

1 MR. JAFFE: Will the record note Colonel
2 Kelly has already been sworn previously and this
3 is a continuation of his testimony?

4 Whereupon,

5 DAVID B. KELLY

6 recalled, duly previously sworn, testified further as
7 follows:

8 DIRECT EXAMINATION

9 By Mr Jaffe:

10 Q Colonel, my recollection is we finished with the
11 question you were describing, a meeting in August, I think
12 August 17, 1965, in Newark which begins the specific
13 preparation in your administration for civil disturbances
14 Could you tell us, please, what occurred at that meeting?

15 A The Governor called a meeting, and we met at the
16 Newarker Restaurant at the airport, and the reason for the
17 meeting was to coordinate the major cities with the State
18 Police and the National Guard At the meeting were the
19 Mayors of Newark, Camden, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Paterson
20 and Trenton.

21 Q Could you tell us, Colonel, in essence what the
22 discussion was about and what plans were made as a result?

23 A At that meeting the Governor, through our information
24 outlined the possibility of disorders in the state, and it
25 was agreed at that time that the policy by the Governor was

1 that the State Police would be the first state agency in
2 to any municipality and the National Guard would be alerted
3 and activated only at the request of the State Police

4 The policy was discussed with the mayors, and some of
5 the mayors said that they would never need the State Police
6 or National Guard, and others said that they did have things
7 under control Others said they would call the State Police
8 immediately At least they were set pretty firm on the
9 policy that the Governor had decided upon.

10 Q Do you know whether or not there was any general
11 order of the State Police or a memorandum from the
12 Governor's Office confirming that procedure? Would you
13 know that?

14 A No, there wasn't any order, but we have the
15 minutes of that meeting, and I can give you those minutes.

16 Q Do you have those minutes?

17 A Yes

18 Q May I have them, please?

19 A I think they are someplace in this correspondence
20 I will give you the minutes. They are here someplace.

21 MR. JAFFE: Just note in the record that this
22 will be Exhibit C-3 It will be a copy of the
23 minutes of the meeting the Colonel referred to.

24 (EXHIBIT NO. C-3 WAS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.)

25 By Mr. Jaffe:

1 Q As a result of that meeting, could you tell me
2 what were the next steps taken by the State Police in
3 preparation for handling civil disturbances?

4 A Well, we immediately got working with the National
5 Guard First we became familiar with the commanders in
6 the National Guard.

7 Q Who was your liaison man with the National Guard?
8 With whom did you work?

9 A I worked with General Cantwell, but Colonel Sharp
10 was the liaison.

11 Q Is Colonel Sharp on General Cantwell's staff?

12 A Right.

13 Q What is his title?

14 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: He is the Chief of
15 Staff of the Department of Defense In the State
16 of New Jersey we have a Department of Defense
17 just as the national Department of Defense This
18 is headed by Major General Cantwell. He would be
19 the equivalent of the full-time adjutant in other
20 states. His staff is headed by Colonel Sharp as
21 opposed to, for example, the Fiftieth Armored
22 Divisions headed by General Weyhenmeyer, whose
23 Chief of Staff is Colonel Britt It is important
24 to remember this because it will help you to define
25 some of the things that happened in Newark and



1 Plainfield in terms of chain of command and control
 2 You must think of the Department of Defense as
 3 sitting in this corner and the Fiftieth Armored
 4 Division which supplied the troops headed by
 5 General Weyhenmeyer and his staff in this corner
 6 (indicating), General Cantwell's Chief of Staff
 7 over here, being Colonel Sharp, who is not the
 8 Chief of Staff normally

9 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: It seems to me we now have
 10 a Department of Defense, an Army, a National Guard,
 11 a State Police Am I correct?

12 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: No. It breaks down
 13 this way, Bishop: You have a Department of
 14 Defense. Under the Department of Defense are the
 15 Air National Guard people and our National Guard,
 16 which is called the Army National Guard, both at
 17 which administratively come under that corner
 18 (indicating), General Cantwell and Colonel Sharp.

19 The operational units, the Air National Guard,
 20 which is commanded by a General and the main army
 21 force, which is the 50th armored division, plus
 22 non-divisional units, come under them but are not
 23 operational generally They are under them for
 24 administration.

25 Colonel Kelley, you met with General Cantwell

1 and Colonel Sharp. You did not meet with Colonel
2 Weyhenmeyer or Colonel Britt, the actual
3 commanders of troops, with the administrative
4 commanders?

5 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: General Cantwell testified
6 in Washington this week.

7 THE WITNESS: Very critically.

8 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: Is that relevant to our
9 discussions at all?

10 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: It will be, and it is
11 very relevant, particularly his criticisms of
12 what the national body compared to this had said
13 and done. Also I believe that you are in receipt
14 of certain statements sent by General Cantwell.

15 MR. WACHENFELD: He is going to appear as a
16 witness before us?

17 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. I think, Judge,
18 before he comes, if you don't understand this
19 structure, some of the very crucial areas of
20 control and administrative chain of command which
21 Dave will testify to as being pertinent to
22 control of specific troops, reaction of troops
23 and the general demeanor will help you.

24 MR. WACHENFELD: I may not understand the
25 structure, but you understand what he said That

1 is sure

By Mr. Jaffe:

3 Q Colonel, could you tell us, then, what your
4 conversations with the National Guard were and what kind of
5 liaison you established? This is in the period of the fall
6 of 1965, is that right?

7 A Right From that period on we had meetings with
8 the National Guard, first, to determine their structure as
9 you received it here, the equipment, the availability of
10 personnel and equipment, the State Police role and
11 association, the missions that would be assigned and
12 generally familiarization with their equipment and the use
13 of their equipment and our equipment and familiarization
14 with personnel commanders.

15 Q Did the National Guard set up a specific unit to
16 handle civil disorders as a result of your conversations?

17 A The National Guard has an MP Company with the
18 primary role for civil disorders. Their role was in this
19 conventional type organization where the formation is in
20 squads and platoons and the dispersing of people en masse
21 and the use of gas and such things as this, but never in the
22 use of firearms.

23 Q Was there an agreement made at this time as to the
24 command structure that would result if a civil disturbance
25 occurred and both the State Police and the National Guard

1 were in the same area?

2 A Right

3 Q What was that?

4 A The command structure was this: That General
5 Cantwell would react to any request I made of him for the
6 National Guard and if I requested the National Guard --

7 Q Excuse me by interrupting you. It would be your
8 decision based on the Governor's decision, and you would
9 implement the Governor's decision to bring the National
10 Guard in? Is that the agreement?

11 A Let me go back. As you know, the legal structure
12 of this is that if the mayor of the municipality requested
13 assistance, the State Police would go first. Our policy is
14 that wherever there is a disturbance or a pending disturbance
15 or a possible disturbance, we have observers there. The
16 observers and the State Police keep us constantly informed
17 of the situation. We in turn will keep the Governor
18 informed. If the mayor requests assistance, it has to be
19 from the mayor to the Governor; the Governor then asks me,
20 "Is this request valid?" and I say yes or no.

21 On this I would say I need the National Guard. He in
22 turn would accept this recommendation and activate the
23 National Guard.

24 Q That was the agreement you reached in the fall of
25 1965?



1 A Right

2 Q When the National Guard would come into a particular
3 area, who would be the commander in charge?

4 A The National Guard is commanded and would be
5 commanded by National Guard officers as the State Police
6 would be commanded by State Police officers.

7 Q The liaison would be worked out between you and
8 the National Guard?

9 A Right

10 Q As an overall responsibility?

11 A Right

12 Q At this time, Colonel, did you also work out the
13 tactical aspects of a joint operation?

14 A Right

15 Q Could you tell what those were?

16 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Is it true that actually
17 at the time of call you would work out with the
18 National Guard the overall responsibility, or is it
19 a fact that it was determined that you would have
20 the overall responsibility?

21 THE WITNESS: It was determined that I would
22 have the overall responsibility

23 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: It was not to be worked
24 out; this was predetermined that you as commander
25 of the State Police would have the overall



1 responsibility for operations?

2 THE WITNESS: Right

3 By Mr Jaffe:

4 Q Could you tell us the tactical -- by that I mean
5 the radio communication, command structures and so forth
6 that were worked out?

7 A If you are talking of 1965 --

8 Q Yes, I am talking 1965.

9 A At that time we were talking about conventional
10 disturbances where we weren't involved in sniper fighting
11 and shooting and this type of thing. At that time the
12 communications were tested, National Guard communications
13 and our communications were tested. We put in State Police
14 radios in the National Guard commanders' cars and General
15 Cantwell has a State Police radio and his major commanders
16 do have State Police radios. We tested their equipment.

17 Q When you say major commanders, how many people
18 would that be?

19 A Three brigade commanders, Colonel Sharp and General
20 Cantwell.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: These three brigades
22 are from the 50th Armored Division? They are the
23 integral striking arms of the division, three
24 brigades and an administration company which handles
25 the administration aspects, including the chaplain,



1 the Adjutant General and so forth Then there is
2 the staff or headquarters, which includes General
3 Weyhenmeyer, Colonel Britt and his operational
4 people, including the S-3 or operations officer

5 So in your plan they were not included?

6 THE WITNESS: I can best describe it this way:

7 That the radios were put in the command vehicles
8 and they were state-owned cars. Whether General
9 Weyhenmeyer has a state-owned car or not assigned
10 to him I don't know, but General Cantwell does,
11 Colonel Sharp does, and those people that had
12 state-owned cars we put radios in there. Whether
13 General Weyhenmeyer has one I don't know, and the
14 brigades belong to him.

15 By Mr. Jaffe:

16 Q What other actions did you take to integrate the
17 forces?

18 A We had meetings within each troop and, as I said
19 before, Troop A in the State Police is South Jersey; Troop
20 B is North Jersey and Troop C is Central Jersey. The
21 brigades as such were married up to the particular troops.

22 They had meetings; they had CPX's, command post exercises.

23 We had the M. P. company train State Police and the
24 State Police train the M. P. companies. We had courses in
25 legal procedures as to arrest procedures and as to

1 containment procedures and such as that

2 Q What role during the fall of 1965 and the period
3 thereafter did the State Police play with any of the local
4 municipalities in the area of preparing for civil defense
5 orders?

6 A Well, again, as I told you, we have observers, and
7 there are many instances that come within the course of the
8 year, strikes and so forth.

9 Q Did you make any surveys of the capabilities of any
10 of the local municipalities?

11 A We made surveys, and I can give you copies.

12 Q Will you tell us generally and what cities?

13 A 5/8/65 The cities we have are Jersey City,
14 Elizabeth, Newark, Paterson, Camden.

15 Q Could we have those surveys?

16 A Right.

17 MR. JAFFE: Will the record note that C-4 will
18 be surveys prepared by the State Police of cities
19 in 1965

20 (EXHIBIT NO. C-4 WAS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.)

21 By Mr Jaffe:

22 Q Tell us how the surveys were prepared and generally
23 what they said.

24 A We made out a format and we went to the city and
25 asked the cities to cooperate, and this is what it contains --

1 the size, the population, the mayor, the police director,
2 the chief, the location of their headquarters and their
3 precincts, their manpower, their supervisors, the uniformed
4 personnel, their plainclothes personnel, their emergency
5 equipment to include ammunition, guns, gas masks, helmets,
6 auxiliary lighting, portable barriers, photographic
7 equipment, copies of local ordinances, transportation
8 available, communications, their frequencies, the number of
9 walkie-talkies, the number of public address system
10 bull horns and the points of assembly that we would have,
11 and the approach routes that we would have, the alternate
12 approach routes

13 Q Do those reports show the names of individuals in
14 the local municipalities with whom your people worked in
15 preparing those reports?

16 A No, but I would assume it would have to be the
17 responsibility of the chief

18 Q The chief of police in the municipality?

19 A Right.

20 Q Were the cities given copies of your reports?

21 A Right Actually it came from the cities, but they
22 have a copy of this survey.

23 Q Were those surveys also given to the National Guard?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Did the State Police or the National Guard act on

1 those surveys in any manner?

2 A When you say act on them --

3 Q As a result of making a survey of a particular
4 city would any organization in the state review the survey
5 to ascertain whether or not the equipment, the manpower,
6 the emergency procedures were adequate or inadequate?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Who would do that?

