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Date: August 17, 2024 Sat
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Results for illicit firearms
8 results foundAuthor: Moffatt, Luke Title: Crime Mapping Project: Project Safe Neighborhoods Hawaii Summary: Project Safe Neighborhoods is a partnership program designed to reduce firearm-related crime. This report presents the offender dataset and crime mapping used in the implementation of Project Safe Neighborhoods in Hawaii. The report presents 37 maps constructed to show the location of offenses targeted in the program. Details: Honolulu: Hawaii Department of the Attorney General, Crime Prevention and Justice Assistance Division, 2005. 56p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119134 Keywords: Crime MappingFirearms and CrimeGun ViolenceGunsIllicit FirearmsProject Safe Neighborhoods (Hawaii) |
Author: Title: Illicit Arms in Indonesia Summary: A bloody bank robbery in Medan in August 2010 and the discovery in Aceh in February 2010 of a terrorist training camp using old police weapons have focused public attention on the circulation of illegal arms in Indonesia. These incidents raise questions about how firearms fall into criminal hands and what measures are in place to stop them. The issue has become more urgent as the small groups of Indonesian jihadis, concerned about Muslim casualties in bomb attacks, are starting to discuss targeted killings as a preferred method of operation. The Indonesian government could begin to address the problem by reviewing and strengthening compliance with procedures for storage, inventory and disposal of firearms; improved vetting and monitoring of those guarding armouries; auditing of gun importers and gun shops, including those that sell weapons online; and paying more attention to the growing popularity of “airsoft” guns that look exactly like real ones but shoot plastic pellets. The problem needs to be kept in perspective, however. It is worth addressing precisely because the scale is manageable. Indonesia does not have a “gun culture” like the Philippines or Thailand. The number of people killed by terrorist gunfire in Indonesia over the last decade is about twenty, more than half of them police, and most of the deaths took place in post-conflict central Sulawesi and Maluku. The nexus between terrorism and crime is not nearly as strong as in other countries. There have been a few cases of bartering ganja (marijuana) for guns – and one case of trading endangered anteaters – but in general, narco-terrorism is not a problem. Jihadi use of armed robberies as a fund-raising method is a more serious issue, with banks, gold stores and ATMs the favourite targets. As of this writing it remained unclear who was behind the Medan robbery – although criminal thugs remain the strongest possibility – but jihadi groups have robbed Medan banks before, most notably the Lippo Bank in 2003. Such crimes constitute a miniscule proportion of the country’s robberies, but it is still worth looking at where the guns come from when they occur. The problem may increase as the larger jihadi groups weaken and split, particularly those that once depended on member contributions for financing day-to-day activities. Recruitment by jihadis of ordinary criminals in prisons may also strengthen the linkage between terrorism and crime in the future. There are four main sources of illegal guns in Indonesia. They can be stolen or illegally purchased from security forces, taken from leftover stockpiles in former conflict areas, manufactured by local gunsmiths or smuggled from abroad. Thousands of guns acquired legally but later rendered illicit through lapsed permits have become a growing concern because no one has kept track of them. Throughout the country, corruption facilitates the circulation of illegal arms in different ways and undermines what on paper is a tight system of regulation. Details: Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Briefing; Asia Briefing No. 109: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B109-illicit-arms-in-indonesia.aspx Year: 2010 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B109-illicit-arms-in-indonesia.aspx Shelf Number: 119762 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeGun ControlGun ViolenceGunsIllicit FirearmsSmugglingWeapons |
Author: Bricknell, Samantha Title: Firearm Trafficking and Serious and Organised Crime Gangs Summary: Despite strict regulations on the import, export, ownership, use, transfer and storage of licit firearms, there exists in Australia a potentially large pool of illicit firearms, some of which are acquired, stockpiled and used for serious and organised crime. This report follows a modest group of publicly released examinations of firearm trafficking operations in Australia, to describe what can be determined about the composition and maintenance of the illicit firearm market, its use by serious and organised crime groups and the diversity of transaction arrangements used to vend illicit firearms. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 60p. Source: Initernet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series 116: Accessed July 2, 2012 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp116.aspx Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp116.aspx Shelf Number: 125456 Keywords: Illicit FirearmsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons (Australia) |
