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Results for extremists

37 results found

Author: Jacobson, Michael

Title: Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left

Summary: There is a growing recognition that capturing or killing every terrorist is not a realistic strategy and that we need to spend more time exploring the radicalization process - what motivates people to become extremists in the first place. Despite this, little study has been undertaken of the "flip side" - those who decide to leave terrorist and extremist organizations. This report is based on approximately twenty-five interviews with those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations. An analysis of the interviews reveals that individual dropout cases clearly show that no single overarching reason explains why individuals leave terrorist or extremist groups, just as no single reason leads to their radicalization in the first instance. Nonetheless, several patterns emerge that should give policymakers cause for optimism. First, it is clear that many of those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations have done so without being harmed or even threatened. And second, these organizations are often hid hard when leadership defections take place.

Details: Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010. 34p.

Source: Internet Resource; Policy Focus #101

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL:

Shelf Number: 117701

Keywords:
Extremist Groups
Extremists
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: European Police Office - EUROPOL

Title: TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report

Summary: Terrorism continues to pose a high threat to the security of the EU and its citizens and has become more diverse in its methods and impact. That is the conclusion of Europol's annual review of terrorism, presented today in the European Parliament by the agency's Director, Rob Wainwright. Europol's EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) records a total of 249 terrorist attacks in the EU in 2010, in which seven people died and scores of others were injured. Most of these were related to violent separatist, nationalist, or anarchist activities. Three attacks were attributed to Islamist terrorist groups, of which two were aimed at causing mass casualties. In addition an attempted attack, claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in November 2010 had the capacity to cause serious damage and possible loss of life for a large number of EU citizens. A package containing explosive devices was sent by airfreight from Yemen to the US and was intercepted in the UK. Another one was intercepted in Dubai. In overall terms the number of attacks in the EU represents a decrease on the figure for 2009, due largely to a significant decrease in the number of attacks attributed to ETA.

Details: The Hague: EUROPOL, 2011. 43p.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 17, 2011 at:https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/te-sat-2011-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-reportt

Year: 2011

Country: Europe

URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/te-sat-2011-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report

Shelf Number: 121731

Keywords:

Extremist Groups
Extremists
Terrorism (Europe)

Author: Kartas, Moncef

Title: On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border

Summary: Tunisia, Libya, and much of the Arab world are in the midst of political and social upheaval widely known as the 'Arab Spring-. Thus far, the tidal wave of change that began in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010 has led to the end of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 23-year dictatorship and to the fall of fellow dictator Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, while also setting off government transformations and conflict across the region. The revolutions in Tunisia and Libya have not only changed the political landscapes in both countries, but also affected the informal networks and ties that have long characterized the shared border region of the two nations: the Jefara. Indeed, the revolution in each country has profoundly affected the other and will probably continue to do so. With this understanding, this report investigates how the Libyan armed conflict and its aftermath have affected the security situation in Tunisia, particularly in light of the circulation of firearms and infiltrations by armed groups. As the circulation of Libyan small arms and light weapons in Tunisia cannot be adequately understood without a closer look at the tribal structures behind informal trade and trafficking networks in the border region, this report examines how the Libyan revolution affected such structures in the Jefara. This Working Paper presents several key findings: - Despite the weakening of the Tunisian security apparatus and the ongoing effects of the armed conflict in Libya, the use of firearms connected to crime and political violence has remained relatively low in Tunisia. Even in light of recent assassinations of two prominent leftist politicians and regular armed clashes between violent extremists, the military, and security forces on the Algerian–Tunisian border, the use of firearms remains the exception rather than the rule. - In Tunisia, firearms trafficking currently exists in the form of small-scale smuggling. However, larger smuggling operations have been discovered and tied to Algeria-based violent extremist networks-such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-which have infiltrated the country. - Since the 1980s, tribal cartels have been in control of informal trade and trafficking in the Jefara. Their continued control rests on the cartels' strategic stance, informal agreements with the government, and their ability to withstand new, Libya-based competitors (both tribal and militia-based).

Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of international and Development Studies, 2013. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 17: Accessed April 19, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf

Shelf Number: 132077

Keywords:
Armed Conflict
Arms Trafficking
Border Security
Criminal Networks
Extremists
Gun-Related Violence
Organized Crime
Smuggling

Author: Beirich, Heidi

Title: White Homicide Worldwide

Summary: A typical murderer drawn to the racist forum Stormfront.org is a frustrated, unemployed, white adult male living with his mother or an estranged spouse or girlfriend. She is the sole provider in the household. Forensic psychologists call him a "wound collector." Instead of building his resume, seeking employment or further education, he projects his grievances on society and searches the Internet for an excuse or an explanation unrelated to his behavior or the choices he has made in life. His escalation follows a predictable trajectory. From right-wing antigovernment websites and conspiracy hatcheries, he migrates to militant hate sites that blame society's ills on ethnicity and shifting demographics. He soon learns his race is endangered - a target of "white genocide." After reading and lurking for a while, he needs to talk to someone about it, signing up as a registered user on a racist forum where he commiserates in an echo chamber of angry fellow failures where Jews, gays, minorities and multiculturalism are blamed for everything. Assured of the supremacy of his race and frustrated by the inferiority of his achievements, he binges online for hours every day, self-medicating, slowly sipping a cocktail of rage. He gradually gains acceptance in this online birthing den of self-described "lone wolves," but he gets no relief, no practical remedies, no suggestions to improve his circumstances. He just gets angrier. And then he gets a gun. The hatemaker: Don Black, the former Alabama Klan leader who founded and still runs Stormfront, provides an electronic home and breeding ground for racists who have murdered almost 100 people in the last five years. To this day, he remains fiercely unapologetic, even as he rakes in donations from his forum members. It is a myth that racist killers hide in the shadows. Investigators find that most offenders openly advocated their ideology online, often obsessively posting on racist forums and blogs for hours every day. Over the past two decades, the largest hate site in the world, Stormfront.org, has been a magnet and breeding ground for the deadly and the deranged. There is safety in the anonymity of the Web, and comfort in the endorsement others offer for extreme racist ideas, argues former FBI agent Joe Navarro, who coined the term "wound collector." "Isolation permits the free expression of ideas, especially those which are extreme and which foster passionate hatred," Navarro, who helped found the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Division, wrote in 2011 in Psychology Today. "In this cocoon of isolation the terrorist can indulge his ideology" without the restrictions of the routines of daily life. Then there is a trajectory from idea to action. Though on any given day, fewer than 1,800 registered members log on to Stormfront, and less than half of the site's visitors even reside in the United States, a two-year study by the Intelligence Report shows that registered Stormfront users have been disproportionately responsible for some of the most lethal hate crimes and mass killings since the site was put up in 1995. In the past five years alone, Stormfront members have murdered close to 100 people. The Report's research shows that Stormfront's bias-related murder rate began to accelerate rapidly in early 2009, after Barack Obama became the nation's first black president. For domestic Islamic terrorists, the breeding ground for violence is often the Al Qaeda magazine Inspire and its affiliated websites. For the racist, it is Stormfront.

