Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 19, 2024 Fri
Time: 10:30 pm
Time: 10:30 pm
Results for hostages
6 results foundAuthor: Caldwell, Stephen L. Title: Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa Summary: As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in collaboration with industry and international partners. However, piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles. Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since 2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast and much harder to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008 and 2009, the pirates' success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009 to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S. piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking action. GAO's September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things, collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple U.S. agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to assess this effort's effectiveness in bolstering interagency collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2) assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in this statement Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-449T: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf Shelf Number: 121026 Keywords: Hijackings of ShipsHostagesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Hurlburt, Kaija Title: The Human Cost of Somali Piracy Summary: In 2010, thousands of seafarers in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden were subjected to assaults with automatic gunfire and RPGs, beatings, and extended confinement as hostages. In some cases, hostages were used as human shields to protect pirates from navy vessels or were forced to crew “motherships” that were then used to lure and attack other merchant traffic. Some captive seafarers also were abused, both physically and psychologically. There is a genuine fear that abuse and even torture will be used with increasing frequency to provide additional leverage during ransom negotiations. Somali communities are also suffering, and their youth are put at risk by this criminal activity. In spite of the violent nature of these crimes, the human cost of piracy is still underreported and misunderstood by the public. In most communities ashore, the type of violent crime occurring in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean would be reported in a systematic and consistent way, allowing the public to grasp the significance of these crimes. However, the unique challenges of coordinating rule of law operations and public affairs in international waters, and the multinational nature of crews and the shipping industry, have resulted in inconsistent reporting of these violent crimes. The economic cost of piracy is well known. This report illustrates that the human cost of piracy may be less known, yet staggering. Details: Louisville, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human_cost_of_somali_piracy.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human_cost_of_somali_piracy.pdf Shelf Number: 121976 Keywords: Hijacking of ShipsHostagesMaritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Sloan, M. Title: Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Operational Responses for the Discouragement and Suppression of Marine Piracy Summary: The overall goal of the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project (DMPP) is set out in the capping paper to this Inter-Sectoral Working Group Draft of the operational responses module report. Scope -- Under the operational responses thematic area of the DMPP, the following sub-themes have been examined a. The discouragement of piracy: disincentive strategies designed to discourage or frustrate piracy activities. b. The suppression of piracy: Operational responses, naval patrols, integrated enforcement initiatives, surveillance and intelligence. 3. This report considers operational responses employed to counter recent and current outbreaks of piracy, and draws initial deductions from that analysis. It then applies those deductions to identifying the operational response issues that need to be addressed in order to deal effectively with future piracy outbreaks. Although written as a stand-alone report, it complements, and is complemented by, reports from the other DMPP modules. Details: Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2012. 154p. Source: Internet Resource: (Marine Affairs Program Technical Report #3): Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%233-2012-12.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%233-2012-12.pdf Shelf Number: 128760 Keywords: HostagesMaritime CrimesPirates/Piracy |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Deadly Journeys: The Refugee and Trafficking Crisis in Southeast Asia Summary: In May 2015 three boats carrying 1,800 women, men and children landed in Aceh, Indonesia. Most of the passengers were Muslim Rohingya, a persecuted religious and ethnic minority from Myanmar. All those who arrived had endured weeks or months at sea, in overcrowded boats controlled by ruthless traffickers or abusive people-smugglers. The report includes testimonies from the Rohingya on the shocking conditions and human rights abuses they suffered on the boats for weeks or sometimes months on end, including killings and beatings while they were held hostage for ransom. Details: London: AI, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2015 at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA21/2574/2015/en/ Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA21/2574/2015/en/ Shelf Number: 137048 Keywords: HostagesHuman Trafficking Refugees |
Author: Police Foundation Title: Final Report: Independent Review of Security Issues at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center Summary: On February 1, 2017, the State of Delaware was confronted by the news of an ongoing incident in which inmates housed in the C-Building at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC), seized the building and took hostages. The seizure of the building resulted in the death of one correctional sergeant; injuries sustained by two other correctional officers; one non-custodial staff member being taken to the hospital for precautionary reasons; and, allegations of inmate injuries. On February 14, 2017, Governor John Carney issued an Executive Order establishing an Independent Review Team to investigate and report on "any conditions at the James T. Vaughn Center that contributed to the hostage situation on February 1, 2017." In response to the Executive Order, the Independent Review Team conducted interviews with correctional, educational, mental health and medical staff, including correctional supervisors, JTVCC administrators, and Delaware Department of Correction (DOC) executive administrators past and present. The Team also reviewed numerous letters from inmates and family members, spoke with community and inmates' rights