Author: Wepundi, Manasseh Title: Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment Summary: Kenya has experienced the effects of small arms availability and misuse for many years, but the unprecedented violence that erupted after the December 2007 general elections placed the issue of small arms reduction higher on the national agenda. The government of Kenya started a number of important initiatives, such as the establishment of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) as an interagency directorate within the Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security. Despite significant progress, law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms still face significant challenges. The extent of illicit firearms and their distribution over the Kenyan territory were the object of the 2003 National Mapping for Illicit SALW, carried out by the KNFP, which informed the development of the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management (KNFP, 2006). However, for the eight subsequent years there has been no study with national coverage, with most research on small arms in Kenya focusing on the northern parts of the country (North Rift, Upper Eastern, and North Eastern Province). This joint study by the Government of Kenya and the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey aims to assess small arms proliferation in Kenya (mapping their location, sources, and movements) and the capacity of various actors involved in small arms control and peace-building efforts in the country. For this purpose, the study adopted a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods involving approximately 2,500 interviews with households, representatives of civil society organizations, law enforcement agents, and other key informants from 31 out of the 47 counties of Kenya. The geographical coverage of the sample specifically included all counties perceived as highly volatile (those where small arms are endemic, those with significant pastoralist communities who have propensity for small arms ownership to protect their livestock, emerging areas, and high-density urban areas with high crime levels), as well as representatives from areas considered to be of medium and low volatility. The major findings of the study are the following: • Between 530,000 and 680,000 firearms may be in civilian hands nationally. • Despite an overall perception of a reduction in the number of firearms nationally, some zones, including areas such as Mt Elgon and Rift Valley, where important disarmament initiatives have been carried out, have recorded a significant increase in gun possession since 2003. • The period of violence around the December 2007 elections has left its mark on the population, with the majority of household respondents stating that they feel the most insecure during election periods. • Approximately 20 per cent of household respondents were victims of a crime or an act of violence over the year preceding the interviews, but twice as many felt that there is a likelihood of their being a victim of violence and/or crime in the next year. • More than one-third of those who were victims of crimes were confronted with a firearm. • There is a discrepancy between the views of law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations as regards the effectiveness of current efforts to reduce firearm proliferation and increase security, with the former being more optimistic than the latter. Based on main findings above, the study provides a number of recommendations on monitoring and understanding the nature of the problem, changes to the institutional environment, measures to reduce access to small arms and light weapons and to deal with victims, and steps to address development using a more systemic approach. This study is composed of five chapters. The first covers the background and introduces the study. The second and the third discuss findings based on surveys of households, law enforcement agents, and members of civil society organizations, as well as qualitative information based on statements from focus group discussions and key informant interviews on arms trends, sources, and movements, and ongoing efforts made by the government to limit the proliferation of firearms. The fourth chapter contains conclusions and recommendations, and the fifth describes in detail the methodology used in several of the study’s components. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2012. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2013 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR16-Kenya.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR16-Kenya.pdf Shelf Number: 127460 Keywords: Gun ViolenceIllicit FirearmsViolent CrimeWeapons (Kenya) |
Author: Jaynes, Natalie Title: Flying Below the Radar? The Armed Private Security Sector in South Africa Summary: This paper examines the South African private security sector, with particular focus on the firearms holdings of South African private security companies (PSCs). The central question that this paper seeks to answer is whether PSCs in South Africa are a source of illicit firearms and ammunition, and contribute to levels of firearm death and injury. This key question is addressed in six parts, commencing with a scene-setting discussion on international benchmarks for PSC firearms and ammunition controls. Against this backdrop, the paper then investigates the current state of South African legislation and regulations on firearms and ammunition controls for PSCs, and the extent to which these relate to and comply with international standards. The paper focuses on the South African private security sector and explores to what extent this sector utilises firearms/ammunition. The following section then attempts to gauge the extent to which relevant legislation and regulatory frameworks are being implemented, enforced and adhered to within the private security sector. The paper then examines the extent and dynamics of firearms and ammunition diversion and misuse from/by the private security sector. Details: Pinelands, South Africa: Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://osf.org.za/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CJI-Occasional-Paper-11.pdf Year: 2012 Country: South Africa URL: http://osf.org.za/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CJI-Occasional-Paper-11.pdf Shelf Number: 127538 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGunsIllicit FirearmsPrivate Security (South Africa) |