Details: Atlanta, GA: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014. 7p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 12, 2014 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/intelligence_report_154_homicide_world_wide.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: United States

URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/intelligence_report_154_homicide_world_wide.pdf

Shelf Number: 132327

Keywords:
Extremists
Hate Crimes
Homicide
Racism
Violent Crime

Author: Australia. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Title: Martin Place Siege: Joint Commonwealth - New South Wales review

Summary: The Martin Place siege on 15 and 16 December last year was both an atrocity and a tragedy. The review found that there were no major failings of intelligence or process in the lead up to the siege. It is nonetheless important we learn whatever lessons At around 8.33 am on 15 December 2014, Man Haron Monis walked into the Lindt Cafe, on the corner of Martin Place and Phillip Street, in the heart of Sydney's commercial district. Shortly thereafter, he produced a gun and ordered that the customers and staff be locked inside as hostages. After a standoff lasting around 17 hours, the siege ended in gunfire. Three people died: two hostages and Monis. Several of the other hostages sustained injuries. The Martin Place siege has deeply affected the community. The Review analysed the events that led up to the siege and the range of interactions Monis had with agencies including the criminal justice system, beginning with his arrival in Australia. It asked: - were the decisions of government agencies in respect of Monis reasonable given the laws and policies in place when the decisions were made? - should decision-makers have had other information before them when making their decisions? Overall, the Review has found that the judgments made by government agencies were reasonable and that the information that should have been available to decision-makers was available. Changes to laws and policies in relation to national security involve judgments about public safety and personal liberty - i.e. the risk framework within which society operates. We expect that public discussion and consultation about these judgments will continue over the coming months as further information about the circumstances of the conduct of the Martin Place siege operation becomes available. However, the Review has concluded that some modest changes are needed to our laws and government processes to mitigate the public security risks exposed by this case. Some of these changes are already being made. For example, new bail arrangements have now been introduced in New South Wales. New programmes to counter violent extremism in the community are being developed. Other initiatives, such as a review of immigration policies, laws and capabilities in relation to visa applications should be pursued. The Review's recommendations would maintain broadly the current balance in our existing regulatory and legislative framework. The Review's decision to not propose steps beyond this is based on our view that introducing substantial further controls involves a larger choice about the sort of society we wish to live in and is properly the province of the public and our elected representatives. Any further controls would be based on judgments as to whether increases in policing, surveillance and controls and the related extra burden on the taxpayer and intrusions into Australians' lives would make us appreciably safer.

Details: Canberra: Australian Government, 2015. 90p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/martin_place_siege_review.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Australia

URL: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/martin_place_siege_review.pdf

Shelf Number: 134913

Keywords:
Deadly Force (Australia)
Decision Making
Extremists
Hostage Taking
National Security
Violent Extremism

Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel

Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel

Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores.

Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: United States

URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf

Shelf Number: 137746

Keywords:
Airport Security
Border Security
Extremists
Homeland Security
Radicals
Terrorism
Terrorists
Violent Extremism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center

Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism

Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage.

Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: United States

URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf

Shelf Number: 137895

Keywords:
Extremists
Homeland Security
Islamic State
Islamists
Jihad
Lone Wolf Terrorism
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)

Title: Online Activism and Social Media Usage among Indonesian Extremists

Summary: Indonesian extremists have a long history of online activism, but links to the Islamic State (still better known in Indonesia by its former acronym ISIS) have raised questions about whether social media usage is significantly changing patterns of radicalisation and recruitment. The answer seems to be a qualified no, but ISIS propaganda seems nevertheless to be having an impact, persuading some Indonesians that the "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq is a well-run state where devout Muslim families can find fulfilment. Where social media has made a difference is in its ability to turn anyone with a Twitter account into a potential propagandist, meaning that the ISIS message may start with friends and family linked into online networks but quickly reaches a much broader public. Despite the heavy reliance of Indonesian extremists at home and abroad on Facebook, Twitter a"d WhatsApp and similar services, "self-radicalization" and "lone wolf " actions have been extremely rare. Personal contacts and direct face-to-face engagement in religious discussion groups (pengajian) remain important, with friendships reinforced through Internet messaging and mobile phone communication. As one analyst notes, individuals do not become supporters of ISIS by simply by being exposed to propaganda, but the propaganda can help transform them from passive supporters into active members. Social media may play a more important role in recruitment in countries like Malaysia with a very strict legal regime, where police monitoring of suspected extremists is so strict that the only relatively "safe" means of interaction is online - and then only with some form of encryption. In Indonesia, however, it is easy for extremists to hold meetings and discussions, and this is where recruitment generally begins. The very few Indonesian groups that have identified potential members through Facebook have been among the least competent, in part because they have not been able to vet potential members properly.

Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2015. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 24: Accessed March 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Indonesia

URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf

Shelf Number: 138034

Keywords:
Extremism
Extremists
Lone Wolf Terrorism
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Social Media

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)

Title: Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence

Summary: Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The bombing and shooting in Indonesia's capital killed four civilians and four terrorists. The Jakarta attack is now known to have been locally organised - not directed from Syria as originally thought - but it almost instantly resulted in instructions from a Syria-based leader to his followers to do one better," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. "Leaders of Indonesia's tiny pro-ISIS camp are competing to prove their fighting credentials." The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah's rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal's position.

Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2016. 16p.

Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No.25: Accessed march 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Indonesia

URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf

Shelf Number: 138035

Keywords:
Extremists
ISIS
Islamic State
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Terrorists

Author: Phillips, Peter J.

Title: Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists: The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory

Summary: This paper presents an economic analysis of the choices made by lone wolf terrorists. Using RAND-MIPT data about the fatalities that are inflicted by different attack methods, the paper develops an analysis on a foundation of orthodox utility theory and Markowitz-Tobin approximations. This approach permits a computable opportunity set within a risk-reward or mean-variance framework. Optimal choices can be determined using the Markowitz quadratic programming technique. The framework may provide a useful foundation for an economic perspective on 'offender profiling' applied within a terrorism context. Mapping attack methods into mean-variance space provides a more definitive categorisation of the riskiness of attack methods from the terrorist's perspective and suggests the possibility of identifying the terrorist's revealed risk preference. Inferences about the unknown offender may be drawn that complement other aspects of the investigative process. One of the key challenges of law enforcement is drawing inferences about the offender's location and the location of potential targets. Superimposing a game theoretical payoff matrix over a geographic location where payoffs are partially informed by the terrorist's choices and risk preference may contribute another, economic, perspective to this part of the law enforcement process. Prospect theory may also contribute useful insights into the geographical profiling problem.

Details: Toowoomba, QLD: University of Southern Queensland - Faculty of Business, 2014. 19p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272

Shelf Number: 138469

Keywords:
Extremist Groups
Extremists
Geographic Profiling
Lone Wolf Terrorists
Offender Profiling
Radicalization
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Veldhuis, Tinka M.

Title: Thinking before Leaping: The Need for More and Structural Data Analysis in Detention and Rehabilitation of Extremist Offenders

Summary: In this ICCT Research Paper, Tinka M. Veldhuis and Eelco J.A.M. Kessels argue that our current understanding of detention and rehabilitation of extremist offenders is sub-optimal, and highlight several key questions that require answering before policy interventions can be truly optimised. The authors suggest that increased and structural data analysis is essential to produce evidence-based policies that are tailored to the problem and geared to an effective solution.

Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 14p.

Source: Internet Resource: ICCD Research Paper, 2013: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Veldhuis-Kessels-Thinking-before-Leaping-February-2013.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Veldhuis-Kessels-Thinking-before-Leaping-February-2013.pdf

Shelf Number: 138568

Keywords:
Counter-Terrorism
Deradicalization
Extremists
Terrrorists

Author: Buggy, Kate

Title: Under the Radar: How might Australia enhance its policies to prevent 'lone wolf' and 'fixated person' violent attacks?

Summary: This paper addresses the detection, intervention and prevention of so-called 'lone wolf' and 'fixated perso' violent attacks in Australia. It argues that while the threat of terrorism may vary over time, the increase in lone wolf terrorism over the past decade requires a more focused approach to the identification and monitoring of individuals who are moving along the pathway from radical ideology to radical violence. The paper proposes that a specialised unit, the National Fixated Threat Assessment Centre, be established to assess the threat posed by such persons, regardless of whether they fall into the category of lone wolf, fixated persons or other, grievance-fuelled violent actors. It also proposes community-friendly options of e-referral and a new hotline in an effort to identify persons on a radicalisation pathway. With research confirming that the majority of such individuals suffer from mental illness or mental instability, the paper concludes that these initiatives should reduce the risk by providing an opportunity to intervene before violent activity occurs.

Details: Canberra: Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2016. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf

Shelf Number: 139257

Keywords:
Extremists
Lone Wolf Terrorism
Radicalization
Terrorists

Author: Horgan, John

Title: Across the Universe? A Comparative Analysis of Violent Radicalization Across Three Offender Types With Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education

Summary: Using a series of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses, this study compared demographic, psychological, and offense-related behavioral variables across and between 71 lone-actor terrorists and 115 solo mass murderers. The study found little to distinguish these two violent offender types in their socio-demographic profiles. Their behaviors, on the other hand, differed significantly in the degree to which they had interacted with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they lacked information prior to their attack. Unlike lone terrorists, mass murderers' violence was spontaneous due to unplanned physical or emotional conflicts. Lone terrorists, on the other hand, were motivated to commit violence due to ideologically based conflicts or differences with potential target victims. Regarding threat or risk, there are a number of overlapping questions that must be considered, including what type of action is most likely, under what conditions is a particular mass violence attack likely to be perpetrated, and what interventions are likely to be effective in preventing or mitigating the perpetration of violence. Lack of predetermined intent and strategy distinguishes mass murderers and lone terrorists. The lone terrorist tends to engage in more observable behaviors and planning than the mass murderer, which presents more of an opportunity to observe and assess preparatory actions and intervene to prevent the planned violence from occurring.

Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 122p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf

Shelf Number: 139625

Keywords:
Extremists
Lone Actor Terrorists
Mass Murderers
Police Education and Training
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Schuurman, Bart

Title: Converts and Islamist Terrorism: An Introduction

Summary: Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably over-represented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert over-representation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that over-representation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for converts' involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet under-researched topic.

Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p.

Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf

Shelf Number: 139817

Keywords:
Counter-Terrorism
Extremists
Jihad
Muslims
Radicalization
Terrorism
Terrorists
Violent Extremism

Author: Mercy Corps

Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth

Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services.

Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Nigeria

URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf

Shelf Number: 139949

Keywords:
Boko Haram
Extremist Groups
Extremists
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Terrorists

Author: Veldhuis, Tinka M.

Title: Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach

Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT - The Hague Research Fellow Tinka Veldhuis makes an argument for a Realist approach to rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for inmates with a terrorist or extremist background. Accordingly, within the Realist framework, it is stressed that the outcomes of rehabilitation programmes should be understood as a product of the policy mechanisms and the context in which they are implemented. To maximise the likelihood of success it is important to make explicit the underlying assumptions about how the intervention should, given the unique context, contribute to achieving its objectives. This paper endeavours to highlight some of the key questions that need to be answered before and during the implementation of rehabilitation policies.

Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 23p.

Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf

Shelf Number: 140257

Keywords:
Extremists
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Terrorists
Violent Offenders

Author: Human Rights Watch

Title: Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks

Summary: In November 2015, coordinated attacks by armed extremists killed 130 people in Paris. Four months later, attackers struck in Brussels, killing 32. The attacks were the deadliest in France and Belgium in decades. In both cases, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility. Perpetrators in both strikes had connections to Belgium. The Belgian authorities responded by enacting a ra‚ of counter-terrorism laws and deploying 1,800 soldiers in major cities. The police have carried out several hundred raids, detentions, and stops-and-searches. These actions have helped the authorities charge and convict dozens of terrorism suspects. But as Grounds for Concern reveals, these laws, particularly if enforced arbitrarily or in ways that could be perceived as discriminatory, threaten basic rights including those to movement, liberty, free expression and privacy. In addition, some police operations have involved alleged beatings or other use of excessive force. Human Rights Watch investigated 26 incidents of alleged police abuse. In all but one case those targeted were Muslim. The Belgian authorities should amend and monitor counter-terrorism laws and policies to ensure they do not erode fundamental rights and enforce zero tolerance for police abuse. Governments have a responsibility to protect people from attack and to hold those responsible to account. But disproportionate responses are not only unlawful, they also risk driving a wedge between the Belgian authorities and communities that feel targeted—the very outcome that ISIS seeks to provoke.

Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 65p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Belgium

URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf

Shelf Number: 147308

Keywords:
Counter-terrorism
Extremist Violence
Extremists
Human Rights Abuses
ISIS
Islamic State
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Klausen, Jytte

Title: Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks

Summary: Online extremists in social networks pose a new form of threat to the general public. These extremists range from cyberbullies who harass innocent users to terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that use social networks to recruit and incite violence. Currently social networks suspend the accounts of such extremists in response to user complaints. The challenge is that these extremist users simply create new accounts and continue their activities. In this work we present a new set of operational capabilities to deal with the threat posed by online extremists in social networks. Using data from several hundred thousand extremist accounts on Twitter, we develop a behavioral model for these users, in particular what their accounts look like and who they connect with. This model is used to identify new extremist accounts by predicting if they will be suspended for extremist activity. We also use this model to track existing extremist users as they create new accounts by identifying if two accounts belong to the same user. Finally, we present a model for searching the social network to efficiently find suspended users' new accounts based on a variant of the classic Polya's urn setup. We find a simple characterization of the optimal search policy for this model under fairly general conditions. Our urn model and main theoretical results generalize easily to search problems in other fields.

Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2016 at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a42/19deb22b90f807cec920ade6470a7bd44c3b.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a42/19deb22b90f807cec920ade6470a7bd44c3b.pdf

Shelf Number: 147812

Keywords:
Extremist Groups
Extremists
Online Extremism
Radical Groups
Social Networks

Author: Fekete, Liz

Title: Exit from White Supremacism: the accountability gap within Europe's de-radicalisation programmes

Summary: In a timely report, the IRR cautions against the importation to the UK of Scandinavian-style Exit programmes for dealing with far-right extremists. It was one of the big news stories of October 2013 and something of a coup for 'counter-radicalisation', when Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll quit the EDL - and think-tank Quilliam claimed the credit for choreographing their exit. Ever since then, a head of steam has built up in favour of a UK deradicalisation programme for the far Right. But in Exit from White Supremacism: the accountability gap within Europe's de-radicalisation programmes, the IRR reveals the problems of such existing Exit programmes across Europe. The IRR suggests that: Considerable resources are being invested in Exit, but there has been scant evaluation of its methodology or statistical analysis of its vaunted success rate; There needs to be more critical evaluation of Exit's methods. Programmes, often run and designed by 'formers' ignore questions of political ideology and past racist activity, but focus instead on the social alienation and psychological problems of 'clients'; In Sweden, past failures and bitter controversies about lack of oversight within Exit have been airbrushed from the official record; In Norway, Exit practitioners have been accused of claiming credit for work done outside Exit, principally by dedicated police and youth workers; In Germany, victim support groups show concern that some 'formers' have been faking political conversion to reduce a sentence, secure probation or otherwise manipulate the security services which, in turn, has its own agenda of recruiting neo-Nazis to act as paid informants. One German 'former' who was helped by federal intelligence services to write a confessional account of his disengagement from the neo-Nazi scene, went on to become a leading light within the counter-jihadi movement. Liz Fekete, Director of the IRR and author of the report said today: 'After months of research into these Exit programmes, I am quite frankly baffled by the lack of official acknowledgement of its many manifest failures. I hope that this report will act as a wake-up call to all those hitherto seduced by the Exit brand that the total lack of transparency and accountability within Exit is not only unacceptable but potentially dangerous.'

Details: London: Institute for Race Relations, 2014. 8p.

