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Date: April 26, 2024 Fri
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Results for deterrence
58 results foundAuthor: Offler, Naomi Title: A Review of the Literature on Social, Non-Technical Deterrents for Vandalism in the Rail Industry Summary: This report discusses short and long term strategies for addressing vandalism and graffiti on rail property in Australia. Details: Brisbane: CRC for Rail Innovation, 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 116516 Keywords: DeterrenceGraffitiVandalism |
Author: Garrett, Thomas A Title: Crime and Arrests: Deterrence or Resource Reallocation? Summary: This study uses monthly time-series data for 20 large U.S. cities to test the deterrence hypothesis (arrests reduce crimes) and the resource reallocation hypotheses (arrests follow from an increase in crime). The study found (1) weak support for the deterrence hypothesis, (2) much stronger support for the resource reallocation hypothesis, and (3) differences in city-level estimates suggest much heterogeneity in the crime and arrest relationship across regions. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2010. 9p. Source: Internet Resource; Working Paper 2010-011A Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 118801 Keywords: Arrests (U.S.)Deterrence |
Author: Bhati, Avinash Title: Quantifying the Specific Deterrent Effects of DNA Databases Summary: "Forensic science has come to play an increasingly important role in aiding criminal investigations. The field has experienced numerous advances over the last two decade. This has lead courts, practitioners, prosecutors and legislators to embrace the tools it offers, in general, and DNA profiling, in particular. The National Institute of Justice consequently sought applications to study a broad array of social science research issues that these advances have raised. This report describes findings from a project aimed at quantifying the specific deterrent effects of DNA databases. Re-offending patterns of a large cohort of offenders released from Florida Department of Corrections custody between 1996 and 2004 were analyzed. During this period, several important pieces of legislation were passed in Florida requiring convicted felons — convicted of an increasing number of crime types - to submit biological samples for DNA profile extraction and storage in searchable databases. Models constructed to identify the specific deterrent effects of DNA databases distinct from their probative effects yielded mixed results. Small deterrent effects — 2 to 3 percent reductions in recidivism risk attributable to deterrence — were found for only offense categopries (robbery and burglary). Strong probative effects — 20 to 30 percent increase in recidivism risk attributable to probative effects — were uncovered for most offense categories. Methods, data, results and implications are discussed in this report." Details: Washington, DC: Justice Policy Center, The Urban Institute, 2010. 98p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 13, 2010 at: http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412058_dna_databases.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412058_dna_databases.pdf Shelf Number: 118537 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationDeterrenceDNA TypingForensic Science |
Author: Seattle (Washington). Office of City Auditor Title: Cal Anderson Park Surveillance Camera Pilot Program Evaluation Summary: From January through February 2008, the City of Seattle installed three surveillance cameras in Capitol Hill’s Cal Anderson Park. In June 2008, the Seattle City Council adopted an ordinance that created the Surveillance Camera Pilot Program and established controls over the cameras’ use. The ordinance governing the pilot program requires that the City Auditor conduct a program evaluation to address: Departmental compliance with the policies of the ordinance; The effect of the cameras on crime deterrence; The effect of the cameras on crime detection and investigation; and The effect of the cameras on the public perception of safety. This program evaluation is intended to help the Seattle City Council decide whether to grant additional authority to the Department of Parks and Recreation, the Seattle Police Department, and the Department of Information Technology to operate surveillance cameras in Cal Anderson Park, or to install surveillance cameras in other City parks. Details: Seattle, WA: Office of City Auditor, 2009. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2010 at: http://www.cityofseattle.net/audit/docs/2009Oct_PublishedReportSurveillanceCameras.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.cityofseattle.net/audit/docs/2009Oct_PublishedReportSurveillanceCameras.pdf Shelf Number: 119819 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationDeterrenceParksPreventionSituational CrimeVideo Surveillance |
Author: Dutta, Mousumi Title: Determinants of Crime Rates: Crime Deterrence and Growth in Post-Liberalized India Summary: Becker’s analysis of crime and punishment has initiated a series of theoretical and empirical works investigating the determinants of crime. However, there is a dearth of literature in the context of developing countries. This paper is an attempt to address this deficiency. The paper investigates the relative impact of deterrence variables (load on police force, arrest rates, charge sheet rates, conviction rates and quick disposal of cases) and socio-economic variables (economic growth, poverty,, urbanization and education) on crime rates in India. State-level data is collected on the above variables for the period 1999 to 2005. Zellner’s SURE model is used to estimate the model. Subsequently, this is extended by introducing endogeneity. The results show that both deterrence and socioeconomic factors are important in explaining crime rates. However, some of their effects are different from that observed in studies for developed countries. Details: Munich: University Library of Munich, 2009. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2010 at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14478/1/MPRA_paper_14478.pdf Year: 2009 Country: India URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14478/1/MPRA_paper_14478.pdf Shelf Number: 120039 Keywords: Crime RatesDeterrenceSocio-Economic Conditions |
Author: Wright, Valerie Title: Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment Summary: Over the past several decades state and federal incarceration rates have increased dramatically. As a consequence of more punitive laws and harsher sentencing policies 2.3 million people are incarcerated in the nation’s prisons and jails, and the U.S. leads the world in its rate of incarceration. Sentencing systems and incarceration traditionally have a variety of goals, which include incapacitation, punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. In recent decades, sentencing policy initiatives have often been enacted with the goal of enhancing the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system. Under the rubric of “getting tough on crime,” policies such as mandatory minimums, truth in sentencing, and “three strikes and you’re out” have been designed to deter with the threat of imposing substantial terms of imprisonment for felony convictions. While the criminal justice system as a whole provides some deterrent effect, a key question for policy development regards whether enhanced sanctions or an enhanced possibility of being apprehended provide any additional deterrent benefits. Research to date generally indicates that increases in the certainty of punishment, as opposed to the severity of punishment, are more likely to produce deterrent benefits. This briefing paper provides an overview of criminological research on these relative impacts as a guide to inform future policy consideration. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2010. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefing%20.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefing%20.pdf Shelf Number: 120303 Keywords: DeterrencePunishmentSentencing |
Author: Kelaher, Richard Title: Crime and Punishment Revisited Summary: Despite an abundance of empirical evidence on crime spanning over forty years, there exists no consensus on the impact of the criminal justice sys- tem on crime activity. We argue that this may be due to the combined e®ect of simultaneity, omitted variable bias and aggregation bias that may confound many of these studies. We construct a new panel data set of lo- cal government areas in Australia and develop a testing framework for the implications of economic theory on crime behaviour. The empirical results suggest that the criminal justice system can potentially exert a much greater in°uence on crime activity than is the common view in the literature. In addition, we ¯nd that increasing the risk of apprehension and conviction is more in°uential in reducing crime than raising the expected severity of punishment. Violent crime is more persistent and relatively less responsive to law enforcement policies compared to non-violent crime. Details: Sydney: University of Bydnes, Faculty of Economics and Business, 2011. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 28213: Accessed February 16, 2011 at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28213/1/MPRA_paper_28213.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28213/1/MPRA_paper_28213.pdf Shelf Number: 120805 Keywords: DeterrenceEconomics and CrimePunishment |
Author: Kelaher, Richard Title: Crime and Punishment Revisited Summary: Despite an abundance of empirical evidence on crime spanning over forty years, there exists no consensus on the impact of the criminal justice sys- tem on crime activity. We argue that this may be due to the combined e®ect of simultaneity, omitted variable bias and aggregation bias that may confound many of these studies. We construct a new panel data set of lo- cal government areas in Australia and develop a testing framework for the implications of economic theory on crime behaviour. The empirical results suggest that the criminal justice system can potentially exert a much greater in°uence on crime activity than is the common view in the literature. In addition, we ¯nd that increasing the risk of apprehension and conviction is more in°uential in reducing crime than raising the expected severity of punishment. Violent crime is more persistent and relatively less responsive to law enforcement policies compared to non-violent crime. Details: Sydney: University of Sydney, Faculty of Economics and Business, 2011. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 28213: Accessed February 16, 2011 at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28213/1/MPRA_paper_28213.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28213/1/MPRA_paper_28213.pdf Shelf Number: 120805 Keywords: DeterrenceEconomics and CrimePunishment |
Author: Loughran, Thomas Title: 'A Good Man Always Knows His Limitations': Overconfidence in Criminal Offending Summary: Traditional criminological research in the area of rational choice and crime decisions places a strong emphasis on offenders’ perceptions of risk associated with various crimes. Yet, this literature has thus far generally neglected the role of individual overconfidence in both the formation of subjective risk perceptions and the association between risk and crime. In other types of high risk behaviors which serve as analogs to crime, including stock trading and uncertain business and investment decisions, overconfidence is shown to have a stimulating effect on an individuals’ willingness to engage in these behaviors. Using data from two separate samples, this paper explores the prevalence of overconfidence in offending risk perceptions for a variety of crime types, and, in one sample serious offending juveniles, attempts to link overconfidence to a higher likelihood of offending. Our results show that overconfidence is both highly prevalent in risk perceptions across samples, and it is highly associated with higher rates of offending, even when controlling for risk. We also outline several theoretical issues for future research on this topic, including its relationship to self-serving bias and Bayesian updating. Details: New York: Columbia Law School, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 11-264; Accessed March 11, 2011 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1772185 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1772185 Shelf Number: 120972 Keywords: DeterrenceOffendersRisk Perceptions |