Author: Meijers, Loy Title: Trafficking in Illicit Firearms: A global and European overview Summary: This theoretical paper is published by the EUCPN Secretariat in connection with the theme of the Dutch Presidency, which is trafficking in illicit firearms. With the terrorist attacks that shook Europe the past months in hindsight, the subject is more relevant than ever. Trafficking in illicit firearms is a dangerous and deadly business, which should not be taken lightly. Because of the cross-border aspect of trafficking in illicit firearms, it is important to have a global overview. Where do the weapons come from, how do they enter the illicit market and what are the modus operandi of the traffickers? This paper should function as a base for a more prevention-orientated manual in which we will look at the difficulties and attempts to prevent trafficking in illicit firearms. Furthermore we will focus at the main international weapons and what the international agencies already do against the phenomenon. Through these actions, we hope to raise awareness concerning trafficking in illicit firearms, to exchange good practices and hopefully to propose general guidelines for a trafficking in illicit firearms policy. Details: Brussels: European Crime Prevention Network, 2016. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: EUCPN Theoretical Paper Series; Accessed May 19, 2016 at: http://eucpn.org/sites/default/files/content/download/files/theoretical_paper_-_trafficking_in_illicit_firearms.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://eucpn.org/sites/default/files/content/download/files/theoretical_paper_-_trafficking_in_illicit_firearms.pdf Shelf Number: 139109 Keywords: Illicit FirearmsTrafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Summary: Project SAFTE is an international research project, funded by the European Commission, that aims to contribute to the fight against (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe. This research project has demonstrated the existence of various illicit firearms markets in the EU, each with their own specific features and dynamics. The traditionally closed character of these markets has partially eroded in several EU member states in recent years, which has increased the availability of firearms in general, and military-grade firearms in particular, to criminals and to terrorists with criminal connections. To combat this, a comprehensive and proactive approach is needed that consists of improving the intelligence picture on illicit firearms trafficking, upgrading the policy and the regulatory framework on firearms, and optimising operational capacities and cooperation. Background Several terrorist attacks have been carried out with firearms in Europe in recent years, causing the deaths of hundreds of people and injuries to hundreds more. These events demonstrate that terrorists are able to get their hands on various types of firearms, including military-grade firearms. Although the use of firearms to commit terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon in the EU, Europol recently noted that firearms have become the most prevalent type of weaponry used by terrorists and violent extremists across a range of ideologies. This observation led policy-makers in Europe to develop specific measures to combat terrorist access to firearms. In-depth, evidence-based insight into the firearms acquisition dynamics of terrorists in the EU is limited, however. This is part of the larger problem of the scarcity of reliable data and in-depth research with regard to Europe's illicit firearms markets. Process The goal of Project SAFTE is to improve knowledge regarding (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe and to provide information that can influence policy intended to enhance the fight against this security threat. The Flemish Peace Institute coordinated the project, and carried it out in partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitarie di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna (SSSA). In addition, research teams from Arquebus Solutions, the Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma contributed extensively to the study. The design of the research project consisted of two phases. In a first phase, specialised research teams conducted qualitative, in-depth studies into illicit firearms markets, terrorist access to these markets and national policies to counter these phenomena in eight EU member states: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Romania, the Netherlands and the UK. More than one hundred key national actors were interviewed during this process. The second phase consisted of a systematic and comparative analysis, in which the studies in these countries were supplemented by an explorative mapping of the situation in the other twenty EU member states. In addition, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood (the Balkans, Northern Africa and Ukraine), to address the significant interconnections between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. All these findings were then linked to the EU policy context by, for example, interviews with several key international actors. The research conducted for Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications. The findings of the systematic and comparative analysis are presented in a policyoriented synthesis report, Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe: Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE. A separately edited volume, Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, publishes the individual country studies, together with the studies on the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa and Ukraine. indings on illicit firearms markets There is no unified illicit firearms market in the EU. Various regional variants of illicit firearms markets can be identified, however, each with distinct characteristics and dynamics. These differences can be attributed to a variety of local elements that shape local demand and supply of illicit firearms and influence the involvement of different actors. Although it is currently impossible to quantitatively estimate the scope of illicit firearms markets in the EU in a credible way, it is clear that most of the firearms that are available on illicit firearms markets are handguns. The presence of military-grade firearms is generally more limited. The easy and cheap access to certain firearms in some countries strongly contributes to illicit firearms trafficking across the EU. Most illicit firearms markets in Europe are driven by criminal demand. Different types of criminals tend to procure, possess and use different types of firearms, and contemporary terrorist networks usually rely on established criminal connections to acquire firearms from these markets. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the illicitly possessed firearms are in the hands of private citizens in several EU member states who have no criminal or terrorist motives. These are individuals who simply possess firearms without holding the necessary permits. Firearms end up in illicit markets in the EU through cross-border smuggling from both outside the EU (mainly from the Western Balkans) and intra-EU trafficking (mainly as a result of differences in national legislation). The most important illicit supply mechanisms for firearms in the EU are cross-border smuggling, change of ownership through theft, the conversion of blank-firing guns, and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. Each EU member state has a different illicit firearms market with its distinct supply mechanisms, however. These different supply mechanisms are characterised by their own dynamics, and present specific policy and law enforcement challenges. Our analyses indicate that supplying firearms to European illicit firearms markets is not very lucrative, and is generally not a primary source of income for those actors involved in trafficking firearms. Another observation is the cyclical nature of supply and demand in these markets. The actors involved in firearms trafficking in the EU have constantly adapted their operating methods in reaction to regional, national and European policy initiatives and law enforcement operations. Traditionally, illicit firearms markets in Europe are closed markets with restricted access for people outside criminal networks, and having the right criminal connections and reputation are crucial factors in this, even in countries with rather high levels of illicit firearms possession. Differences can be observed in the access to illicit firearms, and especially military-grade firearms, and these differences are linked to the criminal hierarchy and the criminal milieu to which the potential buyer belongs. They are also reflected by a price hierarchy for illicit firearms markets that is similar across the EU: the most expensive firearms on the illicit firearms market are generally military-grade firearms such as assault rifles, while the cheapest firearms are generally (converted) blank-firing firearms. The closed character of these markets has been under pressure in recent years, which is linked to the observed growing availability of certain types of firearms. The underlying factors of this erosion are the emergence of the Internet, the crossborder smuggling of military-grade assault rifles into the EU, the conversion of blank-firing guns and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. The increased availability of firearms has contributed to arms races between criminal groups across the EU. This has facilitated the gradual tricklingdown of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU member states, especially in Western Europe. Findings on terrorist access to illicit firearms markets Significant amounts of firearms have been seized from different types of terrorist networks in recent years. These firearms include various models and brands of pistols and revolvers, but also various types of military-grade firearms, such as assault rifles and sub-machine guns. Terrorists who procure firearms generally do so exclusively for carrying out terrorist acts and to defend themselves against law enforcement agencies. Most terrorists seem to have a preference for military-grade firearms, although the observed possession of less-suitable firearms among terrorist networks suggests that not all terrorists have access to a wide range of firearms. Our comparative analysis identified clear distinctions between different types of terrorist networks in the EU in the acquisition, possession and use of firearms. While the traditional separatist groups have developed their own distinct (and context-specific) firearms acquisition patterns, religiously-inspired terrorist networks across the EU generally rely on criminal connections to obtain firearms from local illicit markets. There are no indications of significant firearms flows between the various types of terrorist networks in Europe today and also no indications of recent state-sponsored arms transfers to terrorist groups in the EU. For most of the contemporary terrorist networks operating in Europe, access to local criminal firearms markets is a key element in their firearms acquisition patterns. Through their criminal pasts, contemporary terrorists with criminal antecedents have acquired various skills that can be used in the planning and execution of successful terrorist attacks, including the skills and network needed to acquire weapons more easily. Given the generally closed character of these markets, only terrorists with the right criminal connections can acquire firearms, and in particular military-grade firearms, on illicit firearms markets in the EU. The observed terrorist firearms arsenals therefore generally reflect the specific dynamics of the local criminal firearms market. Individuals without a developed criminal network generally experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms, and are more likely to use an alternative