Source: Internet Resource: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf

Shelf Number: 146688

Keywords:
Counter-Radicalization
Extremist Groups
Extremists
Radical Groups
Radicals

Author: Klausen, Jytte

Title: The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015

Summary: 1. Purpose of Study: This report analyses the networks and organizations that mobilize and direct Americans for jihadist action, or that raise money in the US for Hamas and Hezbollah. The study employs a quasi-experimental method using a control-case design, comparing the network structures of American terrorism offenders inspired by Hezbollah with those of Sunni extremist groups aligned with Al Qaeda, and in recent years ISIL. 2. The Problem: How and why do foreign terrorist organizations recruit Americans to their cause? Three answers have been proposed to this question:  Homegrown terrorism is a tactic developed by the foreign terrorist organization to further its strategic interest in attacking Western targets. Command and control is essential to all terrorist organizations.  Homegrown terrorism is essentially "leaderless". The root cause of militancy lies at home. US militants may declare allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations, but this is just a matter of aspiration.  Terrorist groups are comprised of leaders and foot soldiers, and tailor their operations to meet strategic goals, including, perhaps most importantly, keeping their numbers up. An emphasis on recruitment requires an open structure; fundraising requires centralized control over the flow of money; plotting attacks needs a covert and decentralized and covert organization. 2. Data and Methodology: The data were collected as part of the Western Jihadism Project (WJP), a database of Western nationals associated with terrorist plots related to Al Qaeda and aligned groups, including ISIL, from the early 1990s to the end of 2015.  Over the past twenty-five years, close to 800 residents or citizens of the U.S. have committed terrorism offenses inspired by one of the many Islamist terrorist groups that have been active in this country.Of these, about 560 may be described as "homegrown" terrorists: American citizens or residents who have been arrested or have died in incidents related to Al Qaeda and its many affiliates and successors. Foreigners who have attacked the United States, e.g. the September 11 hijackers, or have been brought to trial in the United States, are excluded from this estimate, and are not considered in this study.  Data were also collected on Americans convicted on charges related to Hamas and Hezbollah in order to assess differences in network organization that are related to the particular objectives of international terrorist groups operating in the United States. All data were collected from court records and other public documentation. Data collection procedures were designed to facilitate social network analysis through the comprehensive coding of information about communications and relationship between known terrorist offenders.  The study uses a method termed social network analysis (SNA). Developed by sociologists to study informal network dynamics, it has proved to be helpful in ascertaining structures, variations and patterns of change in terrorist organizations. 3. Key Findings: 2015 ended with a record number of arrests in the U.S. related to Salafi-jihadist inspired terrorism, the highest count since the 9/11 attacks. The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings and the ability of home-based if not necessarily homegrown militants to carry out successful mass shooting attacks in 2015 and 2016 are further indications that the country faces a significant and growing threat from Americans who are inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology and who are guided by recruiters acting on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations.  Islamist terrorism in the United States has taken many different forms. These range from the pyramidal hierarchy of the Brooklyn-based cell in the 1990s to the family-based criminal fundraising schemes run by Hamas and Hezbollah and the recent decentralized pop-up cells of Americans who have become enamored of the Islamic State’s propaganda.  The 1993 Brooklyn-based cell was markedly hierarchical and typical for an enclave-based terrorist organization that combines proselytizing and recruitment with planning and mobilization for terrorism. It was therefore vulnerable to prosecution and suppression, and its legacy for jihadist terrorism in the Untied States was minimal. Only actors who escaped abroad were able to carry on.  Hamas and Hezbollah have used the United States as a base for raising funds, and occasionally as a safe harbor for important operatives. They retained the character of diaspora organizations focused on supporting organizations in the Middle East and eschewed domestic recruitment and mobilization for violent action in the United States. Highly centralized and vertical networks, they tend to organize around large-scale family-based fraud conspiracies involving siblings, parents and children, spouses, in-laws, uncles, cousins, and even more distant relatives. While the cells lacked broader connections within the United States, they were linked to the mother organizations in Lebanon or Gaza, often through nodes placed outside the United States.  The number of Americans who die abroad in connection with terrorist actions on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations has risen sharply in recent years. Homegrown American militants nearly always first want to go abroad to fight. Later, they may be turned around to carry out attacks at home—or if they are frustrated in their ambition to go abroad, choose to commit acts of terrorism at home. After the 9/11 attacks, jihadist recruitment in the United States recovered only slowly, facilitated by travel to Al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and a web-based proselytizing and recruitment strategy. In the last two years, travel to territories controlled by ISIL produced an uptick in deaths.  Recruitment networks funneling people abroad look very different from the networks of the past that were intent of organizing attacks at home. The Islamic State’s recruitment structure presents a classic pattern of what is known as a star network, i.e. a communication network in which all nodes are independently connected to one central unit, here the recruiters for the Islamic State. Flat, dispersed, and highly connected through the central hub, all traffic goes through the leadership based abroad. The peripheral nodes may be comprised of just one person linking up via a home computer or the node may be a pop-up cell of friends and family communicating with the central hub. But characteristically those on the periphery have little awareness of each other.  The new network structure associated with social media recruitment prioritizes recruitment over exercising control and command of violent plots. It is inaccurate to say that it exemplified “leaderless” terrorism as all information and action scripts run through the central hub of the network, comprised of recruiters and middle-men acting on behalf of the ISIL.  Jihadist recruitment has reached into small and mid-sized cities in every state of the country. The impact of online recruitment is evident in the diversity of American terrorism offenders, who today have come from forty different ethnicities and all races. In 2015 investigations related to the Islamic State were in progress in all fifty states. Given the extraordinary diversity of the American homegrown terrorism offenders, no common denominator and no common set of grievances, or even common motivations, can explain what makes a few individuals opt to join groups espousing violent jihad. 4. Inferences and Recommendations For Policy: Family members and spouses are often the first to know when a person is about to do something. American homegrown terrorists rebel against the nation and their parents, and against the American Muslim community. Establish a duty to report: State and federal laws should make it a duty to report suspicions about imminent criminal activity related to terrorism. The legal construction may mirror current rules regarding the obligation to report child abuse if the family member, teacher, or community member has “cause to believe” that a risk to the public exists. But what are bystanders supposed to see? There is a real risk that American Muslims will be unfairly stereotyped in the absence of a clearly formulated public education program that focus on signs of radicalization to violent extremism. Focus on community education: The growing involvement of converts and the diffusion of risk outside the metropolitan areas suggests a need to educate community leaders, teachers, prison wardens and social workers in the detection of the signs of dangerous radicalization. The number of Americans participating in lethal attacks abroad has increased. For this reason and because of the intimate connection between perpetrating an attack at home and going abroad—in whatever order— the expression of a desire to go abroad to fight for a jihadist organization should be treated as an immediate risk to homeland security. Disrupt and intercept travel to foreign terrorist organizations and insurgencies: Withdrawal of passports is one tool. Preventing the development of hidden communities of extremism should continue be a high priority. Radicalization takes place in online and offline networks and peer groups. Profile the networks: Social network analysis may provide a fuller picture of an individual’s risk profile if it is used to profile all contact points, ranging from social media networks to offline engagements with other militants. The focus should be on top-down suppression of the purveyors of extreme political violence rather than bottom-up elimination of militant social media activists. Many would-be terrorists are caught online. That does not mean that they radicalized online. Moreover, online data have proven of value to law enforcement. Suppress Internet Producers of Online Violent Extremism: Policy should focus on targeting and suppressing the recruiters rather than retail-level consumers of terrorist propaganda.