Author: Mastrobuoni, Giovanni Title: Optimal Criminal Behavior and the Disutility of Jail: Theory and Evidence On Bank Robberies Summary: This paper uses unique data on the benefits of individual crimes, in particular, 5,000 Italian bank robberies – representing 57 percent of all European bank robberies – to identify the distribution of criminals’ perceived disutility of jail or value of freedom. Bank robbers behave according to an instantaneous version of Becker’s model of crime: during bank robberies both the probability of apprehension and the average haul increase over time. At the margin this trade-off depends on: i) the criminal’s expected haul at time t, ii) its expected increase between t and t+1, iii) the hazard rate of arrest, and iv) the criminals’ disutility of ending up in jail. The optimal duration t in successful robberies allows me to identify the individual disutility of ending up in jail or value of freedom. The distribution of the disutility of jail is positively skewed and resembles a typical earnings distribution. Ability among criminals appears to be distributed like ability among workers since both earnings and the disutility of jail – an opportunity cost that is larger for more able criminals – arise from an underlying distribution of ability. Moreover, the relationship between the modus operandi of bank robberies and the derived disutility of jail time is consistent with the existence of general deterrence. Sentence enhancements appear to be correctly targeting the most able bank robbers. Finally, more able bank robbers are considerably more responsive to deterrence than less able ones. Details: Unpublished Paper, 2011. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/mastrobuoni/doc/ValueFreedom4.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Italy URL: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/mastrobuoni/doc/ValueFreedom4.pdf Shelf Number: 121618 Keywords: Bank Robberies (Italy)DeterrenceRobberySentencing |
Author: Barbarino, Alessandro Title: The Incapacitation Effect of Incarceration: Evidence From Several Italian Collective Pardons Summary: We estimate the “incapacitation effect” on crime using variation in Italian prison population driven by eight collective pardons passed between 1962 and 1995. The prison releases are sudden — within one day —, very large — up to 35 percent of the entire prison population — and happen nationwide. Exploiting this quasi-natural experiment we break the simultaneity of crime and prisoners as in Levitt (1996) and, in addition, use the national character of the pardons to separately identify incapacitation from changes in deterrence. The elasticity of total crime with respect to incapacitation is -15 percent. A cost-benefit analysis suggests that Italy’s prison population is below its optimal level: the estimated marginal social cost of crime is more than two times the cost of incarceration. Details: Unpublished Paper, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 5, 2011 at: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/mastrobuoni/doc/ReducedPardonJan2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Italy URL: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/mastrobuoni/doc/ReducedPardonJan2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121647 Keywords: AmnestyCost-Benefit AnalysisDeterrenceImprisonmentPardons |
Author: Males, Mike Title: Striking Out: California’s “Three Strikes And You’re Out” Law Has Not Reduced Violent Crime. A 2011 Update. Summary: In March 1999, the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (CJCJ) released a report through the Justice Policy Institute (JPI) that investigated the effects of the “Three Strikes” Law. It noted, In the wake of the widely publicized 1993 kidnapping and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas, California Governor Pete Wilson signed into law on March 7, 1994, one of the most punitive sentencing statutes in recent history. The law was dubbed “Three Strikes and You’re Out” because of its provision requiring 25-years-to-life prison terms for defendants convicted of any felony (or misdemeanor such as petty theft reclassified as a felony) after having previously been convicted of two specified “serious” or “violent” felonies. The law was affirmed by three-fourths of California voters through a statewide initiative in November of that year. The Three Strikes law promised to reduce violent crime by putting repeat violent offenders behind bars for life. The severe nature of the law was intended to maximize the criminal justice system’s deterrent and selective incapacitation effect. Under deterrence theory, individuals are dissuaded from criminal activity through the threat of state-imposed penalties. Selective incapacitation suggests that crime can be reduced by incapacitating the small group of repeat offenders who are responsible for a large portion of serious crime. As of December 31, 2010, 40,998 Californians were behind bars for strike offenses, including 8,727 for third strikes. While the second strike population in prisons actually declined over the 1999-2010 period, the third strike population, due to very lengthy sentences, nearly doubled. At an average of $46,700 per inmate per year, a 25-year sentence costs the State $1.1 million per inmate; a life sentence, assuming incarceration at age 43 (the average third strike commitment age) and death at 82 (the average life expectancy for a male alive at age 43) costs $1.8 million per inmate, even without adding the higher medical costs of aged prisoners. Thus, just imprisoning the current third-strike population will cost taxpayers at least $10 billion in 2010 dollars over the next 25 years. Despite its high costs, candidates of both major parties have credited the “Three-Strikes” law with reducing crime in California. However, national crime trends show that crime has been dropping in every region regardless of incarceration practices since the early 1990s. An earlier JPI study found that California’s declining crime rates were no different than in states without a Three Strikes law, while a CJCJ study found California counties that used the law the least had reductions in crime slightly larger than counties that used the law the most. Other early research found similar results, while some other studies have disagreed, and other recent reviews such as by the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law have found only mixed results. The crime control impact of the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law is an important subject to analyze. Under deterrence and incapacitation theories, counties that most heavily used the “Three Strikes” law, thereby removing larger proportions of their criminal population from public, should experience greater crime declines than more lenient counties. Because of its broad applications and disparate enforcement, California’s “Three Strikes” law provides a rare opportunity to analyze these theories. This report updates the 1999 Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice report using 2009 and 2010 data to examine crime trends in California counties with widely varying “Three Strikes” imprisonment levels. Details: San Francisco: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Brief: Accessed May 17, 2011 at: http://www.cjcj.org/files/Striking_Out_Californias_Three_Strikes_And_Youre_Out_Law_Has_Not_Reduced_Violent_Crime.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.cjcj.org/files/Striking_Out_Californias_Three_Strikes_And_Youre_Out_Law_Has_Not_Reduced_Violent_Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 121736 Keywords: DeterrenceLife SentenceSentencingThree Strikes Legislation (California)Violent Crime |
Author: Kirchgassner, Gebhard Title: Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology? Summary: In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more than 70 lives. This example is used to show how easy it is, using simple or advanced econometric techniques, to produce results that do or do not support the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate. Details: Munich: CESifo Group, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 3443: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1205541.PDF Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1205541.PDF Shelf Number: 121834 Keywords: Capital PunishmentDeath PenaltyDeterrenceEconometric Evidence |
Author: Victoria. Sentencing Advisory Council Title: Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the Evidence Summary: Deterrence can be described as the prevention of crime through the fear of a threatened – or the experience of an actual – criminal sanction. General deterrence is aimed at reducing crime by directing the threat of that sanction at all potential offenders. Specific deterrence is aimed at reducing crime by applying a criminal sanction to a specific offender, in order to dissuade him or her from reoffending. Deterrence is only one of the purposes of sentencing in Victoria, determined by section 5(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). The other purposes are: punishment, denunciation, rehabilitation and community protection (incapacitation). The scope of this paper is limited to examining the sentencing purpose of deterrence only – it does not present an analysis of the evidence of imprisonment’s effectiveness in regard to other sentencing purposes. There is an overlap in some studies when measuring deterrence and incapacitation; however, the paper does not draw conclusions on the effectiveness of imprisonment as a means of reducing crime through incapacitation. Deterrence theory is based upon the classical economic theory of rational choice, which assumes that people weigh up the costs and benefits of a particular course of action whenever they make a decision. Deterrence theory relies on the assumption that offenders have knowledge of the threat of a criminal sanction and then make a rational choice whether or not to offend based upon consideration of that knowledge. Rational choice theory, however, does not adequately account for a large number of offenders who may be considered ‘irrational’. Examples of such irrationality can vary in severity – there are those who are not criminally responsible due to mental impairment, those who are drug affected or intoxicated and those who simply act in a way that is contrary to their own best interests. Research shows that the majority of offenders entering the Victorian criminal justice system have a history of substance use that is directly related to their offending. That people are not perfectly rational and do not always make decisions that are in their own best interests is supported by studies in behavioural economics. Behavioural economic theory proposes that individuals make decisions on the basis of mperfect knowledge by employing ‘rules of thumb’, rather than strict logic, and are subject to limits on their willpower. People are also subject to a great number of patterns of deviation in judgment that occur in particular situations (known as ‘cognitive biases’), which influence decision-making in predictable – but often irrational – ways. The evidence from empirical studies of deterrence suggests that the threat of imprisonment generates a small general deterrent effect. However, the research also indicates that increases in the severity of penalties, such as increasing the length of terms of imprisonment, do not produce a corresponding increase in deterrence. It has been suggested that harsher penalties do not deter because many crimes are committed in circumstances where it is difficult to identify when, or if, offenders have considered the consequences of their criminal behaviour. In addition, otherwise rational individuals are more strongly influenced by the perceived immediate benefits of committing crime and individuals ‘discount’ the cost of future penalties. A consistent finding in deterrence research is that increases in the certainty of apprehension and punishment demonstrate a significant deterrent effect. Perceptions about the certainty of apprehension, for example, may counter the ‘present bias’ and reinforce the potential cost of committing crime. This result is qualified by the need for further research that separates deterrable from non-deterrable populations. Research into specific deterrence shows that imprisonment has, at best, no effect on the rate of reoffending and often results in a greater rate of recidivism. Possible explanations for this include that: prison is a learning environment for crime, prison reinforces criminal identity and may diminish or sever social ties that encourage lawful behaviour and imprisonment is not the appropriate response to many offenders who require treatment for the underlying causes of their criminality (such as drug, alcohol and mental health issues). Harsh prison conditions do not generate a greater deterrent effect, and the evidence shows that such conditions may lead to more violent reoffending. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of imprisonment as a deterrent to crime suggests that the purposes of sentencing should be considered independently – according to their own merits – and that caution should be exercised if imprisonment is to be justified as a means of deterring all crimes and all kinds of offenders. Details: Melbourne: Sentencing Advisory Council, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Sentencing Matters: Accessed July 5, 2011 at: http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/files/does_imprisonment_deter_a_review_of_the_evidence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/files/does_imprisonment_deter_a_review_of_the_evidence.pdf Shelf Number: 121964 Keywords: DeterrenceDrug Abuse and CrimeImprisonmentPunishmentRational Choice TheorySentencing (Australia)Substance Abuse |
Author: Entorf, Horst Title: Crime, Prosecutors, and the Certainty of Conviction Summary: This paper tests predictions of a structural, augmented supply-of-offenders model regarding the relative effects of police, public prosecution and courts, respectively, on crime. Using detailed data on the different stages of the criminal prosecution process in Germany, empirical evidence suggests that public prosecutors and their influence on the probability of conviction play a major role in explaining the variation of crime rates, while the impact of the severity of punishment is small and insignificant. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2011. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper No. 5670: Accessed July 15, 2011 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5670.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Germany URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5670.pdf Shelf Number: 122076 Keywords: DeterrenceProsecutionPublic ProsecutorsPunishment (Germany) |
Author: Dhami, Sanjit Title: The Behavioral Economics of Crime and Punishment Summary: The celebrated Becker proposition (BP) states that it is optimal to impose the severest possible punishment (to maintain effective deterrence) at the lowest possible probability of detection (to economize on enforcement costs). However, the BP is not consistent with the evidence. This inconsistency is known as the Becker paradox. In fact, the BP is a general result that applies to all low-probability events that lead to 'unbounded loss' of utility. Hence, it is applicable to a wide class of problems in economics. We clarify the BP and its welfare implications under expected utility, which remains the favoured framework. We argue that none of the proposed explanations of the Becker paradox is satisfactory. We show that the BP also holds under rank dependent expected utility and cumulative prospect theory, the two main alternatives to expected utility. We show that composite prospect theory (CCP), of al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010a), can resolve the Becker paradox. Our paper opens the way for incorporating non-expected utility theories into the economic analysis of criminal activity. Details: Leicester, UK: University of Leicester, Department of Economics, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 10/14: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://www.le.ac.uk/ec/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp10-14.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/ec/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp10-14.pdf Shelf Number: 122387 Keywords: DeterrenceEconomicsPunishment |
Author: Dhami, Sanjit Title: The Hyperbolic Punishment Function Summary: All models in Law and Economics use punishment functions (PF) that incorpo- rate a trade-o¤ between probability of detection, p, and punishment, F. Suppose society wishes to minimize the total costs of enforcement and damages from crime, T (p; F). For a given p, an optimal punishment function (OPF) determines an F that minimizes T(p; F). A popular and tractable PF is the hyperbolic punishment function (HPF). We show that the HPF is an OPF for a very large class of total cost functions. Furthermore, the HPF is an upper bound for an even larger class of pun- ishment functions. If the HPF cannot deter crime then none of the PFs for which the HPF is an upper bound can deter it either. Thus, if one can demonstrate that a particular policy is ine¤ective under the HPF, there is no need to even compute the OPF. Our results should underpin an even greater use of the HPF. Details: Leicester, UK: University of Leicester, Department of Economics, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 16, 2011 at: http://www.le.ac.uk/ec/sd106/HPF.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/ec/sd106/HPF.pdf Shelf Number: 122406 Keywords: DeterrencePunishment |
Author: Johnson, Rucker Title: How Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy? Summary: We present new evidence on the effect of aggregate changes in incarceration on changes in crime that accounts for the potential simultaneous relationship between incarceration and crime. Our principal innovation is that we develop an instrument for future changes in incarceration rates based on the theoretically predicted dynamic adjustment path of the aggregate incarceration rate in response to a shock (from whatever source) to prison entrance or exit transition probabilities. Given that incarceration rates adjust to permanent changes in behavior with a dynamic lag (given that only a fraction of offenders are apprehended in any one period), one can identify variation in incarceration that is not contaminated by contemporary changes in criminal behavior. We isolate this variation and use it to tease out the causal effect of incarceration on crime. Using state level data for the United States covering the period from 1978 to 2004, we find crime-prison elasticities that are considerably larger than those implied by OLS estimates. For the entire time period, we find average crime-prison effects with implied elasticities of between -0.06 and -0.11 for violent crime and between -0.15 and -0.21 for property crime. We also present results for two sub-periods of our panel: 1978 to 1990 and 1991 to 2004. Our IV estimates for the earlier time period suggest much larger crime-prison effects, with elasticity estimates consistent with those presented in Levitt (1996) who analyzes a similar time period yet with an entirely different identification strategy. For the latter time period, however, the effects of changes in prison on crime are much smaller. Our results indicate that recent increases in incarceration have generated much less bang-per-buck in terms of crime reduction. Details: Berkeley, CA: Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 16, 2011 at: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_crimeincarcJLE.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_crimeincarcJLE.pdf Shelf Number: 122415 Keywords: Cost-Benefit AnalysisCrime PreventionCrime ReductionDeterrenceImprisonment (U.S.) |
Author: Seal, Susan Title: A Dynamical Interpretation of the Three-Strikes Law Summary: California’s Three Strikes Law has been in effect since 1994. Advocates of this policy claim it acts as a deterrent for violent crime; yet critics allege it acts solely as an incapacitant–a device used to segregate a population of “undesirables” from the total population in an attempt to lower criminal susceptibility. To determine the true relationship between these two intimately connected phenomena, we construct a dynamical model of the Three-Strikes Law within the framework of inner-city communities located in Los Angeles County. We then compare this model to one of Los Angeles County before California implemented the Three-Strike policy–the classical incarceration model. Through qualitative analysis we determine the basic reproductive number, R0, for each of the models. Using numerical simulations, we then determine the net change in the total population of reformed inmates and the total number of incarcerated individuals due to the Three-Strikes Law. We also analyze the impact of population density on crime rates in states that utilize the Three-Strikes Law. Finally, we construct and examine a hypothetical One-Strike model to determine the impact of different strike policies on the reformed, criminal and incarcerated populations. We find that the Three-Strikes policy deters crime better than the classical incarceration policy in densely populated areas like Los Angeles County. In the context of population density, the Three-Strikes Law is a better deterrent in a sparsely populated region than a densely populated region. The optimal policy is found to be one that consists of more than three strikes. Details: Tempe, AZ: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Arizona State University, 2007. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2011 at: http://mtbi.asu.edu/files/A%20Dynamical%20Interpretation%20of%20the%20Three%20Strikes%20Law.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://mtbi.asu.edu/files/A%20Dynamical%20Interpretation%20of%20the%20Three%20Strikes%20Law.pdf Shelf Number: 122729 Keywords: DeterrencePunishmentRepeat OffendersSentencingThree-Strikes Law (California) |
Author: Manski, Charles Title: Deterrence and the Death Penalty: Partial Identification Analysis Using Repeated Cross Sections Summary: Researchers have long used repeated cross sectional observations of homicide rates and sanctions to examine the deterrent effect of the adoption and implementation of death penalty statutes. The empirical literature, however, has failed to achieve consensus. A fundamental problem is that the outcomes of counterfactual policies are not observable. Hence, the data alone cannot identify the deterrent effect of capital punishment. How then should research proceed? It is tempting to impose assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive finding, but strong assumptions may be inaccurate and yield flawed conclusions. Instead, we study the identifying power of relatively weak assumptions restricting variation in treatment response across places and time. The results are findings of partial identification that bound the deterrent effect of capital punishment. By successively adding stronger identifying assumptions, we seek to make transparent how assumptions shape inference. We perform empirical analysis using state-level data in the United States in 1975 and 1977. Under the weakest restrictions, there is substantial ambiguity: we cannot rule out the possibility that having a death penalty statute substantially increases or decreases homicide. This ambiguity is reduced when we impose stronger assumptions, but inferences are sensitive to the maintained restrictions. Combining the data with some assumptions implies that the death penalty increases homicide, but other assumptions imply that the death penalty deters it. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 17455: Accessed September 26, 2011 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17455 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17455 Shelf Number: 122900 Keywords: Capital PunishmentDeath PenaltyDeterrenceHomicides |