acquisition method, for example the Internet, or to use a different type of weapon. No illicit firearms dealers have been observed who exclusively supply firearms to terrorist networks. There seem to be a number of barriers that inhibit criminals from actively and knowingly supplying weapons for terrorist attacks. Illicit firearms dealers are generally not eager to engage in activities that are not very lucrative, but at the same time involve an increased risk of detection and higher penalties. Terrorists will generally rely on already established criminal connections, often pre-dating their radicalisation, in order to obtain firearms on illicit markets, and sellers often do not know they are selling to terrorists. This can be observed among the significant number of terrorists with a criminal history. Prisons have also been identified as places that offer new opportunities for terrorists who do not yet have the necessary criminal connections to acquire firearms. The overwhelming majority of those perpetrators of recent jihadi terrorist attacks who had a criminal history were involved in low-level criminality. There have been some exceptions of perpetrators who attained a mid-level position in the criminal underworld, but none of the perpetrators or people arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in the EU in recent years was a member of a high-level organised crime group. In countries where illicit firearms supply channels are tightly controlled by a limited number of highly-organised crime groups, it is quite difficult for terrorists to acquire firearms. In particular, countries with more chaotic criminal landscapes present potential terrorists with increased opportunities for illicit firearms acquisition. Individuals who acquire firearms for a terrorist network are generally not recruited for this specific purpose, but are already part of the network, and become responsible for this task later because of their skills and networks. Contemporary terrorist networks seeking (specific types of) firearms, but who lack the necessary criminal connections or are operating in a context of limited firearms availability in the local illicit market, can engage in the direct diversion of legally owned firearms, for example by targeted thefts of firearms from state stockpiles or legal gun owners. From a historical perspective, targeted thefts have been a vital element in the firearms acquisition patterns of separatist terror groups in Europe, but such thefts have decreased in recent years. Firearms that were deliberately stolen have only been encountered among jihadi networks in exceptional cases. The diversion of legal ownership for terrorist aims through various forms of embezzlement is also quite exceptional in the EU, as well as the legal possession of firearms by perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Yet, in some EU member states significant numbers of legally-owned firearms have been observed among members of extremist networks, and especially right-wing networks. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Shelf Number: 149820 Keywords: Illicit FirearmsTerrorismTerroristsTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe Summary: In recent years there has been growing policy attention for illicit firearms markets in Europe. Yet, in-depth research into the scale of the problem as well as the specific characteristics and dynamics of these markets is lacking for most EU member states. This is part of larger problem where firearms and gun violence in the European context have traditionally received scant research attention. To illustrate this, in 2012 Greene and Marsh found that, between 1999 and 2009, 665 Web of Science articles had been written on firearms and violence. Two thirds of these articles, however, covered the situation in the United States (US), and were written primarily by authors based in the US.1 In contrast, research on the situation in Europe continues to be rather sparse. One of the reasons for this difference is that levels of gun crime and gun deaths in Europe are relatively low. A recent study demonstrated that, in the EU, on an annual basis an average of 1,000 homicides are committed with a firearm.2 As such, firearms-related homicides in Europe are among the lowest in the world.3 In addition, large-scale illicit firearms trafficking is quite exceptional in the EU and the illicit firearms market is considered to be modest in size. Nevertheless, the lack of a sound understanding of illicit firearms markets in Europe is not only an epistemological problem. It has obvious and far-reaching policy implications. Specifically, it hampers attempts to develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory and operational approach to combat illicit firearms markets and terrorist access to these markets. The EU has repeatedly stated that building a better intelligence picture on this multifaceted security phenomenon is urgently needed. Recent terrorist attacks involving firearms in Europe significantly boosted the sense of urgency. Both at national and EU levels various legislative and policy initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in general, and to prevent terrorist firearms acquisition in particular. Yet, due to the lack of sound research, these initiatives have often been based on a case-bound, partial or even completely lacking, meaningful intelligence pictures. A mature research community could contribute significantly to the intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking that is being developed by national law enforcement agencies and Europol. Yet, a European research community focused on illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe is currently still germinal. In their extensive literature review Greene and Marsh identified two distinct research mainly relied on in-depth interviews with key national actors involved in the combat against illicit firearms trafficking or terrorism. During the initial phase of the