immigration status families is steadily increasing, mothers, fathers, and guardians who are deported by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are often separated from their citizen children, who remain in the U.S. with their other parent, guardians, other family members, or in foster care. This section also examines how many of those deported by U.S. migration authorities were attempting to reunite with immediate family members already living in the United States. 3. Violence as a cause of migration and abuses and physical security threats experienced by migrants during northward journeys, border crossing, and after deportation from the United States. As levels of violence directly and indirectly related to drug trafficking have increased throughout Mexico and Central America in recent years, violence has become an increasingly common cause of migration. Furthermore, the growing prevalence of violence along the border means migrants are often the victims of theft and physical, verbal and sexual abuse at the hands of criminal gangs, human smugglers, human traffickers and thieves, risks that ought to be taken into consideration by U.S. migration authorities when deporting unauthorized immigrants to northern Mexico border towns. 4. Abuses and misconduct committed by the U.S. Border Patrol and other U.S.migration authorities. Based on multiple data sources, the report demonstrates that there is systematic abuse and misconduct in the process of apprehending, detaining and deporting undocumented migrants. One in four migrants surveyed (24.8%) reported being abused in some way by U.S. Border Patrol agents, and data show that Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and particularly the Border Patrol, systematically deny Mexican migrants the right to contact their consulate. 5. Abuses and misconduct committed by local police in Mexico.When traveling north, as well as after deportation, migrants are in a particularly vulnerable position and can be taken advantage of by local, state, and federal authorities in Mexico.This section provides estimates of the extent of these abuses, finding that men are more likely to be abused by Mexican police than women, and Central Americans are more likely to be abused by Mexican police than their Mexican migrant counterparts. Exploration of the five themes above reveals a complex set of distinct, but interrelated problems. The final section of the report provides a list of recommendations that, if implemented, would begin to address the most pressing problems faced by immigrants and their families. Details: Washington, DC: Jesuit Refugee Services, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Report prepared for the Kino Border Initiative Nogales, Arizona, U.S.A. and Nogales, Sonora, Mexico with funding from Catholic Relief Services of Mexico: Accessed February 19, 2013 at: http://www.jesuit.org/jesuits/wp-content/uploads/Kino_FULL-REPORT_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.jesuit.org/jesuits/wp-content/uploads/Kino_FULL-REPORT_web.pdf Shelf Number: 127652 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHuman RightsIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigration (U.S.)Immigration Policy |
Author: Barry, Tom Title: Policy on the Edge: Failures of Border Security and New Directions for Border Control Summary: Ten years after America’s rush to secure our borders, we must review, evaluate and change course. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 set off a multibillion-dollar border security bandwagon and distinctly altered the way the Border Patrol operates. Yet, despite massive expenditures and the new commitment to “border security,” our border policy remains unfocused and buffeted by political forces. In the absence of a sharp strategic focus, the management of the U.S.-Mexico border continues to be the victim of the problems and pressures created by our failed immigration and drug policies. Over the past decade, the old politics of immigration enforcement and drug control—not counterterrorism or homeland security—are still the main drivers of border policy. “Policy on the Edge” is an International Policy Report published by the Center for International Policy. The report examines the failures, waste and misdirection of the border security operations of the Department of Homeland Security. “Policy on the Edge” concludes that there has been more continuity than change in U.S. border policy. The final section of the report describes a policy path that charts the way forward to regulatory solutions - for immmigration, drugs, gun sales, border management - that are more pragmatic, effective and cost-efficient than current policies. Specific recommendations to improve border policy are included. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2013 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Barry_IPR_Policy_Edge_Border_Control_0611.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Barry_IPR_Policy_Edge_Border_Control_0611.pdf Shelf Number: 127655 Keywords: Border Control (U.S.)Border SecurityDrug TraffickingGun TraffickingIllegal ImmigrationImmigrants |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Southwest Border Security: Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary about Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border Summary: Drug-related homicides have dramatically increased in recent years in Mexico along the nearly 2,000-mile border it shares with the United States. U.S. federal, state, and local officials have stated that the prospect of crime, including violence, spilling over from Mexico into the southwestern United States is a concern. GAO was asked to review crime rates and assess information on spillover crime along the border. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) What information do reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime? GAO analyzed crime data from all of the 24 southwest border counties from 2004 through 2011 and federal documentation, such as threat assessments and DHS’s plans for addressing violence along the southwest border. GAO interviewed officials from DHS and DOJ and their components. GAO also interviewed officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and tracking crime in the border counties in the four southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). While the results of the interviews are not generalizable, they provided insights. GAO is not making any recommendations. DHS provided comments, which highlighted border-related crime initiatives recognized by GAO. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-175: Accessed March 1, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652320.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652320.pdf Shelf Number: 127743 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeSpillover CrimeViolence Crime (U.S. and Mexico) |
Author: Carker, Cat Title: The People Smugglers' Business Model Summary: This paper examines first some of the more recent international research, and second, relevant Australian case law and the more limited body of Australian research on people smuggling, to determine whether this business model can be identified. It does not seek to evaluate the appropriateness or efficacy of specific anti-people smuggling policies that have been or are currently being pursued by Australian Governments. Key points: •Since the late 1990s, people smuggling has been a key focus of political debate on irregular migration to Australia. Most recently, attention has turned to how to ‘break the people smugglers’ business model’ . While there is continuing debate about how best to achieve this objective, the business model being referred to remains largely unarticulated, at least publicly . •Examination of recent open source research and Australian case law reveals there is no single ‘people smugglers’ business model’ that explains how people smugglers operate, either internationally or to Australia . However, certain themes are evident, including the predominance of fluid networks over more hierarchical organisations and the flexibility, adaptability and resilience of those involved. It appears that a variety of business models are employed (either explicitly or implicitly) and that they are constantly evolving. •Some basic characteristics of maritime people smuggling from Indonesia to Australia can be discerned from open source information that can be used to outline some of the basic components of a common business model that seems to operate. However, there appear to be many variations on different components of the model. Further, the Indonesia to Australia leg is only part of a much longer journey, and Indonesia is not the only departure point for boats to Australia organised by people smugglers. Finally, while political and popular attention has focused largely on irregular maritime arrivals, people smuggling to Australia also occurs by air. •The use of the singular terms ‘the people smugglers’ business model’ or ‘the people smuggling business model’ gives the impression of a homogeneous market for which a single measure or ‘one size fits all’ solution might exist. The reality of a variety of business models operating at different stages of the supply chain between source countries and destination countries, including Australia, points to the need for a more tailored and considered approach. The points at which to intervene in order to ‘break’ a certain business model, and the most appropriate modes of intervention, will depend on the particular characteristics of that model. Details: Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 2, 2012-13: Accessed March 7, 2013 at: http://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/docs/ParliamentaryLibrary_SmugglersBusinessModel_Feb2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/docs/ParliamentaryLibrary_SmugglersBusinessModel_Feb2013.pdf Shelf Number: 127862 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Smuggling (Australia)Human TraffickingIllegal ImmigrationMaritime CrimeMigrantsRefugees |
Author: National Research Council: Carriquiry, Alicia Title: Options for Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for securing and managing the nation’s borders. Over the past decade, DHS has dramatically stepped up its enforcement efforts at the U.S.–Mexico border, increasing the number of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents, expanding the deployment of technological assets, and implementing a variety of “consequence programs” intended to deter illegal immigration. During this same period, there has also been a sharp decline in the number of unauthorized migrants apprehended at the border. Trends in total apprehensions do not, however, by themselves speak to the effectiveness of DHS’s investments in immigration enforcement. In particular, to evaluate whether heightened enforcement efforts have contributed to reducing the flow of undocumented migrants, it is critical to estimate the number of border-crossing attempts during the same period for which apprehensions data are available. With these issues in mind, DHS charged the National Research Council (NRC) with providing guidance on the use of surveys and other methodologies to estimate the number of unauthorized crossings at the U.S.–Mexico border, preferably by geographic region and on a quarterly basis. The NRC appointed the Panel on Survey Options for Estimating the Flow of Unauthorized Crossings at the U.S.–Mexican Border to carry out this task. A better understanding of the magnitude, timing, and location of these flows will help DHS to better evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts and to more efficiently allocate its resources along the border. This study focuses on Mexican migrants since Mexican nationals account for the vast majority (around 90 percent) of attempted unauthorized border crossings across the U.S.–Mexico border. A discussion of the use of surveys and statistical methods to measure unauthorized border flows needs to be set in the context of border enforcement and the migration process, both current and past. The migration process is highly complex, and it is influenced by a variety of factors such as the economic, social, and environmental conditions in sending and destination areas; immigration policies; and interior and border enforcement. Furthermore, migrants and their smugglers have adapted, and can continue to adapt, to changes in resources and strategies on the U.S. side of the border, and enforcement efforts in one geographic area can have spillover effects into another. This situation argues for a broader conception of the border, not segmented into ports of entry and sectors between the ports of entry. The migration process is also dynamic and evolving, and survey designs and modeling approaches that may be well suited for capturing certain aspects of migration flows today may not be able to do so with the same reliability in the future. Thus, flexibility of design and continuous evaluation of how DHS is implementing border metrics will be of the utmost relevance. Within this context, one can assess the usefulness of different types of data to capture information on migration flows. There are a number of major surveys in the United States and Mexico that collect some information about migration and border crossing. On the U.S. side, the American Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS) each target U.S. households. On the Mexican side, the “long questionnaire” of the Mexican Census of Housing and Population (administered to a 10 percent sample of the population in Mexico), the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE), the National Survey of Population Dynamics (ENADID), and the longitudinal Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) target households at a national level. None of these surveys was specifically designed to study migration. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP), in contrast, focus on studying migration, although the surveys are not based on probability sampling. The Survey of Migration at the Northern Border (EMIF-N), which has a probability sample conceptual basis, targets migrants passing through northern border cities of Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2013. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2013 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13498 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13498 Shelf Number: 128011 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration (U.S.) |
Author: McDougal, Topher Title: The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Traffic Across the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: This new study estimates the volume and value of arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. We apply a unique GIS-generated county-level panel dataset (1993-1999 and 2010-2012) of Federal Firearms Licenses to sell small arms (FFLs) and we create a demand curve for firearms based on the distance by road from the nearest point on the U.S.-Mexico border and official border crossing. We use a time-series negative binomial model paired with a post-estimation population attributable fraction (PaF) estimator. In this way, we are able to estimate a total demand for trafficking, both in terms of firearms and dollar sales for the firearms industry. Details: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarape Institute; San Diego, University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2013. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2013 at: http://pt.igarape.org.br/the-way-of-the-gun-estimating-firearms-traffic-across-the-u-s-mexico-border/ Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://pt.igarape.org.br/the-way-of-the-gun-estimating-firearms-traffic-across-the-u-s-mexico-border/ Shelf Number: 128044 Keywords: Border SecurityFirearms TraffickingGun TraffickingGun Violence (U.S., Mexico)HomicidesMurders |
Author: Mawdsley, Jocelyn Title: A European Agenda for Security Technology: From Innovation Policy to Export Controls Summary: The development and production of scanners, unmanned aircraft, cameras, coding, firewalls etc., are heavily promoted at the European level. These technologies are important for our security and they are an incentive for a new economic market. However, we have to ensure security technology doesn't become a weapon against human rights. Security first -- Attention to security has become an unprecedented priority ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. More than ever, citizens are made aware of the security risks in every aspect of our society and have become accustomed to various controls. Politicians emphasize the importance of 'homeland security', which must be defended on our own territory as well as elsewhere in the world. An industrial security industry, which taps into these new markets, has emerged alongside the traditional defence industry. This has to do with research, development and production for information technology, navigation, biometry, communication equipment, electronic identification, etc. In this regard, frequent use is made of generic civil technologies from, for instance, the world of communication and information technology. The 'civil' industries, but also the traditional defence industries, are active on the security market. European Commission explores new economic market -- Following the lead of the US, the European Union is also focusing on greater collaboration to reinforce internal security. Combating terrorism, attacks to critical infrastructure, cyber crime or guarding external European borders are among the policy areas that the EU takes to heart. Greater security is, however, not the only motive of the EU: in its report, the Flemish Peace Institute demonstrates how the European Commission seizes upon this area in order to develop a new economic market. A great deal of attention and resources are being dedicated to research in the security industry: 1.4 billion euros in the five past years. In this way, the European Commission is also specializing in research and development for security and defence, a domain which has traditionally been controlled by the Member States themselves. Exports in order to make the European security industry profitable -- The European Commission stimulates the supply, but the European demand (still a matter for the Member States) is not following. Member States are not totally convinced that these security technologies are a universal remedy against security threats. Moreover, European agencies have a smaller budget due to the economic crisis. Thus, according to the Commission, external markets are required in order to keep the European security industry profitable. This economically oriented attitude of the European Commission does not take into account the strategic and ethical aspects of the common foreign and security policy which the Member States within the EU are developing. Human rights on the radar -- The risks of the growing technological security apparatus with respect to privacy and respect for human rights in our own society, have often been pointed out. In the search for new markets, however, these risks are also exported outside the EU. Recently, during the Arab Spring, it became clear that security technologies are not only used to guarantee the security of civilians, but also for repression and human rights violations. European deep packet inspection technologies were used to filter the information available to citizens on the internet, while surveillance technologies were used to track and capture activists through social media use. Details: Brussela: Flemish Peace Institute, 2013. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2013 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/images/manager/publicaties/onderzoeksrapporten/pdf/a%20european%20agenda%20for%20security%20technology_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/images/manager/publicaties/onderzoeksrapporten/pdf/a%20european%20agenda%20for%20security%20technology_report.pdf Shelf Number: 128083 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecuritySecurity IndustrySecurity TechnologyTechnology and Crime (Europe) |
Author: Doctors Without Borders Title: Violence, Vulnerability and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe. A report on the situation of sub-Saharan migrants in an irregular situation in Morocco Summary: Over the last ten years, as the European Union (EU) has tightened its border controls and increasingly externalised its migration policies, Morocco has changed from being just a transit country for migrants en route to Europe to being both a transit and destination country by default. MSF’s experience demonstrates that the longer sub-Saharan migrants stay in Morocco the more vulnerable they become. This preexisting vulnerability, related to factors such as age and gender, as well as traumas experienced during the migration process, accumulates as they are trapped in Morocco and subjected to policies and practices that neglect, exclude and discriminate against them. MSF’s data demonstrates that the precarious living conditions that the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are forced to live in and the wide-spread institutional and criminal violence that they are exposed to continue to be the main factors influencing medical and psychological needs. MSF teams have repeatedly highlighted and denounced this situation, yet violence remains a daily reality for the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco. In fact, as this report demonstrates, the period since December 2011 has seen a sharp increase in abuse, degrading treatment and violence against sub-Saharan migrants by Moroccan and Spanish security forces. This report also reveals the widespread violence carried out by criminal gangs, including bandits and human smuggling and human trafficking networks. It provides a glimpse into the shocking levels of sexual violence that migrants are exposed to throughout the migration process and demands better assistance and protection for those affected. These unacceptable levels of violence should not overshadow the achievements that have been made in recognition and respect for sub-Saharan migrants’ right to health over the last ten years. Progress has been made, however considerable challenges remain, particularly with regard to non-emergency, secondary care, care for people with mental health problems and protection and assistance for survivors of sexual violence. Further investment and reform of the healthcare system is needed, however the impact of the progress made to date and any future reforms will be limited unless concrete action is taken to address the discrepancy between European and Moroccan policies which view migration through a security prism and criminalise, marginalise and discriminate against sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco and those which protect and uphold their fundamental human rights. This report highlights the medical and psychological consequences of this approach and the cumulative vulnerability of the significant numbers of sub-Saharan migrants who are trapped in Morocco. In doing so it calls, once again, on the Moroccan authorities to respect their international and national commitments to human rights, develop and implement protection mechanisms and ensure that sub- Saharan migrants are treated in a humane and dignified manner, no matter what their legal status. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Doctors Without Borders, 2013. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2013 at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2013/Trapped_at_the_Gates_of_Europe.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Morocco URL: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2013/Trapped_at_the_Gates_of_Europe.pdf Shelf Number: 128194 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityImmigrationMigrantsMigration (Morocco)Victims of ViolenceViolence |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Partnership Agreements and Enhanced Oversight Could Strengthen Coordination of Efforts on Indian Reservations Summary: Individuals seeking to enter the United States illegally may attempt to avoid screening procedures at ports of entry by crossing the border in areas between these ports, including Indian reservations, many of which have been vulnerable to illicit cross-border threat activity, such as drug smuggling, according to DHS. GAO was asked to review DHS’s efforts to coordinate border security activities on Indian reservations. This report examines DHS’s efforts to coordinate with tribal governments to address border security threats and vulnerabilities on Indian reservations. GAO interviewed DHS officials at headquarters and conducted interviews with eight tribes, selected based on factors such as proximity to the border, and the corresponding DHS field offices that have a role in border security for these Indian reservations. While GAO cannot generalize its results from these interviews to all Indian reservations and field offices along the border, they provide examples of border security coordination issues. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in December 2012. Information that DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS examine the benefits of government-to-government agreements with tribes and develop and implement a mechanism to monitor border security coordination efforts with tribes. DHS concurred with our recommendations Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-352: Accessed April 5, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653590.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653590.pdf Shelf Number: 128290 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationIndian Reservations |
Author: U.S. Immigration and CustomsEnforcement Title: Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens. Strategic Plan Summary: Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens (Secure Communities) is working with ICE senior leadership and offices, as well as the broader law enforcement community, to better identify criminal aliens, prioritize enforcement actions on those posing the greatest threat to public safety, and transform the entire criminal alien enforcement process. Through improved technology, continual data analysis, and timely information sharing with a broad range of law enforcement agency (LEA) partners, we are helping to protect communities across the country. This document outlines our goals, objectives, and our strategic approach to accomplishing them. Details: Wshington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2013 at: http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf Shelf Number: 128336 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal AliensCustoms EnforcementHomeland Security (U.S.)Illegal MigrantsImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Council of Europe. Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) Title: Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by Poland. First evaluation round Summary: The Polish authorities have taken a number of important steps to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings, but several important challenges remain, according to a report published today by the Council of Europe’s expert group on human trafficking, GRETA. The report notes that the criminalisation of trafficking in human beings in Poland took effect only in September 2010. There is still a significant gap between the number of identified victims of trafficking and the number of successful prosecutions and convictions. Despite efforts to provide training to relevant professionals, GRETA considers that there is a need to improve the knowledge and sensitivity of judges, prosecutors, investigators and other professionals about human trafficking and the rights of victims. GRETA’s report highlights are positive features the transparent approach to the planning and financing of anti-trafficking activities and the setting up of specialised structures. It also underlines the multi-disciplinary approach to victim identification in Poland and the issuing of special instructions to the Police and Border Guard on the identification of human trafficking victims. However, further steps are necessary to ensure that all victims of trafficking are properly identified. In particular, the report notes that more attention should be paid to the identification of cases of trafficking for labour exploitation, which has been on the rise in Poland. In addition, the report calls upon the authorities to introduce a nation-wide procedure for the identification of child victims of trafficking and to improve the provision of assistance tailored to their needs. GRETA also urges the Polish authorities to facilitate and guarantee access to compensation for victims of trafficking. Despite the existence of legal possibilities, very few - if any - victims of trafficking have received compensation. The report is the first assessment by GRETA of the extent to which Poland implements the Council of Europe’s 2005 anti-trafficking convention. The convention came into force in respect of Poland in March 2009. Details: Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2013. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: GRETA(2013)6: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/trafficking/Docs/Reports/GRETA_2013_6_FGR_POL_with_cmnts_en.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Poland URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/trafficking/Docs/Reports/GRETA_2013_6_FGR_POL_with_cmnts_en.pdf Shelf Number: 128765 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman RightsHuman Trafficking (Poland)Sexual Exploitation |
Author: Schwan, Michael J. Title: Border Cracks: Approaching Border Security from a Complexity Theory and Systems Perspective Summary: Presently, U.S. border security endeavors are compartmentalized, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. Moreover, international collaborations are extremely limited; success hinges on effective international cooperation. This thesis addresses U.S. border security management using complexity theory and a systems approach, incorporating both borders and all associated border security institutions simultaneously. Border security research has rarely viewed all stakeholders as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border security been thoroughly examined using a systems approach. This research scrutinizes the current U.S. border security paradigm in an attempt to determine the systemic reasons why the system is ineffective in securing U.S. borders. Additionally, the research investigates the current level of international cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase North American security. The thesis contends that the establishment of a tri-national— United States, Canadian, and Mexican—border security agency, in addition to legalizing drugs and reestablishing a guest worker program, will be more effective and costefficient in securing North American borders. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732181 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732181 Shelf Number: 128908 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityIllegal Immigration |
Author: Frontex Title: Annual Risk Analysis 2013 Summary: Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU’s external borders dropped sharply in 2012 to about 73 000, i.e. half the number reported in 2011. This was the first time since systematic data collection began in 2008 that annual detections have plunged under 100 000. In the Central Mediterranean area, the large number of detections in 2011, which suddenly increased following the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Libya, had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011. However, throughout 2012, detections steadily increased and by the end of the year they totalled more than 10 300. Starting from 2008, considerable numbers of migrants had been detected crossing illegally the border between Turkey and Greece, along the so-called Eastern Mediterranean route. The situation changed dramatically in August 2012 when the Greek authorities mobilised unprecedented resources at their land border with Turkey, including the deployment of 1 800 additional Greek police officers. The number of detected illegal border-crossings rapidly dropped from about 2 000 in the first week of August to below 10 per week in October 2012. The enhanced controls along the Greek-Turkish land border led to a moderate increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Aegean Sea and at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey, but simultaneous mitigation efforts in Turkey and Bulgaria have so far contained the displacements. There remains the risk of resurgence of irregular migration, since many migrants may be waiting for the conclusion of the Greek operations before they continue their journey towards Europe. Many migrants who cross the border illegally to Greece move on to other Member States, mostly through the land route across the Western Balkans. Contrary to the decrease at the Greek-Turkish land border, there was no decrease in detections of illegal border- crossing on the Western Balkan route (6 390, +37%). In 2012, in the Western Mediterranean area between North Africa and Spain, detections of illegal border-crossing decreased by nearly a quarter compared to 2011 but remained above the levels recorded in previous years (6 400, -24%). In 2012, Afghans remained the most detected nationality for illegal border-crossing at EU level, but their number considerably dropped compared to 2011. Syrians stand out, with large increases in detections of illegal bordercrossing and for using fraudulent documents compared to 2011. Most of the detected Syrians applied for asylum in the EU, fleeing the civil war in their country. There were large increases in refusals of entry at the Polish land border with Belarus and Ukraine. However, these increases were offset by a decrease in refusals of entry issued at other border sections, resulting in a stable total at EU level compared to 2011 (-3%, 115 000 refusals of entry). Detections of illegal stayers, which totalled about 350 000 in the EU in 2012, have shown a stable but slightly declining long-term trend since 2008. Most migrants detected illegally staying in the EU were from Afghanistan and Morocco. Despite a short-term increase of 10% between 2011 and 2012, the overall trend of detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been falling since 2008, totalling about 7 700 in 2012. This long-term decline may be in part due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels (such as overstaying, abuse of visa-free regime, etc.) and document fraud, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously. In 2012, there were around 8 000 detections of migrants using fraudulent documents to enter the EU or Schengen area illegally. Preliminary data on asylum applications in 2012 indicate an overall increase of about 7% compared to the previous year. While Afghans continue to account for the largest share of applications, much of the increase was due to an increasing number of applications submitted by Syrian nationals. The number of asylum applications submitted in the EU by Western Balkan citizens, mostly those from Serbia, remained unabated in 2012. Consequently, following the implementation of the visa facilitation agreement with five Western Balkan countries that started at the end of 2009, there are now discussions in the EU about the possible reintroduction of the visa regime. In 2012, there was a steady trend of about 160 000 third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries. Greece reported the largest number of returns of a single nationality (Albanians), and effective returns in Greece increased markedly in the last quarter of 2012 following the launch of the Xenios Zeus operation. Looking ahead, the assessment of risks along the EU’s external borders shows that despite a sharp reduction in detections between 2011 and 2012, the risks associated with illegal border- crossing along the land and sea external borders remain among the highest, in particular in the southern section of the border of the EU. The risk of illegal border-crossing along the land borders of the Eastern Mediterranean route, including the Greek and Bulgarian land border with Turkey, is assessed amongst the highest. This comes after several years of large numbers of migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey. Although the flow abruptly stopped in August 2012, there are reports of uncertainties related to the sustainability of the efforts and growing evidence that migrants are waiting in Turkey for the end of the operation. Increases at the neighbouring sea border (Aegean Sea), at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey and increases in detections of document fraud from Istanbul airports, although so far relatively small, indicate that alternatives to the Greek land border are being explored by facilitators. Many of the migrants who crossed illegally through the Eastern Mediterranean route are expected to continue making secondary movements across the Western Balkans and within the EU. The risk of illegal border-crossing across the Central Mediterranean area was also assessed amongst the highest due the continued volatile situation in countries of departure in North Africa. Crisis situations are still likely to arise at the southern border with thousands of people trying to cross the border illegally in the span of several weeks or months. Past experiences also show that these crises take their toll on human lives, and are very difficult to predict and quell without a coordinated response. Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. These risks are also common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flows and border checks, which are a specific expertise of bordercontrol authorities. Fraud is expected mostly among EU travel documents (e.g. passports, visas and ID cards). False pretence or deception is used to obtain a wide range of documents. The most common technique is to use fraudulent documents to obtain short-term visas. Most risks associated with the abuse of legal channels are assessed as high as they are common and widely spread phenomena. Based on currently available information, the risks associated with cross-border criminality are assessed as moderate, including the risks of trafficking in human beings, terrorism, smuggling of illicit drugs and exit of stolen vehicles. Details: Warsaw, Poland: Frontex, 2013. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 128911 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDrug SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrationRisk Assessment (Europe)Stolen Vehicles |
Author: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) Title: Situational Overview on Trafficking in Human Beings Summary: Although trafficking in human beings (THB) is not frequently reported at the external border of the European Union (EU), this phenomenon is, by its transnational nature, closely related to the national borders and the work of border guards. As exploitation predominantly starts after the potential victim crosses the border, the data collected for the purposes of this analysis reflect cases of trafficking detained inland (inside the EU). The definitions of trafficking in human beings used by the Member States and Schengen Associated Countries* (SAC) are not all harmonised with the definition used by Frontex,** where a potential victim of trafficking is understood as “a person that most probably suffered or will suffer from offences related to trafficking in human beings.” Although some Member States and SAC could not provide the numbers of potential victims of trafficking as defined by Frontex, the collected data will be considered comparable for the purposes of this analysis, as the need for a situational overview of THB in the EU and SAC outweighs the need for stricter data guidelines. The following analysis is based on statistical data and reports of national rapporteurs provided by Member States and SAC for the years 2008 and 2009, analytical materials collected during Frontex Joint Operations (JO) and open source data. As there is limited intelligence-based evidence on the timeframes, mode, and locations of the arrival of victims of trafficking at the EU external border, reliable conclusions are limited. Statistical data collected shows that Member States and SAC reported 3 023 potential victims of trafficking from third countries in 2009, while there had been only 2 075 cases reported in 2008. This represents a 27% increase in 2009, if the countries that provided the data in both years are the only ones taken into account. Most of the third-country potential victims came from West African countries (showing an increase of 75% in the years compared), followed by nationals from South America, East Asia, and North Africa. The most common nationalities among the potentially trafficked non-Europeans are Nigerian, Chinese and Brazilian. Most of the potential victims were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, but trafficking for forced labour or services is reported as an increasing phenomenon. The same increasing trend is also observed regarding male victims. The number of male victims in 2009 was ten times higher than the number in 2008. The most common male victims were Pakistani nationals, followed by Chinese and Vietnamese. Details: Warsaw, Poland: FRONTEX, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2013 at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Situational_Overview_on_Trafficking_in_Human_Beings.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Situational_Overview_on_Trafficking_in_Human_Beings.pdf Shelf Number: 128918 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Trafficking (Europe)Sexual Exploitation |
Author: Martinez, Daniel E. Title: A Continued Humanitarian Crisis at the Border: Undocumented Border Crosser Deaths Recorded by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2012 Summary: This report analyzes the numeric trends and demographic characteristics of the deaths of undocumented border crossers in the area covered by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner which is located in the city of Tucson, Arizona. This office provides medico-legal death investigation for the western two-thirds of the Tucson Sector’s southern border with Mexico (Anderson 2008) and has been the office responsible for the examination of over 95% of all migrant remains discovered in Arizona since 2003 (Coalición de Derechos Humanos 2013). The data for this report come from the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner. Details: Tucson, AZ: The Binational Migration Institute, The University of Arizona, 2013. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://bmi.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/border_deaths_final_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://bmi.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/border_deaths_final_web.pdf Shelf Number: 128974 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigration PoliciesMigrant DeathsUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Great Britain HM Revenue and Customs Title: Tackling Tobacco Smuggling–building on our success Summary: The Government believes that tobacco smuggling must be tackled head on. Tobacco fraud costs taxpayers over £2 billion a year, depriving the general public of revenue to fund vital public services that support us all. The availability of illegal tobacco products undermines public health objectives and impacts on the health of both individuals and wider communities; circumventing health labelling requirements and age of sale restrictions. Since Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC) “Tackling Tobacco Smuggling” Strategy was first introduced in 2000 the size of the illicit cigarette market has been cut by almost half with more than 20 billion cigarettes and over 2,700 tonnes of hand-rolling tobacco seized. There have been more than 3300 criminal prosecutions for tobacco offences following action by our officers. The smuggling of cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco is also a key business for organised criminal gangs who use the proceeds of this crime to fund the smuggling of drugs, weapons and also human beings. It harms the overwhelming majority of law-abiding businesses who sell tobacco products legally, diverting revenues from retailers all over the country. This Government is committed to stepping up action to deal with this problem and “Tackling Tobacco Smuggling –building on our success” shows how HMRC with the support of UK Border Agency will work together to ensure that those who think that this is a quick, easy and above all profitable crime are targeted, tackled and punished. Details: London: HM Revenue & Customs and the UK Border Agency, 2011. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=pageLibrary_MiscellaneousReports&propertyType=document&columns=1&id=HMCE_PROD1_031246 Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=pageLibrary_MiscellaneousReports&propertyType=document&columns=1&id=HMCE_PROD1_031246 Shelf Number: 129011 Keywords: Border SecurityCigarettesIllicit TradeOrganized CrimeTobacco Smuggling (U.K.) |
Author: Lundin, Lars-Erie Title: Perils of the Drug Trade: Implications and Challenges of Central Asia's "Northern Route" Summary: The international trade in Afghan drugs is one of the most significant transnational threats emanating from Central Asia. Exacerbated by weak border management, corruption, and lack of income-generating alternatives, the “Northern Route” is a scourge not only for the Central Asian states but also Russia and Europe, undermining a vision of a Eurasian community based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as posing attendant health risks. International efforts have so far failed to adequately come to grips with the problem. It is clear that there is no quick fix and that hope rests in a mixture of instruments, not least promoting long-term socio-economic development in the region, stemming pervasive corruption, engaging in human rights dialogues, as well as promoting more effective international cooperation—in particular involving Russia. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: The Institute for Security and Development Policy , 2013. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Review No. 125: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-lundin-vankaathoven-central-asia-northern-route.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-lundin-vankaathoven-central-asia-northern-route.pdf Shelf Number: 129275 Keywords: Border SecurityCorruptionDrug Trafficking (Asia)Drug-Related Violence |
Author: Daudelin, Jean Title: Border Integrity, Illicit Tobacco, and Canada's Security Summary: T he small town of Cornwall in eastern Ontario can be considered the contraband capital of Canada, thanks to the high volume of cross-border smuggling and illicit trade in the area. The problem has two sources: the unique local geography combined with practical, legal, and political problems that make it easy to bypass border controls; and the tolerance of Canadian and US law enforcement toward the illicit manufacture and sale of tobacco products on the Mohawk territory that straddles the Canada-US border between Ontario, Quebec, and New York State. Much of the local problem revolves around tobacco; however, significant amounts of illegal drugs, weapons, and humans have been trafficked through the area, all of these accounting for a chain of collateral crime in the surrounding region. The gross value of these illegal practices reaches into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Contraband has national security implications for Canada. Tobacco and its trade generate important economic benefits for the Mohawk community that lives on the Akwesasne (Canada) and St. Regis (US) Mohawk reserves that straddle the border. A substantial part of the production and sale is legal, but the Mohawk generally refuse to apply taxes to their legal tobacco products, and they tolerate the illegal production and sale of tobacco. As a result, a direct attack on those activities may provoke confronta- tions, and possibly even a loss of federal control over the border area. In addition, US authorities are preoccupied with the movement of illegal drugs and humans through Cornwall: any measures they take to stem the flow would hurt Canada economically by inhibiting the free circulation of goods and people across the border. Illicit tobacco accounts for about 15 percent of cigarette sales in Canada, a large proportion of which comes through Cornwall. Attempts to constrict that flow have failed. However, the pressure exerted on the trade has helped keep profits much lower than they could have been. Given the sensitive political situation and the overlapping jurisdictions and legal frameworks, enforcement authorities have been remarkably effective in containing broader security fallout. We found little evidence of extensive smuggling of drugs, weapons, and humans in recent years, and the large-scale involvement of organized crime appears to have been curtailed. Tensions with the Mohawk community have been rare, confrontations largely avoided, and a fluid and effective relationship with the Mohawk police on everything but tobacco on reserve has been built. In summary, federal authorities on both sides of the border appear to tolerate the illicit tobacco trade in favour of containing the broader criminal and security dangers that smuggling and its repression represent. On that count, current efforts have been quite successful. Executive Summary The Seaway International Bridge over the St.Lawrence River connecting the city of Cornwall, Ontario in Canada to the town of Massena, New York in the US. Details: Ottawa, ON: MacDonald-Laurier Institute, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2013 at: http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MLIBorder-Integrity-Illicit-Tobacco-Canadas-Security.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MLIBorder-Integrity-Illicit-Tobacco-Canadas-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 129489 Keywords: Border SecurityCigarette SmugglingIllegal Trade (Canada)Illicit Tobacco |