Author: Abram, David S. Title: Building Criminal Capital vs Specific Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism Summary: In evaluating the efficacy of most modern criminal justice systems, a vital relationship to understand is that between incarceration length (and likelihood) and recidivism. Because most previous attempts to estimate this relationship suffer from omitted variables bias, even the sign is unknown. In this paper, I build on previous work identifying substantial heterogeneity in attorney ability in a public defender office with random case assignment. I make use of this variation to address the omitted variables problem by instrumenting for sentence length and incarceration rate using the randomly assigned public defender. A negative relationship between recidivism and sentence length goes away when instrumenting for sentence. Similarly, a positive and statistically significant relationship between recidivism and incarceration becomes insignificant in the IV regressions. However the regression results do not reveal the full story, as the relationships are rather nonlinear. A graphical examination reveals a negative relationship between recidivism and sentence length and also recidivism and incarceration rate, particularly for shorter sentences and lower incarceration rates. In addition, longer sentences tend to lead to more severe crimes upon offender release. Put together, these findings provide some evidence for a mild specific deterrent effect, but one that rapidly diminishes. Details: Berkeley, CA: Law and Economics Workshop, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 29, 2011 at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2fj8691d Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2fj8691d Shelf Number: 123179 Keywords: DeterrencePunishmentRecidivismSentencing |
Author: Givens, Aldon Garrett Title: Crime and Punishment: Institutional Sanctions and Other Characteristics that Effect Campus Crime Summary: Crime, has and continues to be, a major issue in the world of institutions of higher education. Colleges and universities are constantly working on ways to prevent and improve crime on their respective campuses, which in most occasions includes collecting and reporting crime data to law enforcement agencies and the general public. By setting up punishment schemes and sanctions to deter criminal activity at their institution, administrators and faculty are looking for better, more efficient ways to influence the behavior or their students and steer them away from a life of criminal activity. By studying existing literature, crime definitions, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report, this thesis attempts to uncover some of the influences of criminal activity and seeks to discuss possible ways to deter such activity. Taking an economic approach to crime, we seek to take an empirical and theoretical path in order to answer the behavioral questions of criminal activity. Using the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report for campuses across the county, as well as a sample of twenty-one colleges and universities in the state of South Carolina, we are able to investigate criminal activity and changes in criminal behavior. This research and analysis might be able to give institutions a better view of how to approach and deter criminal activity among their student body. By knowing how and why prospective offenders react to the changing costs and benefits of committing crime can greatly aid in the process of finding a better, more effective way to deter criminal activity. Details: Clemson, SC: Clemson University, 2010. 66p. Source: Master's Thesis, Economics: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2012 at http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1306870856/Givens_clemson_0050M_11020.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1306870856/Givens_clemson_0050M_11020.pdf Shelf Number: 124434 Keywords: Campus CrimeColleges and UniversitiesCrime StatisticsDeterrence |
Author: Harbaugh, William T. Title: Theft and Deterrence Summary: We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper 17059: Accessed April 19, 2012 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17059.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17059.pdf Shelf Number: 125030 Keywords: DeterrencePetty LarcenyStealingTheft |
Author: Ozdemir, Habib Title: Compstat: Strategic Police Management for Effective Crime Deterrence in New York City Summary: This is a descriptive study of Compstat. It is a popular American police management model innovated in 1994 by then NYPD Police Commissioner. Compstat helps departments to control and decrease crime. In Compstat departments, middle and lower managers are more likely to have an organizational environment facilitating to share knowledge, ideas, experience and cooperation. In sum, it is a simplified but highly sophisticated police management model. It systemically produces crime prevention and public order maintenance strategies created mainly by mid-level managers. This paper examines the Compstat model, its implementation in the U.S. by using research data of the Police Foundation concerning Compstat and non-Compstat departments‘ strategic policing methods. Comparison of the crime statistics between New York City and the U.S. is asserted as appropriateness of Compstat as a strategic management tool in police administration for effective crime deterrence. Details: International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) and COGINTA., 2011. 31p. Source: Working Paper No. 30: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2012 at http://www.coginta.org/pdf/WPS/WPS%2030%20final.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.coginta.org/pdf/WPS/WPS%2030%20final.pdf Shelf Number: 125084 Keywords: Compstat (New York City)DeterrencePolice Management (New York City) |
Author: Nagin, Daniel S. Title: Deterrence and the Death Penalty Summary: Many studies during the past few decades have sought to determine whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect on homicide rates. Researchers have reached widely varying, even contradictory, conclusions. Some studies have concluded that the threat of capital punishment deters murders, saving large numbers of lives; other studies have concluded that executions actually increase homicides; still others, that executions have no effect on murder rates. Commentary among researchers, advocates, and policymakers on the scientific validity of the findings has sometimes been acrimonious. Against this backdrop, the National Research Council report Deterrence and the Death Penalty assesses whether the available evidence provides a scientific basis for answering questions of if and how the death penalty affects homicide rates. This new report from the Committee on Law and Justice concludes that research to date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide rates is not useful in determining whether the death penalty increases, decreases, or has no effect on these rates. The key question is whether capital punishment is less or more effective as a deterrent than alternative punishments, such as a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Yet none of the research that has been done accounted for the possible effect of noncapital punishments on homicide rates. The report recommends new avenues of research that may provide broader insight into any deterrent effects from both capital and noncapital punishments. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13363#description Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13363#description Shelf Number: 125115 Keywords: Capital PunishmentDeath Penalty (U.S.)DeterrenceHomicidesMurders |
Author: Entorf, Horst Title: Certainty and Severity of Sanctions in Classical and Behavioral Models of Deterrence: A Survey Summary: This survey summarizes the classical fundamentals of modern deterrence theory, covers major theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of certainty and severity of punishment (and the interplay thereof) as well as underlying methodological problems, gives an overview of limitations and extensions motivated by recent findings of behavioral economics and discusses ‘rational’ deterrence strategies in subcultural societies. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2012. 22p. Source: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6516: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2012 at http://ftp.iza.org/dp6516.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6516.pdf Shelf Number: 125378 Keywords: DeterrenceEconomics of Crime |
Author: Cheng, Cheng Title: Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Castle Doctrine Summary: Since Florida adopted the first castle doctrine law in 2005, more than 20 other states have passed similar self-defense laws that justify the use of deadly force in a wider set of circumstances. Elements of these laws include removing the duty to retreat in places outside of one’s home, adding a presumption of reasonable belief of imminent harm necessitating a lethal response, and removing civil liability for those acting under the law. This paper examines whether aiding self-defense in this way deters crime or, alternatively, escalates violence. To do so, we apply a difference-in-differences research design by exploiting the within-state variation in law adoption. We find no evidence of deterrence; burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault are unaffected by the laws. On the other hand, we find that murder and non-negligent manslaughter are increased by 7 to 9 percent. This could represent either increased use of lethal force in self-defense situations, or the escalation of violence in otherwise non-lethal situations. Regardless, the results indicate that a primary consequence of strengthening self-defense law is increased homicide. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 36p. Source: NBER Working Paper 18134: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2012 at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18134.pdf?new_window=1 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18134.pdf?new_window=1 Shelf Number: 125387 Keywords: Castle DoctrineDeterrenceHomicideLegislationSelf-DefenseViolent Crime |