9 A We did this and we found that one of the major
10 problems we would have is gas. None of the police departments
11 in the whole state had a gas mask that could contain CS gas,
12 the new type gas. It boiled down to the point if we did
13 have to use gas, the only people that would be equipped
14 would be the National Guard and the State Police. Everybody
15 else would have to get out of the area. Local police
16 departments did not have the gas masks that could contain
17 this new gas.

18 Q Was any effort made to apprise local municipalities
19 of this type of efficiency?

20 A We told them. We had meetings with them, we
21 informed them of the situation about the gas masks with the
22 type of gas we used, and they were informed of this.

23 Q To your knowledge none of the local municipalities
24 obtained the type of gas masks you are referring to?

25 A They got some. In fact, there are many requests

1 of the National Guard for use of gas masks, use of helmets.
2 They didn't have helmets and gas masks

3 Q Were these requests in 1965 or were they post riot
4 requests?

5 A These were in 1965. We told them about it.

6 MR. LOFTON: Colonel, were all of the
7 municipalities that were included in the capability
8 survey found to be deficient as far as these gas
9 masks are concerned?

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 MR. LOFTON: All of them?

12 THE WITNESS: I am talking about the six
13 major cities This was a 1965 report, and Newark
14 is one of them.

15 MR. LOFTON: In terms of their reaction to
16 your evaluation did all six make the requests for
17 the gas masks?

18 THE WITNESS: No.

19 MR. LOFTON: Which ones did and which ones
20 didn't?

21 THE WITNESS: It was a local municipality,
22 and it was up to them to purchase them and get them
23 whatever way they could. I don't think they got
24 them. They may have by now, but not until after
25 July.

1 By Mr Jaffe:

2 Q It would not be your function to supply them but
3 to point out the deficiencies?

4 A Right

5 Q What other deficiencies did you point out to the
6 six municipalities as a result of your 1965 surveys?

7 A One of the deficiencies -- it really isn't a
8 deficiency but an inadequacy -- we didn't have enough radio
9 frequencies, or there were not common channels With the
10 agencies involved there were not enough common frequencies
11 that we could communicate with one another. This was a
12 deficiency

13 Q Were there other inadequacies based on your review?

14 A Yes. We found out that they didn't have any
15 barrier equipment, stanchions

16 Q Describe that.

17 A Stanchions and rope and things like that to contain
18 people in crowds if they did have something of this sort.
19 We asked them if they would make a survey to determine
20 whether it would be available by county or by any other
21 agency that would have this type of equipment if they
22 needed it We found out that they did have this problem.

23 Q What about transportation facilities in local
24 municipalities, what was the status of those facilities?

25 A Transportation facilities, if we are talking about

1 cars, it is contingent on the local agencies to determine
2 whether they need cars for patrols or investigators or
3 detectives. If we are talking about cars for a type of --

4 Q Vehicles to handle disturbances, was that evaluated
5 at that time?

6 A No, not as such. We told them of the type of
7 mobile patrols that we would have, type and kind of patrols
8 that we would have. Whether they could have enough to take
9 care of this we didn't know.

10 Q Was there any attempt in this period of 1965 to
11 request from the local municipalities a plan of riot control
12 as to whether or not (a) they had one, or (b) they were
13 working on one?

14 A On some municipalities we requested the State
15 Police to give them training in the conventional book type
16 riot control. We have a book, and I can give you a copy of
17 it. It has been a long time that we have had it, but we
18 have updated it. It is on the formations, the type and kind
19 of equipment to be used. We did provide most of the
20 municipalities and requested it.

21 MR. JAFFE: Could the record note that C-5
22 will be a manual of the State Police on riot
23 training which we will get later?

24 (EXHIBIT NO. C-5 WAS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.)

25 MR. GIBBONS: Which municipalities requested

1 it?

2 THE WITNESS: There are many of them, but I
3 don't know specifically. I could find out, of
4 course. There are many smaller municipalities
5 that requested it.

6 MR. GIBBONS: Did any of the major cities
7 request it?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes. We gave Jersey City copies
9 of it.

10 MR. WACHENFELD: Did Newark request it?

11 THE WITNESS: I don't know.

12 By Mr. Jaffe:

13 Q Could you check and let us know?

14 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Would you know about
15 Plainfield, Englewood and Paterson? You have talked
16 about the major cities. Would you list them?
17 Perhaps they are not included in the ones we
18 discussed. Six major cities I think you said.

19 THE WITNESS: It was Newark, Paterson, Jersey
20 City, Elizabeth, Trenton and Camden.

21 By Mr. Jaffe:

22 Q Colonel, besides the riot training manual of the
23 State Police, did any of the municipalities indicate to you
24 whether they had a plan of operation, a practical plan, if
25 that is the right phrase, as to how to contain and handle

1 such disturbances?

2 A We talked about Jersey City; we talked about
3 Newark.

4 Q Is this again in the period 1965?

5 A Yes. We are staying in that period. The municipal
6 police departments did have plans for disorder.

7 Q Which municipal departments?

8 A All of them had some sort of a plan that they would
9 put into effect

10 Q Were those plans submitted to you for approval?

11 A No.

12 Q Did any State Police official that you know review
13 those plans?

14 A No.

15 Q Did any National Guard official review those plans?

16 A No. We have no authority nor could we demand.

17 Q Did any of the six largest municipalities in the
18 state ask you to review the plans or ask the National Guard,
19 if you know?

20 A No, not that I know of

21 MR. WACHENFELD: If you had received such a
22 request, would you have reviewed them and made
23 recommendations and suggestions?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

25 By Mr. Jaffe:

1 Q Colonel, before we leave this area, when you
2 reviewed the city surveys and you found what in your opinion
3 were inadequacies or deficiencies, were the municipalities
4 notified by letter or by oral notification?

5 A The procedure is this: As we are broken down
6 geographically, B Troop had the responsibility of contacting
7 the particular police departments. B Troop had the major
8 cities -- Jersey City, Newark, Paterson -- and the commander
9 or his representative did visit the local police departments.
10 The equipment status charts we got came from the local
11 police department We informed them of what we thought
12 were the inadequacies

13 Q So it was worked out through the relationship,
14 through the local troop commanders and the municipalities?

15 A Yes

16 Q Colonel, after this period of initial city
17 surveying and initial liaison with the National Guard,
18 could you describe for us the next steps taken by the State
19 Police in their role in preparation for civil disturbances?

20 A We continued our training We changed our tactics
21 right after the Jersey City affair, and I guess Ray Brown
22 could fill you in.

23 Q When was that?

24 A Three years ago.

1 THE WITNESS: Nineteen-sixty four Jersey
2 City had a situation, and we were called as
3 observers. The Governor sent me up

4 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Could I fill in here?
5 I think what Dave is referring to is this: That
6 in 1964, and I remember his meeting was August,
7 1965 when not even this preliminary work had been
8 done, so there was no order precedent and, John
9 Gibbons, no statute nor anything else which
10 empowered anybody to enter any municipality except
11 on the request of the municipality. In other
12 words, if Newark or Jersey City blew up, they
13 could technically stop the State Police at their
14 borders, and in Jersey City that was not impossible
15 to have happen.

16 MR. GIBBONS: Nor anyplace else I suppose

17 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: I suppose, but Jersey
18 City has a certain tradition of isolation which is
19 different. But in the situation there the police
20 were using tactics that anybody could see were not
21 successful, particularly like myself being fire-
22 bombed in the middle of the street. The police
23 were led by Mr. Tumulty in a charge down the street
24 in which the CORE agitators and innocent people
25 were clubbed, including several Catholic priests

1 Father Kennedy and I were clubbed and everybody
2 else went up to the roofs and threw fire bombs on
3 on them, and they became so disorganized that I
4 called the Governor and said they better get
5 somebody in.

6 Colonel Kelley was the only man with the
7 training and the only man with the state no doubt
8 who could have the diplomacy and the ability at
9 the same time. So I think unofficially he advised
10 them, and they immediately began to use what were
11 then rather effective tactics such as holding
12 their people in reserve and picking up groups and
13 doing selective work rather than just charging
14 anybody in the middle of the street.

15 This, incidentally, brought it under control
16 within about twenty-four hours, but Dave was in an
17 untenable position. He wasn't asked; he wasn't
18 commanded; he wasn't supposed to be around. One
19 of his chief problems was he couldn't get in touch
20 with anybody at the Jersey City police because
21 there was nobody at headquarters and nobody had
22 any command sets, and he couldn't find the chief
23 of police. But I think that it has this historical
24 importance: That it led to the 1965 meeting, and
25 the very simple thing, Justice, if you,

1 Bud McManimon, tried to get in touch with Bob Lilley
2 now and he had no communications -- it just
3 recommended itself to everybody This is the
4 beginning of the pre-planning that resulted in
5 August from the Jersey City experience

6 By Mr Jaffe:

7 Q Could you continue for us as to what activities
8 the State Police continued to engage in in preparation
9 subsequent to 1965?

10 A Primarily updating the status charts, keeping in
11 contact with the major municipalities. We had two incidents,
12 if I can go off the record.

13 (Discussion off the record.)

14 By Mr. Jaffe:

15 Q Proceed, Colonel.

16 A In 1966 the State Police and the National Guard
17 decided that a test vehicle would be the Bridgeton incident
18 wherein the KKK was going to hold a rally, and it was
19 decided then that we would use this incident or situation
20 as a means of testing the liaison, cooperation and
21 communication and equipment. It proved worthwhile to this
22 extent: We found we needed some closer liaison; we needed
23 more communications, and it was very helpful to us in our
24 planning

25 Q Colonel, were there any tests between the

1 State Police and/or the National Guard with local municipali-
2 ties in that period?

3 A No.

4 Q Were any local municipalities involved in the
5 incident you just referred to?

6 A Yes, one municipality, Bridgeton.

7 Q But none of the six major municipalities had any
8 test runs with the State Police or National Guard?

9 A No

10 MR. GIBBONS: With respect to Bridgeton, isn't
11 that the place where there is a City of Bridgeton
12 and a Township of Bridgeton?

13 THE WITNESS: There is a City of Bridgeton,
14 and the township -- I have forgotten the township.
15 You may be right

16 MR. GIBBONS: Isn't the Township of Bridgeton
17 completely surrounding the City of Bridgeton?

18 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, but I don't
19 know. That doesn't sound right to me

20 MR. GIBBONS: There is a small city and a
21 large township surrounding it?

22 THE WITNESS: Right. There are many smaller
23 communities, but they are not part of Bridgeton.

24 MR. GIBBONS: Is this the incident that grew
25 out of desegregation efforts in the City of Bridgeton?

1 THE WITNESS: Well, there were some internal
2 problems in the City of Bridgeton. I guess it is
3 segregation. I really don't remember the problem,
4 but I knew the local residents had called the KKK,
5 and they decided to hold a rally in Bridgeton.

6 MR. GIBBONS: I am trying to place that in
7 context because I have recollection of a specific
8 school desegregation problem.

9 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Then it accelerated
10 into a situation where there was supposedly police
11 brutality. I think they inaugurated an official
12 curfew, and I think Lillian Smith --

13 THE WITNESS: Irene Smith, who lives down
14 there about a mile or two away in Pitman.

15 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: They started picketing
16 for school desegregation, and that is when the KKK
17 was organized with the participation of the locals.

18 MR. GIBBONS: Off the record.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 By Mr. Jaffe:

21 Q In the period subsequent to 1965 were there any
22 other city surveys run like the ones you ran in 1965? Did
23 you update those in 1966 and 1967?

24 A Yes, they were updated.

25 Q When were they updated?

1 A In 1966 and in 1967 we updated the major cities.
2 I don't have the 1967's with me

3 MR. JAFFE: Will the record note that C-6 will
4 be the surveys for 1966 and C-7 will be the surveys
5 for 1967?

6 (EXHIBITS NOS. C-6 AND C-7 WERE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.)

7 By Mr Jaffe:

8 Q When you reviewed the surveys for 1966, could you
9 tell us to the best of your recollection what, if anything,
10 you did with that information from the six major municipali-
11 ties?

12 A We did nothing but file it This was for our
13 information. There was nothing we could do with it

14 Q Were there any significant changes in some of the
15 deficiencies pointed out in 1965?

16 A I don't know for a certainty, but I don't think so.

17 Q What about in 1967, were those city surveys
18 sufficiently different than the ones in 1965?

19 A I can't guarantee that, but I don't think so either.
20 I don't think there was any change

21 Q You don't recall any significant action taken by
22 the State Police as a result of the 1966 or 1967 surveys?

23 A Right.

24 Q Would that be a fair statement?

25 A It wouldn't be a fair statement in that we have no

1 control. It makes no difference

2 Q Let me rephrase that question. You don't recall
3 any significant action taken by the municipalities in the
4 1966 and 1967 surveys different than in the 1965 surveys?

5 A To my recollection, no.

6 Q Colonel, were there any other specifics in this
7 area of preparation by the State Police prior to the summer
8 of 1967 that you would like to discuss?

9 A I can say this to you: That one thing we did, we
10 intensified our intelligence to the point that we had more
11 of our investigators in the major towns. We had more
12 intensified investigations in the area of disorder

13 Q Could you tell us when you began that program of
14 intensifying your intelligence and how you did it?

15 A I will tell you what we did, not how we did it.
16 All we did was go around and ask questions, meet people, and
17 if you ask enough questions, you will finally find out
18 something is going on. From the reports that we got from
19 other agencies this information was all correlated. This
20 is how we did it really.

21 MR. GIBBONS: What other agencies?

22 THE WITNESS: Federal agencies, Institutions

23 And Agencies, municipalities.

24 By Mr Jaffe:

25 Q Were there any other meetings in the period between



1 1965 and the summer of 1967 between the State Police, the
2 National Guard and the local municipalities?

3 A Yes

4 Q Could you tell us generally when those meetings
5 occurred and the subject matter?

6 A If you are talking of State Police and National
7 Guard, we had many meetings, practically every quarter.

8 Q State Police, National Guard and municipalities?

9 A One of the major meetings we had was on June 1st
10 when we met in Jersey City.

11 Q What year?

12 A June 1, 1967.

13 Q Could you tell us who was there and what the
14 purpose of the meeting was?

15 A I have the minutes, and I can give you the minutes.

16 Q Just give us a general resume

17 A Present at the meetings, inspectors from Jersey
18 City, Captain Olaff at that time, Sergeant Halton and
19 Detective Goch. Detective Goch is our man in civil
20 disorders.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: That is your special
22 man?

23 THE WITNESS: He is. The meeting was arranged
24 to discuss the racial situation and possible
25 disorder in Jersey City



1 By Mr. Jaffe:

2 Q By whom was it called?

3 A Jersey City and the State Police

4 Q Did the officials of Jersey City request the
5 meeting?

6 A I don't know whether they did or we did, but we
7 had some information and they had some information.

8 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Off the record.

9 (Discussion off the record.)

10 THE WITNESS: One of the things that brought
11 this about was Hillside Metal Products, a large
12 factory on Clay Street in Newark, and I am reading
13 from the report now, with 1,560 employed in their
14 plant, of which 1,300 are negroes. There are no
15 negroes among the 50 office employees. Information
16 from a negro told the plant president that there
17 would be a picketing protesting employment
18 practices for negroes and that July is the target
19 date for trouble

20 A negro was also quoted as saying there will
21 simultaneous picketing by negroes during the three-
22 day period in July in "red hot Jersey City," bust
23 out all over Trenton, Camden, Elizabeth, Edgewater
24 and Perth Amboy. He hinted that there will be
25 general havoc, rioting, bloodshed and picketing

1 with the labor movement.

2 The dates of the picketing in July were
3 undetermined. This plant will be closed during
4 the first week in July for vacations. He suggested
5 that we contact the plant president for further
6 information.

7 This is part of the report. Inspector McGee
8 of Jersey City had informed that the Black Muslims
9 were making plans to take over the Fourth and Fifth
10 Precincts when the rioting started sometime in
11 July. "The Muslims planned to station men in front
12 of each officer's home to prevent him from getting
13 to the scene of the disorder. The scene of
14 meetings was the temple at Kerney Street and
15 Leslie's Barber Shop at Ocean Avenue. Meetings
16 were recently held there. Chief Smith discussed
17 the problem concerned; a Roman Catholic police
18 was critical of the police and the civil rights in
19 the city."

20 By Mr. Jaffe:

21 Q Was there any general discussion at that meeting
22 on how to handle civil disturbances in Jersey City?

23 A "The purpose of the meeting is to discuss plans
24 for the added police protection in the downtown area. The
25 chief stated that as many as 4,000 persons could be on hand

1 and picketing by civil rights groups is expected. Chief
2 Smith stated that Mayor Whelan will call the State Police
3 and militia without delay if anything erupted within the
4 city He asked how long it would take The reply was
5 two hundred men within two hours supplemented by three
6 hundred additional men. Captain Olaff then answered the
7 chief's inquiry concerning procedure in requesting State
8 Police and National Guard assistance The discussion then
9 centered on assembly points for the State Police, and it was
10 the opinion that the Jersey City armory would be the first
11 choice due to the location and facilities available."

12 The meeting was arranged with myself, Chief Smith
13 and several other chiefs in the metropolitan area for
14 Friday, June 2nd, in Chief Smith's office I at the time
15 was on active duty at Fort Knox, and I flew home from Fort
16 Knox on June 2nd and we had a meeting in the Jersey City
17 Police Department headquarters on June 2nd. The meeting
18 was attended by the New Jersey State Police, myself,
19 Captain Olaff; Sergeant Halton of the Jersey City Police
20 Department; the Newark Police Department, Chief Oliver
21 Kelly; the Elizabeth Police Department; the Paterson Police
22 Department; Perth Amboy Police; Bayonne; Hoboken; Secaucus;
23 North Bergen; Guttenberg; Weehawkin; Hudson County Police;
24 Union City; West New York and the New Jersey Department of
25 Defense

1 Q What was the general subject matter of that
2 meeting?

3 A This meeting was called due to increase of activity
4 in racial incidents that were reported to us and reported
5 to the municipalities. It was mentioned that the possibility
6 of Stokley Carmichael being in Jersey City on June 1 should
7 be considered and the Black Moslems plan in Jersey City was
8 discussed.


9 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: This was 1966?

10 THE WITNESS: Nineteen-sixty seven. We
11 discussed the Black Moslems' plan in Jersey City,
12 among which would be attempts by them to obtain
13 automatic weapons and conduct raids in white
14 neighborhoods. Again I have the minutes of this
15 meeting.

16 By Mr. Jaffe:

17 Q Did you at that meeting discuss the general plan
18 as to how to handle civil disturbances, if any would occur?

19 A The State Police began active planning for civil
20 disorders four years ago. Recently the State Police met
21 with the National Guard officials to discuss plans in the
22 event both organizations were called to quell a civil
23 disorder. Police departments must exchange information of
24 a racial or subversive nature because incidents can happen
25 anywhere. The problem was mutual. We need a central clearing



1 agency to disseminate the information The state will have
2 observers in troubled areas in the state We will go into
3 an area upon receiving word from the Governor The National
4 Guard will not be committed unless the State Police request
5 it

6 This is a general statement I made to open the meeting

7 Q Did you at that meeting or as a result of that
8 meeting coordinate with the local police forces who were
9 there, coordinate matters such as tactics to be employed,
10 assembly points, radio frequencies, communications and so
11 forth?

12 A Captain Olaff discussed the regional meetings held
13 with the State Police and National Guard, then he referred
14 to the trouble in Cambridge, Maryland The problem arose
15 among local and State Police and the National Guard
16 concerning areas of responsibilities This is when we told
17 them we needed maps, their road block plans and assembly
18 plans

19 Q Did you obtain those?

20 A Right. We obtained them and explained the State
21 Police communications capabilities, our man power and equipment
22 assets to them.

23 Q Colonel, was there any follow-up meeting with
24 Jersey City and/or Hudson County Police Chiefs? Was a
25 liaison established that worked pretty closely?

1 A On June 7 a meeting was held in the office of the
2 Police Chief, Oliver Kelly, Newark Police. The purpose was
3 to discuss plans in the event the State Police called for
4 assistance Present were troop commander of Troop B, Chief
5 Kelly, and again you can have this for the record unless
6 you want me to read the names.

7 Q Colonel, is this the first meeting you had in 1967
8 with the Newark officials?

9 A It is the first time

10 Q Who called that meeting?

11 A We did.

12 Q Could you just briefly tell us what happened at the
13 Newark meeting

14 MR. WACHENFELD: And when it occurred.

15 THE WITNESS: On June 7

16 By Mr Jaffe:

17 Q 1967?

18 A Right

19 Q What happened there?

20 A I will read the minutes. "Chief Kelly of Newark
21 took into account the possibility of three forthcoming
22 meetings in Newark -- June 12, the Medical Center Site
23 hearing; June 27, the Board of Education hearing, and July
24 20 to 23, the National Conference of Black Power. He advised
25 that Deputy Chief Redden would be in charge of the uniformed

1 personnel during the street disorders. Chief Kelly
2 questioned Captain McElroy on the State Police on the
3 procedure in establishing requests for State Police assistance
4 The State Police explained the governing body must make the
5 request of the Governor. The chief said that he didn't
6 know what person in authority in his municipality should
7 make the request. He said the municipal attorney would
8 interpret 53:2-1 to decide."

9 Q Were you at that meeting?

10 A No. That was Captain McElroy of B Troop. He
11 discussed the background of State Police activities during
12 disorders in Englewood and Paterson when troopers were
13 mobilized. As a result, plans were drawn up for assembly
14 points and plans were established for municipalities. We
15 stated then that the National Guard Armory was preferred
16 over the police station due to the facilities.

17 The State Police and Chief Kelly discussed the area of
18 communication concerning a command post. We were told to
19 contact a Captain Spiesak, Newark Police Department, to make
20 arrangements for communication.

21 Q Was that done, do you know? Was that contact made?

22 A Yes. We did that.

23 Q At that meeting was there a general exchange of
24 information between the Newark Police Department and the
25 State Police as to what their plans were for handling civil

1 disturbances?

2 A Our captain introduced Detective Goch and requested
3 intelligence information be forwarded to him on the Newark
4 situation. We weren't getting too much out of Newark in
5 terms of intelligence. Maybe we were getting all we had --
6 I don't know -- but we were not getting too much.

7 Q What I am driving at, was there a discussion with
8 the Newark authorities as to the plan they would use if a
9 civil disturbance occurred?

10 A I don't think so because we never did have a plan
11 for Newark as to the type and kind of formation. They did
12 have the conventional organization for mass control, but I
13 don't think any thought was given to anything other than
14 that

15 Q As a result of that meeting in Chief Kelly's office
16 were there any other meetings, follow-up meetings prior to
17 the riots in Newark this summer, any other Newark meetings
18 between State Police and the local police force?

19 A Not that I can recall. As I say now, the troop
20 commander has the responsibility for close association and
21 liaison with the municipality, and it is entirely possible.
22 I know there were telephone conversations and communications
23 back and forth.

24 Q What is the name of the troop commander?

25 A Captain McElroy.



1 Q Captain McElroy will be available to the committee?

2 A Yes. I see we have here the minutes of the National
3 Guard-State Police meetings, and we had them on the 17th,
4 18th and 19th of May.

5 Q Before we get back to that, I want to finish up
6 the Newark relationship. Were there any other meetings
7 between State Police and the Newark authorities between the
8 period January 1, 1967 and up until the riot in July of
9 1967 other than the meeting referred to in your minutes,
10 official meetings, to the best of your recollection?

11 A There were meetings on the lower echelon level, in
12 the communications level and in the telephone level and in
13 the armory level, but not on the major levels, not on
14 command levels

15 Q What do you say, Colonel, was the major purpose of
16 the June meeting you referred to between the Newark officials
17 and the State Police?

18 A Say that again.

19 Q What was the major purpose of the meeting in June
20 of 1967 between the Newark officials and the State Police?

21 A To prepare primarily the State Police -- I am
22 talking personally now -- prepare our organization in the
23 event there was a disorder in Newark and what we could do
24 because if something did happen, the State Police had the
25 prime role of moving in first. We felt we should be

1 prepared. This is why we went to Newark. Prior to this
2 there was not too much communication between Newark and the
3 State Police.

