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Date: April 18, 2024 Thu
Time: 2:42 am
Time: 2:42 am
Results for informants
6 results foundAuthor: Victoria. Office of Police Integrity Title: Report on Investigation into Operation Clarendon Summary: This report deals with issues that were the subject of an investigation into matters relating to the activities of Victoria Police members and a citizen, Mr. Kerry Milte. The inquiry examined allegations of unlawful activities between current members of the Victoria Police and Mr. Kerry Milte, who was acting as a police informant. Details: Melbourne: Government Printer, 2008. 23p. Source: Parliamentary Paper; Session 2006-2008, no. 79 Year: 2008 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 117612 Keywords: InformantsPolice CorruptionPolice Ethics |
Author: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Title: Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States Summary: Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has targeted Muslims in the United States by sending paid, untrained informants into mosques and Muslim communities. This practice has led to the prosecution of more than 200 individuals in terrorism-related cases. The government has touted these cases as successes in the so-called war against terrorism. However, in recent years, former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, local lawmakers, the media, the public, and community-based groups have begun questioning the legitimacy and efficacy of this practice, alleging that—in many instances—this type of policing, and the resulting prosecutions, constitute entrapment. This Report examines three high-profile terrorism prosecutions in which government informants played a critical role in instigating and constructing the plots that were then prosecuted. In all three cases, the FBI or New York City Police Department (NYPD) sent paid informants into Muslim communities or families without any particularized suspicion of criminal activity. Informants pose a particular set of problems given they work on behalf of law enforcement but are not trained as law enforcement. Moreover, they often work for a government-conferred benefit—say, a reduction in a preexisting criminal sentence or a change in immigration status—in addition to fees for providing useful information to law enforcement, creating a dangerous incentive structure. Details: New York: New York University School of Law, 2011. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 2, 2012 at: http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/targetedandentrapped.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/targetedandentrapped.pdf Shelf Number: 124344 Keywords: Human RightsInformantsMuslimsTerrorism (U.S.) |
Author: Justice Project Title: Jailhouse Snitch Testimony: A Policy Review Summary: This report offers recommendations and solutions for improving the standards of admissibility of in-custody informant or "snitch testimony." The review includes an overview of current snitch testimony laws, case studies, information about states and jurisdictions that have enacted successful methods for safeguarding against perjured testimony, voices of support, model policy, and key statistics. The review notes that by improving standards for admissibility of jailhouse informant evidence at trial, states can help ensure that finders of fact are able to make more informed decisions when life and death are at stake. The Justice Project's key policy recommendations for states considering snitch testimony reform include: -Written pretrial disclosures of witness compensation arrangements and other information bearing on witness credibility -Pretrial hearings on the reliability of a particular informant's testimony -A requirement that accomplice or in-custody informant testimony be corroborated -Cautionary jury instructions alerting the jury to the reliability issues presented by snitch testimony Details: Washington, DC: The Justice Project, 2013. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2015 at: http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/death_penalty_reform/Jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy20briefpdf.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/death_penalty_reform/Jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy20briefpdf.pdf Shelf Number: 135177 Keywords: InformantsJailhouse SnitchesPrison Informants |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Confidential Informants: Updates to Policy and Additional Guidance Would Improve Oversight by DOJ and DHS Agencies Summary: Federal law enforcement components used more than 16,000 confidential informants in fiscal year 2013 as part of criminal investigations. Informants can be critical to an investigation, but without appropriate oversight, problems can occur that undermine the credibility of the informant's role in an investigation. The Attorney General's Guidelines sets forth procedures on the management of informants, including vetting potential informants and overseeing informants' illegal activities that components authorize to support an investigation. GAO was asked to review the use of confidential informants. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOJ and DHS components' policies address the Guidelines for vetting informants and overseeing their illegal activities and (2) selected components have monitoring processes to ensure compliance with the Guidelines. GAO reviewed components' documented policies and monitoring processes and interviewed agency officials about their practices. GAO visited components' field offices in three locations chosen based on the numbers of informants overseen, among other factors. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ and DHS and their components take actions to update components' policies and monitoring processes to improve handling and oversight of confidential informants. DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-807: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672514.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672514.pdf Shelf Number: 136790 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationHomeland SecurityInformants |