Author: Bartels, Lorana Title: Sentencing Scammers: Law and Practice Summary: Consumer fraud costs Australians almost $1b a year and most of this fraud involves scams in which individuals are persuaded to part with an upfront, or advance, fee, with the promise of large financial or other gain in the future. In this paper, consideration is given to the sentencing issues that apply in cases of this nature. In particular, the author examines the application of the key sentencing purposes, such as deterrence and rehabilitation, and the sentencing principles applied by courts, such as the proportionality principle, and the challenges that may arise in this context. Key sentencing factors often cited in aggravation or mitigation are also reviewed, before an examination of some of the issues relating to specific sentencing options is undertaken. This paper goes some way in providing a brief analysis of sentencing practices. However, further research is required to better explore how sentencers respond to consumer fraud matters. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 443: Accessed September 10, 2012 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/441-460/tandi443.aspx Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/441-460/tandi443.aspx Shelf Number: 126283 Keywords: Consumer Fraud (Australia)Consumer ProtectionDeterrenceFinancial CrimesSentencing |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Why Are Mexican Traffickers Killing Each Other? Government Coordination and Violence Deterrence in Mexico's Drug War Summary: Mexico’s Drug War was a drug war between criminal organizations ignited by a state that enforced the law without coordinating with its different levels of government. In this paper, I show why. In doing so, I provide a theory of how political institutions induce competing groups to either peacefully cooperate or go to war. I argue that when formal and informal institutions lead to coordination among different levels of government, such that they act as a single coordinated entity, criminal organizations behave and organize in ways that are less prone to violence, and thus, less damaging to citizens. A time-variant data-set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the sub-national level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions are used to test my argument. I provide empirical evidence that the propensity of criminal organizations to engage in damaging criminal activities increases when municipal and state governments are not coordinated (i.e. are ruled by different political parties). A detailed description of corruption dynamics within Mexico’s drug trafficking industry is also presented to show how lack of government coordination caused a war of 51,000 casualties on the US-Mexico border. Details: Cambridge, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2012_CoordinationCriminality.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2012_CoordinationCriminality.pdf Shelf Number: 127267 Keywords: DeterrenceDrug TraffickingDrug Violence (Mexico)Violent CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Doleac, Jennifer L. Title: Under the Cover of Darkness: Using Daylight Saving Time to Measure How Ambient Light Influences Criminal Behavior Summary: We use data from the National Incidence-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to examine how the probability of getting caught when committing a crime, proxied by ambient daylight, impacts criminal activity. We exploit the existence of daylight saving time (DST) to provide within-hour exogenous shock to daylight, using both the discontinuous nature of DST as well as the 2007 extension of DST as sources of variation. Further, we consider both crimes where darkness is likely to play a role in avoiding capture and crimes where darkness would make little difference. Our preferred specification, a regression discontinuity design, shows robbery rates decrease by an average of 51% during the hour of sunset following the shift to DST in the spring. We also find large drops in cases of reported murder (48%) and rape (56%). Effects are largest during the hour of sunset prior to DST (i.e., the hour which was in darkness before but, post-DST, is now light), suggesting changes are due to ambient light rather than other factors such as increased police presence, and we find no changes in crimes where ambient light is unlikely to be a factor. As an additional robustness check, we exploit the variation in the impact of DST by hour and crime to repeat our analysis in a triple-difference framework and show results are largely consistent. Using the social cost of crime, we estimate the 2007 spring extension of DST resulted in $558 million in avoided social costs of crime per year, suggesting investment in lighting such as street lights could have high returns. Finally, we consider if our findings are the result of increased criminal incapacitation or deterrence of criminal behavior, and provide suggestive evidence the majority of the effect is due to deterrence. Details: Charlottesville, VA: Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia,, 2012. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://www.batten.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/fwpapers/Doleac_Sanders_DST_Crime.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.batten.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/fwpapers/Doleac_Sanders_DST_Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 127844 Keywords: Daylight Saving TimeDeterrenceLighting and CrimeNational Incidence-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) |
Author: Gerritzen, Berit C. Title: Facts or Ideology: What Determines the Results of Econometric Estimates of the Deterrence Effect of Death Penalty? A Meta-Analysis Summary: Provided that the literature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment is overall inconclusive, the fact that individual authors persistently claim to have found solid evidence in one or the other direction raises two questions. Firstly, what are the causes for these different results? Do different data samples, estimation methods or time periods lead to different results or do the outcomes merely reflect prior convictions of the authors? Secondly, to what extent is it possible to derive such diverging results by slightly changing the specification of the test equations without violating scientific standards? After a survey of the over forty reviews of this literature available so far, we perform a meta-analysis of 102 deterrence studies published between 1975 and 2011. The profession of the author turns out to be the only statistically significant explanatory variable: Economists claim significantly more often to have found a significant deterrence effect than members of law or other social science departments. Furthermore, using a panel data set of U.S. states, we show how easy it is to derive contradictory results by employing alternative specifications. Thus, our results reinforce the claim that the empirical evidence presented to date is by far too fragile in order to base political decisions on it. Details: Munich: CESifo Group, consisting of the Center for Economic Studies (CES), the Ifo Institute and the CESifo GmbH , 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 4159: Accessed March 27, 2013 at: http://www.cesifo-group.de Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de Shelf Number: 128149 Keywords: Capital PunishmentDeath PenaltyDeterrenceEconomic Evidence |
Author: Hui, Kai-Lung Title: Marginal Deterrence in the Enforcement of Law: Evidence from Distributed Denial of Service Attack Summary: By studying a panel dataset of distributed denial of service attack across 240 countries over 5 years, we find that enforcing the Convention on Cybercrime had increased the intensity of attack by 43 to 52 percent. It did not significantly reduce the chance for a country to be selected for the attack. We conducted a battery of identification and falsification tests to show that such increased attack intensity arose because of failure in marginal deterrence, instead of other theories such as brutalization, stigmatization, or defiance, or general forms of endogeneity. We show that raising the standard of proof of conviction is one way to facilitate marginal deterrence, but it has the undesirable effect of raising the offense rate. We discuss other possible solutions. Details: Unpublished paper, 2013. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://home.ust.hk/~davcook/marginal%20deterrence.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://home.ust.hk/~davcook/marginal%20deterrence.pdf Shelf Number: 128967 Keywords: Computer CrimesCybercrimesDeterrence |
Author: Simpson, Sally S. Title: Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review Summary: BACKGROUND Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is "the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law." Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVES Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategiesi.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non-punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES We were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: experimental (e.g., lab studies or vignette surveys), quasi-experimental (e.g., pre/post-tests), and non-experimental (e.g., correlational statistics using secondary data). The studies included also contained a wide variety of data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, individuals' survey responses, etc.). Our search included published and unpublished articles, reports, documents, and other readily available sources. The outcome of interest, corporate offending, could reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as reported by respondents. Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size for 19. Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some (including a significant effect) were iatrogenic. Looking at the specific mechanisms, the impact of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for individuals). However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies. For punitive sanctions, where there was substantially more data from which to calculate effect sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are cross-sectional or longitudinal. The one area where there appears to be a consistent treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, but only at the individual level. Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least methodologically rigorous designs those that were not experimental versus experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls were associated with a treatment effect. We also found that older studies were associated with stronger deterrent effectsperhaps because the older studies are less methodologically rigorous that those that are newer. Other moderator results were less clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous and focused studies particularly in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas. Details: Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Campbell Systematic Review 2014:4: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Shelf Number: 132243 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCrime PreventionDeterrenceFinancial CrimeFraudWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Farrall, Stephen Title: Intelligent Justice: Balancing the effects of community sentences and custody Summary: The paper draws on evidence from the United States, where research has shown that imprisoning a large number of people for longer periods causes crime to fall in the short term but rise in the long term when they are eventually released. Places where many people are jailed see a range of negative consequences, including increased rates of sexually transmitted diseases, teenage births and serious juvenile delinquency. This results in more people being imprisoned and creates a system 'that feeds upon itself', exacerbating the very social problems that led to increases in crime. The pamphlet states that prison's effect of deterring people from committing crime can be overestimated. The key factor which prevents most people from offending is how likely they are to be punished, rather than how severe the punishment is. Crime reduction caused by prison taking offenders out of the community can also be overestimated, the pamphlet adds. For example, evidence suggests that, in some cases, imprisoning one person creates a 'job vacancy' for another to take their place and commit offences. The paper illustrates that, by the Ministry of Justice's own admission, current data such as reconviction statistics do not reliably measure the true impact of probation supervision and offender management programmes. This has important ramifications for the government's desire to use payment by results in prisons and probation. Finally, the pamphlet offers suggestions on how people who have committed crime should be reintegrated into society. Emphasising the importance of redemption, the paper says that it is usually more effective - and cheaper - to get people to 'buy into' behaviour rather than compel or cajole or supervise them into it. Details: London: Howard League for Penal Reform, 2014. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2014 at: https://d19ylpo4aovc7m.cloudfront.net/fileadmin/howard_league/user/online_publications/Intelligent_Justice.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://d19ylpo4aovc7m.cloudfront.net/fileadmin/howard_league/user/online_publications/Intelligent_Justice.pdf Shelf Number: 133450 Keywords: Criminal Justice ReformDeterrencePrison Construction (U.K.)Prison ReformPunishment |
Author: Mungan, Murat C. Title: Reducing Guilty Pleas Through Exoneree Compensations Summary: A great concern with plea-bargains is that they may induce innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes they have not committed. In this article, we identify schemes that reduce the number of innocent-pleas without affecting guilty individuals' plea-bargain incentives. Large compensations for exonerees reduce expected costs associated with wrongful determinations of guilt in trial and thereby reduce the number of innocent-pleas. Any distortions in guilty individuals' incentives to take plea bargains caused by these compensations can be off-set by a small increase in the discounts offered for pleading guilty. Although there are many statutory reform proposals for increasing exoneration compensations, no one has yet noted this desirable separating effect of exoneree compensations. We argue that such reforms are likely to achieve this result without causing deterrence losses. Details: Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 705; FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper No. 14-12; U of Penn, Institute for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-34: Accessed September 29, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490518 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490518 Shelf Number: 133473 Keywords: DeterrenceExoneration Innocence Judicial Errors Wrongful Convictions (U.S.) |
Author: Anderson, Lisa R. Title: Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence Summary: Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We experimentally test a two-stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. We find that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. Additionally, our econometric analyses reveal a number of behavioral findings. Subjects are deterred by past convictions, even though the probability of detection is independent across decisions. Further, subjects appear to take the two-stage nature of the decision making task into account, suggesting that subjects consider both current and future penalties. Even controlling for the fine a subject faces for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence. Details: Working paper, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597609 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597609 Shelf Number: 135513 Keywords: DeterrenceEconomics and Crime Fines Punishment Repeat Offenders |
Author: Mastrobuoni, Giovanni Title: Optimizing Behavior During Bank Robberies: Theory and Evidence on the Two Minute Rule Summary: I use data on individual bank robberies to estimate the distribution of criminals' disutility of jail. The identification rests on the money versus risk trade-off that criminals face when deciding whether to stay an additional minute while robbing the bank. The observed (optimal) duration of successful robberies identifies the individual compensating variation of jail, called disutility of jail. The distribution of the disutility which is often assumed to be degenerate, resembles instead an earnings distribution, and highlights heterogeneity in the response to deterrence. General deterrence effects are increasing in criminal's disutility. Details: Unpublished paper, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://www.ceistorvergata.it/public/ceis/file/seminari/2014/mastrobuoni.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Italy URL: http://www.ceistorvergata.it/public/ceis/file/seminari/2014/mastrobuoni.pdf Shelf Number: 135622 Keywords: DeterrencePunishmentRobbersRobberyRobbery (Italy)Sentencing Enhancements |
Author: Loughran, Thomas Title: Studying Deterrence Among High-Risk Adolescents Summary: The Pathways to Desistance study followed more than 1,300 serious juvenile offenders for 7 years after their conviction. In this bulletin, the authors present some key findings on the link between perceptions of the threat of sanctions and deterrence from crime among serious adolescent offenders. Selected findings are as follows: - There was no meaningful reduction in offending or arrests in response to more severe punishment (e.g., correctional placement, longer stays). - Policies targeting specific types of offending may be more effective at deterring youth from engaging in these specific offenses as opposed to general policies aimed at overall crime reduction. - In response to an arrest, youth slightly increased their risk perceptions, which is a necessary condition for deterrence. - Creating ambiguity about detection probabilities in certain areas or for certain types of crime may have a deterrent effect by enhancing the perceived risk of getting caught. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Accessed August 10, 2015 at: http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248617.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248617.pdf Shelf Number: 136383 Keywords: DeterrenceJuvenile OffendersPathways to DesistanceRecidivismSerious Juvenile Offenders |
Author: Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin Title: Do Thieves React to Prices? - Evidence from Gas Stations Summary: In this paper we examine whether fuel theft reacts on prices changes. We cooperated with the State Office of Criminal Investigation Stuttgart and collected data on fuel theft. So we have a unique data set with which we can investigate if and how much fuel thieves react on price changes of fuel. We find that fuel price has a statistically significant positive effect on fuel theft. In our most extensive model we include a lagged detection rate and unemployment as further time-variant variables and control for overall crime by including a crime index. Details: Ulm, Germany: Institute of Economics, Ulm University, 2015. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2674651 Year: 2015 Country: Germany URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2674651 Shelf Number: 137140 Keywords: DeterrenceEconomics of CrimeFuel TheftGasoline StationsGasoline TheftPetrol TheftStealingTheft |
Author: Harcourt, Bernard E. Title: Beccaria's 'On Crimes and Punishments': A Mirror on the History of the Foundations of Modern Criminal Law Summary: Beccaria's treatise "On Crimes and Punishments" (1764) has become a placeholder for the classical school of thought in criminology, for deterrence-based public policy, for death penalty abolitionism, and for liberal ideals of legality and the rule of law. A source of inspiration for Bentham and Blackstone, an object of praise for Voltaire and the Philosophies, a target of pointed critiques by Kant and Hegel, the subject of a genealogy by Foucault, the object of derision by the Physiocrats, rehabilitated and appropriated by the Chicago School of law and economics - these ricochets and reflections on Beccaria's treatise reveal multiple dimensions of Beccaria's work and provide an outline of a history of the foundations of modern criminal law. In becoming a classic text that has been so widely and varyingly cited, though perhaps little read today, "On Crimes and Punishments" may be used as a mirror on the key projects over the past two centuries and a half in the domain of penal law and punishment theory - and this essay hopes to contribute, in a small way, to such an endeavor. In the end, we may learn as much about those who have appropriated and used Beccaria than we would about Beccaria himself - perhaps more. Details: Chicago: University of Chicago Law School, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 648: Accessed November 12, 2015 at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1633&context=law_and_economics Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1633&context=law_and_economics Shelf Number: 137273 Keywords: BeccariaCapital PunishmentCriminal LawDeterrence |
Author: Hashimi, Sadaf Title: "On to the next one:" Using social network data to inform police target prioritization Summary: As part of the portfolio of strategies used to achieve crime reductions, law enforcement agencies routinely establish a list of offenders to be targeted as priorities. Rarely considered, however, is the fact that targets are embedded in larger social networks. These networks are a rich resource to be exploited as they facilitate: 1) efficient prioritization by understanding which offenders have access to more resources in the network, and 2) assessments of the impact of intervention strategies. Drawing from law enforcement data, the personal networks of two mutually connected police targets from a mid-size city in British Columbia, Canada were constructed. Results show that of the 101 associates in their combined network, 50 percent have a crime-affiliated attribute. The network further divides into seven distinct communities, ranging from four to 25 members. Membership to these communities suggests how opportunities, criminal and non-criminal, form and are more likely to occur within one's immediate network of associates as opposed to the larger network. As such, seven key players that have the highest propensity to facilitate crime-like behaviours are identified via a measure of "network capital," and located within the communities for informed target selection. Details: Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 2015. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed January 12, 2016 at: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/15667 Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/15667 Shelf Number: 137469 Keywords: Communities Deterrence Intelligence-led policing Police Policies and PracticesSocial Network Analysis |
Author: Gilbert, Jarrod Title: Youth Desistance in Aotearoa New Zealand: What We Can Learn from Higher Risk Former Offenders Summary: This report is based on a study of 51 people who were imprisoned at a young age and who were assessed as having a medium to high risk of re-offending, but who nonetheless desisted from crime. The research was commissioned to understand how and why this desistance occurred. Despite uniformity of the qualifying factors, there were significant differences between many participants within the research cohort. At each end of this spectrum of difference we identified high- and low-end outliers, and these became important lenses through which to view different desistance processes and challenges. - Prison was reported to be a deterrent from crime by 81 percent of the cohort. - Sentence length was not related to deterrence: there were no meaningful differences between longer and shorter sentences. - Deterrence was influenced by both fear of returning to prison and the boredom associated with imprisonment. Executive summary - There was a sense among most participants that they did not 'fit in' with other prisoners. Nonetheless, many reported in hindsight that the prison experience had some positive effects. - Those who had spent time in both youth and adult units reported that youth units were harder, more frightening and more dangerous places than adult facilities, and that they felt less safe within them. - In order of likelihood, the decision to desist was made in prison, before prison, and after prison. The decision to desist was most often a conscious and quick one, made at the point of arrest, conviction or imprisonment. For a minority of subjects the decision formed over a longer timeframe and tended not to be overt or conscious. Both types of desistance decision ended in a 'switch' in thinking, meaning a desire to not commit crime in the future. - One strong deterrent element of imprisonment among some participants was the shame they felt about the embarrassment caused to other family members. Details: Canterbury, NZ: Independent Research Solutions, 2014. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: http://www.jarrodgilbert.com/uploads/1/1/6/3/11633778/desistance_report_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.jarrodgilbert.com/uploads/1/1/6/3/11633778/desistance_report_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138493 Keywords: DesistanceDeterrenceJuvenile OffendersOffender RehabilitationReoffendingRepeat Offenders |
Author: Guarin, Arlen Title: The Effects of Punishment of Crime in Colombia on Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Human Capital Formation Summary: Based on individual data on the population of those arrested in Medellin, we assess whether the change in punishment at age 18, mandated by law, has a deterrent effect on arrests. No deterrent effect was found on index, violent or property crimes, but a deterrence effect was found on non-index crimes, specifically those related to drug consumption and trafficking. This implies an elasticity of arrests with respect to punishment that varies between -1.0 and -6.7 percent. The number of days that arrested individuals take to recidivate is 300, higher for index crimes if they are arrested right after, rather than before, reaching 18 years of age, in which case they are less likely to recidivate in any type of crime. The change in criminal penalties at 18 years of age does not explain future differences in human capital formation among the population that had been arrested immediately after versus immediately before reaching 18 years of age. There is no evidence that the longer length of time to recidivate on the part of individuals arrested for the first time immediately after reaching 18 implies future differences in human capital formation. This suggest that our estimated incapacitation effect would not be explained by the impossibility of the arrested population to recidivate due to their having been imprisoned, but rather by a specific deterrence effect resulting from the harsher experience while in prison of those arrested right after, rather than before, reaching 18. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Banco de la Repblica, 2013. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: : Accessed August 5, 2016 at: http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/borrador-774 Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/borrador-774 Shelf Number: 130037 Keywords: DeterrenceDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingPunishment |
Author: Long, Wei Title: Does Longer Incarceration Deter or Incapacitate Crimes? New Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Reform Summary: This paper estimates how violent crimes respond to a policy change which requires violent offenders to serve a substantial propertion of their sentenced terms before being eligible to release to community supervision. Focusing on states with effective TIS laws which meet the federal 85 percent rule, we utilize the differences-in-differences design to investigate both deterrent and incapacitative effect of TIS on crimes. We observe statistically significant -7 percent deterrent effect of TIS on growth of violent crime two years after its passage. A series of placebo tests confirm the robustness of the estimates and inferences. In the long-run, additional incapacitative effect also becomes significant, making the treatment effect of TIS even greater in magnitude. Even though insignificant in the first two years after TIS was passed, growth of non-violent property crime rates decreases by 7 percent in the long-run in TIS states, indicating relative greater importance of incapacitative effect which locks up offenders who commit both types of crimes. A rough approximation shows that TIS is an economically efficient method to decrease crimes. Details: New Orleans, LA: Tulane University, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Tulane Economics Working Paper Series 1607: Accessed September 23, 2016 at: http://econ.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul1607.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://econ.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul1607.pdf Shelf Number: 146112 Keywords: DeterrenceImprisonmentIncapacitationPunishmentSentencingTruth-in-SentencingViolent Crime |
Author: Khadjavi, Menusch Title: Deterrence Works for Criminals Summary: Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker's deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals. Details: Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Kiel Working Paper no. 1938: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/deterrence-works-for-criminals/KWP1938_Deterrence%20works%20for%20criminals_Khadjavi.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Germany URL: https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/deterrence-works-for-criminals/KWP1938_Deterrence%20works%20for%20criminals_Khadjavi.pdf Shelf Number: 145426 Keywords: DeterrencePrisonPunishmentStealingTheft |
Author: Jaqua, Daniel Title: How to Catch Capone: The Optimal Punishment of Interrelated Crimes Summary: This paper characterizes optimal criminal punishments when there are multiple interrelated crimes. Optimal punishments are functions of the extent to which related crimes are complements or substitutes weighted by their relative harms to society. The available empirical evidence on the relationship between index crimes in the United States suggests that tailoring criminal punishments properly to incorporate relationships between crimes could reduce the aggregate harm to victims by 3%, or about $8 billion dollars annually, holding enforcement expenditures fixed. The actual harm reduction of a marginal increase in arrests for an index crime is on average about 1.5-3 times greater than the harm reduction calculated without these effects. Details: Working paper, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831590 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831590 Shelf Number: 145431 Keywords: Criminal SanctionsDeterrencePunishment |
Author: Nakao, Keisuke Title: Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators Summary: Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy's three advantages: (a) Proxy can convince Perpetrators of punishments more credibly than Defender (communicative advantage); (b) Proxy is more likely to identify Perpetrators and detect what they hold dear (informational advantage); (c) Proxy can cripple and punish Perpetrators more effectively (offensive advantage). On the other hand, the delegation may cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy's choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g., Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each's own domain (Interpol, Budapest Convention). Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808474 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808474 Shelf Number: 144872 Keywords: CybercrimeDeterrenceIntellectual PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Chiarini, Bruno Title: Is the Severity of the Penalty an Effective Deterrent? A Strategic Approach for the Crime of Tax Evasion Summary: In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be simply read with mixed strategies. These are inconclusive on how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering the risk of breaking the law. Although an irreducible minimum of uncertainty remains, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played. In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian historical experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute (CESifo, 2016. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 6112: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6112.html Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6112.html Shelf Number: 145894 Keywords: DeterrenceFinancial CrimePunishmentTax EvasionWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Mungan, Murat C. Title: Reducing Crime through Expungements Summary: Expungements reduce the visibility of a person's criminal record, and thereby reduce the informal sanctions that may be imposed on him. This reduction is enjoyed by the ex-convict only if he does not become a repeat offender, because otherwise he re-obtains a criminal record. Thus, the value a person attaches to having his record expunged is inversely related to his criminal tendency. Therefore, by making expungements costly, the criminal justice system can sort out low criminal tendency individuals -- who are unlikely to recidivate -- from people who have high criminal tendencies. Moreover, the availability of expungements does not substantially affect a first time offender's incentive to commit crime, because one incurs a cost close to the reduction in informal sanctions that he enjoys by sealing his criminal record. On the other hand, expungements increase specific deterrence, because a person who has no visible record suffers informal sanctions if he is convicted a second time. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, allowing ex-convicts to seal their records at substantial costs reduces crime. Details: Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University College of Law, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 786 ; FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper No. 16-2 Accessed October 28, 2016 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711024 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711024 Shelf Number: 145015 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCriminal RecordsDeterrenceExpungements |
Author: Iyengar, Radha Title: I'd Rather be Hanged for a Sheep than a Lamb The Unintended Consequences of 'Three-Strikes' Laws Summary: Strong sentences are common "tough on crime" tool used to reduce the incentives for individuals to participate in criminal activity. However, the design of such policies often ignores other margins along which individuals interested in participating in crime may adjust. I use California's Three Strikes law to identify several effects of a large increase in the penalty for a broad set of crimes. Using criminal records data, I estimate that Three Strikes reduced participation in criminal activity by 20 percent for second-strike eligible offenders and a 28 percent decline for third-strike eligible offenders. However, I find two unintended consequences of the law. First, because Three Strikes flattened the penalty gradient with respect to severity, criminals were more likely to commit more violent crimes. Among third strike eligible offenders, the probability of committing violent crimes increased by 9 percentage points. Second, because California's law was more harsh than the laws of other nearby states, Three Strikes had a "beggar-thy-neighbor" effect increasing the migration of criminals with second and third-strike eligibility to commit crimes in neighboring states. The high cost of incarceration combined with the high cost of violent crime relative to non-violent crime implies that Three Strikes may not be a cost-effective means of reducing crime. Details: London: London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for Economic Performance, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: CEP Discussion Paper No 1017: Accessed February 13, 2017 at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1017.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1017.pdf Shelf Number: 145122 Keywords: DeterrencePunishmentSentencingThree Strikes Laws |
Author: Mungan, Murat C. Title: Optimal Preventive Law Enforcement and Intervention Standards with Endogenous Non-Preventive Law Enforcement Probabilities Summary: I propose a simple model of law enforcement where offenders can be prevented from completing their offenses ex-ante or may be caught and punished subsequent to completing their offenses. The former method of law enforcement increases social welfare by preventing the infliction of criminal harm, but produces inconvenience costs to the general public, because it requires interfering with the acts of innocents as well as attempters. The magnitude of these inconvenience costs, and therefore the optimal frequency with which preventive enforcement ought to be used, depend on the responsiveness of potential criminals to punishment; the proportion of potential criminals in the population; the intervention techniques employed; and the harm from crime. I also show that weak intervention standards can be used in conjunction with more frequent monitoring to increase the frequency of prevention, and that these two methods are complements. These observations provide rationales for why preventive enforcement sometimes takes place through random (or suspicionless) interventions, and in other cases through stops based on reasonable suspicion. Details: Tallahassee: Florida State University, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 701: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481367 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481367 Shelf Number: 145398 Keywords: DeterrenceJudicial ErrorWrongful Convictions |
Author: Ofo, Nat Title: Effectiveness of Capital Punishment as Deterrence to Kidnapping in Nigeria Summary: The menace of kidnapping in Nigeria has become embarrassingly unstoppable. The situation has completely gone out of control. One approach that has gained some popularity in an attempt to curtail kidnapping incidents in the country is the amendment of the statute and the upgrading of kidnapping to a capital offence by the legislature in some States of the Federation. It is believed that by imposing capital punishment for the offence, people would be deterred from committing the offence. This paper reviews the crime of kidnapping, tracing the circumstances leading to its present rampancy. It also evaluates the effectiveness of death penalty as deterrence to crime. Relying on the continued, increased and sophisticated practice of armed robbery in the country in spite of its being made a capital offence since the 1970s, it concludes that imposing death penalty for the offence of kidnapping will not solve the problem. It further points out that the real solution to the problem lies in dealing with the root causes of the problem. Practical and effective solutions to the kidnapping saga in Nigeria were consequently proffered. Details: Okada, Edo State: Igbinedion University - College of Law, 2010. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646867 Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646867 Shelf Number: 131361 Keywords: Capital Punishment Death Penalty DeterrenceKidnapping |
Author: Polinsky, A. Mitchell Title: Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation Summary: In this article we derive the sentence - choosing among the sanctions of prison, parole, and probation - that achieves a target level of deterrence at least cost. Potential offenders discount the future disutility of sanctions and the state discounts the future costs of sanctions. Prison has higher disutility and higher cost per unit time than parole and probation, but the cost of prison per unit of disutility can be lower or higher than the cost of parole and probation per unit of disutility. The optimal order of sanctions depends on the relative discount rates of potential offenders and the state, and the optimal duration of sanctions depends on the relative costs per unit of disutility among the sanctions and on the target level of deterrence. We focus on the case in which potential offenders discount the disutility of sanctions at a higher rate than the state discounts the costs of sanctions. In this case, if prison is more cost-effective than parole and probation - that is, has a lower cost per unit of disutility - prison should be used exclusively. If prison is less cost-effective than parole and probation, probation should be used if the deterrence target is low enough, and prison followed by parole should be used if the deterrence target is relatively high. Notably, it may be optimal to employ a prison term even if prison is less cost-effective than parole and probation and even if prison is not needed to achieve the target level of deterrence, because of what we refer to as the front-loading advantage of imprisonment. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working paper No. 23436: Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 507: Accessed May 22, 2017 at: Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 145662 Keywords: Costs of CorrectionsDeterrenceImprisonmentParolePrisonProbationPunishmentSentencing |
Author: Lando, Henrik Title: The Effect of Type-1 Error on Deterrence Summary: A common view in the law and economics literature holds that equal increases in type-1 and type-2 error lower deterrence by the same amount. We demonstrate that this view is generally incorrect both when the court's error concerns the assessment of the alleged offender's act (mistake of act) and when it concerns the identity of the offender (mistake of identity). As for mistakes of act, the common view ignores that the two types of error are conventionally defined as court errors, i.e. as conditional on adjudication, and that abiding by the law reduces the probability of adjudication. This means that type-1 error exerts a lesser effect on deterrence than type-2 error. Moreover, we demonstrate that type-1 error may lead a potential offender to over-comply with the law, both when choice is binary and when it is continuous. This holds whether or not errors are defined as conditional on adjudication. As for mistakes of identity, we formalize the view that the potential offender may be falsely convicted of a crime committed by someone else whether or not he himself acts lawfully, and that type-1 error, whether or not it is defined as conditional on adjudication, therefore does not exert any direct effect on deterrence. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 687: Accessed August 16, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=244. Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=244 Shelf Number: 146784 Keywords: DeterrenceInnocence Judicial Errors Wrongful Convictions |
Author: Weisburd, Sarit Title: Police Presence, Rapid Response Rates, and Crime Prevention Summary: This paper estimates the impact of police presence on crime using a unique database that tracks the exact location of Dallas Police Department patrol cars throughout 2009. To address the concern that officer location is often driven by crime, my instrument exploits police responses to calls outside of their allocated coverage beat. This variable provides a plausible shift in police presence within the abandoned beat that is driven by the police goal of minimizing response times. I found that a 10 percent decrease in police presence at that location results in a 1.2 to 2.9 percent increase in crime. These results shed light on the black box of policing and crime and suggest that routine changes in police patrol can significantly impact criminal behavior. Details: Tel Aviv University, 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 17, 2017 at: https://econ.tau.ac.il/sites/economy.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/Economics/PDF/seminars%202016-17/Sarit%20Weisburd_Police%20Presence%2C%20Rapid%20Response%20Rates%2C%20and%20Crime.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://econ.tau.ac.il/sites/economy.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/Economics/PDF/seminars%202016-17/Sarit%20Weisburd_Police%20Presence%2C%20Rapid%20Response%20Rates%2C%20and%20Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 147707 Keywords: Crime PreventionDeterrencePolice EffectivenessPolice PatrolPolice Response |
Author: Gomez, Santiago Title: Big brother: Good brother? CCTV systems and crime rates in Medellin-Colombia Summary: We investigate whether there is any effect on crime rates following the installation of public surveillance cameras in the city of Medellin-Colombia. To do so, we benefit from a quasi- experiment that took place in the installation of 366 cameras from April 2013 through October 2014. We highlight three main findings. First, there is a decline in total crime after the installation of the CCTV system. On average, year on year monthly changes in a total crime index are between 0.004 and 0.012 lower (i.e. between 33.3% and 100% of the average total crime index from January 2011 to October 2014 lower) in a street segment following the installation of one camera. This effect seems to be driven mainly by a decline in property crime. Second, we find no significant effects on apprehensions following the installation of surveillance cameras. These results may suggest the main channel for CCTV systems to deter criminals is through the subjective certainty of punishment. Third, we do not find crime displacement effects after the installation of CCTV systems. Instead, we find diffusion of benefits to the street segments surrounding installation sites when we restrict our sample to high crime places. This diffusion of benefits seems to be driven by a reduction in violent crime. Details: Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2018 at: https://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/52981/lacea2015_cctv_systems_crime_rates.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2015 Country: Colombia URL: https://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/52981/lacea2015_cctv_systems_crime_rates.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 150321 Keywords: CCTVClosed-Circuit TelevisionCrime PreventionDeterrenceVideo Surveillance |
Author: Janhuba, Radek Title: Criminals on the Field: A Study of College Football Summary: Economists have found mixed evidence on what happens when the number of police increases. On the one hand, more law enforcers means a higher probability of detecting a crime, which is known as the monitoring effect. On the other hand, criminals incorporate the increase into their decision-making process and thus may commit fewer crimes, constituting the deterrence effect. This study analyzes the effects of an increase in the number of on-field college football officials, taking players as potential criminals and officials as law enforcers. Analyzing a novel play by play dataset from two seasons of college football, we report evidence of a monitoring effect being present in the overall dataset. This effect is mainly driven by offensive penalties which are called in the area of jurisdiction of the added official. Decomposition of the effect provides evidence of the presence of the deterrence effect in cases of penalties with severe punishment or those committed by teams with moderate to high ability, suggesting that teams are able to strategically adapt their behavior following the addition of an official. Details: Prague: Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute), 2017. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series No. 610: accessed August 16, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084348 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084348 Shelf Number: 151154 Keywords: DeterrenceFootball Sports Violence |
Author: Nussio, Enzo Title: Deterring delinquents with information: Evidence from a randomized poster campaign in Bogota Summary: In this article, we test whether an isolated information campaign can deter criminals by appealing to their apprehension risk perception. A randomized trial was conducted around 154 high crime housing blocks in Bogota. With support of the Colombian Police, half of the blocks were exposed to a three month poster campaign reporting the number of "arrests around this street block" and half to a no-treatment control condition. The main outcome measure (total registered crime) and secondary outcome measures (calls to the emergency line for thefts and attacks, and minor wrongdoings) were provided by the Police. Additionally, trust in police, security perception, and police performance perception were measured among residents and workers in the treatment and control areas (N = 616) using a post-treatment survey. Measures were analyzed with linear regression analysis and two-sample t-tests. Over the course of the treatment period, premeditated crime was reduced, while spontaneous crime remained unchanged. Overall levels of crime were not significantly altered. Also, a moderate crime reduction is detectable during the first month of the treatment period. The posters were highly visible (93% of respondents in the treated areas recalled them) and positively received (67% "liked" them). Perceptions of security and police among locals improved, though not significantly. Inherent among residents of Bogot is a pervasive feeling of impunity and low trust in authorities, making the city a hard test case for an offender-targeted advertising campaign. Initial reductions of crime and overall reductions of premeditated crime are thus noteworthy. These results align with key principles of apprehension risk updating theory. Details: PLosONE, 33(7): 1-20 Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2018 at: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0200593&type=printable Year: 2018 Country: Colombia URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0200593&type=printable Shelf Number: 153311 Keywords: Delinquency PreventionDeterrenceMedia Campaign |