4 Q Were there discussions then or subsequent as to
5 the type of radio frequencies you would use and the type
6 of communication facilities?

7 A Newark gave us their frequency and we, of course,
8 gave Newark our frequencies.

9 Q At that point?

10 A Yes. Of course, that is all on the survey, too.
11 We knew their frequencies.

12 Q What kind of concrete steps were taken to mesh the
13 frequencies?

14 A There isn't anything you can do about meshing
15 frequencies. You have them or you don't have them.

16 Q Let me ask you as a layman, Colonel on a State
17 Police frequency can you communicate with the Newark Police
18 on their frequency?

19 A No. What we have to do is put a State Police
20 radio in there and monitor it and they have to do that.

21 Q Was this done in Newark? Were State Police
22 frequencies put in Newark police cars?

23 A You can't do this. What we did, we tested all
24 our radio and communications equipment and the National
25 Guard equipment from the Roseville Armory, and this is



1 when we learned that our walkie-talkies needed a relay
2 station We established a relay station in the Martlandt
3 Medical Center

4 Q When was this done?

5 A This is the Communications Section report. At the
6 request of Major Olaff recommendations were developed
7 following meetings, studies and inspection of the facilities
8 at Newark on June 27 through June 29. An inspection of the
9 Roseville Armory established the authority as a location and
10 command post. The armory has adequate facilities for
11 quartering personnel over an extended period of time.

12 Q This is a State Police report?

13 A This is our report

14 Q The purpose of that report is an inventory for
15 State Police purposes?

16 A We established telephone communications, and we
17 had direct lines from the Roseville Armory We established
18 a press line at the Roseville Armory, and we established a
19 hot line direct from room 201 A of the Newark Police
20 Department to our command post at the Roseville Armory.
21 These phones were installed on June 27 and were operational.

22 For security purposes the phones have been placed in
23 a metal chest at the command post and locked. They are the
24 pull-out type thing. The plugs are in. All we do is plug
25 them in we are in business.



1 We had to have direct hot lines, and we had to have
2 outside lines.

3 A radio survey of the City of Newark disclosed that
4 neither the police headquarters building nor the armory
5 could receive handy walkie-talkie transmission from every
6 point in the city.

7 Q It could not?

8 A No. It was necessary to establish a monitoring
9 position from which transmission could be received from our
10 walkie-talkies and radio contact could be maintained in the
11 armory and with the Newark police. The monitoring position
12 is located on the fourteenth floor of the Martlandt Hospital,
13 65 Bergen Street, Newark. Admission is gained by the
14 elevator. The key is in our headquarters for this room.
15 This location also serves as a monitoring position for the
16 Newark Police Department radio and affords an excellent
17 view of the entire City of Newark. We established this.
18 We found our walkie-talkies couldn't transmit throughout
19 the city without a high vantage point.

20 Q When you talk about transmitting on a walkie-talkie,
21 would your walkie-talkies be able to be used by local police?

22 A No.

23 Q They would have to have the same type and kind of
24 frequency before they could pick it up?

25 A Right. I don't know how many walkie-talkies they



1 have. It is revealed in the survey We are on an internal
2 frequency We have a high frequency for our walkie-talkie
3 and a low frequency for our cars. If you are going to get
4 technical, I can't answer you.

5 MR. GIBBONS: Is the technical information
6 on these frequencies contained in the volume of
7 the President's Commission On Crime in the
8 administration of justice dealing with technical
9 police problems?

10 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you said.

11 MR. GIBBONS: There is one whole volume
12 dealing with technical devices.

13 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: The difference is
14 their radio is on a different frequency and you
15 can't interchange, you can't call.

16 By Mr Jaffe:

17 Q That is the question I have.

18 A Let me give you some lay language The problem
19 in police work today is that there are too many frequencies,
20 too many municipalities having their own frequency. A little
21 town has two frequencies or three frequencies that they
22 don't even use. Newark is limited to one frequency and
23 should have about six or seven.

24 The frequency is tied up through some complicated
25 FCC regulation wherein this is regulated by the spectrum



1 which runs 44 to 60 megacycles as the spectrum for police
2 and something else would be for commercial and something
3 else for something else.

4 But we find there are not enough police frequencies
5 We have five, which are not enough. We need at least ten,
6 but we can't get them because they are controlled by the FCC.
7 The smaller municipalities may have two and probably never
8 use them, maybe make two transmissions in the course of a
9 day. Newark needs more frequencies, I understand.

10 But we cannot communicate on the Newark frequency.
11 We have our own frequencies

12 Q That is really the question I wanted to ask you.
13 As a result of even after you put your transmitter up in
14 Martlandt Medical Center, the purpose of that survey and
15 improving your communications in Newark in June was to
16 enable the State Police to more effectively function in
17 Newark; it was not to establish an integrated communications
18 facility between Newark and the State Police because that
19 could not be done?

20 A No. The only way we did it, we had a Newark radio
21 at our command post and he had to transmit to the Newark
22 cars.

23 Q Was that Newark radio at your command post to be
24 operated by a State Policeman or a Newark Policeman?

25 A Newark.

1 Q So that would be the only way in which State Police
2 command instructions could be gotten to the Newark Police,
3 through the Newark operator in the Martlandt Center?

4 A No. He had a relay station in the Martlandt
5 Center and at our command post in the Roseville Armory and
6 their police headquarters communications center We are
7 talking about three physical communications there, but
8 through their system.

9 Q In any of the six large municipalities in this
10 State is there any integrated communications between the
11 State Police and the local police?

12 A No Only right now there are three county systems,
13 Union County being one, Monmouth County being one, and we
14 can go through the county system and get to a municipality,
15 but direct State Police to a municipality, no One of the
16 reports at the Jersey City meeting shows this was one of
17 things we mentioned. We wanted a centralization of
18 communications so the state could communicate with all
19 municipalities at one time if necessary.

20 Q Has that been done?

21 A No, but we have made a survey and we are working
22 on this and we have recommendations made for this.

23 Off the record.

24 (Discussion off the record.)

25 MR. GIBBONS: The Colonel is indicating the



1 reasons, some of the reasons why they haven't
2 been able to achieve an integrated statewide
3 communications system, and I would like to have
4 him explore that further.

5 THE WITNESS: There seems to be a reluctance
6 on the part of the municipality to relinquish the
7 frequencies that they do have now in that they
8 feel they should maintain their own sovereignty,
9 integrity, there is a reluctance on their part
10 to want to be part of the statewide system.

11 We have advocated this, and I have this
12 recorded in the minutes in Jersey City, and we
13 have made a survey in the State Police and we
14 have made recommendations. We are going to go
15 through and request funds for a communications
16 system that will envelop the whole state

17 MR. GIBBONS: There is no legislative means
18 now whereby the State Police could step in and
19 regulate this?

20 THE WITNESS: No. To repeat what I said,
21 the frequencies are controlled by the federal
22 government, and no matter what legislation they
23 did have in the state, they could not give us
24 frequencies.

25 By Mr. Jaffe:



1 Q It seems to me, Colonel, one of the problems that
2 is developed as we listen to you testify is that fact that
3 the State Police has a very major responsibility pursuant
4 to the Governor's direction when a civil disturbance has
5 reached the proportions in which a local municipality
6 cannot handle it. In order to meet that responsibility is
7 it realistic for the State Police to not have an integrated
8 communications facility with the local municipality? Does
9 that hamper your work?

10 A It certainly hampers our work.

11 Q Could you describe how it would hamper it, please?

12 A We need direct communications; we need on-the-ground
13 communications with the municipality that we are working
14 with. We need person-to-person communications for
15 supervision, direction and control, and we must have this
16 type of communication.

17 Q Without that type of integrated communications
18 wouldn't you say the role of the State Police and the local
19 municipality in coordinating and containing a civil
20 disturbance is much more difficult?

21 A Oh, certainly.

22 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: It goes further. It is
23 almost impossible, isn't it?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes.

25 By Mr. Jaffe:

1 Q Mr Gibbons discussed a question of legislation.
2 Couldn't it also be done physically by physically placing
3 radios or some types of transmitters in there? Isn't there
4 a means of doing it?

5 A Physically this is what we did do. We established
6 communications between the National Guard, the State Police
7 and the Newark Police by physically locating individual
8 radios, the Newark radio, the State Police radio and the
9 National Guard radio. These three communicators sat next
10 to one another in the operational control of this whole
11 phase. If something came in over the Newark network, it
12 was conveyed to the National Guard and State Police.

13 Q Is there any way that could be done on a common
14 frequency?

15 A Presently, no, and this is what we are advocating,
16 that there should be some way and some common frequency
17 throughout the state for all police agencies in the event
18 there is anything of a disorder.

19 Q How are you advocating it? Is there anything the
20 Committee could do in that area?

21 A Get us money. That is all we need.

22 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Some of these questions
23 are loaded because you come under the jurisdiction
24 of the Attorney General strictly, and many of these
25 questions relate to legal and legislative problems



1 that really do not come within your purview, is
2 that correct?

3 THE WITNESS: I don't think it is a question
4 of legislation; I think it is a question of, again,
5 federal legislation on control of the frequency

6 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Suppose you had the
7 frequency As the law presently reads and as the
8 Attorney General's Office is organized, you couldn't
9 move in there and put up a radio anyhow.

10 THE WITNESS: We couldn't demand a municipality
11 to take upon itself the buying of the equipment
12 or the radio

13 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let's say tomorrow the
14 FCC says okay and someone says, "Here is the money."
15 You still couldn't do it?

16 THE WITNESS: We could get it, but we couldn't
17 get the municipality to accept it.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Nor have you any
19 authority for requiring that the local municipalities
20 have equipment which could contain this because
21 there are dozens of radios?

22 THE WITNESS: With different agencies. We
23 have RCA, Motorola, et cetera.

24 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: In other words, the
25 State Police can't say standardize or have one unit



1 for standardization, and "we now have the FCC
2 permission. We now have the money and we direct
3 you to standardize," and the state contributes
4 or you contribute part?

5 THE WITNESS: This would take legislation.

6 By Mr. Jaffe:

7 Q My question really was whether or not it was
8 technically feasible to do it

9 A I have made surveys, and it is technically feasible
10 to do it. The surveys we had made are that we want to go
11 video in addition to audio, and we have the capability
12 within the state, that this would be on the microwave, and
13 this has already been established for us by the Turnpike
14 and Parkway systems. This is entirely possible.

15 We have had people in to conduct surveys in this area,
16 and it could be a common frequency. It could be an
17 educational channel, too.

18 MR. GIBBONS: You mentioned earlier an
19 exchange of intelligence between the municipalities
20 and the State Police. Is there a statewide
21 telecommunications system between --

22 THE WITNESS: The State Police controls the
23 teletype system.

24 MR. GIBBONS: So you are into every police
25 department?



1 THE WITNESS: Into every police department
2 that has a system. There are 467 municipalities
3 but only 200 and some have a teletype system.
4 Major municipalities do have the teletype system,
5 but they do not have sending equipment They only
6 have receiving equipment The only sending
7 equipment they do have would be in Newark to
8 transmit internally. When they receive a message
9 from us, they would transmit to their precincts

10 MR. GIBBONS: So there is no wire communication
11 except phone, but no teletype communication to
12 Newark from the State Police?

13 THE WITNESS: The telephone, and we put it
14 on the teletype This we are trying to overcome,
15 too. We are trying to overcome this whole system
16 of communication I think we made some inroads
17 indirectly with the uniform crime reporting system
18 wherein all municipalities must report quarterly
19 to the State Police on the activities. We developed
20 the format, the forms, the whole bit

21 In addition to that, we have seven men who do
22 nothing but visit municipalities and assist them
23 in making out these reports

24 MR. GIBBONS: Will that eventually lead to a
25 wire reporting network statewide?

1 THE WITNESS: Right. It is up to us to give
2 the information so that they can evaluate this
3 information comparatively for their use in criminal
4 work or any work. As of now the only central
5 agency for intelligence since January of this year
6 is in terms of uniform crime reporting, which is
7 a quarterly report, but they do not submit them
8 monthly

9 MR. GIBBONS: But that is only on the incidents;
10 it is not really intelligence of the type you want?

11 THE WITNESS: It is not the type of intelligence
12 you are talking about. It is things that happened,
13 not things that are going to happen.

14 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let's take the mythical
15 city of Bridgewater, and they have a riot situation
16 and elect not to call the State Police no matter
17 how serious it gets, for whatever internal reasons
18 they have. Could you move in?

19 THE WITNESS: By law, no

20 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: You could come up to
21 the boundaries of the town and the mayor comes to
22 the boundary and says, "Stop. We didn't send for
23 you. We don't want you." What will happen under
24 the present law and under the present regulations?

25 THE WITNESS: This now is one of those things

1 we kicked around many times in the legal opinion
 2 as to the real interpretation of Title 53, and
 3 the State Police is not to be used as a posse
 4 Whatever a posse means in legal terms, that is your
 5 problem. That is the language of the law

6 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Whatever language you
 7 use, could you come up to the boundaries of the
 8 city and the city officials say, "We don't want
 9 you in, but could you under the law say, "We have
 10 information this is out of hand and you can't
 11 control it We are moving in"?

12 THE WITNESS: Let me go around to the back
 13 door and answer you We have observers in
 14 Bridgewater whether they like us or not We would
 15 be there. We would send back information and in
 16 turn I would convey this to the Governor. I think
 17 in turn he would say yes or no, whether we could
 18 go in or not.

19 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let's forget the
 20 Governor He is the ultimate authority. Let's
 21 have a situation in this mythical town of Bridgewater
 22 and your observers tell you this is pretty serious
 23 and the forty-man police force can't handle it.
 24 The Bridgewater authorities say, "Stop." Could
 25 you within the framework of the Attorney General's

1 authority -- he is the cabinet officer, without
2 relying on the overall emergency powers of the
3 Governor -- could you and Attorney General Sills
4 come up to the border and say, "You can't handle
5 it We are moving in," without the Governor's
6 order?

7 THE WITNESS: I doubt very much whether I
8 would have the authority to mass troopers and move
9 them in The troopers that were in the geographic
10 location of that town that pass through there
11 normally that do that type of work, I would assume
12 they would take action

13 MR. WACHENEELD: Even if you did doubt your
14 authority under those circumstances as related by
15 Mr Brown, would you go in?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let's take Bridgewater
18 in a situation that has already happened there.
19 The police don't want you in for reasons that may
20 relate to the feeling that they don't want the
21 common radio. They have certain situations they
22 don't want you to know about.

23 THE WITNESS: This is not uncommon

24 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is why I am using
25 a mythical city I think it happens in all of the

1 towns and boroughs They say the don't want you
2 down on X Street because that is where the horse
3 parlors are. What do you do then? You can't do
4 a thing, can you?

5 THE WITNESS: No, sir. If you are talking
6 about the criminal aspect, the prosecutor can
7 request and we send them in. If you are talking
8 disorders, this is something different

9 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: I am talking disorders.

10 MR. WACHENFELD: If you add to that a direction
11 by the Governor, you would go in?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

13 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: I realize he can
14 over ride, but this creates some very serious
15 political situations.

16 THE WITNESS: We know This is what happened
17 in Detroit.

18 MR. WACHENFELD: If you had legislation, the
19 only difference would be he could use his own
20 discretion, but he could accomplish the same thing
21 now and he says he would if he gets a direction from
2 the Governor.

3 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: I am talking about
4 mythical Bridgewater, but we know what happened in
5 Detroit. You went to Detroit Would you agree?

1 THE WITNESS: Right

2 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: I think you could state
3 a similar Bridgewater situation happened there in
4 Detroit. It was a question of authority and who
5 should move in. Would that be correct?

6 THE WITNESS: I don't think this is possible
7 in the state now for a reason that the State Police
8 are in there first. Let me explain why. We don't
9 want the business; we don't need this disorder
10 business. There are other jobs to do besides this.
11 But the problem in Detroit, as I see it -- we have
12 in the State of New Jersey centralization with
13 intelligence and centralization of the command of
14 the National Guard and State Police. This did not
15 happen in Detroit. In Detroit they had five
16 separate commands. They had three brigades of
17 National Guard independently operating, the State
18 Police of Michigan independently operating, and
19 the city police independently operating. There
20 was no centralization of command. Therefore, there
21 was guidance or no guidance or misguidance, and
22 operated independently on their own.

23 But the reason the State Police is first is
24 within the framework of your organization in the
25 National Guard you do not have the capability of

1 intelligence, police intelligence. This is not
2 your makeup. We in the State Police are in the
3 business of intelligence. When the National Guard
4 moved into Detroit, there was no intelligence for
5 them. They didn't know what to do, where to go.
6 This was established in the State of New Jersey
7 I want this as an observation

8 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Is this established by
9 any legislation?

10 THE WITNESS: This is established by the
11 policy of the Governor that the State Police would
12 go first

13 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let's assume the
14 Governor changes in 1968. Is there anything that
15 would give a continuing body of law or direction to
16 your successor, to his successor or to the National
17 Guard, the Department of Defense? Is there
18 anything which is in the law or in regulation
19 which prescribes the kind of coordinated approach
20 which you have said now exists by virtue of your
21 conferences starting in 1965?

22 THE WITNESS: To my knowledge, no sir.

23 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let's assume Colonel
24 Jaffe takes over in 1968 and says, "I am not going
25 to follow that." What happens then? It is gone.

1 THE WITNESS: Right

2 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: What we have here is
3 really a liaison and cooperation, a pattern which
4 you yourself have created by exercising your
5 indirect supervision.

6 MR. WACHENFELD: You mean it is gone if a
7 new administration doesn't endorse it?

8 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: That is what I mean.
9 There is no law to require that such a thing
10 happen. There is no framework or regulation of
11 law which requires and establishes the procedure
12 such as you have outlined, and in Detroit you said
13 it didn't exist but it could exist here if you had
14 a change of personnel. If the Kellys go, the
15 Governor goes, if Cantwell goes, you may have the
16 same situation.

17 THE WITNESS: Could be. Because of my military
18 background I realize how inadequate the intelligence
19 for the National Guard is in that you are not in
20 the business.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: You hold a brigadier
22 general's slot in the reserve?

23 THE WITNESS: Yes.

24 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: So if a man comes in who
25 is not a brigadier general in the reserve, you may

1 very well not have the understanding and cooperation
2 with the military?

3 THE WITNESS: It is possible

4 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: What we had here was a
5 brigadier and a major general of the Department of
6 Defense working out a coordinated plan which in
7 part was due to the fact of your military
8 background.

9 THE WITNESS: This is possible

10 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: So if something happens
11 to you, we don't even have this conceivably

12 THE WITNESS: Right

13 MR. WACHENFELD: You mean look at the results
14 we got under those favorable conditions. What
15 might we get under unfavorable conditions?

16 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: God help us

17 By Mr. Jaffe:

18 Q Were there any other meetings between the State
19 Police and the local police force in Englewood in 1967 prior
20 to the civil disturbances in July?

21 A I don't have this, but the troop commander, again
22 McElroy, was in Englewood and we talked with the Englewood
23 Police Department and Paterson.

24 Q What about Plainfield? Were there meetings in
25 Plainfield?

1 A No We had surveys but never had any meetings
2 with the police officials as such. Maybe he was part of
3 the meeting, but I don't think that specifically Plainfield
4 was --

5 Q What about Camden or Atlantic City?

6 A Atlantic City is a continual thing We have been
7 in there since 1964 since the convention

8 Q There has been a continuing liaison?

9 A Yes

10 Q And a continuing preparation for possible civil
11 disturbances?

12 A Not only for civil disturbances. It seems since
13 the 1964 convention the President has been in and out
14 several times, and as such we have established relations
15 with the local police department and with the communities.
16 We are pretty well oriented in terms of communications.

17 Q What about Camden, did you have any prior preparation
18 with the local officials in Camden in 1967?

19 A We had meetings where the troop commander went to
20 Camden and established what they had through the survey,
21 established some sort of rapport with these people. Again
22 this is a major city, and we may or may not be accepted.
23 We have plans for Camden. Whether they have plans or not
24 I don't know.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: You never had anything

1 similar in Camden to your meeting with Jersey City
2 and Newark in June of 1967?

3 THE WITNESS: No. Only the troop commander,
4 the same relationship in Camden with the troop
5 commander and with the commander in Englewood and
6 Paterson. Although we are very suspicious of
7 Camden all the time.

8 By Mr. Jaffe:

9 Q Would you characterize your prior riot preparation
10 meetings by saying the meetings with the officials were the
11 most in depth and most meaningful, or is that an unfair
12 characterization?

13 A If we are talking comparatively --

14 Q Compared to the meetings you have had with other
15 local municipalities

16 A I think that was the most fruitful meeting, the
17 one we had in Jersey City where we brought in the major
18 municipalities

19 Q Is it really a very meaningful way of setting forth
20 specific plans and meeting the problems logistics through
21 these meetings? Has that accomplished the basic purpose of
22 providing a smooth road ahead if the State Police have to
23 move in?

24 A Primarily this is what we did it for. We have to
25 know what we are doing, and we wanted to find out what the

1 physical facilities are or were in a particular municipality.
2 We want to know what their communications are, who their
3 commanders are. Primarily we did this.

4 Remember, we have absolutely no control and we cannot
5 dictate to a municipality. We can't tell a municipality to
6 do anything. If we could say to Jersey City, "We want you
7 to do this," and they say, "You get out of here," there is
8 nothing we can do about this. We can only suggest and
9 recommend.

10 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: We will take a ten-
11 minute recess and run until twelve-thirty.

12 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

13 By Mr. Jaffe:

14 Q Colonel, one more question on the liaison I didn't
15 put in. Could you tell us if you established any liaison
16 with the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other
17 federal agencies in you pre-riot planning?

18 A Yes. We have pretty good working relationships
19 with the FBI now, and we did establish communications in
20 the intelligence area. The federal agencies do not have
21 a function in this particular area. As such there wasn't
22 much they could do other than give us information on the
23 criminal element concerned.

24 Q Would you say the primary role of the Bureau has
25 been as a gathering source on intelligence which they



1 transmitted to you?

2 A In the criminal field.

3 Q Not in the riot area?

4 A No.

5 Q Were there any other federal agencies that were
6 active with you in the pre-riot planning?

7 A No, sir.

8 Q Did you do any work with the Community Relations
9 Service of the United States Department of Justice?

10 A My relationship was on a personal relationship
11 with the United States Attorney, and it is through his
12 agency we would have communications

13 Q But none of this was prior riot planning?

14 A No.

15 Q Colonel, bringing your testimony up until the
16 riots in Newark, you have described for us your June, 1967
17 meeting and the July 3, 1967 communications set up in
18 Newark. Could you tell us the first indication you had as
19 commander of the State Police of a possible disturbance in
20 Newark in July of 1967?

21 A We had nothing firm on the City of Newark or any
22 other city, but as the intelligence built up and the
23 incidents were accumulated we had the feeling of a disturbance
24 or disorder.

25 Q When you say incidents, what do you mean by incidents?

1 Are you talking about incidents with civil rights overtones?

2 A Right Aggressiveness on the part of police,
3 civilians or both, reports of incidents where there were
4 reports of police brutality and reports of aggressiveness
5 on the people that were arrested. These things seemed to
6 be building up in this Newark area. If we are talking about
7 the Jersey City area, we had reports of the Moslem meetings
8 and their aggressiveness, overtones in this direction. This
9 gave us the feeling of possible disorder.

10 Q What period of time are we talking about?

11 A The period of June, 1967

12 Q Could you tell me what happened as this began to
13 build up? What did you do and what then happened?

14 A I thought I went through that We updated all of
15 our orders in State Police We then updated our mobilization
16 on our alert plan on our recall system. We put the troops
17 on a standby and we kept constant contact --

18 Q When were the troops put on standby, what date?

19 A The latter part of June. Our mobilization plan
20 was tested. Our recall system was tested.

21 Q In the latter part of June?

22 A Right

23 Q How did it work?

24 A We found that on our first test we had a 95 percent
25 efficiency, which we felt was pretty good, contacting people,

1 getting people in telephone conversation and some reporting.
2 We found that it was effective. We realized we were not
3 going to contact one hundred percent of the people, but we
4 found it was ninety-five percent effective.

5 We maintained practically constant liaison in the
6 City of Newark in that we had our investigators or observers
7 in Newark with the Newark Police Department. We worked
8 with the captain of their Community Affairs Division in
9 Newark. Our human relations people or community relations
10 people on the State Police were in constant touch with the
11 Newark Police Department.

12 The information we had was we were getting the
13 newsprints, periodicals, things like that that were coming
14 up, how to make Molotov cocktails and such stuff as this.
15 This kind of engendered a little excitement on our part
16 as to possible disturbance. The reaction we got from the
17 City of Newark was everything was under control and they
18 could contain and handle any situation.

19 Q When you say the reaction you got from the City of
20 Newark, could you be specific as to what individuals you
21 are referring to?

22 A Yes. I spoke with the police director.

23 Q Who is that?

24 A Spina.

25 Q What is his first name?

1 A Dominic.

2 Q Could you tell us when you spoke to him?

3 A This was not a formal meeting, but it was sometime
4 in June, 1967 I met him and he said, "We have things
5 under control."

6 Q What is it that you told him?

7 A I asked specifically if he expected any trouble
8 during the summer, and he said if there was trouble, it
9 would be under control and they could handle it. This was
10 the impression from my observers up there, that the higher
11 echelon of the government agencies was under the impression
12 they could control this.

13 Q When you refer to the higher governmental echelon,
14 you mean the mayor and his cabinet?

15 A I would assume. This is what my report was,
16 people in authority

17 MR. LOFTON: Colonel, just so that I
18 understand the reaction you are indicating the
19 police director gave to the information that you
20 communicated to him about the possibility of
21 disturbance erupting, were you suggesting to the
22 police director that certain special kinds of
23 procedures be inaugurated as a result of the
24 intelligence information that you had that the
25 police director did not feel was necessary because

1 he thought a civil disturbance would not break out?
2 Is that what you are saying?

3 THE WITNESS: I am saying in effect that I
4 personally felt from my information that there
5 could be or would be a disorder in Newark. He
6 didn't seem to feel so, and as such there wasn't
7 need for too much State Police cooperation in this
8 particular area. This did not take place in the
9 lower echelon with the chief and with the acting
10 chief and other people

11 MR. LOFTON: But with the police director?

12 THE WITNESS: But with the police director
13 He felt he could contain or take care of the
14 situation. The other people in the operational
15 end, Chief Kelly, Redden, Foley, they were under
16 the impression that there would be some problems
17 and they were making plans for it and it was done
18 on a cooperative basis. The only operational
19 planning that we have with the City of Newark was
20 done through the chief of police and that level

21 MR. LOFTON: There was during this period a
22 constant feeding of intelligence information on
23 the lower echelon into the Newark Police Department?

24 THE WITNESS: Right.

25 MR. LOFTON: Could you tell me how the

1 picture then develops as we get into July from the
2 State Police viewpoint, standpoint?

3 THE WITNESS: Do you want to take it up to
4 Wednesday night before the incident? I refer now
5 to the State Police logs. I will give you the logs
6 we have with reference to the night of July 12,
7 which is the night preceding the riot, wherein our
8 observers were in Newark and sending back reports

9 MR. JAFFE: Just for the record Committee
10 Exhibit 8 will be the logs of the State Police of
11 July 12

12 (EXHIBIT NO C-8 WAS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.)

13 THE WITNESS: On July 12 our logs revealed
14 that there was a situation created by an arrest of
15 a taxicab driver wherein there was a disorder or a
16 disturbance within the city and primarily within
17 the area of the Fourth Precinct At that time our
18 State Police reporters expected that there would be
19 trouble, and there was trouble, but this was
20 contained and the thing tapered off at about
21 two-thirty in the morning There was no request
22 for State Police at that time.

23 By Mr Jaffe:

24 Q Were any of your observers present at the Fourth
25 Precinct where the cab driver was taken?



1 A I don't think so. I think our observers at that
2 time were in the police headquarters

3 Q Police headquarters in Newark?

4 A Right

5 Q How many observers did you have?

6 A There are two on duty at all times

7 Q Could we have their names for the record?

8 A I will quote from our State Police log at Trenton,
9 the entry at 1:50 a.m. on 6/13: "Deputy Chief Redden of
10 Newark P.D. contacted State Police, Morristown, reference
11 looting, window breaking and use of Molotov cocktails in
12 the Fourth Precinct and racial disturbance

13 "1:57 a.m. a teletype message from Morristown. Trooper
14 Longo of our turnpike called reference a disturbance in
15 the Fourth Precinct. Lieutenant Palacia, Newark Police
16 Department, advised him it was under control and localized
17 by the Newark Police Department. The Newark P.D. was being
18 recalled "

19 The 2:45 entry reads: "Lieutenant Pepe, State Police,
20 Morristown, states that he had been in contact with Chief
21 Redden and the situation is simmering. Two plainclothes
22 personnel, Investigator Debuist and Investigator Steckel in
23 Newark as a surveillance team. Captain McElroy has assigned
24 Lieutenant Mount to interview Acting Chief Foley in the A.M.
25 No assistance requested at this time."

1 Q That is a log prepared by your two observers?

2 A This is a log prepared at our police headquarters.
3 The observers make reports of their own. This log is as it
4 is reported to us by teletype or telephone to the duty
5 officer in Trenton.

6 Q Would it be proper for your State Police observers
7 to have gone to the Fourth Precinct Station House that night?

8 A Right They probably were, too, if I recall this

9 "3:55 a.m. phoned Deputy Chief Redden. He advised
10 that a minor motor vehicle incident (cab following too
11 close to a police car) and arrest was made Fight broke
12 out about 9:30 to 10:30 p.m. at midnight a large group
13 descended on the Fourth Precinct across from the Hayes
14 project, stoned police cars, buildings and the police;
15 looted stores along Belmont and Seventeenth and Springfield
16 Avenue Cab drivers formed a motorcade and there were 30
17 or 40 cabs loaded with people, they drove to City Hall.
18 Several arrests were made and the group disbursed. Several
19 incidents occurred in the Fifth Precinct Things are
20 quiet now."

21 Q Do you know at this point where your observers
22 are?

23 A Four-ten our duty officer called Detective Trainor
24 to report to Newark Police Department and met with two
25 detectives, Debuist and Steckel, and opened the police

1 emergency room 201 A, which is the State Police room we
2 established the week before.

3 Q Where is that room, in State Police headquarters?

4 A No, in the Newark Police Department, in Newark
5 headquarters.

6 "Trainor will meet with Deputy Chief Foley at Newark
7 Police headquarters, Mulberry, Broad and McKinley Streets.
8 Lieutenant Mount is assigned from Troop B headquarters to
9 proceed to Newark.

10 "Seven-ten in the morning Trainor called and said
11 fifteen arrests were made, ten at the Fourth Precinct, one
12 at the First Precinct. Stores at Fifteenth and Belmont
13 Avenue section all damaged and looted. Entire Fourth
14 Precinct of 180 men on duty. Police car damaged True
15 picture of damage to be made in the A.M."

16 Q Does that report indicate where your observers
17 are?


18 A No, but his report would. This is only a log as
19 he called in.

20 Q And that would be Detective Steckel?

21 A Steckel, Debuist, Trainor and Mount.

22 Q And it would indicate whether or not that report
23 is based on their observations or whether it is based on
24 what the local police had told them?

25 A Right



1 Q Develop the narrative as to what happens with the
2 State Police and how they get involved in Newark.

3 A We are now at 7:45

4 Q What day is this, July 13?

5 A July 13, A.M. Major Olaff called me and we
6 instructed --

7 Q Was this the first time you personally had been
8 called?

9 A No. We are in continual contact I am sorry the
10 telephone company has a phone in my house it rings
11 continually, I think.

12 Q At 7:30 you received a phone call from Major Olaff?

13 A It was all night, regarding the situation, but he
14 said he recalled Captain Gurkin, who was at that time
15 Communications Officer, and he sent up Palma and Ficke to
16 activate the armory post This was 7:45 a.m. that these
17 men were sent up.

18 If I might digress for a second, I want to inject this
19 into the record: Ficke and Palma are two men that we
20 trained to be communicators They are not technical men
21 but communicators.

22 Q What is the distinction?

23 A The distinction is this: These men handle the
24 radio and they must know the operational phase and they
25 must have a true picture all of the time as to what is going

1 on. To give an example, if a report came in from a car
2 that there was a sniper fire in X place, these communicators
3 were to establish, locate, record and control all
4 communication in an emergency like this. They were trained,
5 their job was, as soon as one of these things would come in
6 -- "Okay, calm it. We will take it from here " They would
7 calm the whole situation locally This was their job and
8 no one else was permitted to do this, but these two people,
9 but they had to have operational knowledge of the whole
10 situation. They had to know where the Newark police,
11 State Police and National Guard were. They operated from
12 maps, and the maps I will show you. A report would come in
13 there is looting in such and such a place. He had to know
14 what patrol was in that sector so he could send the patrol
15 to that sector. This was the training of these people
16 They as such are not technical men. They couldn't fix a
17 radio or tear it apart

18 Q Relate that back to the time.

19 A These two men were sent at 7:45 to activate the
20 post.

21 Q Who made that decision?

22 A I did.

23 Q Had there been a request by the Newark authorities
24 for State Police help?

25 A No.

1 Q Had there been a decision by the Governor to send
2 the State Police?

3 A No.

4 Q This was a decision that you made within your
5 discretion?

6 A Right, remembering we are now in an armory which
7 is state property and there is no infringement on the rights
8 of the municipality at all.

9 Q My question is not meant to imply that You just
10 want to set the record straight?

11 A Right There are a lot of phone calls here,
12 sending people to different places. "8:15 a.m., teletype
13 alarm, State Police. To All Troops: Man on standby as of
14 now "

15 Q Who ordered that, you?

16 A Yes

17 Q That was eight o'clock in the morning?

18 A Eight-fifteen.

19 Q What is the next action you took?

20 A Well, during the day, the rest of the day there
21 wasn't much more action other than the reports we did get
22 back from our observers and with regard to the situation in
23 Newark and with regard to association with the Newark
24 police

25 Q That brings us up to the evening of July 13. What

1 then happened?

2 A July 13, 8:35 p.m. This again is from the log.
3 "Acting Chief Foley, Newark, phones reference conditions in
4 Fourth Precinct, Seventeenth and Livingston Avenue, Newark;
5 indicates expected trouble "

6 MR. GIBBONS: What time was that?

7 THE WITNESS: 8:35 p.m.

8 MR. GIBBONS: This is a characterization by
9 Foley, or is this a characterization by the State
10 Police?

11 THE WITNESS: This is Foley. He called
12 reference conditions in the Fourth Precinct

13 MR. GIBBONS: Was that personal call to you?

14 THE WITNESS: This is to the State Police,
15 not to me This is the State Police duty officer

16 MR. GIBBONS: Then what happens?

17 THE WITNESS: At ten-thirty five we had in
18 turn alerted the National Guard that we were in
19 business in Newark.

20 MR. GIBBONS: You did that at 10:35 p.m.?

21 THE WITNESS: No, in the morning. The next
22 entry is 10:30, "Colonel Sharp, New Jersey National
23 Guard, phones from Sea Girt to advise that Colonels
24 Britt, McLean and Boyle of the New Jersey National
25 Guard have been activated and are en route to the

1 Roseville Armory. Newark "

2 MR. GIBBONS: Was this activation of the --

3 THE WITNESS: We notified them. They in turn
4 sent their people up there to be available at the
5 Roseville Armory

6 MR. GIBBONS: This was still done pursuant to
7 your general discretion in this area? The Governor
8 at this point had not acted?

9 THE WITNESS: That's right

10 MR. GIBBONS: Then what happened?

11 THE WITNESS: We were advised that General
12 Cantwell would be available at a certain number in
13 Sea Girt where he was. Conversations between
14 myself, Major Olaff and the Attorney General about
15 the situation

16 MR. GIBBONS: Was the Attorney General in
17 Trenton?

18 THE WITNESS: No, home.

19 MR. GIBBONS: Where were you, home or in
20 State Police headquarters?

21 THE WITNESS: I was not at State Police
22 headquarters. I left there about seven-thirty. I
23 don't know where I was. I was at Camp Kilmer, and
24 I left there.

25 MR. GIBBONS: Major Olaff was in charge of

1 State Police headquarters?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, and he called me reference
3 the Newark situation at ten-forty five. At
4 ten-fifty two Acting Chief Foley called Major Olaff
5 reference Newark situation. Area presently affected
6 on Springfield Avenue between Tenth and Morris
7 Avenue, ten to fifteen blocks affected. Looting
8 and fires

9 MR. GIBBONS: As of 10:50 on the evening of
10 July 13 had you been in communication with the
11 Governor's office?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, through the Attorney
13 General. At 10:51 Attorney General Sills phoned
14 and discussion had weighed the situation with
15 Major Olaff

16 MR. GIBBONS: Had you been in communication
17 with the Attorney General from the evening of
18 July 12 through the morning of July 13 and through
19 the day?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 MR. GIBBONS: You had not been in direct
22 communication with the Governor?

23 THE WITNESS: No

24 MR. GIBBONS: Were you basically informing
25 the Attorney General of the reports you received

1 from your observers?

2 THE WITNESS: Right

3 MR. LOFTON: You indicated in the latter part
4 of June you had a meeting with Director Spina?

5 THE WITNESS: It wasn't a meeting I met him
6 somewhere It was not a formal meeting.

7 MR. LOFTON: But you had a discussion with
8 him based on the intelligence information that
9 you had that something may break out in Newark,
10 and you related the substance of the director's
11 reaction. After the incident of July 12, on that
12 night when they arrested a cab driver when the
13 situation intensified beyond the point where you
14 had the discussion with the director, on July 12
15 did you at anytime communicate with your two
16 observers who were in Newark?

17 THE WITNESS: Right

18 MR. LOFTON: Based on the information they
19 gave you did you then in turn communicate with
20 Director Spina to activate the kind of intensified
21 coordination you had talked about before?

22 THE WITNESS: We had dealt with Acting Chief
23 Foley at the time. I don't know whether the
24 direct was available or not. We dealt with Acting
25 Chief Foley who was in charge of the police department

1 By Mr. Jaffe:

2 Q You didn't have any communication with the mayor
3 of the City of Newark as of 10:50 that evening?

4 A No. There is a sequence I am up to 10:52 I
5 gave you the area affected.

6 "Newark has 400 men committed to duty, of which 250 men
7 are committed to the trouble area. Director Spina presently
8 is in the Fourth Precinct, and there has been no mention
9 of requesting State Police assistance Foley advises that
10 the situation is ten blocks from Irvington and the Irvington
11 P.D. has been notified."

12 "10:53: Division headquarter key personnel recalled
13 to duty " These are the people in our division headquarters
14 that activate the command post, the operational center and
15 the communications That is Acting Chief Foley. "(continu-
16 ing) and requests assistance from Major Olaff. Major Olaff
17 advised Inspector Donnelly that the request will have to
18 come from the governing body through the Governor."

19 Q Was this the first mention as far as you are
20 concerned of a request by the local authorities for State
21 Police activity?

22 A Yes, it was at 10:10

23 Q At ten-ten the night of July 13th, and it was a
24 communication by --

25 A Inspector Donnelly

1 Q Of the Newark Police force, who called Major Olaff
2 to find out the procedure for bringing the State Police in?

3 A Yes

4 Q Was it Major Olaff who handled the call, or was
5 that communicated to you?

6 A He called me in the meantime He instructed
7 Sergeant Bianchini to contact a command post at Newark and
8 advise them to report progress every fifteen minutes. Our
9 people have to send progress reports in.

10 "11:50 Attorney General Sills phones and is given the
11 progress report. Attorney General requests periodic
12 progress. We will comply

13 "12:21, July 14: Lieutenant Mount (had been sent
14 there the night before) phoned while Olaff talks with
15 Attorney General Sills. Major Olaff carries on a dual
16 conference with A.G. Sills and Lieutenant Mount relaying
17 information directly to A.G. as received from Lieutenant
18 Mount Presently bands of eight to fifteen people traveling
19 on foot and in cars looting and starting first. Four
20 policemen injured, four new areas have broken out within
21 the past fifteen minutes. There is still no organization
22 within the Newark Police Department."

23 I don't know whether I should say that, but this is
24 the report in the law office.

25 Q What is meant by "organization"? No organization

1 in terms of riot control?

2 A Within the Newark Police Department I will have
3 to just state that. "All available transportation now in
4 use. The Fourth Precinct appears to be running their own
5 show. There are no barricades. No requests for State
6 Police assistance from Director Spina. Lieutenant Mount
7 now given instruction as to attempt to survey the area and
8 report back immediately.

9 "12:30: Detective Palma phones to call there are
10 seven drivers and six personnel carriers at the Roseville
11 Armory from the National Guard.

12 "12:50: Lieutenant Mount phones and advises that
13 Captain Graff and Detective Pollack, Newark Police Department,
14 and Detective Walker and Skarzinski of our State Police are
15 in the area using State Police Car No 488. Also Newark
16 Police has a vehicle equipped with a public address system
17 traveling through the area advising of a 1:00 a.m. curfew.
18 Looting on South Orange Avenue. Fire on Princeton and
19 Springfield Avenues and report of an alleged shooting
20 involving a woman on Blum Street. Crowds gathering at
21 Broad and Market Streets."

22 Q Were you at home at this point receiving this
23 information?

24 A Right.

25 Q Does this type of information continue through the

1 evening?

2 A The next one is 1:21, and I will excerpt it.

3 Lieutenant Mount is in charge of observation for the State
4 Police in the City of Newark at this point. "Car No. 488
5 cannot get into the Fourth Precinct area. Vehicle is being
6 stoned. Seven or eight large fires within the past half
7 hour Some shooting near Sears & Roebuck. Car 488 reports
8 looting; women and children doing most of the looting
9 Ninety-five percent of the stores on Springfield Avenue are
10 out Cars are overturned on the street

11 "Lieutenant Mount further advised that he has asked
12 Acting Chief Foley reference any request for State Police
13 assistance forthcoming from Newark officials and received
14 a negative reply "

15 Q What time was this?

16 A One-twenty one

17 Q The morning of July 14, 1967?

18 A Right We are now receiving phone calls from
19 people in Springfield Avenue requesting State Police
20 assistance.

21 Q These were from citizens?

22 A Mrs. Ahern, Springfield Avenue phones her father's
23 store broken into and looted; inquired why State Police had
24 not come into the area. Advised Mrs. Ahern that request
25 for State Police assistance must come from the city officials

1 through the Governor, and no request for assistance has
2 been received from Newark at this time.

3 Q Was the Attorney General being constantly informed
4 during this time?

5 A Right.

6 "1:37: Captain McElroy, troop commander, phoned
7 reference receiving request for State Police assistance
8 from Deputy Chief Redden, Newark; request Major Olaff
9 called Deputy Chief Redden in Director Spina's office.

10 "1:40: Major Olaff phones Deputy Chief Redden Chief
11 Redden apologizes to Major Olaff and recites request for
12 assistance, advising that he had been overridden by the
13 Mayor Newark Police Department had selected to ride out
14 night without assistance."

15 Q Is this a conference that occurs between Major
16 Olaff and Chief Redden?

17 A Yes.

18 Q As taken down and put in the log?

19 A Right.

20 "2:00: Lieutenant Mount phoned; no evidence of
21 subsiding; widespread looting; looting on Broad and Market.
22 Mob moving to Broad and Branford; could be curiosity seekers.

23 "2:30: Attorney General Sills phones Olaff. Governor
24 has received a request from Mayor Addonizio for State Police
25 assistance "

1 Q Was that the first information that the State Police
2 had as to whether or not the mayor had been in communication
3 with the Governor? Had the mayor been in communication
4 with the Governor prior to that to your knowledge?

5 A Not to my knowledge.

6 Q To your knowledge had the mayor of the City of
7 Newark been in communication with any state officials
8 concerning the riot?

9 A Not that I know of

10 Q Your knowledge starts at 2:30 in the morning of
11 July 14?

12 A Attorney General phones that the Governor received
13 request from Mayor Addonizio of Newark for State Police
14 assistance Instructed Major Olaff to have Colonel Kelly
15 call Mayor Addonizio at Market 2-5055 and Olaff to call
16 Director Spina."

17 Q Did you make that call, Colonel?

18 A Yes

19 Q Could you tell us what happened when you made the
20 call?

21 A I called and I spoke to the mayor and --

22 Q Would you tell us the substance of that call?

23 A I told the mayor that I had people on duty in
24 Newark and that until I got there I wished that he would
25 communicate directly with them and Lieutenant Mount. I

1 asked him if he had a specific request or requirements His
2 reply was that the whole city is gone.

3 Q The mayor said that to you?

4 A Yes I said I would be there in a half hour and
5 that just about ended the conversation

6 Q Did you discuss with the mayor in that short
7 conversation any question of command structure, responsibility?

8 A No, no

9 Q Anything of that nature?

10 A No.

11 Q You have given us basically the substance of your
12 conversation?

13 A Right I said I would be there within a half hour

14 Q Then what happened? Had Major Olaff meanwhile
15 communicated with Director Spina?

16 A "2:37: Called Director Spina and line busy 2:39
17 Major Olaff calls Director Spina. He answered phone at
18 2:43. Arrangements completed to meet Director Spina at the
19 Roseville Armory to discuss the mission," he to discuss the
20 mission with him.

21 Q Do you know what the contents of that discussion
22 were?

23 A No I know generally

24 Q Could you tell us generally to the best of your
25 recollection?



1 A About our pre-arranged plans where the State Police
2 assembly area would be, where we are going and we will be at
3 the Roseville Armory, which was our assembly area No. 1,
4 and we will be there to discuss further plans with Director
5 Spina.

6 Q After your conversation with the mayor, what did
7 you do?

8 A I got dressed and went to Newark. I got to
9 Newark approximately in a half hour by the turnpike.

10 Q About three-thirty in the morning now?

11 A I think it was earlier than that. I have forgotten
12 the time This is logged, too.

13 Q Somewhere around three in the morning?

14 A That is a good number. Probably around there
15 I spoke with him and at four-twelve he was at the armory.
16 I was at the police headquarters -- I don't know whether
17 police headquarters or city hall, whether they are both
18 the same or not.

19 MR. GIBBONS: City Hall is on Broad Street
20 and the police department is immediately in back
21 of it

22 THE WITNESS: I think I was immediately in
23 back of it. It seems to me I was in Director Spina's
24 office, but he wasn't there. The mayor was there
25 and other people

1 MR. GIBBONS: Who was with you?

2 THE WITNESS: Just the driver, a lieutenant
3 who lives only a block from me. We met the mayor,
4 and I asked him what the situation was. He said,
5 "It is all gone, the whole town is gone." I asked
6 him where the problem was. He said, "It is all
7 over." I asked him if he had any idea of the
8 instigators or trouble makers or what we should
9 look for. He didn't know.

10 MR. GIBBONS: Who was with the mayor? Do
11 you recall?

12 THE WITNESS: Melifonte. The other faces I
13 don't know.

14 MR. GIBBONS: Was Norman Schiff there, the
15 grey haired city attorney?

16 THE WITNESS: I remember Melifonte because he
17 was talking.

18 MR. GIBBONS: How long was your discussion
19 with the mayor?

20 THE WITNESS: I would say ten minutes, fifteen
21 minutes.

22 MR. GIBBONS: Did the mayor have any
23 instructions for you?

24 THE WITNESS: Nothing.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Did the mayor have any

1 specific idea of where the crucial areas were?

2 THE WITNESS: If he did, he didn't say it to

3 me

4 By Mr. Jaffe:

5 Q Did he have any specific request for the State
6 Police?

7 A No.

8 Q Did the mayor give you a general order?

9 A The mayor gave me nothing. He gave me no orders
10 nor did I take any

11 Q Any requests?

12 A Nothing

13 Q What did you do after you left the mayor's armory?

14 A I went to the Roseville Armory.

15 Q Did you tell the mayor what you planned on doing?

16 A No.

17 Q What did you do when you got to the armory?

18 A I waited for our people to come in and as they came
19 in at that time, they were coming in piecemeal and the
20 orders were to come in and bring as many cars as possible,
21 one-man, two-man to a car because we needed the transportation.
22 As the cars were coming in, we met in the Roseville Armory
23 and as we got missions that came across, we sent them out.

24 Q What time had the orders gone out to your force --
25 there had been a standby issued a few weeks before. What

1 time specifically was your force mobilized?

2 A Three-fifteen after our conversation with General
3 Cantwell

4 Q Are you talking about the morning of July 14?

5 A July 14. At least 1,000 men would be available,
6 two battalions to be activated immediately. The rendezvous
7 set was for the Roseville Armory. This is our conversation
8 with General Cantwell Three-thirty, Troop A.

9 Q Your phone call to General Cantwell is after the
10 phone call you received from the Attorney General?

11 A Right.

12 Q Was it prior to the phone call to the mayor or
13 subsequent to it?

14 A Two-thirty I called the mayor and Olaff called Spina.

15 Q The call to Cantwell was after that?

16 A Right, to discuss the mission. The National Guard
17 was activated. This was the word at two-forty five. Olaff
18 called Morven to give General Cantwell's phone number to the
19 Governor, and the Governor then activated the National Guard
20 personally at that time At three-fifteen he discussed the
21 thousand men he would have available, two battalions. The
22 State Police was activated immediately. Three-thirty Troop
23 A, our farthest station, was activated and the teletype
24 message went out simultaneously to all the troops.

25 Q So your force was mobilized at three-thirty that

1 morning?

2 A Right

3 Q You arrived at the Roseville Armory approximately
4 four or four-thirty?

5 A Right.

6 Q Was General Cantwell there yet?

7 A No

8 Q Who represented the National Guard?

9 A Colonel Sharp. "Three-thirty five a.m. Colonel
10 Sharp, National Guard, phones and requests transportation
11 for General Cantwell He is to arrive at Gate No. 7,
12 Newark Airport, expected to arrive at four-twenty

13 Q Could you very briefly describe for us the physical
14 setup that you established at the Roseville Armory when you
15 moved in at four-thirty?

16 A This was pre-planned. The State Police had the
17 Roseville Armory This is all diagramed in these reports.
18 The Roseville Armory, all of the vehicles were inside.
19 Arrangements were made for gasoline There was 7,000
20 gallons of gasoline Arrangements were made for messing
21 The National Guard was fed. We had three hundred cots
22 available that were in trucks in Trenton that we did not
23 move at this time Every troop was assigned an office with
24 a phone and their own radios, and as the troops reported,
25 they reported to their troop commander and given assignments.

1 Assignments and administrations were by troops

2 We immediately set up the divisional operational center,
3 and we divided the area into sectors. The sectors were
4 established by the intelligence reports from our men and
5 the Newark Police Department as the situation developed.

6 Q Just before we get to the sectors, up until this
7 time had you or any member of your staff seen the police
8 director of the City of Newark?

9 A I didn't

10 Q Was Director Spina present at the Roseville Armory
11 the morning of July 14th from four o'clock while you were
12 going through the process of setting your command structure
13 up?

14 A At 4:25 Mayor Addonizio; Paul Riley, Deputy Mayor;
15 Norman Schiff; Dom Melifonte, Public Relations man;
16 Lieutenant Ferrante, Newark Police Department, arrived at
17 the CP.

18 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: Spina is not mentioned
19 there?

20 THE WITNESS: No. Four-forty five Governor
21 Hughes arrived at Newark CP. When I say CP, that
22 is the armory. Four-fifty Director Spina, Deputy
23 Chief Redden, Newark police officials arrived at
24 the CP.

25 By Mr. Jaffe:

1 Q What was the role that the Newark police played
2 in setting up the command at the armory?

3 A Nothing

4 "Four-fifty one Governor Hughes, Mayor Addonizio,
5 General Cantwell, Colonel Kelly and Newark personnel
6 confer in the Essex Room. We met at four-fifty one."

7 Q You said the answer to my question was "nothing."
8 Was that because you felt that this should be a State Police
9 and National Guard CP headquarters, or was it because of the
10 fact that the local police did not coordinate with you?

11 A For two reasons: It was our mission, our role,
12 and we established this by sheer takeover. When I say sheer
13 takeover, this is where we were This is our CP. We
14 established this The Newark Police Department we have
15 requested to bring a radio so that we could have communica-
16 tions They did this. They also assigned an inspector who
17 was a liaison officer. I have forgotten his name in the
18 record.

19 The Newark Police Department was established and
20 located their liaison through a radio and their inspector.
21 He in turn conveyed messages to his police department or
22 directed his police department or cars, whichever, to give
23 assistance.

24 Q But that was the only participation at that time
25 in the CP headquarters?

1 A At that time In fact, all of the time they had
2 no other function

3 Q Could you give instructions to the local police
4 through the inspector?

5 A Yes. This is how we did it. I did not tell the
6 Newark Police Department, nor did I have authority or would
7 I tell the Newark Police Department, what to do. I
8 recommended and requested of the inspector they had there
9 our desires and wants and such.

10 Q And he would communicate those to his headquarters
11 where they may or may not have been acted upon?

12 A Right

13 BISHOP TAYLOR: Is there a dual line of
14 control in this case that the State Police has
15 certain authority and the City Police has certain
16 authority?

17 THE WITNESS: I think we established this,
18 Bishop, in this respect: We took over the critical
19 area, tried to take it over as best we could. We
20 outposted it, we contained it Newark or any city
21 still has the normal police functions throughout.
22 There are still going to be fights and children
23 born and this type of thing What we tried to do
24 was take over the critical area. We had this
25 responsibility

1 One of the problems that we encountered, we
 2 had our communications, telephone-radio communica-
 3 tions, but the municipality did not know State
 4 Police numbers. Consequently, all reports of
 5 looting, any damage, reports of anything were
 6 directed to the Newark Police Department because
 7 naturally they knew the number. As such the Newark
 8 Police Department would dispatch their patrols to
 9 take care of a situation that they heard over the
 10 telephone. They in turn received a Newark patrol
 11 or two patrols moving through an area that
 12 eventually we had contained. What would happen is
 13 that we would move in and stop looting or whatever
 14 the situation may be

15 What we would have to do is follow them and
 16 just observe or stand outside just to protect
 17 them. At the end of the whole mission when it
 18 ended we had control over two-thirds of the city,
 19 approximately fourteen miles, and eventually we
 20 tried to let Newark phase out of the critical area
 21 so they could perform their normal functions
 22 throughout the city. They had to function
 23 throughout the earlier phases of it because there
 24 was no communication to us

25 By Mr Jaffe:

1 Q When you set up your CP center and you had the
2 inspector and radio communication, that was from you to
3 police headquarters. Was there any set up of messages
4 that were coming in to police headquarters that would come
5 back to you at the CP?

6 A They had a line they were calling their inspector
7 on. This is why we had to have our communicators know the
8 situation. I could probably show you better on the map.

9 Q We will get to that next week.

10 A The citizens had a problem. There were two or
11 three children that were born during the holidays. They
12 needed ambulances, and they would call the police department.
13 The police department would react to this and move this into
14 the areas we had already posted National Guard in and the
15 State Police were patrolling in. We had no way of knowing
16 they received a phone call or where they were going or what
17 they were doing. All they were reacting to was a police
18 service

19 Q There was no counter feedback from Newark Police
20 headquarters to the CP?

21 A Not in areas like this. Later it was family
22 established, but in the first two days, no.

23 Q Colonel, how long did it take for you to fully
24 activate your troop and have the CP center operational on
25 the morning of July 14?

1 A The CP was operational prior to this. We have a
2 phasing in and a phasing-timing sequence that I will give
3 you here.

4 Q Give us that for the record.

5 A I will give you this in terms of logs as they
6 reported in. I think it was around five-thirty that the
7 first contingent from B Troop arrived. Again, they are
8 arriving kind of piecemeal. They came in as transportation
9 and travel would permit. We committed them piecemeal to
10 the areas

11 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But you first committed
12 around five-thirty?

13 THE WITNESS: Right

14 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Was there any time when
15 your command post at Roseville Armory was so set
16 up that the Newark Police cooperated in terms of
17 immediate advice and sharing of the command
18 exercise?

19 THE WITNESS: Through the inspector that they
20 had assigned there as liaison.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But Spina didn't come
22 in; Foley didn't come in?

23 THE WITNESS: Periodically I would see the
24 director

25 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But you didn't have

1 anybody in authority above the director there to
2 coordinate the command?

3 THE WITNESS: No The mayor would be in
4 every now and then.

5 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: At anytime did the police
6 authorities or the mayor defined the perimeter of
7 the area over which you would exercise command as
8 the riot area?

9 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I think we
10 found out

11 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Through trial and error?

12 THE WITNESS: We found out from reports from
13 their patrols that this would happen and that this
14 incident took place So we finally defined it as
15 you will see on the operational map we have here

16 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But this was only after
17 operational experience of two days?

18 THE WITNESS: No, that night, and it grew.
19 We only had six sectors and then it grew to eight
20 and then to twelve sectors we had.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Was this growing like,
22 you will pardon the expression, Topsy or the
23 question of the police saying to you that there is
24 a definite area where certain things are happening?

25 THE WITNESS: It was growing for two reasons:

1 Because the Newark Police were eventually phasing
2 out of the things, and it was growing because
3 there were periodic and spasmodic incidents going
4 on

5 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But this was something
6 as your experience indicated?

7 THE WITNESS: Right As our expectations
8 happened, we said that we better lock off and
9 contain these areas

10 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Was this as a result of
11 any understanding you had with the police that it
12 would mature in this way, or was it something of
13 operational experience of the riot itself?

14 THE WITNESS: It was primarily a personal
15 experience I had We met some resistance from the
16 mayor and the police director, and I said the
17 Springfield Avenue will be closed.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: What sort of resistance
19 did you meet from them?

20 THE WITNESS: The resistance in terms of,
21 "Well, you can't close Springfield Avenue. This is
22 our main artery." I said, "Main artery or not, it
23 is closed. Good bye Boom!"

24 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: What did they say to
25 that if anything?

1 THE WITNESS: There was a little opposition,
2 the Governor said, "Dave, do you want to close it?"

3 "Yes, sir " That's it

4 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: From this did it evolve
5 that you acted in support of the Newark Police,
6 or did you supersede them in certain areas where
7 there were defined perimeters as to the emergency?
8 In other words, would the Newark Police say to
9 you, "The emergency area of Springfield Avenue is
10 in a certain perimeter and you will control this,
11 and we will phase it out," or did you move and say,
12 "We will define this as an area of Springfield
13 Avenue where we must take over because it is out
14 of control," and they more or less agreed to take
15 over?

16 THE WITNESS: It was that type of thing

17 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: So you had no predetermin-
18 ed system of handling this?

19 THE WITNESS: No.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Is there any predetermi
21 priority today in terms of perimeter you would take
22 over leaving the baby services and the others?

23 THE WITNESS: There is, and there probably
24 had been established some at that time, but one
25 of the things in a phasing out period, they were

1 in there They just didn't abruptly move out
2 because situations were occurring, incidents were
3 occurring They were there They would get called
4 and react accordingly

5 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But you wouldn't know
6 what they were doing?

7 THE WITNESS: No I don't know the telephone
8 calls they received at police headquarters Many
9 phone calls they reacted to we didn't know about.
10 The same way with the fire companies There were
11 telephone calls direct to the police department
12 which, in turn, directed the fire company to the
13 fire We didn't know anything about that

14 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: But your role was
15 command of the perimeter area and the National
16 Guard supported you and reacted to your command?

17 THE WITNESS: Right

18 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: I was trying to define
19 the area so that we can take up next time It is
20 now twelve-thirty, and I know you all have
21 commitments, but I want to end at a point where
22 we know we can resume

23 THE WITNESS: You want me to show the areas
24 the next time?


25 VICE CHAIRMAN BROWN: Right, so that you can

1 know you are beginning from approximately five-thirty
2 to develop a pattern of control and how it developed
3 and how the role of the various agencies fitted in.
4 I think this would be most useful to the committee
5 in terms of any definition or recommendations

6 - - -

7
8
9 C E R T I F I C A T E

10 I, JOSEPH F. READING, a Certified Shorthand Reporter
11 and Notary Public in and for the State of New Jersey, do
12 hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcript
13 of my stenographic notes to the best of my ability

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September 23, 1967.