Details: Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 71p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf

Shelf Number: 146964

Keywords:
Al Qaeda
Extremists
Homegrown Terrorism
Homeland Security
ISIL
Islam
Radical Groups
Social Networks
Terrorists
Violent Extremism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Title: Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons

Summary: This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support Member States in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It is designed to be used by prison managers and prison staff, in particular, but will also be relevant for other actors involved in the criminal justice system, such as policymakers, legislators and members of non-governmental organizations. It can be used in a variety of contexts, both as a reference document and as the basis for staff training. While some elements of the Handbook may not be achievable immediately in some jurisdictions, particularly in post-conflict situations, the Handbook provides national authorities with guidelines for the development of policies and protocols that meet international standards and good practice. This Handbook constitutes the first technical guidance tool to addresses the manifestation of radicalization to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the level of the United Nations. It provides practical guidance on: • The management of violent extremist prisoners (prisoners who have embraced violent extremism) • Preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons (prisoners who may be vulnerable to radicalization to violence) • Interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and at facilitating their social reintegration upon release. Within these parts, the Handbook covers key prison management policies and mechanisms, such as the need for: overall prison conditions to be in line with international minimum standards; effective assessment and classification systems; physical, procedural and dynamic security; professional prison staff training; fair, humane and non-discriminatory treatment; preventing corruption; various categories of disengagement interventions involving experts from different disciplines; and social reintegration and post-release support. Overall, the Handbook advocates an approach aimed at strengthening these key components of prison management. Not only is such an approach explicitly called for in the international good practice documents, it also provides value by creating sustainable benefits for the entire prison system. The following considerations summarize the key principles underlying all recommendations made in the Handbook: • Adherence to fundamental rights, international standards, and good prison practice: It is crucial that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled. Under international human rights law, no exceptions or restrictions are permissible to the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Equally relevant is the protection of the right to hold an opinion and to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice,1 although certain manifestations may be subject to limitations, if strictly necessary and provided by law (e.g. for the protection of public order or the respect of others’ rights). At the same time, Member States should prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. • Relevance of overall prison conditions and prison management: Guidance on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons must ensure that any proposed intervention is closely embedded in broader prison reform efforts. Stand-alone disengagement interventions, which are implemented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results, in particular if the latter fails to adhere to international standards and norms. Vulnerability to radicalization to violence is exacerbated in prisons that are overcrowded, understaffed, fail to provide basic services to prisoners, or are otherwise managed in a disorderly manner. • The importance of definitions and differentiation: This Handbook reiterates that prisoner radicalization, far from being a new phenomenon, is a very old issue which is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists. Definitions and differentiation are important, therefore, when dealing with the sensitive topic of (violent) extremism and radicalization (to violence), in particular in order to differentiate between thought and action. • Specific challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners: The above notwithstanding, prison managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, and believe that they are fighting for a cause. This can have a significant impact on the way violent extremist prisoners should be managed, as this Handbook will set out. The focus of this Handbook is on adult male and female violent extremist prisoners. The specific issue of children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having committed violent extremist offences will be dealt with in a separate UNODC publication, recognizing the different legal regime applicable to children deprived of their liberty. Collective disengagement from violent extremism is also not covered in this Handbook, as its focus is on the individual prisoner and interventions aimed at individual disengagement from violence. Groups may also abandon their use of violent methods, but the reasons for them doing so are not necessarily the same as when an individual disengages from violence.

Details: New York: UNODC, 2016. 160p.

Source: Internet Resource: Criminal Justice Handbook Series; Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf

Shelf Number: 141300

Keywords:
Correctional Administration
Extremist Groups
Extremist Prisoners
Extremists
Prison Violence
Radical Groups
Radicalization

Author: Speckhard, Anne

Title: Psychosocial Drivers, Prevention and Sequelae of Engaging in Torture

Summary: Torture resorted to as a method to extract information believed to be of an urgent security relevance to the state not only harms prisoners, but also leads to adverse conditions in the perpetrator. This paper presents a model of the psychosocial drivers as well as the psychosocial sequelae of torture upon perpetrators, factors derived from a review of existing literature and the authors' interviews with detainees who were tortured and with military and nonmilitary personnel who have tortured. The model predicts the following factors contribute to the likelihood of committing torture: (a) an "us versus them" mentality with language and training that dehumanizes the enemy; (b) a particularly egregious enemy who engages in atrocities; (c) beliefs that torture may elicit "ticking bomb" type or other valuable, actionable information to protect others; (d) annihilating a threat to the existing order; (e) psychological numbing and dissociation as a result of cumulative battlefield traumas; (f) extreme anger and a desire for revenge over the deaths of comrades; (g) poor training to avoid torture (h) selection and training for blind obedience; (i) ambiguous orders and failure to clearly define proscribed behaviors constituting torture; (j) authority figures ordering torture; (k) group pressure to engage in torture; (l) situational dynamics that place prisoners in positions of being helpless and distant while potential torturers are placed in unchecked power positions with; (m) poor supervision, or actual disavowal, by supervisors that torture is occurring; (n) group dynamics that allow for diffusion of blame; and strong unit loyalty and group cohesion; along with (o) punishments for failing to engage in torture, including exclusion from the group upon whom one relies for self- preservation and security. Just as the authors identify the factors that are predictive of those individuals and situations that are most likely to give rise to torture, they also identify the psychosocial sequelae of engaging in torture. These include intrusive thoughts and flashbacks, avoidance of reminders/triggers, social alienation/isolation, self-condemnation with guilt and shame, fears of retaliation and retribution, anger, nightmares and sleep disturbances, high arousal states with the inability to concentrate or sleep well, dissociative personality splinters, suicidal thoughts and behaviors and drug and alcohol abuse to forget and painful emotional states upon remembering. Lastly, the authors identify the practices that can be put in place to protect individuals, particularly military and paramilitary personnel, from crossing the line into perpetrating abuse, atrocities, and torture upon those placed in their custody. This includes but is not limited to carrying out beatings, sleep deprivation, inducing hypothermia, waterboarding, rectal feedings, and other harsh treatment of prisoners.

Details: Washington, DC: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 2017.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/psychosocial-drivers-prevention-and-sequelae-of-engaging-in-torture/

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/psychosocial-drivers-prevention-and-sequelae-of-engaging-in-torture/

Shelf Number: 145049

Keywords:
Extremists
Military Detainees
Prisoners
Terrorists
Torture

Author: Beckett, Charlie

Title: Fanning the Flames: Reporting Terror in a Networked World

Summary: Terrorism is a brutal and violent practice, but it is also a media phenomenon. Terror is vital news: a dramatic, important story that the public needs to know about and understand. But terrorism also relies on such publicity to disrupt society, provoke fear, and demonstrate power. This problematic relationship predates digital technology. In 1999, American historian Walter Laqueur wrote: It has been said that journalists are terrorists' best friends, because they are willing to give terrorist operations maximum exposure. This is not to say that journalists as a group are sympathetic to terrorists, although it may appear so. It simply means that violence is news, whereas peace and harmony are not. The terrorists need the media, and the media find in terrorism all the ingredients of an exciting story. So what is the responsibility of journalists, who supply the oxygen of publicity? Journalism that reports, analyzes, and comments upon terror faces a challenge in creating narratives that are accurate, intelligible, and socially responsible. Many of the issues journalists face also relate to wider journalism practices, especially around breaking news and conflict journalism. In the last few years, this problem has become more acute and more complicated technically, practically, and ethically with the acceleration of the news cycle and the advent of social media. News events are amplified by social media, which often host the "first draft" of terror coverage. These platforms are specifically targeted by terrorists and referenced by journalists. Yet these companies often have only a short history of dealing with the political and commercial pressures many newsrooms have lived with for decades. The fear is that reporting of terror is becoming too sensationalist and simplistic in the digitally driven rush and that the role of professional journalism has been constrained and diminished. In February 2016, when the White House sought help to counterterror groups, it invited executives from Facebook, Google, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, Tumblr, and Microsoft to come up with ideas to halt the use of the internet by extremists.