Author: Hataley, Todd Title: Organized Crime Beyond the Border Summary: On February 4, 2011, President Barak Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper launched a strategy for new era of cooperation called Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness. Although the strategy of loosening the “belt” and tightening the “suspenders” instead is widely believed to be economically advantageous for Canada, it also lends itself to ready exploitation by organized crime. Perimeter security may be good for economic competitiveness; whether it makes us any safer, by contrast, is debatable. Beyond the Border has four goals: addressing early threats; and facilitating the growth of trade, the national economies and jobs. It envisages a layered approach to border security, with the two nations working jointly to shift border functions away from the border itself to points inland. As the title suggests, a perimeter agreement between the United States and Canada defines an established security perimeter around the continent, ostensibly protecting the approaches to the region. Its premise is to push the perimeter out by means of pre-clearance for customs, reducing the need for enforcement at actual ports of entry. Like its antecedents, Beyond the Border’s purpose is diminish marginal costs of legal cross-border activity. Yet, it does little to raise the marginal costs of illicit cross-border activity. In fact, it actually risks lowering marginal costs for illicit cross-border activity which has significant implications for law enforcement. Its assessment of the resources necessary for adopting a layered security strategy in the region is deficient and does little to curb organized crime. Far from discouraging organized crime groups from crossing the Canada–US border, the streamlining processes in Beyond the Border may actually abet intra-continental organized crime. As law enforcement agencies shift their attention beyond the North American perimeter, there is potential to pay attention to those travelling within it, thereby easing the movement of organized criminals and illicit goods within North America . Organized crime groups exploit risk management models that facilitate trusted shippers. Fitting neatly into a trustedshipper program, either by appearing as a legitimate trader or by using corrupt officials (or better yet, both), gives them the same expedited border passage afforded to legitimate businesses. Finally, Beyond the Border does not address transnational crime and related smuggling at the border point near Cornwall, Ont., which spans the Mohawk nation of Akwesasne. Without a strategy targeted specifically at this region, nefearious elements will continue to capitalize on Akwesasne’s multiplier effect on the markets of opportunity created by the differences in policy in either side of the Canada-US border. Security and economic competitiveness are at stake for both countries. However, the Americans appear to want, first and foremost, to achieve greater security, while Canadians are prioritizing economic competitiveness. Security and economic competitiveness are a false dichotomy. Paradoxically, Beyond the Border skirts Canada’s most pervasive and persistent cross-border security liability—that is, organized crime—and may even enhance its economic competitiveness. Details: Ottawa, ON: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2013 at: http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/2013.04.24-MLI-BorderSecurity_F_vWeb.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Canada URL: http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/2013.04.24-MLI-BorderSecurity_F_vWeb.pdf Shelf Number: 129491 Keywords: Border SecurityOrganized Crime (Canada, U.S.) |
Author: Thomas, Chantal Title: Immigration Controls and 'Modern-Day Slavery' Summary: Are immigration controls the single biggest legal factor contributing to modern‐day slavery? In a national and international political moment in which immigration law and policy are being hotly debated, participants in the debate should recognize the impact of strict migration controls – one of the clearest results of the current U.S. immigration law reform effort – is to exacerbate conditions of immiseration that are frequently associated by anti‐trafficking advocates and reformers with "modern‐day slavery." Conversely, those who are fighting to end modern‐day slavery might be best advised to focus on immigration reform that relaxes border control and increases the rights and remedies of undocumented migrants, as the measures that could most provide immediate redress. Details: Ithaca, NY: Cornell Law School, 2013. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-86 : Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294656 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294656 Shelf Number: 129599 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration (U.S.)Immigration Policy |
Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy: 2013 Summary: The United States, at the local, state, tribal, and Federal levels, has made a concerted effort to enhance, expand, and codify multiple measures designed to address the serious threats posed by illicit drug trafficking across the Southwest border and violence in Mexico. Despite many successes, improved cooperation, coordination, unity of effort, and information sharing, illicit drug trafficking continues to be a multi-faceted threat to our national security which requires additional focus and effort. Transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico with world-wide international connections continue to dominate the illegal drug supply chain and are continuing to expand their illegal activities throughout the United States. Indeed, 90 to 95 percent of all cocaine that enters the United States continues to pass through the Mexico/Central America corridor from the cocaine source countries further south. Mexico remains the primary foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also a source and transit country for heroin. The same organizations that traffic in drugs also control the south-bound flow of drug-related bulk currency and illegal weapons. The smuggling and illegal export of weapons from the United States into Mexico is a threat to the overall safety and security of both countries and continues to fuel violence along the Southwest border and in the interior of Mexico. Indeed, weapons smuggled into Mexico often end up in the hands of the Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) or other smuggling organizations where they can be employed against law enforcement officers and citizens in either country. On its northern border with the United States, Mexico experienced a dramatic surge in border crime and violence in recent years due to intense competition between Mexican TCOs that employ predatory tactics to realize their profits. The U.S. Government continues to respond to the challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations through a variety of coordinated activities, both at the operational and national policy levels. The U.S.–Mexico bilateral relationship continues to grow based on increasingly strong, multi-layered institutional ties. The commitment of both governments to improve citizen security in each country is underscored by the Merida Initiative, an unprecedented partnership between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of law. Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence, the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013 and beyond. Details: Washington, DC: ONDPC, 2013. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129615 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Trafficking (U.S.)Drug-Related ViolenceHomicidesNarcotics |
Author: Arbel, Efrat Title: Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics of Refugee Exclusion Summary: The report examines Canadian border measures designed to intercept and deflect "undesirable travelers", including asylum seekers, before they set foot on Canadian soil and make a claim for refugee protection. It also examines the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, a "refugee sharing" agreement implemented by Canada and the United States to exercise more control over their shared border. In effect since 2004, the Agreement forces refugee claimants to seek protection in the first country they reach-either Canada or the United States. It prevents asylum seekers who are in the United States, or traveling through the United States, from making refugee claims at the Canadian border (and vice versa), subject to certain exceptions. The report finds that through these measures, Canada is systematically closing its borders to asylum seekers, and avoiding its refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program, Harvard Law School, 2013. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2014 at: http://harvardimmigrationclinic.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/bordering-on-failure-harvard-immigration-and-refugee-law-clinical-program1.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Canada URL: http://harvardimmigrationclinic.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/bordering-on-failure-harvard-immigration-and-refugee-law-clinical-program1.pdf Shelf Number: 131809 Keywords: Asylum, Right ofBorder PatrolBorder SecurityRefugees |
Author: Rusev, Atanas Title: Human Trafficking, Border Security and Related Corruption in the EU Summary: Trafficking in human beings (THB), as a transnational crime, involves movement of people across borders. In this regard, border control authorities are expected to play an important role in preventing and curbing this phenomenon. Border guards are identified as key actors in fight against trafficking in human beings both in the new Directive 2011/36/EU and the associated EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings. The role of border guards in combating trafficking, is largely seen as in the role of "first responder" as part of the National Referral Mechanisms in identification of victims of trafficking, as well as for the identification and apprehension of traffickers within border control procedures. The growing commitment on the EU policy level for prevention of, and fighting against, trafficking of human beings, has also led to recognition of the issue as an important priority to border control authorities of all Member States as well. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) has already recognised THB as one of its priorities and has developed a training manual for border guards related to THB and a handbook for Border Control Authorities on good practices to counter THB. This paper Human Trafficking, Border Security and Related Corruption in the EU, by Atanas Rusev of the Center for Study of Democracy in Bulgaria, investigates the much under-researched aspect of corruption and human trafficking. Rusev explores this topic vis-a-vis border authorities and connected corruption to facilitate, inter alia, THB and how this corruption can be related to the corporate sector and enter into the highest political spheres. Details: Brussels: DCAF, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Migration and the Security Sector Paper Series: Accessed January 31, 2014 at: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Human-Trafficking-Border-Security-and-Related-Corruption-in-the-EU Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Human-Trafficking-Border-Security-and-Related-Corruption-in-the-EU Shelf Number: 131833 Keywords: Border SecurityCorruptionHuman Trafficking |
Author: Shaw, Mark Title: Illicit Trafficking and Libya's Transition: Profits and Losses Summary: As Libya emerges from forty years of autocratic rule, the criminal economy is undermining government efforts at state consolidation. This report maps the flow of weapons, migrants, drugs, and smuggled goods through Libya and details the interactions between armed groups who control illicit markets and local communities. The authors warn that efforts to beef up border control policing will not be sufficient. Combating organized crime in Libya requires a broader approach that will engage marginalized groups in a political process. Failure to do so will affect not only Libya but the region as well. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Peaceworks No. 96: Accessed April 19, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW96-Illicit-Trafficking-and-Libyas-Transition.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Libya URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW96-Illicit-Trafficking-and-Libyas-Transition.pdf Shelf Number: 132069 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Trafficking Illegal Markets Organized Crime Smuggling |
Author: Kartas, Moncef Title: On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border Summary: Tunisia, Libya, and much of the Arab world are in the midst of political and social upheaval widely known as the 'Arab Spring-. Thus far, the tidal wave of change that began in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010 has led to the end of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 23-year dictatorship and to the fall of fellow dictator Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, while also setting off government transformations and conflict across the region. The revolutions in Tunisia and Libya have not only changed the political landscapes in both countries, but also affected the informal networks and ties that have long characterized the shared border region of the two nations: the Jefara. Indeed, the revolution in each country has profoundly affected the other and will probably continue to do so. With this understanding, this report investigates how the Libyan armed conflict and its aftermath have affected the security situation in Tunisia, particularly in light of the circulation of firearms and infiltrations by armed groups. As the circulation of Libyan small arms and light weapons in Tunisia cannot be adequately understood without a closer look at the tribal structures behind informal trade and trafficking networks in the border region, this report examines how the Libyan revolution affected such structures in the Jefara. This Working Paper presents several key findings: - Despite the weakening of the Tunisian security apparatus and the ongoing effects of the armed conflict in Libya, the use of firearms connected to crime and political violence has remained relatively low in Tunisia. Even in light of recent assassinations of two prominent leftist politicians and regular armed clashes between violent extremists, the military, and security forces on the AlgerianTunisian border, the use of firearms remains the exception rather than the rule. - In Tunisia, firearms trafficking currently exists in the form of small-scale smuggling. However, larger smuggling operations have been discovered and tied to Algeria-based violent extremist networks-such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-which have infiltrated the country. - Since the 1980s, tribal cartels have been in control of informal trade and trafficking in the Jefara. Their continued control rests on the cartels' strategic stance, informal agreements with the government, and their ability to withstand new, Libya-based competitors (both tribal and militia-based). Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of international and Development Studies, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 17: Accessed April 19, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf Shelf Number: 132077 Keywords: Armed ConflictArms TraffickingBorder SecurityCriminal NetworksExtremistsGun-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Benton, Meghan Title: Spheres of Exploitation: Thwarting Actors Who Profit from Illegal Labor, Domestic Servitude, and Sex Work Summary: Large-scale migration flows are too often exploited by "bad actors" for profit-ranging from criminals who exploit trafficked people to employers who do not meet legal hiring practices. Even consumers, who may not know the source of their goods and services, sometimes aid the exploitation of migrants. This report analyzes such exploitation in three spheres: the domestic care sector, the labor market, and the sex industry. Across all three, perpetrators are broadly motivated by the lure of high profits and low risks. The report, part of a Transatlantic Council on Migration series on migration "bad actors," details several obstacles governments face in their efforts to weaken such actors: victims may be unwilling to report crimes, the crimes themselves fall into a gray area in which identification and prosecution are complex, and the leaders of criminal organizations often successfully protect themselves from enforcement efforts by implicating their foot soldiers and victims in illegal activity. Policies to disrupt the business model of exploitation seek to increase risks and reduce profits for facilitators, and they may also aim to reduce the supply and demand of exploitable labor. Most policies carry risks and practical challenges. One of the main legal tools-anti-trafficking legislation-aims to increase the risks of severe exploitation, but low prosecution rates and trivial sentences reduce their utility as a deterrent. Measures that target employers also face several challenges, such as proving employer guilt and administering high-enough fines. Increasing subcontractors' regulations, if successfully implemented, can raise standards across the board, but may also inadvertently lead to more severe exploitation (and more illegal immigration) if some operators are pushed underground. The report argues that one of the biggest challenges facing law enforcement is that the focus on serious criminals and lawbreakers ignores those who operate on the edge of legality; the reality is that creative criminal organizations exploit legal routes wherever possible, sometimes flying under the radar of police. This situation often creates unexpected results. Some policies to encourage legal migration-like those that tie workers to a particular employer-can facilitate exploitative practices, while policies designed to reduce exploitation (such as licensing systems) might make some operators more likely to hire unauthorized workers. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2014. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2014 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migration-exploitation-illegal-labor-domestic-servitude-sex Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migration-exploitation-illegal-labor-domestic-servitude-sex Shelf Number: 132222 Keywords: Border SecurityDomestic WorkersForced LaborHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsSexual ExploitationUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Collett, Elizabeth Title: Trade-Offs in Immigration Enforcement Summary: Unauthorized migrants - those without a legal right of residence - live in all modern industrialized countries. Beyond their responsibility to respond to the challenges of fast-paced, diverse migration patterns, it is vital that public and private sector institutions address the harms associated with illegal or unauthorized migration. Policymakers face significant constraints in addressing this population, including insufficient financial and human resources, and legal frameworks that protect individuals regardless of their residence status. This report, part of a Transatlantic Council on Migration series focused on migration "bad actors," argues that a successful migration enforcement regime is best defined as one that does limited (or zero) harm to a country's institutions of governance and to citizens' livelihoods, while fortifying public trust that the government is running an efficient and effective system. The report concludes that policymakers have two main policy options: to offer legal residence to unauthorized immigrants, or to identify them and seek to return or deport them to their country of origin. Yet return remains an incomplete policy option. Despite political and public distaste for the policy, regularization remains a frequently employed tool. The authors suggest that one of the key elements of success in this field may well be the recognition that success is not solely an enforcement approach, but one which takes the broad range of policy tools (including regularization) into account. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2014 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trade-offs-immigration-enforcement Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trade-offs-immigration-enforcement Shelf Number: 132386 Keywords: Border SecurityDeportationsIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal ImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Corridor of Violence: the Guatemala-Honduras Border Summary: Competition between criminal groups over drug routes has made the frontier between Guatemala and Honduras one of the most violent areas in Central America, with murder rates among the highest in the world. In the absence of effective law enforcement, traffickers have become de facto authorities in some sectors. Crisis Group's latest report, Corridor of Violence: The Guatemala-Honduras Border, examines the regional dynamics that have allowed criminal gangs to thrive and outlines the main steps necessary to prevent further violence as well as to advance peaceful economic and social development. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - The border corridor includes hotly contested routes for transporting drugs to the U.S. Traffickers, with their wealth and firepower, dominate some portions. On both sides of the border, violence, lawlessness and corruption are rampant, poverty rates and unemployment are high, and citizens lack access to state services. - The arrest of local drug lords has been a mixed blessing to local populations, as the fracturing of existing groups has allowed a new generation of sometimes more violent criminals to emerge. - To prevent further violence, an urgent shift in national policies is needed. The governments should send not just troops and police to border regions, but also educators, community organisers and social and health workers. If criminal structures are to be disrupted and trust in the state restored, these regions need credible, legitimate actors - public and private - capable of providing security, accountability, jobs and hope for the future. - Guatemala and Honduras should learn from other countries facing similar security threats. The Borders for Prosperity Plan in Colombia and the Binational Border Plan in Ecuador and Peru can serve as examples for economic and social development in insecure areas. The U.S., Latin American countries and multilateral organisations should provide funds, training and technical support to embattled border communities to help them prevent violence and strengthen local institutions via education and job opportunities. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 52: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf Shelf Number: 132467 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal NetworksDrug ControlDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsOrganized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Title: Tunisia's Borders: Jihadism and Contraband Summary: Tunisia is embroiled in recurrent political crises whose origins in security concerns are ever more evident. While still of low-intensity, jihadi attacks are increasing at an alarming rate, fuelling the rumour mill, weakening the state and further polarising the political scene. The government coalition, dominated by the Islamist An-Nahda, and the secular opposition trade accusations, politicising questions of national security rather than addressing them. Meanwhile, the gap widens between a Tunisia of the borders - porous, rebellious, a focal point of jihadism and contraband and a Tunisia of the capital and coast that is concerned with the vulnerability of a hinterland it fears more than it understands. Beyond engaging in necessary efforts to resolve the immediate political crisis, actors from across the national spectrum should implement security but also socio-economic measures to reduce the permeability of the country's borders. The security vacuum that followed the 2010-2011 uprising against Ben Ali's regime - as well as the chaos generated by the war in Libya - largely explains the worrying increase in cross-border trafficking. Although contraband long has been the sole source of income for numerous residents of border provinces, the introduction of dangerous and lucrative goods is a source of heightened concern. Hard drugs as well as (for now) relatively small quantities of firearms and explosives regularly enter the country from Libya. Likewise, the northern half of the Tunisian-Algerian border is becoming an area of growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms. These trends are both increasing the jihadis' disruptive potential and intensifying corruption of border authorities. One ought neither exaggerate nor politicise these developments. Notably, and against conventional wisdom, military equipment from Libya has not overwhelmed the country. But nor should the threat be underestimated. The war in Libya undoubtedly has had security repercussions and armed groups in border areas have conducted attacks against members of the National Guard, army and police, posing a significant security challenge that the return of Tunisian fighters from Syria has amplified. By the same token, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking. Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders - or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis. Addressing border problems clearly requires beefing up security measures but these will not suffice on their own. Even with the most technically sophisticated border control mechanisms, residents of these areas - often organised in networks and counting among the country's poorest - will remain capable of enabling or preventing the transfer of goods and people. The more they feel economically and socially frustrated, the less they will be inclined to protect the country's territorial integrity in exchange for relative tolerance toward their own contraband activities. Weapons and drug trafficking as well as the movement of jihadi militants are thus hostage to informal negotiations between the informal economy's barons and state representatives. Since the fall of Ben Ali's regime, such understandings have been harder to reach. The result has been to dilute the effectiveness of security measures and diminish the availability of human intelligence that is critical to counter terrorist or jihadi threats. In an uncertain domestic and regional context, restoring trust among political parties, the state and residents of border areas is thus as crucial as intensifying military control in the most porous areas. In the long term, only minimal consensus among political forces on the country's future can enable a truly effective approach to the border question. On this front, at the time of writing, an end to the political crisis seems distant: discussions regarding formation of a new government; finalising a new constitution and new electoral law; and appointing a new electoral commission are faltering. Without a resolution of these issues, polarisation is likely to increase and the security situation to worsen, each camp accusing the other of exploiting terrorism for political ends. Overcoming the crisis of trust between the governing coalition and the opposition is thus essential to breaking this vicious cycle. Yet the current political impasse should not rule out some immediate progress on the security front. Working together to reinforce border controls, improving relations between the central authorities and residents of border areas as well as improving relations among Maghreb states: these are all tasks that only can be fully carried out once underlying political conflicts have been resolved but that, in the meantime, Tunisian actors can ill-afford to ignore or neglect. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Middle East and North Africa Report N148: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Tunisia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Shelf Number: 132473 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingJihadismOrganized Crime |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the Lens of the Southwest Border Summary: Federally led law enforcement task forces and intelligence information sharing centers are ubiquitous in domestic policing. They are launched at the local, state, and national levels and respond to a variety of challenges such as violent crime, criminal gangs, terrorism, white-collar crime, public corruption, even intelligence sharing. This report focuses on those task forces and information sharing efforts that respond to federal counterdrug and counterterrorism priorities in the Southwest border region. More generally, the report also offers context for examining law enforcement coordination. It delineates how this coordination is vital to 21st century federal policing and traces some of the roots of recent cooperative police endeavors. Policy makers interested in federal law enforcement task force operations may confront a number of fundamental issues. Many of these can be captured under three simple questions: 1. When should task forces be born? 2. When should they die? 3. What overarching metrics should be used to evaluate their lives? Task forces are born out of a number of realities that foster a need for increased coordination between federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local counterparts. These realities are particularly evident at the Southwest border. Namely, official boundaries often enhance criminal schemes but can constrain law enforcement efforts. Criminals use geography to their advantage, profiting from the movement of black market goods across state and national boundaries. At the same time, police have to stop at their own jurisdictional boundaries. Globalization may aggravate such geographical influences. In response, task forces ideally leverage expertise and resources-including money and manpower to confront such challenges. Identifying instances where geography, globalization, and criminal threat come together to merit the creation of task forces is arguably a process best left to informed experts. Thus, police and policy makers can be involved in highlighting important law enforcement issues warranting the creation of task forces. Task forces, fusion centers, and other collaborative policing efforts can be initiated legislatively, administratively, or through a combination of the two, and they can die through these same channels. While some clarity exists regarding the circumstances governing the creation of task forces, it is less clear when they should die and how their performance should be measured. Two basic difficulties muddy any evaluation of the life cycles of law enforcement task forces. First, and in the simplest of terms, at the federal level no one officially and publicly tallies task force numbers. The lack of an interagency "task force census" creates a cascading set of conceptual problems. - Without such information, it is challenging, if not impossible, to measure how much cooperation is occurring, let alone how much cooperation on a particular threat is necessary. - Concurrently, it may be difficult to establish when specific task forces should be disbanded or when funding for a particular class of task forces (e.g., violent crime, drug trafficking, counterterrorism) should be scaled back. - Additionally, how can policy makers ascertain whether task force programs run by different agencies duplicate each other's work, especially if they target the same class or category of criminals (such as drug traffickers or violent gangs)? For example, do the violent crime task forces led by one agency complement, compete with, or duplicate the work of another's? To give a very broad sense of federal task force activity in one geographic area, CRS compiled a list of task forces and fusion centers operating along the Southwest border, which are geographically depicted in this report. To be included in the list, a task force had to exhibit the possibility of either directly or indirectly combatting drug trafficking or terrorism. Thus, task forces devoted to fighting gangs, violent crime, public corruption, capturing fugitives, and money laundering may be included. Second, there is no general framework to understand the life trajectory of any given task force or class of task forces. What key milestones mark the development and decline of task forces? (Can such a set of milestones even be produced?) How many task forces outlive their supposed value because no thresholds regarding their productivity are established? Though federal law enforcement has embraced the task force concept, it has not agreed on the breadth or duration of such cooperation. Such lack of accord extends to measuring the work of task forces. This report suggests a way of conceptualizing these matters by framing task force efforts and federal strategies tied to them in terms of input, output, and outcome-core ideas that can be used to study all sorts of organizations and programs, including those in law enforcement. An official task force census coupled with a conceptual framework for understanding and potentially measuring their operations across agencies could greatly assist policy making tied to federal policing throughout the country, and particularly along the Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R43583: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Shelf Number: 132554 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingFusion CentersIntelligence GatheringOrganized CrimePartnershipsTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint operations. DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command - the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies - consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives. GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 30, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664479.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664479.pdf Shelf Number: 132572 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityPartnerships |
Author: Martinez, Daniel E. Title: No Action Taken: Lack of CBP Accountability in Responding to Complaints of Abuse Summary: Data obtained by the American Immigration Council shine a light on the lack of accountability and transparency which afflicts the U.S. Border Patrol and its parent agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The data, which the Immigration Council acquired through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, covers 809 complaints of alleged abuse lodged against Border Patrol agents between January 2009 and January 2012. These cases run the gamut of physical, sexual, and verbal abuse. Although it is not possible to determine which cases had merit and which did not, it is astonishing that, among those cases in which a formal decision was issued, 97 percent resulted in "No Action Taken." On average, CBP took 122 days to arrive at a decision when one was made. Moreover, among all complaints, 40 percent were still "pending investigation" when the complaint data were provided to the Immigration Council. The data indicate that "physical abuse" was the most prevalent reason for a complaint, occurring in 40 percent of all cases, followed by "excessive use of force" (38 percent). Not surprisingly, more complaints were filed in sectors with higher levels of unauthorized immigration. During the time period studied, more than one in three complaints filed against Border Patrol agents were directed at agents in the Tucson Sector. After accounting for the different numbers of Border Patrol agents in each sector, the complaint rate remained the highest in the Tucson Sector, with the Rio Grande Valley Sector a close second. Complaint rates as measured in terms of numbers of apprehensions were highest in Del Rio, Rio Grande Valley, and San Diego. Taken as a whole, the data indicate the need for a stronger system of incentives (both positive and negative) for Border Patrol agents to abide by the law, respect legal rights, and refrain from abusive conduct. In order to do that, complaints should be processed more quickly and should be carefully reviewed. Furthermore, the seriousness of the complaints demands an external review. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, 2014. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/No%20Action%20Taken_Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/No%20Action%20Taken_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 132573 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrisoner Abuse |
Author: Seghetti, Lisa Title: Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview Summary: The number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) arriving in the United States has reached alarming numbers that has strain the system put in place over the past decade to handle such cases. UAC are defined in statute as children who lack lawful immigration status in the United States, who are under the age of 18, and who are without a parent or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody. Two statutes and a legal settlement most directly affect U.S. policy for the treatment and administrative processing of UAC: the Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997; the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. Several agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) share responsibilities for the processing, treatment, and placement of UAC. DHS Customs and Border Protection apprehends and detains UAC arrested at the border while Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) handles the transfer and repatriation responsibilities. ICE also apprehends UAC in the interior of the country and is responsible for representing the government in removal proceedings. HHS is responsible for coordinating and implementing the care and placement of UAC in appropriate custody. Four countries account for almost all of the UAC cases (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico) and much of the recent increase has come from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In FY2009, Mexican UAC accounted for 82% of 19,668 UAC apprehensions, while the other three Central American countries accounted for 17%. By the first eight months of FY2014, the proportions had almost reversed, with Mexican UAC comprising only 25% of the 47,017 UAC apprehensions, and UAC from the three Central American countries comprising 73%. Both the Administration and Congress have begun to take action to respond to the surge in UAC coming across the border. The Administration has developed a working group to coordinate the efforts of the various agencies involved in responding to the issue. It also has opened additional shelters and holding facilities to accommodate the large number of UAC apprehended at the border. The Administration has also announced plans to provide funding to the affected Central American countries for a variety of programs and security-related initiatives. Relatedly, Congress is considering funding increases for HHS and DHS. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: R43599: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf Shelf Number: 132583 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationUnaccompanied Alien ChildrenUndocumented AliensUndocumented Children |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Coast Guard: Resource Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Summary: The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the transit zonethe area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United Statesduring fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 daysa 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measurethe removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zoneonce, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets. In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increasedfrom about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-527: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Shelf Number: 132631 Keywords: Border SecurityCoast GuardDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Allouche, Jeremy Title: Cross-border Violence as an External Stress: Policy Responses to Cross-border Dynamics on the Border between Cte dIvoire and Liberia Summary: One of the key issues identified in the new policy literature on external stress is the incidence of cross-border violence and the current lack of efficient and permanent mechanisms supported by international organisations, governments and civil society to deal with the violence. The focus of this research is the border region between Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia. The protracted violence which has affected the region for many years stems from the internal conflicts which afflicted both countries at different times, and which had regional dynamics and implications. Western Cote d'Ivoire acted as a proxy battleground in the first Liberian civil war (1989-96), and the region is the birthplace of the military and political crisis that affected Cote d'Ivoire from 2002 onwards. An inaccessible and neglected region, it has acted as a training ground and base for rebel groups and security forces, and it is local people who have borne the brunt of the insecurity. In 2012-13 the region experienced a resurgence of cross-border violence linked to the 2011 electoral and political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. Some accuse the political elite loyal to former Cote d'Ivoire president, Laurent Gbagbo, who are based in Ghana, of funding military incursions by militants and Liberian partners in the west of Cote d'Ivoire to destabilise the region. Animosity between different communities and the limited capacity of security forces to provide safety to the people perpetuates the precarious situation. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Evidence Report No. 77: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4026/ER77%20Cross-border%20Violence%20as%20an%20External%20Stress%20%20Policy%20Responses%20to%20Cross-border%20Dynamics%20on%20the%20Border%20between%20Cte%20dIvoire%20and%20Liberia.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4026/ER77%20Cross-border%20Violence%20as%20an%20External%20Stress%20%20Policy%20Responses%20to%20Cross-border%20Dynamics%20on%20the%20Border%20between%20Cte%20dI Shelf Number: 132662 Keywords: Border SecurityMilitant GroupsPolitical ViolenceViolence (Africa) |
Author: Triandafyllidou, Anna Title: Governing Irregular Migration and Asylum at the Borders of Europe: Between Efficiency and Protection Summary: This paper investigates recent developments in EU policy on controlling irregular migration and managing asylum at the EU's southern borders. The paper focuses on the (im) balancing act between efficiency and protection in EU policies. Beginning by expounding the notion of governance of irregular migration and asylum, we turn to critically discuss current European border control practices with a focus on the agencies and policies in place (including the Common European Asylum System). The paper concludes by showing how the EU's balancing act between irregular migration control and asylum management tips clearly towards the former even if it pays lip service to the latter as well as to the need of preventing the loss of human life. Details: Rome: Isituto Affari Internazionali, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Imagining Europe, no. 6: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.iai.it/pdf/ImaginingEurope/ImaginingEurope_06.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.iai.it/pdf/ImaginingEurope/ImaginingEurope_06.pdf Shelf Number: 132667 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsIrregular Migration (Europe)Migration |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Containment Plan: Bulgaria's Pushbacks and Detention of Syrian and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants Summary: Since the Bulgarian government announced a plan in early November 2013 to contain and reduce the number of asylum seekers and other migrants irregularly crossing the border with Turkey, Bulgarian authorities have systematically prevented Syrians, Afghans, and other undocumented people from entering Bulgaria to lodge asylum claims. Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants gave Human Rights Watch detailed accounts of 44 incidents involving at least 519 people in which Bulgarian border police apprehended and summarily returned them to Turkey without proper procedures and with no opportunity to lodge asylum claims, often using excessive force. Containment Plan also documents Bulgaria's failure to provide new arrivals with basic humanitarian assistance in 2013 such as adequate food and shelter, the brutal conditions of detention, inadequacies in Bulgaria's asylum procedures, shortfalls in its treatment of unaccompanied migrant children, and failure to support and integrate recognized refugees. With the help of the European Union, the humanitarian situation in Bulgaria has improved in 2014, but this coincides with the implementation of the pushback policy and a drop in arrivals of new asylum seekers. This suggests that those fortunate enough to have entered before the door was slammed will now be treated decently, but the rest will face a closed door. Containment Plan calls on the Bulgarian government to end summary expulsions at the Turkish border and to stop the excessive use of force by border guards. It also calls on the Bulgarian government to improve the treatment of detainees and detention conditions in police stations and migrant detention centers. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bulgaria0414_ForUpload_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bulgaria0414_ForUpload_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132731 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityHuman Rights AbusesImmigrant DetentionImmigrants (Bulgaria)Immigration |
Author: Migreurop Title: Europe's Murderous Borders Summary: Born in 2002, the Migreurop network brings together activists and over forty associations from thirteen countries both north and south of the Mediterranean. Its goal is to collect information to reveal and denounce the effects of the European Union's migration policies insofar as human rights violations are concerned, particularly in places of detention. The map of camps for foreigners in Europe and in Mediterranean countries drawn up by Migreurop, which is regularly updated, has become a reference in this field. Since 2008, the Migreurop network's work has taken on the form, in particular, of a Borders Observatory that rests upon a number of tools: apart from the divulging of information on human rights violations at borders through its e-mail list and website, Migreurop has launched a campaign for a 'Right of access in the places of detention for migrants', and has set up a working group on the consequences of readmission agreements reached between the European Union and its neighbours. In September 2009, Migreurop published an 'Atlas of migrants in Europe', which aims to be a work of critical geography of border controls. Migreurop releases this report on the violation of human rights at borders, 'Murderous Borders', within the framework of the Borders Observatory. For this first edition, Migreurop has chosen to focus on four symbolic poles of the misdeeds of the policies enacted by the European Union: the Greek-Turkish border, the Calais region in northwestern France, that of Oujda, in eastern Morocco, and the island of Lampedusa in the far south of Italy. They represent as many stops, of varying length and too often tragic, in the odyssey of thousands of people who, every year, seek to flee persecutions through chosen or obligatory exile, or simply to escape the fate that is reserved to them, by attempting to reach Europe. Details: Paris: Migreurop, 2009. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport-Migreurop-nov2009-en-final.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport-Migreurop-nov2009-en-final.pdf Shelf Number: 132903 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHuman Rights (Europe)Immigrant DetentionImmigrationMigrant DetentionMigrants |
Author: Migreurop Title: European Borders: Controls, detention and deportations Summary: Abbiamo fermato l'invasione: "We have stopped the invasion", a Northern League poster boasted in March 2010 before the regional elections in Italy. The press could rejoice about seeing "Lampedusa returned to the fishermen", since the identification and expulsion centre on the island, which had seen over 30,000 "illegals" disembark in 2008, and still 1,220 in February 2009, was henceforth empty since October. In turn, the Italian government was trumpeting the fact that, against "illegal" immigration, firmness had ended up paying off. From the other islands in the Sicily Channel to Malta, to the Canary islands, and to the coasts of Andalusia in Spain, the same fact could be noted: unwanted arrivals on the coasts had ended, at least on that side of Europe. Moreover, at a time when Migreurop is completing its second annual report, it has even been stated that Libya has closed its detention centres - those camps that were hastily created following great inputs of "aid" from north of the Mediterranean. Readers should read this report with caution, because, in the field of migration, the gateways and routes open up and close down very quickly, in accordance with the deals between European Union member states and those between the latter and so-called "third" countries, in spite of the strong trends that we denounce here. Details: Paris: Migreurop, 2010. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/rapport-migreurop-2010-en_-_2-121110.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/rapport-migreurop-2010-en_-_2-121110.pdf Shelf Number: 132972 Keywords: Border Control Border Security Human Rights (Europe) Immigrant Detention Immigration Migrant Detention Migrants |
Author: Manuel, Kate M. Title: Unaccompanied Alien Children - Legal Issues: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Summary: Recent reports about the increasing number of alien minors apprehended at the U.S. border without a parent or legal guardian have prompted numerous questions about so-called unaccompanied alien children (UACs). Some of these questions pertain to the numbers of children involved, their reasons for coming to the United States, and current and potential responses of the federal government and other entities to their arrival. Other questions concern the interpretation and interplay of various federal statutes and regulations, administrative and judicial decisions, and settlement agreements pertaining to alien minors. This report addresses the latter questions, providing general and relatively brief answers to 14 frequently asked questions regarding UACs. Some of the questions and answers in the report provide basic definitions and background information relevant to discussions of UACs, such as the legal definition of unaccompanied alien child; the difference between being a UAC and having Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status; the terms and enforcement of the Flores settlement agreement; and why UACs encountered at a port of entry-as some recent arrivals have been-are not turned away on the grounds that they are inadmissible. Other questions and answers explore which federal agencies have primary responsibility for maintaining custody of alien children without immigration status; removal proceedings against such children; the release of alien minors from federal custody; the "best interest of the child" standard; and whether UACs could obtain asylum due to gang violence in their home countries. Yet other questions and answers address whether UACs have a right to counsel at the government's expense; their ability under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to have consular officials of their home country notified of their detention; and whether UACs are eligible for inclusion in the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: R43623: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43623.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43623.pdf Shelf Number: 132989 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal Aliens Illegal ImmigrantsUndocumented AliensUndocumented Children (U.S.) |