groups, and interviewed other agency representatives. The Independent Review Team also visited the JTVCC, including the C-Building, observed grievance proceedings, and spoke with inmates individually and in focus groups. The Team also conducted in depth research through review and analysis of policy, training and other departmental documentation; open source media searches; and identification and gap analysis of national corrections and behavioral health best and promising practices. Collectively, the Independent Review Team conducted a comprehensive and thorough review and analysis of the facts and circumstances leading up to the incident that began on February 1, 2017. On June 1, 2017, the Independent Review Team issued a Preliminary Report concerning the causes and conditions leading up to the incident that began on February 1, 2017. Since June 1, 2017, the Independent Review Team conducted further interviews and assessments. This Final Report expands upon the Preliminary Report. It addresses actions taken by the JTVCC, the DOC, and the State of Delaware since February 2017, and contains specific recommendations to prevent, or at least minimize, the likelihood of another similar event. The tragic incident that began on February 1, 2017 in the C-Building of the JTVCC could have occurred elsewhere in the facility. Factors unique to that particular building, however, resulted in the incident occurring there. For some period of time, conditions at the JTVCC had deteriorated to the point that there was unrest among inmates, and distrust between inmates and correctional officers, as well as between correctional officers and JTVCC administrators. Factors giving rise to this unrest included adverse working conditions for the correctional officers, who continue to feel unappreciated by the administration, inconsistently implemented rules and regulations, an inmate grievance procedure deemed unfair, a distrusted medical/mental health system, and a real lack of morale permeating the line officers. The conditions set forth in this report created an environment in which an occurrence like the incident that began on February 1, 2017 would have likely occurred at some point somewhere within the JTVCC. However, the mix of inmates flowing down from maximum to medium security and inmates flowing up from medium towards maximum security in the C-Building and the circumstances giving rise to that mix, as more specifically set forth in the body of the report, hastened the inevitable. Most unfortunately, the Independent Review Team believes that had the request for the removal of certain inmates from the C-Building - made on January 20, 2017 by the very correctional officer who was killed during the incident that began on February 1, 2017 - been taken more seriously and carried out, the incident and the resulting death may not have occurred. As tragic as the unnecessary loss of life is, the incident that began on February 1, 2017 spearheaded long overdue changes in the DOC that will hopefully result in better working conditions for the correctional officers and professional staff as well as living conditions for inmates. Work remains to be done and recommendations are made herein. Lastly, the Independent Review Team commends Governor Carney for his immediate action in requesting this review and already addressing some of the most pressing problems facing the DOC. Details: Dover, DE: Governor's Office, State of Delaware, 2017. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2017 at: http://governor.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2017/08/JTVCC-Independent-Review-Team-FINAL-Report-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://governor.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2017/08/JTVCC-Independent-Review-Team-FINAL-Report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 147467 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationHostagesPrison AdministrationPrison ConditionsPrison RiotsPrison Violence |
Author: Arizona. Department of Corrections Title: Arizona State Prison-Kingman Riots Assessment Summary: On July 1, 2015, at approximately 6:10 p.m., a riot occurred at the Cerbat Unit of the Arizona State Prison in Kingman operated by private contractor Management & Training Corporation (MTC). The Incident Command System (ICS) was activated due to the aggravated assault of an inmate, the subsequent aggravated assault of five staff members, and the rioting that followed these assaults. The MTC Designated Armed Response Team (DART) and Tactical Support Unit (TSU) responded to the riot, joined by the ADC Winslow Tactical Support Unit, the Mohave County Sheriff's Office (MCSO), Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS), and local ambulance providers. The inmates broke windows and destroyed surveillance cameras, and severely damaged numerous staff offices and officer stations. On July 2, 2015, and again on July 4, 2015, a riot occurred at the Hualapai Unit of the Arizona State Prison in Kingman operated by private contractor Management & Training Corporation (MTC). The riot spread throughout multiple buildings and rendered four of the five housing units uninhabitable. This subsequent riot triggered the immediate deployment of six of the remaining nine ADC Tactical Support Units from Lewis, Perryville, Tucson, Safford, Florence, Eyman, Douglas, Yuma, and Phoenix. On July 3, 2015, Arizona Department of Corrections Director Charles L. Ryan declared an emergency pursuant to A.R.S. S 41-1609(E)(2) and notified Governor Douglas A. Ducey and Attorney General Mark Brnovich of the need to relocate inmates to other facilities. ADC subsequently relocated 1202 inmates to other prisons and numerous county jails: 40 inmates from the Cerbat Unit and 1162 inmates from the Hualapai Unit. An ADC Assessment Team assembled by Director Ryan, and pursuant to the direction of Governor Ducey, conducted a comprehensive investigation of the riots, ultimately completing approximately 300 interviews with MTC employees and approximately 400 inmates, and reviewing thousands of pages of MTC documents. The scope of the investigation included a thorough analysis of (1) the riots, including the precipitating events and the aftermath, (2) MTC's operational response to the riots, (3) MTC's leadership and staff, (4) MTC's inmate management, supervision, and communication practices, (5) MTC's training practices for leadership and staff, (6) MTC's interactions with ADC's Monitoring Team, and (7) MTC's performance deficiencies compared to five years earlier following the escape of three inmates from the same facility. Details: Phoenix: Author, 2015. v.p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2019 at: https://corrections.az.gov/reports-documents/reports/kingman-riots-assessment Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://corrections.az.gov/reports-documents/reports/kingman-riots-assessment Shelf Number: 156413 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationHostagesPrison AdministrationPrison ConditionsPrison Riots |