Details: New York: Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Columbia Journalism School, 2016. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 12, 2017 at: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/Reporting%20on%20Terror%20in%20a%20Networked%20World%20%28Beckett%29.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/Reporting%20on%20Terror%20in%20a%20Networked%20World%20%28Beckett%29.pdf

Shelf Number: 145447

Keywords:
Extremists
Journalism
Media
Publicity
Social Media
Terrorism

Author: Wilson, Tom

Title: Extremism in the Community: The Case of Shakeel Begg

Summary: Shakeel Begg, described in court by a judge as "an extremist Islamic speaker who espouses extremist Islamic positions", has established himself as an influential figure within numerous public bodies and groups - even after the ruling, where he lost a libel case against the BBC. A new Henry Jackson Society report, Extremism in the Community: The Case of Shakeel Begg, has found that Begg firmly entrenched himself within numerous community groups, and has been active even since he was declared to be an extremist in court. He has also continued to associate with senior politicians, including the leaders of major British political parties. The report's main findings include: He shared a platform with Tim Farron and Stella Creasy in December after the ruling declared him an extremist. This was not reported at the time. He shared a platform in 2013 with Jeremy Corbyn in the days following the Lee Rigby killing - in spite of the fact that the killers came from the mosque where he was Imam, and the fact that his mosque has a long history of hosting hate preachers. The John the Baptist Primary School put documents on their website stating that they work to promote British values, and gave the fact that they worked with Begg as evidence for this. This relationship continued after the ruling, with school children visiting Begg's mosque. This was a clear breach of the Prevent duty. Begg sat on a body at Lewisham Council charged with advising on religious education. He was advised them on their response to the Trojan horse revelations. Begg is known to have worked closely with the police in community partnerships, and the police provided character witnesses during the libel case. He has been a Muslim chaplain at Lewisham and Greenwich NHS trust in the past. He was also a chaplain at Goldsmith's university, and has continued to visit as a guest speaker since.

Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism , 2017. 31p.

Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 8: Accessed May 25, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/20/extremism-in-the-community-the-case-of-shakeel-begg/

Year: 2017

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/20/extremism-in-the-community-the-case-of-shakeel-begg/

Shelf Number: 145800

Keywords:
Extremists
Islam
Radicalization
Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League

Title: A Dark and Constant Rage: 25 Years of Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States

Summary: In March 2017, a white supremacist from Maryland, James Harris Jackson, traveled to New York City with the alleged intention of launching a series of violent attacks on black men to discourage white women from having relationships with black men. After several days, Jackson chose his first victim, a 66-year old black homeless man, Timothy Caughman. Jackson later allegedly admitted that he had stabbed Caughman with a small sword he had brought with him, describing the murder as a "practice run." Right Wing Terror Incident 1993-2017 by Movement However, after the killing, Jackson's angry energy dissipated and he turned himself over to the authorities. A week later, New York prosecutors announced that they were charging him with second-degree murder as a hate crime and also with a state charge of terrorism. Jackson's aborted killing spree was a shocking example of right-wing terror in the United States but it was unfortunately far from an isolated example. For over a century and a half, since 'burning Kansas' of the 1850s and the Ku Klux Klan of the 1860s, right-wing terrorism has been an unwelcome feature of the American landscape. Yet today, many people are barely aware that it exists and most people don't recognize its frequency or scope. Far more attention in recent years has been given to the threat of homegrown radical Islamic terror - a danger that has generated such horrific acts as the Orlando and San Bernardino shooting sprees. Yet the very real specter of radical Islamic terror in the United States has existed alongside an equally serious threat of terror from right-wing extremist groups and individuals. Both movements have generated shooting sprees, bombings, and a wide variety of plots and conspiracies. Both pose threats so significant that to ignore either would be to invite tragedy. To illustrate the threat of right-wing terrorism in the United States, the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism has compiled a list of 150 right-wing terrorist acts, attempted acts, plots and conspiracies from the past 25 years (1993-2017). These include terrorist incidents from a wide variety of white supremacists, from neo-Nazis to Klansmen to racist skinheads, as well as incidents connected to anti-government extremists such as militia groups, sovereign citizens and tax protesters. The list also includes incidents of anti-abortion terror as well as from other, smaller right-wing extremist movements. AD's Center on Extremism defines terrorism as a pre-planned act or attempted act of significant violence by one or more non-state actors in order to further an ideological, social or religious cause, or to harm perceived opponents of such causes. Significant violent acts can include bombings or use of other weapons of mass destruction, assassinations and targeted killings, shooting sprees, arsons and firebombings, kidnappings and hostage situations and, in some cases, armed robberies. Domestic terrorism consists of acts or attempted acts of terrorism in which the perpetrators are citizens or permanent residents of the country in which the act takes place. The right-wing terrorist incidents in ADL's list include those that best fit the above criteria. They are drawn from the much larger pool of violent and criminal acts that American right-wing extremists engage in every year, from hate crimes to deadly encounters with law enforcement. Right-wing extremists annually murder a number of Americans, but only some of those murders occur in connection with terrorist acts. There are, after all, hundreds of thousands of adherents of right-wing extremist movements in the United States and all such movements have some degree of association with criminal activity. No one should think, therefore, that the incidents listed here represent the breadth of right-wing violence in the U.S. But, as acts of terrorism, they do show right-wing movements at their most vicious and ambitious.

Details: New York: ADL, 2017. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: United States

URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf

Shelf Number: 145981

Keywords:
Extremist Violence
Extremists
Islamic Terrorism
Radicalism
Terrorism
Violence

Author: Schmid, Alex P.

Title: Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and Resistance

Summary: Since President Trump attempted to ban Muslims from certain countries from entering the United States, the question which Muslims are 'moderate Muslims' and which are potential 'radical Islamist terrorists' has gained new relevance. While some Muslim leaders deny any connection between their religion and terrorism, it is undeniable that many terrorists claim to act in the name of Islam. This Research Paper first seeks to determine where the world's 1.6 billion Muslims stand in relation to terrorism, distinguishing between Jihadist Muslims, Islamist Muslims, Conservative Muslims and Pluralist Muslims. It then looks at which criteria would allow us to distinguish between 'moderates' and other Muslims. Subsequently, the focus is on the role of moderation in Islam itself, whereby attention is given to the Global Movement of Moderates which originated in Malaysia. While some leading Muslim scholars stress that moderation is a central value in Islam, many Muslims nevertheless do not like to be called 'moderates' for fear of being seen as pro-Western. A further section of this Research Paper looks at how Islamist extremists view moderate Muslims. This is followed by a section that focuses on moderate Muslims voicing their opposition to Islamist terrorism - something often overlooked by Western media. The concluding section raises the thorny question whether moderation is rooted in Islam itself or comes from outside and the author pleads for humanism to be the middle ground for moderates of all faiths and political persuasions.

Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ICCT-Schmid-Moderate-Muslims-and-Islamist-Terrorism-Aug-2017-1.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ICCT-Schmid-Moderate-Muslims-and-Islamist-Terrorism-Aug-2017-1.pdf

Shelf Number: 147498

Keywords:
Extremists
Islam
Muslims
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Singh, Jasjit

Title: The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain

Summary: The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas. Bringing together evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews, the report answers the following questions: FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? NARRATIVES AND ISSUES: Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues? THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES: How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved? TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus? THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? The report also maps events and incidents of Sikh political violence, highlighting how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. In June 1984 Operation Bluestar saw the Indian forces storming the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple). In November the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, triggering a wave of violence against Sikhs across India. These events remain traumatic issues for many Sikhs in Britain. Since then most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons. The report concludes that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with 'the West'. In terms of integration, the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism.