Author: No More Deaths Title: A Culture of Cruelty: Abuse and Impunity in Short-Term U.S. Border Patrol Custody Summary: In 2006, in the midst of humanitarian work with people recently deported from the United States to Nogales, Sonora, No More Deaths began to document abuses endured by individuals in the custody of U.S. immigration authorities, and in particular the U.S. Border Patrol. In September 2008 No More Deaths published Crossing the Line in collaboration with partners in Naco and Agua Prieta, Sonora. The report included hundreds of individual accounts of Border Patrol abuse, as well as recommendations for clear, enforceable custody standards with community oversight to ensure compliance. Almost three years later, A Culture of Cruelty is a follow-up to that report-now with 12 times as many interviews detailing more than 30,000 incidents of abuse and mistreatment, newly obtained information on the Border Patrol's existing custody standards, and more specific recommendations to stop the abuse of individuals in Border Patrol custody. The abuses individuals report have remained alarmingly consistent for years, from interviewer to interviewer and across interview sites: individuals suffering severe dehydration are deprived of water; people with life-threatening medical conditions are denied treatment; children and adults are beaten during apprehensions and in custody; family members are separated, their belongings confiscated and not returned; many are crammed into cells and subjected to extreme temperatures, deprived of sleep, and threatened with death by Border Patrol agents. By this point, the overwhelming weight of the corroborated evidence should eliminate any doubt that Border Patrol abuse is widespread. Still the Border Patrol's consistent response has been flat denial, and calls for reform have been ignored. We have entitled our report "A Culture of Cruelty" because we believe our findings demonstrate that the abuse, neglect, and dehumanization of migrants is part of the institutional culture of the Border Patrol, reinforced by an absence of meaningful accountability mechanisms. This systemic abuse must be confronted aggressively at the institutional level, not denied or dismissed as a series of aberrational incidents attributable to a few rogue agents. Until then we can expect this culture of cruelty to continue to deprive individuals in Border Patrol custody of their most fundamental human rights. Details: Tucson, AZ: No More Deaths, 2010. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 23, 2014 at: http://www.nomoredeathsvolunteers.org/Print%20Resources/Abuse%20Doc%20Reports/Culture%20of%20Cruelty/CultureofCrueltyFinal.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.nomoredeathsvolunteers.org/Print%20Resources/Abuse%20Doc%20Reports/Culture%20of%20Cruelty/CultureofCrueltyFinal.pdf Shelf Number: 133123 Keywords: Border Patrol (U.S.)Border SecurityHuman Rights AbusesIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrationPrisoner AbuseUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Guerra, Santiago Ivan Title: From Vaqueros to Mafiosos : a community history of drug trafficking in rural South Texas Summary: My dissertation, From Vaqueros to Mafiosos: A Community History of Drug Trafficking in Rural South Texas is an ethnographic study of the impact of the drug trade in South Texas, with a specific focus on Starr County. This dissertation examines drug trafficking along the U.S-Mexico Border at two levels of analysis. First, through historical ethnography, I provide a cultural history of South Texas, as well as a specific history of drug trafficking in Starr County. In doing so, I highlight the different trafficking practices that emerge throughout South Texas' history, and I document the social changes that develop in Starr County as a result of these illicit practices. The second half of my dissertation, however, is devoted to a contemporary analysis of the impact of the drug trade on the border region by analyzing important social practices in Starr County relating to drug abuse, policing and the criminal justice system, youth socialization and family life. Through ethnography I present the devastating effects of the drug trade and border policing on this Mexican American border community in rural South Texas. Details: Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin, 2011. 244p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 29, 2014 at: http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3036 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3036 Shelf Number: 129918 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime |
Author: Brazil Ministry of Justice Title: Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Border Areas Summary: Behind the scenes of the festivities surrounding Brazil's hosting of the football World Cup this summer, vulnerable Brazilians and immigrants were being trafficked into exploitation for many different purposes, including football itself. New research on trafficking in children, women and men at the Brazilian land borders identified forms of exploitation that were previously unknown to policy-makers and researchers. From the Amazon to the Iguazu Falls, a team of researchers conducted field research in the regional capitals of all eleven border states in Brazil - along a land border that is 16,886 km long, and separates Brazil from nine other South American countries and a French overseas territory. The resulting research report, Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Border Areas of Brazil, was launched in Portuguese in Brasilia late last year and has just been published in English and Spanish. Brazil's recent rapid economic growth, largely based on tapping into its vast natural resources, has led to situations of labour and sex trafficking for men, women and children. Both Brazilian and foreign, they are exploited at hydroelectric power plants, in mines, on plantations and on cattle ranches. Some children and adults were also identified as trafficked for exploitation in illegal activities, such as illegal logging, drug cultivation, drug trafficking and the smuggling of contraband goods. Sexual exploitation remains the most common form of trafficking identified, and affects girls, boys, young transgender women and girls, and adult women, both with and without prior experience working in the sex industry. Girls from impoverished rural families are also trafficked into wealthier families under the guise of an informal fostering system that would allow them to receive an education. This system is then abused to exploit the girls through domestic work. Boys are taken to and from Brazil with promises of success as professional footballers, but neither they nor their families receive the promised payments. A clear geographical pattern emerges from this research, which was funded by the Brazilian government and coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), headquartered in Vienna, in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Sexual exploitation was most commonly reported in the Northern border region, whereas forced labour was more commonly identified in the Centre and South Region. The report also reveals a pattern to the profiles of trafficked people; some indigenous groups, women, children and transgender women can be more vulnerable. While there may be some fear of reporting trafficking and exploitation to the authorities, many trafficked people and their families are in such a state of economic and social vulnerability that they see no viable alternative to being trafficked and exploited in order to survive. The Brazilian Minister of Justice, Jose Eduardo Cardozo, who launched the research in Brasilia in October of last year, calls trafficking an "underground" crime, because of the lack of police records. According to Cardozo, 'the research identified a permissive culture that legitimises the commission of the crime. Without numbers, it is difficult to carry out an efficient investigation and to effectively combat trafficking.' Among the recommendations ensuing from the assessment is for Brazil to develop its migration policy with a focus on providing assistance to migrants, including trafficked people, as well as to improve local service provision and public policies to ameliorate the individual, social and situational vulnerability of potential trafficking victims in the border area. Clearly, the opportunity to earn an income through some form of decent work would go a long way in preventing these situations from arising. Details: Brussels: International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2013. . 270p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 11, 2014 at: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/Enafron_IN_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/Enafron_IN_web.pdf Shelf Number: 133281 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingForced LaborHuman Trafficking (Brazil)Sexual ExploitationSmuggling |
Author: Schbley, Ghassan Title: Piracy, Illegal Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania Summary: Long coastlines, porous borders, a lack of government capacity, weak enforcement mechanisms, corruption, and other factors have enabled illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing to thrive in Somalia's waters. The same factors have allowed other transnational threats to develop in Somalia-and spread further south into Kenya and Tanzania. This study, which draws on extensive field research along the East African littoral, identifies and analyzes linkages between piracy and IUU fishing. In addition, the report examines the role of the maritime sector in facilitating the illegal movement of drugs, weapons, and people through the region. This study also highlights the role of small vessels in a system that transports terrorists from al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda's East Africa affiliate, to and from Somalia. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf Shelf Number: 133298 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Africa)Wildlife Crimes |
Author: Pew Research Center Title: More Prioritize Border Security in Immigration Debate. How to Accommodate Undocumented Central American Children in the U.S.? Summary: How to Accommodate Undocumented Central American Children in the U.S.? The national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted August 20-24 among 1,501 adults, finds that 33% say the priority should be on better border security and tougher enforcement of immigration laws, while 23% prioritize creating a way for people in the U.S. illegally to become citizens if they meet certain conditions. About four-in-ten (41%) say both should be given equal priority. Details: Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/09/9-3-14-Immigration-Release.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/09/9-3-14-Immigration-Release.pdf Shelf Number: 133567 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigration PolicyImmigration ReformMigrantsUndocumented Children |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Risk-Informed Covert Assessments and Oversight of Corrective Actions Could Strengthen Capabilities at the Border Summary: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting-or intercepting-nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities-including nuclear and radiological testing-covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies. OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders. Why GAO Did This Study Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-826: Accessed October 15, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665998.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665998.pdf Shelf Number: 133922 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SEcurityNuclear Smuggling (U.S.)Terrorism |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "You Don't Have Rights Here". US Border Screening and Returns of Central Americans to Risk of Serious Harm Summary: In recent years, the United States has apprehended growing numbers of Central Americans crossing the US-Mexico border without authorization. These migrants have left their countries for many reasons, including fleeing rising violence by gangs involved in the drug trade. US Customs and Border Protection deports the overwhelming majority of migrants it apprehends from Central America in accelerated processes known as "expedited removal" or "reinstatement of removal." These processes include rapid-fire screening for a migrant's fear of persecution or torture upon return to their home country. "You Don't Have Rights Here" details how summary screening at the US border is failing to identify people fleeing serious risks to their lives and safety. It is based primarily on the accounts of migrants sent back to Honduras or in detention in US migrant detention facilities. An analysis of US government deportation data shows that the Border Patrol flags only a tiny minority of Central Americans for a more extended interview to determine if they have a "credible" fear of returning home. Migrants said that Border Patrol officers seemed singularly focused on deporting them and their families despite their fear of return. Some said that after their deportation they went into hiding, fearful for their lives. Human Rights Watch calls on the US government to ensure that immigration authorities give the cases of Central American migrants sufficient scrutiny before returning them to risk of serious harm. It also urges US authorities to stop detaining migrant children, and to improve migrants' access to lawyers. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 17, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1014_web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1014_web.pdf Shelf Number: 133732 Keywords: Border SecurityDeportationHuman Rights AbusesIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrantsImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay Title: Understanding the Structure of Transnational Criminal Networks Operating in the U.S./Mexico Border and the Southeastern Border of the European Union Summary: Systemic crime and systemic corruption, much like any other activity, require the interaction of different agents. Some of those interactions are sporadic and some are permanent. In general, there are "many situations that social actors create and must negotiate in their behavior" (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010, p. 308), and it is possible to model and analyze those situations when arranged as a social network. Additionally several States and multilateral agencies acknowledge Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs) as one of the most important threats for the domestic and transnational stability. Bearing this in mind, the purpose of this document is to model and analyze situations of crime consisting on Transnational Criminal Network (TCNs) operating in the southern border of The United States and the Southeastern border of the European Union, both regions concentrating some of the most dangerous and powerful TCNs on a global scale. The present document consists of eight sections. The first is the methodological and theoretical framework. The second is an introduction to the current situation of crime in Mexico. The third is the model and analysis of a TCN operating across Mexico and the United States, in which members of "Los Zetas" and "La Familia Michoacana" participate on activities of drug and hydrocarbons trafficking. The fourth section is an analysis of how the modeled Mexican TCN operates inside the United States. Implications for the stability and national security of the United States are also explored in the fourth section. The fifth section is an introduction to the situation of crime and corruption in Bulgaria, herein interpreted as the southeastern border of the European Union. In the sixth section four TCNs are modeled and analyzed: two consisting on crime transiting through Bulgaria, related to Drug Trafficking, and two consisting on exporting human trafficking from Bulgaria to Western Europe and a Skimming network. The final section is a summary of recommendations for improving the confrontation of TCNs. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation; Sophia, Bulgaria: Risk Monitor, 2013. 235p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf Shelf Number: 133820 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingGang ViolenceGangsHuman TraffickingOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Morse, Amyas Title: Reforming the UK Border and Immigration System: report Summary: The Home Office (the Department) has been directly responsible for managing the UK's immigration and border operations since April 2013. The Department aims to ensure the flow of people and goods through the system is efficient, while working towards its target to reduce net migration. In 2013-14, nearly 112 million people arrived in the UK. Before 2013, the former UK Border Agency (the Agency) managed the Department's immigration and asylum work. The Home Secretary separated border operations from the Agency in March 2012, setting up Border Force as a directorate within the Department. In March 2013, the Home Secretary abolished the remaining Agency and brought its work into the Department under two new directorates: UK Visas and Immigration and Immigration Enforcement. The Home Secretary did this because of the Agency's troubled history, including its large size and conflicting cultures; inadequate IT systems; the problematic policy and legal framework it worked in; and the resulting lack of transparency and accountability. The three directorates now working within the Department each have a different focus. UK Visas and Immigration decides on applications to visit and stay in the UK with a strong customer focus. Immigration Enforcement's remit is to enforce the law for those who break immigration rules. Border Force secures the UK border, through immigration and customs controls. The Department's new corporate centre, comprising finance, human resources, IT and performance reporting, supports the directorates. We reported progress in cutting costs and improving performance in the Agency and Border Force in July 2012. We also reported progress in Border Force in September 2013. After our 2012 report, the Committee of Public Accounts (the Committee) wrote to the Department expressing concerns, including: delays to the former Agency's transformation programme; the risk that a flagship IT programme would not deliver intended benefits; significant backlogs; poor workforce planning and skills strategy; inadequate demand modelling; and an insufficient focus on improvingperformance management. This report focuses on the progress the two new directorates have made in addressing the Committee's concerns and the Home Secretary's reasons for abolishing the Agency. Details: London: National Audit Office, 2014. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2015 at: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Reforming-the-UK-border-and-immigration-system.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Reforming-the-UK-border-and-immigration-system.pdf Shelf Number: 134415 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigration (U.K.) |
Author: Coombs, Kyle Title: Do U.S. Border Enforcement Operations Increase Human Smuggling Fees Along the U.S.-Mexico Border? Summary: Undocumented migrants frequently hire border crossing experts, called "coyotes" to facilitate a successful, safer crossing. U.S. border enforcement actively counters these migrants. U.S. measures of enforcement and coyote fees grew together during the 20th century, suggesting a connection between enforcement and the coyote market. This paper tests the effect of border patrol agents and operations on coyote fees using a dataset compiled from the Mexican Migration Project, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security, and the United States Sentencing Commission. I do not find a significant connection between coyote fees and border enforcement, but do show that average prison time along the border acted as a shifter of supply prior to 2005. Details: St. Paul, MN: Macalester College, 2014. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Economics Honors Projects, Paper 57: Accessed February 7, 2015 at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=economics_honors_projects Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=economics_honors_projects Shelf Number: 134556 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCoyotesHuman SmugglingMigrationUndocumented Migrants (U.S.) |
Author: Rosenblum, Marc R. Title: Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension between Protection and Prevention Summary: Between 2011 and 2014, the number of Central American children and "family units" - parents traveling with minor children - who arrived at the U.S.-Mexico border increased rapidly, reaching a peak of 137,000 in fiscal year 2014. While many of these migrants have valid claims for asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief, others are chiefly driven by economic concerns and a desire to reconnect with family members. This mixed flow has challenged the capacity of the United States to carry out its core immigration functions of preventing the admission of unauthorized immigrants while also providing protection to those who cannot be safely returned to their home countries. Media coverage of Central American arrivals in 2014 portrayed their entry as a failure of border security, but the actual policy failures were in the processing and adjudication of claims for relief from migrants presenting in a mixed migration flow of humanitarian and irregular migrants. Inadequate judicial and legal resources left some migrants waiting two years or more for a hearing before an immigration judge. Such delays amounted to a de facto policy of open admission for children and families. Furthermore, the Obama administration's responses to the rising Central American flows, including greater law enforcement resources at the border, expanded detention facilities, and the establishment of dedication child and family immigration court dockets, focused exclusively on immediate needs rather than longer-term solutions and they failed either to adequately protect vulnerable immigrants or to prevent future unauthorized flows. This report explains the shifting patterns of Central American migration between 2011 and 2014, analyzes the root of the policy challenges posed by these flows, and outlines U.S. and regional policy responses to address the crisis. It also makes recommendations on policies that advance both critical protection and enforcement goals in situations of complex, mixed flows, and provides additional policies that the United States, Mexico, and the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras might adopt to better manage child and family migration pressures today and in the future. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 8, 2015 at: http://migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migration-united-states-tension-between-protection-and-prevention Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migration-united-states-tension-between-protection-and-prevention Shelf Number: 135193 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityChild ProtectionHuman SmugglingIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationUnaccompanied Children (U.S.) |
Author: Hansen, Randall Title: Securing Borders: The Intended, Unintended, and Perverse Consequences Summary: All countries have the same basic goals in regard to national borders: to ensure that the beneficial movement - of legal goods, tourists, students, business people, and some migrants - is allowed, while keeping unwanted goods and people out of the country. All countries also face a similar set of border enforcement goals and challenges. They must prevent cross-border terrorism, illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking, and other criminal activity such as drug trafficking. In adopting policies and practices to combat these activities, countries also face a common and basic dilemma: policies in any one area have perverse, regrettable, and often unintended, consequences and feedbacks. As states implement extensive border controls and apply a wide variety of deterrence measures such as visas and carrier sanctions to prevent illegal migration, they indirectly push unauthorized migrants into the hands of smugglers and traffickers who promise to evade these controls. This report is first in a series that focuses on ways to curb the influence of these"bad actors" who pose challenges to countries' immigration control efforts. The report outlines the security-related challenges that borders are intended to address and, in turn, the perverse consequences that tighter border enforcement generates. The report analyzes challenges in five key categories: terrorism, asylum, human smuggling and trafficking, illegal migration, and drug trafficking. Turning to policy implications of the analysis, the authors argue that in order to operate successfully in the changing landscape of border management, and prevent the perverse consequences of border control efforts, policymakers must focus on principles of good governance. Weak states cannot have strong borders, and states will not get border policy right unless they get their institutions right. Accordingly, proper border policy depends on a commitment to the rule of law, low levels of corruption, effective police and border control forces, and successful coordination both among responsible agencies and with like-minded states. To this end, this report offers several policy recommendations for more effective border security. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2015 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/securing-borders-perverse-consequences Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/securing-borders-perverse-consequences Shelf Number: 135282 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal Immigration |
Author: Australia. Department of Immigration and Border Protection Title: Review into recent allegations relating to conditions and circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru Summary: A number of allegations have been made recently regarding conditions and circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru (also known as 'the centre'). These allegations include issues relating to the conduct and behaviour of staff employed by contracted service providers, claims of sexual and other physical assault of transferees, the orchestration and facilitation of transferees to engage in non-compliant or harmful behaviour and protest actions potentially endangering the safety and security of all persons at the centre, and the misuse and unauthorised disclosure of sensitive and confidential information, including to undermine the proper management of the centre. The purpose of this review is to provide a complete and accurate account of the circumstances, to determine the substance (if any) of the allegations and to provide recommendations to relevant authorities to strengthen arrangements at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru. The Acting Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection has initiated a review to investigate and report on the key issues, in particular: - to determine exactly what the facts are - to ensure that those facts are available to any authorities for any action required as a result - to ensure that the department is provided with clear recommendations on any improvements that can be made to support the Republic of Nauru with the ongoing management of the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru. Consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding between The Republic of Nauru and the Commonwealth of Australia, relating to the transfer to and assessment of persons in Nauru and related issues (dated 3 August 2013), the security, good order and management of the centre, including the care and welfare of persons residing in the centre, remain the responsibility of the sovereign Government of Nauru. In relation to service providers, the scope of this review is limited to an examination of those service providers and staff engaged by the Commonwealth of Australia for the purposes of providing services of any kind at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru. Should it become apparent in the course of the review that there is information of concern in relation to service providers engaged by the Republic of Nauru, this information will be provided to the Government of Nauru. Details: Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2015. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/review-conditions-circumstances-nauru.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/review-conditions-circumstances-nauru.pdf Shelf Number: 135399 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrant Detention (Australia)ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:The Merida Initiative and Beyond Summary: Violence perpetrated by a range of criminal groups continues to threaten citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico, a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and more than $500 billion in annual trade. Although organized crime-related violence in Mexico has generally declined since 2011, analysts estimate that it may have claimed more than 80,000 lives between December 2006 and December 2014. Recent cases - particularly the disappearance of 43 students in Guerrero, Mexico in September 2014 - have drawn attention to the problems of corruption and impunity for human rights abuses in Mexico. Supporting Mexico's efforts to reform its criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality and better protecting citizen security in the country. U.S. support for those efforts has increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Merida Initiative, a bilateral partnership launched in 2007 for which Congress has appropriated some $2.5 billion. U.S. assistance focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. Inaugurated to a six-year term in December 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has continued U.S.-Mexican security cooperation begun during the Felipe Calderon government. Pena Nieto has requested increased assistance for judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limited U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations. Despite those restrictions, U.S. intelligence has helped Mexico arrest top crime leaders, including Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman - the world's most wanted drug trafficker - in February 2014.The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Merida training and equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The 114th Congress is continuing to fund and oversee the Merida Initiative and related domestic initiatives. From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress appropriated roughly $2.5 billion in Merida Initiative assistance for Mexico, including some $194 million provided in the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235). That total is $79 million above the Administration's request; it aims to support efforts to secure Mexico's southern border and justice sector programs. As of April 2015, more than $1.3 billion of Merida Initiative assistance had been delivered. The FY2016 request for the Merida Initiative is for $119 million to help advance justice sector reform, modernize Mexico's borders (north and south), and support violence prevention programs. Possible questions for oversight may include the following. 1) How is the State Department measuring the efficacy of Merida programs and improving or eliminating ineffective programs? 2) To what extent is the Mexican government moving judicial and police reform efforts forward, and how is U.S. assistance supporting those reforms? 3) Are Merida-funded programs helping the Mexican government respond to new challenges and priorities, including securing its southern border? 4) Is Mexico meeting the human rights conditions placed on Merida Initiative funding? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: R41349: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Shelf Number: 135554 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal Justice ReformDrug TraffickingMerida InitiativeOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Donnelly, Robert Title: Transit Migration in Mexico: Domestis and International Policy Implications Summary: The recent surge in Central American migration has challenged Mexico to implement policies that uphold human rights for migrants (especially unaccompanied children) who are passing through the country while also deterring unauthorized crossings at the southern border and cracking down on human smuggling and trafficking. However, finding the appropriate balance for these policies - with a humanitarian focus on the one hand and meeting larger "security concerns" on the other hand - has been elusive for the Mexican government. This essay discusses the historical and political context of Mexico's various policy responses to the spike in Central American migration through Mexico toward the United States and analyzes related implications for the country's relationships with the United States and its Central American neighbors. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2014. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2015 at: http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/4a32803e/MC-pub-TransitMigration-120214.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/4a32803e/MC-pub-TransitMigration-120214.pdf Shelf Number: 135741 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman RightsHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration Policy |
Author: Eguizabal, Cristina Title: Crime and Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved Summary: Throughout the spring and summer of 2014, a wave of unaccompanied minors and families from Central America began arriving at the U.S.-Mexican border in record numbers. During June and July over 10,000 a month were arriving. The unexpected influx triggered a national debate about immigration and border policy, as well as an examination of the factors compelling thousands of children to undertake such a treacherous journey. Approximately two-thirds of these children are from Central America's Northern Triangle-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. According to interviews with the children their motives for migrating ranged from fleeing some of the world's highest homicide rates, rampant extortion, communities controlled by youth gangs, domestic violence, impunity for most crimes, as well as economic despair and lack of opportunity. Many hoped to reunite with family members, especially parents, who are already in the United States. The wave of migrants has underscored chronic problems in the region that stem back decades. It is often assumed that international drug trafficking explains the surge in violence since 2009, but other important factors are also at play. Drug trafficking is certainly a factor, especially in areas where criminal control of territory and trafficking routes is contested, but drugs do not explain the entirety of the complex phenomenon. Other factors have also contributed. While there are important differences among the three countries, there are also common factors behind the violence. Strong gang presence in communities often results in competition for territorial and economic control through extortion, kidnapping and the retail sale of illegal drugs. Threats of violence and sexual assault are often tools of neighborhood control, and gang rivalries and revenge killings are commonplace. Elevated rates of domestic abuse, sexual violence, and weak family and household structures also contribute as children are forced to fend for themselves and often chose (or are coerced into) the relative "safety" of the gang or criminal group. Likewise, important external factors such a weak capacity among law enforcement institutions, elevated levels of corruption, and penetration of the state by criminal groups means impunity for crime is extraordinarily high (95 percent or more), and disincentives to criminal activity are almost non-existent. Public confidence in law enforcement is low and crime often goes unreported. U.S. policy and practice are also a major contributing factor to the violence. U.S. consumption of illegal drug remains among the highest in the world, and U.S. and Mexican efforts to interdict drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Mexico has contributed to the trade's relocation to Central America. Furthermore, the policy of deporting large numbers of young Central Americans in the 1990s and 2000s, many of them already gang members in the United States, helped transfer the problem of violent street gangs from the United States to Central America's northern triangle. El Salvador now has the largest number of gang members in Central America followed close behind by Honduras and Guatemala. Finally, the trafficking of firearms, especially from the United States, has also contributed to the lethality and morbidity of crime. Efforts to slow firearms trafficking from the United States have encountered many domestic and political barriers and continue largely unchecked. Over the past year, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program has undertaken an extensive review of the principal United States security assistance program for the region-the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This review has focused on the major security challenges in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and how CARSI seeks to address these. This publication includes country reports on each country including a review of the current in-country security context, as well as assessing CARSI's effectiveness for addressing these challenges. The report also includes a chapter providing an in-depth analysis of the geographic distribution of homicides and an examination of how such an analysis can help policy makers design more effective targeted strategies to lower violence. A final chapter outlining policy options for the future completes the report. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Shelf Number: 135789 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationKidnappingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office Title: The Border Force: Securing the Border Summary: Since the UK Border Force was separated from the UK Border Agency, it has met some important objectives such as reducing queuing times both during and after the 2012 London Olympics. To provide value for money, however, it needs to perform effectively and in a sustained way across the full range of its activities. The Border Force separated from the UK Border Agency because the Home Office was not confident the Border Force was capable of responding to instructions. To address this, the Border Force has standardized how its officers check passengers, and almost 100 per cent of passengers at the border now receive full passport checks. The Border Force has also successfully reduced passenger queuing times at the border. In April 2012, just before the Olympics, it became clear that the Border Force was struggling to manage queue times. The Border Force introduced measures to deal with this and, in 2012-13, more than 99 per cent of passengers cleared passport controls within the target times of 25 minutes for European arrivals and 45 minutes for those arriving from outside the EEA. Border Force officers, however, reported that staff shortages and the requirement to prioritize full passenger checks while managing queue times often prevented their performing other important duties, such as checking freight. In addition, during the first months of 2012-13, the Border Force's performance in some of its activities, such as seizures of cigarettes and counterfeit goods, entry refusals and detecting forgeries, was below target. The Home Office's internal auditors confirmed in April 2013 that the 2012 Olympics and wider resourcing issues had an effect on the Border Force's ability consistently to resource customs controls. The Border Force's workforce lacks organizational identity. The Border Force consists largely of officers who previously worked in separate customs and immigrations agencies, who typically still identify themselves as 'ex-customs' or 'ex-immigration'. Five director-generals have been in post over the course of 18 months. To meet the demands the Home Office has placed on it, such as carrying out full checks on all passengers rather than risk-based checks, the Border Force is recruiting more staff. Despite this, NAO visits revealed continuing staff shortages at the border. The Border Force has not established whether it has the resources it needs to deliver all its objectives. The Border Force needs to deploy staff flexibly to respond to its competing demands, but is prevented from doing this as efficiently as possible because almost a fifth of its workforce is employed under terms and conditions that restrict working hours to fixed periods during the week. At Heathrow in spring 2013, less than half the workforce was contractually obliged to work before 5am without being paid additional benefits in kind, despite a significant number of long-distance flights arriving at that time. Details: London: National Audit Office, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/The-Border-force-securing-the-border.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/The-Border-force-securing-the-border.pdf Shelf Number: 129778 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigration |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Interim Report of the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel Summary: Created as part of the homeland security eorganization of 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the single, unified agency to protect and secure our nation's borders. CBP is by far the largest law enforcement agency of our country. In terms of its more than 44,000 arms carrying, sworn law enforcement officers, CBP is more than double the size of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and substantially larger than New York Police Department (NYPD), the largest local police force in the U.S. Unquestionably, CBP is far more effective in performing its border protection mission than was the case pre-2003 when border enforcement authority and personnel were fragmented into four separate agencies aligned within three different departments of government. Yet as a border agency with a national security and law enforcement mission, CBP is vulnerable to the potential for corruption within its workforce which, if not detected and effectively investigated, could severely undermine its mission. Moreover, it is imperative, as with all law enforcement, that CBP officers and agents avoid using excessive and unnecessary force in carrying out their duties. To this end, it is essential that CBP be capable of effectively investigating and deterring the potential unlawful and out-of-policy use of force by its personnel . It is within this context that in December 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security requested the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to create the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel ("Panel"), a subcommittee of the HSAC, in order to take stock of and evaluate the progress of CBP regarding its efforts to deter and prevent corruption and the use of excessive force and its efforts to restore public confidence through more transparency with key stakeholders and the public. As part of the Secretary's tasking, he requested recommendations based upon law enforcement best practices regarding further steps needed to assure the highest level of integrity, compliance with use of force policy, incident response transparency, and stakeholder engagement. The Secretary's six specific tasking's are set forth in his letter to the HSAC dated December 9, 2014. (See Appendix B) This interim report discusses integrity and use of force/transparency issues separately, yet some of our recommendations apply to both. A prime example is our recommendation that the number of criminal investigators in CBP's Office of Internal Affairs (IA) be substantially increased. An adequately staffed IA is essential to giving CBP the capacity to timely and thoroughly investigate all allegations of corruption as well as all use of force violations of CBP policy. Since its inception less than four months ago, in March 2015, the Panel has met and reviewed numerous prior reports, gathered a prodigious amount of data and met with and interviewed dozens of representatives of CBP, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), various stakeholders and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). This is our first interim report and recommendations with more to follow in the future. Given the extraordinary importance of maintaining integrity and assuring compliance with use of force policy, the Panel believes that consideration of our recommendations, and action upon them, should not await our final report. Details: Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2015 at: http://soboco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report_FINAL_062915.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://soboco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report_FINAL_062915.pdf Shelf Number: 136026 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityNational SecurityUse of Force |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Reversing a fairly robust record of capturing and imprisoning leaders of Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), the escape of notorious cartel leader Joaquin El Chapo Guzman on July 11, 2015, was a huge setback for the Mexican government already beleaguered by charges of corruption and low approval ratings. Mexico's efforts to combat drug traffickers have touched all of the major organizations that once dominated the illicit drug trade: for example, the February 2014 capture of Guzman who leads Sinaloa, Mexico's largest drug franchise; top leaders of Los Zetas in 2013 and March 2015; the October 2014 arrests of Hector Beltran Leyva of the Beltran Leyva Organization and, later, of Vicente Carrillo Fuentes of the once-dominant Juarez cartel. The DTOs have been in constant flux in recent years. By some accounts, in December 2006 there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured into many more groups. In recent years, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these might be viewed as the traditional DTOs. However, many analysts suggest that those 7 seem to have now fragmented to 9 or as many as 20 major organizations. Several analysts estimate there have been at least 80,000 homicides linked to organized crime since 2006. Few dispute that the annual tally of organized crime-related homicides in Mexico has declined since 2011, although there is disagreement about the rate of decline. It appears that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides during the six-year administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) is likely to trend down far more slowly than it rose. The Mexican government no longer publishes data on organized crime-related homicides. However, the government reported the rate of all homicides in Mexico has declined by 30% since 2012 (roughly 15% in 2013, and another 15% in 2014). Although murder rates have diminished, the incidence of other violent crimes targeting Mexican citizens, such as kidnapping and extortion, has increased through 2013 and stayed elevated. Notably, questions about the accuracy of the government's crime statistics persist. Former President Calderon made his aggressive campaign against the DTOs a defining policy of his government, which the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change that led to significantly greater instability among the groups and continued violence. Since his inauguration in December 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs have fragmented, and new crime groups have emerged. Meanwhile, the DTOs and other criminal gangs furthered their expansion into other illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft, and the organizations now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to governance in Mexico no less threatening to the rule of law than the challenge that faced Pena Nieto's predecessor. According to the Pena Nieto Administration, 93 of the 122 top criminal targets that their government has identified have been arrested or otherwise "neutralized" (killed in arrest efforts) as of May 2015, although Guzman's escape confounds that achievement. Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution through alliances with U.S. gangs. This report provides background on drug trafficking and organized crime inside Mexico: it identifies the major DTOs, and it examines how the organized crime "landscape" has been significantly altered by fragmentation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed July 28, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 136160 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Walther, Olivier J. Title: Mapping and Deterring Violent Extremist Networks in North-West Africa Summary: This article examines the structural and spatial organization of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) across the Sahara. Building on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), a public collection of political violence data for developing states, the article investigates structural connections of VEOs and the effect of borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. Social network analysis reveals that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors, three typical characteristics of negative-tie networks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unquestionably the most connected VEO, which in purely network terms can be seen as a liability. Spatial analysis shows that, while violence was almost exclusively concentrated within Algeria between 1997 and 2004, cross-border movements intensified in the mid-2000s following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali. As of late, VEOs have primarily concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as well as Southern Algeria, whereas Mauritania, Niger and Chad have been relatively unaffected. It follows that deterrence and containment strategies should be devised for regions rather than states. The findings have significant implications for multinational security and stability operations and the need to coordinate transnationally. Details: Sonderborg, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Department of Border Region Studies Working Paper No. 04/15: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Shelf Number: 136293 Keywords: Border SecurityExtremist GroupsSocial NetworksTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Obokata, Tom Title: North-South Irish Responses to Transnational Organised Crime: Research Report of Findings Summary: This project was funded by the Arts & Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for the duration of two years (2012-2014). Its main objective was to critically analyse the extent to which Northern Ireland and Ireland have been successful in implementing effective action against transnational organised crime, including the observance of relevant human rights norms and principles, with particular reference to cross-border co-operation. The core research team consisted of Professor Tom Obokata (Principal Investigator), Dr Brian Payne (Research Fellow), and Professor John Jackson (Consultant). The project was overseen by an advisory board of stakeholders from both jurisdictions, representing agencies such as the Police Service of Northern Ireland, An Garda Siochana, the Department of Justice Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice and Equality in Ireland, the Organised Crime Task Force in Northern Ireland, HM Revenue & Customs, the Committee on the Administration of Justice, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties. They provided advice on the direction of the project and identified relevant stakeholders for in-depth interviews. The research team would like to express its immense gratitude to the members of the advisory board for their support and guidance throughout the research cycle. Before the initiation of the project, the following research questions were identified: - How is organised crime defined in Northern Ireland and Ireland? Do the definitions adopted by both jurisdictions reflect the regional or international standards? If not, why not? - What are the key law enforcement strategies and measures being adopted in these two jurisdictions, including those relating to protection and promotion of human rights? - What provision is there to facilitate cross-border co-operation? - What are the factors affecting the effective prevention and suppression of organised crime? Are these factors common to both jurisdictions or particular to one? - What challenges are posed to the protection of the human rights of those suspected of organised crime and its victims as well as the general public? - Is there a strong link between organised crime and terrorism, particularly in Northern Ireland? Are the law enforcement responses adequate to address this nexus? - In light of the devolution of powers relating to criminal justice and policing in Northern Ireland, what are the key challenges facing authorities from both jurisdictions, particularly in relation to cross-border co-operation? - How are the regional (EU law) and international (UN Convention) standards implemented in practice at the national level? This final report provides answers to these research questions. In order to facilitate maximisation of impact, it also highlights numerous examples of good practice and recommendations for further consideration. Many issues discussed in this report also have wider implications beyond the island of Ireland, and it is hoped that relevant stakeholders and scholars in other jurisdictions find it useful. In relation to research methodologies, the bulk of the research was based on a desktop analysis (literature survey) of relevant national, regional, and international legislation, reports published by governmental and non-governmental organisations, and national/international cases, as well as academic literature on the subject. This desktop work was significantly supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. The research team was granted unprecedented access to key law enforcement agencies, civil society organisations, and the legal profession in both jurisdictions, allowing it to interview over 90 stakeholders. The research team is extremely grateful to everyone who kindly offered his/her time to be interviewed as well as to the advisory board for their assistance in identifying interviewees. This report is divided into several sections. Section 1 starts with an analysis of the legal and nonlegal definitions of organised crime adopted in Northern Ireland and Ireland. Section 2 examines the legislative frameworks relating to three forms of organised crime: human trafficking, drug offences, and fiscal/excise fraud. Section 3 continues with an analysis of law enforcement practice. The major focus was placed upon the use of special investigative techniques which facilitate intelligence-led law enforcement, including surveillance and interception of communications, and provisions for formal and informal cross-border co-operation. In Section 4, issues relating to criminal proceedings and confiscation of criminal proceeds-such as trial without jury, evidential matters, and civil recovery-are explored. Section 5 looks at prevention initiatives implemented by both jurisdictions. Finally, in Section 6, appropriate benchmarks to measure the effectiveness of action against organised crime are proposed. Details: Keele, UK: Arts & Humanities Research Council, Keele University, 2014. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.keele.ac.uk/law/research/researchprojects/respondingtotransnationalorganisedcrimeintheislandofireland/AHRC%20OC%20Project%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.keele.ac.uk/law/research/researchprojects/respondingtotransnationalorganisedcrimeintheislandofireland/AHRC%20OC%20Project%20Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 136347 Keywords: Border SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: Sluyk, Robin Philip Title: Strengthening the Enforcement Capacity of the Serbian Customs Administration Summary: This is the final evaluation report of a project aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Serbian Customs Administration, in further support of harmonisation with methodologies and operational standards of EU enforcement agencies. The project covered training as well as procurement of training tools for Custom Houses in Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad and Kraljevo in the Republic of Serbia. Implementation ran from July 2009 to July 2010. The overall objective of this project was to contribute to enabling the Republic of Serbia to establish open and secure borders through efficient border control and management systems, based on EU best practices. Its project purpose was to provide technical support to build up capacity of the Serbian Customs Administration by institution building in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of border control. The project sought to address this issue via achieving the following results: 1. Establishment of an overall specialised training programme; 2. Improved training programme of the Enforcement Division; 3. Enhanced insight in the specific technical needs of the Custom Units. The project is regarded as successful. Needs assessments were finished in support of the EU project fiche that this project belongs to. Specialist trainers designed and provided a training programme in line with EU standards (e.g. CAFAO), as well with beneficiary needs. Equipment to support training facilities was timely purchased and delivered, and enhanced insight in specific equipment needs was obtained through the preparation of a tender package that was intended to be executed via the donor, the EU Delegation in Belgrade. The weak point of this project was its design and its incidentally conflicting project documents - the EU Action Description and the UNODC Project Document. Baseline data were missing which led to weak indicators at the objective levels. The reporting frequency was rather low which hampered thorough monitoring, which means that some outputs could not always be measured against indicators. The development of 'master trainers' (via ToT) to provide sustainable capacity development should be exploited further. Training Modules were produced however not specifically for this project, rather in line with CAFAO methods. It is unclear to what extent the beneficiary units have adopted it. Additionally, the master trainers have conducted no training yet. Lack of experience may result in low confidence. The quality of training scored high, although a 'notable' number of participants stated not to use the learned material in their work. Survey feedback shows that the score for practical use is high in absolute terms, but on the low side of other scores. This deserves further analysis. Specifications for portal monitors and procurement of special equipment (e.g. night vision adapters, etc.) proved to be problematic. Night vision adapters had to be omitted from the project due to UN Procurement regulations (only eligible firm also dealt with landmine import-export). The tender for portal monitors took a long time to draft. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2011/SRBT82_Final_evaluation_report_30May2011.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2011/SRBT82_Final_evaluation_report_30May2011.pdf Shelf Number: 136378 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityPolice Training |
Author: Newland, Kathleen Title: Irregular Maritime Migration in the Bay of Bengal: The Challenges of Protection, Management, and Cooperation Summary: In recent decades, maritime migration in Asia has become increasingly contentious, as refugees and irregular migrants traversing the region by sea complicate the attempts of governments in the Asia-Pacific region to control their borders, regulate immigration, and fulfill their obligations under international law. In the spring of 2015, irregular maritime migration across the Bay of Bengal to Southeast Asia entered a period of crisis as a wave of migrants and refugees crossed or attempted to cross the Bay of Bengal to reach Southeast Asia. The discovery in April and May 2015 of smuggler camps on both sides of the Thailand-Malaysia border showed the critical dangers that attend the journey. At the center of the migration crisis is the exodus of stateless Muslims from western Myanmar (and in some cases, Bangladesh), mingled with Bangladeshi migrants seeking work opportunities in the wealthier countries of the region. Members of the Muslim minority, known as the Rohingya, have suffered extreme poverty and discrimination since the end of British colonial rule and establishment of the modern state of Myanmar. Communal violence between the Rohingya and Buddhists in Myanmar's Rakhine state flared in 2012, resulting in the flight of Rohingya to neighboring Bangladesh, where at least 200,000 remain. Tens of thousands of others embarked on irregular maritime journeys from Bay of Bengal ports in Myanmar and Bangladesh. This MPI-International Organization for Migration (IOM) Issue in Brief attempts to put the crisis of 2015 into context, providing an overview of the routes and patterns of migration, the development of migration out of Myanmar's Rakhine state over the past few years and how policy responses to it have assigned priority to the protection of migrants and refugees, to the management of the maritime flows and to cooperation on migration with countries in the region and beyond. The brief concludes with several recommendations, and a consideration of what recent history has to teach us about responses to maritime migration crises. Details: Bangkok and Washington, DC: International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue in Brief, Issue No. 13: Accessed August 14, 2015 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/irregular-maritime-migration-bay-bengal-challenges-protection-management-and-cooperation Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/irregular-maritime-migration-bay-bengal-challenges-protection-management-and-cooperation Shelf Number: 136406 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingImmigrantsImmigrationMigrantsMigration EnforcementRefugees |
Author: Slack, Jeremy Title: Border Militarization and Health: Violence, Death and Security in Mexico and the United States Summary: Despite proposed increases in spending on personnel and equipment for border enforcement tied to the amended version of the U.S. Senate's current immigration reform bill, the public health impacts of border militarization are relatively under-examined. We begin to explore these health impacts by drawing on the Migrant Border Crossing Study (MBCS) a new data source based on 1,110 surveys of a random sample of deportees we carried out with a bi-national team in five Mexican border cities and in Mexico City. The violence generated by current border and immigration enforcement practices has led to a humanitarian crisis on the U.S.-Mexico border. We specifically examine the risks and dangers associated with contemporary border crossing experiences, migrant deaths in the desert, abuses committed by U.S. authorities involved in immigration enforcement, and migrants' conditions while in U.S. custody, including access to medical attention. The paper also draws from research with families of migrants in Puebla to expand our understandings of the health impacts of migration that extend beyond people impacted directly by U.S. policies to include their families and return migrants' experiences. We end this paper with suggestions about how to address negative health impacts through policy changes. Details: Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona, Center for Latin American Studies, 2014. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2015 at: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=scott_whiteford Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=scott_whiteford Shelf Number: 136420 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementMigrant Deaths |
Author: U.S. White House Title: Moderning & Streamlining our Legal Immigration System for the 21st Century Summary: On November 20, 2014, President Obama acted within his authority to take executive action to fix our broken immigration system. He announced critical measures that enhance border security; create accountability for certain undocumented individuals; and modernize our legal immigration systems for high-skilled workers, entrepreneurs, students, and families. These steps are enhancing the integrity of our immigration system and national security while contributing to our economy. According to the Council of Economic Advisors, the President's executive actions, if fully implemented, would be expected to boost our nation's gross domestic product (GDP) by between $100 billion and $250 billion, expand the size of the American labor force, and raise average annual wages for U.S.-born workers by 0.4 percent, or $220 in today's dollars, over the next 10 years. The President's actions would also cut the Federal deficit by $30 billion in 2024. As a part of these actions, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum on "Modernizing and Streamlining the U.S. Immigrant Visa System for the 21st Century." In this Memorandum, the President directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead an interagency effort to develop recommendations, in consultation with stakeholders and experts, to: (1) reduce government costs, improve services for applicants, reduce burdens on employers, and combat waste, fraud, and abuse in the system; (2) ensure that policies, practices, and systems use all of the visa numbers that Congress provides for and intends to be used, consistent with demand; and (3) modernize the information technology infrastructure underlying the visa processing system with the goal to reduce redundant systems, improve the experience of applicants, and enable better oversight. The Departments of State (State) and Homeland Security (DHS), working in consultation with the White House and other federal agencies, conducted a thorough review of options to modernize and streamline our legal immigration system within existing authorities. This process included internal assessments of potential agency actions, engagement with external stakeholders, and a public call for comments and suggestions through a Request for Information (RFI) published in the Federal Register on December 30, 2014, that generated approximately 1,650 responses from both individuals and organizations. Several clear themes emerged from this interagency process and stakeholder feedback. Internal and external stakeholders alike emphasized the need to fully utilize technology to improve and streamline the current system for processing visa applications and requests for other immigration benefits. External stakeholder comments also emphasized frustration with burdensome application requirements, long processing times, and a need for greater transparency and accountability in the application and adjudication processes. Some concerns, such as extended waiting times for immigrant visas, reflect statutory constraints that must be addressed through legislative reform of our immigration system. However, many other concerns can be addressed through administrative reforms and greater collaboration within agencies. To that end, this report makes numerous recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: The White House, 2015. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2015 at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/final_visa_modernization_report1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/final_visa_modernization_report1.pdf Shelf Number: 136427 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration EnforcementImmigration Policy |
Author: Hobbing, Peter Title: Customs Cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The role of customs in the management of the EU's external border Summary: This study contrasts the current role of customs at the EU's external borders with the role it was intended to perform according to international standards in border management. There is a considerable imbalance between the involvement of customs and border guards, which impedes the smooth operation of border control and poses security risks for the Union and its citizens, including terrorist attacks. This paper analyses the causes of this imbalance and proposes appropriate solutions that are in line with international standards. Details: Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: CEPS 'Liberty and Security in Europe' Working Paper 39: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://aei.pitt.edu/32072/1/No_39_Hobbing_on_Customs_Cooperation.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://aei.pitt.edu/32072/1/No_39_Hobbing_on_Customs_Cooperation.pdf Shelf Number: 136559 Keywords: Border GuardsBorder SecurityCustomsCustoms Agents |
Author: Bigo, Didier Title: Justice and Home Affairs Databases and a Smart Borders System at EU External Borders An Evaluation of Current and Forthcoming Proposals Summary: This study examines current and forthcoming measures related to the exchange of data and information in EU Justice and Home Affairs policies, with a focus on the 'smart borders' initiative. It argues that there is no reversibility in the growing reliance on such schemes and asks whether current and forthcoming proposals are necessary and original. It outlines the main challenges raised by the proposals, including issues related to the right to data protection, but also to privacy and non-discrimination. Details: Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2012. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 52: Accessed August 25, 2015 at: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%2052%20JHA%20Databases%20Smart%20Borders.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%2052%20JHA%20Databases%20Smart%20Borders.pdf Shelf Number: 136574 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrationInformation SharingOrganized Crime |
Author: Eren, Yunus Title: The Impact of Land Border Security on Terrorism Financing: Turkey's Southeast Land Border and the PKK Summary: Terrorism has become the one of the major threats facing many states. Understanding the potential sources of and preventing the financial support of terrorist organizations takes an important place in countering terrorism. This thesis focuses on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) financing activities through the land border of Turkey. In doing so, this study mainly examines how the Turkish border security system can stop the trans-border financial activities of PKK along its land borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. This thesis also takes the U.S. as a case study in terms of border security measures, and within that framework, makes recommendations for safeguarding Turkey's land borders to prevent financial activities of the PKK terrorist organization without affecting free trade and the economic flow of services. Presently, the Turkish border security system is fragmented and poorly coordinated. Border management is currently split between the army, gendarmerie, police and coast guard. Moreover, international and interdepartmental collaborations are extremely limited. The prevention of cross-border financial activities of the PKK might be accomplished by forming an independent border security agency, adopting modern international standards and the latest technological innovations, and sustaining international and interdepartmental cooperation. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 25, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38924/13Dec_Eren_Yunus.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Turkey URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38924/13Dec_Eren_Yunus.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 136575 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Police Service of Northern Ireland Title: Cross border organised crime assessment 2014 Summary: Cross border cooperation between law enforcement agencies (of Ireland and Northern Ireland) continues to play a key role in our fight against organised crime groups who cause harm to communities on both sides of the border. Organised crime groups often operate on a cross border basis, by disregarding the border or by using it to facilitate criminality. Consequently, it is essential that authorities on both sides of the border cooperate together and with other law enforcement agencies in order to thwart the threat posed by these groups Details: Belfast and Dublin: Department of Justice and Department of Justice and Equality, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/22721/1/cross-border-crime-assessment-final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/22721/1/cross-border-crime-assessment-final.pdf Shelf Number: 136588 Keywords: Border Control Border SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Support to strengthening of immigration control capacity at the international border gates and international cooperation to prevent and control migrant smuggling and human trafficking Summary: This report is the independent final evaluation (FE) of the project "Support to Strengthening of Immigration Control Capacity at the International Border Gates and International Cooperation to Prevent and Control Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking", implemented by the UNODC Office in Ha Noi, Viet Nam (refer nr VNMS79). Implementation commenced in February 2010 with a duration of 3 years and 6 months, with a budget of USD 1,078,540 (both after project revision). In supporting the Government of Viet Nam to combat the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of people, VNMS79 was designed with a focus on building capacities at land-, air- and seaports through the strengthening of law enforcement and immigration methods (e.g. detection of document and passport fraud, information and trend analysis) in order to better identify and investigate cases of trafficking and smuggling. The objective of VNMS79 is defined as 'To strengthen the capacity of immigration control at the border gates and improved skills of investigation, detection and information processing on migrant smuggling and human trafficking in line with the requirements of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its Protocols Against Trafficking of Persons and Smuggling of Migrants'. It is supported by two outcomes: (1) 'Improved capacities at selected border gates to prevent, detect and investigate human trafficking and migrant smuggling', further aided through six outputs, and (2) 'Enhance international cooperation to prevent and control migrant smuggling and trafficking', supported by two outputs. The outputs include delivery of training, supporting equipment and the provision of legal assistance in setting up legal frameworks and cooperation mechanisms. Details: New York: UNODC, 2013. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: VNMS79: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2014/VNMS79_Final_Evaluation_Report_2014.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Vietnam URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2014/VNMS79_Final_Evaluation_Report_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 136613 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingImmigration EnforcementMigrantsOrganized Crime |
Author: International Detention Coalition Title: Does Detention Deter? Summary: This briefing paper reviews the international research literature on the effectiveness of border control policies - particularly immigration detention - in reducing irregular migration. The brief argues that detention is not only ineffective at reducing irregular migration to desired levels, but also weakens other migration management outcomes such as case resolution, departure for refused cases and integration for approved cases. Given these weaknesses, governments would be better placed prioritizing alternatives to detention. The brief further shows policy development and targeted resource allocation could improve the prospects of migrants by increasing avenues for legal migration and improving life chances in countries of origin and transit. The brief shows destination countries must consider big picture, multi-layered responses to address root causes of irregular movement and reduce the pressures on migrants to undertake risky journeys in an irregular manner. Details: Melbourne: International Detention Coalitions, 2015. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://idcoalition.org/detentiondatabase/does-detention-deter/ Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://idcoalition.org/detentiondatabase/does-detention-deter/ Shelf Number: 136615 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementMigrants |
Author: Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu Title: Illegal Immigration and Fiscal Competition Summary: Reflecting recent enforcement policy activism of US states, this paper examines federal-state overlap of illegal immigration policy in a spatial context. Keeping the US-Mexico context in mind, we assume that labor from a source nation enters a host nation through bordering states. Once in the host, illegal immigrants may stay in the state of entry or move to another state. The host nation's federal government and/or the state governments choose border and internal enforcement policies, and also provide local goods. As a benchmark, we define the completely centralized solution as the case where the federal government chooses all the policies, while the state governments are passive. At higher levels of decentralization (i.e., as states take more responsibility in deciding some of the policies), the overlap of federal and state policies is associated with both vertical and horizontal externalities. Among other results, we find that if inter-state mobility is costless, internal enforcement is overprovided, and border enforcement and local goods are under-provided under decentralization, leading to relatively high levels of illegal immigration. While inter-state migration costs moderate such overprovision/under-provision, extreme levels of inter-state immobility may lead to too little illegal immigration, and an overprovision of local goods. Details: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2015. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9061: Accessed October 5, 5015 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9061.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9061.pdf Shelf Number: 136959 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal Immigration |
Author: Pierce, Sarah Title: Unaccompanied Child Migrants in U.S. Communities, Immigration Court, and Schools Summary: More than 102,000 unaccompanied children (UACs) from Central America and Mexico were apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the U.S.-Mexico border between October 1, 2013 and August 31, 2015. The rapid influx of child arrivals in the spring and summer of 2014, which caught the attention of a concerned public and policymakers, briefly overwhelmed the systems in place for processing and caring for these children. While most of the Mexican children are quickly returned to Mexico, under U.S. law children from noncontiguous countries are transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to be processed and simultaneously placed in removal proceedings. The vast majority of these are released by ORR into the custody of a parent, relative, or friend in the United States while they wait for their cases to progress through the immigration court system. This issue brief summarizes the available data and qualitative research on where unaccompanied child migrants are being placed, how they are faring in immigration court, what types of services are available to them, and how communities, in particular schools, are adapting to their arrival. Even though a priority docket was created in the immigration courts system for unaccompanied minors, their cases continue to lag. Even when their cases are finally heard, the immigration court system has resolved the status for relatively few of them: a review of the data shows that while 70 percent of those who show up for their hearings receive some form of immigration relief, 97 percent do not receive a simultaneous grant of immigration status - meaning they remain unauthorized. Meanwhile, most removal orders go to children who fail to attend their hearings, and as a result many orders of removal go unexecuted. As these cases make their way through the courts, the children become further engrained in communities and school districts across the country. The brief finds that communities and school districts largely continue to face challenges meeting the needs of these children and have responded in disparate ways to their arrival, some creating additional programs to address children's particular needs, while others have made school enrollment more difficult for this population. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: MPI Issue Brief: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migrants-us-communities-immigration-court-and-schools Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migrants-us-communities-immigration-court-and-schools Shelf Number: 136993 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingImmigrant ChildrenImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicyUnaccompanied ChildrenUndocumented Children |
Author: Amnesty International Title: By Hook or By Crook: Australia's Abuse of Asylum-Seekers at Sea Summary: Operation Sovereign Borders is Australia's military-led border control operation. In operations called turn-backs, Australian officials intercept boats of asylum-seekers and prevent them from landing in Australia. This report examines the legality and human rights impact of Operation Sovereign Border turn-backs, based on testimonies from people who had been on board boats that Australian officials intercepted between 2013 and 2015. Details: London: Amnesty International, 2015. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 6, 2015 at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA12/2576/2015/en/ Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA12/2576/2015/en/ Shelf Number: 137204 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityHuman Rights Abuses |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Increased Enforcement at Mexico's Southern Border: An Update on Security, Migration, and U.S. Assistance Summary: Key Findings - Far from deterring migrants from making the journey north, the most notable effect of Mexico's migration crackdown has been changes in how migrants are traveling. With decreased possibilities of boarding the train in Chiapas, migrants and smugglers are now relying on different and dangerous routes and modes of transportation, including by foot, vehicle, and boat. These routes expose migrants to new vulnerabilities while simultaneously isolating them from the network of shelters established along traditional routes. - Raids and operations to prevent migrants from riding atop cargo trains, known collectively as La Bestia, have been the most visible and aggressive enforcement efforts under the Southern Border Program. Migration authorities have blocked migrants from boarding trains, pulled migrants off of trains, and raided establishments that migrants are known to frequent, detaining thousands. The train operations have prompted concerns about excessive use-of-force and other abuses by the authorities involved. - U.S. assistance to help Mexico secure its southern border region has increased, though there is limited transparency regarding dollar values, recipient units, equipment, and training. Additionally, some of the U.S.- donated equipment at Mexico's southern border has seen little use and was reported to be ill-suited for the terrain in this region. For example, U.S.-donated observation towers serve little purpose at the densely forested Mexico-Guatemala border. U.S.-donated biometric data equipment was also observed to be in disuse or only used sporadically. - The Southern Border Program brought an increase in mobile checkpoints, and new customs facilities have opened since its launch. Beyond these, there has been little change in the number of roadside checkpoints present on main highways in Chiapas. We observed no new checkpoints on the Pacific coast between Tapachula and Arriaga. The most notable difference is the INM's use of volantas, or mobile checkpoints, which frequently change geographic position, ensnaring unaware migrants and smugglers. The large multi-agency customs checkpoints (Centros de Atencion Integral de Transito Fronterizo, CAITFs) are not a product of the Southern Border Program but have become a key component of the region's border security strategy. Three of these facilities in Huixtla, La Trinitaria, and Playas de Catazaja, Chiapas are already in operation; construction is underway on an additional center in Chiapas and one in Tabasco. - Between July 2014 and June 2015, the Mexican government's apprehensions of Central American migrants increased by 71 percent over the same period in the previous year, before the July 2014 launch of its Southern Border Program. The Southern Border Program modestly increased the presence of immigration agents and security forces, including from Mexico's National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migracion, INM), Federal Police, and Gendarmeria, a new division of the Federal Police. On the train lines, companies have begun to employ more private security personnel to monitor the cars and tracks. - Increased apprehension and rapid deportation of migrants has not coincided with increased capacity to screen migrants for protection concerns. Rather than viewing this heavy movement of people as a refugee and protection crisis, the Mexican government sees this as an issue of managing large flows of people. Mexican law recognizes a broad definition of "refugee" under which a significant number of Central Americans fleeing violence could qualify; however, few request protection and few receive it. Mexico only granted refugee status in approximately 21 percent of requests in 2014 and during the first seven months of 2015. The lack of awareness or understanding of the right to solicit asylum, the prolonged stay in grim detention center conditions while asylum requests are processed, lack of legal representation, and the shortage of protection officers authorized to make determinations are among the reasons why so few refugees are recognized in Mexico. - Mexico's stepped-up migrant apprehensions reduced the sense of urgency in the United States to support addressing the "root causes" of Central American migration, namely the high levels of violence and poverty, and the lack of opportunity. With fewer migrants arriving at the U.S. border, legislators have delayed or scaled back badly needed reforms or assistance. Whereas Mexico apprehended 67 percent more unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras from October 2014 to September 2015 compared to the same period in the previous year, U.S. authorities apprehended 45 percent fewer over this period. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/WOLA%20Report_Increased%20Enforcement%20at%20Mexico%E2%80%99s%20Southern%20Border_Nov%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/WOLA%20Report_Increased%20Enforcement%20at%20Mexico%E2%80%99s%20Southern%20Border_Nov%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 137237 Keywords: Border EnforcementBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigration EnforcementMigrants |
Author: Coyne, John Title: Securing the Australian Frontier: An agenda for border security policy Summary: This report explores the key border security concepts and emergent policy challenges that will impact on Australia's border security policy. Effective border security allows for the seamless legitimate movement of people and goods across Australia's borders, which is critical to enhancing trade, travel and migration. The provision of border security involves far more than creating a capability focused solely on keeping our borders secure from potential terrorists, irregular migrants and illicit contraband. Border security policy deals with a unique operating space, in which extraordinary measures (extraordinary in character, amount, extent or degree) are often needed to provide a sense of security at the same time as creating the sense of normalcy that will allow economic interactions to flourish. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Stategic Policy Institute, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 12, 2015 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/securing-the-australian-frontier-an-agenda-for-border-security-policy/SR83_ASPI_Border_security_agenda.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/securing-the-australian-frontier-an-agenda-for-border-security-policy/SR83_ASPI_Border_security_agenda.pdf Shelf Number: 137275 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllicit GoodsIrregular MigrantsTerrorists |
Author: Lopez, James R. Title: Body Cameras and CBP: Promoting Security, Transparency and Accountability at out Nation's Borders Summary: Body Cameras and CBP: Promoting Security, Transparency and Accountability at our Nation's Borders debuts in advance of an expected CBP announcement on the feasibility and implementation of body cameras. The report examines the benefits of requiring body-worn cameras for all CBP agents and officers, as well as the privacy concerns for the public and for the agency related to implementing body cameras. After conducting a feasibility study in early 2015, CBP has been slow to move forward with implementation of body-worn cameras. For an agency in which more than 2,000 incidents of misconduct were reported over a seven-year period, implementation of body-worn cameras across CBP would be a significant step toward repairing the agency's image. Details: Washington, DC: National Immigration Forum, 2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Body-Cameras-and-CBP-Report-11062015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Body-Cameras-and-CBP-Report-11062015.pdf Shelf Number: 137768 Keywords: Body-Worn Cameras Border GuardsBorder SecurityPolice Accountability Police Policies and Practices Police Technology |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Country Office Pakistan Title: The Socio-Economic Impact of Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling in Pakistan Summary: Pakistan's population as of July 2011 is estimated at 187.3 million, with an annual estimated growth rate of 1.5 per cent, comprising 52 per cent male and 48 per cent female with more than 50 per cent being youth between 15 and 29 years of age. Pakistan is bordered by Afghanistan and Iran in the west, India in the east and China in the far northeast, with sea borders to the south. It is a federation of four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), a capital territory (Islamabad), and two semi-autonomous regions (FATA and Gilgit-Baltistan), and the Pakistan administered portion of Kashmir. Pakistan has faced numerous economic, social and security challenges since 2007, commencement point of this research. These combined factors are matter of an acute concern for the law enforcement agencies provide the ideal environment for transnational organised crime networks to flourish and exploit weaknesses in the system. The impact is not limited solely to the human costs relating to the extreme suffering and dehumanization of the individuals who are trafficked but also poses serious governance risk within the wider region. This has a direct detrimental effect on the state structures arrayed against corruption and organized crime. It also poses a threat to the economic development of the country. Pakistan is a source, transit and a destination country for human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The problem manifests itself within the country and across borders. In Pakistan, Sindh and Punjab remain a source of concern with high instances of bonded labour in agriculture, brick making and other industries. In response to migrant smuggling and human trafficking issues, the Government of Pakistan has taken important steps in developing strategies to combat these crimes and protect the rights of victims. In 2002, the Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance (PACHTO) was enacted. This was followed by the development of a National Action Plan for Combating Human Trafficking, as well as establishment of Anti-Human Trafficking Units (AHTUs) and Circles under the jurisdiction of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). Details: Islamabad: UNODC - Pakistan, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 17, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/pakistan/The_Socio-economic_impact_of_human_trafficking_and_migrant_smuggling_in_Pakistan_19_Feb_2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/pakistan/The_Socio-economic_impact_of_human_trafficking_and_migrant_smuggling_in_Pakistan_19_Feb_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137312 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal MigrantsMigrantsSocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Knippen, Jose Title: An Uncertain Path: Justice for Crimes and Human Rights Violations against Migrants and Refugees in Mexico Summary: In the report An Uncertain Path: Justice for Crimes and Human Rights Violations against Migrants and Refugees in Mexico released today, participating organizations explain how the Southern Border Program has significantly increased migration enforcement operations, apprehensions, and deportations of migrants. This stepped-up enforcement has led to an increase in human rights violations against migrants. These migration operations are increasingly conducted in conjunction with Mexican security forces, and migrant shelters have documented kidnappings, extortions, robberies, and abuses throughout the country. Given that Mexico's National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migracion, INM) has been the primary agency responsible for carrying out the Southern Border Program, it is clear that, far from a development program, the strategy is focused on migration enforcement actions. The report finds that in 2014, the year the Southern Border Program was announced, the INM spent the largest budget in its history, and that this increase goes hand in hand with the increase in migrant apprehensions. For its part, the United States government has provided political and financial support to the Mexican government for migration enforcement, especially following the 2014 "surge" of migrants, mostly unaccompanied children and families from Central America that arrived at the U.S. southwest border. In July 2014, it was revealed that the State Department was working with the Mexican government on enforcement at its southern border, providing some US$86 million in funds already included in the Merida Initiative, a multi-year U.S. security aid package to Mexico. Furthermore, Congress allocated up to US$79 million in additional funds in fiscal year 2015 for this same purpose. The report demonstrates how the Mexican government's efforts to strengthen protections for migrants have fallen far short of their actual needs. There is no evidence that migrants who are victims of crimes and human rights violations have effective access to justice, despite the creation of new specialized prosecutors for attention to migrants. There is a lack of conclusive data regarding justice for migrants in Mexico. The most detailed data are from the specialized prosecutor's office in Oaxaca, which reports that of the 383 complaints received over four years, only 96 resulted in a preliminary investigation being opened and only four resulted in sentences for the perpetrators. Although the National Human Rights Commission (Comisioin Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) and state-level human rights commissions are more approachable for demanding justice, the report finds that their "procedures and investigative capacities are not particularly expeditious or effective." The report reveals that of the 1,617 complaints of human rights violations against migrants that the CNDH received from December 1, 2012 to June 15, 2015, only four resulted in a formal recommendation issued to the institution implicated in the complaint. The report also discusses why there are so many potential refugees in Mexico and so few recognized refugees. It stresses that the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (Comision Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR), only has 15 protection officers in the entire country to ensure access to international protection for the more than 100,000 migrants that are detained over the period of a year. Moreover, COMAR's budget did not increase in real terms from 2014 to 2015. Given this context, An Uncertain Path: Justice for Crimes and Human Rights Violations against Migrants and Refugees in Mexico, provides concrete recommendations to the relevant governmental agencies within the Mexican government, including the INM, the Ministry of the Interior, and the federal Attorney General's office, as well as to the United States government. The report is the result of a close collaboration between the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Fundar, Centro de Analisis e Investigacion, and seven shelters and organizations that work to defend migrant rights in five areas of Mexico: Casa del Migrante "Frontera con Justicia," AC in Saltillo, Coahuila; the "Red Sonora" (a network composed of three organizations in Sonora: Kino Border Initiative in Nogales, Centro de Recursos para Migrantes in Agua Prieta y Centro Comunitario de Atencion al Migrante y Necesitado, or CCAMYN, in Altar); Albergue de Migrantes "Hermanos en el Camino" in Ixtepec, Oaxaca; La 72, Hogar - Refugio para Personas Migrantes in Tenosique, Tabasco; and Un Mundo, Una Nacion in Apizaco, Tlaxcala Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2015. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/An%20Uncertain%20Path_Nov2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/An%20Uncertain%20Path_Nov2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137321 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Rights AbusesImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration EnforcementMigrantsRefugees |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Flight Capital and Illicit Financial Flows to and from Myanmar: 1960-2013 Summary: Myanmar is the most porous economy we have studied in depth. Long isolation, trade restrictions, and attempts to regulate currency exchange rates have combined to drive a substantial part of the economy underground. Totaling the flight capital numbers indicates that Myanmar has experienced largely unregulated financial movements of nearly US$120 billion over the period (a small portion of flight capital may be licit), while total illicit flows amounted to almost US$100 billion. In 2013 alone, unregulated financial inflows totaled some US$10 billion, over 20 percent of GDP. Purely illicit inflows were on a similar scale in that year, at 17 percent of GDP. And these numbers do not include the smuggling of drugs, timber, precious stones, and other goods, transported across various routes and mountain passes to and from India and China, as indicated by a brief selection of satellite images included in the pages following. Interestingly, the greater part of what we can analyze as illicit flows have been inward, in reaction to import controls and to escape import levies. Undervalued and smuggled imports have sustained the weakened economy through years of insularity, isolation, and instability. Tax collection to GDP at seven percent is one of the lowest in the world, undermining the ability of the state to provide adequate health and education services. Corruption, according to Transparency International's Perceptions Index, places Myanmar among the bottom 20 in the world. These are extremely serious challenges for a nation just beginning, haltingly, to emerge from its shadows. Within our focus on financial transparency concerns, we recommend that Myanmar 1) make concerted efforts to adopt and enforce Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing regulations, 2) provide its Customs Department with real-time world market trade pricing data, 3) greatly improve its statistical capabilities, and 4) enhance border security and curtailment of smuggling. For this the nation will need sustained external financial and technical assistance for years to come. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Burma URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Shelf Number: 137330 Keywords: Border SecurityFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingSmugglingTax EvasionTerrorist Financing |
Author: Title: Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing Summary: Streamline is an initiative to criminally prosecute individuals who illegally enter the United States through defined geographic regions along the Southwest border. We reviewed: (1) whether Border Patrol measures Streamline' effect on illegal re-entry; (2) whether the cost of Streamline can be determined; and (3) how Streamline affects U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations' (ER)) resources. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: OIG-15-95: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-95_May15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-95_May15.pdf Shelf Number: 137459 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementOperation Streamline |
Author: Cantor, Guillermo Title: Hieleras (Iceboxes) in the Rio Grande Valley Sector: Lengthy Detention, Deplorable Conditions, and Abuse in CBP Holding Cells Summary: Each year, the Border Patrol-a division of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) - holds hundreds of thousands of individuals in detention facilities near the U.S. southern border. These facilities are not designed for overnight custody, and yet they are routinely used in this way. Until recently, CBP policy was clear that these facilities were to serve exclusively as short-term holding cells-meaning that a person should be held there less than 12 hours. Evidence presented in this report, which pertains to Border Patrol holding cells in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) Sector, reveals that, instead, individuals are routinely held for days. In October 2015, CBP updated its guidance on how long it may detain individuals. The new guidance states that "short-term" detention generally should last no longer than 72 hours. Notably, however, no structural changes have been made to the facilities. These facilities, which are often referred to as "hieleras" (Spanish for "freezers" or "iceboxes"), remain wholly inadequate for any overnight detention. Moreover, the conditions are reprehensible, even with respect to truly short-term detention. In addition to the fact that there are no beds in the holding cells, these facilities are extremely cold, frequently overcrowded, and routinely lacking in adequate food, water, and medical care. Recent accounts from families held in short-term facilities also demonstrate that Border Patrol officers harass and ridicule individuals in their custody and separate mothers from their minor children. This report focuses on two aspects of detention in CBP facilities in RGV. First, based on never-before-released government data and documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it examines length of detention. Second, analyzing new survey data from the Binational Defense and Advocacy Program (in Spanish, Programa de Defensa e Incidencia Binacional, or PDIB), as well as declarations from a sample of women who were recently detained in RGV facilities, it sheds light on the conditions of detention that are prevalent in Border Patrol holding cells in the RGV sector. Government data show that during the months of August, September, October, and December of 2013, on average, 1173 individuals were detained in RGV facilities at any given time. Also, on average, 212 individuals were held in custody for over 72 hours at any given time. The share of individuals detained for over 72 hours ranged from 2.3 percent of all detainees at its lowest point to 42.5 percent at its peak. A significant number of individuals were held in detention even after their CBP "processing" was completed - meaning that these individuals were ready to be released or transferred to another federal agency. These data reveal that the Border Patrol regularly uses holding cells to detain people for prolonged periods, forcing men, women, and children to sleep on concrete floors and hard benches in holding cells that have no beds and are not equipped for sleeping. Additionally, our analysis of the PDIB survey data collected between June and November 2015 reveals that previously reported issues such as extreme temperatures, overcrowding, and inadequate food are routine. Three out of every four individuals detained in the RGV sectors reported having been exposed to extremely cold temperatures. Everyone who was held in detention in the RGV sector agreed that there was not enough space in the holding cell to lie down, and all but one indicated that there was not enough space for people to sit down. Almost all of the interviewees who were detained in RGV asserted that the food they received while detained was insufficient. In an effort to better illustrate the conditions individuals experience while in detention, the report also analyzes personal accounts of women who were held in CBP facilities in the Border Patrol RGV Sector. These accounts, shared by women who were held in Border Patrol cells in October or November 2015, reveal the markedly dehumanizing conditions to which these women were subjected while in Border Patrol custody. Recurring themes include overcrowding, separation of mothers from their children, inadequate access to medication and/or medical care, extreme temperature, lack of access to showers, food insufficiency, and sleep deprivation. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/hieleras_iceboxes_in_the_rio_grande_valley_sector.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/hieleras_iceboxes_in_the_rio_grande_valley_sector.pdf Shelf Number: 137460 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain Summary: Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report (GAO-09-709) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-223: Accessed January 12, 2016 at: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137468 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingHomeland SecurityTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137746 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityExtremistsHomeland SecurityRadicalsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Rosenblum, Marc R. Title: Trends in Unaccompanied Child and Family Migration from Central America Summary: After reaching record high levels during the spring and summer of 2014, the flow of Central American unaccompanied children (UACs) and families arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border declined sharply. Data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) show a resurgence in the numbers of child migrants and families from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arriving in the United States in the summer and fall of 2015. What caused the sharp drop in Central American child and family migration flows in summer 2014, and why have the numbers begun to climb once again? Undoubtedly, numerous factors contributed to the downturn. The United States intensified its enforcement efforts at the U.S.-Mexico border, detained large numbers of Central American women and children, targeted more resources to investigate and prosecute migrant smugglers, and worked with the Northern Triangle countries on a public information campaign to discourage outflows. Perhaps most importantly, Mexico significantly stepped up its enforcement, with the advent of the Southern Border Program. Guatemala and Honduras also took additional steps to secure their common borders and Guatemala's border with Mexico; and the three Northern Triangle countries announced a large-scale development strategy known as the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity. While the drop in child migration and family arrivals in 2014 led some to believe the regional migration crisis had been resolved, rising flows in 2015 offer a reminder that humanitarian and migration pressures in the Northern Triangle remain a major concern, and that smuggling networks play a significant role. This fact sheet examines influencing factors on the recent trends in unaccompanied child and family arrivals from Central America to the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as Mexico's role in enforcement. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Fact Sheet: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trends-unaccompanied-child-and-family-migration-central-america Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trends-unaccompanied-child-and-family-migration-central-america Shelf Number: 137790 Keywords: Border Law EnforcementBorder SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrationUnaccompanied Children |
Author: Argueta, Carla N. Title: Border Security Metrics Between Ports of Entry Summary: Understanding the risks present at the U.S. borders and developing methods to measure border security are key challenges for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Border Patrol, the agency within DHS charged with securing the border between ports of entry. Metrics for border security are used at both the strategic level, by DHS, and at the operational level by Customs and Border Protection (Border Patrol). This report reviews DHS's and the Border Patrol's use of metrics in evaluating their objective to secure the border between ports of entry. DHS and the Border Patrol can use metrics to measure their performance and estimate risks at the border. Additionally, metrics provide Congress with an understanding of DHS's and Border Patrol's progress in securing the border. At a strategic level, DHS uses performance metrics to understand its ability to meet border security objectives. However, DHS has struggled to create a comprehensive measure of border security. Most recently, DHS has labored to create a new generation of performance metrics, through the estimation of unauthorized entry of migrants into the United States. This measure represents the volume of migration entering the United States and can be influenced by factors outside of DHS's control, and therefore may not directly speak on border security. Congress may want to consider whether this is an adequate performance metric for border security and whether additional and/or more comprehensive and targeted metrics are required. DHS's Annual Performance Report for FY2014-FY2016 reported two other performance metrics used to measure its progress in securing the border. First, the percentage of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border, or the recidivism rate, is used to capture the ability of the Border Patrol to deter migrants from re-entering the United States. Second, the rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest border between ports of entry, or the effectiveness rate, measures the Border Patrol's ability to apprehend unauthorized migrants. In the past, DHS has used several different performance metrics. For example, from 2001 to 2004, DHS, and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), used optimum deterrence as a measure for border security, defining it as the level where applying more border security would not significantly increase apprehensions or deterrence. In 2005, DHS began to use operational control as a new measure, describing it as the miles along the border where the Border Patrol had the ability to detect, identify, respond to, and interdict cross-border unauthorized activity. When operational control was retired as a metric, migrant apprehensions became the interim measure for border security from 2011 to 2013. At an operational level, the Border Patrol uses metrics within its risk assessments At an operational level, the Border Patrol uses metrics within its risk assessments. The estimation of risk at the sector level assists the Border Patrol in making day-to-day decisions with regard to how to best align its resources against different threats. The agency determines risk through its "State of the Border Risk Methodology." A secured border is characterized as low risk. The Border Patrol's methodology estimates the magnitude of risk by gathering and understanding intelligence information, developing a detailed awareness of threats at the border, and applying a standardized measurement of risk. These assessments are not used as metrics themselves. However, the Border Patrol's methodology monitors certain metrics at the sector level, such as the recidivist rate and effectiveness rate, which may be able to speak to the Border Patrol's performance. Metrics can provide an understanding of the state of the border. In reviewing border security metrics, Congress may be interested in issues surrounding the oversight of DHS's measurement practices, the determination of acceptable levels of risk for each metric, and the implementation of strategic and operational metrics and how they relate to one another. Moreover, Congress may consider how metrics can be used to inform decisions on expenditures and whether additional data and methodologies are needed to provide a more holistic view of border issues. Lastly, with migrant demographics shifting and some transit countries conducting their own enforcement of unauthorized migration, Congress may consider how these practices affect data and outcomes and what can be done to account for these changes. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44386.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44386.pdf Shelf Number: 137930 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigration PolicyMigrants |
Author: Carper, Thomas R. Title: Stronger Neighbors - Stronger Borders: Addressing the Root Causes of Illegal Migration from Central America Summary: Given the increasingly dangerous world in which we live today, there is broad agreement among Americans that secure borders are more important than ever. In response to those concerns, our country has spent nearly $250 billion over the past decade to make our southern border with Mexico more secure. We've built over 600 miles of fencing. We've doubled the number of Border Patrol agents to more than 21,000. And we've deployed technology such as drones, helicopters, sophisticated surveillance systems, and ground sensors. But all of these security enhancements along our borders could not hold back the waves of tens of thousands of unaccompanied children and families who arrived at our southern border in 2014, mostly into Texas. Significant flows continue even today. The overwhelming majority of these migrants are coming -not from Mexico -but from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, three Central American countries collectively known as the Northern Triangle. For the most part, the children and families aren't evading Border Patrol agents. They are surrendering and asking for help. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://www.carper.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0d5438ad-7cfb-4afe-be3f-f94a01546f6a/stronger-neighbors---stronger-borders.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.carper.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0d5438ad-7cfb-4afe-be3f-f94a01546f6a/stronger-neighbors---stronger-borders.pdf Shelf Number: 138111 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementMigrants |
Author: Papworth, Tom Title: Harnessing Entrepreneurship to Secure Britain's Borders: The Case for Privatising the Passport and Immigration Functions of UK Border Force Summary: - The UK border is becoming increasingly busy. In 2014-15 118 million passengers entered the UK; air passengers are expected to double by 2050. - UK Border Force (UKBF) is already under strain due to its workload doubling since it has been ordered to undertake exit checks for all people leaving the country. - UKBF has not performed well recently, and its ability to meet these new challenges is questionable. Poorly managed, understaffed, and struggling with outdated and unreliable IT systems and infrastructure, UKBF is failing to secure the UK's borders. - Currently, most of the 90,000 general aviation flights a year entering the UK are not met by UKBF. The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration has criticised weak risk assessment and rising numbers of missed passengers. According to a 2013 PAC report, the Border Force missed eight out of 19 seizure and detection targets, six of which were missed by over 10%. Unless UKBF improves productivity, it will require a $1 billion/year increase in its budget (in 2015 pounds) to keep up with its workload. - The Government's most recent attempt to digitise border security failed catastrophically, with Raytheon, the official partner, suing the Home Office - who eventually settled out of court at a cost of potentially over $1 billion to the taxpayer. - According to the Major Projects Authority, the Digital Services at the Border programme is still facing "major risks or issues" such that "successful delivery is in doubt". - The efficient operation of the UK's borders is a core responsibility of the state, but the Home Office and UKBF have struggled to meet that requirement. UKBF and its predecessors have underperformed both as part of an arms-length agency and as an in-house directorate. - The potential cost savings from contracting out the IT and non-law enforcement operations needed to secure the border are the only way border control can be made both effective and affordable for the future. The Government should therefore contract out the border control functions of UKBF and transfer all staff to a new private sector contractor. Details: London: Center for Policy Studies, 2016. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Pointmaker: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/160223111848-HarnessingEntrepreneurship.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/160223111848-HarnessingEntrepreneurship.pdf Shelf Number: 138126 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigration Law EnforcementPrivatization |
Author: Hiskey, Jonathan Title: Understanding the Central American Refugee Crisis: Why They are Fleeing and How U.S. Policies are Failing to Deter Them Summary: In the spring and summer of 2014, tens of thousands of women and unaccompanied children from Central America journeyed to the United States seeking asylum. The increase of asylum-seekers, primarily from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala - the countries making up the "Northern Triangle" region - was characterized by President Obama as a "humanitarian crisis." The situation garnered widespread congressional and media attention, much of it speculating about the cause of the increase and suggesting U.S. responses. The increase of Central Americans presenting themselves at the United States' southwest border seeking asylum, President Obama and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), specifically, implemented an "aggressive deterrence strategy." A media campaign was launched in Central America highlighting the risks involved with migration and the consequences of illegal immigration. DHS also dramatically increased the detention of women and children awaiting their asylum hearings, rather than release on bond. Finally, the U.S. government publicly supported increased immigration enforcement measures central to the Mexican government's Southern Border Program that was launched in July of 2014. Together, these policies functioned to "send a message" to Central Americans that the trip to the United States was not worth the risk, and they would be better off staying put. Yet the underlying assumption that greater knowledge of migration dangers would effectively deter Central Americans from trying to cross the U.S. border remains largely untested. This report aims to investigate this assumption and answer two related questions: "What motivates Central Americans to consider migration?" and "What did Central Americans know about the risks involved in migrating to the United States in August 2014?" An analysis of data from a survey of Northern Triangle residents conducted in the spring of 2014 by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) reveals that respondents were more likely to have intentions to migrate if they had been victims of one or more crimes in the previous year. In a separate LAPOP survey of residents of selected municipalities across Honduras, carried out in late July and early August of 2014, we find that a substantial majority of respondents were also well aware of the dangers involved in migration to the United States, including the increased chances of deportation. This widespread awareness among Hondurans of the U.S. immigration climate in the summer of 2014, however, did not have any significant effect on whether or not they intended to migrate. In sum, though the U.S. media campaigns may have convinced - or reminded - Hondurans, and perhaps their Salvadoran and Guatemalan counterparts, that migration to the United States is dangerous and unlikely to be successful, this knowledge did not seem to play a role in the decision calculus of those considering migration. Rather, we have strong evidence from the surveys in Honduras and El Salvador in particular that one's direct experience with crime emerges as a critical predictor of one's emigration intentions. What these findings suggest is that crime victims are unlikely to be deterred by the Administration's efforts. Further, we may infer from this analysis of migration intentions that those individuals who do decide to migrate and successfully arrive at the U.S. border are far more likely to fit the profile of refugees than that of economic migrants. Upon arrival, however, they are still subject to the "send a message" policies and practices that are designed to deter others rather than identify and ensure the protection of those fleeing war-like levels of violence. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2016 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/understanding_the_central_american_refugee_crisis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/understanding_the_central_american_refugee_crisis.pdf Shelf Number: 138142 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicyRefugees |
Author: Kandel, William A. Title: U.S. Immigration Policy: Chart Book of Key Trends Summary: This report is a chart book of selected immigration trends. Key immigration issues that Congress has considered in recent years include increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, reforms to the system for legal temporary and permanent immigration, and options to address the millions of unauthorized aliens residing in the country. The report offers snapshots of time series data, using the most complete and consistent time series currently available for each statistic. The key findings and elements germane to the data depicted are summarized with the figures. The summary offers the highlights of key immigration trends. The United States has a history of receiving immigrants, and these foreign-born residents of the United States have come from all over the world. - Immigration to the United States today has reached annual levels comparable to the early years of the 20th century. - Immigration over the last few decades of the 20th century was not as dominated by three or four countries as it was earlier in the century, and this pattern has continued into the 21st century. - The absolute number of foreign-born residents in the United States is at its highest level in U.S. history, reaching 42.4 million in 2014. - Foreign-born residents of the United States made up 13.3% of the U.S. population in 2014, approaching levels not seen since the proportion of foreign-born residents reached 14.8% in 1910. Legal immigration encompasses permanent immigrant admissions (e.g., employment-based or family-based immigrants) and temporary nonimmigrant admissions (e.g., guest workers, foreign students). The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) contains the provisions detailing the requirements for admission (permanent and temporary) of foreign nationals and the eligibility rules for foreign nationals to become U.S. citizens. - In FY2013, about 991,000 aliens became U.S. legal permanent residents (LPRs). Of this total, 65% entered on the basis of family ties. - The pool of people potentially eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically exceeds the worldwide level set by the INA. - Most of the 4.6 million approved petitions pending at the close of FY2015 were for family members of U.S. citizens. - After falling from 7.6 million in FY2001 to 5.0 million in FY2004, temporary visa issuances reached 9.9 million in FY2014. - Generally, all of the temporary employment-based visa categories have increased since FY1994. Although there was a dip during the recent recession, the number of employment-based temporary visas increased each year between FY2010 and FY2014. Immigration control encompasses an array of enforcement tools, policies, and practices to secure the border and to prevent and investigate violations of immigration laws. The INA specifies the grounds for exclusion and removal of foreign nationals as well as the documentary and entry-exit controls for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: CSR R42988: Accessed March 21, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42988.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42988.pdf Shelf Number: 138351 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Bohn, Sarah Title: U.S. Border Enforcement and Mexican Immigrant Location Choice Summary: We provide the first evidence on the causal effect of border enforcement on the full spatial distribution of Mexican immigrants to the United States. We address the endogeneity of border enforcement with an instrumental variables strategy based on administrative delays in budgetary allocations for border security. We find that 1,000 additional border patrol officers assigned to prevent unauthorized migrants from entering a state decreases that state's share of Mexican immigrants by 21.9%. Our estimates imply that border enforcement alone accounted for declines in the share of Mexican immigrants locating in California and Texas of 11 and 6 percentage points, respectively, over the period 1994-2011, with all other states experiencing gains or no change. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2013. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7842: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7842.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7842.pdf Shelf Number: 138573 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementUnauthorized Immigration |
Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCybercrimeData ProtectionDrug TraffickingExtremist GroupsInformation SharingMoney LaunderingPartnershipsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: A European Border and Coast Guard: What's in a Name? Summary: This paper assesses the Commission's proposal presented in December 2015 to set up a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), based on the responses made by the EU border agency Frontex to the "refugee crisis" that began in 2015 and continues unabated. It explores the extent to which this proposed new body will be capable of remedying the EU's shortcomings in meeting established border and asylum standards and related institutional needs on the ground and concludes that it is unlikely to do so. The paper argues that the EBCG proposal does not establish a true European Border and Coast Guard. Instead it would revamp Frontex into a Frontex Agency. The EBCG would expand the current logic of national border guards to be committed to the Frontex Agency 'pools' and therefore does not solve the 'dependency' of Frontex on member states. More importantly, the EBCG would do too little to ensure that member states comply with EU border and asylum standards, which has constituted the central deficiency throughout 2015 and earlier. We find that it will also fall short of establishing a professional culture in border control cooperation to be shared across the Union. Revamping and relabelling Frontex will create expectations that will be difficult to fulfil if compliance with EU border, reception, and asylum standards remains weak on the ground. The paper calls on the EU to give higher priority to policies dealing with the structural compliance with EU border and asylum standards by all member states, moving beyond the EU Dublin system and including an enlarged role for the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Details: Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2016. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe : Accessed April 11, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745230 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745230 Shelf Number: 138628 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder ControlBorder Security |
Author: Katwala, Sunder Title: Engaging the Anxious Middle on Immigration Reform: Evidence from the UK Debate Summary: The United Kingdom is often presented as having particularly hostile attitudes toward immigration compared to other countries. Momentum generated by those who are firmly opposed to current immigration levels was a major factor behind the call for a June 2016 referendum on UK membership in the European Union, and has also played a role in tough migration policies put forward by the coalition and Conservative governments. Certainly, immigration is an increasingly salient issue in UK politics and surveys indicate that public trust in the government's ability to manage inflows has fallen to abject levels. Immigration emerged as a key political issue in the late 1990s, and from 2013 onwards politics "caught up" with public views, as parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) rose to prominence campaigning on a populist, anti-immigration platform. However, the authors of this report make the case that polls reveal far more nuanced public attitudes towards immigration and immigrants than commonly depicted in the media and political discourse. Though there are substantial minorities of strong opinion for and against immigration, most people fall into the "anxious middle." They are skeptical about the government's handling of immigration and worried about the effects of immigration on society and the economy, but are not hostile toward immigrants themselves, especially skilled ones who can contribute to the economy. This Transatlantic Council on Migration report analyzes polling data in an attempt to paint a more accurate picture of public opinion on immigration - focusing on the concerns of the anxious middle. It examines several drivers of public opinion in the United Kingdom, including media coverage of immigration, before considering how recent migration policy changes can be linked to public opinion - or, crucially, what policymakers perceive to be the public will. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 11, 2016 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/engaging-anxious-middle-immigration-reform-evidence-uk-debate Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/engaging-anxious-middle-immigration-reform-evidence-uk-debate Shelf Number: 139001 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicyMigrationRefugees |
Author: McCarthy-Jones, Anthea Title: Mexical Drug Cartels and Dark-Networks: An Emerging Threat to Australia's National Security Summary: Over the past decade Mexican drug cartels' power and the violent struggles between them have increased exponentially. Previously Mexico, and in particular the border regions with the US, were the key battle grounds for control of distribution routes. However, today Mexican drug cartels are now looking abroad in an attempt to extend their operations. This expansion has seen several cartels moving into lucrative international markets in Europe and the Asia Pacific. It is in this context that Australia has now become a target of several Mexican cartels. They have already established linkages in the Asia Pacific and are further attempting to strengthen and expand these - with a particular focus on penetrating the Australian market. These developments show how Mexican drug cartels operate as 'dark-networks', successfully creating a global system that seeks to capture new markets, and further extend their control and dominance of the flow of illicit drugs around the world. For Australia, the emergence of Mexican drug cartels in local markets presents not only criminal but strategic challenges. The size of these operations, their resources and 'dark-network' structure makes them a difficult opponent. Their presence threatens to not only increase the supply of illicit drugs in Australia, but encourage turf wars, increase the amount of guns in the country, tax border security resources and threaten the stability and good governance of South Pacific transit spots. This represents the end of Australia's 'tyranny of distance', which previously acted as a buffer and protected Australia from the interests of remote criminal groups such as the Mexican cartels. Details: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Centre of Gravity Series: Accessed May 18, 2016 at: http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2325%20Web%20v3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2325%20Web%20v3.pdf Shelf Number: 139078 Keywords: Border SecurityDark NetworksDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingIllegal DrugsOrganized Crime |
Author: Akkerman, Mark Title: Border Wars: The Arms Dealers Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy Summary: The refugee crisis facing Europe has caused consternation in the corridors of power, and heated debate on Europe's streets. It has exposed fundamental faultlines in the whole European project, as governments fail to agree on even limited sharing of refugees and instead blame each other. Far-right parties have surged in popularity exploiting austerity-impacted communities in putting the blame for economic recession on a convenient scapegoat as opposed to the powerful banking sector. This has been most potently seen in the UK, where leaders of the 'Leave EU' campaign unscrupulously amplified fears of mass migration to successfully mobilise support for Brexit. Refugees fleeing terrible violence and hardship have been caught in the crossfire; forced to take ever more dangerous routes to get to Europe and facing racist attacks in host nations when they finally arrive. However there is one group of interests that have only benefited from the refugee crisis, and in particular from the European Union's investment in 'securing' its borders. They are the military and security companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance technology to monitor frontiers, and the IT infrastructure to track population movements. This report turns a spotlight on those border security profiteers, examining who they are and the services they provide, how they both influence and benefit from European policies and what funding they receive from taxpayers. The report shows that far from being passive beneficiaries of EU largesse, these corporations are actively encouraging a growing securitisation of Europe's borders, and willing to provide ever more draconian technologies to do this. Most perverse of all, it shows that some of the beneficiaries of border security contracts are some of the biggest arms sellers to the Middle-East and North-African region, fuelling the conflicts that are the cause of many of the refugees. In other words, the companies creating the crisis are then profiting from it. Moreover they have been abetted by European states who have granted the licences to export arms and have then granted them border security contracts to deal with the consequences. Their actions are also in the framework of an increasingly militarised response to the refugee crisis by the European Union. Under the banner of 'fighting illegal immigration', the European Commission plans to transform its border security agency Frontex into a more powerful European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This would have control over member states border security efforts and a more active role as a border guard itself, including purchasing its own equipment. The agency is backed up by EUROSUR, an EU system connecting member and third states' border security surveillance and monitoring systems. Militarisation of border security is also demonstrated by the military objectives of the 'European Union Naval Force - Mediterranean Operation Sophia' (EUNAVFOR MED) as well as the use of military on many borders, including Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. NATO naval missions in the Mediterranean are already actively assisting EU border security. Meanwhile, countries outside the EU are being pushed to take up a role as outpost border guards to try to stop refugees from reaching the EU borders. The recent EU migration deals with Turkey, which have been severely criticised by human rights organisations, deny refugees access to Europe and have resulted in more violence against them. The report shows that: The border security market is booming. Estimated at some 15 billion euros in 2015, it is predicted to rise to over 29 billion euros annually in 2022 The arms business, in particular sales to the Middle-East and North-Africa, where most of the refugees are fleeing from, is also booming. Global arms exports to the Middle-East actually increased by 61 per cent between 2006-10 and 2011-15. Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros The European policy response to refugees which has focused on targeting traffickers and strengthening its external borders (including in countries outside the European Union) has led to big budget increases which benefits industry Total EU funding for member state border security measures through its main funding programmes is 4.5 billion euros between 2004 and 2020 Frontex, its main border control agency's budget increased 3,688% between 2005 and 2016 (from $6.3m to $238.7m) EU new member states have been required to strengthen borders as a condition of membership, creating additional markets for profit. Equipment purchased or upgraded with External Borders Fund money includes 54 border surveillance systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment for border surveillance and 212,881 items of operating equipment for border checks Some of the arms sales permits to the Middle-East and North Africa are also intended for border control. In 2015, for example the Dutch government granted a 34 million euro export license to Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt despite reports of human right violations in the country The European border security industry is dominated by major arms companies, who have all set up or expanded security divisions as well as a number of smaller IT and specialist security firms. Italian arms giant Finmeccanica identified "border control and security systems" as one of the primary drivers for increase in orders and revenues The big players in Europe's border security complex include arms companies Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales and Safran, as well as technology giant Indra. Finmeccanica and Airbus have been particularly prominent winners of EU contracts aimed at strengthening borders. Airbus is also the number one winner of EU security research funding contracts Finmecannica, Thales and Airbus, prominent players in the EU security business are also three of the top four European arms traders, all active selling to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Their total revenues in 2015 amounted to 95 billion euros Israeli companies are the only non-European receivers of research funding (thanks to a 1996 agreement between Israel and the EU) and also have played a role in fortifying the borders of Bulgaria and Hungary, and promote their expertise based on the West Bank separation wall and the Gaza border with Egypt. Israeli firm BTec Electronic Security Systems, selected by Frontex to participate in its April 2014 workshop on 'Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms', boasted in its application mail that its "technologies, solutions and products are installed on [the] Israeli-Palestinian border" The arms and security industry helps shape European border security policy through lobbying, through its regular interactions with EU's border institutions and through its shaping of research policy. The European Organisation for Security (EOS), which includes Thales, Finmecannica and Airbus has been most active in lobbying for increased border security. Many of its proposals, such as its push to set up a cross European border security agency have eventually ended up as policy - see for example the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coastguard Agency (EBCG). Moreover Frontex/EBCG's biannual industry days and its participation in special security roundtables and specialist arms and security fairs ensure regular communication and a natural affinity for cooperation. The arms and security industry has successfully captured the 316 million euros funding provided for research in security issues, setting the agenda for research, carrying it out, and then often benefiting from the subsequent contracts that result. Since 2002, the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security and border control. Collectively the evidence shows a growing convergence of interests between Europe's political leaders seeking to militarise the borders and its major defence and security contractors who provide the services. But this is not just an issue of conflicts of interest or of profiteering from crisis, it is also about the direction Europe takes at this critical moment. More than a half century ago, then US President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of a military-industrial complex, whose power could "endanger our liberties or democratic processes". Today we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex, using technologies that point outwards and inwards, that right now are targeted at some of the most vulnerable desperate people on our planet. Allowing this complex to escape unexamined poses a threat to democracy and to a Europe built on an ideal of cooperation and peace. As Eisenhower put it: "Down the long lane of the history yet to be written... this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2016. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web.pdf Shelf Number: 139605 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityImmigrantsImmigrationRefugeesTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Greene, Judith Title: Indefensible: A Decade of Mass Incarceration of Migrants Prosecuted for Crossing the Border Summary: December 2015 marked the 10th anniversary of the launch of a program to target for criminal prosecution migrants who had crossed the border without authorization. It was named "Operation Streamline." It is known for the mass hearings (often lasting less than two hours) in which up to 80 migrants are arraigned, found guilty, convicted and sentenced for 8 USC 1325 (improper entry, a misdemeanor) simultaneously. The policy has long been decried by immigrant rights advocates. However, the mass hearings of Operation Streamline, as shocking as they are, are only the tip of the iceberg. Lesser known by the general public, media, and even some immigrant rights and criminal justice reform advocates, is the widespread expansion of 8 USC 1326 (re-entry, a felony) prosecutions over the past decade that came with the Streamline program. Though border officials in some sectors say that Operation Streamline has ended, the numbers of migrants prosecuted in federal courts is still massive in sheer numbers. The criminal prosecution of migrants crossing our southern border has had profound impacts on the federal courts and federal prisons over the last decade. In 2015, improper entry and re-entry prosecutions accounted for almost half of all federal prosecutions (49 percent). Improper entry is punishable by up to 180 days in federal jail while improper re-entry is punishable by up to two years. And if the migrant has a serious prior criminal history, many more years may be added to the sentence. Almost a quarter of those in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prison population are non-citizens (23 percent). Using the data available, we conservatively estimate the incarceration costs for those convicted of improper entry and re-entry at more than $7 billion since the start of Operation Streamline in 2005. This book provides an oral history of the evolution of Operation Streamline over 10 years and its legacy today. We document the beginnings Operation Streamline and the evolution of targeted migrant prosecutions. We explore how the program took hold across border districts in distinct ways. We examine how an already politicized issue collided with media hype and, "moral panic" over immigration levels. We describe how ambitious and powerful individuals and agencies within the newly formed Department of Homeland Security launched this huge, targeted prosecution program. We interviewed more than three dozen people who work inside the federal criminal justice system, or who have been impacted by it, for this book. We have attempted to amplify their voices by using their own words as often as possible. In looking back at 10 years of mass prosecution of migrants, we have an opportunity to examine how and why the program emerged. We can also examine the harm it has caused against the scant evidence that it has achieved the stated goal of deterring migration at the southern border. There exists in the story of migrant prosecutions an intersection where those working for immigrant rights and for criminal justice reform can join hands to work together. Finally, we can find inspiration in the ample opportunities for resistance and in this book we highlight the efforts of those who are organizing to bring an end to prosecution of migrants at the border. Details: Austin, TX: Grassroots Leadership; New York: Justice Strategies, 2016. 181p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2016 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/indefensible_book_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/indefensible_book_web.pdf Shelf Number: 139655 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrant DetentionImmigrantsOperation StreamlineUndocumented Migrants |
Author: Finch, Jessie K. Title: Legal Borders, Racial/Ethnic Boundaries: Operation Streamline and Identity Processes on the US-Mexico Border Summary: How do individuals navigate situations in which their work-role identity is put in competition with social identities of race/ethnicity, nationality, or citizenship/generational status? This research uses a controversial criminal court procedure (Operation Streamline) as an optimal setting to understand the strategies employed by lawyers and judges who manage such delicate identity processes. I examine how legal professionals assign salience to their various identities while developing a perspective of competing identity management that builds on and further integrates prior sociological research on identity. In particular, Latino/a judges and lawyers who participate in Operation Streamline (OSL) take on a specific work-related role identity that entails assisting in the conviction and sentencing of border-crossers with whom they share one social identity - race/ethnicity - but do not share another social identity - citizenship. I systematically assess identity management strategies used by lawyers and judges to manage these multiple competing identities while seeking to comprehend under what circumstances these identities affect legal professionals' job-related interactions. In this dissertation, I demonstrate that Latino/a lawyers and judges involved with OSL manage their potentially competing social and role identities differently than non-Latino/as whose social identities do not compete with their role identities, demonstrating variation between racial/ethnic social identities. I also find that some Latino/a lawyers and judges (those with higher racial/ethnic social identity salience) involved with OSL manage their potentially competing social and role identities differently than other Latino/a lawyers and judges (those with higher racial/ethnic social identity salience), demonstrating variation within racial/ethnic social identity based on the social identity of citizenship/generational status. Finally, I demonstrate that situationality is a factor in identity management because a shared social identity with defendants seems to be useful in the daily work of Latino/a lawyers and judges, but often detrimental in how they are perceived by outsiders such as activists and the media. From this case, we can take the findings and begin to create an outline for a new theory of competing identity management, integrating prior literatures on social and role identities. I have been able to elaborate mechanisms of some identity management processes while also developing grounded hypotheses on which to base future research. My research also contributes to improving how the criminal justice system deals with sensitive racial/ethnic issues surrounding immigration crimes and en masse proceedings such as OSL. Because proposed "comprehensive immigration reform" includes expanding programs like OSL, my research to understand the broader effects of the program on legal professionals is especially important not only to social scientists but to society at large. The fact that there is a difference in identity management strategies for Latino/a and non-Latino/a respondents helps demonstrate there is in fact an underlying racial tension present in Operation Streamline. Details: Tucson: University of Arizona, 2015. 222p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 20, 2016 at: http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/578902 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/578902 Shelf Number: 139720 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigrantsImmigrationOperation Streamline |
Author: Arsenault, Jean-Francois Title: A Discussion of the Economics of Preclearance with Proposed Measurement Methodologies Summary: This report has three objectives: summarize the international literature on the economic and social impact of preclearance operations; identify additional benefits of preclearance not well covered in the literature; and propose feasible methodologies to quantitatively measure the benefits to Canada of establishing preclearance processes and facilities in different environments. Preclearance benefits have not generally been the subject of much measurement. Based on an analysis and literature review, benefits were classified in five categories: optimizing border resources; improving security; improving the experience of crossing the border for passengers; improving the experience of crossing the border for carriers; and generating 'spin-off' benefits. In general, benefits in the first four categories are additive, while the last category spans a wide range of beneficial impacts of preclearance which generally can only be assessed using input-output or computable general equilibrium models. The report describes each benefit, identifies the main recipient of the benefit, and proposes specific methodologies to measure these benefits. For some benefits, in particular those related to security, the inherent difficulties in measuring the impact of preclearance leads the authors to suggest a qualitative treatment. Some preliminary estimates, based on heavy assumptions, are provided as a first step towards an accurate measurement of benefits. Executive Summary Preclearance refers to a process in which customs, immigration and other border functions of a foreign country (e.g. United States) are undertaken within a host country (e.g. Canada). Such operations can potentially generate significant benefits for governments, users and carriers. Preclearance benefits, however, have not generally been the subject of much measurement. This report has three objectives: summarize the international literature on the economic and social impact of preclearance operations; identify additional benefits of preclearance not well covered in the literature; and propose feasible methodologies to quantitatively measure the benefits to Canada of establishing preclearance processes and facilities in various contexts. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report:2015-R032: Accessed July 26, 2016 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-r032/index-en.aspx Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-r032/index-en.aspx Shelf Number: 139860 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecuritySecurity |
Author: Gutierrez, Carlos Title: Shared Border, Shared Future: A Blueprint to Regulate US-Mexico Labor Mobility Summary: Mexico and the United States have lacked a bilateral agreement to regulate cross-border labor mobility since 1965. Since that time, unlawful migration from Mexico to the US has exploded. Almost half of the 11.7 million Mexican-born individuals living in the U.S. do not have legal authorization. This vast black market in labor has harmed both countries. These two neighboring countries, with an indisputably shared destiny, can come together to work out a better way. The time has come for a lasting, innovative, and cooperative solution. To address this challenge, the Center for Global Development assembled a group of leaders from both countries and with diverse political affiliations - from backgrounds in national security, labor unions, law, economics, business, and diplomacy - to recommend how to move forward. The result is a new blueprint for a bilateral agreement that is designed to end unlawful migration, promote the interests of U.S. and Mexican workers, and uphold the rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-shared-border-shared-future-report-eng1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 140364 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrationMigrantsMigration |
Author: Cantor, Guillermo Title: Detained Beyond the Limit: Prolonged Confinement by U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the Southwest Border Summary: For some time now, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been in the spotlight for its questionable practices regarding the treatment of migrants. One such practice concerns the manner in which the Border Patrol-a component of CBP-operates its holding facilities near the U.S.' southern border. Each year, hundreds of thousands of individuals are held in these facilities, which are meant to hold individuals for a short time while they undergo initial processing and until a decision is made about the appropriate next step in their case. The holding cells, which are often referred to as "hieleras" (Spanish for "freezers" or "iceboxes"), are typically small concrete rooms with concrete benches and no beds. They are not designed for overnight custody, and yet they are routinely used in this way. Government records analyzed in this report, which contain information on length of detention for all Border Patrol sectors along the U.S.' southwest border, reveal that individuals are frequently held for days and sometimes even months in such facilities. As numerous reports, media accounts, and documented complaints of former detainees have previously shown, these facilities remain wholly inadequate for any overnight detention. Moreover, the conditions are reprehensible-as consistently reported by many who were held in them-even with respect to truly short-term detention. In addition to the fact that there are no beds in the holding cells, these facilities are extremely cold, frequently overcrowded, and routinely lack adequate food, water, and medical care. This report, which is based on never-before-released government data and documents obtained by the American Immigration Council through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), examines length of detention in nine Border Patrol sectors: Big Bend, Texas; Del Rio, Texas; El Centro, California; El Paso, Texas; Laredo, Texas; Rio Grande Valley, Texas; San Diego, California; Tucson, Arizona; and Yuma, Arizona. Between September 1, 2014 and August 31, 2015, 326,881 individuals were held in CBP facilities across the southwest border. Of the cases analyzed, which include only cases with complete data (326,728), 69,016 (21.1 percent) were women. Mexican nationals represent the largest share (57.1 percent) of those detained in CBP facilities during this period, followed by Guatemalans (16.9 percent), Salvadorans (12.7 percent), and Hondurans (9.8 percent). Looking at all sectors combined, the data reveals that a shocking 217,485 individuals (or 67 percent of the total number detained during this period) were held in CBP facilities for 24 hours or more; 93,566 (29 percent) for 48 hours or more; and 44,202 (14 percent) for 72 hours or more. The average number of hours that individuals were detained shows some variation, ranging from 65 hours at its lowest point in July 2015 to 104 hours at its peak in October 2014. Length of detention varies considerably across border sectors. For example, lengthy detention is remarkably frequent in the Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, Tucson, Yuma, and El Centro sectors. Laredo in particular shows the most disturbing numbers; 54 percent (19,000) of the 35,494 individuals held in detention facilities in Laredo were detained for at least 72 hours. A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) raises questions about the possible existence of irregularities in the way Border Patrol officers capture information on length of detention. Consequently, the data presented here should be interpreted with caution. However, the findings of our analysis are consistent with those reported in previous publications by the American Immigration Council. For example, according to a report released in May 2015, 58,083 individuals-or over 80 percent of people detained by the Border Patrol in its Tucson Sector between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2013-were held for over 24 hours, and 10.9 percent (7,839 individuals) were held for 72 hours or more. Another report which focused on the Rio Grande Valley Sector showed that during the months of August, September, October, and December of 2013, the share of individuals detained for over 72 hours ranged from 2.3 percent of all detainees at its lowest point to 42.5 percent at its peak. Lengthy detention is especially problematic given the inhumane conditions that characterize these holding facilities. The findings presented in this report document a troublesome reality: lengthy detention is not just a random occurrence that happens to a few individuals in one or two Border Patrol sectors; it is, instead, a systemic practice that affects, to varying degrees, all the sectors along the southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2016 at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/detained_beyond_the_limit.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/detained_beyond_the_limit.pdf Shelf Number: 146113 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Island of Despair: Australia's "Processing" of Refugees on Nauru Summary: The current policy of the Australian Government is that no person who arrives in the country by boat seeking asylum can ever settle in Australia. Instead, anyone who arrives by boat is forcibly taken to offshore "Refugee Processing Centres", one of which is on the remote Pacific island of Nauru. The government claims that the policy protects people who might otherwise undertake the hazardous boat crossing to Australia. However, since its inception, offshore processing has been designed to be punitive and has been widely promoted by a succession of Australian governments as a deterrent and as a demonstration of Australia securing its borders. Details: London: AI, 2016. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2016 at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa12/4934/2016/en/ Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa12/4934/2016/en/ Shelf Number: 145007 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityHuman Rights AbusesRefugees |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel Summary: After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening. Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and non-immigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals. Screening Aliens Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in “lookout” databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB. Screening at the Transportation Security Administration The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA’s Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person’s first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44678: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Shelf Number: 146283 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Manuel, Kate M. Title: State Challenges to Federal Enforcement of Immigration Law: From the Mid-1990s to the Present Summary: States and localities can have significant interest in the manner and extent to which federal officials enforce provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) regarding the exclusion and removal of unauthorized aliens. Some states and localities, concerned that federal enforcement disrupts families and communities, or infringes upon human rights, have adopted 'sanctuary' policies limiting their cooperation in federal efforts. Other states and localities, in contrast, concerned about the costs of providing benefits or services to unauthorized aliens, or such aliens settling in their communities, have adopted measures to deter unauthorized aliens from entering or remaining within their jurisdiction. In some cases, such states or localities have also sued to compel federal officials to enforce the immigration laws, or to compensate them for costs associated with unauthorized migration. This report provides an overview of challenges by states to federal officials' alleged failure to enforce the INA or other provisions of immigration law. It begins by discussing (1) the lawsuits filed by six states in the mid-1990s; (2) Arizona's counterclaims to the federal government's suit to enjoin enforcement of S.B. 1070; and (3) Mississippi's challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. It then describes the challenge brought by over 25 states or state officials in December 2014 to the Obama Administration's proposal to expand DACA and create a similar program for unauthorized aliens whose children are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident aliens (LPRs) (commonly known as DAPA)." Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43839.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43839.pdf Shelf Number: 146677 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicySanctuary Cities |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Smuggling of Migrants: A risk assessment of border communities: Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand Summary: Southeast Asia continues to experience rapid economic and social development. In the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS), economic development in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Thailand is progressing at different paces. The resulting economic disparity between these countries is a driving force for both regular and irregular labor migration to Thailand. Since regular labor migration channels and opportunities are not sufficient to match the demand for unskilled or low-skilled migrant workers in Thailand, irregular migration continues to flourish. In this context, migrant smuggling - the procurement of illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national for a financial or other material benefit - accounts for much of the irregular migration in the GMS. Driven by supply and demand, illegal flows of goods and people tend to be more prevalent in specific border areas, which become core hubs for organizing illegal border transportation and crossing. This makes the underdeveloped border communities of these GMS countries susceptible targets for organized criminal groups that seek to generate profits from transporting and facilitating illegal entry for migrants. The objectives of this study are to determine key motivators and facilitators of irregular migration, explore the concept of Border Community Committees and their potential effectiveness in reducing the smuggling of migrants, evaluate existing mechanisms for combating irregular migration, and assess the role of law enforcement officials in preventing and prosecuting migrant smuggling and irregular migration practices. Details: Bangkok: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 12, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2014/08/patrol/Final_Report_SOM_in_Border_Communities_11_25_Aug_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2014/08/patrol/Final_Report_SOM_in_Border_Communities_11_25_Aug_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 146667 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingIllegal ImmigrantsMigrant SmugglingMigrantsOrganized Crime |
Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Responding to Migrant Deaths Along the Southwest Border: Lessons from the Field Summary: The United States is grappling with a migration crisis. Since the late 1990s, migrants from Mexico and Central America have been dying by the thousands as they cross into the United States through the unforgiving deserts and scrubland of the Southwest United States. Agencies along the U.S.-Mexico border have been stretched thin as they have tried to save migrants in distress and, when those efforts fail, identify the deceased and return their remains to their loved ones. In 2013, with support from the Ford Foundation, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) began to explore the issue of migrant deaths along the Southwestern border and identify strategies to reduce these fatalities. PERF staff members travelled to Mexico City and South Texas to meet with practitioners and conducted in-depth interviews of experts and stakeholders from nonprofit organizations, local and federal law enforcement agencies, medical examiners’ offices, and universities. After gathering input from these representatives, PERF held an unprecedented, multi-state, multi-agency meeting in Washington, D.C. on June 1, 2016 to discuss interdisciplinary partnership-building and strategies to reduce migrant deaths and improve processes for identifying and repatriating migrants’ remains. This report is the result of PERF’s efforts. It highlights the factors that contribute to the migrant deaths crisis; identifies the key stakeholders in the field and the resources that they represent; examines the partnership-building efforts that are already in place along the border to increase successful rescues of migrants in distress and improve identifications of those who perish; and presents new opportunities for collaboration and information-sharing moving forward. This report serves as a chronicle of the efforts of practitioners in the field, highlights the crisis of migrant deaths in the Southwest, and proposes short-term and long-term solutions for practitioners and policy-makers. It is important to recognize that the migrant deaths crisis is a large-scale humanitarian issue. More than 6,500 migrants have died along the U.S-Mexican border since 1998, and that number is almost certainly an underestimate of the scale of the tragedy. While this report provides guidance on how to reduce these deaths now, in the current legal environment, the real solution lies in comprehensive immigration reform legislation that will provide new pathways to legal immigration and reduce incentives for attempting dangerous illegal border crossings. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2016 at: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/respondingmigrantdeaths.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/respondingmigrantdeaths.pdf Shelf Number: 146666 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman RightsIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration PoliciesMigrant Deaths |
Author: Chassamboulli, Andri Title: The Labor Market Effects of Reducing the Number of Illegal Immigrants Summary: A controversial issue in the US is how to reduce the number of illegal immigrants and what effect this would have on the US economy. To answer this question we set up a two-country model with search in labor markets and featuring legal and illegal immigrants among the low skilled. We calibrate it to the US and Mexican economies during the period 2000-2010. As immigrants, especially illegal ones, have a worse outside option than natives their wages are lower. Hence their presence reduces the labor cost of employers who, as a consequence, create more jobs per unemployed when there are more immigrants. Because of such effect our model shows that increasing deportation rates and tightening border control weakens the low-skilled labor markets, increasing unemployment of native low skilled. Legalization, instead decreases the unemployment rate of low-skilled natives and it increases income per native. Details: London: Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration Department of Economics, University College London, 2015. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: CReAM Discussion Paper Series, no. 6/16: Accessed November 17, 2016 at: http://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_06_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_06_15.pdf Shelf Number: 141198 Keywords: Border SecurityDeportation Illegal Immigrants Illegal Immigration Immigrants Unemployment |
Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: Irregular Migration, Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU Summary: While the current migration and refugee crisis is the most severe that the world has known since the end of the Second World War (with over 60 million refugees worldwide, according to the UNHCR), it may turn into the norm, because the reasons to migrate keep on multiplying. These reasons range from long-lasting political crises, endemic civil wars, atrocities committed against ethnic or religious groups by extremist organisations to the lack of economic development prospects and climate change. The European Union has a duty to welcome some of these people – namely those who need international protection. With over a million irregular migrants crossing its external borders in 2015, the European Union has to engage in a deep reflection on the rationale underpinning its policies on irregular migration and migrant smuggling – and their effects. At such a strenuous time, the challenge before us is “to work closely together in a spirit of solidarity” while the “need to secure Europe’s borders” remains an imperative, to recall President Juncker’s words. Of particular relevance in this framework is the issue of migrant smuggling, or facilitation of irregular entry, stay or transit. Addressing migrant smuggling – located at the intersection of criminal law, which sanctions organised crime, the management of migration and the protection of the fundamental rights of irregular migrants – has become a pressing priority. But the prevention of and fight against migrant smuggling is a complex process, affected by contextual factors, including a high level of economic and social disparity between the EU and several third countries, difficult cooperation with source and transit countries and limited legal migration channels to the EU. In this framework, the European Commission tabled two agendas prioritising the fight against migrant smuggling. The European Agenda on Security, adopted in April 2015, and the European Agenda on Migration, presented in May 2015, both attach major importance to cooperation against the smuggling of migrants inside the EU and from third countries. Shortly afterwards, to operationalise these frameworks, the European Commission presented the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling, in May 2015. It foresees a comprehensive, multidisciplinary response against migrant smuggling involving relevant stakeholders and institutions at all levels. The Action Plan covers all phases and types of migrant smuggling and all migratory routes, including the facilitation of secondary movement, unauthorised residence within the EU and the necessity to enforce return and readmission procedures. It endorses a comprehensive approach ranging from preventive action targeting potential migrants in countries of origin and transit to measures against smuggling rings operating along the migratory routes, while ensuring the full respect of the human rights of migrants. The implementation, involving different actors and organisations at local, regional, national and international levels, as well as EU agencies, is coordinated by the Commission. The Action Plan sets out both short-term and long-term objectives around four main priorities: reinforcing investigation and prosecution of smugglers; improved information gathering, sharing and analysis; better prevention of smuggling and assisting vulnerable migrants and enhancing cooperation with third countries. The Action Plan underlines the critical need to collect and share information on the modus operandi, routes and economic models of smuggling networks in order to understand the business model of criminal networks and design adequate responses. In this framework, full use should be made of the available risk analyses and monitoring of pre-frontier areas. The dissemination of information related to the external borders will be increased with the support of Eurosur, while further research on the phenomena and on the links with other crimes needs to be initiated. The relevant EU agencies must scale up their work on migrant smuggling. Their resources devoted to migrant smuggling have been increased substantially. Europol’s new European Migrant Smuggling Centre should become the EU information hub in the fight against migrant smuggling. The presence of both Europol and Frontex in the hotspots of frontline member states is crucial for gathering and processing information – and for launching investigations leading to prosecutions. Funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research, the FIDUCIA project has promoted research on the role of trust-based policies in legal compliance in the field of migration, through the work done by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and a group of academics. The initiative aims to stimulate evidence-based policy-making and to bring fresh thinking to develop more effective policies. The European Commission welcomes the valuable contribution of this initiative to help close the wide gap in our knowledge about the smuggling of migrants, and especially the functioning of smuggling networks. Details: Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2016. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 19, 2016 at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Irregular%20Migration,%20Trafficking%20and%20SmugglingwithCovers.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Irregular%20Migration,%20Trafficking%20and%20SmugglingwithCovers.pdf Shelf Number: 147762 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal MigrationMigrantsMigrations |
Author: Sahan Foundation Title: Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route Summary: As Europe struggles to manage its largest migrant crisis in more than half a century, attention has focused largely upon the refugee flows from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where years of war and instability are driving the exodus. But in 2015, an estimated 154,000 migrants entered Europe via the Central Mediterranean Route – an increase of nearly 400% over the previous year, and more than 1,000% over 2012 – most of them from the Horn of Africa. By far the largest contingent of migrants – nearly 39,000 in 2015 – is from the sub-region's second smallest country: Eritrea. In contrast with the mass, largely uncontrolled movements of refugees from the Middle East, irregular migration from the Horn of Africa is dominated by highly integrated networks of transnational organised criminal groups. Coordinated by kingpins based chiefly in Libya and the Horn of Africa, these networks "recruit" their clients via schools, the Internet and word of mouth; they corrupt government officials to ensure seamless travel across borders; they collude with Libyan militias to secure safe passage across the desert to launching points on the southern shores of the Mediterranean; and they cast their human cargoes adrift at the limit of Libyan territorial waters in order to avoid interdiction and arrest by European security forces. Inception and Purpose of the Report Security has long been a shared preoccupation of countries of the region. The "revitalisation" of IGAD in 1996 expanded the organisation’s mandate to more directly address challenges of peace and stability in the sub-region, including, under Article 18(a), "effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability." In 2002, the states of the region signed the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, which outlined the various components of a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) built around structures, objectives, principles, and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. In this context, in 2003, the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government endorsed a new strategy for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR), which was enlarged upon in October 2005 to develop an IGAD “Peace and Security Strategy” in line with APSA. Although the new strategy remained heavily focused on inter-state and intra-state conflict, it called for the enhancement of IGAD activities on countering emerging transnational security threats. IGAD, coming to terms with the expanding scope of regional security challenges, adopted a new Security Strategy in December 2010 and, in October 2011, launched the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), whose expanded mandate included counter-terrorism, transnational organised crime (TOC), maritime security, and security institutions' capacity-building. Details: Sahan Foundation, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 147783 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: Garcia, Michael John Title: Barriers Along the U.S. Borders: Key Authorities and Requirements Summary: Federal law authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to construct barriers along the U.S. borders to deter illegal crossings. DHS is also required to construct reinforced fencing along at least 700 miles of the land border with Mexico (a border that stretches 1,933 miles). Congress has not provided a deadline for DHS to meet this 700-mile requirement, and as of the date of this report, fencing would need to be deployed along nearly 50 additional miles to satisfy the 700-mile requirement. Nor has Congress provided guidelines regarding the specific characteristics of fencing or other physical barriers (e.g., their height or material composition) deployed along the border, beyond specifying that required fencing must be reinforced. The primary statute authorizing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the international borders is Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208, div. C). Congress made significant amendments to IIRIRA Section 102 through three enactments - the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, div. B), the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, div. E). These amendments required DHS to construct hundreds of miles of new fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and they also gave the Secretary of DHS broad authority to waive - all legal requirements - that may impede construction of barriers and roads under IIRIRA Section 102. These statutory modifications, along with increased funding for border projects, resulted in the deployment of several hundred miles of new barriers along the southwest border between 2005 and 2011. But in the years following, DHS largely stopped deploying additional fencing, as the agency altered its enforcement strategy in a manner that places less priority upon barrier construction. On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order that, among other things, instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border ... to most effectively achieve complete operational control" of the U.S.-Mexico border. The order defines a 'wall' to mean "a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier." The order does not identify the contemplated mileage of the wall to be constructed. Until recently, interest in the framework governing the deployment of barriers along the international border typically focused on the stringency of the statutory mandate to deploy fencing along at least 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. But attention has now shifted to those provisions of law that permit deployment of fencing or other physical barriers along additional mileage. IIRIRA Section 102 authorizes DHS to construct additional fencing or other barriers along the U.S. land borders beyond the 700 miles specified in statute. Indeed, nothing in current law would appear to bar DHS from installing hundreds of miles of additional physical barriers, at least so long as this action was determined appropriate to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry or was deemed warranted to achieve "operational control" of the southern border. DHS's policy not to deploy a substantial amount of additional fencing, beyond what is expressly required by law, appeared primarily premised on policy considerations and funding constraints, rather than significant legal impediments. This report discusses the statutory framework governing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the U.S. international borders. For more extensive discussion of ongoing activities and operations along the border between ports of entry, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Carla N. Argueta. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: R43975: Accessed February 4, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43975.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43975.pdf Shelf Number: 145879 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: The European Border and Coast Guard: Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean? Summary: The humanitarian refugee crisis in Europe of 2015-2016 has revealed several unfinished elements and shortcomings in current EU policies and approaches to migration, asylum and borders, particularly those applying in southern EU maritime borders and frontier states in the Mediterranean. This book provides a critical examination of the main issues and lessons learned from this crisis and gives an up-to-date assessment of the main policy, legal and institutional responses that have been put in place at the EU level. It further examines the extent to which these responses can be expected to work under the current system of sharing responsibilities among EU member states in assessing asylum applications and ensuring a consistent implementation of EU legal standards that comply with the rule of law and fundamental rights. This report is based on original research and draws upon the existing literature, along with the discussions of a CEPS Task Force that met over six months, under the chairmanship of Enrico Letta, President of the Jacques Delors Institute, Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) at Sciences Po and former Prime Minister of Italy. The rapporteurs offer specific recommendations and possible scenarios for policy optimisation and assess the extent to which the establishment of a European Border and Asylum Service (EBAS) could address the current gaps and challenges in EU and member states' migration policies. Details: Brussels: The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2016. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2017 at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR%20EU%20Border%20and%20Coast%20Guard%20with%20cover_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR%20EU%20Border%20and%20Coast%20Guard%20with%20cover_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145880 Keywords: AsylumBorder SecurityImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicyRefugees |
Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks Summary: In July 2011, President Barack Obama promulgated the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In the letter presenting the strategy, the president stated that the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century. Through an analysis of transnational criminal networks originating in South America, this report develops a more refined understanding of the operational characteristics of these networks; the strategic alliances that they have established with state and other nonstate actors; and the multiple threats that they pose to U.S. interests and to the stability of the countries where they operate. It identifies U.S. government policies and programs to counter these networks; the roles of the Department of Defense, the geographic combatant commands, component commands, and task forces; and examines how U.S. Army assets and capabilities can contribute to U.S. government efforts to counter these networks. The report also recommends reconsidering the way in which nontraditional national security threats are classified; updating statutory authorities; providing adequate budgets for the counternetwork mission; and improving interagency coordination. Key Findings Countering Transnational Organized Crime Is a New Mission for the Department of Defense Success in counternarcotics has been traditionally measured by the amount of illicit drugs interdicted. However, even if drug flow reduction goals are met, the drug trafficking infrastructure would still be in place. Countering transnational criminal networks requires identifying the critical nodes in the criminal organizations and determining where operations can achieve the greatest effect. Gaps in authorities may create difficulties in military abilities to participate in this effort. Destabilizing Effects of Transnational Criminal Networks These criminal organizations take root in supply areas and transportation nodes while usurping the host nations' basic functioning capacity. Over time, the illicit economy grows and nonstate actors provide an increasing range of social goods and fill the security and political vacuum that emerges from the gradual erosion of state power, legitimacy, and capacity. The U.S. Army Could Play a Role in Combating Transnational Criminal Networks Combating transnational criminal organizations is an endeavor in which the Army could help develop interagency and multinational strategies to more effectively counter these organizations and then assist with planning to implement those strategies. Such initiatives would constitute a valuable expansion from the Army's current efforts to build partner capacity, perform network analysis, and support detection and monitoring. Recommendations The U.S. government could bring authorities and policy guidance in line with the strategy to combat transnational organized crime. Interagency efforts to combat these networks could be improved, roles could be better defined, and joint doctrine could be developed. The Army could take several steps to clarify its role in countering criminal networks, including participating in strategy development, increasing support to network analysis efforts, and working with partner nations and militaries to help them strengthen border control. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND< 2017. 215p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html Shelf Number: 145102 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCriminal NetworksIllegal Drug TradeOrganized CrimeTransnational Crime |
Author: Bakker, Anne Title: At the Gate: Civil and military protection of Europe's Borders Summary: The migratory pressures on Europe's borders present the EU with an enormous challenge to get its act together. While the objectives and mandates of internal and external security actors increasingly overlap, these actors often still live in separated worlds. This Policy Brief analyses how the EU’s border security can be strengthened through a more joined-up approach between internal and external security actors. Furthermore, it looks into how civil-military connectivity in border security can be changed from the existing ad hoc nature to more structural cooperation. Despite the EU deal with Turkey in early 2016, the migration pressure on Europe's borders persists. The Syrian war lingers on, while instability and conflicts in Northern Africa continue to offer human traffickers ample opportunities to conduct their dirty business. Many politicians earmarked 2016 as the political breakthrough year in halting massive migration flows to Europe. Stepping up the protection of Europe's borders can certainly help to better manage migration flows. Yet, gatekeeping alone will not solve the problem. Cooperations agreements have been signed, but further steps are needed to translate this into action. With so many actors involved in mapping the routes and modus operandi of smugglers, sharing information is crucial to ensure the complementarity of action and to avoid any duplication of efforts. This also requires an increase in civil-military cooperation concerning capablities. Details: The Hague: Clingendael, 2017. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB_At_%20the_%20gate.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB_At_%20the_%20gate.pdf Shelf Number: 145397 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman TraffickingIllegal MigrantsMigrationSmuggling |
Author: Petrunov, Georgi Title: Analysis of Social Network Models of Transnational Criminal Networks operating in the Southeastern Border of the European Union Summary: This paper examines the transnational criminal networks (TCN) operating in the Southeastern border of the European Union (SBEU). More specifically, the analysis focuses on TCN operating on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, which became the external border of the European Union after the country’s accession to the EU in 2007. The primary data used for the analysis is based on court rulings from four criminal trial cases in Bulgaria. The indictments for each of the four cases were also studied, in order to provide more details about the criminal activities of the TCN. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2013. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 10: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_c7a68970d13d4fad80374ad3c7ffc0a7.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_c7a68970d13d4fad80374ad3c7ffc0a7.pdf Shelf Number: 141199 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal NetworksOrganized CrimeSocial Network Analysis |
Author: Perez Casanova, Gaspar M. Title: The Lost Path: Regulating Transit Illegal Immigration on Mexico's Southern Border Summary: This thesis focuses on the efforts that the Mexican government has made for the regulation of illegal immigration in transit through the country. This study explores the origins and trends of Central American migration, the complexity of Mexico’s southern border, and the reasons for the failure of plans and programs implemented by three different administrations to regulate and protect migration flows. It finds that those plans and programs failed because Mexico did not perceive the control of Central American illegal immigration as an end; instead, it has been used to foster foreign policy objectives or to respond to second-order effects produced by the war against organized crime. Since 2000, Mexican administrations have faced different realities, both domestic and international, which have shaped their response for border management and the regulation of illegal immigration. Security and the reordering of regional migration flows have been the priorities, relegating transit migration to a second plane. Mexico has accomplished important advances to give certainty and protection to illegal immigrants, but an integral and effective framework to regulate migration is lacking. Processes of planning, implementation, and evaluation of migration policies are barely defined, and the implementation of plans and programs is ineffective due to institutional weaknesses. The regulation of transit migration in Mexico is an unresolved issue. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44643/14Dec_Perez_Casanova_Gaspar.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44643/14Dec_Perez_Casanova_Gaspar.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 141206 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Sullivan, John P. Title: Cross-Border Connections: Criminal Inter-Penetration at the U.S.-Mexico "Hyperborder" Summary: The United States (US) and Mexico share a complex border and a common threat for transnational organized crime. The US-Mexico border is one of the most complex in the world. At first glance cross-border threats appear to be concentrated along the nearly 2,000 mile long frontier. This frontera divides the American states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas from their Mexican counterparts Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. Yet, as I will describe the impact of cross-border criminal connections reach far from the frontera and influences crime and corruption in major cities and exurban enclaves far from the actual border. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 11: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_bd5201a66cbd4437b6ef6dc91dce4b46.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_bd5201a66cbd4437b6ef6dc91dce4b46.pdf Shelf Number: 141256 Keywords: Border SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: Muggah, Robert Title: Securing the Border: Brazil's Summary: Brazil is at a crossroads in the fight against transnational organized crime. For one, Brazil is claiming a wider involvement in the international peace and security agenda and pursuing priorities overseas. At the same time, the country is adopting what might be described as a "South American first" approach to dealing with narco-trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering and cybercrime. It consists of investing in subregional institutions and discrete bilateral agreements in its near abroad. This more localized approach is contributing to the consolidation of Brazilian state institutions in its hinterland. But what direction will Brazil take in the coming decade? This Strategic Paper offers an overview of the scope and scale of organized crime in Latin America and Brazil more specifically. It critically reviews Brazil's normative and institutional responses – both regional and national – and considers likely future security postures. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Paper 5: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AE-05_EN_Securing-the-border.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AE-05_EN_Securing-the-border.pdf Shelf Number: 146410 Keywords: Arms SmugglingBorder SecurityCybercrimeDrug TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime |
Author: Australia. Auditor General Title: The Australian Border Force's Use of Statutory Powers Summary: Background 1. On 9 May 2014, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection announced the government's decision to bring together the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Immigration) and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs) in a single department from 1 July 2015. Within the integrated department, the government established the Australian Border Force (Border Force) as a 'single frontline operational border agency to enforce our customs and immigration laws and protect our border'. 2. Both the Customs Act 1901 (Customs Act) and Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) contain a wide range of powers. While many of these are essentially administrative in nature, there are a wide range of coercive powers - such as powers to question, search, detain or arrest people, or enter and search vehicles or premises - which departmental officers, such as Border Force officers, can now exercise. Other Acts (such as the Maritime Powers Act 2013) also confer powers on officers. In total, officers can exercise coercive powers under 35 Acts and more than 500 empowering provisions. Audit objective and criteria 3. The objective of the audit was to assess the establishment and administration of the Australian Border Force's framework to ensure the lawful exercise of powers in accordance with applicable legislation. 4. To form a conclusion against the audit objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level audit criteria: Is there an effective accountability and reporting framework for the lawful exercise of powers? Do Border Force officers have adequate knowledge of their powers and how to use them? Conclusion 5. As part of the integration of Immigration and Customs, the department has made progress towards establishing a framework to ensure Border Force officers exercise coercive powers lawfully and appropriately. However, significantly more work needs to be done to gain assurance that controls are effective. 6. The department's enterprise risk management framework does not adequately address the risk of officers exercising coercive powers unlawfully or inappropriately. Several internal assurance reviews have uncovered problems relating to the exercise of statutory powers. The Border Force has established an integrated operational quality assurance team, which has not yet finalised any reports. Delegations and authorisations for coercive powers are complete and in place but not all instruments are accessible to officers. 7. The ANAO found instances of potentially unlawful searches and failure to comply with instructions under both the Customs Act and Migration Act, which indicate current internal controls for mitigating the risk of unlawful or inappropriate use of coercive powers are inadequate. 8. The department has not provided adequate instructions and guidance for officers exercising coercive powers. There is currently no single source of instructions and guidance material for Border Force officers, and much of the guidance material available is out of date and inaccurate. While positive foundational work has commenced on integrating the former Customs and Immigration training regimes, officers have been exercising significant coercive powers without having undertaken pre-requisite training. Supporting findings 9. The department's approach to risk management at the enterprise level has been developing over the past two years. It has established an enterprise risk framework and is finalising profiles for each of its enterprise risks. The current profile relating to unlawful or inappropriate use of coercive powers conflates this risk with integrity and corruption risks, which require different internal controls. This has the potential to divert attention from controls relating to the risk of unlawful or inappropriate use of coercive powers. 10. The department has undertaken several internal assurance reviews that have uncovered problems relating to the exercise of statutory powers. The Border Force has recently established an integrated team responsible for operational quality assurance testing. The team has not yet completed any reviews. Prior to this, the department did not have satisfactory mechanisms for gaining assurance that officers understand their powers and are exercising them lawfully. 11. Instruments of authorisation and delegation for coercive Migration and Customs Act powers are complete and up-to-date. While Migration Act instruments of authorisation and delegation are available on the intranet, instruments relating to the Customs Act (and other Acts) are not accessible to officers. 12. Some personal searches of passengers at international airports examined by the ANAO were unlawful or inappropriate, indicating weaknesses in the control framework. A number of searches of premises under the Migration Act potentially exceeded the authority of the warrant which authorised them, and officers routinely questioned people without documenting their legal authority to do so. Officers also frequently failed to comply with departmental policy instructions, including compliance with certification and recordkeeping requirements. 13. The department has commenced a project to identify the statutory powers of officers of the integrated department, with a longer term view to possibly amending some powers. As part of the project, in July 2016, the department completed a consolidated inventory of all powers available to departmental officers under Commonwealth legislation. Such an inventory will enable the department to identify overlap, duplication, redundancy and inconsistency within and between Acts. It will also assist with identifying any gaps or deficiencies in powers in order to be able to submit a proposal for potential legislative change for government consideration. 14. The Border Force is developing a coordinated systematic framework for reporting on its use of coercive powers. It presently does not have such a framework. 15. Many of the instructions that are provided to Border Force officers on the department's intranet are out of date, incomplete, inaccurate and are not accessible to all officers. A project to remedy this situation was endorsed by the department's executive in December 2015 and has to date delivered only a very small number of operational instructions for Border Force officers. 16. The department has made progress in integrating the former Customs and Immigration training regimes and addressing deficiencies identified through pre-integration training audits conducted in 2014. The establishment of an integrated Learning and Development Branch and the Border Force College has been managed as a priority project, under the Reform and Integration Taskforce. While this project has delivered solid foundations for enhancing the learning maturity of the department, at the time of examination the results of these foundational efforts had yet to be realised. 17. Not all officers exercising coercive powers under the Migration Act and Customs Act have received pre-requisite training. The department has established an integrated Learning Management System but issues remain in relation to the completeness of training records. 18. The department has been undertaking a project to transition to a new workforce model, which has involved establishing 'vocations', profiling job roles under each vocation, mapping required competencies, and developing high level curricula. Training needs analysis for the Border Force vocational stream commenced in October 2016. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian National Audit Office, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_39.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_39.pdf Shelf Number: 146415 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCustoms EnforcementIllegal ImmigrationImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementUse of Force |
Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: Not a National Security Crisis: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Humanitarian Concerns, Seen from El Paso Summary: Contrary to popular and political rhetoric about a national security crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, evidence suggests a potential humanitarian—not security—emergency. This report, based on research and a field visit to El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico in April 2016, provides a dose of reality by examining one of the most emblematic of the U.S.-Mexico border's nine sectors, one that falls within the middle of the rankings on migration, drug seizures, violence, and human rights abuses. At a time when calls for beefing up border infrastructure and implementing costly policies regularly make headlines, our visit to the El Paso sector made clear that what is needed at the border are practical, evidence-based adjustments to border security policy, improved responses to the growing number of Central American migrants and potential refugees, and strengthened collaboration and communication on both sides of the border. • WITH 408,870 MIGRANT APPREHENSIONS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER IN FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2016, OVERALL UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION IS AT LEVELS SIMILAR TO THE EARLY 1970S. Apprehensions of migrants per Border Patrol agent are less than one-tenth what they were in the 1990s. With 19 apprehensions per agent, FY2015 had the second-lowest rate of the available data. It makes sense that staffing has leveled off since the 2005-2011 buildup that doubled the size of Border Patrol. • THE NUMBER OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS HAS FALLEN TO LEVELS NOT SEEN SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, AND DECLINES HAVE BEEN FAIRLY CONSISTENT. Between FY2004 and FY2015 there were fewer apprehensions of Mexican citizens each year than in the previous year. Apprehensions of Mexicans in FY2016 increased by 2.5 percent. Even though the nearest third country is over 800 miles away from the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexicans comprised less than half of migrants apprehended there in FY2014, and again in FY2016. • OF THE MIGRANTS ARRIVING AT THE BORDER, MANY ARE CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA WHO COULD QUALIFY AS REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION. A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) analysis of credible fear screenings carried out by U.S. asylum officers revealed that in FY2015, 82 percent of women from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, as well as Mexico, who were screened on arrival at the U.S. border "were found to have a significant possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum or protection under the Convention against Torture." This phenomenon is not a threat to the security of the United States. Nor is it illegal to flee one's country if one's life is at risk. Most Central American families and children do not try to evade U.S. authorities when they cross: they seek them out, requesting international protection out of fear to return to their countries. • VIOLENT CRIME RATES IN U.S. BORDER COMMUNITIES REMAIN AMONG THE LOWEST IN THE NATION, AND VIOLENCE HAS LARGELY DECREASED ON THE MEXICAN SIDE AS WELL. The El Paso crime rate in 2015 was below the U.S. national average. Although homicides have increased in Ciudad Juárez during 2016, the security situation has dramatically improved from when the city was considered the murder capital in the world in 2010. • SEIZURES OF CANNABIS, WHICH IS MOSTLY SMUGGLED BETWEEN OFFICIAL PORTS OF ENTRY, ARE DOWN AT THE BORDER. However, seizures of methamphetamine and heroin have increased, indicating that more drugs are probably getting across and, in the case of heroin, feeding U.S. demand that has risen to public-health crisis levels. Meth, heroin, and cocaine are very small in volume and are mostly smuggled at official border crossings. Building higher walls in wilderness areas along the border would make no difference in detecting and stopping these drugs from entering the country. • PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE BORDER ARE UNDERSTAFFED AND UNDER- EQUIPPED. As evidenced by the El Paso sector’s continued long wait times, ports of entry remain understaffed and under-equipped for dealing with small-volume, high-potency drug shipments, and for dealing more generally with large amounts of travelers and cargo. Much of the delay in hiring results from heightened screening procedures for prospective Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to guard against corruption and abuse, an important effort in need of additional resources. Screening delays are also the principal reason for a slight recent reduction in Border Patrol staffing. • ALTHOUGH NEW LOCAL REPATRIATION ARRANGEMENTS (LRAS) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO ARE A STEP FORWARD IN PROTECTING MEXICAN MIGRANTS RETURNED AT THE BORDER, SOME CHALLENGES STILL REMAIN IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. Both governments announced in February 2016 the finalization of new LRAs to regulate the return of Mexican migrants at nine points of entry along the border. The agreements represent important efforts of both governments to curtail many of the practices that negatively affect this vulnerable population, such as nighttime deportation. In the El Paso sector, however, repatriated migrants are often returned without their belongings, such as cell phones, identification documents, and money, presenting them with challenges in accessing funds, communicating with family, and traveling in the country. • THERE ARE FEWER COMPLAINTS ABOUT BORDER PATROL DETENTION CONDITIONS AND ABUSE BY AGENTS IN THE EL PASO SECTOR COMPARED TO OTHER PARTS OF THE BORDER. However, there are concerning reports about abuses by CBP agents at El Paso's ports of entry. A May 2016 complaint lodged by several border organizations points to troubling incidents of excessive force, verbal abuse, humiliating searches, and intimidation by agents at the ports of entry in El Paso and southern New Mexico that must be investigated and addressed. • STRONG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN EL PASO HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN MAKING IT ONE OF THE SAFEST U.S.-MEXICO BORDER CITIES. Consistently ranked one of the country’s safest cities of its size, El Paso demonstrates the importance of communication and constructive relationships between communities and border law enforcement agencies. Local and federal authorities and social service organizations interviewed noted interagency coordination, open lines of communication, and strong working relationships throughout the sector. The local policy of exempting offenders of Class C misdemeanors from federal immigration status checks does much to ensure community members' willingness to cooperate with law enforcement without fear of deportation. However, reports of racial profiling do exist, and state-level policy proposals against “sanctuary cities,” if passed, could threaten this trust. • MEXICAN FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROVIDE IMPORTANT SERVICES FOR REPATRIATED MIGRANTS, AND COULD BE A MODEL FOR OTHER MEXICAN BORDER CITIES. Mexico’s National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM) works in close coordination with the one-of-its-kind Juárez municipal government’s office to provide important basic services to repatriated migrants and assist them with legal services, recovering belongings left in the United States, and transportation to the interior of the country. Civil society organizations also provide similar important services to migrants and document abuses by U.S. and Mexican officials. • U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION IS INCREASINGLY FOCUSING ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ISSUES AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS. U.S. agencies provide support for violence reduction efforts in Ciudad Juárez, as well as support for police training and judicial reform for state and federal agents in Chihuahua. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America: Mexico, 2016. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/not-national-security-crisis-u-s-mexico-border-humanitarian-concerns-seen-el-paso/ Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/analysis/not-national-security-crisis-u-s-mexico-border-humanitarian-concerns-seen-el-paso/ Shelf Number: 141369 Keywords: Border SecurityHumanitarian AidImmigrant DetentionImmigrationImmigration and CrimeImmigration EnforcementMigrants and CrimeNational Security |
Author: Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service Title: Betraying Family Values: How Immigration Policy at the United States Border is Separating Families Summary: Over the past five years, the United States has seen a shift in the demographics of migrants encountered at our borders—from a majority of adult males, often from Mexico, seeking employment, to families, children, grandparents, aunts, and uncles fleeing together, seeking protection in the United States, coming mostly from Central America. Tragically, U.S. immigration enforcement policies, instead of shifting to adapt to this significant change, have continued to try forcing a square peg into a round hole, and in doing so have compounded the vulnerabilities of families and protection-seeking migrants. Instead of promoting family unity, we as a nation are breaking families apart. This report documents the ways in which family separation is caused, both intentionally and unintentionally, by the U.S. government’s immigration custody and enforcement decisions. It explains how the government's lack of consistent mechanisms for identifying and tracking family members result in family members being detained or removed separately and often losing contact with each other. Because the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies currently have little policy guidance on humanitarian considerations during enforcement actions, many families are needlessly torn apart. This report demonstrates how the process of enforcement along the border subjects families to separation, how children, even when accompanied by a parent, can be rendered unaccompanied, and how such separation impacts the family's well-being and access to due process. Finally, this report explains how family separation through the deportation process is dangerous and impedes safe repatriation and reintegration. Our findings of policies and practices in this report have been informed in part from our discussions and interviews with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DHS Policy, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS Office of Inspector General, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Family unity is important not only to maintain the integrity of the family unit, but also because its destruction has a detrimental impact on liberty, access to justice, and protection. It also negatively impacts emotional and psychological development and well-being, creates security and economic difficulties, and strips the dignity of an individual and their family as a whole. In addition, it is a fundamental human right enshrined in international and U.S. child welfare law. The federal government should prioritize liberty and family unity in its immigration policy, including enforcement actions. Government agencies with enforcement and custody responsibilities should have mechanisms to identify family members, and to prevent, mitigate, and track family separation in all cases. Instead of pursuing policies of deterrence and detention, family unity, the right to liberty, and reunification must become presumptive principles. Details: New York: Women's Refugee Commission, 2017. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2017 at: https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/ Shelf Number: 144479 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrant Families Immigration Enforcement Immigration Policy |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: The European Union's Policies on Counter-Terrorism: Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness Summary: This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, identifies (counter-) terrorism trends, threats and policies in the EU, focussing particularly on seven themes, including database access and interoperability, measures on border security, criminal justice and prevention of radicalisation. It also analyses the coherence and effectiveness of the counter-terrorism policy (architecture), and issues of cooperation, oversight and implementation, in particular of seven focus Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain. Moreover, this study addresses future scenarios and formulates concrete policy options and recommendations. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2017. 224p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 31, 2017 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583124/IPOL_STU(2017)583124_EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583124/IPOL_STU(2017)583124_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 144649 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-Terrorism Radical groups Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Baldo, Suliman Title: Border Control from Hell: How EU's migration partnership legitimizes Sudan's "militia state" Summary: Large-scale migration to Europe has precipitated a paradigm shift in relations between the European Union (EU) and the government of Sudan, and closer ties between both entities. This new partnership has resulted in the EU disbursing millions of euros to the Sudanese government for technical equipment and training efforts geared toward stopping the flow to Europe of migrants from Sudan and those from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa who come through Sudan. The EU's action plan will involve building the capacities of Sudan's security and law enforcement agencies, including a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been branded as Sudan's primary "border force." The EU will assist the RSF and other relevant agencies with the construction of two camps with detention facilities for migrants. The EU will also equip these Sudanese border forces with cameras, scanners, and electronic servers for registering refugees. There are legitimate concerns with these plans. Much of the EU-funded training and equipment is dual-use. The equipment that enables identification and registration of migrants will also reinforce the surveillance capabilities of a Sudanese government that has violently suppressed Sudanese citizens for the past 28 years. Sudan's strategy for stopping migrant flows on behalf of Europe involves a ruthless crackdown by the RSF on migrants within Sudan. Dogged by persistent armed uprisings led by opponents protesting chronic inequalities in the distribution of national wealth and political power in its periphery regions, the Sudanese government has always relied on a plethora of militia groups to counter insurgencies. The RSF is one of these militia groups. It evolved from the disparate Janjaweed militias that carried out the genocidal counterinsurgency policy of the Sudanese regime in Darfur that began in 2003. However, in its functions and evolution, the RSF differs significantly from other militia groups employed by the government. The RSF first evolved from a strike force deployed against insurgents in Darfur into a national counterinsurgency force under the operational command of Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) that was tasked with fighting the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Then, in September 2013, the RSF was deployed against peaceful demonstrators who were protesting the Sudanese government's removal of subsidies on basic commodities. More than 170 people were killed in September 2013, in incidents that unmasked the Sudanese regime's dependence on the militia to quell political dissent and marked a new evolution in the role of the RSF. Starting in 2015 and 2016, and convinced of the RSF's effectiveness as a counterinsurgency force, the regime designated the RSF as Sudan's primary force tasked with patrolling Sudanese borders to interdict migrants' movement. The Sudanese government made this designation within the framework of its partnership with the EU for the control of migration. As such, the RSF is positioned to receive EU funds for reducing the flows of migrants from Sudan to Europe. The Sudanese government enacted a law in January 2017 that integrated the RSF into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, national army). The 2017 law (conflictingly) made the RSF autonomous, integrated into the army, and under the command of President Omar al-Bashir. The EU and the EU member states that are most engaged with Sudan in the actual programmatic partnership on migration flows should scrutinize the record and conduct of the RSF as the partnership unfolds. By "building the capacity" of Sudan's newly minted border force with funding and training, the EU would not only be strengthening the hand of the RSF but also could find itself underwriting a complex system of a "militia state" that Sudan has evolved into since the current regime came to power in 1989. In so doing, the EU contradicts and undermines the overriding objectives of its own founding treaty. EU members cannot advance peace, security, and human rights and they cannot stem irregular migration from Sudan and the Horn of Africa by directly funding a government that deploys a militia group that stokes violent conflict, commits atrocities, and creates massive displacement of populations within Sudan. The remainder of this paper synthesizes public information about the RSF's activities and argues how EU support for this group could ultimately worsen irregular migration to Europe, escalate violent conflict within Sudan and the Horn of Africa, and embolden a regime and militia force that acts with impunity and now faces even fewer checks on its criminal behavior. This paper aims to highlight the latest developments from Sudan and examine the record of earlier engagements of the RSF, lest one or all of Sudan's EU partners claim, at a later date, that they were unaware of the perverse incentives at play. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2017 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf Shelf Number: 144768 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrationMigrantsMigration Enforcement |
Author: Espach, Ralph Title: The Dilemma of Lawlessness: Organized Crime, Violence, Prosperity, and Security along Guatemala's Borders Summary: For centuries, the Central American region has been among the world's most important transit zones. The Spanish shuttled the gold, silver, and other valuables from Southeast Asia and from South America across the Panamanian isthmus. Later, the French and the Americans competed to control and improve that route with a water canal, either in Panama or Nicaragua. Since the emergence of the United States as a major economy and consumer market, the region has been a key zone for the northward flow of all kinds of products - legal and illegal. Economically, the countries of Central America, particularly northern Central America (including Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador), have traditionally been among the most unequal in the Americas. Throughout most of these countries' histories, political power and state resources were controlled by the same families and networks that owned most of the land and industries. Relatively few resources and little state attention were dedicated to improving the lives of the poor, especially in isolated rural areas. Except during infrequent instances of insurgency, civil war, or interstate conflict, border control or even preserving a state presence in rural areas in these regions was not an important concern. In practical terms, national territorial borders were unmarked and did not exist. What is today considered smuggling was a normal, everyday practice. Many border communities had closer economic ties to cities, agricultural zones, or economic infrastructure such as railroads or ports in countries across the border than they did to those within their own country. Moreover, most of the residents of these rural areas were indigenous and largely disconnected from the country in which they lived and the government that notionally had authority over them. In this way, most border zones in these countries have traditionally been "ungoverned," or "undergoverned," in terms of their relations with the national and provincial or departmental governments. Over the decades, numerous groups have taken advantage of the porousness of these borders, and the general lawlessness of these remote areas (many of which are heavily forested and/or mountainous), to elude governments or armed forces. In addition to the ever-present smugglers, armed insurgent groups from both the left and the right, as well as paramilitaries of all stripes, crossed borders to conduct their operations during the Cold War. The most recent, and by some accounts the most dangerous, type of actors to exploit these weakly governed, porous borders in northern Central America have been narcotics trafficking networks. Illegal drugs have been smuggled from the world's foremost coca production zone - the northern Andean foothills - to the world's richest and largest drug consumption market - the United States - since at least the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, however, an international crackdown on drug smuggling through the Caribbean region led Colombian cartels to favor overland routes through Central America and Mexico. The Colombians moved product through the region largely by buying the services of local trafficking networks. These networks were particularly well developed in Guatemala as a result of the intelligence and transport networks the military created during that country's civil war from the 1960s to the 1990s. Over time, Mexican trafficking networks grew into competitive cartels themselves and began to fight each other for control over valuable transport and smuggling routes. Mexico's largest cartels-including the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Zeta-grew their operations from merely trafficking the product of others to buying the product upstream and controlling its transit in Central America. Traditionally, Colombian- or Mexican-run trafficking cartels operated in Guatemala by buying the services of local trafficking networks, but around 2008 they began to seek to control routes themselves. Many of these routes lie along the Guatemalan coast, where drugs are brought in by boat and then transferred onto land for transit into Mexico. Other routes enter from Honduras, with the drugs being flown in from Venezuela or brought in via boat. Recently, there has been evidence not only of a broad presence of Mexican drug-trafficking networks across Guatemala but also of the expansion of their operations there, particularly into drug processing. They also sell more of their product in local markets, rather than shipping it onward, fueling local gang activity and urban violence. Details: Arlington, CA: CNA; Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Shelf Number: 144948 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingGang-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSmugglingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Capps, Randy Title: Advances in U.S.- Mexico Border Enforcement: A Review of the Consequence Delivery System Summary: Questions about how to best secure the U.S.-Mexico border are central to U.S. immigration policy and debates around reforming U.S. immigration laws. In fiscal year (FY) 2011, the U.S. Border Patrol began implementing what it terms the Consequence Delivery System (CDS), its first systematic attempt to employ metrics of effectiveness and efficiency to the different forms of removal and other enforcement consequences that migrants face after being apprehended at the Southwest border. This report presents findings from a year-long study that included analysis of previously unpublished CDS data provided to MPI by the Border Patrol as well as fieldwork in the Tucscon and Rio Grande Valley sectors, discussing which consequence measures may be most effective in deterring illegal migration. As the Border Patrol has shifted towards greater use of formal removal and away from voluntary return, its use of consequences and allocation of resources-including expedited removal, lateral repatriation, and criminal prosecution via Streamline - have been measured and guided by CDS. Overall, the share of migrants apprehended more than once in the same fiscal year fell from 29 percent in FY 2007 to 14 pecent in FY 2014. Ultimately, while CDS has become an important tool that informs Border Patrol priorities, the authors find that some of its underlying assumptions about effectiveness and deterrence may be less applicable to the U.S.-Mexico border today than in the past. The shift from majority Mexican arrivals to new and diverse migrant groups, particularly women and children fleeing violence in Central America, has both limited the consequences the Border Patrol can impose and revealed limitations in data collection. Tackling these challenges will be essential to future enforcement strategy and policy-making. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2017. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/advances-us-mexico-border-enforcement-review-consequence-delivery-system Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/advances-us-mexico-border-enforcement-review-consequence-delivery-system Shelf Number: 145309 Keywords: Border EnforcementBorder SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DeportationImmigration Policy |
Author: Drake, B. Shaw Title: Crossing the Line: U.S. Border Agents Illegally Turning Away Asylum Seekers at U.S. Border Summary: The U.S. government is illegally turning away asylum seekers at official land crossings all along the southern border. Border agents must refer a person seeking asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a protection screening interview or an immigration court proceeding where they can seek asylum. Instead, some border agents are blocking access to asylum by refusing to process protection requests. This practice violates both U.S. law and U.S. treaty obligations. It also clashes with the ideals of a nation that has often led globally on refugee protection, a nation that President Reagan aptly described as a "beacon" to people searching for freedom. U.S. government entities have raised concerns about the treatment of asylum seekers. In 2016, for example, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) cited some Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers' "outright skepticism, if not hostility, toward asylum claims and inadequate quality assurance procedures." Also in 2016 Human Rights First and other non-governmental organizations raised concerns about reports that the government was turning away asylum seekers in San Ysidro, California as CPB officers struggled to manage an increase in arrivals. This practice proliferated after the November 2016 election and persists even as the number of arrivals has fallen sharply. In the wake of the election and President Trump's January executive orders relating to refugees, CPB agents have in some cases claimed the United States is no longer accepting asylum seekers. For example, a CBP officer in south Texas reportedly told a Central American asylum seeker, "Trump says we don't have to let you in." In San Ysidro a CPB officer reportedly told a Mexican asylum seeker, "[Christians] are the people we are giving asylum to, not people like you." CBP officers are improperly rejecting asylum seekers at small ports of entry and major ones across the border, including in Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, El Paso, and San Diego. When they are blocked from protection, asylum seekers face continued danger in Mexico, often immediately. Cartels, smugglers, and traffickers - who control areas around border crossings and wait outside some ports of entry where they see migrants and asylum seekers as easy prey - have kidnapped, raped, and robbed asylum seekers wrongly turned away by the U.S. government. In February, March, and April, Human Rights First researchers visited the border regions of California, Texas, and Arizona, and the Mexican border cities of Reynosa, Matamoros, Nogales, and Tijuana. They interviewed asylum seekers, attorneys, non-profit legal staff, faith-based groups assisting refugees, and migrant shelter staff. While recent data shows CBP agents referred some 8,000 asylum seekers at ports of entry from December 2016 to March 2017, an unknown number of asylum seekers have been unlawfully rejected. This report is based on 125 cases of individuals and families wrongfully denied access to U.S. asylum procedures at U.S. ports of entry. Many more have likely suffered a similar fate as these abuses often goes unreported due to the security threats faced by those who are turned away, the dearth of legal counsel, and the lack of effective compliance mechanisms and monitoring of CBP practices. Details: New York: Human Rights First, 2017. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 5, 2017 at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-line-report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-line-report.pdf Shelf Number: 145318 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder PatrolBorder SecurityHuman Rights AbusesImmigration EnforcementImmigration Policy |
Author: Luong, Hai Thanh Title: Transnational Narcotics Trafficking and Law Enforcement: A Vietnam Perspective Summary: Close proximity to the major production zones, porous borderlands, mountainous frontiers and long coastlines offer advantageous conditions for trafficking narcotics. The illicit drug situation has become much more complex in Vietnam with the growth in amphetaminetype stimulants production and trade. Even so, empirical research and analysis of the organization and operation of transnational narcotics trafficking (TransNT) remains limited. The purpose of this thesis is to present the first detailed inquiry into the nature of TransNT across the border between Lao PDR and Vietnam using an exploratory approach which draws upon qualitative and quantitative methods. In particular, the thesis presents findings from case studies of cross-border trafficking between Vietnam and Lao PDR in the period of 2003-2013 combined with interview and survey data from criminal investigation police and drug-related crimes officers (CIPDRC) from six border provinces who are directly and indirectly involved in investigating these cases. The findings of this study indicate that drug markets in Vietnam are not controlled by monopolistic, hierarchical organizations or 'cartels'. The structures of TransNT entities operating across the Lao-Vietnam border are small, based on family ties and fellow-countrymen relations, are fluid and loosely organized. They are very adaptable and sophisticated with diverse modus operandi and multiple divisions of labour. This presents particular challenges to law enforcement agencies (LAEs). This thesis questions to capacity of Vietnam's police to enforce the government's zero-tolerance anti-narcotics policy. The study highlights practical problems and specific barriers in combating TransNT. LEAs in Vietnam and Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) operate without effective mechanisms to cooperate and share information. It is also the case that traffickers often have more sophisticated equipment at their disposal to help them avoid arrest. Police forces work within national structures and yet are faced with the task of combatting transnational crime. This reality affects law enforcement capacity at a national as well as regional level, but Association of the Southeast Asian Nations member states have yet to establish effective structures for dealing with this non-traditional security challenge. Based on these findings, therefore, the thesis proposes recommendations to enhancing the effectiveness of LEAs in dealing with TransNT across Vietnam's border with Lao PDR. Details: Melbourne, AUS: School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, College of Design and Social Context, RMIT University, 2017. 417p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 16, 2017 at: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:162002/Luong.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Vietnam URL: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:162002/Luong.pdf Shelf Number: 145478 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug EnforcementDrug marketsDrug TraffickingIllicit Drugs |
Author: Altangerel, Khulan Title: U.S. Immigration Reform and the Dynamics of Mexican Migration Summary: he 1986 US Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was directed at tackling the problem of growing unauthorized migration through legalization of unauthorized immigrants, increasing border security and sanctioning employers who hired unauthorized immigrants. Our paper investigates how the IRCA affected the migration dynamics of Mexican immigrants focusing on their age of onset of migration and the duration of their first trip. We find that the IRCA had a positive effect in reducing unauthorized migration to the US. Although primarily aiming at unauthorized immigration, the IRCA had substantial effects on legal migration through its legalization program. Details: Bonn: IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 2017. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10771: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971387 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971387 Shelf Number: 145752 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal Immigrants Immigration Enforcement Immigration Policy |
Author: Galemba, Rebecca B. Title: Cultures of Contraband: Contesting Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border Summary: Driving from Frontera Comalapa, Chiapas, Mexico to the communities on the Mexico-Guatemala border where I planned to live and conduct fieldwork from September 2006- September 2007, I drove through several rural farms, towns, and winding roads. Upon reaching the Pan-American Highway is a makeshift police station, a small concrete building labeled, PFP (Policia Federal Preventiva, or Federal Preventative Police). Outside a police car was stationed as traffic whizzed by. Shortly before entering the border communities, there is also a military base. The Mexican government installed this base in the late 1990s during the Zapatista conflict to monitor resistance, despite the fact that the Zapatistas had little presence in the Comalapa region. The military currently uses the base to erect road blockades to inspect for contraband, illegal migrants, illicit drugs, and illegal firearms. There were almost always blockades on Fridays so that soldiers could inspect vehicles returning from market day at the official border crossing at La Mesilla, Guatemala and Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, Mexico. I had originally intended to conduct research at the Mexico-Guatemala border to study the contrasts between policies that simultaneously advocated an "open" border for free trade and a militarized border to comply with Washington's security demands to stem the northward flow of illicit drugs, crime, and undocumented migrants (Benitez Manaut 2003; Pickard, CIEPAC 2007). Despite the increased presence of the Mexican military and police forces2 in the region, border residents agreed that since the late 1990s they experienced less official border surveillance. Instead, residents allude to a booming industry of cross-border contraband in everyday goods, as well as undocumented migrants, arms, and drugs. I realized that my original interest in undocumented migration formed part of a larger picture of historical and cross-border flows of people, goods, and information. Studying border flows from the ground-up revealed a border region that was not just simultaneously "open" to goods and "closed" to people as I had anticipated, but full of various contingent and conflicting openings and enclosures. When I interviewed a Mexican customs inspector at Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, he lamented, "In this region illegality governs. It is what distinguishes this region [from other customs inspections posts]." This inspector had worked in multiple customs ports throughout Mexico, but seemed to resign and adapt himself to this aspect of "illegality," referring to it as part of the "regional culture." Despite stricter laws and Mexico's modernization of the official border crossing and customs inspections in the late 1990s, he told me that most commerce in the region occurred in clandestine crossings. This dissertation examines the multiple meanings of illegality and how notions of illegality permeate, and at times govern, social, political, and economic life at the Mexico-Guatemala border. A 2006 article in El Financiero, labeled the Mexico-Guatemala border "a paradise for contraband...[stating that] the problem, which is little spoken about, is that illegality dominates everything at the border." By focusing on the residents of a clandestine border pathway on the Mexico-Guatemala border, I problematize the concept of "illegality," arguing that the social and economic relations engendered by illegal practices often generate new forms of law, economy, and moral norms. While legal and illegal practices may blur in everyday interactions (Nordstrom 2007), I examine how residents distinguish and organize the heterogeneity of these practices in order to situate illegality within the larger political and moral economy. By examining the daily relations between border residents, state and federal agents, farmers, formal-sector companies, and smugglers, I illustrate how illegality produces and reconstitutes gendered, ethnic, and class inflected subjectivities. Details: Providence, RI: Brown University, 2009. 364p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Shelf Number: 130138 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug TraffickingIllegal FirearmsIllegal MigrantsIllicit DrugsTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Mexico's Southern Border: Security, Central American Migration, and U.S. Policy Summary: It has been nearly three years since the Mexican government announced its Southern Border Program, which dramatically increased security operations and apprehensions of northbound migrants. This report-based on field research in the area surrounding Tenosique, Tabasco along Mexico's border with Guatemala-examines migration flows, enforcement, and insecurity in southern Mexico. - THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO INTEND TO STAY IN MEXICO, RATHER THAN TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. Many are seeking asylum or other forms of immigration status. Between 2014 and 2016, there was a 311 percent increase in asylum requests in Mexico. In the first three months of 2017, Mexico had received more asylum applications than all of 2015. The UN Refugee Agency estimates that Mexico will receive up to 20,000 asylum requests in 2017. - DECREASED MIGRATION FLOWS THROUGH MEXICO AND AT THE U.S. SOUTHWEST BORDER DURING THE MONTHS FOLLOWING PRESIDENT TRUMP'S INAUGURATION ARE NOT SUSTAINABLE. News of the Trump administration's hard line appears to have caused a wave of Central American migration before January 20, and a sharp drop afterward. However, until there are improvements in the violence and adverse conditions from which Central Americans are fleeing, people will continue to migrate en masse. By May 2017, apprehension levels at the U.S-Mexico border had begun to tiptoe back up, with a 31 percent increase in total apprehensions compared to April, and a 50 percent increase in apprehensions of unaccompanied minors. - ALTHOUGH MEXICO REGISTERED LOWER APPREHENSION LEVELS IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 2017 COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS, MIGRATION ENFORCEMENT UNDER MEXICO'S SOUTHERN BORDER PROGRAM REMAINS HIGH. Total migrant apprehensions increased by a staggering 85 percent during the Southern Border Program's first two years of operation (July 2014 to June 2016) compared to pre-Program levels. Limited government resources, migrants' and smugglers' ability to adjust to new security patterns, corruption among authorities, and an overall drop in migration from Central America since President Trump took office have all likely contributed to the leveling off of apprehensions seen in Mexico in recent months. - CRIMES AND ABUSES AGAINST MIGRANTS TRAVELING THROUGH MEXICO CONTINUE TO OCCUR AT ALARMING RATES, AND SHELTERS HAVE NOTED A MORE INTENSE DEGREE OF VIOLENCE IN THE CASES THEY DOCUMENT. While Mexico's major organized criminal groups do not operate heavily in the Tenosique corridor, smaller criminal bands and Central American gang affiliates routinely rob, kidnap, and sexually assault migrants along this portion of the migration route. Migrant rights organizations in southern Mexico documented an increase in cases of migration and police authorities' abuse of migrants as a result of the Southern Border Program, including recent accounts of migration agents, who are supposed to be unarmed, using pellet guns and electrical shock devices. - THERE HAVE BEEN FEWER U.S. ASSISTANCE DELIVERIES TO MEXICO FOR THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROGRAM THAN ORIGINALLY EXPECTED, BUT BIOMETRIC AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS CONTINUE APACE. The U.S. State and Defense Departments are currently implementing a US$88 million dollar program to increase Mexican immigration authorities' capacity to collect biometric data and share information about who is crossing through Mexico with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. State and Defense Departments are also funding a US$75 million project to improve secure communications between Mexican agencies in the country's southern border zone. This program has erected 12 communications towers so far, all of them on Mexican naval posts. - THE MIGRATION ROUTE INTO MEXICO THROUGH TENOSIQUE, TABASCO HAS SEEN A SHARP INCREASE IN CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FLEEING VIOLENCE IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE REGION. Between 2014 and 2016, the number of children (both accompanied and unaccompanied) apprehended in the state of Tabasco increased by 60 percent. The majority of migrants traveling through this area of the border are from Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2017 at: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/980081/download Year: 2017 Country: Central America URL: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/980081/download Shelf Number: 147169 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityHuman SmugglingIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementMigrantsUnaccompanied Minors |
Author: Jones, Chris Title: Market Forces: The development of the EU Security-Industrial Complex Summary: Despite the economic crisis, EU funding for new security tools and technologies will double in the 2014-20 period compared to the previous 6 years. The biggest winners have been the "homeland security" industry whose influence on European policy continues to grow, constructing an ever more militarised and security-focused Europe. While the European Union project has faltered in recent years, afflicted by the fall-out of the economic crisis, the rise of anti-EU parties and the Brexit vote, there is one area where it has not only continued apace but made significant advances: Europe's security policies have not only gained political support from across its Member States but growing budgets and resources too. The increased securitisation of the European Union has relevance not only for its Member States but for the world which will be affected by the measures, technologies and strategies being developed, sold and deployed. The emergence of 'security' as the EU's increasingly default response to complex social and ecological crises is also significant given the current political context of rising authoritarian parties and governments all-too-willing to use the latest security tools to maintain and extend power. This report digs deep into the EU's funding of its security strategy. It shows that between 2014 and 2020, a total of at least L11 billion has been allocated to budgets directed towards security measures - L3.8 billion to the Internal Security Fund (ISF), L1.7 billion to the European Security Research Programme, L3.1 billion to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (which has numerous uses in the context of security policy) and some L2.4 billion for EU home affairs agencies such as Europol and Frontex. While still a small amount in comparison to the EU's total budget of "1 trillion between 2014 and 2020, it is a significant development given that a decade ago the bloc had no dedicated budgets for security, justice or home affairs. The report's investigation of the different budgets also draws out the big picture of where the funding is going and what it is helping to construct: an all-encompassing vision of security that seeks to combat a seemingly limitless number of "threats" ranging from terrorism to petty crime, and which displays a marked tendency of treating the entire population (European and especially non-European) as potential objects of suspicion that must be surveyed and if necessary detained, obstructed or even killed. This vision has been propelled by military and security corporations whose profits depend on a world of suspicions, fears and threats - and who have not only been major beneficiaries of EU security spending, but have also been given an unprecedented role in designing the security research programme. In a 2009 report by Statewatch and TNI, we warned that EU's security, research and development policies were "coalescing around a high-tech blueprint for a new kind of security". We summed up the vision in the title of the report, NeoConOpticon, to capture the metaphor of an all-seeing prison combined with the increasingly neoconservative, corporate-led vision of the EU's security and defence policies. It warned that we were "turning a blind eye to the start of a new kind of arms race, one in which all the weapons are pointing inwards". That report examined the early years of EU security strategies, from 2003 to 2008, and focused on the beginnings of the European Security Research Programme (ESRP) and the 85 projects it had funded up to that point. Market Forces focuses on the development of EU security policies and budgets through the 2007-13 period and their successors, which were launched in 2014 and will run until 2020. These include the ESRP, which funds research to develop new technologies for law enforcement, border control, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection and leans heavily towards technologies and techniques initially deployed or favoured by military forces: drones, data-mining tools, large-scale surveillance systems, biometric recognition and automated behaviour analysis tools. It also explicitly seeks to develop "dual-use" technologies for both civil and military use. The report also analyses the Internal Security Fund (ISF), distributed to EU Member States to enhance the powers of law enforcement and border control agencies (including through numerous new surveillance and analysis systems). The aim - albeit not yet realised - is that EU funds pay for both the development of new technologies and their subsequent purchase at EU or national level, creating a self-fulfilling loop of supply and demand. Despite warnings and public concerns over the direction of the EU's security strategy, the journey towards a world of ubiquitous public-private surveillance and control systems continues, for the time being, largely unabated. The report is divided into three sections: the first provides a summary of the early development of the European Security Research Programme, its incorporation into the EU's formal research agenda, and the concurrent development and implementation of EU policies and budgets in the area of justice and home affairs from 2007 to 2013. The second section looks at the institutions, corporations and organisations involved in the development and ongoing implementation of the EU's security research agenda and security policies, and the ways in which private interests have long-managed to successfully shape the public policy and research agenda. The third section looks at current EU security policies and budgets. It seeks to provide a general overview of aims and objectives of current policies, the funds available for implementing them, and which organisations have so far been the chief beneficiaries. The EU's security agenda is now so sprawling and complex that no one report can cover every aspect of it, but there are a few key themes that are worth drawing out here. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2017. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2017 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf Shelf Number: 147371 Keywords: Border SecurityCybersecurityHomeland SecurityLaw Enforcement TechnologySecurity PolicySurveillanceTerrorism |
Author: Petrossian, Gohar Title: Export of Stolen Vehicles Across Land Borders Summary: Each year a large number of cars and trucks are stolen for export in regions of the United States bordering Mexico. Most of these vehicles are simply driven across the border where they generally remain. By contrast, few stolen vehicles are reportedly exported across the border with Canada. This guide is therefore mostly concerned with the problem of vehicles stolen for export to Mexico, though it should also be useful to police dealing with the problems of exporting stolen vehicles across land borders elsewhere in the world. There is no reliable measure of vehicle thefts for export in the United States. These thefts are included in the police statistics of unrecovered vehicle thefts, a broad category that includes many other kinds of vehicle theft, such as vehicles stolen for the sale of their parts. This means that local police may underestimate the scale of theft for export in their jurisdiction. The lack of data also makes it difficult for local police to analyze and deal with the problem. This guide is primarily intended to help local police deal with theft for export, though it might also be of value to county or state agencies. It summarizes the factors that put local jurisdictions at risk of theft for export, and provides a method of estimating the size of their problem. It identifies information that police should collect when engaged in a problem-oriented project to reduce theft for export. Finally, it provides details on methods that have been developed to deal effectively with this problem. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2012. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Problem-Specific Guides Series Problem-Oriented Guides for Police; No. 63: Accessed January 30, 2018 at:https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p213-pub.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p213-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 131199 Keywords: Automobile Theft Border SecurityMotor Vehicle Theft Stolen Vehicles |
Author: Grimes, Mark Title: Reasons and Resolve to Cross the Line: A Post-Apprehension Survey of Unauthorized Immigrants along the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: To better understand the histories and motivations of immigrants who attempt to cross the U.S.-Mexico border without authorization, researchers with the National Center for Border Security and Immigration (BORDERS) interviewed 1,000 detainees in the U.S. Border Patrol Tucson Sector during the summer of 2012. Survey approach - The research team used a 38-question sur vey (Appendix A) administered by bilingual inter viewers to learn about the detainees' characteristics, their current and previous border crossing attempts, and their reasons for crossing. Overarching questions - To address the primar y goal of the study, all sur vey questions were related to two principal questions: (1) Do you think you will attempt to cross again in the next seven days? (2) Do you think you will return to the U.S. someday? Interview safeguards and assurances - To encourage truthful responses, the interviewers assured the individuals that their responses would remain anonymous, that the inter viewers did not work for the Border Patrol, that individual sur vey results would not be shared with the Border Patrol, that the individuals' answers would not influence legal or administrative outcomes, and that the individuals could skip any question or could conclude the interview at any point. Cross-check of data veracity - To cross-check the veracity of the data, responses to two questions-date of birth and number of previous apprehensions-were compared with fingerprint verified data from the Border Patrol. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS - What are the motivations for crossing? This study found that work and the existence of family in the United States are the primary motivations for individuals who attempt to enter the country without authorization. Which persons will attempt to reenter? According to this study, in general, detainees who are more likely to attempt to re-cross the border are those that: - have relatives or friends in the United States, - have a job in the United States, - have relatively more education than other detainees, - live in the United States (or consider the United States home), - are relatively familiar with crossing options and dangers, and/or - have made relatively more attempts at crossing. What are the effects of the consequences of apprehension? For individuals with motivations listed above, the consequences of apprehension do not seem to be a major deterrent. Details: Tucson: University of Arizona, National Center for Border Security and Immigration, 2013. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: http://www.borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/Post-Aprehension-Survey-REPORT%20may31-2013_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/Post-Aprehension-Survey-REPORT%20may31-2013_0.pdf Shelf Number: 148983 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrants |
Author: Johnson, Jennifer Title: The Forgotten Border: Migration and Human Rights at Mexico's Southern Border Summary: The nature of transborder migration and human rights violations against migrants at Mexico's southern border has received scant attention. The Forgotten Border: Migration & Human Rights at Mexico's Southern Border sheds light on the abuse and exploitation experienced by many transmigrants as they journey northward, as well as trends in Mexico's practices regarding immigration and border enforcement policies. The nature of transborder migration and human rights violations against migrants at Mexico's southern border has received scant attention. The Forgotten Border: Migration & Human Rights at Mexico's Southern Border sheds light on the abuse and exploitation experienced by many transmigrants as they journey northward, as well as trends in Mexico's practices regarding immigration and border enforcement policies. In 2008, the U.S. Congress will consider giving $1 billion in assistance to Mexico as part of the "Merida Initiative." As programs in this aid package are framed as support for human interdiction, border security and law enforcement activities, it is critical that policymakers and advocates gain a clearer understanding of the broader context in which human rights abuses take place in Mexico's southern border region to ensure that U.S. policy, and in particular, the Merida Initiative, does not aggravate a precarious situation any further. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Working Group, 2008. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2018 at: http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/forgotten%20border.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/forgotten%20border.pdf Shelf Number: 149528 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Rights AbusesIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationImmigration EnforcementMigration |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Performance Management and Planning for Expansion of DHS's Visa Security Program Summary: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) manages the Visa Security Program (VSP), which provides an additional layer of review to the visa adjudication process; however, VSP agents are not consistently providing required training to consular officers. ICE implemented the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT) in fiscal year 2014. PATRIOT screens 100 percent of nonimmigrant visa applications at VSP posts against U.S. databases, and U.S.-based analysts manually vet applications with potential matches to derogatory information. VSP agents at post then make recommendations to Department of State (State) consular officers on whether to refuse a visa. In fiscal year 2016, VSP screened over 2.1 million visa applications, and recommended over 8,000 visa refusals. In addition, VSP agents and VSP-funded locally employed staff dedicated approximately 43 percent of their work hours in fiscal year 2016 to non-VSP activities-such as assisting ICE investigations not directly related to visas. ICE increased the percentage of VSP posts providing quarterly training from 30 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 79 percent in fiscal year 2016. However, some trainings are not targeted to the specific post and do not address identified threats to the visa process, as required. Ensuring that VSP agents provide required training would help ensure consular officers have information that could assist them in adjudicating visas. ICE developed objectives and performance measures for VSP, but its measures are not outcome-based and limit the agency's ability to assess the effectiveness of VSP. As of fiscal year 2017, none of VSP's 19 established performance measures are outcome-based. For example, ICE measures its activities, such as number of visa refusals VSP agents recommended, rather than the outcomes of those recommendations. ICE officials stated that measuring VSP's outcomes is difficult due to the qualitative nature of the program's benefits; however, solely tracking activities, such as number of recommended refusals, does not allow ICE to evaluate VSP's effectiveness. Developing and implementing outcome-based performance measures, consistent with best practices for performance management, would help ICE determine whether VSP is achieving its objectives. ICE evaluated options for VSP expansion but its site selection process did not incorporate PATRIOT data or options for remote operations that, for example, use U.S.-based VSP agents. ICE has previously utilized PATRIOT to gather data to estimate program capacity, but ICE officials stated that they do not use PATRIOT to collect data on the potential number of ineligible visa applicants and workload for posts under consideration for VSP expansion. By incorporating PATRIOT data on posts under consideration into its site selection process, ICE could more effectively manage human capital and other resources. Further, ICE has implemented remote VSP operations in some posts, but does not consider such approaches during its annual site selection process. ICE documentation stated that ICE could successfully screen and vet applicants remotely through VSP, however the officials' preferred approach is to deploy agents to posts overseas. Incorporating remote options for VSP operations could help identify opportunities to further expand VSP and better utilize resources. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2018. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-18-314: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690732.pdf Shelf Number: 149678 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigration and Customs EnforcementImmigration EnforcementVisas |
Author: Coyne, John Title: Border security lessons for Australia from Europe's Schengen experience Summary: Brexit, and the 2016 US presidential election result, provided tangible evidence that migration and border security policies are becoming increasingly politicised in Western liberal democracies. Public policy dialogue on migration and border security has become ever more polarised into a zero sum game in which debates on both issues descend into a binary 'secure' or 'insecure' ultimatum. Far too often, pragmatism is giving way to simplistic 'balancing' metaphors that achieve neither security nor border facilitation goals. It's this binary border security policy thinking that's tearing at the Schengen Area's collaborative strategy. Adding further complexity to this policy space is a phenomenon in which citizens of Western liberal democracies are experiencing an inexplicable and illogical fear of migrants. In a practical sense, the public policy dialogue, along with its media coverage, is widening the gap between the fear of migrants and migration-related risks and the actual or estimated probable threat. From a security perspective, people are more scared of migration and migrants than they ought to be. US President Trump's successful 2016 election platform engaged with this emotively charged public fear by further demonising migration. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Insights, 117: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/import/SI117_-Schengen-lessons-for-Australia.pdf?fr4QW2WQxT2ozsmvLeaOyunDB7o83kWb Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/import/SI117_-Schengen-lessons-for-Australia.pdf?fr4QW2WQxT2ozsmvLeaOyunDB7o83kWb Shelf Number: 149753 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllicit GoodsIrregular MigrantsTerrorists |
Author: Danelo, David J. Title: For Protection or Profit? Free trade, human smuggling and international border management Summary: For the past two decades, policy officials and human-rights groups in both Europe and the US have participated in a vicious cycle of criticizing each other over the impact of border-control policies. Many activists hold enforcement authorities responsible for the human impact of migration enforcement, evident in allegations of increases in human smuggling and the grim realities of migrant deaths. In contrast, policymakers often claim that humanrights advocates encourage migration and risk-taking by proposing consequence-free international transit, which exacerbates the problem. Although the role of free-trade policies and supply chains is critical to understanding the border-management landscape in which these activities play out, customs laws are rarely considered by either side in this debate. This policy paper considers the impact of multinational corporations on border control through so-called trusted trader and traveller programmes, whose aim is to reduce border inspections for individuals and companies by allowing inspectors to pre-screen cargo and passengers who pass background investigations. Although these programmes have become essential to the management of global supply chains, they often create an illusion of increased security while simultaneously intensifying the divide between those who are and those who are not willing to pay the fees to participate in them. The paper also critically examines two pillars of American border policy - beyond-the-border initiatives and joint border management - and compares them with security elements of the European system. These mechanisms, which increased sharply through American-led initiatives following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, often appear effective and harmless, and therefore receive little scrutiny. Both in the US and Europe, multinational border-control agreements have been subjected to little scrutiny because of the failure of stakeholders to hold the global transportation system and state authorities accountable for these agreements. Although scant empirical evidence is available, what little does exist suggests that illicit activities, such as smuggling, are only marginally deterred by these strategies. By taking advantage of the vulnerabilities in such border-control agreements, smugglers of migrants and contraband are able to exploit trusted trader/ traveler programmes and public-private partnerships by using companies or people that are participants to make illicit transits. Although these agreements should not be eliminated, Europe should be cautious about mirroring the American approach to border management. And amid the current political climate of increasingly xenophobic US immigration policies, European policy negotiators should consider stipulating minimum requirements for participation in US programmes, including protections for people seeking humanitarian relief. Details: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Note: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/For-Protection-or-Profit-Intl-Border-Management-March-2018-web.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/For-Protection-or-Profit-Intl-Border-Management-March-2018-web.pdf Shelf Number: 149847 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder ControlBorder SecurityHuman SmugglingIllegal ImmigrationMigration EnforcementOrganized Crime |
Author: Bruni, Vittorio Title: Study on Migration Routes in West and Central Africa Summary: This report provides an overview of the complex migration trends in West and Central Africa. Based on a desk review of the existing literature and data, the report presents the main drivers and trends of migration in the region, the main routes migrants take to move from the region to get to Europe, migrant vulnerabilities, and the policy and programme responses to migration (multilateral and inter-regional frameworks, regional organizations, and bilateral agreements). The migration contexts of thirteen countries in West and Central Africa are examined: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. These countries are, to different extents, all origin, transit, and/or destination countries of migrants. In West and Central Africa, asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants move within the region and beyond it, motivated by different and often overlapping factors, including conflicts, political and socio-economic conditions, and environmental causes. Economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, tend to use similar migration routes and modes of travel. Among the group of migrants originating from the focus countries there are also irregular migrants and victims of human trafficking. For most "irregular" West-African migrants, migration is "regular" in the sense that movements of citizens of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are prescribed by the freedom of movement protocols of ECOWAS. However, while citizens in this region have the right to free movement, they often lack the correct or recognised documents for movement, making them "irregular" migrants in the region. Even with the ECOWAS free movement protocol in place, there are many barriers to regular migration for prospective migrants, including administrative and bureaucratic challenges and a lack of governmental ability to implement ECOWAS legislations. Corruption is also a major impediment to regular migration, as paying bribes to border patrols is, in many countries, an institutionalised norm. Bribes are often required even when migrants are in possession of proper documentation. Most migrants in the West and Central African region move within the region, and they largely do so by travelling by highways in private cars or buses. Contrary to popular belief, the minority of people that migrate from the region seek to reach Europe. Among those migrants that seek to reach Europe, most rely for the last part of their journey on smugglers that will bring them from some northern Nigerien or Malian cities to either Algeria or, more commonly, Libya. Generally, the complex nature of migration in the region makes it a challenge to identify different types of migrants and their specific vulnerabilities and needs. For these reasons, the flows of migration in the region are often referred to as mixed or complex migration. Details: Maastricht, Netherlands: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017. 170p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed April 27, 2018 at: https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1518182884.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1518182884.pdf Shelf Number: 149927 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityHuman TraffickingImmigrantsImmigration PolicyMigrantsRefugees |
Author: Marchand, Katrin Title: Study on Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa Summary: This report provides an overview of the complex mixed migration trends in the East and Horn of Africa. Based on a desk review of the existing literature and data on the main drivers and trends of migration in the region, the main routes, migrant vulnerabilities and needs as well as policy and programme responses to migration are presented. Specifically, the mixed migration context of eight countries in the East and Horn of Africa is examined: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. These countries are, to different extents, all origin, transit and/ or destination countries of migrants. In the East and Horn of Africa, asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants move within the region as well as beyond for a variety of different factors, including conflicts, political and socio-economic conditions as well as environmental causes in their respective countries of origin. These migrants often use the same migration routes and modes of travel, including smugglers. In addition, victims of trafficking may also be among these migrants. Overall, this mixed nature of migration in the region makes it a challenge to identify different types of migrants and their specific vulnerabilities and needs. Drivers of Migration The factors that lead people to make the decision to migrate through both regular and irregular channels are often called the drivers of migration. This includes both voluntary and forced movements as well as temporary and permanent ones. The countries in the East and Horn of Africa share many characteristics, but differ in others. It can be said that the region as a whole faces challenges associated with low human and economic development. In addition, violent conflicts, political oppression and persecution are or have been main migration drivers in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. In the case of Eritrea the obligatory national service requirements present another significant driver of migration. Environmental factors are also increasingly affecting countries in the region and impact peoples' livelihoods and migration decisions. Migration from Uganda and Kenya is mainly driven by economic factors. Often it is a mix of different factors that lead to the decision to migrate. It is important to keep in mind that even though the eight focus countries share some common drivers of migration the specific country context matters. Details: Maastricht, Netherlands: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 27, 2018 at: https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1517475164.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1517475164.pdf Shelf Number: 149929 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Border Security Human TraffickingImmigrants Immigration Policy Migrants Refugees |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Lessons from San Diego's Border Wall: The limits to using walls for migration, drug trafficking challenges Summary: The prototypes for President Trump's proposed border wall are currently sitting just outside San Diego, California, an area that serves as a perfect example of how limited walls, fences, and barriers can be when dealing with migration and drug trafficking challenges. As designated by Customs and Border Protection, the San Diego sector covers 60 miles of the westernmost U.S.-Mexico border, and 46 of them are already fenced off. Here, fence-building has revealed a new set of border challenges that a wall can't fix. The San Diego sector shows that: - Fences or walls can reduce migration in urban areas, but make no difference in rural areas. In densely populated border areas, border-crossers can quickly mix in to the population. But nearly all densely populated sections of the U.S.-Mexico border have long since been walled off. In rural areas, where crossers must travel miles of terrain, having to climb a wall first is not much of a deterrent. A wall would be a waste of scarce budget resources. - People who seek protected status aren't deterred by walls. Some asylum-seekers even climbed existing fence at the prototype site while construction was occurring. In San Diego, they include growing numbers of Central American children and families. Last year in the sector, arrivals included thousands of Haitians who journeyed from Brazil, many of whom now live in Tijuana. The presence or absence of a fence made no difference in their decision to seek out U.S. authorities to petition for protection. - Fences are irrelevant to drug flows. Of all nine border sectors, San Diego leads in seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and probably fentanyl. Authorities find the vast majority of these drugs at legal border crossings-not in the spaces between where walls would be built. Interdicting more drugs at the border would require generous investment in modern, well-staffed ports of entry-but instead, the Trump administration is asking Congress to pay for a wall. - The border doesn't need a wall. It needs better-equipped ports of entry, investigative capacity, technology, and far more ability to deal with humanitarian flows. In its current form, the 2018 Homeland Security Appropriations bill is pursuing a wrong and wasteful approach. The experience of San Diego makes that clear. Details: Washington, DC: WOLA, 2017. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2018 at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-lessons-san-diegos-border-wall/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-lessons-san-diegos-border-wall/ Shelf Number: 149951 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Akkerman, Mark Title: Expanding the Fortress: The policies, the profiteers and the people shaped by EU's border externalisation programme Summary: The plight of the world's 66 million forcibly displaced persons tends to only trouble the European Union's conscience when the media spotlight turns on a tragedy at Europe's borders or when displacment is perceived to be en route to Europe. Only one European nation - Germany - is even in the top ten countries worldwide that receive refugees leaving the vast majority of forcibly displaced persons hosted by some of the world's poorest nations. The invisibility therefore is only broken when border communities such as Calais, Lampedusa, Lesvos become featured in the news as desperate people fleeing violence end up dead, detained or trapped. These tragedies aren't just unfortunate results of war or conflict elsewhere, they are also the direct result of Europe's policies on migration since the Schengen agreement in 1985. This approach has focused on fortifying borders, developing ever more sophisticated surveillance and tracking of people, and increasing deportations while providing ever fewer legal options for residency despite ever greater need. This has led many forcibly displaced persons unable to enter Europe legally and forced into ever more dangerous routes to escape violence and conflict. What is less well-known is that the same European-made tragedy plays out well beyond our borders in countries as far away as Senegal and Azerbaijan. This is due to another pillar of Europe's approach to migration, known as border externalisation. Since 1992 and even more aggressively since 2005, the EU has developed a policy of externalising Europe's border so that forcibly displaced people never get to Europe's borders in the first place. These policies involve agreements with Europe's neighbouring countries to accept deported persons and adopt the same policies of border control, improved tracking of people and fortified borders as Europe. In other words, these agreements have turned Europe's neighbours into Europe's new border guards. And because they are so far from Europe's shores and media, the impacts are almost completely invisible to EU citizens. This report seeks to shine a spotlight on the policies that underpin this externalisation of Europe's borders, the agreements that have been signed, the corporations and entities that profit, and the consequences for forcibly displaced people as well as the countries and populations that host them. It is the third in a series, Border Wars, that have examined Europe's border policies and shown how the arms and security industry has helped shape European border security policies and have then reaped the rewards for ever more border security measures and contracts. This report shows a significant growth in border externalisation measures and agreements since 2005 and a massive acceleration since the November 2015 Valletta Europe - Africa Summit. Using a plethora of new instruments, in particular the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Migration Partnership Framework and the Refugee Facility for Turkey, the European Union and individual member states are now providing millions of euros for an array of projects to stop migration of certain people from taking place on or across European territory. This includes collaboration with third countries in terms of accepting deported persons, training of their police and border officials, the development of extensive biometric systems, and donations of equipment including helicopters, patrol ships and vehicles, surveillance and monitoring equipment. While many projects are done through the European Commission, a number of individual member states, such as Spain, Italy and Germany also take a lead in funding and training through bilateral agreements with non-EU-countries. What makes this collaboration in the context of border externalisation particularly problematic is that many of the governments receiving the support are deeply authoritarian, and the support they are receiving is often going to precisely the state security organs most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. The European Union in all its policies has a fine rhetoric on the importance of human rights, democracy and rule of law, but there seems to be no limits to the EU's willingness to embrace dictatorial regimes as long as they commit to preventing 'irregular migration' reaching Europe's shores. As a result there have been EU agreements and funding provided to regimes as infamous as Chad, Niger, Belarus, Libya and Sudan. These policies therefore have far-reaching consequences for forcibly displaced persons, whose 'illegal' status already makes them vulnerable and more likely to face human rights abuses. Many end up in either exploitative working conditions, detention and/or get deported back to the countries they have fled from. Women refugees in particular face high risks of gender-based violence, sexual assault and exploitation. Violence and repression against forcibly displaced persons also pushes migration underground, reconfigures the business of smuggling and reinforces the power of criminal smuggling networks. As a result, many persons have been forced to look for other, often more dangerous routes and to rely on ever more unscrupulous traffickers. This leads to an even higher death toll. Moreover the strengthening of state security organs throughout the MENA, Maghreb, Sahel and Horn of Africa regions also threatens the human rights and democratic accountability of the region, particularly as it also diverts much needed resources from economic and social spending. Indeed, this report shows that Europe's obsession with preventing migrants is not only diverting resources, it is also distorting Europe's trade, aid and international relationships with the entire region. As many experts have pointed out, this is laying the ground for further instability and insecurity in the region and the likelihood of greater refugees in the future. There is however one group that have benefited greatly from the EU's border externalisation programmes. As the earlier Border Wars reports showed, it is the European military and security industry that have derived the most benefit for delivering much of the equipment and services for border security. They are accompanied by a number of intergovernmental and (semi-)public institutions that have grown significantly in recent years as they implement dozens of projects on border security and control in non-EU-countries. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute (TNI), 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 30, 2018 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf Shelf Number: 150748 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDeportationImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration PolicyRefugeesSmuggling of Goods |
Author: Gerstein, Daniel M. Title: Looking to the Future of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP): Assessment of the Consolidation of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) and the DIBP (2016-2017) Summary: In 2016, RAND Corporation conducted an evaluation of the newly integrated Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP). This report, requested by the DIBP, presents a second, follow-on evaluation with two thrusts: to update the previous analysis and identify lessons for continued DIBP reform, and to inform the upcoming transition to an Australian Department of Home Affairs (HA). Interviews with senior leaders and documents dating to 2005 provide the foundation for judgments and findings in this report, concentrating on changes during the period 2016-2017 and ongoing and planned efforts by DIBP as part of future reform. Analysis focuses on: (1) intelligence, (2) investigations, (3) detention, (4) integrity and corruption, and (5) learning and development. This report finds that (1) previous DIBP progress toward integration and reform has continued, although uneven across the department, and many goals remain a work in progress, (2) lessons and insights applicable to the formation of the soon-to-be-established HA have been learned; and (3) other organisational transformations by similar organisations identify insights and pitfalls for the establishment of HA. Overall, progress has been made in building a modern border management capability for Australia, though more work remains. The foundations of the DIBP are solid and can serve as a basis for the establishment of HA. Key Findings DIBP Progress Toward Integration and Reform Noted, Although Uneven Across Five Areas of Analysis Resource reductions hindered development in some areas. Aggressive integration timelines outpaced organizational capacity. Intelligence made the most progress, with shortfalls in technical areas and use of intelligence to develop enforcement priorities. Detention made progress, particularly in key policies and in closures of facilities. Investigations show improvement from both internal and external perspectives. However, both were underfunded, hindering timeliness of investigations and resolution of cases. Progress was made in integrity and anti-corruption, but this area requires continued emphasis. L&D made the least progress of the five areas. Lessons and Insights Learned as DIBP Forms the Soon-To-Be-Established HA ECM functions are a year behind POI functions. This is important going into the establishment of HA, where DIBP will likely serve as the receiving organisation for the new department. Managers with the correct authorities, experience, and leadership skills must in charge of reform initiatives. The pace of change may strain the ability of the organisation and staff to keep up. Key skill sets are missing among staff. Unrealistic integration and reform timelines result in overpromising and underdelivering. HA establishment will require deconfliction between the agencies being integrated. POI and ECM areas should receive equal attention from leadership. Senior leader turbulence - staff turnover - should be avoided; this slows momentum and destabilises staff. L&D should receive appropriate attention from the onset. Expenditures will be necessary to assist building new institutions for HA. Early savings turn into a self-defeating proposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 30, 2018 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2262.html Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2262.html Shelf Number: 150946 Keywords: Border Control Border Security Customs Immigration Control |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: "Come Back Later": Challenges for Asylum Seekers Waiting at Ports of Entry Summary: At the height of the Trump's "zero tolerance" immigration policy at the U.S.-Mexico border, Trump administration officials have justified the US's disgraceful detention and deportation policies under the pretext that these families and individuals are passing the border 'illegally,' that is, between ports of entry. Rightly so, the media has focused primarily on the consequences of detention, namely family-separation and the inhumane conditions in detention centers. Less scrutiny has been given to the inefficient and technically illegal practices occurring at ports of entry across the border. Officials at Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have been on the offensive in delaying and preventing the processing of families seeking to petition for asylum. Ranging from leaving families out in the sun and heat for days as they wait to enter the U.S. to misinforming migrants on their rights to come onto US land and request asylum, CBP actions at ports of entry are escalating in severity and are threatening, if not already violating, various human rights laws. The distinction between those migrants entering the country 'fairly and legally' through the ports and those 'sneaking in' between the ports is a misguided comparison. Most migrants do not have the autonomy to choose the exact location in which they will attempt to enter the United States. Obstacles varying from coyotes to gruesome conditions of gang and criminal violence throughout Mexico make it such that passing through a port of entry is not always an obvious or feasible choice for people fleeing. Based on the intensive documentary research efforts of our border security and migration team throughout the past seven years, supplemented by a four-day visit to southern Arizona from June 19 to June 22, this report will detail the challenges for asylum seekers arriving at ports of entry and lay out recommendations for a more humane and efficient approach to securing the US border and confronting the humanitarian crisis emerging from Central America and Mexico. This report is the second segment in a three-part series that is comprised of the following topics: an overview of the zero tolerance policy that the Trump administration launched in April 2018 and its effects; a look at the dire situation of asylum-seekers at land ports of entry along the border; and, a recounting of the resulting separation of parents and children, and potential mass detention that may follow. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2018. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 29, 2018 at: https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ports-of-Entry-Report_PDFvers-3.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ports-of-Entry-Report_PDFvers-3.pdf Shelf Number: 151279 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Border SecurityHuman Rights Abuses Immigrants Immigration Policy |
Author: Strategic Applications International Title: Below Ten: Combating Drugs, Guns, and Human Trafficking at the U.S. Southwest Border Summary: The Below Ten project focused on three cities located on or below Interstate 10 - (1) Nogales, Arizona; (2) Pharr, Texas; and (3) San Diego, California - and their efforts to respond to a wide range of problems related to guns, drugs, and human trafficking. A key component of the project was the series of summits held to develop stakeholder-led plans to respond to the wide range of humanitarian, commercial, and enforcement issues. This publication describes the outcomes of these summits, which brought community members together with local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement; public health providers; social services; and other groups to identify problems, challenges, and solutions. It also provides detailed information on the approach adopted by each community and the activities that have been sustained since the project ended. Details: Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2018 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p369-pub.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p369-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 151604 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingGun TraffickingHuman TraffickingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Meissner, Doris Title: The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward Summary: Each year, the U.S. asylum system offers protection to thousands of persecuted individuals. Yet the system has reached a crisis point, the result of a confluence of factors that have led to a major backlog of cases, with many applicants waiting years for a decision. This slowdown both harms those eligible for protection and invites abuse, with some claims filed to secure the right to remain and work legally in the United States while awaiting long-off adjudication. Amid rising numbers of asylum claims, the Trump administration has taken a number of actions to narrow access to humanitarian protection in the United States. These include largely eliminating gang and domestic violence as grounds for asylum and introducing a "zero-tolerance" approach to border enforcement that entails prosecuting all first-time border crossers, including adult asylum seekers, for illegal entry. This report takes a step back to examine the factors that have brought the U.S. asylum system to this crisis point - from regional migration dynamics that are changing the profile of migrants arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, to inefficiencies in affirmative and defensive asylum processes. Based on this analysis and lessons learned from the mid-1990s reform of the asylum system, the authors propose common-sense steps that can be implemented now to get the system back on track. This multi-pronged approach includes measures to help make asylum workflows more strategic and effective, resolve cases in a timely fashion, deter abuses, and strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries to better manage humanitarian flows through the region. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2018 at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward Shelf Number: 152834 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Border SecurityIllegal Immigrants Immigrants Immigration Enforcement Immigration Policy |
Author: Leutert, Stephanie Title: Asylum Processing tne Waitlists at the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: "For more than two years, CBP has implemented "metering" procedures for asylum seekers in multiple ports of entry across the U.S.-Mexico border. However, over the past six months, these practices have become institutionalized and have been extended across the entire southern border. Currently, CBP officers are stationed at the international dividing line between the United States and Mexico at all ports of entry and provide a similar message" there is currently no processing capacity"-to arriving asylum seekers. Instead, each port of entry coordinates with Mexican officials to accept a certain number of asylum seekers every day. These shifts in CBP procedures have left lines of asylum seekers waiting in almost every major Mexican border city. Yet while CBP officers have standardized their practices, there is no set process for asylum seekers on the Mexican side of the border. While almost all border cities now have a "list" that functions as a virtual line for asylum seekers-for example, the infamous "notebook" in Tijuana-the list management and logistics vary significantly by city. For example, the actual list managers have ranged from Grupo Beta (the Mexican government agency in charge of humanitarian assistance for migrants) to civil society organizations to municipal governments, and the processing steps may entail providing asylum seekers with bracelets or taking their photos after they arrive to the U.S.-Mexico border. There are also a range of practices and dynamics in Mexican border cities that block asylum seekers from accessing U.S. ports of entry. In Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexican migration officials stationed near the international bridges have stopped all asylum seekers from crossing during the past three months. In Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and Piedras Negras, Coahuila, Central Americans cannot access the international border bridges without temporary transit permits. In Matamoros, Tamaulipas there are allegations of asylum seekers having to pay a fee in order to get on the waiting list, and in Tijuana, Baja California asylum seekers currently face a three month wait time in order to make their claim. This report provides a snapshot of the asylum processing system at the U.S.-Mexico border, with particular attention to asylum seekers waiting in Mexico. The report compiles fieldwork carried out in eight cities along the U.S.-Mexico border in November 2018. It draws on in-person and phone interviews with government officials, law enforcement officers, representatives from civil society organizations, journalists, and members of the public on both sides of the border. The report also relies on observations carried out at ports of entry and neighboring areas, and draws from government and legal documents, and news articles to detail current asylum processing dynamics." Details: Austin, TX: Robert Strauss Center, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Migration Policy Centre, 2018. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed Dec. 11, 2018 at: https://www.strausscenter.org/images/MSI/AsylumReport_MSI.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.strausscenter.org/images/MSI/AsylumReport_MSI.pdf Shelf Number: 153958 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityImmigrantsImmigration PolicyRefugees |
Author: Kandel, William A. Title: The Trump Administration's "Zero Tolerance" Immigration Enforcement Policy Summary: For the last several years, Central American migrant families have arrived at the U.S.-Mexico border in relatively large numbers, many seeking asylum. While some request asylum at U.S. ports of entry, others do so after entering the United States "without inspection" (i.e., illegally) between U.S. ports of entry. On May 7, 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) implemented a zero tolerance policy toward illegal border crossing both to discourage illegal migration into the United States and to reduce the burden of processing asylum claims that Administration officials contend are often fraudulent. Under the zero tolerance policy, DOJ prosecutes all adult aliens apprehended crossing the border illegally, with no exception for asylum seekers or those with minor children. DOJ's policy represents a change in the level of enforcement for an existing statute rather than a change in statute or regulation. Prior Administrations prosecuted illegal border crossings relatively infrequently. Criminally prosecuting adults for illegal border crossing requires detaining them in federal criminal facilities where children are not permitted. While DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have broad statutory authority to detain adult aliens, children must be detained according to guidelines established in the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. A 2015 judicial ruling held that children remain in family immigration detention for no more than 20 days. If parents cannot be released with them, children are treated as unaccompanied alien children and transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for care and custody. The widely publicized family separations are a consequence of the Trump Administration's 100 percent prosecution policy, not the result of any family separation policy. Since that policy was implemented, up to 3,000 children may have been separated from their parents. Following mostly critical public reaction, President Trump ordered DHS to maintain custody of alien families during the pendency of any criminal trial or immigration proceedings. DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) subsequently stopped referring most illegal border crossers to DOJ for criminal prosecution. A federal judge then mandated that all separated children be promptly reunited with their families. Another rejected DOJ's request to modify the FSA to extend the 20-day child detention guideline. DHS has since reverted to some prior immigration enforcement policies. Family unit apprehensions, which increased from just over 11,000 in FY2012 to 68,560 in the first nine months of FY2018, are occurring within relatively low historical levels of total alien apprehensions. The national origin of recently apprehended aliens and families has shifted from mostly Mexican to mostly Central American. Administration officials and immigration enforcement advocates argue that measures like the zero tolerance policy are necessary to discourage migrants from coming to the United States and submitting fraudulent asylum requests. They maintain that alien family separation resulting from the prosecution of illegal border crossers mirrors that occurring under the U.S. criminal justice system policy where adults with custody of minor children are charged with a crime and held in jail, effectively separating them from their children. Immigrant advocates contend that migrant families are fleeing legitimate threats from countries with exceptionally high rates of gang violence, and that family separations resulting from the zero tolerance policy are cruel and violate fundamental human rights - such as the ability to request asylum. They maintain that the zero tolerance policy was hastily implemented and lacked planning for family reunification following criminal prosecutions. Some observers question the Trump Administration's capacity to marshal sufficient resources to prosecute all illegal border crossers without additional resources. Others criticize the family separation policy in light of less expensive alternatives to detention. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018, 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45266.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=814001 Shelf Number: 154108 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBorder SecurityCustoms and Border ProtectionFamily SeparationHomeland Security Act of 2002Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration EnforcementMigrantsTrafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act |
Author: Pro Asyl Title: Humiliated, ill-treated and without protection: Refugees and asylum seekers in Bulgaria Summary: In the first months of 2015, PRO ASYL has heard shocking accounts from asylum seekers reaching Germany via Bulgaria. These accounts include reports of inhumane and degrading treatment as well as torture. PRO ASYL has written up some of these accounts, mainly from asylum seekers and refugees who arrived in 2014, to serve as an example of the treatment experienced by many who travel through Bulgaria. The majority of the accounts provided are those of Syrian or Iraqi nationals. Following the closure of the Greek-Turkish border in August 2012, the overland flight route to Europe shifted course. This resulted in an increase in the number of asylum applicants in Bulgaria, as can be seen from the numbers of claimants: 2012: 1.385 people 2013: 7.145 people 2014: 11.080 people Of the claims made in 2014, over half were made by Syrian nationals. As is also happening elsewhere, Bulgaria's border zone is becoming increasingly militarised; the government is working towards sealing the border completely. According to Bulgarian authorities, 38.000 people tried to cross the Turkish-Bulgarian border in 2014. Of these, only about 6.000 reached Bulgarian territory. The attempts by the Bulgarian government to close the border have resulted in the refoulement of individuals at risk of persecution, contrary to human rights principles enshrined in international law. This has been independently verified by a number of international NGOs, including Human Rights Watch. In 2014, Frontex provided further resources, through the deployment of 170 additional experts, to assist with the policing of the Bulgarian border. Frontex's 2014 budget for Operation Poseidon Land, which operates in the zones along the Greek-Bulgarian borders, was 2.673.454 , 90 Euros. Details: Frankfurt, Germany: The Author, 2015. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2019 at: https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Bulgaria_Report_en_Dez_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Bulgaria URL: https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Bulgaria_Report_en_Dez_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 155007 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Border SecurityHuman Rights Abuses Refugees |
Author: Meissner, Doris Title: Eight Key U.S. Immigration Policy Issues: State of Play and Unanswered Questions Summary: The United States is witnessing one of the most dynamic policy periods in the immigration arena, with the Trump administration moving to reshape many facets of the immigration system with use of its executive powers. The administration's marked activity on the immigration front contrasts sharply with Congress, which has been largely unable to tackle substantive change to the immigration system over nearly two decades. While the administration has been significantly focused on the border, this report examines a range of policy areas that have not been at the forefront of debate but deserve greater information sharing with the public and policymakers. "This period of significant action by the executive branch, which has surfaced a real questioning of long-held immigration policies and practices, presents a new opportunity for lawmakers to inject policy ideas of their own into what have been prolonged, often stagnant, legislative debates," the report states. Among the questions it asks: What achievable definition of border security should the federal government be measured on? And what border spending is likely to generate the highest returns on investment, in particular in an era where migration patterns have changed significantly and the U.S. government is spending one-third more on immigration enforcement than on the combined budgets of the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Secret Service, U.S. Marshal's Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives? With the H-1B visa program the main vehicle through which U.S. employers can sponsor skilled foreign workers for admission, what program reforms would address concerns about the replacement of U.S. workers while still meeting employer needs? With 1.6 million unauthorized immigrants eligible for green cards as the spouses or minor children of U.S. citizens or green-card holders, is it time for Congress to revisit the three- and ten-year bars on re-entry that are blocking most unauthorized immigrants who could be sponsored by a relative or employer from applying for fear of triggering lengthy absences from the United States? Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2019 at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/eight-key-us-immigration-policy-issues Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/eight-key-us-immigration-policy-issues Shelf Number: 155707 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigrants Immigration Enforcement Immigration Policy |
Author: No Name Kitchen Title: Illegal Push-Backs and Border Violence Reports Summary: The following document presents testimonies of illegal push-backs where displaced people are expelled into the Bosnian territory from the borderlands and interior of Croatia and Slovenia. All testimonies are gathered from oral interviews via a standardised framework used by the grassroots organisations working in Velika Kladusa. Details: Kladusa, Bosnia: No Name Kitchen, 2018. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2019 at: http://nonamekitchen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Push-backs-and-violence-report-August.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina URL: http://nonamekitchen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Push-backs-and-violence-report-August.pdf Shelf Number: 156182 Keywords: Border SecurityBosniaCroatiaDisplaced PersonsIllegal ImmigrationPush-BacksSlovenia |