Author: Squires, Peter Title: Police Perceptions of Gang and Gun Related Offending: A Key Informant Survey Summary: This survey of Police officers (and civilian intelligence analyst staff) within one police force (GMP) offers an important and unusual insight into the problem of urban gun crime. Our findings reflect the perceptions of the problem of gun crime shared by a group of uniquely experienced police officers whose daily work involves dealing with, responding to and forward planning in respect of the problems of gun crime in one major British city with a particular reputation for gun crime. The particular survey itself comprises responses from 55 police personnel, ranking from detective constable to chief superintendent, (including a number of civilian intelligence analysts). Those GMP staff included in sample shared 835 years within policing, suggesting a mean duration of police service of some 15.8 years. Respondents were drawn from all of the force's separate geographical divisions. As suggested, the sample also included 20 GMP intelligence analysts, five of these working on attachment with the GMP Firearms Desk and operational gang response units. The intelligence analysts alone had a mean duration of service within GMP of between 8-9 years. Taken together, therefore, these lengths of service in the GMP suggest that our sample is appropriately drawn from an experienced and uniquely well qualified section of the police workforce, and a group we would expect to be able to speak knowledgeably, informatively and constructively about the gun crime and gang crime problems that they work with on a regular basis. There was a threefold purpose in reviewing 'key informant' perceptions of the gun crime problem within the project. First, in a wider sense it is part of our effort to get a clear perspective on how the problem is understood or constructed - this is, in a simple sense, what the 'experts' dealing with the problem think about it, the forms it takes and the means by which it might usefully be tackled. Second, in a more critical sense the survey is also very much about how these same 'experts' (or 'primary definers' (Hall et al, 1978)) help to construct the issue for the rest of us. A third issue relevant here concerns how the constructions of these 'experts' represent and yet may also 'misrepresent' aspects of the problems represented by 'gun' and 'gang' crime. For example, the particular professional preoccupations of police officers may tend to distort their perceptions of both the offence and of the offenders (or it may dwell upon some aspects of these matters at the expense of others). Or, to put it another way and recognising the "political" nature of problem definition in public policy-making, our respondents might perpetuate a perception of the gun crime problem which does not necessarily correspond with views shared by others, or they may hold views uncorroborated, for example, by research findings. All of this is, perhaps, only to be expected. Our group of respondents were selected precisely for their specialist knowledge and experience, and this knowledge and experience may lead them to see the matter in a different way. Details: Brighton, UK: University of Brighton, 2007. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://about.brighton.ac.uk/staff/profiles/pas1-magnet.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://about.brighton.ac.uk/staff/profiles/pas1-magnet.pdf Shelf Number: 137807 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangsGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceGunsInformants |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Management and Oversight of its Confidential Source Program Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Confidential Source Program. The OIG initiated the audit as a result of the OIG's receipt and review of numerous allegations regarding the DEA's handling and use of confidential sources. This audit report specifically focuses on our examination of the DEA's confidential source policies and their consistency with Department-level standards for law enforcement components, review of the DEA's oversight of certain high-level confidential sources and high-risk activities involving confidential sources, and evaluation of the DEA's administration of death and disability benefits to confidential sources. Our audit work thus far has been seriously delayed by numerous instances of uncooperativeness from the DEA, including attempts to prohibit the OIG's observation of confidential source file reviews and delays, for months at a time, in providing the OIG with requested confidential source information and documentation. In each instance, the matters were resolved only after the Inspector General elevated them to the DEA Administrator. As a result, over 1 year after we initiated this review, the OIG only has been able to conduct a limited review of the DEA's Confidential Source Program. Nevertheless, we have uncovered several significant issues related to the DEA's management of its Confidential Source Program that we believe require the prompt attention of DOJ and DEA leadership, as identified in this report. We will continue to audit the DEA's Confidential Source Program to more fully assess the DEA's management and oversight of its confidential sources. The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants (AG Guidelines) provide guidance to all Justice Law Enforcement Agencies(JLEA), including the DEA, related to establishing, approving, utilizing, and evaluating confidential sources. Compliance with the AG Guidelines is important for JLEAs to manage confidential sources appropriately and to mitigate the risks involved with using confidential sources in federal investigations. However, instead of implementing the AG Guidelines verbatim as a separate policy, the DEA chose to incorporate provisions from the AG Guidelines into its preexisting policy - the DEA Special Agents Manual - and the DEA stated that manual successfully captured the essence of the AG Guidelines. The Criminal Division's leadership approved the DEA policy in January 2004. We found that the Criminal Division's 2004 approval of the DEA policy allowed the DEA to have a policy that differed in several significant respects from the AG Guidelines' requirements. We believe this has resulted in areas in which the DEA is not fully addressing the concerns underlying the AG Guidelines and, as a result, the DEAs Confidential Source Program lacks sufficient oversight and lacks consistency with the rules governing other DOJ law enforcement components. The DEA's differing policies have resulted in DEA personnel being able to use high-risk individuals as confidential sources without the level of review as would otherwise be required by the AG Guidelines for high-level and privileged or media-affiliated sources. These categories include individuals who are part of drug trafficking organization leadership, as well as individuals who are lawyers, doctors, or journalists. The AG Guidelines provide a special approval distinction for these individuals because the use of them as confidential sources poses an increased risk to the public and DEA and creates potential legal implications for DOJ. The exemption of the DEA from these requirements results in a relative lack of DEA and DOJ oversight, and in our view should be revisited by the DEA and DOJ. We similarly found that the DEA policies and practices are not in line with the AG Guidelines' requirements for reviewing, approving, and revoking confidential sources authorization to conduct Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA). The effects of inadequate oversight of OIA may not only prove to be detrimental to DEA operations and liability, but also could create unforeseen consequences. For instance, confidential sources may engage in illegal activity that has not been adequately considered, or may overstep their boundaries with a mistaken belief that the DEA sanctions any illegal activities in which they participate. This is another area that should be revisited by the DEA and DOJ. Moreover, we found that although the DEA's policy includes a provision that generally follows the AG Guidelines requirement for evaluating the use of long-term confidential sources, sources in use for 6 or more consecutive years, the DEA was not adhering to its policy and conducted inadequate and untimely reviews of these sources. In fact, over a 9-year period, DEA documentation indicates that the DEA spent minimal time meeting to determine the appropriateness of the continued use of long term sources. While a more detailed review was done in 2012, and then even more in 2014 (when we observed some of the process) in total we found that the DEA utilized over 240 confidential sources without rigorous review and, in most instances, without the same Departmental concurrence required for other JLEAs. This created a significant risk that improper relationships between government handlers and sources could be allowed to continue over many years, potentially resulting in the divulging of sensitive information or other adverse consequences for the government. In some cases, the DEA continued to use, for up to 6 years without any DOJ intervention, individuals who were involved in unauthorized illegal activities and who were under investigation by federal entities. We also identified that the DEA's confidential source policies do not include any specific mention of recruiting, establishing, or using sources who are also subject to regulation by the DEA because they have a DEA-provided controlled substance registration number. DOJ guidance emphasizes the need for controls to ensure that no licensee is led to believe that the continued validity of their license is in any way predicated on their status as a source. This was an issue we highlighted in our report on the Bureau of the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Operation Fast and Furious, where ATF was obtaining information in connection with its criminal investigations from individuals who were also Federal Firearm Licensees. We believe that a clearly stated policy is necessary to provide DEA Special Agents with sufficient information to understand all of the implications of these relationships' Finally, we learned that the DEA was providing Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) benefits to confidential sources, yet had not established a process or any controls regarding the awarding of them. We estimated that, in just the 1-year period from July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014, the DEA paid 17 confidential sources or their dependents FECA benefits totaling approximately $1.034 million. The DEA lacked a process for thoroughly reviewing FECA claims for confidential sources or determining eligibility for these benefits. In addition, the DEA did not oversee and ensure that the established pay rate for these sources was proper and inappropriately continued using and paying confidential sources who were also receiving full disability payments through FECA. We also found that the DEA had not adequately considered the implications of awarding such benefits on the disclosure obligations of federal prosecutors, and had not consulted the Department about the issue. Details: Washington, DC: DOJ, 2016. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 16-33: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1528.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1528.pdf Shelf Number: 140529 Keywords: Confidential SourcesDrug Enforcement AdministrationInformants |