Details: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster: 2017. 108p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/

Year: 2017

Country: United Kingdom

URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/

Shelf Number: 148691

Keywords:
Extremists
Homeland Security
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Lee, Benjamin

Title: Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons

Summary: Peers, education and prisons is the second of three literature reviews on ideological transmission. The first review dealt with the ideological influence of the family on young people. The third review will deal with transmission by and through political and religious organisations. This second review focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons. The research questions that inform these reports are as follows: How is political and religious ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes, and embodied practices) passed on between and across generations and to newcomers? Who is responsible for ideological transmission? Where and when does ideological transmission take place? How do these issues apply to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies? These questions are addressed across three stages of the research review, with findings summarised in the final report. In research on families, the focus on intergenerational transmission and socialisation is well developed (see Ideological Transmission I: Families), but that is not the case in research on friendship and other peer networks. This report has revealed that there is little work that concentrates explicitly on ideological transmission between peers. Studies have focused predominantly on behaviours, relationships and to a lesser extent influences, with relatively little consideration of ideas, values and beliefs or their connection to action.

Details: Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, 2017. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/

Year: 2017

Country: United Kingdom

URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/

Shelf Number: 148692

Keywords:
Extremists
Homeland Security
Peer Influence
Radical Groups
Radicalization
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs

Title: EU and Member States' Policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes

Summary: This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee), presents an overview of the legal and policy framework in the EU and 10 select EU Member States on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes. The study analyses how Member States define suspects of terrorism-related crimes, what measures are available to state authorities to prevent and investigate such crimes and how information on suspects of terrorism-related crimes is exchanged between Member States. The comparative analysis between the 10 Member States subject to this study, in combination with the examination of relevant EU policy and legislation, leads to the development of key conclusions and recommendations.

Details: Brussels: European Union, 2017. 164p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 1, 2018 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596832/IPOL_STU%282017%29596832_EN.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596832/IPOL_STU%282017%29596832_EN.pdf

Shelf Number: 149305

Keywords:
Extremist Violence
Extremists
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Wilson, Tom

Title: Mend: "Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians"

Summary: Compiling years' worth of evidence, the report, Mend: "Islamists Masquerading As Civil Libertarians", demonstrates how Mend meets the government's own definition of extremism, even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with this organisation. Our findings include: How Mend meets the government's own definition of extremism, even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with this organisation. It reveals how Mend has regularly hosted illiberal, intolerant and extremist Islamist speakers, while also pushing a message that risks being inflammatory and making British Muslims feel further alienated from wider society. Mend and key figures in the organisation have also attacked moderate Muslim groups. Mend has openly sought to undermine counter-terrorism legislation and counter-extremism efforts, in addition to having its own links to extremists. Despite this, the group received public funding from Tower Hamlets council to review part of the borough's counter-radicalisation Prevent programme. Several of the organisation's employees and volunteers, including senior figures, have publicly expressed a range of disturbing views on terrorism and anti-Semitism. This has included expressing support for terrorists overseas, dismissing recent terror attacks in the UK, promoting anti-Semitic conspiracies and even calling on British Mosques to hold prayers for "the Mujahedeen".

Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 87p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report-2.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report-2.pdf

Shelf Number: 149596

Keywords:
Extremists
Islam
Islamophobia
Radicalization
Terrorists

Author: Birkeland, Jane

Title: Extremist Use of Social Media: Balancing Privacy and National Cybersecurity

Summary: Social media is used by extremists, terrorists, activists, and ordinary people. The complexity of tackling extremist use of social media lies in balancing the privacy of civilians and US national security interests. Currently, there is a lack of comprehensive policy across industry and government to effectively manage extremist usage-providing a unique dilemma in dealing with extremist use patterns for online recruiting and communication efforts, while maintaining privacy and security for ordinary citizens. We have sought to propose solutions to this dilemma through research of the following aspects of social media usage: - Recruitment and communication efforts between extremists and citizens - Private industry's efforts to balance between online security and privacy - Existing constitutional rights, government policies, and organizations relevant to addressing extremist use of social media - Civil society's role in keeping the government accountable for citizen rights in relation to cybersecurity-related policies Through our research, we found an overall lack of coordination and communication between industry and government, which creates grey areas in current policy and law. The following recommendations have been made to effectively address extremist use of social media: - Civil Society Interaction o Sponsor ad-campaigns that seek to raise awareness of extremist contact via social media and how to approach and report such situations o Begin the education of children and young adults, focusing on internet safety and online extremism o Create an official summit that includes industry and civil society to enhance cybersecurity discourse. - Industry Interaction o Take into account what industry has already implemented when creating new policy o Maintain that the removal of extremist accounts stays in the hands of industry o Allow the legal collection of necessary information by the government and law enforcement if the person(s) in question present a clear and present danger In this report, we will outline extremist use patterns of social media and explore the balance of civilian privacy with national security. We will then address existing government responses to extremist use patterns and end with civil society's role in keeping government accountable to the people it serves. We will lastly demonstrate that the afore summarized recommendations are the best way to effectively address extremist use patterns of social media for fundraising and communication efforts.

Details: Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2017. 100p.

Source: Internet Resource: Task Force Report 2017: Accessed May 10, 2018 at: https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-B-Report_2017_Beyer.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: United States

URL: https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-B-Report_2017_Beyer.pdf

Shelf Number: 150141

Keywords:
Cybercrime
Cybersecurity
Extremists
National Security
Social Media
Terrorists

Author: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism

Title: Action Agenda on Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali: Gaps, Challenges and Action Plans for the Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali

Summary: he violent conflict in Mali, initiated in 2012, is complex and continuously evolving: the groups involved include terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mouvement pour l'Unicite and le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Al Mourabitoune. As the number of extremist detainees has increased due to the country's situation, it is important to consider issues that come along with this: how to deal with violent extremists when they are in prison? What different actors can play a role during this detention time? As most of the detainees will eventually be released, it is also important to take into consideration challenges linked to re-integration. This Action Agenda aims to address a number of these issues by outlining four Action Areas that currently deserve the attention of both national and international actors in order to efficiently deal with problems associated with detaining Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs). In August 2016, UNICRI conducted an assessment mission in Mali to present its programme on Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, developed within the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The presentation was addressed to key national and international stakeholders and aimed to ensure their engagement. From September 2016 onwards, ICCT and UNICRI joined their efforts in Mali on Reintegration and Rehabilitation (R&R) of violent extremists. Three trainings have been jointly organised so far: first, a training on the psychological aspects of violent extremism for prison staff in the Central Prison of Bamako (December 2016); second, a training for religious leaders on radicalisation (April 2017); and third, a training on risk assessment with a special focus on violent extremism for personnel of the National Prison Administration, DNAPES (August 2017). These training workshops have been designed in close consultation with national authorities and international partners, such as the Justice and Correction Section of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA/JCS). Throughout the needs assessment mission and training workshops, and in consultation with different actors on the ground, ICCT and UNICRI have identified four target areas that deserve the attention of both national and international actors, namely (1) increasing awareness of the causes and consequences of violent extremism in the Malian context, (2) intake and risk assessment of violent extremist offenders, (3) empowerment of youth leaders, and (4) disengagement of VEOs through vocational training and engagement of communities through dialogue sessions in prison. These areas will be further discussed below, outlining specific actions recommended to increase capacity building, intensify inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and design and implement an R&R program, all using research to ensure that actions are tailored to local needs and guided by an evidence-based approach. This Action Agenda is composed of three sections: the first briefly discusses the background of the conflict in Mali as well as some of the issues faced in Mali with regards to VEOs in prison. The second section describes the four Action Areas and outlines proposed activities to address concerns and needs identified by ICCT and UNICRI throughout the initiatives implemented by both organisations so far. Finally, next steps and recommendations will be discussed.

Details: The Hague: ICCT, 2018. 21p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Mali

URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf

Shelf Number: 150408

Keywords:
Extremists
Prisoner Reintegration
Rehabilitation
Terrorists
Violent Extremists

Author: Phillips, Whitney

Title: The Oxygen of Amplification: Better Practices for Reporting on Extremists, Antagonists, and Manipulators Online

Summary: We live in a time where new forms of power are emerging, where social and digital media are being leveraged to reconfigure the information landscape. This new domain requires journalists to take what they know about abuses of power and media manipulation in traditional information ecosystems and apply that knowledge to networked actors, such as white nationalist networks online. These actors create new journalistic stumbling blocks that transcend attempts to manipulate reporters solely to spin a beneficial narrative - which reporters are trained to decode - and instead represent a larger effort focused on spreading hateful ideology and other false and misleading narratives, with news coverage itself harnessed to fuel hate, confusion, and discord. The choices reporters and editors make about what to cover and how to cover it play a key part in regulating the amount of oxygen supplied to the falsehoods, antagonisms, and manipulations that threaten to overrun the contemporary media ecosystem—and, simultaneously, threaten to undermine democratic discourse more broadly. This context demands that journalists and the newsrooms that support them examine with greater scrutiny how these actors and movements endeavor to subvert journalism norms, practices, and objectives. More importantly, journalists, editors, and publishers must determine how the journalistic rule set must be strengthened and fortified against this newest form of journalistic manipulation - in some cases through the rigorous upholding of long-standing journalistic principles, and in others, by recognizing which practices and structural limitations make reporters particularly vulnerable to manipulation. With a particular focus on coverage of internet trolls, conspiracy theories, and networks of white nationalists during and after the 2016 US presidential election, this report explores these issues through the perspectives of those who must navigate this territory every day: the journalists themselves. The report's three parts incorporate interviews with 50 individuals with intimate knowledge of the contemporary news media. Fifty-six percent of these respondents are women, 30% are people of color, and 26% are natural-born citizens of countries outside the United States, with additional insights gleaned from the scores of the more informal discussions the author - a frequent expert commentator on stories about internet trolling - has had with reporters since 2010. While each part may be read on its own, each informs and is informed by the others.

Details: New York: Data & Society, 2018. 128p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 31, 2018 at: https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FULLREPORT_Oxygen_of_Amplification_DS.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: United States

URL: https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FULLREPORT_Oxygen_of_Amplification_DS.pdf

Shelf Number: 150414

Keywords:
Extremists
Internet
Journalists
Mass Media
Media
Social Media
Terrorists

Author: Mahmood, Omar S.

Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods

Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf

Shelf Number: 151026

Keywords:
Boko Haram
Extremist Violence
Extremists
Islamic State
Radical Groups
Terrorism
Vigilantism
Violent Extremism

Author: Dean, Chris

Title: Intervening with Extremist Offenders: A Pilot Study

Summary: In order to respond to the increasing number of individuals convicted of extremist offences HMPPS developed the Motivational and Engagement Intervention (MEI) and the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII). These were piloted in 2010 and 2011, and were the first offender behaviour programmes to be delivered to convicted extremists in England and Wales. The programmes aim to encourage and facilitate desistance and disengagement from extremist offending, regardless of a person's particular ideological background. A process evaluation of the pilot explored the implementation using a qualitative approach. Twenty-two intervention participants and 22 facilitators who delivered the interventions were interviewed. This summary presents the findings of the process evaluation as the first indicative step toward establishing whether the MEI and HII programmes are useful in facilitating desistance and disengagement, and preventing future extremist offending. The findings have led to a number of intervention revisions. Key findings - Overall, HII and MEI were viewed positively by facilitators and participants, and are believed to have utility with a range of extremist offenders. Participants reported that the programmes helped them gain an understanding of their motivations for offending and develop strategies to facilitate desistance. - The interventions were responsive and flexible in sequencing, pace and material. Facilitators particularly praised the focus on personal and social identity and needs, and the capacity to elicit discussions around faith, personal values and goals. Further positive aspects included the motivational and engaging approach used to deliver the interventions, with the supportive and collaborative facilitator-participant relationship playing a key part. - There was some repetition within and between the MEI and HII, leading to the recommendation to combine the two with a range of mix-and-match modules. - The interventions may not be suitable for people whose offending is not driven by engagement and identification with an extremist group, cause and/or ideology. - For participants who justified offending on religious grounds, a twin-track approach of addressing psycho-social issues alongside religious and/or political issues is recommended. - Barriers to engaging in treatment were reported to include solicitors dissuading offenders from participating, and a previous lack of engagement between individuals and sentence management staff.

Details: London:HM Prison & Probation Service, 2018. 5p.

Source: Internet Resource: Analytical Summary: Accessed August 17, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727966/Intervening_with_Extremist_Offenders_A_Pilot_Study.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: United Kingdom

URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727966/Intervening_with_Extremist_Offenders_A_Pilot_Study.pdf

Shelf Number: 151163

Keywords:
Behavior Modification
Extremists
Interventions
Terrorists
Violent Offenders

Author: Lauland, Andrew

Title: Countering Violent Extremism in Australia and Abroad: A Framework for Characterising CVE Programs in Australia, the United States, and Europe

Summary: As countries around the world develop countering violent extremism (CVE) programs to prevent homegrown terrorism, there is a dearth of understanding about what types of CVE programs exist and which CVE approaches are most effective. (CVE is a relatively new, and potentially still evolving, term for a set of programs that share ties to, but are distinct from, traditional counterterrorism efforts and domestically focused law enforcement activities, such as community policing.) Significant differences exist across nations in terms of CVE strategy and approach, how long government-funded efforts have been underway, and how government and other partners and stakeholders work together. This report documents an effort to help CVE program directors and policymakers in Australia place their efforts in context and identify promising approaches internationally. The authors developed a general framework for characterising CVE programs and then interviewed project staff at and collected information on two promising Australian CVE programs. Using this framework and the results of the interviews and data collection, the project team analysed the Australian programs to identify their primary characteristics, and then examined publicly available information to identify programs in Europe and the United States with goals, approaches, and target populations similar to the Australian programs. This method for mapping programs against goals and activity types could facilitate information exchange across countries.

Details: Canberra, AUS: RAND, 2019. 112p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2168.html

Year: 2019

Country: International

URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2168.html

Shelf Number: 155449

Keywords:
Counter-Terrorism
Domestic Terrorism
Extremists
Radicalization
Terrorism
Violent Extremism

Author: Kruglanski, Arie

Title: Potential for radicalization amongst Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Risks, factors, and implications

Summary: The purpose of the research was to investigate various factors in the radicalization of refugees of the Syrian conflict that were living in Jordan and Lebanon. Specifically, we analyzed the relationship between refugees' extremism and emigration intentions. Results showed that Syrian refugees of our samples are more willing to return to Syria than to move to a Western country. More interestingly, our findings suggest that refugees who lean more toward expressing extreme beliefs are less motivated to go to the West and therefore less likely to present a direct threat to Western societies. Similarly, refugees who want to move to the West also expressed more positive attitudes toward Western countries. These findings were consistent in both samples. Additionally, data collected in Lebanon revealed that refugees living inside camps are more prone to hold extreme beliefs than refugees living outside camps. However, the former group is also less willing to immigrate to Western countries.

Details: College Park, MD: START, 2018. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2019 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_PotentialforRadicalizationAmongstSyrianRefugeesJordanLebanon_July2018.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Jordan

URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_PotentialforRadicalizationAmongstSyrianRefugeesJordanLebanon_July2018.pdf

Shelf Number: 155881

Keywords:
Deradicalization
Extremists
Radicalization
Refugees
Terrorism