research, it became clear that the phenomena under consideration could not be adequately understood without a sounder understanding of what happened in Europe's wider neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to the eight country studies, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood in order to address the significant nexus between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. Overview of the chapters The research conducted within the framework of Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications: a policy report and a comprehensive research volume. The policy report10 contains the systematic and comparative analysis of the main findings of the different country and neighbourhood studies, whereas this research volume contains all eight in-depth country studies and two neighbourhood studies as separate chapters. This allows the reader to gain profounder and more detailed insight into the research findings of Project SAFTE. The first chapter of this book examines the illicit gun market in Belgium, a country often labelled as one of Europe's hotspots for illicit firearms trade. In this chapter Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris argue that the illicit gun market in Belgium is largely driven by criminal demand, especially from drugs criminals, armed robbers and organized motorcycle gangs. In recent years an increase in converted blank firing weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed. The availability of these weapons eroded the traditional closed character of this market. This made it easier for both lower-ranking criminals and terrorists with criminal connections to acquire firearms. The authors warn that current heightened prioritisation of terrorism in Belgium has become a double-edged sword in the fight against illicit firearms trafficking: while it has increased policy attention for this security phenomenon, it has also brought about a (temporary) displacement of people and resources towards preventing and investigating terrorism. Duquet and Goris conclude that Belgian law enforcement services all too often treat terrorism and illicit firearms trafficking as two distinct problems. They strongly recommend better information sharing and the development of joint actions between and within the law enforcement services that combat these interconnected security phenomena. In the second chapter Filip Dragovic, Paul James, Kresimir Mamic and Robert Mikac analyse the illicit firearms market in Croatia. Despite large number of weapons handed in during voluntary surrender programmes, the current illicit firearms market in Croatia is still largely based on the significant presence of weapons left over from the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, including large quantities of military grade firearms. A great number of these legacy weapons ended up in the hands of civilians. The authors note that alongside these legacy weapons, firearms have also entered the illicit market through illicit production and thefts. Small storage facilities at police stations and lower-level military units in particular, remain prone to theft. Interestingly, the authors argue that, despite the widespread illegal firearms possession in the country, Croatia is not characterized by a very active illicit firearms market because many of the illegal gun owners prefer to retain their firearms. They conclude that research on the Croatian illicit firearms market is still limited and stress the need for more cooperation between law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, the private sector and the research community to improve the current intelligence picture and enhance the combat against illicit firearms trafficking. In the third chapter of this book Lina Grip demonstrates that the illicit gun market in Denmark is fragmented and supply-driven. Criminal gangs, both organized motorcycle gangs as well as less organized urban street gangs, are the main customers on the illicit firearms market in Denmark. Violent conflicts between such groups are responsible for most of the public shootings in the country. A majority of firearms on this market are locally sourced, especially through thefts of old unregistered firearms. Grip warns that shooting clubs are commonly being used by criminals to practice their shooting skills and as a target for thefts. She also stresses the role played by gun enthusiasts, without violent or criminal intentions, who act outside of the law and this way may feed the illicit market. Not surprisingly, the firearms used in recent terrorist attacks in Denmark were acquired through thefts. While Danish policy to combat illicit firearms possession has been primarily focused on deterring the use of firearms by criminal gangs, Grip concludes that more can be done to integrate firearms-specific initiatives into programmes to prevent violent extremism. In the fourth chapter Nicolas Florquin and Andre Desmarais present a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France and the firearms possessed and used by different terrorist groups in recent years. They argue that France has a sizeable and growing pool of illicit firearms as a result of a historic tolerance towards unregistered rifles and shotguns, and because of cross-border smuggling of firearms in recent decades. This chapter demonstrates that the firearms on the French illicit market originate from a wide variety of sources and that terrorist groups have used a wide range of procurement methods to access firearms. Florquin and Desmarais demonstrate that different types of terrorist groups and networks are characterized by different firearms acquisition patterns. While jihadi terrorist networks have used their, mainly low-level, criminal connections to procure firearms, a terrorist group like ETA, for example, has instead relied heavily on targeted thefts. Tracing firearms often proves very difficult, but the authors stress the merits of doing so. The tracing of the reactivated rifles used in recent terrorist attacks, for example, has been a crucial step in building momentum to politically address the problem of easy-to-reactivate weapons from Slovakia. The illicit firearms market in Italy and terrorist access to this market is the focus of the fifth chapter. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni note that the Italian market has mainly been supplied with a wide variety of firearms from the Western Balkans since the 1990s, but that organised crime groups have also relied on firearms thefts and the reactivation of firearms. The authors stress that terrorist access to this market is rather difficult because the supply channels are tightly controlled by Italian organised criminal groups, who believe that it is not in their best interest to sell firearms to terrorist networks. In the sixth chapter Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens provide an overview of the main features of the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands as well as an in depth analysis of terrorist access to this market and Dutch policies that have been developed to tackle this access. This chapter demonstrates the increased availability and criminal use of military-grade assault rifles in the country in recent years. This has partly been a result of trafficking of easy-to-reactivate firearms from Slovakia. Not only criminals, but also terrorists have been able to access the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands. In recent years the Dutch police have arrested at least fifteen terror suspects for the illegal possession or (attempted) acquisition of firearms. An in-depth analysis indicates that a broad range of firearms have been seized in these cases and demonstrates a firearms acquisition pattern for terrorists in which (usually pre-existing) criminal connections are crucial. The seventh chapter contains the first ever in-depth study on the illicit firearms market in Romania. Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena and Matthew Lewis note that researching this topic in Romania is hindered by the lack of uniform data collection and registration procedures on illicit firearms possession or use by the different law enforcement and other government agencies involved. Despite this caveat, the authors clearly demonstrate the detrimental effects of national legal loopholes on regional illicit firearms markets: the significant availability of easy-toconvert blank firing firearms in Romania is directly connected to the situation in Bulgaria, where these weapons can be bought legally for low prices and where controls can easily be bypassed. This has resulted in significant cross-border smuggling of these weapons into Romania where they are sold to Romanian criminals across the country and in various criminal contexts. While there are no known recent cases of terrorist acquisition of firearms in the country, the authors warn that some of the firearms that are currently legally exported from Romania and EU member states to third countries might eventually end up on criminal markets in the EU, where they can be bought by local terrorists. In the eighth chapter Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore analyse terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK). The authors demonstrate that the combination of a restrictive legislative framework for legal firearms possession, a proactive operational 'investigate the gun' - approach to combat illicit possession and use of firearms, and the use of tough prison sentences as a deterrent, has had a positive influence on the illicit firearms markets in the UK. The firearms that circulate in the UK's criminal underground are therefore very often converted blank firing weapons and antique handguns rather than more heavy duty variants seen elsewhere. The recent cases of terrorist possession of firearms suggest that the access of jihadi and right-wing terrorists to the illicit firearms market is likewise quite restricted. These terrorists' options are largely restricted to converted or antique firearms. They do not usually have access to the semi-automatic or automatic firearms that have been used in terrorist attacks in other parts of the EU. The findings of this chapter, however, indicate that the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly, with Republican splinter groups having retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the 'Troubles', including different types of military-grade firearms, and continuing to use them in politically motivated attacks. The illicit proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa is the focus of the ninth chapter of this book. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni argue that in recent years illicit firearms possession has increased significantly in several Northern African countries as a direct result of the volatile political and security situation in the region. In particular the fall of the Libyan dictator Qaddafi in 2011 and the armed violence that has ravaged the country afterwards has significantly increased illicit arms trafficking. A vast regional black market in firearms has emerged which has reached various groups from the western Sahel to the Middle East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit firearms possession, the authors demonstrate that criminal activities and the recent episodes of armed violence in the country have significantly exacerbated opportunities for state stockpile captures and arms transfers to different non-state actors. While most of the firearms trafficking is currently contained within the state borders of Ukraine, the authors warn that there are signs that this will likely change when the armed conflict stabilizes and the internal demand for these weapons decreases. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Shelf Number: 149844 Keywords: FirearmsGun MarketsIllicit Firearms Smuggling of FirearmsTerrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |