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Date: August 17, 2024 Sat
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Results for violence
495 results foundAuthor: Garfield, Richard Title: Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei Summary: This report discusses victimization findings regarding both coercive and 'voluntary' civilian disarmament in Southern Sudan following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007 Source: HSBA Working Paper 11, Graduate Institute of International Studies Year: 2007 Country: Sudan URL: Shelf Number: 116489 Keywords: FirearmsVictimizationViolence |
Author: United Nations Children's Fund. Innocenti Research Centre Title: A Study on Violence Against Girls: Report on the International Girl Child Conference, 9-10 March 2009, The Hague, the Netherlands Summary: This document summarizes the discussions and outcomes of the International Girl Child Conference. The conference addressed the gaps in knowledge, research and responses to violence against girls in the home and family. Details: Florence, Italy: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2009 Source: Government of the Netherlands Year: 2009 Country: Netherlands URL: Shelf Number: 116245 Keywords: Female VictimsJuvenilesViolence |
Author: Zaluar, Alba Title: Violence Related to Illegal Drugs, "Easy Money" and Justice in Brazil: 1980-1995. Summary: The aim of this paper is to understand the connections between poverty and drug traffic, specifying the different economic, social and institutional devices and changes that affect the matter in question. It is based on primary data from several fieldwork researches as well as data obtained from official sources in Brazil - the Ministry of Health, the Police and the Judiciary. Details: Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, MOST Programme, 1999 Source: Discussion Paper Series - No. 35 Year: 1999 Country: Brazil URL: Shelf Number: 117333 Keywords: Drug TraffickingPovertyViolence |
Author: Kurtenbach, Sabine Title: Guatemala's Post-War Development: The Structural Failure of Low Intensity Peace Summary: The present study is part of the research project on "Social and Political Fractures after Wars: Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala." The project aims at explaining different levels of youth violence in two post-war societies whose process of war termination are regarded as successful. However, both societies face serious problems of post-war development that are closely related to the experiences of war and war termination. Guatemala suffers from levels of violence higher than during most of the war. The differences between both countries in levels of violence and mechanisms of violence control are also visible in the incidence of youth violence. The project aims to explain these differences through the contextualization of youth violence. This working paper analyses continuity and change of violence in post-war Guatemala. Four development areas in post-war Guatemala are analyzed due to their relevance for the question of continuity and change of violence: organization, operating mode and legitimacy of the public security sector; development of the political system; deficits in the establishment of civil forms of conflict regulation; and the use of material, natural and human resources. Details: Duisburg, Germany: Institute for Development and Peace, 2008 Source: Social and Political Fractures after Wars: Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala; Project Working Paper no. 3 Year: 2008 Country: Germany URL: Shelf Number: 114775 Keywords: JuvenilesViolence |
Author: Lake, Jannifer E. Title: Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence Summary: This report focuses on how policy makers would identify any spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. It provides (1) an overview of Mexican drug trafficking organization structures, how they conduct business, and the relationship between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and their partnerships operating here in the United States; (2) a discussion of the illicit drug trade between Mexico and the United states; (3) an analysis of the possibly nature of any spillover violence may arise; and (4) an evaluation of the available data concerning drug trafficking-related crime. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 32p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117834 Keywords: Drug TraffickingViolence |
Author: Mesnard, Alice Title: Migration, Violence and Welfare Programmes in Rural Colombia Summary: This paper studies migration decisions of very poor households in an environment of high level of violence. Details: London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2009. 42p. Source: IFS Working Paper W09/19 Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 117378 Keywords: MigrationPovertyViolenceWelfare |
Author: Lind, Jo Thori Title: Opium for the Masses? Conflict-Induced Narcotics Production in Afghanistan. Summary: Opium production in Afghanistan has helped finance holy wars against Soviet occupation, violent power contests among warlords, the rise of Taliban and its way to power, and the present resistance against Western intervention. What is less well known is how conflicts have spurred opium production as well. This paper shows how the recent rise in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan can be understood as a direct consequence of the rising violent conflicts. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2009. 30p. Source: CESifo Working Paper; no. 2573 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 113843 Keywords: Narcotics ProductionOpiumViolence |
Author: Martin, Laura Title: Operation Border Star: Wasted Millions and Missed Opportunities Summary: Operation Border Star is the latest in a succession of homeland security efforts implemented in Texas. In the 80th Regular Session, the Texas Legislature appropriated $110 million for border security efforts, calling for multi-agency collaboration to respond to violent crime, drug smuggling and the threat of terrorism. This report examines the data reported by eleven of the almost 40 participating local law enforcement entities who were awarded $5 million through Operation Border Star during the latter half of 2007 and into 2008, and suggests more effective strategies to make Texas safer. Details: Austin, TX: American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, 2009. 33p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117755 Keywords: Border Security (Texas)Drug Control (Texas)Drug Smuggling (Texas)Violence |
Author: Yule, Alison Title: Investing in Youth for Violence Prevention: Gang Rehabilitation Programs in El Salvador Summary: El Salvador's armed conflict came to an end with Peace Accords signed in 1992. However the political war in El Salvador has now transformed into a social war. Gangs are feared as the most dangerous perpetrators of social violence. In the past, as an attempt to improve citizen security and attract voters, the government introduced a package of controversial anti-gang laws designed as a temporary means to criminalize gangs, violating several codes of international human rights. In response to failed repressive approaches, a shift towards a rehabilitative approach is now being encouraged whereby gang members deactivate and then reintegrate back into normal society. This research seeks to define gang rehabilitation and looks at what constitutes a rehabilitated gang member. Details: Utrecht: Utrecht University, Institute of Development Studies, 2008. 65p. Source: Thesis Year: 2008 Country: El Salvador URL: Shelf Number: 118309 Keywords: Gangs (El Salvador)Rehabilitation (El Salvador)Violence |
Author: Sin, Chih Hoong Title: Disabled People's Experiences of Targeted Violence and Hostility Summary: This report draws on an extensive literature review, qualitative interviews with disabled people and stakeholder interviews to examine disabled people's experiences of targeted violence and hostility. The report examines the risk, prevalence and nature of targeted violence in the U.K. and hostility experienced by disabled people; the experiences of individuals; the impact on disabled people, family, carers and wider society, and issues of reporting, recording and redress. The wider policy implications are also outlined. Details: London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009. 155p. Source: Research Report; 21 Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118294 Keywords: Developmentally DisabledDisabilityHate CrimesPolice AdministrationPolice ReformPolicing (Colombia)Policing TrainingViolence |
Author: Skaperdas, Stergios Title: The Costs of Violence Summary: The cost of violence on development is very high, but measuring this cost has received little attention. More effective measurements of these costs will help ensure that adequate attention is paid by government and civil society to the design and implementation of violence prevention policies and programs. The reviews presented in this publication are designed to contribute to a better understanding of where the international community stands on the debate over how best to measure the costs of violence on economics and societies. Details: Washington, DC: Social Development Department, World Bank, 2009. 102p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118334 Keywords: Costs of CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Fox, Sean Title: The Political Economy of Social Violence: Theory and Evidence from a Cross-Country Study Summary: Why are some countries more prone to social violence than others? Drawing on theoretical and empirical insights from the fields of political economy, sociology and criminology, the authors develop and empirically test a holistic theory of social violence that accounts for political-institutional, socio-economic and socio-demographic factors. The study finds that hybrid political regimes, political-institutional volatility, poverty, inequality and ethnic diversity are associated with higher rates of social violence. Unexpectedly, higher rates of economic growth are also found to be robustly correlated with higher rates of social violence. Details: London: Crisis States Research Center, 2010. 24p. Source: Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2; Working Paper No. 72 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118431 Keywords: Economic DevelopmentInequalityPovertyViolence |
Author: Diprose, Rachael Title: Safety and Security: A Proposal for Internationally Comparable Indicators of Violence Summary: One of the challenges for academics, policy makers, and practitioners working broadly in programs aimed at poverty alleviation, including violence prevention, is the lack of reliable and comparable data on the incidence and nature of violence. This paper proposes a household survey module for a multi-dimensional poverty questionnaire which can be used to complement the available data on the incidence of violence against property and the person, as well as perceptions of security and safety. Violence and poverty are inextricably linked, although the direction of causality is contested if not circular. The module uses standardized definitions which are clear and can be translated cross-culturally and a clear disaggregation of different types of interpersonal violence (not including self-harm) which bridges the crime-conflict nexus. Details: Oxford, UK: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), University of Oxford, 2008. 61p. Source: CRISE Working Paper No. 52; Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118575 Keywords: Criminal StatisticsInequalityPovertyVictims of CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Benton, Nic Title: Trap Guns in Sri Lanka Summary: In Sri Lanka, the use of home-made weapons known as trap guns for crop protection and poaching is a significant cause of insecurity, indiscriminately threatening human life and development. This publication highlights the human, economic and environment impacts of trap gun use, the weak enforcement of laws controlling these illicit small arms, and calls for a co-ordinated solution to the trap gun problem. Details: London: Saferworld, 2008. 12p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: Sri Lanka URL: Shelf Number: 118676 Keywords: GunsPoachingViolenceWeapons (Sri Lanka) |
Author: Reidy, Aisling Title: Paramilitaries' Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia Summary: Between 2003 and 2006 the Colombia government implemented a demobilization process for 37 armed groups that made up the brutal, mafia-like, paramilitary coalition known as the AUC. The government claimed success, as more than 30,000 persons went through demobilization ceremonies and entered reintegration programs. But almost immediately afterwards, new groups cropped up all over the country, taking the reins of the criminal operations that the AUC leadership previously ran. Today, these successor groups are engaging in frequent and serious abuses against civilians, including massacres, killings, forced displacement, rapes, threats, and extortion. This report documents the extent to which the emergence of the successor groups is related to the government's failure to effectively demobilize main AUC leaders and fighters. It describes the groups' brutal abuses against civilians, particularly in Medellin, the Uraba region, and the states of Meta and Narino. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010. 113p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 117328 Keywords: Human Rights (Colombia)Organized CrimeParamilitary ForcesViolence |
Author: Von Kemedi, Dimiear Title: Fuelling the Violence: Non-State Armed Actors (Militia, Cults, and Gangs) in the Niger Delta Summary: This working paper on the formation, organization, activities, rivalries and impact of non-state armed actors- militia, gangs and cult groups in the Niger Delta is intended to situate these groups in the intricate and often confusing canvass of factors that determine the increasingly upward spiral of violence in the Niger Delta. It will attempt a crude geographical mapping of these groups, locate their collective and individual origins as much as possible and highlight the factors that feed the growth of these groups. Finally the paper makes recommendations on how the activities of these groups may be contained and who needs to do what to that effect. Details: Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, university of California; Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace; Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Our Niger Delta, 2006. 24p. Source: Internet Resource; Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 10 Year: 2006 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 119297 Keywords: CultsGangsMilitiaViolence |
Author: Attree, Larry Title: SASP Test of North East Serbia: Evaluation Report Summary: The initial idea for the project was to implement a targeted SALW Awareness campaign around the town of Zrenjanin in North East Serbia. As well as aiming to have a positive effect on the attitudes of local people towards firearms possession and safety, the project was designed as a test for the principles of the SEESAC SALW Awareness Support Pack (SASP) in a project with limited resources at its disposal. The project also offered a local NGO, European Movement Zrenjanin, the opportunity to build capacities in carrying out an awareness campaign following the principles of SASP. The effects of SALW on the local area were made clear by a phase of initial information gathering. European Movement gathered the information from the local police department, a local hospital and the courts. Where information was confidential or not systematically collated to provide figures specifically useful to the campaign, informal methods were used to allow the initial profile of the problem to be as detailed as possible. The initial assessment identified a significant number of local casualties and criminal prosecutions related to the problems of weapons in local society. Details: Belgrade: SEESAC (South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons), 2005. 71p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2005 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: Shelf Number: 118681 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeGun ViolenceGunsViolenceWeapons |
Author: Agostini, Giulia Title: Understanding the Processes of Urban Violence: An Analytical Framework Summary: As of this year half of the world’s population is estimated to be living in cities, therefore, an understanding of conflict and violence within an urban space is increasingly important. This paper’s output is an analytical framework, which examines the processes that lead from conflict to violence. Defining violence as the manifestation of distorted power relationships produced by the complex interaction between risk factors, the paper assumes that it is the interaction of these risk factors, which creates the processes that lead to violent outcomes. Risk factors are viewed as existing conditions that could potentially culminate in violence. Based upon a threefold taxonomy of violence, rooted in existing literature, three exemplary cities were chosen and analysed. These cities are Nairobi, Kinshasa, and Bogota, which respectively typify economic, political, and social violence. The cases demonstrate coinciding and context specific processes, with three significant points of overlap being identified: 1 The Primary Nexus: Is envisioned as the point where there is a significant alignment of common processes, and the point at which the potential for violence is extremely high. These processes are: a crisis of governance, unequal access to economic opportunity, economic decline, and the naturalisation of fear and insecurity. 2. Secondary Nexuses: Are the points of overlap between two of the case cities, where the potential for violence is significant, but not as likely as in the primary nexus. 3. Context Specific Processes: Highlight the unique manner in which risks factors interact to produce violence in each of the cities. This analysis led to the production of a two-stage analytical framework. These stages are not mutually exclusive, as an understanding of the first stage is essential for the second stage to be meaningful. The first stage is the contextualisation of the urban environment under examination, in order to understand the interaction between risk factors as they produce the processes leading to violence. While the second stage extracts these processes for the purpose of comparison to the processes that constitute the primary nexus. An alignment of processes should be viewed as an indicator of the high potential for violence within the urban environment being examined, however, processes are understood to be summative in nature, and thus, the more processes present, the more likely it is that violence will occur. In addition to the production of a framework, the analysis demonstrates how the interaction between risk factors creates processes leading to violent outcomes. As a policy conclusion, given that processes are the result of this interaction and that they are difficult to influence or change in and of themselves, a focus on prevailing risk factors is suggested in order to mitigate urban violence. Details: London: Crisis States Research Center, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, 2007. 70p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: Africa URL: Shelf Number: 118435 Keywords: Urban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Mozambique Ministry of the Interior Title: Firearm-related Violence in Mozambique Summary: This report examines the scope of firearm-related violence in Mozambique, as well as the circumstances surrounding this violence. It identifies some of the factors that influence the use of firearms and groups at risk of violence and risk behaviors. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2009. 106p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Mozambique URL: Shelf Number: 118406 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeViolenceWeapons |
Author: Astorga, Luis Title: Arms Trafficking from the United States to Mexico: Divergent Responsibilities Summary: Arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico is a central issue in bilateral relations, closely linked to drug trafficking and, in particular, the lethal violence unleashed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Violence is always a possibility in any illegal activity, but the magnitude of the current violence is largely related to the availability of high-powered firearms being trafficked across the border from the United States to Mexico. Contributing to this are the divisions and disputes among the leaders of the drug trafficking organizations and their fight for hegemony over routes, markets and other areas created by the diversification of the profits and power derived from this business, as well as the increasing level of conflict with the police and armed forces. Other areas that cannot be overlooked include the weaknesses of Mexican institutions in charge of guaranteeing security and justice, and the decisions of those who run institutions to reduce or neutralize the capacity of criminal organizations, which could be contributing to the violence unleashed by drug traffickers. The availability of guns alone does not necessarily generate violence, but when such violence does exist access to weapons allows it to take on greater dimensions and makes it much harder to control. Drug traffickers are obtaining increasingly sophisticated weapons at reasonably low prices thanks to easy access to guns in the U.S. market. As with drug trafficking, gun smuggling implies a relationship of coresponsibility between supplier and consuming countries; the responsibilities and the capacities of states are different, as are the actions and policies that they should adopt. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2010. 5p. Source: Internet Resource; IDPC Policy Briefing Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 119375 Keywords: Arms SmugglingArms TraffickingFirearms and ViolenceViolenceWeapons |
Author: Zavala, Diego E. Title: Understanding Violence: The Role of Injury Surveillance Systems in Africa Summary: "This working paper applies a public health approach to engaging with injury prevention and identifies several public health methods for collecting data pertinent to violence control. The paper documents findings from a multinational project undertaken in 2007-2009 in five African countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia). This pilot project involved the creation of an injury surveillance system in five hospitals, one in each country. The analysis of the project offers valuable insight into what is required in order to successfully implement and sustain a hospital-based injury surveillance system under challenging circumstances. This paper is designed for a broad audience interested in armed violence prevention and reduction and it specifically speaks to African decision-makers, development practitioners, and medical professionals." Details: Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2009. 52p. Source: Internet Resource; Working Paper Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: Shelf Number: 119394 Keywords: Armed ViolenceInjury Surveillance SystemsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Buchanan, Cate Title: Guns and Violence in the El Salvador Peace Negotiations Summary: This report examines the peace negotiation process that put an end to a twelve- year-long civil war in El Salvador. The report aims to show how the various negotiators approached the multiple tasks of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of rebel and government forces; security sector reform; the control of vast quantities of weapons in circulation throughout the country after decades of militarisation; and strategies for assisting those traumatised and disabled by armed violence. Details: Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008. 46p. Source: Internet Resource; Negotiating Disarmament: Country Study, No. 3 Year: 2008 Country: El Salvador URL: Shelf Number: 119438 Keywords: Armed Violence (El Salvador)Guns and ViolenceViolenceWeapons |
Author: Muntingh, Lukas Title: Towards An Understanding of Repeat Violent Offending: A Review of the Literature Summary: This paper explores South African and international literature relevant to repeat offending. It serves to inform a three-year study on sentenced repeat violent offenders in South Africa to be undertaken by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in collaboration with the Community Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape (in particular the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative - CSPRI) and the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). The study is motivated by the understanding that the identification of indicators of risk before young offenders embark on a life trajectory of violent crime, and the implementation of appropriate interventions will, in the long term, contribute towards reducing levels of violent crime and re-offending. The purpose of the study is thus to provide detailed data about the life histories and life circumstances of repeat violent offenders in South Africa. Details: Pretoris, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 24p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 0 Country: South Africa URL: Shelf Number: 119450 Keywords: Repeat OffendersViolenceViolent Offenders |
Author: Gasparini Alves, Pericles Title: Illicit Trafficking in Firearms: Prevention and Combat in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: A National, Regional and Global Issue Summary: Since the 1980s, Brazil has faced one of the worst small arms problems in the world. Drug and arms trafficking have lead to increasing levels of violence in Brazilian society, notably in large cities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This publication offers and account of the arms trafficking situation in Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian Government's response to it. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2001. 66p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2001 Country: Brazil URL: Shelf Number: 119478 Keywords: CrimeIllegal Arms TransferSmugglingTransnationalViolence |
Author: Vinck, Patrick Title: Building Peace, Seeking Justice: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes About Accountability and Social Reconstruction in the Central African Republic Summary: Decades of political instability, state fragility, mismanagement, and a series of armed conflicts have led the Central African Republic (CAR) to a state of widespread violence and poverty. This study provides a better understanding of the scope and magnitude of violence in CAR and its consequences, as well as a snapshot of what the citizens of CAR believe is the best way to restore peace. It also examines the issue of justice and accountability for the serious crimes that were committed. This report provides the findings from a survey of 1,879 adults, residents of CAR, randomly selected in the capital city of Bangui, and the prefectures of Lobaye, Ombella M’Poko, Ouham, and Ouham Pende. These prefectures encompass a large geographic area representing 52 percent of the total population of CAR and have experienced varying levels of exposure to the conflicts. Locally trained teams conducted the interviews between November and December 2009. This report provides a detailed analysis of results on a wide range of topics related to the population’s priorities and needs, exposure to violence, security, community cohesion and engagement, access to information, conflict resolution, reintegration of former combatants, transitional justice, and reparations for victims. Details: Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, 2010. 41p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Central African Republic URL: Shelf Number: 119520 Keywords: Human RightsTransitional JusticeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Walser, Ray Title: Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight We Cannot Afford to Lose Summary: Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in 2006, a virulent war has raged with the Mexican drug cartels, and this drug-related violence has spilled across the U.S. border, threatening U.S. lives and public safety. Geostrategic pessimists fear that the U.S. has been taking Mexico's stability for granted and warn that Mexico is teetering on the brink of a drug-induced disaster. However, the seriousness of the drug threat to Mexico also presents a strategic opportunity. At the invitation of the Mexican government, the Bush Administration is working to establish a partnership to make Mexico safer and more secure without sacrificing the sovereignty of either nation. The Bush Administration's Merida Initiative—a three-year, $1.5 billion anti-drug assistance package for Mexico and Central America—is a quantitative and qualitative jump in support for the drug fight in the region. Unlike Plan Colombia, which helped to rescue Colombia from the throes of a narco-war, the Merida Initiative will provide assistance in equipment, technology, and training without a significant U.S. military footprint in Mexico. President George W. Bush signed the Merida Initiative into law as part of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 on June 30, 2008. In Mexico and in the press, the Merida Initiative is being viewed as a critical test of U.S.–Mexican relations. Its implementation will be closely scrutinized on both sides of the aisle in Congress. The Merida Initiative could become an important legacy of the Bush presidency in the Western Hemisphere and should create a solid platform for U.S.–Mexican cooperation for the next Administration. The initiative, however, is just a start. The U.S. needs to do more to secure the border, reduce the flows of illegal arms and illicit cash south into Mexico, and alter immigration laws to permit temporary workers to cross the border legally to help fill the U.S. demand for labor. Policymakers need to develop a comprehensive strategy that covers all transit and source countries. Mexico needs to continue exercising the political will to combat the deadly drug cartels and continue reforming its judicial system, overhauling police and law enforcement, and modernizing and developing its economy. Finally, the Mexican government needs to take an active role in preventing illegal third-country nationals from transiting Mexican territory, as well as in closing down smuggling organizations that operate on Mexican soil and discouraging Mexican citizens from entering the U.S. illegally. Both nations would benefit substantially from a return to law and order on both sides of the border. Details: Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Backgrounder, No. 2163 Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 119542 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug ControlDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingViolence |
Author: Gordon, Gretchen Title: Truth Behind Bars: Colombian Paramilitary leaders in U.S. Custody Summary: Colombian drug lords extradited to the United States must be held accountable for their role in the mass atrocities that have devastated their country. This report calls on the U.S. government to give Colombian authorities access to these extradited drug lords for their own criminal investigations. By supporting Colombia’s human rights probes, the U.S. may help bring an end to that country’s cycle of violence. Details: Berkeley, CA: International Human Rights Law Clinic, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 119535 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Colombia)Human RightsViolence |
Author: Partnership Africa Canada Title: Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarized Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe Summary: This report exposes some of the players who have been at the forefront of the plunder of diamonds in Chiadzwa, Marange. It shows how the Chiadzwa diamonds are fuelling the ongoing political conflict in the region. Details: Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2010. 29p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Zimbabwe URL: Shelf Number: 119548 Keywords: Diamond SmugglingIllegal TradeViolence |
Author: Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives, Standing Committee on Family, Community, Housing and Youth Title: Avoid the Harm - Stay Calm: Report on the Inquiry into the Impact of Violence on Young Australians Summary: This report attempts to answer the following qustion - What needs to be done to curb youth violence and address the concerns of young people and of the wider Australian community? As such, it reports on the impact of violence on young Australians with particular reference to: perceptions of violence and community safety among young Australians; links between illicit drug use, alcohol abuse and violence among young Australians; the relationship between bullying and violence and the well-being of young Australians; social and economic factors that contribute to violence by young Australians; and strategies to reduce violence and its impact among young Australians. Details: Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010. 180p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 119529 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisorderDrug Abuse and CrimeJuvenile OffendersVictims of CrimeViolenceViolent Offenders |
Author: McKinlay, William Title: Alcohol and Violence Among Young Male Offenders in Scotland (1979-2009) Summary: The purpose of this research is to inform and support the Scottish Prison Service’s alcohol desistance and violence reduction agenda. This research aims to develop our understanding of the use of alcohol, and violence, among male Young Offenders in Scotland. Understanding the reasons why young people now commonly accept that excessive drinking is the cultural norm and understanding young people’s perceptions of the disinhibiting effects that can lead to crime and violence, are central to the objectives of reducing offending and making Scotland a safer place to live. This report brings together the findings of four research studies carried out over the past 30 years. These are: 1) A survey of Young Offenders’ drinking conducted in 1979; 2) A survey of Young Offenders’ drinking and drug use conducted in 1996; 3) A survey of Young Offenders’ drinking, drug and weapon use conducted in 2007 and 4) Interviews with Young Offenders about the above issues conducted in 2008. Details: Glasgow: Scottish Prison Service, 2009. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: SPS Occasional Paper No. 1/2009: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.sps.gov.uk/MultimediaGallery/80c8249a-3305-41b7-96ba-970412a81c68.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.sps.gov.uk/MultimediaGallery/80c8249a-3305-41b7-96ba-970412a81c68.pdf Shelf Number: 113961 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime and Disorder (Scotland)ViolenceViolent CrimeYouthful Offenders |
Author: Braga, Anthony A. Title: Preventing Violent Street Crime in Stockton, California: A Report to the Stockton Police Department Summary: In 2004, the City of Stockton was identified as the most violent city in California with a rate of 1,362 violent crimes per 100,000 residents. A recent 2005 analysis by the Stockton Police Department (SPD) revealed that Stockton remained the most violent city in California with a violent crime rate of 1,503 (10.4% increase over the previous year). The high violent crime rate has generated considerable concern among Stockton city leaders and residents. A number of factors, such as poverty, lack of education, unemployment, overcrowded jails, illegal drug use, and gangs, have been identified as important contributors to Stockton’s violent crime problem. In August 2005, the Mayor launched a Crime Suppression Initiative that included a series of innovative police strategies to reduce violence and established a Blue Ribbon Crime Prevention Committee to examine issues related to Stockton violence and make recommendations regarding community crime prevention. This study examines the nature of violent street crime in the city, reviews the violence prevention activities of the SPD, and makes recommendations on improving the police department’s response to violent street crime problems. Details: Cambridge, MA: Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 23, 2010 at: http://online.recordnet.com/pdconsultreport_07_06.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://online.recordnet.com/pdconsultreport_07_06.pdf Shelf Number: 119667 Keywords: GangsStreet CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Hipple, Natalie Title: The High Point Drug Market Initiative: A Process and Impact Evaluation Summary: The High Point Police Department in High Point, North Carolina has gained attention from the U.S. Department of Justice and police departments, prosecutors, and local governmental officials through a strategic problem solving intervention that has come to be known as the High Point Drug Market Intervention Program (DMI). The DMI seeks to focus on geographically-defined drug market locations and eliminate the overt drug market and the associated violence. The model includes a highly focused deterrence strategy coupled with police-community partnerships that seek to offer sources of social support to the subjects of the deterrence strategy while at the same time re-establishing informal social controls within the neighborhood in order to prevent the re-emergence of the drug market. HPPD has reported very significant declines in crime in the neighborhoods where the DMI has been implemented and an NIJ-supported study indicates strong support for the intervention among justice system officials and local residents. The purpose of this report is to test the impact of the intervention in the original DMI neighborhood through a rigorous outcome assessment. ARIMA time series models were used to test the impact of the DMI intervention. Trends in violent, property and drugs/nuisance offenses were compared for the 37 months prior to the intervention and 37 months following the intervention. Conservative time series estimates that controlled for prior trends in the data and examined the logged-crime incidents in the target community (in order to compress the skewed nature of the count data) indicated that violent crimes declined an average of 7.3 percent following the intervention, property offenses declined 9.1 percent (though this decline was not statistically significant when controlling for other trend influences), and drug and nuisance offenses declined roughly 5.5 percent between the pre and post intervention period, controlling for important trend influence factors. Perhaps most importantly, the decline in the trend in violent crime and in drug and nuisance offenses was marginally statistically significant (p < .10) meaning the observed post-intervention reduction was very unlikely to have been produced by chance. In future analyses these trends will be tested with comparison locations and similar analyses will be conducted in the other DMI intervention sites in High Point. The results of this analysis are consistent with the impressions of HPPD officials as well as residents of the affected neighborhood, the DMI intervention in the West End appears to have had a significant impact on the level of violent, drug, and nuisance offenses. When coupled with the results of a recent assessment of a similar intervention in Rockford, Illinois that was modeled on the High Point experience, these results suggest the DMI is a highly promising intervention for addressing the problem of illegal drug markets and deserves further implementation and evaluation. Details: East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice, 2010. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Project Safe Neighborhoods Case Study #12; Accessed August 23, 2010 at: http://www1.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/psn/DMI/HighPointMSUEvaluationPSN12.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www1.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/psn/DMI/HighPointMSUEvaluationPSN12.pdf Shelf Number: 119670 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug OffendersNuisance Behaviors and DisordersPulling Levers StrategyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Colak, Alexandra Abello Title: Civil Society and Security Transformation in Medellin: Challenges and Opportunities Summary: Medellin, the second biggest city in Colombia, experienced an impressive transformation after 2002 when a combination of national and local initiatives succeeded in dramatically reducing acute levels of violence. After being the most violent city in the world, Medellin became a successful case of urban security transformation. The aim of this research was to explore the role played by civil society in that process. However, not long before this project began, the security situation started to deteriorate in the poor communities of Medellin. The vacuum of power created by the extradition of a demobilized paramilitary leader had triggered wars between gangs and criminal groups. This made it necessary to explore not only the limitations of the recent security transformation, which is now in question, but also the way this outbreak of violence is affecting communities and the role that civil society can play in this context. In the first section this document presents an overview of the insecurity context of Medellin prior to the transformation started in 2002. The second section discusses the problems with the role that civil society is asked to play within current frameworks for security transformation, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and current models of democratic security governance in Latin America. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices Series, no. 2: Available at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php Shelf Number: 119680 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: O'Regan, Davin Title: Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean Summary: Africa is facing an increasingly menacing threat of cocaine trafficking that risks undermining its security structures, nascent democratic institutions, and development progress. Latin America has long faced similar challenges and its experience provides important lessons that can be applied before this expanding threat becomes more deeply entrenched on the continent - and costly to reverse. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 5: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/AfricaBriefFinal_5.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/AfricaBriefFinal_5.pdf Shelf Number: 119704 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingViolence |
Author: Bailey, John Title: Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What are Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working? Summary: Mexico confronts the greatest threat to its democratic governance from internal violence since the Cristero Revolt of the latter stages of the Revolution of 1910-29. In this case, the threat is posed by criminal groups, especially by politically savvy, hyper-violent drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), currently inflicting spectacular damage in several regions and sowing insecurity throughout the country. But the DTOs are only the most pressing symptom of a growing mix of forms of organized crime (OC) rooted in a robust informal economy and a civic culture marked by comparatively little confidence in the police-justice system and low compliance with the state’s law. The threat is further exacerbated by a crisis of political legitimacy and state capacity. Neo-liberal policies since the mid 1980s have not generated a new social contract to replace the populist consensus of the “golden age” of growth with stability (1950s-1970s), and the Mexican state lacks an effective police-justice-regulatory system capable of enforcing its laws with respect to public security. This chapter first examines the evolution of the Mexican and US national government strategies for confronting OC/DTOs, with particular attention to the institutional frameworks that have been established to implement these strategies. It then evaluates the degree of “fit” between the two governments’ strategies and considers metrics by which progress can be measured. It concludes with an assessment of progress. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute; San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Combating%20Organized%20Crime.%20Bailey.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Combating%20Organized%20Crime.%20Bailey.pdf Shelf Number: 119588 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Reforming Haiti's Security Sector Summary: Operations led by the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) largely disbanded armed gangs in the slums of Haiti's cities, but progress has been undermined by persisting crime, political instability and natural disasters. Reforming Haiti's Security Sector , the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the difficulties in strengthening the justice sector and establishing an operational and sufficiently staffed police force - two crucial elements for the country's future stability and development. Making decisive and swift headway with security sector reform (SSR) is a vital part of any durable solution to Haiti's political and economic, as well as security problems", says Bernice Robertson, Crisis Group's Haiti Senior Analyst. "The process to create a 14,000-strong Haitian National Police (HNP) by 2011 must be speeded up". The fall of Prime Minister Jacques-Adouard Alexis during last April's protests, the drawn-out negotiations between President Rena Preval and parliament over his successor and new Prime Minister Michele Pierre-Louis' political difficulties have put Haiti's fragile governance once again under severe strain. Drug traffickers, organised criminals and corrupt politicians have mobilised the population for their own benefit and a procession of hurricanes in August and September has caused enormous damage to Haiti's physical infrastructure. HNP vetting needs to be concluded, the number of police cadets has to be increased and officers should receive further training in specific skills, including anti-kidnapping, riot control, counter-drug, border control, forensics and intelligence gathering and analysis. Special crime chambers ought to be created to try serious offenders, and the inhumane prison conditions have to be improved quickly. MINUSTAH should maintain its present military component but increase the number of international police, and deploy UN civil affairs and police personnel with special experience in border control to assist HNP units along the frontier with the Dominican Republic. "Haiti urgently needs a professional HNP as a prerequisite and bulwark if the new government is to move the country, with MINUSTAH and donor help, toward stability", says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group's Latin America Program Director. "But it also needs a justice system capable of upholding the rule of law and programs that provide swift, visible relief to families enduring extremely harsh living conditions and natural disasters". Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2008. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 28: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/28_reforming_haiti_s_security_sector.ashx Year: 2008 Country: Haiti URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/28_reforming_haiti_s_security_sector.ashx Shelf Number: 119709 Keywords: Drug TraffickingKidnappingOrganized CrimePolice CorruptionPolice ReformViolence |
Author: Title: Improving Security Policy in Colombia Summary: Colombia’s new government has to improve security policy to tackle the guerrilla tactics of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as their broadened participation in drug trafficking and newly forged alliances with other illegal armed groups. Details: Brussels; Bogota, Colombia: International Crisis Group, 2010. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Briefing No. 23: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.ashx Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.ashx Shelf Number: 119714 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangsSecurityViolence |
Author: Eckersley, Richard Title: Violence in Public Places: Explanations and Solutions: A Report on an Expert Roundtable for Victoria Police Summary: Combating the problem of violence in public places will require the cooperation of everyone from parents and young people to education providers, police and government, a new report from Australia21 suggests. Key factors identified in explaining violence in public places were the growth in the night time economy, a 24/7 lifestyle, technology and the media, links between antisocial behaviour and young people’s health and well-being, parental overprotection or neglect, increased social expectations or social exclusion and alienation and a perception of violence as the norm. The report was commissioned by Victoria Police and is based on an expert roundtable held in Melbourne in October 2008. Details: Weston, ACT: Australia 21, 2008. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://www.australia21.org.au/pdf/Violence%20in%20public%20places%20report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Australia URL: http://www.australia21.org.au/pdf/Violence%20in%20public%20places%20report.pdf Shelf Number: 117398 Keywords: Antisocial BehaviorPublic PlacesViolenceYouth Violence |
Author: International Alert Title: The Role of the Exploitation of Natural Resources in Fuelling and Prolonging Crisis in the Eastern DRC Summary: For more than a decade, research has stressed the importance of the economic dimension of conflict, and of the economic interests of belligerents. Competition among political, military and business actors for the control of mineral resources in the east of the country is being increasingly recognised as a pivotal factor in assessing the causes of instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This report is based on a thorough review of all the main literature on the subject since the year 2000. It describes and assesses the different categories of actors and the processes, chains and linkages that are involved in mining and trading of minerals in the Kivu provinces and in the territory of Ituri. It also reveals some of the main gaps in the information on the issue that is needed to develop and refine more effective peace-building strategies by national and international interveners. Details: London: International Alert, 2009. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://international-alert.org/pdf/Natural_Resources_Jan_10.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://international-alert.org/pdf/Natural_Resources_Jan_10.pdf Shelf Number: 118599 Keywords: Illegal TradeOffenses Against the EnvironmentViolenceWildlife Crime |
Author: Moser, Caroline Title: Violence in the Central American REgion: Towards an Integrated Framework for Violence Reduction Summary: This Report was commissioned by the UK Department of International Development (DFID) and Swedish International Development Co-Operation (SIDA) as a background document to assist both agencies in developing both regional and country specific violence reduction strategies and programmes in Central America, The objective of this study is to provide a conceptual framework, and associated overview, for understanding regional violence in Central America. This is intended to contribute to the development of an integrated approach to violence reduction interventions in the region. The study aims to familiarise those working in this area with the complex multi-dimensional nature of violence. This will assist agencies in their efforts to undertake the following tasks: 1) Define a future over-arching framework when designing related programmes; 2) Mainstream such an understanding in all future development co-operation in Central America; and 3) Inform key partners of the current dynamics of violence as well as potential approaches to violence reduction. Details: London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 171: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1199.pdf Year: 2002 Country: Central America URL: Shelf Number: 119758 Keywords: ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cordeweners, Tom Title: Violence in Bogota, Colombia? A Rich Man's Problem? Summary: In this thesis, I will discuss how violence affected the lives of upper-middle class habitants of Bogotá, Colombia. For this, I will use the information that I obtained during four months of fieldwork. In Colombia, guerrilla movements, paramilitary organisations, drug cartels, youth gangs and common criminals all use violence to protect their interests. Economic violence is the sort of violence that most members of the upper-middle class encounter in a direct way. However, different forms of political violence also have certain consequences for Bogotá’s upper-middle class. Most people take personal measures and protect their houses in order to prevent being victim of a violent crime. Although some upper-middle class inhabitants cooperate with neighbours, the police or other state institutions, this is not the way most people deal with fear and insecurity. The security policies of both the national and the local government are generally seen as effective. However, most members of the uppermiddle class are not satisfied with the way the police tries to improve security. As we shall see, this is one of the reasons for the fact that Bogotá’s upper-middle class calls in the help of private security companies to make their environment safer. Details: Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2008. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2008-0912-200805/UUindex.html Year: 2008 Country: Colombia URL: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2008-0912-200805/UUindex.html Shelf Number: 119760 Keywords: Fear of CrimePrivate SecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of Defense Title: Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood. Report of the DoD Independent Review Summary: Following the tragic shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, on Nov. 5, 2009, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood to examine the circumstances behind this tragedy. He directed that the assembled group to conduct the investigation and to report back to him by Jan. 15, 2010, with recommendations to identify and address possible deficiencies in: - the Department of Defense's programs, policies, processes, and procedures related to force protection and identifying DoD employees who could potentially pose credible threats to themselves or others; - the sufficiency of the Department of Defense's emergency response to mass casualty situations at DoD facilities and the response to care for victims and families in the aftermath of mass casualty events; - the sufficiency of programs, policies, processes, and procedures for the support and care of healthcare providers while caring for beneficiaries suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or other mental and emotional wounds and injuries; - the adequacy of Army programs, policies, processes, and procedures as applied to the alleged perpetrator. After conducting the review, the assembled group reached a number of conclusions and made corresponding recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010. 54p., app. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2010 at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf Shelf Number: 118087 Keywords: Emergency PreparednessMass MurderViolenceViolence in the WorkplaceViolent Offenders |
Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Summary: Conspiracy theories have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon. This paper considers the role they play in extremist groups and counterterrorism work. It presents the first ever analysis of conspiracy theories in the ideology and propaganda of fifty extremist groups: religious, far-right and left, eco, anarchic and cult-based. It is argued that conspiracy theories are a ‘radicalising multiplier', which feed back into the ideologies, internal dynamics and psychological processes of extremist groups in three ways. Firstly, they create demonologies of ‘the enemy’ that the group defines itself against. Secondly, they delegitimise voices of dissent and moderation. And thirdly, they encourage a group or individuals to turn to violence, because it acts as rhetorical devices to portray violence as necessary to ‘awaken’ the people from their acquiescent slumber. More broadly, conspiracy theories drive a wedge of distrust between governments and particular communities which can hinder community-level efforts to fight violent extremism. It is, however, difficult for government to tackle conspiracies. The paper calls for government institutions to be more open, investment to enable young people to think critically and recognise propaganda, and for civil society to play a proactive role. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Shelf Number: 119795 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsTerrorismViolence |
Author: Kilmer, Beau Title: Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help? Summary: U.S. demand for illicit drugs creates markets for Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and helps foster violence in Mexico. This paper examines how marijuana legalization in California might influence DTO revenues and the violence in Mexico. Key findings include: 1) Mexican DTOs' gross revenues from illegally exporting marijuana to wholesalers in the United States is likely less than $2 billion; 2) The claim that 60 percent of Mexican DTO gross drug export revenues come from marijuana should not be taken seriously; 3) If legalization only affects revenues from supplying marijuana to California, DTO drug export revenue losses would be very small, perhaps 2–4 percent; 4) The only way legalizing marijuana in California would significantly influence DTO revenues and the related violence is if California-produced marijuana is smuggled to other states at prices that outcompete current Mexican supplies. The extent of such smuggling will depend on a number of factors, including the response of the U.S. federal government. 5) If marijuana is smuggled from California to other states, it could undercut sales of Mexican marijuana in much of the U.S., cutting DTOs' marijuana export revenues by more than 65 percent and probably by 85 percent or more. In this scenario, the DTOs would lose approximately 20% of their total drug export revenues. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf Shelf Number: 119939 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingMarijuanaViolence |
Author: Tedesco, Laura Title: Urban Violence: A Challenge to Institutional Strengthening. The Case of Latin America Summary: Urban violence in Latin America has been related to the increase in social, political and economic exclusion experienced by much of the population. This Working Paper offers an analysis of the causes of violence, presenting a study that considers the possibility of stateless territories within states. Various examples of the region are presented, with a particular focus on the rapid increase of violence in Mexico. The conclusions and recommendations given in this document point to the need to create an agenda for citizen security between Europe and Latin America that would put the emphasis on the exchange of ideas and local programmes. Details: Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2009. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 78: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.fride.org/publication/573/urban-violence:-a-challenge-to-institutional-strengthening Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fride.org/publication/573/urban-violence:-a-challenge-to-institutional-strengthening Shelf Number: 119947 Keywords: Urban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jones, Craig Title: The Impact of Restricted Alcohol Availability on Alcohol-Related Violence in Newcastle, NSW Summary: In March 2008, the New South Wales Liquor Administration Board (LAB) introduced significant restrictions on hotel trading hours for a number of licensed premises in the Newcastle CBD. We sought to determine whether this reduced the incidence of assault in the vicinity of these premises. Three sources of police data were employed to address this research question: recorded crime data, last-place-of-consumption data from the Alcohol Linking Program and police call-out data. Recorded crime and Linking data revealed a significant reduction in alcohol-related assaults in the intervention site but not the comparison site. These two data sources revealed no evidence of any geographic displacement of assaults to other licensed premises or neighbouring areas. There was no evidence of any decrease in the total number of calls for service in either the intervention or comparison sites but this is most likely due to limitations inherent in the call-out data. All three data sources revealed a significant decrease in the proportion of assaults occurring after 3 a.m. in the intervention site but not in the comparison sites. Collectively, the data provide strong evidence that the restricted availability of alcohol reduced the incidence of assault in the Newcastle CBD. Details: Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2009. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice, No. 137: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/CJB137.pdf/$file/CJB137.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Australia URL: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/CJB137.pdf/$file/CJB137.pdf Shelf Number: 118549 Keywords: Alcohol AbuseAlcohol Related Crime, DisorderAssaultsCrime DisplacementViolence |
Author: Berg, Louis-Alexandre Title: Crime, Politics and Violence in Post-Earthquake Haiti Summary: Crime and violence are on the rise in Port-au-Prince due to prisoner escapes during the earthquake. Youth gangs and other armed groups are regaining strength in the most vulnerable neighborhoods and spreading to other areas of the city. In the tent camps around Port-au- Prince, displaced people—especially women — remain vulnerable to crime. These factors have contributed to an increasing sense of insecurity. As political tensions rise in the run-up to elections, armed groups, criminal enterprises and vulnerable youth could once again be mobilized by political forces to fuel violence or disrupt the political process. Gangs and their involvement in criminal and political violence are deeply rooted in Haitian politics, and fueled by widespread poverty, inadequate police presence, government weakness, and social and economic inequities. Prior to the earthquake, criminal violence had begun to decline due to a combination of political reconciliation, law enforcement operations and investment in marginalized neighborhoods. These fragile gains have been reversed since the earthquake and public confidence in the police has been shaken. Directing resources toward mitigating violence while addressing the underlying sources of crime and violence should remain a priority in post-earthquake reconstruction. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief, no. 58: Accessed October 18, 2010 at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2058%20-%20Crime%20Politics%20and%20Violence%20in%20Post-Earthquake%20Haiti.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Haiti URL: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2058%20-%20Crime%20Politics%20and%20Violence%20in%20Post-Earthquake%20Haiti.pdf Shelf Number: 119996 Keywords: GangsNatural DisastersViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Dreyfus, Pablo Title: Small Arms in Brazil: Production, Trade, and Holdings Summary: It is not difficult to find evidence of Brazil’s high levels of armed violence. The proof is in the grim statistics of the country’s hospitals, morgues, and prisons. This Special Report looks at two aspects of this problem. First, it explores the thriving Brazilian small arms industry, which, together with international trafficking networks, contributes to control failures and fuels small arms violence. Second, it maps out weapons holdings—by weapon type, holder, and location Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010. 170p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR11-Small-Arms-in-Brazil.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR11-Small-Arms-in-Brazil.pdf Shelf Number: 120035 Keywords: GunsIllegal TradeTrafficking in WeaponsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Harriott, Anthony Title: Controlling Violent Crime: Models and Policy Options Summary: The increase in the levels of crime and violence in Jamaica has been traumatic for the nation’s citizens. The scourge of crime has penetrated even our schools as the youth solve their problems in an aggressively confrontational manner which too often has ended in the death of one of the contenders. The problem of crime is not confined to Jamaica but is one that the entire region has had to confront. This Lecture, which will focus on models and policy options for the control of crime, is timely and should provide practical recommendations to contribute to the lessing of crime in Jamaica and the Caribbean. Details: Kingston, Jamaica: GraceKennedy Foundation, 2009. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.gracekennedy.com/files/doc/GRACE-Lecture-2009.pdf.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Jamaica URL: http://www.gracekennedy.com/files/doc/GRACE-Lecture-2009.pdf.pdf Shelf Number: 120018 Keywords: Criminal Justice PolicyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Aguirre, Katherine Title: Assessing the Effect of Policy Interventions on Small Arms Demand in Bogota, Colombia Summary: In Bogotá, some 50,000 people died in firearm-related events between 1979 and 2009. This constitutes roughly 8% of the total number of deaths, by natural or external causes, registered in the Colombian capital. While the impact of firearms in Bogotá is smaller than in Colombia as a whole, where approximately 11% of deaths have been attributed to firearms, Bogotá contributed 10% of all firearms deaths in Colombia over the period 1979 to 2009. In Bogotá as in the rest of Colombia, homicides are the primary event through which firearms deaths occur (more than 90% of cases). In 2009, there were over 15,000 homicides registered in Colombia. Despite an impressive reduction since 2002 (26.8%), and this figure being the lowest in more than 20 years, the homicide rate in Colombia continues to rank as one of the highest in the world, if not the highest. Improvements in the city of Bogotá have contributed substantially to the overall reduction in homicides. The city has experienced an impressive reduction of homicide violence since its peak in 1993, when the number of homicides rose from 3,000 in 1992 to almost 4,500, a 33% increase. According to the National Police, the figure of 2009 of Bogotá was 1,327 a reduction of around 70% with respect to the 1993 level. The current homicide rate of 18 per 100,000 inhabitants is still quite high, but contrasts with the rate of 1993 of 80 per 100.000. The contribution of Bogotá to the total number of homicides of the country has not declined at the same speed as the level of homicides. For the 2007, the Ministry of Defence says that the capital contribute with 32.7 per cent in the decrease of the homicides in the whole country. Violence in Colombia is a result of two interconnected complex social phenomena. The first is the prevalence of entrenched criminal organisations, mainly involved in the production and transport of illegal narcotics. The second is the three-sided armed conflict between the government, guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups. The situation in Bogotá is influenced more by common urban delinquency by conflict dynamics. In this document, we assess the market associated with the criminal use of firearms. Recent academic studies highlighted demand for firearms for violent use. This assessment will distinguish demand for firearms along two main axes: the markets in which they can be obtained (legal and illegal markets) and how individuals use them (criminally and non-criminally). Specifically, we will explore the impact that active antigun policies and other security interventions, established in the mid-1990s, had on reducing firearm-related homicides in Bogotá. After reviewing the general context, we will introduce the policies that have been implemented by local administrations during the period in which the homicide rate fell drastically. We then use a variety a statistical methods to assess the impact of gun-carrying and violence reduction interventions on homicide in Bogotá. Details: Bogota, Colombia: CERAC - Centro de Recursos para el Analisis de Conflictos, 2009. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Documentos de CERAC, No. 14: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.cerac.org.co/pdf/CERAC_WP_14_DemandBogotaFinal.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.cerac.org.co/pdf/CERAC_WP_14_DemandBogotaFinal.pdf Shelf Number: 120022 Keywords: Gun ControlGun ViolenceGunsHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cassematis, Peter Title: Understanding Glassing Incidents on Licensed Premises: Dimensions, Prevention and Control Summary: ‘Glassings’ have emerged as a particularly concerning component of violence occurring within licensed establishments in many parts of Queensland. The current project aimed to address the knowledge gap about glassing behaviour by examining various dimensions of glassing, and evaluating the likely success of alternative strategies for reducing glassing incidents and minimizing related harm. The analysis was informed by undertaking a review of published literature that addressed the causes and management of aggression in venues, as well as literature addressing the comparative safety of plastic and toughened glass to normal glass as well as the impact of changing drinking vessels on venue aggression. The findings drawn from prior research were then integrated with new data collected for this project. Two sources of raw data were analysed. One source of raw data was text based reports of 34 glassing incidents in Gold Coast venues (October 2007 - February 2009). These reports were provided by Qld. Liquor Licensing, Queensland Police Service and newspaper reports. Frequency counts were generated based on themes present within each separate incident report. The second source of data was semi-structured interviews of venue representatives with managerial responsibilities. Frequency counts of themes were aggregated to identify typical venue management experiences, attitudes, and beliefs regarding predictors of glassing assault and the perceived efficacy of plastic, glass and rapid removal. Based on our analysis, we formed the view that glassing is an outcome from a complex interaction of patron and venue based characteristics. Glassing is most likely to occur on weekends between 9.00 pm and 3.00 am. Taverns or nightclubs are the most likely to be the site of a glassing. Glassing assaults have the same initial conflicts as non-glassing assaults. Young males are most likely to be offenders but participants believed a variety of intrapersonal deficits were more predictive than demography. Glass is used as a weapon because it is convenient. Plastic is likely to be the safest material but is least acceptable to venues. Most participants favoured a combination of toughened glass and rapid removal. An educative advertising campaign, tougher penalties for offenders and a safer drinking vessel combined with rapid removal is likely to have the biggest impact on glassing behaviour. The findings of the research gave rise to six practical recommendations intended to control the frequency of glassing attempts and lessen the severity of injury that occurs from completed attempts. Six areas for research have been suggested as particularly pertinent to increasing the presently limited store of relevant knowledge. Key learnings emerging from the project have been identified and presented in this report. Details: Brisbane: Queensland Government, 2009. 190p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 22, 2010 at: http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/resources/liquorDocs/Glassing_Incidents_Final_Report_Sept_2009.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Australia URL: http://www.olgr.qld.gov.au/resources/liquorDocs/Glassing_Incidents_Final_Report_Sept_2009.pdf Shelf Number: 120053 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisorderAnti-Social BehaviorAssaultsInjuryViolence |
Author: Winder, Belinda Title: Last Orders for Alcohol Related Violence: Exploring Salient Factors in the Occurrence of Violent Incidents in UK Pubs and Other Late Night Venues Summary: Research was conducted exploring the possible interaction between drinking containers and antisocial behaviour in pubs and other late night venues in the UK. The research further attempted to identify salient factors leading to violent incidents at these locations. The research comprised two types of study; an interview study and three correlational surveys. For the interview study, a purposive sample of 50 individuals who had either been involved in an aggressive / violent altercation in a pub, bar or other late night drinking venue in the last 3 years, or who had first hand experience of the same, was recruited. Participants were recruited from a number of UK cities, including Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Sheffield, Nottingham and city locations in Scotland. Five themes were identified from the interviews: rivalry; crowding; staff; glass and accidental injury and glass as a weapon. Each of these themes was considered in turn and examples from participants’ transcripts were included in the results to allow the reader to assess the interpretations. In all of the incidents described by participants alcohol was involved, although this is probably to be expected given that the research focused on late night drinking venues. Nevertheless, the majority of incidents described involved people who were drunk and hence it is probably fair to state that alcohol is a major factor linked to violent / aggressive incidents in pubs and other late night venues. However, other factors are necessary to trigger violent / aggressive behaviour, and three factors (or themes) were identified from the research interviews conducted for this study. These factors are outlined below; they include rivalry, crowding and staff. In addition, two further themes emerged from the interviews; these related to glass and accidental injury and glass as a weapon. Key factors relating to the theme of rivalry were: sporting rivalry, local or territorial rivalry, and romantic rivalry. In the case of the first two factors, aggression evolved from social tensions created when different groups met, such as rival football supporters or groups of students and locals. However, there was a clear consensus that staff in venues are aware of these factors as potential sources of aggression and already take necessary steps to avoid conflict. The latter factor was much more unpredictable, and predicting where and when such aggression would occur is more problematic. The key factors within the theme of crowding were: bad management practices, poor design, and frustration. Participants were critical of venues that allowed in more clients than they could comfortably accommodate, especially in venues where the layout meant bumping into people at peak times was inevitable. Such factors link into the issue of frustration, as overcrowding can led to increased waiting times to get served, and invasion of personal space. Criticism of how venues are managed continued into the theme of staff. Here participants highlighted the fact that it was not always the clientele of pubs that were fully to blame when aggressive incidents escalated, with door staff being criticised for a lack of intervention, or too much intervention, in that they were deemed to be excessively aggressive. However, staff themselves also commented that aggressive behaviour can arise when they try to enforce sensible serving practices. The final two themes related to specifically to the use of glassware; glass and accidental injury and glass as a weapon. Participants noted that although many venues used glassware, accidental injury did occasionally arise from this. Many venues already self-manage where and when glass could and could not be used, although it is noted that more efficient house-keeping of venues would further reduce incidences of accidental injury. There were two differing perspectives on the theme of glass as a weapon – it was perceived as either a deliberate action to cause harm, or it was an unintentional action in which glass was not intended as a weapon. Although severe, the deliberate action of using glass as a weapon was the exception to the norm and incidences were deemed rare, especially given the extensive use of glassware in the venues participants frequented. In the case of the latter a further noteworthy factor emerged. Glass was seen more often to be used as a threat rather than an actual weapon. However, this perceived threat was sometimes the catalyst for an aggressive response, thus blurring the boundaries between ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ in the case of such incidents. Data from the correlational surveys suggested that the most effective form of intervention in terms of reducing accidents and injuries would be a more stringent policy to bar aggressive individuals and prompt action by bouncers / bar staff to deal with potential trouble. Banning the use of glass vessels was not seen as a useful strategy in reducing aggression in pubs. Additional qualitative comments form the largest survey (n = 165) were further analysed and three main distinct themes identified in the responses: Considering the causes of aggressive behaviour, Methods to address aggressive behaviour and the Impact of the drinking vessel. Considering the causes of aggressive behaviour there were some suggestions put forward by respondents as to the causes of these. These include the amount of alcohol consumed, overcrowding in the pubs, televising sports events, attitudes, culture and acceptance of binge drinking, promotional offers and happy hours and the non-management of the queue for the bar. Respondents also suggested methods that they feel would address these events. These include bar staff having greater powers and training to refuse service to intoxicated customers and extending licensing hours. However some respondents felt that extending licensing hours would not make any difference to the amount of aggression shown by individuals. Regarding the vessels drinks are served in, there was a re-occurring theme that aggressive customers would probably use other objects in a conflict, if they did not have a glass in their hand at that time. Conversely to this, there was a theme suggesting that if glass was replaced with plastic then there would be less damage caused. However participants mostly followed this suggestion with the theory that if plastic vessels were only used, they would use another object (e.g. ashtray) in any aggressive conflict. Overall therefore the analysis suggests that respondents feel there are many causes of aggressive behaviours and that glass vessels are not responsible. If they were replaced with plastic vessels, then the aggressors would replace them with another implement. Details: Nottingham, UK: Nottingham Trent University, 2006. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 22, 2010 at: http://www.britglass.org.uk/files/last_orders_for_alcohol_related_violence_-_final_bw.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.britglass.org.uk/files/last_orders_for_alcohol_related_violence_-_final_bw.pdf Shelf Number: 120054 Keywords: AggressionAlcohol Related Crime, DisorderAssaultsInjuryViolence |
Author: Dekker, Sonja Title: Aging and Violent Crime in New Zealand Summary: This report documents trends in age-sex-specific offence and apprehension rates for violent crime in New Zealand, and estimate the impact of population change on offence rates and justice sector expenditure for violent crime. The main data source is New Zealand Police data on recorded offences and apprehensions for violent crime between 1994 and 2008. These data are combined with Statistics New Zealand population data, and published estimates of government expenditure per offence. The impact of population change is assessed using demographic decompositions. Complex visualisations of the data allow trends and impact to be examined. The age-sex profile of violent offending in New Zealand has been changing, with the largest growth rates occurring at age 30 years and over, and among women. Changes in population age-sex structure have moderated increases in violent offence rates since 1994. Prospective changes in age-sex structure should moderate future growth in offence rates and justice sector expenditure. Details: Wellington, NZ: Statistics New Zealand, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Statistics New Zealand Working Paper No. 10-01: Accessed October 22, 2010 at: http://www.stats.govt.nz/surveys_and_methods/methods/research-papers/working-papers/ageing-violent-crime-nz-workingpaper-10-01.aspx Year: 2010 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.stats.govt.nz/surveys_and_methods/methods/research-papers/working-papers/ageing-violent-crime-nz-workingpaper-10-01.aspx Shelf Number: 120055 Keywords: AgeOffendersOffense StatisticsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Hughes, Ed Title: Community Safety and Small Arms in Somaliland Summary: Between August 2008 and August 2009, data was collected and analysed across Somaliland in order to improve understanding of community safety and small arms and light weapons in Somaliland. Data has been collected from 157 communities in 32 districts and the data set includes a total of 2846 household questionnaires and 281 focus group and key informant interviews with key players in the field of community safety, such as the police, civil society organisations, the UN and traditional and religious leaders. The publication is a joint effort by DDG and the Small Arms Survey. The findings of the survey are presented in this report along with contextual interpretations of the results and information that may be of use to practitioners. For the purposes of this summary and because of the representativeness of the data sample, the results from the household survey have been generalised for the whole population and percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number to facilitate reading. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Demining Group; Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-DDG-2010-Somaliland.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-DDG-2010-Somaliland.pdf Shelf Number: 120090 Keywords: Community SafetyGun ViolenceViolenceViolent CrimeWeapons |
Author: Fraser, Alistair Title: Youth Violence in Scotland: Literature Review Summary: Youth violence remains a contentious public and political issue. A great deal of media attention and public debate is devoted to the phenomenon of youth violence. Yet very little is known about the scale or nature of violence committed by youth, trends in violent youth offending, or the role played by violence in the everyday lives of children and young people in Scotland. The aim of the review is to identify and collate available qualitative and quantitative research data and information about youth violence in Scotland, in order to construct a research-informed picture of ‘what is currently known’ about youth violence in this country. It will form part of a wider programme of work on youth violence currently being conducted within the Scottish Government and, in particular, will complement an ongoing audit of official data sources. This review is intended to facilitate an enhanced awareness of potential gaps in recording procedures within the Scottish Government for capturing data on youth violence, identify areas in which there is a particular dearth of information about youth violence, and suggest areas for future research. Details: Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2010. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2010 at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/326952/0105428.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/326952/0105428.pdf Shelf Number: 120141 Keywords: Juvenile OffendersViolenceViolent CrimeYouth Violence |
Author: Thaler, Kai Title: Weapons, Violence and Personal Security in Cape Town Summary: Given the high levels of crime and violence in South Africa, there may be a temptation for citizens to arm themselves for protection. Using quantitative survey data from the Cape Area Panel Study and qualitative interviews with residents of high-violence neighborhoods, this paper examines the question of who carries weapons outside the home in Cape Town and what the effects of weapon carrying may be. Multiple regression analysis is used to test the significance of possible socioeconomic drivers of weapon carrying and the results are discussed in the South African social context. Weapon carrying is found to be associated with both assault perpetration and victimization, suggesting that it is part of a violent lifestyle in which weapon carriers are likely to use their weapons both offensively and defensively. Possible weapon-related policies for violence reduction are also discussed. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working Paper 85: Accessed November 5, 2010 at: http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp85.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp85.pdf Shelf Number: 120191 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGunsSocio-Economic ConditionsViolenceViolent CrimeWeapons (South Africa) |
Author: Cavallaro, James Louis Title: Crime, Public Order and Human Rights Summary: Crime and street violence cross borders, ideologies, classes, ages and gender. In many societies, ordinary crime and victimisation have come to be perceived not merely as a high priority problem requiring technical resources. A new discourse has developed, emphasising crime as a threat to individual personal security and a potential source of state instability. In addition, where crime is a problem, a pattern has emerged wherein as a result of rising crime, hardline law and order policies attract public support. Increasingly, punitive and authoritarian methods of control and punishment are suggested or implemented without much public opposition. This report examines the problems that surges in criminality pose for the provision of security and the safeguard of human rights. While the perspective and responses of authorities are considered, the report focuses on the role of civil society and the particular issues it faces in this environment. The varied responses of the state — from collaborative efforts with civil society to attacks on rights groups, tolerance of police abuse or vigilantism — provide the context in which rights groups must manoeuvre. The main aim is to analyse the challenges that human rights groups must address in the context of rising crime. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2003. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2010 at: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/8/114_report_en.pdf Year: 2003 Country: International URL: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/8/114_report_en.pdf Shelf Number: 120198 Keywords: Human Rights WorkersStreet CrimeVigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation Title: Tackling Armed Violence: Key Findings and Recommendations of the Study on the Violent Nature of Crime in South Africa Summary: In February 2007 the Minister of Safety and Security contracted the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation to carry out a study on the violent nature of crime in South Africa. In terms of an agreement, entered into by the Minister on behalf of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster of cabinet, CSVR was required to produce six reports: Component 1: A concept paper on the violent nature of crime in South Africa (submitted: June 2007). Component 2: A study of murder entitled “Streets of Pain, Streets of Sorrow: The circumstances of the occurrence of murder in six areas with high rates of murder” (submitted: June 2008). Component 3: A study on sexual violence entitled: “A state of sexual tyranny: The prevalence, nature and causes of sexual violence in South Africa” (submitted: December 2008). Component 4: An analysis of the socioeconomic factors that contribute to violence, entitled: “Adding injury to insult: How exclusion and inequality drive South Africa’s problem of violence” (submitted: October 2008). Component 5: “Case studies on perpetrators of violent crime” (submitted: December 2008). Component 6: A summary report on key findings and recommendations. This document is the final report, Component 6 of the project. It provides what may be regarded as the “high level” findings of the study as well as the principal recommendations emerging from it. It therefore integrates some, but not all, of the material from the five other reports and readers are referred to these reports for more in-depth data and analysis on the issues which they deal with. In particular the concept paper (Component 1) provides a broad overview of available information on violent crime in South Africa, including trends in the various categories of violent crime up to the date of its publication. Details: Pretoria: Secretariat of Police, Department of Safety and Security, Republic of South Africa: Braamfontein: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2010. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/study/6.TAV_final_report_13_03_10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/study/6.TAV_final_report_13_03_10.pdf Shelf Number: 120307 Keywords: ViolenceViolent Crime (South Africa) |
Author: Estevez, Dolia Title: Protecting Press Freedom in an Environment of Violence and Impunity Summary: This chapter reviews the situation of violence against the press in Mexico and what each of the different actors involved is doing, or not doing, to address a problem that in some Mexican states has reached alarming crisis levels. The essay examines the political willingness and steps taken by the federal and legislative branches of government to protect freedom of expression, through the exercise of journalism. It discusses measures taken by reporters, editors, media companies and civil society, to defend that right. Special attention is given to explain how the failure of federal and local authorities to effectively prosecute crimes against reporters has resulted in almost total impunity. Most crimes againts reporters remain unsolved, authorities rarely determine who perpetrated the crime and there are no prosecutions much less convictions. The report also examines the extent to which editors and journalists, working in states overwhelmed with violence, have engaged in widespread self-censorship out of fear for their lives. The report emphasizes freedom of expression and a free press as fundamental and universal rights protected by international law. These rights are also consider an effective way to measure the strength of a democracy. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Accessed December 8, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Protecting%20Press%20Freedom.%20Estevez.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Protecting%20Press%20Freedom.%20Estevez.pdf Shelf Number: 120411 Keywords: Freedom of the PressJournalismMediaViolence |
Author: Soares, Rodrigo Title: Understanding High Crime Rates in Latin America: The Role of Social and Policy Factors Summary: This paper discusses the pattern, causes and consequence of the high crime rates observed in Latin America. Crime represents a substantial welfare loss and a potentially serious hindrance to growth. We conduct an informal assessment of the relative strength of the alternative hypotheses raised in the literature to explain the phenomenon. We argue that, despite being extremely high, the incidence of crime in the region is not much different from what should be expected based on socioeconomic and public policy characteristics of its countries. Estimates from the empirical literature suggest that most of its seemingly excessively high violence can be explained by three factors: high inequality, low incarceration rates, and small police forces. Still, country specific experiences have been different in many respects. The evidence suggests that effective policies toward violence reduction do exist and have been shown to work within the context of Latin America itself. Details: Manuscript originally prepared for the conference "Confronting Crime and Violence in Latin America: Crafting a Public Policy Agenda, July 2007. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2010 at: http://www.sebh.ecn.br/seminario_5/arquivo1.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Central America URL: http://www.sebh.ecn.br/seminario_5/arquivo1.pdf Shelf Number: 120410 Keywords: HomicideSocioeconomic ConditionsViolenceViolent Crime (Latin America) |
Author: Steel, Nerissa Title: Information Sharing Aimed at Reducing Violent Crime: A Survey of Community Safety Partnerships Summary: This report describes findings from a survey of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) across England and Wales on the extent and nature of information sharing arrangements that were introduced to prevent and reduce violence and other crime types. The questionnaire investigated the types of information sharing arrangements in place, CSP’s understanding of and adherence to the legislative framework surrounding data sharing, and levers and barriers of effective data sharing. The findings suggest that, at the time of the survey (late 2009), arrangements involving the sharing of either anonymised or personalised data were being widely used by CSPs to prevent and reduce crime. In general, personalised information sharing arrangements were perceived to be working effectively. In comparison, some anonymised information sharing arrangements – particularly the sharing of data on assault related attendances at Emergency Departments - may require further development in order to become widely effective tools for violence and crime reduction. Details: London: Home Office, 2010. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Home Office Research Report 45: Accessed December 9, 2010 at: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/horr45c.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/horr45c.pdf Shelf Number: 117765 Keywords: Community Safety PartnershipsData SharingInformation Sharing (U.K.)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jacobson, Mireille Title: Aftershocks: The Impact of Clinic Violence on Abortion Services Summary: Between 1973 and 2003, abortion providers in the United States were the targets of over 300 acts of extreme violence, including arson, bombings, murders and butyric acid attacks. After a period of decline, abortion clinic violence is on the rise again. The recent murder of Dr. George Tiller has brought attention back to the role of extreme violence in the anti-abortion movement. Using unique data on attacks and on abortions, abortion providers, and births, we examine how anti-abortion violence has affected providers' decisions to perform abortions and women's decisions about whether and where to terminate a pregnancy. We find that clinic violence reduces both abortion providers and abortions in the areas where the violence occurs. Once travel is taken into account, however, the overall effect of the violence is much smaller. On net, roughly 90 percent of the fall in abortions in targeted areas is balanced by a rise in abortions in nearby areas. Thus, the main consequence of this violence is a displacement rather than an elimination of abortions, a presumed goal of this terrorism. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series: Working Paper 16603: Accessed December 15, 2010 at: http://www.nber.org/~jacobson/JacobsonRoyer6.2.10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/~jacobson/JacobsonRoyer6.2.10.pdf Shelf Number: 120518 Keywords: AbortionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security Summary: La Familia Michoacana burst onto the national stage on September 6, 2006, when ruffians crashed into the seedy Sol y Sombra nightclub in Uruapan, Michoacán, and fired shots into the air. They screamed at the revelers to lie down, ripped open a plastic bag, and lobbed five human heads onto the beer-stained black and white dance floor. The day before these macabre pyrotechnics, the killers seized their prey from a mechanic’s shop and hacked off their heads with bowie knives while the men writhed in pain. “You don’t do something like that unless you want to send a big message,” said a U.S. law-enforcement official, speaking on condition of anonymity about an act of human depravity that would “cast a pall over the darkest nooks of hell.” The desperados left behind a note hailing their act as “divine justice,” adding that: "The Family doesn't kill for money; it doesn't kill women; it doesn't kill innocent people; only those who deserve to die, die. Everyone should know . . . this is divine justice.” While claiming to do the “Lord’s work,” the ruthless leaders of this syndicate have emerged as the dominant exporter of methamphetamines to the United States, even as they control scores of municipalities in Michoacán and neighboring states. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1033 Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1033 Shelf Number: 120529 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Violence |
Author: Title: Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic Summary: In the diamond mines of the Central African Republic (CAR), extreme poverty and armed conflict put thousands of lives in danger. President Franacois Boziza keeps tight control of the diamond sector to enrich and empower his own ethnic group but does little to alleviate the poverty that drives informal miners to dig in perilous conditions. Stringent export taxes incentivise smuggling that the mining authorities are too few and too corrupt to stop. These factors combined - a parasitic state, poverty and largely unchecked crime - over jealous factions to launch rebellions and enable armed groups to collect new recruits and profit from mining and selling diamonds illegally. To ensure diamonds fuel development not bloodshed, root and branch reform of the sector must become a core priority of the country's peacebuilding strategy. Nature scattered diamonds liberally over the CAR, but since colonial times foreign entrepreneurs and grasping regimes have benefited from the precious stones more than the Central African people. Mining companies have repeatedly tried to extract diamonds on an industrial scale and largely failed because the deposits are alluvial, spread thinly across two large river systems. Instead, an estimated 80,000-100,000 mostly unlicensed miners dig with picks and shovels for daily rations and the chance of striking it lucky. Middlemen, mostly West Africans, buy at meagre prices and sell at a profit to exporting companies. The government lacks both the institutional capacity to govern this dispersed, transient production chain and the will to invest diamond revenues in the long-term growth of mining communities. Chronic state fragility has ingrained in the political elite a winner-takes-all political culture and a preference for short-term gain. The French ransacked their colony of its natural resources, and successive rulers have treated power as licence to loot. Jean-Badel Bokassa, the CAR's one-time "emperor", created a monopoly on diamond exports, and his personal gifts to French President Giscard d'Estaing, intended to seal their friendship, became symbols of imperial excess. Ange-Falix Patassa saw nothing wrong in using his presidency to pursue business interests and openly ran his own diamond mining company. Boziza is more circumspect. His regime maintains tight control of mining revenues by means of a strict legal and fiscal framework and centralised, opaque management. Since Boziza came to power in 2003, industrial diamond mining companies have almost all left, in part because the authorities' high demands erode potential profits. Informal artisanal mining carries on apace, but the government's closure in 2008 of most diamond exporting companies - a ruse to better control the market - severely cut investment in the production chain, cost many miners their jobs and helped cause a spike in infant malnutrition. Expensive licences and corrupt mining police make it harder for miners to escape the poverty trap. A 12 per cent tax on diamond exports, the highest in the region, makes smuggling worthwhile and fosters illicit trading networks that deprive the state of much needed revenue. The government's refusal to distribute national wealth fairly has led jealous individuals and disenfranchised groups to take up arms for a bigger slice of the cake. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces damocratiques pour le rassemblement, UFDR), more ethnic militia than rebel group, has signed a peace agreement but still mines diamonds in the north east and sells them on the black market. Poor miners joined its ranks to improve their lot, and though taking power is no longer a prospect, diamond profits are a strong incentive not to disarm. Meanwhile, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, CPJP), the most active rebellion, preys on miners and traders in the east. This insecurity, largely banditry under a rebel flag, severely restricts economic activity, inhibits the holding there of elections set for 23 January 2011 and puts civilian lives at great risk. Reform of the diamond sector is a crucial element, alongside wider governance and conflict resolution measures, for improving the living conditions of miners and their families, boosting the state's scant domestic revenues and helping break the cycle of armed conflict. The government needs first to improve governance of the mining sector, which is a question more of political will than capacity. Only when Boziza has shown commitment to instituting more democratic control of mining revenues and enhancing transparency in management processes should international partners support mining authorities in the capital and mining zones. The reform strategy should prioritise artisanal above industrial mining, which has less direct impact on mining communities, aim to reduce incentives for smuggling and tighten controls to stop armed groups profiting from diamonds. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 167: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.ashx Year: 2010 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.ashx Shelf Number: 120551 Keywords: CorruptionDiamond Smuggling (Africa)MiningPovertyViolence |
Author: Stovel, Laura Title: Restorative Justice After Mass Violence: Opportunities and Risks for Children and Youth Summary: There is growing interest in the role that restorative justice can play in addressing mass atrocities. This paper describes the associated principles and practices within juvenile justice systems and in societies emerging from mass violence. It also examines the meaning, opportunities and limitations of restorative justice in transitional societies, particularly in relation to the needs of young victims and offenders. We argue that procedural forms of restorative justice, involving redress by offenders, face considerable challenges because communities and governments often lack the coercive capacity or will to hold offenders accountable. In contexts where accountability is lacking we argue that pressuring victims to meet with, and forgive, those who harmed them may be inappropriate. Such encounters should only occur where victims see them as necessary to their own healing. Despite the procedural limitations of restorative justice, this perspective (ontology) helps us analyse the route to reconciliation in different conflict contexts and reveals opportunities and challenges for justice and reconciliation in each case. This ontology reveals that intra-communal and inter-communal (ethnic/religious) conflicts have dramatically different justice and reconciliation challenges. In an intra-communal conflict, such as in Sierra Leone, offenders need to reintegrate into communities that they or their factions harmed. The desire to reintegrate into communities that condemn their crimes while accepting them provides opportunities for young offenders to address their crimes. In ethnically divided societies, offenders are often seen as heroes in their communities and may not have to address their crimes until the communities themselves condemn them. This makes restorative justice and reconciliation much more difficult, as communities do not take on the role of promoting accountability for their own members. In such cases, restorative justice efforts must promote social trust between groups. In both intra-communal and inter-communal conflicts, victims are often marginalized by their own communities and receive inadequate assistance. Restorative justice shows us that much can be done to help young victims, and this should become an explicit part of the justice picture. Finally, we argue that traditional justice is not synonymous with restorative justice. While traditional justice is community based and often meaningful to people, many of its forms are retributive; deny a voice to children, youth and other disadvantaged groups; or place community reconciliation above individual justice. Therefore, traditional justice practices should be assessed case by case if they are to be claimed as restorative justice equivalents. Details: Florence, Italy: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Innocenti Working Paper 2010-15: Accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/iwp_2010_15.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/iwp_2010_15.pdf Shelf Number: 120628 Keywords: Juvenile OffendersJuvenile Victims of CrimeRestorative JusticeViolence |
Author: Robinson, Catherine Title: Rough Living: Surviving Violence and Homelessness Summary: Rough Living: Surviving Violence and Homelessness reveals the ways in which intense chains of disadvantage incorporating homelessness are triggered by very early experiences of violence. Drawing on biographic interviews with 6 men and 6 women, the project bears witness not only to horrendous repeated experiences of physical and sexual violence but discusses what may be understood as related multi-dimensional vulnerability in areas such as physical and mental health, education, employment and social connectedness. A picture of the long-term cycles of violent victimisation and homelessness and their compounding traumatising effects are made clear and the importance of trauma-informed service delivery is outlined as a key way forward. Details: Sydney: UTSePress - University of Technology Sydney, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: UTS Shopfront Monograph Series, No. 6: Accessed February 2, 2011 at: http://www.piac.asn.au/sites/default/files/news/attachments/Rough_Living.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.piac.asn.au/sites/default/files/news/attachments/Rough_Living.pdf Shelf Number: 120667 Keywords: Discrimination Against the HomelessHomelessness (Australia)Sexual ViolenceViolence |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence Summary: In Mexico, the violence generated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years has been, according to some, unprecedented. In 2006, Mexico’s newly elected President Felipe Calderón launched an aggressive campaign — an initiative that has defined his administration — against the DTOs that has been met with a violent response from the DTOs. Government enforcement efforts have had successes in removing some of the key leaders in all of the seven major DTOs. However, these efforts have led to violent succession struggles within the DTOs themselves. In July 2010, the Mexican government announced that more than 28,000 people had been killed in drug trafficking-related violence since December 2006 when President Calderón came to office. Although violence has been an inherent feature of the trade in illicit drugs, the character of the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico seems to have changed recently, now exhibiting increasing brutality. In the first ten months of 2010, an alarming number of Mexican public servants have been killed allegedly by the DTOs, including 12 Mexican mayors and in July, a gubernatorial candidate. The massacres of young people and migrants, the killing and disappearance of Mexican journalists, the use of torture, and the phenomena of car bombs have received wide media coverage and have led some analysts to question if the violence has been transformed into something new, beyond the typical violence that has characterized the trade. For instance, some observers have raised the concern that the Mexican DTOs may be acting more like domestic terrorists. Others maintain that the DTOs are transnational organized crime organizations at times using terrorist tactics. Still others believe the DTOs may be similar to insurgents attempting to infiltrate the Mexican state by penetrating the government and police. The growing security crisis in Mexico including the March 13, 2010, killing of three individuals connected to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, (two of the victims were U.S. citizens) has drawn the attention of the U.S. Congress and has raised concerns about the stability of a strategic partner and neighbor. Congress is also concerned about the possibility of “spillover” violence along the U.S. border and further inland. The 111th Congress held more than 20 hearings dealing with the violence in Mexico, U.S. foreign assistance, and border security issues. The 112th Congress is likely to be interested in progress made by the Calderón government in quelling the violence and asserting its authority in DTO strongholds, and in the implications for the United States. Members are also likely to continue to conduct close oversight of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and other related bilateral issues. This report provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico, identifies the major drug trafficking organizations operating today, and analyzes the context, scope, and scale of the violence. It examines current trends of the violence, analyzes prospects for curbing violence in the future, and compares it with violence in Colombia. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report No. 7-5700: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 120722 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Horne, Christine Title: Using Laboratory Experiments to Study Law and Crime Summary: The 19th and 20th centuries produced breakthroughs in physics, chemistry, and the biological sciences. Laboratory research played an important role in the rapid advances made in these fields. Laboratory research can also contribute progress in the social sciences and, in particular, to law and criminology. To make this argument, we begin by discussing what laboratory experiments can and cannot do. We then identify three issues in the criminological and legal literature: why violence is higher in the southern United States than in the North, the relation between the severity of punishment and crime, and the expressive effects of law. We describe the relevant data from laboratory experiments and discuss how these data complement those gained through other methods. Details: Zurich, Switzerland: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2010. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: CCSS Working Paper Series 10-010: Accessed February 9, 2011 at: http://web.sg.ethz.ch/wps/pdf/CCSS-10-010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://web.sg.ethz.ch/wps/pdf/CCSS-10-010.pdf Shelf Number: 120732 Keywords: Experimental MethodsPunishmentSentencingViolence |
Author: Lemieux, Andrew Michael Title: Risks of Violence in Major Daily Activities: United States, 2003-2005 Summary: The routine activity approach, lifestyle perspective, and environmental criminology, all argue the risk of violence is not distributed evenly across time and space. This dissertation quantifies the risk of violence for different activities and types of place. Using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey and American Time Use Survey, activity- and place-specific rates of violence are calculated to determine (a) which activity or type of place is the most dangerous, (b) the relative risk of activities and types of place, and (c) how activity- and place-specific risks vary between demographic subgroups. Time-based rates are used to account for the reality that Americans do not spend equal amounts of time in activities and types of place. The activity-specific analysis showed sleeping was the safest activity in America; going to and from school was the most dangerous. The risk of violence during the school commute is 285 times higher than it is while sleeping. The place-specific analysis indicated home was the safest place to be while the street was the most dangerous; the risk of violence on the street was 51 times higher than it was at home. When rates of violence were calculated for demographic subgroups of the American population, the race and sex of individuals were found to have little effect on the risk of violence. Age was the only demographic variable included in the analysis that had substantial impact on the risk of victimization in different activities and types of place. These findings indicate crime prevention strategies cannot neglect the role lifestyles play in an individual’s risk of victimization. Because the risk of violence varies greatly between activities and types of place it is inappropriate to label demographic subgroups as high risk based on the population size alone. This research indicates it is what people do, not who they are, that determines their risk of violence. Additionally, this research shows risk assessments that do not account for the transient nature of Americans in time and space can produce misleading information as to which activities and types of place are the most dangerous. Details: Unpublished Dissertation, Rutgers University, School of Criminal Justice, 2010. 549p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232436.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232436.pdf Shelf Number: 120744 Keywords: Routine ActivitiesVictimizationViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Dixon, Bill Title: Gangs, Pagad & the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape Summary: The report begins by setting popular activism against gangsterism and drugs in the historical and social context of the Western Cape. It goes on to provide a short history of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) - as seen through the eyes of the media - since its formation in December 1995. The main body of the report is devoted to the accounts of Pagad's origins, development and current status provided by the nine people interviewed for the research: two senior police intelligence officials, two former gangsters, a prominent member of Pagad, two seasoned observers of the organisation and two anticrime activists with an intimate knowledge of Pagad and recent developments in the Western Cape. What emerges from these competing narratives is an extremely complex picture. Defining moments - the death of Hard Livings gang leader Rashaad Staggie in August 1996, the failure of successive rounds of peace negotiations between representatives of Pagad and the security services, a 'shoot-out' in the Tafelsig area of Mitchells Plain in May last year between police and armed 'vigilantes'- are subject to vastly different interpretations. The concluding sections of the report try to make some sense of the events of the last five years. They trace the origins of gang and vigilante violence in the Western Cape and provide an analysis of Pagad's formation, its development and the evolution of the state's response to it, first as a popular movement, then as a 'vigilante group' and now as an 'urban terror' organisation. The report ends with an assessment of the prospects for reconciliation between Pagad, the State and the gangs and an end to organised violence in the Western Cape. Details: Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2001. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 2: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/gangs/gangspagadstate.pdf Year: 2001 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/gangs/gangspagadstate.pdf Shelf Number: 121024 Keywords: GangsOrganized CrimeVigilantism (South Africa)Violence |
Author: Shirk, David A. Title: The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat Summary: The drug war in Mexico has caused some U.S. analysts to view Mexico as a failed or failing state. While these fears are exaggerated, the problems of widespread crime and violence, government corruption, and inadequate access to justice pose grave challenges for the Mexican state. The Obama administration has therefore affirmed its commitment to assist Mexico through continued bilateral collaboration, funding for judicial and security sector reform, and building “resilient communities.” This paper analyzes the drug war in Mexico, explores Mexico’s capacities and limitations, examines the factors that have undermined effective state performance, assesses the prospects for U.S. support to strengthen critical state institutions, and offers recommendations for reducing the potential of state failure. He argues that the United States should help Mexico address its pressing crime and corruption problems by going beyond traditional programs to strengthen the country’s judicial and security sector capacity and help it build stronger political institutions, a more robust economy, and a thriving civil society. Details: Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Council Special Report No. 60: Accessed March 17, 2011 at: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262?co=C009602 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262?co=C009602 Shelf Number: 121051 Keywords: Drug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlViolence |
Author: Thouni, Francisco E. Title: The Impact of Organized Crime on Democratic Governance in Latin America Summary: Organized crime in Colombia is today more complex, diversified and sophisticated than when the cocaine industry started. Indeed, the illegal industry has been a catalyst that aggravated many of the main social conflicts of the country and encouraged the growth of organized crime. Organized crime has become a great obstacle to democratic governance in Colombia. We can say that the Mexican state is losing the war against drug trafficking and that therefore it must radically change its strategy because of the following: the spike in executions, the exponential increase in U.S. aid, the increased presence of the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking and in public security in high risk cities, the transformation of Juarez into the most dangerous city in the world, increasing cocaine consumption and the sentiments that Mexico could become a failed state. The management, administration and overall control of public security matters and, amongst these, combating organized crime, as well as the organization and running of the police system remain in the hands of the police themselves, generating a sort of "police-ification" of public security. In Brazil, Paraguay and to a lesser extent in Uruguay this process has also included a strong tendency to incorporate the Armed Forces in the "war on organized crime", all prompted by the failings of the police system in tackling the problem. If Unasur is to be defined as an integration scheme and a successful one, certain basic questions have to be answered in the short-term: how is integration being defined-what are we talking about? The promotion of inter-regional dialogues, for instance between Unasur and the EU, could contribute to this process regarding three main issues: security and defense; security and democratic governance; and security, organized crime and transnational violence. Details: Berlin: Department for Latin America and the Caribbean, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2011 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07386.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Latin America URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07386.pdf Shelf Number: 121237 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimePublic SecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: World Bank. Social Development Department. Conflict, Crime Title: Violence in the City: Understanding and Supporting Community Responses to Urban Violence Summary: For millions of people around the world, violence, or the fear of violence, is a daily reality. Much of this violence concentrates in urban centers in the developing world. These cities are home to half of the world’s population and are expected to absorb almost all new population growth over the next 25 years. In many cases, the scale of urban violence can eclipse that of open warfare. Some of the world’s highest homicide rates occur in countries that have not undergone wars but have violence epidemics in their urban areas. As one example, between 1978 and 2000, more people (49,913) were killed by violence in the slums of Rio de Janeiro than in all of Colombia (39,000), a country experiencing civil conflict. Concern over these experiences has made urban violence a central preoccupation of policymakers, planners, and development practitioners. This study emerged from a growing recognition that urban communities themselves are an integral part of understanding the causes and impacts of urban violence and for generating sustainable violence prevention initiatives. Participatory appraisals in Latin America and the Caribbean have produced important insights into the manifestations of violence in different contexts. Nevertheless, much still is to be learned in understanding the myriad strategies that communities employ to manage high levels of violence. Coping mechanisms may range broadly from individual strategies, such as changing one’s work or study routine to avoid victimization, to collective strategies that involve formal institutions such as community-based policing, to reliance on traditional or alternative dispute fora. Some coping mechanisms—such as forming extralegal security groups — can be negative and undermine the bases for long-term violence prevention. This study aims to understand how urban residents cope with violence, or the threat of it, in their everyday lives, to inform the design of policies and programs for violence prevention. The study is the first global study on urban violence undertaken by the World Bank and covers three regions. It emerged from the growing demand within the Bank and client governments for a more comprehensive understanding of the social dimensions of urban violence. The study is not an exhaustive review of the topic, but rather is an exploration of the social drivers of violence, and its impact on social relations. The work has been guided by five objectives: Introduce the social dimensions of urban violence and review existing lessons for supporting community capacities to prevent violence. 2. Analyze from the community perspective the experience of violence in five urban areas, including the different forms of violence found there, their prevalence, impacts on different groups, and communities’ perceptions of the driving factors behind the violence. 3. Provide insights into community responses to high levels of violence, including individual and collective help-seeking behavior, and reliance on different informal and formal institutions to deal with and prevent violence. 4. Drawing on these insights, provide orientations to policymakers, especially mayors and municipal authorities, to inform successful violence-prevention interventions. 5. Suggest ways that the World Bank could be more involved in addressing the social dimensions of violence. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010. 346p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/Violence_in_the_City.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/Violence_in_the_City.pdf Shelf Number: 121251 Keywords: HomicidesUrban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime (Brazil, Haiti, South Africa, Kenya, |
Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS Summary: When Evo Morales won an overwhelming victory in Bolivia's December 2005 presidential elections, it signaled a historic new chapter in the nation's political history. For the first time in decades a presidential candidate won an outright electoral majority, garnering almost 54 percent of the vote. Morales, an indigenous peasant who remains the head of the cocalero (coca growers) union, inherited a country that had lived through three years of permanent crisis and the resulting deep disillusionment with the traditional political parties. On taking office Morales promised to oversee the "refounding" of the Bolivian republic based on socialist and indigenous precepts to be enshrined in a new constitution, a sharp repudiation of traditionally close ties to the United States and its counter-drug efforts, and fundamental restructuring of foreign investment laws. However, he pledged to work with all Bolivians within the context of respect for the rule of law and tolerance. Those promises of inclusive governance have been breached almost from the beginning of the MAS government, leading Bolivia to its worst political crisis since the hard-fought return to democratic rule in 1982. Morales recently proclaimed himself a "Marxist-Leninist," further dimming the prospects of developing a pluralistic, tolerant political structure. And while the government has fashioned itself as nationalistic and unaccepting of outside interference, foreigners have seldom exercised more influence that they do today, from those of Spanish intellectuals who helped draft the new constitution and military doctrine to the significant presence of Venezuelan military and governmental advisers and direct involvement creating the voter registration rolls to the Cuban and Iranian presence in the intelligence structures and economic activity. The Morales government has also allowed formal and informal ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC), a designated terrorist and drug trafficking entity by both the United States and the European Union to flourish. This is due in part to the relationships maintained by close Morales advisers, including his vice president, to armed groups in the region. Relations between Bolivia and the United States are at one of their lowest points ever, and, despite recent high-level talks, that situation is unlikely to change in the near future. The cost of such radical and rapid change has been high, and could well spell the end to Bolivia's territorial integrity and existence as a liberal democratic state. Morales' tenure has been marked by: o Unprecedented regional and ethnic tensions that have led to violence; o The systematic de-institutionalization of the nation's fragile democratic structures, including the judiciary and independent auditing agencies; o A complete restructuring of the military patterned after the Venezuelan model of integrating the armed forces into a host of civic and traditionally civilian roles; o A radical restructuring of the military doctrine, endorsing the asymmetrical warfare tactics embraced and employed by radical Islamist groups and formally adopted by Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan military; o A complete restructuring of the nation's intelligence apparatus, advised by Cuban and Venezuelan experts on internal security; o Growing ties to the FARC and other armed groups in Latin America; o Permanent confrontation, insults and attacks-verbal and physical-on members of the press, leading to numerous international expressions of concern; o A growing intolerance for all lawful opposition and the use of mass mobilizations, often violent, to intimidate the opposition and confiscate personal property, severely impinging on the legal rights of the minority; o Significant corruption that has reached to the inner circle of the MAS; o Increased cocaine trafficking, in part due to the changing nature of Latin American drug trafficking and in part because of Morales' own policies, that are accelerating the process of widespread criminalization; o A widespread breakdown in the rule of law and the use of illegal detention against opposition leaders; o Legitimate concerns about the significant foreign intervention, including evidence that the voter registration rolls, (padrón electoral) have been tampered with by the Venezuelan officials. These developments do not bode well for Bolivia or Latin America if one values the hard-fought return to democracy after years of military dictatorship in most of these countries. The price paid by many of the leaders of the democratization process, who are now being called reactionaries and traitors, was high. The international dimension to the regional trends are exacerbated because the move toward autocracy has been accompanied by the mentorship and funds of Hugo Chávez and the embrace of Iran, the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism and financier of state and non-state armed groups that have carried out numerous successful terrorist attacks. Finally, these countries are bound most strongly by a single factor--a declared hatred for the United States and a public-stated desire to see it disappear from the face of the earth. Details: Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2011 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20090618_IASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Bolivia URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20090618_IASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf Shelf Number: 121272 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Bolivia)Violence |
Author: Shabangu, Themba Title: A Comparative Inquiry Into the Nature of Violence and Crime in Mozambique and South Africa Summary: The degree and type of violence that offenders use when committing crime is worrying and unexplainable. Offenders rape females during house robberies or carjacking. They shoot infants who cry during house robberies. They use guns and weapons to commit acquisitive and interpersonal crimes. The use of violence and weapons, especially in instances where the victim is neither resisting nor posing any danger to the offender, serves to increase fear of crime and insecurity. When this report was being compiled South Africans and policy-makers knew that crime is high. President Zuma and the Minister of the Police publicly stated that the government must reduce crime, violent crime in particular. This report, however, looks beyond the premise that reducing crime is the priority. Citizens are far more afraid of violence that threatens their lives, there is therefore an equally urgent need to develop interventions to reduce violence in general. This research centres on the assumption that the drivers for violence are different from those for crime. Accordingly, these phenomena, violence and crime, must be understood and managed separately. The interventions and skills required to prevent and reduce violence are different to those that must be employed to address crime. Another assumption that has driven this research is the knowledge that South Africans exposed to violence that was used to maintain the apartheid regime is being neither addressed currently nor was it managed during transitional period leading to the 1994 elections. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission provided a platform for offenders to disclose and to seek forgiveness from victims. It however did not address the effects of the apartheid violence on South Africans. The government and the South African society did not put in place public programs to assist South Africans exposed to state violence, alternatively to educate them about alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. As a result of the failure, violence has now become part of the societal culture. It manifests itself increasingly in relationships (domestic violence), crimes against privately owned property (car jacking, house robberies) and during public demonstrations (service delivery protests, xenophobia etc). Mozambicans also faced the same challenge as South Africans. Government has not put in place mechanism and institutions to assist citizens to cope with the effects of the civil war that raged for years. Unlike South Africa, where the truth and reconciliation process was put in place, Mozambicans have not gone through a similar process. The gap exists in both countries and feeds violence and crime. The primary purpose of this research is to interrogate the phenomenon of increasing levels of criminal violence in Africa, particularly during transitional period, by drawing on intellectual resources from different field such as criminology and psychology (see findings on chapter 5) and from perpetrators of violent crime serving time at Correctional Centres in South Africa and Mozambique. The specific issues that this research seeks to fulfil are: • To understand what triggers violence during the commission of crimes. • To investigate the variables that coalesce within violent perpetrators. • To clarify triggers and variables that coalesce to cause violence that can be addressed through interventions of criminal justice agencies and other agencies responsible for ensuring safety and security. • To establish areas for further in-depth research to assist decision-makers. This research was carried out in order to contribute to the body of evidence that seeks to explain the use of violence during criminal activities. It aims to explain the historical origins, motivating factors, the surrounding psychology and the use of violence when committing crime. The ultimate objective is to start debate and discussion that will lead to the review or confirmation of policies that will hopefully reduce both the general level of violence and its criminal application. South Africa and Mozambique are the foci of this study. A number of reasons such as, their geographical proximity, historical political, poverty and huge black population influenced this choice. These two countries have historical and developmental differences. They have different colonial legacies, have undergone political transition and are at different development stages. South Africa is a former British colony, achieved a peaceful transition to democracy and has the highest GDP per capita compared to Mozambique. Mozambique, on the other hand, is a former Portugal colony; the transition to democracy was violent and it experienced a protracted civil war. The colonial masters did not invest in Mozambique’s education or other infrastructure. By contrast, South Africa experienced a much larger degree of colonial investment. Some regions of South Africa have first-world infrastructure and communities benefitted (and still do) from education, albeit unequal in terms of quality. Other racial groups, specifically blacks and coloured racial groups continue to receive poor quality education as exemplified by the matriculation pass rates and school finishing rate. Some of the regions suffer from high levels of poverty. South Africa, like Mozambique, has high levels of illiteracy. By examining these contrasts and similarities, this report aims to reach a better understanding of the triggers of violence and crime-related violence in particular. One common feature between South Africa and Mozambique is that the state sponsored violence was committed in individuals’ private spaces and not in the bush. The violence was therefore intertwined with all aspects of their lives. They were not safe either walking on the street or even in their own homes. Ordinary warfare separates the “home space and the war space”. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), 2011. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2011 at: http://www.idasa.org/media/uploads/outputs/files/comparing_crime_in_mozambique_and_south_africa.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.idasa.org/media/uploads/outputs/files/comparing_crime_in_mozambique_and_south_africa.pdf Shelf Number: 121298 Keywords: Victims of CrimesViolenceViolent Crime (South Africa and Mozambique) |
Author: Berry, Geoff Title: The Effectiveness of Partnership Working in a Crime and Disorder Context: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Summary: Partnership approaches are largely built on the premise that no single agency can deal with, or be responsible for dealing with, complex community safety and crime problems. There are a range of ways of describing what constitutes a partnership approach; however it can be described in simple terms as a cooperative relationship between two or more organisations to achieve a common goal. Partnership approaches to tackling crime are now strongly embedded in the way in which local areas in England and Wales approach community safety. The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) defines the core group of agencies involved in these partnerships as well as their functions and role at the local level. However, as yet, there have been no systematic attempts to review the social research evidence base around partnership working, and synthesise the evidence base in a way which makes it easily available for practitioners and policy makers. This rapid evidence assessment (REA) represents an attempt to address this gap. An REA provides a robust method of synthesising evidence by adopting systematic review methods to search and critically appraise avaliable research in a subject area. The approach is made more “rapid” then traditional systematic reviews by limiting the breadth or depth of the process whilst maintaining the same level of quality criteria in assessing the avaliable evidence. This REA sought to address two questions; i) “Are partnerships more effective and efficient in achieving crime-related outcomes than alternatives?” and ii) “What factors have been identified as making partnerships work effectively and efficiently in delivering crime-related outcomes?” Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report No. 52: Accessed April 12, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/horr52/horr52-report?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/horr52/horr52-report?view=Binary Shelf Number: 121321 Keywords: Crime-Reduction PartnershipsPartnerships (U.K.)Violence |
Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Violent Crime in America: What We Know About Hot Spots Enforcement Summary: This report is the fourth in a series in which the Police Executive Research Forum focuses on violence in the United States and what local police agencies are doing to prevent homicides, robberies, assaults, and other violent crimes. Once again, PERF has been able to call on our member police chiefs, sheriffs, and other local police officials as well as federal agency leaders and other experts to provide answers to these questions: Are violent crime levels going up or down in your jurisdiction? What kinds of strategies and tactics are you using to fight violent crime? In particular, most of you have told us that “hot spots” enforcement is high on your list of violent crime countermeasures. Please give us all of the details you can about this. Tell us stories that illustrate what hot spots enforcement means to you. A bit of background: In 2005, police chiefs began telling PERF that violent crime seemed to be making an unwelcome comeback in the United States, following a decade in which levels of violence fell dramatically. PERF began tracking this development by conducting surveys of our member police agencies in which we asked them for their most up-to-date statistics on their violent crime levels. We also began convening Violent Crime Summits, where police officials gathered to discuss the survey findings and talk about the latest tactics that seemed effective in pushing violent crime back down. To date, we have conducted four violent crime surveys and organized three Violent Crime Summits. Here’s where we stand in the spring of 2008: Violent crime spiked dramatically in 2005 and 2006, with many jurisdictions showing double-digit percentage increases in homicides and other crimes; PERF’s surveys, while much smaller than the FBI’s massive Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, seem to be a good sample of jurisdictions, because when the FBI released its UCR figures, they confirmed PERF’s finding of significantly higher violence in 2005 and 2006; Police agencies have responded to the higher crime levels quickly, implementing many types of programs designed to bring violent crime back down. The most common type of violence reduction strategy reported is hot-spots enforcement; It appears that the police anti-violence strategies are having an impact in many jurisdictions. PERF’s latest figures for all of 2007 show that in the same sample of 56 jurisdictions that proved accurate in 2005 and 2006, violent crime fell approximately 4 to 8 percent in all four categories tracked by PERF: homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated assault with a firearm. Violent crime does remain volatile, however. Even though the total numbers of violent crimes in PERF’s sample of jurisdictions are down, many cities and counties are still reporting increases in violence. In fact, depending on the type of crime, our most recent numbers for all of 2007 show that 42 to 48 percent of the reporting jurisdictions reported increases in violence. Details: Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2008. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Critical Issues in Policing Series: Accessed April 15, 2011 at: http://www.policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/HotSpots_v4.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/HotSpots_v4.pdf Shelf Number: 121365 Keywords: Crime ClustersCrime RatesCrime SurveysHot SpotsPolicingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Title: Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans Summary: Violent extremism in Indonesia increasingly is taking the form of small groups acting independently of large jihadi organisations but sometimes encouraged by them. This is in part a response to effective law enforcement that has resulted in widespread arrests and structural weakening of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and other organisations accused of links to terrorism. But it is also the result of ideological shifts that favour “individual” over “organisational” jihad and low-cost, smallscale targeted killings over mass casualty attacks that inadvertently kill Muslims. The suicide bombing inside a police station mosque on 15 April 2011 and a spate of letter bombs delivered in Jakarta in mid-March are emblematic of the shift. The government needs urgently to develop prevention strategies to reduce the likelihood that more such groups will emerge. Unlike the small group proponents, advocates of “organisational” jihad believe that nothing can be accomplished without a large organisation and a strong leader, but if the ultimate goal is an Islamic state, then it is imperative to build public support. Rather than engage in violence, groups like JI and JAT are focused for the moment on building up a mass base, by finding issues that resonate with their target audience. Increasingly this means a greater focus on local rather than foreign “enemies”, with officials who are seen as oppressors, particularly the police; Christians; and members of the Ahmadiyah sect topping the list. It also means a greater willingness than in the past to join coalitions with non-jihadi groups. The two strands of jihadism are complementary. The larger organisations can fund the religious outreach that attracts potential recruits for the small groups. They can also provide the translators and distributors for material downloaded from extremist websites in Arabic or English that buttress the small group approach. They can maintain plausible deniability for acts of violence while trying to rebuild their ranks, while at the same time providing the cover under which small groups emerge. The report looks at detailed case studies of small violent groups that have emerged in Indonesia in 2009 and 2010 in Medan and Lampung, on Sumatra, and in Bandung and Klaten, on Java. All involved at least one former prisoner; three of the four had links to JAT but operated independently of JAT control. Three of the four also involved mosque-based study groups that evolved into hit squads, and all were committed to the idea of ightiyalat, secret assassinations. In none of them was poverty a significant driver of radicalisation. Information about these groups is only available because their members were caught. This raises the question of how many similar small groups operating under police radar exist across Indonesia that will only come to light when one of their murderous attempts succeeds. Prevention strategies that go beyond law enforcement are critical, and the new National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has an important role to play in designing and testing them. All such strategies, however, must be based on wellgrounded research and informed by serious study of what has and has not worked elsewhere. Details: Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 204: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/204%20Indonesian%20Jihadism%20%20Small%20Groups%20Big%20Plans.ashx Year: 2011 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/204%20Indonesian%20Jihadism%20%20Small%20Groups%20Big%20Plans.ashx Shelf Number: 121409 Keywords: Extremist GroupsTerrorism (Indonesia)Violence |
Author: Kelly, Jocelyn Title: Hope for the Future Again: Tracing the Effects of Sexual Violence and Conflict on Families and Communities in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Summary: The vicious and widespread sexual violence that characterizes the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) not only traumatizes individuals, it fractures families and communities. In our search for solutions to this protracted and brutal war, the collective voice of affected communities has been largely silent. This project is an attempt to amplify these community voices – bringing forward their own words, needs, concerns and hopes for the future. This report outlines how violence in general, and sexual violence in particular, has changed the family foundations, economies and community structures of those touched by it. While difficult to trace and quantify, these effects are not secondary to individual trauma – they are fundamental to how individuals, families and communities experience, and ultimately recover from, conflict. Only through understanding the ripple effects of this particularly savage and destabilizing violence can we begin to address holistic needs for healing. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/13218750/Hope-for-the-Future-Again-report-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/13218750/Hope-for-the-Future-Again-report-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121617 Keywords: RapeSexual Violence (Democratic Republic of the Congo)Violence |
Author: Manwaring, Max G. Title: A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies Summary: This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Shelf Number: 121700 Keywords: CartelsOrganized CrimePrivate Armies (Mexico)PrivatizationSecurityTerrorismViolence |
Author: Guberek, Tamy Title: To Count the Uncounted: An Estimation of Lethal Violence in Casanare Summary: Casanare is a large, rural department in Colombia, with 19 municipalities and a population of almost 300,000 inhabitants located in the foothills of the Andes and on the eastern plains. Multiple armed actors in the Colombian conflict have operated there, including paramilitary groups, guerillas and the Colombian military. Many people of Casanare have suffered violent deaths and disappearances. But how many people have been killed or disappeared? For reasons of policy, accountability and historical clarification, this question deserves a valid answer. The Benetech Human Rights Program has used a statistical technique called Multiple Systems Estimation to estimate the total number of killings and disappearances in Casanare between 1998-2007. This report explains why it is often difficult to calculate an accurate accounting of the killed and missing, and why it is important to make sure these people are accounted for accurately. We then explain a methodology we have developed to estimate both the number of the known victims, and the number of victims who have never been counted. Any accounting of lethal violence will be incorrect if we assume that any one dataset or combination of datasets contains a comprehensive count of killings and disappearances. Registries of violent acts kept by governmental and non-governmental institutions contain some, but not all, of the records of lethal violence. Organizations collecting this data may only have access to certain subsets of a population or geographic areas. Some reports of violent acts may be easier to locate than others and the resulting datasets will be biased toward those cases. How can we overcome these difficulties? Correct answers about the number of killings and disappearances rely on statistical estimation to overcome the complex, incomplete patterns of reporting. Getting the numbers right is extremely important: appropriate estimates can help account for unnamed, unreported victims in the historical record and guide the development of policies to respond to past violence. Using biased or incomplete figures, on the other hand, risks losing all trace of the existence of some victims and generates ongoing trauma for society. Victims who remain undocumented by any dataset become invisible, removed not only from their lives and the lives of their loved ones, but from historical memory. Since we consider individual datasets to be incomplete, we prefer to use all available lists or datasets of killings and disappearances to generate statistical estimates. The estimation procedure used to calculate the magnitude of killings and disappearances for Casanare is called Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE). MSE requires analysts to carefully review all known incidents in multiple lists, in order to determine whether some cases, either within one list or across lists, refer to the same victim. Matching cases that appear on more than one list allows statisticians to model the process by which violent acts are reported and to estimate the number of uncounted cases. MSE then uses the number of unique observations on each list in combination with the number of overlaps to estimate the total number of victims. Using a scientifically rigorous, transparent method to “count the uncounted” means that the results are less vulnerable to claims of partiality or bias. The work presented in this paper builds on a previous study which estimated missing people in Casanare. We chose to continue our research in Casanare for three reasons: 1) The line between killings and disappearances is often indistinct. Some people who are disappeared are presumed to be dead. In order to understand the magnitude of lethal violence affecting Casanare, we decided to analyze killings and disappearances side by side. In all of the following analysis, we present results for killings and disappearances together so that readers can draw a comparison between the pattern and magnitude of the two lethal acts. 2) Since the release of our 2007 report on missing people in Casanare, we have made important methodological improvements to our implementation of MSE. These advances allow us to include all of the available datasets and capture more precisely the range of uncertainty in the estimates. 3) We are integrating into this analysis new data shared with the Benetech Human Rights Program since the 2007 report. In this study, we have used information about victims of killings and disappearances provided by 15 datasets. These 15 sources of data come from state agencies – including government, security, forensic and judicial bodies – and from civil society organizations. Using this data and our methodological developments, we estimate that there were between 3,944 and 9,983 killings in Casanare from 2000-2007. In the period from 1998-2005, we estimate that there were between 1,270 and 5,552 disappearances in Casanare. We present and discuss these estimates in more detail in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the reported data and how it was processed for use in the analysis. We also show how descriptive summaries of individual datasets may be misleading. In Section 4, we draw some general conclusions. In Section 5, we outline areas where we plan to focus our future work. Lastly, we offer the methodological developments in technical detail in an appendix. Details: Palo Alto, CA: Benetech Human Rights Program, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2011 at: http://www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/results-paper.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/results-paper.pdf Shelf Number: 120640 Keywords: DisappearancedHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime (Colombia) |
Author: Silva, Romesh, Jasmine Marwaha & Jeff Klingner, Title: Violent Deaths and Enforced Disappearances During the Counterinsurgency in Punjab, India Romesh Silva Jasmine Marwaha Jeff Klingner A Preliminary Quantitative Analysis Summary: This report analyzes reported fatal violence across Punjab during a period of conflict from 1984 to 1995. This preliminary, descriptive statistical analysis uses systematic and verifiable quantitative research to interrogate the Indian government’s portrayal of the Punjab counterinsurgency as a successful campaign with isolated human rights violations. The empirical findings indicate that the intensification of coordinated counterinsurgency operations in the early 1990s was accompanied by a shift in state violence from targeted enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions to large-scale and systematic lethal human rights violations, accompanied by mass “illegal cremations.” Details: Palo Alto, CA: Benetech's Human Rights Data Analysis Group; Fremont, CA: Ensaaf, Inc., 2009. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2011 at: http://www.ensaaf.org/publications/reports/descriptiveanalysis/ Year: 2009 Country: India URL: http://www.ensaaf.org/publications/reports/descriptiveanalysis/ Shelf Number: 121774 Keywords: DisappearancesExtrajudicial ExecutionsHuman Rights (India)TerrorismViolence |
Author: Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas Title: Journalism in Times of Threats, Censorship and Violence Summary: Journalism in Times of Threats, Censorship and Violence, a report from the workshop “Cross-border Coverage of U.S.–Mexico Drug Trafficking” held March 2000 in Austin, Texas. This report presents a summary of the experiences shared by the participating journalists and the presentations made by experts. The working conditions for journalists covering the drug trade on the border have become increasingly difficult, and Mexico has become one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists, according to studies by journalism organizations and human rights groups since the mid-2000s. More than 20 journalists have been killed in Mexico since President Felipe Calderón launched his anti-drug campaign in December 2006. The text deals with violence and other challenges faced by journalists covering the drug trade. It explains how journalists face different levels of risk, depending on whether they are members of the foreign press corps, Mexican reporters who work and live in Mexico City, local journalists who live and work in the cities directly affected by drug trafficking violence, or reporters who run specific risks by crossing the border every day to cover the drug trafficking beat. The report also addresses the evolution of the history of the drug trade in Mexico. It explains that journalists on both sides of the border have reported for decades on links between state and local authorities and drug groups. But the outbreak of drug-related violence that began in the last decade is a new phenomenon that has rapidly intensified, turned more brutal, and spread to parts of Mexico that were once peaceful. The report concludes that questions about how to perform quality journalism while keeping reporters safe in the violent, rapidly changing environment of drug trafficking on the U.S.–Mexico border can not be answered in a single workshop. Networking and collaboration among Mexican and U.S. colleagues is fundamental to informing the public on both sides of the border. Details: Austin, TX: Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, 2010. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/ebook/journalism-times-threats-censorship-and-violence Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/ebook/journalism-times-threats-censorship-and-violence Shelf Number: 121942 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)MediaViolence |
Author: Finklea, Kristin M. Title: Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence Summary: There has been an increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. Currently, U.S. federal officials deny that the recent increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern. The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, and this threat is driven partly by U.S. demand for drugs. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the Southwest border (SWB). The nature of the conflict between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of these smuggling routes into the United States. Further, in an illegal marketplace — such as that of illicit drugs — where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes. When assessing the potential implications of the increased violence in Mexico, one of the central concerns for Congress is the potential for what has been termed “spillover” violence — an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities — excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence — other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the SWB and in the nation’s interior). Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to draw definitive claims about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41075_20110125.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41075_20110125.pdf Shelf Number: 121947 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDrug Trafficking (U.S. and Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cunningham, A. Scott: Engelstatter, Benjamin Title: Understanding the Effects of Violent Video Games on Violent Crime Summary: Psychological studies invariably find a positive relationship between violent video game play and aggression. However, these studies cannot account for either aggressive effects of alternative activities video game playing substitutes for or the possible selection of relatively violent people into playing violent video games. That is, they lack external validity. We investigate the relationship between the prevalence of violent video games and violent crimes. Our results are consistent with two opposing effects. First, they support the behavioral effects as in the psychological studies. Second, they suggest a larger voluntary incapacitation effect in which playing either violent or non-violent games decrease crimes. Overall, violent video games lead to decreases in violent crime. Details: Unpublished Working Paper Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2011 at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1804959 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1804959 Shelf Number: 122026 Keywords: Media ViolenceVideo GamesViolence |
Author: Pearce, Jenny Title: Violence, Security and Democracy: Perverse Interfaces and their Implications for States and Citizens in the Global South Summary: How does violence affect the everyday lives of citizens in the global South? Researching this theme under the aegis of the Violence, Participation and Citizenship group of the Citizenship DRC coordinated by IDS, we generated some answers, but also more questions, which this paper starts to explore. Why have democratisation processes failed to fulfil expectations of violence reduction in the global South? How does violence affect democracy and vice versa? Why does security practice in much of the global South not build secure environments? When examined empirically from the perspectives of poor Southern citizens, the interfaces between violence, security and democracy – assumed in conventional state and democratisation theory to be positive or benign – are often, in fact, perverse. Empirically-based reflection on these questions leads us to two propositions, which the paper then explores through the use of secondary literature. In essence: Proposition 1: Violence interacts perversely with democratic institutions, eroding their legitimacy and effectiveness. Democracy fails to deliver its promise of replacing the violence with accommodation and compromise, and democratic process is compromised, with citizens reacting by withdrawing from public spaces, accepting the authority of non-state actors, or supporting hard-line responses. Proposition 2: Security provision is not making people feel more secure. State responses to rising violence can strengthen state and non-state security actors committed to reproducing violence, disproportionately affecting the poorest communities. These ‘perverse interfaces’, we argue, warrant research in themselves, rather than minimal or tangential consideration in research on democracy, as tends to be the case. Further research needs to adopt fresh epistemological, methodological and analytical perspectives and seek to re-think and re-frame categories and concepts, rather than working within the received wisdoms of state and democratisation theory. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 2011. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper, Volume 2011, No. 357: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734710/original/1052734710-pearce_etal.2011-perverse.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734710/original/1052734710-pearce_etal.2011-perverse.pdf Shelf Number: 122124 Keywords: HomicideViolenceViolence and DemocracyViolent Crime |
Author: Moncrieffe, Joy Title: Making and Unmaking the Young ‘Shotta’ [Shooter]: Boundaries and (Counter)- Actions in the ‘Garrisons’ Summary: This paper comprises a patchwork of conversations and life-stories from two of Jamaica’s reputedly violent ‘garrison’ communities. The stories come from a variety of sources, grandparents to the very young; however, the principal focus is on the children and, specifically, on how some among them – those labelled as ‘young shottas’ [shooters] are cultivated. Our storytellers expose the effects of deep-rooted economic and social inequalities; the perception that gun violence is a means to personal liberation and ‘power’, particularly among males; and the concentration of conflict within and across like neighborhoods. There are stories about social conditioning and manhood, the role of families and peers and of how children are forced to grow in contexts where there are little or no opportunities for exit and restricted spaces for change. There are also accounts of how some actual and potential ‘shottas’ are attempting to contest the physical, material and socio-psychological boundaries within and outside of their immediate communities, through what Hayward (2000) describes as ‘action upon boundaries to action’. Notably, contestation does not always comprise those productive social actions that are considered crucial for participation and vibrant citizenship; it is often much more complex, combining non violent and violent actions, ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ measures. It is important to dissect how perceptions, such as of legality and illegality, legitimacy and illegitimacy are framed for the stories indicate that in these communities such concepts can have different meanings and that what is considered indefensible in some areas may be both justified and regarded as normal practice in others. Through these forthright and compelling accounts, readers will be exposed to the routes to and experiences of different citizenships as well as the substantial challenges to transformational change, particularly for the children who were born and cultivated in these particular violent environments. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 2008. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 297: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734559/original/1052734559-moncrieffe.2008-making.pdf?1289991772 Year: 2008 Country: Jamaica URL: http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734559/original/1052734559-moncrieffe.2008-making.pdf?1289991772 Shelf Number: 122125 Keywords: Gun ViolencePovertySocioeconomic ConditionsViolenceViolent Crime (Jamaica)Youth Violence |
Author: McLean-Hilker, Lyndsay Title: Broadening Spaces for Citizens in Violent Contexts Summary: Violence and everyday insecurity are amongst the root causes of poverty: a simple and true statement that has at last been acknowledged in several international agreements, including the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence (2008) and Dili Declaration (2010). Several new funding mechanisms have even been established to support efforts to reduce violence, including those that address the special security needs of excluded groups, women, youth and children. What recent policies have failed to adequately consider, however, is that poor and dispossessed people often perceive the state as a perpetrator or accomplice - whether by active complicity or passive omission – in the violence visited upon them. For policymakers and practitioners eager to move beyond top-down approaches to reducing insecurity and violence, this policy briefing offers insights into how local residents can be directly involved in finding solutions for their security and livelihood needs. Research from a range of contexts characterised by violence and everyday insecurity suggests that external actors can help to broaden spaces where citizens can take action in non-violent, socially legitimate ways, but that success depends on gaining a locally nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between violent and non-violent actors, and between forms of everyday violence and political violence. Details: Brighton, UK: Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability, 2011. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Citizenship DRC Policy Briefing: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734708/original/1052734708-hilker_etal.2010-broadening.pdf?1299616068 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734708/original/1052734708-hilker_etal.2010-broadening.pdf?1299616068 Shelf Number: 122126 Keywords: PovertySocioeconomic ConditionsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: San Francisco. Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Title: SF Safe City: A Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Reduce Crime and Violence in San Francisco Summary: In the summer of 2006, San Francisco launched SF Safe Summer 2006, a coordinated effort amongst City departments, law enforcement, the courts and the community to combat the high rate of violence plaguing San Francisco. Together, these efforts created new job opportunities for at risk youth and adults, advanced new strategies to combat gun and gang violence, and bolstered social services for families impacted by violence. The summer passed but the city's efforts to stop violence continue to grow. The Mayor's Office prepared SF SAFE CITY to report on San Francisco's ongoing violence prevention and reduction strategies moving forward. These efforts are organized into five key elements: collaboration, prevention, intervention, enhanced criminal justice system effectiveness, and community policing. In 2005, homicides in San Francisco reached a ten-year high, with 96 people slain. So far this year, San Francisco continues to see high numbers of lives lost to violence. Homicides from gun violence constitute the majority of homicides in San Francisco. The violence and homicides disproportionately affect low-income communities of color. Victims of violence need support services to help them heal. Perpetrators must be prosecuted and held accountable for their actions. Youth and young adults need access to positive and productive activities as alternatives to crime and violence. Residents need to be safe in their communities. San Francisco launched SF Safe Summer 2006 to advance the kind of collaboration and innovation needed to solve this intolerable problem. Among other accomplishments, the Juvenile Probation Department and the Department of Children, Youth and their Families spearheaded the most ambitious effort in San Francisco history to provide jobs to youth on probation. The Mayor's Office of Economic and Workforce Development expanded its CityBuild Academy to provide job-training services in the construction field. The Department of Children, Youth and their Families commenced an effort to expand the Community Response Network crisis response program in the Mission and bring this model to the Bayview and Western Addition neighborhoods. The Department of Public Health initiated a new citywide Crisis Response Team to assist family members and witnesses of violent incidents. Operation Ceasefire, a collaboration among local and federal public safety agencies to combat gun and gang violence, began extensive data collection and planning. The District Attorney and Public Defender continued their efforts to improve outcomes for people exiting jail, and Police District Stations carried out violence reduction plans to tackle the unique crime problems in each neighborhood. These initiatives have laid the foundation for change, but a tremendous amount of work lies ahead. The ongoing violence must be stopped through a combination of intensive prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies that can both respond to the immediate crisis on the streets and begin to deal with the underlying social and economic conditions that contribute to instability, violence, and crime. This report, SF SAFE CITY, describes San Francisco's ongoing violence prevention, intervention, and reduction efforts. Details: San Francisco: Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, 2006. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2011 at: http://sfmayor.typepad.com/sf_mayor/files/SFSafeCity.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://sfmayor.typepad.com/sf_mayor/files/SFSafeCity.pdf Shelf Number: 122152 Keywords: CollaborationCrime Prevention (San Francisco)GangsGun ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bilbray, Brian Title: Broken Neighbor, Broken Border: A Field Investigation Report of the House Immigration Reform Caucus Summary: Since passage into law of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 and the Secure Fence Act of 2006, illegal entries on the U.S. southern border are down by half. The degree to which these reforms have contributed to this success balanced against the decreased activity of economic illegal aliens due to recession is subject to honest debate. However there is no doubt by any law enforcement agency on the southern border that both reform bills have worked to increase security and reduce illegal entries into the United States, especially at ports of entry. However, the nature of illegal entries has become increasingly dangerous to the homeland security of our nation, based on the near collapse of civil authority in the northern states of Mexico. The Rule of Law in Mexico has degenerated to a point of near anarchy along our shared border. Violent and heavily armed Mexican drug cartel members, human traffickers, and Middle East terrorists are crossing at will, with Al-Qaeda affiliated Somalis the target of Department of Homeland Security alerts in the Houston area. A long-term deployment of a minimum 25,000 armed troops with enforcement power is necessary on our southern border to preserve U.S. sovereignty and the lives of American citizens from organized armed forces hostile to the United States. The southern border of the United States is still being successfully infiltrated by a half million illegal aliens annually, according to Department of Homeland Security statistics. While down from a high mark of over a million in 2006 due to increased manpower and resources of the U.S. Border Patrol and the recession, the nature of illegal crossings has grown far more sinister and threatening. The illegal entrants consist of not just “economic” violators, but also heavily armed drug cartel members and “OTMs” - other than Mexican illegal aliens - from diverse countries including Middle Eastern nations with terrorist factions currently at war with U.S. forces. Mexican drug cartel members now operating inside the United States as a result of these breaches are directly linked to over 28,000 violent murders and executions on the other side of the Rio Grande. According to virtually all law enforcement on the border, Texas and the other border states are in imminent danger of this level of violence exploding across the border into the United States. Kidnappings and murders by the cartels inside the U.S. are already occurring. Both U.S. Border Patrol officers and Texas law enforcement agencies are at present forced to back down from these heavily armed incursions, due to the overwhelming firepower and manpower of the drug cartels. U.S. private property owners on the border have been largely abandoned to defend themselves, and have begun to be murdered. The U.S. Border Patrol is operating under conditions set by the Administration that guarantee hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens will succeed in their effort to infiltrate the United States. The official position of the Administration, which has been forced on the U.S. Border Patrol, is that even after admitting to these conditions, the border is more secure than it has ever been, that U.S. national security needs are being met as well as they can be, and that efforts by the states and local law enforcement to combat this explosive situation beyond the efforts of the Administration should be legally stymied. Texas Sheriffs are now experiencing the first spillovers of the mass murders and executions that have effectively destroyed social order across the border. To place in perspective the degree of anarchy and violence, Mexico has experienced 28,000 murders since the drug wars began in 2006; by comparison, the United States has lost around 6,000 soldiers in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. The U.S. justified going to war against Serbia in 1998 based on an estimated and highly debatable 10,000 civilian casualties in that civil war. Like that conflict, mass graves continue to be found in Mexico, including the most recent discovery of 72 murdered Central and South American immigrants just south of the Texas border. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, House Immigration Reform Caucus, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2011 at: http://www.protectyourtexasborder.com/Portals/6/Documents/Broken%20Neighbor%20Broken%20Border.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.protectyourtexasborder.com/Portals/6/Documents/Broken%20Neighbor%20Broken%20Border.pdf Shelf Number: 122487 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)HomicidesIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationViolence |
Author: Chimeli, Ariaster B. Title: The Use of Violence in Illegal Markets: Evidence from Mahogany Trade in the Brazilian Amazon Summary: Agents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to guarantee property rights, to enforce contracts, or to seek protection from competitors’ improper behaviors. In these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to fight for market share. This relationship plays a major role in the debate on the pernicious effects of the illegality of drug trade. This paper explores a singular episode of transition of a market from legal to illegal to provide a first piece of evidence on the causal effect of illegality on systemic violence. Brazil has historically been the main world producer of big leaf mahogany (a tropical wood). Starting in the 1990s, policies restricting extraction and trade of mahogany, culminating with prohibition, were implemented. First, we present evidence that large scale mahogany trade persisted after prohibition, through misclassification of mahogany exports as “other tropical timber species.” Second, we document relative increases in violence after prohibition in areas with: (i) higher share of mahogany exports before prohibition; (ii) higher suspected illegal mahogany activity after prohibition; and (iii) natural occurrence of mahogany. We believe this is one of the first documented experiences of increase in violence following the transition of a market from legal to illegal. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2011. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper, No. 5923: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5923.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Brazil URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5923.pdf Shelf Number: 122631 Keywords: HomicidesIllegal LoggingIllegal Markets (Brazil)Offenses Against the EnvironmentTimberViolence |
Author: United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Title: Exploring Policy Linkages Between Poverty, Crime and Violence: A Look at Three Caribbean States Summary: Crime and violence threaten individual safety and affect the social, economic and political life of a country and its citizens. As one of the most critical issues affecting Caribbean societies today, crime and violence have a significant impact on the achievement of development goals. Lower levels of life satisfaction, the erosion of social capital, intergenerational transmission of violence and higher mortality and morbidity rates are just some of the nonmonetary costs of crime and violence. Direct monetary costs include medical, legal, policing, prisons, foster care and private security. This discussion paper seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge on crime and violence through an exploration of the possible policy linkages between poverty, crime and violence, using data from Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago. It does so against the backdrop of increasing concern for the impact of violence on the social and economic development and human welfare of Caribbean societies. In addition to the primary objective of exploring the policy and programming linkages between poverty reduction programming and that aimed at reducing crime and violence, the study includes an overview of crime and poverty statistics in the three countries under investigation as well as a review of literature which examines the crime, violence and poverty nexus. Finally the paper seeks to generate discussion regarding future research that could inform public policy in this sensitive area. Details: Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: ECLAC, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/2/33252/L.172.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Trinidad and Tobago URL: http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/2/33252/L.172.pdf Shelf Number: 131584 Keywords: Economics and CrimePoverty (Caribbean)Social CapitalViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Gayle, Herbert Title: Male Social Participation and Violence in Urban Belize: An Examination of Their Experience with Goals, Guns, Gangs, Gender, God and Governance Summary: The report has ten chapters, divided into four sections. • The first is the Introduction comprised of the Research Design or methodology and the Critical Background. • The second section is an Assessment of the Human Ecology of Belize with emphasis on the urban centres, where social violence is concentrated. It is comprised of three chapters and is a discussion of the ‘pre‐conditional’ areas of the human ecology that contribute to social violence. These are the areas of a society that socialize and or nurture its populace: home, school and community. In the latter we have selected those institutions that comprise the central political authority, responsible for discipline, justice and equality. A breakdown in any of these institutions creates major crises leading to social violence. The third section is the Male Social Participation and Violence which is comprised of four chapters focused on the crisis of youth living in and affected by violence, with the emphasis on boys. The section begins with an Animated Life History of the very young children, ages 6‐13, followed by a PEER analysis of youth, then an Integrated Trauma Survey, and ends with a chapter on Gang Formation and Maintenance in urban Belize. The final section is the Summary and Suggestion. Details: Belize City: Ministry of Education, 2011. 401p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.belize.gov.bz/public/Attachment/0112315573071.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Belize URL: http://www.belize.gov.bz/public/Attachment/0112315573071.pdf Shelf Number: 122677 Keywords: GangsGender and ViolenceMalesPovertyUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime (Belize)Youth Violence |
Author: Dudley, Steven Title: The Zetas in Guatemala Summary: The Zetas, Mexico's most feared and violent criminal organization, has moved operations to Guatemala. In the process, they have shifted the balance of power in the region, undermining and overwhelming Guatemala's government and putting its neighbors in El Salvador and Honduras on high alert. They have also introduced a new way of operating. The Zetas are focused on controlling territory. In this they are the experts, creating a ruthless and intimidating force that is willing to take the fight to a new, often macabre level. Whoever becomes Guatemala's new president will face this challenge with little resources and government institutions that have a history of working for criminal organizations of all types. In sum, the Zetas are a test for Guatemala and the rest of the region: fail this test, and Central America sinks deeper into the abyss. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Latin American and Latino Studies "InSight Project", 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2011 at: http://insightcrime.org/specials/zetas-in-guatemala/item/1526-part-1-the-incursion Year: 2011 Country: Guatemala URL: http://insightcrime.org/specials/zetas-in-guatemala/item/1526-part-1-the-incursion Shelf Number: 122682 Keywords: Organized Crime (Guatemala)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Karp, Aaron Title: Estimating Civilian Owned Firearms Summary: Most of the world’s firearms are privately owned. They include improvised craft guns as well as handguns, rifles, shotguns, and machine guns. The legal definition of a civilian firearm varies; some states allow civilian ownership of certain firearms that are restricted to military use in other states. The word civilian is used here to refer to actual possession, not legality. In 2007, the Small Arms Survey estimated the number of civilian firearm ownership worldwide at approximately 650 million weapons out of some 875 then in existence. National ownership rates range from a high of 90 firearms per every 100 people in the United States, to one firearm or less for every 100 residents in countries like South Korea and Ghana. With the world’s factories delivering millions of newly manufactured firearms annually, and with far fewer being destroyed, civilian ownership is growing. Poor record-keeping and the near absence of reporting requirements for detailed information complicate assessments of global stockpiles of small arms and light weapons. When it comes to estimating civilian firearm ownership, differences in national gun culture - each country’s unique combination of historic and current sources of supply, laws and attitudes toward firearms ownership — often have distinct effects on the classification, ownership and perception of firearms. In addition, categories of firearm holders may overlap, as some individuals may use their private firearms at work as security guards, in armed groups, or in gangs. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2011. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Note No. 9: Accessed September 15, 2011 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-9.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-9.pdf Shelf Number: 122739 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeGangsGun OwnershipGunsViolence |
Author: Hagedorn, John M. Title: Variations in Urban Homicide: Chicago, New York City, and Global Urban Policy Summary: In the United States during the 1990s, some cities saw drastic drops in violence while others did not. Detroit, Washington DC, and New Orleans, for example, remain among the most violent cities in the world. On the other hand, San Francisco, Houston, Boston, and San Diego have seen rates of violence plummet to European-like lows. Entering the 1990s, Chicago and New York City had similar homicide rates, but the two cities sharply diverged in the next few years, with Chicago’s murder rate hovering at three times New York’s rate or roughly equivalent to homicide rates in Mexico City or Moscow. Notions that policing strategies largely explain variation in rates of violence have been skeptically greeted by criminologists (Blumstein and Wallman 2000). However, no plausible explanation for the stark divergence in U.S. urban homicide rates has been credibly presented. One reason for this may be the narrowness of criminological investigations. In fact, very few studies, in the US of internationally, look at variation in violence between cities, instead focusing on national-level analyses (e.g. Gurr 1989). This essay seeks to supplement the criminological thinking on homicide by adding insights from studies in urban and globalization research. First, we review several literatures relating to violence. Second, we describe the methods of a study of homicide in the 1990s in Chicago and New York City and present its qualitative and quantitative data. Finally, we discuss some implications of our study for policy on urban violence through-out the world. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Great Cities Institute, 2004. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed SEptember 19, 2011 at: http://www.gangresearch.net/Archives/hagedorn/articles/homvar2.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.gangresearch.net/Archives/hagedorn/articles/homvar2.pdf Shelf Number: 122781 Keywords: GangsHomicidesUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Rodgers, Dennis Title: Urban Violence Is not (Necessarily) a Way of Life: Towards a Political Economy of Conflict in Cities Summary: As the world moves towards its so-called urban ‘tipping point’, urbanization in the global South has increasingly come to be portrayed as the portent of a dystopian future characterized by ever-mounting levels of anarchy and brutality. The association between cities, violence, and disorder is not new, however. In a classic article on… ‘Urbanism as a way of life’, Louis Wirth (1938: 23) famously links cities to ‘personal disorganization, mental breakdown, suicide, delinquency, crime, corruption, and disorder’. He does so on the grounds that the urban context constituted a space that naturally generated particular forms of social organization and collective action as a result of three key attributes: population size, density, and heterogeneity. Large numbers lead to a segmentation of human relations, the pre-eminence of secondary over primary social contact, and a utilitarianization of interpersonal relationships. Density produces increased competition, accelerates specialization, and engenders glaring contrasts that accentuate social friction. Heterogeneity induces more ramified and differentiated forms of social stratification, heightened individual mobility, and increased social fluidity. While large numbers, density, and heterogeneity can plausibly be considered universal features of cities, it is much less obvious that they necessarily lead to urban violence. This is a standpoint that is further reinforced by the fact that not all cities around the world – whether rapidly urbanizing or not – are violent, and taking off from Wirth’s characterization of the city, this paper therefore seeks to understand how and why under certain circumstances compact settlements of large numbers of heterogeneous individuals give rise to violence, while in others they don’t, focusing in particular on wider structural factors as seen through the specific lens of urban gang violence. Details: Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2010. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 2010/20: Accessed September 21, 2011 at: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/rodgers_wp2010_20.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/rodgers_wp2010_20.pdf Shelf Number: 122801 Keywords: GangsUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Kohli, Anil Title: Mapping Murder: The Geography of Indian Firearm Fatalities Summary: Rates of murder, and firearms murder in particular, vary dramatically across India's 28 states and seven union territories, as well 35 cities with over one million residents. National statistics and autopsy findings reveal the range of variation between states and cities. Murder and firearms death are declining in many regions, but much of the country still faces extreme problems. This Issue Brief identifies those areas worst affected and those most immune. Access to illegal firearms is a major element in this variation. Details: New Delhi: India Armed Violence Assessment, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 2: Accessed September 21, 2011 at: http://www.india-ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB2-mapping-murder.pdf Year: 2011 Country: India URL: http://www.india-ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB2-mapping-murder.pdf Shelf Number: 122803 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeGun ViolenceGunsHomicides (India)ViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Goodwin, Matthew Title: Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe Summary: Populist extremist parties (PEPs) present one of the most pressing challenges to European democracies, but their appeal and the profile of their supporters remain poorly understood. This report examines what is causing citizens across Europe to shift support behind populist extremists and recommends how mainstream political parties can respond to the challenge. PEPs have spent much of the past two decades exchanging strategies, ideas and best practice. This has enabled them to respond to new issues and events more innovatively and effectively than the established parties. Until the mainstream parties similarly begin to exchange lessons, root their responses in the evidence and address the actual anxieties of PEP voters, populist extremists will continue to rally support among a new generation of citizens. If politicians and policymakers are to meet this challenge, they need to radically rethink their current approach to populist extremism. Details: London: Chatham House, 2011. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 122924 Keywords: Radical Groups (Europe)TerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Moyano, Inigo Guevara Title: Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11 Summary: Mexico’s armed forces are in the midst of a transformation to better perform in an ongoing war against organized crime. Their role and visibility have escalated considerably since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December of 2006. Although the fight against organized crime is clearly a law enforcement matter, the absence of effective and accountable police forces has meant that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been used as supplementary forces to defend the civilian population and enforce the rule of law. While the federal government has striven to stand up a capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that possibility is still distant. Five years into the Calderon administration, the armed forces continue to be the main implementers of the National Security policy, aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the operational capacity of organized crime. Their strong institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to political control, and history of interaction with the population mainly through disaster relief efforts have made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society. Mexico’s armed forces have long been used as an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of public policies at the national level, from emergency vaccinations, to post-earthquake rescue, to reforestation campaigns. They have been at the forefront of disaster relief operations in reaction to the calamities of nature, within and beyond their borders, with humanitarian assistance deployments to Indonesia, the United States, Haiti, and Central America among the most recent. The Mexican armed forces are quite unique, as they are divided into two separate cabinet-level ministries: the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretary of National Defense or SEDENA), which encompasses the Army and Air Force, and the Secretaría de Marina (the Secretary of the Navy or SEMAR), which comprises the Navy. The level of engagement with society and the results obtained from this division in military power confirms the utility of their independence. Their use as the state’s last line of defense has led to severe criticism from opinion leaders, opposition forces, international analysts, and human rights organizations. Their level of commitment remains unaltered and they have undertaken a number of significant transformations to better address their continued roles as the guardians of the State and protectors of the population. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Letort Paper: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1081.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1081.pdf Shelf Number: 122957 Keywords: Armed ForcesMilitary ForcesOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Kan, Paul Rexton Title: Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security Summary: Since 2006, when Mexican president Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels, there has been a rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States to escape the ongoing drug cartel violence in their home country. Political asylum cases in general are claimed by those who are targeted for their political beliefs or ethnicity in countries that are repressive or failing. Mexico is neither. Nonetheless, if the health of the Mexican state declines because criminal violence continues, increases, or spreads, U.S. communities will feel an even greater burden on their systems of public safety and public health from “narco-refugees.” Given the ever-increasing brutality of the cartels, the question is whether and how the United States Government should begin to prepare for what could be a new wave of migrants coming from Mexico. Allowing Mexicans to claim asylum could potentially open a floodgate of migrants to the United States during a time when there is a very contentious national debate over U.S. immigration laws pertaining to illegal immigrants. On the other hand, to deny the claims of asylum seekers and return them to Mexico, where they might very well be killed, strikes at the heart of American values of justice and humanitarianism. This monograph focuses on the asylum claims of Mexicans who unwillingly leave Mexico, rather than those who willingly enter the United States legally or illegally. To navigate wisely in this sea of complexity will require greater understanding and vigilance at all levels of the U.S. Government. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1083.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1083.pdf Shelf Number: 0 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division Title: Investigation of the Puerto Rico Police Department Summary: The Puerto Rico Police Department is Puerto Rico’s primary law enforcement agency. Its mission is critical: To protect and serve the residents of Puerto Rico by designing and implementing policies and practices that control crime, ensure respect for the Constitution and the rule of law, and enable the Department to enjoy the respect and confidence of the public. Many hard working and dedicated PRPD officers serve the public with distinction under often challenging conditions. Unfortunately, PRPD is broken in a number of critical and fundamental respects that are clearly actionable under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”). Based on our extensive investigation, we find reasonable cause to believe that PRPD officers engage in a pattern and practice of: • excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; • unreasonable force and other misconduct designed to suppress the exercise of protected First Amendment rights; and • unlawful searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition to these findings, our investigation uncovered other deficiencies of serious concern. In particular, there is troubling evidence that PRPD frequently fails to police sex crimes and incidents of domestic violence, and engages in discriminatory policing practices that target individuals of Dominican descent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Safe Streets Act, and Title VI. At this time, we do not make a formal finding of a pattern and practice violation in these areas, in part because PRPD does not adequately collect data to evaluate these issues. However, we are quite concerned that PRPD lacks basic systems of accountability to ensure that all individuals are treated equally by PRPD officers, regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, or sex as required by federal law. Furthermore, our investigation raises serious concerns that PRPD policies and practices are woefully inadequate to prevent and address domestic violence committed by PRPD officers. We find that these deficiencies will lead to constitutional violations unless they are addressed. PRPD’s continued failure to keep necessary data in light of our findings and despite knowledge of these indicators of a very serious problem, may constitute a pattern and practice that violates federal law. We recognize that PRPD faces significant challenges as Puerto Rico’s primary law enforcement agency. The unconstitutional acts that we have identified arise at a time of crisis in public safety. Contrary to national trends, violent crime increased overall in Puerto Rico by 17% from 2007 to 2009. In 2010, Puerto Rico saw the second highest number of murders in its history, a trend that is escalating in 2011. The clearance rate for murders remains below the national average. Some Puerto Rico officials maintain that drug trafficking and social deterioration are fueling the wave of violent crime. However, increasing crime cannot be used to justify continued civil rights violations or the failure to implement meaningful reforms. Constitutional policing and effective law enforcement are inextricably bound. Public safety depends on the trust and cooperation of the community, which in turn depends on constitutional police practices that respect civil rights. Our previous efforts in working with large police departments strongly suggest that by addressing the civil rights concerns we raise in this report, the Commonwealth will not only meet its constitutional duty, but also reduce crime, improve public safety, and increase community confidence. i For many years, victims’ families, civic leaders, legislators, and civil rights advocates have voiced concerns over chronic mistreatment by police. For example, over the past decade, various legislative measures have called for comprehensive investigations of police misconduct, greater education and training, and an accounting of public funds spent on civil rights lawsuits against the Commonwealth. Other grass-roots and advocacy organizations have sent letters to Puerto Rico officials denouncing allegations of discrimination against people of Dominican descent, and civic and professional organizations have issued investigative reports detailing numerous civil rights violations at the hands of police. PRPD officers have also called for agency reforms. One police affinity group representing thousands of officers attributed widespread low morale among officers to verbal abuse from supervisors, indifference to officers’ personal problems, lack of support and training, absence of motivational and educational activities, deficient equipment and materials, and late payment. The public’s demands for remedial action are fueled in part by the appalling number of officer arrests and convictions for serious misconduct and criminal activity. Among these are: the killing of family members by two police officers in the “Massacre of Las Piedras” in 2007; the videotaped shooting of a civilian by a Tactical Operations Unit (“TOU”) officer during a birthday celebration in Humacao in 2007; the shooting death of a PRPD lieutenant by a sergeant at a police station in Yabucoa in 2007; the conviction of multiple officers assigned to the Mayagüez Drug Unit for planting drugs in 2008; the conviction of the director of the Special Arrests and Extraditions Unit and several of his officers on drug-related charges in 2009; the conviction of a lieutenant directing the weapons registry at PRPD headquarters as part of an illegal gun licensing scheme in 2009; the indiscriminate use of batons and chemical irritants against protesters at the Capitol in June 2010; the shooting death of an unarmed young man who was reportedly aiding police following a robbery in September 2010; and the arrest of 61 PRPD officers as part of the largest police corruption operation in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) history in October 2010. In the report that follows, we discuss the wide range of issues that were the focus of our investigation and the findings that result from our review. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 116 p., app.; Executive Summary Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/prpd_exec_summ.pdf (executive summary) Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/prpd_exec_summ.pdf (executive summary) Shelf Number: 122984 Keywords: Police AccountabilityPolice AdministrationPolice MisconductPolice Use of ForcePolicing (Puerto Rico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data Summary: The UNODC 2011 Global Study on Homicide brings together global, regional, national and subnational homicide data in one publication. It is hoped that the data and analysis of the most violent crime against the person will assist global efforts to design evidence-based policies to prevent and reduce crime in those areas and population groups where violence is most acute. This study was made possible because of increased efforts by countries to produce and share good quality homicide data. However, homicide data remain far from perfect—indeed, the study draws attention to the large geographic and thematic data gaps in many regions of the world—and comparisons should always be made with caution. This is also true because legal systems and practices, as well as capacities in reporting intentional homicide, can vary significantly between countries and regions. Nevertheless, there are a number of key messages that may be derived from the wealth of data in this study. First, there is a clear link between violent crime and development: crime hampers poor human and economic development; this, in turn, fosters crime. Improvements to social and economic conditions go hand in hand with the reduction of violent crime. The development agenda must also include crime prevention policies and the enhancement of the rule of law at both national and international level. Reducing violent crime should also be a priority for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in those countries where crime is disproportionally high. The study also represents an important advance in our understanding of the trends and patterns of homicide. One of the most important considerations is the recognition that different factors drive violent crime rates and trends. In some regions, organized crime, drug trafficking and the violent cultures of youth gangs are predominantly responsible for the high levels of homicide; while in others, killings connected to intimate partner and family-related violence account for an important share of homicides. Although it is important to understand that the sharp increase in homicides in some countries, particularly in Central America, are making the activities of organized crime and drug trafficking more visible, it should not be assumed that organized crime is not active in other regions as well. Another aspect is the role played by firearms in violent crime. It is crucial that measures to prevent crime should include policies towards the ratification and implementation of the UN Firearm protocol. Domestic policies in furtherance of the Protocol’s provision can help avoid the diversion of firearms to fuel violence and increase homicides. Knowledge of the patterns and causes of violent crime are crucial to forming preventive strategies. Young males are the group most affected by violent crime in all regions, particularly in the Americas. Yet women of all ages are the victims of intimate partner and family-related violence in all regions and countries. Indeed, in many of them, it is within the home where a woman is most likely to be killed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed october 7, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf Shelf Number: 123002 Keywords: Crime StatisticsFirearms and CrimeGun ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Amunwa, Ben Title: Counting the Cost: Corporations and Human Rights Abuses in the Niger Delta Summary: This report examines the role of Shell in human rights abuses committed by Nigerian government forces and other armed groups between 2000 and 2010. It provides eight case studies, places them in wider social and environmental context and evaluates the level of legal, reputational and operational risk the company faces. Each case illustrates different but related ways that Shell’s conduct has led to repression and conflict. All eight cases are from the ‘eastern division’ of Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta, where the company first struck oil in commercial quantities in 1956. As the largest operator in the Delta, Shell is the focus of this report. But the issues, conclusions and recommendations apply to other oil companies operating in the region. The past decade in the Delta has brought brutal government crackdowns, the rise of armed groups and a multiplicity of intense conflicts. While primary responsibility for human rights violations falls on the Nigerian government and other perpetrators, Shell has played an active role in fuelling conflict and violence in a variety of forms. This report finds that: Shell’s close relationship with the Nigerian military exposes the company to charges of complicity in the systematic killing and torture of local residents. Testimony and contracts seen by Platform implicate Shell in regularly assisting armed militants with lucrative payments. In one case from 2010, Shell is alleged to have transferred over $159,000 to a group credibly linked to militia violence. Shell’s poor community engagement has provided the “catalyst” for major disruption, including one incident that shut down a third of Shell’s daily oil production in August 2011. In the absence of proper supervision and controls, Shell contractors, including multinationals like Halliburton, Daewoo and Saipem, have replicated many of Shell’s mistakes. Shell’s conduct in the Delta has local and global implications. Basic company errors have exacerbated violent conflicts in which entire communities have been destroyed. Billions have been lost in revenues to the government and oil companies, sending shockwaves through the global economy. These are not new phenomena. In 2003, a leaked internal report denounced Shell for its active involvement in the Delta conflict. Then, as now, Shell pledged to improve. But Platform’s report finds that Shell has not taken the necessary steps to de-militarise its operations in the Delta, resolve longstanding grievances and respect the human rights of local communities. The eight cases in this report are the thin end of the wedge. Many further cases of human rights abuse are associated with Shell’s operations in the western, central and outer Delta regions, as well as with Chevron, Eni and other oil companies and private military and security contractors (PMSCs). Given the widespread and systematic nature of the problem, this report aims to provide a cross-section, not a comprehensive overview. Platform believes there are many ways to address this urgent issue and at the end of this report puts forward key recommendations to the Nigerian authorities, Shell, shareholder investors and the UK, US and Dutch governments. Details: London: Platform, 2011. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 18, 2011 at: http://platformlondon.org/nigeria/Counting_the_Cost.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria URL: http://platformlondon.org/nigeria/Counting_the_Cost.pdf Shelf Number: 123042 Keywords: Corporate CrimeHuman Rights Abuses (Nigeria)Violence |
Author: Mink, Michael D. Title: Violence and Rural Teens Teen Violence, Drug Use, and School-Based Prevention Services in Rural America Summary: This study had three main purposes: (1) to explore the prevalence of violence-related exposures and drug use among rural teens, (2) to investigate the effects of race and gender on the risk of exposure to violence and drug use, and (3) to compare the policies and mental health care services of rural and urban schools. The sections below summarize the results of this research: Exposure to Violence: This study found no evidence to support the common assumption that rural youth are protected from exposure to violence. • Of the 15 measures of violence activities, none showed a significantly lower prevalence among rural teens when compared to suburban and urban teens. In fact, rural teens were more likely than urban or suburban teens to have carried a weapon within the last 30 days. These results suggest that rural teens are equally or more likely than suburban and urban teens to be exposed to violent activities. Drug Use: Rural teens are at significantly greater risk of using drugs than both suburban and urban teens. • Five of the 13 measures of drug use showed a significantly higher prevalence rate among rural teens: chewing tobacco (11.5%), chewing tobacco at school (7.6%), smoking cigarettes at school (14.8%), using crack/cocaine (5.9%), and using steroids (7.4%). Only one measure showed a significantly higher prevalence rate among urban teens (smoking marijuana at school at 6.8%). The remaining seven measures showed no differences by residence. • Of important note is the prevalence of crystal meth use among rural teens. The proportion of rural teens who reported every using crystal meth (15.5%) was almost double the proportion of urban (8.8%) and suburban teens (9.5%). Crystal meth was the 4th most commonly used drug among rural teens after alcohol, cigarettes, and marijuana, making it more popular among rural teens than chewing tobacco. Effects of Race: Racial differences for exposure to violence and drug use are negligible among rural teens. • Non-white rural teens were no more likely than white rural teens to experience the 15 measures of exposure to violence. This result was similar to comparable comparisons among urban teens but not suburban teens, where non-white teens were more likely than white teens to experience 9 of the violence exposure measures. • Among rural teens, only one measure of drug use differed by race: rural non-white teens were less likely to report chewing tobacco compared to rural white teens. This pattern was strikingly different from the racial differences found among urban teens (9 differences) and suburban teens (7 differences). Effects of Gender: Exposures to violence and drug use vary by gender among rural teens. • Among rural teens, females are more likely than males to be coerced into sex or engage in suicide behaviors, while males are more likely than females to use weapons, be threatened at school, or engage in fighting behaviors. Male teens are also more likely than female teens to chew tobacco and smoke marijuana, both on and off school grounds. Teen Violence Services: Rural schools offer somewhat fewer teen violence services than rural schools. • Rural schools were less likely than urban schools to offer peer counseling and self help services, but just as likely to offer 14 other violence prevention and treatment services. • There were very few significant differences between rural and urban school in the way these services are delivered. Out of the 66 possible combinations of violence-related services and service delivery option, only 6 showed significantly lower utilization rates for rural schools. The remaining 60 combinations showed no differences by location. Teen Violence Services Personnel: Mental health care staff in rural schools are available for fewer hours, have fewer hiring requirements, and receive training for fewer teen violence services than their counterparts in urban schools. • Rural and urban schools were equally likely to have a guidance counselor, a psychologist, and a social worker on staff. However, all three of these professionals were available for significantly fewer hours per week in rural schools. • Rural and urban schools were equally likely to require a graduate degree, board certification, and a state license for newly hired guidance counselors and for newly hired psychologists. However, rural schools were significantly less likely than urban schools to require a graduate degree or a state license for newly hired school social workers. • Mental health care staff from rural schools were less likely than their counterparts in urban schools to receive training for certain teen violence services. Specifically, Mental Health Care Coordinators were less likely to receive training in suicide prevention, family counseling, peer counseling, and self help, while Health Education Coordinators in rural schools were less likely to receive training in tobacco use prevention. School Environment: Overall, rural schools report fewer policies and security practices that prevent violence and drug use than do urban schools. • Rural schools were less likely than urban schools to report using five (5) administrative policies to prevent student violence: prohibiting gang paraphernalia, student education on suicide prevention, violence prevention, and tobacco use prevention, and having a council for school health. The remaining 13 measures showed no differences by school location. • In response to student fighting, rural schools were less likely than urban schools to encourage or require participation in a student assistance program. • Rural schools were more likely than urban schools to monitor school hallways and to arm their security staff, but less likely to use a closed campus, prohibit bookbags, require school uniforms, use surveillance cameras, use uniformed police, use undercover police, and use security guards. The remaining seven school security measures did not differ by school location. Details: Columbia, SC: South Carolina Rural Health Research Center, 2005. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 29, 2011 at: http://rhr.sph.sc.edu/report/(4-5)%20Violence%20and%20Rural%20Teens.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://rhr.sph.sc.edu/report/(4-5)%20Violence%20and%20Rural%20Teens.pdf Shelf Number: 123173 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeJuvenile OffendersRural AreasRural CrimeSchool CrimeTeenagersViolence |
Author: Gilgen, Elisabeth Title: Reading between the Lines: Crime and Victimization in Liberia Summary: Reading between the Lines: Crime and Victimization in Liberia considers information on the types of violence reported, how violence is perpetrated, where it takes place, when it occurs, and who the main perpetrators and victims are. The Issue Brief also presents examples of programming efforts prevent and reduce crime and violence. The study finds that almost one in seven households reports that at least one household member was the victim of an act of violence or crime between mid-2009 and mid-2010. Crime and violence are more common in Monrovia than in the rest of the country, and robbery and theft is by far the most frequent crime and act of violence. Details: Geneva: Liberia Armed Violence Assessment, Small Arms Survey, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Issue Brief No. 2: Accessed November 1, 2011 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/Liberia-AVA-IB2.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/Liberia-AVA-IB2.pdf Shelf Number: 123194 Keywords: RobberyVictimizationViolenceViolent Crime (Liberia) |
Author: Gilgen, Elisabeth Title: A Legacy of War? Perceptions of Security in Liberia Summary: A Legacy of War? Perceptions of Security in Liberia — explores the general security perceptions and particular safety concerns of Liberians in 2009 and 2010. Its key findings include that respondents rate development concerns higher than safety concerns, with four-fifths of all responses raising concerns about access to clean water, health care, transportation, and education. The survey also found that most respondents believe safety conditions in mid-2010 had improved over the previous year, and around 70 per cent describe their own neighbourhood or community as ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’. Details: Geneva: Liberia Armed Violence Assessment, Small Arms Survey, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Issue Brief No. 1: Accessed November 1, 2011 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/Liberia-AVA-IB1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Liberia URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/Liberia-AVA-IB1.pdf Shelf Number: 123195 Keywords: Crime (Liberia)SecurityViolence |
Author: Ringland, Clare Title: Is the Assault Rate in NSW Higher Now Than It Was During the 1990s? Summary: The rate of police-recorded assault more than doubled in NSW between 1990 and 2007. This bulletin investigates whether the increase was due to a genuine increase in violence or an increase in the amount and/or type of violent behaviour coming to police attention. Trends and patterns in police-recorded assault from 1995 to 2007 are supplemented with crime victim survey data, hospitalisations data and a selection of narratives for assault incidents. Over the period, rates of assault increased for both males and females and for all age groups. Increases occurred in both aggravated and common assault, assault with a weapon and without, in all statistical divisions and premise types. These trends in police-recorded assault, supported by increases in hospitalisation and victim survey data, suggest a real increase in violence. However, less serious police-recorded assaults (e.g. common assault and assault without a weapon) have increased at a greater rate than more serious assaults, and more recent assault narratives included a greater proportion of assaults with less serious actions. In addition, the increase in hospitalisations for assault was small in comparison to increases in police-recorded assault and crime survey victimisation rates. Thus, it is likely that the increase in assault was due not only to an increase in violence, but also to an increase in public awareness of assault and the increased willingness of victims and third parties to report, and/or police willingness to record, incidents as assault. Published by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research Details: Sydney: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2009. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice, no. 127; Accessed November 2, 2011 at: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/cjb127.pdf/$file/cjb127.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Australia URL: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/cjb127.pdf/$file/cjb127.pdf Shelf Number: 123215 Keywords: Assaults (Australia)Crime RatesCrime TrendsPolice ReportingVictimizationViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Leggett, Ted Title: Organized Crime and Instability in Central Africa: A Threat Assessment Summary: This study was undertaken to inform programme development efforts in the context of UNODC’s regional programme approach. The Great Lakes region of Central Africa is a region of vast natural resources – and great potential – with a tragic history. Remarkable progress has been made in some countries, while others are only now beginning to find their feet. Many of the problems facing the region stretch back to colonial times, but the current situation is best explained by reference to more recent events. By some estimates, over five million people died during the eight-country conflict known as the Second Congo War which started in 1998, making it one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II. The human impact has been tremendous: communities have been displaced, weapons disseminated, the population traumatized, and the economy decimated. Although the formal hostilities ended in 2002-2003, violence has continued to afflict the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Smouldering grievances, often highly local ones, were again stirred to a blaze. Ethnic tensions in Ituri, a region in Orientale province, stretch back many decades, but violence surged again after the end of the war. The Kivu provinces experienced continuing bouts of extreme brutality fuelled by competition for land and resources, as well as by ethnic grievances. Today, however, the DRC is in a state of transition. Deaths due to disease and malnutrition, tied in part to the displacement caused by violence, continue, but the World Bank estimates that there were only 610 battlefield deaths in 2008. Though no one is declaring victory yet, it appears that the scale of the conflict has substantially declined. The violence that remains, however, is a potent mix of interpersonal violence and the continuing presence of armed groups across the Eastern DRC, much of which is connected to the exploitation of natural resources. The violence is preventing the region as a whole from benefiting from development opportunities that would come with stability. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 4, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Central_Africa_Report_2011_web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Central_Africa_Report_2011_web.pdf Shelf Number: 123225 Keywords: Exploitation of Natural ResourcesOffenses Against the EnvironmentOrganized Crime (Central Africa)ViolenceViolent CrimeWildlife Crime |
Author: Amnesty International Title: 'Shut Up If You Don't Want To Be Killed!" Human Rights Violations by Police in the Dominican Republic Summary: Hundreds of people are shot and killed every year by police in the Dominican Republic. Members of the national police are responsible, on average, for 15 per cent of all homicides in the country. although the vast majority of these fatal shootings are described by the police as “exchanges of gunfire” with criminal suspects, the evidence suggests that in many cases the killings are unlawful. Widespread corruption within the national police force and aggressive policing methods have undermined public trust and exacerbated the public security crisis in a country where levels of violent crime have increased significantly in recent years. This report details numerous cases of human rights violations by police including unlawful shootings, torture and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention. it analyses the difficulties faced by victims’ families and survivors in getting justice. The report also examines how weak oversight mechanisms have allowed human rights abuses by the police to persist and flourish. Details: London: Amnesty International, 2011. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR27/002/2011/en/6ead3e9d-0684-40ae-aa71-73c3dc5382dc/amr270022011en.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Dominican Republic URL: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR27/002/2011/en/6ead3e9d-0684-40ae-aa71-73c3dc5382dc/amr270022011en.pdf Shelf Number: 123234 Keywords: HomicidesHuman RightsPolice CorruptionPolice Use of Force (Dominican Republic)Violence |
Author: Gutierrez Sanin, Francisco Title: Stupid and Expensive? A critique of the costs-of-violence literature Summary: This paper considers the impact of war and violence from a perspective of economic development. The author highlights conceptual issues that have often been disregarded in the costs-of-violence literature and outlines distinctions between bullionist, deadweight and distributive approaches. The paper examines key trends emerging from the existing literature and considers Colombia and Peru as case studies. The author concludes that a more careful approach to the data when assessing the costs of war could assist in understanding how and why war may on occasion lead to patterns of increased growth and welfare and how this could better inform policy interventions. Details: London: Crisis States Research Center, 2009. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, No. 48: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP482.pdf Year: 2009 Country: South America URL: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP482.pdf Shelf Number: 123273 Keywords: Costs of CrimeEconomics of CrimeViolence |
Author: Bouhana, Noemie Title: Al Qa'ida-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory: Scientific Report Summary: This paper presents findings from research into the causes of Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation. It looks to understand vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa‘ida influenced violent extremism; and distinguishes between indicators and causal factors of criminal and violent behaviour. It also explores what transferable knowledge can be applied from youth gangs, new religious movements and violent radical activism. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 97: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123274 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence |
Author: Munton, Tony Title: Understanding Vulnerability and Resilience in Individuals to the Influence of Al Qa’ida Violent Extremism Summary: In the absence of a mature empirical evidence base it explores what transferrable knowledge can be taken from the more developed literature on other types of violent activity e.g. other terrorist activity, gangs, cults, etc. This report presents the findings of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of open source empirical studies that seek to answer two key questions: • What factors, social, psychological and physical, make a person more vulnerable to participation in Al Qa’ida (AQ)-influenced violent extremism? • What factors enable vulnerable individuals to resist the influence of AQ-influenced violent extremism? This report also presents the findings from a second targeted REA on other relevant types of violent activity, including: • other (non-AQ-influenced) types of terrorist activity; • animal rights activism; • cults; • gangs; • right-wing extremism; and • youth crime. The report discusses learning from these other areas and how far lessons learned can be applied to the study of AQ-influenced violent extremism. Both REAs involved systematic searches of relevant electronic databases and hand searches of academic journals and websites. Additional relevant literature was identified by topic experts, peer reviewers, specific websites, and through backward and forward citation chasing. Studies were included if they were based on empirical research, were relevant to the REAs’ questions and were assessed to be of high scientific quality. The empirical evidence base on what factors make an individual more vulnerable to AQ-influenced violent extremism is weak. Even less is known about why certain individuals resort to violence, when other individuals from the same community, with similar experiences, do not become involved in violent activity. The following conclusions are based on the limited empirical evidence base identified by the two REAs. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 98: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 123275 Keywords: Extremist GroupsGang ViolenceRadical GroupsTerrorismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Disley, Emma Title: Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism Summary: This paper looks at why and how individuals stop being violent and whether there are intervention practices to learn from. It also explores transferable knowledge from the literature on street gangs, religious cults, right-wing groups and organised crime groups. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper No. 99: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123276 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDesistanceExtremist GroupsGangsOrganized CrimeRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence |
Author: Steinberg, Nik Title: Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on Drugs” Summary: Five years since President Felipe Calderón declared “war” on organized crime in Mexico and dispatched the military to confront the country’s drug cartels, the government’s policy is failing on two fronts. It has not succeeded in reducing violence, and has resulted in a dramatic increase in grave human rights violations, which have only exacerbated the climate of violence, lawlessness, and fear that exists in many parts of the country. Based on extensive research in five states — Baja California, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Nuevo León, and Tabasco — Neither Rights Nor Security presents compelling evidence of the systematic use of torture by Mexican security forces, as well as the involvement of police and soldiers in scores of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. These are not isolated acts. Rather as the testimonies of victims, eyewitnesses, and evidence from public information requests and official government statistics show, these abusive tactics are endemic to Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts. The violations persist in large part because the members of security forces who commit them are virtually never held accountable. Many cases languish in the military justice system. And even when investigations are opened in the civilian justice system, prosecutors repeatedly fail to take basic steps such as identifying and interviewing witnesses. Nevertheless, government officials are often quick to dismiss victims’ allegations as false and to cast victims as criminals. Such accusations compound the suffering already inflicted by these serious violations and place the burden on victims and their families to conduct investigations themselves. Neither Rights Nor Security demonstrates how this pattern of abuse and impunity is undercutting Mexico’s efforts to reduce violence, dismantle criminal networks, and restore the rule of law in parts of the country where it has been badly damaged. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011. 218p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2011 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf Shelf Number: 123278 Keywords: DisappearancesDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingHomicidesHuman Rights (Mexico)Organized CrimePolice Use of ForceTortureViolence |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform Summary: Violent drug-trafficking organizations (VDTOs) in Mexico produce, transship, and deliver into the United States tens of billions of dollars worth of narcotics annually, but their activities are not limited to drug trafficking. VDTOs have also engaged in human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, racketeering, and assassinations. In an effort to clarify the scope and details of the challenges posed by VDTOs, a RAND team conducted a Delphi expert elicitation exercise, the results of which offer an assessment of the contemporary security situation in Mexico through the lens of existing RAND research on related issues. The exercise centered around three strands of prior RAND research on urban instability and unrest, historical insurgencies, and defense-sector reform. Although this prior research was not designed specifically for the study of Mexico, all three areas offer applicable insights. Assessment scorecards from these projects were used to obtain input from the expert panel and to guide the resulting discussion. The goal was not to break significant new ground in understanding the dynamics of drug violence in Mexico or to offer a qualitative assessment of these dynamics, but rather to provide an empirically based platform for identifying key areas that merit further investigation. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 108p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html Shelf Number: 123414 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Illegal DrugsViolence |
Author: Erikson, Bryan Title: Crimes in Northern Burma: Results from a Fact-Finding Mission to Kachin State Summary: On 9 June 2011, civil war broke out in northern Burma between the Burma Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), ending a 17-year long ceasefire agreement. This report presents data collected from a Partners investigation in southern Kachin State, Burma in October 2011. The testimony of witnesses and on-site photographs reveal multiple acts perpetrated by Burma Army battalions 74 and 276 against ethnic Kachin civilians that potentially amount to war crimes and other extreme crimes. These acts include torture, extrajudicial killing, the specific targeting of civilians, human shielding, unlawful arrest, unlawful detention, forced labor, forced relocation, displacement, property theft and property destruction. Witnesses reported that Burma Army soldiers entered Nam Lim Pa village on 8 October 2011. Men were arrested and detained for forced labor. Women and children were detained in the Roman Catholic church compound against their will and without provocation or expressed reason. Violent injuries demonstrate signs of extreme physical abuse and strongly suggest the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering while in custody. Civilian casualties included torture and execution. Eyewitness reports indicate no Kachin Independence Army presence during the time of the attacks. Villagers were forcibly relocated and displaced by armed soldiers. Houses, offices and churches were robbed and vandalized, all without justification. At least one home was robbed and burned to the ground while its owner was arrested and detained. The results from this fact-finding mission to Kachin State reveal evidence of crimes that potentially amount to war crimes, perpetrated by the Burma Army against ethnic Kachin civilians and their properties in October 2011. Based on the incidents documented in this report, the Burma Army is in contravention of its legal obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. Considering the nature and scale of these acts in combination with documented abuses in the broader civil war in Kachin State, the actions of the Burma government and the Burma Army may also amount to other serious violations, including crimes against humanity. Those responsible must be brought to justice and held accountable for their actions. Partners makes the following key recommendations: To the Burma government and the Burma Army — Cease targeting civilians in the civil war in northern Burma and other ethnic areas, and respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law. — Permit independent, impartial, and credible investigations of human rights violations. — Develop a legal framework to investigate, prosecute and address allegations of abuse. — Allow United Nations and humanitarian agencies unfettered access to conflict-affected communities. To the International Community — Support a UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry into international crimes in Burma, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, as recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Tomas Ojea Quintana. — Engage the Burmese authorities on serious human rights violations occurring in the country with an emphasis on accountability. To UN agencies and the Donor Community — Support and coordinate activities with Burma-based and border-based humanitarian agencies working with conflict-affected communities. — Urge the Burma government to increase access to at-risk civilian populations and all populations of internally displaced persons. Details: Partner's Relief & Development, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://partnersworld.org/usa/images/stories/crimes_in_northern_burma/crimes_in_northern_burma.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Burma URL: http://partnersworld.org/usa/images/stories/crimes_in_northern_burma/crimes_in_northern_burma.pdf Shelf Number: 123596 Keywords: Extrajudicial KillingsHuman Rights (Burma)TortureViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo Title: Final Report: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Municipal Police of Ciudad Juárez Summary: On September 26, 2011, the Justice in Mexico Project presented the results of its latest Justiciabarómetro survey, titled: Diagnóstico integral de la policía municipal de Ciudad Juárez (in Spanish), which was developed in collaboration with the Colegio de Chihuahua, the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and the Comisión Nacional Para Prevenir y Erradicar la Violencia Contra Las Mujeres de la Secretaría de Gobernación. The survey builds on the findings of a similar study conducted one year earlier in Guadalajara, and was implemented for the Justice in Mexico Project by the polling firm Data Opinión Pública y Mercados (DATA-OPM). Along with the Guadalajara survey, this study of the Ciudad Juárez police department, conducted in represents one of the largest independent studies of a police force ever published in Mexico. Focusing on the border city of Ciudad Juárez, adjacent to El Paso, Texas, this study focuses on one of the country’s most important industrial cities and, at the time the survey was implemented, the most violent municipality in Mexico. This study surveyed 75% of the 3,146 municipal police officers serving the roughly 1.3 million inhabitants of Ciudad Juárez. This survey was conducted in June 2010, during the worst year of violence since rival organized crime groups began fighting for control of drug trafficking routes through this major trade corridor. In October 2010, a new mayoral administration took office, introducing new measures to improve the local police department. This study therefore provides a snapshot of the department as the new administration took over, and a useful baseline for evaluating what progress has been made over the last year. Among the key findings of the survey were severe deficiencies in training and equipment, a lack of merit-based hiring criteria and civil service protections, high levels of distrust among law enforcement personnel, and severe problems of coordination with state and federal law enforcement agencies. Over half the force indicated that they do not have the equipment that they need to do their job, including adequate police uniforms, and half said that the condition of available equipment was bad (33%) or very bad (17%). Respondents demonstrated a basic knowledge of proper law enforcement protocols, but also expressed a strong demand (47%) for more training. 85% said that they have no opportunity to practice the proper use of a firearm on a regular basis, 55% indicated that they do not receive any breaks during their shift, and a significant portion (47%) indicated that they do not have adequate time to exercise during their shift. Among various questions on law enforcement integrity, 60% of respondents indicated that honesty is the most important virtue of a police officer, but only 40% believed that it was the virtue most present on the force. Notably, on a scale of 0 to 4, roughly 65% indicated that the the level of corruption was at 2 or higher and 36% of respondents felt that the level was above 3. In terms of where corruption is located, 44% of respondents indicated that it was found at the highest levels, 29% indicated that corruption was found at all levels, and the remainder indicated corruption was found only in at lower or middle management levels. Such problems reflect systemic problems common in police departments in Mexico (as evidenced by the aforementioned survey in Guadalajara), and will no doubt take considerable time to redress. In the meantime, monitoring by the Justice in Mexico Project suggests that the security situation has improved moderately in Ciudad Juárez, with at least a 30% decline in homicides in 2011 compared to 2010. Many credit Ciudad Juárez’s newly appointed police chief, Julian Leyzaola, for achieving a dramatic drop in drug violence. As chief of Tijuana’s police department during 2007-2010, Leyzaola presided over a dramatic decline in drug related violence during his tenure in office, an achievement that many hope will now be replicated in Ciudad Juárez. This survey helps to measure many of the challenges the department faces, and sets a baseline for evaluating reform efforts over the coming years. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute , University of San Diego, Justice in Mexico Project, 2011. 52p. Source: Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 123643 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimePolice (Mexico)Police AgenciesPolicingViolence |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers Summary: Public safety is increasingly determined by crime and security in urban spaces. How the public safety problem in urban spaces is dealt with in the 21st century as urbanization intensifies will determine citizens’ perceptions of the accountability and effectiveness of the state in upholding the social contract between the citizens and the state. Major cities of the world, and the provision of security and order within them, will increasingly play a major role in the 21st century distribution of global power. In many of the world’s major cities, law enforcement and social development have not caught up with the pace of urbanization, and there is a deep and growing bifurcation between developed and reasonably safe sectors of economic growth and social advancement and slums stuck in a trap of poverty, marginalization, and violence. Addressing the violence and lifting the slums from this trap will be among the major challenges for many governments. Aerial view of Venezuela's bigest slum of Petare in Caracas September 1, 2010. There are many forms of urban violence. This article presents some of the key law enforcement and socioeconomic policy lessons from one type of response to urban slums controlled by non-state actors: namely, when the government resorts to physically retaking urban spaces that had been ruled by criminal or insurgent groups and where the state’s presence had been inadequate or sometimes altogether nonexistent. Its focus is on Latin America—specifically Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Jamaica; but its findings apply more broadly and are informed by similar dynamics between non-state actors and state policies in places like Karachi, Pakistan, and Johannesburg, South Africa. In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavily-armed police or military units to physically retake territories controlled de facto by criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of resumed state control, the heavily-armed units hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police forces, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since 2000. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-state criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions: whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance; how to generate local intelligence; and when to hand over law enforcement to regular or community police forces. With respect to announcing the force insertion in advance, the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations has to be traded off against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to hide and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the state and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as the government’s tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the state and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is, at times, even more challenging than conducting the initial clearing operations. Although unlike the heavily-armed forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust by the community and ultimately to focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amounts of time, often at least over a year. Ideally, police develop not only local police forces, but community-based and problem-oriented policing as well. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizen boards, further facilitates building community trust in the police. After the disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavily-armed and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the state. Thus, developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Addressing street crime, especially when through problem-oriented policing approaches, also often tends to be relatively simple and inexpensive. Moreover, preventing at least some street crime through such measures allows police forces to concentrate on more complex street and organized crime. Moreover, community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Ceding a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust of the local population and being able to resurrect it later. Rather than operating on a predetermined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and the criminal groups following clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit—in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly-valuable land and other previously- inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal businesses outside of their area of operation. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public-safety gains from the clearing operations can be completely lost. Instead of countering the causes of illegal economies and violent organized crime through strengthening effective and accountable state presence, government intervention may only alter the form of criminality and displace existing problems to other areas. Expanding the justice system to cover areas where no courts were previously present usually takes considerable time. As a result, a dispute-resolution vacuum often emerges immediately following the clearing operations. This near-term absence of dispute resolution processes and enforcement is one impetus for the rise of crime and disorder in the post-clearing phase. One of the acute dilemmas encountered by law enforcement forces in the retaken territory and managers of the operation is whether or not, how quickly, and in what form to suppress illegal economies that exist in the retaken territory. There may be several reasons why the state would want to suppress the illegal economy. These include the leakage of illicit flows to other locales, a belief that the profitability of illicit profits will dissuade slum residents from switching to legal economies, and a fear that the persistence of illegal economies will pull in new violence and perpetuate anti-social and anti-state values among the slum residents.However, suppressing local illegal economies in urban spaces comes with significant costs, such as massive drops in household income of slum residents, new alienation of the population from the state, expansion of criminal activity and the rise of extortion, and the dissipation of law enforcement focus. Generating legal alternative livelihoods in urban spaces requires that the economic development strategy addresses all the structural drivers of illegal economic production. Beyond providing for security and the rule of law, such a comprehensive approach requires that stable property rights be established, access to microcredit developed, access to education and health care expanded, and crucial infrastructure deficiencies redressed. Often the most challenging problem for economic development in such situations is to generate sustainable legal jobs. Limited, isolated, discreet interventions, even when responsive to the wishes of the local community, are particularly ineffective in changing socioeconomic dynamics in a marginalized community. They do not have the capacity to alter basic social patterns or generate jobs in the community, and therefore, do not reduce crime. If they amount largely to patronage handouts, they can generate complex negative equilibria between criminal and official political patrons or a crime-pays type of mentality. Saturating an area with money in order to buy the political allegiance of the population produces neither sustainable economic development nor desirable social and political practices. Such massive cash infusions distort the local economy, undermine local administration, and can fuel corruption, new crime (such as extortion and resource theft), and moral hazard. Economic development of marginalized urban spaces is rarely politically neutral. While it does strengthen marginalized communities, it has the potential to undermine established powerbrokers (especially those who straddle the crime world and the official political world) by depriving them of their agent-patron role. Such powerbrokers, therefore, have an interest in hampering and limiting the extent to which the state is extended to the marginalized areas. Coordination across different line-ministries and agencies, and across different levels of government is often difficult to achieve, but failure to achieve good coordination can undermine the entire effort. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Latin America Initiative, 2011. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18, 2012 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/1205_latin_america_slums_felbabbrown/1205_latin_america_slums_felbabbrown.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/1205_latin_america_slums_felbabbrown/1205_latin_america_slums_felbabbrown.pdf Shelf Number: 123652 Keywords: Orbanized Crime (Latin America)SlumsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Oakley, Robin Title: Are you saying I'm Racist? An evaluation of work to tackle racist violence in three areas of London Summary: Racist violence continues to be a serious problem in Britain. In 2010/11 more than 51,187 racist incidents were recorded by the police in England & Wales, of which 9,464 (18%) occurred in London and the British Crime Survey estimates that the actual number of such incidents is around 200,000 annually. A recent study by the Institute of Race Relations indicates that more than 90% of perpetrators are white, 85% are male, and 60% are perpetrated by children or young adults under 25. The emergence of the English Defence League, and signs that inter-ethnic violence between minority groups may be increasing, both underline that this is an issue that continues to need to be addressed, especially through work with young people. Current approaches, however, do not seem to be proving effective. Focusing on tackling the problem primarily through responding to incidents once they have occurred is too limited an approach. ‘Zero tolerance’ as a response to racism in work with young people (e.g. by teachers excluding pupils for such behaviour from school) fails to address the underlying causes of their attitudes and behaviour. There is little reason to believe that reactive and repressive responses will bring about the necessary change: a more proactive response that draws out the problem and confronts it with the aim of prevention is needed. Three projects in London have been developing ways of working with young people to prevent them becoming involved in racist violence. The Trust for London initiated and funded this initiative after research had shown that, although young people tend to be the main perpetrators, there was little preventive work being targeted directly at those at risk of such involvement. The projects developed a variety of innovative approaches, engaging mainly with groups of young people in neighbourhoods and schools. Most of the young people the projects worked with were white, but some were black or from other minority ethnic groups. Some were linked with gangs, but most were not, and the project workers found that racist attitudes were widely held among young people in their areas, and that being ‘at risk’ of involvement in racist violence was widespread rather affecting only a special few. Their experience shows that face-to-face work with young people at the local level by skilled practitioners can have a significant impact on racist attitudes and behaviour, thus reducing ethnic tensions and promoting integration among young people with different backgrounds and identities. There is an urgent need, however, to integrate the lessons from this initiative into mainstream policy around youth and community issues, and also into the core training and everyday practice of youth and community workers and staff in schools. Details: London: Trust for London, 2011. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 21, 2012 at http://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/PVR_Full%20Report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/PVR_Full%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 123715 Keywords: Hate CrimesJuvenilesRacist Crimes (United Kingdom)Violence |
Author: Helweg-Larsen, Karin Title: Framework for Nordic youth surveys on child sexual abuse and exposure to violence outside and in the family. Summary: In June 2007 the Danish Crime Prevention Council (Det Kriminalpræventive Råd, DKR) engaged a group of Nordic researchers in a dialogue on the feasibility of setting up a framework for future surveys on violence and sexual abuse during childhood and early adolescence. The major objective was to promote research networking in order to create a basis for comparable studies in the five Nordic countries as a part of a joint Nordic project on violence "Violence and its reduction in the Nordic countries" (Våld och våldsreducering i Norden). Thereby, a solid foundation for prevention of sexual abuse and other violence against children would be achieved. By establishing a research network for a youth survey in different aspects of child violence in the Nordic countries, the aim was to encourage a joint Nordic framework. The Nordic researchers have agreed upon a survey model that may describe the current prevalence and character of child abuse and have tried to ensure future joint research projects on risk factors of child violence and abuse in the different Nordic countries based on comparable data. The present report describes the planning of a framework for youth surveys. In the report is documented the background for setting up school based youth surveys and the decisions taken by a working group. Details: Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord, 2009. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2009-540/at_download/publicationfile Year: 2009 Country: Denmark URL: http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2009-540/at_download/publicationfile Shelf Number: 123750 Keywords: Child AbuseChild Sexual AbuseDenmarkFinlandIcelandNorwaySwedenVictimization SurveysViolence |
Author: Takala, Jukka-Pekka Title: Looking at violence in the Nordic Countries: statistical sources, variations, improving measurement Summary: This report reviews and discusses violence statistics and their problems and possible improvements from various angles. The report is based on the work of the "statistical" subproject of the Nordic Project on Violence: "Violence and its reduction in the Nordic countries" (Våld och våldsreducering i Norden) financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers and carried out by the Nordic councils for crime prevention and the Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology. The Statistics Subproject was to look at three related but originally separate subprojects of the original overall plan: 1. To describe and compare violence with the help of extant statistics; 2. To chart variations in violence in the Nordic countries; 3. To develop instruments of measuring violence in intimate relations including violence in the family. With the resources available, the subproject was unable to carry out any of these tasks in a truly systematic and comprehensive manner. However, we hope that the variable material we were able to produce on all these themes can contribute to better accounting for violence and be of help when devising methods for preventing violence. The report describes levels and trends in violence. It touches on problems and solutions in their measurement. Some suggestions are tentative, others are more firmly established and the reader can turn to the research and web pages that are referred to in the reports. Details: Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord, 2009. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at http://www.norden.org/sv/publikationer/publikationer/2009-542/at_download/publicationfile Year: 2009 Country: Denmark URL: http://www.norden.org/sv/publikationer/publikationer/2009-542/at_download/publicationfile Shelf Number: 123751 Keywords: DenmarkFinlandIcelandNorwaySwedenVictimization SurveysVictims of CrimeViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Adams, William Title: An Analysis of Federally Prosecuted CSEC Cases since the Passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 Summary: This study examined the prosecution of the commercial sexual exploitation of children and youth (CSEC) in the United States. The research took the form of a national analysis of federal prosecutions since the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000, answering the following research questions: (1) Is the United States enforcing existing federal laws related to CSEC? (2) What are the key features of successfully prosecuted CSEC cases? (3) Have the U.S. courts increased penalties associated with sexual crimes against children? (4) What are the effects of CSEC legislation on service providers who work with victims? This assessment provides policy makers with a means of assessing the effects of legislation aimed at combating CSEC. Details: Washington, DC: Justice Policy Center, Urban Institute, 2008. 163p. Source: Final Report: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 27, 2012 at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411813_CSEC_analysis.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411813_CSEC_analysis.pdf Shelf Number: 123832 Keywords: Commerical Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC)Human TraffickingProsecutionTrafficking in PersonsViolence |
Author: Geneva Declaration Title: Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011 Summary: Drawing on comprehensive country-level data, including both conflict-related and criminal violence, it estimates that at least 526,000 people die violently every year, more than three-quarters of them in non-conflict settings. It highlights that the 58 countries with high rates of lethal violence account for two-thirds of all violent deaths, and shows that one-quarter of all violent deaths occur in just 14 countries, seven of which are in the Americas. New research on femicide also reveals that about 66,000 women and girls are violently killed around the world each year. This volume also assesses the linkages between violent death rates and socio-economic development, demonstrating that homicide rates are higher wherever income disparity, extreme poverty, and hunger are high. It challenges the use of simple analytical classifications and policy responses, and offers researchers and policy-makers new tools for studying and tackling different forms of violence. Details: Geneva: Geneva Declaration, 2012. 175p. (Also available from Cambridge University Press) Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2012 at: http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2011.html Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2011.html Shelf Number: 123918 Keywords: Armed ViolenceGun ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Carpenter, Ted Galen Title: Undermining Mexico's Dangerous Drug Cartels Summary: Since President Felipe Calderón launched a military-led offensive against Mexico's powerful drug cartels in December 2006, some 42,000 people have perished. The situation is so bad that the Mexican government's authority in several portions of the country, especially along the border with the United States, is shaky, and the growing turbulence creates concerns that Mexico is in danger of becoming a failed state. Although such fears are excessive at this point, even that dire scenario can no longer be ruled out. U.S. political leaders and the American people also worry that Mexico's corruption and violence is seeping across the border into the United States. That danger is still fairly limited, but the trend is ominous. Both the number and severity of incidents along the border are rising. Experts propose several strategies for dealing with Mexico's drug violence. One suggestion is to apply the model used earlier to defeat the Colombian drug cartels. But the victory in Colombia is not as complete as proponents contend, and the situation in Mexico is far less favorable to using that strategy. Another suggested approach is to try to restore Mexico's status quo ante, in which the government largely looked the other way while drug traffickers sent their product to the United States. But too much has changed politically in Mexico for that approach, which would be only a temporary Band-Aid solution in any case. The only lasting, effective strategy is to defund the Mexican drug cartels. Reducing their billions of dollars in revenue requires the United States, as the principal consumer market for illegal drugs, to abandon its failed prohibition policy. That move would eliminate the lucrative black-market premium and greatly reduce the financial resources the cartels have available to bribe officials or hire enforcers to kill competitors and law enforcement personnel and intimidate the Mexican people. A refusal to abandon prohibition means that Mexico's agony will likely worsen and pose a significant security problem for the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2011. 20p. Source: Policy Analysis No. 688: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA688.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA688.pdf Shelf Number: 124075 Keywords: Border Security (U.S. and Mexico)Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingViolence |
Author: Hervieu, Benoit Title: Paraguay: Journalists Alone Facing Trafficking Summary: Last February, Reporters Without Borders released its first-ever thematic report on organized crime, the main source of physical danger for journalists since the end of the Cold War. Produced with the help of our correspondents and specialists in several continues, that report underlined how difficult it is for the media to investigate the criminal underworld’s activities, networks and infiltration of society. Aside from covering bloody shootouts between rival cartels, news media of any size usually seem ill-equipped to describe organized crime’s hidden but ubiquitous presence. Paraguay, which a Reporters Without Borders representative visited from 3 to 10 July, is a good example of these problems. Overshadowed by Brazil and Argentina, its two big neighbours in the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), it has long received one of the world’s worst rankings in Transparency International’s corruption index. It is also a major way station in the trafficking of cocaine from the Bolivian Andes to the Southern Cone. While the level of violence is not as high as in Mexico, Colombia or some Central American countries, the persistent corruption, judicial impunity and influence of mafia activity on political and business activity prevent the media and civil society from playing a watchdog role. Although elections brought about a real change of government for the first time in 2008, Paraguay is still struggling to free itself from the code of silence and complicity that prevailed during the decades of dictatorship and affects the media as well. This was clear from interviews with journalists, observers and state officials in Asunción and Concepción, in the border cities of Ciudad del Este and Encarnación, and the Argentine border city of Posadas. Details: Paris: Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom, 2011. 11p. Source: Inquiry Report: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2012 at http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/paraguay_report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Paraguay URL: http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/paraguay_report.pdf Shelf Number: 124205 Keywords: Drug CartelsJournalistsMediaOrganized CrimeTrafficking (Paraguay)Violence |
Author: Huhn, Sebastian Title: Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua: Social Perceptions in Everyday Life Summary: Central America has the reputation of being a violent region with high crime rates, youth gangs, drug traffic, and ubiquitous insecurity. Politicians, the media, and social scientists in and outside the region often claim that the societies are in complete agreement with their judgment of the situation and that all society members are calling for law and order and social segregation. Focusing on Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the paper analyzes the social perception of violence and crime. On the basis of essays written by secondary school students and interviews with citizens from all walks of life in the three countries, the paper points out how elite arguments on violence and crime are translated into everyday life, and what society members suggest be done to deal with these problems. The sources prove that there are noticeable hegemonic discourses on violence and crime in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Simultaneously, a majority of the respondents call for social and integrative solutions rather than the so-called “iron fist.” The repressive trend in Central American policies therefore does not necessarily receive the presumed affirmation asserted by many authorities on and in the region. Details: Hamburg, Germany: GIGA Research Programme, Violence, Power and Security, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2008. 31p. Source: GIGA Working Paper No. 81: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at Year: 2008 Country: Central America URL: Shelf Number: 124224 Keywords: Costa RicaEl SalvadorNicaraguaPublic OpinionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Liang, Christina Schori Title: Shadow Networks: The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organised Crime Summary: Key Points: there are growing links between terrorist and organised crime groups who are sharing expertise and are cooperating in kidnapping, arms, drugs and human trafficking, as well as drug production, cigarette smuggling, extortion and fraud; The growing nexus of shared tactics and methods of terror and crime groups is due to four major developments: globalization, the communication revolution through the Internet, the end of the Cold War, and the global "war on terror"; Both terrorist and organised crime groups are leveraging the Internet for recruitment, planning, psychological operations, logistics, and fundraising. The Internet has become the platform for both organised crime and terrorists to conduct cybercrimes ranging from video piracy, credit card fraud, selling drugs, extortion, money laundering and pornography; The growing nexus has facilitated terrorists to access automatic weapons, including stand-off weapons and explosive devices, empowering them to challenge police, land and naval forces with the latest sophisticated weaponry and intelligence; The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime is exacerbating efforts in war-fighting and peacemaking in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, West Africa in general and the Sahel in particular have become a dangerous new trafficking hub uniting both terrorists and organised crime cartels across a wide and mostly ungoverned land mass; The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime groups is challenging international and national security by weakening democratic institutions, compromising government institutions, damaging the credibility of financial institutions and by infiltrating the formal economy, leading to increased crime and human security challenges. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011. 6p. Source: GCSP Policy Paper No. 20: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://gcsp.ch/content/download/6607/61163/download Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://gcsp.ch/content/download/6607/61163/download Shelf Number: 124228 Keywords: InternetOrganized CrimeTerrorismTransnational CrimeViolenceWeapons |
Author: Carius, Alexander Title: Minerals and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention Summary: This toolkit is part of a series that explores how development assistance can address key risk factors associated with conflict. One area that is receiving increasing attention is the relationship between natural resources and violence. In many recent conflicts, valuable or scarce resources — land, water, timber, or minerals — have played a central role in both causing and sustaining violence. In particular, valuable minerals took center stage after "conflict diamonds" or "blood diamonds" became a prominent feature of Sierra Leone's civil war. Unfortunately, competition over minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has followed a similarly brutal course. This toolkit: 1) examines the relationship between valuable minerals, such as diamonds or coltan, and violence; 2) discusses lessons learned in developing programs to deal with "conflict commodities"; 3) presents a range of program options; 4) provides a survey instrument that identifies key questions related to minerals and conflict; and 5) identifies relevant USAID mechanisms and implementing partners. Monitoring and evaluation tools are being developed.Together, the elements of this toolkit are designed to raise awareness about the linkages among valuable minerals, development assistance, and conflict; and to help integrate a conflict perspective into development programming. The toolkits in this series explore individual risk factors in depth.They do not identify all relevant factors linked to violence. As such, they are designed to serve as companion pieces to conflict assessments. Conflict assessments provide a broad overview of destabilizing patterns and trends in a society.They sift through the many potential causes of conflict that exist and zero in on those that are most likely to lead to violence (or renewed violence) in a particular context. While they provide recommendations about how to make development and humanitarian assistance more responsive to conflict dynamics, they do not provide detailed guidance on how to design specific activities.The toolkits in this series are intended to fill that gap by moving from a diagnosis of the problem to a more detailed discussion of potential interventions.Together, the assessment framework and toolkits are designed to help Missions gain a deeper understanding of the forces driving violence and to develop more strategic and focused interventions. This toolkit was initially authored by a team of researchers, including Alexander Carius (Adelphi Research); Geoffrey Dabelko (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars); Doris Capistrano (CIFOR); Moira Feil (Adelphi Research); and Jason Switzer (International Institute for Sustainable Development). It was subsequently revised with substantial input from officers in USAID Missions, other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, academic experts, and members of the NGO community. Comments, questions, and requests for additional information should be directed to the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. Details: Washington, D.C.: Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 2005. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2012 at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_Minerals_and_Conflict_Toolkit_April_2005.pdf Year: 2005 Country: International URL: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_Minerals_and_Conflict_Toolkit_April_2005.pdf Shelf Number: 124639 Keywords: Conflict MineralsIllicit Mineral TradeNatural ResourcesViolence |
Author: Verité Title: Hidden Costs inthe Global Economy: Human Trafficking of Philippine Males in Maritime, Construction and Agriculture Summary: workers for almost all parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, North America, and Europe. However, certain workforce mechanisms and policies in these developed countries exploit the vulnerabilities of male Filipino workers (OFWs) overseas. The working conditions in these developed countries, combined with the Filipino workers’ significant lack of education on relevant topics, results in migrant workers falling prey to unscrupulous employers and human traffickers. Many of these OFWs are promised jobs that often entail exploitation, violence, poor working conditions, and offer little hope for improvement. Little is known about the trafficking of Filipino men. In the Philippines, as in other countries, the focus of anti-trafficking policy, research, and law enforcement has been almost exclusively on women and children victims, and consequently, more information is known on the industries and destinations into which women and children are often trafficked. Notably, in the last five years, Philippine media organizations have consistently carried reports of male overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) subjected to various exploitative and distressed situations. However, only recently have these situations been explicitly labeled as cases of trafficking. Despite the media mileage and the growing awareness and activism on human trafficking here and abroad, there remains a deep deficit of understanding with respect to male victims of human trafficking; the circumstances that lead to their being trafficked; and the places, sectors, or industries where the exploitation takes place. This discrepancy with respect to attention on male victims of human trafficking has begun to be recognized by policymakers and researchers. At the same time, the operational definition of human trafficking is being slowly expanded to encompass various modes of exploitation of migrant workers, including the exploitation of workers migrating legally under their own will for legitimate forms of employment. Several international organizations have published reports exploring the issue of male human trafficking, in response to the dearth of available studies. Some of these reports show that men are vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation in ways distinct from women, and that men may be less likely to report and talk openly about experiences of exploitation. Although Philippine anti-trafficking laws are constructed in a way that recognizes women, children and men as victims, available government databases reveal that very few cases involving male victims of labor trafficking are ever formally filed for litigation in court. Of the 12 convictions in 2006, when this research project was being conceptualized, none of these cases involved trafficking of men. Moreover, according to the 2009 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, there have been no reported labor trafficking convictions, despite extensive reports on Filipinos trafficked for forced labor domestically and across borders. Both the large numbers of Philippine males employed abroad, and the known labor violations among migrant workers employed in various types of work that are characteristically male, make the plight of male Philippine trafficking victims ripe for exploration. The short-term goal of this project was to build understanding and awareness of human trafficking of Philippine males by expanding the breadth and depth of knowledge surrounding male trafficking. The long-term goal is to make this increased body of knowledge available to governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, unions and other stakeholders who, through their policy and programmatic initiatives and services, will be able to reduce, via targeted prevention and victim assistance programs, the incidence of male trafficking and mitigate the subsequent devastating impact on victims. Details: Amherst, MA: Verité, Undated. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2012 at http://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/images/Verit%C3%A9%20TIP%20Report%20Male%20Trafficking.pdf Year: 0 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/images/Verit%C3%A9%20TIP%20Report%20Male%20Trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 124748 Keywords: Human TraffickingMales, FilipinoMigrant WorkersViolence |
Author: Patel, Deepali M. Title: Social and Economic Costs of Violence - Workshop Summary Summary: Violence not only causes physical and emotional damage, but also creates a social and economic burden on communities. Measuring these costs can be difficult, and most estimates only consider the direct economic effects of violence, such as productivity loss or the use of health care services. Beyond these clear-cut costs, however, the pain and suffering of violence can affect human and social development and increase the risk of chronic outcomes later in life. Communities and societies feel the effects of violence through loss of social cohesion, financial divestment, and the increased burden on the health care and justice systems. Initial estimates show that the cost of implementing successful violence prevention interventions is usually less than the cost borne by individuals and society if no action is taken. April 28-29, 2011, the IOM’s Forum on Global Violence Prevention held a workshop to evaluate the social and economic costs of violence. The workshop was designed to examine cross-cutting public health approaches to violence prevention from multiple perspectives and at various levels of society. Participants focused on exploring the successes and challenges of calculating direct and indirect costs of violence, as well as the potential cost-effectiveness of intervention. Speakers discussed social and economic costs of violence at four levels: individual, family, community, and societal. This document is a summary of the workshop. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2012 at: http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Social-and-Economic-Costs-of-Violence-Workshop-Summary.aspx Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Social-and-Economic-Costs-of-Violence-Workshop-Summary.aspx Shelf Number: 124762 Keywords: Costs of CrimeEconomics and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jain, Sonia Title: The Power of Developmental Assets in Building Behavioral Adjustment Among Youth Exposed to Community Violence: A Multidisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Resilience Summary: Researchers and practitioners have repeatedly noted substantial variation in the behavioral functioning of youth exposed to community violence. Several studies across fields have documented the detrimental effects of exposure to violence, while other studies have considered how developmental assets promote positive youth development. However, few have examined the lives of the many youth who demonstrate resilience (that is, positive adjustment despite risk) and hardly any have examined how developmental assets may shape resilient trajectories into adulthood for youth exposed to violence. What resources and relationships can high-risk youth leverage to tip the balance from vulnerability in favor of resilience? We used generalized estimating equations, a multivariable technique appropriate for longitudinal and clustered data, to examine multilevel longitudinal data from 1,114 youth ages 11-16 from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). We considered whether baseline family, peer and neighborhood-level protective factors predicted behavioral adjustment 3-7 years later, among youth who were victims of, witnesses of, or unexposed to violence, controlling for individual and neighborhood-level risks. Behavioral adjustment varied across waves and by exposure to violence. In the short-term, being a victim was associated with increased aggression and delinquency. In the long-term, though, both victims and witnesses to violence had higher odds of behavioral adjustment. Family support, friend support and neighborhood support, family boundaries and collective efficacy had protective effects, and family support, positive peers, and meaningful opportunities modified the effect of exposure to violence to increase the odds of behavioral adjustment over time. Policies, systems and programs across sectors that help nurture these specific supports and opportunities can promote positive behavioral trajectories and resilience into adulthood among urban youth exposed to community violence. Details: San Francisco: WestEd Health and Human Development Program, 2012. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237915.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237915.pdf Shelf Number: 124795 Keywords: Behavior ModificationCommunities and CrimePredictionViolenceViolent CrimeViolent Juvenile Offenders |
Author: United Nations Development Programme Title: Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security Summary: The increase in violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is an undeniable fact that erodes the very foundation of the democratic processes in the region and imposes high social, economic and cultural costs. Our region is home to 8.5 percent of the world’s population, yet it concentrates some 27 percent of the world’s homicides. Violence and crime are therefore perceived by a majority of Latin American and Caribbean citizens as a top pressing challenge. The resulting alarm has often led to short-sighted, mano dura (iron fist) policies, which have proven ineffective and, at times, detrimental to the rule of law. The situation varies much among and within countries. Broadly speaking, there are high- and low-crime countries in the region, and differences exist even within each of the sub-regions (i.e., South America, Central America, and the Caribbean). However perceived insecurity and citizens´ concern are independent of actual crime rates, so that mano dura policies are not exclusive of high-crime countries. In this context, we are confronted by a paradox: Why is it that, despite the democratization process experienced in the region in the last 20 years, citizen security levels, as well as the justice and security institutions in the region, are in crisis? Why is it that, despite the structural and institutional reforms promoted by countries in the region in order to construct governance mechanisms which are more transparent, horizontal and democratic, the justice and security institutions are overwhelmed and confidence in them is shattered? To begin to resolve this paradox and deal effectively with crime and violence, we need accurate assessments that provide evidence for action. To this end, the United Nations Development Programme, in association with governments, civil societies and international agencies, is leading numerous initiatives aimed at improving citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean. This report is a one of these efforts. Drafted by a team of outstanding scholars building upon previous research and practical experience, this report also reflects findings from the analysis of extensive new survey data and sustained consultations involving over 450 experts, practitioners and stakeholders in seven Dutch- and English-speaking Caribbean countries. Of primary concern with citizen security is the issue of public confidence in state capacity to protect citizens and ensure justice. If citizens lack confidence in the police, the judiciary and other public authorities, no amount of repression will restore security. The success of any law enforcement system depends on the willingness of the people to participate and contribute. For the state to enjoy the trust and commitment of the people, it must strive to eradicate exclusion, improve transparency and create opportunities that encourage a sense of belonging for all. A key message of the report is that Caribbean countries need to focus on a model of security based on the human development approach, whereby citizen security is paramount, rather than on the traditional state security model, whereby the protection of the state is the chief aim. Indeed, the contrast between prevention on the one hand and repression and coercion on the other is ill conceived. Social inclusion to help prevent crime and violence and efficient and effective law enforcement are by no means incompatible or mutually exclusive. In a truly democratic society, broad based social inclusion and swift criminal justice–or “prevention” and “coercion”—serve to reinforce and complement each other. This is one of the most important lessons to be taken from this report – and not only for the Caribbean but for all of Latin America as well. An issue of common interest to Latin America and the Caribbean is security. Organized transnational crime, mainly that which involves drug trafficking, looms large in the security crisis currently affecting an increasing number of countries in both sub-regions. Although this report concentrates on implications for the domestic dimensions of the problem in the Caribbean, especially among youth, it is also important to note that the Caribbean is a critical transit route between drug producers and large-scale consumers. As a result of this geographical positioning, it is necessary for the Caribbean to strengthen cooperation with its Latin American neighbours and project a larger voice in the global dialogue on existing policies and possible alternatives. An improved worldwide policy addressing the problem of addictive drugs could contribute considerably to reducing levels of violence and social disruption in the Caribbean. This belief is substantiated by an encouraging finding presented in the report: despite exceptionally high homicide rates, the overall incidence of crime in the Caribbean as measured by the victimization survey data “compares favourably at the lower end with countries such as Japan,” referring to nations that participated in the 2004-2005 International Crime Victimization Survey This suggests that the spiral of violence generally associated with drug trafficking exists within the context of an otherwise durable social fabric that makes for lesser ordinary “street” crime. Details: New York: UNDP, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Latin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%20HDR/C_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Latin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%20HDR/C_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf Shelf Number: 125173 Keywords: Crime (Latin American and Caribbean)Drug Trafficking - Economic DevelopmentHomicidesTransnational CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Williams, Phil Title: Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability Summary: The rationale for this series is a reflection of the ways in which the world of armed groups has changed and is continuing to change, and the impact of these changes on threats and challenges to national and global security. Although challenges posed by various kinds of violent armed groups initially appear highly diverse and unrelated to one another, in fact they all reflect the increasing connections between security and governance—and, in particular, the relationship between poor governance and violent armed groups. The growth in the number of states with capacity gaps, functional holes, and legitimacy deficits helps to explain the resurgence of a new medievalism, and the rise of illegal quasi-governments in localized areas. The irony is that after several decades in which the number of sovereign states represented in the United Nations (UN) has increased significantly, relatively few of these states can truly claim a monopoly on force within their territorial borders. Violent challengers to the Westphalian state have taken different forms in different parts of the world. These forms include tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug trafficking organizations, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations. In many cases, these groups are overtly challenging the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state structures while subtly undermining them; in yet others, the state is a passive bystander while violent armed groups are fighting one another. The mix is different, the combinations vary, and the perpetrators of violence have different motives, methods, and targets. In spite of their divergent forms, however, nonstate violent actors share certain viii qualities and characteristics. As Roy Godson and Richard Shultz have pointed out, “As surprising as it may seem, pirate attacks off Somalia, militias in Lebanon, and criminal armies in Mexico are part of a global pattern and not anomalies.” Indeed, these violent armed groups or, as they are sometimes called, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) represent a common challenge to national and international security, a challenge that is far greater than the sum of the individual groups, and that is likely to grow rather than diminish over the next several decades. Although the U.S. military—especially the Air Force and the Navy—still place considerable emphasis on the potential emergence of peer competitors among foreign armed forces, more immediate challenges have emanated not from states but from various kinds of VNSAs. This monograph, “Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability,” focuses on the complex relationship between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement. It also seeks to disentangle the linkages between insurgency on the one hand and drug trafficking and organized crime on the other, suggesting that criminal activities help sustain an insurgency, but also carry certain risks for the insurgency. Subsequent monographs will focus on specific areas where violent armed groups operate, or they will delve into specifics about some of those groups. Some works will be descriptive or historical, while others are more analytical, but together they will clarify the security challenges that, arguably, are the most important now faced by the United States and the rest of the world. The series will include monographs on Mexico, the Caribbean, and various kinds of violent armed groups. Details: Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Securities Studies; Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2012 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf Shelf Number: 125243 Keywords: Criminal OrganizationsDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimeTerroristsViolenceViolent CrimeYouth Gangs |
Author: Gilgen, Elizabeth Title: Armed Violence: Spotlight on Lethal Effects Summary: Armed violence—‘the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, or state’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 2)—has many harmful consequences, death being the most extreme. The reason why the number of violent deaths is frequently used as a proxy for armed violence is that killings are likely to be recorded more systematically than other crimes. Indeed, ‘[k]illing is treated seriously in all societies, which renders it more readily amenable to examination and measurement’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 43). This Research Note is largely based on Chapter 2 of the Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011 (GBAV 2011) report, which presents the GBAV 2011 database (Gilgen, 2011). Established by the Small Arms Survey, the database provides an overview of the number of violent deaths that took place across all settings from 2004 to 2009, revealing that 9 out of 10 violent deaths occur in non-conflict settings. The chapter sheds light on the 58 countries most affected by armed violence between 2004 and 2009 and focuses on trends in countries that exhibit the highest rates of violent deaths per capita. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2012. 4p. Source: Research Notes Number 17: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://mafiaandco.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/armed-violence-spotlight-on-lethal-effects.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://mafiaandco.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/armed-violence-spotlight-on-lethal-effects.pdf Shelf Number: 125328 Keywords: Armed ViolenceCrime TrendsViolence |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Crime and error: why we urgently need a new approach to illicit trafficking in fragile states Summary: Transnational organized crime has boomed in some of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world, prompting the international community into renewed efforts to devise a response. So far, however, the results have not been impressive. Murder rates remain stubbornly high along the cocaine highways of Central America, West African crime expands unabated, and in Central Asia, the trade route for heroin from Afghanistan remains under the control of armed groups and opaque political interests. This brief seeks to explain the fundamental errors and misconceptions which ensure that the fight against global crime, while scoring ever more arrests and interdictions, has failed to make headway against trafficking through fragile states. Although progress has been made in understanding how security and justice systems work, Western donors still need to confront the endemic weaknesses of institution-building, the extraordinary allure of the global criminal economy, and the ways that politicians and business systematically collude with traffickers. The brief concludes by listing a series of new policy areas that could underpin a new approach. Above all, these emphasize reducing the receptivity of fragile states to criminal enterprise, staunching violence, and ensuring the gradual build-up of trust, probity and clean business. Details: The Hague, The Netherlands: The Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2012. 6p. Source: CRU Policy Brief #23: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CRU_CrimeandError.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CRU_CrimeandError.pdf Shelf Number: 125329 Keywords: CorruptionOrganized CrimeTraffickingTransnational CrimeViolence |
Author: Shapiro, Robert J. Title: The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime: A Case Study of 8 American Cities Summary: This report presents the findings and conclusions of a yearlong project to examine and analyze the costs of violent crimes in a sample of eight major American cities and estimate the savings and other benefits that would accompany significant reductions in those crimes. This analysis draws on data pinpointing the incidence and location of murders, rapes, assaults, and robberies. The data were provided by the police departments of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Jacksonville, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Seattle. We examined a broad range of both direct and intangible costs associated with those violent crimes based on their incidence in each of the eight cities in 2010. The direct costs reported here are those borne by the residents and city governments of the eight cities, although additional costs are also borne by state and federal governments and the taxpayers who finance them. Finally, we calculated the benefits to those residents associated with substantial reductions in violent crime, including the impact on residential home values and a variety of savings to the city governments. In today’s tight fiscal and economic environment, the mayors and city councils of every city—along with state and the federal governments—are searching for ways to reduce their spending and expand their revenues. The common challenge is to achieve sustainable fiscal conditions without hobbling government’s ability to provide the vital goods and services that most Americans expect, all without burdening businesses and families with onerous new taxes. This analysis provides another way available to many American municipalities: Secure budget savings, higher revenues, and personal income and wealth gains by reducing violent crime rates. To calculate the extent of those savings and benefits, we analyze a broad range of direct costs associated with the violent crime in the eight cities sampled here. These direct costs start with local spending on policing, prosecuting, and incarcerating the perpetrators of those crimes. These costs also encompass out-of-pocket medical expenses borne by surviving victims of violent crime as well as the income those victims must forgo as a result of the crimes. These costs also include the lost incomes that would otherwise be earned by the perpetrators of violent crimes had they not been apprehended—as distasteful as it is to calculate the foregone income of rapists or armed robbers who are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated. These direct, annual costs range from $90 million per year in Seattle to around $200 million per year in Boston, Jacksonville, and Milwaukee, to more than $700 million in Philadelphia and nearly $1.1 billion for Chicago. This report also examines certain intangible costs associated with violent crime, including the pain and suffering of the surviving victims of violent crime and the costs to the families of murder victims. Across the eight cities examined here, the total annual costs of violent crimes, including these intangible costs as well as the more direct ones, range from more than $300 million per year in Seattle to more than $900 million in Boston, to some $3.7 billion per year in Philadelphia and $5.3 billion for Chicago. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2012. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 10, 2012 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/06/pdf/violent_crime.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/06/pdf/violent_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 125533 Keywords: Costs of CrimeEconomic AnalysisEconomics and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime (U.S.) |
Author: Title: Dismantling Colombia's New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender Summary: The surrender of the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC) in December 2011 risks going down as a failure. Only a fraction of the group took part; leaders may be getting away with short prison sentences; and the underlying criminal and corrupt structures will likely remain untouched. The impact on conflict dynamics in the group’s eastern-plains stronghold has been limited. As worrying, the lack of transparency, including of international oversight, has damaged the credibility of the process, leaving the impression that an illegal armed group has again outwitted state institutions to the detriment of the public and particularly of the victims. The authorities need to draw the right conclusions from the process. Otherwise, the lack of appropriate instruments to manage collective surrenders will continue to hamper efforts to combat groups such as ERPAC that have grown into one of the country’s top security challenges. The surrender of 272 members – slightly more than a third of ERPAC’s total armed strength – was the first time a New Illegal Armed Group (NIAG) with roots in the demobilised paramilitaries had chosen to give up its weapons. Pressure to surrender had been building, externally and within the group, since police killed its founder, alias “Cuchillo”, in December 2010. The former mid-level paramilitary leader had made ERPAC the dominant illegal armed force in parts of Meta, Guaviare and Vichada departments, with a key role in drug trafficking and other organised criminal activities. But with substantial links to the regional and local political elite as well as to parts of the security forces, ERPAC was always more than an ordinary criminal outfit. It exercised strict social control in its strongholds, including through targeted killing of community leaders, and was responsible for displacements, child recruitment and sexual violence. ERPAC members currently face criminal proceedings before ordinary courts. They may seek benefits provided for by the criminal justice system such as the reduction of sentences in return for accepting charges. But they are not eligible for the benefits of the government’s demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. This is because the government considers groups such as ERPAC criminal organisations (BACRIMs in the Spanish acronym) and not part of the internal armed conflict. For the same reason, NIAG members are also not eligible for consideration under transitional justice measures such as the 2005 Justice and Peace Law (JPL). A wholesale extension of DDR and transitional justice mechanisms to NIAGs would be unwarranted, but the exclusive reliance on the ordinary criminal law to try their members has its downsides. First, it leaves victims without legal guarantees and benefits extended to the victims of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries; a March 2012 Constitutional Court ruling might, however, open the door for some NIAG victims to be covered by the new 2011 Victims Law. Secondly, it leaves former fighters without a clear perspective of civilian reintegration, thus increasing risks they will take up arms again. Serious crimes committed by NIAGs need to be fully investigated and prosecuted, but a more expansive approach to dismantling these groups is also required where there is a sufficient link to the armed conflict. Contrary to government hopes, the ERPAC process revealed the limits of its surrender strategy, rather than vindicating it. The attorney general’s office had little choice but to free most of the fighters almost immediately, as only nineteen leaders were originally subjects of an arrest warrant. This obliged prosecutors and the police to recapture ERPAC members one by one, an onerous, still incomplete task. The public outrage was understandable, but more damaging is that the process will likely fail both to punish those responsible for serious crimes and to have a structural impact on ERPAC’s business activities as well as its corrupt links with politicians and security forces. Potential information from rank-and-file members on ERPAC operations appears not to have been fully exploited. Leaders do not face a credible threat of serious criminal charges and thus have little incentive to collaborate seriously with the judicial system. But the problem goes further. The government’s sharp conceptual distinction between parts of the conflict and organised crime groups – upon which the logic of the surrender was built – poorly reflects on-the-ground complexities. Groups such as ERPAC do not fully replicate the paramilitaries, but they cannot and should not be considered in isolation from the broader context of the internal armed conflict. This means that dismantling the NIAGs involves more than investigating and punishing individual criminals. It also requires dismantling corrupt networks, guaranteeing victims’ rights and preventing rearmament. Given its current weakness, reconciling such disparate interests overburdens the judicial system. The Santos administration deliberately left the field to the attorney general’s office, but the shortcomings revealed in the ERPAC experience have highlighted the need for an explicit surrender policy that goes beyond individual criminal prosecution and has active government leadership. After the Uribe administration long downplayed the NIAG threat, President Santos has taken a stronger stand, though results have remained elusive. Combating NIAGs is a complex challenge, involving multiple government agencies and cutting across several policies. But without an explicit surrender policy, the government’s anti-NIAG strategy will continue to fall short. Such a policy could also have benefits beyond future exercises with NIAGs. A more credible and encompassing approach to tackling NIAGs might become a crucial part of guarantees for the new peace talks with the guerrillas that the government is slowly preparing the ground for. RECOMMENDATIONS To facilitate collective surrenders of NIAGs in a manner that ensures their complete dismantlement, including front structures and corrupt networks, guarantees the protection of victims’ rights and prevents rearmament, while avoiding impunity To the Government of Colombia and the Attorney General and other Judicial System Authorities: 1. Ensure police and judicial institutions have the resources, capacity and career-incentives to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of NIAG crimes, including serious offences equivalent to grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), and the corrupt networks behind the groups. 2. Strengthen incentives for rank-and-file NIAG members to surrender and cooperate in revealing information about operations, superiors and enabling networks by clarifying whether and how the “opportunity principle” – which permits the attorney general’s office to suspend or desist from prosecution in a given case that does not involve grave violation of human rights and IHL – applies to them. 3. Improve the civilian perspective for former NIAGs members by introducing basic reintegration benefits, subject to strict criteria of eligibility, judicial records and behaviour. 4. Clarify the handling of young NIAG members, who should be eligible to enter the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF) program for child soldiers, despite the government’s classification of NIAGs as criminal organisations rather than part of the armed conflict. 5. Improve institutional guarantees for NIAG victims by an extensive and pro-victim interpretation of Law 1448 (2011), and if this proves ineffective, consider introducing legislation to ensure equal treatment for them. 6. Strengthen victims’ rights to truth by introducing an administrative program similar in design to Law 1424 (2010), under which NIAG rank-and-file members would receive legal benefits in return for contributing to the establishment of non-legal truth and historical memory; individuals responsible for serious offences should not be eligible for such a program. 7. Increase the credibility and accountability of surrender processes by inviting international organisations, in particular the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organisation of American States (Mapp-OAS), to monitor and accompany them. Details: Bogota; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report N°41: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/41-dismantling-colombias-new-illegal-armed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/41-dismantling-colombias-new-illegal-armed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender Shelf Number: 125653 Keywords: Armed Groups (Colombia)Illegal WeaponsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Title: Police Reform in Guatemala: Obstacles and Opportunities Summary: The 25,000 members of the National Civil Police (PNC) are on the front lines of Guatemala’s battle against crime. But all too often citizens distrust and fear the police – widely dismissed as inefficient, corrupt and abusive – as much as the criminals. Underfunded, poorly trained and often outgunned, they are frequently incapable or unwilling to confront criminals and gain the public trust needed to build a state based on rule of law. Drug traffickers, including Mexican cartels, move at will across porous borders, while criminal gangs dominate many urban areas. The government of President Otto Pérez Molina must reboot and revitalise police reform, as part of an overall effort to strengthen justice and law enforcement, with financial support from the U.S. and other countries interested in preventing Guatemala from becoming a haven for organised crime. Progress has been made, but achievements are fragile and easily reversed. Since the 1996 peace accords that ended 36 years of armed conflict, donors have poured tens of millions of dollars into police and justice sector reform. But despite these efforts, Guatemala, with its neighbours in the Northern Triangle of Central America, remains one of the most violent countries in the world. Governments have repeatedly promised reform, including the Pérez administration that took office in January 2012. The new president, a retired general, campaigned on the promise that his government would combat crime with an “iron fist”. Since then, he has deployed troops to help patrol high-crime areas, reinforced the military in border regions to fight drug trafficking and declared a state of siege to quell a local protest. He has also promised to strengthen the police by adding thousands of recruits, while restarting stalled efforts to overhaul the institution. The question is whether his government will be able to muster the resources and will to bolster institutional reform or will rely primarily on militarised crime-fighting operations that provide short-term gains without solving long-term problems. Some projects may provide templates for broader institutional change. Certain investigative units have demonstrated that the police can – given the proper resources, training and supervision – solve complex crimes. The UN-sponsored Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is providing training to both police and prosecutors. There are also encouraging developments within the area of preventive or community-oriented policing. In two municipalities outside Guatemala City, Villa Nueva and Mixco, activist mayors are trying to combat gangs and create stronger ties between the local communities and law enforcement. Those cities are also the location of two “model precincts”, supported by the U.S. government, which finances the vetting and training of police and supports programs designed to strengthen police-community collaboration. But these efforts are dependent on the financial aid and political backing of donors. The initiatives in Villa Nueva and Mixco rely on local politicians whose successors may not share their commitment. It is unclear whether reform efforts have enough support within the PNC hierarchy to survive over the long term. Without strong and consistent backing from the national government, business, civil society and the international community, the lessons learned from these pilot projects may be lost before they can be perfected and replicated. Compounding the difficulties reformers face is that change must take place following a decade of rising violence, much of it fuelled by organised crime, including Mexican drug cartels. High crime rates tend to overwhelm incremental progress, making it harder to resist calls for tough solutions that rely on the superior strength and discipline of the army. Using the army to fight crime, however, further demoralises and weakens the police, especially when the military’s role is poorly defined. This makes it harder in the long run to build the competent civilian forces needed to enforce the law under stable, democratic regimes. There is no single, fail-safe formula for reshaping an institution as complex as the police. Nor do police exist in a vacuum; permanent change can only take place within broader efforts to battle corruption and favouritism within the justice system as a whole. Nonetheless, there are steps that the government, with international backing, should undertake to ensure that the PNC becomes a professional force capable of investigating and preventing the crime that threatens Guatemalan democracy. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report N°43: Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/43-police-reform-in-guatemala-obstacles-and-opportunities Year: 2012 Country: Grenada URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/43-police-reform-in-guatemala-obstacles-and-opportunities Shelf Number: 125764 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimePolice ReformPolicing (Guatemala)Violence |
Author: Institute for Security Studies Title: Unban Violence and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Report Summary: This second colloquium organised jointly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) aimed to present the causes and humanitarian consequences of urban violence, as well as related trends and challenges for the European Union and humanitarian actors. Two case studies have been selected, focusing on different types of violence affecting urban environments. The first case study examines pilot projects to address humanitarian needs arising from organised crime and gang violence in megacities; the second is an analysis of the humanitarian challenges emerging from urban violence in the context of uprisings, referring specifically to the lessons learned from the protests in the Arab world. Urban violence represents numerous challenges for policy makers and humanitarian actors alike. Today, more than half of the world’s population lives in cities and it appears that urban centres will absorb almost all new population growth in the coming decades. It has therefore become increasingly important to understand the dynamics of violence in an urban setting. By bringing together experts, academics and representatives from various relief organisations, the ICRC and the EUISS hope to have contributed to the debate and spurred further interest in this increasingly important issue. The present publication includes summaries of both the presentations provided by the speakers and the discussions held during the colloquium. Details: Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Urban_violence_and_humanitarian_challenges.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Urban_violence_and_humanitarian_challenges.pdf Shelf Number: 125774 Keywords: Cities and CrimeGangsOrganized CrimeUrban Areas (International)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Moreno Gómez, Edgar Title: Staging the War on Drugs: Media and Organised Crime in Mexico Summary: The steep upsurge in the number of drug‐related homicides in Mexico has been matched by an even greater increase in the news coverage of violence and organised crime. However, both journalists and scholars have overlooked how organised crime makes use of the media and vice versa. By drawing on previous research on the relationship between the media, terrorism and public opinion this Working Paper looks into the rise of mass‐mediated organised crime in Mexico. Based on a quantitative analysis of the news coverage of violence and organised crime in three major newspapers as well as a qualitative study of selected events, the paper offers an insight to understand the political ramifications of the news coverage of violence. Even when drug trafficking organisations are not terrorists who seek the publicity of the press to advance a political cause, this paper shows that they have important goals related to the media, the impact of news on public opinion and the consequent influence over policy making. Details: Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2012. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Elcano Royal Institute Working Papers No. 8: Accessed August 2, 2012 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=147776 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=147776 Shelf Number: 125843 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Daly, Catherine Title: Armed with Impunity: Curbing Military Human Rights Abuses in Mexico Summary: This report examines the current context and possible remedies to protect against human rights abuses in Mexico. The report then provides documentation and analysis of the pattern of human rights complaints that have been formally registered against the military since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and through mid-2012. • The military has played a constantly expanding role in efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, and to provide domestic security more generally. As Calderón deployed tens of thousands of troops to regions and cities known to be drug-trafficking routes and hubs at the outset of his term. Calderón also significantly increased the size of the Mexican army, as well as military spending overall. • The Mexican public holds mixed feelings about the Calderón administration’s strategy. On the one hand, in a March 2012 poll by Consulta Mitofsky, 43% of respondents indicated that they viewed the Mexican government’s strategy as a “failure,” and 53% thought that organized crime was winning the fight against government forces. Only 28% felt Calderón’s strategy had been successful. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of those surveyed support using the military to combat organized crime. • The massive deployment of the Mexican military has increased civilian exposure and vulnerability to military personnel. In this context, there has been a surge of formal complaints (quejas) of military abuses submitted to National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the ombudsman that generates formal reports or “recommendations” (recomendaciones) for the government agency against which a complaint has been levied. • All told, since the organization was created in 1990 through July 22, 2012, CNDH received 140,699 written complaints, out of which the agency was able to establish that there were reasonable claims of abuse in 34,651 cases, or about one in four cases. A growing number of complaints against the Mexican army (SEDENA) were recorded since the deployment of troops after Calderón took office: 367 in 2007; 1,230 in 2008; 1,800 in 2009; 1,415 in 2010; 1,626 in 2011. As for the current year, SEDENA reported that there were 479 reports as of May 3, 2012. • Alleged military human rights violations represent a fraction of the total number of complaints in any given year. For example, in 2011, even as SEDENA reportedly held the largest number of complaints for a given agency, it accounted for only 6% of all complaints to CNDH. Still, CNDH reports that during the 12 years that it has been documenting human rights abuses, SEDENA is one of the top three institutions with the most filed complaints against it. In 2011, SEDENA reportedly led the list with 1,626 complaints. • The Mexican government points out that, as of May 3, 2012, only about 100 (less than 2%) of the 6,544 complaints against SEDENA that CNDH received since December 1, 2006 have resulted in CNDH reports of credible abuses. Moreover, SEDENA reports that 5,661 complaints have been resolved, meaning that they have This report examines the current context and possible remedies to protect against human rights abuses in Mexico. The report then provides documentation and analysis of the pattern of human rights complaints that have been formally registered against the military since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and through mid-2012. • The military has played a constantly expanding role in efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, and to provide domestic security more generally. As Calderón deployed tens of thousands of troops to regions and cities known to be drug-trafficking routes and hubs at the outset of his term. Calderón also significantly increased the size of the Mexican army, as well as military spending overall. • The Mexican public holds mixed feelings about the Calderón administration’s strategy. On the one hand, in a March 2012 poll by Consulta Mitofsky, 43% of respondents indicated that they viewed the Mexican government’s strategy as a “failure,” and 53% thought that organized crime was winning the fight against government forces. Only 28% felt Calderón’s strategy had been successful. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of those surveyed support using the military to combat organized crime. • The massive deployment of the Mexican military has increased civilian exposure and vulnerability to military personnel. In this context, there has been a surge of formal complaints (quejas) of military abuses submitted to National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the ombudsman that generates formal reports or “recommendations” (recomendaciones) for the government agency against which a complaint has been levied. • All told, since the organization was created in 1990 through July 22, 2012, CNDH received 140,699 written complaints, out of which the agency was able to establish that there were reasonable claims of abuse in 34,651 cases, or about one in four cases. A growing number of complaints against the Mexican army (SEDENA) were recorded since the deployment of troops after Calderón took office: 367 in 2007; 1,230 in 2008; 1,800 in 2009; 1,415 in 2010; 1,626 in 2011. As for the current year, SEDENA reported that there were 479 reports as of May 3, 2012. • Alleged military human rights violations represent a fraction of the total number of complaints in any given year. For example, in 2011, even as SEDENA reportedly held the largest number of complaints for a given agency, it accounted for only 6% of all complaints to CNDH. Still, CNDH reports that during the 12 years that it has been documenting human rights abuses, SEDENA is one of the top three institutions with the most filed complaints against it. In 2011, SEDENA reportedly led the list with 1,626 complaints. • The Mexican government points out that, as of May 3, 2012, only about 100 (less than 2%) of the 6,544 complaints against SEDENA that CNDH received since December 1, 2006 have resulted in CNDH reports of credible abuses. Moreover, SEDENA reports that 5,661 complaints have been resolved, meaning that they have This report examines the current context and possible remedies to protect against human rights abuses in Mexico. The report then provides documentation and analysis of the pattern of human rights complaints that have been formally registered against the military since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and through mid-2012. • The military has played a constantly expanding role in efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, and to provide domestic security more generally. As Calderón deployed tens of thousands of troops to regions and cities known to be drug-trafficking routes and hubs at the outset of his term. Calderón also significantly increased the size of the Mexican army, as well as military spending overall. • The Mexican public holds mixed feelings about the Calderón administration’s strategy. On the one hand, in a March 2012 poll by Consulta Mitofsky, 43% of respondents indicated that they viewed the Mexican government’s strategy as a “failure,” and 53% thought that organized crime was winning the fight against government forces. Only 28% felt Calderón’s strategy had been successful. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of those surveyed support using the military to combat organized crime. • The massive deployment of the Mexican military has increased civilian exposure and vulnerability to military personnel. In this context, there has been a surge of formal complaints (quejas) of military abuses submitted to National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the ombudsman that generates formal reports or “recommendations” (recomendaciones) for the government agency against which a complaint has been levied. • All told, since the organization was created in 1990 through July 22, 2012, CNDH received 140,699 written complaints, out of which the agency was able to establish that there were reasonable claims of abuse in 34,651 cases, or about one in four cases. A growing number of complaints against the Mexican army (SEDENA) were recorded since the deployment of troops after Calderón took office: 367 in 2007; 1,230 in 2008; 1,800 in 2009; 1,415 in 2010; 1,626 in 2011. As for the current year, SEDENA reported that there were 479 reports as of May 3, 2012. • Alleged military human rights violations represent a fraction of the total number of complaints in any given year. For example, in 2011, even as SEDENA reportedly held the largest number of complaints for a given agency, it accounted for only 6% of all complaints to CNDH. Still, CNDH reports that during the 12 years that it has been documenting human rights abuses, SEDENA is one of the top three institutions with the most filed complaints against it. In 2011, SEDENA reportedly led the list with 1,626 complaints. • The Mexican government points out that, as of May 3, 2012, only about 100 (less than 2%) of the 6,544 complaints against SEDENA that CNDH received since December 1, 2006 have resulted in CNDH reports of credible abuses. Moreover, SEDENA reports that 5,661 complaints have been resolved, meaning that they havebeen settled through reconciliation or closed for other seemingly justifiable reasons. Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses. Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses.Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses. Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses.Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses. Males above the age of 18 constitute the population mostly likely to be abused by the military in its public security efforts. Out of the 516 victims involved in cases recommended to the military, roughly 10% (51) were women and 7% (35) were minors. • Up until June 2011, the military maintained jurisdiction over all criminal cases and alleged human rights violations involving military personnel, and critics also charged that CNDH was ineffective in following up on and ensuring compliance with its recommendations. In 2011, legislative initiatives in the Mexican Senate, as well as a landmark ruling by the Mexican Supreme Court, emphasized the need for binding civilian court judgments regarding confirmed abuses by military personnel and domestic compliance with international human rights treaty obligations. It is believed that these developments will greatly bolster the ability of CNDH to protect against human rights abuses. • It still remains unclear whether recent legislation and court decisions will significantly curb military violations. The crux of the human rights issue hinges on whether the civilian court system will achieve unequivocal jurisdiction over cases of human rights abuse that involve the military and civilians, and supporting legislation to this effect has not yet been passed. Specifically, further legislative efforts are needed to revise Mexico’s code of military justice. As the Calderón administration comes to a close, the prospects of these reforms and what lies ahead under the next administration. • After PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto was declared the victor in Mexico’s July 1 elections, he affirmed the continued role of the military in domestic security operations. Yet, Peña Nieto has professed a commitment to uphold and preserve the human rights of Mexican citizens “first of all, through the real, objective application of [human rights] protocols to agencies that are dedicated to public security.” • When Peña Nieto takes office in December 2012, it will be important to evaluate how the incoming president will handle pending cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. One of the most notable cases involves the 2006 rape of 11 women by police forces in Atenco in the State of Mexico that was brought before the commission in November. Since he was the sitting governor of the State of Mexico when this incident occurred, Peña Nieto's handling of this case as president will be an important indicator of the new administration’s approach to human rights. • Ongoing concerns about human rights abuses in Mexico raise questions about what can be done to address these issues under the framework of the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year U.S.- Mexico collaboration initiative launched in 2007. The United States is therefore in a powerful position to support Mexico’s efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, but it also has an obligation to make sure that human rights are respected in the process. If the war on drugs is a joint task, then protecting against human rights violations and other unintended consequences also should be a shared responsibility. • The authors offer several recommendations to strengthen human rights protections in Mexico, including reducing overall reliance on military deployments in Mexican counter-drug efforts, investing in greater human rights training for military and judicial sector personnel, implementing reforms to transfer all military abuse cases to civilian courts, bolstering the CNDH to fulfill its new responsibilities, strengthening civil society to combat abuses and improve security, and reframing U.S.-Mexico security collaboration to better protect human rights. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2012. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Justice in Mexico Project: Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/12_07_31_armed-with-impunity.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/12_07_31_armed-with-impunity.pdf Shelf Number: 125864 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman Rights (Mexico)Organized CrimeViolence |
Author: Cook, Nicolas Title: Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses Summary: “Conflict minerals” are ores that, when sold or traded, have played key roles in helping to fuel conflict and extensive human rights abuses, since the late 1990s, in far eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The main conflict minerals are the so-called the “3TGs”: ores of tantalum and niobium, tin, tungsten, and gold, and their derivatives. Diverse international efforts to break the link between mineral commerce and conflict in central Africa have been proposed or are under way. Key initiatives include government and industry-led mineral tracking and certification schemes. These are designed to monitor trade in minerals to keep armed groups from financially benefitting from this commerce, in compliance with firm-level and/or industry due diligence policies that prohibit transactions with armed groups. Congress has long been concerned about conflicts and human rights abuses in the DRC. Hearings during successive congresses have focused on ways to help end or mitigate their effects, and multiple resolutions and bills seeking the same goals have been introduced. Several have become law. The most extensive U.S. law aimed at halting the trade in conflict minerals, specifically the 3TGs, is Section 1502 of Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). Among other ends, Section 1502 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue rules mandating that SEC-regulated businesses that use conflict minerals in their products: • report if they obtained their mineral supplies from the DRC or nearby countries; • be permitted to label as “DRC conflict free” products that they can credibly demonstrate do not incorporate minerals sourced in a manner that directly or indirectly finances or benefits armed groups in DRC or adjoining countries; • publicly report to the SEC on those of their products which do incorporate minerals that are not “DRC conflict free”—and which may not be labeled as such—and on diligence measures used to obtain these minerals. Section 1502 raises complex rule design, compliance, cost estimate, and implementation questions, and Section 1502 advocates and critics—many politically influential—have been urging the SEC issue rules favorable to their respective views and interests. The complexity of the matters at issue and diversity of interests affected have prompted the SEC to repeatedly delay issuance of a final rule, although it is expected to act on the matter in mid-August 2012. Key rulemaking issues under debate include: • timing and a possible phase-in of rule implementation; and • what due diligence standards are to be used. There is widespread support for use of due diligence guidelines developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in eventual Section 1502 rules, both to ensure complementarity between U.S. and international conflict mineral trade abatement efforts, most of which employ the OECD guidelines, and to enable these schemes to mature. The State Department has provided to Congress a strategy aimed at breaking the link between mineral trade and conflict and, together with the U.S. Agency for International Development, is implementing programs in central Africa to support tracking and certification schemes; local small-scale mining communities; anti-mining labor abuse efforts; and related ends. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R42618: Accessed August 7, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42618.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42618.pdf Shelf Number: 125897 Keywords: Conflict Minerals (Africa)Forced LaborHuman Rights AbusesNatural ResourcesViolence |
Author: De Martino, Luigi Title: Reducing Armed Violence, Enabling Development Summary: The residents of low- and middle-income countries bear a grossly disproportionate share of the global burden of armed violence. Insecurity and high levels of violence have profoundly negative consequences for societies and the quality of people’s lives. Not only does armed violence in its different forms kill and injure hundreds of thousands of people every year, but the impact of wide-scale violence and armed conflict is devastating on a country’s public institutions, national economy, infrastructure, and social cohesion (GD Secretariat, 2008, p. 31). Violence stops or even reverses development, especially in low- and middle-income countries. At the same time, weak governance, economic stagnation, and social inequalities contribute to the persistence of violence. This Research Note relies mostly on the key findings of the 2008 and 2011 Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV) reports (GD Secretariat, 2008; 2011), as well as on the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 (World Bank, 2011). It examines the negative relationship between armed violence and development by providing an overview of the impacts of armed violence and considering the links between armed violence and development; more specifically, it highlights the statistical evidence on the linkages between lethal violence and specific Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A clear message emerges from this analysis: if countries and donors want to realize their development goals, then addressing the root causes of armed violence becomes a priority for policy-makers. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012. 4p. Source: Small Arms Survey Research Notes, Number 19: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2012 at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-19.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-19.pdf Shelf Number: 125946 Keywords: Armed ViolenceCosts of CrimeCrime PreventionViolence |
Author: Watts, Michael Title: Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict, Violence and Political Disorder in the Niger Delta Summary: The Niger delta has become the home of an oil insurgency (see Obi 2004): remotely detonated car bombs and highly sophisticated arms and equipment are the tools of the trade; over 250 foreign hostages have been abducted in the last fifteen months and close to 1000 Nigerian workers detained or held hostage on facilities; major and often spectacular attacks on and on and off shore facilities are endemic and can be perpetrated at will. Unlike the 1980s or 1990s, militants are willing and able to directly confront federal and state security forces. The vast cache of sophisticated arms are skillfully deployed in an environment - the mangrove creeks running for hundreds of miles along the Bight of Benin - in which the Nigerian security forces to quote the new Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan “cannot cope with the situation” (Daily Trust, February 27th 2007). According to a World Bank report (Jua 2007), over 600 people have been killed in the course of these conflicts -often engagements between militias and the joint military task forces - since 2000. Pipeline breaks due to vandalization and sabotage have almost doubled between 1999 and 2004 (from 497 to 895); product loss (in metric tons) due to pipeline ruptures have grown steadily from 179,000 to 396,000 metric tons over the same period (a figure roughly equal to four supertankers) [see STATOIL 2006: 25]. The direct assaults on oil installations and infrastructure cost the Nigerian government $6.8 billion losses in revenue between 1999-2004 but in the last three years the figure has increased dramatically (currently the conflicts cost Nigeria $60 million per day, roughly $4.4 billion per annum in damages and lost revenue (www.strategypage.com/qnd/nigeria/20070630.aspx). In May 2007 Nigeria drew upon $2.7 billion from its ‘domestic excess crude’ (a windfall profits account) to plug revenues shortfalls from oil deferment. President Obasanjo ordered the military in mid-2006 to adopt a ‘force for force’ policy in the delta in a vain effort to gain control of the creeks; in early 2007 the Nigerian navy had embarked upon its biggest sea maneuver in two decades deploying 13 warships, four helicopters and four boats to the Bight of Bonny to test ‘operational capability’. Yet the month of May 2007, according to a Norwegian consulting company BergenRiskSolutions (BergenRiskSolutions2007), witnessed the largest monthly tally of attacks since the appearance of a shadowy but militarily wellarmed insurgent group called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) eighteen months ago. Many of the oil-producing communities across the delta are torn apart by all manner of internal (for example Nembe or Finima) and inter-community (Ogoni-Andoni) conflicts or both (Soku-Kula-Oluasiri)3. There has certainly been no period since the first oil boom – palm oil in the nearly nineteenth century – in which the delta has been in such turmoil other than the civil war. The conflicts have an organic connection to oil but their genealogies are complex: in some cases communities fight over land and territorial disputes over oil bearing lands (Odiama); in some cases they are successional disputes, often of great historical depth, driven by the prospect of access to oil rents and company cash payments (Okrika) compounded by party politics; in other youth groups struggle among themselves or with elders over access to companies (Nembe); and in other cases they are sectional and communal, as ethnic communities in multi-ethnic settings, rural and urban, struggle over the establishment of electoral wards or local government councils to ensure they too can feed at the oil trough (Warri). The social forces are at once ethnic, generation, gender, class (chiefs, politicians), corporate and of course state (military and security). Conflicted communities across the oilfields entail complex configurations of such forces. They constitute a social field of violence in which the delta is now embroiled is a multi-headed hydra. Details: Berkeley, CA: Department of Geography, University of California, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 16: Accessed August 10, 2012 at: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/16-Watts.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Nigeria URL: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/16-Watts.pdf Shelf Number: 125958 Keywords: Natural Resources (Nigeria)OilViolenceViolent Conflict |
Author: Umana, Isabel Aguilar Title: Nine Strategies to Prevent Youth Violence in Central America: Policy Recommendations for the European Union Summary: Violence in Central America is widespread and is a major concern. Youth are particularly targeted and vulnerable, both as victims and perpetrators of violence. There is a number of risk factors for youth to become victims of violence. The recommendations set out in this report call for the adoption of a holistic approach to prevent youth violence and emphasise that the actions taken be effective and grounded in sound principles of youth and adolescent policy, such as respect for human rights; promotion of a culture of peace; inclusion and respect for pluralism; diversity; gender equality; youth leadership and participation. Details: Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2012. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 11, 2012 at: http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201204IfPEW9StrategiesPreventYouthViolenceCentAmEU.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201204IfPEW9StrategiesPreventYouthViolenceCentAmEU.pdf Shelf Number: 125974 Keywords: ViolenceYouth GangsYouth Violence (Central America) |
Author: Watts, Michael Title: Crude Politics: Life and Death on the Nigerian Oil Fields Summary: Nigeria is an oil-rich petro-state but its developmental record in one of catastrophic failure (Ahmad and Singh 2003). According to IMF, the $700 billion in oil revenues since 1960 have added almost nothing to the standard of living of the average Nigerian. Eighty-five per cent percent of oil revenues accrue to one percent of the population and a huge proportion of the country’s wealth – perhaps 40% or more, has been stolen. Over the last decade GDP per capita and life expectancy have, according to World Banks, both fallen. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2005), ranks Nigeria in terms of human development - a composite measure of life expectancy, income, and educational attainment – on par with Haiti and Congo. Why has such extraordinary oil wealth – and the developmental opportunities it affords - generated nothing more than violence, rage, disillusionment and catastrophically failed development? Why has the heart of the Nigerian petrostate degenerated into a zone of insurrection and how has the political nerve centre of the country, the Muslim north, come to be a breeding ground for radical Islamists? Both of these questions are related in complex ways to oil, to the fact that oil (and gas) saturates, provides the ether, the political, economic, cultural and ideological realities of contemporary Nigeria. Details: Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 2009. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 25: Accessed August 11, 2012 at: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/Watts_25.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Nigeria URL: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/Watts_25.pdf Shelf Number: 125989 Keywords: Natural Resources (Nigeria)OilViolenceViolent Conflict |
Author: FMR Research Title: Final Report May 2009: Evaluation of Nite Zone Summary: This report is a study evaluating the Nite Zone programme implemented by the Glasgow City Centre Alcohol Action Group (GCCAAG). This report highlights the findings of the evaluation and offers recommendations regarding improvements for the project. The evaluation was undertaken during January to April 2009. Glasgow city centre can host between 70,000 to 100,000 people on a Friday or Saturday night which creates challenges when looking at protection and control issues around alcohol. This led to the establishment of the Glasgow City Centre Alcohol Group (CCAAG) in 2003 to tackle alcohol related harm in the City Centre. GCCAAG is a partnership between Strathclyde Police, Glasgow City Council, Glasgow Community & Safety Services and NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde. The remit of the group is to develop actions around a range of activities to reduce alcohol-related harm and promote a safer environment by co-ordinated action; with the implicit recognition that at all levels alcohol-related harm cannot be tackled without multi-agency effort. Nite Zone draws together a number of community safety strands which helps to facilitate the prompt and safe exit of users of the Glasgow city centre night time economy. While initially focusing on the area around Glasgow Central Station when the project was established in December 2005, the project was extended to Sauchiehall Street in June 2006. Nite Zone‟s main aims are to get people who are using the night time economy quickly and safely out of the city centre with a positive impact on violent crime, disorder, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime. 1.2 Objectives The overarching aim of this evaluation was to evaluate and report on the contribution that Nite Zone had made with regard to reducing violence in the City Centre as well as reviewing the success of the specific strands of the Nite Zone initiative. These include: increasing the capacity of night taxi ranks; amending traffic sequences to reduce congestion at night; provision of public street white lighting; developing a radio network involving night clubs and other late night premises; providing Taxi and Bus Marshalls; increasing CCTV operators and providing Public Help Points; and providing first aid to people in taxi queues. Details: Glasgow: FMR Research, 2009. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: www.shiftingthebalance.scot.nhs.uk Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 126047 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisordersCrime PreventionDisorderly ConductNightime Economy (Scotland)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bird, Annie Title: Collateral Damage of a Drug War: The May 11 Killings in Ahuas and the Impact of the U.S. War on Drugs in La Moskitia, Honduras Summary: In the early morning hours of May 11, 2012, residents of the peaceful indigenous community of Ahuas in northeastern Honduras awoke to the sound of low flying helicopters circling above the nearby Patuca River. Shortly afterwards, bursts of automatic gunfire were heard. Later that morning the Honduran National Police announced that they had killed two drug traffickers in the course of a counternarcotics operation that had recovered hundreds of kilos of cocaine. However, it soon emerged that local residents of Ahuas had a very different story to tell. Four innocent boat passengers, they said, had been killed by security agents: two women, one 14-year-old boy and one 21-year-old man. Four other passengers had been injured by gunfire, three of them critically. Men speaking English and identified as U.S. nationals were among the security agents who descended from the helicopters and attacked and threatened members of the community. In late July of 2012, analysts from Rights Action and the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) visited the Honduran capital and the region where the incident took place – the Department of Gracias a Dios – in order to collect detailed information connected to this incident from surviving victims and other eyewitnesses, Honduran state and local officials and U.S. officials. This report summarizes and analyzes the extensive testimony and other information obtained during the visit. It presents detailed narratives of the sequence of events on May 11 and provides detailed background profiles on the boat passengers who were fired upon as well as on key witnesses. It also describes the region and context in which the shooting incident occurred, in order to better understand its impact on the local community. Finally, it offers a series of key findings and formulates recommendations of next steps to be taken in order to ensure that justice is achieved in this case and that measures are taken – both by Honduran and U.S. policymakers – to avoid the recurrence of future tragic incidents of this nature. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in collaboration with Rights Action, 2012. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2012 at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/honduras-2012-08.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/honduras-2012-08.pdf Shelf Number: 126129 Keywords: Counternarcotics (Honduras) (U.S.)Drug Trafficking (Honduras) (U.S.)ViolenceWar on Drugs (Honduras) (U.S.) |
Author: Davis, Diane E. Title: Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence Summary: While the sources and forms of social and political violence have been extensively examined, the ways ordinary people along with their neighbors and officials cope with chronic urban violence have earned far less attention. This eight-case study of cities suffering from a history of violence explores this latter phenomenon, which we call resilience. We define resilience as those acts intended to restore or create effectively functioning community-level activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetrators of violence are marginalized and perhaps even eliminated. This report identifies the sets of conditions and practices that enhance an individual or a community’s capacity to act independently of armed actors. We specify the types of horizontal (e.g., intra-community, or neighborhood-to-neighborhood) and vertical (e.g., state-community) relationships that have been used to sustain this relative autonomy. Violence and responses to it are situated in physical space, and we look for the spatial correlates of resilience, seeking to determine whether and how physical conditions in a neighborhood will affect the nature, degrees, and likelihood of resilience. Urban resilience can be positive or negative. Positive resilience is a condition of relative stability and even tranquility in areas recently or intermittently beset by violence. Strong and cooperative relationships between the state and community, and between different actors—businesses, civil society, the police, etc.—tend to characterize positive resilience. Negative resilience occurs when violence entrepreneurs have gained effective control of the means of coercion, and impose their own forms of justice, security, and livelihoods. In such situations—most frequently in informal neighborhoods where property rights are vague or contested—the community is fragmented and seized by a sense of powerlessness, and the state is absent or corrupted. Our findings suggest that resilience appears at the interface of citizen and state action, and is strengthened through cooperation within and between communities and governing authorities. Resilience is robust and positive when ongoing, integrated strategies among the different actors yield tangible and sustainable gains for a particular community: improvement in the physical infrastructure, growing commercial activity, and communityoriented policing, to name three common attributes. When citizens, the private sector, and governing authorities establish institutional networks of accountability that tie them to each other at the level of the community, a dynamic capacity is created to subvert the perpetrators of violence and establish everyday normalcy. The security activities produced through citizen-state networks are most accountable, legitimate, and durable when they are directed and monitored by communities themselves, in a relationship of cooperative autonomy. More broadly, urban resilience benefits from good urban planning—promoting and investing in mixed commercial and residential land use, for example, particularly in areas of the city at-risk for crime, and building infrastructure that enables free movement of people within and between all neighborhoods (via pedestrian corridors; parks; public transport) to promote security and livelihoods. This speaks to the challenge of informality—the communities built up, usually on the city’s periphery, without regard to ownership rights. The legal entanglements of informality can be daunting, but some cities have finessed this to provide services, with substantially positive outcomes. Formal property rights or not, citizens of all income groups need to have the opportunity to live in vibrant areas where social, economic, and residential activities and priorities reinforce each other in ways that bring a community together in the service of protecting and securing those spaces. This process yields good results for the entire metropolitan area. Finally, this report develops the idea of legitimate security as a way to address the vexing interactions of the state and communities in the provision of security and positive resilience. The relationship of at-risk communities with the police is often troubled. Legitimate security addresses this by seeking to ensure democratic and participatory governance in every sense—political, civil, and social. It recognizes needs specific to marginalized and underrepresented populations, including ethnic/racial minorities, women, the poor, and indigenous groups. It is, moreover, a viable alternative to deleterious responses to insecurity—e.g., privatization of security, fortification of urban spaces, and vigilantism, among others. Legitimate security fosters broad participation and initiatives from “below” with an increased focus on multi-sector partnerships to provide more effective, lasting, and accountable ways forward for cities seeking security. Details: Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies; Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2012. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2012 at: http://web.mit.edu/cis/urbanresiliencereport2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://web.mit.edu/cis/urbanresiliencereport2012.pdf Shelf Number: 126361 Keywords: Crime PreventionNeighborhoods and CrimeSocial CapitalUrban Areas and CrimeUrban PlanningViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Levinthal, Jodi Title: The Community Context of Animal and Human Maltreatment: Is there a Relationship between Animal Maltreatment and Human Maltreatment: Does Neighborhood Context Matter? Summary: The purpose of the study is to explore the influence of demographic and neighborhood factors on the phenomenon of animal maltreatment in an urban setting as well as the association of animal maltreatment with human maltreatment. Using a unique dataset of animal maltreatment from the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the distribution and prevalence of animal neglect, abuse, and dog fighting in Philadelphia were mapped with Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Statistical analysis was employed to examine the relationship between animal maltreatment and neighborhood factors, domestic violence, and child maltreatment. The low correlation between animal abuse and neighborhood factors in this study suggests that animal abuse may be better explained as an individual phenomenon than a behavior that is a function of neighborhoods. However, animal neglect does correlate with demographic, cultural, and structural aspects of block groups, suggesting social disorganization may lead to animal neglect. This study also suggests that dog fighting is a crime of opportunity, as dog fighting correlates with indicators of abandoned properties. Finally, this study is unable to demonstrate a community link between animal maltreatment and child maltreatment, which does not preclude the link among individuals. The findings suggest caution in policies and advocacy campaigns that link human and animal violence in all arenas. Details: Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2010. 115p. Source: Publicly accessible Penn Dissertations, Paper 274: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2012 at http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/274/ Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/274/ Shelf Number: 126375 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCruelty to AnimalsGeographic Distribution of CrimeGeographic StudiesNeighborhoods and CrimeViolence |
Author: Finlay, Brian Title: Beyond Boundaries in the Andean Region: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance Summary: As a direct result of globalization and expanded economic opportunity, the last half century has yielded the most remarkable exodus from poverty in human history. Yet despite this remarkable improvement in the human condition, not everyone has benefitted equally. While much advancement has been witnessed across the Andean region-Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru-these countries continue to face significant security and development threats that threaten the foundations of progress, including the intersecting challenges of lack of public health capacity, illicit trafficking in arms and drugs, and terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: The Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2012 at: Beyond Boundaries in the Andean Region: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: Shelf Number: 126391 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllegal ArmsOrganized CrimeTerrorismViolence |
Author: Alderden, Megan A. Title: Gang Hot Spots Policing in Chicago: An Evaluation of the Deployment Operations Center Process Summary: From 2000 to 2007, Chicago experienced a significant decline in violent crime (murder, criminal sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault/battery), particularly gun-related public violence. In public discourse, this decline was attributed to the Chicago Police Department (CPO) and, in particular, to a process spearheaded by the Deployment Operations Center (DOC). The primary mission of the DOC was to analyze crime and intelligence data, identifying areas of the city believed to have a high probability for violent crime (i.e., violent crime "hot spots"). Areas identified by DOC analysts, termed Level II deployment areas, were used to guide deployment decisions for specialized units, whose responsibility was to enter designated hot spots and suppress gang, drug, and gun crime. The primary purpose of this study, funded by the National Institute of Justice, was to evaluate whether the aforementioned crime reductions could be attributed to the DOC process. To accomplish this, researchers used both qualitative and quantitative research methods, collecting data on various elements of the DOC logic model - analysis of crime and intelligence data, identification of hot spots, communication of designated hot spots to CPO personnel, redeployment of officers to hot spots, and engagement in suppression activities. CPO administrators believed that, through this process, gang, drug, and gun-related crime would be reduced. Details: Final Report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2011. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 25, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239207.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239207.pdf Shelf Number: 126452 Keywords: Crime Hot SpotsGangs (Chicago)Gun ViolenceHomicidesPolicingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Pilnik, Lisa Title: Victimization and Trauma Experienced by Children and Youth: Implications for Legal Advocates Summary: The Safe Start Center, ABA Center on Children and the Law, and the Child and Family Policy Associates recently released a new resource, Victimization and Trauma Experienced by Children and Youth: Implications for Legal Advocates. In this resource, you'll find: Information about the prevalence and impact of victimization and exposure to violence; Practice tips for juvenile defenders, children's attorneys and GALs, judges, and CASAs; Explanations of traumatic stress symptoms and trauma-related assessments and treatments; Descriptions of promising local and state initiatives to address trauma; and, Guidance on policy reforms and other considerations for trauma-informed advocacy. Details: North Bethesda, MD: Safe Start Center, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 2012. Source: Moving From Evidence to Action: The Safe Start Center Series on Children Exposed to Violence, Issue Brief #7: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2012 at Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126509 Keywords: Child WelfareChild WitnessesChildren and ViolenceExposure to ViolenceJuvenile VictimsVictimizationViolence |
Author: McGee, Sibel Title: Mexico's Cartel Problem: A Systems Thinking Perspective Summary: The unprecedented increase in recent years of cartel-related violence has presented growing challenges both to Mexico’s socio-political stability and to the United States’ (US) National interests. Current efforts to address Mexican cartels treat these organizations as only drug-trafficking networks and focus on law enforcement measures to interdict their operations. In this paper, we approach the cartel problem from a systems thinking perspective and present a holistic assessment of these complex criminal networks operating in multiple domains. By highlighting the dynamic relationships and complex feedbacks between critical variables involved in different domains of cartel operations, we identify the inherently systemic causal factors contributing to the problem situation. We argue that the efforts that rely purely on law enforcement measures will fail to produce lasting change unless they are coupled with high leverage strategies that address the root causes of illicit activities in Mexico. Details: Arlington, VA: Applied Systems Thinking Institute, Analytic Services, Inc., 2011.10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.anser.org/docs/asyst-doc/Mexican_Cartels.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.anser.org/docs/asyst-doc/Mexican_Cartels.pdf Shelf Number: 126577 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingLaw EnforcementViolence |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment Summary: This study finds that while cocaine trafficking has undeniably catalyzed violence in some areas, the security problem in the region is much deeper, rooted in weak governance and powerful sub-state actors. According to the study, cocaine has been trafficked through Central America for decades, but the importance of the region to this flow increased dramatically after 2000 and again after 2006, due to an escalation in Mexican drug law enforcement. The resulting displacement effect underscores the importance of coordinated strategies to addressthe entire contraband flow, so that one country’s success does not become another’s problem. The implementation of the new Mexican security strategy in 2006 has disrupted cocaine supply to the United States market, forcing dealers to cut purity and raise prices. These changes have deeply undermined United States demand for the drug, but not yet reduced the violence associated with the flow. In response to an increasingly inhospitable environment in Mexico, traffickers have shifted their focus to new routes along the Guatemalan/Honduran border and contesting new “plazas” throughout the region. Displacement to the Caribbean remains a threat. The contest today is between longstanding organized crime families that effectively govern the remote areas of the countries in which they operate. In addition to cocaine trafficking, these groups are involved in a wide range of organized crime activities, and manipulate local politics. If cocaine flows abate, they will seek revenuesfrom other forms of acquisitive crime, such as extortion, which may cause violence levels to increase. The Zetas, the Maras, and other territorial groups appear to be involved in migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and the firearms trade. This involvement may increase if cocaine revenues decline. Addressing transnational flows requires international cooperation. Full implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols and the UN Convention against Corruption is critical. National police services cannot resolve the organized crime problems of this region alone, because reducing the contraband flows requires tools they do not possess. Development actors must cooperate in a global strategy to address the problems of drugs and illicit markets. Programmes to build capacity among local law enforcement cannot bring about the rapid results required, due to widespread corruption. The temporary use of armed forces for some law enforcement tasks should not delay police development and reform, including the promotion of civilian oversight. The international community should do what it can to supplement local criminal justice capacity. Cross-sectoral crime prevention strategies must be explored. Crime affects all aspects of life, and so a multiagency crime prevention plan, involving the participation of the private sector, should be developed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_Exsum_english.pdf (executive summary) Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_Exsum_english.pdf (executive summary) Shelf Number: 126657 Keywords: Cocaine TraffickingDrug TraffickingDrug Trafficking ControlOrganized Crime (Central America, Caribbean)Violence |
Author: Heung, Carly Title: Alcohol and Community-based Violence: A Systematic Review Summary: Alcohol is one of the most widely available psychoactive drugs. Both alcohol use and violence share some common physiological, social, and economic variables. While the link between alcohol consumption and violent behaviour has been well established, the mechanisms – social and environmental influences – by which this occurs, are not fully understood. This association highlights the need to gain a better understanding of the contributing factors associated with alcohol-related violence. Purpose: To identify the associated effects of alcohol sales on community-based violence as explained in the existing literature. Methodology: A systematic review of recent literature published from 1999 to 2009 was completed. The search strategy included only articles published in English, with a specific focus on alcohol sales and community-based violence. Electronic databases, grey literature, reference lists of relevant studies and previously published reviews on similar topics were searched using seventeen keywords representing ‘alcohol use’ and ‘community-based violence’. Results: Twenty-eight studies were identified that addressed alcohol outlet density, hours and days of alcohol retail sale, price of alcohol, alcohol sales, characteristics of violent bars, and alcohol-related violent injuries from Emergency Room data. The general finding is that alcohol-related violence is perpetuated by the availability and harmful use of alcohol. Recommendations and Conclusion: These research findings provided ample basis for providing direction and recommendations for informing public health policies to reduce alcohol’s contribution to community-based violence. Eight strategies and 21 commendations are proposed which follow a coordinated, comprehensive health promotion approach incorporating healthy public policy and community action along with the ‘four pillars’: prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and enforcement. Details: Toronto: Alcohol Policy Network, Ontario Public Health Association, 2010. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://www.apolnet.ca/resources/pubs/rpt_Alcohol_and_Violence-2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.apolnet.ca/resources/pubs/rpt_Alcohol_and_Violence-2010.pdf Shelf Number: 126879 Keywords: Alcohol AbuseAlcohol Related Crime, DisorderViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Rogan, Michael G. Title: Is the Narco-violence in Mexico an Insurgency? Summary: Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared war on the drug cartels in December 2006, more than 35,000 Mexicans have died due to narco-violence. This monograph examines whether the various Mexican drug trafficking organizations are insurgents or organized criminal elements. Mexican narco-violence and its affiliated gang violence have spread across Mexico’s southern border into Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Additionally, the narco-violence is already responsible for the deaths of American citizens on both sides of the United States – Mexico border, and the potential for increased spillover violence is a major concern. This monograph argues that the Mexican drug cartels are transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that pose a national security threat to the regional state actors; however, they are not an insurgency for four reasons. First, none of the cartels have the political aim or capability to overthrow the Mexican government. Second, the various TCOs are competing criminal organizations with approximately 90 percent of the violence being cartel on cartel. For example, the violence in the city of Juárez is largely the result of the fighting between the local Juárez cartel and the Sinaloa cartel for control of one of the primary smuggling routes into the United States. Third, the cartels’ use of violence and coercion has turned popular support against them thus denying them legitimacy. Fourth, although the cartels do control zones of impunity within their areas of influence, the Mexican government has captured, killed, and extradited kingpins from every major TCO. The monograph also examines the violence that has taken place in Colombia as a case study comparison for the current narco-violence in Mexico. The Colombian government battled and defeated both the Medellín and Cali drug cartels in the 1990s. It also has made significant progress against two leftist insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The Colombian government also reached agreement with the right-wing United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) who officially disbanded in April 2006. The primary implication of this monograph is that it is the responsibility of the leadership of the Mexican government, its law enforcement institutions, its judicial system, and the military to defeat the TCOs. The case study of Colombia provides strong evidence of the importance of competent political, judicial, law enforcement, and military leadership. It is also clear that the United States provided valuable assistance, but it was the Colombians’ efforts that reduced violence, secured the population, and marginalized the insurgents. The conclusion of this monograph is that the TCOs have a weak case for being an insurgency due to their lack of legitimacy because violence has been excessively cruel and lacking in purpose in the eyes of the Mexican people. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=721559 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=721559 Shelf Number: 127032 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Gang ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Kennedy, David M. Title: The High Point Drug Market Intervention Strategy Summary: Drug markets are the scourge of too many communities in the United States. They destroy neighborhoods, a sense of community, and the quality of life. They contribute to crime, shootings, prostitution, assaults, robbery, and have a negative effect on local businesses and on business and residential property values. Police sweeps, buy-bust operations, warrant service, and the arrests and jailing of drug dealers have not eliminated the problem. The drug dealers return, new dealers come into the neighborhood, and the drug markets are quickly back in business. Exasperated by the problem, the High Point (North Carolina) Police Department tried a different tactic and, to the surprise of many, succeeded in eliminating the notorious West End drug market. Creating swift and certain consequences by “banking” existing drug cases; addressing racial conflict between communities and law enforcement, setting strong community and family standards against dealing; involving dealers’ family members, and offering education, job training, job placement, and other social services, the police department was able to close the drug market. Buoyed by this success, the police also were able to close three other drug markets in the city using the same tactics. After studying the successes in High Point, other cities across the country have used similar strategies with similar levels of success. The High Point strategy does not solve the drug problem, but by eliminating street drug markets, we can reduce crime, reduce racial conflict, reduce incarceration, build a sense of camaraderie among residents, and turn some dealers’ lives around. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2012 at: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/publications/e08097226-HighPoint.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/publications/e08097226-HighPoint.pdf Shelf Number: 127117 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug OffendersNuisance Behaviors and DisordersPulling Levers StrategyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Gordon, Rachel Title: Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence Case Study of Managua, Nicaragua Summary: This report explores the ways in which citizens of Managua cope with and adapt to dynamic security conditions in their daily lives as well as the interactions among institutions, actors and spaces that enable and constrain strategies of resilience. Despite the Nicaraguan government’s oft-touted assertion that it is the safest country in Central America, relatively little empirical research exists to shed light on residents’ quotidian experiences of insecurity or senses of agency regarding conditions of violence in their immediate surroundings. How are experiences and perceptions of insecurity shaped by the spatial and social configurations of urban life? How are they mediated by state institutions and non-state actors? What strategies enable resilience? Underlying this case study is the observation—herein regarded as sufficiently accurate—that Managua has thus far avoided the dire urban security challenges facing many of its neighbors, particularly those to the north: Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. It does, however, face the same mounting security difficulties as all of its neighbors in the region: a spiraling struggle against corruption, narco-trafficking and other organized crime, a dearth of economic opportunities, and the legacies of intra-state conflicts. While the legacy of civil war is an oft-cited factor underlying chronic violence, the correlation may be a spurious one. In fact, a central argument of this study is that the multi-layered legacy of the 1979 Sandinista revolution is not anathema to, but is the basis of, citizen resilience to current, entwined economic and security challenges. Such resilience is manifest in localized spatial and social loyalties that contribute to strong neighborhood identities, at the expense of a single broad urban identity. Resilience is defined here as residents’ ability to absorb, cope with, and adapt to the realities of insecurity and violence such that their lives are not consistently disrupted by it. The main focus of this study is on how social and spatial factors interact to determine resilience: how and why a strong neighborhood identity – itself a fusion of social and spatial characteristics – is central to citizens’ ability to cope and adapt in various ways. It is noted that all resilience strategies are not necessarily “positive.” The actions people take to enable the survival and security of themselves and their families in the face of an array of daily threats are what those individuals see as necessary; that does not make them necessarily positive in the long run. Instead, they must be understood to spring from inevitably imperfect sets of options under invariably constrained circumstances. In a hypothetical final accounting, they might prove to be at least as detrimental to security conditions as they are beneficial. Resilience, however, like history, has no such end point toward which human beings, communities and governments can plan. Instead, they must constantly confront multiple stressors and constraints utilizing various dynamic options and strategies. It is also noted that research inevitably offers only snapshot, a momentary freezing of the frame outside of which these various processes continue their constant cycles. While there exists a great volume of political and philosophical polemics on Nicaragua’s historical and modern development, relatively few scholars—in either Spanish or English—have reliably documented current chronic security challenges. The lack of reliable crime statistics and the confusing and inconsistent manner in which crimes are categorized place significant limitations on this and other analyses. In addition, the dearth of specific and non-politicized data and analysis regarding broad physical and livelihoods security factors—including infrastructure, social services, economic activity and opportunities, and vulnerability to hazards and shocks—makes Managua ripe but particularly challenging for analysis. It is explicitly assumed that ideology always shapes discourse, and that all analysis is inherently subjective. That said, the role of ideology in shaping discourse both within and related to Nicaragua is particularly outsized. This study attempts depoliticized analysis to the greatest extent possible, recognizing that such an extent may not be very great given the politicized nature of nearly all discourse in and related to Nicaragua today and throughout the past several decades. This study takes five parts. First, it locates Managua within its national and regional context, describing the physical and social development of the city itself and mapping key socio-historical events onto the geo-spatial layout of the city. Second, it describes current data and perceptions of violence, primary security actors, and the nature of state intervention. This section introduces the role of the National Police force, itself deeply rooted in the 1979 revolution, as a key mediator of security and resilience. Third, it explores spatial and social aspects of resilience, focusing on strong neighborhood identity—a legacy of geological and political upheaval—as a primary source of resilience. This section discusses the reaches and limitations of overt state intervention, as well as the implications of politicized organizing in diverse neighborhood contexts. Fourth, it examines enabling and constraining factors of resilience in greater depth, including poverty and inequality, narco-trafficking, the “youth bulge,” and the gendered dimensions of violence. This section posits a distinction between “public” and “private” spheres of violence by which some types of violence are deemed socially problematic while others—namely, “domestic” violence against women and children—are treated as ordinary and commonplace. Fifth and finally, it offers a brief analysis of the sustainability of resilience in the Managua context. Details: Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://www.urcvproject.org/uploads/Managua_URCV.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nicaragua URL: http://www.urcvproject.org/uploads/Managua_URCV.pdf Shelf Number: 127138 Keywords: Urban AreasUrban NeighborhoodsUrban ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime (Managua, Nicaragua) |
Author: Kartas, Moncel Title: Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Kigali, Rwanda Summary: The question guiding the Kigali case study is how formal and informal institutions interact in the process of urban adaptation to external and internal shocks and stress factors. For instance, if state institutions are failing to provide acceptable levels of services, do informal groups rise in prominence (numbers, resources, visibility, or physical activity)? If such informal institutions do become more salient, how does the state then react to them? By defining urban resilience as an ongoing process of coping and adaptation of territorially bounded units (characterised as a city’s formal as well as informal social, political, and economic institutions and its members and affiliates) to exogenous and endogenous stress, the present study distinguishes between what could be called “negative” and “positive” resilience. The main emphasis of this case study has been placed on the security dimension of resilience. The main argument is that it is not the formal or informal nature of institutions which matter for the production of positive or negative effects, but rather that the strategic orientation underlying their organisation, and the social dynamics in which they operate, influence their ultimate effect on violence and perceived insecurity. In other words, even if the same measures are introduced in urban and rural areas, in an urban space they develop their own urbanspecific resilience mechanisms. Overall, the research team noticed the stark absence of available data sets related to urban parameters such as infrastructure, security, health, housing, and education. Moreover, Rwandan official showed great reluctance in sharing information, datasets, reports and studies with the research team, even when it was stated that the project was being conducted for USAID. Surprisingly, even within and between various government and city-level administrations, there appears to be little capacity and/or willingness to share documents and data. Ultimately, and as no previous work exists on urban violence in the city of Kigali, the research strategy had to be adapted accordingly. The focus was moved to: • localising where and what data exists; • understanding the broad urban dynamics in Kigali and the main urbanisation policies; and • identifying instances of urban resilience in the different sectors discussed by conceptual framework of the project (security, infrastructure, basic service delivery, etc.). To this end, the research has focused on qualitative approaches based on open interviews and narrative conversations. Furthermore, the team used basic participant observation techniques and a thorough visual exploration of the city and its different neighbourhoods using photographic support. The present report is thus able to provide an interpretation and illustrations of urban resilience in Kigali, but not a systematic survey supported by GIS data. The report is divided into five sections. The first provides a descriptive account of Kigali’s main stress factor, namely its demographic explosion, against the backdrop of its topography. It also gives a schematic picture of the city’s neighbourhoods and the scope of informal and formal settlement. The second section introduces the Kigali City Master Plan (KCMP) to familiarise the reader with the macro-policies of the authorities towards urbanisation. It also highlights how the city has shown signs of resilience through the adaptation of its population and institutions to wide-spread expropriation, eviction and resettlement schemes. The third section focuses on the evolution of informal security institutions and their interaction with formal institutions, notably with the security sector reform efforts undertaken by the government and their link to the government’s decentralisation and community-based development policy. The fourth section seeks to relate instances of informal coping strategies with phenomena of urban resilience through a number of illustrations in the fields of public utilities (electricity, sanitation, and waste management), microfinance, and transportation. A final section then briefly reflects on the links between urbanisation and development in present-day Rwanda. Details: Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2012 at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5917/Kigali_URCV.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Rwanda URL: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5917/Kigali_URCV.pdf Shelf Number: 127203 Keywords: Urban Areas (Rwanda)Urban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Kartas, Moncef Title: Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Kigali, Rwanda Summary: With support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), URCV researchers have produced a series of publications that include a report that summarizes the research findings and recommendations, a toolkit that focuses on the practical implications of our findings, in-depth case studies of seven cities facing diverse violence challenges, a working paper, and policy briefs (forthcoming). The question guiding the Kigali case study is how formal and informal institutions interact in the process of urban adaptation to external and internal shocks and stress factors. For instance, if state institutions are failing to provide acceptable levels of services, do informal groups rise in prominence (numbers, resources, visibility, or physical activity)? If such informal institutions do become more salient, how does the state then react to them? By defining urban resilience as an ongoing process of coping and adaptation of territorially bounded units (characterised as a city’s formal as well as informal social, political, and economic institutions and its members and affiliates) to exogenous and endogenous stress, the present study distinguishes between what could be called “negative” and “positive” resilience. The main emphasis of this case study has been placed on the security dimension of resilience. The main argument is that it is not the formal or informal nature of institutions which matter for the production of positive or negative effects, but rather that the strategic orientation underlying their organisation, and the social dynamics in which they operate, influence their ultimate effect on violence and perceived insecurity. In other words, even if the same measures are introduced in urban and rural areas, in an urban space they develop their own urbanspecific resilience mechanisms. The report is divided into five sections. The first provides a descriptive account of Kigali’s main stress factor, namely its demographic explosion, against the backdrop of its topography. It also gives a schematic picture of the city’s neighbourhoods and the scope of informal and formal settlement. The second section introduces the Kigali City Master Plan (KCMP) to familiarise the reader with the macro-policies of the authorities towards urbanisation. It also highlights how the city has shown signs of resilience through the adaptation of its population and institutions to wide-spread expropriation, eviction and resettlement schemes. The third section focuses on the evolution of informal security institutions and their interaction with formal institutions, notably with the security sector reform efforts undertaken by the government and their link to the government’s decentralisation and community-based development policy. The fourth section seeks to relate instances of informal coping strategies with phenomena of urban resilience through a number of illustrations in the fields of public utilities (electricity, sanitation, and waste management), microfinance, and transportation. A final section then briefly reflects on the links between urbanisation and development in present-day Rwanda. Details: Cambridge, MA: Urban Resilience in Chronic Violence, MIT. 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2012 at http://urcvproject.org/uploads/Kigali_URCV.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Rwanda URL: http://urcvproject.org/uploads/Kigali_URCV.pdf Shelf Number: 127219 Keywords: Urban Areas (Rwanda)Violence |
Author: Muggah, Robert Title: Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence Case Study of Nairobi, Kenya Summary: While the sources and forms of social and political violence have been extensively examined, the ways ordinary people along with their neighbors and officials cope with chronic urban violence have earned far less attention. This eight-case study of cities suffering from a history of violence explores this latter phenomenon, which we call resilience. We define resilience as those acts intended to restore or create effectively functioning community-level activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetrators of violence are marginalized and perhaps even eliminated. Fragile cities suffer from violence enacted on multiple scales concentrated in a single metropolitan space. How, then, do the spatial characteristics of the city shape violence? Are urban interventions successful in transcending sectoral approaches to violence by focusing on the greater community and city? Using case studies of cities suffering from long histories of chronic violence, this project examines how citizens have evolved coping mechanisms (strategies of resilience) at various scales. Insights from field research in these cities are combined with theoretical approaches to security, violence, and resilience in order to develop a systemic, multi-sectoral approach to chronic violence. The present study of service provision, violence, and resilience in Nairobi’s informal settlements has several objectives. First, it intends to describe various types of formal and informal services provided to residents of low- and medium-income areas. Second, it seeks to develop a more exhaustive review of the providers of these services and their interrelationships. Third, the assessment explores the character of resilience amongst residents of selected slums and the absence of formal state services. All of these objectives are of intense interest to national and metropolitan planners, preoccupied as they are with questions of urban violence and poverty. In order to unpack these questions, the assessment undertook focused research in a selection of sites as well as a literature review of the history of urbanization in Nairobi proper. Two of these sites included “informal settlements,” or slums in the vernacular. The third site was “middle class” and offered a control against which to examine patterns of service delivery and local forms of resilience. The assessment was also informed by a number of focus group discussions with municipal counselors, leaders in the various settlements, service providers, and residents to examine their perspectives and interrogate key issues. This report is itself divided into several discrete sections. The first section provides a cursory overview of the methodology deployed during the research period. Section two issues a historical assessment of Nairobi’s urbanization trajectory, which is critical in understanding contemporary realities. It also considers contemporary trends and patterns of exclusion and how these relate to older planning and development strategies. The third section explores in more detail issues of service provision in different neighborhoods of Nairobi, tracing out a range of services and the ways in which they interact. While a preliminary assessment, this study nevertheless generated a host of findings with implications for public policy in Nairobi and beyond. Overall, the assessment detects a surprising level of dynamism in the provision and supplementing of services in neglected informal settlements. It found that while residents frequently struggle to adjust in situations of adversity, there is a bewildering array of locally arising coping strategies in relation to security, water, sanitation, solid waste disposal, housing, and infrastructure provision. The assessment also highlights the more “negative” forms of resilience emerging both to fill the gaps left by an absence of state presence, but also in the wake of competition between rival service providers. Details: Cambridge, MA: Urban Resilience in Chronic Violence, MIT. 2012. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2012 at http://urcvproject.org/uploads/Nairobi_URCV.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Kenya URL: http://urcvproject.org/uploads/Nairobi_URCV.pdf Shelf Number: 127220 Keywords: Urban Areas (Kenya)Violence |
Author: Feigelson, Michael Title: Stopping it Before it Starts: Strategies to Address Violence in Young Children's Lives Summary: This document advocates for systematic and reliable measures of the effect of violence on young children. It was produced by the Bernard van Leer Foundation as a contribution to the International Expert Consultation on the Prevention and Response to Violence in Early Childhood held in Lima, Peru, August 27-28 2012. It presents evidence that violence in young children's lives can be prevented through programmes such as home visitation, family strengthening, women's economic empowerment, alcohol regulation, and efforts to change social norms. It examines policy windows to achieve impact at scale on violence against children, asserting that leaders need to engage more effectively in areas of social policy such as social protection, employment, women's rights, and public security. The document suggests that more sophisticated communications strategies can drive sustained public political engagement and gain new champions for violence prevention. Details: The Hague: Bernard van Leer Foundation, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 17, 2012 at http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/events/Expert%20Consultation%20Lima/International%20Consultation%20VAc-%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/events/Expert%20Consultation%20Lima/International%20Consultation%20VAc-%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 127234 Keywords: Criminal Justice PolicyJuvenile VictimsViolenceViolence Prevention |
Author: The Netherlands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Title: An Integrated Strategy to Combat Insecurity in Guatemala Summary: Fifteen years after the formal end of its civil war, Guatemala is now one of the most violent countries on the planet. Alongside its neighbours in the “northern triangle” of Central America, Honduras and El Salvador, the end of war has not brought the onset of civil peace. Murder rates in Guatemala are extraordinarily high, reaching approximately 50 times that of the Netherlands, and even higher in particularly violent regions such as the Atlantic coast or the capital city. Surveys repeatedly reveal the intensity of public anxiety over insecurity, while the effects of this crime wave on the stability of the democratic system and on economic growth are becoming increasingly evident. Tackling this explosion in violence is by no means an easy task. In the case of Guatemala, it is now widely accepted that a history of inequality, authoritarianism, civil war and weak state institutions have provided the fertile ground for impunity. But the sheer complexity of the current crime wave also points to the influence of numerous recent trends. Gang violence has afflicted the big cities since the mid-1990s. Former military officers have been involved in major rackets that profited from links with the state. More recently, and most notoriously, drug-trafficking has penetrated the country, first through a number of local mafia, and nowadays in the shape of major Mexican cartels. With them has come the horrors of the “theatre of violence”: bombings, carjackings and mutilations. Guatemalan society, however, cannot be considered an innocent victim of these developments. Prominent cases have shown the ease with which hit-men can be employed, or criminal goods purchased. Lynching is still practiced in certain communities, though many citizens simply find it easier to retreat from public space and ignore the violence in their midst. No constituency, and least of all the business community, seems eager to increase the extremely low tax rates so as to fund better, more efficient security forces and a functioning judicial system. Numerous international efforts are now underway to support the fight against insecurity in Guatemala. The insignia effort of the United Nations, the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), will celebrate its fourth year of existence in September this year. A recent visit to Guatemala City by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, meanwhile, marked the start of a programme of support for the country under the UN Peacebuilding Fund, with a first tranche of funding worth 10 million US dollars. The United States is supporting the fight against crime through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), while the EU has unveiled a new four-year programme for institution-building in security and justice worth a total of 20 million euros. A major conference on regional security, organized by the System of Central American Integration (SICA), took place in June in Guatemala, and was attended by representatives from the US, the EU and a host of multilateral organizations. Other countries, particularly Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, run intense bilateral support programmes in this field. In order to frame a structured policy for the reform of Guatemala’s security and justice institutions, the research team1, under assignment from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carried out an extensive desk review and conducted two weeks’ of fieldwork in February 2011 in Guatemala (in the capital, Quetzaltenango and San Marcos). Interviews were carried out with embassies and UN agencies, heads of key institutions in the country’s judicial system, leading figures in the security forces, analysts of criminal trends, NGO and human rights experts, and officials in the prosecution service and police forces. Throughout this research, an emphasis was placed on three issues that should guide future Dutch policy in the country. These are: Analysis of the impact of the CICIG, and its possible future strategy ahead of a phased withdrawal; Assessment of how the capacities and effectiveness of Guatemalan institutions of security and justice can best be strengthened, and the role that the international community should play in this process; Exploration of the emerging trends of criminality in Guatemala, and the effectiveness of current and future responses to these dynamics. Our aim in developing this paper has also been to explore more broadly how, through its cooperation, the international community as a whole can contribute to improving the delivery of security and justice in Guatemala. Having noted a lack of coordination among international actors, we hope that this document can serve as a tool for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to encourage a more integrated, focused and coherent approach. To this end, initial consultations with diplomatic representatives in Guatemala have shown that considerable interest in such an initiative exists. Details: The Netherlands: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2011. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 22, 2012 at Year: 2011 Country: Guatemala URL: Shelf Number: 127262 Keywords: Human Rights (Guatemala)rmed Conflict (Guatemala)Security (Guatemala)Violence |
Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Violence Containment Spending in the Untied States: A New Methodology to Categorize and Account for the Economic Activity Related to Violence Summary: It has been well established that violence has a marked effect on economic activity with many studies demonstrating the negative economic impacts of crime, incarceration, insurgencies and especially war. However, there have been no studies to systematically aggregate the economic costs of all forms of violence, including the costs of prevention and protection, to understand how much of an economy is captured by violence and violence containment. For the purposes of classification, this form of economic activity has been defined as the violence containment industry (VCI). Aggregated as an industry sector it would be the single largest in the United States. The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) has developed a new methodology to quantify the cost of violence and the economic gains associated with peace for the U.S. economy. All expenditure that is related to violence containment, whether performed by the military on the international stage or domestically through the provision of services to fight crime, has been classified together as the Violence Containment Industry or alternately, as violence containment spending. This provides a framework to classify and better understand a substantial part of the U.S. economy as well as providing a platform for future research. Given the sheer size of the U.S. economy that is dedicated to containing violence, quantifying the expenditure as a discrete industry creates a unique basis for further analysis and debate. IEP defines violence containment spending as economic activity that is related to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is directed against people or property. This includes all expenditures related to violence, including but not limited to medical expenses, incarceration, police, the military, insurance, and the private security industry. It is divided into local, state, and federal government expenditure as well as private spending by corporations, households, and individuals. While expenditures on containing violence are an important and necessary public good, the less a nation spends on violence related functions the more resources a nation can allocate to other, more productive areas of economic activity. Expenditure on violence containment is economically efficient when it effectively prevents violence for the least amount of outlay. However, money that is spent on surplus violence containment, or money that is spent on inefficient programs has the potential to constrain a nations’ economic growth. This is simply because much of this type of expenditure is fundamentally unproductive, and if redirected toward productive pursuits, would improve government balance sheets, company profits and ultimately, the productivity and wellbeing of society. The research presented in this report shows that in 2010, VCI accounted for $2.16 trillion or around 15% of U.S. gross domestic product. This figure is considered conservative due to the difficulties of accounting for all private and public sector spending. Having not conducted an analysis of the size of the violence containment spending in other countries it is difficult to assess independently how the U.S. fares compared to other countries. Given the size of its defense and associated homeland security spending, the final size of the VCI in the U.S. is likely higher than other developed nations. THE KEY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ARE: • Violence Containment spending in the U.S. amounted to $2.16 trillion in 2010 equivalent to just over $15,000 for each taxpayer or $7,000 per year for every man, woman and child.¹ • If violence containment spending was represented as a discrete industry, it would be the largest industry in the United States economy, larger than construction, real estate, professional services or manufacturing. • If violence containment spending was represented as a discrete national economic entity, it would be the seventh largest economy in the world - only slightly smaller than the UK economy. • Violence containment spending is four times higher than the national defense budget. • Public sector spending on VCI accounts for 10.8% of GDP while private sector spending is 4.2% of GDP.² • If U.S. federal violence containment spending was reduced by $326 billion or 25%, i.e. to the same relative levels as in 2001, then in one year the saved funds would be sufficient to entirely update the energy grid, rebuild all levies and renew the nation’s school infrastructure. Violence containment spending has been broken down into both the public and private sectors, and is represented in terms of net value added.³ It shows that the Federal Government spends over $1.3 trillion or approximately 9% of GDP on violence containment. This is more than was spent on pensions and more than double what was spent on infrastructure in 2010. National defense spending includes the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs and the debt servicing on these expenditures which is based on the proportion of military related government expenditure.4 Private sector spending on violence containment is conservatively estimated to be $605 billion or 4.2% of 2010 GDP. The remaining amount is spent by state and local government on police, justice, corrections and other security related measures. The approach presented in this report enables a new and novel approach to understanding the international economic competitiveness of a nation, based on calculating the percentage of GDP spent on violence containment. The less a nation spends on violence containment, providing it is also more peaceful, then the more competitive the economy should be, due to the ability to deploy its resources more efficiently. This evidently is only one dimension of national competitiveness, but a uniquely original and important one. For business, higher violence containment spending can result in unaccounted costs such as higher taxes, increased sunken costs and increased ancillary costs such as investing in security systems, security guards or even higher insurance premiums. Additionally, the higher the level of violence in a corporation’s area of operations then the more management time is devoted to responding to security rather than market development or competitive issues. This represents ‘lost’ opportunity which could be transferred into developing capital and expanding profits. Given the enormity of the number of items that needed to be counted in this exercise, it is inevitable many much smaller items were excluded given the difficulty of obtaining data on the true value-added figure. As an illustrative example some of the more meaningful items excluded have been included on page ten. The sheer size of spending on the Violence Containment Industries very clearly illustrates the enormous benefits of investing in the prevention of violence. If policymakers clearly understood the economic burden of non-productive violence containment then improving the levels of peacefulness would be seen as central to long term structural reforms. Details: New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2013 at: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Violence-Containment-in-the-US-Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Violence-Containment-in-the-US-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 127342 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCosts of Criminal JusticeEconomics of Crime (U.S.)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Thaler, Kai Title: The Utility of Mixed Methods in the Study of Violence Summary: The study of violence has expanded in recent decades, concurrent with a rise in the use of mixed quantitative and qualitative methods in research throughout the social and health sciences. Methodologists have also begun to engage in a thorough theorization of both the epistemological foundations and empirical practice of mixed methods research. Mixed methods enable us to tie the broader patterns revealed by quantitative analysis to underlying processes and causal mechanisms that qualitative research is better able to illuminate, examining and explicating the interactions of structure and agency. This paper examines how qualitative and quantitative research methods may best be integrated in the study of violence, providing and critiquing examples from previous work on different forms of violence. Through the use of mixed methods, we can both improve the accordance of theories and empirical studies with social reality and gain a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of violence. Details: Brighton, UK: MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex,, 2012. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: MICROCON Research Working Paper 61: Accessed January 22, 2013 at: http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP61_KT_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP61_KT_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 127348 Keywords: Mixed MethodologyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cruz, Jose Miquel Title: Public Insecurity in Central America and Mexico Summary: Criminal violence and insecurity have grown to become some of the main challenges for governance and democratization in Latin America. A recent report released by the UNDP places Central America as the most violent subregion in the world, higher than the Latin American region as a whole, which itself is the most criminally violent of all world regions. According to the data, Central America has a homicide rate of 30 deaths per one hundred thousand people (PNUD 2009). This is three times the overall rate for the world, and places Central America above the Latin American average. The impact of crime on development seems hard to overstate but as violence spreads out and becomes a frequent phenomenon in Latin American societies, public insecurity grows to be a normal feature in social interactions (Bailey and Dammert 2006). Fear of crime can be generated by different variables, not only by crime and violence. Economic security, institutional performance, ecological conditions and individual characteristics may affect levels of public insecurity. All these conditions interact with crime and violence to generate more uncertainty and, in some cases, social unrest. This report in the AmericasBarometer Insights series seeks to explore the conditions that boost feelings of insecurity among the population in Central America and Mexico. We have chosen to focus on these countries because they provide good grounds for comparison regarding different levels of violence. While El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have the highest crime rates in the hemisphere, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama report some of the lowest rates in the Americas. A further reason for focusing on this region is that the surveys carried out in these countries incorporated some questions that were not included in other countries in the 2008 series. Details: Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2009. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: AmericasBarometer Insights: 2009 (No.28): Accessed January 24, 2013 at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0828en.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0828en.pdf Shelf Number: 127395 Keywords: Fear of CrimeHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime (Central American, Mexico) |
Author: Selee, Andrew Title: Crime and Violence in Mexico and Central America: An Evolving but Incomplete U.S. Policy Response Summary: Amid dramatic increases in crime and violence in Mexico and Central America, the US government has significantly increased its attention to public security issues in the region since 2007, with the Merida Initiative and the Central American Regional Security Initiative. The US policy response has been hampered to an extent, however, by US and regional obstacles. The authors suggest the policy emphasis has begun to shift in important ways, with more attention paid to addressing the citizen security crisis — a move away from the earlier near-total focus on combating drug trafficking and transnational crime. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Migration Policy Institute, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2013 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-EvolvingPolicyResponse.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-EvolvingPolicyResponse.pdf Shelf Number: 127404 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimeTransnational Crime (Central America and Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bateson, Regina Title: The Political Consequences of Crime Victimization in Latin America Summary: In the last two decades, violent crime rates in Latin America have increased exponentially. Though this is one of the most significant recent developments in the region, the political consequences of Latin America’s violent crime epidemic are largely unknown. Many scholars and commentators imply that the crime wave bodes ill for democracy in the region, suggesting that high levels of violent crime cause disillusionment with government, reduce mass political participation, and increase popular support for authoritarianism and mano dura. This paper evaluates the micro-foundations of that conventional wisdom. Analysis of data from the Latinobarómetro and LAPOP surveys consistently and convincingly shows that recent crime victimization is associated with increased political participation. Rather than becoming disenchanted or disempowered, Latin American crime victims are actually more politically active than comparable citizens who have not been victimized. Crime victimization has a more ambiguous relationship to political opinions. Victims are less satisfied with law enforcement than their non-victimized peers, and they are more likely to be concerned about crime as a public policy issue. Some regressions suggest that victims may have more pro-authoritarian views than their peers and may be more likely to support mano dura and vigilantism, but this result is not consistent across analysis of multiple surveys so the true relationship is difficult to ascertain. Details: Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 02, 2009. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 29, 2013 at: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/kyHPZ6/Bateson_CPW_April_14.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/kyHPZ6/Bateson_CPW_April_14.pdf Shelf Number: 127424 Keywords: Crime Statistics (Latin America)Crime VictimizationVictims of CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: U.S. Attorney General's National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence Title: Defending Childhood. Protect. Heal. Thrive. Summary: Exposure to violence is a national crisis that affects approximately two out of every three of our children. Of the 76 million children currently residing in the United States, an estimated 46 million can expect to have their lives touched by violence, crime, abuse, and psychological trauma this year. In 1979, U.S. Surgeon General Julius B. Richmond declared violence a public health crisis of the highest priority, and yet 33 years later that crisis remains. Whether the violence occurs in children’s homes, neighborhoods, schools, playgrounds or playing fields, locker rooms, places of worship, shelters, streets, or in juvenile detention centers, the exposure of children to violence is a uniquely traumatic experience that has the potential to profoundly derail the child’s security, health, happiness, and ability to grow and learn — with effects lasting well into adulthood. Exposure to violence in any form harms children, and different forms of violence have different negative impacts. Sexual abuse places children at high risk for serious and chronic health problems, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, suicidality, eating disorders, sleep disorders, substance abuse, and deviant sexual behavior. Sexually abused children often become hypervigilant about the possibility of future sexual violation, experience feelings of betrayal by the adults who failed to care for and protect them. Physical abuse puts children at high risk for lifelong problems with medical illness, PTSD, suicidality, eating disorders, substance abuse, and deviant sexual behavior. Physically abused children are at heightened risk for cognitive and developmental impairments, which can lead to violent behavior as a form of self-protection and control. These children often feel powerless when faced with physical intimidation, threats, or conflict and may compensate by becoming isolated (through truancy or hiding) or aggressive (by bullying or joining gangs for protection). Physically abused children are at risk for significant impairment in memory processing and problem solving and for developing defensive behaviors that lead to consistent avoidance of intimacy. Intimate partner violence within families puts children at high risk for severe and potentially lifelong problems with physical health, mental health, and school and peer relationships as well as for disruptive behavior. Witnessing or living with domestic or intimate partner violence often burdens children with a sense of loss or profound guilt and shame because of their mistaken assumption that they should have intervened or prevented the violence or, tragically, that they caused the violence. They frequently castigate themselves for having failed in what they assume to be their duty to protect a parent or sibling(s) from being harmed, for not having taken the place of their horribly injured or killed family member, or for having caused the offender to be violent. Children exposed to intimate partner violence often experience a sense of terror and dread that they will lose an essential caregiver through permanent injury or death. They also fear losing their relationship with the offending parent, who may be removed from the home, incarcerated, or even executed. Children will mistakenly blame themselves for having caused the batterer to be violent. If no one identifies these children and helps them heal and recover, they may bring this uncertainty, fear, grief, anger, shame, and sense of betrayal into all of their important relationships for the rest of their lives. Community violence in neighborhoods can result in children witnessing assaults and even killings of family members, peers, trusted adults, innocent bystanders, and perpetrators of violence. Violence in the community can prevent children from feeling safe in their own schools and neighborhoods. Violence and ensuing psychological trauma can lead children to adopt an attitude of hypervigilance, to become experts at detecting threat or perceived threat — never able to let down their guard in order to be ready for the next outbreak of violence. They may come to believe that violence is “normal,” that violence is “here to stay,” and that relationships are too fragile to trust because one never knows when violence will take the life of a friend or loved one. They may turn to gangs or criminal activities to prevent others from viewing them as weak and to counteract feelings of despair and powerlessness, perpetuating the cycle of violence and increasing their risk of incarceration. They are also at risk for becoming victims of intimate partner violence in adolescence and in adulthood. The picture becomes even more complex when children are “polyvictims” (exposed to multiple types of violence). As many as 1 in 10 children in this country are polyvictims, according to the Department of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s groundbreaking National Survey of Children’s Exposure to Violence (NatSCEV). The toxic combination of exposure to intimate partner violence, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and/or exposure to community violence increases the risk and severity of posttraumatic injuries and mental health disorders by at least twofold and up to as much as tenfold. Polyvictimized children are at very high risk for losing the fundamental capacities necessary for normal development, successful learning, and a productive adulthood. The financial costs of children’s exposure to violence are astronomical. The financial burden on other public systems, including child welfare, social services, law enforcement, juvenile justice, and, in particular, education, is staggering when combined with the loss of productivity over children’s lifetimes. It is time to ensure that our nation’s past inadequate response to children’s exposure to violence does not negatively affect children’s lives any further. We must not allow violence to deny any children their right to physical and mental health services or to the pathways necessary for maturation into successful students, productive workers, responsible family members, and parents and citizens. The findings and recommendations of the task force are organized into six chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the problem and sets forth 10 foundational recommendations. The next two chapters offer a series of recommendations to ensure that we reliably identify, screen, and assess all children exposed to violence and thereafter give them support, treatment, and other services designed to address their needs. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the task force focuses on prevention and emphasizes the importance of effectively integrating prevention, intervention, and resilience across systems by nurturing children through warm, supportive, loving, and nonviolent relationships in our homes and communities. In the sixth and final chapter of this report, the task force calls for a new approach to juvenile justice, one that acknowledges that the vast majority of the children involved in that system have been exposed to violence, necessitating the prioritization of services that promote their healing. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2012. 183p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2013 at: http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf Shelf Number: 127452 Keywords: Child AbuseChild Sexual AbuseChildren, Exposure to Violence (U.S.)Community ViolenceIntimate Partner ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Violence Policy Center Title: Black Homicide Victimization in the United States. An Analysis of 2010 Homicide Data Summary: America faces a continuing epidemic of homicide among young black males. The devastation homicide inflicts on black teens and adults is a national crisis, yet it is all too often ignored outside of affected communities. This study examines the problem of black homicide victimization at the state level by analyzing unpublished Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) data for black homicide victimization submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The information used for this report is for the year 2010 and is the most recent data available. This is the first analysis of the 2010 data on black homicide victims to offer breakdowns of cases in the 10 states with the highest black homicide victimization rates and the first to rank the states by the rate of black homicides. It is important to note that the SHR data used in this report comes from law enforcement reporting at the local level. While there are coding guidelines followed by the law enforcement agencies, the amount of information submitted to the SHR system, and the interpretation that results in the information submitted (for example, gang involvement) will vary from agency to agency. While this study utilizes the best and most recent data available, it is limited by the quantity and degree of detail in the information submitted. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2013 at: http://www.vpc.org/studies/blackhomicide13.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.vpc.org/studies/blackhomicide13.pdf Shelf Number: 127575 Keywords: African AmericansGun ViolenceHomicides (U.S.)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Collier, Paul Title: Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria Summary: Elections are now common in low-income societies. However, they are frequently flawed. We investigate a Nigerian election seriously marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on anti-violence campaigning. The campaign appealed to collective action through electoral participation, and worked through town meetings, popular theaters, and door-to-door distribution of materials. We find that the campaign reduced the intensity of violence, as measured by independent sources. We also observe an increase on voter turnout, and infer that the intimidation was dissociated from incumbents. These effects are accompanied by improved perceptions of security and empowerment to counteract violence. Details: Dublin: Department of Economics, trinity College Dublin, 2011. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://www.pedrovicente.org/violence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.pedrovicente.org/violence.pdf Shelf Number: 127605 Keywords: Electoral PoliticsPolitics and ViolenceViolence |
Author: Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Eduardo Title: Security, Drugs, and Violence In Mexico: A Survey. 7th North American Forum, Washington, DC, 2011 Summary: The survey is composed by five sections. The first one is a diagnosis with two components. The first one is a brief description of Mexico’s security institutions. The survey includes a brief update of the most significant changes on these institutions during the last year, especially a report on the current situation of the police forces. The second component has to do with the present dynamics of Mexican organized crime. Here, the survey provides an account of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations, including the different criminal activities these organizations perform, their geographic distribution, and the relationships among them. Also, the fragmentation of some of these organizations is described, and a new typology of cartels is included. The second section is about organized crime violence. Considering that violence trends are changing quickly this survey includes a general update of the phenomenon. In addition to the factors that explain increases of violence, the survey also points out the main factors that explain the geographic dispersion of violence as well as its regional specifics. The third section reviews the government’s strategy and actions against organized crime. This section includes an analysis of the outcomes of the Federal Government’s deployment of the force against organized crime through “joint operations” (operativos conjuntos), and an assessment of the government’s security policy impact on violence levels. The fourth section describes the general traits of the Mexican and North American drug markets. Finally, the fifth section addresses Mexican public opinion; it brings together the results of recent polls regarding security and government actions against organized crime, and provides an account of the government’s communication strategy on security issues. This Survey’s Data Sources The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures derive from two databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies. The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 30,000 news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crónica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Gráfico, El Norte, El Sol de México, El Universal, Excélsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razón, La Segunda de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMásUno. This database is complementary to the official one, which has not been updated since December 2010. The second database contains information on 1,029 messages placed by criminal organizations next to corpses of executed individuals. Details: Mexico: Lantia Consultores, S.C., 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Shelf Number: 127617 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: Is More Getting Us Less? Real Solutions for Securing Our Border Summary: Ongoing reports about Mexico’s bloody conflict with organized crime have raised again the question of whether the United States should do more to prevent such violence from “spilling over” into the country. While officials have documented few cases of actual “spill over,” fears of exploding violence in Mexico and concerns about illegal migration are driving a policy debate that is centered on “securing the border.” To whit, President Barack Obama announced last May the deployment of 1,200 more National Guard troops to enhance border security, and requested an additional $500 million from Congress to further modernize southwestern border security. In August, the U.S. Congress approved a $600 million “Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010” in near record time. The question is whether such policy actions are effective. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Shelf Number: 127619 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal CartelsOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Azrael, Deborah Title: Developing the Capacity to Understand and Prevent Homicide: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission Summary: The Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (MHRC) was established in May 2004 to address the city’s persistent lethal violence problem. The MHRC is a multi-tiered intervention with four levels, each of which involves participation by a different set of agencies and stakeholders. A key assumption underlying the four levels of MHRC review, and driving its decision to include stakeholders outside of the traditional criminal justice arena, was that the development and implementation of homicide prevention strategies is a complex and multi-faceted process that can be strengthened by input and buy-in from stakeholders throughout the community. The goal of the MHRC was to foster and support innovative homicide prevention and intervention strategies using the emerging tool of strategic problem analysis. In February 2005, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded the Harvard School of Public Health to evaluate the MHRC. The evaluation, which utilized a randomized matched pair design, consisted of three principal components: 1) a formative evaluation, 2) a process evaluation, and 3) an impact evaluation. More specifically, through semi-structured interviews and analysis of homicide data collected as part of the project, the evaluation examined whether homicide reviews provide additional insights into the nature of homicide problems relative to traditional methods; whether these insights lead to the development of new strategic responses to homicide problems; whether law enforcement agencies, social service providers, and the community feel that sharing information improves their ability to work together; and whether these responses seem to have short-term homicide reduction impacts. The NIJ-sponsored evaluation closely examined MHRC work from January 2005 through December 2007. During this time period, the MHRC conducted thirty criminal justice reviews, fifteen community service provider reviews and two community reviews, covering cases from January 2005 through November 2007. Overall, the homicide review process revealed that homicides in the City’s intervention districts were largely clustered in very specific places, such as in and around taverns, and among active offenders who were very well known to the criminal justice system. Homicides were often the outcome of an ongoing dispute between individuals and/or groups (usually gangs) and involved respect, status, and retribution as motives. The MHRC process yielded a comprehensive set of actionable policy and program development recommendations. These recommendations were ratified by and the implementation was continuously monitored by the MHRC Working and Executive Committees. In general, the MHRC recommendations better positioned criminal justice, social service, and community-based organizations to address high-risk places and high-risk people central to recurring homicide problems. MHRC participants credited the implementation of the recommendations with improving both criminal justice and community provider capacity to prevent violence. A key to this increased capacity was the improved communication, information sharing and cooperation both within and between criminal justice agencies, community service providers and community members. The impact evaluation used statistical models to analyze a time series of monthly counts of homicides in the control and treatment districts (January 1999 – December 2006). The impact evaluation revealed that the implementation of the MHRC iv interventions was associated with a statistically significant 52% decrease in the monthly count of homicide in the treatment districts. The control districts experienced a non-significant 9.2% decrease in homicide, controlling for the other covariates. While these analyses can’t be used to specify the exact effect of the MHRC interventions, the empirical evidence suggests that the MHRC interventions were associated with a noteworthy decrease in homicide. As such, the MHRC homicide review process seems to add considerable value to understanding the nature of urban homicide problems, crafting appropriate interventions to address underlying risks associated with homicides, implementing innovative strategies to address these risks, and assessing the impacts of these strategies. Details: Unpublished report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2013. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240814.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240814.pdf Shelf Number: 127695 Keywords: Crime PreventionGun ViolenceHomicide PreventionHomicides (Milwaukee, U.S.)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Communities Shattered by Arms Proliferation and Abuse in Côte d’Ivoire Summary: The irresponsible and illegal supply of weaponry and munitions to the warring parties in Côte d’ivoire has continued for over a decade, despite the 2004 un arms embargo. these arms have contributed to an escalation of hostilities that fuelled a pattern of serious violations of human rights and violent crime, in particular during the 2011 postelectoral crisis. the violence that followed the disputed presidential election in november 2011 caused the most serious humanitarian and human rights crisis in Côte d’ivoire since the de facto partition of the country in 2002. all sides to the conflict committed international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. hundreds of people were unlawfully killed, women and children were subjected to rape and sexual violence, and people were forced to flee their homes. yet the weapons kept flowing. the dire situation in Côte d’ivoire underscores the urgency for un member states to finalize an effective arms trade treaty at the march 2013 un conference. such a treaty could protect and save lives by containing strong measures requiring all states parties to stop any international transfer of arms which carry a substantial risk of being used to facilitate atrocities or grave abuses of human rights. preventing the international arms trade from repeatedly shattering such societies requires the application of a global treaty with robust rules based upon respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. Details: London: Amnesty International, 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2013 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Communities%20shattered%20by%20arms%20proliferation%20and%20abuse%20in%20Cote_d_Ivoire.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Cote d'Ivoire URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Communities%20shattered%20by%20arms%20proliferation%20and%20abuse%20in%20Cote_d_Ivoire.pdf Shelf Number: 128077 Keywords: Gun ViolenceIllegal Guns (Cote d'lvoire)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Doctors Without Borders Title: Violence, Vulnerability and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe. A report on the situation of sub-Saharan migrants in an irregular situation in Morocco Summary: Over the last ten years, as the European Union (EU) has tightened its border controls and increasingly externalised its migration policies, Morocco has changed from being just a transit country for migrants en route to Europe to being both a transit and destination country by default. MSF’s experience demonstrates that the longer sub-Saharan migrants stay in Morocco the more vulnerable they become. This preexisting vulnerability, related to factors such as age and gender, as well as traumas experienced during the migration process, accumulates as they are trapped in Morocco and subjected to policies and practices that neglect, exclude and discriminate against them. MSF’s data demonstrates that the precarious living conditions that the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are forced to live in and the wide-spread institutional and criminal violence that they are exposed to continue to be the main factors influencing medical and psychological needs. MSF teams have repeatedly highlighted and denounced this situation, yet violence remains a daily reality for the majority of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco. In fact, as this report demonstrates, the period since December 2011 has seen a sharp increase in abuse, degrading treatment and violence against sub-Saharan migrants by Moroccan and Spanish security forces. This report also reveals the widespread violence carried out by criminal gangs, including bandits and human smuggling and human trafficking networks. It provides a glimpse into the shocking levels of sexual violence that migrants are exposed to throughout the migration process and demands better assistance and protection for those affected. These unacceptable levels of violence should not overshadow the achievements that have been made in recognition and respect for sub-Saharan migrants’ right to health over the last ten years. Progress has been made, however considerable challenges remain, particularly with regard to non-emergency, secondary care, care for people with mental health problems and protection and assistance for survivors of sexual violence. Further investment and reform of the healthcare system is needed, however the impact of the progress made to date and any future reforms will be limited unless concrete action is taken to address the discrepancy between European and Moroccan policies which view migration through a security prism and criminalise, marginalise and discriminate against sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco and those which protect and uphold their fundamental human rights. This report highlights the medical and psychological consequences of this approach and the cumulative vulnerability of the significant numbers of sub-Saharan migrants who are trapped in Morocco. In doing so it calls, once again, on the Moroccan authorities to respect their international and national commitments to human rights, develop and implement protection mechanisms and ensure that sub- Saharan migrants are treated in a humane and dignified manner, no matter what their legal status. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Doctors Without Borders, 2013. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2013 at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2013/Trapped_at_the_Gates_of_Europe.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Morocco URL: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2013/Trapped_at_the_Gates_of_Europe.pdf Shelf Number: 128194 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityImmigrationMigrantsMigration (Morocco)Victims of ViolenceViolence |
Author: Thomas, Kylie Title: The Power of Naming: ‘Senseless Violence’ and Violent Law in Post-Apartheid South Africa Summary: This report focuses on vigilantism, on the practice of ‘necklacing’ as a form of punishment, and on police violence in South Africa post-apartheid. The report engages with a series of questions about how popular forms of justice are imagined and enacted and about what the persistence of forms of violent punishment that originated during apartheid signifies in South Africa today. The report explores some of the complex reasons why people understand violence to be a means for achieving justice. It considers issues related to collective violence, violence connected to service delivery protests, and violence widely understood by perpetrators, onlookers, and researchers to be punitive in intent. It contests the idea that such forms of violence are ‘senseless’, arguing that to do so is to evade the question of how violence is bound to the political order, both past and present. Details: Cape Town: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Centre for Humanities Research, University of the Western Cape, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.csvr.org.za/images/docs/VTP3/k_thomas_the_power_of_naming_senseless_violence_and_violent_law_in_post_apartheid_sa.pdf Year: 2012 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.csvr.org.za/images/docs/VTP3/k_thomas_the_power_of_naming_senseless_violence_and_violent_law_in_post_apartheid_sa.pdf Shelf Number: 128413 Keywords: Police MisconductVigilantism (South Africa)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Nobis, Elizabeth Title: Improving the Epidemiology of Alcohol-Related Violence in the City of Philadelphia Using Geospatial Analysis Summary: In the United States, alcohol related violence is a major public health problem. There is a significant amount of evidence suggesting that the density of alcohol outlets and the level of social disorganization in a neighborhood are related to levels of violent assault. Less is known about the spatial distribution of assaults surrounding these alcohol outlets including the neighborhood characteristic of vacant lots. Better understanding these spatial linkages will contribute to improvements in the public health efforts to suppress violence and morbidity. Objective: This project aims to determine whether the density of alcohol outlets in Philadelphia is associated with neighborhood levels of violence and whether this relationship is influenced by the density of vacant lots. It was then investigated how violence geographical clusters around these spaces. Methods: This study utilized police-recorded data of aggravated assaults in Philadelphia, alcohol outlet addresses in Philadelphia, and 2010 Census Bureau block group information. Descriptive statistics, regression, spatial clustering, and qualitative mapping analysis were used to identify the distribution and relationships of assaults in the city. Results: Areas with higher percentages of vacant housing in combination with high density of alcohol outlets have a positive relationship with increased levels of aggravated assaults. This effect is most evident in economically disadvantaged areas. Conclusion: There is significant evidence that aggravated assaults are spatially linked to alcohol outlets and vacant lots. Development of alcohol policy, as well as improving neighborhood environments in low-income areas will reduce alcohol-related violence and improve the safety of Philadelphia’s general public. Details: Philadelphia: Drexel University, School of Public Health, 2012. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed April 25, 2013 at: http://idea.library.drexel.edu/handle/1860/3946 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://idea.library.drexel.edu/handle/1860/3946 Shelf Number: 128500 Keywords: Aggravated AssaultsAlcohol-Related Crime, Disorder (Philadelphia, U.SGeographical Information Systems (GIS)Geospatial AnalysisViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Desai, Ashwin Title: The Cape of Good Dope? A post-apartheid story of gangs and vigilantes Summary: Everything lies in the challenge and the duel – that is to say, everything still lies in the dual personal relation with the opposing power. It is that power which humiliated you, so it must be humiliated. And not merely exterminated. It has to be made to lose face ... it must be targeted and wounded in a genuinely adversarial relation. (Baudillard 2002:25-26) Pagad (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs)entered the South African political landscape in dramatic fashion. On the night of the 4th August 1996, Pagad drove in convoy from the Gatesville Mosque to the house of the head of the Hard Livings gang, Rashaad Staggie. He was not home, but in an act of bravado, arrived. Already shots had been fired between Pagad and those inside Staggie’s Salt River home. While trying to alight from his vehicle, he was shot in the head. As he fell out of his bakkie, ‘his inert body, apparently dead, was kicked, jumped on, hit with the butt of a shotgun and shot several more times before a petrol bomb was hurled at the body. Miraculously, this revived the mortally wounded man and he rose and tried to run away, only to be brought down by a volley of gunfire from the crowd’. (Sunday Tribune 11 August 1996) All this happened in the full glare of the media and with the police present. It was one of the first times a movement in post-apartheid South Africa acted with such impunity and with such directness in respect of their aims and objectives. Pagad wanted to rid the flats of gangs and drugs. Participants in its first big mass march had just killed a leading gangster and known drug-dealer. Five years later Pagad was involved in another dramatic incident in the city centre: Shots were fired and pedestrians scrambled for cover as policemen engaged in a shootout with seven men who escaped from court in Cape Town . . . The seven members of Pagad’s G-Force, faced urban terrorism charges. They apparently overpowered a policemen in the high court’s holding cells during a lunch break and seized his gun . . . scaled a gate to reach Queen Victoria Street, and were then involved in a shootout with the police in the after-lunch traffic in the city centre. (The Mercury, 5 October 2001) What had happened in the five years that turned Pagad from being an organisation seeking to rid the Cape Flats of druglords into fugitives from the law? Details: Durban, South Africa: Centre for Civil Society; University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Development Studies, 2004. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Acessed May 1, 2013 at: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Desai%20Pagad%20Research%20Report.pdf Year: 2004 Country: South Africa URL: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Desai%20Pagad%20Research%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 128593 Keywords: Gangs (South Africa)Vigilantes (South Africa)VigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Wilson, David A. Title: Violent Crime: A Comparative Study of Honduras and Nicaragua Summary: This thesis explains variation between contemporary Honduras and Nicaragua in terms of their levels of violent crime. The thesis is driven by an empirical observation: Nicaragua, a country that shares a border with Honduras and where the U.S.-backed Contras waged a civil war against the Sandinista government during much of the 1980s, is considerably less violent than Honduras, which did not undergo civil war. This variation conflicts with expectations in studies of security in Central America that countries that have experienced civil war will, during the post-conflict period, experience higher rates of violent crime than countries that have not. In contrast, this thesis argues that in Nicaragua it was precisely the conclusion of the civil war that drew attention from domestic and international actors who implemented changes that resulted in the demilitarization of internal security, the reduction of weapons in society, and the emergence of social movements that gave ex-combatants voice through non-violent means. Honduras, which did not experience civil war and a subsequent peace process, has seen the circulation of large amounts of weaponry and ongoing military participation in internal security, which has meant human rights abuses and low social capital. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 13, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=703242 Year: 2009 Country: South America URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=703242 Shelf Number: 128723 Keywords: Civil WarsGangsPost-Conflict SocietiesSocial CapitalViolenceViolent Crimes (Honduras; Nicaragua) |
Author: Planty, Michael Title: Firearm Violence, 1993–2011 Summary: –Firearm-related homicides declined 39 percent and nonfatal firearm crimes declined 69 percent from 1993 to 2011, the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) announced today. Firearm-related homicides dropped from 18,253 homicides in 1993 to 11,101 in 2011, and nonfatal firearm crimes dropped from 1.5 million victimizations in 1993 to 467,300 in 2011. For both fatal and nonfatal firearm victimizations, the majority of the decline occurred during the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002. The number of firearm homicides declined from 1993 to 1999, rose through 2006 and then declined through 2011. Nonfatal firearm violence declined from 1993 through 2004 before fluctuating in the mid- to late 2000s. In 2011, about 70 percent of all homicides and eight percent of all nonfatal violent victimizations (rape, sexual assault, robbery and aggravated assault) were committed with a firearm, mainly a handgun. A handgun was used in about 7 in 10 firearm homicides and about 9 in 10 nonfatal firearm violent crimes in 2011. In the same year, about 26 percent of robberies and 31 percent of aggravated assaults involved a firearm, such as handguns, shotguns or rifles. In 2007-11, about one percent of victims in all nonfatal violent crimes reported using a firearm to defend themselves during the incident. A small number of property crime victims also used a firearm in self-defense—about 0.1 percent of all property victimizations. The majority of nonfatal firearm violence occurred in or around the victim’s home (42 percent) or in an open area, on the street, or while on public transportation (23 percent). Less than one percent of all nonfatal firearm violence occurred in schools. From 1993 to 2010, males, blacks and persons ages 18 to 24 were most likely to be victims of firearm-related homicide. In 2011, the rate of nonfatal firearm violent for males (1.9 per 1,000) was not significantly different than the rate for females (1.6 per 1,000). Non-Hispanic blacks (2.8 per 1,000) and Hispanics (2.2 per 1,000) had higher rates of nonfatal firearm violence than non-Hispanic whites (1.4 per 1,000). Persons ages 18 to 24 had the highest rates of nonfatal firearm violence (5.2 per 1,000). In 2004 (the most recent year of data available), among state prison inmates who possessed a gun at the time of the offense, fewer than two percent bought their firearm at a flea market or gun show. About 10 percent of state prison inmates said they purchased it from a retail store or pawnshop, 37 percent obtained it from family or friends, and another 40 percent obtained it from an illegal source. Findings in this report on nonfatal firearm violence are based on data from the BJS National Crime Victimization Survey. Findings on firearm homicide are based on data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed May 20, 2013 at: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf Shelf Number: 128751 Keywords: Crime StatisticsFirearms and Crime (U.S.)Guns and CrimeHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Peetz, Peter Title: Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua: Laws and the Construction of Drug- and Gender-Related Violence Summary: In Central America, legislation aiming to reduce violence and crime has become an important topic in the security debate. Focusing on Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, this paper analyzes laws and other legal texts regarding the trade in and consumption of drugs on the one hand, and gender-related violence on the other. It shows how the content and the wording of legal texts contribute to the social construction of stereotyped offenders, such as youth gang members, drug users, or foreign nationals. The legal texts in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua reflect both the hegemonic and the counter-discursive influences on each country's legal discourse. Details: Hamburg, Germany: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2008. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working Paper No 72 ; Accessed June 21, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1122406 Year: 2008 Country: Central America URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1122406 Shelf Number: 129042 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeGender-Related ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime (Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicara |
Author: Kolbe, Athena R. Title: Revisiting Haiti´s Gangs and Organized Violence Summary: Though a preoccupation with organized violence has dominated much of the discourse on politics and development in Haiti, little research exists on Haiti’s urban gangs and insurgent groups. This paper examines urban gangs through intensive field research conducted over a number of years with both members of armed groups and residents of areas in which they operate. Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, the paper sets out to examine whether Haiti ́s gang-related violence constitutes a “war” using criteria embedded in the Geneva Conventions. Advancing the debate, this study finds that there are surprising convergences in the views and experiences of armed group members and Haitian civilians. Details: Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil: HASOW (Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War), 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper 4: Accessed June 21, 2013 at: http://www.hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/102/doc/923593528.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Haiti URL: http://www.hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/102/doc/923593528.pdf Shelf Number: 129120 Keywords: Gang ViolenceViolenceViolent CrimeYouth Gangs (Haiti) |
Author: Lunde, Henriette Title: The Violent Lifeworlds of Young Haitians: Gangs as livelihood in a Port-au-Prince ghetto Summary: Seven months after the forced departure of elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004, the ghettos in Port-au-Prince erupted in a violent uprising costing thousands of lives. The tension simmered for seven months until the use of force against demonstrators by the interim government caused it to blow up. The sudden outburst of massive organized violence came as a surprise to the interim government, as well as to the UN peacekeepers. Could what happened in 2004 happen again today? By analyzing the social structures facilitating the rapid mobilization of armed resistance in the Port-au-Prince ghettos, together with the incentives for local youth to join armed groups and participate in the fighting, this report points to important parallels between post-Aristide and post-earthquake Haiti. Examining these factors raises questions such as how best to address both the security challenge and the living conditions for marginalized urban youth in present-day Haiti. Details: Oslo, Norway: Fafo, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: The Haiti Youth Project: Accessed June 21, 2013 at: http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10149/10149.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Haiti URL: http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10149/10149.pdf Shelf Number: 129122 Keywords: ViolenceViolent CrimeYouth Gangs (Haiti) |
Author: Streicher, Ruth Title: The Construction of Masculinities and Violence: „Youth Gangs“ in Dili, East Timor Summary: It was the sudden resurgence of violence in 2006 that brought Southeast Asia’s newest nation – East Timor – back to the forefront of public attention, and spotlighted the role of youth gangs as main perpetrators of street violence in East Timor’s capital Dili. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2007, this paper challenges conventional myths about an aggressive East Timorese ‘youth bulge’ by using theoretical notions on the construction of masculinities and violence as tools for analysis. The paper will portray gangs against the structural background of major socio-economic transformations accelerated by the international intervention and experiences of violence during Indonesian occupation as active agents strategically using violence as resource for (identity) politics. Details: Berlin: Freie Universitat Berlin, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Policies, 2011. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 2: Accessed June 21, 2013 at: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/vorderer-orient/publikation/WP_serie/WP2_Streicher_FINAL_web.pdf?1367710157 Year: 2011 Country: East Timor URL: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/vorderer-orient/publikation/WP_serie/WP2_Streicher_FINAL_web.pdf?1367710157 Shelf Number: 129123 Keywords: Juvenile OffendersSocio-Economic ConditionsViolenceYouth Gangs (East Timor) |
Author: Donaldson, William Title: Gangbangers and Politicians: The Effects of Mano Dura on Salvadoran Politics Summary: In 2009, El Salvador’s homicide rate reached seventy-one deaths per 100,000 people, the highest in the world outside of active war-zones. In the same year Mauricio Funes, the candidate of the leftist FMLN party, was elected president, an unprecedented event that marked the end of the right-wing ARENA party’s hold on power since 1989. To describe the political landscape of El Salvador as polarized would be an understatement: the founder of ARENA was responsible for much of the right-wing death squad activity in El Salvador during the 1980s, while the FMLN originally was the umbrella organization of leftist guerrilla groups during the civil war from 1979 to 1992. Veterans of the civil war are involved in both political parties and decades-old grievances between the two sides manifest themselves in the contentious political debates surrounding free trade, El Salvador’s relationship with the United States, and socio-economic inequality among other topics. However, despite rhetoric to the contrary, both previous ARENA administrations and the Funes administration have adopted the same policies in regards to the post-war crime surge, specifically the problem of youth gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS13). The policies revolve around the controversial mano dura (“iron fist”) laws that advocate a strong law enforcement approach towards gangs or maras and involve questionable methods such as the arbitrary detention of suspected gang youth for simply wearing baggy pants or sporting tattoos. Details: New Orleans, LA: Tulane University, Stone Center for Latin American Studies, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://stonecenter.tulane.edu/uploads/Donaldson,_UploadVersion-1368207121.pdf Year: 2012 Country: El Salvador URL: http://stonecenter.tulane.edu/uploads/Donaldson,_UploadVersion-1368207121.pdf Shelf Number: 129131 Keywords: Gangs (El Salvador)HomicidesViolence |
Author: Masese, Grace Title: Crime and Violence Trends in Nairobi, Kenya Summary: This paper examines the phenomenon of youth crime in Nairobi especially in relation to youth gangs. The case pays special attention to the Mungiki movement and street families. It also examines some of the organized responses to crime of this nature. As the administrative, political and commercial capital of Kenya, Nairobi is a significant trendsetter in the country. The city holds approximately 3 million residents, 10% of the Kenyan population. An additional 1.5 million persons from neighboring districts come to work in the city on a daily basis. In addition the industrial satellite towns; Mavoko, Thika, Ruiru, and Kikuyu depend on Nairobi’s facilities such as water supply, schools and health facilities among other amenities for their survival. The city also provides services to a large population in the neighboring rural, peri-urban and urban areas of Kiambu, Kajiado, Machakos, and Thika districts. The status of Nairobi as a national hub acts as a powerful magnet for people from rural areas in search of better opportunities, resulting in a great strain on the city’s capacity to handle the influx. The growth of slums and mushrooming of unplanned and unauthorized settlements such as Kibera, Mathare and Mukuru kwa Njenga, within the city and its peripheries is a direct consequence of this migratory tide. Informal settlements are found in all the divisions of Nairobi. These settlements vary in size and density, are characterized by very poor environmental and health conditions, inadequate shelter, unemployment and insufficient services. Over 60% of the population of Nairobi resides in informal settlements.1 The problem of crime in Nairobi is closely associated with but not limited to informal settlements due to various reasons such as: • limited opportunities for gainful legal employment and consequently fertile grounds for the nurturing a sense of helplessness and hopelessness; • often neighboring most affluent residential neighborhoods makes theft and robbery an attractive option for idle youths • frequent eviction of the inhabitants from their residence pushing the poor into criminal activities; • easy hideout for criminals as formal social control institutions are weak coupled with inadequate accessibility among others. This is in line with the structural and organizational perspective that regards crime as a product of social change and its influence on behaviour in specific cultural, political, economic and social contexts. For example, forces existing in the deprived and demeaning conditions of living for the lower classes in society may push many of their members into criminal behavior, resulting in increase in crime rates;‘Crime does not happen spontaneously. It grows out of an unequal and exclusive society and out of lack of institutional and social control’2. The cultural perspective views delinquent behavior in groups among the lower classes as a protest against norms and values of the upper classes. Since lower class individuals are unable to achieve success legitimately they experience a cultural conflict, which is referred as status frustration, and often join in gangs and engage in behavior that is legally non-conformist. Therefore, crime has been viewed as sub-culture among certain groups that represent a value system directly opposed to that of the larger society. Details: Case study prepared for Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements 2007. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2007.CaseStudy.Crime.Nairobi.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2007.CaseStudy.Crime.Nairobi.pdf Shelf Number: 129134 Keywords: Juvenile Delinquency (Kenya)ViolenceYouth Gangs |
Author: Oettler, Anika Title: Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua: National Patterns of Attention and Cross-border Discursive Nodes Summary: It has become common to state that youth gangs and organized crime have seized Central America. For theories on contemporary Central American violence, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua present important test cases, demonstrating the need to differentiate the diagnosis. First, national discourses on violence differ from country to country, with varying threat levels, patterns of attention, and discursive leitmotivs. Second, there are border-crossing discursive nodes such as the mara paradigm, the perception of grand corruption, and gender-based violence tied to cross-national, national or sub-national publics. The paper explores the ambiguity and plurivocality of contemporary discourses on violence, emanting from a variety of hegemonic and less powerful publics. Details: Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2007. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working Papers No. 65: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp65_oettler.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Central America URL: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp65_oettler.pdf Shelf Number: 129135 Keywords: Organized Crime 00 CorruptionViolenceYouth Gangs (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua) |
Author: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Title: Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations in El Salvador Summary: This Issue Paper was drafted by the Department of State’s Office of Asia and Western Hemisphere Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for use by the Executive Office of Immigration Review and the Department of Homeland Security in assessing asylum claims.a It is intended to provide a convenient, updated summary regarding gang organizations in El Salvador.b Under 8 C.F.R. 208.11 and 1208.11, the Department of State may provide information on country conditions that may be pertinent to the adjudication of asylum claims.c The purpose of this issue paper is to present information relating to such conditions;d it is not intended to convey a description of all of the possible circumstances from which legitimate asylum claims may arise. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2007. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2013 Year: 2007 Country: El Salvador URL: Shelf Number: 129136 Keywords: 18th Street GangAsylumMara SalvatruchaViolenceYouth Gangs (El Salvador) |
Author: Huhn, Sebastian Title: A History of Nonviolence: Insecurity and the Normative Power of the Imagined in Costa Rica Summary: Crime, violence, and insecurity are among the most important social topics in contemporary Costa Rica. These three issues play a central role in the media, politics, and everyday life, and the impression has emerged that security has changed for the worse and that society is now threatened permanently. However, crime statistics do not support this perception. The paper thus asks why violence and crime generate such huge fear in society. The thesis is that the Costa Rican national identity—with Costa Rica constructed as a nonviolent nation— impedes a realistic discussion about the phenomena and their causes, and simultaneously provides a platform for sensationalism and the social construction of fear. Details: Hamburg, German: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2008. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working Paper No. 84: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp84_huhn.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Costa Rica URL: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp84_huhn.pdf Shelf Number: 111681 Keywords: ViolenceViolent Crime (Costa Rica) |
Author: Brands, Hal Title: Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America: Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces Summary: The problems of criminal fiefdoms—alternatively governed spaces (AGSs) in which criminal organizations, rather than formal authorities, effectively control the population and act as the arbiter of internal order—have become a serious security issue in Latin America. In several countries, criminal fiefdoms have taken shape against the backdrop of rampant criminality that has afflicted much of the region over the past two decades, with this phenomenon intensified by competition between rival transnational drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Brazil, criminal organizations ranging from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control large portions of the national territory. They serve as de facto governments as they collect “taxes” through dues and extortion, demand the loyalty, or at least the acquiescence, of the people under their control, and punish those who interfere with their illicit activities. Such groups wage irregular warfare—defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations”—against their competitors and governments.1 While criminal organizations like MS-13 and the First Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo sometimes provide order and limited social services, they also exploit and terrorize the populace. Criminal fiefdoms have thus exposed the weakness of governance, showing that states cannot control their territory or protect their citizens. This is having a corrosive impact on the public psyche, material conditions and is undermining democracy. Addressing this problem will be a difficult and complex task. The issue of criminal fiefdoms is rooted in structural problems—inequality, lack of opportunity, corruption, and above all, weak state capacity. Efforts must concentrate on building broad political compacts in support of holistic anti-crime programs and efforts to strengthening the state. • Within this context, there are several initiatives to consider, including: Smarter targeting and efforts to develop tools necessary to sustain long-term investigations and successful prosecutions; Creative policing strategies that focus on policecivilian interaction and protection of the population; Short and long-term efforts to strengthen honest law enforcement and judicial officials to reduce corruption; Building the institutional capacity of the agencies and offices charged with combating and prosecuting organized crime; Macro and micro-economic initiatives to broaden opportunity and stem the stream of recruits for organized crime; Intensified U.S. efforts to deal with the demand side of the DTO problem and a capacity and willingness for innovation and experimentation. During the Cold War, Latin America was roiled by Marxist insurgencies that, in the process of seeking to overthrow governments, carved out “liberated zones” in which insurgents could operate freely and extract resources from the population. Today, ideological violence has faded, but the problem of alternatively governed spaces (AGSs)—areas in which some groups other than the government are the de facto arbiter of internal order—continues to plague the region. A variety of criminal organizations, ranging from youth gangs to transnational drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), have established “criminal fiefdoms” in which they operate with little or no interference from the authorities and have established a form of dominance—complete with “taxation,” limited social services, and often-brutal punishment—over the population. This phenomenon is most pronounced in Central American countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, but it is also evident in Brazil. Where fiefdoms exist, states are essentially experiencing irregular warfare, as criminal groups compete with established governments for control and influence over the civilian population. This phenomenon has highlighted the weakness of many states, and is having a severely corrosive impact on democratic governance and the rule of law. This paper thus analyzes the origins, manifestations, and ramifications of the problem of criminal fiefdoms. The first section offers an analytical framework for understanding the issue. The second and third sections present case studies, focusing on the current situation in Guatemala and São Paulo, Brazil. The fourth section discusses policy implications. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2010. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 25, 2013 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=whemsac Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 129154 Keywords: Drug TraffickingFirst Capital Command (PCC)GangsMS-13Organized Crime (Latin America)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Sookram, Sandra Title: Serious Crime in Trinidad and Tobago: An Empirical Analysis Using Time-Series Data Between 1970-2007 Summary: This paper uses time-series data from Trinidad and Tobago and tests for the existence of a long-run cointegration relationship among serious crime, clearance rate and various socio-economic indicators. The cointegration analysis provides strong evidence of the existence of a long-run model, with the normalised coefficients showing a negative effect of the clearance rate, the percentage of females in the labour force and the percentage of the labour force with tertiary education on serious crime, with the sole exception being the unemployment rate which is found to exert a positive effect. Details: St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, The University of the West Indies, 2009. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: SALISES Publications • Working Papers: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: https://sta.uwi.edu/salises/pubs/workingpapers/DPCrimeTTFeb2010.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Trinidad and Tobago URL: https://sta.uwi.edu/salises/pubs/workingpapers/DPCrimeTTFeb2010.pdf Shelf Number: 129198 Keywords: Crime Statistics (Trinidad and Tobago)Socio-Economic VariablesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bernard van leer Foundation Title: Community Violence and Young Children: Making Space for Hope Summary: Since 2007, one of my responsibilities at the Bernard van Leer Foundation has been supporting advocacy for young kids in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. During this period we have had some success – new policy, a growing coalition of advocates, and a fourfold increase in public childcare provision. But also during this period, Ciudad Juárez recorded a homicide rate about three times that of 13th-century Holland, and well above many current war zones. So, while we are pleased to see progress, it is hard to fully celebrate. Kids are safer in childcare and parents are less stressed, but they are both still scared. The last issue of Early Childhood Matters was devoted to the topic of domestic violence. This time we turn to the effects of community violence on young children. As the authors in this journal confirm, we know that just growing up around this kind of persistent violence changes the architecture of children’s brains, obstructs their ability to learn and literally makes them sick. For example: • Shonkoff and Fox explain how prolonged exposure to fear in early childhood can impair the development of the pre-frontal cortex and future executive function (page 7). • Guerra et al. describe how exposure can be linked to both mental health problems in young children and physical health such as asthma (pages 8–9). • Sharkey finds significant effects on Chicago preschoolers’ cognition when a homicide had occurred in the last week within 1500 feet of a child’s home (pages 10–12). Complementing these scientific accounts, Nashieli Ramirez’s description from Ciudad Juárez (page 13) looks at the problem through the eyes of young children themselves. She puts a human face on how little people experience these big problems, in the same way that the interview with Beth by Hermílio Santos gives a moving account from a mother’s point of view (page 17). These are important reminders of how young children’s lives are affected by violence on a day-to-day basis even though they themselves are not directly involved. In this vein, Robert Muggah and Helen Mostue explore the development of an index that can give voices like these a more systematic treatment, arguing that such an index would be a better barometer for success than simply counting shootings and killings (page 26). One idea that all of the authors in this issue of Early Childhood Matters seem to share is that violence is contagious – something exemplified by the mapping exercise shared in Elizabeth Ward’s article about Jamaica (page 33). The more we see it in the community, the more we see it at home, and vice versa. But, as Susan Lee points out in an article on her experience with the Advancement Project in Los Angeles, in places with exceptionally high levels of community violence we need to stabilise the situation in order to make families’ lives easier. In her words, ‘before we can expect improved educational and health outcomes, the goal must be to achieve a basic level of safety so that children can learn and thrive.’ What I find most compelling in this series of articles, however, is the sense of hope. Hidden between layers of text describing the gravity of the problem, authors in this journal have shown that there are things that we can do to reduce community violence and to mitigate the effects of this violence on young children. We can get away from what Susan Lee denominates ‘a lethal absence of hope’ and we have results to prove it. • Detective Chief Superintendent John Carnochan explains how the Scottish police took the lead on a violence prevention strategy that has led to a 50% reduction in gang violence in Strathclyde (page 36). • Yvonne Bezerra de Mello describes a harm reduction strategy for children who have been witness to violence, implemented through 150 schools in Rio de Janeiro, going into detail about the successful recuperation of three young children who experienced extreme levels of post-traumatic stress (page 40). • Susan Lee writes about a programme run by Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa that has helped reduce homicides by 33% in some of the most violent neighbourhoods of Los Angeles (page 44). • Alicia Lieberman shows evidence from randomised controlled trials of how parent–child psychotherapy has improved child and maternal mental health after exposure to violence, evidence which has informed a Child Development – Community Policing Programme implemented in 16 us sites (page 48). • Charles Ransford recounts the experience of Cure Violence, which has achieved reductions of between 16% and 56% in shootings and killings in Chicago and Baltimore and is now being replicated in South Africa and Iraq (page 54). • Mayor Rodrigo Guerrero of Cali discusses VallenPaz, a strategy that returned 400 families who had been violently displaced to their homes and prevented any further displacement despite the ongoing conflict in the area (page 59). These stories and others like them are the ones that I think we need to help people remember. Explaining the extraordinary impacts on a young child’s brain of just growing up around this kind of violence may get us an extra five minutes of a policymaker’s time, but unless we can offer some semblance of tangible hope then the hard facts will eventually fall on deaf ears. Details: The Hague: Bernard van leer Foundation, 2012. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Early Childhood Matters: Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://bernardvanleer.org/Community-violence-and-young-children-making-space-for-hope Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://bernardvanleer.org/Community-violence-and-young-children-making-space-for-hope Shelf Number: 129222 Keywords: Children and ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: U.S. Attorney General's National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence Title: Report of the Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence Summary: Exposure to violence is a national crisis that affects approximately two out of every three of our children. Of the 76 million children currently residing in the United States, an estimated 46 million can expect to have their lives touched by violence, crime, abuse, and psychological trauma this year. In 1979, U.S. Surgeon General Julius B. Richmond declared violence a public health crisis of the highest priority, and yet 33 years later that crisis remains. Whether the violence occurs in children’s homes, neighborhoods, schools, playgrounds or playing fields, locker rooms, places of worship, shelters, streets, or in juvenile detention centers, the exposure of children to violence is a uniquely traumatic experience that has the potential to profoundly derail the child’s security, health, happiness, and ability to grow and learn — with effects lasting well into adulthood. Exposure to violence in any form harms children, and different forms of violence have different negative impacts. Sexual abuse places children at high risk for serious and chronic health problems, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, suicidality, eating dis-orders, sleep disorders, substance abuse, and deviant sexual behavior. Sexually abused children often become hypervigilant about the possibility of future sexual violation, experience feelings of betrayal by the adults who failed to care for and protect them. Physical abuse puts children at high risk for lifelong problems with medical illness, PTSD, suicidality, eating disorders, substance abuse, and deviant sexual behavior. Physically abused children are at heightened risk for cognitive and developmental impairments, which can lead to violent behavior as a form of self-protection and control. These children often feel powerless when faced with physical intimidation, threats, or conflict and may compensate by becoming isolated (through truancy or hiding) or aggressive (by bullying or joining gangs for protection). Physically abused children are at risk for significant impairment in memory processing and problem solving and for developing defensive behaviors that lead to consistent avoidance of intimacy. Intimate partner violence within families puts children at high risk for severe and potentially lifelong problems with physical health, mental health, and school and peer relationships as well as for disruptive behavior. Witnessing or living with domestic or intimate partner violence often burdens children with a sense of loss or profound guilt and shame because of their mistaken assumption that they should have intervened or prevented the violence or, tragically, that they caused the violence. They frequently castigate themselves for having failed in what they assume to be their duty to protect a parent or sibling(s) from being harmed, for not having taken the place of their horribly injured or killed family member, or for having caused the offender to be violent. Children exposed to intimate partner violence often experience a sense of terror and dread that they will lose an essential caregiver through permanent injury or death. They also fear losing their relationship with the offending parent, who may be removed from the home, incarcerated, or even executed. Children will mistakenly blame themselves for having caused the batterer to be violent. If no one identifies these children and helps them heal and recover, they may bring this uncertainty, fear, grief, anger, shame, and sense of betrayal into all of their important relationships for the rest of their lives. Community violence in neighborhoods can result in children witnessing assaults and even killings of family members, peers, trusted adults, innocent bystanders, and perpetrators of violence. Violence in the community can prevent children from feeling safe in their own schools and neighborhoods. Violence and ensuing psychological trauma can lead children to adopt an attitude of hypervigilance, to become experts at detecting threat or perceived threat — never able to let down their guard in order to be ready for the next outbreak of violence. They may come to believe that violence is “normal,” that violence is “here to stay,” and that relationships are too fragile to trust because one never knows when violence will take the life of a friend or loved one. They may turn to gangs or criminal activities to prevent others from viewing them as weak and to counteract feelings of despair and powerlessness, perpetuating the cycle of violence and increasing their risk of incarceration. They are also at risk for becoming victims of intimate partner violence in adolescence and in adulthood. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2012. 256p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2013 at: http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf Shelf Number: 129237 Keywords: Child Abuse and NeglectChild ProtectionChild Sexual AbuseChildren and ViolenceChildren, Crime AgainstCommunity ViolenceFamily ViolenceViolenceViolence Against Children (U.S.) |
Author: Fraga, Paulo Cesar Pontes Title: Urban Brazil: Drug Trafficking and Violence Summary: Throughout the 1980s, Brazil has gone through a phenomenon classified by experts as an epidemiological transition. In the beginning of this period, infectious-parasitic diseases were the leading cause of mortality in the population. By the end of the 80s, these had fallen to second place, after external causes or violent deaths. At the beginning of the decade, violence was the fourth cause of death. Aside from being a public health problem, the changes in these indicators brought changes in the behaviour of the population and in inter-institutional, cultural and social relations. Violence has become more visible in Brazilian society. A paradoxical aspect of this phenomenon is that increases in violence, most notably criminal violence, intensified at the end of the military dictatorship and the beginning of the transition to democracy. Coincidentally, it was in 1989 – the year of the first free presidential elections since 1960 – that external causes (violence) became the leading cause of death. In other words, the period of the military regime, which maintained its power through a constant and indiscriminate use of extreme violence – such as arbitrary and illegal persecutions and imprisonment, torture of political and common prisoners, assassinations of leftist political leaders and/or those opposed to the regime – had lower rates of violent death than the civilian government administrations that followed. As we will see further on, in the 1990s there was a new upsurge in these indicators. The fact is that the same system of domination by elites was prevalent under both the military and civilian governments. The reestablishment of open elections was not capable of generating effectively democratic institutions in which the people trusted and which could be controlled by society. Analyses point out that, far from legitimate uses of violence and the construction of a consensus, security forces resorted to abuse of power and torture in order to control certain sectors of the population. Further, corruption also became characteristic of police action – a practice that existed in the authoritarian period and intensified after the end of the dictatorship, representing an institutional continuity. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2004. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Drugs and Conflict No. 11: Accessed July 3, 2013 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/crime-docs/RioDC11.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/crime-docs/RioDC11.pdf Shelf Number: 129239 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime (Brazil) |
Author: Rodriguez, Alfredo Title: Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: The Case of Santiago, Chile Summary: This working paper presents the results of the research project on Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: violence, cities and poverty reduction in the developing world, undertaken in Santiago, Chile. The paper consists of two sections: the city profile and the sub-city study. The city profile uses secondary sources and is structured in two chapters. Chapter 1 presents changes in the city’s structure that have developed over the last 40 years, identifying the tipping points that have marked the process of neoliberal urban development. Chapter 2 establishes what is understood by ‘violence’ and offers an analysis of the types and categories of urban violence in Santiago. The sub-city study, Chapter 3, is presented in the second section of this working paper. This chapter describes results of the Participatory Violence Appraisal methodology applied in three urban areas of Santiago. The sub-city study identifies violence-related problems that affect women and men both in public places and in the home, tipping points and violence chains at the sub-city level, as well as institutions linked to violence in the three areas. The sub-city study highlighted the fact that all three city areas evidence manifestations of direct violence that are economic, socio-economic and social in nature. Participants reported the existence of violence against people as well as violence against property. However, when asked about the causes of these violence-related problems, all of them ventured explanations revealing the existence of a much deeper and widespread problem rooted in structural violence and legitimated by cultural violence. This reality is clearly demonstrated by the three case studies. Details: Manchester, UK: Urban Tipping Point, University of Manchester, 2012. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper # 3: Accessed July 10, 2013 at: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/Working%20Papers/WP3_Santiago.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Chile URL: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/Working%20Papers/WP3_Santiago.pdf Shelf Number: 129348 Keywords: PovertyPublic SpaceUrban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime (Chile) |
Author: Moser, Caroline Title: Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Global Policy Report Summary: The purpose of this Global Policy Report is to provide general policy recommendations from the four city studies undertaken for the research project Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Violence, Cities, and Poverty Reduction in the Development World (UTP), carried out by the University of Manchester in collaboration with partner institutions in Kenya, India, Chile and Switzerland. The project, which runs from 1 September 2010 to 31 August 2012, is funded by an award from the ESRC/DFID Joint Scheme for Research on International Development (Poverty Alleviation). This report starts by briefly summarising the background to the project, its objectives, conceptual framework, rationale for case study selection, and methodology. It then discusses the key findings by city, before turning to comparative policy recommendations. The report draws on documents produced during the course of the research project, including city profiles, sub-city findings, and city-level policy briefs. Details: Manchester, UK: Urban Tipping Point, University of Manchester, 2012. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper #7: Accessed July 10, 2013 at: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/Working%20Papers/WP7_GlobalPolicyReport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/Working%20Papers/WP7_GlobalPolicyReport.pdf Shelf Number: 129352 Keywords: PovertyUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Moser, Caroline Title: Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Participatory methodology for gender-based and political violence Summary: The objective of this working paper is to outline the participatory violence appraisal (PVA) methodology implemented for the sub-city level studies in the ‘Understanding the Tipping Points of Urban Conflict’ (UTP) research project. It is intended to assist researchers when designing sub-city or local level research. As such it does not provide a definitive ‘blueprint’ but rather elaborates a generic methodology that may be easily adapted to the needs of different research objectives. This working paper complements the UTP Concept Paper (Moser and Horn 2011) that sets out the UTP research project’s objectives, and its associated conceptual framework. Underlying the UTP project is the assumption that two concepts – tipping points and value chains – provide added value and introduce new perspectives on an already much debated and contested issue, namely violence in cities of the South. As elaborated in detail in the concept paper the research focuses less on documenting a static phenomenon, be it conflict or violence, and more on examining the shift from one state to another, in this case from conflict to violence – the so-called tipping point – and from one type of violence to another, identified as a violence chain. A focus on processes rather than a phenomenon requires a research methodology that moves from statistical measurement to a narrative understanding of social, economic and political processes – but also one that is sufficiently robust and cannot be dismissed as anecdotal information. Considerations such as these have important implications for the design of the research methodology. Details: Manchester, UK: Global Urban Research Centre, University of Manchester, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper #2: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/Working%20Papers/WP2_March2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/documents/Working%20Papers/WP2_March2012.pdf Shelf Number: 129371 Keywords: Gender-Based ViolencePolitical ViolenceUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Foundation for the Development of Guatemala Title: Drugs, Guns and Cash: Analysis and Proposals on How To Manage the Crisis in Central America Summary: The most important message extracted from this study is that without intergovernmental and international cooperation and support, primarily between the countries most involved, Guatemala and Central America will soon collapse into failed states dominated by shadow economies and run by Criminal Organizations that buy political power. Without decisive action, these countries will be ―handed to these criminal organizations and groups of people that wish to form their own type of government system and inadvertently create greater regional instability. This scenario must not be permitted. These same groups of people will eventually take control of the agricultural and industrial markets in the region, to which the United States and many other countries depend and, will determine where and at what price they would want to sell their products. Simultaneously, the United States would lose its position and influence in Central America. As a result, the region would begin to foster a unique environment where Narco-Terrorism and quasi-states can flourish. Efforts to stem the momentum of these events from evolving must be instantaneous and holistic to produce the desired effect. The carnage and destruction experienced in Colombia and Mexico is on the doorstep of Central American countries and the criminals have resources that are far greater today. Therefore, this report was developed with the hope of achieving three purposes. First, it is a learning process and a means to bring better understanding about the deteriorating situation in Central America. Secondly, it is to engender a general awareness on the various issues that impact the national security, wellbeing and safety of the citizens of countries in Central America. Thirdly, it is to initiate a deeper and more thoughtful discussion about these topics, recognizing that old debates, paradigms, and historical assumptions must be revisited to better analyze the gravity of the situation as critically and objectively as possible. The forces of organized crime are clashing against the forces of development. This clash impedes the regions ability to develop concrete solutions. Traditional strategies have led to limited results. The type of alternative solutions that should be favored are not based on conventional wisdom but instead of a result-oriented approach. The supporting structural ideas applied throughout this report will attempt to stimulate strategic thinking, debunk myths, understand displacement and its consequences, suggest concrete and cost-effective solutions, and develop an analytical framework, which allows a balanced fact-based approach. The most significant ideas that relate to strategic thinking are cohesive intelligence sharing, combined tactics, operational strategies and a collective initiative without regional borders and barriers. In the case of debunking myths, it is necessary to end the denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that this is a regional problem that requires an Integrated Regional Security Strategy and, unmask numerous erroneous conceptions and assumptions within Guatemala - and other regional countries - in their political, social, and economic arenas. Lastly, to understand the seriousness of displacement and its consequences, especially around the Latin American and Caribbean region. Prioritized allocation of counter-initiative resources must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will remain being shuffled around the geographic chessboard that haunts the region. Much time and effort has been devoted to the escalating problems of the region with few concrete and cost-effective solutions implemented in a timely manner. In contrast, an integrated analytical framework will guide the type of actionable strategies that are necessary to better approach these critical issues in Central America. In brief, the goal of this study is to promote a new and informed dialogue on these complex and vastly misunderstood matters. The proposed suggestions and recommendations are not meant to be final or conclusive, but rather, they are meant to spark a debate around sustainable solutions and ideas, and their potential results and benefits to the region. Hopefully, with this Central Americans can find common ground within which these findings and recommendations can be formulated and executed. Nonetheless, this report was developed with the intention of finding immediate and strategic regional solutions, underscoring a sense of urgency more so for Guatemala. Details: Ala Sur: Foundation for the Development of Guatemala, 2012. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.fundesa.org.gt/cms/content/files/DRUGS,%20GUNS%20AND%20CASH.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fundesa.org.gt/cms/content/files/DRUGS,%20GUNS%20AND%20CASH.pdf Shelf Number: 129379 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Okombo, Okath Title: The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums Summary: Nairobi’s informal settlements and slums were the epicentre of the post-election violence (PEV) that erupted in December 2007 and led to massive destruction of property, looting, displacement and forceful eviction of some ethnic communities from their homes. In many cases, minority rival communities were forced to relocate to other estates where their community members constitute a dominant group. Slum-based vigilante and militia groups consolidated themselves into two main rival factions in order to defend their communities and lawlessness threatened to engulf the city. Despite the fact that youth were at the centre of the crisis, most interventions that were initiated soon after the PEV failed to involve them. It is against this background that the Citizens Against Violence (CAVi) in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) sought to make a contribution to the country’s peace restoration effort, targeting six affected slums in Nairobi. In 2008, the “slum tenants and landlords dialogues” series began. This was a special intervention to reduce ethnic tension and reconcile the two groups so that residents could return to their homes. This led to the formation of interest groups representing the landlords and tenants respectively for purposes of formal negotiation, paving the way for some landlords to recover their houses and tenants to move back. The initiative also enabled youth and community leaders to deliberate on postpoll challenges in their estates as a step towards finding sustainable solutions to violence. Issues of cultural assimilation, access to land titles, widespread poverty and unemployment among the youth and fanatical support for some political players emerged as challenges that could still precipitate future ethnic conflicts. Candid discussions provoked many of the young leaders in the slums to aspire for better living conditions and improved socio-ethnic relations. This led in 2009 to the launch of the Nairobi Slums Assembly, a forum in which the young leaders from the six slums met every month to discuss specific issues affecting their particular environments and to come up with proposals which they then shared with the provincial administration, the police and elected leaders. In many cases, this has led to positive change as well as the building of bridges with the authorities. However, more work needs to be done. Integrated ethnic co-existence may be difficult to achieve in the urban slums without a multi-pronged effort by both government and civil society. It is our hope that sharing the findings of the project with a wider group of stakeholders will mobilize public interest and goodwill towards improving the conditions in the Nairobi slums for sustainable peace and socio-economic development. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 2010. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2013 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/07884.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Kenya URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/07884.pdf Shelf Number: 129508 Keywords: LootingPoverty and CrimeSlums (Nairobi, Kenya)Socioeconomic ConditionsVigilantismViolence |
Author: Berg, Mark Title: Murders and Aggravated Assaults in Indianapolis, 2004 to 2009 Summary: This research brief employs information from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) homicide data base (called Homistat) and uniform crime reports assault data spanning 2004 to 2009, disaggregated to Indianapolis census tracts. Assaultive violence and homicide share several empirical regularities. Both are more common in densely populated urban areas characterized by socioeconomic deprivation. In this brief, we ask (a) whether these two forms of violent crime are spatially located in similar types of areas in Marion County, and (b) if they vary systematically with one another over time. The analyses reported here help identify the areas within Marion County that constantly exhibit higher levels of the most lethal forms of interpersonal violence and, in so doing, can delineate the neighborhoods and locales that require focused applications of preventive public safety resources. Details: Indianapolis: Center for Criminal Justice Research, Indiana University, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2013 at: https://archives.iupui.edu/handle/2450/5122?show=full Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://archives.iupui.edu/handle/2450/5122?show=full Shelf Number: 129564 Keywords: Aggravated AssaultsHomicides (Indianapolis, U.S.)Socioeconomic VariablesUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bowers, Len Title: Inpatient violence and aggression: a literature review. Report from the Conflict and Containment Reduction Research Programme Summary: Mentally ill people in hospital sometimes behave aggressively. They may try to harm other patients, staff, property or themselves. In the UK, the National Audit of Violence found that a third of inpatients had been threatened or made to feel unsafe while in care [Royal College of Psychiatrists 2007]. This figure rose to 44% for clinical staff and 72% of nursing staff working in these units. Such aggression can result in injuries, sometimes severe, to patients or to staff, causing staff absence and hampering the efficiency of the psychiatric service. The ways in which aggressive behaviour is managed by staff is contentious and emotive, and there is little evidence or agreement about their effectiveness. This review aims to describe the available research literature on the prevalence, antecedents, consequences and circumstances of violence and aggression in psychiatric hospitals. Our previous research has focussed on how to reduce of conflict and containment on acute wards. By conflict we mean those things that threaten patient and staff safety, such as aggression, rule breaking, drug/alcohol use, absconding, medication refusal, self-harm/suicide etc. By containment we mean those things the staff do to prevent these things occurring, or reduce the amount of harm that occurs, such as giving extra medication, intermittent observation, constant observation, show of force, manual restraint, coerced injections of medication, seclusion, time out, locking of the ward door, and other security policies. This research indicates a complicated relationship between conflict behaviours and containment, and that the behaviour and attitudes of staff may influence both. It led to the development of the ‘City model’ describing the ways in which staff factors can reduce rates of conflict and containment on wards. Three processes are posited to create low conflict and containment: positive appreciation of patients (kindness), emotional self-regulation of anger and fear (tranquillity), and an effective structure of rules and routines for patients based upon an ethical (not punitive) stance (orderliness). In addition to an analysis of the research literature, therefore, each chapter considers the evidence for and against the City Model and suggests lessons for future research. Details: London: Section of Mental Health Nursing, Health Service and Population Research, Institute of Psychiatry, Kings College London, 2011. 196p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/iop/depts/hspr/research/ciemh/mhn/projects/litreview/LitRevAgg.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/iop/depts/hspr/research/ciemh/mhn/projects/litreview/LitRevAgg.pdf Shelf Number: 129604 Keywords: AggressionHospitalsMental HealthMental Illness (U.K.)ViolenceWorkplace Violence |
Author: Kirk, David S. Title: A Spatio-Temporal Assessment of Exposure to Neighborhood Violence Summary: Research Goals and Objectives -- The bulk of “neighborhood effects” research examines the impact of neighborhood conditions cross-sectionally. However, it is critical to understand whether the effects of neighborhood context are situational and whether they endure over time. In this study, we take seriously the notion that there are enduring consequences of exposure to deleterious neighborhood conditions, and estimate both the acute and enduring consequences of exposure to neighborhood violence. Methods and Data -- Using a rich set of longitudinal data on adolescents from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN), including the PHDCN Longitudinal Cohort Study (LCS) and the 1994-1995 PHDCN Community Survey (CS), we estimate the effect of exposure to violence on both internalizing (depression and anxiety) and externalizing problems (aggression). We use propensity score matching for this purpose, drawing upon 68 different individual, peer, family, and neighborhood covariates measured at the first wave of the PHDCN-LCS to predict the propensity of exposure to violence. Following estimation of the propensity score, we match each treated subject (i.e., exposed to violence) with a control subject (i.e., non-exposed) with a similar propensity score. Our objective is to produce treatment and control groups that are indistinguishable once we have conditioned on propensity scores. Results -- We find that exposure to violence has both an acute and an enduring effect on aggression, yet no effect on anxiety-depression, net of individual, family, peer, and neighborhood influences. Part of the enduring effect of violence exposure is explained by changes in social cognitions brought on by the exposure, yet much of the relationship remains to be explained by other causal mechanisms. Details: Unpublished Report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2013 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243039.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243039.pdf Shelf Number: 129644 Keywords: Neighborhoods and Crime (U.S.)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Title: Armed Violence in Norway: Incidence and Responses Summary: This report concerns the incidence and impact of armed violence in Norway and the strategies employed by both state agencies and civil society to prevent and reduce the phenomenon. The report also presents Norway's broad range of responses to the global problem of armed violence. Armed violence has been recognised by the United Nations, an increasing number of member states, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and civil society organisations as a global humanitarian, developmental and security problem. The UN estimates that armed violence claims some 740,000 lives each year, with several million more people being injured for life. This report has been produced as a follow-up to the May 2010 "Oslo Conference on Armed Violence", where some 60 states committed themselves to measure and monitor the incidence and impact of armed violence in a transparent way, and develop targets and indicators to assess progress on reducing armed violence. This was part of the "Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence", the declaration endorsed by the conference. The conference was jointly organised by Norway and UNDP. The Oslo Commitments identify four key actions states can undertake, alone or in cooperation with each other, the UN, international organisations and civil society to reduce the incidence and impact of armed violence, both at the national and international level. The actions concern monitoring and reporting, the rights of victims, the integration of armed violence prevention and reduction strategies into planning and programming, the relationship with, and the role of, international cooperation and assistance. Armed violence is a global problem that manifests itself in a variety of ways in different geographical areas and political contexts in the world. Thus there is no one single way of addressing armed violence, and meaningful responses need to be multi-sectoral and adapted to local, national and regional contexts. A first step in developing effective responses is to acknowledge the problem and get an overview over its scope and magnitude. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2014 at Year: 2010 Country: Norway URL: http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-MRC2/Armed_Violence_in_Norway.pdf Shelf Number: 131772 Keywords: Armed Violence (Norway)Guns and ViolenceViolenceViolence Prevention (Norway)Weapons |
Author: Title: Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan Summary: Endemic violence in Pakistan's urban centres signifies the challenges confronting the federal and provincial governments in restoring law and order and consolidating the state's writ. The starkest example is Karachi, which experienced its deadliest year on record in 2013, with 2,700 casualties, mostly in targeted attacks, and possibly 40 per cent of businesses fleeing the city to avoid growing extortion rackets. However, all provincial capitals as well as the national capital suffer from similar problems and threats. A national rethink of overly militarised policy against crime and militancy is required. Islamabad and the four provincial governments need to develop a coherent policy framework, rooted in providing good governance and strengthening civilian law enforcement, to tackle criminality and the jihadi threat. Until then, criminal gangs and jihadi networks will continue to wreak havoc in the country's big cities and put its stability and still fragile democratic transition at risk. Some of the worst assaults on religious and sectarian minorities in 2013 occurred in Quetta and Peshawar, including the 10 January suicide and car bomb attack that killed over 100, mostly Shias, in Quetta; the 16 February terror attack that killed more than 80, again mostly Shias, in Quetta's Hazara town; and the 22 September bombing of a Peshawar church that killed more than 80 people, mostly Christians. The provincial capitals of Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore are bases of operations and financing for a range of extremist groups and criminal gangs that exploit poor governance and failing public infrastructure to establish recruitment and patronage networks. As urban populations grow, the competition over resources, including land and water, has become increasingly violent. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)'s capital, Peshawar, and Balochistan's capital, Quetta, are hostage to broader regional security trends. The conflict in Afghanistan and cross-border ties between Pakistan and Afghan militants have undermined stability in KPK and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Military-dictated counter-insurgency policies, swinging between indiscriminate force and appeasement deals with tribal militants have failed to restore the peace, and instead further empowered violent extremists. Police in Peshawar, which has borne the brunt of militant violence and where violence is at an all-time high, lack political support and resources and appear increasingly incapable of meeting the challenge. Indeed, while militants and criminals frequently target that city, the force is powerless to act when they then seek haven in bordering FATA agencies, because its jurisdiction, according to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, does not extend to these areas. Balochistan's location, bordering on southern Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban's homeland, and longstanding Pakistani policies of backing Afghan Islamist proxies are partly responsible for the growth of militancy and extremism that now threatens Quetta. Aided by a countrywide network, Sunni extremists have killed hundreds of Shias there, while their criminal allies have helped to fill jihadi coffers, and their own, through kidnappings for ransom. Civilian law enforcement agencies cannot counter this rising tide of sectarian violence and criminality, since they are marginalised by the military and its paramilitary arms. Continuing to dictate and implement security policy, the military remains focused on brutally suppressing a province-wide Baloch insurgency, fuelled by the denial of political and economic autonomy. The end result is more Baloch alienation and more jihadi attacks undermining peace in the provincial capital. In Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, which generates around 70 per cent of national GDP, much of the violence is driven by the state's failure to meet the demands of a fast growing population and to enforce the law. Over the past decade, the competition over resources and turf has become increasingly violent. Criminals and militant groups attempt to lure youth by providing scarce services, work and a purpose in life. Demographic changes fuel ethno-political tensions and rivalries, accentuated by the main political parties: the mostly Sindhi Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) representing mohajirs and the predominately Pashtun Awami National Party (ANP) forging links with criminal gangs. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2014. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report N255: Accessed January 27, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan Shelf Number: 131805 Keywords: Extremist GroupsGangsHate CrimesUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Reisman, Lainie Title: Assessment of Crime and Violence in Mozambique and Recommendations for Violence Prevention and Reduction Summary: This report is an assessment of crime and violence in Mozambique undertaken between August 2011 and March 2012. The objective of the assessment was to provide a broad overview of the crime and violence situation in Mozambique and help inform future programming decisions there for OSISA and the OSF CVPI. It was written on the basis of key stakeholder interviews and analysis of existing data. Given the complexity of issues surrounding crime and violence, the report attempts to highlight major initiatives in a variety of sectors and is meant to inform debate and programme design. Section 1 of the assessment introduces the report and presents the methodology. Section 2 focuses on the Background and Context of crime and violence in Mozambique. After a brief history, the emphasis is on crime and violence data and analysis. As the report argues, reliable data is hard to obtain, but recent victimization surveys indicate that Mozambique is significant in that rates of victimization are particularly high, while rates of reporting crime to the police are particularly low. This phenomena is likely linked to issues around a lack of trust in the police services and perceived corruption. Armed robberies are the major reported crime concern for most Mozambicans, although levels of domestic violence and child abuse are also estimated to be extremely high. Maputo City, Maputo Province, and Sofala are the provinces with the highest levels of reported crime. Following the analysis on crime and violence data, the section ends with a summary of the Mozambican legal and policy framework, which is considered to be well developed although clearly lacking in full implementation. Section 3 analyses the major drivers of crime and violence in Mozambique and includes a detailed analysis on inequality, urbanization, corruption, organized crime, centralization, lack of opportunities for youth, victimization of women and children, high numbers of street dwellers, culture of violence, weak criminal justice system, prevalence of HIV/AIDS, rise in vigilantism, damaging customary practices and local beliefs, and trafficking along the coastlines and land corridors. While none of these factors in isolation cause crime and violence, all contribute to the challenges faced by Mozambique. Section 4 of the assessment report highlights the key actors in crime and violence prevention. Government agencies (including MDI, MDN, PRM, MINJUS, MINED, MISAU, MMAS), key donors, non-governmental organizations, and research and academia organizations are included and their relevant initiatives and interventions presented. For ease of analysis, the NGO sector is broken down into four areas, namely 1) women victimization organizations, 2) children victimization organizations, 3) governance, human rights, and community development organizations, and 4) peace, security, and conflict prevention organizations. The assessment notes the particular emphasis placed on women and children victimization by almost all of the key actors, although also notes an absence of support for unemployed and out-of-school youth. Section 5 of the assessment highlights promising prevention initiatives in Mozambique undertaken by key stakeholders. Innovative programs range from local level interventions to national government programmes. Section 6 analyses some of the key challenges to crime and violence prevention in Mozambique including: 1) Lack of opportunities for youth, 2) Marginalized role of local government, 3) Lack of engagement of the private sector, 4) Limited research and knowledge sharing on crime and violence prevention, 5) Absence of debate on security sector reform, 6) Parenting and early childhood development not prioritized, 7) Religious sector not fully engaged, 8) Poor support for displaced people, and 9) Disconnect between national policies and programs and local realities. The final Section 7 of the report makes a series of recommendations for Open Society, largely directed towards a community based focus, the importance of knowledge generation, building off of Brazilian expertise, providing opportunities for marginalized youth, and engaging new sectors in the crime and violence prevention debate. The assessment report is also accompanied by a community case study, which analyses crime and violence issues in two communities, Magoanine C and Feroviario das Mahotas. The case study, which was conducted by FOMICRES, provides an important point of reflection and highlights the juxtaposition between the national level policy and programs and the realities on the ground in marginalized communities. Details: Washington, DC: Open Society Foundations Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative; Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2012. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2014 at: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/cvpi_mozambique_report_-_final_english.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mozambique URL: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/cvpi_mozambique_report_-_final_english.pdf Shelf Number: 131892 Keywords: CorruptionCrime PreventionCrime StatisticsOrganized CrimeRobberyVictimizationViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Latin America Working Group Education Fund Title: Perilous Journey: Kidnapping and Violence against Migrants in Transit through Mexico Summary: Every year, hundreds of thousands of undocumented Central American migrants, primarily from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, travel through Mexico on their way to the U.S. border. These migrants are vulnerable during their journey through Mexico, due both to the clandestine nature in which they are obligated to travel and to the generalized context of violence and impunity that dominates Mexico. Many suffer grave human rights abuses and violence along their journey at the hands of organized crime and corrupt officials. Kidnapping and extortion of migrants are among the most lucrative - and brutal - practices by organized crime in Mexico and are pervasive along the migratory route. Roughly five years ago, advocates at migrant shelters along the south-north train route began to systematically document and gather first-hand accounts of migrants who had survived kidnapping. What may have initially appeared to be sporadic and anecdotal accounts were soon recognized as reflecting a true humanitarian crisis rooted in flawed migration policy and a culture of impunity. A series of 33 of these testimonies were published by the Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez (Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center, or Center Prodh) and the Casa del Migrante de Saltillo (Migrant Shelter of Saltillo, Coahuila) in the Cuaderno sobre Secuestro de Migrantes (Report on Migrant Kidnappings) in December 2011. In the pages that follow, English translations of a sampling of those testimonies can be found. The migrants' testimonies vividly describe their experiences during kidnapping - rape and sexual assault; physical abuse and mutilation; torture; food and sleep deprivation. In some cases, victims were forced to serve as witnesses to sexual and physical assaults, and even murder. In others, migrants were forced to carry out physical abuse of fellow kidnapping victims. Although it is difficult to read the accounts of the barbaric treatment that many migrants endured, these testimonies help us to grasp the profound human impact of this crisis and confirm the experiences recounted by kidnapped migrants elsewhere. From these stories, we get a more complete picture of the depth of this humanitarian crisis that has destroyed the dignity and safety of thousands of victims and traumatized families and communities across the region. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Working Group Education Fund, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2014 at: http://www.lawg.org/storage/LAWG2-13_Migrant_Report-v5.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.lawg.org/storage/LAWG2-13_Migrant_Report-v5.pdf Shelf Number: 131930 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrationKidnappingMigrantsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Gangs in Central America Summary: Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. This report focuses primarily on U.S.-funded international anti-gang efforts. The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang (also known as M-18), continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have had among the highest homicide rates in the world. Recently, some governments have moved away from repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador having facilitated a historic-and risky-truce involving the country's largest gangs in 2012. The truce contributed to a large reduction in homicides, before beginning to unravel in recent months. The truce carries risks for the Salvadoran government that will take office on June 1, 2014, such as what might happen if the gangs were to walk away from the truce stronger than before and/or if the truce were to end abruptly and prompt an escalation in intra-gang violence. U.S. agencies have engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was announced in July 2007. The strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be bolstered by the Treasury Department's October 2012 designation of the MS-13 as a major Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. In recent years, Congress has dedicated funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Merida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the impact of the Treasury Department's TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: RL34112: Accessed March 18, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Shelf Number: 131956 Keywords: 18th Street GangGang-Related ViolenceGangsM-18Mara SalvatruchaMS-13Violence |
Author: Coy, Maddy Title: Violent Disorder in Ciudad Juarez: A Spatial Analysis of Homicide Summary: This HASOW Discussion Paper considers how demographic and socioeconomic factors correlate with homicidal violence in the context of Mexico's "war on drugs". We draw on Ciudad Juarez as a case study and social disorganization theory as an organizing framework. Social disorganization is expected to produce higher levels of homicidal violence. And while evidence detects several social disorganization factors associated with homicidal violence in Ciudad Juarez not all relationships appear as predicted by the theory. Drawing on public census and crime data, our statistical assessment detects 6 significant variables (or risks) positively associated with homicidal violence in Ciudad Juarez between 2009 and 2010. Likewise, the assessment finds 6 specific variables (or protective factors) that are negatively associated with above average homicide in the city between 2009 and 2010. The data and level of analysis do not conclusively present causation, nor was this the intent. Rather, we propose a baseline model for testing spatial-temporal dynamics of organized violence. Details: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW), 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: HASOW Discussion Paper 1: Accessed March 20, 2014 at: http://www.hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/68/doc/1934668792.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/68/doc/1934668792.pdf Shelf Number: 131979 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceHomicideMurdersViolenceViolent CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Llorente, Maria Victoria Title: One Goal, Two Struggles: Confronting Crime and Violence in Mexico and Colombia Summary: Since the mid-2000s, violence related to drug trafficking and other transnational crime has increased exponentially in Mexico. By the end of the decade the public began to seriously doubt the government's strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The nature and intensity of violence in Mexico brought forth memories of the 1980s and '90s in Colombia, when the country was besieged by the Medellin and Cali drug cartels. Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia's security situation has improved dramatically; it has become an "exporter" of security expertise and has trained thousands of military and police personnel in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean as well as around the world. What aspects of Colombia's strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia's steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter-example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? In One Goal, Two Struggles: Confronting Crime and Violence in Mexico and Colombia, international experts address the utility of comparing Colombia and Mexico's experiences and strategy for combatting organized crime and violence more generally. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2014. 126p. Source: Internet Resource: Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas - #32: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Colombia_Mexico_Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Colombia_Mexico_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 132052 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingGang ViolenceOrganized CrimeTransnational CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Durante, Ruben Title: Fighting crime with a little help from my friends. party affiliation, inter-jurisdictional cooperation and crime in Mexico Summary: We investigate the relationship between inter-jurisdictional cooperation and the effectiveness of law enforcement in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in close municipal elections, we study how improved opportunities for cooperation in crime-prevention among neighboring municipalities - proxied by their degree of political alignment - may result in lower rates of violent crime. We find that municipalities in which the party in power in the majority of neighboring jurisdictions barely won experience significantly lower homicide rates during the mayor's mandate than those in which it barely lost. This effect is sizeable - a decrease of 52 to 65% - and is independent of which party is in power in the neighboring municipalities. Political alignment with neighbors is not correlated with a variety of other outcomes including homicide rates during the previous mandate. The observed reduction in crime does not appear to be driven by improved cooperation with state and federal authorities. Details: Paris: Sciences Po - LIEPP, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://vox.lacea.org/pdf/lacea2013_fighting_crime.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://vox.lacea.org/pdf/lacea2013_fighting_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 132137 Keywords: CooperationCrime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: In its latest report, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, the International Crisis Group examines the emergence, rise and evolution of a movement whose four-year insurgency has killed thousands, displaced close to a million, destroyed public infrastructure and weakened the country's already poor economy, particularly in the North East. The government's failure to provide security and basic services makes poor youth, in particular, an easy recruitment target for anti-state militias. As Boko Haram's network expands into Cameroon and Niger, a military response is not enough. Only deep political and socio-economic reform can ease the injustices that fuel the insurgency. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - Boko Haram's evolution since 2002 is strongly linked to failed governance, economic hardship, rising social inequality, corruption and impunity. Most Nigerians are poorer today than at independence in 1960. Poverty is most dire in the north, where Boko Haram, the latest of many northern fundamentalist movements, has tapped into Muslim revivalism and hopes to establish an Islamic state. - Since 2010, the group's campaign has grown, targeting not only security forces and politicians, but also civilians, traditional and religious leaders, public institutions, the UN presence and schools. It is more dispersed than ever, with many leaders in Cameroon and Niger, both of which are poorly equipped to address an armed Islamist threat. Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau, seems to have little control over its factions, including Ansaru, which focuses on foreign targets. - Insecurity in much of the north may also worsen political violence and undermine the credibility of the 2015 elections, further damaging government legitimacy. -Federal and state governments must end impunity by prosecuting crimes by security services, government officials and Boko Haram members alike, and urgently develop and implement a socio-economic intervention program for the North East region. - Civic education to halt politicisation of religions, effective development and anti-corruption efforts, and police who are seen as partners to citizens are all vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 216: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 1132191 Keywords: HomicidesHuman Rights (Nigeria)Political CorruptionViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Lundholm, Lena Title: Substance Use and Violence: Influence of Alcohol, Illicit Drugs and Anabolic Steroids on Violent Crime and Self-directed Summary: Interpersonal violence and suicide are major health concerns, leading to premature death, extensive human suffering and staggering monetary costs. Although violent behaviour has multiple causes, it is well known that acute substance intake and abuse increase the risks of both interpersonal and self-directed violence. This association is quite well established for alcohol, while a more ambiguous literature exists for other common drugs of abuse. For example, anabolic androgenic steroids (AAS), synthetic analogues to the "male" sex hormone testosterone are suggested to elicit violent and aggressive behaviour. Two studies (I and III) in the present thesis addressed the association between AAS use and being suspected or convicted of a violent crime among remand prisoners and in a general population sample, respectively. Further, using the case-crossover design to control for confounders stable within individuals, I also investigated the triggering (short-term risk) effect of alcohol and drugs such as benzodiazepines and AAS, on violent crime (Study II). Finally, a fourth study (IV) based on a large national forensic sample of suicide completers (n=18,894) examined the risk of using a violent, more lethal, suicide method, when under acute influence of alcohol, central stimulants or cannabis. The results of this thesis suggested that AAS use in itself is not a proximal risk factor for violent crime; the observed risk is probably due to the co-occurrence of abuse of other substances. Alcohol is a strong triggering risk factor for violent crime, constant across males and females as well as individuals with or without behavioral and psychiatric vulnerability. Intake of high doses of benzodiazepines is associated with an increased risk for violent crime. Cannabis use is associated with an increased risk of using the lethal suicide method of jumping from a height. I conclude that mapping substance abuse patterns may inform violence risk assessment and treatment planning. Details: Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2013. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 8, 2014 at: http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:601819/FULLTEXT01.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Sweden URL: http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:601819/FULLTEXT01.pdf Shelf Number: 132287 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisorderDrug Abuse and CrimeSubstance AbuseSuicideViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Sanchez, Arabeska Title: Firearms and Violence in Honduras Summary: More than 42,000 people have been violently killed in Honduras over the past nine years. In 80 per cent of cases the weapon used was a firearm. To explain this, analysts and the media point randomly to the political instability and polarization of the country, the level of corruption in the police and state institutions, and the climate of terror created by gangs and organized crime. Comprehensive solutions based on solid empirical evidence, however, are not yet available. This Research Note is based on a scoping assessment of armed violence in Honduras. It summarizes and briefly unpacks specific characteristics of armed violence in the country and explores some of the key questions that need to be asked. As such, it provides a basis on which work and research can draw to design responses to Honduras's challenges by answering the following questions: What kind of knowledge is needed to tackle the spiralling violence in Honduras? How can actors be mobilized more effectively to influence policy responses to violence? Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Notes No. 39: Accessed May 12, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-39.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-39.pdf Shelf Number: 132338 Keywords: Crime StatisticsGun PolicyGun-Related ViolenceHomicides (Honduras)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Agger, Kasper Title: Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic Summary: The situation in the Central African Republic, or CAR, remains chaotic and violent with public lynchings and daily attacks terrorizing civilians across the country. The United Nations estimates that more than 1 million people - roughly one-quarter of the total population - have been displaced or fled the country. Thousands of people have been killed - at least 2,000 since December alone, although no one knows the exact figure, which is likely much higher. Despite having the largest number of peacekeepers ever deployed to the country, the violence in CAR continues unabated. At least 60 people were killed in the capital city of Bangui over a period of just 10 days in March. Armed groups in CAR are financing their activities in part with significant revenues from natural resources and looting. When the Seleka rebel alliance captured the capital in March 2013, heavily armed and well-trained wildlife poachers and mercenary fighters from Chad and Sudan - some of whom were members of the Sudanese government-supported Janjaweed militia-backed the group. Seleka rebels and foreign fighters have been plundering, looting, and smuggling diamonds and ivory to pay for arms, fuel, food, and soldiers. Meanwhile, Anti-Balaka militias have been looting and killing in Muslim communities and have taken control of diamond-rich areas in the western part of CAR. Seleka forces used violence and threats against local populations in CAR to extract diamond revenues through forced mining, theft, and cheap purchases from local traders. The diamonds were then sold to local traders or taken out of the country and sold to intermediaries, mainly in South Darfur, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC. CAR was suspended in May 2013 from the Kimberley Process, an international certification mechanism designed to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the international market. However, the diamond trade has continued in CAR and conflict diamonds are likely entering markets abroad. Other countries have pursued political and economic interests that have exacerbated violence in CAR and destabilized the country. Neighboring Chad and Sudan provided support to the Seleka with the goal of installing a cooperative government that could help protect Chadian oil interests and prevent CAR from becoming a safe haven for rebels that could potentially destabilize the two countries. South Africa deployed up to 400 soldiers to protect South African investments in the oil and diamond sectors when former President Francois Bozize was in office. South African soldiers fought to protect the Bozize government when Seleka fighters attacked Bangui, leading to the death of 13 South African soldiers. The Chadian and French governments, which also sent soldiers to CAR, did not intervene to save President Bozize, as they had done previously in his decade-long rule. They helped him to capture power in 2003 but gradually withdrew support when he favored South Africa and China for trade and military cooperation arrangements. Bozize's shift, and that of France and Chad, helped enable Seleka forces to capture power. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 17, 2014 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf Shelf Number: 132386 Keywords: Animal PoachingConflict DiamondsHomicidesLootingViolenceWildlife Crime |
Author: De Choudhury, Munmun Title: "Narco" Emotions: Affect and Desensitization in Social Media during the Mexican Drug War Summary: Social media platforms have emerged as prominent information sharing ecosystems in the context of a variety of recent crises, ranging from mass emergencies, to wars and political conflicts. We study affective responses in social media and how they might indicate desensitization to violence experienced in communities embroiled in an armed conflict. Specifically, we examine three established affect measures: negative affect, activation, and dominance as observed on Twitter in relation to a number of statistics on protracted violence in four major cities afflicted by the Mexican Drug War. During a two year period (Aug 2010-Dec 2012), while violence was on the rise in these regions, our findings show a decline in negative emotional expression as well as a rise in emotional arousal and dominance in Twitter posts: aspects known to be psychological markers of desensitization. We discuss the implications of our work for behavioral health, facilitating rehabilitation efforts in communities enmeshed in an acute and persistent urban warfare, and the impact on civic engagement. Details: Redmond, VA: Microsoft Research, 2014. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 29, 2014 at: http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/208580/affect_desensitize-v29.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/208580/affect_desensitize-v29.pdf Shelf Number: 132401 Keywords: Drug War (Mexico)Social MediaSocial Media, TwitterViolence |
Author: Whittington, R. Title: A Systematic Review of Risk Assessment Strategies for Populations at High Risk of Engaging in Violent Behaviour: Update 2002-8 Summary: This review systematically examines the research literature published in the period 2002-8 on structured violence risk assessment instruments designed for use in mental health services or the criminal justice system. Violence is a major social problem and improved assessment of those who present an above-average risk is an important goal in the overall strategy for addressing the issue. Techniques for formally assessing individual and social risk factors have developed rapidly over the past two decades from a process of unstructured clinical judgement to one of structured assessment based on empirically tested instruments. A vast number of structured risk assessment instruments relating to violence in different populations have been developed over this period and attempts have been made elsewhere to summarise aspects of the literature relating to various instruments. This review adopted much broader inclusion criteria than previously used in order to capture and summarise data on the widest possible range of available instruments. Objectives The objectives of the review were to address two questions: (1) what features (i.e. population, instrument, outcome measure and design aspects) are associated with a risk assessment instrument score being significantly associated with a violent outcome? and (2) which risk assessment instruments have the highest level of predictive validity for a violent outcome? Details: London: National Institute for Health Research, 2013. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Health Technology Assessment, Vol. 17, Issue 50: Accessed June 14, 2014 at: http://www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/87108/FullReport-hta17500.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/87108/FullReport-hta17500.pdf Shelf Number: 132459 Keywords: Crime PreventionRisk AssessmentViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Title: Colombia. The War is Measured in Litres of Blood Summary: Colombia has been enduring an internal armed conflict for fifty years. In the conflict members of insurgent groups (guerrillas) have clashed with the National Army and paramilitary groups. Under these conditions, serious human rights violations and international crimes have been committed. Since November 1, 2002, Colombia is party to the Rome Statute, setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC). According to the principle of complementarity established by that statute, Colombia is obliged to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the crimes considered therein, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The ICC went into operation in July 2002, when its Statute went into effect. Since ICC General Prosecutor took office in June, 2003 Colombia has been under "preliminary analysis", but this was made public only in 2006. The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and one of its member organizations in Colombia, the Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective (CAJAR), have been working in research, advocacy, and support for victims of international crimes before the ICC since 2005. According to article 15 of the Rome Statute, interested parties (victims, non-governmental organizations, etc.) may submit to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor statements indicating crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. The FIDH and the CAJAR have submitted twelve communications of this kind to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor since June 2005. During this period the FIDH and the CAJAR were engaged in dialogue with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor and they continue to do so. This communication and careful monitoring of the policy of the Prosecutor's Office with regard to the situations under preliminary analysis and particularly the situation in Colombia, has enabled the FIDH to monitor the evolution of the analysis carried out by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor. One of the observations that has emerged repeatedly during the dialogue between the FIDH and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has been the need to identify the highest-level people responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Colombia which are under the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is appropriate to recall here that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has made the investigation and prosecution of top commanders a key element of its policy. This is the context in which the FIDH transmitted this report to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor along with two confidential attachments which identify those most responsible. The preliminary analysis is governed by article 53, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute. In accordance with this provision, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor carries out analysis in three stages and in the following order: first, it must be determined whether crimes within the competence of the ICC have been committed; second, an analysis of admissibility is carried out, including analysis of the gravity of the phenomenon and the test of complementarity; finally, it is determined whether an investigation is in the interests of justice in the particular case. Details: Paris: FIDH, 2012. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapp_colombie__juin_2012_anglais_def.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 132475 Keywords: Criminal ProsecutionExtrajudicial Executions (Colombia)GuerrillasHuman RightsParamilitary GroupsViolence |
Author: Berg, Louis-Alexandre Title: Crime, Violence and Community-Based Prevention in Honduras Summary: Violent crime has emerged as a growing development challenge, affecting large segments of societies and taking a severe toll on economic development. In Honduras, the most violent country in the world as measured by its homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013, variations in the level of violence across time and space suggest that some communities have successfully prevented crime. This note summarizes the findings of a study of crime dynamics and prevention practices in Honduras. The research revealed that while the transnational drug trade, economic downturn and political crisis have deepened the effects of organized crime, some communities have prevented these forces from taking root in their neighborhoods. The study identified practices that communities have pursued to prevent violence, and examined the capabilities of communities, municipal governments and national institutions that enable or constrain these responses. In the context of the World Banks Safer Municipalities Project in Honduras, this research points to evidence-based approaches for preventing violence at the community level. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Just Development, Issue 4: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:23587510~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:1974062~isCURL:Y,00.html Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:23587510~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:1974062~isCURL:Y,00.html Shelf Number: 132574 Keywords: Crime PreventionNeighborhoods and CrimeOrganized CrimeViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Kennedy, Elizabeth Title: No Childhood Here: Why Central American Children are Fleeing their Homes Summary: Over a decade before President Barack Obama described the influx of unaccompanied child migrants to the United States as an "urgent humanitarian situation requiring a unified and coordinated Federal response," child and refugee advocates warned that children who shared experiences of years-long family separation, widespread violence in home countries, and higher rates of neglect and abuse were fleeing from South of our border in alarming numbers. Then as now, over 95 percent were from Mexico and the Central American nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. When these children were apprehended in the U.S., the Trafficking and Victim's Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) required agents to ask limited and straightforward abuse questions. If the child was determined to be without a parent or legal guardian, s/he had to be transferred to Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) care within 72 hours. Yet, even though 8,000 to 40,000 unaccompanied child migrants were apprehended annually between 2003 and 2011, only 4,800 to 8,300 entered ORR"s care each year. A 2011 report by the Appleseed Foundation documented that most Mexican child migrants did not receive TVPRA screening and thus could not transition to ORR care. Instead, per an agreement between the Mexican and U.S. governments that Obama would like emulated among Central American countries, Mexican children were quickly deported. Nonetheless, those from indigenous areas or areas with high levels of drug violence were able to receive the "Unaccompanied Alien Child" (UAC) designation, alongside thousands from the three countries that make up the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America. In 2012, nearly 14,000 UAC entered ORR care, with 88 percent from the Northern Triangle. In 2013, over 24,000 arrived, with 93 percent from the same three nations. This year, as many as 60,000 could arrive, and while numbers from Mexico have declined, numbers from the Northern Triangle continue rising. What drives these children to flee their homes? What causes their parents to put them and their life's savings in the hands of smugglers? What happens if they fail to reach the U.S.? Since October 2013, with funding from a Fulbright Fellowship, I have lived in El Salvador and worked toward answering these questions through my research into the causes of child migration and the effects of child deportation (see appendix). Based on the evidence I collected and analyzed to date, violence, extreme poverty, and family reunification play important roles in pushing kids to leave their country of origin. In particular, crime, gang threats, or violence appear to be the strongest determinants for children's decision to emigrate. When asked why they left their home, 59 percent of Salvadoran boys and 61 percent of Salvadoran girls list one of those factors as a reason for their emigration. In some areas of El Salvador, however, extreme poverty is the most common reason why children decide to leave. This is particularly true for adolescent males, who hope to work half the day and study the other half in order to remit money to their families and help them move forward in life. In addition, one in three children cites family reunification as a primary reason for leaving home. Interestingly, over 90 percent of the children I interviewed have a family member in the US, with just over 50 percent having one or both parents there. Most referenced fear of crime and violence as the underlying motive for their decision to reunify with family now rather than two years in the past or two years in the future. Seemingly, the children and their families had decided they must leave and chose to go to where they had family, rather than chose to leave because they had family elsewhere. Essentially, if their family had been in Belize, Costa Rica, or another country, they would be going there instead. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 2, 2014 at: http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/no_childhood_here_why_central_american_children_are_fleeing_their_homes_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/no_childhood_here_why_central_american_children_are_fleeing_their_homes_final.pdf Shelf Number: 132610 Keywords: Child MigrantsPovertyUndocumented ChildrenViolence |
Author: Owens, Kaitlin Title: Honduras: Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity Summary: This report examines the surge in violence directed against journalists following the ouster of President Jose Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. Since then at least 32 Honduran journalists have been killed and many more continue to work in a climate of fear and self-censorship. Reporters who cover corruption and organized crime are routinely targeted for their work and attacked or killed with almost complete impunity. The sources of the violence against journalists are varied. Transnational drug cartels have infiltrated the country so effectively that the present crisis in Honduras cannot be understood in isolation from its Central American neighbours. That said, it is also clear that the absence of reliable institutions has allowed the violence to escalate far more rapidly than many anticipated. Much of the violence is produced by the state itself, perhaps most significantly by a corrupt police force. In a special report on police criminality in Honduras, the Tegucigalpa-based Violence Observatory (Observatorio de Violencia) found that between January 2011 and November 2012 police officers killed 149 civilians, approximately six per month. The taint of corruption and a culture of impunity have undermined trust among state agencies and public confidence in key institutions. Public distrust of the police is so great that crimes are rarely reported. Moreover, due to widespread corruption and inefficiency among the force, only an estimated 20 per cent of crime is reported, and of that less than four per cent gets investigated. According to the State's own statistics, less than one per cent of all crime in Honduras is subject to a police investigation. Procedural flaws are evident throughout the system. Police often say an investigation is underway when there is none; the office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights (Fiscala Especial de Derechos Humanos) does not have the jurisdiction to try those responsible for the murders of journalists, and lacks resources to conduct even the most basic investigations into other human rights violations. On the other hand, while some legal initiatives are under-resourced, there is also a proliferation of competing agencies that notionally address the same problem. This has created a situation in which institutional responsibility has been so widely diffused that no one is ultimately accountable for the high level of impunity. With current levels of funding, the office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights, which was nominally responsible for over 7,000 investigations in 2012, can only investigate a small percentage of these cases each year. While the office continues to operate with a serious shortage of funds, the Honduran state is able to argue that it has made progress in addressing human rights violations through the establishment of a Special Prosecutor for Human Rights. Given these crises, this report finds that the Honduran judiciary faces significant challenges in establishing an independent legal culture capable of ensuring accountability for human rights abuses. Furthermore, legal mechanisms to protect journalists are needlessly complicated and often confusing. Even international mechanisms such as the precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (iachr) are poorly understood by local police and, at least as currently implemented, offer little real protection. Deep divisions among the journalists themselves hinder the fight against impunity. A striking absence of camaraderie within the profession has impaired its ability to collaborate effectively in protesting violence against journalists and in promoting protection mechanisms. Mutual suspicion is evident in many journalists' scepticism towards the official Association of Journalists of Honduras (Colegio de Periodistas de Honduras - cph) - an institution that has noticeably failed in its legislative mandate to "promote solidarity and mutual assistance among the media." This failure has meant that there is no united front pressing for greater accountability and an end to the violence. The coup that unseated President Zelaya in 2009 brought these problems into the spotlight, but the roots of the crisis lie further back in Honduras' history, notably in its failure during the demilitarization process that began in the 1980s to hold those who had committed serious human rights violations accountable for their actions. A legacy of failed reforms left the state incapable of dealing with rights violations that took place during and after the 2009 coup. As a result, the recent wave of murderous violence has been met with a familiar mixture of inadequate resources, bureaucratic ineptitude, blame-shifting and denial. The coup interrupted the demilitarization of Honduras. One human rights worker we interviewed spoke of the return of a security-state mindset in which peaceful dissent is often met with reflexive violence. Others noted that the re-emergence of the security state had been justified - as in Colombia and Mexico - as an antidote to pervasive corruption and organized crime. But the real lesson to be drawn from the use of force to compensate for the failures of transitional justice is that state actors no longer need to fear being held to account for their actions. As Bertha Oliva, co-ordinator of the Committee of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (Comite de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras - cofadeh) put it: "When we allow impunity for human rights violations, we see the crimes of the past translated into the crimes of the future." Details: Toronto: PEN Canada; London: PEN International, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.pen-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Honduras-Journalism-in-the-Shadow-of-Impunity1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.pen-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Honduras-Journalism-in-the-Shadow-of-Impunity1.pdf Shelf Number: 132630 Keywords: Drug CartelsHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesJournalistsOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolence Violence Crime |
Author: Muggah, Robert Title: Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence Summary: In 2007, the world became a predominantly urban society. Across the world, an estimated three quarters of economic production takes place in cities. Urbanization brings with it possibilities of improved access to jobs, goods and services for poor people in developing countries and beyond as globalization trends connect cities world-wide. However, urbanization has also brought new challenges in terms of conflict, violence and urban governance - and citizen security in particular. The World Bank's landmark 2011 World Development Report highlighted the significance of violence as a development problem. Its work noted how violence is changing, becoming less structured around notions of civil war and conflict, and more focused around criminal violence, terrorism and civil unrest. The impacts of violence on human development are significant and varied. As Stergios Skaperdas has documented, they include direct costs such as death and injury, destruction to public infrastructure, personal property and assets, as well as indirect costs like psychological trauma, population displacement, the disruption of social services, reduced economic growth, brain drain and increased spending on law enforcement. What is clear is that violence has emerged as one of the central development challenges of our time. Virtually all fragile states have experienced repeated episodes of violence, and the large majority of the world's poorest people live in states affected by violence - over 1.5 billion people. As the 2011 World Development Report has underscored, the close relationship between violence and poverty is reflected in this stark fact: no low-income fragile or conflict-affected state has yet to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal. Today's cities are centres of multi-layered violence. Criminal and organized violence, associated with the drug trade in some countries have become entwined with national politics. Gangs and militias have come to substitute for public authority, offering some protection to communities, but often at great cost. Social violence, including violence within the household, is also a significant problem, particularly for vulnerable youth and women living in these environments. In response to these challenges, Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) have launched Safe and Inclusive Cities. This collaborative research initiative is aimed at generating an evidence base on the connections between urban violence, inequalities and poverty and on identifying the most effective strategies for addressing these challenges. The present study marks the first step in this endeavour, and has served to inform the design and scope of the Safe and Inclusive Cities research initiative. Towards this end, the study set out to achieve four objectives: 1. Document what is known about the connections between violence, inequalities and poverty in urban centres and assess the strength of the knowledge base. Particular focus was given to assessing evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia; 2. Describe the state of theory on violence, urbanization and poverty reduction, and assess the extent to which they interact, and whether emerging evidence actually informs theoretical debates and assumptions guiding work in these fields; 3. Identify key evidence gaps that require further investigation; and 4. Map out key actors (researchers and research organizations) that are producing knowledge on these issues. The outcome is a study that promotes an integrated and comprehensive approach to tackling the challenges posed by rapid urbanization, escalating violence, and increased poverty and inequalities. Details: Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2014 at: http://www.idrc.ca/EN/PublishingImages/Researching-the-Urban-Dilemma-Baseline-study.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.idrc.ca/EN/PublishingImages/Researching-the-Urban-Dilemma-Baseline-study.pdf Shelf Number: 129785 Keywords: PovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Cannon, Ashley Title: Mayhem Multiplied: Mass Shooters & Large-Capacity Magazines Summary: Mass shootings have taken place consistently throughout American history, in every region of the country. Over the last 30 years, however, large-capacity ammunition magazines-which hold more than 10 rounds-have proliferated, allowing assailants to become much more destructive. As the following analysis shows, the results have been deadly for Americans. As part of our non-partisan mission to prevent violence at the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City, we track mass shootings. Our Mass Shooting Incidents in America database catalogs shootings in which four or more victims were killed in a public place unrelated to another crime since 1984. Between 1984 and 2012, there were 64 such incidents-33 of which involved a perpetrator armed with a large-capacity magazine. Large-capacity ammunition magazines were outlawed for 10 years between 1994 and 2004 as part of the federal Assault Weapons Ban, providing us with periods for comparison in order to determine the ban's impact on mass shooting casualties. The results are startling. Details: New York: Citizens Crime Commission on New York City, 2014. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2014 at: http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/CCC-MayhemMultiplied.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/CCC-MayhemMultiplied.pdf Shelf Number: 132636 Keywords: Assault WeaponsGun ViolenceHomicidesMass MurderViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Gupte, Jaideep Title: The Agency and Governance of Urban Battlefields: How Riots Alter Our Understanding of Adequate Urban Summary: For the first time in close to 100 years, India reports higher population growth in its urbanised areas than across its vast rural landscape. However, a confluence of vast urbanisation and scarcity of resources has implied heightened levels of localised violence, centred in and around already impoverished neighbourhoods. This therefore has a disproportionate impact in further marginalising poor communities, and is at odds with the notion that cities are incontestably and inevitably the context of sustained poverty eradication. And yet, we know relatively little about the mechanics of security provisioning in Indian cities at large. The central argument in this paper is that violent urban spaces have a profound impact on how safety and security are understood by the state as well as the urban poor, thereby redefining the parameters of adequate urban living. I look in detail at how the 1992-1993 riots in Mumbai unfolded in a group of inner-city neighbourhoods, and find that specific acts of brutality and violence during the riots continue to shape current understandings of the "safe city‟. In doing so, I also find that the nature and form of informal urban space affects the mechanics by which the state endeavours to control violence, while individual acts of public violence function as markers that legitimate the use of, and reliance on, extralegal forms of security provision. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2012. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Households in Conflict Network Working Paper 122: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/TheagencyandgovernanceofurbanbattlefieldsHowriotsalterourunderstandingofadequateurbanliving.pdf Year: 2012 Country: India URL: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/TheagencyandgovernanceofurbanbattlefieldsHowriotsalterourunderstandingofadequateurbanliving.pdf Shelf Number: 132643 Keywords: Neighborhoods and Crime (India)RiotsUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: 'External Stresses' and Violence Mitigation in Fragile Contexts: Setting the Stage for Policy Analysis Summary: Following on from the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on conflict, security and development, a debate has emerged about the role of so-called 'external stresses' in generating 'new' forms of violence and insecurity in poor and fragile countries. The Bank posits that the combination of internal stresses (e.g. low income levels, high youth unemployment) and external stresses (e.g. cross-border conflict spillovers, illicit drug trafficking) heightens the risk of different forms of violence, which are not confined to inter-state and civil war but range from communal conflicts to criminal violence and terrorism. This perspective is useful in as much as it makes explicit that instability and political disorder are not only related to domestic weaknesses of fragile states, but are also conditioned by outside forces. Yet the binary internal-external/fragility-vulnerability model that underpins the World Bank's analysis of external stresses appears to be too limited to inform strategies to address the challenges that arise from pressures as diverse as illicit transnational trafficking, price and resource shocks, and cross-border conflict spillovers. A more comprehensive and nuanced framework for policy analysis is called for, based on the recognition that external stresses: (a) tend to involve external, internal as well as transnational actors and variables that are often interrelated; (b) create both losers and winners, and can promote the interests of powerful state and non-state groups in and outside of the country or world region under 'stress'; and (c) do not all have the same kind of impact on states and societies in terms of generating violence. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute Of Development Studies, 2013. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Evidence Report No. 36: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ER36FinalOnline.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ER36FinalOnline.pdf Shelf Number: 132645 Keywords: Drug TraffickingSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorismViolenceViolence Prevention |
Author: Davis, Paul K. Title: Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect Potential Violent Acts : A Review of the Science Summary: Government organizations have put substantial effort into detecting and thwarting terrorist and insurgent attacks by observing suspicious behaviors of individuals at transportation checkpoints and elsewhere. Related technologies and methodologies abound, but their volume and diversity has sometimes been overwhelming. Also, effectiveness claims sometimes lack a clear basis in science and technology. The RAND Corporation was asked to review the literature to characterize the base in behavioral sciences relevant to threat detection, in part to help set priorities for special attention and investment. Our study focused on the science base for using new or nontraditional technologies and methods to observe behaviors and how the data gathered from doing so might-especially when used with other information-help detect potential violent attacks, such as by suicide bombers or, as a very different example, insurgents laying improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Behavioral indicators may help identify individuals meriting additional observation in an operational context. For that context, security personnel at a checkpoint are assessing whether an individual poses some risk in the limited sense of meriting more extensive and perhaps aggressive screening, follow-up monitoring, or intercept. They obtain information directly, query databases and future versions of information-fusion centers ("pull"), and are automatically provided alerts and other data ("push"). They report information that can be used subsequently. In some cases, behaviors of a number of individuals over time might suggest a potential ongoing attack, even if the individuals are only pawns performing such narrow tasks as obtaining information. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 306p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR215/RAND_RR215.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR215/RAND_RR215.pdf Shelf Number: 132701 Keywords: Behavioral AnalysisCrime PreventionRisk AssessmentSuicide BombingTerrorism PreventionTerroristsViolence |
Author: Swift, Donna Title: The Girl's Project. Girl Fighting: An investigation of young women's violent and anti-social behaviour Summary: This report is based on the findings from The Girl's Project, a two-year investigation of girls' use of violence and anti-social behaviour, which was conducted in the Tasman Police District between August 2009 and August 2011. The research was funded by the Lottery Community Sector Research Committee. Ethical approval was obtained from the Association of Social Science Researchers and the Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2009. The goal of the research was to establish a substantial base of understanding about young women's use of violent and anti-social behaviour specific to the New Zealand context. From this knowledge Stopping Violence Services Nelson (SVSN) would be able to create guidelines for best practice for agencies and professionals to use when working in young women's violence intervention and have the capacity to evaluate and advise about existing services for girls. Data collection employed both qualitative and quantitative methods. Over 3400 questionnaires were collected from Year 9 and 10 boys and girls to gauge the involvement of young people and provide gender comparison. In addition, 40 focus groups of girls, between the ages of 12 to 18, have provided the perspectives of young women from mainstream settings. However, the most significant contribution to this report comes from the more than 100 interviews conducted with teenage girls, many of whom came to the researchers' attention or were referred by authorities because of their engagement in violent behaviour. Details: Nelson, NZ: Stopping Violence Services Nelson, 2011. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://www.thegirlsproject.org.nz/girls-project.pdf Year: 2011 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.thegirlsproject.org.nz/girls-project.pdf Shelf Number: 132051 Keywords: Antisocial BehaviorFemale CrimeFemale Juvenile Offenders (New Zealand)Female Offenders FemalesGender Violence |
Author: Rios Contreras, Viridiana Title: How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War Summary: This work advances a theory about corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that lead criminal organizations behave, organize, compromise or fight one another. It is my argument that the propensity of criminal groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal political institutions are decentralized because violent criminal organizations are less likely to be punished. Under decentralized institutional environments, understood here as those in which different levels of government fail to act cohesively as a single decision-making body, corruption agreements with one government inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. As a result, belligerent criminal organizations that would otherwise be punished remain untouched. My argument sheds light on why many criminal organizations are able to operate profitably without major episodes of violence, and illuminates the causes of Mexico's large increases in drug{related violence. A formal model (Chapter 2), an analytical narrative (Chapter 3), and an empirical test (Chapter 4 and 5) show that Mexican drug trafficking organizations increased their propensity to engage in injurious behavior only recently, responding to incentives set by political decentralization that inhibited Mexico's federal government from controlling the actions of its local governments, and thus from limiting trafficker's propensity to battle for turf. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2012. 233p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf Shelf Number: 132772 Keywords: Drug Control PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug Wars (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Harris, Richard J. Title: Delaware Shootings 2012: An Overview of Incidents, Suspects, and Victims in Delaware Summary: The following report is the second in a series examining criminal, non-accidental shooting incidents in Delaware that resulted in the injury or death of another person. This report focuses on multiple characteristics of shooting incidents, victims injured as a result, and suspects involved. In 2012, there were 196 criminal, non-accidental shooting incidents in Delaware that resulted in the injury or death of 228 individuals. More than 180 victims had non-fatal injuries and 43 died of their wounds. More than 275 individuals were suspected of involvement in the shooting incidents, with 136 suspects identified by name. As of August 2013, arrests had been made in 37.2 percent of all shooting incidents and 50 percent of homicide incidents. More than half the incidents (51.5 percent) occurred in the City of Wilmington. More than 25 percent occurred in suburban New Castle County, with the remaining incidents split almost equally between Kent and Sussex Counties. Most shooting victims (90.8 percent) were male. Blacks comprised the largest racial group of victims (84.2 percent overall and 85.5 percent of male victims). For the 133 incidents where demographic information was available for both victims and suspects, 88 percent involved victims and suspects who were all or predominantly of the same race. Most victims and those suspects who had been identified by name had criminal histories in Delaware (89.5 percent and 96.1 percent respectively). Of those with a Delaware criminal history, most victims and suspects had at least one felony arrest (78.9 percent and 91.9 percent respectively). Most victims and identified suspects were juveniles at the time of their first Delaware arrest (78.4 percent and 78.9 percent respectively). Details: Dover, DE: Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://cjc.delaware.gov/sac/pdf/Crime/2012StatewideShootingReportNovember%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://cjc.delaware.gov/sac/pdf/Crime/2012StatewideShootingReportNovember%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 132788 Keywords: Gun-Related Violence (Delaware) Guns Homicides ViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Salt, Jim Title: Crime in Delaware 2008 - 2012. An Analysis of Serious Crime in Delaware Summary: Crime in Delaware is the official report of serious crime known to Delaware law enforcement agencies. This report provides information about 22 Violent, Serious Property, Drug/Narcotic and Other Property and Social offenses reported in Delaware's implementation of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) operated by the State Bureau of Investigation of the Delaware State Police. Final data for the years 2008 through 2011 and preliminary data for 2012 are included in this report. The report includes a summary of data on serious offenses, clearances, adult and juvenile arrests, and crimes against law enforcement officers at the state and county levels, followed by a detailed data section organized by state and county. Overall, the occurrence of serious crime has decreased notably since 2008. The number of serious criminal offenses known to police in 2008 was 103,274 compared with 95,872 in 2011, a decrease of 7.2%. Preliminary data for 2012 suggest that pattern is continuing, with the number of offenses at just over 93,000, a decline of about 8% compared to 2008. Violent crime in the State decreased more than 8% from 2008 to 2012. This decrease reflects a steady decline in reported Violent Offenses over the past five years. The number of Homicides in 2012 (59) was comparable to 2008 (58), but markedly higher than 2009, 2010, and 2011 (43, 49, and 51 respectively). Serious Property crime changed little between 2008 and 2012, although motor vehicle-related theft offenses decreased around 40% while Burglary and Shoplifting offenses increased by about 9% and more than 30% respectively. Drug/Narcotic Offenses decreased about 7% between 2008 and 2012. Other Property and Social Offenses decrease around 15% between 2008 and 2012. There has been a steady decline in this offense category over the past five years. Three of the most frequently reported crimes - Assault offenses; Destruction, Damage, and Vandalism of Property; and Drug/Narcotic offenses - showed distinct downward trends from 2008 to 2012. Based on 2012 preliminary data, offenses in all crime categories were cleared by law enforcement officers at rates comparable to or better than the rates from 2008 through 2011. Overall, 51.3% of offenses in 2012 were cleared by the end of the calendar year. Violent crime against law enforcement officers decreased by about one-third between 2008 and 2012. No officers were killed in 2012, but 15% of the 435 assault-related offenses committed against officers resulted in injuries. Details: Dover, DE: Delaware Statistical Analysis Center, 2013. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://cjc.delaware.gov/sac/pdf/Crime/Crime_DE_2008-12_November%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://cjc.delaware.gov/sac/pdf/Crime/Crime_DE_2008-12_November%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 132789 Keywords: Crime Statistics (Delaware)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2013 Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's 2013 Game Changers, where we have sought to highlight some of the year's most important and illustrative trends in the development of organized crime in the Americas. This year has been a year of contradictions. Large criminal groups that seemed untouchable appear to be on the ropes. Others waded through complicated peace and truce processes with incredible patience. Some of the more notable of these processes were initiated by the criminal groups themselves. At the same time, some dynamics in the underworld remained true to form and some new, ugly criminal economies have surged because of these dynamics. Amidst it all, weak states continued to face challenges from below and above, sometimes from those who simply feel they have no choice but to fight criminal groups on their own. These past 12 months could be termed the year of the negotiations. In Colombia, rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued their historic talks with the Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos. By many accounts, these talks are moving along well, but there is concern that even if the FARC leadership signs a deal, parts of the organization will desert and enter the criminal economy. In El Salvador, the truce between the country's two largest gangs showed severe signs of fraying, if not rupturing completely. Homicides surged at the end of the year, as the presidential campaign shifted into full gear. While the mediators claimed the candidates had sought gang support for their campaigns, the country's security minister sought to undermine the truce via public and private channels. Meanwhile, a few more lasting criminal "pacts" emerged, brokered, it appeared, by the criminals themselves. In Medellin, Colombia, remnants of the old guard, known as the Oficina de Envigado, brokered a cease fire with the now surging Urabenos criminal organization, bringing homicides to their lowest levels in 30 years. In Juarez and Tijuana, Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel's apparent dominance over those trafficking corridors led to equally dramatic drops in homicide rates and other criminal acts, such as car-jackings. The emergence of the Urabenos as the singular, monolithic criminal organization to survive the government's assault on the so-called Criminal Bands or "Bandas Criminales" (BACRIM) may be the biggest development in Latin America's underworld. The Urabenos have developed a sophisticated criminal model, which includes a huge variety of revenue streams. They appear to have overcome the loss of numerous top leaders and have an understanding of when to fight and when to make friends, as noted above. However, the Urabenos, and other groups like them, have also ushered in a new era of drug consumption in the region. The consumers are no longer just in Europe, the United States and Asia. They are in small cities and even rural areas throughout the region. They are poor; they are middle class; and they are the elite. And they are getting their drugs from the local criminal groups who are servicing the larger ones, like the Urabenos, throughout the distribution chain. From Brazil and Argentina, to Costa Rica and Mexico, this new, local criminal economy appears to be at the heart of much of the region's violence. It is this violence that pushed civilians to take up arms in places like Guerrero and Michoacan, two embattled Mexican states where so-called "self-defense" groups have surged to try to replace an inept, corrupted and co-opted state. These groups appear to have a wide range of backgrounds: from the poor peasant farmers to the sophisticated rival criminal groups. Yet, the government seems powerless to deal with them, to the point where many authorities have willingly allowed them to break the law in order to ensure others do not. A similar tension between maintaining the law and ensuring justice is also on the minds of the Bolivians as they try to keep some portions of their coca crop in the legal sphere and eliminate those deemed illegal. The challenge is monumental and, as we have seen this year, virtually impossible. Meanwhile, Bolivia's neighbor Peru, is coming to grips with the fact that it is the largest coca producing country in the world. That reality, which is a return to the 1990s status quo, has meant an influx of foreign criminal groups. Finally, for the second straight year, we need to note what is happening in Honduras. The country continues to open its doors to foreign criminal organizations, even while its homegrown groups continue to gain power. This includes one known as the Cachiros, which the US Treasury Department said had accumulated up to $800 million in assets, or roughly five percent of the country's GDP. A newly elected government, which takes power in January, seems to have little idea of how to combat these organizations, much less the resources. Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132877 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingGangsOrganized CrimeStreet GangsViolence |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations Summary: Drug-related violence has become a very serious problem in Mexico. Of particular concern to U.S. policymakers, violent drug-trafficking organizations produce, transship, and deliver tens of billions of dollars' worth of narcotics into the United States annually. The activities of these organizations are not confined to drug trafficking; they extend to such criminal enterprises as human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, and racketeering. Then, there is the violence: Recent incidents have included assassinations of politicians and judges; attacks against rival organizations, associated civilians, and the police and other security forces; and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders. Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico's security, these groups are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia is a tempting and frequently made analogy and source for policy recommendations. A review of these approaches, combined with a series of historical case studies, offers a more thorough comparative assessment. Regions around the world have faced similar challenges and may hold lessons for Mexico. One point is clear, however: Mexico is not Colombia. In fact, Mexico is not particularly like any other historical case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with the greatest improvements in countries facing similar challenges. A companion volume presents in-depth profiles of each of these conflicts. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z1/RAND_RR548z1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z1/RAND_RR548z1.pdf Shelf Number: 132898 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations. Supporting Case Studies Summary: Drug-related violence has become a very serious problem in Mexico. Of particular concern to U.S. policymakers, violent drug-trafficking organizations produce, transship, and deliver tens of billions of dollars' worth of narcotics into the United States annually. The activities of these organizations are not confined to drug trafficking; they extend to such criminal enterprises as human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, and racketeering. Then, there is the violence: Recent incidents have included assassinations of politicians and judges; attacks against rival organizations, associated civilians, and the police and other security forces; and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders. Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico's security, these groups are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia is a tempting and frequently made analogy and source for policy recommendations. A series of historical case studies offers a foundation for a more thorough comparative assessment. Regions around the world have faced similar challenges and may hold lessons for Mexico. One point is clear, however: Mexico is not Colombia. As the historical record shows, Mexico is not particularly like any other case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with the greatest improvements in countries facing similar challenges. A companion volume describes the study's approach to assessing each historical case and presents findings from the overall analyses. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 285p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z2/RAND_RR548z2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z2/RAND_RR548z2.pdf Shelf Number: 132899 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico) Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime |
Author: United Nations Development Programme Title: Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach Summary: The dynamics of violent conflict are changing across the globe. The number of violent conflicts is decreasing, yet the level of social violence is greater than ever. Levels of violence are now higher in a number of non-conflict countries than in countries at war, and communities are facing increasing threats to their security and social cohesion. These changing trends reflect the complex and volatile nature of the root causes of violence, and highlight the importance of adopting a dynamic and multi-faceted approach to addressing these issues. Such complex challenges can no longer be met with separate, sectoral interventions. In light of these changing trends and given the need to balance institutional support with strengthening communities and their ability to resist armed violence, UNDP has prioritized community security and social cohesion as a key goal of its Strategic Plan (2008-2013). To help guide UNDP's evolving work in this area, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has produced this paper to provide a conceptual framework and common understanding of community security and social cohesion and to support the design and implementation of effective programmes in this area. The paper recognizes the imperative to strengthen community security and social cohesion in a multi-sectoral and cross-cutting manner, informed by a clear understanding of the drivers and causes of violence. It also highlights the importance of collaboration across the UN system so that comprehensive assessments and planning processes can lead to effective programming. The paper is the result of a substantive review of UNDP's practice in this field from 14 countries in crisis or emerging from crisis. The paper reflects extensive consultations with UNDP Country Offices, field practitioners, civil society partners, researchers and governments. Most importantly, it has been informed by lessons learnt from communities that are in crisis and those that have averted crisis. Details: Geneva, SWIT: UNDP, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2009. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://www.th.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.th.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf Shelf Number: 132902 Keywords: Communities and CrimeCommunity Crime PreventionCommunity SafetyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bumpus, John Title: Best Practices in Reducing Violent Homicide Rates: Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico Summary: The 2011 World Development Report aptly points out that the nature of violent conflict has changed, warning that the 20th century tools developed to prevent, mitigate, and manage traditional forms of violence may no longer be up to the task. The report's evidence shows that while interstate and civil wars are on the decline, 1.5 billion people worldwide continue to live in areas severely affected-and even debilitated- by persistent gang violence and organized crime. In Central America alone, homicides related to organized crime have increased every year since 1999. This worrying trend is evident even in states that have simultaneously made progress addressing traditional forms of political violence. This disconnect raises the question: what new policy tools are needed to prevent, mitigate, and manage contemporary forms of violence? One way that victims and states are grappling with this dilemma is by leveraging the power of local actors to forge local solutions. Some subnational authorities have taken on the responsibility of reducing gang violence in their own communities. Experiments led by innovative coalitions of mayors, private sector leaders and associations, churches, and other community groups seem to have had some positive effects in Latin American countries. Also of note, some of the best police practices and judicial approaches have occurred at the municipal level. This study identifies and assesses some of these local and innovative efforts in El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico. Despite differences in the composition of violent actors and the nature of violence across these three countries, researchers set out to identify how local communities and nontraditional actors are addressing gang violence in their particular contexts. Findings indicate that non-traditional approaches must carefully consider the specific realities of their contexts, thus having implications for external donors and influential state actors like the United States. Summaries of country assessments, findings, and recommendations follow. Full treatment of these topics is available in each country report. Details: Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 2014(?). 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/591g%20Homicide%20Reduction%20in%20Honduras_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/591g%20Homicide%20Reduction%20in%20Honduras_1.pdf Shelf Number: 132911 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: de Rozas, Diego M. Fleitas Ortiz Title: Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional Country Profiles Summary: Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the regions most affected by violence and crime, but at the same time, has little available information about this problem. When data exist, it is not always presented in a comprehensive way, and usually suffers from reliability problems. Consequently, this publication intends to provide detailed and comprehensive information about the problem of insecurity in the region, using three different data sources. This will help to ensure not only a broad perspective but also to compare and validate the scope and quality of the different sources. One reason for that approach is that another of the publication's goals is precisely to contribute to a better understanding of the characteristics and limitations of security data. This document is a translation of the publication written in Spanish "Delito y Violencia en America Latina y el Caribe", where the reader can find a complete analysis, methodological notes, and a statistic Annex. Whereas this English version contains only the introduction, with a description of the main findings, and the "Country Profiles", which provide detailed information about each country. One of the information sources in this work is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which primarily receives crime statistics from National Polices or Justice Ministries. Another source is the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which collects mortality data from each country, including violent deaths, provided by national health systems, with a detail of event characteristics, as well as the victims' age and sex. The last source was the Americas Barometer survey - Lapop, coordinated by Vanderbilt University in 2012, which contains questions on personal victimization and citizens' opinions on security, justice and the police in 24 countries from the region. The survey contains a sample of 38.631 cases. Regarding the three sources, we not only verified the internal consistency of their data, but we also compared them in order to identify problems or understand their differences. In the Lapop and PAHO cases, we also worked directly with their databases. In addition, this paper conducts statistical analyses to look for tentative explanations of, among other things, victimization levels, fear of crime, trust in the community and the police. We control these variables among themselves as well as with socio-demographic factors at the individual and aggregate (country) levels of analysis, conducting a cross-sectional comparison of countries, which can be found in the full Spanish version. When presenting this complex amount of information, we intended that the content be interesting to both academics and policy makers, as well as for a lay audience. Therefore, in order to facilitate its comprehension, the literature and analyses used have an intermediate level of difficulty. Also to this end, we left some coefficients or statistical analyses in footnotes or in the Annexes. Details: Buenos Aires: Associacion para Politicas Publicas, 2014. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: English Summary: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://www.app.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Crime-and-Violence-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.app.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Crime-and-Violence-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean.pdf Shelf Number: 132983 Keywords: Crime Statistics (Latin America; Caribbean)Crime VictimizationViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel Warfare Summary: The United States has diplomatic relations with 194 independent nations. Of these, none is more important to America than Mexico in terms of trade, investment, tourism, natural resources, migration, energy, and security. In recent years, narco-violence has afflicted Mexico with more than 50,000 drug-related murders since 2007 and some 26,000 men, women, and children missing. President Enrique Pena Nieto has tried to divert national attention from the bloodshed through reforms in energy, education, anti-hunger, health-care, and other areas. Even though the death rate has declined since the chief executive took office on December 1, 2012, other crimes continue to plague his nation. Members of the business community report continual extortion demands; the national oil company PEMEX suffers widespread theft of oil, gas, explosives, and solvents (with which to prepare methamphetamines); hundreds of Central American migrants have shown up in mass graves; and the public identifies the police with corruption and villainy. Washington policymakers, who overwhelmingly concentrate on Asia and the Mideast, would be well-advised to focus on the acute dangers that lie principally below the Rio Grande, but whose deadly avatars are spilling into our nation. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1195.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1195.pdf Shelf Number: 133040 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Chaowsangrat, Chaowarit Title: Violence and Forced Internal Migrants with Special Reference to the Metropolitan Area of Bogota, Colombia (1990-2002) Summary: This thesis addresses topics of violence and forced internal migrants with special reference to the metropolitan area of Bogota, Colombia between 1990 and 2002. While there is much scholarly debate by historians and political scientists about conflict between the state, guerrillas and paramilitaries in rural areas, urban violence has been relatively neglected. Violence caused many people to migrate from rural to urban areas, so that, Colombia had by 2002 more internally displaced persons than any country except Sudan. The main aims of the thesis are 1) to analyse trends in violent crime; 2) to discuss citizen security strategies that were pursued between 1990 and 2002; and 3) to examine the survival strategies of forced internal migrants in Bogota comparing them to the strategies adopted by voluntary migrants and native residents. Chapter 1 focuses on urban homicide and kidnapping. In Colombia, 40 percent of the 25,000 annual homicides were committed in the ten largest cities during the late 1990s. The problem of kidnapping is examined by analysing changes in Colombian anti-kidnapping legislation and its application and by focusing on the authors, the victims and the risk-zones involved. Chapter 2 looks at the issue of perception and fear of violent crime. The concept of risk and the subjectivity of decision-making when facing insecurity are examined. Chapter 3 investigates citizen security strategies during the administrations of Presidents Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), Ernesto Samper (1994- 1998) and Andres Pastrana (1998-2002). Chapter 4 develops an analysis of patterns of selectivity based on the notions of forced vis-a-vis voluntary migration and economic vis-a-vis non-economic migration. A research design collecting comparative data on households with diverse migration experiences residing in three locations within the metropolitan area of Bogota is applied. Chapter 5 explores the socioeconomic characteristics of forced migrants and compares them to voluntary migrants from outside and migrants who moved within Bogota. Details: London: University College London, 2011. 472p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 22, 2014 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1331874/1/1331874.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1331874/1/1331874.pdf Shelf Number: 131358 Keywords: HomicidesKidnappingMigration and CrimeUrban AreasUrban SecurityUrban ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime (Colombia) |
Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Back to the Future: Argentina Unravels Summary: Argentina's flamboyant president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, was indignant when, during a U.S. tour last year, a student at Harvard asked her how her personal wealth had grown more than 900 percent in less than a decade. "I don't know where you get those figures, but that is not how it is," the president responded. Such is Argentina in the time of Fernandez de Kirchner, where official obfuscation and denial of facts are routine, unexplained acquisition of wealth is the norm, official accountability is rapidly disappearing, the rule of law is eroding, and political enemies are publicly attacked as traitors. During her time in office, Fernandez de Kirchner has built a massive patronage system, consistently rewarding close political allies with lucrative business opportunities, often at the expense of foreign investors whose properties have been expropriated in violation of international agreements. Details: Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 23, 2014 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.303/pub_detail.asp Year: 2013 Country: Argentina URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.303/pub_detail.asp Shelf Number: 129927 Keywords: CrimePolitical Corruption (Argentina)Violence |
Author: Chi, Jocelyn Title: Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico: Options for Implementing Targeted Enforcement Summary: Between 2006 and 2012, drug-related violence in Mexico escalated to unprecedented levels. During this time, five of the top ten most violent cities in the world were found in Mexico, and over 60,000 Mexicans were killed at the hands of Violent Drug Trafficking Organizations (VDTOs). This reign of terror has expanded to include other types of violence, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and spectacular public displays of violence. Most alarmingly, VDTO victims increasingly include ordinary citizens, journalists, law enforcement and military, and other government officials. To date, enforcement efforts in the United States (U.S.) have focused almost exclusively on reducing the flow of drugs from, and through, Mexico. Violence reduction has been a secondary concern, and has been mostly considered as a potential side-benefit of flow reduction policies. Until recently, Mexican authorities have focused their attacks on the upper leadership of major organized crime groups as a method of reducing flows, and in an effort to address threats to public safety. However, freshly elected President Enrique Pena Nieto has indicated that his administration will shift focus away from drug flows, in order to prioritize crime prevention and violence reduction. Given that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have acknowledged that the U.S. market for illegal drugs is largely responsible for fueling the Mexican drug trade, and that the U.S. has a strategic interest in Mexican security, the U.S. may have a currently-unexploited opportunity to reduce violence in Mexico. In this project, we explore whether the adoption of targeted enforcement in the Unites States could theoretically effect a reduction in violence in Mexico, and, if so, what form that strategy might take. We consider the operational and informational requirements for implementation, as well as the information a decision-maker would require in order to elect targeted enforcement as a strategy for addressing the security problem in Mexico. Targeted enforcement is novel in several respects. While it is not inconsistent with flow-reduction goals, the strategy leverages enforcement resources in the United States to effect violence reduction in Mexico. Furthermore, because it is a deterrent strategy, targeted enforcement requires authorities on both sides to clearly and publicly identify the target and communicate that violence will no longer be accepted as a method of conducting business. Finally, the target will encompass entire VDTOs, and not just individual offenders, which increases the cost of individual offending through internal organizational pressure. Keeping in mind current budgetary constraints, we develop four design options for violence-focused U.S.-side targeted enforcement. We evaluate our options with reference to the potential for crime and violence reduction, intelligence demands, implementation and political feasibility, and community impacts. Through a series of interviews with experts in the field, and an exhaustive review of secondary sources, we find that not only is U.S. adoption of targeted enforcement possible within existing frameworks, but that this approach has great potential for reducing Mexican-side violence. Our findings suggest: - First and foremost, we note that the adoption of a targeted violence-reduction approach need not conflict with current U.S. efforts to reduce drug flows; thus, there should be no cost in terms of drug abuse in the U.S. - While a short-term surge in violence is possible, attacking drug-trafficking revenues in the U.S. could incentivize VDTOs away from using violence to advance their drug-trafficking interests. Authorities would need to better understand the revenue portfolios of VDTOs in order to estimate how responsive organizations might be to attacks on revenues, and measure the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy. - Successful implementation requires sophisticated intelligence, and while there is some indication that both the U.S. and Mexico possess the capacity to gather this intelligence, this capacity would likely need to be refined and/or expanded. - The necessary administrative and enforcement infrastructures appear to be in place in the U.S., though resources would need to be reallocated, and additional funding might be necessary. - In the U.S., policies targeting drug flows are popular due to a perception that they decrease drug consumption; a shift towards violence reduction would probably require intensive outreach to educate stakeholders. In Mexico, current distrust in government would require clear and public communication about target selection and the role of Mexican authorities in U.S.-side enforcement. - Finally, a number of possible community impacts exist, and U.S. and Mexican authorities would need to establish mechanisms for collecting data and tracking trends in order to respond to negative externalities. Details: Los Angeles: UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 129923 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence (Mexico)HomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeTargeted Law EnforcementViolenceViolence PreventionViolence ReductionViolent Crime |
Author: Moor, Marianne Title: The Dark Side of Coal: Paramilitary Violence in the Mining Region of Cesar, Colombia Summary: PAX Netherlands - the Dutch section of Pax Christi International - is calling on Essent, Nuon, E.ON, Delta and Electrabel to stop buying Colombian "blood coal" from the mining companies Drummond and Prodeco. These mining companies must first contribute to the acknowledgment and compensation of the thousands of victims of paramilitary violence around their mines in the 1996-2006 period, and actively oppose the current human rights abuses. Drummond and Prodeco paid the paramilitaries and exchanged strategic information with them, according to statements from perpetrators and witnesses in the investigation report "The Dark Side of Coal", which PAX presented today, 30 June 2014, to the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, Lilianne Ploumen. Between 1996 and 2006 paramilitaries murdered a total of 3100 people and drove 55,000 farmers from their land. The victims have never received compensation or acknowledgment. To this day the mining companies benefit from these gross human rights abuses. Some of the land that was seized is within the companies' territory. The trade union has been systematically weakened by lethal violence; any critics have been silenced by threats. Perpetrators and witnesses say the collaboration between the coal mining companies and the paramilitaries in the Colombian department of Cesar consisted of financial and material support and the exchange of strategic information. The main focus of the investigation "The Dark Side of Coal" is Drummond. There are fewer sources for Prodeco's involvement, but the information available warrants further investigation. "The Dark Side of Coal" presents previously unreported testimonies of perpetrators and victims, and is the first systematic investigation into the abuses surrounding the coal mines in Cesar. Details: Utrecht: PAX, The Netherlands, 2014. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://actie.paxvoorvrede.nl/actie/stop-bloedkolen/ Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://actie.paxvoorvrede.nl/actie/stop-bloedkolen/ Shelf Number: 133255 Keywords: Coal MiningHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesNatural Resources (Colombia)Paramilitary GroupsViolence |
Author: Goldstein, Daniel M. Title: Qualitative Research in Dangerous Places: Becoming an Ethnographer of Violence and Personal Safety Summary: Conducting qualitative research is a challenge in any environment, but in highly violent settings the obstacles to both successful outcomes and researcher safety are especially high. Not only are the usual problems that confront qualitative researchers intensified when fear and insecurity add to local people's tendency to mistrust strangers asking questions; environments marked by high levels of criminal, political, and/or daily social violence require researchers to be constantly alert to threats to their own physical safety, and to the ways in which their research can imperil their subjects and collaborators. While some dangers will be obvious, such as people firing guns or waving knives, they may include more subtle things as well, like being in the wrong place at the wrong time, witnessing an activity one shouldn't, asking the wrong question of the wrong person, revealing the extent of one's personal resources and equipment, or inadvertently violating the unwritten codes that govern violent areas. Extreme caution is needed, not only when doing research, but when carrying out the daily business of living and working as well. Qualitative researchers working in highly violent settings confront the same risks and dangers that the inhabitants must confront on a regular basis. And like the people who are often the subjects of their research inquiries, researchers must learn how to keep themselves safe in places where violence is always a possibility. One effective way to do this is to adopt the local cultural and linguistic norms their subjects use to promote their own security. In other words, researchers, regardless of discipline, can become "ethnographers" of local violence and the responses it engenders and emulate the behaviors their informants have learned to keep themselves safe. Details: Brooklyn, NY: Social Science Research Council, Drugs, Security and Democracy Program, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: DSD Working Papers on Research Security: No. 1: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://webarchive.ssrc.org/working-papers/DSD_ResearchSecurity_01_Goldstein.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Indonesia URL: http://webarchive.ssrc.org/working-papers/DSD_ResearchSecurity_01_Goldstein.pdf Shelf Number: 133258 Keywords: Criminal Justice ResearchEthnographiesQualitative ResearchViolenceViolent Areas |
Author: Berman, Nicolas Title: This Mine is Mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa Summary: This paper studies empirically the impact of mining on conflicts in Africa. Using novel data, we combine geo-referenced information over the 1997-2010 period on the location and characteristics of violent events and mining extraction of 27 minerals. Working with a grid covering all African countries at a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degree, we find a sizeable impact of mining activity on the probability/intensity of conflict at the local level. This is both true for low-level violence (riots, protests), as well as for organized violence (battles). Our main identification strategy exploits exogenous variations in the minerals' world prices; however the results are robust to various alternative strategies, both in the cross-section and panel dimensions. Our estimates suggest that the historical rise in mineral price observed over the period has contributed to up to 21 percent of the average country-level violence in Africa. The second part of the paper investigates whether minerals, by increasing the financial capacities of fighting groups, contribute to diffuse violence over time and space, therefore affecting the intensity and duration of wars. We find direct evidence that the appropriation of a mining area by a group increases the probability that this group perpetrates future violence elsewhere. This is consistent with "feasibility" theories of conflict. We also find that seccessionist insurgencies are more likely in mining areas, which is in line with recent theories of secessionist conflict. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford, 2014. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: OxCarre Research Paper 141: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/files/OxCarreRP2014141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/files/OxCarreRP2014141.pdf Shelf Number: 133306 Keywords: Conflict-Related Violence Mining Conflicts Natural Resources (Africa) Violence |
Author: Borraz, Fernando Title: Vigilante Justice and Police Protocols in the Latin American South Cone Summary: There is a wide debate worldwide, and particularly in Latin America with respect to citizen insecurity and the proliferation of more punitive claims from the society itself. In this article we analyze the attitude of the citizens belonging to the countries of the Latin American South Cone towards maintaining the law regarding persecuting and punishing criminals. In particular, we tackle the approval of vigilante justice in some circumstances and the justification of police procedures outside the law as a form of guaranteeing the capture of criminals. For this, we use the LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University) database from the year 2008. Analyzing the data using probit estimations, we observe that the approval of vigilante justice is related to the experience and particular situation of the respondent. In this sense, having been victimized in the last months and feeling unsafe in his or her own neighborhood increase the probability of taking that position regarding vigilantism. On the other side, sticking to police procedures is more strongly related to the general political beliefs and the level of concern for the respondents' insecurity. These findings indicate that the formation of these beliefs has a differential dynamic and that when actions outside the law have to be justified, this is distinguished based on the type of involved action and the actor who carries it forward. Details: Montevideo, Uruguay: Universidad de la Repblica, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Documento No. 09/13: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.fcs.edu.uy/archivos/0913.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.fcs.edu.uy/archivos/0913.pdf Shelf Number: 134224 Keywords: CrimePolice ProceduresVigilantism (Latin America)Violence |
Author: Svoboda, Eva Title: The search for common ground: Police, protection and coordination in Timor-Leste Summary: Despite only recently celebrating its tenth anniversary as an independent nation, Timor-Leste has had an extensive experience of international engagement, with two military interventions and five UN missions over the course of less than 13 years. This study examines the evolution of policing in UN missions in Timor-Leste between 1999 and 2012, highlighting their impact on the development of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) and the PNTL's relationship with the Timorese military, the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL). The report focuses particularly on the violence that flared up in the country in April-June 2006, and examines the coordination mechanisms and actors involved in the response. Key findings: - Improvements are needed if international and national police in transitional settings are to provide an effective and reliable service for people affected by violence and crime. - Fragmentation, lack of clarity and language issues undermined the performance of UN police as well as the development of the PNTL throughout the 13 years of international missions. - The failure to take into account the legacy of the liberation struggle, and the prestige veterans of that struggle hold within Timorese society, hampered efforts to promote the independence and integrity of the PTNL. Details: London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: HPG Working Paper: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8783.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8783.pdf Shelf Number: 133621 Keywords: Police PerformancePolicing (Timor-Leste)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jacome, Felipe Title: Trans-Mexican Migration: a Case of Structural Violence Summary: This paper argues that the violence experienced by migrants crossing Mexico in their way to the United States needs to be understood as a case of structural violence. Based on several months of field work conducted along the migrant route in Mexico, the paper emphasizes that trans-Mexican migrants suffer not only from forms of direct violence such as beatings, kidnappings, and rape, but also endure great suffering from expressions of indirect violence such as poverty, hunger, marginalization, and health threats. Addressing trans-Mexican migration as a case of structural violence is also crucial in grasping the complex dynamics that characterize this violence, including the impunity and systematization of violence, and the social forces, policies, and institutions that perpetuate it. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center for Latin American Studies, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource; Working Paper Series No. 2: Accessed October 13, 2014 at: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/CLAS%20RESEARCH/Working%20Papers/WP2.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/CLAS%20RESEARCH/Working%20Papers/WP2.pdf Shelf Number: 131267 Keywords: ImmigrationMigrants (Mexico)Victims of ViolenceViolence |
Author: Livingston, Stephen Title: Africa's Information Revolution: Implications for Crime, Policing, and Citizen Security Summary: Violent crime represents the most immediate threat to the personal security of most Africans. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 36 percent of all homicides globally occur in Africa. With 17 deaths per 100,000, the homicide rate in Africa is double the global average. Rates of robberies and rape in Africa also exceed global norms. The problem is worse in urban areas, with many of Africa's urban-dwellers often worrying about crime. The risk of violent crime has implications for Africa's development, governance, and stability. Crime ranks as one of the major inhibitors to investment on the continent according to private business owners. Parents choose not to send children to school rather than put them at risk in high-crime areas. Countries with higher rates of violent crime tend to make less progress in reducing poverty and expanding development. Closely linked to the threat of violent crime is the weakness of many of Africa's police forces. They are often underfunded, understaffed, and undertrained. Surveys show that a majority of Africans see police only infrequently, and therefore do not view the police as a source of protection. In addition to being ineffective in combatting crime, inadequate police training contributes to unprofessional behavior. In some cases, police are active participants in criminal activity. In others, corruption permeates the force. In still others, police use extrajudicial violence to intimidate and coerce suspected criminals, potential witnesses, and even victims. This generates high levels of distrust of the police in many African countries. The acuteness of the crime challenge has grown with rapid urbanization and the expansion of slums lacking basic services, including police presence. In many urban centers, this vacuum has been filled by gangs and organized criminal organizations that profit from extortion, kidnappings, and violence against the local population. At times these gangs are protected by corrupt police or politicians. As these criminal groups expand into trafficking of illicit goods - drugs, cigarettes, medicines, and arms - they tend to link up with transnational criminal networks, posing an even more formidable security problem. Consistently high levels of violence have far-reaching implications for how youth learn to resolve conflict-perpetuating tolerance for higher levels of violence in a society. This, in turn, fosters the acceptability of political violence and threatens the viability of democratic governance, which relies on dialogue, free speech, tolerance of opposing perspectives, and protection for minorities. The rapid expansion and accessibility of mobile communications technology in Africa is creating new opportunities for combatting crime and strengthening police accountability. Twitter, SMS, and event-mapping technologies are being used to connect communities with police and security forces as never before. This is precedent setting for many citizens, especially those in rural areas who have grown accustomed to fending for themselves. Now at least they are more able to alert one another to potential threats, mobilize the community in self-defense, and inform security sector authorities in the interest of gaining protection. In urban areas, citizens who would not normally have many interactions with the police now have a number they can call in times of trouble. Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are also connecting societies horizontally in real time. This is forging cross-regional ties and linkages that may not have previously existed and historically have emerged only with the development of a national transportation infrastructure. In the process, both economic and social integration are facilitated. This enhanced cohesiveness can contribute directly to greater stability. ICTs, often tapping into their crowdsourcing capabilities, also offer opportunities to improve police responsiveness and accountability. Crime maps provide the basis for allocating resources to match prevailing threats. They also establish a benchmark from which to assess the effectiveness of police responses. Bribe-reporting websites create a record and pattern of illegal police behavior that raise the profile of what are often treated as isolated events into a broader, measurable phenomenon requiring a policy response. While opening opportunities to enhance security and accountability, ICTs are not a panacea for resolving crime and corruption. Information is solely a tool and not the driver of reform. ICTs can be used for nefarious purposes - both by criminal organizations as well as unaccountable police forces. Rather, ICT-generated change requires an organized body of committed individuals who can use the increased accessibility of information to educate the public, engender popular participation, and press authorities for reform. It is this sustained engagement of on-the-ground actors, typically in the form of civil society organizations, that transforms information accessibility into concrete improvements in the lives of ordinary citizens. By lowering information barriers, ICTs are bringing discussion and analysis of crime in Africa out of the shadows, enhancing the potential for oversight of the security forces, and elevating citizen security. ICTs, therefore, are contributing to improved security through both internal channels via the strengthening of the state's crime data gathering capacity as well as external mechanisms to monitor, critique, and hold the security sector accountable. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 5: Accessed October 20, 2014 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ARP5-Africas-Information-Revolution1.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ARP5-Africas-Information-Revolution1.pdf Shelf Number: 131514 Keywords: Crime StatisticsGang ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimePolicingSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime (Africa) |
Author: Prieger, James E. Title: Unintended Consequences of Enforcement in Illicit Markets Summary: Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a competitive market. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence. Details: Malibu, CA: School of Public Policy, Pepperdine University, 2014. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: School of Public Policy Working Papers. Paper 51: Accessed November 18, 2014 at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=sppworkingpapers Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=sppworkingpapers Shelf Number: 134135 Keywords: Black Markets Illegal Markets Illicit Markets Violence |
Author: Peters, Danya J. Title: Public Acquiescence of Police Brutality and Extrajudicial Killings in Sao Paulo, Brazil Summary: The purpose of the current research was to take a social psychological approach to understanding public acquiescence and support for extra legal police violence in Brazil. Data were drawn from research conducted by NEV- CEPID/FAPESP. The sample consisted of 1000 youth and adults age 16 and greater in the city of Sao Paulo who were representative of the general population based on sex, age, education level, occupation, and geographic area (with an oversampling of people from violent neighborhoods). T-tests and ANOVA techniques were utilized to explore group differences in support for citizen and police extra-legal violence based on race, social class, and gender. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was then used to estimate a mediational model of the relationships between environmental influences (direct and indirect victimization, as well as the presence of neighborhood incivilities), general justice related judgments and paradigms (the justice system as inefficient and ineffective, the traditional human rights paradigm, and the emerging human rights paradigm) and support for specific kinds of extra legal violence (support for citizen vigilante justice, support for procedural violence by the police, and support for retributive violence by the police). As hypothesized, direct victimization, indirect victimization, and neighborhood incivilities were all positively associated with fear of crime. In turn, fear of crime was negatively associated with adopting the emerging human rights paradigm and positively associated with viewing the justice system as inefficient and ineffective. Unexpectedly, fear of crime was not associated with a more traditional human rights paradigm. However, the emerging human rights paradigm was negatively associated with support for citizen vigilante justice, as well as support for procedural and retributive violence by the police. Conversely, the traditional human rights paradigm was positively associated with support for all three types of violence. Furthermore, viewing the justice system as inefficient and ineffective was positively associated with support for citizen vigilant justice and retributive violence, but, unexpectedly, was not related to support for procedural violence. Theoretical implications of the results are discussed. Details: Reno, NV: University of Nevada, Reno, 2006. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 21, 2014 at: http://www.nevusp.org/downloads/down159.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.nevusp.org/downloads/down159.pdf Shelf Number: 134184 Keywords: Extrajudicial HomicidesHomicidesPolice Brutality (Brazil)Police MisconductPolice Use of ForceUrban AreasVigilantismViolence |
Author: World Health Organization Title: Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014 Summary: Despite indications that homicide rates decreased by 16% globally between 2000 and 2012, violence remains widespread. Released today, the "Global status report on violence prevention 2014" reveals that 475 000 people were murdered in 2012. Homicide is the third leading cause of death globally for males aged 15-44 years. These facts highlight the importance of creating more decisive action to prevent violence. Jointly published today by WHO, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the report indicates that: only one third of the 133 countries surveyed are implementing large-scale initiatives to prevent violence, such as bullying prevention programmes, visits by nurses to families at risk, and support to those who care for older people; just over half the countries are fully enforcing a set of 12 laws generally acknowledged to prevent violence, although 80% of countries have enacted them; only half of all countries have services in place to protect and support victims of violence The "Global status report on violence prevention 2014" is the first report of its kind to assess national efforts to address interpersonal violence, namely child maltreatment, youth violence, intimate partner and sexual violence, and elder abuse. Individual country profiles reflect the extent to which key violence prevention programmes and laws and selected services for victims of violence are being implemented. Details: Geneva, SWIT: WHO, 2014. 292p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2014 at: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/status_report/2014/en/ Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/status_report/2014/en/ Shelf Number: 134305 Keywords: Child Abuse and NeglectChild MaltreatmentElder AbuseHomicidesInterpersonal ViolenceSexual ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent CrimeYouth Violence |
Author: Lakhani, Sadaf Title: The socio-economic costs of crime and violence in Papua New Guinea : recommendations for policy and programs Summary: At the request of the Prime Minister's office, between 2011‐2013, the World Bank conducted a study to understand the social and economic costs of crime and violence in Papua New Guinea. The purpose of the study was to feed a national conversation about crime and violence and inform policy directions and program interventions. The work has benefitted from extensive input from international partners and local stakeholders through a consultative and participatory methodology. The findings of the study are summarized separately in this Research and Dialogue Series on the Socioeconomic Costs of Crime and Violence in PNG. This brief outlines the policy and programming recommendations that emerge from the research. II. Key Findings of the Study Levels of crime and violence in PNG have remained high, although with annual fluctuations, and differences across regions. According to analysis of RPNGC data conducted for this study, the homicide rate-considered the most reliable indicator of overall crime-was 10.4 per 100,000 habitants in 2010, which is roughly the same as it was in 2000. The rate varies widely across regions, with an estimated rate of 66 per 100,000 in Lae and 33 in NCD, amongst the highest in the world. Robbery and assault are the most commonly reported crimes. Family and sexual violence (FSV) is also highly prevalent, and affects both females and males. Details: Washington, DC: : The World Bank, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Dialogue series ; no. 5: Accessed February 4, 2015 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/06/06/000350881_20140606161204/Rendered/PDF/885450NWP0Box3050Policy0PNG06005014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Papua New Guinea URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/06/06/000350881_20140606161204/Rendered/PDF/885450NWP0Box3050Policy0PNG06005014.pdf Shelf Number: 134535 Keywords: Costs of Crime (Papua New Guinea)Crime RatesCrime StatisticsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Peeters, Timo Title: Truce on a tightrope: risks and lessons from El Salvador's bid to end gang warfare Summary: On 14 March 2012, current affairs website Elfaro broke the story of a truce facilitated by the government between El Salvador's two most powerful gangs, leading to an instant reduction in the country's homicides. Over one and a half years later, the truce is still intact. However, the government's reluctance to take full responsibility for the pacification process, the lack of a comprehensive policy to address root causes of violence, and the fear that the process might strengthen gangs by giving them political power have placed numerous pitfalls in its path. Neither the El Salvadorean public nor the inter-national community is united in its support for negotiating with the maras. Even so, the truce serves as an important example of a more balanced approach to gang violence, and a source of insight into how local patterns of marginalisation and crime, fuelled by rapid urbanisation of the world's population, may on occasion be managed through dialogue. Details: The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2013. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Policy Brief No. 27: Accessed April 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/CRU%20Policy%20Brief%2027.pdf Year: 2013 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/CRU%20Policy%20Brief%2027.pdf Shelf Number: 135130 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangsHomicidesViolenceViolence Crime |
Author: Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., ed. Title: The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer Summary: he 2014 Americas Barometer data and the corresponding regional report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experience as that have been reported to us though first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The Americas Barometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas. In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago. We take this fact as a cornerstone for this report, and devote the first three chapters to an assessment of citizens - experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters to address topics that are considered "core" to the Americas Barometer project: citizens - assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues of crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective - across time, countries, and individuals - on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. 325p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2015 at: http://seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/biblioteca_virtual/pdf/AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_120514_W.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/biblioteca_virtual/pdf/AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_120514_W.pdf Shelf Number: 135204 Keywords: Economic Conditions and CrimeFear of CrimePolitical CorruptionPublic OpinionSecurityViolence |
Author: Euer, Katrin Title: Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalization (STRESAVIORA) Part I: Literature analysis Summary: Radicalization is a complex process. Former research pointed to the importance of multiple factors covering the social-, demographic- and psychological spheres. Furthermore, triggers like the deceasing of a family member or drastic events that circulate on (social) media, play an important part in the development of radical ideas. Especially youngsters and adolescents who are in the process of developing a social identity, are vulnerable to influences from charismatic role models or peers. In this report the results of the research on the process of violent radicalization are presented. During this research, our focus evolved from paying attention to deradicalization interventions and risk factors to prevent radicalization, to a mind set in which we became conscious that the focus should be on positive experiences, instead of fighting against situations we do not want to happen. An overview is given of risk factors as well as protective factors on several levels and related to different spheres in the process of violent radicalization. In the consulted literature, little has been written about protective factors, therefore our aim was to uncover these during the qualitative interviews. Instead of only focussing on aspects which should be banished, attention should be paid to hopes, wishes and dreams. Further, in this report an overview of promising practices concerning trainings for the enlargement of resilience among youths is presented. This research aims to prevent certain (radical) attitudes to develop. Although the process of involvement in radical movements or developing radical attitudes is difficult to grasp, some preventive strategies could be identified. Also, indicators to take into account for the design and evaluation of trainings are discussed, in order to hand out guidelines for the development of tools. There is no univocal answer to the question: which measure or intervention is the most effective and efficient. Yet, we state that a comprehensive, integrated approach is useful if combined with a focus on positive factors, in order to increase youngsters resilience to prevent involvement in violent radicalization. Details: Brussels: Belgian Ministry of the Interior, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Shelf Number: 135542 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadical Groups (Europe)RadicalizationTerroristsViolence |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:The Merida Initiative and Beyond Summary: Violence perpetrated by a range of criminal groups continues to threaten citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico, a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and more than $500 billion in annual trade. Although organized crime-related violence in Mexico has generally declined since 2011, analysts estimate that it may have claimed more than 80,000 lives between December 2006 and December 2014. Recent cases - particularly the disappearance of 43 students in Guerrero, Mexico in September 2014 - have drawn attention to the problems of corruption and impunity for human rights abuses in Mexico. Supporting Mexico's efforts to reform its criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality and better protecting citizen security in the country. U.S. support for those efforts has increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Merida Initiative, a bilateral partnership launched in 2007 for which Congress has appropriated some $2.5 billion. U.S. assistance focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. Inaugurated to a six-year term in December 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has continued U.S.-Mexican security cooperation begun during the Felipe Calderon government. Pena Nieto has requested increased assistance for judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limited U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations. Despite those restrictions, U.S. intelligence has helped Mexico arrest top crime leaders, including Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman - the world's most wanted drug trafficker - in February 2014.The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Merida training and equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The 114th Congress is continuing to fund and oversee the Merida Initiative and related domestic initiatives. From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress appropriated roughly $2.5 billion in Merida Initiative assistance for Mexico, including some $194 million provided in the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235). That total is $79 million above the Administration's request; it aims to support efforts to secure Mexico's southern border and justice sector programs. As of April 2015, more than $1.3 billion of Merida Initiative assistance had been delivered. The FY2016 request for the Merida Initiative is for $119 million to help advance justice sector reform, modernize Mexico's borders (north and south), and support violence prevention programs. Possible questions for oversight may include the following. 1) How is the State Department measuring the efficacy of Merida programs and improving or eliminating ineffective programs? 2) To what extent is the Mexican government moving judicial and police reform efforts forward, and how is U.S. assistance supporting those reforms? 3) Are Merida-funded programs helping the Mexican government respond to new challenges and priorities, including securing its southern border? 4) Is Mexico meeting the human rights conditions placed on Merida Initiative funding? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: R41349: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Shelf Number: 135554 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal Justice ReformDrug TraffickingMerida InitiativeOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Haugaard, Lisa Title: Honduras: A Government Failing to Protect its People Summary: With a population of just over 8 million people, Honduras is home to some of the highest poverty rates in Latin America and most violent cities on earth. The deep roots of organized crime, government corruption and abuses by state forces, and impunity for criminals reverberate throughout the small Central American nation, where 97% of murders go unsolved. These factors have forced many Hondurans to flee towards the United States in hopes of finding an income, security and hope for the future. In response, the Obama Administration has proposed a $1 billion aid package to Central America, which Vice President Biden emphasized in his Central America visit last week. Last December, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWGEF) and Center for International Policy (CIP) traveled to Honduras for a first-hand look. What we found was a security situation in shambles and a country in dire need of reform. We have compiled our findings into this report which paints a picture of the most alarming issues facing Honduras today, including mass migration, the disturbing and highly visible militarization of law enforcement, grave threats against human rights defenders, and a lack of an effective and independent justice system. The report also examines the role U.S. assistance has played, and can play, in the plight of the Honduran people. In addition to describing the depth of the problem, the report points to the elements of a solution, including the development of a more effective, independent judiciary, and a thoroughly reformed civilian police force. The ultimate solution must include tackling the underlying issues of poverty and lack of education that help create an environment in which crime and violence flourish. But this requires what we did not see in Honduras - a government deeply committed to respect for human rights, with a vision of more broadly shared prosperity and a will to protect all Honduran citizens. The report concludes that carefully crafted international aid programs can help address these problems, but that, "political will from the Honduran government to protect and respect its citizenry must come first." Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Honduras-failing-to-protect-its-people.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Honduras-failing-to-protect-its-people.pdf Shelf Number: 135627 Keywords: Crime (Honduras)Law EnforcementMilitarizationSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Levy, Horace Title: Youth Violence and Organized Crime in Jamaica: Causes and Counter-Measures. An Examination of the Linkages and Disconnections Summary: This Project emanated from the need to establish research-based grounds of solid value for an alternative to the mano dura approach, elements of which the authorities planned to continue using, or even extending, to address Jamaica's high homicide rates. The objective, therefore, was to investigate the relationship between youth violence and organized crime, with special attention given to the role of women and best practices and with the aim of influencing policy. Enabled by the Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) qualitative methodology, the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security (ICJS) research team was able, through focus groups and interviews with key informants, to engage directly with gangs and crews in communities in Kingston, and to a lesser extent, those in Spanish Town. The team encountered "defence crews" that were aligned to communities. These crews did not exhibit behaviour similar to that of illegal, wealth-seeking criminal gangs and, indicated no movement in that direction. Instead, they were strongly supported by women and responded positively to the mediatory and developmental "best practices" of state and non-state agencies. A significant number of criminal gang members also showed interest in pursuing an alternative and legal lifestyle. Women, for their part, were not associated with personal weapon usage. They tried to discourage conflicts and played an important part in community bonding. However, by having sexual relationships with "the enemy", they were often the ones blamed for provoking conflicts. For inner-city people, the community is of prime importance and defence crews and sometimes gangs are embedded in it. The various crews provide a constant source of enjoyment for inner-city people who live in depressed conditions. The research team recommends a national security policy that, rather than focusing simply on attacking the gangs, proposes the combination of community policing with community development and firmly asserting the central authority of the state. In the series of public forums held with security officials, the researchers received support for this approach from high-ranking officers of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). A number of specific recommendations include the provision of additional resources to "best practices", and women's empowerment, as well as ceasing to grant contracts to criminal gangs. Details: Ottawa: International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 2012. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 22, 2015 at: https://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/51348/1/IDL-51348.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Jamaica URL: https://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/51348/1/IDL-51348.pdf Shelf Number: 135756 Keywords: GangsHomicidesJuvenile OffendersOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent CrimeYouth Gangs |
Author: Blattman, Christopher Title: Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence on Adult Noncognitive Investments in Liberia Summary: We show self control and self image are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged Liberian men and randomized half to eight weeks of group cognitive behavioral therapy, teaching self control skills and a noncriminal self-image. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash raised incomes and reduced crime in the short-run but effects dissipated within a year. Therapy increased self control and noncriminal values, and acts of crime and violence fell 20--50%. Therapy's impacts lasted at least a year when followed by cash, likely because cash reinforced behavioral changes via prolonged practice. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21204: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21204?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21204?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw Shelf Number: 135781 Keywords: Cognitive-Behavioral TherapyEconomics of CrimeRehabilitationViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: University of Washington. Jackson School of International Studies Title: 2013 Task Force Report: Violent Crime Reduction in Rio de Janeiro Summary: Rio de Janeiro is infamous for violence. In many of the city's large, informal settlements known as favelas, violent drug gangs have ruled with impunity while corrupt police officers contribute to distrust of formal government. The introduction of new Pacifying Police Units (UPP) in 2008 has resulted in impressive progress, but much still remains to be done. The focus of this Task Force is to provide recommendations to ensure that the UPP program continues to be successful. Our recommendations are geared toward furthering UPP integration into communities in a way that 1) preserves the progress that has already been made and 2) ensures permanent change, both within Rio's troubled police force and in "pacified" communities. While much has been accomplished already, the task is far from complete. Each of the policy recommendations presented in the following chapters was prepared for the Public Security Secretary of Rio de Janeiro Jose Beltrame, and is tailored to his position and responsibilities. However, we recognize that a systemic problem cannot be solved by one actor, and real change must come from a combination of efforts on the part of government, NGOs, and community members themselves. The project is loosely divided into two broad sections. The first five chapters address ways internal police policies can be improved to strengthen the ability of UPPs to carry out their community policing mission. Topics include strengthening respect for community policing objectives within the police force, improving working conditions for officers, enhancing community control and involvement with local UPP units, coordinating with other governmental institutions to break the cycle of violence for convicted criminals, and including NGOs and community members in devising training curriculum for officers. The second half involves improving the means by which community upgrading projects and the provision of public services takes place after the UPPs are installed in communities. Topics include instituting a new system for coordinating public service works with ground-level community interests, improving access to healthcare within favelas by involving UPP officers in first-response systems, easing the process of land title formalization, and instituting programs to dissipate tensions between police and youth. Details: Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2013. 270p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/22749/TF%20I%202013%20text.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/22749/TF%20I%202013%20text.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 129789 Keywords: Community PolicingDrug TraffickingDrug-Related CrimeFavelasGang-Related ViolenceGangsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Simmons, Krista Title: The State and Youth Violence:A Socio-Political Approach to Understanding Youth Violence in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas Summary: Drug trafficking has drastically increased levels of violence in Rio de Janeiro since the arrival of the cocaine trade in the early 1980's. The rate of homicides in Rio de Janeiro in the late 1990's and early 2000's marked the city as one of the most violent urban centers in the world. Even today, there is an average of 20 homicides each day in Rio de Janeiro, a city of just under 12,000,000 people. The rate of death as a result of violence and other demographic factors such as an overabundance of male recorded deaths between the ages of 15-24, a deficit of young men, an imbalanced sex ratio, and a rise in youth mortality since the 1980's more closely mirror warzone demographics than those of a city in a modern, stable state such as Brazil. For example, between 1998 and 2000 there were between 2,000 and 5,000 violent deaths, in Yugoslavia, and roughly 11,000 in Angola. In the same period, Rio de Janeiro saw 7,465 citizens die as a result of violence. Of grave concern to children's rights activists has been the accompanying spike in violence against and among children and youth. Deaths by external causes among individuals under 18 years of age in Rio de Janeiro have increased from 8.1% in 1979 to 26.4% in 2002, with violent causes predominating external causes of death increasingly with time. The increased involvement of children in violent drug gangs is reflected in the testimony of local favela dwellers (or favelados), as well as Rio de Janeiro crime statistics. In 1980, there were 110 registered convictions of minors for drug related crime. By 2001, there were 1,584 convictions of minors for drug related crimes: a number shocking, although decreased from a high of 3,211 in 1998. This translates to a 1340% increase in drug related convictions among minors in Rio de Janeiro between 1980 and 2001. It is estimated that 5,000-6,000 children are currently working for drug factions within Rio de Janeiro's favelas (poor shanty towns). The realities faced by youth involved in organized drug violence in Rio de Janeiro are similar to those of child soldiers elsewhere in the world, with whom they share the dynamics of "voluntary" recruitment, a hierarchical structure of orders and punishment, access to and use of firearms and other weapons, kill-or-be-killed surroundings, and involvement in large-scale armed confrontations. Despite the similarities, however, the children of Rio's drug gangs cannot be classified as child soldiers because the drug factions for which they work have no political objectives or desire to replace the state. Furthermore, labeling them child soldiers runs the risk of legitimizing lethal state force against them. However, these children are clearly more than "delinquents." A call for a category all their own has grown in recent years, with Brazilian NGO, Viva Rio, developing a working definition for these children which can be applied in similar circumstances around the world: "Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV) - Children and Youth employed or otherwise participating in Organized Armed Violence where there are elements of command structure and power over territory, local population, or resources." Details: Washington, DC: American University, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://auislandora-dev.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0910capstones%3A108 Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://auislandora-dev.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0910capstones%3A108 Shelf Number: 129786 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceFavelasHomicidesUrban AreasViolenceViolent CrimeYouth GangsYouth Violence |
Author: Davies, Philip Title: Why is crime In South Africa so violent?: Rapid evidence assessment Summary: Political-Historical Factors South Africa's colonial and apartheid legacy is said to have given way to the 'normalisation' of violence, in which violence is seen as an acceptable means of problem solving and resolving conflict. The policing and justice system of South Africa is also seen as having led to a mistrust of the rule of law and authorities, and to some vigilantism and summary justice. Environmental factors Fractured families, poor socialisation, harsh and inconsistent discipline, physical and emotional abuse, and inadequate limit-setting are contributing factors to why crime in South Africa is so violent. So too are gangs that use violence, guns and other weapons to acquire goods, opportunities, and a sense of identity and self-worth. The misuse of alcohol and other drugs also increases the level of violence in criminal activity. Social attitudes and cultural values about gender condone and reinforce abusive practices against women. Individual Factors The age (younger), gender (males) and educational background (low achievement) of criminals are strongly associated with violent behaviour and violent crime. So too are certain psychological profiles and some psychiatric conditions. Poverty, unemployment inequality and social exclusion also contribute to South Africa's burden of violence, but are inseparably related to other key factors (political-historical, environmental and individual). Social Distribution of Violence Violent crime is not uniform across South Africa. The Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal have the highest rates of homicides, and Gauteng has the highest rates of car and truck hijacking and robberies. Affluent areas of South Africa experience more violent property crime, whilst poorer communities have more domestic violence, male-male assaults, murder and rape. Violent crime is a concern for Black and White South Africans, and the concerns of poorer communities about violence and violent crime need to be given greater attention. Promising Interventions for Reducing Violence and Violent Crime These include interventions at the political, environmental and individual levels, requiring actions that are inter-sectoral, strategic, and evidence-based. Interventions to reduce poverty, increase educational participation and completion, develop work-based skills and job opportunities, and support for programmes that seek to change social attitudes and norms (particularly those related to gender and violence), are suggested. Better control of guns, weapons, alcohol and other drugs are also called for. Multi-modal programmes for violent behaviour seem to be more effective than single component interventions. Inter-personal and social skills training, along with parenting skills training, seem to offer considerable opportunity to reduce violent and other antisocial behaviour. Details: Oxford Evidentia, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.pan.org.za/node/8682 Year: 2011 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.pan.org.za/node/8682 Shelf Number: 129779 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceVigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Physicians for Human Rights Title: Patterns of Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: A Call for Accountability and Prevention Summary: Violence against ethnic and other minority groups living in Burma (officially the Union of Myanmar) has marked the country's history over the past several decades. Burma's former military regime made common practice of targeting ethnic communities for forced labor, sexual violence, and other serious crimes. Under Burma's current nominally democratic government, violence against marginalized groups has escalated to an unprecedented level as Rohingyas and other Muslims throughout Burma face renewed acts of violence. Persecution and violence against Rohingyas, a Muslim group long excluded from Burmese society and denied citizenship, has spread to other Muslim communities throughout the country. Serious human rights violations, including anti-Muslim violence, have resulted in the displacement of nearly 250,000 people since June 2011, as well as the destruction of more than 10,000 homes, scores of mosques, and a dozen monasteries. The successive waves of violence too often go unpunished by the Burmese government. At times, the crimes have even been facilitated by the police. The failure of the Burmese government to properly protect its people and address human rights violations committed by police officers signals serious obstacles ahead on the path from military dictatorship to a truly democratic country where everyone has a voice and the rights of all people are respected and protected. One of the most extreme and alarming examples of anti-Muslim violence was the March 2013 massacre of dozens of Muslim students, teachers, and other community members in Meiktila, a town in central Burma. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) conducted an in-depth investigation into those killings and released a report in May 2013 detailing the crimes. In an effort to place this particular incident in the wider context of ongoing violence, PHR produced this report to analyze and asses patterns of extreme violence from various sites across the country, which indicate that the government has consistently failed to properly address attacks driven by hate speech and racism. Further investigation by an independent commission is necessary to uncover additional details about the organization and motivation behind the recent violence. There are no simple solutions to stem rising tides of religious hatred and violence. The people of Burma face the significant task of choosing how to grapple with intolerance and anti-Muslim hatred, as well as myriad abuses by the government against other marginalized groups. The ultimate responsibility, however, rests with the Government of Burma, which must ensure that people are protected from violence and that any perpetrators are investigated, arrested, and charged according to fair and transparent legal standards. As this report demonstrates, while there have been several arrests following some of the most extreme outbreaks of violence, the government must do more not only to respond to the individual acts of violence, but also to promote an atmosphere of tolerance and acceptance where the rights of all people are protected. The Burmese government also has the responsibility to find durable solutions to end violence that respect ethnic diversity. Institutionalized displacement and segregation are abhorrent and unsustainable responses that have devastating consequences for those displaced by violence or fear of persecution. PHR conducted eight separate investigations in Burma and the surrounding region between 2004 and 2013. PHR's most recent field research in early 2013 indicates a need for renewed attention to violence against minorities and impunity for such crimes. The findings presented in this report are based on investigations conducted in Burma over two separate visits for a combined 21-day period between March and May 2013. The Government of Burma, civil society leaders, and the international community must act immediately to stop anti-Muslim violence in the country. The unhampered spread of violent incidents across Burma exposes concerning indicators of future violence. There is, for instance, rapid dissemination of hate speech against marginalized groups, widespread impunity for most perpetrators, and inaction or acquiescence by many leaders in government and the democracy movement. As we have witnessed in the past, these elements are ingredients for potential catastrophic violence in the future, including potential crimes against humanity and/or genocide. If left unchecked, this particular combination could lead to mass atrocities on a scale heretofore unseen in Burma. Details: New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Burma-Violence-Report-August-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Burma URL: https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Burma-Violence-Report-August-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129780 Keywords: Bias-Related CrimesEthnic GroupsHate CrimesHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesMinority GroupsMuslimsReligionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Paparazzo, John Title: Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. Summary: Immediately following the tragic shooting on July 20, 2012, at the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, and in recognition of increased public alarm over multiple casualty violence in the United States, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) began partnering with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership (JHU-PSL), to bring together a cross-section of stakeholders from a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, education, and academia, for the purpose of improving the nation's ability to prevent such incidents. The three partners worked over the next several months to plan and coordinate the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings, held at the FLETC's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, December 11-13, 2012. More than two dozen experts from multiple disciplines assembled in an effort to advance the safety and security of the nation's communities: educational institutions, workplaces, public venues, places of worship, recreational areas, etc. The summit goal was to bring together a cadre of leaders and subject-area authorities to develop and propose a national dialogue on multiple casualty violence and to create a path forward. During the preliminary meeting phase of the summit, the planners developed a set of definitions to serve as a framework for discussions about preventing multiple casualty violence. The FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-PSL invited subject-matter experts from a wide range of disciplines to engage a cross-section of professions positioned to help facilitate the prevention of multiple casualty violence. Over the course of the three-day summit, these participants further refined and structured the national dialogue on multiple casualty violence and discussed, debated, and built consensus on potential strategies for preventing such incidents. Through careful examination of voluminous summit notes and documentation, summit partners synthesized definitions into a common framework and developed recommendations for future actions. These delineate the direction of future conversations and meetings on preventing multiple casualty violence. Summary of Summit Recommendations Summit recommendations fell into a framework comprising one set focused on what institutions, including governmental and non-governmental organizations, can do to improve the prevention of multiple casualty violence, and one set centered on improving prevention efforts pertaining to individual subjects: Institution-focused 1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act. 2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention. 3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting. 4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines. 5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior. Details: Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2013. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 27, 2015 at: https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/publications/summits-on-preventing-multiple-causality-violence/e021311546_MultiCasualty-Violence_v508_05APR13.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/publications/summits-on-preventing-multiple-causality-violence/e021311546_MultiCasualty-Violence_v508_05APR13.pdf Shelf Number: 129823 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceHomicidesMass ViolenceMultiple HomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Myrttinen, Henri Title: Up in Smoke. Impoverishment and Instability in Post-Independence Timor Leste Summary: The scenes in Dili in late May 2006 were reminiscent of a previous wave of violence that had gripped the East Timorese capital. As in September 1999, the town was burning, armed gangs roamed the streets and a large part of the population was huddled together in the squalor of makeshift camps, where shops remained locked up, shots rang out across town and Australian Defence Force (ADF) troops secured the airport perimeter for evacuations. Apart from a sense of deja vu and these superficial similarities, however, the situation in 2006 was very different from 1999. On the one hand, it was much simpler: it was not a campaign of orchestrated, all-out violence committed by a heavily armed occupation force with its paramilitary proxies in defiance of the international community that needed to be brought to a halt. The violence in 2006 was on a much smaller scale. But the problem was also much more complicated this time around, as the perpetrators were members of Timorese society and finding workable solutions to the crisis was far harder. At the end of May 2006, the humanitarian situation in Dili was dire and the security situation precarious. Of the city's approximately 150,000 inhabitants, almost half were in 'internally displaced persons' (IDP) camps. The fighting of the previous few weeks had left at least 37 dead. In addition to perhaps hundreds of houses, much else had gone up in smoke - trust in the central institutions of the state, trust in key political figures, trust in the international community, trust in the power of the intervening peacekeepers to provide security and, perhaps most seriously, trust in one another's neighbours, in the neighbouring communities and even in the unity of the nation. Much had gone up in smoke. Almost a year and a half on, the violence has subsided to a level where it is almost a kind of 'background noise.' There are gang fights, occasional killings, random cases of arson and cars are still stoned on a regular basis, but the violence is usually restricted to certain areas - which then tend to be avoided by all who do not live in them. Few people move around after dark any more. Tens of thousands of Timorese remain in IDP camps, most of them in and around Dili. A new government has been elected, numerous peace and reconciliation efforts have been launched but a long-term solution still seems elusive. Details: Helsinki: Kehitysyhteistyn palvelukeskus, 2007. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Kepa's Working Paper 11: Accessed May 28, 2015 at: https://www.kepa.fi/tiedostot/julkaisut/up-in-smoke.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Indonesia URL: https://www.kepa.fi/tiedostot/julkaisut/up-in-smoke.pdf Shelf Number: 129961 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Levy, Horace Title: Inner city, killing streets, reviving community Summary: Jamaica stands out world-wide for its extremely high rate of homicides. Less known but no less significant is the steady and threatening rate of homicidal increase - and beyond the numbers the daily, endless weeping, the habituation to violence and its ingraining in the life of a people. Still less accessible to the world have been the predictions of knowledgeable observers on the ground for more than a decade that worse was to come. What did these observers see - who evidently did not find the source of the problem all that abstruse - that those did not who might have been able to check the increase, head off the consequences and prevent the pain? Or if they did, were slow or unwilling to act? And why so unseeing - and unwilling? Over 40 per cent of the homicides in Jamaica - it used to be 70 per cent until the epidemic spread - occur in the communities of Kingston's inner city and in a context of community violence. It is clearly necessary, if this current of homicidal violence is to be checked, to examine the community context, the possible sources there of the violence and any countering attempts that have been made, those in particular that have been effective. Hopefully any conclusions reached will have some impact on policy with those who make it. The task then is to trace, even if fairly briefly, the trajectory of violence since the formation of political parties in the late 1930s and early 1940s, while paying special attention to the underlying continuity factor, which is community. A theoretical framework highlighting the importance of the community in civil society as well as the contrary significance of violence will also be tentatively and summarily advanced. This study, then, adopts as a working hypothesis that, however insufficiently recognised by policy makers, community plays a critical role in local homicide. Historically on a national scale community has been paid enormous attention from the days of Jamaica Welfare, which was started in 1937 by Norman Manley, one of the "fathers of the nation". The specific quasi-community or anti-community formation playing a role in homicide is the "garrison". It came into existence between 1965 and 1975 - the major exemplars, that is, and since then most of lower-income Kingston has been garrisoned - but had its foundations laid much earlier. The organization and structure of governance of the garrison are carefully scrutinized in this paper, with examination of actual instances leading to the identification of a typology that explains much of garrison behaviour. Details: Kingston, Jamaica: Arawak, 2009. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Arawak Monograph Series: Accessed May 29, 2015 at: http://sta.uwi.edu/conferences/12/icopa/documents/Horace%20Levy%20PAPER%20Inner%20city%20killing%20streets%20reviving%20the%20community.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Jamaica URL: http://sta.uwi.edu/conferences/12/icopa/documents/Horace%20Levy%20PAPER%20Inner%20city%20killing%20streets%20reviving%20the%20community.pdf Shelf Number: 135799 Keywords: CommunitiesGangsHomicidesUrban Areas and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Braehler, Verena Barbara Title: Inequality of Security: Exploring Violent Pluralism and Territory in Six Neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Summary: Security is a universal human right and a highly valued societal good. It is crucial for the preservation of human life and is of inestimable value for our societies. However, in Latin America, the right to security is far from being universally established. The aim of this sequential, exploratory mixed methods study is to explore the logic of security provision in six neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro (Vidigal, Santissimo, Complexo do Alemao, Tabuleiro, Botafogo and Novo Leblon) and assess its implications for citizens' right to security. The findings from the research show that, on a city level, Rio de Janeiro's security network can best be understood as an oligopoly because different security providers (police, municipal guards, military, private security companies, militias and drug trafficking factions) are connected through cooperative, neutral or conflictual relationships and need to consider the actions and reactions of other groups when taking strategic decisions. On a neighbourhood level, the preferred option for security providers are monopolistic-type constellations, characterised by relative peace and stability. However, all actors are willing to engage in violence if the perceived political and/or economic benefits are great enough. The thesis shows that the relative power and influence of the security providers are primarily determined by the way they are perceived by the local communities and by their capacity to use violence effectively. Despite its appearance as chaotic, violence is therefore an instrument which is negotiated and managed quite carefully. The thesis concludes that insecurity and violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily fuelled by the struggle for territorial control between conflicting security providers within the oligopoly. The oligopolistic constellation of security providers leads to an inequality of security, defined as a condition in which the right to security is not enjoyed by all residents to the same extent. Details: London: University College London, 2014. 292p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 30, 2015 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1457437/1/Verena_Barbara_Braehler_PhD_thesis.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1457437/1/Verena_Barbara_Braehler_PhD_thesis.pdf Shelf Number: 135808 Keywords: GangsNeighborhoods and CrimeOrganized CrimeSecurityUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Santamaria, Gema Title: Drugs, gangs and vigilantes: how to tackle the new breeds of Mexican armed violence Summary: Since 2007 Mexico has experienced a steady increase in lethal and non-lethal forms of violence, including kidnappings, extortion, extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances. This spiral of violence has been driven by the consolidation and expansion of non-conventional armed actors operating in an institutional and political climate characterised by pervasive levels of corruption, impunity and criminal collusion. Public indignation over this state of affairs reached a high after the disappearance of 43 trainee teachers in the town of Iguala in September 2014. This report analyses the objectives, structures and impact of non-conventional armed actors in Mexico, focusing on drug-trafficking organisations, street gangs and so-called self-defence forces. It examines the pitfalls and lessons learned from the country's past and present security strategies, and lays out the basis for an alternative approach to understanding and tackling non-conventional armed violence. Based on a careful analysis of the dynamic and hybrid character of these groups, the report argues for an approach that prioritises the fight against corruption and the protection of embattled communities through localised prevention, geographic sequencing and knowledge-based policing. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Santamar%C3%ADa_NOREF_Drugs%2C_gangs_and_vigilantes_December%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Santamar%C3%ADa_NOREF_Drugs%2C_gangs_and_vigilantes_December%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 135843 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesKidnappingOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Adams, Tani Marilena Title: Chronic violence and non-conventional armed actors: a systemic approach Summary: The phenomenon of "non-conventional armed violence, which refers to the hybrid forms of organised violence that emerge outside or alongside traditional armed conflict, is best understood through a more systemic understanding of violence. Many groups and individuals identified as part of the "nonconventional" phenomenon form part of a larger, self-reproducing system of chronic violence. These systems are driven by a complex combination of structural factors and behaviours, cultures, and practices that undermine human development in predictable ways. In short, chronic violence underpins the spread of the hybrid armed groups and factions that are now the focus of international attention in various regions. As a result, policymakers and practitioners must move beyond the current emphasis on normative approaches that are focused narrowly on security and justice to a broader array of strategies rooted in an understanding of the complex social forces that drive these patterns of behaviour. This requires a shift from single-issue approaches to more systemic multifocal processes; transcending the objective of violence reduction to focus on helping affected communities and groups to "thrive"; combining national-level top-down approaches with micro-level bottom-up strategies; and ensuring that the destructive dynamics of trauma are fully integrated into analysis and programming. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Adams_NOREF_Chronic%20Violence_SEPT_NY%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Adams_NOREF_Chronic%20Violence_SEPT_NY%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135870 Keywords: Chronic ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Macaluso, Agnese Title: Trapped in the City: Communities, Insecurity and Urban Life in Fragile States Summary: Hague Institute Researcher Agnese Macaluso and Clingendael's Senior Research Fellow Ivan Briscoe coauthored a policy brief on the challenges that fast-growing cities in fragile and developing states need to face in tackling insecurity and violence. The brief builds on the expert event Big Cities: Sources of and Solutions to New Insecurities hosted by the Secretariat of the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law in November 2014 at The Hague Institute for Global Justice. The meeting was intended to provide an opportunity for knowledge sharing and policy thinking on the impact of cities in fragile and conflict-affected environments, as well as to discuss possible donor responses to problems associated with urban development. A number of sessions brought together experts from different countries in the Global South, in order to discuss violence and insecurity in their urban dimension on the basis of concrete experiences. Furthermore, the discussion also sought to assess the value and impact of possible responses. Discussions benefited from the presentation of case studies from cities located in diverse geographical and cultural contexts, including Caracas, Karachi, Lagos, Nairobi and San Salvador - different in many ways, yet sharing similar social traumas and security concerns. A vital lesson that emerged from the discussion and participants' experiences is that understanding the real nature of urban insecurity requires stepping beyond the traditional analytical framework based on concepts such as legal and illegal, formal or informal, legitimate or illegitimate, and instead digging into the nuances and social adaptations undertaken in contexts of urban survival. In many urban contexts, the concept of crime is vague and difficult to define, since public institutions can be the main perpetrators of violence and gangs are relied upon to provide stability and security. The same ambiguity characterizes the most recent innovations to social problems that rapid urbanization has generated: while traditional governance approaches are often inadequate, high-tech solutions for urban dilemmas - often dependent on private sector involvement - pose new ethical and social challenges, and demand careful consideration of possible risks for the public interest. This brief builds on the insights from the seminar, and points to some of the more critical and controversial aspects of urban insecurity, above all in fragile and conflict-affected states. It explores relationship between violence, power and society in urban contexts, and aims to provide policy-relevant insights for the design of new approaches to urban governance. Details: The Hague: The Hague Institute for Global Justice, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/cp/uploads/publications/trapped-in-the-city-communities-insecurity-and-urban-life-in-fragile-states%20(2).pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/cp/uploads/publications/trapped-in-the-city-communities-insecurity-and-urban-life-in-fragile-states%20(2).pdf Shelf Number: 135907 Keywords: GangsUrban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Butts, Jeffrey A. Title: Denormalizing Violence: Evaluation Framework for a Public Health Model of Violence Prevention Summary: Despite having one of the lowest murder rates among major U.S. cities, gun violence continues to be a serious problem in New York City. In 2011, the New York City Council created the Task Force to Combat Gun Violence. In a December 2012 report, the Task Force recommended the initiation of a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary "crisis management system" to reduce the incidence and severity of gun violence. The system was based on the Cure Violence model of violence reduction. Cure Violence utilizes a public health approach. It considers gun violence to be analogous to a communicable disease that passes from person to person when left untreated. According to the logic of Cure Violence, gun violence is most effectively reduced by changing the behavior of individuals at risk to participate in gun violence and "denormalizing" violence by working to change the community norms that support and perpetuate gun violence. The Research & Evaluation (R&E) Center at John Jay College of Criminal Justice is currently evaluating the effectiveness of the Cure Violence approach to violence reduction. Between April 2013 and February 2014, staff from the R&E Center began the project by visiting Cure Violence sites in New York City and Chicago, the home base for Cure Violence. Researchers observed the operation of the program and assessed the suitability of the model for detailed evaluation. The team reviewed documents and websites about the project, interviewed program staff, and spoke with local officials involved in the design and launch of the initiative in both cities. Researchers also met with staff of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which supports the Cure Violence model and contributed partial funding for this research. The following report addresses the operations of the Cure Violence model and how it differs from other approaches for reducing gun violence. It reviews the evidence underlying these models and proposes an agenda for future evaluation research. Details: New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Research & Evaluation Center, 2014. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2015 at: http://johnjayresearch.org/rec/files/2014/03/denormalizing.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://johnjayresearch.org/rec/files/2014/03/denormalizing.pdf Shelf Number: 136030 Keywords: Crime PreventionGun-Related ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Marczak, Jason Title: Security in Central America's Northern Triangle: Violence Reduction and the Role of the Private Sector in El Salvador Summary: In the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the increase in violence and organized crime highlights the need for new approaches to improve citizen security. In the case of El Salvador, a March 2012 gang truce has halved the daily homicide rate, opening an opportunity to build on existing efforts or to launch new approaches aimed at violence prevention. While public safety is the responsibility of the state, this Americas Society policy brief highlights the role of the private sector in violence prevention. It highlights innovative corporate efforts in violence prevention so that policymakers, businesses leaders, and others concerned about improvements in security can learn from these initiatives and obtain a more nuanced grasp of the possible space that can be filled by the private sector. Security in Central America's Northern Triangle: Violence Reduction and the Role of the Private Sector in El Salvador focuses on the role that multinational corporations can play in forging an integrated approach to crime reduction. This is a little known field in Central America. While the policy brief analyzes reinsertion efforts for former gang members and at-risk youth programs in the Salvadoran context, it also serves as a reference point for Honduras and Guatemala. Drawing examples from a larger sample of violence prevention efforts, the Americas Society policy brief highlights five corporate efforts that are creating safer communities and contributing to business bottom line. The local focus and the direct or indirect cooperation with the public sector are critical to program success. One of the companies, Grupo Calvo, employs 90 rehabilitated former gang members in its El Salvador plant-about 5 percent of its staff-and facilitates employment opportunities with suppliers for an additional 100 former gang members. These workers are some of the strongest and most productive employees at Grupo Calvo as well as at League Collegiate Wear, where 15 percent (40 employees) of its Salvadoran workforce joined the company through its reinsertion program. Additional companies featured in the policy brief include the AES Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, and Rio Grande Foods. Five recommendations are issued: 1.The private and public sectors each bring unique ideas, resources, and skills to violence prevention efforts and must find ways to coordinate these efforts, especially at the local level. 2.Corporate practices to improve security must be continuously catalogued and updated with a central repository and coordinating institution. 3.Private-sector violence prevention programs must be recognized both for their value in improving local communities as well the potential benefits they can bring to corporate bottom lines. 4.Reinsertion efforts and at-risk youth programs analyzed in the Salvadoran context should serve as examples-both the lessons learned and the overall strategies-for other Northern Triangle countries. 5.Regular dialogue between the public and private sectors is critical for identifying medium- to long-term violence prevention programs that will outlast the period in office of one particular official or political party. Details: New York: Americas Society, 2011. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Americas Society Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/Central%20American%20Security%202012.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/Central%20American%20Security%202012.pdf Shelf Number: 136141 Keywords: At-Risk YouthDrug TraffickingGangsPublic SafetyViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Ingram, Matthew C. Title: Homicide in El Salvador's Municipalities: Spatial Clusters and the Causal Role of Neighborhood Effects, Population Pressures, Poverty, and Education Summary: Violence directly affects individual and community well-being, and is also increasingly understood to undercut democracy and development. For public health scholars, violence presents a direct harm to health and well-being. In the worst cases, violence is lethal. Violence also generates serious costs to democracy. Fear and insecurity erode public trust and interpersonal confidence, hindering civic engagement and participation in public life. Further, low public trust undermines the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and persistent insecurity can generate support for heavy-handed or authoritarian policies. Indeed, in some new democracies in the region, including El Salvador, frustration with criminal violence has led majorities to support a return to authoritarian government. Across the region, polls identify crime and citizen security as top policy priorities. Thus, the prevention and reduction of violence is crucial to democratic stability. Lastly, violence generates heavy economic costs, dampening development. In the U.S., Miller and Cohen (1997) estimated the annual financial costs of gun shots alone at $126 billion. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) found that the health care costs of violence constituted 1.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product in Brazil, 5.0 percent in Colombia, 4.3 percent in El Salvador, 1.3 percent in Mexico, 1. percent in Peru and 0.3 percent in Venezuela5. Along with law enforcement costs, costs to the court system, economic losses due to violence, and the cost of private security, violent crime has been estimated to cost Brazil 10.5 percent of GDP, Venezuela 11.3 percent, Mexico 12.3 percent, and El Salvador and Colombia more than 24 percent of GDP. Restating, violence costs several countries, including El Salvador, 10-20 percent of GDP. Given that GDP growth rates of three to four percent would be considered healthy, a substantial reduction of violence in these countries would have dramatic benefits for development. In sum, concerns about public health, democracy, and development motivate the need for a better understanding of the patterns and causes of violence, and of the need to translate this understanding into improved violence-reduction policies. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2014. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed August 4, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Homicides_El_Salvador.pdf Year: 2014 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Homicides_El_Salvador.pdf Shelf Number: 136308 Keywords: HomicidesMurdersSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: del Frate, Anna Alvazzi Title: Every Body Counts: Measuring Violent Deaths Summary: September 2015 world leaders will meet at the UN to adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),which will be the international development framework that will replace the current Millennium Development Goals. The seventeen proposed goals and associated targets are planned to run until 2030. Among them, Goal 16 focuses on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice, and accountable institutions. The inclusion of Goal 16 in the reflects the growing acceptance that issues related to peace, security, and good governance should play a role in the post-2015 development framework. This progress of a global agenda on peace and development has been possible thanks to the work of several processes, including the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (GD), which calls for measurable reductions in the burden of armed violence that humankind faces. The Small Arms Survey has been the leading research partner of the Geneva Declaration's 'measurability pillar' since the beginning of the initiative. The Global Burden of Armed Violence reports (2008, 2011 and 2015) have used 'violent deaths' as the main indicator for measuring and monitoring the scope and impact of armed violence globally, and refined a methodology for its collection and analysis. The violent death of a human being is the most extreme consequence of armed violence, and is treated seriously in all societies. For this reason it is likely to be recorded more accurately than other violent events. As a consequence, the number of persons who die violently is frequently used as a proxy measure for insecurity in both conflict and non-conflict settings. The Global Burden of Armed Violence reports focus on lethal violence shows that 'violent deaths' is a realistic indicator for policy-making (towards goals and targets) and for the purpose of measuring the results of armed violence prevention and reduction programmes. This experience is of great value to the current discussion around targets and indicators for Goal 16. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Research Notes, No. 49: Accessed August 5, 2015 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-49.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-49.pdf Shelf Number: 136341 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolent CrimeWeapons and Violence |
Author: Carapic, Jovana Title: Violent Deaths Due to Legal Interventions Summary: Killings during 'legal interventions' - the 'killing of civilians by law enforcement officials, or killings of law enforcement officials on duty' -accounted for an estimated 19,000 violent deaths each year during 2007-2012; which is 4 per cent of the 508,000 total violent deaths each year during that period. Such events raise questions about security policy, the role and accountability of the state and law enforcement agencies, the legitimacy of certain state actions, and potential avenues for security sector reform. The use of lethal force by law enforcement officers, including their use of firearms, may be the norm in situations where police face high levels of violence and where law enforcement agencies have adopted highly militarized tactics, however police forces operating under other circumstances seldom resort to the use of firearms. Violent Deaths due to Legal Interventions, a new Research Note by the Small Arms Survey and the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, summarizes key findings of the research on legal interventions conducted for the 2011 and 2015 editions of the Global Burden of Armed Violence, with a view to advancing the debate on the coherence, comprehensiveness, and comparability of relevant data within and across countries. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Research Notes No. 53: Accessed August 5, 2015 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-53.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-53.pdf Shelf Number: 136342 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolence CrimeWeapons |
Author: Fuller, Georgina Title: The serious impact and consequences of physical assault Summary: In 2012, there were 116,105 recorded victims of physical assault in New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory combined (ABS 2013); equating to a victimisation rate of 969 per 100,000 population. This reflects a trend that has been consistent for the last 18 years of police recorded crime statistics, where physical assault has had the highest rate of victimisation of any of the four major types of violent crime (ie homicide, physical assault, sexual assault and robbery; AIC 2014). Estimates provided by the ABS' Crime Victimisation Survey provide further insight into the nature of physical assault in Australia. In 2012-13, there was an estimated 498,000 people over the age of 15 years who were the victim of a physical assault. An estimated 60 percent (n=294,100) of these were male, while individuals aged less than 34 years were more likely to have been assaulted compared with any other age group (ABS 2014). Females were more likely to be victimised in the home by a family member, whereas males were more commonly assaulted by a stranger in place of recreation (ie pubs or nightclubs) or on the street (ABS 2014). Yet despite these statistics, the narrow focus of academia and policy on particular types of violence has resulted in the impact of some forms of physical assault being somewhat overlooked. For example, the negative consequences of experiencing domestic violence or sexual assault have been extensively studied. Briefly, the experience of domestic or intimate partner violence has been associated with the development of a wide range of negative outcomes including mental health issues, feelings of shame or guilt and difficulties relating to men (see Ansara & Hindin 2011; Coker et al. 2002; Roberts et al 1998). Similar negative consequences have been found for sexual abuse, as well as other effects such as difficulties in interpersonal relationships, particularly around sexual functioning (see Cashmore & Shackel 2013; Colman & Widom 2004; Watson & Halford 2010). This type of information is particularly relevant, as it has been used to inform the types of services available to support victims of these types of violence. Yet victims of non-domestic, non-sexual physical assault have not received the same level of attention. In order to address this knowledge gap, the consequences of physical assault victimisation in isolation from other types of violent crime are explored in this paper. The purpose is to discover the impact of physical assault on both the victim and their family. This includes the effect of this type of violence on the victim's physical and psychological health, as well as their social, educational and occupational functioning Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2015. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 496: Accessed August 13, 2015 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi496.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi496.pdf Shelf Number: 136386 Keywords: AssaultsCrime StatisticsVictimizationVictims of CrimeViolence |
Author: Sivarajasingam, V. Title: Violence in England and Wales in 2014: An Accident and Emergency Perspective Summary: Executive Summary - A structured sample of 117 Emergency Departments (EDs), Minor Injury Units (MIUs) and Walk-in Centres in England and Wales which are certified members of the National Violence Surveillance Network (NVSN) were included in this national study of trends in serious violence. - Anonymous data relating to age, gender and attendance date of those treated for violence-related injuries were collected. - Overall, an estimated 211,514 people attended EDs in England and Wales for treatment following violence in 2014. - There were an estimated 101,519 fewer ED violence-related attendances in England and Wales in 2014 compared to 2010 - 22,995 fewer than in 2013. - According to these data, serious violence in England and Wales decreased by 10% in 2014 compared to 2013. Apart from a 7% increase in 2008 there have been decreases in every year since 2001 according to this measure. - Violent injury of males and females declined by 9.9% and 9.5% respectively in 2014, similar to the falls in 2013. - Serious violence affecting all age groups decreased in 2014 compared to the previous year; falls among children (0-10 year olds, down 18%), adolescents (11 to 17 year olds, down 18%), young adults (18 to 30 year olds, down 9%), those aged 31 to 50 years (down 9%) and those aged 51 years and over (down 4%). - As in previous years, those at highest risk of violence-related injury were males and those aged 18 to 30. Violence-related ED attendance was most frequent on Saturday and Sunday and during the months of May and July. Details: Cardiff, Wales, UK: Violence Research Group, Cardiff University, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 17, 2015 at: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/95778/nvit_2014.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/95778/nvit_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 136437 Keywords: Emergency ServicesInjuryViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Althaus, Dudley Title: Mexico's Security Dilemma: Michoacan's Militias. The Rise of Vigilantism in Mexico and Its Implications Going Forward Summary: Since 2006, violence and criminality in Mexico have reached new heights. Battles amongst criminal organizations and between them have led to an unprecedented spike in homicides and other crimes. Large criminal groups have fragmented and their remnants have diversified their criminal portfolios to include widespread and systematic extortion of the civilian population. The state has not provided a satisfactory answer to this issue. In fact, government actors and security forces have frequently sought to take part in the pillaging. Frustrated and desperate, many community leaders, farmers and business elites have armed themselves and created so-called "self-defense" groups. Self-defense groups have a long history in Mexico, but they have traditionally been used to deal with petty crime in mostly indigenous communities. These efforts are recognized by the constitution as legitimate and legal. But the new challenges to security by criminal organizations have led to the emergence of this new generation of militias. The strongest of these vigilante organizations are in Michoacan, an embattled western state where a criminal group called the Knights Templar had been victimizing locals for years and had co-opted local political power. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 17, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/MichSelfDefense_Althaus_Dudley.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/MichSelfDefense_Althaus_Dudley.pdf Shelf Number: 136439 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMilitiasOrganized CrimeVigilantismViolence |
Author: Turner, Duilia Mora Title: Violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala: causes and policy implications Summary: Guatemala is one of the most violent countries in Latin America, and thus the world. The primary purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question: what factors explain the rise of violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala? The secondary focus of this thesis is to identify the transnational implications of Guatemala's violence for U.S. policy. Guatemala's critical security environment requires the identification of causal relationships and potential corrective actions. This thesis hypothesizes that the causes of violent crime in post-conflict Guatemala are the combination of weak institutional performance and social factors. Determining that Guatemala is not a consolidated democracy, this thesis concludes that a flawed judicial system, inadequate police reform, and weak civil control over the armed forces have a direct causal effect on violent crime in Guatemala. Furthermore, an analysis of social factors demonstrates that these are not causal in nature but rather influential elements in the occurrence of violence. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 131p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 9, 2015 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45266/15Mar_Turner_Duilia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Guatemala URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45266/15Mar_Turner_Duilia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 136711 Keywords: CorruptionDrug TraffickingGang-Related ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Paris, Jeffrey Jonathan Title: Crime, Contraband, and Property Rights: Explaining Variations in Violent Crime Rates Summary: Violent crime affects quality of life on an individual level and development on a national level (Kleiman, 2009), and could be the most important factor in determining whether many low and middle-income countries develop stable governments and implement effective economic policies. I propose a political and natural resource based explanation of the variation in crime rates in order to overcome the lack of connections between macro-level statistical data and causal mechanisms identified up to this point. My explanation involves the dynamics between state strength, property rights formation and enforcement, and the specific nature of criminal markets. When the state is weak crime rates usually increase due to the state's inability to enforce property rights, including the inability to control contraband markets (or adequately taxing legal markets), and the inability to effectively punish defectors. Property rights are established through a political bargaining process between actors that generally depends on the capacity for violence of interested parties (DeSoto, 2000; Umbeck, 1981). Well-defined and enforced property rights reduce transaction costs, and therefore reduce levels of violence (Anderson and Hill, 2003). The specific properties of markets, including the resources they are based on, can shape the market environment, including legality, and affect the resulting "institutions of extraction" (Snyder, 2006, 952). Lootable resources make property rights harder to enforce and interact with the state's ability to provide the rule of law, especially in the case of prohibitions. Illicit markets engender violence because normal business disputes are often settled with violence (Kleiman, 1993, 104-107, 115). My hypotheses examine the relationship between the production of lootable products, while controlling for other factors commonly attributed to crime. My analysis suggests that, all else being equal, the production of lootable resources increases crime rates, while the enforcement of property rights, whether by a state, non-state actor, or community, reduces violent crime rates. To test my hypotheses I use a mix of statistical analysis, case studies based on archival research, and structured interviews. Cross-national data was collected through archival research and existing databases, spanning over seventy countries and fifty years. Local level data comes from fieldwork in Colombia, and includes quantitative data for every municipality in Colombia over a span of nine years, and qualitative data for several regions critical to testing my hypotheses. Details: Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 2012. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/08t0s726 Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/08t0s726 Shelf Number: 136779 Keywords: ContrabandCrime RatesIllicit MarketsLootingProperty RightsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Consolidating "Consolidation": Columbia's "security and development" zones await a civilian handoff, while Washington backs away from the concept Summary: Colombia's government is negotiating peace with the country's largest and oldest guerrilla group, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). If the talks succeed- a strong possibility - Colombia faces a big question: what will be different in the vast territories where the guerrillas have been in control, or operated freely, for decades? In these areas, violence, drug trafficking, and warlordism have long been the norm, and the government's presence has been virtually nonexistent. If the government does not establish itself in these jungles, mountains, plains, coasts, and borderlands, the FARC's negotiated end will make little difference; illegality and violence will continue to fill the vacuum. Colombia must follow a successful negotiation with getting the government into the country's ungoverned zones. And not just military occupiers: a real, civilian state whose members provide basic services, operate without impunity, and thus enjoy the population's support. Will Colombia be able to fill the vacuum and end the cycle of violence? As WOLA's new report Consolidating "Consolidation" describes, the record of the National Territorial Consolidation Plan - a five-year-old program with that very goal - should worry us that it might not. Backed by at least half a billion dollars in U.S. assistance, this ambitious program seeks to bring the government into several areas of the country with histories of illegal armed groups, violence, drug trafficking, and statelessness. (It is often called the "La Macarena" program, after the southern Colombian zone where the most advanced pilot project has taken place.) Today, while "Consolidation" has brought security improvements and more soldiers and police to a few territories, the governance vacuum remains far from filled. In the Consolidation zones, armed groups remain very active, especially outside of town centers. Soldiers are by far the most commonly seen government representatives, and the civilian parts of the government - such as health services, education, agriculture, road-builders, land-titlers, judges, and prosecutors - are lagging very far behind. In Consolidating "Consolidation," WOLA sought to identify the reasons why the Consolidation program's military-to-civilian transfer has stalled. Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy Adam Isacson found that while the U.S. and Colombian governments underestimated the difficulty of achieving security and the cost of "state-building," much of the blame lies with civilian government agencies themselves, most of which have been very reluctant to set up a presence in Consolidation zones. But we found something even more serious: the entire Consolidation model is losing momentum quickly and may have begun to deteriorate. Based on dozens of interviews and a very close read of available evidence, Consolidating "Consolidation" portrays a program lacking interest and backing at high levels of government. What was once a showcase program stagnated during a year and a half-long "rethinking," followed by several months of infighting that culminated in the sudden exit of the program's director. Meanwhile, in places like Afghanistan, the United States is edging away from similar missions, which it calls "Stability Operations," that sought to provide basic services to citizens in ungoverned areas. Instead, U.S. forces are relying more on Special Forces operations and drone strikes. Programs continue in Consolidation zones in Colombia, thanks in great part to US$227 million in USAID contracts awarded since 2010. But Consolidation, which once promised to bring a functioning government to areas that never had one, may be on its way to becoming a politically driven handout program attached to an open-ended military occupation. If Consolidation fades away, the report warns, it is not clear what will replace it in Colombia's neglected territories. As Colombia faces the possibility of peace in zones of historic guerrilla control, it is crucial that a plan be in place to prevent a re-emergence of violence. If the peace talks succeed, for a brief period Colombia will have a window of opportunity to bring the government to areas that have long generated violence, bringing their citizens into national civic and economic life for the first time. The National Territorial Consolidation Plan could offer a way to do this, but only if it returns to its initial vision of a phased, coordinated entry of civilian government. If this scheme, or something like it, is to succeed, it will require political will from the highest levels to ensure that the civilians take over as quickly as security conditions allow. And it will require a renewed - but far more civilian-centered - commitment from the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Shelf Number: 136802 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceViolenceWarlords |
Author: White, Nicole Title: Violent Crime Against Youth, 1994-2010 Summary: Publication Violent Crime Against Youth, 1994-2010 Janet L. Lauritsen, Ph.D., Nicole White, Ph.D., University of Missouri December 20, 2012 NCJ 240106 This report presents patterns and trends in violent crime against youth ages 12 to 17 from 1994 to 2010. The report explores overall trends in violent crime against youth and examines patterns in serious violent crime and simple assault by the demographic characteristics of the victim, the location and time of the incident, weapon involvement and injury, the victim-offender relationship, and whether police were notified. Data are from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which collects information on nonfatal crimes, reported and not reported to the police, against persons age 12 or older from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. Highlights: In 2010, male (14.3 victimizations per 1,000) and female (13.7 per 1,000) youth were equally likely to experience serious violent crimerape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault. In comparison, male youth (79.4 per 1,000) were nearly twice as likely as female youth (43.6 per 1,000) to experience serious violent crime in 1994. Among racial and ethnic groups, black youth experienced the highest rates of serious violent crime in 2010. From 2002 to 2010, rates of serious violent crime declined among white (down 26%) and Hispanic (down 65%) youth, but remained the same among black youth. From 1994 to 2010, youth living with an unmarried head of household were generally more likely than youth living with a married head of household to be victims of violent crime. During this period, the decline in serious violent crime was greater for youth in married households (down 86%) than the decline among youth in unmarried households (down 65%). Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2015 at: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vcay9410.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vcay9410.pdf Shelf Number: 136807 Keywords: Crime StatisticsVictimization SurveyVictims of CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Werblow, Jacob Title: Continuing the Dream: The Effect of Kingian Nonviolence on Youth Affected by Incarceration Summary: The ThinKING program was presented as a three-week course in Kingian Nonviolence to self-selected high school students enrolled in the City of Hartford's Summer Youth Employment and Learning Program (SYELP). Thirty-two students, nearly half of which were children of incarcerated parents (CIP) and many of whom had an incarcerated family member, enrolled during the summer of 2012. The Connecticut Center for Nonviolence (CTCN) developed the ThinKING curriculum based off the Kingian nonviolence Leaders Manual (LaFayette & Jehnsen, 1995). Youth participating in the program received over 80 hours of instruction, involving Kingian Nonviolence Conflict Reconciliation curriculum (level-I), daily arts enrichment, and weekly structured group therapy conversations about incarceration and violence. Twenty-six students successfully completed the program and received certification in Thinking Level-I Kingian Nonviolence Conflict Reconciliation. Pre-and post-test results strongly indicate that the three-week program significantly increased intentions to use nonviolent strategies for the youth and also increased youth's self-efficacy, including confidence in their ability to stay out of fights. After completing the three-week training, youth were 92% less likely to define violence as only a physical act and 81% more likely to describe violence as something that is both physical and nonphysical (both). When asked, "The last time you were in a serious conflict situation, what was the conflict about? How did you respond?" There was no change in the number of students who responded with physical violence; however, there was a 325% increase in the number of participants reporting that they had deescalated the conflict, and a 75% reduction in the number of participants who said they had escalated the situation. These findings suggest that the ThinKING program is a promising strategy for violence prevention for youth with incarcerated parents or family members. Details: New Haven, CT: Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy and the Connecticut Center for Nonviolence, 2013. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2015 at: http://www.ctcip.org/publications/imrp/ Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ctcip.org/publications/imrp/ Shelf Number: 136828 Keywords: At-Risk YouthChildren of PrisonersDelinquency PreventionViolenceViolence CrimeViolence Prevention |
Author: McLean, Fiona Title: Factors associated with serious or persistent violent offending: Findings from a rapid evidence assessment Summary: Identification of serially violent individuals by the police could allow forces to be aware of and, where possible develop strategies to manage the risk to the public. This paper presents findings from a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) designed to explore the evidence base on factors associated with, or predictive of, known serious or persistent violent offending excluding domestic or sexual violence. The REA is based on 53 studies from a systematic search of 7 databases using a strictly applied set of search and assessment criteria and recommended sources by academic experts. The factors identified and discussed in this report have been found by some research studies to be predictive of repeat violent behaviour. The characteristics identified are associated with an increased relative risk of repeat violent offending - that is that offenders with these characteristics are more likely to commit a further offence compared with other offenders. An increased relative risk does not mean that all offenders with that characteristic will go on to commit further offences. Key findings from the REA The range of factors identified by the evidence reviewed as being associated with persistent violent offending is presented in the full report. Those factors identified through studies graded with the highest quality and most likely to be of use to police analysts are listed below. The evidence on factors associated with serial violent offending in women is limited; therefore the factors primarily apply to male offenders: - An offending career that begins before the age of 14 is highly predictive of later violent offending and a longer criminal career (reported in 9 studies of which 4 were graded 1). - Individuals with a long criminal career are more likely to commit violent crimes (reported in 7 studies of which 5 were graded 1). - Individuals with a history of violence are more likely to commit further violent crimes (reported in 10 studies of which 5 were graded 1). There were also several other factors where there is some evidence that suggests it may be associated with violent reoffending but that evidence is not as strong. These may be worth considering when refining the prioritisation of those identified as high risk. These factors include drug use in adolescence (4 studies), gang membership (5 studies) and antisocial behaviour at a young age or anti-social personality traits in adults (4 studies). In addition, there is some limited evidence that previous convictions for certain specific offences such as kidnapping and blackmail are associated with an increased relative risk of committing further serious offences such as homicide and rape (3 studies). A number of 'protective factors' were identified which could be used to filter any high risk population identified. These factors include: marriage, particularly a cohesive or 'good' marriage before the age of 25 (6 studies) and employment (5 studies). The REA also identified literature on many existing violent risk assessment tools that have been developed to try and predict the risk of reoffending, typically in prisons or forensic psychiatric units. Most of the tools identified use a combination of clinical and actuarial measures. Clinical data such as the offender's response to questionnaires and behavioural indicators would not be readily available to the police and so such tools have been excluded from the REA. Where the tools use actuarial data - such as age - that would be available, the factors included in the tools have been examined and found to be largely consistent with those identified separately in the REA. These tools have been discussed within the report. Details: National Policing Improvement Agency, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/REA_violent_reoffending.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/REA_violent_reoffending.pdf Shelf Number: 136853 Keywords: Evidence-Based PracticesSexual ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent CrimeViolent Offenders |
Author: Marc, Alexandre Title: The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa. Summary: This publication seeks to critically examine the challenges of fragility and security in West Africa, along with the factors of resilience. It seeks to investigate key drivers of conflict and violence, and the way in which they impact the countries of the subregion. Along with emerging threats and challenges, these include the challenge of youth inclusion; migration; regional imbalances; extractives; the fragility of political institutions and managing the competition for power; security; and land. The book explores how the subregion, under the auspices of the regional organization ECOWAS has become a pioneer on the continent in terms of addressing regional challenges. This book also seeks to identify key lessons in the dynamics of resilience against political violence and civil war, drawn from countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire that can be useful for countries around the world in the midst of similar situations. Finally, it draws on knowledge and findings from a series background papers written by leading experts, and provides insights from the perspectives of academics and development practitioners. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank; and Agence Francaise de Developpement, 2015. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22033 Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22033 Shelf Number: 136869 Keywords: MigrationPolitical ViolenceSecurityViolence |
Author: Copeland, Casie Title: Dancing in the Dark: Divergent approaches to improving security and justice in South Sudan Summary: The civil war that has consumed South Sudan since late 2013 raises uncomfortable questions about how a country that the international community helped to create and to which such substantial resources were dedicated could descend into civil war so quickly and to the surprise of so many. Violence has been a fact of life in South Sudan for decades; the long and dark history of violence and injustice illustrates the deep-rooted nature of these challenges and the hard work that will be necessary to overcome them. Improving the security and justice context is essential to a successful transition to peace and stability in South Sudan and to the realisation of the objectives of South Sudan's struggle for independence. This paper focuses on how, and to what effect, the international community supported security and justice initiatives in South Sudan from the start of the second Sudanese civil war (1983) up to the present. During that war (1983-2005), international support for security and justice largely took the form of community-based programming, primarily due to the absence of functioning government structures. 'People-to-people peacemaking' models that sought to improve security and justice at the local level in South Sudan generated tangible results in some areas, during some periods, but had little impact on the war's overarching structural dynamics. In the years following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), external support shifted towards nascent Southern Sudanese government structures, despite the limited reach of many civilian structures beyond the capital, as the programming context altered with the peace agreement. This type of support only increased after South Sudan's independence in 2011, despite clear signs that the statebuilding project itself was a major driver of conflict. Following the CPA, the international community approached security and justice development with far too much of a national-level, technical focus. It consistently failed to appropriately diagnose the challenges it sought to remedy. While South Sudanese counterparts sometimes had low capacities, many gained politically or financially from insecurity and a weak justice system. Despite these realities, donors generally programmed to the assumption that these challenges were a result of low capacity, leading to a reliance on technocratic solutions for many essentially political problems - with predictably poor outcomes. Seeing capacity as the primary challenge, the international community failed to recognise the South Sudanese leadership's deliberate efforts to govern and set policy, albeit not always in ways the international community liked. Despite clear evidence, emerging over years, that hundreds of millions of dollars of national-level, technocratic programmatic funding was not producing results, donors largely failed to re-assess their framework of support. The international community now has the opportunity to do better, both during the ongoing war and following a peace agreement. The question of how to do better can be broken down into two broad components. The first examines programming options that could mitigate some of the insecurity and injustice associated with the ongoing civil war. The second identifies critical security and justice building blocks that could be put in place now that would support a future peace. The table below summarises three starting points on each issue based on lessons learned from past international support for security and justice development in South Sudan. Details: The Hague: Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), 2015. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 25, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/CRU_report-Dancing_in_the_Dark-Casie_Copeland-June2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Sudan URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/CRU_report-Dancing_in_the_Dark-Casie_Copeland-June2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136873 Keywords: SecurityTransitional JusticeViolence |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta Summary: Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances. With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting ("return to the creeks"). While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region. The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, a special body mandated in 2008 to advance solutions to the region's multiple problems, proposed the amnesty program, whose implementation since 2009, coupled with concessions to former militant leaders, brought a semblance of peace and enabled oil production to regain pre-insurgency levels. However, the government has largely failed to carry out other recommendations that addressed the insurgency's root causes, including inadequate infrastructure, environmental pollution, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, widespread poverty and youth unemployment. Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective. The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. In sum, seven years after the technical committee's report, the conditions that sparked the insurgency could easily trigger a new phase of violent conflict. The outcome of the presidential election has also heightened tensions. While most people in the region acknowledge that Jonathan lost, some former militant leaders and groups accept Buhari only conditionally. For instance, the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front (NDPSF), the civil successor to the militant Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), claims Jonathan's ouster was the product of a conspiracy by northerners and the Yoruba from the South West against the Delta peoples and the South East. Apparently influenced by that view, some groups are resuming old demands, hardly heard during the Jonathan presidency, for regional autonomy or "self-determination". Local tensions generated by the polls also pose risks, particularly in Rivers state, where Governor Nyesom Wike (of ex-President Jonathan's People's Democratic Party, PDP) and ex-Governor Rotimi Amaechi (of President Buhari's All Progressives Congress, APC) are bitter foes. With many guns in unauthorised hands, politically motivated assassinations and kidnappings for ransom, already common, could increase. Policy and institutional changes are necessary but, if not prepared and implemented inclusively and transparently, could themselves trigger conflict. Buhari has declared that the amnesty program, which costs over $500 million per year, is due to end in December. He has terminated petroleum pipeline protection contracts that Jonathan awarded to companies owned by ex-militant leaders and the Yoruba ethnic militia, O'odua People's Congress (OPC), and may streamline the Delta's inefficient development-intervention agencies. He may also withdraw the PIB from parliament for revision. Some of this is desirable, even inevitable, but a number of former militant leaders and other entrenched interests threaten resistance and a possible return to violence. A perception that the government's actions are reversing the Delta's gains could aggravate local grievances and precipitate armed violence. At its peak in 2009, the insurgency in the Niger Delta was claiming an estimated 1,000 lives a year, had cut Nigeria's oil output by over 50 per cent and was costing the government close to four billion naira (nearly $19 million) per day in counter-insurgency operations. A resurgence of violence and increased oil-related crime in the Delta could seriously undermine national security and economic stability, which is already weighed down by the Boko Haram insurgency and dwindling oil revenues. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 231: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Shelf Number: 136897 Keywords: Boko HaramHuman Rights Oil IndustryPolitical Corruption PollutioniViolence Violent Crimes |
Author: Ley, Sandra Title: Violence and Citizen Participation in Mexico: From the Polls to the Streets Summary: How do citizens cope politically with violence? In the face of rising insecurity, Mexican citizens, particularly victims, have poured into the streets to demand an end to violence and ask for peace and justice. However, as organized crime groups attempt to influence local elections and target political candidates and public officials, citizens have not felt equally encouraged to cast ballots on election day. Elections in Mexico, as well as in other Latin American countries such as Brazil and Guatemala, have been marked by criminal violence. Voters, public officials, and candidates alike have been threatened or attacked by organized crime groups. It is, therefore, important to examine how violence shapes various forms of participation. This paper seeks to provide a broad view of political participation in the midst of Mexico's current security crisis, with the goal of understanding the effects of violence on civic activism. Overall, the paper shows that violence, particularly that directed against party candidates and public officials, threatens the electorate and depresses voter turnout. At the same time, violence has stimulated non-electoral forms of participation that attempt to bring the issue of crime and insecurity onto the political agenda and to hopefully achieve peace and justice. Such demands, however, have not been met yet and much remains to be done. In addition, citizens who take part of these efforts are further exposed to violence and retaliation by criminals and colluded officials. In preparation for the upcoming Mexican midterm elections, this paper also examines the prospects for Mexico's 2015 midterm elections in view of the recent trends in violence and civic protests. Out of the seventeen states that will hold local elections in 2015, six have a particularly alarming violent profile. Guerrero and Michoacan have homicide rates well above the national average. Politicians in both states have also been direct targets of criminal violence. Similarly, in Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, the State of Mexico, and Morelos, criminal groups have made an explicit attempt to influence politics and elections in recent years. Special attention must be paid to these regions. Political authorities must begin developing effective solutions that can effectively keep voters safe and encouraged. The conclusion outlines some policy recommendations on how to generate the necessary conditions for citizens to exercise their right to vote freely. Finally, as a result of the disappearance of the 43 students in Iguala, Guerrero, massive mobilizations have taken place across and outside of Mexico. In the face of the upcoming elections and given the prevailing weaknesses of the instruments so far created for the attention of victims - the General Law of Victims and Provictima - it will be important for these new citizen mobilization efforts to demand the commitment of political candidates and future elected authorities to increase financial and human resources for the effective operation of these institutions, and most important, the fair resolution of their cases. Civil society is a fundamental element for the achievement of political accountability, particularly in a violent context such as the one many Mexican citizens currently live under. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego, Justice in Mexico Project, 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper Series: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015_Ley_Violence-and-Citizen-Participation-in-Mexico.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015_Ley_Violence-and-Citizen-Participation-in-Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 136951 Keywords: HomicidesPolitical ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Heinle, Kimberly Title: Citizen Security in Michoacan Summary: Arguably the most intractable security issue facing the administration of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has been the dynamic and dangerous situation in the state of Michoacan, located on the Pacific in the southwestern portion of the country. During Pena Nieto's first two years in office, the state has seen a significant increase in violence and criminal activities; the emergence, evolution, and internal struggles of armed "self-defense" groups (grupos de autodefensa, commonly referred to as autodefensas); and concerted federal government efforts to gain control and restore order in certain parts of the state, particularly in the state's western Tierra Caliente region. While certain crime indicators - notably homicide - have fallen significantly throughout much of Mexico since 2011, Michoacan is one of the states where problems of crime and violence have been most intractable. It is also one of the places where citizen mobilization has manifested most visibly through self-defense forces and vigilantism, with entire communities rising up to take the law into their own hands because of the real or perceived inability of authorities to address the problem of organized crime. Over the course of 2014, the worsening situation in Michoacan led the Mexican government to intervene heavily and try to regain the trust of the citizenry. The federal government must be exceedingly careful and deliberate in its strategy for intervening in state and local security matters, its approach to dealing with armed citizens taking the law into their own hands, its efforts to empower state and local authorities to pick up the reigns, and its efforts to rebuild civic engagement and social trust. The authors offer three guiding recommendations: First, since achieving success will require that the Mexican government have clear targets focused on outcomes and performance for social development programs aimed at strengthening community resilience (e.g., the relationship between farm subsidies and poppy cultivation, the relationship between the number of student scholarships and gang membership, etc.), the authors recommend that the Pena Nieto administration should conduct and present regular evaluation and assessment of the outcomes of its programs using precise, program-specific performance metrics. Second, a core challenge in Michoacan, as elsewhere in Mexico, is the lack of institutional integrity, which has contributed to often visible corruption of local officials and widespread support for vigilantism. Unfortunately, recent developments have delayed implementation of Michoacan's judicial reform, which was due for implementation in February 2014, pushing back urgently needed reforms to introduce greater transparency and accountability into the state's criminal justice system. Given the state's complex security situation, it is critically important that operators of the criminal justice system - particularly prosecutors, public defenders, and court personnel - be adequately trained and prepared for the transition. Third, the Pena Nieto administration's intervention in Michoacan positions the federal government to help resolve these problems, but it also runs the risk of unwittingly stifling civic engagement. The federal government's liaison should work intently to create spaces and regular opportunities for dialogue and collaboration among citizens and civic organizations, and should particularly empower the state and local citizen security counsels to provide consistent communication and constructive feedback on the progress of security measures. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego, Justice in Mexico Project, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper Series: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015_Heilnle-Molzahn-Shirk_Citizen-Security-in-Michoacan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015_Heilnle-Molzahn-Shirk_Citizen-Security-in-Michoacn.pdf Shelf Number: 136952 Keywords: HomicidesPolitical Violence VigilantesViolence Violent Crime |
Author: Vriniotis, Mary Title: Victimization Surveys 101: Recommendations for Funding and Implementing a Victimization Survey Summary: While crime and violence are major global concerns, they are notoriously difficult to study, particularly in the developing world. Many crimes are never reported to police, and in many countries certain types of violence are not illegal, in which case there are typically no administrative records to collect. To better estimate this "dark figure" of unreported crime and violence, victimization surveys are a very useful tool. Although all surveys follow some core principles, surveys that measure rare events such as crime involve a host of considerations beyond those on topics most people have experienced or those measuring public sentiment. More effort and expense are therefore required to execute these surveys successfully. Setting reasonable goals, obtaining technical assistance from experts, and knowing how to select a survey firm will help ensure a quality survey is conducted. The author consulted several experts in victimization survey design to develop guidelines for anyone planning to fund or implement this endeavor. Key decisions that should be made at the outset are discussed, and characteristics of national surveys in five countries are compared. While national victimization surveys are typically only possible when financed by their governments, international organizations and NGOs may be able to finance surveys of urban areas when a national survey is not feasible. Detailed guidelines appear in the UN Manual on Victimization Surveys referenced at the end of this document with other key resources. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2015. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: IDB Technical Note; 866: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7225/IDB_TN_866_Victimization%20Surveys%20101_final.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7225/IDB_TN_866_Victimization%20Surveys%20101_final.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 137000 Keywords: Crime Statistics Victimization Surveys Victims of Crime Violence |
Author: World Health Organization Title: Preventing Youth Violence: An Overview of the Evidence Summary: Each year an estimated 200 000 young people aged 10-29 years are murdered, making homicide the fourth leading cause of death for this age group. Millions more sustain violence-related injuries that require emergency medical treatment, and countless others go on to develop mental health problems and adopt high-risk behaviours such as smoking and alcohol and drug abuse as a result the violence they experience. Produced with the financial support of the Jacobs Foundation, German International Cooperation, and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Preventing youth violence: an overview of the evidence aims to help policy-makers and planners - particularly in settings with limited human and financial resources - to address youth violence using an evidence-informed approach. Twenty-one strategies to prevent youth violence are reviewed, including programmes relating to parenting, early childhood development, and social skills development, as well as policies related to the harmful use of alcohol, problem oriented policing, and urban upgrading. Details: Geneva, SWIT: World Health Organization, 2015. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/181008/1/9789241509251_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/181008/1/9789241509251_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 Shelf Number: 137011 Keywords: Evidence-Based PracticesFamily InterventionsJuvenile DelinquencyViolenceViolence PreventionViolent CrimeYoung Adult Offenders |
Author: Nelson, Paul Title: Violent and property crime trends: local and international comparisons Summary: Aim: To compare crime trends in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the USA, England and Wales, and Scandinavia. Method: Trend data were extracted from publications and online data repositories. Population counts were used to calculate rates from crime counts as required. Violent and property crime series were presented for the period 1995 to 2014 (where requisite data were available). Results: Rates of recorded property crime have fallen almost continuously since 2003 in all jurisdictions considered in this paper; property crime has fallen since the mid-1990s or earlier in New Zealand, Canada, and the USA, and since 2001 in NSW. Violent crime rates have also trended downwards in most jurisdictions, but over a shorter period than for property crime, for example since 2000 in Canada, 2007 in NSW, and 2010 in New Zealand. Available data suggest that these falls followed longer-term increases in both property and violent crime. The interpretation of these data is complicated by variation around these general trends (e.g. homicide vs. sexual assault) and methodological variation within and between series. Conclusion: Long-term crime data have major limitations but nonetheless show rates of recorded violent and property crime are in widespread decline. These falls began later in NSW than in most jurisdictions. The violent crime decline is a more recent phenomenon and has been less pronounced and less consistent across jurisdictions than the fall in property crime; violent crime began to fall earlier in NSW than in New Zealand. Details: Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2015. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue paper no. 109: Accessed October 20, 2015 at: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/BB/bb109.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/BB/bb109.pdf Shelf Number: 137024 Keywords: Crime Statistics Crime Trends Property Crimes ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: New humanitarian frontiers: Addressing criminal violence in Mexico and Central America Summary: Parts of Central America and Mexico are suffering a humanitarian crisis which stems directly from expanding criminal violence. In vulnerable communities in the region there are mass casualties on a par with conflicts elsewhere in the world - rape, kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion, forced displacement (both internally and across borders), migration of unaccompanied minors from crime-ravaged communities and exploitation and murder. The report pinpoints three structural challenges to a stronger humanitarian agenda in response to criminal violence in the region: the features and characteristics of criminal violence, the presence of self-sustaining regional mixed migration and the flow of narcotics and the extremely fragile nature of Central American states. The case for a reinvigorated humanitarian approach to criminal violence is stronger than ever. There are notable opportunities. This report argues that the existing strengths of humanitarian organisations in addressing criminal violence could be responsibly enhanced. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2015 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201510-am-central-americas-violence-en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201510-am-central-americas-violence-en.pdf Shelf Number: 137158 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceExtortionHomicidesHuman TraffickingKidnappingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mali URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Shelf Number: 137180 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingIllicit NetworksKidnappingOrganized CrimeTerrorismViolence |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: A violent compound: competition, crime and modern conflict Summary: A notable characteristic of several of the most intractable conflicts in the world today is the presence of more than one sort of violence. In cases such as Syria, Mali and Libya the lines between armed conflict and other forms of organised violence have blurred. Conflicts that originated in political divisions have assumed criminal dimensions. At the same time highly criminalised parts of Central America and Mexico have witnessed the coercion of the state and society by groups whose methods resemble the military strategies of an insurgency. "Non-conventional armed violence" is the term used to describe forms of organised violence that do not fit the formal classification of armed conflict as a "contested incompatibility" between two or more parties. However, violence without a clear political or ideological goal is no soft alternative to old-fashioned war. It can be as lethal as conflict, and is a notorious presence in protracted wars where both multiple factions and the state are fighting. The search for new streams of illicit revenue, connections to transnational crime, volatile ties to local communities, the collapse of vertical chains of military authority, and a certain ambivalence to official state and security institutions when these can partly be captured for shared material gain are the hallmarks of this violence wherever it flourishes. Drawing on a series of 12 NOREF reports studying six countries affected by non-conventional armed violence, as well as core areas for policy responses, this synthesis report points to the importance of understanding and addressing this violence due to the critical role it plays in perpetuating insecurity, blocking peace and causing complex emergencies. Among its recommendations, the synthesis report calls for more flexible forms of mediation and reintegration for non-conventional armed groups, the redesign of humanitarian responses, and the implementation of novel controls over illicit flows connected to violent groups. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF); The Hague: the Clingendael Institute, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/A%20violent%20compound.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/A%20violent%20compound.pdf Shelf Number: 137236 Keywords: Conflict Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jakiela, Pamela Title: The Impact of Violence on Individual Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Summary: We estimate the impact of Kenya's post-election violence on individual risk preferences. Because the crisis interrupted a longitudinal survey of more than five thousand Kenyan youth, this timing creates plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to civil conflict by the time of the survey. We measure individual risk preferences using hypothetical lottery choice questions which we validate by showing that they predict migration and entrepreneurship in the cross-section. Our results indicate that the post-election violence increased individual risk aversion significantly. Findings remain robust when we use an IV estimation strategy that exploits random assignment of respondents to waves of surveying. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Working Paper 7440: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://pamjakiela.com/JakielaOzier-2015-09-16.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Kenya URL: http://pamjakiela.com/JakielaOzier-2015-09-16.pdf Shelf Number: 137238 Keywords: Conflict-Related ViolenceViolenceViolent crime |
Author: Fontes, Anthony Wayne, IV Title: Of Maras and Mortal Doubt: Violence, Order, and Uncertainty in Guatemala City Summary: Everyday brutality in Guatemala City shocks and numbs a society that has suffered generations of war and bloodshed. Much of this violence is blamed on maras, gangs bearing transnational signs and symbols, that operate in prisons an poor urban communities. I will explore how the maras' evolution in post-war Guatemala has made them what they are today: victim-perpetrators of massive and horrifying violence, useful targets of societal rage, pivotal figures in a politics of death reigning over post-war society. However, while maras and mareros play starring roles in this account of extreme peacetime violence, they are not the problem. They are a hyper-visible expression of a problem no one can name, a deafening scream, a smokescreen obscuring innumerable and diffuse sources of everyday brutality. The maras will be my entry-point into a world defined by mortal doubt, and my guides as I navigate the rumors, fantasies, fears, and trauma swirling about criminal violence in post-war Guatemala City. The specter of violence has become so utterly entwined with the making of lived and symbolic landscapes that it cannot be extricated from the very fibers of everyday life. I will illuminate the myriad of spaces this violence infiltrates and reorders to expose the existential uncertainty haunting efforts to confront, contain, and overcome violence. In the process, I provide an alternative, intimate understanding of the violence and suffering for which maras speak, or are made to speak, and the ways this violence and suffering affects individual consciousness and communal life, orders urban space, and circulates in public discourse. Thus, I have arranged my arguments and stories in such a way as to capture the destabilizing psychological, affective, and visceral impact the conditions of extreme violation at work in post-war Guatemala City have on knowledge- and meaning-making. The veins of uncertainty fracturing this account are meant to rupture the pretense of knowing, and so break through into the treacherous and largely unmapped territory that is life lived in the shadow of constant violence. Details: Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, 2015. 223p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December, 2015 at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/16c477pk Year: 2015 Country: Guatemala URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/16c477pk Shelf Number: 137426 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceGangsMarasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Front Line Title: Front Line Brazil : murders, death threats and other forms of intimidation of human rights defenders, 1997-2001. Summary: The defence of human rights in Brazil is a dangerous undertaking. In virtually every context in which human rights defenders operate-whether rural conflicts, the fight against urban police brutality and the violence of organised criminal elements, the defence of the environment and of indigenous peoples, or on parliamentary human rights commissions-they face harrassment, intimidation by unwarranted lawsuits, death threats, physical attacks and even murder. This report analyzes fifty-six separate incidents of violence and harrassment of human rights defenders-nineteen instances of homicide, causing twenty-three deaths, and thirty-seven other incidents including attempted murder, death threats and other forms of harassment-over the past five years. These were not the only such cases during this period, but rather represent a frightening national tendency. Still, the numbers are impressive: twenty-three deaths, thirty-two death threats, four instances of attempted murder, four unjustified prosecutions, four beatings, one kidnapping, one disappearance and one unjustified detention. This report sheds light on a series of aspects of the defence of human rights in Brazil that merit attention. First, human rights defenders are a varied lot in Brazil. While most pertain to some form of organised civil society group, such as nongovernmental organisations or unions, many are public authorities, prosecutors, and elected officials. What they have in common is their labour in defence of one or more of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Second, while public authorities, prosecutors and elected officials may enjoy an additional level of protection not afforded to non-state members of civil society groups, even these public authorities are not immune from attacks. This report considers the dangers of human rights defence in Brazil by analyzing instances of abuse and intimidation affecting human rights defenders since 1997, as well as the response of relevant authorities to these incidents. Global Justice chose to limit this report to cases from the past five years due to the existence of literally hundreds of instances over the past decade. Beginning with this universe of cases, we tried to focus on 1) the most serious abuses; 2) instances of abuse that were most representative of the kinds of difficulties faced by defenders; 3) cases that represented the diversity of contexts in which defenders face risks in Brazil; 4) cases that demonstrated the regional diversity of abuses; 5) cases that were well documented and 6) cases known to authorities. Unfortunately, we were forced to eliminate a number of instances that should be in this report due to the lack of corroborating information. As such, while the report includes nineteen cases involving twenty-three homicides, and dozens of incidents of death threats and other forms of intimidation, those figures are not exhaustive, but rather a sampling of the many instances of abuses of the rights of defenders in Brazil. Details: Blackrock : Front Line : Global Justice Center, 2002. 229p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/en/1564_FrontLineBrazil_0.pdf Year: 2002 Country: Brazil URL: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/en/1564_FrontLineBrazil_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137463 Keywords: Civil RightsDeadly ForceHomicidesHuman RightsHuman Rights AbusesPolice Use of ForceViolence |
Author: Cannon, Ashley Title: Responding to Social Media Norms: Development a Comprehensive Strategy to Promote Digital Citizenship Summary: Social media has become a part of everyday life. All types of real-world behavior are now showcased online-including criminal behavior, bullying, threats and the glorification of violence. Increasingly, youth associated with antisocial peer groups-such as neighborhood-based "crews" engaging in violent rivalries-use social media as a tool to create criminal opportunities and amplify conflicts. Unfortunately, in many cases, this type of social media usage can lead to real-life violence or other serious ramifications, such as arrest. The Crime Commission is engaged in several initiatives that seek to provide social media users with tools and information to help them stay safe both on- and off-line, including the development of an innovative new program that trains antiviolence professionals as "E-Responders" to intervene and deescalate violence provoked on social media. As part of this work, this series, "Social Media & Real-World Consequences", provides readers with an overview of the ways youth are communicating on social media, the associated risks of these communications turning into real-world violence, and the range of legal, educational and professional consequences youth may face in the real-world. High-risk youth engage in numerous types of dangerous communication on social media, including threatening and taunting others (often those from rival crews), promoting their self-image and crew, mobilizing others for disorderly or criminal activity, and recruiting other youth to join their crew. These types of communication are highly visible and exist beyond private messages and chats. Status updates, comments, photos, and videos often contain content prohibited by platform providers; however, they remain on the sites, fueling conflict. Moreover, youth often use social media to acquire weapons for attacks and protection. These dangerous communications have an extremely high risk of going from virtual to violent, and often result in very serious consequences in the real-world. When these consequences include violence, such as fights and shootings, they are often immediately documented and discussed online, increasing the likelihood of retaliation and further perpetuating the cycle of street violence. Taunts, threats, and intimidation on social media often lead to in-person fights, which can have deadly consequences. Youth often post continuous information about their ongoing conflicts, including violent intentions prior to carrying out shootings. This was the case in the Bryant Park skating rink shooting in November 2013, as well as in a shooting that occurred at a house party in Brownsville in January 2014, in which a 16-year-old was killed. The Bedford-Stuyvesant bus shooting in March 2014, which led to the death of a straphanger, was instigated by months of taunting on social media between two rival crews. Beyond violence and victimization, these harmful behaviors can lead to a wide range of legal, educational and professional consequences in the real-world. For example, police use social media to help identify, track, and build cases against individuals, culminating in indictments, such as the June 2014 takedown of 103 youth in West Harlem. Schools, financial aid providers, and employers also use social media profiles as a form of background check when considering an individual for admission, scholarship, or employment, and to inform disciplinary actions-something many people are not aware of when they post recklessly on social media. Details: New York: Citizens Crime Commission on New York City, 2015. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Social Media & Real World Consequences, Volume II: Accessed January 25, 2016 at: http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/CCC-Social-Media-Vol2-Responding-To-Norms.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/CCC-Social-Media-Vol2-Responding-To-Norms.pdf Shelf Number: 137653 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Delinquency Prevention Online Communications Online Victimization Social Media Violence Violence-Prevention Violent Crime Youth Violence |
Author: Ahmed, Noman Title: Public and private control and contestation of public space amid violent conflict in Karachi Summary: Few cities in South Asia have been affected by violence more than Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and economic centre. This working paper examines the impacts of the city's declining security situation on the control and contestation of public space. It focuses specifically on the efforts of public and private actors to protect themselves through the widespread use of physical barriers as a form of conflict infrastructure. To help provide a way forward, recommendations are presented for planning and managing barriers more effectively and equitably, and for supporting alternative means of security for the poorest and most insecure groups. Particular attention is paid to the city's ethnic and religious/sectarian politics and the limited capacity of the authorities, and their difficulties in maintaining neutrality in attempting to intervene. Details: London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: IIED Working Paper: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10752IIED.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10752IIED.pdf Shelf Number: 137701 Keywords: Public SafetyPublic SpaceUrban AreasUrban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK) Title: Violence: The short-term management of disturbed/violent behaviour in in-patient psychiatric settings and emergency departments Summary: The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) commissioned the National Collaborating Centre for Nursing and Supportive Care (NCC-NSC) to develop guidelines on the short-term management of disturbed/violent behaviour in adult psychiatric in-patient settings and emergency departments for mental health assessments. This follows referral of the topic by the Department of Health and Welsh Assembly Government. This document describes the methods for developing the guidelines and presents the resulting recommendations. It is the source document for the NICE short-form version, the Quick reference guide (the abridged version for health professionals) and the Information for the public (the version for patients and their carers), which will be published by NICE and be available on the NICE website (www.nice.org.uk). The guidelines were produced by a multidisciplinary Guideline Development Group (GDG) and the development process was undertaken by the NCC-NSC. The main areas examined by the guideline were: environment and alarm systems, prediction (antecedents, warning signs and risk assessment), training, working with service users, de-escalation techniques, observation, physical interventions, seclusion, rapid tranquillisation, post-incident review, emergency departments, and searching. Details: London: Royal College of Nursing, 2006. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: NICE Clinical Guidelines, No. 25: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK55521/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK55521.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK55521/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK55521.pdf Shelf Number: 137851 Keywords: Alarm SystemsHospital SecurityHospitalsMentally Ill ViolenceWorkplace Violence |
Author: National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK) Title: Violence and Aggression: Short-Term Management in Mental Health, Health and Community Settings Summary: This guideline has been developed to advise on the short-term management of violence and aggression in mental health, health and community settings in adults, children (aged 12 years or under) and young people (aged 13 to 17 years). This guideline updates Violence: the Short-term Management of Disturbed/Violent Behaviour in In-Patient Psychiatric Settings and Emergency Departments (NICE clinical guideline 25), which was developed by the National Collaborating Centre for Nursing and Supportive Care and published in 2005. Since the publication of the 2005 guideline, there have been some important advances in our knowledge of the management of violence and aggression, including service users' views on the use of physical intervention and seclusion, and the effectiveness, acceptability and safety of drugs and their dosages for rapid tranquillisation. The previous guideline was restricted to people aged 16 years and over in adult psychiatric settings and emergency departments; this update has been expanded to include some of the previously excluded populations and settings. All areas of NICE clinical guideline 25 have been updated, and this guideline will replace it in full. The guideline recommendations have been developed by a multidisciplinary team of healthcare professionals, people with mental health problems who have personally experienced management of violent or aggressive behaviour, their carers and guideline methodologists after careful consideration of the best available evidence. It is intended that the guideline will be useful to clinicians and service commissioners in providing and planning high-quality care for the management of violence and aggression, while also emphasising the importance of the experience of these service users' care and the experience of their carers. Details: London: British Psychological Society, 2015. 253p. Source: Internet Resource: NICD Guideline No. 10: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK305020/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK305020.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK305020/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK305020.pdf Shelf Number: 137852 Keywords: Alarm SystemsHospital SecurityHospitalsMental Health ServicesMentally Ill ViolenceWorkplace Violence |
Author: Kyle, Chris Title: Violence and Insecurity in Guerrero Summary: This paper is a continuation of the series Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence, a multiyear effort by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego to analyze the obstacles to and opportunities for improving citizen security in Mexico. Insecurity and violence associated with organized criminal activity are pervasive in Mexico's southern state of Guerrero. The state's homicide rate is the highest in the country and extortion and kidnapping are commonplace. For perpetrators, there is near complete impunity. The state is divided into territories within which either drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) or community policing networks exercise control over local policing functions. Local, state, or federal authorities occasionally join this competition, but for the most part policing powers are held by others. In rural areas competition between groups of traffickers over the state's prodigious narcotics output has created violent no-man's-lands in buffer zones between territories controlled by rival groups. In cities violence is mostly a byproduct of efforts to establish and preserve monopolies in extortion, kidnapping, and retail contraband markets. Despite claims to the contrary by state and federal authorities, there has been no discernible improvement in public security in recent months or years. Restraining the violence in Guerrero will require that state authorities make a systematic effort to address two existing realities that sustain the criminal activities producing violence. Thus, this paper examines the security situation in the state of Guerrero, including the operation of drug trafficking organizations, and proposes possible solutions to the security crisis. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence Briefing Paper Series: accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf Shelf Number: 137864 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtortionHomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Abt, Thomas Title: What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle Summary: This report was commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), a United States government effort primarily executed by both USAID and the U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). In preparation for this report, we performed a systematic meta-review of 43 reviews, including over 1,400 studies, to identify what works in reducing community violence. In addition, we supplemented our findings with fieldwork in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States, visiting over 20 sites and conducting over 50 semi-structured interviews. We found that a few interventions, such as focused deterrence and cognitive behavioral therapy, exhibited moderate to strong effects on crime and violence and were supported by substantial evidence. A few others, such as scared straight and gun buyback programs, clearly demonstrated no or negative effects. The vast majority of programmatic interventions, however, exhibited weak or modest effects. We identified six "elements of effectiveness" shared by the most impactful interventions, including maintaining a specific focus on those most at risk for violence; proactive efforts to prevent violence before it occurs whenever possible; increasing the perceived and actual legitimacy of strategies and institutions; careful attention to program implementation and fidelity; a well-defined and understood theory of change; and active engagement and partnership with critical stakeholders. Given the modest effects of most interventions, that violence generally clusters around a small number of places, people, and behaviors, and that violence is not displaced from those clusters when they are targeted, we reach the simple yet powerful conclusion that it is advisable to concentrate and coordinate anti-violence efforts where they matter most. We further conclude that increased attention to program implementation and evaluation is necessary. We close with four recommendations to governmental and non-governmental funders with regard to community violence in the Northern Triangle and globally. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 137993 Keywords: Cognitive Behavioral TherapyFocused DeterrenceGang ViolenceGun ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Crutch to Catalyst? The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala Summary: Guatemala - one of Latin America's most violent, unequal and impoverished countries - is enjoying a rare moment of opportunity. A new president, Jimmy Morales, bolstered by a landslide victory, has taken office promising to end corruption. The old political elite is in disarray. Emboldened citizens are pressing for reforms to make justice more effective and government more transparent. Behind these changes is a unique multilateral experiment, the UN-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), whose investigators work with national prosecutors to dismantle criminal networks within the state. CICIG is not a permanent fix, however. Guatemala will lose its opportunity unless national leaders assume the fight against impunity as their own, approve stalled justice and security sector reforms and muster the financial resources to strengthen domestic institutions. CICIG began operations in 2007 to investigate clandestine security groups that continued to operate within the state following the 1996 accords that ended 36 years of intermittent armed conflict. Such groups still undermine the state, though their main goal now is economic power, not elimination of political opponents. International support and financing guarantee the commission's independence, though it operates under Guatemalan laws. Unlike traditional capacity-building efforts, it not only trains, but also works side by side with national prosecutors and police, providing them with the necessary technical expertise and political autonomy to hold powerful suspects accountable before the law. CICIG has promoted and helped implement legislation to create a witness protection program, tighten gun controls, establish rules for court-ordered wiretaps and asset forfeiture and institute high-risk courts for the trial of particularly dangerous defendants. At the same time, it has carried out complex, high-profile probes that resulted in charges against a former president for embezzlement, an ex-minister and other top security officials for extrajudicial executions and dozens of additional officials and suspected drug traffickers for fraud, illicit association and homicide. The commission has faced significant setbacks and limitations, however. Some high-profile cases have ended in acquittal. Key reforms, such as a judicial career law, have stalled in Congress. While it has helped strengthen certain specialised prosecutorial units, the public prosecutor's office remains overstretched, even absent, in much of the country. Other institutions essential for combatting impunity - notably the civilian police and judiciary - are still weak, vulnerable to corruption and largely unaccountable. The most dramatic blows it has delivered against impunity came in 2015 with the arrest of almost 200 officials for corruption, including a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud customs. Working with national prosecutors, CICIG collected and analysed massive amounts of evidence. The evidentiary trail, according to prosecutors, led to President Otto Perez Molina, who resigned (though denying any criminal activity) and now awaits trial in a military prison. Much of CICIG's recent success is due to the determination and persistence of its current commissioner, Ivan Velasquez, a jurist known for uncovering the links between politicians and paramilitary structures in his native Colombia. CICIG cannot function, however, without the close collaboration and support of Guatemalan prosecutors. Very different attorneys general - Claudia Paz y Paz, a former human rights activist, and Thelma Aldana, a veteran jurist - have shown the independence and courage to pursue complex, controversial cases against powerful suspects. A crucial ingredient is popular support. Both the commission and public prosecutors enjoy wide approval among citizens exhausted by violent crime and corruption. The investigations spawned a broad civic movement for justice reform and government transparency. In a country long polarised by ideological, economic and ethnic differences, the anti-corruption crusade has at least temporarily united groups ranging from business associations to labour unions, urban professionals to indigenous leaders. Anger over government fraud holds this movement together, rather than any clear agenda for change. Elected leaders should channel discontent into positive action by initiating a national debate on the reforms needed to strengthen justice and encourage accountability. Morales, a former television comedian, campaigned as the anti-politician. He has yet to put forward a clear reform program, including new legislation to guarantee the independence of judges and prosecutors, toughen campaign-financing laws and create honest, professional civilian police. Moreover, a weak, underfunded state needs to enact fiscal and tax reforms so that its justice institutions have the resources needed to pay good salaries, provide decent working conditions and extend their coverage across the country. CICIG's mandate ends in September 2017, though the president wisely has proposed extending it. International assistance cannot last indefinitely, however. The commission is Guatemala's best opportunity for genuine justice reform, and it should not be wasted, but the government must start planning for its departure by fortifying its own capacity to fight crime and corruption. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 56: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/056-crutch-to-catalyst-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/056-crutch-to-catalyst-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala Shelf Number: 138031 Keywords: CorruptionPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Granath, Sven Title: Lethal violence in Sweden 1990-2014: A description of trends with a specific focus on firearm violence Summary: Lethal violence is a central type of offence in studies of crime trends in Sweden and in other countries. The rate of unreported cases, i.e. events which never come to the police's attention, is believed to be low for such offences and there is relatively consistent data over time. This report analyses all cases of completed murder, manslaughter, and assault with a lethal outcome of which the police were aware from 1990-2014. The purpose is to describe lethal violence in Sweden, both with a focus on the general trends and with a specific focus on lethal violence with firearms. The latter type of lethal violence has been given a great deal of attention during recent years, not the least in connection with reports of shootings in major cities while, at the same time, there has not yet been a detailed analysis of lethal firearm violence. In addition to information from the criminal justice system regarding cases of lethal violence (police investigations, sentences, etc.), the report also uses data from the National Board of Health and Welfare's cause of death register and patient register. Details: Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Bra), 2015. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: English summary of Bra report 2015:24: Accessed March 14, 2016 at: https://www.bra.se/download/18.47fa372d1520dfb2fc51b888/1452503671860/2015_Lethal_violence_in_Sweden_1990_2014.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Sweden URL: https://www.bra.se/download/18.47fa372d1520dfb2fc51b888/1452503671860/2015_Lethal_violence_in_Sweden_1990_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 138213 Keywords: Alcohol Related CrimeCrime StatisticsCrime TrendsFirearmsGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Title: Preventing Multiple Forms of Violence: A Strategic Vision for Connecting the Dots Summary: The different forms of violence-child abuse and neglect, youth violence, intimate partner violence, sexual violence, elder abuse, and suicidal behavior-are strongly connected to each other in many important ways. Understanding and addressing the interconnections among these forms of violence is the central tenet of this 5-year vision to prevent violence developed by the Division of Violence Prevention (DVP). This document describes this vision-articulating why a cross-cutting approach is important to achieving measureable reductions in violence; the areas where we will strategically focus our attention; and priorities for advancing practice, effectively reaching intended audiences, generating new knowledge, and monitoring and evaluating our progress. Details: Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Division of Violence Prevention, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2016 at: http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/strategic_vision.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/strategic_vision.pdf Shelf Number: 138313 Keywords: Crime PreventionViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Lovgren, Rose Title: Masculinity and mass violence in Africa: Ongoing debates, concepts and trends Summary: At a time when attention to the male gender aspects of violence and security is growing, this DIIS Working Paper by Rose Lovgren analyzes how masculinity has been related to war, conflict and genocide in African countries. The purpose of the paper is twofold: firstly, by reviewing an extensive literature Rose Lovgren seeks to draw up an overview of the ongoing political and academic discussions in which violence is linked to different understandings of masculinity. Secondly, she problematizes some of the underlying assumptions about gender in general and masculinity in particular and highlight their, at times troubling, political implications. Violence on the African continent has often been explained with reference to culturally disconnected anxious young men, who react to 'masculinity in crisis' with a desire for violence and destruction. Other parts of the literature have argued that especially African patriarchies foster violent political organization. What kind of gendered understandings are produced and foreclosed by these interpretations and how do they affect the political responses to violence? More recently, men's participation in war has been explained by a global economic situation that leaves them with no or few other choices of income, and their vulnerability in this situation has received more attention. How can we engage these gender aspects of perpetrating and being subjected to violence academically and politically? Details: Copenhagen: DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Working Paper,2015:08: Accessed March 18, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/380566/WP_2015_8.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/380566/WP_2015_8.pdf Shelf Number: 138337 Keywords: GenocideMalesMasculinityViolence |
Author: Jaitman, Laura Title: The Welfare Costs of Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean Summary: The aim of this volume is to carry out a systematic and rigorous analysis of the costs of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a focus on methodological and conceptual issues that are key to an exhaustive understanding of their economic and social dimensions. It presents an economic model of crime that conceptualizes the impact of violence on welfare. In addition, this volume is the first of its kind to provide estimates of the direct costs of crime and violence with the accounting method in a homogenous manner for a set of countries in the region (Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Furthermore, it presents applied analyses on the indirect and intangible economic and social costs of crime and violence, and discusses the need to improve statistical systems in the region for conducting evidence-based citizen security analyses and obtaining estimates of the welfare costs of crime. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2015. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2016 at: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7246 Year: 2015 Country: Latin America URL: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7246 Shelf Number: 138403 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCosts of WelfarePublic SecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Situation of Human Rights in Honduras Summary: The report "Situation of Human Rights in Honduras", addresses the situation of human rights violations which result of high rates of violence, citizen insecurity and impunity. The report also provides recommendations in order to assist the State in strengthening its efforts to protect and guarantee human rights. The report indicates that the homicide rate in Honduras remains one of the highest in the region and the world, although the State reported numbers that indicate a decline in 2014. These levels of violence are a result of several factors, including the increased presence of organized crime and drug traffickers, an inadequate judicial response that fuels impunity, corruption, and high levels of poverty and inequality. "Violence and insecurity are serious problems that Honduran society faces with a major impact on the enjoyment and effective exercise of human rights in the country," said Commissioner Francisco Eguiguren, IACHR Rapporteur for Honduras. The report indicates that the high levels of violence faced by Honduran society have a particular impact on human rights defenders, indigenous peoples, women, children, adolescents and youth, LGBT persons, migrants, campesinos from the Bajo Aguan, journalists and media workers, and justice operators. The report also analyzes those still considered to be among the most serious problems that the Honduran prison system is facing. Official figures released in 2013 indicate that 80% of murders committed in Honduras go unpunished due to a lack of capacity of investigative bodies. During the visit, civil society organizations claimed that the prevailing levels of impunity in Honduras are even higher. Details: Washington, DC: IACHR, 2015. 230p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Honduras-en-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Honduras-en-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138417 Keywords: Crime RatesCriminal Justice SystemsHomicideHuman Rights AbusesMurdersViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala: Siversity, Inequality and Exclusion Summary: The report "Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala: Diversity, Inequality and Exclusion," addresses structural challenges on public safety, access to justice and impunity, marginalization and discrimination that seriously affect the human rights of its inhabitants. The report particularly analyzes the system of administration of justice in Guatemala and the need for appropriate, efficient, independent and impartial, in order to respond to structural impunity for several past and present human rights violations. Also, the report especially addresses the situation of the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, whose rights to their ancestral lands and territories have been affected, and suffer exclusion, inequality and malnutrition as a result of racism and structural discrimination. The report analyzes the situation of human rights of human rights defenders, journalists, women, children and adolescents, persons with disabilities, lesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual and intersex persons and migrants. "We have noticed changes in Guatemala in favor of a society that is more respectful of human rights," said the IACHR Rapporteur for Guatemala, Commissioner Enrique Gil Botero. "These advances have been promoted and triggered by the efforts of public officials committed to justice, as well as human rights defenders and social leaders. Their work, which often endangers their life and integrity, has been and continues to be essential. " Among the improvements, the IACHR highlights the reduction in the homicide rate and the September 2015 Constitutional Court's decision, which for the first time ordered the implementation of a prior and informed consultation with the indigenous communities affected by an investment project. Furthermore, also regarding administration of justice, the Commission highlights the efforts of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Public Ministry in their work dismantling criminal networks and fighting against corruption. The IACHR also appreciates the efforts taken by the State in order to create a program to protect journalists, prevent and combat human trafficking, as well as to register differentiated statistics on violence against women to feed the design of public policies, among others. The IACHR also applauds the decision taken by the government to extend the mandate of the CICIG in 2015, whose work has been crucial. Details: Washington, DC: IACHR, 2015. 221p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Guatemala2016-en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Guatemala2016-en.pdf Shelf Number: 138418 Keywords: Crime RatesCriminal Justice SystemsDiscriminationHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesIndigenous PeoplesPublic SafetyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Leeds, Elizabeth Title: Civil Society and Citizen Security in Brazil: A Fragile but Evolving Relationship, Summary: The relationship between civil society groups and public safety officials in Brazil has evolved steadily over the past three decades. Human rights groups and academics are increasingly involved in discussions with members of the police and government officials about how to improve both the effectiveness and accountability of public safety policies. However, despite certain political openings for rights-respecting policies, deep-seated obstacles remain that limit the reforms' potential for success. As in many countries in the region, the over-arching trend in public safety policies in Brazil is a pendulum of innovations and retractions where proactive forward-thinking policies are frequently followed by a return to reactive-and frequently repressive-crime-fighting policies. Nevertheless, there are many examples where civil society has successfully advocated for more systemic, lasting reforms at the state and federal levels in Brazil, and these experiences are worth examining. WOLA's new report details how Brazilian civil society has become engaged in the issue of citizen security since the end of the military regime in 1988 to push for effective, rights-respecting public safety policies throughout the country, and examines the principle obstacles to progress and how they might be overcome. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2013. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/WOLACivilSocietyandCitizenSecurityinBrazil.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/WOLACivilSocietyandCitizenSecurityinBrazil.pdf Shelf Number: 138465 Keywords: Human RightsPublic SecurityViolence |
Author: Pinheiro, Alvaro de Souza Title: Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces Summary: If combined special operations are to be conducted effectively in the complex strategic environment of a post 9/11 world, then it is necessary to have a sound understanding of each nation's interests, defense policies, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and practices. This monograph contributes to that goal by exploring avenues for U.S.-Brazilian SOF interaction and cooperation. It provides on an overview of Brazil, its national security and defense policy, and current relations with the United States. This monograph describes the history and present organization of Brazilian SOF and considers its future. To this end, the purpose of this monograph is to offer the U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) community a portrait of Brazilian SOF in areas such as the Tri-Border Area of the Southern Cone, and other operational environments. Details: MacDill AFB F: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-7: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Shelf Number: 138476 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtremist GroupsNational SecurityViolence |
Author: Bennett, Will Title: Summary: Osh, Kyrgyzstan is still working through some of the structural drivers of the 2010 conflict that destroyed 2,677 buildings, displaced 80,000 people, and left approximately 500 people dead. The majority were ethnic Uzbeks, victims of the longstanding anger between themselves and the majority ethnic Kyrgyz. It is an event not yet consigned to history. Ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks live in largely segregated areas, mixing infrequently and increasing the potential for mistrust and violence. Justice is difficult to access and of questionable quality in Osh, and this is likely to have ongoing repercussions for peace and security. Much rests upon the ability of recently elected parliamentarians to understand and address people's underlying social, economic and political grievances. This report is based on research carried out in Osh, looking at the links between injustice and violence. One group of interviewees' conclusion that "there is no fairness in Osh" matches the overall findings of this research. Women and minorities suffer most. Inequality is becoming more noticeable. Land shortages cause domestic overcrowding, contributing to poverty and poor health. Kyrgyzstanis are 'tolerant' but not limitlessly so, and the fear is that with each experience of injustice the potential for even further social division, withdrawal, and violence increases. As such, reducing people's daily experiences of injustice is vital for peace in Osh. The report recommends that efforts should be made to address: - social injustices at the heart of youth disaffection and rejection of the state - bureaucratic opacity and people's unawareness of how to access services, including welfare and birth registration - the full social and political inclusion of marginalised groups, including women, ethnic minorities and people living with disabilities - corruption and transparency among security and justice providers to strengthen public access and confidence - land provision for overcrowded families who risk slipping further into poverty - peace and rights education at schools to ensure young people understand their entitlements and responsibilities Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1050-ldquoeverything-can-be-tolerated-ndash-except-injusticerdquo Year: 2016 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1050-ldquoeverything-can-be-tolerated-ndash-except-injusticerdquo Shelf Number: 138574 Keywords: Criminal Justice SystemsSocioeconomic ConditionsViolence |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Unchecked Power: Police and Military Raids in Low-Income and Immigrant Communities in Venezuela Summary: Since July 2015, Venezuelan security forces have conducted more than 135 operations, including sweeps through low-income communities, as part of the "Operation to Liberate and Protect the People" (OLP), with the alleged purpose of combatting criminal gangs that contribute to the extremely high levels of violence in Venezuela. Participating security forces have included the Bolivarian National Guard, the Bolivarian National Police, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, the Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigative Police, and state police forces. Unchecked Power: Police and Military Raids in Low-Income and Immigrant Communities in Venezuela describes considerable evidence that security forces conducting OLP raids have committed serious abuses. In interviews with the Venezuelan Human Rights Education-Action Program (PROVEA) and Human Rights Watch, victims, witnesses, and other interlocutors described violations including extrajudicial killings and other violent abuses, arbitrary detentions, forced evictions, the destruction of hundreds of homes, and the arbitrary deportation of Colombian nationals including refugees and asylum seekers, often accused without evidence of having links to "paramilitaries." A common denominator shared by these cases, and by government abuses we have documented in other contexts during the past decade, is the extent to which the victims-or their families-have been unable to challenge alleged abuses of state power, feeling they have nowhere to turn for protection of their fundamental rights. The government of Venezuela should ensure that all OLP operations are carried out in accordance with its international human rights obligations, including the requirement to refrain from using unlawful force during public security operations. Ultimately, a strong, independent judiciary is essential to ensure accountability and redress for the kinds of abuses alleged in this report-and to prevent such abuses in the future. PROVEA and Human Rights Watch call on President Nicolas Maduro, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court to take urgent steps to restore the judiciary's role as an independent guarantor of fundamental rights, and on the international community to press Venezuela's government to stop undermining the impartiality and independence of the judicial branch. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/venezuela0416web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Venezuela URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/venezuela0416web.pdf Shelf Number: 138591 Keywords: GangsHuman Rights AbusesParamilitary GroupsPolice BrutalityPolice Use of ForceViolence |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Violence, Children and Organized Crime Summary: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) presents a regional report on violence and other violations of rights to which children and adolescents fall victim in contexts in which organized crime and violent or criminal groups operate. The report identifies the leading factors that make the Americas the region with the highest rates of violence in the world, and focuses primarily on analyzing how children and adolescents are affected by different forms of violence in their communities, especially acts committed by members of armed groups but also by agents of the State. Conditions of insecurity and violence in the region are significant factors of concern which involve serious violations of people's human rights. The public often associates these situations with adolescents, who are blamed to a large extent for the climate of insecurity experienced by many communities. The focus tends to be on male adolescents from poor and marginal neighborhoods who belong to groups that have traditionally been excluded and discriminated against and who are stigmatized on a daily basis and singled out as "potential dangers to society" who must be brought under control. However, as the IACHR explains in the report, the reality is different from these perceptions and much more complex. Children and adolescents, in fact, represent one of the groups most affected by different forms of violence and rights violations, as well as by the actions of criminal groups and by repressive citizen security policies. The inhabitants of some communities suffer the scourge of violence more intensely. The areas that are particularly hard-hit are the least developed neighborhoods where there is limited access to basic services, a lack of opportunities, and little State presence. These are areas with populations living in vulnerable conditions, in which their rights are not guaranteed due to structural situations of marginalization and social exclusion. These factors facilitate the emergence and expansion of criminal groups and organized crime. In addition, the enormous financial revenues associated with the illegal drug market have contributed significantly to the expansion of criminal groups that compete for this market and its benefits, unleashing spiraling violence due to clashes between criminal groups and State security forces. Easy access to firearms and the large number of guns in the hands of private individuals exacerbate the existing climate of insecurity and violence. In the report, the IACHR observes with concern that the conditions for children and adolescents living in these contexts can be daunting. Many of them experience situations of violence, abuse, and neglect in their homes, communities, and schools, at the hands of adults, their peers, and even the police. The quality of education is poor, and there are many barriers to accessing higher education and access to job opportunities and decent employment. Children and adolescents are often subjected to pressure, threats, or trickery to get them to join these organizations; other adolescents seek out these groups in search of opportunities, recognition, protection, and a sense of belonging, aspects that they would otherwise not be able to find. Once they are within these structures, they are used and exploited by the adults for a broad range of activities, including surveillance, the transport and sale of drugs, robberies, extortions, kidnappings, and other violent activities related to maintaining the interests of criminal groups. Girls and adolescents in particular are the primary victims of sexual violence and human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Adults use them as disposable, interchangeable parts of criminal structures - the last link in the chain - with the average age of recruitment 13 years old. State responses to these challenges are primarily based on policies that are strongly focused on aspects of coercive control by security forces and punitive repression through the criminal justice system. The common denominator of security strategies in the region has been the allocation of greater responsibilities to State security forces, along with a progressive militarization of the police and their operations and the participation of the army in citizen security tasks. However, these strategies have not significantly eased the climate of insecurity; on the contrary, many countries have experienced a resurgence of violence, in addition to reported abuses, arbitrary practices, and human rights violations carried out by State security forces. In this report, the IACHR expresses its concern regarding the high rates of arbitrary detentions; excessive use of force and lethal force; cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, even extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances, as well as sluggish investigations and high levels of impunity for these types of acts. Due to the social stigma they face, some adolescents from certain groups of society are often victims of these types of abuses and arbitrary practices. Among the situations it found, the IACHR has observed that the application of the crime of "unlawful assembly" or "conspiracy" or "belonging to a criminal group" has increased the number of arbitrary detentions of adolescents based on their appearance and on the belief that they may belong to a gang or a criminal group, without any evidence that a crime has been committed. Current drug policies have also contributed to an increase in the number of children and adolescents deprived of liberty for drug-related offenses such as micro-trafficking and possession of small quantities. In several countries of the region, adolescents who are poor, of African descent, or members of minorities are over-represented among those detained by the police. The prosecution of crimes of "unlawful assembly" and drug-related crimes has also led to an increase in pretrial detentions and for longer periods, due to an overextended criminal justice system. Meanwhile, States in the region tend to prioritize punitive and retributive responses to adolescent offenders, with incarceration the most widespread measure used. State responses have focused on proposals to reduce the age of criminal responsibility for adolescents, in some cases starting at age 12, and to lengthen prison sentences. In practice, this might mean that they would be locked up for their entire adolescence - a crucial phase for their personal development, growth, and education. Added to this is the fact that detention centers, where conditions are generally alarming in terms of safety, health, and overcrowding, have become factors aggravating adolescents' vulnerability and exposure to violence and crime, which only worsens and reinforces the problem States are seeking to solve. The IACHR reiterates in the report that measures designed to hold adolescents accountable for their actions should be based primarily on a model of restorative justice and socio-educational measures, one whose purpose is to rehabilitate adolescents and reintegrate them into society. In the Inter-American Commission's judgment, current policies seek to show short-term results but do not adequately address structural causes or focus sufficiently on prevention or on social investment programs and promotion of rights. The current policies do not take into account the specific consequences of these environments for adolescents who are in an especially vulnerable and unprotected situation which puts them at risk of being captured and used by organized crime, becoming involved in violent and criminal activities, or becoming victims of such activities. The report concludes with a series of recommendations to the States to address violence and insecurity through comprehensive, holistic public policies that take into account the centrality of human rights and effectively ensure the exercise of rights by children and adolescents. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2016. 227p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ViolenceChildren2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ViolenceChildren2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138593 Keywords: Children and ViolenceCriminal NetworksOrganized CrimeViolenceYouth GangsYouth Violence |
Author: National Network for Safe Communities Title: Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide Summary: The National Network for Safe Communities supports communities around the country in implementing two field-tested crime reduction strategies: the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) first launched in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) first launched in High Point, North Carolina. National Network membership includes law enforcement (e.g., police chiefs; sheriffs; state and federal prosecutors; and corrections, parole, and probation officials), community leaders, mayors, city managers, council members, service providers, street outreach workers, scholars, and others applying these strategies to reduce violent crime. The National Network's GVI has demonstrated that violent crime can be dramatically reduced when law enforcement, community members, and social service providers join together to engage directly with street groups to communicate the following: - A law enforcement message that any future violence will be met with clear, predictable, and certain consequences - A moral message from community representatives that violence will not be tolerated - An offer of help from social service providers for those who want it GVI is now a well-documented approach to reducing serious violence. The strategy is unusual, but it is based on common sense and practical experience. Embedded in empirical analysis of what drives serious violence, and in the schools of thought and practice known as "focused deterrence" and "procedural justice," the strategy follows a basic logic. Evidence and experience show that a small number of people in street groups, cliques, drug crews, and the like cause the majority of violence in troubled neighborhoods. The internal dynamics of the groups and the honor code of the street drive violence between those groups and individuals. The group members typically constitute less than 0.5 percent of a city's population but are consistently linked to 60 to 70 percent of the shootings and homicides. To implement GVI, a city assembles a partnership of law enforcement, community representatives (e.g., parents of murdered children, ministers, street outreach workers, ex-offenders, and other people with moral standing and credibility), and social service providers, all of whom are willing to provide a specific message to group members. A key communication tool of the strategy is the "call-in," a face-to-face meeting between group members and representatives of the GVI partnership. Together, the GVI partners deliver the strategy's antiviolence messages to representatives of street groups and then follow up on those messages. The call-in represents a central shift on the part of law enforcement. At the call-in, law enforcement gives the groups clear notice that it will meet future violence with swift and certain consequences and that it will direct consequences at the group as a whole rather than at individuals. As with ordinary law enforcement, when group members commit violent crimes, those individuals receive enforcement attention. Under GVI, however, law enforcement also holds the entire group accountable for violence. A group member's violent act triggers enforcement against other group members for outstanding warrants, probation and parole violations, open cases, and a variety of other criminal activity. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2013. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2016 at: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf Shelf Number: 135351 Keywords: Community ParticipationFocused DeterrenceGroup Violence InterventionProcedural JusticeViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Mexico Peace Index 2016. Mapping the Evolution of Peace and Its Drivers Summary: In 2015, Mexico's peace improved by 0.3 percent, which is the smallest improvement in peace in the last five years. The improvement is largely attributed to a 10 percent decline in the violent crime rate and an eight percent decline in the rate of organized crime related offenses. However, this was offset by deteriorations in detention without sentencing, weapons crime and the homicide rate. The latter increased by six percent. Furthermore, the gap between the most and least peaceful states widened slightly in 2015, reversing the trend observed in six of the seven prior years. An area of concern is the trend towards increased impunity, which deteriorated dramatically from 2007 onwards. In 2007, there were four convictions for every five cases of homicide, but by 2013 there was only one conviction for every five cases. This, combined with the increases in detention without sentencing, points to an overstretched judicial system, as is further supported by statistics on the over-crowding of prisons. It also highlights the challenges facing the justice system, whose 2015 federal expenditure was 78 billion pesos, below the 2012 level of expenditure. The longer term trends indicate a marked improvement in peacefulness since 2011, the year in which violence peaked in Mexico. The country has improved its peacefulness by 13 percent since that time. Violent crime, homicides and organized crime have all fallen by nearly 30 percent. These improvements mean that twenty-five out of the 32 states in Mexico have become more peaceful since 2011, including four of the five states that ranked at the bottom in that year. These improvements in peace have resulted in roughly 85 percent of The Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico from 2003 to 2015, with new results for 2015. This report aims to deepen the understanding of the trends, patterns and drivers of peace in Mexico, while highlighting the important economic benefits that will flow from a more peaceful society. Details: Sydney, AUS: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2016 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mexico-Peace-Index-2016_English.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mexico-Peace-Index-2016_English.pdf Shelf Number: 138663 Keywords: Crime RatesCriminal Justice SystemsHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Donnelly, Neil Title: Did the 'lockout law' reforms increase assaults at The Star casino, Pyrmont? Summary: Aim: To examine trends in non-domestic assault in Pyrmont and The Star casino since the February 2014 reforms contained in the Liquor Amendment Act 2014 (popularly known as the 'lockout laws') were implemented in central Sydney. Method: Time series analysis, police narrative analysis. Results: The number of non-domestic assaults recorded at The Star casino increased following the introduction of the 'lockout and last drinks laws'. In absolute terms, the increase was fairly small; slightly less than two additional assaults per month. In 2015, 49 per cent of assaults in the suburb of Pyrmont occurred in The Star casino premises. In the majority (71%) of incidents the victim of the assault was a patron at the casino but more than one in 10 (15%) were taxi drivers. In 30 per cent of incidents the assault occurred while the offender was being evicted from the casino or after he or she had been evicted. Conclusion: The February 2014 reforms may have increased the number of assaults in Pyrmont, particularly at The Star casino. The increase, however, is much smaller than the decreases in assault recorded in the Kings Cross and Sydney CBD entertainment precincts following the reforms. Details: Sydney: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics, 2016. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Bureau Brief no.114: Accessed April 21, 2016 at: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/BB/Report-Did-the-lockout-law-reforms-increase-assaults-at-The-Star-casino-Pyrmont-bb114.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/BB/Report-Did-the-lockout-law-reforms-increase-assaults-at-The-Star-casino-Pyrmont-bb114.pdf Shelf Number: 139091 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisorderAssaultsViolence |
Author: New Jersey. Commission on Violence Title: Report of the Study Commission on Violence Summary: The Study Commission on Violence discharged its duty to examine trends and sources of violence, the impact of violence on the community, identified funding opportunities that address violence, and the mental health system through the receipt of subject matter expert briefings, public hearings, and its own independent research. This report summarizes the Study Commission's findings and its recommendations to the Legislature and the Governor. Violence in our communities is a concern we heard expressed time and again in our public hearings and in examining data related to the frequency of violence in New Jersey. There is no one source of violence or a single impact on the communities where it occurs. Rather, violence is brought on by a host of socio-economic factors and individual decisions made by people who choose to perpetrate violent acts against others or themselves. While "violence" is an all-encompassing term, it can also be imprecise. Deaths due to violence are at a generational low; yet, violence remains stubbornly high in certain areas - in New Jersey, roughly 80 percent of all violent crime occurs in just 21 cities. It is not coincidental that these cities also have lower rates of high school graduation, higher rates of unemployment, lower rates of household income, and higher rates of school truancy. Violence does not occur in a vacuum; rather, it thrives in poor and disadvantaged communities where educational and economic opportunities are limited and residents have become accustomed to a certain level of lawlessness. In recent years, the challenges facing these communities have been compounded by economic turmoil that has resulted in reductions in law enforcement. Violence, however, is not confined to urban settings and occurs in suburban and rural communities as well. The issue of violence should be a concern to all New Jersey residents, to one degree or another. And while violent "street" crime is found disproportionately in a small number of places in New Jersey, certain crimes like domestic violence are more widespread. Still others, like elder abuse, are emerging as concerns in the community. At the same time, a consensus has begun to form around the manner in which those who are drug addicted, particularly those suffering from heroin addiction, are treated when they are arrested. Whereas public policy once focused exclusively on incarcerating individuals, even for low-level offenses, for significant periods of time, current policy has shifted toward diverting non-violent offenders away from incarceration and into treatment. Moreover, this trend has extended into how law enforcement treats juvenile delinquents. Through diversion programs that offer community-based oversight, some county youth detention facilities have closed because too few juveniles are being remanded to custody and the number of juveniles in Juvenile Justice Commission facilities has dropped by roughly half. Of course, violence is not limited to acts by one person against another. Self-directed violence in the form of suicide and attempted suicide is also prevalent in our country. Indeed, the number of suicides that occur nationally each year is more than twice the number of homicides that occur in our nation. The Study Commission took seriously its charge to examine the trends, sources, and impact of violence in the community, the availability of grant funding to combat violence, the implementation of expanded involuntary outpatient commitments, and whether and how defendants with identified mental health disabilities but who are charged with crimes, can be offered an alternative to incarceration in the form of a structured, case managed program of treatment and counseling. The Commission learned that there are a wide range of programs and services available to those with a diagnosed mental health disability or illness. Indeed, coverage for mental health treatment is now available to more individuals through the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act. That said, issues still remain regarding access to that treatment due to limited resources and reimbursement for practitioners who treat these patients. With respect to at least one specific charge of the Commission - examining the involuntary outpatient commitment program and whether it should be extended statewide - the Commission determined that this has been mooted by legislation passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor. Details: s.l.: The Commission, 2015. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2016 at: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2455899/study-commission-on-violence-report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2455899/study-commission-on-violence-report.pdf Shelf Number: 138801 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesMental Health ServicesSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeSuicidesUrban AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cockayne, James Title: Strengthening mediation to deal with criminal agendas Summary: A growing proportion of armed conflicts nowadays do not only involve political and ideological agendas but criminal ones. While armed conflict mediators have extensive experience of dealing with armed groups in various contexts of political and ideological conflicts, there is often a lack of attention towards addressing criminal agendas, making it a blind spot of mediation. In Strengthening mediation to deal with criminal agendas, James Cockayne takes an in-depth look at ways in which mediators have addressed, or not, criminal agendas, in peace processes, and the potentially spoiling effect that ignoring them may have had on those processes. Through the review of several peace processes in which criminal agendas have been directly tackled including gang truces in El Salvador and community violence reduction cases in Haiti and Brazil, Cockayne highlights how the practice of mediation can adjust to take criminal agendas into account. While mediation is by no means the only way to address and deal with such agendas, it can be a useful and complementary tool to do so. Cockayne also puts forward examples of peace processes in which criminal agendas were not taken into account and how this has contributed to spoiling those processes, for example through a return to conflict, or the empowerment of criminal agendas through disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes. Cockayne also offers recommendations on ways to ensure that the fundamentals of mediation, such as preparedness, inclusive ownership, legal frameworks and impartiality, are respected despite the presence of criminal agendas. Details: Oslo: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Oslo Forum Papers: Accessed April 25, 2016 at: http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Strengthening-mediation-to-deal-with-criminal-agendas.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Strengthening-mediation-to-deal-with-criminal-agendas.pdf Shelf Number: 138803 Keywords: Armed ConflictGangsMediationViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations Title: Belize Engagement: Evaluation Report Summary: CSO's evaluation of its engagement in Belize was the first formal evaluation conducted by CSO, and was conducted as an independent internal evaluation by CSO's Office of Learning and Training. The Belize engagement was a small innovative program to reduce gang activity and violence in Southside Belize City by developing mediation and community dialogue capacity. The evaluation found that mediation was very effective and showed promise for expansion, while community dialogue was resonating but making slower progress and institutional issues hampered sustainability. Recommendations of the evaluation inspired a second wave of programming to plug gaps in community dialogue training, train mediators more grounded in gang neighborhoods, and improve program management capacity of the local partner, as well as a grant from the U.S. Embassy to the local partner allowing it to hire dedicated staff. Community dialogues consequently grew eight-fold and mediators and trainers doubled. The Prime Minister praised the program for establishing "a sustainable, Belizean community-based approach to reduce violence." While other programs and factors likely contributed, the homicide rate in Belize City decreased by roughly 50% in 2013, though increasing in several other locations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2016 at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223248.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Belize URL: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223248.pdf Shelf Number: 138906 Keywords: Community MediationGang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsHomicideViolence |
Author: Everytown for Gun Safety Title: Beyond Gridlock: How White House Action on Gun Violence Can Save Lives Summary: In the wake of the horrific shooting at Umpqua Community College in Roseburg, Oregon - the 18th mass shooting of 20151 - President Obama spoke to the nation, lamenting that gun violence has grown so routine in America and deploring Congressional inaction. But the President also issued a powerful call to action, and recommitted his administration to exploring its authority to take executive action and enforce the laws already in place. He asked whether there were steps his administration could take to prevent these "tragic deaths from taking place." This report answers the President's call, and offers five life-saving measures that the Administration could advance - today - to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous people. These five critical - and simple - steps would: keep dangerous people with guns out of our schools; crack down on gun trafficking and curb the sale of guns without background checks; ensure that law enforcement identifies and prosecutes the most dangerous criminals who try to illegally obtain guns; help states to enforce their own background check laws; and ensure that all convicted domestic abusers are prohibited from possessing guns. A comprehensive list of these and other recommended executive actions is set forth in the appendix to this report. Details: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2015. 18p. Source: Internet Resource Accessed May 13, 2016 at: https://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/10/beyond-gridlock-white-house-action-gun-violence-can-save-lives.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/10/beyond-gridlock-white-house-action-gun-violence-can-save-lives.pdf Shelf Number: 139016 Keywords: Gun ControlGun Control PolicyGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicideViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: O'Neil, Shannon K. Title: Mexico on the Brink Summary: The headlines don't mislead. Mexican society is reeling from the collateral damage of the permanent war on drugs in the Americas, as crime cartels duke it out for control of illicit exports to the US. Indeed, high levels of violence largely explain why Mexico ranked 104th out of 142 countries in the Safety and Security category in the 2013 Legatum Prosperity Index - and why, in spite of a very high ranking (27th) in the Economy category, the country is only 59th in the overall prosperity ranking. But that's just one element of the story of contemporary Mexico. Here, Shannon O'Neil, a senior fellow for Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (and author of the new book, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead), focuses on Mexico's progress in escaping what development economists call the "middle-income trap". In the early 1980s, Mexico began to shake off the political and economic torpor created by one-party, Tammany Hallstyle rule and self-imposed isolation from the competitive pressures of a rapidly integrating global economy. Reform was initially forced on the country as a condition for relief from the consequences of default on its foreign loans. But it triggered a series of secondary tremors that shook the domestic economic and political landscape, leading first to the free trade agreement with the US and Canada, and then to the opening of the political system to interests that had no stake in preserving a bloated, bureaucratic government and corrupt, state-owned enterprises. O'Neil picks up the story from there. Arguably the least understood aspect of Mexico's coming of age, she suggests, is the role played by global supply chains in manufacturing. Mexico's combination of competitively priced labour, proximity to the US and Canada, and market-friendly regulation has led to an unprecedented degree of integration between the three economies, powering the growth of Mexico's middle-class. O'Neil makes it clear that the path forward is not strewn with roses, however. Organised crime still makes life terrifying for millions on a daily basis. Public services - in particular, public education - remain inadequate to meet the challenge of creating a workforce the equal of, say, the US or Northern Europe. The national oil monopoly is still corrupt, poorly managed and woefully lacking in modern technology. But by O'Neil's reading, Mexico really does have a shot at joining the elite club of rich, democratic nations. Details: London: Legatum Institute, 2013. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Prosperity in Depth: Mexico: Accessed May 13, 2016 at: https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/country-growth-reports/pid-mexico-2013---mexico-on-the-brink.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/country-growth-reports/pid-mexico-2013---mexico-on-the-brink.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Shelf Number: 139017 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeHomicidesOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Nussio, Enzo Title: Peace and Violence in Colombia Summary: The Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos is currently in talks with the oldest of Latin America's guerilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); most recently, it has also engaged with the smaller Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). In particular, it appears possible that a peace agreement will soon be signed with FARC. President Santos is promoting the negotiations in Havana internationally as good news in a crisis-ridden world. However, the general population of Colombia remains skeptical. In a survey of March 2016, about two thirds of respondents were pessimistic about the negotiations; nearly half would prefer an end of negotiations and a military offensive against FARC. Many Colombians have no faith in a treaty with the rebels, whom they regard as untrustworthy, and believe that the violence plaguing Colombia cannot be eliminated at the negotiation table. "Peace" is generally regarded as an unrealistic, utopian goal, even if the FARC and ELN fighters should lay down their arms. Despite the hopeful prospects, it is likely that the pessimism of the general population will prove correct: An end of political violence would by no means lead to the end of societal and criminal violence in the country. Details: Zurich, SWIT: Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-191-EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-191-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 139050 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug-Related ViolenceFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)Guerilla GroupsPolitical ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Conaglen, Philip Title: Violence Prevention: A Public Health Priority Summary: Violence is a public health priority in Scotland There are an estimated 236,000 violent crimes committed against adults in Scotland each year. In a large NHS Board, annual emergency department attendance rates relating to interpersonal violence were 3.6 per 1,000 population. In 2012-13 there were 3,386 emergency hospital admissions in Scotland as a result of assault. Beyond physical harm, violence also causes psychological, economic and social harms and its impact extends well beyond the victim and perpetrator into their relationships, communities and society. Scottish Government modelling indicates that the economic and social costs of violent crimes far outweigh the costs of all other types of crime combined, with estimated costs running into many thousands of millions of pounds. Violence and its risk factors are often both the cause and effect of health, gender, economic and social inequalities. Can there be any doubt that violence is a public health priority, requiring concerted public health action? Violence is preventable Risk and protective factors for violence exist across individual, relationship, community and societal levels. Research shows that these include such things as: being the victim of abuse, experiencing violent parental conflict, poverty and high unemployment and cultural norms which support violence. This paper provides an overview of the evidence base - the wide range of international evidence summaries and briefing papers which relate to violence and (most importantly) to violence prevention. While gaps do remain in the literature, what is there helps shape our understanding of: the scale and impact of violence; what causes violence; and what works to prevent violence and to extend better care and support to affected populations. A range of Scottish Government strategies and initiatives, for example those relating to intimate partner violence, alcohol abuse, child abuse, suicide and knife crime, aim to address the causes of violence. Violence prevention is also incorporated within a range of broader government strategies and policies as the risk and protective factors for violence are experienced across different life stages. These all provide opportunities to renew efforts to prevent violence. Details: Glasgow: ScotPHN, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2016 at: http://www.scotphn.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Report-Violence-Prevention-A-Public-Health-Priority-December-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.scotphn.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Report-Violence-Prevention-A-Public-Health-Priority-December-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 139127 Keywords: Public HealthViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Johnson, Christopher M. Title: "We're from the Favela but "We're Not Favelados": The intersection of race, space, and violence in Northeastern Brazil Summary: In Salvador da Bahia's high crime/violence peripheral neighbourhoods, black youth are perceived as criminals levying high social costs as they attempt to acquire employment, enter university, or political processes. Low-income youth must overcome the reality of violence while simultaneously confronting the support, privileged urban classes have for stricter law enforcement and the clandestine acts of death squads. As youth from these neighbourhoods begin to develop more complex identities some search for alternative peer groups, social networks and social programmes that will guide them to constructive life choices while others consign themselves to options that are more readily available in their communities. Fast money and the ability to participate in the global economy beyond 'passive' engagement draws some youth into crime yet the majority choose other paths. Yet, the majority use their own identities to build constructive and positive lives and avoid involvement with gangs and other violent social groups. Drawing from Brazil's racial debates started by Gilberto Freyre, findings from this research suggest that while identity construction around race is ambiguous, specific markers highlight one's identity making it difficult to escape negative associations with criminality and violence. The discourse surrounding social capital suggests that such individuals can rely on it to overcome these problems. However social capital is used more often as a tool to spatially and socially segregate and consolidate power and opportunity among the powerful and well-connected. That race does not contribute significantly to the debate misses key elements in how social relationships develop and are maintained. This research was conducted over the period of ten months in a peripheral neighbourhood in Salvador through a community social development programme. The study used a mixed qualitative methodology that was part ethnographic examining social networks and protective factors that assist young people at risk from becoming involved in crime or violence. Details: London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. 299p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 26, 2016 at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/390/ Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/390/ Shelf Number: 139161 Keywords: FavelasNeighborhoods and CrimeSlumsSocioeconomics Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Singh, Raju Jan Title: Guns, Books, or Doctors? Conflict and Public Spending in Haiti: Lessons from Cross-Country Evidence Summary: Haiti's economic development has been held back by a history of civil conflict and violence. With donor assistance declining from its exceptional levels following the 2010 earthquake, and concessional financing growing scarce, Haiti must learn to live with tighter budget constraints. At the same time, the United Nations forces that have provided security in the past decade are scaling down. Against this backdrop, this paper explores the conditions under which public spending can minimize violent conflict, and draws possible lessons for Haiti. Drawing on an empirical analysis of 148 countries over the period 1960-2009, simulations for Haiti suggest that increases in military spending would be associated with a higher risk of conflict, an observation in line with Haiti's own history. Greater welfare expenditure (education, health, and social assistance), by contrast, would be associated with lower risk of conflict. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 7681. : Accessed June 1, 2016 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/05/23/090224b084356212/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Guns00books00o0oss0country0evidence.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Haiti URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/05/23/090224b084356212/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Guns00books00o0oss0country0evidence.pdf Shelf Number: 139260 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCosts of Criminal JusticeEconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Fleischner, Justine Title: Deadly Enterprise: Dismantling South Sudan's War Economy and Countering Potential Spoilers Summary: "Deadly Enterprise" is the third in a series of in-depth, field research-driven reports on the dynamics of profit and power fueling war in the Horn, East and Central Africa. Violent kleptocracies dominate the political landscape of this region, leading to protracted conflicts marked by the commission of mass atrocities by state and non-state actors. Enough's Political Economy of African Wars series will focus on the key players in these conflicts, their motivations, how they benefit from the evolving war economies, and what policies might be most effective in changing the calculations of those orchestrating the violence - including both incentives and pressures for peace. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: The Political Economy of African Wars: No. 3: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/DeadlyEnterprise_121515.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/DeadlyEnterprise_121515.pdf Shelf Number: 139292 Keywords: Exploitation of Natural ResourcesNatural ResourcesViolence |
Author: Agger, Kasper Title: Warlord Business: CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power Summary: The two main armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) - the ex-Seleka and the Anti-Balaka, along with their multiple factions - make millions of dollars in profits from illicit activities, which support their operations and create wealth for ruthless warlords and business owners. Killings, extortion, and other forms of violence are used to control areas with gold and diamonds throughout CAR, and the groups are deeply involved in this high-value trade in several ways. The two groups also generate income through illicit taxes and "protection money" from civilians, road travelers, businesses, local organizations, and state institutions. Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups profit from a large illicit minerals trade. They do this directly by the mining and theft of diamonds and gold that they then sell to middlemen. They also profit indirectly by looting, extortion, and predatory taxation of miners and traders. Research presented in this report estimates the total current value of the illicit diamond trade and taxation by armed groups in CAR to be between $3.87 and $5.8 million dollars annually, a sufficient amount in CAR to fund widespread military operations. The majority of the diamonds and the gold are smuggled out of CAR to neighboring countries - mainly Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan - and then on to international markets; a lesser amount is sold on the local market within CAR. Some of the diamonds sold locally are purchased by three Central African diamond buying houses that currently have a total stock of diamonds worth close to $8 million. This domestic diamond trade is not prohibited by the Kimberley Process (KP) suspension of CAR's membership and the decision by KP members to refrain from sending or receiving diamond shipments from CAR that has been in effect since May 2013 and only restricts exports of rough Central African diamonds. Deliberations are, however, underway concerning the possibility of a partial lifting of the KP restrictions. There are concerns that the combination of an inadequate diamond tracing system in CAR and control by armed groups of diamond mines could result in conflict diamonds, which have provided financing for armed groups, entering the KP-approved diamond trade. To counter this danger, any lifting of CAR's KP diamond restrictions should be conditioned on the removal of all armed groups from mining sites, full control of diamond trading markets by U.N. peacekeepers or local gendarmes, and a credible tracing and due diligence system for diamonds bought and sold by Central African diamond companies, including those for export. In addition to natural resource exploitation, ex-Seleka factions in particular have set up efficient tax collection practices. Conservative assessments estimate that different factions within the group collect $1.5 to $2 million annually from illicit road taxation throughout the areas they control in central and eastern CAR. They gain an additional estimated $210,000 to $420,000 in taxation of cattle traders and $200,000 to $240,000 from taxation of coffee traders. Meanwhile, Anti-Balaka groups that roam western CAR collect illicit road taxes, extort money from rural villages, and demand sums that range from $600 to $1,000 as a one-time payment for "protection." Additional research is needed to estimate the total annual profits collected by Anti-Balaka groups through road taxation, looting, and other abusive activities. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: The Political Economy of African Wars: No. 2: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Warlord%20Business%20061615.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Warlord%20Business%20061615.pdf Shelf Number: 139294 Keywords: DiamondsExploitation of Natural ResourcesExtortionIllicit TradeLootingNatural ResourcesViolence |
Author: Witte, Eric A. Title: Undeniable Atrocities: Confronting Crimes Against Humanity in Mexico Summary: This report focuses on the nine-year period of December 1, 2006 to December 31, 2015. This covers the entirety of Felipe Calderon's presidency (December 1, 2006 to November 30, 2012), and just over half of the six-year term of current President Enrique Pema Nieto. To put statistics and institutional developments in context, however, the report includes some information from previous years, and especially the final years of the Vicente Fox presidency (December 1, 2000-November 30, 2006). The current crisis is the most intense period of violence in Mexico's modern history, but not its first. Accordingly, the report includes a brief overview of prior periods in which the government was also implicated in atrocity crimes for which there has been no accountability - including the period of the so-called "Dirty War," waged by the government against left-wing students and dissidents from the late 1960s to 1980s - in order to situate the recent surge in violence within a broader historical and political context. WHAT ARE "ATROCITY CRIMES"? The United Nations defines the term as encompassing the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. This report uses the term to refer to particular forms of violent crime that have affected many tens of thousands of civilians and may amount to crimes against humanity. Those affected include not only Mexicans but migrants from Central America, who travel a perilous path through the country and are increasingly the victims of vicious cartel violence. Specifically, the report examines three types of atrocity crimes: killings, disappearances, and torture and other ill-treatment. The report attempts to paint a composite picture based on a good-faith effort to synthesize all available statistics on and documentation of atrocity crimes in Mexico from December 2006. But that picture is only partial. Only accurate and complete data can reveal the full nature and scale of these crimes. The bulk of the data on which the analysis rests necessarily comes from government sources. This creates a considerable methodological challenge because government data on atrocity and other crime in Mexico is notoriously incomplete, skewed towards minimization, and therefore often unreliable. Collection of crime data is decentralized; states vary in their capacity and will to collect and share data with the federal government and public; some states keep data electronically and online, while others still keep records on paper, which are difficult to access. Particularly for atrocity crimes, data suffers from inaccurate and inconsistent categorization, itself a symptom of enduring denial about the scope and gravity of the situation. For instance, if charged at all, torture is often categorized as a lesser crime, such as "abuse of authority," and enforced disappearances may instead be classified as "kidnappings." Decades of impunity have engendered popular distrust in the justice sector, culminating in one of the greatest barriers to collecting accurate crime statistics: the fact that over 90 percent of crimes in Mexico are never reported to authorities in the first place. All of this has contributed to widely varying assessments of the scale and nature of atrocity crime, and confusion over the adequacy of the justice system's response. Some government data used here comes from public reports and statements from agencies including the federal Attorney General's Office (PGR), the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security (SNSP), the autonomous government statistics office (INEGI), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), and the Defense Ministry (SEDENA). Reports and publications of Mexico's National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) provide another important, if flawed, source of data. BEYOND PUBLIC REPORTS FROM GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, this report relies on information obtained through extensive use of Mexico's progressive legal regime on the right to information. Although critical public information is still too often withheld, the Open Society Justice Initiative, its partners, and others have been able to gain new insight into atrocity crime data, specific cases, and the functioning of justice institutions through information requests submitted to the federal and state governments. This report also relies on an extensive review of United Nations and Inter-American treaty body jurisprudence and reports; federal and state human rights commissions; national, regional, and international civil society reports; legal scholarship by Mexican and non-Mexican academics and political analysts; as well as investigative reports from Mexican and international media. These resources were augmented by over 100 first-hand interviews conducted by Mexico-based and international Justice Initiative staff and consultants, in person and by email and telephone, over the course of 2013-2015. Most in-person interviews were conducted in Mexico City, Coahuila, Guerrero, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, and Queretaro, although a small number were conducted in Morelos and Geneva. Almost all interviews were conducted in Spanish; for some, there was simultaneous interpretation into English, with the Spanish version considered definitive. All interviews were conducted with the verbal consent of the interviewee. Some sourcing has been anonymized at the request of the interlocutor. Those interviewed included government officials at the federal and state levels, including prosecutors, police, judges, members of congress and congressional staff, and officials at human rights and truth commissions. Research also included numerous interviews with Mexican and international experts and civil society representatives, as well as diplomats and academics. Details: New York: Open Society Foundations, 2016. 220p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/undeniable-atrocities-en-20160602.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/undeniable-atrocities-en-20160602.pdf Shelf Number: 139298 Keywords: Crime Against HumanityDisappearancesHomicidesHuman RightsKidnappingsOrganized CrimeTortureViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jensen, Steffen Title: Violence and community activism in Vrygrond, South Africa Summary: This study project is a partnership between the Community Healing Network (CHN) in Vrygrond, Cape Town and the Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims in Copenhagen (RCT). The project has two basic objectives: 1) To conduct a study exploring 1) levels of crime and violence in Vrygrond, Cape Town; 2) the period of xenophobic violence in Vrygrond in May 2008, and 3) what community action was taken to prevent the violence. 2) To understand how the events around May 2008 could be prevented using a community activist model like the one employed by the Community Healing Network, which is one of the authoring organizations of this report. In meeting the first objective, we employed a host of qualitative and quantitative methods, including a violence survey with 517 randomly selected households/- respondents and a study population of 2363 in Vrygrond, interviews with victims of the xenophobic violence and focus group discussions with community activists and community members participating in the data collection. Although it is difficult to collect data in Vrygrond because of security concerns and lack of trust, credible and interesting data was collected by members of the community and analyzed by CHN and RCT. This is s a testimony to the value of actively integrating community members in research projects as partners rather than as research subjects. The quantitative analysis shows an image of a deeply divided, poor and violent community with few state resources, minimal trust in the state or one's neighbours, and endemic intergroup conflicts which are fed by highly derogatory stereotypes on all sides. In many ways, Vrygrond should have experienced xenophobic violence in May 2008. However, the report shows that the direct victimization of violence in Vrygrond during May 2008 was insignificant. Among 517 household respondents, no one had been direct victims of violence during that time. To explore the very real suffering that could not be captured statistically, the report developed a distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary victimization. In the survey, primary victims of the violence provide a measure of the quantitative levels of violence in the general population. Secondary victimization includes those who directly knew people that were affected. Finally, tertiary victimization included all those that felt endangered by the violence because of who they were. The report concludes that the risks of violence are associated with local dynamics around leadership, perceptions of violence as legitimate and gender dimensions. This goes against many other explanations that focus on general structures of poverty, border control and other factors. However, only local dynamics explain why the violence in Vrygrond was relatively low. Finally, the report explores how local dynamics and local activism played itself out in the context of the xenophobic violence. We identified a number of community structures, practices and activities that seemed to have insulated Vrygrond against the worst excesses of the violence: no community authority that legitimised violence, a multiplicity of institutional and individual actors, early warning, interventions of important female community members, activities like feeding programmes and prayer meetings that broke the isolation of non-South Africans, and a constructive relationship to the police who acted according to their prerogative to protect. Perhaps the most important conclusion from the analysis is that individuals demonstrated enormous courage when they risked standing against the xenophobic violence that had enveloped the country. Despite the fact that Vrygrond is a highly divided community, many people acted according to a basic humanity that would dispel the notion that "all South Africans are evil" (as one respondent reflected after the violence). To address the second objective of the study project, the report compares the lessons that could be made regarding preventive community activism with the model and history of the Community Healing Network. The report finds that in many ways CHN is an appropriate model of community healing and prevention of violence. It creates a democratic opportunity for engagement across intrinsic affiliations; because it includes both specialists from NGO's and universities and community members, it serves as the "honest broker" between the state and the community in other contexts. However, CHN is faced with a number of challenges: lack of institutional permanence, lop-sided representation, constant demands for survival needs among the community members, and a historically based antagonistic relationship to the state apparatus. If the challenges are faced, there are clear advantages in developing the model and putting it into practice in Vrygrond and elsewhere. Details: Copenhagen: Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims, 2011. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: RCT International Publication Series No. 1: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: http://doc.rct.dk/doc/mon2011.160.pdf Year: 2011 Country: South Africa URL: http://doc.rct.dk/doc/mon2011.160.pdf Shelf Number: 139361 Keywords: Communities and crimeHate CrimesTortureUrban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Aqil, Nauman Title: Residents' perceptions of neighborhood violence and communal responses: the case of two neighborhoods in Lahore, Pakistan Summary: The preponderance of violence in metropolises has been a persistent concern for successive governments in Pakistan. However, it is pertinent to remark that there are often significant variations in the occurrence of violence between physically and socially similar neighborhoods in a single city. I set out to study one more violent and one less violent neighborhood in Lahore, Pakistan, to try to understand how community organizations, physical characteristics and the residents' strategies for crime prevention and control are related to different levels of criminal violence. A qualitative approach was used (in-depth interviews were conducted with community residents in each neighborhood). I found that spatial dynamics, population heterogeneity, and a lack of social cohesion were important predictors of criminal violence. It was noted that patterns of social interaction among neighbors have undergone significant change over the past few decades. In addition, local strategies of informal social control were limited to random vigilance, settlement of sporadic disputes within community settings, and surveillance of children's activities. I concluded that indigenous means of informal social control can help prevent, or at least control, criminal violence in neighborhoods Details: Beilefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project, Papers, no. 1: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/aqil.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/aqil.pdf Shelf Number: 139374 Keywords: Communities and CrimeNeighborhoods and CrimeSocial CohesionUrban CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Baba, Yahaya Tanko Title: Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto State (2007-2013) Summary: In this article I examine how political parties in Sokoto state, Nigeria, used violence in electoral processes from 2007 to 2013. Using Tilly and Tarrow's concept of contentious politics, the concept of neo-patrimonialism and Schlichte's model of armed groups, I find that violence mostly assumed the form of clashes between rival party youths. While party elites manipulate youths, religious and traditional institutions are also dragged into partisan politics by the elites. However, I also find that as a result of changes in party platforms, intraparty conflicts instigated large-scale interparty violence. In conclusion it can be said that party elites make use of violence as a tool for mobilization either to wrestle power from the governing party or to defend the status quo. Details: Bielefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project - Papers - No. 10: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/baba.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/baba.pdf Shelf Number: 139376 Keywords: Political CorruptionPolitical ViolenceViolence |
Author: Salguero, Jose Alberto Title: A Tale of Two Cities: Violence and Non-Violent Neighborhoods within the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador Summary: The purpose of this research was to explore how control measures work within a specific neighborhood in order to reduce the incidence of crime there. Two cases were selected from the historical centers of San Salvador and Santa Tecla. The study findings suggest that for social control measures by local residents to succeed, certain conditions should be met, such as clear territorial control, openness to citizen's participation, and efforts to include gang-controlled communities in local socioeconomic life, rather than choosing direct confrontation with law-enforcement agents. Details: Bielefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project - Papers - No. 5: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/salguero.pdf Year: 2015 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/salguero.pdf Shelf Number: 139380 Keywords: Gang Violence Gangs Neighborhoods and Crime Social Control ViolenceYouth Gangs |
Author: Nussio, Enzo Title: When Illegal Protection Collapses: Pathways to Increased Post-Demobilization Violence Summary: The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal actors, does not necessarily bring about a reduction in violence. While there are several theories that address the causes of persistent violence, there are few that adequately explain why rates of violence can rapidly increase in a post-demobilization context. This paper uses process tracing following the demobilization of paramilitary groups (AUC) in Cordoba Department, Colombia to assess alternative theories. We argue that the AUC created and maintained a monopolistic illegal protection system during its years of operation, and this type of local order was able to contain violence. After demobilization, the protection system was disrupted and as a consequence, new competition between post-demobilization criminal organizations for existing illegal rents developed, petty crime became pervasive and revenge killings spiked, thus contributing to increased rates of violence in the post-demobilization period. Our theory about the breakdown of protection finds additional support in other AUC dominated regions of Colombia. An alternative theory relating state pressure to increased violence was not strongly supported by our empirical analysis. Details: Zurich, SWIT: Center for Security Studies, 2013. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277954 Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277954 Shelf Number: 139396 Keywords: HomicidesIllegal ProtectionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Zinecker, Heidrun Title: Violence in Peace: Forms and causes of postwar violence in Guatemala Summary: On 29 December, 1996 the conflict in Guatemala between the URNG, a leftist guerrilla organization, and the authoritarian state came to an end. With the implementation of the peace agreements and the completion of peace-building, Guatemala has without doubt taken an important step on the road to democracy. However, the country's regime does not guarantee a civilized life for its citizens. Even by Latin American standards, it permits an extremely high level of violence. This can be characterized as violence in peace. Although the rates of homicide conditioned by this violence are higher than those that prevailed during the civil war, there is no danger of a return to war. During the war political violence was the main cause of death, and violent crime has now taken its place. This report analyses three forms of postwar violence which are especially typical of Guatemala: political violence, the maras, and lynch law. It then goes on to examine their causes. In the course of this examination, a number of elements which are generally supposed to be causes of violence are excluded as causal factors: the perpetuation of a culture of violence or/and war-violence racism and ethnic exclusion, poverty, and inequality in the sense of a general distribution of income as measured by the Gini coefficient. In the next step, an alternative model of explanation is presented. This distinguishes between enabling structures which make violence possible and structures that might prevent it (with particular reference to the absence of preventive structures). The report identifies regime hybridity and a rent economy as structures that make violence possible, and investigates these structures in order to identify the concrete configurations which are immanent to the structures and cause violence. In the case of the rent economy, the specific structures identified are the especially pronounced bipolarity between the oligarchy and the lowest quintile of the population, new rents as outlets for oligarchical structures and catalysts of violence, low rates of investment, and a low level of empowerment of work. However, none of these structures is, on its own, a cause of the high intensity of violence; they form a complex system. The absence in Guatemala of a structure that could prevent violence can be identified in the poor performance of the security sector, i.e. the police and judiciary, and in the lack of democratic commitment on the part of civil society in this sector. This low level of performance is, in addition to political exclusion and the absence of the rule of law, a characteristic feature of regime hybridity. Although this report is a case study, it has an intrinsically comparative character. This is because the other Central American countries (El Salvador and Honduras with a higher, and Costa Rica and Nicaragua with a lower intensity of violence) form the matrix which renders visible the specificity of Guatemala. Nicaragua is of particular significance for this implicit comparison, because it is the only country in Central America that has experienced a civil war in the recent past but seen a low level of violence since the end of that war. The conclusion of the report identifies two ways in which violence, or the intensity of violence, can be limited in the long term. In the Costa Rican model, a low intensity of violence has been achieved directly, via a long historical path in which "Democracy - Performance + Democratic Content" is combined with "Social Market - Empowerment of Labour + Production of Investment Goods". In the Nicaraguan model, a low intensity of violence has been achieved indirectly but over a shorter period of time; here, there can be no doubt about the absence of democracy, and therefore the existence of regime hybridity, or the absence of a social market economy, and therefore the existence of a rent economy. The main finding of the report follows from the Nicaraguan model: the level of violence can be reduced even though ethnically based exclusion, poverty, and inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) are present, and even though a rent economy and regime hybridity are present as well. If violence is to be successfully reduced, it is necessary for the police and judiciary to be supported conceptually and practically in their efforts to prevent violence and to rehabilitate violent offenders, and to bring about improvements in criminal investigation practices, the support provided to victims, and consistent criminal justice policies. Development aid can help in all these areas. Simultaneously, measures must be taken to bring about the empowerment of civil society - which, however, should not mean the empowerment of vigilantism. In addition, the situation of the lowest quintile of the population should be improved in such a way that there is at least a prospect of relative socioeconomic egalitarianism. This can be done if smaller enterprises are strengthened so that they can serve as a counterweight to the ruling oligarchy, in the context of an improvement in the rate of investment in the production of investment goods. In this way it would be possible to reduce both the official level of unemployment and the concealed unemployment that exists in the informal sector, leading to the empowerment of work. These autochthonous policies are necessary for Guatemala, and they should be combined with the exertion of international political pressure on the USA's problematic policies on immigration, integration, and deportation. This should include the provision of support to Guatemala (as well as El Salvador and Honduras) for the integration of young people deported from the USA. This report presents the first systematic analysis of postwar violence in Guatemala. It is based on approximately 50 interviews with Guatemalan academics, politicians, police and judicial officers, Maya priests, and NGO activists, and also with violent offenders, all of whom were interviewed during a month-long period of field research in Guatemala in March 2006. Details: Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2006. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIF Reports No. 76: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: mercury.ethz.ch Year: 2006 Country: Guatemala URL: mercury.ethz.ch Shelf Number: 139425 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMarasPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeVigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Verhulst, Joris Title: Peace in Flanders: Attitudes and commitments of Flemish people regarding peace and violence Summary: Surely everybody agrees that 'peace' is important. Without peace - certainly in the most elementary sense of peace being the absence of war - life as a societal or social expression is not possible. But how exactly do people think about or interpret peace? In a region such as Flanders, where for decades war has been an alien and absent feature, do people think of peace as a prime aspect of life, in other words, as a priority? Does the average Flemish citizen consider peace as a self-evident fact of life? Is peace something that one really should not have to worry about? And how do the Flemish people define the concept of 'peace'? Does it pertain, in effect, only to the peace that reigns amongst states, to the absence of war amongst nations: something that might be defined as 'International Peace'? Or is there, likewise, such a thing as 'Inter-personal Peace', which might be defined as peaceful co-existence? And do this 'International Peace' and this 'Inter-personal Peace' touch upon common ground? These questions form the starting points for this survey report. The report contains the results of a systematic and expansive survey of more than 1,000 inhabitants of Flanders about their perception of peace, their attitudes vis-a-vis peace, and their active and potential commitment to the cause of peace. Aside from organising a broad public survey, the study also includes a number of focus groups consisting of people active in the field of peace. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2007. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2016 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/peace_in_flanders.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Belgium URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/peace_in_flanders.pdf Shelf Number: 139548 Keywords: PeacePublic OpinionViolence |
Author: Moody, Carlisle E. Title: Firearms and the Decline of Violence in Europe: 1200-2010 Summary: Personal violence, has declined substantially in Europe from 1200-2010. The conventional wisdom is that the state's monopoly on violence is the cause of this happy result. I find some evidence that does not support this hypothesis. I suggest an alternative hypothesis that could explain at least some of the reduction in violence, namely that the invention and proliferation of compact, concealable, ready-to-use firearms caused potential assailants to recalculate the probability of a successful assault and seek alternatives to violence. I use structural change models to test this hypothesis and find breakpoints consistent with the invention of certain firearms. Details: Williamsburg, VA: College of William and Mary, Department of Economics, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Number 158: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp158.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp158.pdf Shelf Number: 139579 Keywords: Concealed WeaponsFirearmsGun-Related ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Maiga, Ibrahim Title: Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the labels Summary: The number of armed groups in Mali has increased steadily since the 2012 crisis, although a large swathe of the northern part of the country still remains beyond the control of the national authorities. The armed groups were established either just ahead of or in reaction to peace talks, and their demands often seem to be based on community or individual interests. This report offers an explanation for the delays in the peace process, particularly before the June 2015 Agreement was reached, and the difficulties encountered in implementing that agreement. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mali URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf Shelf Number: 139665 Keywords: Terrorism Violence |
Author: Denman, Kristine Title: Evaluation of the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Area Project Safe Neighborhoods Summary: Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a violent crime reduction initiative sponsored by the Department of Justice (DOJ). It has been in operation for over a decade and has been implemented in jurisdictions throughout the country. It began with a focus on firearm crimes, and in 2006, expanded to include gang crimes. The current initiative is intended to address violent crime, gun crime, and gang crime in Bernalillo County and the surrounding Native American communities, including Isleta Pueblo and To'hajiilee. Across the country, United States Attorney's Offices (USAO) coordinate PSN efforts in their respective districts. The USAO designates a Task Force Coordinator (also referred to herein as the "law enforcement coordinator") whose charge is to convene a PSN Task Force that brings together representatives from law enforcement and prosecution at all jurisdictional levels (local, tribal, state, and federal), as well as community leaders, research partners, and others. These Task Force meetings are a venue for planning, reporting on, and refining PSN activities and initiatives. In addition to managing these efforts, the PSN Task Force Coordinator reports to the Department of Justice regarding the implementation and short-term success of local PSN efforts. New Mexico has had the opportunity to engage in a number of Project Safe Neighborhoods projects in a variety of locations throughout the state. This PSN effort intended to build on those prior initiatives by engaging with established partners, utilizing strategic efforts developed previously, and using other proven resources and strategies developed previously through other efforts like Weed & Seed. This PSN project intends to expand on prior efforts by addressing the concerns of nearby Native American communities, particularly with respect to the transference of criminal activity and values across jurisdictional boundaries, and by addressing the impact of violent crime on urban Native Americans both as victims and offenders. As part of the research support and evaluation efforts for this PSN project, the New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center (NM SAC) at the University of New Mexico's Institute for Social Research has contracted with the New Mexico Department of Public Safety to conduct a process evaluation. Besides documenting project activities, this evaluation focuses on documenting the activities and collaboration that occurred, the perceived impact and success of the initiative, facilitators and barriers to implementation, and directions for future growth. Details: Albuquerque: New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center, 2016. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://isr.unm.edu/reports/2016/evaluation-of-bernalillo-county-metropolitan-area-psn.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://isr.unm.edu/reports/2016/evaluation-of-bernalillo-county-metropolitan-area-psn.pdf Shelf Number: 139804 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceNeighborhoods and CrimeProject Safe NeighborhoodsViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Dari, Elisa Title: Embedded Violence and Youth: The Transmission and Perpetuation of Violence in Post-War Sierra Leone Summary: War exerts an undeniably significant influence on the values, norms, behaviour and attitudes which constitute the shared culture of the society. During prolonged armed conflicts, the exposure to extreme violence creates a 'culture of violence' in which violence becomes embedded in the values system of the society and is therefore permitted and condoned, making violence resilient to peace-building efforts and therefore likely to recur. In order to understand how a 'culture of violence' persists long after the official end of war, it is necessary to understand how it is transmitted to younger generations and through them is carried over into peace time. This thesis aims to explore and understand the phenomenon of transmission of a 'culture of violence' focusing on youths as carriers of such transmission. To analyse the phenomenon, an integrative and comprehensive analytical framework was developed and a case study was chosen to which to apply the framework. The case study is Sierra Leone. The analytical framework is constituted by four 'spaces' of transmission which have emerged from the preliminary research. The four 'spaces' are: poverty, family, peers and social groups. The analytical framework was then utilised during the fieldwork stage of the project in order to identify the relevance of each 'space' as well as the interactions at work among the various 'spaces'. From the material collected during fieldwork, poverty and family emerged as structural factors of the process of transmission while peers and social groups emerged as immediate factors. As a result of the fieldwork political factionalism was added to the analytical framework as a fifth 'space'. The analysis of the fieldwork material revealed how the different 'spaces are inextricably connected with one another and how they support each other while creating a network of forces that supports and perpetuates the transmission of a 'culture of violence'. Details: St. Andrews, Scotland: St. Andrews University, 2011. 172p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/1891 Year: 2011 Country: Sierra Leone URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/1891 Shelf Number: 139813 Keywords: At-Risk YouthCulture of ViolencePeer InfluencesViolence |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh Summary: As the Awami League (AL) government's political rivalry with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) reaches new heights, so has its repression. At the same time, a deeply politicised, dysfunctional criminal justice system is undermining rather than buttressing the rule of law. Heavy-handed measures are denting the government's legitimacy and, by provoking violent counter-responses, benefitting violent party wings and extremist groups alike. The government needs to recognise that it is in its interest to change course, lest it fail to either contain violent extremism or counter political threats. A key part of a more prudent course would be to de-politicise and strengthen all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, so it can address the country's myriad law and order challenges and help stall a democratic collapse. The political conflict between the AL and BNP has resulted in high levels of violence and a brutal state response. The government's excesses against political opponents and critics include enforced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. Police tasked with targeting the government's rivals and an overstretched justice system compelled to prosecute opposition leaders and activists now also face a renewed threat from violent extremists. The permissive legal environment, however, is creating opportunities for extremist outfits to regroup, manifested in the killings of secular bloggers and foreigners and attacks on sectarian and religious minorities in 2015. The government's reaction to rising extremism, including arrest and prosecution of several suspects without due process and transparency, is fuelling alienation that these groups can further exploit. Reconciling with the opposition and hence stabilising the state requires both political compromises and an end to the repressive use of law enforcement agencies and abuse of the courts. Politicising the police and using elite forces, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the seeds of future violence. By concentrating on targeting the opposition, the police are failing to curb criminality; the prisons are overburdened by the mass arrests of opposition leaders and activists; and the judiciary, perceived as partisan for trials and sentences based on political grounds, is losing credibility. The result is a justice system that swings between two extremes: woefully slow and dysfunctional for ordinary cases and speedy, undermining due process, in politically charged ones. Any effort to reform a dysfunctional criminal justice system, including by investing in training, equipping and otherwise modernising the police, prosecution and judiciary, will be insufficient unless it is also taken out of politics. Years of partisan recruitment, promotions and postings have polarised these institutions to the point that officials no longer conceal their allegiances. Partisanship tends to determine the kinds of complaints and cases that get filed and prioritised and even informs verdicts and sentences. The problems surrounding delivery of justice are further compounded by legal mechanisms to silence civil society and prevent media scrutiny and parallel processes that undermine due process in politically charged cases. The deeply flawed International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to prosecute individuals responsible for atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war, is an important example of the dangers of using rule of law institutions for political ends. Perceptions of injustice are creating opportunities for extremist groups and fuelling political conflict. The BNP and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally marked the anniversary of the disputed 2014 elections with indiscriminately violent strikes and traffic blockades, which were matched brutally by the state. The BNP now appears less willing to resort to violence to unseat the government; its decision to re-enter the political mainstream gives the government an opportunity it should exploit by urgently resuming dialogue with the opposition. To demonstrate sincerity and as a first step, it should end use of the rule of law institutions to target opponents and silence critics. Accepting legitimate avenues of participation and dissent would also help regain some lost legitimacy and the trust of citizens in the state's provision of both justice and security. So long as there is no independent court system to arbitrate disputes fairly, the parties are likely to continue taking those disputes to the streets, but a neutral judiciary could help defuse tensions by upholding fundamental principles and preventing executive excesses. The international community can help to promote political reconciliation by, in the U.S. and EU case, using economic levers to pressure Dhaka to respect civil and political rights, and in New Delhi's by using close ties to urge the AL to allow the opposition legitimate political expression and participation. There is no time to lose. If mainstream dissent remains closed, more and more government opponents may come to view violence and violent groups as their only recourse. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 277: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 139829 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsPolitical ViolenceRadical GroupsRadicalizationViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Okolie-Osemene, James Title: Oil companies and lethal violence in Nigeria: Patterns, mapping and evolution (2006-2014) Summary: This study explores different aspects of fatal conflicts that involve oil companies such as Chevron Texaco, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, indigenous companies, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Using both qualitative and quantitative data from the Nigeria Watch Project, the research enhances our understanding of the patterns and evolution of oil companies and lethal violence in the country between 2006 and 2014. Details: Ibadan: IFRA Nigeria, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria Working Paper Series, no. 44: Accessed July 27, 2016 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP14OkolieFinal.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP14OkolieFinal.pdf Shelf Number: 139862 Keywords: Natural Resources Oil Companies Oil Theft Violence |
Author: Maehler, Annegret Title: Oil in Venezuela: Triggering Violence on Ensuring Stability? A Context-Sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance Summary: This paper studies the causal factors that make the oil-state Venezuela, which is generally characterized by a low level of violence, an outlier among the oil countries as a whole. It applies a newly elaborated "context approach" that systematically considers domestic and international contextual factors. To test the results of the systematic analysis, two periods with a moderate increase in internal violence in Venezuela are subsequently analyzed, in the second part of the paper, from a comparative-historical perspective. The findings demonstrate that oil, in interaction with fluctuating non-resource-specific contextual conditions, has had ambiguous effects: On the one hand, oil has explicitly served as a conflict-reducing and partly democracy-promoting factor, principally through large-scale socioeconomic redistribution, widespread clientelistic structures, and corruption. On the other hand, oil has triggered violence - primarily through socioeconomic causal mechanisms (central keywords: decline of oil abundance and resource management) and secondarily through the long-term degradation of political institutions. While clientelism and corruption initially had a stabilizing effect, in the long run they exacerbated the delegitimization of the traditional political elite. Another crucial finding is that the impact and relative importance of oil with respect to the increase in violence seems to vary significantly depending on the specific subtype of violence. Details: Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2009. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working Paper, No. 112: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534618 Year: 2009 Country: Venezuela URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534618 Shelf Number: 140096 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOilPolitical CorruptionSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence |
Author: Maehler, Annegret Title: Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta Summary: This paper studies the oil]violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into consideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource]specific and non]resource]specific causal factors. With regard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political]institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the "oil era." Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, secondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity. Details: Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2010. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working paper No. 120: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria URL: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf Shelf Number: 140097 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOilOil TheftPolitical CorruptionViolence |
Author: McGee, Rosie Title: Power, Violence, Citizenship and Agency: A Colombian Case Study Summary: In a situation of longstanding and complex violent conflict in Buenaventura, Colombia, we used action research to explore with social activists what power, violence, citizenship and agency mean to them and how they experience and exercise citizen agency in relation to the violence. This Working Paper presents our conceptual and theoretical starting points, action research process and findings. Direct violence was at a peak in urban Buenaventura when the action research was conducted, manifest in some particularly macabre forms. Yet in exploring the interconnections between power, violence and active citizenship, what emerged most strongly were structural and symbolic violence. These are experienced by Buenaventura citizens in ways that correspond to certain power theorists' interpretations of 'invisible power'. Most citizens have yielded to the encroachment of violent norms, language and imaginaries, allowing these to infuse their social roles and interactions and the socialisation of children and youth. The action research participants, however, represented a minority of active citizens who respond differently to direct, structural and symbolic violence. They navigate it using a range of responses: innovative organisational practices; mould-breaking models of social leadership; the de-legitimation of violent actors, actions and attitudes; and other visible and invisible expressions of individual and collective resistance to the violent re-shaping of norms, beliefs and values. The case study highlights the interconnected nature of direct, structural and symbolic forms of violence; contributes to theorising invisible power from this grounded and richly contextual perspective; illustrates the shortcomings of simplistic assumptions about citizen engagement in fragile and violent contexts and the importance of 'seeing like a citizen'; and sheds light on debates about citizen agency and structuration in processes of social change. Details: London: Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Working Paper 474: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12139/Wp474.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12139/Wp474.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 140100 Keywords: Urban AreasUrban ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Honduras Elites and Organized Crime Summary: Honduras is currently one of the most violent countries on the planet that is not at war. The violence is carried out by transnational criminal organizations, local drug trafficking groups, gangs and corrupt security forces, among other actors. Violence is the focal point for the international aid organizations, governments and multilaterals providing Honduras with assistance, and it is the central theme of media coverage inside and outside of of the country. There are good reasons for this focus. Violence disproportionately impacts people in poor and marginal areas and tends to remain concentrated in those communities, closing the circle on a vicious cycle that impoverished nations find hard to break. In addition, violence impedes economic development and disrupts lives across a wide socio-economic spectrum. It can lead to major demographic shifts and crises as large populations move to urban areas or try to migrate to other nations. It can undermine governance and democracy, and it can serve as a justification for repression and hardline security policies that divert resources away from much-needed social and economic programs, thus perpetuating the problem. Organized crime plays a role in this violence, but it is more like the gasoline than the engine: it provides an already corrupt system with the fuel it needs to run. That corrupt system is the focus of this study on Honduras. Its most visible manifestation is an inept and criminalized police force that a former security minister once called "air traffic control men" for drug flights coming into the country. Parts of this police force also work as custodians and assassins for criminal groups; rob drugs and resell them to the underworld; and, for a price, they can attack client's rivals and disrupt criminal investigations. But beneath this most obvious form of criminal connection to state officials is a more insidious brand of corruption. This is further from the headlines and much more difficult to tackle since it is embedded in the country's political, economic and social systems. It operates in a gray area, mixing legal and illegal entities, paper companies and campaign contributions, and sweeping its illicit acts under the rug using co-opted members of the justice system and security forces. What we are talking about, of course, is the elite connection to organized crime that this investigation exposes. The elites in Honduras are not like those in the rest of the region. The traditional, agro-export and industrial elites who rule in places like Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua are less prominent in Honduras, mostly because of the country's long history as an enclave economy dominated by multinational companies: the original Banana Republic. Instead, the country's most powerful economic elites have emerged from the service, banking, media, and telecommunications sectors. They are called transnational elites since many of them are first or second generation immigrants from the Middle East and Eastern Europe and depend on international business dealings to accumulate capital. Traditional, land-based elites are present in Honduras. But they have long been relegated to a second tier, forced to seek power through control of government posts, rather than using financial leverage. While the ruling elites in Honduras do not share the same origins or economic base as their counterparts elsewhere in the region, they do share their neighbors' penchant for employing the state for their own ends and systematically impoverishing it. Both the traditional and transnational elites have for years used the military and police to protect their personal land holdings and businesses. They have benefitted from the sale of public companies and lands, and they have enjoyed tax exonerations for their multitude of businesses. They have also pillaged its resources, and, as the government's importance to the economy has grown, relied on it to generate more capital. Their dependence on the state has opened the way for a third set of what we are calling bureaucratic elites, who have developed a power base of their own because of the government positions they occupy. Honduras, meanwhile, has become one of the poorest, most unequal and indebted countries in the world. Any attempts to change this system have been met with stern and often unified opposition from elites of all stripes. And attempts to exert more regulatory control over the activities of the elites are smothered before they begin. It is little surprise then that the country offers criminals, large and small, one of the most propitious environments from which to work. On one side, an ineffective justice system and corrupt security forces, long exploited by these elites, opens the way for large criminal groups to operate with impunity. On the other side, an impoverished populace - which sees and understands exactly how elites abuse a broken system - seeks to get its share by working directly with criminals in the illegal and legal enterprises these criminals operate. Crime, as it turns out, is one of the few forms of social mobility. It is within this gray area that the elites themselves also interact with organized crime. Far from being distant from illegal activities, the elites have long operated in this realm. From dealing in contraband goods and services to buying permission for their illegal dealings and "get-out-of-jail-free cards," those who do politics or business in Honduras understand that the laws governing the nation of eight million people are but a means to make money. Their connection to the underworld therefore is about societal, commercial and political interactions in the multiple spaces where business and politics happen in Honduras. The result is an organic relationship with organized crime that helps some elites reach the top and others stay there. Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Honduras_Elites_Organized_Crime Year: 2016 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Honduras_Elites_Organized_Crime Shelf Number: 140111 Keywords: Contraband BoodsOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Day, Christopher Title: The Bangui Carousel: How the recycling of political elites reinforces instability and violence in the Central African Republic Summary: The successful February 2016 election of President Faustin Archange Touadera marks a new beginning for the Central African Republic (CAR) and provides hope that the country is now stabilizing after three years of violence and political transition. Touadera has been endorsed by many of his political opponents, and the country remained largely peaceful in the weeks following the elections. But CAR is still a long way from political stability. If policymakers fail to address the structural issues that led to the crisis in CAR, the country is likely to repeat its violent past. Sworn in on March 30, Touadera, a former math teacher and prime minister, faces massive challenges. Armed groups and criminal gangs continue to destabilize the countryside, controlling valuable mining areas and commercial towns where they extort illicit taxes and trade diamonds and gold. More than 2 million people, or half of the country's population, are experiencing hunger; close to 415,000 people remain internally displaced, and 467,000 refugees are only slowly trickling back. Thousands of people have been killed since the March 2013 military coup by the Seleka alliance and the violence that followed. CAR has endured persistent violence and instability for decades. Institutional weakness, poverty, and exclusion do much to explain the country's history of disorder. But by significant measure, it is also the deliberate maintenance of such weakness by a small political elite that is at the root of CAR's endemic kleptocracy, a source of political instability, and a driver of violence in the country. Whether ushered in by coup or popular election, successive governments have proved unable to bring about meaningful change in CAR, in part because of the pattern of appointing many of the same people - often relatives and personal friends - to senior government offices. In sum, successive rulers in CAR have maintained authority largely by centralizing control where possible, and extended personal rule by dispensing patronage in return for political support, in particular by personally appointing to senior posts those who served in previous governments or trusted family members. This system has fostered division between the capital and the countryside, incubated the grievances of armed groups, and above all, created significant incentives to hijack the state through violence. This occurs as groups have competed for control of the state to access resources and privileges, instead of to benefit Central Africans. This elite recycling is a key component of what we present here as the "Bangui Carousel" to reflect the many people who rotate through the country's regimes, time and again. This pattern of elite recycling, which is not per se unique to CAR, is more critical in this country than elsewhere because it is interwoven with a near-complete lack of governance. There are few effective state or local government institutions, making the role and impact of the recycled individual leaders that much more potent. Unfortunately, it has been the complete dismantling of institutional checks and balances, the weakening of political parties and civil society organizations, and the use of violence to suppress opposition that have been the hallmark of many of these leaders. This combination of elite recycling on top of a governmental and civic system with little to no capacity and that often reinforces its hold on power through violence defines the Bangui Carousel. It is at the heart of what passes for Central African governance. The recycling and maintenance of a small group of elites - regardless of leadership at the top - combined with the absence of effective state institutions is a fundamental feature of government in CAR. Understanding this matters most to address the structural roots of the country's persistent instability and eventually stop the Bangui Carousel from spinning, so that government can bring about the change the country desperately needs. The recycling of elites is present throughout much of CAR's modern history. To illustrate patterns of elite recycling, the report focuses on appointments to government ministries since early 2013. To gather information and supplement field research, the authors analyzed hundreds of presidential decrees, 15 of which provided information about government reorganizations ordered by former Presidents Francois Bozize, Michel Djotodia, and Catherine Samba-Panza. This was then used to develop an overview of the members in each government and their inter-connections. The report then focuses on some of the individuals who have participated in or benefited from the Bangui Carousel. Those in the report were selected for different reasons: their affiliations with different armed groups, their mere affiliation with past regimes, potential connections to corruption, or their family ties, each of which tends to undermine the possibility of good governance. The analysis has been done with the objective to understand how groups and individuals get access to the Bangui Carousel and how they often benefit from their political appointments at the expense of CAR's citizens or simply forfeit the government's ability to earn the public's trust. Reference to any particular individual in this report does not, in and of itself, mean the individual is responsible for the violence or corruption that typically flows from the Bangui Carousel system. Rather, we highlight these individuals simply to demonstrate how the elite recycling element of the Bangui Carousel has worked. Subsequent reports will examine the governance elements in more detail, as well as the role of foreign powers, such as France and Chad, in perpetuating the system. To disrupt, and eventually, stop the entirety of the Carousel, accountability and effective governance must exist in CAR. And in place of the Carousel, a system of principled governance and greater merit-based criteria for appointments responsive to the needs of ordinary Central Africans must be established. A way forward to accomplish this in part is addressed in a series of recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/bangui-carousel-how-recycling-political-elites-reinforces-instability-and-violence-central-a Year: 2016 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/bangui-carousel-how-recycling-political-elites-reinforces-instability-and-violence-central-a Shelf Number: 140150 Keywords: Gang ViolenceIllegal TradeMining IndustryPolitical CorruptionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Chandler, Arnold Title: Violence Trends, Patterns and Consequences for Black Males in America: A Call to Action Summary: Rates of violent victimization and offending among young black males have declined substantially over the past couple of decades, serving as a welcome reversal to an epidemic growth in violence during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet rates for these young boys and men remain alarmingly high, and their disparate experience with violence sets them apart from nearly every other demographic group including black men older than 25, white men, and black women. This report paints a detailed picture of the trends and patterns of violent offending and victimization among young black males as well as the profound consequences this violence wreaks upon not only the lives and futures of these boys and young men but that of their families and communities as well. Summarizing and marshalling the latest scientific research, this report seeks to galvanize leaders to take vital action across our nation's cities to reduce violence and violent deaths among young black males. Details: Louisville, KY: Cities United, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://citiesunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Violence-Trends-Patterns-and-Consequences-for-Black-Males-in-America-A-Call-to-Action.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://citiesunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Violence-Trends-Patterns-and-Consequences-for-Black-Males-in-America-A-Call-to-Action.pdf Shelf Number: 140154 Keywords: African-AmericansVictims of CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: EUROsociAL Programme Title: Regional Model for a Comprehensive Violence and Crime Prevention Policy Summary: Over the past decade, the premise by which the origin of violence and crime is multicausal and multi-dimensional in nature has been widely accepted as the starting point from which the comprehensive prevention of violence and crime can be approached in order to build safer and more cohesive communities and societies. Proof of this can be found in the principles of the Central America Security Strategy (ESCA). Consequently, the Model is an exercise in supporting the implementation and promotion of the said principles and the approach promoted by the European Union through this strategy, laid down in the EU action plan, CELAC 2015-2017. Within this context and on the basis of the aforementioned premise, the Regional Model for a Comprehensive Violence and Crime Prevention Policy embodies a significant part of the work on Public Security undertaken by the European Union's EUROsociAL II programme. The formulation of the Model began in the first three regional meetings on violence and crime prevention: El Salvador (2011), Panama (2013) and Guatemala (2014). This initiative, taken by the European Commission with Latin America, is primarily a commitment towards the region based on the Commission's main goal: cooperation in order to promote public policies that can contribute to social cohesion. Under this programme, the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) and the International Juvenile Justice Observatory (IJJO), coordinated by Expertise France, worked on the drafting of a comprehensive regional violence and crime prevention policy framework by creating this Model with the support of the consultancy firm, Proyectos Estrategicos Consultoria. The main aim of this document, whose purpose is to review and analyse theoretical and scientific developments in the public policies implemented in Latin America and their respective legal and judicial frameworks, as well as the guidelines of international bodies regarding violence and crime prevention, is to guide and support governments as they create and manage their plans and actions in this area. Accordingly, and in light of the fact that this document is consistent with the situation in the region and can be adapted to all of the circumstances that can be found in Latin America, the participatory nature of this process is worth highlighting. Consultative video-conference meetings allowed the authors to find out about and take note of various practical concerns regarding the management of violence and crime prevention measures voiced by ten countries (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay) and four international cooperation bodies and agencies (Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, Organization of American States, and the United Nations Development Programme). These observations were subsequently integrated into the document. The Model puts forward seven processes and two conditions whose purpose is to facilitate the identification of the circumstances, developments and requirements specific to each country to contribute to the construction and consolidation of comprehensive public violence and crime prevention policies. Details: Madrid: EUROsociAL Programme, 2015. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Collection Working Paper n. 33: Accessed September 7, 2016 at: http://sia.eurosocial-ii.eu/files/docs/1461686840-DT_33-_Modelo%20regional%20Prevencion%20Violencia%20(ENG).pdf Year: 2015 Country: Latin America URL: http://sia.eurosocial-ii.eu/files/docs/1461686840-DT_33-_Modelo%20regional%20Prevencion%20Violencia%20(ENG).pdf Shelf Number: 140223 Keywords: Crime PreventionPublic SecurityViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2015. Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Game Changers 2015, where we highlight the year's most important trends in organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. This year saw some potentially game changing developments related to government corruption, organized crime, and rising pressure to alter alliances between members of the state and criminal groups. It also saw important shifts in the criminal world, in particular related to street gangs and the realignment of large criminal enterprises. From Mexico to Brazil and numerous places in between, officials came under fire for establishing mafia-like schemes that defrauded their citizens and ensured impunity for government officials connected to criminal groups. The long-term results of the widespread outcry from multilateral bodies, non-governmental organizations, private sector, political organizations, and religious and civic groups designed to disrupt these criminal networks are not yet clear, but the short-term impact has been profound. In August, Guatemala's President Otto Perez Molina resigned. This came just three months after Guatemala's Vice President Roxana Baldetti resigned. The two were accused of running a massive customs fraud scheme, which has been a mainstay of a criminal network run by current and ex-military officials for decades. Perez and Baldetti's departures came after the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), working with the Attorney General's Office, began revealing a spate of corruption cases. These investigations touched the highest levels of congress, as well as government purveyors such as the social security institute and mayors' offices. All of these had set up criminal networks to embezzle money from the government coffers. The public outcry that followed hastened the officials' departures. In Mexico, the power and popularity of President Enrique Pena Nieto's government has eroded in large part due to its handling of several major security crises, some of which spilled over from 2014. These events include the disappearance and likely murder of 43 students at the hands of a criminal group with deep ties to the local government and police; the apparent massacre of at least 22 suspected criminals by the Mexican army; and the dramatic escape of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman from a high security prison in June. Outside investigators from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) pilloried Mexico's Attorney General's Office for the numerous gaps, inconsistencies, and improbable explanations about what happened to the student teachers. In October, the government's own Human Rights Commission confirmed that the army extra-judicially executed at least 15 of the 22 suspected criminals in the so-called Tlatlaya massacre. And in September, the government arrested 13 officials - including the former head of the prison system - for allegedly assisting Guzman's flight to freedom via a one kilometer tunnel that ran from underneath the shower in his jail cell to a small farmhouse. Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2015. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf Shelf Number: 140254 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal NetworksDrug Trafficking (South America) Gangs Organized Crime Street GangsViolence |
Author: Rey Marcos, Francisco Title: The Humanitarian Impact of the New Dynamics of the Armed Conflict and Violence Summary: The peace agreement that is expected to be reached between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP) will end more than 50 years of armed conflict. It will highlight new opportunities for the country, and also new violence dynamics that are especially present in remote regions of the country and some urban areas. The role of other armed groups besides the FARC-EP, especially post-demobilisation armed groups, is one of the greatest risks facing the consolidation of a peace process. While the peace talks in Havana were still ongoing, these actors reconfigured their operations and have been responsible for serious humanitarian impacts on some communities. Despite seeing improvements in many indicators (e.g. the homicide rate, acts of war, etc.), other more surreptitious activities such as threats, individual displacement, extortion and social control have increased, indicating that the humanitarian situation remains alarming. This should be a priority in post-agreement peace planning, since this type of violence has a more subtle humanitarian impact and there is the danger that it could become invisible. This report analyses these conflict dynamics, their possible evolution during the post-agreement stage, and their humanitarian and social consequences. It also highlights the need to improve monitoring systems and improve protection for affected communities. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2016. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/NOREF-humanitarian%20impact%20armed%20violence%20Colombia.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/NOREF-humanitarian%20impact%20armed%20violence%20Colombia.pdf Shelf Number: 147919 Keywords: Armed ConflictConflict ViolenceRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Violence |
Author: Sebastian, Sofia Title: Atrocity Prevention through Dialogue: Challenges in Dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations Summary: Dialogue with violent extremist groups is a controversial practice, even when used to prevent widespread violence or atrocities. Humanitarian dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, offering short-term relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Though dialogue as a peacebuilding tool has potential in any stage of a conflict, it is ideally undertaken before widespread violence occurs. However, the conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with violent extremist groups are rarely in place. Summary Various forms of dialogue have traditionally been a central mechanism in the toolbox for atrocity prevention. The utility of this noncoercive peacebuilding practice merits reconsideration as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) increasingly embrace mass violence as a means to advance their objectives. If atrocities are imminent or ongoing, dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, with the potential of offering short-term humanitarian relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Despite the broadening recognition of the need to engage extremist groups through dialogue when possible, controversy continues to surround this practice. The conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with VEOs are rarely in place. Those pursuing dialogue need to gradually build trust, conduct a thorough actor mapping, and reflect on their own role and preparedness to engage. Engaging extremists presents significant risks as well, including extremists' manipulation of the dialogue to buy time for planning atrocity campaigns. Efforts to engage VEOs directly through dialogue have been inconsistent and are handled with the utmost discretion. Restrictive legislative frameworks may limit the ability to exploit opportunities for atrocity prevention through dialogue with these groups. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Shelf Number: 147891 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Sex Workers' Rights Advocacy Network (SWAN) Title: Failures of Justice: State and Non-State Violence Against Sex Workers and the Search for Safety and Redress Summary: This report is about sex work, violence and HIV in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The report provides the results of an extensive community-led research in sixteen countries of the region. It shows the daily violence that sex workers experience from police and clients and documents how violence is associated with lower capacity for HIV risk reduction. It further examines whether and how sex workers may try to halt impunity of law enforcement and access to justice. The figures speak for themselves. Forty percent of respondents in the survey have been arrested in the last twelve months, one in five experienced physical violence and one in seven experienced sexual violence by police. Twenty percent of respondents reported extortion. The report tells us also how condoms are routinely used by police as "evidence of crime", how syringes are confiscated or destroyed on a daily basis, and how street-based workers are displaced from their work location as a consequence of arrests, extortion and fines. It contributes with evidence from the region to the published literature documenting how poor policing practices are causally associated with a lower capacity for risk reduction, poor access to services and increased exposure to HIV. It describes how the fear that someone's drug use or sex work may be reported to police or to child welfare authorities, would discourage sex workers from seeking services, HIV testing and entering the care system. Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the region of the world that has witnessed the largest increase in HIV prevalence over the last ten years and where the epidemic continues to expand. The number of people living with HIV now exceeds 1.4 million. The epidemic is concentrated in that it primarily affects vulnerable groups of the population. Access to HIV treatment remains particularly low in the region. Less than 50 % of people estimated to be infected with HIV know their serologic status and less than a third of the people who have been diagnosed with HIV access antiretroviral treatment. Epidemiological data on sex workers and on other vulnerable groups are scarce because of criminalization of these groups and lack of sentinel surveillance. Throughout the region, sex workers, people who inject drugs and other vulnerable groups are either 'illegal' or face discriminatory legislation and policies. There are high levels of stigma and discrimination, poor access to prevention and care services and an understandable distrust of affected groups towards the public system. Most support services directed to sex workers and people who inject drugs are provided by civil society and community groups who are doing remarkable work - often without adequate resources and in hostile environments. These services have been funded for years by the Global Fund. The Fund however, is now leaving the region, and no mechanisms are in place to allow for the NGO and community-based peer outreach to be funded from governmental budgets. The risk that many of the services will be discontinued and that discontinuation will result in further epidemic outbreaks of HIV, is real. Discriminatory laws, regulations and policies, including those that give a sense of impunity to perpetrators of violence against sex workers - need to be traded for supportive and stigma-free environments that allow sex workers to access crucial health care services, including sexual and reproductive health services and HIV prevention, treatment and care. In other words, we need above all to ensure that human rights are at the forefront of everything we do. Details: Budapest, SWAN, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2016 at: http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/Failures%20of%20Justice%20State%20and%20Non-State%20Violence%2C%20SWAN%20-%20September%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/Failures%20of%20Justice%20State%20and%20Non-State%20Violence%2C%20SWAN%20-%20September%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 124629 Keywords: HIVProstitutesProstitutionSex WorkersViolence |
Author: Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council Title: Trends Analysis: Unlawful Use of a Weapon Summary: Has increasing the sentencing penalties for unlawful use of a weapon offenses had a positive effect on public safety over the last 10 years? This report uses basic trend analysis to examine whether the increased penalties for unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) offenses preceded any change in measurable public safety outcomes. In this report, measurable public safety outcomes are the number of reported violent gun crime offenses and the rate that UUW offenders are reconvicted of crime within three years of release (i.e., recidivism). If the UUW penalty enhancements were effective deterrents, fewer violent gun crimes would be committed. This analysis finds minimal effects on the public safety outcomes: - The 10-year trends for UUW crimes and overall violent crime, represented by incidents reported in Chicago, matched national downward trends in violent crime - Arrest data indicate that Cook County accounted for 65% of all UUW arrests in 2012 - Recidivism rates for UUW offenders are similar immediately before and after the sentencing enhancements This analysis finds an increase in the number of prisoners held by the state: - The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) prisoner population increased after each penalty enhancement This analysis concludes that the increase in UUW prisoners is likely caused by the cumulative effect of (1) a decrease in the use of probation and (2) an increase in technical violations of UUW offenders on supervised release . Details: Springfield, IL: SPAC, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/spac/pdf/SPAC_Trends_Analysis_Report_09_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/spac/pdf/SPAC_Trends_Analysis_Report_09_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 140381 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGun-Related ViolencePunishmentSentencingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Ali, Abdisaid M. Title: Islamist Extremism in East Africa Summary: The growth of Salafist ideology in East Africa has challenged long established norms of tolerance and interfaith cooperation in the region. This is an outcome of a combination of external and internal factors. This includes a decades-long effort by religious foundations in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to promulgate ultraconservative interpretations of Islam throughout East Africa's mosques, madrassas, and Muslim youth and cultural centers. Rooted within a particular Arab cultural identity, this ideology has fostered more exclusive and polarizing religious relations in the region, which has contributed to an increase in violent attacks. These tensions have been amplified by socioeconomic differences and often heavy-handed government responses that are perceived to punish entire communities for the actions of a few. Redressing these challenges will require sustained strategies to rebuild tolerance and solidarity domestically as well as curb the external influence of extremist ideology and actors. Highlights While Islamist extremism in East Africa is often associated with al Shabaab and Somalia, it has been expanding to varying degrees throughout the region. Militant Islamist ideology has emerged only relatively recently in the region-imported from the Arab world-challenging long-established norms of tolerance. Confronting Islamist extremism with heavy-handed or extrajudicial police actions is likely to backfire by inflaming real or perceived socioeconomic cleavages and exclusionist narratives used by violent extremist groups. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 32: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 145573 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsIslamist ExtremismRadical GroupsViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Korthuis, Aaron Title: The Central America Regional Security Initiative in Honduras Summary: In November 2013, Hondurans headed to the election polls for a second time since the 2009 coup d'etat that destabilized the country and left unchecked a problem that the country has long failed to address: violence and organized crime. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) latest homicide report, Honduras continues to struggle with the highest homicide rate in the world. The seriousness of the security situation has provoked travel warnings from the U.S. Department of State and infamy in the international press tied to the violence experienced in Honduran cities and the abuses perpetuated by state security forces. Over the past decade, drug trafficking through the country has surged, making it the "favoured northbound route for cocaine from South America" for many years. Given the country's historically weak law enforcement institutions, persistent problems with corruption, and poverty, as well as a continued U.S. appetite for cocaine, these problems are hardly a novelty - and present grave problems for the country's leaders. Unsurprisingly then, this problem was consistently featured in the leading presidential candidates' discourse and public debate, and was undoubtedly a major factor in the final outcome. National Party candidate and eventual victor, Juan Orlando Hernandez, called for a heavy-handed approach to security that relied on a newly created military police, while LIBRE candidate Xiomara Castr's voice resounded on public airwaves calling for Honduran soldiers to return to their barracks and their traditional role. These starkly divergent views stem from a Honduran population tired of years of violence, organized criminal activity, declining security, and increasingly accustomed to the military's involvement in traditional policing. Alarmingly, only 27 percent of Hondurans expressed any confidence in the civilian police in August 2013, while 73 percent disagreed with the idea that the military should remain in the barracks (and by extension, presumably refrain from involvement in policing efforts). Efforts to address burgeoning organized crime and violence and instigate reform of Honduras' security and justice institutions have consumed the country over the past few years and feature prominently in President Hernndezs plans. Yet, at best, these efforts have produced mixed results, and at worst have resulted in a depressingly stagnant landscape. The United States, through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), seeks to strengthen and improve Honduran initiatives through law enforcement cooperation, capacity building, and prevention programs. These programs persist amidst Honduras' difficult political environment and staggering problems, and success remains isolated, although hope remains that reform may finally gain momentum. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2014. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Honduras.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Honduras.pdf Shelf Number: 144861 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized CrimeSecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Phillips, Nicholas Title: CARSI In Guatemala: Progress, Failure, and Uncertainty Summary: To the extent that the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is a coherent policy, Guatemala is its centerpiece. This land of sultry jungles, volcanic highlands and buzzing cities boasts a population of nearly 16 million-the largest on the isthmus, with roughly 39 percent self-identifying as indigenous. During the first five years of CARSI, no country in Central America received more of the initiative's funds, or was allocated more non-CARSI security aid. Thus it would appear that the U.S. Congress is aware of Guatemala's problems: its weak institutions, drug smuggling, violence, gangs, poverty, inequality, impunity, corruption, and malnutrition. We may now add to this list the recent swell of Guatemalan youth who abandoned their homeland and were caught crossing illegally and unaccompanied onto American soil. But is CARSI a catalyst for adequate solutions? In some ways, yes. In others, no. And in some areas, it is hard to say for lack of performance evaluations. CARSI funds have bolstered the criminal courts and the police's anti-gang unit, for example, but have failed to produce an exemplary police precinct or eradicate poppy farms. Furthermore, some crime prevention efforts bankrolled by CARSI have never been audited, so their effectiveness is not clear. This chapter will shed some light on CARSI's successes, challenges, and unknowns in Guatemala. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2014. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala_1.pdf Shelf Number: 144860 Keywords: Criminal CourtsDrug TraffickingGangsOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Muggah, Robert Title: Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America Summary: Cities are where the policy and practice of citizen security are determined. Although national and subnational strategies are essential to scaling-up crime prevention, cities are where they are put into practice. Because of the way they bring opportunities and risks into focus, cities are natural laboratories of policy innovation to prevent and reduce violence. Some of the most remarkable progress in homicide reduction, crime prevention and public safety in recent decades has occurred in large and medium-sized cities, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. This report explores the evidence of what works, and what does not, when it comes to promoting citizen security in Latin American and Caribbean cities. While not exhaustive, the report features a range of positive and less positive experiences of 10 municipalities and metropolitan areas across the region. The goal is to highlight the change in approach from hardline law and order approaches to ones that emphasize multi-sector and preventive measures. The structure of the report is straightforward. Each case study includes a broad overview of the context and problem, a description of the intervention and how it was implemented, and some reflections on the outcomes and impacts. - Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarape Institute; Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7757 Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7757 Shelf Number: 146157 Keywords: Citizen SecurityCrime PreventionHomicidesPublic SafetyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Dedeloudis, Sotirios Title: Narrative Experience of Violent Offending in Greece Summary: Introduction: Violent offenders are a divergent population of offenders. There are various types of violent offending, such as subcultural violent offenders who perceive a righteousness of violence when protecting and maintaining their reputation. There are considerably few studies that relate the causation of crime and violence with emotions and narrative roles. Furthermore, it is documented that narratives are associated with issues that are considered within the realms of personality. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate how violent offenders' narratives, emotions, and their correlates with background and personality can shape their violent actions and to unfold violent offending patterns. Methodology: A total of 50 violent Greek offenders (41 males and 9 females), who were involved in hooligan/extreme political violent acts, with an age range of 18-63 participated in the study. These Greek participants had commit a wide variety of violent offences including robbery, gang fights and grievous bodily harm and were accused by the Greek court to be a part of a criminal organisation; of collective group violence. Participants who agreed to participate in this study were invited to fill a questionnaire that consisted of five sections (Description of Crime, Emotions Questionnaire, Narrative Roles Questionnaire, The Self-Report Offending Questionnaire and the HEXACO personality inventory). Results: Results revealed that emotions could be differentiated into four themes Elations, Calm, Distress and Depression in line with the circumplex structure of emotions postulated by Russell (1997) and narrative roles into Adventurer, Professional, Revenger and Victim. Furthermore, emotions themes and associated narrative roles themes were differentiated into four criminal narrative experience (CNE) themes namely Calm Professional, Elated Hero, Depressed Victim and Distressed Revenger. Interestingly, further analysis showed that Elated Hero was the most dominant theme for the violent offenders in the study contrasting previous findings (Ioannou, 2006). Significant associations between the CNE and background characteristics as well as personality traits were also demonstrated. Implications: The current study makes a significant contribution to knowledge supporting previous relevant studies. It was the first time that a theoretical framework of Criminal Narrative Experience was combined with personality and the first time that this was applied in a Greek population and exclusively with violent offenders that most had been involved in collective violence. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed as well as limitations and suggestions for future studies are described. Details: Huddersfield, UK: University of Huddersfield, 2016. 248p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.691359 Year: 2016 Country: Greece URL: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.691359 Shelf Number: 140478 Keywords: ViolenceViolent CrimeViolent Offenders |
Author: Pelgrim, Riekje Title: Witchcraft and Policing: South Africa Police Service attitudes towards witchcraft and witchcraft-related crime in the Northern Province Summary: In the last two decades, the Northern Province of South Africa has experienced hundreds of so-called witch attacks: violent assaults in which individuals or groups of people are accused of practicing witchcraft. Since the mid 1980s, the attacking and killing of people believed to be witches has become an increasingly problematic social issue in this part of the world. Narrations of witchcraft related violence have been numerous in the press, police reports and the academic world. South African newspapers and television have covered the issue of witchcraft related problems extensively: a quick review of backdated articles and television programmes reflects the ever-growing social problem caused by the belief in witchcraft. During my six-month fieldwork period in the Northern Province, both The Mirror and the Soutpansberger, two local weekly newspapers, carried on average one witchcraft related article per edition. Even the Mail & Guardian and the Sowetan, national newspapers of substantial influence and objective reputation, have published numerous articles dealing with witchcraft related issues. Additionally, police reports of witchcraft related crime have been numerous. Statistics show that between 1990 and 2001, the number of witchcraft related cases has increased from an estimated 50 cases per year to over 1300 a year. As a result, special attention has been paid to this type of crime: the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) has been collecting statistical data and organising rallies and workshops. In this manner, the police have tried to raise awareness regarding the serious consequences of this type of crime and hope to diminish it. Awakened by these statistics, the social unrest and the subsequent media attention during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the new national ANC government felt that it needed to address this situation. In an attempt to combat the ever-growing problems caused by the belief in witchcraft, it appointed a special research committee in 1995: the Commission of Inquiry into the Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province of South Africa. Through means of unstructured interviews this commission - headed by Professor Ralushai - conducted extensive research regarding the subject of witchcraft and its related problems. The overall findings however were very limited and disappointing due to, inter alia, a complete lack of theoretical foundation and ambiguous methodology. Despite the fact that some recommendations in the fields of education and legislation were made, no constructive steps were ever taken and, like so many other research reports, the Ralushai findings ended up on a government shelf collecting dust. Compared to the media, the SAPS and the national government, the academic world has seriously fallen behind in its attention and concern for contemporary witchcraft related problems in the Northern Province of South Africa. Most scientific studies regarding witchcraft beliefs and their related social consequences are exceptionally dated. Although anthropologists studied the general topic of witchcraft beliefs extensively during the twentieth century, most data regarding the belief in witchcraft in the Northern Province dates back to fieldwork that was conducted during the 1930s and 1940s (Niehaus 2001: 1). Particular ethnic groups, such as the Sotho, the Tswana and Lovedu, were studied in those years by scholars like Junod and Krige, and their studies are to this day regarded as blueprints for Northern Province witchcraft beliefs. Although more recent data regarding these beliefs has been provided by scholars like Hammond-Tooke, Ritchken, Stadler and Delius during the 1980 and even 1990s, real in-depth anthropological studies regarding Northern Province witchcraft beliefs and especially their serious social consequences in the Northern Province leave much to be desired. In an effort to both fill this theoretical gap regarding witchcraft beliefs in the Northern Province, and to collect empirical data regarding specific witchcraft accusations, a research programme named 'Crossing Witchcraft Barriers in South Africa' was set up in 1997 as part of the South Africa-Netherlands Research Programme on Alternatives in Development (SANPAD). The aim of SANPAD programmes has been to stimulate alternative academic research in South Africa in the area of cross-fields of developments. The research project 'Crossing Witchcraft Barriers in South Africa' was based at the University of the North in South Africa and supported by the University of Utrecht in The Netherlands. Its aims were to establish an interdisciplinary study of witchcraft beliefs and witchcraft accusations in South Africa. At first, this programme was carried out by about a dozen senior students and junior staff from the University of the North in cooperation with members of the University of Utrecht. Researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds - sociology, psychology, anthropology, theology and religious studies - were engaged in fieldwork to find out from all parties involved what exactly happens in specific witchcraft related cases, and what their background and consequences are. As part of this project, I was invited as the only non-South African to partake in this research project in the Northern Province. During two periods of three months in 2001, I conducted research regarding the topic of the belief in witchcraft and in particular its relation to policing and legislation. Before going into the finer details of my research however, I will describe the problems caused by the Northern Province witchcraft belief, in order to contextualise the research question. Details: Leiden, NETH: African Studies Centre, 2003. 170p. Source: Internet Resource: African Studies Centre Research Report 72 / 2003 : Accessed September 28, 2016 at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12920/ASC-075287668-076-01.pdf?sequence=2%20- Year: 2003 Country: South Africa URL: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12920/ASC-075287668-076-01.pdf?sequence=2%20- Shelf Number: 146159 Keywords: Criminal LawPolicingViolenceWitchcraft |
Author: Roxburgh, Shelagh Title: Witchcraft, Violence and Mediation in Africa: a comparative study of Ghana and Cameroon Summary: Security, insecurity and protection are all aspects of power relations. This thesis explores how witchcraft - related violence may be addressed through the discipline of political science. A comparative analysis investigates the effectiveness of four actors mediation efforts: the state, religious organizations, NGOs and traditional authorities that are typically unable to acknowledge the reality of witchcraft and or address experiences of it, nor answer the needs of those seeking redress. The history of anthropological works in Africa have been justifiably critiqued for dismissing or ridiculing African traditional religions and beliefs. Though the intention to avoid insult is commendable, it is not reason enough to overlook important questions and to evade debate. Details: Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2014. 253p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: https://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/handle/10625/53279 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/handle/10625/53279 Shelf Number: 140480 Keywords: ViolenceWitchcraft |
Author: Lindell, Magdalena Tham Title: Transnational Threats for Peace and Security in the Sahel: Consequences in Mali Summary: This report reviews the three main transnational security threats present in the Sahel: violent separatism, armed Islamism and transnational organised crime. The analysis shows that these three phenomena form a complex nexus that led to the collapse of state control in northern Mali in 2012 and that now complicates the re-establishment of state authority and contributes to insecurity in the wider region. The complex connections between the threats lead to the conclusion that a broad approach is necessary, as it is impossible to counteract the threats separately. As the threats are transnational in nature, the solution to the situation in Mali must be equally transnational, involving not just the neighbouring states but also states in the extended region, as well as the international community. The underlying problems that led to the rise of separatism, armed Islamism and organised crime in northern Mali can be traced back to social exposure and lack of human security. The solution is therefore dependent on the creation of a new social contract between the Malian state and its citizens that builds on inclusion. In the short-term perspective, immediate improvements in service delivery, the establishment of security and an end to the culture of impunity are important components in creating trust in state institutions. Details: Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2014. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/?query=security+in+the+sahel&fv=36 Year: 2014 Country: Mali URL: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/?query=security+in+the+sahel&fv=36 Shelf Number: 146120 Keywords: IslamOrganised CrimeTerrorism, Violence |
Author: Rosnick, David Title: Have US-Funded CARSI Programs Reduced Crime and Violence in Central America? Summary: In October 2014, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University published an impact assessment study of community-based violence prevention programs that have been implemented under the umbrella of the US State Department's Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The study looked at survey data measuring public perceptions of crime in 127 treatment and control neighborhoods in municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama where the violence prevention programs have been implemented. The study's authors stated that the data shows that "in several key respects the programs have been a success" and note, for instance, that 51 percent fewer residents of "treated" communities reported being aware of murders and extortion incidents during the previous 12 months, and 19 percent fewer residents reported having heard about robberies having occurred. As the LAPOP study is, to date, the only publicly accessible impact assessment of programs carried out under CARSI - a notoriously opaque regional assistance scheme that has received hundreds of millions of dollars of US government funding - a thorough review of the LAPOP study data seemed appropriate. This report examines the data collected during the LAPOP study and subjects them to a number of statistical tests. The authors find that the study cannot support the conclusion that the areas subject to treatment in the CARSI programs showed better results than those areas that were not. This report identifies major problems with the LAPOP study, namely, the nonrandomness of the selection of treatment versus control areas and how the differences in initial conditions, as well as differences in results between treatment and control areas, have been interpreted. In the case of reported robberies, if the areas subject to treatment have an elevated level of reported robberies in the year prior to treatment, it is possible that there is some reversion to normal levels over the next year. The LAPOP methodology does not differentiate between effective treatment and, for example, an unrelated decline in reported robberies in a treated area following a year with an abnormally high number of reported robberies. The series of statistical tests in this report indicate that this possibility is quite plausible, and cannot be ruled out; and that the LAPOP study, therefore, does not demonstrate a statistically significant positive effect of treatment. The same can be said for the other variables where the LAPOP study finds significant improvement. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2016. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2016 at: http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/carsi-2016-09.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/carsi-2016-09.pdf Shelf Number: 146137 Keywords: Crime Prevention ProgramsViolenceViolence PreventionViolent crime |
Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2015-16 Evaluation of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative: Final Report Summary: Program evaluations support accountability to Parliament and Canadians by helping the Government of Canada credibly report on the results achieved with resources invested in programs. They also support deputy heads in managing for results by informing them about whether their programs are producing the expected outcomes efficiently and cost-effectively. Program evaluations support policy and program improvements by helping identify lessons learned and best practices. What we examined This evaluation examined the relevance and performance of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative, a $10-million, five-year initiative established in 2011, to address gaps in understanding of terrorism in Canada and the way it manifests itself in Canadian communities. The Initiative has several components, including a grants and contributions component that is designed to fund research studies and support direct engagement with researchers. Given that the Initiative includes a grants and contributions component, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the design, delivery and administration of this component of the Initiative conformed to the requirements of the Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Why it is important Terrorism is considered a threat to Canada's national interest and security. In recent years, the number of terrorist incidents has been increasing steadily, both in Canada and around the world. Many countries, including Canada, are facing radicalization to violence, particularly of youth. More than 180 Canadians are known to have gone abroad to take part in foreign armed conflicts. Preventing, detecting, denying terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities and responding to these developments are among the Government of Canada's, and by extension, the Department of Public Safety's highest priorities. The Initiative plays an important role in creating networks across sectors, generating knowledge for decision-makers, and increasing Canadians' understanding of terrorism and counter-radicalization to violence, which is increasingly needed to contribute to building a safe and resilient Canada. What we found Relevance The raison d'etre of the Initiative was to invest in research on pressing questions to enable Canada to better understand what terrorism meant in the Canadian context and what could be done to support effective policies and programs to counter-terrorism and violent extremism in Canada. Despite its contribution to date, there is still a continued need for the Initiative to shed more light on these issues. The Initiative is well aligned with the federal government and PS's priorities, as ensuring the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad continues to be among the top priorities of the government. The emphasis on the need for further research communicated as part of the Government's commitment to create the Office of the Community Outreach and Counterradicalization attests to the relevance of the Initiative and ongoing need for similar activities. Performance To a large extent, the Initiative has contributed to the achievement of its expected outcomes: It has supported the creation of various networks and other mechanisms for ongoing dialogue across different sectors on terrorism and counter radicalization; through funding research studies and other mechanisms, the Initiative has facilitated the generation of knowledge and tools to ensure that Canadian policy and decision-makers, as well as frontline officers and other practitioners have access to more relevant and timely information to do their work; and researchers affiliated with the Initiative have more resources and support at their disposal to conduct research and to study the identified priority areas. The Department has put in place a robust governance framework to oversee the delivery of the Initiative. For the most part, the Initiative was delivered efficiently and economically. The design, delivery and administration of the grants and contribution components of the Initiative were found to generally conform to the requirements of Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Notwithstanding the above achievements, the evaluation identified a few opportunities for improvement. The following recommendations are provided in the spirit of continuous improvement. Recommendations The ADM of the Portfolio Affairs and Communications Branch and/or the future Senior Departmental Officer responsible for the Office for Community Outreach and Countering Radicalization to Violence should ensure that: 1. Kanishka-related research findings are better communicated to policy and decision makers and the general public. In collaboration with the Assistant Deputy Minister Corporate Management Branch ensure that: 2. funding recipients' reporting requirements are proportionate to their current risk profile. Management Response and Action Plan Management accepts all recommendations and will implement an action plan. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: 2016-06-28: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140524 Keywords: Counter-radicalizationRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Bobea, Lilian Title: Democratizing Violence: The Case of the Dominican Republic Summary: The state of democracy in the Dominican Republic cannot be analyzed exclusively according to how closely its institutional functions and procedures conform to classic ideals of representative democracy. Instead, the Dominican Republic can perhaps best be described as a "contested democracy" in acknowledgement of certain of its characteristics: informal forms of citizenship, conflicting governability, and precarious institutionalization. The quality of its democracy must be viewed in the context of its ability to offer basic civil guarantees, such as access to security and social justice. This paper focuses primarily on these factors, which determine actual governability in the Dominican Republic. An understanding of the challenges facing Dominican democracy requires an examination at the structural and policy levels. The issues to be considered include mechanisms for the resolution of conflicting interests among actors with asymmetrical access to power, as well as the resilience of nondemocratic institutional cultures within the police, political parties and other key institutions. Such conditions typically inhibit democracy but could be redirected to reach the "positive equilibrium" that John Bailey discusses elsewhere. Security and judicial policies tend to be directed from the top down, but an official attitude that recognizes and nurtures local initiatives and reforms that involve a variety of strategic stakeholders could be more effective. Similarly, the Dominican state must take greater efforts to identify positive role models at the local and national levels, starting by establishing a more responsible law enforcement system that guarantees fair sanctions against predators and compensation to the victims of criminal acts. These steps could have a dramatic impact on curbing violence, crime and injustice. The greatest challenge for the Dominican state, however, is to disrupt the growing nexus between criminal elements and political, economic and governmental actors. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 34. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Dominican Republic URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140537 Keywords: CrimePoliticsViolence |
Author: Mani, Kristina Title: Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America Summary: The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times co-opted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: - Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet "lost" to criminal groups. - Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. - In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. - Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. - Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: - Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. - A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. - More effective securing of military arsenals. - Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices. Details: Miami: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, 2011. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/4690459.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central African Republic URL: https://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/4690459.pdf Shelf Number: 140538 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangsHomicidesMilitary PersonnelOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Corrales Compagnucci, Hugo Title: Armed Groups and Violence in Paraguay Summary: Armed violence in Paraguay is not a recent phenomenon. During the second half of the XX Century, Paraguay saw the rise of a larger number of underground, revolutionary movements that sought the overthrow of the Alfredo Stroessner's (1954-1989) government. From among those movements emerged the Partido Patria Libre (or, Free Fatherland, also known for its acronym PPL), made up of a two branches: one legal and the other one, operational. The latter was based on people's power, as represented by "Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo" (or, the Paraguayan People's Army, with acronym EPP). After EPP broke with PPL in March 2008, this Marxist-oriented revolutionary project, which was apparently oriented to put an end to the social, political and economic inequalities in Paraguay, began to carry out markedly criminal activities, which included bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks and armed confrontations. Its strategies and modus operandi utilized by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepcion, San Pedro, Canindeyu y Caazapa, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as "campanas" (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking. Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger. In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 31. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Paraguay URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140539 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesInequalityKidnappingsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorismViolence |
Author: de Leon-Escribano, Carmen Rosa Title: Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua Summary: A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attaches in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 10. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140540 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllicit ArmsMilitaryOrganized CrimePolicingPublic SecurityViolence |
Author: Palmer, David Scott Title: Peru's Shining Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects Summary: Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso, has eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical, approach. Financial support is derived once again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzman's leadership, while the Apurmac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to continue to grow. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 2. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Peru URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140541 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMilitaryShining PathViolence |
Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: The Economic Cost of Violence Containment: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Global Cost of Violence Summary: One of the major challenges in developing policies aimed at increasing peace is the difficulty of being able to accurately gauge the benefits that result from peace. Recognising this, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) has developed a new and ground breaking methodology to estimate the cost of violence to the global economy, including calculations for 152 countries that detail the costs of thirteen different types of violence. This deeper insight into the breakdown of national costs of violence allows for better targeting of development assistance and also enables national governments to more accurately assess the costs associated with violence and the likely benefits that would flow from improvements in peace. In developing this methodology IEP uses the concept of 'violence containment' spending. IEP defines violence containment spending as economic activity that is related to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is directed against people or property. This approach uses ten indicators from the Global Peace Index (GPI) and three additional key areas of expenditure to place an economic value on 13 different dimensions. This process has been developed to enable relative comparisons between countries at different levels of economic development. GDP per capita has been used to scale the cost of violence containment for each country. In both the U.S. and the U.K. a number of robust analyses have been conducted on the cost of various types of violence and have been used as the basis for the scaling. This study is highly conservative as there are many items that have not been counted simply because accurate data could not be obtained. Future estimates will attempt to capture these items and therefore are expected to be higher. The economic impact of violence containment to the world economy in 2012 was estimated to be $9.46 trillion or 11 percent of Gross World Product (GWP).* This figure is comprised of $4.73 trillion of direct and indirect costs as well as an additional $4.73 trillion in additional economic activity that would flow from the reinvestment of these costs into more fruitful economic activities. Were the world to reduce its expenditure on violence by fifteen percent it would be enough to provide the necessary money for the European Stability Fund, repay Greece's debt and cover the increase in funding required to achieve the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals. One of the easier items to count is military expenditure, thus it is nearly fully included in the study. Military spending constitutes 51 percent of the total accounted expenditure on violence containment. However, the approach excludes many other forms of violence containment due to a lack of available data. If other forms of violence were included in the overall estimate, it is expected that military spending would drop considerably as a proportion of total violence containment expenditure. It is important to highlight that the world's direct expenditure on the military is more than 12 times the world's expenditure on foreign aid, as measured by Official Development Assistance (ODA). The economic impact of homicides represents the next most significant cost at $1.43 trillion dollars or 15 percent of the total impact. The third largest contributor is spending on internal security officers and police, accounting for around 14 percent of the total, or $1.3 trillion dollars of the economic impact. The longer-term research project for IEP aims to categorise and count many of these relevant areas of expenditure. Some examples of items that have been excluded are: The significant costs related to property crimes, motor vehicle theft, arson, household burglary and larceny/ theft, as well as rape/sexual assault Many of the preventative measures, such as insurance premiums or the costs to businesses of surveillance equipment and lost management time The direct costs of domestic violence in terms of lost wages, emotional costs and recovery costs. While expenditures on containing and dealing with the consequences of violence are important and a necessary public good, the less a nation spends on violence-related functions, the more resources can be allocated to other more productive areas of economic activity. Simply put, economic expenditure on containing violence is economically efficient when it effectively prevents violence for the least amount of outlay. However, money that is diverted to surplus violence containment, or money that is spent on inefficient programs, has the potential to constrain a nation's economic growth. Importantly, many societies that have lower levels of violence and crime also have lower violence containment spending. These societies reap a peace dividend. Details: Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 11, 2016 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Cost-of-Violence-Containment.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Cost-of-Violence-Containment.pdf Shelf Number: 145412 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCosts of Criminal JusticeEconomics of Crime ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Trajtenberg, Nico Title: Towards a more Effective Violence Prevention Policy in Uruguay Summary: This report presents the results of the Montevideo Project on the Social Development of Children and Youths (m-proso) study, a large representative school-based survey of young people on deviance and violence conducted in Montevideo. The study was funded by the UBS Optimus Foundation and the data was collected by the University of Cambridge and Universidad de la Republica del Uruguay in coordination with the directorial council of the Administracion Nacional de Educacion Publica (ANEP). The main empirical goal of this study was to describe levels of violent victimization and violent behaviour among adolescents in Montevideo. It also aimed to identify major individual, family, school and life-style risk factors associated with victimization and perpetration that can inform the development of a national policy for the prevention of youth violence. To achieve this goal a large representative survey of over 2202 adolescents in grade 9 (i.e. approximately age 15) from public and private high schools was conducted in 2013. The study results can be divided in two main areas: Victimization: - 25% of adolescents have been victims of one of the three types of violence in the past year. Robbery victimizations are most frequent, followed by assault and sexual assault. Most victimizations occur in public space or at school, and are committed by peers of the same age. Only about one out of ten incidents are reported to the police. - The risk of victimization was associated with a number of lifestyle characteristics. Adolescents who go out frequently, consume psychoactive substances, and who engage in delinquent activities are at a greater risk of violent victimization. Also, adolescents with a disability were at a higher risk of victimization, while socio-demographic characteristics were not found to be predictive of victimization. - 28% of adolescents reported experiences of corporal punishment by their parents. Socio-demographic characteristics did not predict the likelihood of corporal punishment. However, the likelihood of corporal punishment was more likely if there was more parental conflict. The experience of corporal punishment was associated with more depressive symptoms. - 20% of adolescents experienced bullying victimization at least once per month. Bullying victims differed from non-victims in several ways: they were more likely to have a poor relationship with classmates and more likely to have academic difficulties. At home they were more likely to experience erratic discipline and parental conflict. Also, adolescents with a disability were found to be more likely to be victimized. - The results of the present study supported findings from international research that different types of victimization tend to be correlated. For example, victims of corporal punishment by their parents were significantly more likely to also experience bullying and violent victimization. Perpetration - 17% of adolescents admitted to having committed at least one act of violence in the past year. 19% of adolescents reported to be involved in a group that threatens, robs or assaults other people. And 13% of adolescents reported that they bullied other adolescents at least once per month. - Different types of violence are strongly correlated in that, for example, adolescents who verbally bully others also tend to be involved in physical fights or robberies committed within a group of other adolescents. Male adolescents are overrepresented for all types of direct aggression, but their predominance is larger for aggression that entails physical force, is more serious, and committed in groups. - Involvement in violence is part of a wider syndrome of adolescent problem behaviours: Violent adolescents are much more likely to also be involvement in non-violent delinquent acts including theft in school, at home or in shops, vandalism and burglary, or drug dealing. They are also more likely to run away from home and to play truant at school. Finally, adolescents involved in violence are much more likely to use alcohol, cannabis, or hard drugs. - Adolescents with a higher involvement in violent acts differed in their personality characteristics from other youth. They were more riskseeking, impulsive, self-centred and short-sighted than non-violent youth; they were more likely to internalize delinquent norms and to reject conventional moral principles; they had lower conflict resolution skills in that they were more likely to react with anger and less likely to understand diferent sides of an argument; and they tend to believe that they are stronger and better fighters than others. - Adolescents involved in physical violence and bullying also differ on school-related characteristics: They were significantly more likely to have been retained at school, to play truant, to have a poor relationship to the teacher and to have a low commitment to do well at school. They were also less likely to accept the authority of teachers and directors. - More violent adolescents tend to live in families where parents were less likely to be involved in joint activities with the young person, that they were less able to efectively supervise the activities of their child, and that they were more likely to use physical punishment as a disciplining strategy. - Finally, aggressive adolescents tend to spend a lot more time playing violent computer games, they are out on the streets more often during night-time and weekends, and they spend this unsupervised time more often in the company of delinquent peers. Finally, based on the aforementioned results and following the WHO public health framework of violence prevention this report provides recommendations on five areas of intervention: enhance parenting support; improve school climate and behaviour management in schools; improve the legitimacy of the police; reduce early access to psychoactive substances and weapons; and reducing street violence and robbery. Details: Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, Institute of Criminology, Violence Research Centre, 2015. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: http://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/vrcresearch/meuruguay/uruguayeng Year: 2015 Country: Uruguay URL: http://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/vrcresearch/meuruguay/uruguayeng Shelf Number: 145077 Keywords: Juvenile OffendersRobberyStreet ViolenceVictimizationViolenceViolence PreventionViolent CrimeYouth Violence |
Author: Wan, Wai Yin Title: Violent Criminal Careers: A retrospective longitudinal study Summary: Aims: To determine: (1) the long-term risk that someone charged with a violent offence will commit another violent offence (2) what factors influence the likelihood of desistance and the length of time to the next violent offence for those who do re-offend. Method: All 26,472 offenders who were born between 1986 and 1990 (inclusive) and who had at least one violent offence proved against them in New South Wales (NSW) before December 31st, 2014 were followed up to December 31st, 2015. An offence was counted as proved if at the index contact it resulted in a caution, a youth justice conference or proven court appearance. The mean follow-up time for offenders in the study was 6.35 years (range = 21.3 years; interquartile range = 4.7 years). Bivariate correlates of time to re-offend were identified using log-rank tests. Multivariate analysis of survival time was undertaken using a cure fraction model with a loglogistic distribution of survival time. Results: In the median case, after 20 years, an estimated 23 per cent of violent offenders committed a further violent offence. However the risk of violent re-offending varies greatly across different offender groups, being much higher for Indigenous offenders, those who were aged 17 and under at the time of their index contact and those whose first contact with the criminal justice system occurred when they were 12 years of age or younger. There is little evidence of specialisation among violent offenders in the sample. Most have committed a wide variety of different offences prior to their conviction for a violent offence and those who do re-offend commit a wide variety of offences. Conclusion: Authorities charged with responsibility for making bail, sentencing and parole decisions in relation to violent offenders need to pay close attention to the characteristics of the violent offenders they are dealing with. Evaluations of violent offender programs should include both short-term and long-term follow up. Prison is not a very effective instrument through which to reduce violent offending. Details: Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice, no. 198: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/CJB/Report-2016-Violent-Criminal-Careers-A-retrospective-longitudinal-study-cjb198.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/CJB/Report-2016-Violent-Criminal-Careers-A-retrospective-longitudinal-study-cjb198.pdf Shelf Number: 145381 Keywords: Career CriminalsRe-offendingRecidivismViolenceViolent CrimeViolent Offenders |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: The Risk of Returning Home: Violence and Threats against Displaced People Reclaiming Land in Colombia Summary: Violence associated with Colombia's long-running internal armed conflict has driven more than 4.8 million Colombians from their homes, generating the world's largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Colombian IDPs are estimated to have left behind 6 million hectares of land, much of which armed groups, their allies, and others seized, and continue to hold. In June 2011, President Juan Manuel Santos took an unprecedented step towards addressing this problem by securing passage of the Victims Law, which aims to return land to hundreds of thousands of displaced families over the course of a decade. Despite some notable gains in applying the Victims Law, major obstacles stand in the way of its effective implementation. IDPs who have sought to recover land through this new law and other restitution mechanisms have faced widespread abuses tied to their efforts, including killings, new incidents of forced displacement, and death threats. The Risk of Returning Home - based on a year and a half of field research - details those abuses and assesses the government's response. Human Rights Watch found that crimes targeting IDPs for their restitution efforts almost always go unpunished: prosecutors have not charged a single suspect in any of their investigations into threats against land claimants and leaders. Justice authorities also rarely prosecute the people who originally displaced claimants and stole their land. This is a root cause of the current abuses targeting claimants because those most interested in retaining control of the wrongfully acquired land often remain at large and are more readily able to violently thwart restitution. The failure to significantly curb the power of paramilitary successor groups - which have committed many of the abuses against land claimants - also poses a major threat to restitution. To ensure that IDPs can safely return home, Human Rights Watch recommends that prosecutors work with land restitution authorities to vigorously pursue crimes against claimants in the areas where restitution is being implemented. Unless Colombia delivers justice for current and past abuses against land claimants and makes substantial progress in dismantling paramilitary successor groups, the threats and attacks will continue - and the Santos administration's signature human rights initiative could be fundamentally undermined. Details: New York: HRW, 2013. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia0913webwcover.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia0913webwcover.pdf Shelf Number: 131167 Keywords: Armed ConflictHuman Rights AbusesLand GrabsViolence |
Author: World Health Organization Title: Guns, knives and pesticides: reducing access to lethal means Summary: Evidence suggests that limiting access to firearms, knives and pesticides saves lives, prevents injuries and reduces costs to society. Homicide and suicide claim 600 000 and 844 000 human lives respectively, each year worldwide. This comes at a terrible cost to society - psychological and financial - and inhibits progress towards all eight of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals. This carnage could be significantly reduced, however, by limiting access to three of the most lethal means of violence: firearms, sharp objects (such as knives) and pesticides. Firearms: Jurisdictions with restrictive firearms legislation and lower firearms ownership tend to have lower levels of gun violence. Measures include bans, licensing schemes, minimum ages for buyers, background checks and safe storage requirements. Such measures have been successfully implemented in countries such as Austria and Brazil and in a number of states in the United States of America. Introducing national legislation can be complicated, but much can be done at local level. Stiffer enforcement, amnesties and improved security for state supplies of firearms are some of the other promising approaches. Multifaceted strategies are also needed to reduce demand for guns - diverting vulnerable youth from gang membership, for instance. Sharp objects: As well as control measures, governments need broad strategies to reduce socioeconomic factors underlying the violent use of these weapons. Less evidence is available on the impacts of efforts to reduce violence associated with sharp objects than for firearms. Until now concerned authorities have focused on similar measures to those used for the control of guns. In the United Kingdom these have included legislative reforms (bans on flick knives, minimum ages for purchasers etc.), stiffer enforcement ("stop-and-search" initiatives) and amnesties; however, their impact is not yet clear. Pesticides: Safer storage, bans and replacement by less toxic pesticides could prevent many of the estimated 370 000 suicides caused by ingestion of pesticides every year. Members of agricultural communities in low- and middle-income countries are heavily over-represented in the suicide death toll related to pesticides. Controlling access to pesticides is not only critical in reducing self-directed violence, it is key to preventing unintentional poisoning and terrorism. International conventions attempt to manage hazardous substances; however, many highly toxic pesticides are still widely used. Studies indicate that bans must be accompanied by evaluations of agricultural needs and replacement with low-risk alternatives for pest control. Further research is needed, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. The development of robust injury-data collection systems and further studies are required to deepen our understanding of the impacts of measures to reduce access to lethal means, especially in low- and middle-income countries. Details: Geneva: WHO, 2009. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Series of briefings on violence prevention: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44060/1/9789241597739_eng.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44060/1/9789241597739_eng.pdf Shelf Number: 145399 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceHomicidesKnivesViolenceViolence PreventionViolent CrimeWeapons |
Author: Van Metre, Lauren Title: Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya Summary: Focusing on six urban neighborhoods in Kenya, this report explores how key resilience factors have prevented or countered violent extremist activity at the local level. It is based on a one-year, mixed-method study led by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and supported by Sahan Research. Summary - Over the years, Kenya has conveyed an idyllic public image of a peaceful society in a region of conflict-ridden states. A much more contested narrative of a violent past exists, however. - Despite initiatives related to Christian-Muslim conflicts in the 1990s, a new regional security threat emerged, mainly revolving around the activities of al-Shabaab. - Groups like al-Shabaab understand and use a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render many vulnerable to recruitment. - Qualitative studies show a relationship between heavy-handed counterterrorism operations by security forces and radicalization of Kenya's Muslim population. - A paradox has emerged, where emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of target populations has collided with the dominance of hard military and security approaches to countering violent extremism. - The challenge with a concept like resilience to violence, which is both ambiguous and dynamic, is "for analytical purposes" to identify a concrete and measurable relationship. - Communities that prevent the emergence of violent conflict, or rebound more quickly after it, have everyday capacities to successfully harness against extremist violence. Communities with genuine associations with religious members from different groups experience less violent extremist activity. - Fluid religious and ethnic identities, which might lead to higher tolerance of and openness to members of other religions and tribal groups, do not explain community resilience to violent extremism. - Communities facing violent extremist threats need to develop resilience capacities and strategies. Without commensurate capacity and action, threats can overwhelm even highly resilient communities. - Heavy-handed security approaches not only increase the risk of violent extremist activity, they also undermine community resilience factors and relationships. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW122-Community-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW122-Community-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf Shelf Number: 145392 Keywords: Communities and ViolenceExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceRadical GroupsUrban AreasViolence |
Author: Royal College of Psychiatrists Title: Healthcare Commission National Audit of Violence 2006-7: Final Report -- Older People's Services Summary: This report describes the findings from the 2006/7 phase of the National Audit of Violence which was funded by the Healthcare Commission and managed by the Royal College of Psychiatrists' Centre for Quality Improvement. A total of 69 NHS trusts and independent sector organisations took part in the programme, representing 78% of all eligible participants in England and Wales. Work focused on two specialties – older people’s services and acute services. Data was collected between October 2006 and March 2007. This report presents the findings from older people's services. • The Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) states that 'It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees'. The audit found that 64% of nurses on older people's wards reported that they had been physically assaulted. These figures were higher than any other staff group in this specialty, or in services for adults of working age. As one nurse explained, "Sometimes it feels very much part of the daily routine to be either verbally or physically abused by patients." There are many causes of violence on wards. Trusts must use their local audit findings to develop plans that address their problems. • The Government expects that ‘Healthcare services are provided in environments which promote effective care and optimise health outcomes by being a safe and secure environment which protects patients, staff, visitors and their property, and the physical assets of the organisation’ (Core Standard C20a), yet over 40% of staff did not have access to a personal alarm, and 25% of nurses described the emergency alarm system on their ward as ineffective. Many environmental precipitants to violence are amenable to improvement and should be tackled as a matter of urgency. • The NICE Guideline (2005) details the training that those involved in preventing and managing violence on wards should receive: the audit revealed that staff in older people's services were less likely than their colleagues in services for working age adults, to have been trained. For example: although almost 80% of nurses were involved in managing incidents, only 66% of those had received the recommended training; many staff complained that their training was not tailored to the particular needs of older people’s services. Trusts must deal with shortfalls in training as a priority. • The Government’s Core Standard C13a requires that healthcare organisations have systems in place to ensure that staff treat patients, their relatives and carers with dignity and respect. The audit found high levels of compliance with the associated standards: 92% of patients reported that they had been cared for in a dignified manner; only 5% felt that their religious or cultural need had not been respected. Trusts should commend their staffs’ good practice. The NSF for Older People (2001) expects that older people will be treated as individuals and enabled to make choices about their own care. The audit revealed high levels of satisfaction with their experiences: 81% of carers reported that they had been asked to share information about their relative/friend’s likes, dislikes and fears; 98% said that they had witnessed staff caring for patients in a meaningful, person-centred way. This good practice should be shared between organisations. Local and national reports have been sent out to all participating wards and regional action planning workshops were held to support local teams to take forward service improvements. A series of 'change management' workshops are also being held to train staff to lead change within their services. The full report contains detailed findings and many quotations from participants that can help those who need to take action to get to the heart of the problems. Details: London: Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2008. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/PDF/OP%20Nat%20Report%20final%20for%20Leads.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/PDF/OP%20Nat%20Report%20final%20for%20Leads.pdf Shelf Number: 147913 Keywords: Healthcare OrganizationsHospital PatientsViolenceWorkplace Violence |
Author: Huff, Amber Title: Violence and Violence Reduction Efforts in Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Ivory Coast: Insights and Lessons towards Achieving SDG 16 Summary: The 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development states that, ‘repeated cycles of organized criminal violence and civil conflict that threaten development locally and regionally and are responsible for much of the global deficit in meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ (World Bank 2011: 46). As a result, peace and security emerged as a ‘core concern’ in the development of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda (Werner 2015: 348), and a remarkable high-level consensus has emerged on the basic elements of an approach to reduce violence across contexts. These include: (1) the need to create legitimate institutions, often through efforts to craft political settlements; (2) strengthening access to justice; (3) extending economic opportunities and employment, especially for young people; and (4) fostering societal resilience, through institutions as well as by considering the sustainability of interventions (Lind, Mitchell and Rohwerder 2016). Flowing from these ideas, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 aims to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels' by meeting targets that range from reduction of violence and related death rates everywhere, to reducing corruption and bribery in all their forms, ending all forms of legal discrimination and developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions (UNDP 2016a). Details: Brighton, UK:: Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Addressing and Mitigating Violence, Evidence Report No. 210: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12656/ER210_ViolenceandViolenceReductionEffortsinKenyaUgandaGhanaandIvoryCoast.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12656/ER210_ViolenceandViolenceReductionEffortsinKenyaUgandaGhanaandIvoryCoast.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 147957 Keywords: BriberyConflict-Related ViolenceCorruptionHomicidesViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Australian Institute of Criminology Title: Improving lighting to prevent non-domestic violence related assault. Handbook for local government Summary: This handbook forms part of a series of guides to help local governments in New South Wales implement evidence-based crime prevention strategies funded by the Department of Justice (DJ) Crime Prevention Programs (CPP). This handbook has been developed to help guide you through the various stages of planning, implementing and evaluating an improved lighting strategy to reduce non-domestic violence related assault (NDVRA) in your local government area. Using the handbook The handbook provides an overview of the key steps that are involved in delivering an improved lighting strategy to reduce NDVRA. These steps are classified under the following three stages: Stage 1: Planning Stage 2: Implementation; and Stage 3: Review. These steps do not necessarily need to be undertaken in order. You may undertake some steps concurrently, or you may need to go back and revisit earlier steps. However, it is vital that some steps be undertaken early on in the project, such as consulting stakeholders and planning for evaluation. The successful implementation of a strategy to prevent NDVRA will often be heavily influenced by the characteristics of the local community. This needs to be considered throughout the project. Details: Canberra: AIC, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2016 at: http://www.crimeprevention.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Councils-Handbooks/assault_lighting_handbook.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crimeprevention.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Councils-Handbooks/assault_lighting_handbook.pdf Shelf Number: 140314 Keywords: AssaultsCrime PreventionEvidence-Based ProgramsLightingSituational Crime PreventionViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Ogbozor, Ernest Title: Causes and Consequence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria Summary: The consequence of violent extremism on rural livelihoods has received less attention in academic literature. This paper addresses three fundamental questions: What are the socio-economic causes of terrorism and violent religious movements? What is the root cause of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria? And what are the consequences of Boko Haram's violence on rural livelihoods? Based on a review of the literature and current studies in Nigeria, this paper contends that violent extremism has a correlation with the socio-economic conditions in Northeast Nigeria, and there are direct and indirect impacts of extremism on rural livelihoods. The paper concludes with a suggestion of further studies on the drivers of violent extremism, and the rural livelihoods strategies for coping with extremist activities in Nigeria. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working Paper 227: Accessed December 8, 2016 at: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Shelf Number: 148136 Keywords: Extremists GroupsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Small Arms Survey Title: A Gendered Analysis of Violent Deaths Summary: Does the risk of violent death differ for men and women in conflict and non-conflict settings, and across regions and countries? Does it change over the course of a person’s life? And are women targeted because they are women? In other words, is such violence gender-based? Through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the international community has committed to reducing all forms of violence and related deaths (Target 16.1), and to eliminating violence against women and girls (Target 5.2). It has also undertaken to ensure the safety of public spaces (Target 11.7) (UNGA, 2015). Achieving these targets requires a detailed mapping of patterns and risk factors for lethal violence. The collection and analysis of data related to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is still in its infancy, but some broad trends and patterns can be identified nevertheless. This Research Note is the third in a series that presents the latest information from the Small Arms Survey's database on violent deaths (Small Arms Survey, n.d.; see Box 1). The first Note in the series examines broad trends in lethal violence, noting that while the global homicide rate has decreased slowly but steadily since 2004, conflict deaths have almost tripled in recent years, constituting 17 per cent of all the violent deaths in 2010–15 (Widmer and Pavesi, 2016a). The second report analyses the use of firearms as instruments of violence (Widmer and Pavesi, 2016b), while this third instalment in the series analyses available information on violent deaths, disaggregated by sex. It finds that: Globally, men and boys accounted for 84 per cent of the people who died violently in 2010–15; on average during that period, 64,000 women and girls—the remaining 16 per cent—were killed violently every year. The sub-regions with the highest violent death rates for women include Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. In sub-regions with low overall violent death rates, such as Western Europe, Eastern Asia, and Australia/New Zealand, the proportion of women who die violently is often above the global average. In the Afghan and Syrian conflicts, the proportion of women killed has been steadily increasing at least since sex-disaggregated data became available. In industrialized countries, the general decrease in homicide rates entailed a decline in the killing of women, but rates of domestic and intimate partner violence have proven particularly difficult to reduce. In 2015 or the latest year for which data is available, as many or more women than men suffered violent deaths in eight countries characterized by high income and low violence levels: Austria, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia, and Switzerland. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Note: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-63.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-63.pdf Shelf Number: 147374 Keywords: Conflict-Related ViolenceHomicidesMurdersViolence |
Author: Ochan, Clement Title: Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order Summary: This report from an understudied area details the effects of and responses to violence in Ikotos County in Eastern Equatoria in Southern Sudan. The author, from Southern Sudan himself, draws upon five years of experience, observation and interviews in Ikotos and supplements this information with data from interviews with local officials and community groups. Ikotos was spared much of the fighting during Sudan’s protracted north-south war, but has been host to violence and insecurity caused by tensions between sub-tribes, displacement brought by the presence of soldiers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and of the Government of Sudan (GoS), and activity by the Ugandan rebels, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The supply of weapons increased with the presence of the various armed groups. Cattle raids and revenge attacks among sub-tribes became increasingly deadly. By the 1990s Ikotos was infamous for its high rate of gun violence. This report examines the effects of violence on communities and the efforts of local leaders and civil society organizations to address and eventually curb this violence. Inhabited by a number of minority ethnic groups, this region of Southern Sudan has received relatively little attention over the years. This report provides valuable insights and analysis on the extent and repercussions of violence in the area, the gendered and generational effects of the insecurity, and the role of grassroots and official efforts to prevent the violence. This rich analysis allows for a better understand of both the prospects for stability and the implications for regional stability should peace not be realized. Details: Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, 2007. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Responding+to+Violence+in+Ikotos+County+South+Sudan.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Sudan URL: http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Responding+to+Violence+in+Ikotos+County+South+Sudan.pdf Shelf Number: 147791 Keywords: Conflict-Related ViolenceViolence |
Author: Grace, Anita Title: Organized Urban Violence: An Examination of the Threat of Organized Armed Groups to Urban Environments Summary: This research contributes to the assessment of urban violence by developing a category of urban violence, namely organized urban violence (OUV), defined as that which is generated by urban non-state organized armed groups (OAGs) who exert territorial and social control in urban areas. Through detailed examination of academic and policy literature, this thesis explores the types of non-state OAGs involved in urban violence – such as private security companies (PSCs), vigilantes, gangs, and organized crime groups – their characteristics and their impacts on urban environments. The category of OUV is further developed through two case studies: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Cape Town, South Africa – cities which have a proliferation of urban non-state OAGs and high levels of urban violence. Details: Ottawa: Saint Paul University, 2011. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 23, 2016 at: https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/20009 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/20009 Shelf Number: 147787 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceNeighborhoods and CrimeOrganized CrimeUrban Areas and CrimeViolence |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2016. Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's GameChangers 2016, where we highlight the most important trends in organized crime in the Americas. This year we put a spotlight on crime and corruption among the region's political elites, while reporting on government struggles to corral criminality fueled by street gangs, drug cartels and Marxist rebels alike. Top government officials spent much of the year fending off accusations of corruption and organized crime with varying degrees of success. At the center of the storm was Brazil, where government deals led to bribes and kickbacks that over time reached into the billions of dollars. The top casualty of the scandal was Dilma Rousseff who, ironically, was ousted from the presidency for misuse of funds, not corruption. In reality, it is her Worker's Party that more resembles a criminal organization than she does. Like a mafia, the party collected and distributed money to keep the wheels of political power moving and laundered that money through elaborate schemes involving construction companies and offshore accounts. Rousseff's mentor, the celebrated former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was charged with what appeared to be the type of routine payments all Brazilian politicians and ex-politicians get from the movement of state contracts. Indeed, those who ousted Rousseff are facing similar corruption allegations, illustrating just how institutionalized the problem appears to be. Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro is facing down a different type of crisis, one that includes an economic emergency, widespread corruption and rising crime rates at home, and an increasing number of current and ex-officials charged with drug trafficking abroad. The US government's case against the first lady's "Narco Nephews" got most of the headlines, but numerous other former military officials are revealing to US investigators just what the Venezuelan government looks like from the inside. It is a not a pretty picture, and Maduro's domestic and international issues appear to be pushing him into tighter alliances with the criminal elements in his government. Guatemala's Attorney General's Office and its United Nations-backed appendage, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), continued to arrest and charge more suspects from the mafia state established under former President Otto Pérez Molina, his Vice President Roxana Baldetti and their Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota - PP). The most startling and revealing case was one they termed the "cooptación del estado," or the "Cooptation of the State," a scheme involving numerous campaign contributors whose return on investment was guaranteed once the PP took power in 2012. Among those arrested for the Cooptation of the State case was former Interior Minister Mauricio López Bonilla. Once a staunch US counter-drug ally and hero from that country's civil war, López Bonilla is also being investigated for his multiple shady deals with drug traffickers such as Marllory Chacón Rossell, to whom he provided a government protection service even after she was accused of money laundering by the US Treasury Department; and with Byron Lima, a former army captain who was killed in jail amidst a public squabble with the former interior minister. Potential corruption and organized crime cases continue to shake the foundations of Guatemala, including one that connects a now extradited drug trafficker to the current vice president and a corruption scandal connected to the current president's son and his brother. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2016. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2017 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140596 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal Networks Drug Trafficking (South America) Gangs Organized Crime Street Gangs Violence |
Author: Police Foundation Title: Reducing Violent Crime in American Cities: An Opportunity to Lead. Summary: On the national level, crime remains historically low. However, this national aggregate paints a deceiving picture of crime in many major cities. Individual cities experienced grim spikes in violent crime from 2014 to 2015 and through 2016 as well. As such, defining violent crime levels based solely on the national aggregates and distributing federal resources accordingly does not address local realities. The national statistics do not depict the suffering endured by families and individuals living in communities plagued by violence, nor do they depict the frustration felt by local law enforcement leaders who often are seen as responsible officials in their communities. Unfortunately for these leaders and the communities they serve, the federal support actually received to help combat violent crime is often calculated based on national statistics and the perspective of decision-makers in Washington, D.C. At the federal level, law enforcement agencies are tasked with a variety of missions and often cannot or do not prioritize localized violent crime over enforcing other laws and addressing other priorities. The mixture of varied prioritization, flat or reduced funding, traditional approaches, and limited authorities stifles an effective federal response despite the best intentions, hard work, and bravery of federal special agents, investigators, professional staff, and their agencies. Chapter 1 of this report provides a contextual overview and supporting data on the spike in localized violent crime in major cities, a review of the major drivers of crime, and an assertion that federal support is critical. Because collection and aggregation of crime data is disparate in police departments across the country, the extent of the increase in violent crime is difficult to specify. However, one important indicator is that the 2015 Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data1 show an increase in all violent crime types from 2014 to 2015. In addition, a survey of major city police chiefs ranked gang violence (87.8%), drug-related disputes (79.6%), and access to illegal firearms (71.4%) as the top drivers of violent crime. The chapter asserts that despite the generally low levels of crime throughout the nation, the federal government must continue to prioritize violent crime and public safety concerns and focus its attention on local public safety crises, as a number of jurisdictions across the country live in a constant state of fear. What is required from federal agencies, is leadership in propelling an agenda in which violent crime is both a budgetary and policy priority and in addressing problems with evidence-based solutions. Chapter 2 reviews broad federal law enforcement priorities, roles, resources, and accountability in the context of the nation’s fight against violent crime. A Police Foundation study found that while local law enforcement receives federal resources, many of these resources are allocated according to factors other than what is affecting local communities. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) characterizes violent crime as its eighth priority, well behind its number one priority of fighting terrorism. Moreover, no federal agency prioritizes violent crime as its most important issue. Accordingly, the new Administration and Congress must make violent crime, and the federal government’s interest in violent crime, a top priority and be willing to dedicate the resources needed to assist in places where public safety is jeopardized. Major city chiefs interviewed stressed the need for better partnerships in combatting violent crime. Federal policy leaders must work with local law enforcement to improve federal support to fight violent crime. Using the latest crime data, federal, state, and local partnerships, based on shared decision-making and coproduction of public safety, is critical. Chapter 3 provides a detailed examination of the tools that federal law enforcement agencies provide to support those on the state and local levels to address violent crime. The data presented provides an overview of federal initiatives, tools, and roles that have shown evidence of sustainable success in reducing violent crime. Major city police chiefs provided information on federal law enforcement agencies, programs, and tools that have assisted them and stated that the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) show the most interest in prioritizing violent crime. They also found federal support through the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) and the National Tracing Center (NTC) to be the most useful tools. Chapter 4 reviews the importance of U.S. Attorneys in fighting violent crime. It provides information indicating that police chiefs consider the support of U.S. Attorneys to be critical in fighting localized violent crime. Acting as the chief federal law enforcement officer in each judicial district, U.S. Attorneys must act as chief conveners to lead strategic collaborations that build strong federal cases that will impact localized violent crime. This chapter also stresses that the fight against violent crime and criminal justice reform are not mutually exclusive. Chapter 5 provides a detailed review of the impact of firearms availability on violent crime in the U.S. Law enforcement executives expressed their concerns that the most significant threat to the Second Amendment is the misuse of firearms and the ability of criminals to access them. Gun trafficking, illegal gun markets, theft, and illegal diversion are important issues that have not been addressed sufficiently. Legislation and federal tools available to regulate illegal gun markets and keep guns out of the hands of those looking to cause harm are inadequate. Background checks, for example, should be retooled and strengthened, and laws that restrict the effectiveness of federal law enforcement in enforcing them should be eliminated. This report is not intended as a criticism of any previous Presidential Administration, its leaders or appointees, or of the hardworking, professional men and women in federal law enforcement agencies, many of whom began their careers as state or local law enforcement officers. Instead, this report looks toward the new Administration, which has an opportunity to leverage the lessons of the past and lead a legacy of change for the future. In doing so, it will have the opportunity to set forth a new strategy to keep national crime rates at historically low levels while reducing disparate impacts in our major cities and elsewhere. The recommendations in this report create an overarching, new strategy to understand and address violence in today’s cities. They include prioritization and non-traditional approaches, openness and sharing of data, expansion of available technologies, and calls for immediate Congressional and Executive Branch action. The recommendations presented in this report echo similar concerns expressed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors where New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu presented information regarding a forthcoming report, entitled Securing America, to the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) at its October 2016 meeting. The MCCA members expressed substantial concurrence with the forthcoming report. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PF-MCCA_Reducing-Violent-Crime-in-American-Cities_FullReport_RGB.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PF-MCCA_Reducing-Violent-Crime-in-American-Cities_FullReport_RGB.pdf Shelf Number: 144883 Keywords: Crime PreventionEvidence-Based PracticesGun-Related ViolenceIntelligence GatheringViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Beall, Jo Title: PD4: mitigating conflict and violence in Africa's rapidly growing cities Summary: Over the past 50 years, the urban population of sub-Saharan Africa has expanded at a historically unprecedented rate. Although there is little evidence that urbanisation increases the likelihood of conflict or violence in a country, Africa’s urban transition has occurred in a context of economic stagnation and poor governance, producing conditions conducive to social unrest and violence. In order to improve urban security in the years ahead the underlying risk factors must be addressed, including urban poverty, inequality and fragile political institutions. This, in turn, requires improving urban governance in the region, including strengthening the capacity of local government institutions, addressing the complex political dynamics that impede effective urban planning and management, and cultivating integrated development strategies that involve cooperation between various tiers and spheres of government and civil society. Details: London: Government Office for Science, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41855/1/pd4-mitigating-conflict-in-africas-cities.pdf%28lsero%29.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41855/1/pd4-mitigating-conflict-in-africas-cities.pdf%28lsero%29.pdf Shelf Number: 146246 Keywords: Conflict ViolenceHomicidesSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens Summary: Individuals and groups who use violence in ways that threaten the United States, its allies, or its partners habitually find or create ways to operate with impunity or without detection. Whether for private financial gain (e.g., by narcotics and arms traffickers) or for harmful political aims (e.g., by insurgents, terrorists, and other violent extremists), these illicit operations are most successful "and most dangerous" when their perpetrators have a place or situation that can provide refuge from efforts to combat or counter them. Such places and situations are often called safe havens, and potential safe havens are sometimes called ungoverned areas. A key component of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stabilization, peacekeeping, and other such efforts is to reduce the size and effectiveness of the safe havens that protect illicit actors. Agencies in defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and other areas all have capabilities that can be applied to countering such threats and building the capacity and legitimacy of U.S. partners to prevent ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas from becoming safe havens. To do this effectively requires careful consideration of all the geographical, political, civil, and resource factors that make safe havens possible; a sober appreciation of the complex ways those factors interact; and deeper collaboration among U.S. government offices and units that address such problems - whether operating openly, discreetly, or covertly - to ensure unity of effort. This report offers a framework that can be used to systematically account for these considerations in relevant strategies, capabilities, and doctrines/best practices. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Shelf Number: 146248 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingPublic SafetySafe HavensViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Irwin-Rogers, Keir Title: Social Media as a Catalyst and Trigger for Youth Violence Summary: Social media now plays a central role in the lives of young people in the UK, with the vast majority of teenagers using smartphones and tablets to access online platforms throughout their waking hours. The integration of social media into the daily lives of young people has left online - offline boundaries increasingly blurred. Whilst online activity offers huge potential to enhance the quantity and quality of communication between people across the world, it also raises some serious challenges. This report focuses on one of these challenges, namely, the links between young people's use of social media and youth violence. Whilst social media platforms are being used to glamorise, display and incite serious acts of violence, this content currently drifts under the radar of responsible adults and organisations which have the potential to respond to and challenge this behaviour. The report makes for uncomfortable reading, particularly for those who work with young people and recognise the daily challenges that many face. The attitudes and behaviour of the young people discussed in this report must be viewed within the wider social and economic context of their lives. Many will have grown up in areas of socioeconomic deprivation, may be struggling to cope with serious issues around trauma stemming from early childhood experiences and are therefore exhibiting attitudes and behaviours that are tragically understandable when considered in this context. All of the findings presented in this report are intended to be read in light of the above. By highlighting the ways in which social media is acting as a catalyst and trigger for serious incidents of violence between young people in real life, the report provides a springboard for action and collaborative exchanges between a full range of stakeholders as we move forward. It identifies a number of measures aimed at preventing young people harming, and being harmed by, other young people as a result of activity on social media. Its recommendations, however, should not be taken as a fixed blueprint, but as a means of kick-starting the development of appropriate and effective policy and practice in this area. 1.1 Key findings - No holds barred online: Because social media is commonly perceived to be hidden from adults, a virtual free-for-all space has emerged in which a small minority of young people share various forms of material that both display and incite serious incidents of violence in real life. - Impact of the smartphone: Whilst some of the online activities discussed in this report have been occurring for several years, they now pose far greater challenges because of the recent developments in smartphone technology, which have radically altered both the nature and prevalence of young people's use of social media. - Growing audience: By collapsing time and space, social media platforms are providing young people with unprecedented opportunities to disrespect one another. Before the advent of these platforms, incidents of violence, disrespect and provocation were typically confined to relatively small audiences, as well as a single location and point in time. Now, however, visceral displays of violence and disrespect are being captured via photographs and videos, and may be replayed at any time as the content spreads virally over multiple platforms. In addition, the enhanced audience size facilitated by social media makes violent retaliation more likely because of the unprecedented potential for disrespectful online activity to undermine young people's perceived status and reputation. - Threats and provocation in music videos: Young people and professionals reported concerns around what they referred to as drill music videos, which threaten and provoke individuals and groups from rival areas. A clear distinction must be made between the vast majority of music videos that simply provide a raw reflection of the realities of young people's lives (content that does not provoke real-life violence), and a much smaller number of videos that go well beyond this, through displays of young people brandishing weapons, incendiary remarks about recent incidents of young people being seriously injured and killed, and explicit threats to stab or shoot specific individuals and members of rival groups. - Violent intent is the exception rather than the norm: It is important to highlight that the vast majority of young people do not want to live the violent and risky lifestyles that are being glamorised in drill music videos. Many attempt to launch careers as music artists as a means of escaping life 'on road'. In addition, these videos should not be seen as a root cause of youth violence. According to young people and professionals, however, they are acting as a catalyst and trigger for serious incidents of face-to-face violence between young people. - Daily exposure to online violence: A small minority of young people are exposed daily to social media content that displays or incites serious violence in real life. This includes uploads of photos and videos of individuals and groups trespassing into areas associated with rival groups, and serious incidents of theft and violence perpetrated against young people. Some of the latter are being taken within prison settings 5 and broadcast live over social media by prisoners with access to smartphones. Some social media accounts are dedicated entirely to archiving and sharing material that displays young people being seriously harmed, disrespected and humiliated. - Social pressures: When young people are disrespected by content uploaded to social media, this can generate significant social pressure to retaliate in real life to protect their perceived status and reputation. Moreover, when young people witness graphic displays of real-life violence involving their friends and family, this can leave them suffering from significant levels of anxiety and trauma. Those who initially upload the content disrespecting a particular individual or group become prone to retaliatory acts of serious violence and theft, which in turn are often recorded and broadcast over social media, creating a vicious cycle of retaliation. - Vulnerability of young women: Professionals and young people reported cases of girls being violently attacked and sexually assaulted by members of rival groups after appearing in content uploaded online. In addition, professionals described cases in which young women who commented on content uploaded to social media were subsequently groomed and pressured into risky activities such as holding and storing weapons or drugs. - Negative implications for education and employment: The social media accounts of some people who self-identify as being part of a street gang are being followed by tens of thousands of young people. This continuous lens into a seemingly seductive and lucrative lifestyle that glamorises violence and the pursuit of money through illegal activities such as drug distribution further undermines the commitment of some young people to education and legitimate forms of employment. Details: London: Catch22, 2017. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 6, 2017 at: http://eugangs.eu/pdf/05012017/Catch22-Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://eugangs.eu/pdf/05012017/Catch22-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 146029 Keywords: Media ViolenceOnline VictimizationSmartphonesSocial MediaViolenceViolent CrimeYouth Violence |
Author: Chioda, Laura Title: Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood. Overview booklet. Summary: For a long time, the logic seemed unassailable: Crime and violence were historically thought of as symptoms of a country’s early stages of development that could be "cured" with economic growth and reductions in poverty, unemployment, and inequality. More recently, however, our understanding has changed. Studies now show that economic progress does not necessarily bring better security to the streets. Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean exemplify this point. Between 2003 and 2011, average annual regional growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding the global crisis of 2009, reached nearly 5 percent. What’s more, the growth rate among the bottom 40 percent of the population eclipsed that of the same group in every other region of the world. During that same decade, the region experienced unprecedented economic and social progress: extreme poverty was cut by more than half, to 11.5 percent; income inequality dropped more than 7 percent in the Gini index; and, for the first time in history, the region had more people in the middle class than in poverty. Despite all this progress, the region retained its undesirable distinction as the world’s most violent region, with 23.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The rate of homicide actually accelerated during the latter half of the decade. The problem remains staggering and stubbornly persistent. Every 15 minutes, at least four people are victims of homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2013, of the top 50 most violent cities in the world, 42 were in the region. And between 2005 and 2012, the annual growth rate of homicides was more than three times higher than population growth. Not surprisingly, the number of Latin Americans who mention crime as their top concern tripled during those years. Violence makes people withdraw, hide behind closed doors, and avoid public spaces, weakening interpersonal and social ties that bind us as a community. Insecurity is the result of a combination of many factors, from drug trafficking and organized crime, to weak judicial and law enforcement systems that promote impunity, to a lack of opportunities and support for young people who live in deprived communities. Youth bear a disproportionate share of the risk of committing and falling victim to violence, with important repercussions for their life trajectories and society as a whole. The complexity of the issue (and multiplicity of its causes) is one of its defining characteristics and the main reason why there is no magic formula or a single policy that will fix the violence in our region. We will not solve the problem by relying only on greater police action or greater incarceration, or through more education or employment. We must do all this and do it in a deliberate way, based on reliable data and proven approaches, while continuously striving to fill existing knowledge and data gaps to improve policy design. To that end, Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood is a significant contribution. This report takes a new and comprehensive look at much of the evidence that now exists in preventing crime and violence. It identifies novel approaches —both in Latin America and elsewhere—that have been shown to reduce antisocial behavior at different stages in life. Effective prevention starts even before birth, the report argues, and, contrary to common perceptions, well-designed policies can also be successful later in life, even with at-risk individuals and offenders. The report emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to tackle violence, and it highlights the benefits and cost-effectiveness of redesigning existing policies through the lens of crime prevention. This will require substantial coordination across ministries, as well as accountable and efficient institutions. While economic and social development do not necessarily lead to a reduction in crime and violence, high levels of crime and violence do take a toll on development. And in that regard, we at the World Bank are fully aware that in order to succeed in our goals to eradicate extreme poverty and boost prosperity, the unrivaled levels of crime and violence in the region need to come to an end. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25920/210664ov.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Latin America URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25920/210664ov.pdf Shelf Number: 144833 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Osorio, Javier Title: Hobbes on Drugs: Understanding Drug Violence in Mexico Summary: This dissertation analyzes the unprecedented eruption of organized criminal violence in Mexico. To understand the dynamics of drug violence, this dissertation addresses three questions. What explains the onset of the war on drugs in Mexico? Once the conflict starts, why does drug violence escalate so rapidly? And lastly, why is there subnational variation in the concentration of violence? Based on a game theoretic model, the central argument indicates that democratization erodes the peaceful configurations between the state and criminal organizations and motivates authorities to fight crime, thus triggering a wave of violence between the state and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups fighting to control strategic territories. In this account, state action is not neutral: law enforcement against a criminal group generates the opportunity for a rival criminal organization to invade its territory, thus leading to violent interactions among rival criminal groups. These dynamics of violence tend to concentrate in territories favorable for the reception, production and distribution of drugs. In this way, the disrupting effect of law enforcement unleashes a massive wave of violence of all-against-all resembling a Hobbesian state of war. To test the observable implications of the theory, the empirical assessment relies on a novel database of geo-referenced daily event data at municipal level providing detailed information on who did what to whom, when and where in the Mexican war on drugs. This database covers all municipalities of the country between 2000 and 2010, thus comprising about 9.8 million observations. The creation of this fine-grained database required the development of Eventus ID, a novel software for automated coding of event data from text in Spanish. The statistical assessment relies on quasi-experimental identification strategies and time-series analysis to overcome problems of causal inference associated with analyzing the distinct - yet overlapping - processes of violence between government authorities and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups. In addition, the statistical analysis is complemented with insights from fieldwork and historical process tracing. Results provide strong support for the empirical implications derived from the theoretical model. Details: Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2013. 485p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Shelf Number: 150551 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Firearms and Violent Deaths in Europe: An Exploratory Analysis of the Linkages Between Gun Ownership, Firearms Legislation and Violent Death Summary: On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter were killed by firearms in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). Every year, over 4000 suicides by firearm are registered in the EU. This means that, on average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population in Europe every year. Compared with the US or other countries around the globe, the rates of gun-related violent death in Europe are rather low, certainly where the homicide rates are concerned. This does not mean, however, that the problem of gun violence has not appeared on the European policy radar in recent years. On the contrary, the attention devoted to the problem by law enforcement agencies and policy-makers has been growing. Reacting not only to shooting incidents such as those mentioned above, but also to warnings by police and law enforcement agencies that criminals are increasingly willing to use (heavy) firearms and that illegal trafficking in firearms is on the rise, a number of European countries have announced policy interventions targeted at reducing levels of gun-related violence and crime. The European Commission has also become an active actor in firearms policy. In October 2013 it announced a plan to reduce gun violence in Europe, in which it defined the misuse of firearms, whether legally-owned or illicitly manufactured or acquired, as "a serious threat to the EU's security from both an internal and an external perspective". One of the major problems the Commission identified in its initial policy papers was the problem of a lack of sound and adequate knowledge about firearms in Europe. The commission noted that "a lack of solid EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy and operational responses". One of the ambitions of the EU’s firearms policy is, therefore, to address the gaps in knowledge concerning gun violence. An additional problem is that the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on firearms in Europe is not limited to the sphere of law enforcement and policy-making. European scholarly research focusing specifically on firearms availability, gun control and gun-related violence is scarce. There is a research community in Europe focusing on small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it is predominantly concerned with the export of firearms and the connections between these arms flows and violence in developing, transitional or fragile states outside Europe. Scientific research on firearms and gun-related violence in the domestic European context is much less advanced. The scanty research efforts made in this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of research results. Given this relative lack of European firearms research, American studies are still clearly dominant at present in research on the links between the availability of firearms and gun-related violence. Greene and Marsh have calculated that out of the 665 studies on firearms and violence that they reviewed, 64% were about the USA. Of the remaining studies not on the USA, 13% concerned cross-national comparisons or articles in which the geographical focus was unspecified (such as reviews), while 8% were about developing countries. Only 15% concerned other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK and Germany. Given the particularities of the American context, and more specifically the fact that the US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths and crime among industrialized democracies, simply transposing the results of American research to the European context is problematic. What are the levels of firearms availability in Europe? Are there links between the levels of gun ownership in European countries and these countries’ rates of violence and violent death? And what is the impact of European gun laws on public safety and health? The absence of evidence specifically for the European context makes it difficult for policy-makers and researchers to find impartial and unbiased answers to these questions. Hence the pressing need for research that specifically focuses on gun-related violence in the European context: and with the present report, we would like to make a contribution to that effort. As we are moving into largely uncharted territory, our analysis of the European situation will necessarily be exploratory. Our primary ambition is to collect and take stock of the fragmented evidence that is available on gun-related violence in Europe. Our geographical coverage will be broader than the EU and encompasses a group of approximately 40 European countries, although in some instances we will limit our analyses to the EU28. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2015. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://www.vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/firearms_and_violent_deaths_in_europe_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/firearms_and_violent_deaths_in_europe_web.pdf Shelf Number: 141048 Keywords: Gun ControlGun OwnershipGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceGunsHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Global Witness Title: Honduras: The Deadliest Place to Defend the Planet Summary: Sandwiched between Guatemala and Nicaragua on the Caribbean coast, Honduras is blanketed in forest and rich in valuable minerals. But the proceeds of this natural wealth are enjoyed by a very small section of society. Honduras has the highest levels of inequality in the whole of Latin America, with around six out of ten households in rural areas living in extreme poverty, on less than US$2.50 per day. This report documents shocking levels of violence and intimidation suffered by rural communities for taking a stand against the imposition of dams, mines, logging or agriculture on their land – projects that are controlled by rich and powerful elites, among them members of the political class. The root causes of these abuses are widespread corruption and the failure to properly consult those affected by these projects. Details: Global Witness, 2017. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/honduras-deadliest-country-world-environmental-activism/ Year: 2017 Country: Honduras URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/honduras-deadliest-country-world-environmental-activism/ Shelf Number: 146985 Keywords: Environmental CrimesNatural ResourcesOffenses Against the EnvironmentViolence |
Author: Resource Development Associates Title: Oakland Unite: Overview of Evaluation Findings and Recommendations Summary: Resource Development Associates (RDA) has been the external evaluator for the City of Oakland's Measure Y initiative since 2008. In that role, RDA has worked with the City's Human Services Department (HSD) and contracted service providers to design and implement a mixed-methods evaluation to examine both the implementation and the impact of Oakland Unite Violence Prevention Programs. This memo is intended to provide an overview of evaluation findings to date, along with recommendations for improving Oakland Unite programs and the broader Oakland Unite service delivery infrastructure. Evaluation Overview Over the past 8 years, RDA has used a mixed methods approach to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of the Oakland Unite initiative, as well as of specific Oakland Unite strategies, and of individual Oakland Unite programs. Our qualitative data collection activities have included interviews and focus groups with a range of Oakland Unite stakeholders, including both executive-level and line staff in community-based service providers, program participants, and leadership from partner agencies, such as the Oakland Police Department (OPD), Oakland Unified School District (OUSD), Alameda County Health Care Services Agency (ACHCSA), and more. In addition, the evaluation team has collected a range of quantitative data, including client-level service data from Oakland HSD's CitySpan data system; justic esystem data from Alameda County Probation Department's (ACPD) Juvenile Division, ACPD's Adult Division, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); OUSD data on youth attendance, suspensions, and expulsions; and client surveys on development assets, service quality, and more. Overview of Recommendations Drawing on our knowledge of the Oakland Unite programs, our experience in violence prevention, and conversations with experts in the field, the RDA team developed a set of recommendations intended to improve future programming by leveraging current programmatic strengths and addressing areas of need and challenge. These recommendations are grounded in best practices and the current needs of Oakland's crime prevention programs. Informed by discussions with Oakland Unite leadership, partners from other public agencies, and conversations with clients and providers, RDA conducted reviews of best practices in the areas of criminal justice, violence prevention, case management, social work, and mental health. We triangulated these best practices with our evaluation findings to develop a series of targeted recommendations. Below, we present an overview of our evaluation findings along with recommendations for addressing challenges identified in our evaluations. Details: Oakland, CA: Resource Development Associates, 2015. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2017 at: http://oaklandunite.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/RDA-Eval-Recommendations-Memo_20150520_STC.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://oaklandunite.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/RDA-Eval-Recommendations-Memo_20150520_STC.pdf Shelf Number: 146671 Keywords: CollaborationPartnershipsViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Resource Development Associates Title: Oakland Unite Violence Prevention Programs Retrospective Evaluation: 2005-2013 Summary: The City of Oakland's Measure Y ordinance provides approximately $6 million annually for the City to spend on violence prevention programs (VPP), with an emphasis on services for youth and children. The four service areas identified in the legislation and funded via Measure Y include: 1) youth outreach counselors; 2) after and in-school programs for youth and children; 3) domestic violence and child abuse counselors; and 4) offender/parolee employment training. The City's Human Services Department (HSD) is responsible for implementing the VPP component of the Measure Y legislation, which it does through the Oakland Unite programs. In consultation with the Measure Y Oversight Committee and the City Council's Public Safety Committee, HSD develops triennial funding strategies that align with the services delineated in the legislation and that meet the shifting needs of the City of Oakland. HSD then administers and monitors grants to community-based organizations and public agencies that provide these services across the City. Since 2008, the City of Oakland has contracted with Resource Development Associates (RDA) to evaluate various components of Measure Y, including the Oakland Unite Violence Prevention Programs. Over the past six years, these evaluations have taken a variety of approaches to assessing the implementation and effectiveness of Oakland Unite, collecting a range of qualitative and quantitative data to evaluate individual programs, funding strategies, and the initiative as a whole. This report integrates these approaches to provide a retrospective analysis of Oakland Unite, with a focus on the programs and strategies that directly address crime and violence, from the initiative's inception in 2005 through Fiscal Year 2012-2013. In particular, the evaluation examines: - How the Oakland Unite service model has changed over time, including target population, service array, and service dosage; - How participants' justice system involvement changes after participation in Oakland Unite programs; and - How participants' post-service justice system contact has changed over the course of the initiative. Details: Oakland, CA: Resource Development Associates, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2017 at: http://oaklandunite.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/OU-VPP_Retrospective_Report-FINAL.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://oaklandunite.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/OU-VPP_Retrospective_Report-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 146672 Keywords: CollaborationPartnerships Violence Violence Prevention Violent Crime |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar Summary: Following the outbreak of deadly intercommunal clashes in Rakhine State in 2012, anti-Muslim violence has spread to other parts of Myanmar. The depth of anti-Muslim sentiment in the country, and the inadequate response of the security forces, mean that further clashes are likely. Unless there is an effective government response and change in societal attitudes, violence could spread, impacting on Myanmar's transition as well as its standing in the region and beyond. The violence has occurred in the context of rising Burman-Buddhist nationalism, and the growing influence of the monk-led "969" movement that preaches intolerance and urges a boycott of Muslim businesses. This is a dangerous combination: considerable pent-up frustration and anger under years of authoritarianism are now being directed towards Muslims by a populist political force that cloaks itself in religious respectability and moral authority. Anti-Indian and anti-Muslim violence is nothing new in Myanmar. It is rooted in the country's colonial history and demographics, and the rise of Burman nationalism in that context. Deadly violence has erupted regularly in different parts of the country in the decades since. But the lifting of authoritarian controls and the greater availability of modern communications mean that there is a much greater risk of the violence spreading. Among the most discriminated against populations in Myanmar is the Muslim community in northern Rakhine State, the Rohingya. Most are denied citizenship, and face severe restrictions on freedom of movement as well as numerous abusive policies. In June and October 2012, clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State left almost 200 people dead and around 140,000 displaced, the great majority of them Muslims. Communities remain essentially segregated to this day, and the humanitarian situation is dire. In early 2013, the violence spread to central Myanmar. The worst incident occurred in the town of Meiktila, where a dispute at a shop led to anti-Muslim violence. The brutal killing of a Buddhist monk sharply escalated the situation, with two days of riots by a 1,000-strong mob resulting in widespread destruction of Muslim neighbourhoods, and leaving at least 44 people dead, including twenty students and several teachers massacred at an Islamic school. There has been strong domestic and international criticism of the police response. In Rakhine State, the police – who are overwhelmingly made up of Rakhine Buddhists – reportedly had little ability to stop the attacks, and there are allegations of some being complicit in the violence. The army, once it was deployed, performed better. In Meiktila, the police were apparently incapable of controlling the angry crowds that gathered outside the shop, and were hopelessly outnumbered and ineffective when the clashes rapidly escalated. The violence has regional implications. There has been a sharp increase in the number of Muslims making the treacherous journey by boat from Rakhine State to other countries in the region, prompting public criticism from some of those countries. The intercommunal tensions have also spilled over Myanmar's borders, with the murders of Myanmar Buddhists in Malaysia, and related violence in other countries. There have also been threats of jihad against Myanmar, and plots and attacks against Myanmar or Buddhist targets in the region. As Myanmar prepares to take over the rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2014, this could become a serious political issue. The Myanmar government understands what is at stake. President Thein Sein has spoken publicly on the dangers of the violence, and announced a "zero-tolerance" approach. The police response has been improving somewhat, with faster and more effective interventions bringing incidents under control more quickly. And after some delay, perpetrators of these crimes are being prosecuted and imprisoned, although there are concerns that Buddhists sometimes appear to be treated more leniently. But much more needs to be done. Beyond improved riot-control training and equipment for police, broader reform of the police service is necessary so that it can be more effective and trusted, particularly at the community level, including officers from ethnic and religious minorities. This is only just starting. The government and society at large must also do more to combat extremist rhetoric, in public, in the media and online. At a moment of historic reform and opening, Myanmar cannot afford to become hostage to intolerance and bigotry. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-dark-side-of-transition-violence-against-muslims-in-myanmar.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Burma URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-dark-side-of-transition-violence-against-muslims-in-myanmar.pdf Shelf Number: 146641 Keywords: Bias-Motivated CrimesHate CrimesIntoleranceMuslimsViolence |
Author: Caprirolo, Dino Title: Custos de bem-estar do crime no Brasil: Um país de contrastes (Cost of welfare of crime in Brazil: A Country of Contrasts) Summary: n 2014, violence cost US $ 75,894 million to Brazil or 3.14% of GDP. This represents 53% of the total cost of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Brazil stands out for its high spending on private security (48% of the total cost of crime). Public expenditure is the second largest component (36% of costs), while social costs make up the smallest part (16% of the cost). The cost of crime between states and regions is similar in terms of heterogeneity to that observed in LAC countries. There are states whose cost corresponds to about 2% of GDP, while in others violence costs about three times more. The heterogeneity also manifests itself in terms of composition: in some states, social costs represent a relatively large share, while in others, public or private spending accounts for the highest costs of crime. Details: Washington, DC Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento. Divisão de Capacidade Institucional do Estado, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Nota técnica do BID ; 1243: Accessed February 24, 2017 at: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/8131/Custos-de-bem-estar-do-crime-no-Brasil-um-pais-de-contrastes.pdf?sequence=1 (In Portuguese) Year: 2017 Country: Brazil URL: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/8131/Custos-de-bem-estar-do-crime-no-Brasil-um-pais-de-contrastes.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 141209 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCosts of ViolenceEconomics of CrimeViolenceViolent CrimeWelfare |
Author: Romero, Vidal Title: How do Crime and Violence Impact Presidential Approval? Examining the Dynamics of the Mexican Case Summary: In order to effectively fight criminal organizations, governments require support from significant segments of society. If citizens have a positive assessment of the executive’s job, the likelihood that they will report crimes, and act as allies in the fight increases. This provides important leverage for incumbents, and allows them to continue their policies. Yet, winning the hearts and minds of citizens is not an easy endeavor. Crime and violence affect citizens' most valuable assets: life and property. Thus, one would expect a close relationship between public security and presidential approval? To generate robust answers to this question, and its multiple implications, we use Mexico as a case study, and use data at both the aggregate and at the individual level. We find that approval levels are indeed affected by crime, but not by all crimes. Perhaps surprisingly, they are not affected by the most serious of crimes: homicide. At the individual level, we find that support for the mere act of fighting organized crime has a stronger effect on approval than actual performance on public security. We also find no effect of crime victimization on approval at the individual level. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Papers, Vol. 142: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/142.Magaloni_DiazCayeros_Romero_ApprovalandCrime_v1.4..pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/142.Magaloni_DiazCayeros_Romero_ApprovalandCrime_v1.4..pdf Shelf Number: 141227 Keywords: HomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Moestue, Helen Title: "When Kids Call the Shots": Testing a Child Security Index in Recife, Brazil Summary: The Child Security Index (CSI) is a comprehensive assessment of children's perception of everyday violence. It consists of a digital survey that registers their fears, hopes, thoughts, beliefs and day-to-day experiences. The CSI is an open source application and online dashboard that spatially and temporally maps survey-collected data. The CSI was designed to identify the views of children between 8 and 12 years old, and for younger children through the use of adult proxy informants. It offers a platform to facilitate children's participation in understanding how they experience insecurity. The goal is to shine a light on the scale of the problem in low-income settings. This Strategic Paper describes the first pilot study of the Child Security Index (CSI) and its usage as an open source application to capture children's perceptions on violence. The app was tested in hot spot neighborhoods in Recife, capital city of Pernambuco state in Brazil. The survey collected data showed that the gender and age of respondents were more important explanatory factors than location. Younger children in particular reported lower levels of insecurity in comparison to adolescents and adults. Gender-based differences regarding perceived levels of insecurity in certain spaces, especially public venues, were also noted among teens, with girls expressing more fear of outside spaces than boys. The experience in Recife demonstrated that the CSI as a digital survey app can be used as a rapid security assessment technology which can also be adapted to other research questions and contexts. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute. 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Paper 18: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/AE-18_CSI-Recife_EN-27-11_2.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Brazil URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/AE-18_CSI-Recife_EN-27-11_2.pdf Shelf Number: 141326 Keywords: Children and ViolenceCrime HotspotsFear of CrimeViolence |
Author: Giannini, Renata Avelar Title: Where is Latin America? Reflections on Peace, Security, Justice and Governance in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda Summary: Latin American governments and societies played an active role in shaping the United Nations 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. One area where the region came up short, however, relates to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and governance. This Strategic Paper detects a contradiction between the alarming levels of violence and crime in Latin America, and the comparatively low importance attached to SDG 16 during the negotiations from 2013 to the present. The regions's diplomats exhibited varied levels of engagement with the key themes of SDG 16, whether peace, access to justice, rule of law, security or governance. Some governments were concerned with the potential of SDG 16 to securitize development or divert aid away from "core" priorities. Others were uneasy about specific terms, not least the "rule of law". There was no regional consensus on SDG 16 even if governments across the region are prepared to support its current formulation. More positively, Latin America is a hive of innovation and experimentation when it comes to preventing violence, extending justice services, and promoting good governance. As such, the Strategic Paper identifies a number of pathways for governments and civil societies to identify and share lessons from the region. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, 2015. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Paper 17: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AE-17_Where-is-Latin-America-21-09.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Latin America URL: https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AE-17_Where-is-Latin-America-21-09.pdf Shelf Number: 141327 Keywords: ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Nasir, Muhammad Title: It's No Spring Break in Cancun: The Effects of Exposure to Violence on Risk Preferences, Pro-Social Behavior, and Mental Health in Mexico Summary: Exposure to violence has been found to affect behavioral parameters, mental health and social interactions. The literature focuses on large scale political violence. The effects of high levels of criminal violence – a common phenomenon in Latin America and the Caribbean – are largely unknown. We examine drug violence in Mexico and, in particular, the effects of exposure to high municipal levels of homicides on risk aversion, mental health and pro-social behavior. Using a nonlinear difference-in-differences (DID) model and data from the 2005-06 and 2009-12 waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey, we find that the surge in violence in Mexico after 2006 significantly increased risk aversion and reduced trust in civic institutions while simultaneously strengthening kinship relationships. Although the deterioration of mental health due to violence exposure has been hypothesized to explain changes in risk aversion, we find no such effect. This suggests that the literature may be potentially missing out on other relevant channels. Details: Rimini, Italy: Rimini Centre for Economics Analysis, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2690100 Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2690100 Shelf Number: 141343 Keywords: Mental HealthRisk AversionRisk-Taking BehaviorSocial CapitalViolence |
Author: Zimmer, Jacqueline Nicole Title: The New Orleans murder epidemic: Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida on the irresponsibility of violence Summary: I live on Jeannette Street in New Orleans, about fifty yards from where Joseph Massenburg's body was found on the night of April first. On a fence close to where Massenburg lost his life, I recently noticed a sign depicting the Biblical imperative "Thou shall not kill". I have come across these signs around New Orleans since the end of 2012 – they can be found plastered to the façade of churches or displayed as yard signs in front lawns – but this was the first time I considered the irreverent tone of the commandment for the people of New Orleans. What exactly is achieved by posting this message across various public buildings around the city? Does it convey to the city's most dangerous criminals that the community is fed up with the killing? In theory, the placards are intended to evoke a moral response from those individuals who are most likely to engage in activities associated with gun violence. More often than not, these individuals are young, black, and male, and are in some way affiliated with the "narcoeconomy" of New Orleans. Even if the commandment "thou shall not kill" does give some people momentary pause, ultimately its message is devoid of the logical connection between murder and the imperative to not murder. If nothing else, the signs serve as ironic reminders that the slaughter of so many of New Orleans' black citizens is a phenomenon that consistently crowns New Orleans the most deadly city in the United States. On the surface, the murder of eighteen-year old Joseph Massenburg, who was shot in cold blood on the corner of Eagle and Birch Streets, appeared to be anything but unusual considering his victim profile. Massenburg looked like the typical victim of gun violence: black, young, and male. However, information detailing Massenburg's other attributes – a Chicago-born recent New Orleans transplant, an Americorps volunteer, a high school graduate, the son of a highly educated public servant – was not released to the public until a few days after Massenburg had succumbed to his gunshot wounds. Massenburg had gone for a walk in the same area where a bitter feud was underway between two local gangs, the "Hot Glocks" and the "Mid-City Killers". Several months later, the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) charged eighteen-year old Glen Emerson with shooting Joseph Massenburg. Police concluded that Emerson, a member of the Mid-City Killers, had mistakenly identified Massenburg as a member of the Hot Glocks in a drive-by shooting. Massenburg's death symbolizes the endemic gun violence problem that has plagued the city of New Orleans for several decades. The drug and gang-related violence that affects many impoverished black neighborhoods in New Orleans is the modern-day product of a composite of factors, including racial inequity, an untrustworthy police force that is rife with corruption, the prevalence of guns and the ease of gun accessibility, and the successive generations of young men who have grown up in broken, impoverished families with few legitimate economic opportunities. While the problems that characterize New Orleans’s impoverished neighborhoods are comparable to other American urban communities, the murder epidemic of New Orleans is unique to cities of its size. While gang-related gun violence is responsible for a significant number of the city's murders each year, a significant number of the city's homicides result from interpersonal conflicts. In order to combat the conditions that lead to deadly gun violence, the city must be willing to reinstate the legitimacy of the police force, whose corruption and inefficiency has led some New Orleans’ citizens to resort to alternative means of attaining "justice". This essay investigates the conditions that created the "street code" that governs drug-related activity among New Orleans' criminal groups and gangs, and why New Orleans' murder rate is directly linked to the manifestation of the street code. The street code is formulated by a variety of factors and sentiments, including poverty, race, hopelessness, fear, anger, boredom, and a distrust in the police. I argue that people resort to extreme forms of violence when environmental and contextual factors corrupt Emmanuel Lévinas' conception of the face-to-face encounter by priming people automatically to reduce the other to the same as a means of self-protection when the absence of a reliable protective state corrupts the ethical decision to regard the other peacefully. Furthermore, I refer to Jacques Derrida's theoretical approach on hospitality to examine how such collective norms foster a culture of violence. Details: Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2014. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1965&context=gradschool_theses Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1965&context=gradschool_theses Shelf Number: 141351 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesMurdersSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Adams, Tani Marilena Title: How Chronic Violence Affects Human Development, Social Relations, and the Practice of Citizenship: A Systemic Framework for Action Summary: What happens to us when it becomes "normal" everyday life to live with high levels of violence? How does it affect our development as individuals, how we raise our children and relate to others in society, our attitudes and actions as citizens, and the ways we are governed? In this report, Tani Adams describes how living in such conditions affects our lives in myriad and systemic ways. Children fail to flourish; parents are often unable to nurture their children adequately and can turn against them; social relations between individuals and groups become more restricted, polarized, and conflictive; and our role as citizens or participants in the larger community suffers—as do the social support for democracy and the prospects for democratic governance. The Chronic Violence and Human Development Framework developed by Adams systematizes how chronic violence affects human, social, and civic development. It offers a new lens to help policymakers, social activists, scholars, and affected populations to recognize, understand, and approach a global challenge that is hidden in plain sight and that continues to worsen. In her report, Adams describes who is affected by this phenomenon; details the five propositions that make up the Framework; explains how this new "lens" differs from prevailing approaches to the violence challenges; and summarizes key implications for public policy, research, and social action. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2017. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2017 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/chronic_violence_final_by_tani_adams.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/chronic_violence_final_by_tani_adams.pdf Shelf Number: 144435 Keywords: Children and Violence Violence |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Gangs in Central America Summary: The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in parts of Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang-related crime and violence on governance, citizen security, and investment in Central America. Congress has examined the role that gang-related violence has played in fueling mixed migration flows, which have included asylum seekers, by families and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) to the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Central American governments have struggled to address the gang problem. From 2012 to 2014, the government of El Salvador facilitated a historic—and risky—truce involving the country’s largest gangs. The truce contributed to a temporary reduction in homicides but strengthened the gangs. Since taking office in June 2014, President Salvador Sanchez Ceren has adopted repression-oriented anti-gang policies similar those implemented in the mid-2000s, including relying on the military to support anti-gang efforts. El Salvador's attorney general is investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings committed by police engaged in anti-gang efforts. Successive Honduran governments have generally relied on suppression-oriented policies toward the gangs as well, with some funding provided in recent years to support community-level prevention programs. The Guatemalan government has generally relied on periodic law-enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members. U.S. agencies have engaged with Central American governments on gang issues for more than a decade. In July 2007, an interagency committee announced the U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which emphasized diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds through a special line item for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue those anti-gang initiatives. Significant additional support has been provided through CARSI for violence-prevention efforts in communities affected by gang violence, as well as for vetted police units working on transnational gang cases with U.S. law enforcement. Recently, U.S. and Salvadoran officials have also targeted the financing of MS- 13, which the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a Transnational Criminal Organization subject to U.S. sanctions in October 2012, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the potential impact of U.S. sanctions on law-enforcement efforts. See also CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: RL34112: Accessed March 13, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Shelf Number: 144462 Keywords: 18th Street Gang Gang-Related Violence Gangs M-18 Mara Salvatrucha MS-13 Violence |
Author: Kronick, Dorothy Title: Prosperity and Violence in Illegal Markets Summary: Does prosperity generate violence in markets with ill-defined property rights? I consider the consequences of prosperity in drug trafficking markets in Venezuela. Using an original data set constructed from Ministry of Health records, I compare violent death trends in Venezuelan municipalities near trafficking routes to trends elsewhere, both before 1989 - when trafficking volumes were negligible - and after 1989, when heightened counter-narcotics operations in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. I find that, for thirty years prior to 1989, violent death trends and levels were nearly identical in treatment and control municipalities. After 1989, outcomes diverged: violence increased more in municipalities along trafficking routes than elsewhere. I estimate the difference-in-differences as approximately 10 violent deaths per 100,000, a magnitude similar to the overall pre-1989 violent death rate. Together with qualitative accounts, I interpret these findings as evidence in favor of the longstanding notion that, without Leviathan, prosperity creates violence. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/ProsperityViolence_2016July2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Venezuela URL: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/ProsperityViolence_2016July2.pdf Shelf Number: 144742 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesIllegal MarketsMurdersViolenceViolent Crimes |
Author: Castillo, Juan Camilo Title: The Resilience of Illegal Markets Summary: Why are illegal markets so resilient? Literature on the political economy of enforcement points to weak state capacity, ineffective enforcement technology, or electoral incentives for forbearance-none of which characterize prohibition efforts such as the U.S. war on drugs. We propose instead that governments face a tradeoff between prohibition and low violence. Using a model in which policy affects dynamic interaction among traffickers, we show that reducing the supply of an illegal good can increase profits through higher prices-and higher profits drive violence among traffickers, who invest more in fighting over an increasingly valuable prize. Jailing or killing traffickers makes them short-sighted and splinters their criminal organizations-both of which increase violence. While previous models of illegal markets focus either on supply reduction or on violence, we consider both together, revealing why prohibition is self-limiting: the government achieves one enforcement goal only at the cost of another. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/DrugWarfare.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/DrugWarfare.pdf Shelf Number: 144743 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllegal MarketsIllicit DrugsViolence |
Author: Abodunrin, Hammed Title: A Survey of Violence-Related Deaths in Urue-Offong/Oruko and Udung Uko Local Government Areas in Akwa Ibom State (2006-2014) Summary: This paper highlights violent deaths in two local government areas (LGAs) in Nigeria: Urue Offong/Okubo and Udung Uko, both in Awka-Ibom State. Primary data collected using key informant interviews (KIIs), 40 copies of a questionnaire, and focus group discussions (FGDs) were analysed. The respondents considered their LGAs to be generally peaceful and blamed violent incidents on continual deprivation, youth agitation, and skirmishes experienced as part of everyday life. During the period under study (2006-2014), the main causes of violent deaths in Urue Offong/Okubo and Udung Uko were cult attacks, witchcraft, and motor accidents because of bad roads and inadequate education on traffic laws. Although the predominant religion of the area is Christianity, traditional beliefs still have a strong hold over the populace; and accusations of witchcraft sometimes resulted in the killing of persons considered to be a source of misfortune. The reasons for the non-coverage of violence by the national media in the two LGAs include the following: accessibility problems, fear of attack, lethargic attitude to volunteering information, dearth of published official records, and inadequate personnel. Other factors are the irregular salaries of journalists, the presence of many local tabloids, the poor infrastructural facilities, and illiteracy. Also worthy of note is that security operatives in the areas under review were insufficient and uncooperative in releasing information. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 53; Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP15Abodunrin-Dotun.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP15Abodunrin-Dotun.pdf Shelf Number: 144790 Keywords: CultsHomicidesViolenceViolent CrimeWitchcraft |
Author: Munir, A. Title: A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Gudu, Gwadabawa and Illela Local Government Areas of Sokoto State, and Sakaba Local Government Area of Kebbi State (2006-2014) Summary: This paper highlights the outcome of a study on fatal incidents in four local government areas (LGAs) of northwestern Nigeria: Gwadabawa, Gudu, and Ilella LGAs in Sokoto State, and Sakaba LGA in Kebbi State. Data obtained from 1,083 questionnaires (out of 1,200) reveals that, since 2006, the year 2011 had the highest number of fatalities. Between 2006 and 2014, Gudu LGA recorded the highest number of fatalities and violent incidents, while Sakaba LGA had the lowest. For the period under review, the most frequent cause of fatal incidents was cattle grazing, followed by political clashes. Religion, which is often perceived as a major factor of conflict, contributed quite insignificantly to the overall level of violence in the four LGAs, with a few incidents involving the Yan Shi'a, the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood, and the Yan Izala movement. Finally, the study demonstrates that, just as in the urban centres of Sokoto and Kebbi, there are many fatal incidents in rural areas- yet these are unreported. Some explanations for this omission are discussed in relation to poor road infrastructure. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan, 2015. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 47; Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/85-munir-arshad-olojo-akinola-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-gudu-gwadabawa-and-illela-local-government-areas-of-sokoto-state-and-sakaba-local-government-area-of-kebbi-state-2006-2014 Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/85-munir-arshad-olojo-akinola-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-gudu-gwadabawa-and-illela-local-government-areas-of-sokoto-state-and-sakaba Shelf Number: 144793 Keywords: Boko HaramRural AreasViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Espach, Ralph Title: The Dilemma of Lawlessness: Organized Crime, Violence, Prosperity, and Security along Guatemala's Borders Summary: For centuries, the Central American region has been among the world's most important transit zones. The Spanish shuttled the gold, silver, and other valuables from Southeast Asia and from South America across the Panamanian isthmus. Later, the French and the Americans competed to control and improve that route with a water canal, either in Panama or Nicaragua. Since the emergence of the United States as a major economy and consumer market, the region has been a key zone for the northward flow of all kinds of products - legal and illegal. Economically, the countries of Central America, particularly northern Central America (including Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador), have traditionally been among the most unequal in the Americas. Throughout most of these countries' histories, political power and state resources were controlled by the same families and networks that owned most of the land and industries. Relatively few resources and little state attention were dedicated to improving the lives of the poor, especially in isolated rural areas. Except during infrequent instances of insurgency, civil war, or interstate conflict, border control or even preserving a state presence in rural areas in these regions was not an important concern. In practical terms, national territorial borders were unmarked and did not exist. What is today considered smuggling was a normal, everyday practice. Many border communities had closer economic ties to cities, agricultural zones, or economic infrastructure such as railroads or ports in countries across the border than they did to those within their own country. Moreover, most of the residents of these rural areas were indigenous and largely disconnected from the country in which they lived and the government that notionally had authority over them. In this way, most border zones in these countries have traditionally been "ungoverned," or "undergoverned," in terms of their relations with the national and provincial or departmental governments. Over the decades, numerous groups have taken advantage of the porousness of these borders, and the general lawlessness of these remote areas (many of which are heavily forested and/or mountainous), to elude governments or armed forces. In addition to the ever-present smugglers, armed insurgent groups from both the left and the right, as well as paramilitaries of all stripes, crossed borders to conduct their operations during the Cold War. The most recent, and by some accounts the most dangerous, type of actors to exploit these weakly governed, porous borders in northern Central America have been narcotics trafficking networks. Illegal drugs have been smuggled from the world's foremost coca production zone - the northern Andean foothills - to the world's richest and largest drug consumption market - the United States - since at least the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, however, an international crackdown on drug smuggling through the Caribbean region led Colombian cartels to favor overland routes through Central America and Mexico. The Colombians moved product through the region largely by buying the services of local trafficking networks. These networks were particularly well developed in Guatemala as a result of the intelligence and transport networks the military created during that country's civil war from the 1960s to the 1990s. Over time, Mexican trafficking networks grew into competitive cartels themselves and began to fight each other for control over valuable transport and smuggling routes. Mexico's largest cartels-including the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Zeta-grew their operations from merely trafficking the product of others to buying the product upstream and controlling its transit in Central America. Traditionally, Colombian- or Mexican-run trafficking cartels operated in Guatemala by buying the services of local trafficking networks, but around 2008 they began to seek to control routes themselves. Many of these routes lie along the Guatemalan coast, where drugs are brought in by boat and then transferred onto land for transit into Mexico. Other routes enter from Honduras, with the drugs being flown in from Venezuela or brought in via boat. Recently, there has been evidence not only of a broad presence of Mexican drug-trafficking networks across Guatemala but also of the expansion of their operations there, particularly into drug processing. They also sell more of their product in local markets, rather than shipping it onward, fueling local gang activity and urban violence. Details: Arlington, CA: CNA; Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Shelf Number: 144948 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingGang-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSmugglingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: The Day after Tomorrow: Colombia's FARC and the End of the Conflict Summary: As a final peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) nears, negotiators face an elaborate juggling act if they are to lay out a sustainable path for guerrilla fighters to disarm and reintegrate into civilian life. A viable transition architecture not only needs to be credible in the eyes of FARC but must also reassure a society that remains deeply unconvinced of the group's willingness to lay down its arms, cut its links with organised crime and play by the rules of democracy. The failure of disarmament and reintegration would at best delay the implementation of reforms already agreed at the Havana talks since 2012. At worst, it could plunge the entire agreement into a downward spiral of renewed violence and eroding political support. Strong internal and external guarantees are needed to carry the process through a probably tumultuous and volatile period ahead. There is a lot that can go wrong. Most of the 7,000 or so combatants, and three times that number in support networks, are concentrated in peripheral zones with little civilian state presence and infrastructure. Some guerrilla fronts are involved in the drug economy and illegal mining. In most regions FARC operates in proximity to the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's second guerrilla group, or other illegal armed groups, exposing its members to security threats and an array of options for rearmament, recruitment and defiance. Major doubts linger about the military's commitment to the peace process, and its readiness to take the steps necessary to end the conflict. Political violence has subsided from the paramilitary heyday but could grow again, and FARC has not forgotten the thousands of killings that decimated the Patriotic Union (UP), a party it created as part of peace talks in the 1980s. And after decades of conflict with a rising civilian toll and negotiation efforts that ended in bitter failure, the parties are feeling their way forward amid deep mutual distrust and strong political opposition. None of these problems has a perfect short-term fix. But the starting position is not all bad. Colombia can tap into three decades of experience in reintegrating members of illegal armed groups and it has more financial and human resources than most post-conflict countries. FARC's command and control structures are in decent shape and guerrilla leaders have a strong interest in a successful transition. The Havana agenda, which alongside the "end of the conflict" includes rural development, political reintegration, transitional justice and the fight against illicit drugs, is, at least on paper, broad enough to embed the reintegration of FARC into a long-term peace-building strategy, particularly focused on the most affected territories. Finally, in sharp contrast to the paramilitary demobilisation, the region and the wider international community are strongly supportive. Negotiators need to agree on a reintegration offer that allows FARC to close ranks behind a transition process riddled with uncertainty and ambiguity. Given its deep-seated distrust toward the state, the best way to achieve this is, probably, to give FARC a stake in reintegration, capitalising on its cohesion. This would minimise the risk that FARC could split over the transition. But the parties must also be aware of and carefully manage the drawbacks to such a solution. To make a collective reintegration model palatable to a society disinclined to be generous to FARC and sceptical of its true intentions, negotiators should agree on strong measures of accountability, over-sight and transparency. They also need to promote local transitional justice to avoid an intensification of communal tensions following the arrival of FARC combatants. Such a long-term reintegration offer would probably facilitate the fraught negotiations over the conditions under which FARC is willing to abandon the conflict early on in the transition. A bilateral ceasefire needs to go into effect immediately after a final accord has been signed. This will require military de-escalation well ahead of that, but a formal ceasefire will only be sustainable once FARC's forces have been concentrated in assembly zones. After the agreement has been ratified, measures for "leaving weapons behind" (or disarmament) should begin. These are irreversible, risky steps, and convincing the guerrillas to take the plunge will not be made easier by the government's refusal to negotiate broader changes to the security forces. But the shared interest in a stable post-conflict period should provide sufficient space to hammer out a workable solution. Alongside security safeguards and interim measures to stabilise territories with FARC presence, this should include early progress in implementing key elements of the peace agreement and the establishment of a joint follow-up committee to ensure that the accords will be honoured after disarmament has been completed. Implementing the agreements will largely be the responsibility of the government and FARC. But in Colombia's sharply polarised environment, international actors will have to play a crucial role. An international, civilian-led mission should be invited to monitor and verify the ceasefire and disarmament. For such monitoring to be successful, the mission needs to have the necessary autonomy from the parties and the technical as well as the political capacity to deal with the predictable setbacks and disputes. Beyond that, international actors should remain engaged by providing high-level implementation guarantees, political support for contentious reforms, including of the security sector, and long-term financial commitment. None of the elements needed to stabilise the immediate post-conflict period is entirely new in the Colombian context, but jointly they will break the mould of previous disarmament and reintegration programs. Flexibility and determination from the negotiators will be needed, alongside renewed government efforts to boost social ownership of the peace process, in particular in conflict regions. Previous transitions have faltered over high levels of violence, public indifference and timid international involvement. A bolder and faster response is needed this time to set Colombia on an irreversible path toward peace. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 53 ; Accessed April 21, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/53-the-day-after-tomorrow-colombia-s-farc-and-the-end-of-the-conflict.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Colombia URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/53-the-day-after-tomorrow-colombia-s-farc-and-the-end-of-the-conflict.pdf Shelf Number: 145138 Keywords: FARCGuerrilla FightersTransitional JusticeViolence |
Author: Missionary Council for Indigenous Peoples Title: Violence against the Indigenous Peoples in Brazil: Data for 2015. Summary: The Report on Violence Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil - Data for 2015, published by the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI), highlights the persistence of the public authorities' omission in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples, especially in relation to the right to land, which drastically impacts on their right to live in their traditional way, both recognized and guaranteed by the Brazilian Federal Constitution. It is with a feeling of the most profound indignation that the Indigenist Missionary Council (Conselho Indigenista Missionario - Cimi) presents this report on Violence against the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil with the data for the respective occurrences in 2015. Indignation because the same criminal practices are being repeated and intensified without any effective measures having been taken The situation of omission on the part of the authorities continues; they deny their respect for the Constitution and fail to comply with its provisions in regard to the demarcation, protection and surveillance of the lands; the reality of aggression against persons who struggle for their legitimate rights persists in the form of assassinations, beatings, threats to kill; the attacks against communities grow worse, especially those against the more fragile ones and those that live in camps; the invasion and devastation of the demarcated lands goes on. Details: Brasilia: The Council, 2015. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2017 at: http://www.cimi.org.br/pub/relatorio2015/Report-Violence-against-the-Indigenous-Peoples-in-Brazil_2015_Cimi.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.cimi.org.br/pub/relatorio2015/Report-Violence-against-the-Indigenous-Peoples-in-Brazil_2015_Cimi.pdf Shelf Number: 145190 Keywords: DiscriminationHomicidesIndigenous PeoplesLand RightsProperty RightsViolence |
Author: Ingram, Matthew C. Title: Targeting Violence Reduction in Brazil: Policy Implications from a Spatial Analysis of Homicide Summary: Violence in Latin America generates heavy economic, social and political costs for individuals, communities and societies. A particularly pernicious effect of violence is that it undermines citizen confidence in democracy and in their own government. Responding to public fear, politicians across the region have hastily adopted a wide range of policy responses to violence, ranging from militarizing public security, to 'mano dura' crack downs, to negotiating truces with organized crime, to decriminalizing illicit economic activity. Although many of these policies are politically expedient, few are based on evidence of how public policy actually affects rates of violence. By contrast, this paper examines how violence clusters within a country-Brazil-to study how public policies affect homicide rates and how these policies might be further tailored geographically to have greater impact. Brazil provides a particularly useful case for examining the effectiveness of violence-reduction strategies because of the availability of comparable data collected systematically across 5562 municipal units. This allows for an explicitly spatial approach to examining geographic patterns of violence-how violence in one municipality is related to violence in neighboring municipalities, and how predictors of violence are also conditioned by geography. The key added value of the spatial perspective is that it addresses the dependent structure of the data, accounting for the fact that units of analysis (here, municipalities) are connected to each other geographically. In this way, the spatial perspective accounts for the fact that what happens in nearby units may have a meaningful impact on the outcome of interest in a home, focal unit. Thus, the spatial approach is better able to examine compelling phenomena like the spread of violence across units. We visualize data on six types of homicide-aggregate homicides, homicides of men, homicides of women (i.e., "femicides"), firearm-related homicides, youth homicides (ages 15-29) and homicides of victims identified by race as either black or brown (mulatto), i.e., non-white victims-all for 2011, presenting these data in maps. We adopt a municipal level of analysis, and include homicide data from 2011 for the entire country, i.e., on all 5562 municipalities across 27 states (including the Federal District). This allows us to develop maps that identify specific municipalities that constitute cores of statistically significant clusters of violence for each type of homicide. These clusters offer a useful tool for targeting policies aimed at reducing violence. We then develop an analysis based on a spatial regression model, using predictors from the 2010 census and other official sources in Brazil. This paper finds that areas with higher rates of marginalization and of households headed by women who also work and have young children experience higher rates of homicide, which suggests increased support for policies aimed at reducing both marginalization and family disruption. More specifically, the paper finds that policies that expand local coverage of the Bolsa Familia poverty reduction program and reduce the environmental footprint of large, industrial development projects tend to reduce homicide rates, but primarily for certain types of homicide. Thus, violence-reduction policies need to be targeted by type of violence. In addition, the spatial analysis presented in the paper suggests that violence-reduction policies should be targeted regionally rather than at individual communities - informed by the cluster analysis and the spatial regression. Finally, this paper argues that policies aimed at femicides, gun-related homicides, youth homicides and homicides of non-whites should be especially sensitive to geographic patterns, and be built around territorially-targeted policies over and above national policies aimed at homicide more generally. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Initiative Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS, 2014. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 28, 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ingram-Policy-Brief.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ingram-Policy-Brief.pdf Shelf Number: 145192 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCrime ClustersCrime HotspotsFemicidesGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo Title: Security and Justice in Jalisco: Scenarios and proposals Summary: In the year 2015, the escalade of violence closes with a crisis of (in) security in the state of Jalisco which is unparalleled in its recent history. In that context, the demand for public security and justice has become the main concern and request by the citizenry, in accordance with the results of the most reliable opinion polls, as well as of the more diverse and representative sectors of our entity. In view of the State's failure to fulfill its obligation to guarantee the right to security for everyone who lives in our community, the University of Guadalajara, in compliance of all and every one of its substantial functions (teaching, generating knowledge and establishing links), has been systematically carrying out significant contributions in the areas of security, human rights and the justice for years. The work is a compilation of 25 collaborations, divided in five thematic sections. The great majority of the authors identify with the theories of multidimensional and integral security which claim that the phenomena of violence, crime and delinquency are based on structures of socioeconomic difference, contexts of poverty, marginality and weak social cohesion. This interpretation also leads to maintaining that government institutions suffer from notable insufficiencies, among them the lack of professionalism of government employees, corruption, opacity and lack of transparency, as well as the absence of planning and administration of the public budgets. In the first thematic section block, "Strategic vision and critical issues", the four collaborations that make it up study from the historic factors to the problems of implementing public policies in Jalisco as a whole and, in particular, in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara. The topic of the link between public security and penal justice is approached as two factors that should be integrated accompanying each other. The second section "Violence and high-impact crimes", compiles studies that compare homicides at national and state levels; the manifestation of the different kinds of violence and the study of disappearances, kidnapping and torture. These contributions expose how the official statistics are unequal and omit the description of reality, basically with political purposes, in order not to look like a state that has high crime indicators that could tint the image of local government officials, and inhibit tourism or capital investment. The six chapters making up the section "Human Rights and vulnerable groups" make a realistic analysis of the human rights violations in the state, emphasizing the lack of independence of the State Human Rights Commission. They cover the topics of suicide, juvenile delinquency, gender violence and the difficulties migrants face on their route throughout Jalisco. These analyses reflect the vulnerability besetting a lot of sectors of the population. The fourth section is devoted to the "Institutions and capacities of the state of Jalisco". It consists of five chapters that analyze the Judiciary power and the relation among the implementation of the new penal justice system; police corps, their weaknesses and capacities; the public advocacy and the public security system (or systems), which must be encouraged as a State policy. The panorama that is emerging is worrying: The justice system lacks independence and the police bodies, coordination; which has led to the proposal of a unified command, which in Jalisco has been advertised as one of the steps to follow. The articles strongly stress the weaknesses of these institutional subsystems, and they almost take for granted that they do not have the strength to implement the reforms to penal justice and the coordination of police corporations. Furthermore, if these institutional capacities are too weak to confront common crime, all the more reason to believe that they would be unable to do their job, that they would be overpowered rapidly if the cjng were to grow in influence and managed to consolidate in the state of Jalisco. In addition, in the light of the new adversarial Justice system, the aforementioned section includes recommendations made from good practices documented in the last few years in those federated entities that have already implemented them. The final section "Federacion Jalisco in the frame of national security", contains four chapters that close the book with excellent analyses on CJNG penetration and growth and the presence and role of the Army. It is pointed out that due to both, the existence of a criminal group whose name locates it in the state and to the increased presence of the Army and the Federal Police to face it; Jalisco risks a growth in the presence of organized crime, which will force the participation of the federal forces. In short, this work implicitly presents the possible scenarios for Jalisco: An increase of violence that would require the federal forces to head the effort to curb the enemy or, on the contrary, that the Jalisco leaders face reality, become aware of the magnitude of the phenomenon of (in) security, and implement the necessary reforms. This publication makes concrete recommendations, provides tools, raw materials and information to understand the security crisis that can be brewing. It is up to society and government officials to use it to put together a new security agenda. Details: Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, 2016. 259p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 1, 2017 at: http://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/Novedades-PDF/Security_%20justice_Jalisco.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/Novedades-PDF/Security_%20justice_Jalisco.pdf Shelf Number: 145221 Keywords: Criminal Justice SystemsHomicidesPublic SecuritySecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Perkins, Christina Title: Achieving Growth and Security in the Northern Triangle of Central America Summary: The Northern Triangle of Latin America, consisting of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, has experienced overwhelming challenges to economic growth and development. Gang violence is the root of many of these challenges, and the cost of hiring security forces for individuals and businesses creates a significant tax on the economy of these three countries. Beyond this drain on the region's finances, the Northern Triangle is considered one of the most dangerous places on the planet, excluding active war zones. The interrelated issues of violence, poverty, and slow economic growth have led to high rates of emigration from the region, such as during the summer of 2014 when thousands of unaccompanied minors entered the United States. This study examines these issues and goes on to explore connections to the successes of Plan Colombia. Specifically, it considers the opportunity for a "Plan Colombia for the Northern Triangle" to generate long-term economic growth, personal safety, and political stability and accountability in the region. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161201_Perkins_NorthernTriangle_Web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161201_Perkins_NorthernTriangle_Web.pdf Shelf Number: 145259 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesPlan ColombiaSecuritySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cuartas, Jorge Title: Parenting, Scarcity and Violence: Theory and Evidence for Colombia Summary: During early childhood, children develop cognitive and socioemotional skills that predict success in multiple socioeconomic dimensions. A large part of the development of these skills depends on the child's context during the first years of life and, in particular, on the quality of parental care. Grounded on recent literature in psychology and behavioral economics, we discuss a theoretical framework for understanding why some children receive adequate care, while others do not. Within this framework, we identify a determinant of the quality of parenting that has not yet been explored in-depth: the availability of parents' mental resources, which are depleted by the subjective feeling of scarcity and the stress generated by adversities. Using cross-sectional data from a household survey in Colombia and administrative data on crime and violence, we find that a greater subjective feeling of scarcity (β=0.45, IC95%:[0.082, 0.979]) and greater exposure to violence (β =0.09, IC90%:[0.004, 0.182]) are associated with a lower likelihood that parents engage in stimulating activities with their children. At the same time, the results show that receiving information on childrearing is correlated with better parental practices (β =-0.48, IC95%:[-0.822, -0.136]). Details: Bogota; Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Economa, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Documento CEDE No.38 2016: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2912482). Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2912482 Shelf Number: 145401 Keywords: Child Abuse and NeglectChild MaltreatmentParentingSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence |
Author: Human Security Report Project (Simon Fraser University) Title: Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation Summary: During the past decade, an increasing number of studies have made the case that levels of violence around the world have declined. Few have made much impact outside the research community-Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined is a major exception. Published in 2011, Better Angels' central argument-one made over some 700 densely argued pages of text, supported by 70 pages of footnotes-is that there has been an extraordinary but little-recognized, long-term worldwide reduction in all forms of violence-one that stretches back at least to 10,000 BCE. Better Angels has received high praise for its extraordinary scope, its originality, and the breadth and depth of its scholarship. It is engagingly written, powerfully argued, and its claims are supported by a mass of statistical evidence. It has also generated considerable skepticism and in some cases outright hostility. Part I of this Report discusses the central theses of Better Angels and examines the major claims of its critics. Part II presents updated statistics on armed conflicts around the world since the end of World War II, plus post-Cold War trends in assaults on civilians and conflicts that do not involve governments. Details: Vancouver, Canada: Human Security Report Project, 2014. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/178122/HSRP_Report_2013_140226_Web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/178122/HSRP_Report_2013_140226_Web.pdf Shelf Number: 145152 Keywords: Armed ConflictCrime StatisticsHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Ichite, Christian Title: Land conflicts, population pressure and lethal violence in the Niger Delta (Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta), 2006-2014 Summary: This study relies on the Nigeria Watch database to assess the contributions of land and population pressures to overall lethal violence in the core Niger Delta states of Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta over an eightyear period (2006-2014). Disaggregated data on land issue-related violent deaths was obtained for each Local Government Area (LGA) of the four states under review. Population densities were computed based on the Nigeria 2006 Census and available or 'real' surface area. The study arrived at two main findings. First, casualties associated with land issues in the core Niger Delta states do not account for a significant contribution to overall lethal violence in the region, contrary to popular claims and declarations based on the unresearched impacts of the Land Use Act of 1978. Fatal land conflicts in Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta result significantly from inter-communal clashes, just as inter-communal clashes over political, religious, and ethnic issues also significantly account for deaths. Second, overall crude death rates (mortality) from multiple causes, including land issues, do not strictly conform to a relationship of direct proportionality with the spatial distribution of population densities within the region. Some LGAs with high population densities record low death rates, and vice versa. Moreover, intercommunal clashes also significantly account for most of the deaths from multiple causes in the LGAs, irrespective of the patterns of population density. The findings, by implication, attest to a deteriorating quality of human conditions and habitat in the Niger Delta, despite existing measures aimed at resolving conflicts in the region. They also make necessary a re-assessment of studies on the region. Such studies hitherto have often been based on simplistic applications of the Malthusian theoretical framework to the relationships between environmental degradation, population density, and lethal violence in the region. A reassessment would involve a renaissance of rigorous research into the causes and drivers of lethal violence in the region - in a disaggregated manner and based on systematic evidence. Such research increasingly requires a hybrid of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 48; Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP1Ichite.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP1Ichite.pdf Shelf Number: 145818 Keywords: Land ConflictsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Mills, Elizabeth Title: Turning the Tide: The Role of Collective Action for Addressing Structural and Gender-based Violence in South Africa Summary: The case study discussed in this Evidence Report explores the value and limitations of collective action in challenging the community, political, social and economic institutions that reinforce harmful masculinities and gender norms related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). As such, the concept of structural violence is used to locate SGBV in a social, economic and political context that draws histories of entrenched inequalities in South Africa into the present. The research findings reinforce a relational and constructed understanding of gender emphasising that gender norms can be reconfigured and positively transformed. We argue that this transformation can be catalysed through networked and multidimensional strategies of collective action that engage the personal agency of men and women and their interpersonal relationships at multiple levels and across boundaries of social class, race and gender. This collectivity needs to be conscious of and engaged with the structural inequalities that deeply influence trajectories of change. Citizens and civil society must work with the institutions - political, religious, social and economic - that reinforce structural violence in order to ensure their accountability in ending SGBV. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Evidence Report No. 118: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5858/ER118_TurningtheTide.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2015 Country: South Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5858/ER118_TurningtheTide.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145830 Keywords: Gender-Based ViolenceInequalityViolenceViolence Against Women |
Author: Martinez, Denis Roberto Title: Youth under the Gun: Violence, Fear, and Resistance in Urban Guatemala Summary: This study examines how violence affects youth in marginalized urban communities, focusing on the experiences of three groups of young people: gang members, activists, and the "jovenes encerrados", youth who live confined to their homes due to fear. Based on 14 months of ethnographic research in El Mezquital, an extensive marginalized urban area in Guatemala City, I explore the socio-economic conditions that trigger violence in these communities, the responses of young people and the community to violence, and the State's role in exacerbating violence in impoverished neighborhoods. In this dissertation I argue that gang members and activists are expressing a deep-seated social discontent against the exclusion, humiliation, and social stigmatization faced by young people in marginalized urban neighborhoods. However, the two groups express their discontent in significantly different ways. Initially, gangs used violence to express their discontent, but they gradually resorted to a perverse game of crime, in complicity with the police, and they distanced themselves from their own communities; in this work I analyze gangs' process of transformation and the circumstances that led to this change. Activists express their discontent through community art and public protest, but their demonstrations have limited social impact, since public attention continues to focus on gangs; here I examine activists' motivations, struggles, and obstacles. However, the vast majority of young people live in a state of fear, preferring to keep quiet and withdraw into their homes; here I show how violence, fear, and distrust affect the generation born into postwar Guatemala. This study illustrates the perverse role of the State in impoverished urban neighborhoods and its responsibility for the escalation of urban violence in Guatemala. On the one hand, the State shuns residents from these neighborhoods and systematically denies them basic services; it criminalizes and abuses young people, even forming social cleansing groups to eliminate gang members. On the other hand, the State fosters crime in these communities and acts as gangs' accomplice in extortions, drug trade, and robberies. As in many other Latin American countries, the Guatemalan State penalizes crime, but simultaneously encourages and benefits from it; the State is complicit in crime. Details: Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin, 2014. 263p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/28318/MARTINEZ-DISSERTATION-2014.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Guatemala URL: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/28318/MARTINEZ-DISSERTATION-2014.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145831 Keywords: Fear of CrimeGang-Related ViolenceGangsNeighborhoods and CrimePovertySocioeconomic conditions and CrimeUrban Areas and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Collodi, Jason Title: External stresses in West Africa: Cross-border Violence and Cocaine Trafficking Summary: The 2011 World Development Report on conflict, security and development highlights the centrality of 'external stresses' for generating insecurity and increasing the risk of violence in fragile areas. West African states are particularly vulnerable, with serious concerns around cross-border violence and illicit drug-trafficking. Policy responses need to: tackle the region's recent legacy of conflict and violent upheaval; address weak governance and entrenched corruption; improve regional cooperation; and support border and outlying communities that have been marginalised by insecurity, poverty and unemployment. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Policy Briefing 60: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3858/External%20Stresses%20in%20West%20Africa%20cross-border%20violence%20and%20cocaine%20trafficking.pdf;jsessionid=706100FE21470352417E0571F8249D73?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3858/External%20Stresses%20in%20West%20Africa%20cross-border%20violence%20and%20cocaine%20trafficking.pdf;jsessionid=706100FE21470352417E0571F8249D73?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145950 Keywords: CocaineConflict-Related ViolenceDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceViolence |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: A Dark and Constant Rage: 25 Years of Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States Summary: In March 2017, a white supremacist from Maryland, James Harris Jackson, traveled to New York City with the alleged intention of launching a series of violent attacks on black men to discourage white women from having relationships with black men. After several days, Jackson chose his first victim, a 66-year old black homeless man, Timothy Caughman. Jackson later allegedly admitted that he had stabbed Caughman with a small sword he had brought with him, describing the murder as a "practice run." Right Wing Terror Incident 1993-2017 by Movement However, after the killing, Jackson's angry energy dissipated and he turned himself over to the authorities. A week later, New York prosecutors announced that they were charging him with second-degree murder as a hate crime and also with a state charge of terrorism. Jackson's aborted killing spree was a shocking example of right-wing terror in the United States but it was unfortunately far from an isolated example. For over a century and a half, since 'burning Kansas' of the 1850s and the Ku Klux Klan of the 1860s, right-wing terrorism has been an unwelcome feature of the American landscape. Yet today, many people are barely aware that it exists and most people don't recognize its frequency or scope. Far more attention in recent years has been given to the threat of homegrown radical Islamic terror - a danger that has generated such horrific acts as the Orlando and San Bernardino shooting sprees. Yet the very real specter of radical Islamic terror in the United States has existed alongside an equally serious threat of terror from right-wing extremist groups and individuals. Both movements have generated shooting sprees, bombings, and a wide variety of plots and conspiracies. Both pose threats so significant that to ignore either would be to invite tragedy. To illustrate the threat of right-wing terrorism in the United States, the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism has compiled a list of 150 right-wing terrorist acts, attempted acts, plots and conspiracies from the past 25 years (1993-2017). These include terrorist incidents from a wide variety of white supremacists, from neo-Nazis to Klansmen to racist skinheads, as well as incidents connected to anti-government extremists such as militia groups, sovereign citizens and tax protesters. The list also includes incidents of anti-abortion terror as well as from other, smaller right-wing extremist movements. AD's Center on Extremism defines terrorism as a pre-planned act or attempted act of significant violence by one or more non-state actors in order to further an ideological, social or religious cause, or to harm perceived opponents of such causes. Significant violent acts can include bombings or use of other weapons of mass destruction, assassinations and targeted killings, shooting sprees, arsons and firebombings, kidnappings and hostage situations and, in some cases, armed robberies. Domestic terrorism consists of acts or attempted acts of terrorism in which the perpetrators are citizens or permanent residents of the country in which the act takes place. The right-wing terrorist incidents in ADL's list include those that best fit the above criteria. They are drawn from the much larger pool of violent and criminal acts that American right-wing extremists engage in every year, from hate crimes to deadly encounters with law enforcement. Right-wing extremists annually murder a number of Americans, but only some of those murders occur in connection with terrorist acts. There are, after all, hundreds of thousands of adherents of right-wing extremist movements in the United States and all such movements have some degree of association with criminal activity. No one should think, therefore, that the incidents listed here represent the breadth of right-wing violence in the U.S. But, as acts of terrorism, they do show right-wing movements at their most vicious and ambitious. Details: New York: ADL, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf Shelf Number: 145981 Keywords: Extremist ViolenceExtremistsIslamic TerrorismRadicalismTerrorismViolence |
Author: Sana, Olang Title: Taking Stock of Socio-economic Challenges in the Nairobi Slums: An Inventory of the Pertinent Issues between January 2008 and November 2012 Summary: Kenya's post-2007 elections violence was a landmark event in the country's political history. The violence led to the death of over 1, 300 people, displacement of others, and destruction of property of unknown value especially in the then Nyanza, Western, Rift-valley and Coast provinces. Howevwer, the social cost of the violence was greater than the visible dislocations reported in the media and elsewhere. Over four and a half years after the violence, the social cost of the phenomenon still lives with the victims: survivors who suffered in not-so-visible ways, the internally displaced persons, people who lost property, victims of sexual assault, and people who sustained different kinds of physical and emotional injury. And whereas post -2007 elections crisis speeded up the pace of reforms in Kenya's body politic including the completion of the hitherto stalled constitutional review process, it is surprising that the Kenya government has made frail efforts to address the socio-economic needs of the communities and families affected by the scourge of violence. More surprisingly, very little attention to understand and act on the potential effects of post 2007 elections crisis on the forthcoming polls already slated for March 2013. The Nairobi slums are one area that was adversely affected by the December 2007-January 2008 post elections violence. The slums occupy one-eighth of the land space in Nairobi but host three-quarters of the city's population of four million people. Many factors combine to make the Nairobi slums the most violent and vulnerable neighborhoods in Nairobi. And as media reports indicate, post-election violence started in the Nairobi slums (Kibera) before it spread to other parts of the country. Consequently, the slums bore the heaviest brunt of the violence (relative to the up-market neighborhoods of Nairobi). A lot of information is still outside the public domain regarding how the violence erupted, immediate issues that provoked the violence, the ethnic character of the violence, the nature of disruptions wrought by the violence, and how various slum villages are coping with the trauma. Also outside the public domain is information regarding how the actual socio-economic conditions that prevail in the slums add to their violent character, and an exposition of some unresolved issues as well as emerging threats that could affect the stability of these neighborhoods both before and after the March 2013 polls. More importantly, there is an urgent need to re-examine the slums with reference to the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and other gains so far made towards the implementation of the Constitution. Can the (new) Constitution be used as a reference document for increasing service delivery, advancing rights protection, and laying the foundation for the rule of law in the lives of the three million slums dwellers? What can be done in the pre-and post-March 2013 elections to not only rid the slums of their violent character but also to initiate programmes geared towards changing the face of the slum permanently? The purpose of this booklet is to provide some insight into the concerns outlined above. The authors of the booklet note that there has been some good progress towards addressing some or a combination of the above concerns especially in the aftermath of the violence. However, the intellectual discourse about the slums and violence is as yet embryonic and far too incoherent to guide focused interventions before and after the forthcoming polls. Primarily, the booklet aspires to provoke some thought about the slums and slum dwellers with a view to encouraging government policy makers, the civil society, the international community, the academia and other actors to make informed interventions geared towards improving the physical conditions in the slums without depriving the dwellers of dignity and rights. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/09860.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Kenya URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/09860.pdf Shelf Number: 146172 Keywords: Neighborhoods and CrimePoverty and CrimeSlums (Nairobi, Kenya)Socioeconomic Conditions and CrimeVigilantismViolence |
Author: van Schalkwyk, Lin Title: (Re)Framing Gangsterism in the Western Cape: Facilitating a Dialogue between Local Government and Ex-Gang Members Summary: One of the earliest Roman deities was a god named Janus. Within ancient Roman religion, Janus was "the god of the beginnings and the ends" and was believed to preside "over every entrance and departure" (Wasson, 2015, para. 5). Every door and every passageway was thought to be guarded by Janus. He was, (as I like to believe) 'the god of the thresholds'. Insofar as each threshold holds the existence of two worlds, i.e. the world that exists before the threshold and the world that exists beyond it, Janus was also believed to have two faces - one for each of the two worlds he presided over. And so he later became known as "the god who looked both ways" (Wasson, 2015, para. 5). Today, we still refer to Janus and his two-faced nature, although no longer with sole reference to his deity. We now call upon Janus in our attempts to conceive of dissonance. We refer to things as Janus-faced when we assert that it has two (often contradicting sides); sides that each tell a different story and that each look out on a different truth. We call on Janus to describe polarity, to illustrate the existence of two different interpretative spaces, often standing in contrast or tension with one another. And it is here, precisely within the recognition of this modern-day Janus, that I first embarked on the writing of this dissertation. The current dissertation was motivated by a deep-felt acknowledgement of the Janus-faced realities facing my home province in Western Cape, South Africa. Often, as I had worked on this study, I could see in my mind's eye - Janus, standing there - presiding over the social landscapes of the Cape. There I imagined him, guarding the many thresholds that divide social prosperity from social decay; his two faces painted in the style of theatre masks - showing both a laughing and a weeping face. Looking one way, he sees a South African province with foreigners "lounging on palm-lined Camps Bay beach, gazing at the steep mountains framed by gossamer clouds" (Pinnock, 2016, p.2). Looking the other way, he observes countless drug wars, human trafficking, rival gang-shoot-outs and poverty, no more than a stone throw away from where the lounging foreigners sit (Pinnock, 2016). This dissertation is not about the Western Cape's elegance, grandeur or charm. It is about facing the world of tragedy and social decay that lies on the other side. Taken even further, it is about recognizing that there is in fact no 'other side'. There is no 'other world' to be denied or silenced by those in the Western Cape who are lucky enough to not suffer from it. There is only but one Western Cape, albeit one of relentless disparities. And so I argue that there is an urgent need for both these worlds to acknowledge each other; to engage and to be accountable to one another. For as far as the Western Cape belongs to all its citizens, there will be no victory in denial. Details: Tilburg, NETH: Tilburg University, 2016. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 16, 2017 at: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=142103 Year: 2016 Country: South Africa URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=142103 Shelf Number: 146203 Keywords: GangsViolence Violent Crime |
Author: Lansdowne Title: Ottawa Gang Strategy: Seeking Solutions to Street-Level Violence. Technical Evaluation Report: Our First Three Years Summary: From 2013-16, the Ottawa Gang Strategy (OGS) offered a roadmap to help Ottawa address gangs and street level violence. This vast partnership - made up of social service agencies, community organizations, police, schools and others - developed and implemented 12 initiatives that address the problem from multiple angles. Together, the partner organizations formed the Ottawa Gang Strategy Steering Committee, which was collectively informed by each group's expertise, knowledge of the issues, networks, resources and determination to work to collaboratively address the problem. This report details the individual project outputs, outcomes and collective results achieved in three years, as set forth in the logic model. As the work on gangs and street level violence continues, this independent evaluation is intended to assist the OGS Steering Committee in transitioning the Strategy to its next phase of implementation based on the shared understanding of the issues and the shifting realities in Ottawa. Details: Ottawa: Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2017 at: http://www.crimepreventionottawa.ca/Media/Content/files/Publications/Youth/OGS%20TechEvalReport%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: http://www.crimepreventionottawa.ca/Media/Content/files/Publications/Youth/OGS%20TechEvalReport%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 146207 Keywords: Gang-Related ViolenceGangsStreet CrimeViolenceViolence Prevention |
Author: Courson, Elias Title: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta Summary: This Discussion Paper explores the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the context of a full-blown insurgency linked to local resistance and violence in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta. By focusing on MEND, an armed group that has been largely responsible for the escalation of the struggle by the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta into an armed phase since late 2005, the author draws attention to the roots, causes and complex dynamics underpinning the violent conflict and insecurity in the region. This study is both timely and important as it focuses on a festering local conflict that is of great significance to political stability in Nigeria's multi-ethnic federation, as well as to global energy security considering the high stakes involved as the region hosts Africa's most productive oil fields. The importance of this study lies in the ways it interrogates some of the existing perspectives to armed conflict in resource-rich contexts by providing a systematic analysis of the roots and drivers of violence in the Niger Delta. By examining the complex connections between the political economy of oil and the ways it has fed into the politics of dispossession, the history of ethnic minority agitation, resource control, and the vicious cycle of repression and insurgency, the author provides a good case study of the oil-conflict nexus in Nigeria. It also introduces some interesting perspectives to the linkages at the local-national-global levels in the conflict in the region. Although active in the Niger Delta the impact of MEND's attacks has been felt both nationally and globally. Attacks by MEND and other armed groups have led to the loss of a quarter of Nigeria's daily oil exports since 2006. This has adversely affected the revenue base of the Nigerian government, the profit margins of international oil companies operating in the region, and disrupted global oil supplies, contributing to rising prices in the volatile oil markets. Located in West Africa's oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, the Niger Delta is strategic to the energy security calculations of the world's established and emerging powers: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and India. For this reason, the crisis in the Niger Delta has attracted a lot of international attention and concern underscoring both the high stakes involved and the importance of ending the conflict and building sustainable peace in the region. MEND's propaganda machinery has also been active at the national and global levels in seeking attention for its local course. By focusing on MEND, this study casts more light on its origins, methods, strategies and objectives. It also nuances some of the more complex aspects of the conflicts in the oil-rich region, providing to some extent a basis for understanding some of the contradictions and ambivalence within MEND itself, and other actors, local and international involved in the conflict. Beyond this, it provides a sound basis for grappling with the challenge of resolving the complex conflict, starting with a review of some of the more recent efforts of various Nigerian governments, and calling attention to the need to tackle the problem from its roots. The analysis and material contained in this Discussion Paper should be of interest to scholars of conflict and peace in Africa, strategic and energy analysts, as well as policy makers working in the fields of democracy and development on the continent. Details: Uppsala: Nordiska AfrikainstitutetT, 2009. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion paper 47: Accessed June 22, 2017 at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112097/47.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112097/47.pdf Shelf Number: 146340 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOil IndustryOil-Conflict NexusPetroleum IndustryResource CurseViolence |
Author: Hanley, Matthew D. Title: Killing Barney Fife: Law Enforcement's Socially Constructed Perception of Violence and Its Influence of Police Militarization Summary: Police militarization is a complex subject with significant homeland security implications. Efforts to implement militarization reform without a clear understanding of the issue could negatively impact law enforcement's ability to respond to emerging threats from terrorism, homegrown violent extremism, and armed criminals. Conversely, unfettered militarization of domestic policing could result in abuse of authority and loss of public confidence. This thesis proposes a nuanced definition of police militarization based on existing literature. The research then examines the correlation between violence and police militarization. A statistical analysis of crime data found an inverse relationship between levels of reported violence and militarization. However, the research discovered a strong nexus between perceptions of violence by the police and efforts to militarize. Social identity theory was used to explain why isolated acts of violence against police officers are perceived as attacks on the law enforcement community and lead to deep social divisions between the police and the public. This socially constructed reality of violence, which is reinforced by the media and training, has a powerful effect on police attitudes and behavior. The conclusion is that police militarization has been influenced by violence, and appropriate levels of militarized capabilities are needed to protect both the police and the public. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 29, 2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=788377 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=788377 Shelf Number: 146466 Keywords: Assaults Against PolicePolice MilitarizationViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Berk-Seligson, Susan Title: Impact Evaluation of USAID's Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Approach in Central America: El Salvador Country Report Summary: El Salvador, and its neighboring countries in Central America, Guatemala and Honduras, are among the most criminally violent nations in the world. The USAID Missions (specifically, Democracy and Governance (DG) and other offices within the Missions) in five Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) have administered and overseen the execution of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) interventions-a set of programs with the objective of reducing crime rates and improving security in Central America by strengthening community capacity to combat crimes and creating educational and employment opportunities for at-risk youth. USAID/Washington, via its Cooperative Agreement with the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, asked LAPOP to design and carry out an impact evaluation of the CARSI interventions in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, as part of a broader effort to establish the effectiveness of USAID democracy and governance interventions through scientifically rigorous studies such as those recommended in the comprehensive study by the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 2008). LAPOP has had more than 20 years of experience in carrying out policy-relevant surveys in Latin America, having conducted hundreds of country-based surveys, including many specialized studies designed to evaluate programs. This impact evaluation was designed to measure the overall impact of the interventions, not to distinguish among the specific types of interventions, nor to evaluate the implementing partners, per se. To have done so would have required a very different (and more costly) research design, and most likely would have duplicated at least some of the evaluation efforts involved in each implementing partner's contract with USAID. Nonetheless, as noted later in this report, statistical tests performed clearly suggest that the impacts found were generalizable and not confined to one implementing partner versus the other. Ultimately, however, the initial decision made to limit each implementing partner's scope to specific, non-overlapping municipalities makes it impossible to disaggregate statistically the impact of the partner's efforts vs. the conditions of the municipalities in which it operated. That is to say, all of the treated communities in a given municipality experienced the same treatment approach, while all of those of a different municipality received a different partner's treatment. Thus municipal conditions and implemention are indistinguishable. Moreover, because a variety of interventions were used in the neighborhoods (some of which were used by both implementing partners), it is impossible to disentangle the effect of each type of intervention from any other. Details: Nashville, TN: The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University , 2014. 299p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2017 at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi/El_Salvador_v22_English_W_2_04.08.15.pdf Year: 2014 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi/El_Salvador_v22_English_W_2_04.08.15.pdf Shelf Number: 147037 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Community-Based Programs Crime Prevention Violence Violence Prevention Violent Crime |
Author: Berk-Seligson, Susan Title: Impact Evaluation: Panama Country Report Summary: Central America, especially Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, are among the most criminally violent nations in the world. The USAID Missions (specifically, the Democracy and Governance (DG) and other offices within the Missions) in five Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) have administered and overseen the execution of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) interventions-a set of programs with the objective of reducing crime rates and improving security in Central America by strengthening community capacity to combat crimes and creating educational and employment opportunities for at-risk youth. USAID/Washington, via its Cooperative Agreement with the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, asked LAPOP to design and carry out an impact evaluation of the CARSI interventions in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, as part of a broader effort to establish the effectiveness of USAID democracy and governance interventions through scientifically rigorous studies such as those recommended in the comprehensive study by the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 2008). LAPOP has had more than 20 years of experience in carrying out policy-relevant surveys in Latin America, having conducted hundreds of country-based surveys, including many specialized studies designed to evaluate programs. The CARSI approach has been focused on community -based violence prevention, of which the CARSI program in Panama that is the subject of this report, is an example. Two factors, however, made the CARSI impact evaluation LAPOP conducted in Panama different from the impact evaluations carried out elsewhere in Central America. First, unlike in the "northern triangle" countries of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, the level of crime in Panama is not especially high for the Latin American region. Therefore, since the starting base for crime is so much lower in Panama than in the other countries included in this impact evaluation, crime rates there have far less to fall, and impact will, of necessity, be lower. Second, the sample size of communities for the quantitative data obtained from the treated Panamanian communities is too small to justify treating the Panama sample as adequate for country-level analysis. In the other countries covered by the LAPOP CARSI impact evaluation, the minimal sample size of communities was met or exceeded, and therefore justified a country-level analysis of the quantitative data, and for each of those countries, such a report was written and is available on-line at www.LAPOPsurveys.org. In the case of Panama, the quantitative data obtained there have been added to the Central Americawide pooled data base and are reported on only in the regional report of the LAPOP impact evaluation. Third, program implementation lagged in Panama, and in some of the treatment communities the central treaments had not been applied by the end of the impact evaluation surveys. For this reason alone, measurement of impact in those communities would not have meaning. Finally, a number of the key elements of the community-based violence prevention programs initiated by CARSI in the other countries in which this evaluation has taken place were already in place by the time the baseline data were collected, put there by the govnment of Panama and cooperating agencies and NGOs. Therefore, a baseline of "untreated" communities was less meaningful than in the other countries. Details: Nashville, TN: The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University , 2014. 241p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2017 at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi/CARSI_Panama_v3_FinalV_W_02.17.16.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Panama URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi/CARSI_Panama_v3_FinalV_W_02.17.16.pdf Shelf Number: 147038 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Community-Based Programs Crime Prevention Violence Violence Prevention Violent Crime |
Author: Tasmania Law Reform Institute Title: Review of the Law Related to Self-defence Summary: 1.1.1 In November 2012, the Attorney-General requested the Tasmania Law Reform Institute to conduct a wide-ranging examination of the law in Tasmania relating to self-defence. The reference arose from concern expressed by the then Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Tim Ellis SC, that this defence may operate too leniently, potentially resulting in unmerited acquittals. 1.1.2 This Report considers the circumstances in which a person can lawfully use force (including lethal force) to defend himself or herself or someone else. It focuses on areas of uncertainty and controversy in relation to the operation of the defence. In cases where the accused's perception of the need to use defensive force corresponds with the actual need to do so, the law of self-defence is unproblematic. However, difficulties arise when there is a difference between the actual circumstances and the circumstances as the accused mistakenly believed them to be. There is scope for considerable debate about the extent to which a person can rely on a mistaken belief for the purposes of self-defence, and whether the reason for the mistake has a role to play in determining the availability of the defence. A mistaken belief in the need for self-defence is particularly problematic in four situations: - when it results from a delusion caused by a mental illness; - when it is the product of psychological factors personal to the accused that made him or her more sensitive to threats of danger than the normal person; - when it arises from self-induced intoxication; or - when it proceeds from a delusion caused by drug-induced psychosis. There is concern that the current formulation of self-defence in s 46 of the Criminal Code (Tas) does not preclude reliance on the defence in these circumstances, even if the accused's perception of the situation is entirely irrational. This is said to be inappropriate as it affords an unduly favourable defence to those who may resort to violence in the absence of any objective evidence of the need to do so. 1 For these reasons, the former Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions suggested that the defence operates too leniently and in a manner that is out of step with modern standards and community expectations. 1.1.3 These concerns are addressed in this Report. Their resolution is complex because it involves delineating the relationship of different defences, which have different theoretical and policy backgrounds. It also involves determining whether s 46 should be reconceptualised to introduce requirements of reasonableness into all components of self-defence. Additionally, it prompts consideration of whether new and partial defences should be created for situations where an accused acts upon a mistaken belief in the need for self-defence or uses excessive force in defending him or herself. 1.1.4 Another area of concern that is addressed in this Report is the operation of the law of self-defence in the context of family violence. For many years, the operation of the law of self-defence in the context of those who kill (particularly women who kill) in response to family violence has been a key area of critique. The argument has been that the law is not sufficiently receptive to their self-defence claims and that it is out of step with contemporary understandings of the nature and dynamics of family violence. While the law of self-defence in Tasmania is theoretically capable of accommodating the claims of those who use violence in response to family violence, its operation in this context remains largely untested. This Report includes recommendations for reform that would clarify the law and facilitate reliance on self-defence in cases arising in the context of family violence. 1.1.5 In summary, this Report makes recommendations in relation to whether the current law of self-defence in Tasmania should be retained or whether it should be amended. Based on the questions considered in the Issues Paper, recommendations are made in relation to: - whether or not additional or different requirements of reasonableness should be introduced into the Criminal Code (Tas) s 46 (Questions 1 3 of the Issues Paper); - the interaction of mental illness and self-defence (Questions 4 - 26 of the Issues Paper); - the interaction of intoxication and self-defence (Questions 8 - 11 of the Issues Paper); - the operation of the law of self-defence in the context of family violence (Questions 12 - 14 of the Issues Paper); - whether or not partial defences of mistaken self-defence, excessive self-defence, killing for self-preservation in a domestic relationship and diminished responsibility should be introduced into the Criminal Code (Tas) (Questions 15 - 18 of the Issues Paper). 1.1.6 In the Issues Paper, the circumstances in which a person can use force in defence of property, in particular in defence of a persons home, was also considered. Defence of property is dealt with in Part 6 of this Report. Details: Hobart: The Institute, 2015. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report No. 20: Accessed September 9, 2017 at: http://www.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/756570/TLRI_Self-defence_FR_A4_06_Print.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/756570/TLRI_Self-defence_FR_A4_06_Print.pdf Shelf Number: 147167 Keywords: Criminal Law Self-Defense Violence |
Author: Mutahi, Patrick Title: Where is the Money? Donor Funding for Conflict and Violence Prevention in Eastern Africa Summary: In 2014, Kenya and Uganda were two of the top three recipients of official development assistance (ODA) in Africa (OECD n.d.). The funding focused on education, health care, infrastructure, entrepreneurship development, HIV/AIDS treatment, conflict prevention and relief from natural crises such as droughts, famines or earthquakes. Such a mixed bag of funding priorities points to the variegated nature of the development agenda of both the funding actors and the recipient countries. This broad scope, however, obscures the recent shifts and developments with regard to the major challenge of violence and conflict facing the region, and the growing importance of this field for donors and national governments. The Eastern Africa region in general currently faces security and violence challenges linked to terrorism, internal armed conflicts and resources-based conflicts, as well as insecurity linked to everyday crime. These forms of insecurity and violence are seen both by the states of the region and by Western donor states as a threat to state stability as well as the region's development ambitions. Violence reduction is therefore a shared goal both within Eastern Africa and among these Western donor nations. This study seeks to critically examine the shifts and trends in current donor funding in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan aimed at reducing violence and conflict. It analyses key issues being funded as well as trends in donor funding. It is notable that there is a long tradition of donor support to conflict reduction and prevention in the region, as well as support to security sector and policing reforms. However, recent years have witnessed a shift in this support, with the appearance of new security emergencies in the form of terrorist threats in, for example, Kenya and Somalia, and threats of state disintegration in places such as South Sudan. Of course, the agenda of conflict and violence prevention has not always been without its ambiguities even in earlier years, and the donor priorities and those of the populations in the region have not always converged. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular Goal 16, are meant to ensure that interventions for violence reduction and prevention as well as development are part of a common and shared vision. Goal 16 aims to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'. It recognises the link between peace and prevention of violence and conflict and the building and strengthening of functioning and inclusive societies. While the SDGs represent a powerful political commitment by the member states of the United Nations to work towards a common development agenda, the recognition of the linkages that Goal 16 makes between peace, security and development is not entirely new. Indeed, the link between security and development was made quite eloquently by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. An examination of the funding trends on violence in the Eastern Africa region demonstrates that most donor projects explicitly recognise this link. Funding for various violence prevention interventions also seeks to promote good governance, better functioning law and order and justice institutions, and to promote cohesion among other institutions. It therefore seems that if the funding interventions have not worked as expected, it is not because the link had not been made . Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2017. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Addressing and Mitigating Violence, Evidence Report No. 217: Accessed September 12, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12725/ER217_WhereistheMoneyDonorFundingforConflictandViolencePreventioninEasternAfrica.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12725/ER217_WhereistheMoneyDonorFundingforConflictandViolencePreventioninEasternAfrica.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 147224 Keywords: Conflict-Related ViolenceViolenceViolence Prevention |
Author: Clemens, Michael A. Title: Violence, Development and Migration Waves: Evidence from Central American Child Migrant Apprehensions Summary: A recent surge in child migration to the U.S. from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala has occurred in the context of high rates of regional violence. But little quantitative evidence exists on the causal relationship between violence and international emigration in this or any other region. This paper studies the relationship between violence in the Northern Triangle and child migration to the United States using novel, individual-level, anonymized data on all 178,825 U.S. apprehensions of unaccompanied child migrants from these countries between 2011 and 2016. It finds that one additional homicide per year in the region, sustained over the whole period - that is, a cumulative total of six additional homicides - caused a cumulative total of 3.7 additional unaccompanied child apprehensions in the United States. The explanatory power of short-term increases in violence is roughly equal to the explanatory power of long-term economic characteristics like average income and poverty. Due to diffusion of migration experience and assistance through social networks, violence can cause waves of migration that snowball over time, continuing to rise even when violence levels do not. Details: Bonn: IZA (Institute of Labor Economics), 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA DP No. 10928: Accessed October 3, 2017 at: IZA DP No. 10928 Year: 2017 Country: Central America URL: IZA DP No. 10928 Shelf Number: 147526 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Human Trafficking Migration Unaccompanied Children ViolenceWar on Drugs |
Author: Hale, Gary J. Title: Vigilantism in Mexico: A New Phase in Mexico's Security Crisis Summary: The violent struggle between rival Mexican drug cartels and other criminal groups has left tens of thousands dead and towns across Mexico paralyzed with fear. With overwhelmed police forces relatively powerless to control drug-related murders and kidnappings, a growing number of vigilante organizations, or self-defense groups, aim to restore order-but now even they are fighting, and killing, among themselves. The rise of these vigilantes is yet another test for the Mexican government. Will people continue to take security matters into their own hands? How long will they operate as independent security units? In Michoacan, what started as a cooperative agreement between self-defense groups and the federal government has become a tug-of-war over which group will ultimately provide security in Western Mexico. In one incident, police in March 2014 found two charred bodies-believed to be members of a self-defense group-in the back of a pickup truck. Days later, Mexican federal police arrested Hipolito Mora, leader of a prominent, rival self-defense group.1 Internecine fighting among the vigilante groups only means trouble for their future- and the government that deputized them as armed, rural defense forces. Details: Baker Institute, Rice University, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief 04.18.14: Accessed November 16, 2017 at: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/3e645892/BI-Brief-041814-Vigilantism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/3e645892/BI-Brief-041814-Vigilantism.pdf Shelf Number: 148201 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMilitiasOrganized CrimeVigilantismViolence |
Author: Taylor, A.Y. Title: This isn't the life for you: Masculinities and nonviolence in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) with a focus on urban violence Summary: Homicide and other forms of violence persist at high levels in Rio de Janeiro. This violence overwhelmingly affects low-income, young black men. Past research has rarely examined the relationship of this violence to gender norms nor has it focused on the interplay between urban violence and family and intimate partner violence (IPV). While most studies focus on pathways into violence, only a few studies examine at factors that encourage nonviolence. In favelas3 and other low-income, marginalized neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, boys are exposed from an early age to multiple forms of violence in the household and in their communities. At critical points in life, boys and young men who lack attractive economic opportunities are invited to participate in drug trafficking and, oftentimes, encouraged to use arms or use violence in everyday life. Amidst high levels of urban violence, how do many men adopt and sustain nonviolence in their lives? This research led by Promundo seeks to address two key questions: 1. What factors support groups of men who are surrounded by social and economic inequality, high exposure to violence, and incentives to use violence (e.g., members of drug gangs and the police) in avoiding, abandoning, or lessening their use of violence in complex urban settings? 2. How does higher and lower exposure to urban violence (defined by homicide rates) influence construction of masculinities, experiences of violence during childhood, attitudes and self-reported behaviors about gender among the broader population? Promundo examines these questions in "IMAGES-Urban Violence", a study that adapts IMAGES, the International Men and Gender Equality Survey, to focus on gender and urban violence and the interactions between violence in the public and private spheres in Rio de Janeiro. IMAGES is a comprehensive, multi-country study on men's practices and attitudes toward gender norms, gender equality policies, household dynamics, caregiving and involvement as fathers, intimate partner violence, sexual diversity, and health and economic stress. Promundo's offices in Brazil and the United States coordinated the study, which was part of Safe and Inclusive Cities (SAIC), an initiative of Canada's International Development Research Centre and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. IMAGES STUDY ON URBAN VIOLENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO - 1,151 household surveys were conducted with adult men and women in two sites: "South," in the city's southern zone where homicide rates are lower, and "North," predominately in the city's northern zone where homicide rates are high. The sample was drawn using public security administrative areas. - 14 key informant interviews and 45 in-depth life history interviews were carried out. The in-depth interviews sought to capture factors that promote men's trajectories away from the use of violence in complex urban settings. Former drug traffickers, members of the police force, and local activists were invited to participate because these groups of men play crucial roles in using and experiencing of violence and nonviolence in the city. Female partners and family members were also interviewed. Details: Washington, DC and . Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Promundo, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 18, 2017 at: https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/56228/IDL-56228.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Brazil URL: https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/56228/IDL-56228.pdf Shelf Number: 148263 Keywords: Family ViolenceHomicidesIntimate Partner ViolenceMasculinityUrban Areas and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Title: Community Violence as a Population Health Issue: Proceedings of a Workshop Summary: On June 16, 2016, the Roundtable on Population Health Improvement held a workshop at the Lutheran Church of the Good Shepherd in Brooklyn, New York, to explore the influence of trauma and violence on communities. George Isham, co-chair of the roundtable, welcomed participants and explained that hanging behind the podium was a peace quilt created by children of the church congregation. The quilt included several quotes, such as "Love and Open Your Hearts to Others" and "Peace Begins with Me." Isham pointed out that this was a significant backdrop, both physically and metaphorically for the conversation of the day. As participants were painfully aware, though the workshop on community violence as a population health issue had been in the planning stages for several weeks, just a few days earlier, on June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen shot and killed 49 people and injured 53 others at Pulse, a gay nightclub located in Orlando, Florida. Isham said it was appropriate to keep this tragic national event and the loss of lives and injured people in mind, as well as to think of the families, loved ones, and others in the community affected by this violence. In his introductory comments, Isham said that since February 2013, the roundtable has served as a venue for leaders to meet and discuss the leverage points and opportunities arising from changes in the social and political environment for advancing better population health. At previous workshops held by the roundtable, "The Role and Potential of Communities in Population Health Improvement: A Workshop" (IOM, 2015) and "Supporting a Movement for Health and Health Equity: Lessons from Social Movements: A Workshop" (IOM, 2014), several individual workshop speakers emphasized that safe and healthy communities are central to health equity and improving population health. Individual speakers also conveyed the message that community engagement and organizing are important approaches to addressing the social determinants of health, such as housing, education, and violence. Isham added that also relevant was the workshop "Framing the Dialogue on Race and Ethnicity to Advance Health Equity: A Workshop" (NASEM, 2016b), in which Gilbert C. Gee discussed how racism contributes to shorter lives for people of color and inequities in life expectancy. This workshop builds on those insights and seeks to explore ways in which communities are addressing violence and building safe, healthy, and resilient communities. Details: Washington,DC: The National Academies Press, 2017. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2017 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/23661 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/23661 Shelf Number: 148531 Keywords: Communities and CrimeCommunity ViolenceViolence Violent Crime |
Author: Martinez, Cesar Title: Security Policy in Mexico: Recommendations for the 2018 Presidential Election Summary: For over ten years, Mexico's security situation has been a consistent public concern and policy priority. Since the 2000 democratic transition, the country's criminal landscape has changed dramatically. The dissolution of implicit organized-crime political agreements, a move toward more confrontational security strategies, and intra- and inter-group fighting have shattered criminal groups, pushed criminal activity into new industries and exploitative practices, and forced the Mexican government to rethink and continuously adjust its security strategy. The result of these changes is that today's organized criminal groups look different from their historic predecessors, which dedicated their time and energy primarily to transporting and cultivating drugs and keeping a low profile. Today's groups experiment with a range of illicit revenue-generating activities and have adopted shockingly brutal and violent tactics. These profits are then funneled into corrupting political institutions at every level, weakening the government's ability to fulfill its mandate and decimating public trust. The overall insecurity also hurts the country's economy, with estimates that it slashes 1.25 percent off the country's GDP every year. In July 2018, Mexico will elect its next president for the following six years. In the backdrop, the country's homicide level is once again on the rise after a two-year drop. Further, almost 60 percent of the population reported in 2016 that insecurity or delinquency was Mexico's principal problem. These ongoing challenges and concerns will ensure that public security features prominently in the upcoming presidential campaigns and will be a central issue for the incoming administration. To address some of these issues, this Policy Research Project on Mexico's security policy- sponsored by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law-will address Mexico's major security challenges and offer a series of policy recommendations. The report is divided into four chapters, focusing on the overall security strategy, important domestic and international security issues, illicit economic markets, and civil society efforts. Within each chapter, the authors identify the current policies, evaluate their effectiveness, and provide steps for a path forward to a safer and more secure Mexico. Details: Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 2017. 166p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Project Report Number 193 ; Accessed December 6, 2017 at: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/61475/prp_193-security_policy_in_mexico-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/61475/prp_193-security_policy_in_mexico-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 148728 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesIllegal MarketsIllicit MarketsMurdersOrganized CrimePublic SecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: McEvoy, Claire Title: Global Violent Deaths 2017: Time to Decide Summary: Global Violent Deaths 2017: Time to Decide, a new report from the Small Arms Survey, shows that while the global conflict death rate dropped, the global homicide rate increased for the first time since 2004. Although this does not necessarily indicate a new trend, it does signal growing insecurity in non-conflict areas. Of the five countries with the highest death rates in 2016-Syria, El Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras, and Afghanistan-only two had active armed conflicts. The study also elaborates scenarios for the future based on current trends, to assess the number of people that could be saved if states implement effective violence reduction initiatives in support of Agenda 2030, as opposed to more negative outcomes if trends worsen. If prevailing trends remain unchanged, the annual number of violent deaths is likely to increase to 630,000 by 2030. On the contrary, if states commit themselves to effectively address conflict and armed violence, the number of annual deaths could be lowered to 408,000 by 2030-even considering the population increase. In total, over the next twelve years, approximately 1.35 million lives could be saved. Within the Agenda 2030 framework and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, states have an unprecedented opportunity to save lives. It's time to decide. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-GVD2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-GVD2017.pdf Shelf Number: 148756 Keywords: Conflict Related ViolenceHomicidesMurdersViolence |
Author: Straub, Frank Title: Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub Summary: On June 12, 2016, what began as an active shooter incident when a lone gunman entered the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, and began shooting innocent club goers transitioned into a barricaded suspect with hostages incident and ended as the deadliest terrorist attack1 on American soil since September 11, 2001. By the time the incident was over, at least one of every three people in Pulse was either wounded or killed. One hundred two innocent people had been shot: 53 injured and 49 killed. The destruction that occurred on June 12 was the direct result of the shooter's actions. The decisions made and actions taken by the men and women of the Orlando Police Department (OPD) and Orlando's other law enforcement agencies embody the bravery, strength, and professionalism of our nation's law enforcement and public safety first responders as well as the strength of the Orlando community. As demonstrated by many other events-the Boston Marathon terrorist bombings in 2013; the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris and in San Bernardino, California, in 2015; in Brussels in 2016; in Charleston, South Carolina, in 2016 and Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012 and throughout Europe in June 2017-persons and groups motivated by violent ideological, political, or individual factors continue to commit acts of mass public violence and terrorism. Instances of mass shootings increased in both frequency and lethality during the period from 2000 to 2013, and it is undeniable that communities across the United States will continue to be the targets of these events. According to a Washington Post article, there were 154 mass shootings in the first half of 2017, including the June 14, 2017, attack on Republican members of Congress. Still, our law enforcement officers and their public safety partners continue to put themselves in harm's way to protect the communities they serve. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Community Oriented Services, 2017. 198p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2018 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0857-pub.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0857-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 148852 Keywords: Critical Incident Management Homicides Mass Murders Mass Shootings Police Response Public Safety Violence |
Author: Kleinfeld, Rachel Title: Reducing All Violent Deaths, Everywhere: Why the Data Must Improve Summary: The new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include a target to "Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related deaths everywhere." Given the vast decline in violence since the Middle Ages, particularly since the end of the Cold War, this ambitious target is achievable. But policymakers know the least about the countries receiving the most aid. To ensure that aid and policy are effective, current data gaps and deficiencies must be fully understood and improved. Equally important, the target must include indicators that capture all the main types of violence, not just homicide. The Data Problem - Current statistics are marred by problems that make them incomparable across countries. Policymaking that ignores flawed data may focus on less effective goals or assume programs are working when, in fact, violence is being hidden through statistical manipulation. - Policymakers know the least about the countries receiving the most aid. Among the top ten British aid recipients, four have reported no homicide statistics or have had only one data point in twenty-seven years. Eight of the top ten U.S. aid recipients have no reported homicide statistics for the past four years. Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have no reported homicide statistics since the Arab Awakening. - Failure to accurately count different types of violence obscures possible relationships among them. For instance, these include connections between the end of civil war and rising homicide, between state brutality and increased insurgency, and possible connections between state repression and homicide. The Way Forward - A global violence dataset that accounts for "all violent deaths everywhere" should include four disaggregated types of data: homicides, deaths among armed groups in conflict, deaths of unarmed civilians perpetrated by state or nonstate actors, and deaths caused by on-duty government security forces. - The international community needs accurate data across these categories to know which programs and policies actually reduce violence, rather than simply alter the form violence takes. - If the international community does not explicitly include state repression and terrorist killings in the SDG 16.1 target, it opens a loophole to politicizing numbers through reclassification and the use of state violence to try to reduce homicide and rebellion. - International actors should press for a comprehensive set of indicators for SDG 16.1, which currently only include homicides. - Data reporting and collection could be improved by investing in independent observatories, standardization of definitions and methodologies, and other crucial steps. - These decisions are not technical, but political. Statistical manipulation is inevitable and occurs in countries from the United States to Russia. Impartial, trained, and internationally funded violence observatories can assist in gaining accurate statistics so resources can target the most effective place and programs. Details: Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 22, 2018 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_297_Kleinfeld_Crime_Final_Web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_297_Kleinfeld_Crime_Final_Web.pdf Shelf Number: 148900 Keywords: Crime StatisticsHomicidesMurdersViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Chapman, John Title: Police Effectiveness in a Changing World: Slough site report Summary: Between 2011 and 2015, the Police Foundation's Police Effectiveness in a Changing World research team worked closely with the police and their community safety partners in Luton and Slough - two English towns that had experienced the local impact of global change particularly acutely. This is one of two concluding reports from the project which details the process, experience and research findings from Slough. The research started with a problem orientated, multi-agency approach to tackling violence. Using action research we took a problem-oriented approach by identifying local crime problems, improving the way they were understood and developing interventions to tackle them. Then we assessed the outcomes of these and the challenges of implementing them. Throughout the project we drew on the wider evidence-base on police effectiveness to promote local partnerships, to better deal with the 'changing world' and to find sustainable solutions to local crime problems. Most importantly we sought to learn lessons from the process of working with forces on the ground. Details: London: Police Foundation, 2017. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/2017/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/slough_site_report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/2017/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/slough_site_report.pdf Shelf Number: 148978 Keywords: Crime PreventionPolice EffectivenessPolice PerformancePolice ReformProblem-Oriented PolicingViolenceViolence Prevention |
Author: Organization of American States. Secretariat for Multidimensional Security Title: Report on Citizen Security in the Americas/ Official Statistical Information on Citizen Security provided by the OAS Member States - Informe sobre Seguridad Ciudadana en las Americas 2012 Summary: In 2009, the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS) created Alertamerica, the OAS Hemispheric Observatory on Security, which authorities, security specialists and the general public can visit at www.alertamerica.org. The OAS Hemispheric Observatory on Security contains official data from OAS Member States which is sub-divided into 122 indicators that encompass the totality of areas related to the social phenomena of crime and violence, as well as information on the initiatives undertaken by Member States to control and sanction these. The indicators constitute the widest possible repertoire of official information on these themes in the Americas. It is hoped that they will act as a cause for reflection and debate on a topic which has become the principal source of concern for citizens in our region. It constitutes, moreover, the most appropriate indicators and points of reference for the short, medium, and long-term policies which the American countries have implemented with a view to improving citizen security. The document which the reader has in his/ her hands, The Report on Citizen Security in the Americas 2012, is the second version of the General Secretariat's Annual Report comprising the information available through Alertamerica. The reader will find a synthesis of the current citizen security situation in the Americas, broken down into eighty-two statistical tables, as well as the opinions of renowned experts from throughout the continent on the principle areas of regional concern in this field. Details: Washington, DC: OEA, 2012. 164p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: http://www.oas.org/dsp/alertamerica/Report/Alertamerica2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/dsp/alertamerica/Report/Alertamerica2012.pdf Shelf Number: 148985 Keywords: Crime StatisticsNational SecurityViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Hollis, Meghan E. Title: Homicide, Home Vacancies, and Population Change in Detroit Summary: The city of Detroit has maintained steady and high rates of violence over a long period of time. Forbes named Detroit the most dangerous city in the United States for the seventh year in a row in 2015 (Fisher, 2012; 2015). This report examines the relationship between population change, home vacancies, citizen perceptions, and homicide rates in Detroit. Population decline has led to important changes in Detroit. It is essential to understand how those changes have related to crime patterns as well as what the current resident perceptions of their environment are. The findings indicate that the population outmigration combined with the increasing volume of vacant homes is strongly related to the high violence rates and tries to explain why these high violence rates are concentrated in some census tracts. Summary results from the survey are discussed as well. Details: East Lansing: Michigan Applied Policy Research program, Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, 2017. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Informing the Debate: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: http://ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/files/MAPPR/Homicide_Vacancies_PopChange.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/files/MAPPR/Homicide_Vacancies_PopChange.pdf Shelf Number: 149107 Keywords: Homicides Housing and Crime Neighborhoods and Crime Violence |
Author: Delaware Criminal Justice Council. Statistical Analysis Center Title: Crime in Delaware 2012 - 2016: An Analysis of Serious Crime in Delaware Summary: Crime in Delaware is the official report of serious crime known to Delaware law enforcement agencies. This report provides information about 24 Violent, Serious Property, Drug/Narcotic and Other Property and Social offenses reported in Delaware's implementation of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) operated by the State Bureau of Identification of the Delaware State Police. Data for the years 2012 through 2016 are included in this report. Also, as appropriate, data for the years 2005 through 2011 are included to illustrate long term trends. The report includes a summary of data on serious offenses, clearances, adult and juvenile arrests, and crimes against law enforcement officers at the state and county levels, followed by a detailed data section organized by state and county. Key Findings/Trends Overall, the occurrence of serious crime has decreased notably since 2012. The number of serious criminal offenses known to police in 2012 was 93,756 compared with 83,342 in 2016, a decrease of 11.1%. There was a small increase from 2015 to 2016 of .3%. Violent crime in the State decreased 15% from 2012 to 2016, continuing a long term decline in overall offenses. Homicides show a 5% increase from 2012 to 2016. The number of Homicides in 2016 (61) was lower than the high point in 2015 (66). From 2012 to 2016, New Castle County decreased by one, Sussex County increased by one and Kent County increased by three (roughly a 60% increase). Serious Property Offenses decreased 15% between 2012 and 2016. Burglary offenses decreased 33% but showed a 3% increase from 2015 to 2016. Drug/Narcotic Offenses increased 10% between 2012 and 2016. Actual drug offenses increased 23% while drug equipment-related offenses decreased 9%. Other Property and Social Offenses decreased more than 10% between 2012 and 2016. There has been a decline from 2012 to 2015 with an increase from 2015 to 2016. Two of the most frequently reported crimes-Assault offenses and Destruction, Damage, and Vandalism of Property offenses-showed distinct downward trends from 2012 to 2016. From 2015 to 2016, Destruction, Damage and Vandalism showed a recent increase from 2015. Based on 2016 data, offenses in all crime categories were cleared by law enforcement officers at rates comparable to or better than the rates from 2012 through 2016. Overall, 52.7% of offenses in 2016 were cleared by the end of the calendar year. Violent crime against law enforcement officers decreased by 7% between 2012 and 2016. No officers were killed in 2016, but 19% of the 414 assault-related offenses committed against officers resulted in injuries, which is a five year high. Details: Dover: Delaware Criminal Justice Council, 2017. 217p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2018 at: https://sac.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/64/2017/04/Crime-in-Delaware-2012-2016.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://sac.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/64/2017/04/Crime-in-Delaware-2012-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 149509 Keywords: Crime Statistics (Delaware)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: National Threat Assessment Center Title: Exploring the Effect of Stressors in Threat Assessment Investigations: A Case Study on Bart Allen Ross Summary: A threat assessment investigation may be initiated when someone comes to the attention of law enforcement for engaging in threatening or concerning behavior. Identifying stressors that have caused or could potentially cause significant negative pressure on the individual is a key part of this type of investigation. The findings of a recent study by the U.S. Secret Service that examined attacks on federal government targets highlights the importance of assessing the impact of stressors on the person's decision to engage in targeted violence. The study found that over 90% of the offenders experienced stressful events prior to carrying out their attacks. Further, over three-quarters of the offenders experienced at least one stressor in the year prior to their attacks, and over two-thirds within the six months prior. These stressors occurred in personal, health, professional, and legal contexts and covered a range of issues, from minor losses to major adverse changes. Some of the stressors identified were related to conflicts in relationships, health problems, financial hardships, work or school-related problems, arrests or convictions, and civil filings by or against the perpetrators. Using examples from the case of Bart Allen Ross, this document offers some considerations in assessing the role of stressors in conducting threat assessment investigations. Ross fatally shot U.S. District Judge Joan Lefkow's husband and mother in February 2005. A case summary of Ross' life also follows. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=788761 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=788761 Shelf Number: 149668 Keywords: Homeland Security Secret Service Stress Targeted Violence Threat Assessment Violence |
Author: National Threat Assessment Center Title: Mass Attacks in Public Spaces - 2017 Summary: Between January and December 2017, 28 incidents of mass attacks, during which three or more persons were harmed, were carried out in public places within the United States (see map for locations). These acts violated the safety of the places we work, learn, shop, relax, and otherwise conduct our day-to-day lives. The resulting loss of 147 lives and injury to nearly 700 others had a devastating impact on our nation as a whole. As the uncertainty they caused continues to ripple through our communities, those charged with ensuring public safety strive to identify methods to prevent these types of attacks. To aid in these efforts, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) examined these 28 incidents, to identify key themes for enhancing threat assessment and investigative practices. Regardless of whether these attacks were acts of workplace violence, domestic violence, school-based violence, or terrorism, similar themes were observed in the backgrounds of the perpetrators, including: Nearly half were motivated by a personal grievance related to a workplace, domestic, or other issue. Over half had histories of criminal charges, mental health symptoms, and/or illicit substance use or abuse. All had at least one significant stressor within the last five years, and over half had indications of financial instability in that timeframe. Over three-quarters made concerning communications and/or elicited concern from others prior to carrying out their attacks. On average, those who did elicit concern caused more harm than those who did not. These findings, and others in this report, support existing best practices that the U.S. Secret Service has established in the field of threat assessment. They highlight the importance of gathering information on a person's background, behaviors, and situational factors; corroborating the information from multiple sources; assessing the risk the individual poses for violence; and identifying intervention points to mitigate that risk. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2017. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC-Mass_Attacks_in_Public_Spaces-2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC-Mass_Attacks_in_Public_Spaces-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149673 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceMass ShootingsPublic SpacesSecret ServiceThreat AssessmentViolence |
Author: Hsiao, Celia Title: Reducing violence in South Africa: From research to action Summary: Preventing and reducing violence in South Africa must be a national priority if the country is to realise the development goals set by the National Development Plan 2030. Violence exacts an enormous cost - both directly and indirectly - and will undermine and hamper efforts to reduce poverty and inequality and to grow the economy. In December 2017 South Africa joined 15 Pathfinding countries under the Global Partnership to End Violence against Children. Being a Pathfinding country commits South Africa to realise the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 16.2: to end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children. It also commits the country to ensuring that all sectors - government, civil society and the private sector - work together to end violence against children. But ending violence experienced by children requires us also to end violence against women. Not only is this important because it will reduce children's exposure to violence, but also because violence against women is a human rights violation that impacts negatively on the society in which children are raised. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, Accessed April 9, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/plicybrief108-v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/plicybrief108-v2.pdf Shelf Number: 149735 Keywords: Children Exposed to ViolenceCrime and DevelopmentCrime PreventionEvidence-Based ProgramsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent CrimeViolent Prevention |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Serious Violence Strategy Summary: The Government is determined to do all it can to break the deadly cycle of violence that devastates the lives of individuals, families and communities. This strategy sets out how we will respond to serious violence. The strategy consolidates the range of very important work already being taken forward and renews our ambition to go further, setting out a number of significant new proposals. We want to make clear that our approach is not solely focused on law enforcement, very important as that is, but depends on partnerships across a number of sectors such as education, health, social services, housing, youth services, and victim services. In particular it needs the support of communities thinking about what they can themselves do to help prevent violent crime happening in the first place and how they can support measures to get young people and young adults involved in positive activities. Our overarching message is that tackling serious violence is not a law enforcement issue alone. It requires a multiple strand approach involving a range of partners across different sectors. The strategy sets out our analysis of the evidence and the trends and drivers of serious violent crime. The evidence shows that while overall crime continues to fall, homicide, knife crime and gun crime have risen since 2014 across virtually all police force areas in England and Wales. Robbery has also risen sharply since 2016. These increases have been accompanied by a shift towards younger victims and perpetrators. Most of the violence is also male on male. About half the rise in robbery, knife and gun crime is due to improvements in police recording. For the remainder, drug-related cases seem to be an important driver. Between 2014/15 and 2016/17, homicides where either the victim or suspect were known to be involved in using or dealing illicit drugs increased from 50% to 57%. Crack cocaine markets have strong links to serious violence and evidence suggests crack use is rising in England and Wales due to a mix of supply and demand factors. Drug-related cases also seem to be one of the driving factors in the homicide increase in the United States. Drug-market violence may also be facilitated and spread to some extent by social media. A small minority are using social media to glamorise gang or drug-selling life, taunt rivals and normalise weapons carrying. There has also been an increase in vulnerable groups susceptible to the related exploitation and/or drug use. The strategy is framed on four key themes: tackling county lines and misuse of drugs, early intervention and prevention, supporting communities and partnerships, and an effective law enforcement and criminal justice response. This strategy represents a step change in the way we think and respond to serious violence, establishing a new balance between prevention and law enforcement. Given the strong link between drugs and serious violence and the related harm and exploitation from county lines, we have set out the action we will take to tackle this violent and exploitative criminal activity. The Home Office is supporting the development of a new National County Lines Co‑ordination Centre. We will continue to raise awareness of county lines and the related exploitation, and we will provide funding to support delivery of a new round of Heroin and Crack Action Areas. Our work on early intervention and prevention is focused on steering young people away from crime and putting in place measures to tackle the root causes. The Home Office has committed $11 million over the next two years through a new Early Intervention Youth Fund to provide support to communities for early intervention and prevention with young people. We will support Redthread to expand and pilot its Youth Violence Intervention Programme outside London, starting with Nottingham and Birmingham, and to develop its service in major London hospitals. We will also continue to fund Young People's Advocates working with gang-affected young women and girls, and exploring whether the model should be expanded. The Home Office will work with the Department for Education and Ofsted to explore what more can be done to support schools in England to respond to potential crime risks and to provide additional support to excluded children. We need an approach that involves partners across different sectors, including police, local authorities and the private and voluntary sector. Communities and local partnerships will be at the heart of our response. This issue must be understood and owned locally so that all the relevant partners can play their part. We will support local partnerships, working with Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), to galvanise the local response to tackling serious violence and ensure that they are reflecting local challenges within their plans. We have launched a new media campaign raising awareness about the risks of carrying knives. To help communities tackle knife crime, the Home Office is providing up to $1 million for the Community Fund in both 2018/19 and 2019/20, in addition to continuing the Ending Gang Violence and Exploitation (EGVE) Fund and EGVE review programme. We are clear that tackling serious violence is not a law enforcement issue alone and requires partnerships across a range of agencies; however we want to ensure that we are providing the tools to support the law enforcement and criminal justice response. We are planning new legislation to strengthen our controls on knives, corrosive substances and firearms. The Home Office will also work with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service (HMICFRS) to ensure their PEEL inspections focus on serious violence and support a HMICFRS thematic inspection of county lines in 2018/19. The Home Office has commissioned the Centre for Applied Science and Technology to ensure that the police have the capability to undertake street testing for corrosives. Finally, we will ensure that there is a framework in place to support delivery of the strategy. The Home Office will establish a new cross sector Serious Violence Taskforce with key representatives from a range of national, local and delivery partner agencies to oversee delivery and challenge the impact of delivery of the Serious Violence Strategy. The current Inter-Ministerial Group on Gangs will be refocused to oversee and drive delivery of the strategy. The Home Secretary will also hold an International Violent Crime Symposium to bring together the international academic community to understand the trends in serious violence in different parts of the world. Details: London: Home Office, 2018. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698009/serious-violence-strategy.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698009/serious-violence-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 149794 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Crime and Development in Africa Summary: Our knowledge on the state of crime in Africa is limited. Given the many development challenges facing the continent, it is not surprising that little attention has been given to crime. But Africa's development challenges are precisely the social factors found to be associated with high crime situations internationally. For example: - Income inequality is one of the most robust quantitative correlates of official crime rates, and Africa hosts some of the most unequal countries in the world: on average, the richest 10% earn 31 times more than the poorest 10%. - Throughout the world, teenaged and young adult males commit most of the crime, and Africa's youthful population (43% under the age of 15) means that a greater part of the society falls into this pool of potential offenders. Many of these young people are not enrolled in educational programmes and cannot find employment. - Rapid rates of urbanisation, a factor that combines elements of population density, cultural clash, and population instability, is also a strong correlate of crime rates. Africa is urbanising at about 4% a year, about twice the global average. - Poor countries have poorly-resourced criminal justice systems, and Africa suffers from the world's least favourable police- and judge-to-population ratios. This ultimately impacts on conviction rates; even if the police perform optimally, offenders in Africa are much less likely to be punished for their wrongdoings than those in the rest of the world. Such a system cannot effectively deter, incapacitate, or rehabilitate criminals. - The proliferation of firearms, related in part to the recurrence of conflict in all regions of the continent and in part to a growing sense of public insecurity, enables and aggravates violent crime. While none of these factors alone causes crime, their presence together does make it more probable that crime will occur, all other things being equal. This does not mean that the continent is doomed to criminality. Rather, it means that crime needs to be anticipated and that development planning should proceed with these dynamics in mind. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2005. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2018 at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/African_report.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/African_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149797 Keywords: Developing CountriesGun-Related ViolencePovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Summary: Key findings Terrorism At the crossroads of the region's most violent conflicts, Niger has served as a primary transit point for armed criminal and terrorist groups operating in the various conflict theatres that surround it. Everything from people, weapons, and low-tech communications pass through Niger's borders, providing a rich source of intelligence that is critical to understanding the nature of cross-border relationships and networks of trafficking and terrorist groups. Niger presents a privileged arena in which to observe the array of terrorist dynamics across the Sahel, and to take action against them. The country has become a major partner in counter-terrorism strategies for regional and western powers. Relatively spared by the threat of terrorism until 2015, the increase in terrorist attacks in Niger since then, first by Boko Haram and then by AQIM-related groups or splinter cells, run in parallel with the enhanced engagement of the Nigerien authorities against terrorism in the region, including MNJTF, MINUSMA, and G5 Sahel efforts. While the north of the country is particularly affected by armed banditry, the south has suffered the bulk of terrorist attacks. In 2016, Boko Haram was responsible for perpetrating 80 per cent of the terrorist attacks carried out on Nigerien soil, but 2017 saw a surge in deadly attacks against security positions near the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali by AQIM- and IS-related groups based in Mali. Sahelian terrorist groups find Niger a fertile recruiting ground and exploit long-standing community divisions, which are in turn exacerbated by increasing insecurity. Arms trafficking Niger has served as a key transit route for weapons heading to conflict zones in the region, but the deterioration of the country's security situation has resulted in an increase in the domestic demand for weapons, particularly for small arms and ammunition. Arms seized from terrorists or en route to terrorist groups in Niger over the past five years include explosives, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and associated ammunition (including MANPADS, mortar rounds, and machine guns). Vehicles were also seized. Terrorist groups operating in Niger, including those based in Mali and Nigeria, have been obtaining materiel from a variety of sources-including from national stockpiles in the region-following the collapse of state control over arsenals, as in Libya or northern Mali, attacks against security positions, or diversion in countries such as Niger or Nigeria. Ammunition held by terrorist groups, other armed actors, and civilians is very similar, indicating common sources of illicit ammunition, including past rebellions and national stockpiles from Niger and neighbouring countries. However, it does vary between the regions: while chains of transfers in the north originate mainly from Libya and Mali, materiel in the south-east comes mainly from Chad and Nigeria. While Libya continues to be a source for illicit weapons in Niger, including converted blank'firing handguns, trafficking from Libya has declined significantly since 2014 due to the depletion of Qaddafi's SALW stockpiles, national demand reinvigorated in light of renewed conflict in Libya, and increased levels of surveillance and counteraction in Niger with the deployment of Operation Barkhane. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Niger URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Shelf Number: 149854 Keywords: Arms TraffickingIllicit TraffickingTerrorismTerroristsTrafficking in ArmsViolence |
Author: University of Washington. Jackson School of International Studies Title: The Cycle of Violence: Migration from the Northern Triangle Summary: This report documents the brutal and pervasive abuses suffered by Central American migrants in efforts to seek refuge from gang and state violence, government corruption, social exclusion, and endemic poverty. The cyclical nature of this violence - that is, the tendency of its victims to be caught in a cycle of forced migration, deportation, and remigration - reflects that the involved governments have collectively failed in both resolving its underlying causes and stemming its devastating effects. For instance, reintegration programs that might afford deportees the opportunity to rebuild their lives are thoroughly lacking in the NTCA; and simultaneously, U.S. and Mexican immigration officials are routinely neglecting their legal obligations to screen apprehended migrants for asylum claims before summarily deported them. Our aim is to explicate factors such as these, which reveal long-standing patterns of impunity for criminal organizations and corrupt officials, negligence, and a lack of political will which perpetuate what has become a deepening cycle of human rights abuses. By using data from the cases of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Honduran, and Mexican clients who sought legal counsel at El Rescate - as well as scholarly works, government figures, and the findings of various nongovernmental organizations - our report sheds light on the policies and practices that have systematically marginalized those compelled to flee the Northern Triangle. Details: Seattle: The School, 2017. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 27, 2018 at: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/38696/Cycle%20of%20Violence_Task%20Force%20Report%202017%20FINAL.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Central America URL: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/38696/Cycle%20of%20Violence_Task%20Force%20Report%202017%20FINAL.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 149925 Keywords: DeportationGangsImmigrantsMigrationViolence |
Author: Brennan, Iain Title: Weapon-carrying and the reduction of violent harm Summary: Criminology has much to offer activities to reduce the harm of violent incidents -- particularly by reducing weapon carrying and use - but the discipline's engagement with the harm reduction agenda has been limited. In addressing this, the paper identifies risk factors for carrying a weapon by a young person in England and Wales. It demonstrates that this decision is influenced by individual-, interpersonal- and community-level factors and that weapon carriers can be distinguished from other respondents using relatively few characteristics. The study also shows that defensive factors, such as victimisation and concerns about personal safety are relevant to understanding weapon-carrying, but they are outweighed by criminogenic factors such as violence, neighbourhood disorder and, importantly, lack of trust in the police. Details: Unpublished paper, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 9, 2018 at: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/5kdrf/ Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/5kdrf/ Shelf Number: 150128 Keywords: Harm ReductionPersonal SafetyViolenceWeapons |
Author: Ellis, Geoffrey A. Title: Evaluating common hypotheses for violence in Central America Summary: This thesis endeavors to bring analytical clarity to the assumptions that inform proposed policy solutions to the alarming rise in violence in Central America. The thesis evaluates three of the most common hypotheses for citizen insecurity in the region: the impact of structural economic problems like poverty and inequality; the efficacy of state criminological approaches; and the effectiveness of internal security institutions. To evaluate each hypothesis, the thesis uses a comparative case analysis of Nicaragua and El Salvador. In spite of dramatic divergence in violence outcomes, the two countries share many variables including geographical proximity, economic development challenges, a history of civil conflict, and democratic transition in the 1990s. Using homicide rates as the most reliable indicator of violence, the findings reveal that structural economic problems like poverty and inequality have only an imperfect correlation with citizen security. On the contrary, variables that correlate more closely with peaceful security outcomes include the effectiveness of security institutions-characterized by sophisticated plans, sound structures, and adequate resources-and rigorous criminological approaches as characterized by community involvement, efficient intelligence-gathering mechanisms, and recidivism reduction programs. The thesis's implications pertain not only to Central America but also to troubled regions throughout the world. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 9, 2018 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/51687 Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/51687 Shelf Number: 150130 Keywords: Citizen SecurityHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Blake, Damion Keith Title: Violent Actors and Embedded Power: Exploring the Evolving Roles of Dons in Jamaica Summary: The Jamaican don is a non-state actor who wields considerable power and control inside that nation's garrison communities. A don is a male figure, usually from the community in which he plays a leadership role. Garrisons in Jamaica have often emerged as neighborhoods that are don-ruled shadow versions of the official State. These are poor inner city communities characterized by homogeneous and, in some cases, over-voting patterns for one of Jamaica's two major political parties: the Peoples National Party (PNP) or the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). This dissertation explores the major roles dons played in Jamaican garrisons. It focused on one community in the downtown metro area of one of the nation's cities. Additionally, it investigated the factors that account for the evolution of such roles performed by dons from the 1960s to the present. I used governance theories and the concept of embeddedness as an analytic framework to interpret the power and authority dons have in garrisons. Dons, as it turned out, perform four central roles in garrisons: security/protection, social welfare, partisan mobilization and law, order and conflict resolution via "jungle justice" measures. Different types of dons perform alternate mixes of these roles. The case study described here led me to develop a taxonomy of these informal community leaders by separating them into Mega, Area and Street Dons. I argue overall that dons are embedded governing authorities in Jamaican garrisons based on the socio-economic and political roles they carry out. By examining the responsibilities of dons in Jamaica, this analysis contributes to the literature on the activities of non-state criminal actors and their forms of influence on governance processes. The study suggests that it may now be appropriate to re-think the nature of governance and the actors we broadly assume are legitimate holders of power and authority in developing nation contexts. Details: Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2012. 213p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 14, 2018 at: https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/49569/Blake_DK_D_2012.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2012 Country: Jamaica URL: https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/49569/Blake_DK_D_2012.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 150186 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGun TraffickingOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Open Society Justice Initiative Title: Corruption that Kills: Why Mexico Needs an International Mechanism to Combat Impunity Summary: In 2017, Mexico experienced its deadliest year in two decades, with homicides exceeding 25,000. Despite the many crimes which have been committed in Mexico, however, criminal accountability still remains virtually absent. The extraordinary violence Mexico is experiencing, and the questions it raises about collusion between state actors and organized crime, demand a commensurate response. This report calls for an international mechanism-based inside the country, but comprised of national and international staff-which would have a mandate to independently investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes and the corrupt acts that enable them. This report follows the Open Society Justice Initiative's 2016 report, Undeniable Atrocities, which found reasonable basis to believe that Mexican federal forces and members of the Zetas cartel have perpetrated crimes against humanity. Corruption That Kills was produced by the Open Society Justice Initiative in partnership with eight Mexican organizations: the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, the Diocesan Center for Human Rights Fray Juan de Larios, Families United for the Search of Disappeared Persons, Piedras Negras/Coahuila, I(dh)eas Human Rights Strategic Litigationos, the Mexican Institute of Human Rights and Democracy, Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center, the Foundation for Justice and Rule of Law, and PODER. Details: New York: Open Society Foundation, 2018. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/corruption-that-kills-en-20180502.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/corruption-that-kills-en-20180502.pdf Shelf Number: 150193 Keywords: Criminal Justice SystemsDrug Policy ReformHomicidesHuman RightsPolitical CorruptionViolence |
Author: Knight, Victoria Title: Engaging with the Night Time Economy Community: Finding Ways to Enhance Violence Reduction Across Leicester City Summary: This report documents the outcome of a series of consultations with the night time economy community in Leicester city. Its focus was to explore the ways in which this community and its stakeholders views and responds to the incidence of violent crime. The report describes the rationale and approach to understanding violent crime in the night time economy in the context of Leicester city. A number of key messages and themes have been identified as a result of this consultation. These messages have helped to secure a number of priorities to assist with violence reduction in the night time economy and more broadly enhance harm reduction associated with alcohol consumption. The report captures what Leicester city is doing well and highlights additional areas to enhance good practice for all stakeholders. A consolidated and joint approach is imperative to securing good working relationships across the night time community in order for it succeed. This executive summary highlights the key points of the full report. Rationale and Approach to the Consultation Violent crime reduction has been identified as a priority for the Safer Leicestershire Partnership. Common assault was identified as an area which required attention in Leicester's city centre and the West of the City. It was also observed that common assault and other violent crime was occurring more frequently during the night time periods, especially those where individuals visit these areas to consume alcohol. An audit of the night time economy in 2011 highlighted a number of complex issues associated with violence and the night time economy. In addition Leicestershire police conducted a review of violent crime data in the night time economy in 2011. Although useful, it was recognised that a much deeper understanding of the practices of key stakeholders was necessary in order to develop strategies to bring about harm minimization and a safer night time experience for all stakeholders. A series of consultations occurred in 2012 which was led by an independent researcher from De Montfort University. Key stakeholders who included licensees, door supervisors, police, clinical staff, volunteers and key strategic and operational staff took part in a series of group discussions to describe their practice and their views on violence reduction. What Research says about Violence in the Night Time Economy The causes and impact of violence in the night time economy have been closely associated with the consumption of alcohol. Using geographical techniques research has identified that violence increases during 'hot times' and in 'hot spots'. Extended opportunities to consume more alcohol as a result of relaxed licensing hours have also been attributed to an increase in violent crime. Injury is an outcome for some of the violence that occurs during these times and more recently clinical data has been used to understand the scale of violent crime. It is widely acknowledged that the extent of violence is not fully understood, with a large proportion going unreported. Significant contributors to violent crime in the night time economy include; drunkennessexacerbated by long drinking periods extended by 'pre-' and 'back-' loading and the availability of cheap alcohol, previous involvement in violence, drinking in single sex groups, young and male. Violence is also increased in spaces where crowds can gather, where loud music is played and in standing-only venues. Police typically employ two generic models of policing for the night time economy; community/preventative policing and reactive/fast response. Together these use intelligence and knowledge of the community to deliver their services. Clinical provision typically provides static care within A&E departments. More recently mobile and specialist units have been deployed at night time periods to slow down entrants to A&E. Research indicates that the night time periods have demanded an increase in staffing to manage an increase in alcohol related injury. Some departments now provide alcohol specialist nurses, alcohol screening tool, and joint working with police officers to promote harm minimization. Door supervisors contribute significantly to the regulation of the night time economy. Volunteers like Street Pastors provide additional pastoral care for vulnerable night time users. A range of prevention and intervention strategies have been trialed and implemented to assist with violence reduction in night time economy contexts. These include practices and techniques adopted by licensees and door supervisors such training for dealing with drunkenness, drinks or entry refusal and ID checking. The adoption of banning patrons, using plastic glasses instead of glass and pub/club watch initiatives. Policing has also used high visibility techniques to increase police presence, test purchasing, targeting hot spots and vulnerable venues, the use of dispersal orders and training the drinks industry. Local government initiatives include coordinated transport arrangements, multi-agency working, temporary road closures and replacing conventional street lighting with 'white lighting'. Public health interventions include harm minimization awareness campaigns and alcohol screening tools. Key Findings Maintaining standards across the night time economy is achieved through compliance with regulations and good practice. Balancing safety and working within resources and creating a healthy economy can be a challenge. There is a strong desire to maintain and extend standards. Barriers to this included lack of understanding about other services, working relationships, ability to invest in better practice and access to support. Good practice includes: coordinated forum through Citywatch to access support, advice and their radio service, licensee practices within venues to maintain compliance with Licensing Act, the city's shared agreement not to sell alcohol cheaply, designing in environmental features to keep night time visitors calm in venues, use of experienced and legitimate door supervisors, regulation of the security industry, joint local partnership between licensing and specialist licensing officers, focused policing- licensing officers and dedicated night time economy responsive teams, high visibility policing in hot spots, joint police and paramedic mobile unit- POLAMB, availability of voluntary services. Access and availability of training is limited across the city for all stakeholders. Despite training being available, this is uncoordinated and lacks consolidation. There is a desire for more frequent and diverse training to enhance knowledge and practice. The supply of alcohol across the city that exacerbates drunkenness and disorder has brought about a stigmatization of the industry and for licensees and door supervisors this has meant they are unable to promote their professionalism more extensively. There is evidence to support that licensees and door supervisors do accept a duty of care for their customers but it was felt this was not widespread or acknowledged by other stakeholders. Dealing with difficult situations as a result of drunkenness is a pressure point for all stakeholders. Stakeholders are routinely subjected to abuse (verbal and physical) from night time visitors. Stakeholders who used the Citywatch radio felt that this facility should be used more to help tackle these issues and help other services and visitors to keep safe There is some frustration about the ways in which offenders of crime and anti-social behaviour are dealt with. Confidence in the Section 27 disposal (dispersal order) is limited. All stakeholders expressed some misunderstandings about what other services can do. As a result disproportionate expectations of services have emerged. Achieving trust and sound working relationships between services is limited by lack of understanding, negative experiences of services, stigma and ability to forge relationships based on time and resources. The night time economy in Leicester is diverse in terms of places (including types of venues), people and behaviour. Open and transparent communication and targeting the right resources to the right places at the right time can enhance this. Problems arise when crowds are able to gather, transport remains limited, extended availability of alcohol (including off-licenses), litter is allowed to gather, response times are delayed by accessibility issues and the availability of food is limited. Competing agendas between stakeholders is a barrier to enhancing working relationships and subsequent partnerships. Limited resources were identified as a significant barrier. Details: Leicester, UK: Leicester City Council, 2012. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://www.dora.dmu.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2086/9336/Engaging%20with%20the%20Night%20Time%20Economy%20Community%20Full%20Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.dora.dmu.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2086/9336/Engaging%20with%20the%20Night%20Time%20Economy%20Community%20Full%20Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 150347 Keywords: Alcohol Law EnforcementAlcohol Related Crime, DisorderAnti-Social DisorderNight-Time EconomyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Jackman, David Title: Living in the shade of others: intermediation, politics and violence in Dhaka City Summary: Bangladesh is often perceived as disordered, characterised by the absence of law abiding systems of governance, and with the poor left to rely on corrupt and dysfunctional relationships. This thesis tells a different story. Examining the lives of people living in the open and most basic slums ethnographically in Dhaka city reveals that people have complex dependencies on 'intermediaries' or 'brokers' to access resources. Rather than see these relationships as dysfunctional, the core argument developed is that they are inherently part of how social order is maintained in Bangladeshi society. If order is understood as contingent on actors throughout society establishing a dominant capability for violence and accruing resources on this basis, then intermediation can be seen as a prominent means by which both of these ends are achieved. These relationships are thus intertwined with how violence is organised and controlled. A young man who grew up at a bazar described how people need to live in the shade of others, and this metaphor is used to portray this phenomenon. This thesis argues that intermediation in Dhaka has changed significantly over the past decade, with the mastan gangs once identified as powerful in radical decline, replaced by wings of the ruling political party. At the lowest levels of urban society, a complex web of intermediaries exists, including labour leaders, political leaders, their followers and informers. Some people attempt to rise in this order by mobilising as factions and demonstrating their capability for violence, but more generally people employ tactics and strategies for avoiding, negotiating and even exiting these relationships. Negotiating these relationships and one's place in this order is conceptualised here as the politics of intermediation. Details: Bath, UK: University of Bath, 2017. 223p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2018 at: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/57425/ Year: 2017 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/57425/ Shelf Number: 150356 Keywords: Political CorruptionUrban Areas and CrimeViolence |
Author: Arredondo Sanchez Lira, Jaime Title: Mapping violence: homicides trends in Mexico and Brazil 1990-2010 Summary: Latin America has become one of the most violent regions in the world. Public Safety is now among the principal citizen's demands in some of those countries. This paper begins with a consideration of the role of police in answering the demand for public safety by local populations, and its role as a tool for exercising the state's monopoly of legitimate violence within a territory. Two relevant countries in the region, Brazil and Mexico, have undertaken police reform throughout these two decades, emphasizing lately a combination of new social and policing strategies. However, public opinion and the demand for solutions vary accordingly to changes in general crime trends; previous studies have used a methodology to understand such phenomenon. Homicides provide a good indicator of violence, since its measurement is based upon a common international methodology of mortality public health data. This research develops a new comparison approach that takes into account national tendencies, historical averages and the stability across time of homicides rates at the federal state level in Mexico and Brazil. These trends draw a general picture of violence that is helpful for future public policy discussions. The correlation between violence levels and stability of crime hold for the Brazilian case but not for Mexico, where we can observe a shift of violence to federal Border States and cities. The lack of proper crime statistics and a more detailed conceptualization of reform efforts should be address in future studies to fully understand regional tendencies and tailor local solutions. Details: San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 2012. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt4bd8c6p9/qt4bd8c6p9.pdf?t=msz23w Year: 2012 Country: Latin America URL: https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt4bd8c6p9/qt4bd8c6p9.pdf?t=msz23w Shelf Number: 150596 Keywords: Crime TrendsHomicidesPolice ReformPublic SafetyViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Arredondo Sanchez Lira, Jaime Title: The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana Summary: This policy brief provides an assessment of the recent resurgence of violent crime in the Mexican border city of Tijuana in the state of Baja California. With an estimated 1.8 million inhabitants in 2017, Tijuana is the largest Mexican city on the U.S.-Mexico border. The city is home to roughly 49% of Baja California's population, while comprising only around 2% of the state's territory. Today one of Mexico's fastest growing cities, Tijuana reportedly grows at an annual rate of 35,000 people per year, or nearly 96 new inhabitants per day, drawing large numbers of immigrants from elsewhere in Mexico to join the city's robust economy. A longtime destination for cross-border tourism, Tijuana has long prided itself as the "world's most visited city." Today, nearly 190,000 people cross the border between Tijuana and neighboring San Diego on a daily basis for work, commerce, schooling, fine dining, family gatherings, and other recreational pursuits. Moreover, an estimated 200,000 U.S. citizens reside in the state of Baja California (roughly one in five of all U.S. citizens estimated to reside in Mexico), with many of them living in Tijuana. The city's thriving manufacturing sector makes Tijuana a vital part of the vibrant cross-border economic area known as the "Cali-Baja" region, particularly in areas such as electronics and medical devices; one study estimates that this region is responsible for roughly 40% of all audio-visual manufacturing in North America. Yet, dating back to the Prohibition-era of the 1920s, Tijuana also has long suffered a reputation as a city of vice. Over the last decade, that reputation has been further damaged by dramatic surges of violent crime, often attributable to drug-trafficking and organized crime groups. The city also has high levels of drug use that are shaped by its proximity to the United States. While methamphetamine is the main illicit drug used in the State of Baja California, the city has a higher concentration of heroin drug users compared to the national average, resulting in a concentrated epidemic of HIV and Hepatitis C virus among this high-risk population. In 2017, Tijuana had more homicides than any other city in Mexico, in a record year for national homicide figures. According to information from the Baja California Ministry of Public Safety, from 2016 to 2017 Tijuana saw the number of investigations on homicide cases rise from 872 to 1,618, an increase of roughly 86% in just one year. Preliminary figures from the Baja California State Secretary of Public Security put the total number of homicides in these cases at 1,780 homicide victims in Tijuana. 8 Preliminary data from Mexico's National Public Security system puts the total number of victims of homicide in the country at 29,168, a number that could increase to over 30,000 when final tallies are completed in the coming months.9 Based on these figures, the authors calculate that in 2017 one out of twenty murders in Mexico took place in Tijuana. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, 2018. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180205_TJViolence.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180205_TJViolence.pdf Shelf Number: 150597 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesIllicit DrugsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in DrugsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Brazil. Secretary General Title: Custos Economicos da Criminalidade No Brasil Summary: - Brazil is among the top 10% of countries with the highest homicide rates in the world - despite having a population equivalent to 3% of the world population, the country accounts for about 14% of all homicides in the world. Brazilian homicide rates are similar to those in Rwanda, the Dominican Republic, South Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo. - There have been three distinct times in the number of homicides in Brazil in the last 20 years. In the first period, from 1996 to 2003, there was an increase, from 35 thousand to 48 thousand homicides per year. In the subsequent period, between 2003 and 2007, there was a 48 thousand to 44 thousand victims a year. Finally, as of 2008, there was a further increase in the number of victims, although at a slower pace than before 2003, reaching 54 thousand in 2015. - Homicide rates are highly heterogeneous in the country. Some microregions, especially that of Sao Paulo, which has the largest population, has homicide rates close to 10 per 100 thousand inhabitants. On the other hand, some North-Northeast, such as Belem, Salvador, Fortaleza and Sao Luis, as well as the micro-region of the Surroundings of the Federal District, have homicide rates above 50 per 100 thousand inhabitants, which would place them at levels of some of the world's most violent countries, such as Jamaica, Venezuela and Honduras. - The evolution in homicide rates in the last decade was also significantly with a declining trend in homicide rates in the Southeast and increase in the North-Northeast. - It is estimated that, for each homicide of 13- to 25-year-olds, the present value of loss of productive capacity is about 550 thousand reais. The cumulative loss of productive capacity resulting from homicides, between 1996 and 2015, surpassed 450 billion reais. - The economic costs of crime increased substantially between 1996 and 2015, from about 113 billion reais to 285 billion reais. This is equivalent to an average real increase of about 4.5% per year. By 2015, the components, in order of relevance were: public security (1.35% of GDP); private security (from Google Translations) Details: Brasilia: Secretary General, 2018. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: RELATORIO DE CONJUNTURA No. 4: Accessed June 27, 2018 at: http://www.secretariageral.gov.br/estrutura/secretaria_de_assuntos_estrategicos/publicacoes-e-analise/relatorios-de-conjuntura/custos_economicos_criminalidade_brasil.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.secretariageral.gov.br/estrutura/secretaria_de_assuntos_estrategicos/publicacoes-e-analise/relatorios-de-conjuntura/custos_economicos_criminalidade_brasil.pdf Shelf Number: 150714 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCrime StatisticsEconomics of CrimeHomicidesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers 2017: What to Watch for in 2018 Summary: Organized crime thrives amid political corruption and uncertainty. There will be plenty of this in Latin America in 2018, helping organized crime deepen its roots across the region over the course of the year. This is the moment when we draw on our extensive research and experience to make our predictions for the coming year. And the panorama for 2018 is one of the bleakest that InSight Crime has faced in our nine years of studying criminal phenomena in Latin America and the Caribbean. Tackling organized crime requires stable governments with purpose, strategy, strong security forces, healthy democracy and transparency, along with international cooperation. These currently seem in short supply around the region. Political chaos, infighting and upheaval ensure that attention is occupied on survival and manipulation of democracy, not with tackling organized crime. State legitimacy has come into question in certain nations in the region, as political leaders are investigated for corruption or manipulation of power. Embattled political leaders will often cut backroom deals with criminal elements to ensure their survival. Moreover, several countries will see important elections in the coming year, contributing to political instability. Political Hangovers From 2017 As we wrote in our introduction to this GameChangers, 2017 saw corruption take hold at high levels in governments across the region. So we enter 2018 with several political hangovers, where we believe corruption will assume a still stronger grip: Venezuela, where the last fig leaf of democracy has fallen and a corrupt regime is entrenching itself in power. As oil revenue dries up, the government may further criminalize to survive. The disintegration of the Venezuelan state and its total corruption has far-reaching regional implications for criminal dynamics. These are most immediately impacting on neighbors like Colombia, Brazil and Caribbean nations (Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba and the Dominican Republic foremost among them), but the effects are spreading further afield. Honduras, where the re-election of President Juan Orlando Hernandez has been disputed amid claims of fraud and corruption. This has further undermined his already battered legitimacy. This Northern Triangle nation is of extraordinary importance for drugs moving from South America to the United States. Peru, which saw President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski narrowly avoid being removed from power amid accusations of corruption. He survived only by pardoning former President Alberto Fujimori, who was jailed for human rights abuses. The Fujimori family control one of the most powerful factions in Congress. Kuczynski has been fatally weakened and discredited. We expect to see major underworld activities such as cocaine, timber and gold trafficking strengthened as a result. Bolivia's president, Evo Morales, has manipulated the constitution and looks set to perpetuate himself in office by standing for a fourth term. Most checks on his power now seem to have been stripped away, even as the country plays a central role in South America's drug trade. Ecuador has seen its vice president removed after a conviction for corruption, while President Lenin Moreno find himself locked in a political war with former President Rafael Correa. Organized crime is far down the president's list of priorities, despite that the fact that we believe the port of Guayaquil to be one of the major departure points for cocaine shipments across the globe. Presidential Elections in 2018 To further feed the political uncertainty, there are elections in six important nations, which mean that political attention will be utterly focused on these and not on the fight against organized crime. Brazil has a president with around five percent approval rating universally seen as corrupt. The favorite to win this election, Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, was convicted in July of accepting bribes from an engineering firm in exchange for public works contracts. Colombia, the world's foremost producer of cocaine, is struggling to implement a peace agreement with Marxist rebels and prevent a recycling of criminal actors. The enemies of peace seem stronger than its friends as the candidates line up. Costa Rica, sat astride the Central America route for cocaine heading towards the United States, has seen transnational organized crime take root and feed national criminal structures. Mexico has seen violence reach new heights and its current president, Enrique Peea Nieto, has provided few new strategies to tackle homicides or the organized crime that feeds them. New leadership is desperately needed, but no matter who wins the July elections no real changes in strategy are expected until the end of the year, when a new president will take office. Paraguay, South America's most prolific producer of marijuana already has a president associated with criminal activity in the form of cigarette smuggling. With Brazilian criminal groups projecting themselves into this landlocked nation, clear leadership is needed to contain rampant criminal activity. Venezuela is due to have presidential elections, but with President Nicolas Maduro now operating a dictatorship, there are no guarantees these will be held, much less that any real change will occur. Economic collapse is more likely to produce change than political challenge. Even in Cuba, dominated by the Castro brothers since 1959, change is coming as Raul Castro has promised to step down in 2018. And Nicaragua's president Daniel Ortega, in power since 2007, is tightening his grip on the levers of power and undermining democracy. Not since the days of the Cold War have democracy and good governance been under such threat in Latin America. These conditions have in part been created by organized crime and the corruption it feeds. And organized crime will continue to profit from the chaos. Cooperation is also key to fighting transnational organized crime and for good or ill, the United States has often provided coherency and leadership in the war on drugs and organized crime. That leadership is gone along with much US credibility in the region. All this simply gives yet more room for criminals to maneuver. More 'Plata' Than 'Plomo' There is another aspect of organized crime worth mentioning when we look to 2018. While corruption has always been one of the primary tools for organized crime, its flip side has been intimidation and violence. Pablo Escobar used to famously offer his victims two choices: "plata" ("silver," a bribe) or "plomo" ("lead," a bullet). What is becoming clear to the most sophisticated criminals is that bribery now gets you a lot further, a lot quicker, than violence. The expanding corruption scandals are evidence of this. While Mexico, Venezuela and much of the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras register epidemic levels of homicides, Colombia is bucking the trend. Even as cocaine exports reach record levels, along with internal drug consumption, with other booming illegal economies such as gold mining and extortion, murders are falling. While this is in part due to the de-escalation of the civil conflict with the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), the other major factor is the development of a Pax Mafiosa. The first "mafia peace" was forged in Medellin, the capital of the cocaine trade, and expanded from there across the country. This means that our mission of exposing organized crime is getting harder here in our home base of Colombia. The criminal history of Latin America has been driven by criminal entrepreneurs, principally in the forms of the drug cartels. This is not the case in Africa, where criminal activity is often managed by elements within government. As Latin organized crime continues to fragment, and corruption becomes the preferred method of doing illicit business, Latin America may begin to look more like Africa. Criminality may not only be protected at the highest levels of government but perhaps run by these elements. This is a phenomena we have studied closely in our "Elites and Organized Crime" investigations. We will dedicate yet more resources to these kinds of investigations as we believe they point the way forward in terms of criminal evolution. SEE ALSO: InDepth Coverage of Elites and Organized Crime Transnational organized crime is the most agile business on the planet and adapts to changing conditions much faster than governments. When those governments become weakened, undermined and corrupted by transnational crime groups, the already uneven playing field become yet further skewed. This year is likely to be a year of further criminal entrenchment in the region, of further corruption of high levels of government or even state capture. Be ready, because we need to pay very close attention, if we are to see the hand of organized crime amid the political chaos Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2018. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf Year: 2018 Country: South America URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 150738 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal Networks Drug Trafficking (South America) Gangs Homicides Organized Crime Street GangsViolence |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: The notorious drug trafficking kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman is now imprisoned in the United States awaiting trial, following the Mexican government's decision to extradite him to the United States on January 19, 2017, the day before President Trump took office. Guzman is charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conducting drug-related crimes as the purported leader of the Mexican criminal syndicate commonly known as the Sinaloa cartel. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains that the Sinaloa cartel has the widest reach into U.S. cities of any transnational criminal organization. In November 2016, in its National Drug Threat Assessment, the DEA stated that Mexican drug trafficking groups are working to expand their presence, particularly in the heroin markets inside the United States. Over the years, Mexico"s criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and increasingly the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have been in constant flux. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured. In recent years, the DEA has identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations might be viewed as the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. New crime groups have emerged since the December 2012 inauguration of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and oil syphoning, posing a governance challenge to President Pena Nieto as daunting as that faced by his predecessors. Former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. Such violence appears to be rising again in Mexico. In January 2017, the country registered more homicides than in any January since the government began to release national crime data in the late 1980s. In a single weekend in April 2017, more than 35 died in what was assumed to be drug trafficking-related violence. Although the Mexican government no longer estimates organized crime-related homicides, some independent analysts have claimed that murders linked to organized crime may have exceeded 100,000 since 2006, when President Calderon began his campaign against the DTOs. Mexico's government reported that the annual number of all homicides in Mexico declined after Calderon left office in 2012 by about 16% in 2013 and 15% in 2014, only to rise in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, the Mexican government reported a 22% increase in all homicides to 22,932, almost reaching the high point of nearly 23,000 murders in 2011, Mexico's most violent year. The 115th Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape has been significantly altered by fragmentation and how the organizational shape-shifting continues Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 150740 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal DrugsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Heeks, Matthew Title: The economic and social costs of crime Summary: The economic and social costs of crime estimates are important in helping to develop an understanding of the wider costs and benefits associated with changes in the number of crimes. Although methods have been developed to try to capture an assessment of the societal harms of different crime types, for example the Crime Harm Index, these do not set out to estimate the monetary costs of different offences. This report uses existing crime and cost data to update previous analysis by the Home Office to estimate the economic and social costs of different offences. It does not estimate the economic and social costs of every type of crime; it concentrates on more serious victim-based offences which are likely to have the largest economic and social costs. Costs have been estimated for crimes against individuals and, for a limited number of sectors, businesses. Those crimes which are not committed against an individual victim - so-called crimes against society - are excluded from the analysis; for example, possession of drugs. The report considers three main cost areas: - Costs in anticipation of crime, for example the cost of burglar alarms. - Costs as a consequence of crime, for example the cost of property stolen or damaged. - Costs in response to crime, for example costs to the police and criminal justice system. The total costs of crime in England and Wales in the 2015/16 are estimated to be approximately L50bn for crimes against individuals and L9bn for crimes against businesses. Violent crimes make up the largest proportion of the total costs of individual crime - almost three quarters - but only one third of the number of crimes. This is mainly due to the higher physical and emotional costs to the victims of violent offences. These costs are particularly high for crimes that are more likely to result in emotional injuries, such as rape and violence with injury. The offence with the highest estimated unit cost2 is homicide (L3.2m). Rape (L39,360) has the highest estimated unit cost of non-fatal offences. Thefts from businesses make up almost 90% of business crime but account for approximately half of the total estimated costs of crime against businesses (L4.2bn), as each crime has a low impact on society. In contrast, robberies and burglaries against businesses - estimated to cost L2bn and L1.6bn respectively - make up over 40% of the costs of crime, but account for only 5% of all crimes against businesses. Details: London: Home Office, 2018. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 99: Accessed August 1, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727958/the-economic-and-social-costs-of-crime-horr99.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727958/the-economic-and-social-costs-of-crime-horr99.pdf Shelf Number: 150989 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCrime RatesCrime StatisticsPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Mockus, Antanas Title: Antipodas de la violencia: Desafios de cultura ciudadana para la crisis de (in)seguridad en America Latina Summary: This book examines the relationship between culture and citizen security in eight Latin American cities. It incorporates a broad culture concept into diagnostics, analyzes, surveys and actions. What interests us most about culture is its regulatory power. The worldwide distribution of homicides and suicides shows enormous differences between countries whose explanation can not but give a great weight to cultural differences. The ability of each culture to regulate, interpret and justify certain behavior or not offers vital keys to understand and deal with the problems that come together in the current crisis of citizen security in Latin America. Cultural impunity and moral impunity sometimes come to add their effect to legal impunity. Details: Washington, DC: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Corpovisionarios, 2012. 314p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2018 at: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/383 Year: 2012 Country: Latin America URL: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/383 Shelf Number: 151061 Keywords: Citizen SecurityCrime PreventionFamily ViolenceHomicideViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Graves violaciones a los derechos humanos en el marco de las protestas sociales en Nicaragua Summary: Four months after the start of social protests in Nicaragua and following eight weeks of work in the field by the Special Monitoring Mechanism for Nicaragua (MESENI), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) alerts about the ongoing stigmatization and criminalization of social protest on unjustified and disproportionate grounds; serious problems of access to legal defense and due process; and violations of the rights of persons deprived of liberty and their families. MESENI has registered a decrease in violent actions and the disproportionate use of lethal force at protests. Notwithstanding, the IACHR is concerned that an adverse environment for social protest, through a strategy of criminalization and stigmatization. This entails the use of declarations, Statements, and official announcements that intend to suggest that life is continuing as normal in the country while simultaneously stigmatizing demonstrators, dissidents, social leaders and human rights defenders. The IACHR updates the number of people who have died during the events that have unfolded in the country since April 18, 2018, which now stand at 322, 21 of whom were police officers and 23 of whom were children or teenagers. In addition, according to the information received by MESENI, hundreds of people are currently under detention. However, the IACHR insists on the need for the State of Nicaragua to provide official figures and detailed information on the persons detained. Details: Washington, DC: CIDH, 2018. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2018 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Nicaragua2018-en.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Nicaragua URL: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Nicaragua2018-en.pdf Shelf Number: 151258 Keywords: Homicides Human Rights Abuses Protests and Demonstrations Violence |
Author: University of Texas School of Law. Human Rights Clinic Title: Summary: he Human Rights Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law, in cooperation with the Centro Diocesano para los Derechos Humanos Fray Juan de Larios from Coahuila, Mexico, has compiled a report based on analyzed witness testimonies from three U.S. federal trials. Between 2013 and 2016, Zeta members were put on trial in Austin, San Antonio, and Del Rio for crimes of homicide, conspiracy to import drugs and weapons, and money laundering. These trials brought new information to light and corroborated information that has already been documented about Zeta operations and human rights abuses. First-hand testimonies of ex-Zeta cartel members and victims provide a more comprehensive understanding of the dire situation in Coahuila and offer a glimpse into the Zeta structure, members, and nexus with state officials and institutions. After reviewing the witness testimonies, the Clinic has determined two major findings: (1) the Zeta cartel committed numerous human rights abuses in Coahuila with impunity; (2) public institutions and officials played a role, by actions or omissions, in the commission of these abuses. Testimonies describe the nature and degree of Zeta influence over state and municipal officials and institutions. The Zetas paid bribes and integrated police officers into their hierarchy to ensure the cartel would be able to continue their illicit operations without resistance. However, the Zetas did not only influence low level state or municipal police; witnesses described a level of Zeta control which extended to city police chiefs, state and federal prosecutors, state prisons, sectors of the federal police and the Mexican army, and state politicians. Multiple witnesses described bribery payments of millions of dollars to Humberto Moreira and Ruben Moreira, the former and current governors of Coahuila, in exchange for complete control of the state. According to the testimonies, the Zetas' influence over Coahuila government operations at all levels allowed them to conduct their business throughout the state with impunity and often with direct assistance from state officials and police officers. The report also documents the human rights abuses discussed in the witness testimonies, including the large-scale disappearances and killings in March and April of 2011, during what is known as the Piedras Negras and Allende Massacres. These crimes were perpetrated in response to information that three former Zeta operatives had begun to cooperate with U.S. authorities. In retaliation, the Zetas kidnapped, killed, and disappeared over 300 people who they believed to be associated with the former Zeta operatives. According to witnesses, this brutality was not unique to these massacres. The report documents a pattern of kidnappings, killings, torture and disappearance, targeting anyone whom the Zetas believed posed a threat to their illicit operations. In order to exercise control, Zetas also targeted innocent civilians who were completely unconnected to the cartel. Witnesses described the callous manner in which the Zetas stripped victims of their humanity, killed, and disposed of their bodies. The Zetas maintained a tight grip on Coahuila through violence and intimidation tactics such as death threats and through the forced recruitment of Coahuila residents, including the recruitment of minors. It is also clear from the testimonies that witnesses were being threatened even when members of the Zetas were already in custody in the United States. The testimonies also highlight the transnational nature of drug trafficking and the violence associated with this. In particular, witnesses discussed how weapons purchased in the United States were imported to Mexico and drugs produced in Mexico were trafficked into the U.S. Zeta operations extend to various cities in the United States, including San Antonio, Houston, Austin, Eagle Pass, Chicago and Atlanta, as well as to other states, such as New Mexico, California, and Oklahoma. The Zetas supported this transnational operation through a large network of businesses, which they used to launder money and fuel their operations in the trafficking of people, guns, and drugs. The Zetas owned ranches, race tracks, and breeding facilities in the U.S. and Mexico as a part of an elaborate horse racing scheme. Aside from owning properties connected to the horse racing scheme, the Zetas also exploited numerous businesses in Mexico, such as stores, casinos, restaurants, gyms, and carwashes. These enterprises were used as safe houses, as meeting points for drug and money trafficking operations, or instruments of the money laundering operations. Witnesses explained how the Zetas paid bribes and contributed to the campaigns of governors and political candidates to secure the free continuation of their illegal operations. These bribes also ensured that Zeta-owned companies received government contracts and building permits. Further, as has been made clear from the three analyzed trials, the U.S. government possesses valuable information regarding killings, disappearances, threats, and other violations perpetrated by the Zetas. Witness testimonies and the investigations carried out for these trials include key information, such as the location where disappearances and murders occurred. This indicates that the U.S. government may currently have undisclosed information that could lead to the clarification of murders and disappearances perpetrated in Mexico. However, witnesses made clear that the Mexican state has not conducted investigations into these murders, even when the U.S. government has directly shared vital information. Mexican State officials have willfully refused to pursue justice despite having knowledge of countless human rights abuses carried out by members of the Zeta cartel. Both the Zetas and the State are responsible for the violence in Coahuila. At best, the State turned a blind eye to the widespread corruption and grave human rights abuses committed by the Zetas in Coahuila, and at worst, directly participated in the perpetration of these abuses. Details: Austin: University of Texas School of law, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/11/2017-HRC-coahuilareport-EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/11/2017-HRC-coahuilareport-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 151321 Keywords: CartelsHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesMexican CartelsViolenceViolent CrimeZetas |
Author: United Nations Development Programme Title: Know Violence: Exploring the Links Between Violence, Mental Health, and HIV Risk Among Men who have Sex with Men and Transwomen in South Asia Summary: This report by UNDP, ICRW and APCOM Foundation explores the links between violence, mental health and HIV risk among men who have sex with men and transwomen in seven South Asian countries - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It is based on focus group discussions in 12 sites in 7 countries with men who have sex with men and transwomen who have direct experience of violence, as well as interviews with key informants from community-based organizations, health, law, and government. The report provides concrete recommendations to stakeholders across many sectors to mitigate and minimize the effects of violence on mental health and HIV vulnerabilities through programme and policy efforts. Details: Thailand, 2018. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/library/democratic_governance/hiv_aids/know-violence--exploring-the-links-between-violence--mental-heal.html Year: 2018 Country: Asia URL: http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/library/democratic_governance/hiv_aids/know-violence--exploring-the-links-between-violence--mental-heal.html Shelf Number: 151538 Keywords: HIVLGTBQMental HealthPolicy RecommendationsSexViolence |
Author: Gavira, Simon Title: Invisible Walls: Measuring the Impact of Organized Violence on Urban Expansion Summary: In this paper, we examine the relationship between density and organized violence. Security for most of human history has been one of the determinant factors for city development and growth; this remains true today. What is new, and the focus of this paper, is that the prevalence of organized violence increases the density of adjacent areas. Throughout history, those fleeing organized violence have sought refuge in cities or neighboring towns that provided pockets of safety or a measure of relative security. We first observed this phenomenon in Colombia when we found that after decades of organized conflict between guerilla groups and the Colombian national government, its cities were denser than neighboring cities. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, we found that in a representative sample of 200 global cities, cities with frequent organized violence were significantly denser as well. We conclude that organized violence creates an invisible wall that contains the outward expansion of cities adjacent to organized conflict. Details: New York, 2018. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: http://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/working-papers/invisible-walls Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/Invisible_Walls_Final_Paper(1).pdf Shelf Number: 151530 Keywords: Organized Violence Security Urban Violence Violence |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment published in October 2017. These organizations have for years been identified for their strong links to drug trafficking, money laundering, and other violent crimes. These criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, increasingly, the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. U.S. overdoses due to opioid consumption sharply increased to a record level in 2016, following the Mexican criminal syndicates expanded control of the heroin and synthetic opioids market. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft that costs the government's oil company more than a billion dollars a year. Mexico's DTOs have also been in constant flux. Early in his term, former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. In recent years, larger and more stable organizations have fractured, leaving the DEA and other analysts to identify seven organizations as predominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations include the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented further to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. A new transnational criminal organization, Cartel Jalisco-New Generation, which split from Sinaloa in 2010, has sought to become dominant with brutally violent techniques. During the term of President Enrique Peea Nieto that will end in 2018, the government has faced an increasingly complex crime situation that saw violence spike. In 2017, Mexico reached its highest number of total intentional homicides in a year, exceeding, by some counts, 29,000 murders. In the 2017-2018 election period that opened in September 2017 and ran through June 12, 2018, 114 candidates and politicians were killed allegedly by crime bosses and others in an effort to intimidate public office holders, according to a security consultancy that tracks these homicides. On July 1, 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obredor won the election for President by as much as 30 points over the next contender. He leads a new party, Morena, but has served as Mayor of Mexico City and comes from a leftist ideological viewpoint. Lopez Obredor campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime and manage the illicit drug trade. U.S. foreign assistance for Mexico in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) totaled $152.6 million, with more than $100 million of that funding focused on rule of law and counternarcotics efforts. The 115th Congress pursued oversight of security conditions inside of Mexico and monitored the Mexican criminal organizations not only because they are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States but also to appraise their growing control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape in Mexico has been altered by fragmentation of criminal groups and how the organizational shape-shifting continues. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed )ctober 22, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 153043 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal DrugsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) Title: Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and Gender-based Violence and Gang Violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala Summary: The Northern Triangle of Central America, which includes El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, is one of the most violent regions in the world. Along with staggering homicide rates, all three countries have extremely high rates of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including rape and sexual assault, domestic violence, human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and sexual abuse of children. The three countries also have some of the highest rates of femicide, or the gender-motivated killing of women and girls, in the world, and rates have risen dramatically over the past several years. In El Salvador, a woman was murdered every 16 hours in 2015. In Honduras, gender-based violence is the second leading cause of death for women of reproductive age. On average, two women are murdered each day in Guatemala, and the number of women murdered each year has more than tripled since 2000. The rise of violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala is in large part attributable to gangs that have grown increasingly powerful in all three countries. These gangs employ brutal forms of violence to maintain control over the territories where they operate. Gangs dominate urban areas of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and have increased their presence in rural and semi-urban areas in recent years, leaving children and youth in these areas vulnerable to gang violence. This intensified gang violence has a particularly severe impact on women, children, and LGBTI people who are vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence within their homes, schools, and neighborhoods, and find little hope of receiving protection or justice from the state. Rates of SGBV in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are extremely high, and in the vast majority of cases, violence goes unreported and unpunished. When victims of SGBV live in gang-controlled areas or when perpetrators have gang affiliations, crimes are even more likely to result in impunity. Many victims do not report violence because they do not trust authorities or because they know that doing so will put them, and their families, at greater risk of retaliation by gangs. Those few who do report violence confront the unwillingness or inability of the state to provide either protection or justice. With no place to turn, many of these women and children are forced to flee their country to save their lives. Whether they ultimately reach Mexico, the United States, or any other country, they need-and in many cases should qualify for-refugee protection. This report examines the relationship between gang violence and SGBV in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. It describes common forms of SGBV in the gang context and the ways in which gangs use SGBV to exert and maintain control over populations and territories in the areas where they operate. It also explains the factors that prevent reporting and prosecution of SGBV, both when the perpetrator is a gang member and when the victim lives in a gang-dominated area. The report briefly outlines government efforts to address violence and impunity. It provides recommendations on how the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala can work to reduce gang-related SGBV and increase assistance and justice for survivors, which in turn will provide affected individuals and families with alternatives to forced migration. The report also makes recommendations to the U.S. government on how to direct and prioritize aid to Central American countries to effectively bolster efforts to prevent and address SGBV. Details: Washington, DC, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Neither-Security-nor-Justice_SGBV-Gang-Report-FINAL.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Central America URL: https://supportkind.org/resources/neither-security-justice/ Shelf Number: 152874 Keywords: Femicide Gangs Homicides Human Trafficking Sexual and Gender Based Violence Violence |
Author: Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) Title: Improving the Protection and Fair Treatment of Unaccompanied Children Summary: Unaccompanied children continue to come to the United States from Central America in significant and rising numbers due to continued violence and danger in their home countries, much of it perpetrated by gangs, narco-traffickers, and other criminal groups. Child arrivals from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala - collectively known as the Northern Triangle of Central America - began to increase noticeably from previous years in October 2011 and rose significantly each year from that time forward, to a historic peak in 2014. Since 2014, more than 160,000 unaccompanied children have arrived seeking protection in the United States. Although fewer children came in Fiscal Year 2015 due to increased interdiction and deportation of unaccompanied children by Mexico with support from the United States, the numbers began to rise again in August 2015. The number of children seeking protection in the United States in 2016 will be higher than 2015, and will be close to 2014 arrivals. This large flow of children from Central America seeking protection in the United States is not surprising. The root causes of these children's flight have not been resolved. They face unprecedented violence in their home countries. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are among the top five most violent countries in the world due to gang and other organized criminal violence. El Salvador recently unseated Honduras as the most murderous country in the Western Hemisphere and is facing violence not seen since the end of its civil war. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras rank first, third, and seventh, respectively, for rates of female homicides globally. The governments of these countries are unable or unwilling to control this pervasive violence. KIND regularly receives referrals of children in need of attorneys to represent them in immigration court who have endured horrific abuse; KIND has seen a rise in young children, both boys and girls, who have been raped or sexually assaulted, often more than once. Others have been abducted, witnessed family members murdered, or been threatened themselves with murder. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found in 2014 that 58 percent of the unaccompanied children interviewed for its report Children on the Run would have valid claims to international protection, meriting further evaluation of their cases because their primary motivation for coming to the United States was to escape violence in their home countries. The United States is not alone in receiving high numbers of vulnerable children. Since 2008, Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama have seen the number of asylum applications from citizens fleeing the Northern Triangle grow nearly 13 times the number in 2008. Just as in other refugee situations around the world, Central Americans typically flee to countries where they have familial or other connections. Not only are thousands of unaccompanied children traveling on their own, but high numbers of young mothers are also migrating with their young children in search of protection. Details: Washington, DC, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/KIND-Protection-and-Fair-Treatment-Report_September-2016-FINAL.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://supportkind.org/resources/improving-protection-fair-treatment-unaccompanied-children/ Shelf Number: 152873 Keywords: Gangs Homicide Immigration Migration Unaccompanied Youth Violence |
Author: The Sentry Title: Fear, Inc. War War Profiteering in the Central African Republic and the Bloody Rise of Abdoulaye Hissene Summary: Since 2013, the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) has repeatedly made international headlines, with alarms being raised over the escalating violence and even precursors to genocide in the country. Ethnic purges and other mass atrocities continue to take place on a near-daily basis against entire communities. A great, but unknown, number of civilians have died in the conflict and the instability has led to a major humanitarian crisis. In May 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that an unprecedented 1.27 million people have been internally displaced or forced to flee the country. Over the past 20 years, there have been a growing number of initiatives aimed at ending the CAR conflict, but these have had little impact. The country has seen a series of peace, disarmament and amnesty agreements; long-term UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance; foreign military operations; and elections. Billions of dollars have been spent in an attempt to restore stability and compensate for the lack of state control. Since 2014, the UN mission in CAR, also known as MINUSCA, has cost more than $3.2 billion. The European Union, a long-term and major development partner in CAR, has also disbursed nearly $200 million during the same period. Despite these efforts, the various mediation initiatives have failed to obtain a political compromise sufficient to manage the simple respect of a ceasefire. Today, there are multiple armed gangs, self-defense and politico military groups that control or exercise influence across the entire national territory. Worse yet, the perpetrators of atrocities are recognized by regional and international actors as legitimate political interlocutors with whom dialogue is necessary and peace must be negotiated. In August 2018 the African Union announced the end of a series of meetings with representatives of 14 armed groups to record their claims, even though some of the leaders have been placed under sanctions by the United Nations (UN) and the United-States (US). The African Union presented a list of more than 100 demands made by armed groups, including power sharing and amnesty. At the same time, a parallel dialogue was initiated by the Russian government, which invited to Khartoum the military leaders of the most violent armed groups active in the CAR conflict for almost a decade. Today, these so-called dialogues aimed at ending the deadly war have been captured by the agenda of perpetrators of mass atrocities who have shown no intention of making peace. Between 2016 and 2018, The Sentry investigated one such armed group representative, Abdoulaye Hissene, a notorious warlord involved in CAR's conflict for almost a decade. Formerly a diamond and gold trader, and since 2009 the leader of various politico-military groups, Hissene has been recognized as being responsible for an attempted coup in late 2015 and for targeted violence against UN and humanitarian staff. Since 2017, the United States, then followed by the full UN Security Council, have decided to impose sanctions through an asset freeze and travel ban. Chad announced it had implemented these sanctions, and the CAR government issued an international arrest warrant for him in 2016. Despite these measures and several attempts to arrest him, he remains a free man. The Sentry's investigation also reveals that Hissene has been successful building a profitable business and even since he has been under sanctions. He has amassed a fortune out of devastating sectarian violence. By inciting hatred and sowing divisions between ethnic and religious communities, he has gradually become a central player in the country's conflict. Hissene's rise has been possible thanks to strong ties he has developed over time with national and regional heads of state, their close allies, and with foreign business partners. In 2014, amid the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in CAR, Hissene enjoyed diplomatic status and traveled abroad, notably to Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Chad, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and France. During these travels, he expanded his list of partners and created lucrative business opportunities. At the end of 2014, after being fired from office and formally joining the armed opposition movement, he declared to the Chadian and Congolese heads of state that "what we want is to destroy everything to rebuild the country." He also convinced a Swiss oil company that he would be able to secure an oil contract with the Chadian national oil petroleum company. Acting as a "minister" and a leader of armed groups, and advertising his control of rich mining sites, Hissene has also developed an illicit trade in diamond and gold, particularly in Cameroon and in Kenya. Hissene's rise illustrates a violent system endemic in CAR, and similar to other countries in east and central Africa, that incentivizes conflict over peace. War profiteers and their allies hamper political and peace efforts, since conflict and state collapse are seen as lucrative business and smart politics. Sectarian violence is used as a political negotiation tool and actors who chose to pursue peace are largely kept out of negotiations. In this system, the greater the perpetrators of atrocities and their accomplices represent a threat to the central power, the more they will become essential political interlocutors and increase their financial gain. In 2015, the UN Security Council took a strong step when It decided to impose sanctions on a diamond company, Badica/Kardiam, accused of financing armed groups at the peak of the 2014 crisis. Despite this positive step, no other entities or businessmen faced any consequences for their role in the financing of the deadly conflict. By focusing on Hissene to illustrate war profiteering, this report calls for an in-depth reassessment of the strategy to support the emergence of CAR from its crisis. As long as violence is profitable for those behind the atrocities and their business networks both inside and outside the country, long-term peace in CAR and the rest of the Central African region will remain an illusion. It is time to send a strong signal to war profiteers so that their crimes will be less lucrative and bear increasingly costly consequences. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentry, 2018. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2018 at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FearInc_TheSentry_Nov2018-web.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Central African Republic URL: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FearInc_TheSentry_Nov2018-web.pdf Shelf Number: 153409 Keywords: GangsGenocideIllicit TradeProfiteeringViolenceViolent ConflictWarlords |
Author: Maternowska, M. Catherine Title: Research that Drives Change: Conceptualizing and Conducting Nationally Led Violence Prevention Research. Synthesis Report of the "Multi-Country Study on the Drivers of Violence Affecting Children" in Italy, Peru, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe Summary: Globally, studies have demonstrated that children in every society are affected by physical, sexual and emotional violence. The drive to both quantify and qualify violence through data and research has been powerful: discourse among policy makers is shifting from "this does not happen here" to "what is driving this?" and "how can we address it?" To help answer these questions, the MultiCountry Study on the Drivers of Violence Affecting Children - conducted in Italy, Viet Nam, Peru and Zimbabwe - sought to disentangle the complex and often interrelated underlying causes of violence affecting children (VAC) in these four countries. Led by the UNICEF Office of Research - Innocenti with its academic partner, the University of Edinburgh, the Study was conducted by national research teams comprised of government, practitioners and academic researchers in each of the four countries. Drawing on human-centred principles, the Study used an iterative approach which put national ownership and co-creation at its core. Government partners were actively engaged as co-researchers and all data analysis was conducted in-country by government statisticians. Facilitating and prioritizing national meaning-making through dialogue and joint analysis and synthesis of findings was also a key part of the Study design. Each national team used a common process involving three separate components, all of which build on existing data and research: a systematic literature review of academic and 'grey' literature (such as research reports) including both quality quantitative and qualitative research, secondary analyses of nationally representative data sets and an initial mapping of the interventions landscape. Analysed together, these sources of information helped build initial hypotheses around what drives violence in each country. Two key frameworks were applied to the analysis in this Study: 1) a version of the socio-ecological model, which helps to understand the dynamic relationships between factors at the micro-, meso-and macro-levels, and 2) an age and gender framework, which recognizes that a child's vulnerability and ability to protect herself from violence changes over time with her evolving capacities. Through these lenses, common themes emerged across contexts. Guided by findings from the four countries highlighting the dynamic and constantly changing and/or overlapping domains that shape violence in children's lives, this Study moved beyond understanding the risk and protective factors for violence affecting children, which are often measured at the individual, interpersonal and community level. In doing so, it demonstrated how patterns of interpersonal violence are intimately connected to larger structural and institutional factors-or the drivers of violence. The structural drivers of violence identified across the four country sites, representing high (Italy), upper middle (Peru), lower middle (Viet Nam) and low income (Zimbabwe) settings, include: rapid socio-economic transformations accompanied by economic growth but also instability; poverty; migration; and gender inequality. The institutional drivers of violence, such as legal structures, ineffective child protection systems, weak school governance and harmful social and cultural norms, often serve to reinforce children's vulnerabilities. Drivers are rarely isolated factors and tend to work in potent combination with other factors within a single level as well as between levels of the social ecology that shapes children's lives. While some drivers can lead to positive change for children, in this study, these factors or combinations of factors are most often invisible forms of harm in and of themselves While VAC is present in every country, the analyses also show how violence conspires unevenly to create and maintain inequalities between and within countries. The institutions and communities upon which children and their families depend are changing social entities with many interdependent parts. The type of violence in any one or multiple settings may vary depending on a variety of risk or protective factors and/or by age and gender. One of the most important findings is that violence is a fluid and shifting phenomenon in children's lives as they move between the places where they live, play, sleep and learn. Identifying and addressing unequal power dynamics - wherever they may occur in the home, school or community - is of central importance to effective violence prevention. The research also shows how behaviours around violence are passed through generations, suggesting that the social tolerance of these behaviours is learned in childhood. Data across countries also shows how violence is intimately connected to how relationships are structured and defined by power dynamics within and among families, peers and communities. These findings, along with learning from the study process, led to the development of a new child-centred and integrated framework, which proposes a process by which interdisciplinary coalitions of researchers, practitioners and policymakers can understand violence affecting children and what can be done to prevent it. Using data to drive change, our proposed Child-Centred and Integrated Framework for Violence Prevention serves to situate national findings according to a child's social ecology, making clear how institutional and structural drivers and risk/protective factors together shape the many risks and opportunities of childhood around the world. KEY POINTS: - Unpacking the drivers of violence at the structural and institutional levels, and analysing how these interact with risk and protective factors at the community, interpersonal and individual levels is critical to understanding how violence affects children. It is this interaction between drivers and risk/protective factors that delineates how, where, when and why violence occurs in children's lives. - Focusing solely on the types of violence and the places where it occurs - as is commonly done in large-scale surveys and some qualitative studies - will only provide part of the picture of a child's risk of violence. - The role of age and gender as childhood unfolds over time is also essential to understanding violence. - Qualitative inquiry and analysis should be further promoted within the field of violence prevention - on its own or as part of a mixed-methods approach - to ensure meaningful data interpretation of the social world, including the webs of interactions and the concepts and behaviours of people within it. - Research that engages and empowers stakeholders can contribute to a common strategy for building and sustaining political will to end violence affecting children. - The way the study was conducted - led by national teams and using existing literature and data - provided a relatively low-cost and human-centred alternative model to costly surveys that assess the scope of violence without examining the drivers that determine it. - Moving forward, violence prevention research should continuously and critically examine the ways in which we count and construct the complex social phenomenon of violence affecting children: placing recognition of process and power at the heart of our research endeavours. Details: Florence, Italy: UNICEF, Innocenti Office of Research, 2018. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2018 at: https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/Drivers-of-Violence_Study.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/Drivers-of-Violence_Study.pdf Shelf Number: 153883 Keywords: Child Abuse and Neglect Child Maltreatment Child Sexual Violence Children and Violence Crime PreventionViolenceViolence Against ChildrenViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Jack, Shane P.D. Title: Surveillance for Violent Deaths-- National Violent Death Reporting System, 27 States, 2015 Summary: Problem/Condition: In 2015, approximately 62,000 persons died in the United States as a result of violence-related injuries. This report summarizes data from CDC's National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) regarding violent deaths from 27 U.S. states for 2015. Results are reported by sex, age group, race/ethnicity, location of injury, method of injury, circumstances of injury, and other selected characteristics. Reporting Period: 2015. Description of System: NVDRS collects data regarding violent deaths obtained from death certificates, coroner/medical examiner reports, law enforcement reports, and secondary sources (e.g., child fatality review team data, supplemental homicide reports, hospital data, and crime laboratory data). This report includes data from 27 states that collected statewide data for 2015 (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin). NVDRS collates documents for each death and links deaths that are related (e.g., multiple homicides, a homicide followed by a suicide, or multiple suicides) into a single incident. Results: For 2015, NVDRS captured 30,628 fatal incidents involving 31,415 deaths in the 27 states included in this report. The majority (65.1%) of deaths were suicides, followed by homicides (23.5%), deaths of undetermined intent (9.5%), legal intervention deaths (1.3%) (i.e., deaths caused by law enforcement and other persons with legal authority to use deadly force, excluding legal executions), and unintentional firearm deaths (<1.0%). (The term "legal intervention" is a classification incorporated into the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision [ICD-10] and does not denote the lawfulness or legality of the circumstances surrounding a death caused by law enforcement.) Demographic patterns varied by manner of death. Suicide rates were highest among males, non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Natives, non-Hispanic whites, adults aged 45-54 years, and men aged ≥75 years. The most common method of injury was a firearm. Suicides often were preceded by a mental health, intimate partner, substance abuse, or physical health problem, or a crisis during the previous or upcoming 2 weeks. Homicide rates were higher among males and persons aged <1 year and 20-34 years. Among males, non-Hispanic blacks accounted for the majority of homicides and had the highest rate of any racial/ethnic group. Homicides primarily involved a firearm, were precipitated by arguments and interpersonal conflicts, were related to intimate partner violence (particularly for females), or occurred in conjunction with another crime. When the relationship between a homicide victim and a suspected perpetrator was known, an acquaintance/friend or an intimate partner frequently was involved. Legal intervention death rates were highest among males and persons aged 20-54 years; rates among non-Hispanic black males were approximately double the rates of those among non-Hispanic white males. Precipitating circumstances for legal intervention deaths most frequently were an alleged criminal activity in progress, the victim reportedly using a weapon in the incident, a mental health or substance abuse problem (other than alcohol abuse), an argument or conflict, or a recent crisis (during the previous or upcoming 2 weeks). Unintentional firearm deaths were more frequent among males, non-Hispanic whites, and persons aged 1024 years; these deaths most often occurred while the shooter was playing with a firearm and most often were precipitated by a person unintentionally pulling the trigger or mistakenly thinking the firearm was unloaded. Deaths of undetermined intent were more frequent among males, particularly non-Hispanic black and American Indian/Alaska Native males, and persons aged 3054 years. Substance abuse, mental health problems, physical health problems, and a recent crisis were the most common circumstances preceding deaths of undetermined intent. In 2015, approximately 3,000 current or former military personnel died by suicide. The majority of these decedents were male, non-Hispanic white, and aged 45-74 years. Most suicides among military personnel involved a firearm and were precipitated by mental health, physical health, and intimate partner problems, as well as a recent crisis. Interpretation: This report provides a detailed summary of data from NVDRS for 2015. The results indicate that deaths resulting from self-inflicted or interpersonal violence most frequently affect males and certain age groups and minority populations. Mental health problems, intimate partner problems, interpersonal conflicts, and general life stressors were primary precipitating events for multiple types of violent deaths, including suicides among current or former military personnel. Public Health Action: NVDRS data are used to monitor the occurrence of violence-related fatal injuries and assist public health authorities in the development, implementation, and evaluation of programs and policies to reduce and prevent violent deaths. For example, Virginia VDRS data are used to help identify suicide risk factors among active duty service members, Oregon VDRS suicide data are used to coordinate information and activities across community agencies that support veterans and active duty service members, and Arizona VDRS data are used to develop recommendations for primary care providers who deliver care to veterans. The continued development and expansion of NVDRS to include all 50 states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are essential to public health efforts to reduce deaths due to violence. Details: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Surveillance Summaries / Vol. 67 / No. 11: Accessed December 6, 2018 at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6181254/pdf/ss6711a1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6181254/pdf/ss6711a1.pdf Shelf Number: 153921 Keywords: Child DeathsGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesMurdersPolice Deadly ForcePublic Health IssuesSuicides Violence |
Author: Mourao, Barbara Title: Police, Justice, And Drugs: How Is Our Democracy? Summary: Over the last 25 years, the most consistent feature of public security policies in Brazil has been the lack of continuity, with moments of hope, optimism and advancement prospects being succeeded by disappointment and disappointment. In this changing scenario, CESeC has brought us courageous, honest and balanced research on the most pressing problems that Brazilian cities face, deconstructing myths, shedding light on the deeper causes of violence and revealing structural difficulties to reduce it. Since it was founded 16 years ago, the CESeC was notable for its research and activism around the potentialities and shortcomings of the Brazilian criminal justice system. Through books, reports, conferences and opinion articles in newspapers of the whole country, this production became a national reference for those concerned with equitable justice and guarantee of citizens' rights under the Democratic State right. The articles published in this volume are only a small fraction of the and discuss recent public security issues and policies. Although almost all refer to Rio de Janeiro, its relevance extends to cities across the country facing the same problems. The review of the public security policies of the State of Rio in the last thirty years, developed by Silvia Ramos, clearly shows inconsistencies and oscillations of the pendulum, where new policies emerge as promises and then dismantled with a return to violent and militaristic practices. Is the case of the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs), whose initial success and weaknesses later, analyzed in the texts of Leonarda Musumeci and Barbara Mourao, should be taken as relevant lessons for any attempt to reform models of public safety in force in Brazil. The serious problem of the excessive use of force by the Brazilian police forces is evident both in the form of daily lethal violence against the poorest and in the brutality against demonstrations of protest of the population. Mapping the international debate of the so-called "non-lethal" or "less Leonard Musumeci's article discusses the impacts of this dissemination on the levels of police use of force, the legitimacy of police action and the exercise of democratic right to protest. Promising innovations in the areas of justice and security with potentially equitable and effective depend on a series of variables that will determine their greater or lesser success. Evaluating impacts of the introduction of mediation of conflicts in judicial practice in 2010, the article by Barbara Musumeci Mourao analyzes the reactions of people who participated in mediations in centers in Rio de Janeiro. Despite the relatively positive results of the evaluation, the text raises important critical questions to reflect on what is essential for the success of the initiative. In the same way, the look at the gender relations that cross and configure the police institutions is present in another article by the same author, as a crucial element for the democratization of the police, giving consistency and sense to any attempt to innovate their models of action. In practically all the great Brazilian cities there are spaces popularly known as "cracolandias", generally seen as epicenters of marginalization violence.The study coordinated by Eliana Sousa Silva (Networks of the Tide) and Julita Lemgruber (CESeC) shows the human face of a community crack users and the need to adopt integrated public policies that emphasize harm reduction, rather than repressive policies that marginalize even more street drug users. Since 2009, CESeC has been a pioneer in researching and promoting debate excessive use of the provisional arrest, which contributes to overcrowding, incarceration and for daily violations of basic human rights. The article by Julita Lemgruber and Marcia Fernandes included in this volume specifically analyzes violation of the constitutional rights of those charged with drug trafficking, showing that convictions are generally based only on the testimony of police officers who made the arrest in flagrante. Details: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Centro de Estudos de Seguranca e Cidadania, 2016. 303p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2018 at: https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/livro/policia-justica-e-drogas-como-anda-nossa-democracia/ Year: 2016 Country: Brazil URL: https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Livro-PJD.pdf Shelf Number: 153951 Keywords: Brazil Drug Users Excessive Use of Force Gender Issues Law Enforcement Police Legitimacy Public Policy Public Security Issues Security Sector Use of Force Violence |
Author: European Commission Title: Firearms and the Internal Security of the EU: Protecting Citizens and Disrupting Illegal Trafficking Summary: Firearms have lawful and responsible civilian uses, and their manufacture, sale and purchase are a part of the EUs internal market. Firearms in the wrong hands, however, can have devastating consequences for citizens and communities. There are still far too many victims of gun-related violence in the EU. In the first decade of the 21st century there were over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter, killed by firearms, in the 28 Member States of EU, and every year there are over 4,000 suicides by firearm. On average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population per year in the EU. The presence of powerful and often illegally-held firearms in particular in deprived urban areas can create a sense of insecurity among citizens. The gunmen responsible for horrendous shootings in recent years, in the schools in Tuusula (2007) and Kauhajoki (2008), and in Cumbria (2010) and Alphen aan den Rijn (2011), were mentally unstable adults and yet were licensed to possess a firearm. In Winnenden (2009) an adolescent used a pistol which had been insecurely stored in his parents' bedroom. In the attacks in Liege in 2011, the gunman drew from a huge personal arsenal including military weapons and collectors' items which he had purchased and converted. These specific incidents alone claimed the lives of 61 people, including 19 children. Illegally-held firearms, meanwhile, are often used to coerce and to intimidate victims of organised crime. The illegal import and sale of these weapons, as well as their production, provide lucrative business for the EUs estimated 3600 organised crime groups. Terrorists and extremists have used firearms to instil fear and to kill: seven died in the Toulouse and Montauban attacks in 2012, and two in the 2011 Frankfurt airport incident. There are an estimated 80 million legally-held civilian firearms in the EU. While there are no precise statistics, the many firearms in illegal circulation are often the result of theft or diversion from their lawful lifecycle, of being illegally imported from third countries and of the conversion of other objects into firearms. Almost half a million firearms lost or stolen in the EU remain unaccounted for, the overwhelming majority of which are civilian firearms, according to the Schengen Information System. In one Member State, France, the authorities reported a 40 percent increase in seizures of stolen civilian and military weapons between 2010 and 2011. Large amounts of powerful military grade weapons have since the mid-1990s reached the EU from the Western Balkans and former Soviet Bloc countries, often trafficked in small quantities and hidden in vehicles like long distance coaches to avoid detection. Recent upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East carry a risk that surplus and stolen military arms will reach European criminal markets along similar routes. Firearms, parts and components are also, to an increasing extent, traded online and delivered through mail order, postal or express delivery services. Law enforcement authorities in the EU are concerned that firearms which have been deactivated are being illegally reactivated and sold for criminal purposes, that items such as alarm guns, air weapons and blank-firers are being converted into illegal lethal firearms, and that criminals may very soon exploit 3D printing technologies for assembling home-made weapons or making components to be used for reactivating firearms. An overview of some of the trafficking routes which have been reported by firearms experts in Member States is illustrated below. Details: Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 2013. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2018 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-firearms/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-firearms/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf Shelf Number: 154015 Keywords: Europe Firearms Military Grade Weapons Organized Crime Suicide Trafficked Arms ViolenceWeapons |
Author: Payan, Tony Title: Mexico's Security Challenges are Jeopardizing its Future Summary: Mexicos public safety and security were severely challenged between 2007 and 2012, a period marked by a dramatic rise in the number of homicides and other violent crimes. The situation was widely considered to be the result of President Felipe Calderon Hinojosas frontal assault on organized crime, which included the deployment of federal police and the military throughout the country. The administration argued that its crackdown paradoxically resulted in greater violence in the short-term because criminals responded by lashing out against the government, tightening their grip on society by expanding the scope of their criminal activities, and - eventually - fighting each other for control of their illegal but highly profitable enterprises. The logic behind the strategy, as outlined by Joaquin Villalobos in De los Zetas al cartel de la Habana, was to target cartel leaders through military force, which destabilized the organizations, causing them to fragment into smaller groups. The approach came as the powerful cartels challenged the viability of the Mexican state and ultimately controlled the countrys criminal activity. The second part of the plan was to strengthen law enforcement and the judicial system, which could in time successfully arrest and prosecute members of the smaller gangs. However, the result of the strategy - including the deaths of tens of thousands of people - horrified the public and eventually cost Calderons National Action Party (PAN) the presidency in 2012. Enrique Pena Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took office at the end of 2012 with two major goals in mind: 1) a reduction of overall violence, though not necessarily of crime in general, and 2) a singular focus on pushing through structural reforms, such as those affecting the energy industry, the administration of justice, and elections. To accomplish his first objective, he eliminated the Ministry for Public Safety - the agency behind Calderons strategy - and ended the governments military campaign against organized crime. Penas approach did reduce crime for a time, but the incidence of homicides and other crimes gradually crawled back up to record levels: Statistics suggest that 2017 may be the most violent year on record since the Mexican Revolution (c. 1910-1920), and that violent crime levels may exceed those of the Calderon administration. Today, the central question is whether, by letting up on the fight against organized crime, Pena is in a situation that jeopardizes the success of the structural reforms that are the legacy of his presidency. Details: Houston, TX: Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, 2017. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 18, 2018 at: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/12479/ Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/12479/ Shelf Number: 154209 Keywords: Cartel Leaders Homicides Institutional Revolutionary Party Mexico Organized Crime Public Safety Violence |
Author: Alvarado, Nathalie Title: Crime and Violence: Obstacles to Development in Latin America and Caribbean Cities Summary: Crime and violence are a common threat to Latin America and the Caribbean, but their manifestations vary across countries, cities, and neighborhoods. Reducing and preventing crime is fundamental to achieving sustainable development in our region, and local governments are strategically positioned to tackle this challenge. Today's cities are increasingly innovating with crime and violence prevention programs. Ensuring the safety and security of citizens is one of some might even say the primary functions of municipal governments. Owing to their proximity to local neighborhoods, mayors and other local actors are particularly well located to play a central role in designing, implementing and evaluating strategies to make cities safer and more secure. And while there are obvious benefits to be gained from improving the overall security of cities, they are far from guaranteed. In many parts of the world, including Latin America and the Caribbean, there are few incentives and limited capacity for local governments to play a more active role in improving citizen security. Details: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarape Institute, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://igarape.org.br/en/crime-and-violence-obstacles-to-development-in-latin-america-and-caribbean-cities/?utm_campaign=2018_newsletter_10&utm_medium=email&utm_source=RD+Station Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Crimeand-Violence-ObstaclestoDevelopment.pdf Shelf Number: 154137 Keywords: Caribbean Citizen Security Crime Prevention Latin America Local Government Reducing Crime Security Violence |
Author: Dowling, Christopher Title: Is Methamphetamine Use Associated with Domestic Violence? Summary: Abstract There is considerable evidence of the impact of methamphetamine use on violent behaviour. This paper presents findings from a review of existing research on the association between methamphetamine use and domestic violence. Eleven studies met the criteria for inclusion. Domestic violence is common among methamphetamine users; however, methamphetamine users account for a small proportion of all domestic violence offenders. There is evidence that methamphetamine users are more likely than non-users to perpetrate domestic violence. Importantly, methamphetamine use is frequently present along with other risk factors. This means methamphetamine use probably exacerbates an existing predisposition to violence, rather than causing violent behaviour. Details: Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi563 Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi563 Shelf Number: 154075 Keywords: Domestic Violence Drug Use Interpersonal Violence Methamphetamine Substance Abuse Violence |
Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Evolucion y Perspectiva de los Factores que Hacen Posible La Paz (Evolution and Perspective of the Factors that Make Peace Possible) Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Mexico 2018 Peace Index (IPM), prepared by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), provides an integral measure of peace levels in Mexico. The IPM is based on the methodology of the Global Peace Index, the most recognized measure of peace in the world, and has been prepared by the IEP every year since 2007. This is the fifth annual edition of the IPM and it presents the main trends, models and factors that drive peace in Mexico; also, the most important public policy opportunities for the authorities of the three levels of government stand out. The report analyzes the dynamics of violence in Mexico, as well as the weaknesses and strengths of the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies, known as Positive Peace, necessary to substantially reduce the rates of violence in Mexico. Likewise, the considerable economic impact of the violence on the Mexican economy and the need to increase the level of investment in its containment are quantified. Finally, quantitatively sound evidence is provided to help develop public policies aimed at creating a more peaceful society. This research will be useful for policymakers, researchers, business leaders, civil society organizations and, in general, anyone interested in the task of building peace in Mexico. After two years of escalating violence, Mexico's homicide rate in 2017 reached record highs: 24 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, or more than 29,000 victims. This level of violence surpasses the high point observed in 2011. The increase in the homicide rate in 2017 was accompanied by a substantial increase in the rate of violence with firearms, which rose 36%, and 28 of the 32 states of Mexico report increasing rates of crimes committed with firearms. The report concludes that not only violence is increasing at the hands of organized crime groups, but also common crime and interpersonal violence. Leaderships within the cartels have been broken by neutralizing 107 of the 122 most influential leaders by mid-2017. This led to the fracture of the cartels, which increased competition among them. In this context, it can be assumed that many of its members have resorted to common criminal activity as the risk of belonging to a cartel increases; this contributes to the growth of common crime. Violence is also increasing in other areas of society. A fact that is striking is that domestic violence increased 32% during the three years prior to December 2017. Due to the seriousness of the violence, only seven states managed to improve their level of peace in 2017. Once again, Yucatn was the most peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Coahuila and Chiapas. All these states, except Coahuila, improved their level of peace. Although four of the five states with the best performance registered improvements in their peace levels, the opposite happened with the less peaceful ones, since four of the five states located in the last sites deteriorated in 2017. All five experienced an increase in their rates of homicide. In 2017, Baja California Sur was classified as the least peaceful state in Mexico for the first time, followed by Guerrero, Baja California, Colima and Zacatecas. Three of these states are located on major drug trafficking routes, on the Pacific coast, while Zacatecas is located just next to them. The report also contains a strong political message, concluding that the population's concern about impunity and their confidence in judges increases and decreases along with the increase and reduction of violence. Details: Mexico City, Mexico: Institute of Economics and Peace, 2018. 94p. Source: Internet Resource (in Spanish): Accessed January 18, 2019 at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/04/Mexico-Peace-Index-2018-Spanish.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/mexico/ndice-de-paz-m-xico-2018-evoluci-n-y-perspectiva-de-los-factores-que-hacen-posible-la Shelf Number: 154269 Keywords: Cartels Criminal Groups Domestic Violence Global Peace Index Homicide Rate Mexico Mexico Peace Index Organized Crime Peace Levels Positive Peace Rates of Violence Violence |
Author: Squires, Peter Title: Street Weapons Commission: Guns, Knives and Street Violence Summary: The purpose of this report is to provide the Channel 4 Street Weapons Commission with an informed analysis of patterns and significant trends in 'gun and knife crime' across the country and also to focus specifically on five major cities - London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow - over at least three years. In order to achieve this we have collated national and city-wide recorded crime statistics for the current and previous two years. Statistics have also been obtained from the Home Office and, where necessary, from separate police forces. In addition, local studies in the cities have been collated from the police forces and from local researchers. Where the evidence was available, we also sought police performance data detailing the impact of police interventions. An interim report of 10 to 12 pages was to be produced to provide background information to the Commission, and a final report, this report, was to present a more comprehensive analysis of trends and local differences in the recorded crime statistics whilst also collating the findings of local research reports and studies. The report would also provide a demographic analysis of those accused of gun- and knife-related crimes and, where possible, available victimisation data. The final report was to be up to 40 pages long. The fact that the interim report ran to over 40 pages and that this final report exceeds 100 suggests that there is no shortage of data, but that the issues are often complex and involved, and the data do not always easily speak for themselves but require careful interpretation. There are important gaps: for example, English and Welsh police forces were not required by the Home Office to collect knife crime data until 2007. In London, by contrast, although the Metropolitan Police have been collecting such data since 2003, in the midst of our recent 'knife crime crisis', the police figures seem to show knife crimes to be falling and few think them reliable indicators of the trend. Likewise, the police recorded crime data are generally collected and made available at the police force level. While the Metropolitan Police is generally (with the exception of the City of London Police district) coterminous with Greater London, the same is not true of Greater Manchester Police (covering a substantially larger area than the City of Manchester alone), Merseyside Police (extending beyond Liverpool) West Midlands Police (rather more extensive than Birmingham) and Strathclyde Police (covering rather more than just Glasgow). Generally speaking, police forces were often either unable or unwilling to provide city-level data of the type necessary to enable us to be able to make neat, city-based comparisons, although Home Office staff were able to help us to fill some of these gaps. With these kinds of considerations in mind, in the following pages we attempt to fulfil three related aims: 1. Collate the best available data capable of throwing light upon the nature, scale and relevant trends concerning young people and weapon-related violence. While the questions about scale and trends privilege the use of quantitative data, we will also be employing some more qualitative and experiential material to explain and explore issues further. 2. Interpret what the data is telling us, recognising that it is not always consistent, compatible or comparable. Data are often collected at different times for different purposes and may be more or less reliable, and sometimes the priorities and perspectives of the agencies undertaking the data collection may compromise the utility of that which is collated - they may not tell us what they claim or what we think. 3. Finally we intended to indicate where the gaps in the evidence base lie, as well as suggesting how those gaps may be filled and, where possible, what the evidence is likely to look like. Details: London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2008. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2019 at: https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/C4%20Street%20crime_1.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/C4%20Street%20crime_1.pdf Shelf Number: 111535 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGun-Related CrimeKnife CrimeStreet CrimesViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Davies, Tom Title: Group Violence Intervention London: An Evaluation of the Shield Pilot Summary: Gang, group and serious street orientated violence continue to be a significant problem in London, demanding innovative and collaborative solutions. In June 2014, at MOPAC's Policing Global Cities: Gangs Summit, Professor David Kennedy delivered a keynote speech outlining the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) approach he developed in Boston during the 1990's (known as 'Ceasefire'). Professor Kennedy was subsequently invited by MPS Trident to deliver a two day 'Ceasefire University' in the GVI model. As a result, the MOPAC Evidence and Insight team, with input from MPS central intelligence, undertook analysis using crime and social demographic data to develop a comprehensive borough level picture on gang and youth violence. The analysis was used to identify potential pilot boroughs with whom MOPAC initially engaged in dialogue, and this was followed up with senior level meetings with Lambeth, Haringey, Westminster, Hackney and Newham between August and October of 2014. Agreement followed from these meetings to proceed with Lambeth, Haringey, and Westminster. In selecting the three boroughs MOPAC recognised the strength of their community safety partnerships and willingness to trial the Group Violence Intervention approach. To this end, Shield - an adaptation of the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) strategy - was developed as a pilot programme and rolled out in three boroughs (Lambeth, Westminster and Haringey). This report presents learning from the evaluation covering performance, process (i.e. implementation challenges and benefits), and impact. Details: London: Mayor of London, Office for Policing and Crime, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2019 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gvi_london_evaluation270117.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gvi_london_evaluation270117.pdf Shelf Number: 154949 Keywords: GangGang-Related ViolenceGroup ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent CrimeYouth Violence |
Author: Idris, Iffat Title: Interventions to Support Victims of Modern Slavery Summary: Abstract This helpdesk report addresses this question: What evidence is there, from academic or other sources, about effective and ineffective interventions to provide support for victims of modern slavery? This review found few evaluations of interventions to support victims of modern slavery, even though there is recognition of the need for support services. While there is little evidence on effectiveness of interventions, the literature highlights the importance of victim-centred, holistic (multi-disciplinary) approaches to supporting victims. There is strong consensus in the literature on the importance of providing support to victims of modern slavery. Many will have experienced physical violence, psychological abuse and even sexual abuse. The conditions they suffer from can include anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies and abortions, physical ill-health and malnourishment. Mental health issues are particularly significant, especially in children. 'Even if the physical wounds have been healed, it is still a long process to help the victims regain their dignity and the confidence to make choices and move forward with their lives. It is therefore crucial ...to ensure that the rights, needs and requests of the victims are recognised'. In the absence of suitable support, victims are at heightened risk of becoming slaves again/being re-trafficked. This review drew on a mixture of academic and grey literature. Significant information was found on provision of services (or lack of it) to survivors of modern slavery in the UK (as well as some other developed countries), but far less on developing countries. Some of the literature made specific reference to the needs of women, but much was gender-blind or focused on the needs of men. Nothing was found from the perspective of persons with disabilities. K4D helpdesk reports provide summaries of current research, evidence and lessons learned. This report was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development. Details: Brighton, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies, 2017. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2019 at: https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/interventions-to-support-victims-of-modern-slavery Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0e2c/025c49bd41e62813a3a873a63c1dbc26360a.pdf Shelf Number: 155138 Keywords: Modern Slavery Psychological Abuse Sexual Abuse Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Slavery Slaves Victim Assistance Violence |
Author: Bucheli, Jose R. Title: Return migration and violence Summary: There is reason to suspect that return migrants can reduce social violence in migrant-prone regions of the world. Taking into account that recent research shows positive effects of return migration, we consider that returners may reduce violence by contributing to social renewal and economic growth in their home communities. We estimate the direct effects of return migration in the context of Mexico, a traditionally migrant country that has suffered record levels of violence in the past decade. Using data on homicide rates from 2,456 municipalities for the 2011-2013 period and an instrumental variable bivariate Tobit maximum likelihood approach, we find that higher rates of return migration lead to a decline in local homicide rates. We also show, with a censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV) model, that municipalities in the bottom quartile of the homicide rate distribution benefit the most from return migration. Our work has important implications for crime reduction policies in developing countries, and specifically in Mexico, where social violence has wreaked havoc on society in recent years Details: Unpublished paper, 2018. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2019 at: http://www.jrbucheli.com/uploads/1/0/4/8/104882217/return_migration_and_violence.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.jrbucheli.com/uploads/1/0/4/8/104882217/return_migration_and_violence.pdf Shelf Number: 155169 Keywords: Homicides Migrants Migration Return Migration ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Mexico's Out-of-Control Criminal Market Summary: This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multi-polar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence. Focusing on the middle layer of criminal groups prevents such an easy and violent regeneration of the leadership. But the Mexican government remains deeply challenged in middle-layer targeting due to a lack of tactical and strategic intelligence arising from corruption among Mexican law enforcement and political pressures that makes it difficult to invest the necessary time to conduct thorough investigations. In the absence of more effective state presence and rule of law, the fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups turned a multi-polar criminal market of 2006 into an ever more complex multi-polar criminal market. Criminal groups lack clarity about the balance of power among them, tempting them to take over one another's territory and engage in internecine warfare. The Mexican crime market's proclivity toward violence is exacerbated by the government's inability to weed out the most violent criminal groups and send a strong message that they will be prioritized in targeting. The message has not yet sunk in that violence and aggressiveness do not pay. For example, the destruction of the Zetas has been followed by the empowerment of the equally aggressive Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Like the Zetas, the Jalisco group centers its rule on brutality, brazenness, and aggressiveness. Like the Zetas and unlike the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG does not invest in and provide socio- economic goods and governance in order to build up political capital. Equally, the internal re-balancing among criminal groups has failed to weed out the most violent groups and the policy measures of the Mexican governments have failed to reduce the criminal groups' proclivity toward aggression and violence. The emergence of the CJNG has engulfed Mexico and other supply-chain countries, such as Colombia,in its war with the Sinaloa Cartel. The war between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG provides space for local criminal upstarts, compounds instability by shifting local alliances, and sets off new splintering within the two large cartels and among their local proxies. To the extent that violence has abated in particular locales, the de-escalation has primarily reflected a "narco-peace," with one criminal group able to establish control over a particular territory and its corruption networks. It is thus vulnerable to criminal groups' actions as well as to high-value targeting of top drug traffickers. In places such as Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and Monterrey, local law enforcement and anti-crime socio-economic policies helped in various degrees to reduce violence. When the narco-peace was undermined, the policies proved insufficient. At other times, the reduction of violence that accompanied a local narco-peace gave rise to policy complacency and diminished resources. Socio-economic policies to combat crime have spread resources too thinly across Mexico to be effective. Violence in Mexico has become diversified over the past decade, with drug trafficking groups becoming involved in widespread extortion of legal businesses, kidnapping, illegal logging, illegal fishing, and smuggling of migrants. That is partially a consequence of the fragmentation, as smaller groups are compelled to branch out into a variety of criminal enterprises. But for larger groups, extortion of large segments of society is not merely a source of money, but also of authority. Violence and criminality have also become "popularized," both in terms of the sheer number of actors and also the types of actors involved, such as "anti-crime" militias. Widespread criminality increases the coercive credibility of individual criminals and small groups, while hiding their identities. Low effective prosecution rates and widespread impunity tempt many individuals who would otherwise be law-abiding citizens to participate in crime. Anti-crime militias that have emerged in Mexico have rarely reduced violence in a sustained way. Often, they engage in various forms of criminality, including homicides, extortion, and human rights abuses against local residents, and they undermine the authority of the state. Government responses to the militias-including acquiescence, arrests, and efforts to roll them into state paramilitary forces-have not had a significant impact. In fact, the strength and emergence of militia groups in places such as Michoacan and Guerrero reflect a long-standing absence of the government, underdevelopment, militarization, and abuse of political power. In places such as Guerrero, criminality and militia formation has become intertwined with the U.S. opioid epidemic that has stimulated the expansion of poppy cultivation in Mexico. The over-prescription of opioids in the United States created a major addiction epidemic, with users turning to illegal alternatives when they were eventually cut off from prescription drugs. Predictably, poppy cultivation shot up in Mexico, reaching some 30,000 hectares in 2017. Areas of poppy cultivation are hotly contested among Mexican drug trafficking groups, with their infighting intensely exacerbating the insecurity of poor and marginalized poppy farmers. Efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation have often failed to sustainably reduce illicit crop cultivation and complicated policies to pacify these areas, often thrusting poppy farmers deeper into the hands of criminal groups that sponsor and protect the cultivation. Eradication is easier than providing poppy farmers with alternative livelihoods. Combined with the Trump administration's demands for eradication, the Enrique Peea Nieto administration, and Mexico historically, showed little interest in seriously pursuing a different path. Poppy eradication in Mexico does not shrink the supply of illegal opioids destined for the U.S. market, since farmers replant poppies after eradication and can always shift areas of production. The rise of fentanyl abuse in the United States, however, has suppressed opium prices in Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations and dealers prefer to traffic and sell fentanyl, mostly supplied to the United States from China, because of its bulk-potency-profit ratio. The CJNG became a pioneer in fentanyl smuggling through Mexico into the United States, but the Sinaloa Cartel rapidly developed its own fentanyl supply chain. Although the drug is deadly, the Sinaloa Cartel's means of distribution remain non- violent in the United States. Fentanyl enters the United States from Mexico through legal ports of entry. In the short term, fentanyl has not altered the dynamics of Mexico's criminal market, but in the long term, fentanyl can significantly upend global drug markets and the prioritization of drug control in U.S. agendas with other countries. If many users switch to synthetic drugs, the United States may lose interest in promoting eradication of drug crops. Such a switch would also weaken the power of criminal and insurgent groups who sponsor illicit crop cultivation. Even if they switch to the production of synthetic drugs, they will only have the capacity to sponsor the livelihoods of many fewer people, thus diminishing their political capital with local populations and making it less costly for the government to conduct counter-narcotics operations. Mexico's violence can decline in two ways. First, a criminal group can temporarily win enough turf and establish enough deterrence capacity to create a narco-peace, as has been the case so far. Alternatively, violence can decline when the state at last systematically builds up enough deterrence capacity against the criminals and realigns local populations with the state, from which they are now often alienated. Mexico must strive to achieve this objective. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155192 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingFentanylHomicidesNarcoticsOpioidsOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence |
Author: Calderon, Laura Title: Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Analysis Through 2018 Summary: Justice in Mexico, a research-based program at the University of San Diego, released its 2019 report on Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, co-authored by Laura Calderon, Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk. This report analyzes the latest available data to broadly assess the current state of violence, organized crime, and human rights in Mexico. The tenth edition in a series is published under a new title to reflect the gradual shift that has occurred to the restructuring illicit drug trade and the rise of new organized crime groups. In 2018, Mexico saw record violence with 28,816 homicide cases and 33,341 victims reported by the Mexican National Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Publica, SNSP). This reflects the continued augmentation in violent crime in Mexico for more than a decade with a notable increase in the last few years. The homicide rate has dramatically escalated from 16.9 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 as reported to UNODC to 27.3 per 100,000 in 2018 based on SNSP figures. In this and past reports, the authors attribute much of the violence, between a third to a half, to the presence of organized crime groups, particularly drug trafficking organizations. According to the report, violence has become more pervasive throughout the country but remains highly concentrated in a few specific areas, especially in the major drug trafficking zones located in the northwest and the Pacific Coast. The top ten most violent municipalities in Mexico accounted for 33.6% of all homicides in Mexico in 2018, with 24.7% concentrated in the top five: Tijuana (2,246), Ciudad Juarez (1,004), Acapulco (839), Cancun-Benito Juarez (537), Culiacan (500). Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2019. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Organized-Crime-and-Violence-in-Mexico-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Organized-Crime-and-Violence-in-Mexico-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155611 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHomicidesHuman RightsOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Baumgardner-Zuzik, Jessica Title: Violence Reduction Subsector Review and Evidence Evaluation Summary: With levels of global violent conflict at a 25-year peak, the need for effective and impactful peacebuilding programming could not be more pressing. The peacebuilding field has shown immense commitment to understanding, preventing, and mitigating the impact of violent conflict, but has struggled to aggregate evidence across efforts to analyze, understand, and advocate for what works to reduce violence. If the peacebuilding field identifies where its programming has directly correlated to reduced levels of violence, then it will be better able to ground program design, monitoring, and evaluation (DM&E) in evidence, and leverage evidence to advocate for the necessity and utility of the field-making the case for peace. This evidence evaluation and subsector review analyzes data from twenty-two cases. Six macro-level violence reduction Theories of Change (ToC) were developed across three approaches from an analysis of the peacebuilding cases and the strength of evidence for each was assessed. This subsector review and evidence evaluation contains four sections. Section 1 introduces the scope and necessity of the subsector review, and articulates definitions, boundaries, and the methodology for finding and selecting sources. Section 2 examines the implications of peacebuilding programming for both the understanding and evaluation of violence reduction. Section 3 presents, in tabular form, the central theories of change (ToC) that emerged from the subsector review. These ToC are organized by approach and presented alongside their associated indicators, common activities, and a summary of the strength of evidence for each ToC. Following the table is an in-depth analysis of the strength of evidence for each ToC, examining where peacebuilding programs have successfully measured levels of violence and presented significant evidence attributing changes in levels of violence to peacebuilding programming. Section 4 concludes with identification of gaps in knowledge, opportunities for further study, and recommendations for where the peacebuilding field should focus evaluation efforts moving forward. Details: Washington, DC: Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2019. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2019 at: https://allianceforpeacebuilding.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/AFP_Violence_reduction_subsector_WEB_FINAL_4.17.2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://allianceforpeacebuilding.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/AFP_Violence_reduction_subsector_WEB_FINAL_4.17.2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155620 Keywords: Peace Building Social Cohesion ViolenceViolence Prevention Violent Conflict Violent Crime |
Author: Sutton, Heather Title: Understanding and Combatting Crime in Guyana Summary: Over the past decade, Guyana has recorded impressive economic growth. Many argue that the countrys economic future looks even brighter thanks to the recent massive oil discovery. But its development potential is hindered by many factors, including high levels of crime and violence tied to low levels of interpersonal trust and social cohesion and low trust in criminal justice institutions. Important related factors include high tolerance for the use of violence to solve problems in the home and the community. These issues can be successfully addressed by promoting a better balance between crime suppression and prevention programmes. However, for such programmes to be successful, the country needs data that are consistent, reliable, and detailed. Specifically, this means data that are collected frequently and are disaggregated according to critical demographics, such as gender, age, ethnicity, socio-economic stratum, and neighbourhood. Resources should be directed towards (1) acquiring an adequate quality and quantity of data that will ensure greater success in preventative programmes to increase the country's return on investment, (2) promote more preventative programmes and conduct rigorous monitoring and evaluation to identify the effects, and (3) improve the capacity and performance of the criminal justice system by improving police investigation capabilities and training on community relations, improved case management for the courts, and increased use of alternative sentencing based on clear rules. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2019 at: https://publications.iadb.org/en/publication/12914/understanding-and-combatting-crime-guyana Year: 2017 Country: Guyana URL: https://publications.iadb.org/en/publication/12914/understanding-and-combatting-crime-guyana Shelf Number: 155952 Keywords: Alternative Sentencing Case Management Community Policing Crime in Developing Countries Crime Prevention Guyana Law Enforcement Violence |
Author: Paddock, Ellen Title: Federal Actions to Engage Communities in Reducing Gun Violence: Recommendations from the Engaging Communities Report Summary: Decades of research confirm that urban gun violence has devastating effects on the physical health, mental health, economic vitality, and future growth of US communities (Wilson et al. 1998; Buka et al. 2001; Irvin-Erickson et al. 2016; Schwartz and Gorman 2003). Furthermore, these effects fall disproportionately on neighborhoods already highly disadvantaged because of several factors, including limited employment opportunities, poor infrastructure, underinvestment, and structural and racial inequality (Krivo and Peterson 1996). Many responses to gun violence have relied on sweeping tactics with the potential to label entire neighborhoods as "violent." However, such generalizations can be counterproductive, undercutting community members potential to become essential allies in reducing gun violence and failing to recognize that gun violence and victimization are typically concentrated within a very small subset of people and places (Tyler and Fagan 2008; Papachristos and Wildeman 2014; Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2010). In other words, whole communities are not "violent," and those most likely to be involved in firearm violence are also more likely to be victims (Braga 2010; Flannery, Singer, and Wester 2001). Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2017. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 22, 2019 at: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/federal_actions_to_engage_communities-in-reducing-gun-violence.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/federal_actions_to_engage_communities-in-reducing-gun-violence.pdf Shelf Number: 156003 Keywords: Community Engagement Firearm Violence Gun Violence Gun Violence Reduction Mental Health Violence |
Author: Calderon, Laura Title: Organized Crime and Violence in Baja California Sur Summary: During the last decade, Mexico has witnessed elevated levels of violence, reaching a total of almost 300,000 victims of intentional homicide from 2000 to 2017. Violence, however, is now affecting areas that it did not reach before, turning vacation paradises into hotly contested areas of control for organized crime groups in recent years. Such has been the case of Manzanillo, Cancun, Acapulco, and most recently, the case of Baja California Sur cities, Los Cabos and La Paz, as the state's homicide levels increased by almost 300% in 2017. There is a significant need for objective analysis on the recent surge of violence in these areas in order to properly assess the risks posed both to locals and visitors. This brief examination of recent violence is focused on the western coastal state of Baja California Sur, where the resort cities of La Paz and Los Cabos are located. Overall, this analysis discovered that much of the violence in Baja California Sur is linked to organized crime groups fighting for control of key drug trafficking areas and subsequently reviews the recent efforts by Mexican authorities in addressing the problem. Details: San Diego, California: Justice in Mexico, 2018. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180216_CALDERON-WP-BCS_v1.1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/violence-baja-california-sur/ Shelf Number: 156191 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicide Mexico Organized Crime Violence |
Author: Haarr, Robin Title: External Evaluation of International Justice Mission's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia, 2004-2014 Summary: International Justice Mission Overview: International Justice Mission (IJM) is a global organization with headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC, USA that works to protect the poor from various forms of violence throughout the developing world. IJM employs a global team of attorneys, investigators, social workers, and community activists who work in nearly 20 communities throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia. To accomplish their mission, IJM partners with local authorities to rescue victims of violence, bring criminals to justice, restore survivors, and strengthen justice systems. International Justice Mission in Cambodia In 2000, IJM began documenting and investigating cases of CSEC in Cambodia. Initial assessments conducted by IJM staff revealed the prevalence of CSEC was quite high and children easily accessible, and it was openly available in certain areas of Svay Pak, Toul Kork, and along Street 63 in Phnom Penh. In 2002, IJM began talks with the Royal Cambodia Government about the CSEC problem; and in 2004, IJM officially opened its Cambodia Field Office in Phnom Penh and began implementing its Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia (hereinafter referred to as "Program"). Over the past decade (2004-2014) IJM's Cambodia Field Office has focused the Program in three target areas - Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville. IJM's aim is to build political will and capacity to protect the poor from the targeted form of violence, and to train, resource, and mobilize government and community partners to do the same. IJM's unique model is called Justice System Transformation (JST). IJM provides direct services by working in partnership with government leaders and public justice system entities to improve the capacities of the public justice system to effectively respond to CSEC, but also to address gaps and barriers that exist in the public justice system in an effort to change the system as a whole. IJM's Program focused on using Collaborative Casework to identify and investigate suspected cases of CSEC, provide collected evidence to local authorities, advocate for the arrest and prosecution of sex traffickers, and facilitate the rescue and referral of child sex trafficking victims to agencies that provide assistance for recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. IJM coupled their Collaborative Casework with a System Reform Approach which included capacity building of government partners and public justice system entities to change and strengthen the public justice system to handle and respond to CSEC. In IJM's system reform phase, IJM continues collaborative casework and adds an intense focus on strengthening the criminal justice system. This approach has enabled IJM to identify places in the public justice system where laws are not being enforced in CSEC cases, knowledge gaps and patterns of dysfunction exist, incidents of corruption occur, and gaps exist in the legal frameworks to effectively address CSEC; each of which keeps the public justice system from functioning and performing effectively in cases of CSEC. Evaluation Purpose and Scope: In 2015, IJM concluded its Program and called for an external summative evaluation. In keeping with the Terms of Reference (TOR), the purpose of this external evaluation was to provide an independent, in-depth evaluation of the Program in terms of relevance, effectiveness and impact during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014, and to assess the potential for sustainability of IJM's work and results achieved in Cambodia. In accordance, the evaluation scope is summative and focused on the Program's approach, results achieved, lessons learned, challenges encountered, and adjustments made in each of the three project areas of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014. Evaluation Approach: To ensure the evaluation approach was as thorough and reliable as possible, different data collection methods and tools were employed. The evaluation methods and tools were in keeping with the TOR for this consultancy. These included (each of these are described in more detailed in the sections that follow): Desk review of research on CSEC in Cambodia and IJM Program documents and reports: -Consultations with IJM HQ staff in Washington, DC, USA and Field Office staff in Phnom Penh, Cambodia; -Sample of and interviews with key stakeholders and IJM staff; -Focus group discussions with faith-based communities; -Interviews with adult survivors of CSEC; -Assessment of IJM police and social service trainings; -Consultation on preliminary findings and conclusions with IJM HQ and FO staff. The evaluation team used a participatory approach that recognizes key stakeholders and beneficiaries as important and active participants that contribute to the production of knowledge and understanding. Triangulation was also a part of the evaluation approach to ensure not only the credibility of information and data collected, but also to allow diverse perspectives and experiences to be captured and to come to the forefront and reveal the full influence or impact and range or reach IJM's Program activities in Cambodia. Details: S.L., 2015. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.ijm.org/documents/studies/2015-Evaluation-of-IJM-CSEC-Program-in-Cambodia-Final-Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Cambodia URL: https://www.ijm.org/studies/external-evaluation-of-ijms-program-to-combat-sex-trafficking-of-children-in-cambodia-2004-2014 Shelf Number: 156563 Keywords: Cambodia Child Exploitation Child Prostitution Child Sex Trafficking Program Evaluation Sexual Exploitation Social Workers Violence |
Author: Heen, Miliaikeala SJ. Title: Sexual Harassment and Violence at Music Concerts and Festivals Summary: Sexual harassment and violence frequently occur at music events in the United States, as well as internationally. Crowd dynamics, inadequate crowd monitoring, alcohol consumption, and other factors may contribute to the prevalence of harassment and assault in live music settings. Details: Las Vegas, Nevada: University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2018. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2019 at: https://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/CCJP-Heen_Stat_Sheet.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.unlv.edu/ccjp/publications Shelf Number: 156725 Keywords: Sexual Assault Sexual Harassment Venue Security Violence |
Author: Physicians for Human Rights Title: "There is No One Here to Protect You": Trauma Among Children Fleeing Violence in Central America Summary: A Child Rights Crisis: Policy debates rage over what has been termed a humanitarian crisis, a human rights crisis, or a national emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border. What is clear is that it is a child rights crisis. Unaccompanied children, adolescents, and young families have fled in increasing numbers from violence in the "Northern Triangle" countries of Central America - El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras - and have been met at the U.S. border with harsh and punitive policies which violate their rights and compound existing trauma, thereby threatening the health and well-being of thousands. These policies are justified in the name of deterrence. However, if persecution and violence are the primary factors influencing migration, harsh border enforcement will not serve as an effective deterrent and will only cause more harm to an already traumatized population. Though high levels of child migration have captured the national attention, there has been comparatively little medical research in the United States about child asylum seekers' trauma experiences and resulting negative health outcomes. However, the limited number of studies of immigrant and refugee children who have resettled in developed countries have identified a high rate of trauma exposure and high rates of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic pain, musculoskeletal injuries, scars, and neuro-cognitive problems. The aim of this study is to provide the first detailed case series of recent child and adolescent asylum seekers in the United States. This report communicates the findings from more than 180 physical and psychological evaluations of children seeking asylum in the United States. The evaluations were conducted by members of the Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) Asylum Network between January 2014 and April 2018 and were analyzed by medical school faculty and students from Weill Cornell Center for Human Rights. The vast majority of the children evaluated were from the Northern Triangle countries (89 percent), of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Children reported that they survived direct physical violence (78 percent) and sexual violence (18 percent), threats of violence or death (71 percent), and witnessing acts of violence (59 percent) in their home countries. This violence was most often gang-related (60 percent), but a significant portion of children (47 percent) faced violence perpetrated by family members. PHR's clinicians documented negative physical aftereffects of this abuse: from musculoskeletal, pelvic, and dermatologic trauma to severe head injuries. 76 percent of children were suspected to have or diagnosed with at least one major mental health issue, most commonly post-traumatic stress disorder (64 percent), major depressive disorder (40 percent), and anxiety disorder (19 percent). Furthermore, children reported that government authorities in their home countries did not effectively prevent, investigate, prosecute, or punish crimes against children. These findings document that children arriving in the United States are fleeing severe forms of harm which may amount to persecution if their home government is unable or unwilling to control the perpetrators, and if their persecution is based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Asylum jurisprudence in the United States and internationally recognizes that gang and domestic violence may amount to persecution. In accordance with international and U.S. law, individuals with a credible fear of persecution arriving at the U.S. border have the legal right to apply for asylum. International and U.S. law also prohibit the return of any individual to a country where they face persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations, with children deserving heightened consideration. Child asylum seekers are also entitled to additional protections under international and U.S. law, including accommodations in the asylum process which take into account their level of development and maturity and their specific health and mental health needs. The right of children to be heard and to remain with their parents, as long as it is in their best interest, is recognized as a civil and political right. The findings in this report and the relevant legal standards demand an effective and humane policy response both in countries of origin, to prevent the violation of child rights, and in the United States, to fairly recognize claims of persecution and end practices that expose these young migrants to further trauma. PHR calls on countries of origin to urgently direct resources to end impunity and protect children. As a priority, governments must ensure adequate resources to investigate, prosecute, and punish violent acts against children, and establish or maintain independent investigatory bodies to address corruption and impunity. Governments must also ensure adequate resources for violence prevention and response, such as specialized police units, education initiatives, and specialized assistance for child survivors. Given the extreme levels of violence experienced by the children from the Northern Triangle evaluated by PHR, the U.S. administration must safeguard access to asylum in the United States, in order to meet immediate needs for protection and to maintain vital aid to Northern Triangle countries for addressing violence and instability in the long term. Since children's health has been affected by repeated trauma exposure, the administration should ensure that all children receive pediatric medical screening upon arrival at custody and uphold child protection standards in custody, prioritizing least restrictive settings and increasing use of alternatives to detention. Details: New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2019. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2019 at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PHR-Child-Trauma-Report-June-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/united-states-america/there-no-one-here-protect-you-trauma-among-children-fleeing-violence Shelf Number: 156817 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Central America Child Migration Human Rights Immigrant Children Mental Health Trauma Unaccompanied Children Unaccompanied Minors Violence |
Author: Treloar, Carla Title: The Prison Economy of Needles and Syringes: What Opportunities Exist for Blood Borne Virus Risk Reduction When Prices are so High? Summary: Abstract: AIM: A formal Needle and Syringe Program (NSP) is not provided in Australian prisons. Injecting equipment circulates in prisons as part of an informal and illegal economy. This paper examined how this economy generates blood-borne virus (BBV) risk and risk mitigation opportunities for inmates. METHOD: The HITS-p cohort recruited New South Wales inmates who had reported ever injecting drugs and who had a negative HCV serological test within 12 months prior to enrolment. For this study, qualitative interviews were conducted with 30 participants enrolled in HITS-p. Participants included 10 women and were incarcerated in 12 prisons. RESULTS: A needle/syringe was nominated as being typically priced in the 'inside' prison economy at $100-$150, with a range of $50-$350. Purchase or hire of equipment was paid for in cash (including transactions that occurred outside prison) and in exchange for drugs and other commodities. A range of other resources was required to enable successful needle/syringe economies, especially relationships with visitors and other prisoners, and violence to ensure payment of debts. Strategies to mitigate BBV risk included retaining one needle/syringe for personal use while hiring out others, keeping drug use (and ownership of equipment) "quiet", stealing used equipment from the prison health clinic, and manufacture of syringes from other items available in the prison. CONCLUSIONS: The provision of prison NSP would disrupt the inside economies built around contraband needles/syringes, as well as minimise BBV risk. However, any model of prison NSP should be interrogated for any unanticipated markets that could be generated as a result of its regulatory practices. Details: San Francisco, California: Plos One, 2016. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 27, 2019 at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5017673/pdf/pone.0162399.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27611849 Shelf Number: 156935 Keywords: Australia Contraband Needle and Syringe Prison Prisoners Violence |
Author: Myrna Mack Foundation Title: Guatemala's Justice System: Evaluating Capacity Building and Judicial Independence Summary: A crisis of insecurity and impunity has deeply affected the people in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras over the past decade, making this region (known as the Central America Northern Triangle) one of the most violent corners of the world. High levels of violence, corruption, and impunity have eroded the capacity of the states to develop accessible and efficient institutions, and address the needs of their populations. The lack of an effective response has eroded the population's trust in state institutions, leading to an alarming number of people who have been internally displaced or forced to migrate to other countries to escape violence and lack of economic opportunities. In the face of this situation, the Washington Office on Latin American (WOLA), Guatemala's Myrna Mack Foundation (Fundacion Myrna Mack, FMM), the Honduran University Institute on Democracy, Peace and Security (Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad, IUDPAS), and El Salvador's University Institute on Public Opinion (Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica, IUDOP), developed a tool for monitoring and evaluating policies and strategies currently being implemented in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to reduce insecurity and violence, strengthen the rule of law, improve transparency and accountability, protect human rights, and fight corruption. This initiative was made possible thanks to the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Tinker Foundation, the Seattle International Foundation, and the Moriah Fund. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office for Latin America and the Myrna Mack Foundation, 2019. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2019 at: https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Informe_cam_english_final6.27.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.wola.org/2019/06/report-cam-guatemala-justice-system/ Shelf Number: 156979 Keywords: Insecurity Judicial Independence Rule of Law Violence |
Author: Newton, Alexander Title: Economic and Social Costs of Reoffending: Analytical Report Summary: Executive summary: The appraisal and evaluation of policies and interventions is a key part of the decisionmaking process in government. Assessing the costs and benefits of these allows evidence-based decisions that enable the government to use its limited budgets to best effect and to ensure interventions deliver value for money. This report therefore fills a key evidence gap by estimating the economic and social costs of reoffending in England & Wales. It can be used by policy makers to assess the value for money of interventions that aim to reduce reoffending. Furthermore, the analyses by reoffence group and index disposal provides a level of granularity which enables a firmer understanding of the potential impacts of policy decisions and the feasibility of future options compared to previous estimates. In 2018, the Home Office (HO) published an updated version of the economic and social costs of crime which has provided a valuable starting point to estimate the costs of reoffending. Cost estimates are based on a cohort of offenders that had either been released from custody or had received a caution or non-custodial conviction between January to December 2016, and who then went on to reoffend over a 12-month follow-up period, as defined in the proven reoffending official statistics. These proven reoffences are counted from a cohort which spans offenders released from custody or who received a caution or non-custodial conviction (hereafter, known as the index disposal) in 2016. Reoffences, as counted in this report, could therefore take place from January 2016 to December 2017 but are only counted if they take place within a 12-month follow-up period from the index disposal. This is used to approximate the number of reoffences over a 12-month period. Therefore, it does not capture reoffending where reoffences occur over a longer period after the index disposal. Estimates have subsequently been uplifted to 2017/18 prices by using a Gross Domestic Product deflator. Assumptions and limitations outlined in Section 3 of the report should be considered when interpreting the results. In particular, total costs of reoffending presented will be underestimates given that figures associated with certain offence groups represent partial costs only. Furthermore, the estimates do not capture reoffending where reoffences occur over a longer period after the index disposal. Main results, which are based on a cohort of offenders identified in 2016 who subsequently went on to reoffend over a 12-month follow-up period, show that: - The total estimated economic and social cost of reoffending was 18.1 billion pounds. - The estimated economic and social cost of reoffending by adults was 16.7 billion pounds. - Theft reoffences made up most of the estimated costs for adults compared to other offence groups, at 9.3 billion pounds, followed by violence against the person reoffences, at 4.2 billion pounds. - In terms of index disposal type, adult offenders who had previously received a court order or custodial sentence accounted for the largest portion of estimated costs, at 6.5 billion pounds and 6.0 billion pounds respectively. - The cost of reoffending by children and young people (i.e. those under the age of 18 at the time of entry into the cohort) was 1.5 billion pounds, with theft comprising the largest portion compared to other offence groups, at 532 million pounds. - Reoffences committed by children and young people who had previously received youth rehabilitation orders or first tier penalties as their index disposal type incurred most of the costs, at 510 million pounds and 468 million pounds respectively. - The cost of reoffences committed by adults who had previously received a custodial sentence of less than 12 months was 5.0 billion pounds whilst those who had served a sentence of 12 months or more cost 1.0 billion pounds. The cost difference is primarily driven by the greater number of offenders receiving shorter sentences compared to those receiving a longer sentence. The equivalent costs for reoffending by children and young people were 52 million and 22 million pounds respectively. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2019. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 18, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/814650/economic-social-costs-reoffending.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economic-and-social-costs-of-reoffending Shelf Number: 157025 Keywords: Evidence-Based Decisions Offenders Recividism Reoffending Social Costs Theft Violence |