

1 I overlooked. If you don't mind, we swear our
2 witnesses. I forgot to. Everyone does it. If
3 you don't mind we would like to do it.

4 MAYOR WHELAN: Absolutely not.

5
6 MAYOR THOMAS J. WHELAN,
7 sworn.

8 MAYOR WHELAN: The rioting which has gripped
9 our nation's cities -- and specifically New
0 Jersey's cities -- in the last four years
1 represents something new in American life.

2 Violence and rioting are not new, in
3 themselves. But today's riots differ in that
4 they are directed, not by one group against
5 another group, but against all of society.

6 As the Mayor of a city which had its turn on
7 the hit parade, I feel certain patterns are
8 evident which help answer the questions of, "who
9 riots," and, "why." My opinions are based both
0 upon our experiences in Jersey City and on our
1 observation of what has happened in other cities.

2 It is customary for those concerned with
3 urban rioting, in answering the first question of,
4 "who riots?", to suggest that the "typical" rioter
5 is a poor, uneducated, jobless teenager, recently

1 yanked off a farm in the South and placed down
2 in an urban society with which he can't cope.

3 As with all stereotypes, that one has just
4 enough accuracy in it to bring the rapid nod of
5 assent. But upon examination, we find enough
6 contrary evidence to call that theory into serious
7 question. Not all rioters are poor, uneducated
8 and unemployed. Not all are recent immigrants
9 into the cities.

10 I think the only real common denominator
11 which can be accurately applied to a cross-section
12 of rioters -- and most specifically those who
13 take part in the initial hours of a riot -- is
14 youth. And perhaps that helps answer the second
15 question: Why do they riot?

16 First, my sincere belief is that riots are
17 not caused by social conditions: by poverty or
18 joblessness or poor housing. Riots may be
19 prolonged and aggravated by these causes, but not
20 started by them. Those conditions are the tinder,
21 but not the spark.

22 From the public testimony and statements of
23 police and other public officials in riot-towns,
24 it seems clear that there are groups in virtually
25 every city who are working to bring about violence.

Who are they precisely? I don't subscribe to the conspiracy theory that suggests that Fidel Castro picks up the phone and Detroit burns down.

Instead, I believe, we are dealing with a loose coalition of various elements under a string of different names, but all of whom have a common denominator. That common denominator is their hatred for our nation and its democratic institutions. In my view, they are, as Professor Moynihan of the Institute for Urban Affairs suggests, irreversibly committed to the destruction of American democratic society.

They have their supporters too, the people who give instant credibility to anything said by the hate-mongers. These followers and supporters are all people who, for one reason or another, still view our racial problems in the "all good" or "all bad" frame of reference that was so successful in the civil rights marches of a half-dozen years ago. Times have changed but these people haven't.

These supporters are the people who can still talk of brotherhood and justice, and yet smile approvingly at Black Power calls for armed revolt.

1 All these people, the racial agitators and
2 their supporters, are the ones who work -- some
3 of them willingly, some of them unwittingly --
4 to bring about racial strife in our cities; and
5 their message gets its easiest, earliest and
6 warmest reception from the young people who make
7 up the advance guard of the actual rioters. The
8 unsophisticated young are easy prey for the Big
9 Lie technique that these outlaws use to keep the
10 pot bubbling.

11 Their mimeograph machines keep turning out
12 the tracts of hate all year round. The whole
13 traveling roadshow of professional haterongers
14 keeps rolling from town to town and their
15 message is always the same: Whitey's keeping
16 you down; the cops are always beating up on you;
17 the only way to keep respect from Whitey is with
18 a gun.

19 In a report put out in June by the President's
20 Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
21 of Justice, an interesting statistic helps make
22 a point: In a city, the majority of white residents

23 UCLA did a statistical survey of 586 Watts
24 Negroes after the riots there. When the UCLA
25 surveyors asked open-ended questions along the

1 lines of "What is your biggest complaint about
2 this neighborhood?" mistreatment by the police
3 was rarely mentioned. In fact, more than one-
4 quarter of those interviewed had no complaints at
5 all. But other questions, such as "What caused
6 the riot?" elicited a sizeable citation of police
7 mistreatment.

8 Doesn't this indicate strongly that the
9 complaints of police brutality and social
10 deprivation, as excuses for the rioting, are
11 after-the-fact explanations drilled into the minds
12 of the people by the racists and given instant
13 credibility by their white supporters?

14 Following the Newark riots, the various
15 Black Power militants were thiruting for the
16 scalp of Mayor Addonnizio. And they did it
17 through the usual press-release barrage designed
18 to inflame already-tender nerve ends: Send in a
19 team of U.N. observers; create a separate black
20 state in Newark; rescue us before the cops kill
21 us all.

22 But in a city, the majority of whose residents
23 are Negro, it does not require a political genius
24 to figure out the simple way to depose Mayor
25 Addonnizio -- assuming that the vast majority of

1 Negroes in Newark want him deposed. That way is
2 simply to register all Negroes to vote and toss
3 him out at the next election. However, while
4 there has been some talk in that direction, we'll
5 see little such action by the Black Power militants
6 and their cohorts because that way is the legally-
7 accepted way in our society, and their goal is not
8 to succeed in our society but to overthrow it.

9 In addition to the propaganda barrage directed
0 toward them, there is another factor which makes
1 the young people readier to riot. This is their
2 feeling that somehow they will be exempt from
3 punishment. Partly, this is the result of the
4 militants' propaganda; partly it is the result of
5 the white hangers-on whose approval of their every
6 act the young take to be the feeling of all society;
7 and partly, and regretably, it is a natural out-
8 growth of the civil rights movement.

9 No matter how well-intentioned their goals --
0 and I supported those goals then and support them
1 now -- the civil rights movement's methods were
2 wrong because massive disobedience to the law, if
3 allowed to go unpunished, can result only in
4 massive disregard for the law. Aided and abetted
5 by society's leaders who chose to wink at violations

1 of the law, that has come about.

2 It was made clear to me in discussions with
3 some of the youths who participated in our 1964
4 riots, that they just didn't believe they'd be
5 arrested. It may well be that once a city
6 experiences a substantial riot which results in
7 a massive -- even if tardy -- show of force and
8 power on the side of the law, it is more difficult
9 for the agitators to again start a riot there.

10 Jersey City is a case in point. Our riot
11 occurred in 1964. It came as the result of a
12 routine police incident, which was enflamed and
13 distorted by rumors. At no time did the rioters'
14 number exceed 500, which is only one per cent of
15 the city's total Negro population. It was almost
16 entirely composed of young men and teenagers.

7 Our position was made clear on the first
8 night of the riot. We would meet force with
9 force. An overt display of force by the police
0 quickly dampened the enthusiasm of the rioters.
1 The second night, there was less violence, and
2 by the third night it had about died out. There
3 were very few injuries, no deaths, and property
4 damage was minimal in the light of today's riot
5 tolls.

1 I think the rapid display of force and
2 the willingness to use it prevented the secondary
3 rioters -- the older people who are aggrieved at
4 society -- from entering the picture and prolonging
5 the rioting.

6 That position in 1964, I believe, prevented
7 a riot in 1967. As the storm clouds were brewing
8 this year, we let it be known that the city's
9 position hadn't changed and that power was still
10 the order of the day. This was disseminated
11 widely by the news media and by word of mouth into
12 those areas most likely to riot.

13 Then, too, when the Newark rioting erupted,
14 we mobilized virtually our entire police depart-
15 ment and put them on the night duty in the ghetto
16 areas. The lesson of their presence was not lost
17 on anyone, particularly when a brief flurry of
18 window breaking was met by dozens of policemen
19 who made over 50 immediate arrests.

20 Thus it was when Rap Brown came to town and
1 gave one of his typical "burn down the town"
2 speeches, the next speaker warned the audience
3 that if they tried to burn down the town, they
4 would have to contend with police shotguns. The
5 crowd went home peaceably.

1 You might contrast that attitude with that
2 shown in other cities. In some cities, for
3 instance, the black militants pushed and probed
4 and every time they were met by weakness they
5 probed deeper. In Newark it was virtually
6 impossible to hold a public meeting in the weeks
7 before violence erupted. The meetings were broken
8 up by disorderly gangs and when those responsible
9 were not arrested -- perhaps out of a mistaken
10 desire not to stir things up -- the troublemakers
11 were emboldened and the direct result, I feel, was
12 rioting.

13 And then the initial response by the
14 authorities was one of weakness and I think that
15 enflamed the rioters and led to days of disorder
16 when swift, forceful action might have snuffed it
17 out in minutes.

18 The control of a riot hinges around one
19 thing: the swift, effective use of force. And
20 the prior knowledge that such force will be used
21 may very well constitute the greatest possible
22 deterrent to a riot.

23 That's how to handle a riot. But how, over
24 the long term, to handle rioting? That's another
25 question, but it has specific answers:

1 First and foremost, we must reassert
2 unmistakably the supremacy of the law. It is a
3 disgrace when the Mayor of any American city has
4 to announce that the law will be enforced. That
5 should go without saying, but unfortunately today
6 it does not. We should also make it clear that
7 those who wish to overthrow our society are
8 outlaws and we intend to treat them as outlaws.

9 We must stop using the so-called "urban
10 crisis" as an excuse for all our past mistakes
11 and as a justification for all our future ones.
12 Let's admit, for once, that the real urban crisis
13 is a physical one -- a crisis of bricks and stones
14 and mortar -- and that the social crisis of our
15 cities is just a part of the social crisis of
16 our entire nation. Let's quit the sociological
17 tinkering and mount a major national effort to
18 solve the physical problems of our cities.

19 Let's have the courage to admit that the
20 biggest single problem in the Negro ghetto today
21 is the instability of the family unit, and let's
22 try to rebuild that family through economic
23 strength. If we can tie this in with the physical
24 rebuilding of our cities, to make them fit for
25 people again, so much the better. But if it

1 requires a federal make-work program, similar
2 to the W.P.A., then let's have a make-work
3 program.

4 At all levels of government, let's set up a
5 reasonable system of priorities and have no more
6 of the nonsense, such as in New Jersey, where
7 the state is spending an unnecessary \$100 million
8 to move a medical school from one urban area to
9 another urban area, but cannot find adequate
10 funds for housing and school construction.

11 That is the formal presentation. We will be
12 happy to answer any questions that any members
13 of the Commission have.

14
15 EXAMINATION BY MR. PORTUNATO:

16 Q With respect to the social area which I take it
17 you discount to a certain extent, have you instituted
18 policies nonetheless in that area to attempt to reach the
19 youth of Jersey City?

20 A Yes, we have, counsellor. But the resources which
21 we have to work with are such that our effort has really
22 been feeble, just as I am sure the efforts throughout the
23 land have been feeble. Because if the sociological conditions
24 are the formal cause, which I don't believe they are --
25 I believe they are the material cause and not the formal

1 cause -- we should not have had a riot in Detroit, we should
2 not have had a riot in New Haven, where both mayors who I
3 know, both mayors who I visited, have used what I like to
4 call a textbook approach to these problems. If there
5 ever were two cities that should not have had a riot, if
6 there is a sympathetic approach to the sociological
7 conditions, it was Detroit and New Haven.

8 We have the same sociological conditions in Appalachia
9 and we don't have rioting. We have the same sociological
10 conditions in cities throughout the South and we don't have
11 rioting. I believe the sociological conditions are the
12 material cause but this group that desires to overthrow
13 our democratic society, these agitators, use this material
14 cause to ferment into rioting and these agitators, these
15 revolutionaries, they are the formal cause of the riot I
16 believe.

17 Q Can you tell us what your guess is as to the
18 number of agitators in any particular city such as Jersey
19 City? Are they great, small in number?

20 A I would say they are very small. I would estimate
21 the principals in our city who would fall in that category
22 would be about 20.

23 Q These agitators, are they residents of Jersey
24 City or are they outsiders?

25 A The 20 I speak of are residents of our city. But

1 there is sufficient evidence from what I read that the
2 agitators that are involved in the national movement, the
3 Rap Browns, the Stokely Carmichaels, they travel from city
4 to city. Well, have you instituted a community relations

5 Q After the Newark riots was an effort made in effect
6 to seek out these agitators and surround them prior to
7 rioting? Is that a technique used? Well our policemen take

8 A Well, we keep our own under surveillance but we
9 are somewhat discouraged and dismayed to see that the laws
10 of our land permit a Rap Brown to move about the country
11 in just about complete freedom as to what he wants to say
12 and just about to do what he wants to do. Well, it is a

13 Q In emphasizing the law, and I guess the police are
14 a necessary enforcement arm of the law, can you describe
15 in general what the general attitude of the populace of
16 Jersey City is towards the law and the police department?

17 A I would say in general the attitude of the white
18 population is the police department are doing a good job.
19 I would say the attitude of a certain percentage, a small
20 percentage of the Negro population, is that the police have
21 the same failings that they have in other cities as looked
22 upon by this particular group, that the police are unfair,
23 that the police are prejudiced against the Negro, and that
24 the police use means which we generally refer to as police
25 brutality. I would say that the majority of the Negroes and

1 the majority of the white people in our cities respect the
2 law and look upon the police department as doing a good job
3 in enforcing the law.

4 Q Well, have you instituted a community relations
5 program where the policeman is put in a different light
6 just to combat the small minority feeling that you speak of?

7 A Yes, we have. We have had all our policemen take
8 a course in community relations at St. Peter's College.
9 We had them all taking a course in Spanish to meet the
10 needs of the Puerto Rican community. In general we have
11 taken the recommended professional steps by the sociologists
12 to overcome this difficulty. It is not an easy thing to
13 accomplish but we are taking definite steps in that direction.

14 Q In what period of time did you embark on these
15 programs? You speak of the 1964 riot. Had you started
16 planning for civil disorders before '64 or was that more
17 or less the time from whence you started?

18 A Well, I hadn't had much of an opportunity to do
19 much before '64 in that I was not the mayor but I was with
20 the New Jersey Bell at that time -- hopefully going back
21 one day, by the way. No. I would say that most of the
22 effort that I have made as mayor came after the 1964 riots.

23 Q You became mayor in 1963?

24 A In November of '63, just about seven months prior
25 to the riots.

1 Q Do you think what is true for Jersey City is also
2 true for the other cities in the state of New Jersey? Is
3 1954 the first period of immediate awareness of the problem?

4 A I honestly don't know. I couldn't answer that
5 question without sufficient research and sufficient
6 knowledge as to what went on in the other cities prior to
7 that time.

8 Q How much discussion is there among the mayors of
9 the various cities in New Jersey regarding civil disorders?

10 A I would say very little formal intercommunication.
11 The only relationship that I have had with the other mayors
12 other than through the established organizations, the League
13 of Municipalities and the Conference of Mayors, has been
14 periodic meetings with what we call the Mayors of the Big
15 Six, the mayors of the six largest cities. Other than that
16 there has been little formal interchange of information.

17 Q Would you be in favor of more formal meetings?

18 A Sure, by all means.

19 Q What would you expect to get out of these meetings?

20 A I expect the greatest gain would be to learn
21 from the other person his mistakes and his successes.

22 Q What has been the role of the state agencies in
23 helping Jersey City in its problems?

24 A Well, I would have to be critical there. I would
25 have to say that the experience that I have had now which is

1 four years as mayor of the city we have received very little
2 support from the state government. Now, this is partially
3 the result of the state government not having the fiscal
4 muscle to help, but we have been crying about the tax policies.
5 As a for instance, for four years I have been trying to get
6 a tax convention to take a new look at the tax structure.
7 For example, here we are subsidizing the commuter to go from
8 Morristown to New York, which is a noteworthy adventure,
9 because if the railroads would fail our highways would be
10 cluttered with automobiles. But on the other side of the
11 coin is that this makes it more attractive, makes it easier
12 for what is left of the middle-class of the city to live
13 in Morristown. If the commuter had to pay the full fare
14 to travel from suburbia to New York City or to the central
15 cities of Newark and Jersey City he may not leave the city.
16 But actually the state is subsidizing the demise of the
17 cities and the people in the cities through taxation are
18 asked to subsidize their own demise.

19 I am very bitter and feel very strongly about the
20 state medical college. We offered the entire complex in
21 Jersey City for a dollar to the state of New Jersey to use
22 that as the medical college. For ten years the only doctors
23 trained in this state were trained in Jersey City in
24 cooperation with Seton Hall. Now the moment the state took
25 it over they decided to leave Jersey City and they're going

1 to spend \$100 million to build a new complex in Newark
2 and probably another 90 to 100 million dollars in New
3 Brunswick for Rutgers's Medical College. They also
4 dislocated somewhere around 20,000 people from the Central
5 Ward, which I understand could have been one of the causes
6 of the rioting in Newark. At least a sufficient number of
7 people complained bitterly to bring that to our attention.

8 Here we are, the state is broke, we can't get any
9 additional school aid to help our school system in the
10 central city. Fifty per cent of our school plant was built
11 prior to World War I and I am sure this is equally so in
12 Newark. Yet the state is going to spend \$100 million
13 to build a new complex in Newark when they could have our
14 entire complex in Jersey City for a dollar.

15 The arguments against that were: one, you can't
16 operate in Jersey City because of political interference;
17 and two, the buildings are delapidated and need repair and
18 Jersey City is asking us to take over their debt, and we
19 are not. Since that time we have appointed a Board of
20 Managers to operate the hospital and now a deficit of about
21 \$7 million for the care of indigents is down to \$2½ million.
22 We would be able to assume that. We would pay the state
23 that amount of money to take care of the indigents. But
24 how can you at a time when every dollar counts, when the
25 cities need more help, justify the expenditure of \$100 million

1 when it is the testimony of outstanding medical architects
2 the buildings in Jersey City Medical Center could be put
3 into first class condition to be used as a medical school?

4 So when we look at the record we have to say in all
5 fairness and honesty that the state hasn't helped us at all.

6 Take the sales tax. And again, I am not criticizing
7 anyone. I am just looking at the picture as a mayor
8 struggles in a city. We send approximately in dollars to
9 the state from the sales tax about \$7½ million, poor city
10 such as Jersey City. We get back \$4 million. So the city
11 of Jersey City didn't gain by the sales tax.

12 We have forced upon us 100 per cent evaluation and the
13 argument is well, every other county has done it. But
14 Hudson County is different in its structure. We are
15 roughly 25 per cent residential and 75 per cent railroads
16 and industry. Particularly in Jersey City the railroads
17 were practically the only industry we had as far as providing
18 revenue to run the city. Yet we are being forced to go into
19 100 per cent evaluation which means that if we have to do
20 this we have to shift \$6½ million from industry onto the
21 one and two family home owners, which is going to further
22 drive the middle-class out of the city and out of the vacuum
23 is going to come the poor. Ultimately you will have a city
24 of all poor.

25 And we have been asking for four years for a tax

1 convention to take a new look at the tax laws in such a way
2 that we can help stop this deterioration of the cities
3 rather than accelerate it.

4 Q How do you relate this fiscal policy of the state
5 as it were to the causes of civil disorder? Is it your view
6 that this physical deterioration of the cities which may
7 result from these policies provides the place where a civil
8 disorder can breed?

9 A Well, as I mentioned earlier, counsel, this
10 deterioration brings about the sociological conditions, the
11 unemployment, the poor housing, the poor educational
12 facilities. We need better trained teachers and better
13 techniques which are costly to train these people who have
14 been absorbed in the industrial society. These are the
15 material causes. I believe they are not the formal causes
16 because if they were the formal causes then you would have
17 unrest wherever these conditions existed.

18 With good, tough supervisory controlling and enforcing
19 of the law with a good police department -- and if we can't
20 do it locally then we are going to have to do it on a state-
21 wide level. In Detroit we had to bring in Federal troops
22 finally. But if we have control of the situation we have
23 time to work on the predispositions, the material causes, the
24 sociological conditions. But no city, Jersey City, Newark,
25 Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, New York City, no city can do

1 this on their own because we cannot generate the revenues
2 on our own flesh that are needed to meet the problem.

3 For example just take the sewerage condition in Jersey
4 City alone. Our sewerage system is 100 years old. Every
5 day in Jersey City a sewer caves in. This results in
6 flooding of sewerage in the neighborhood. It is estimated
7 it will cost \$100 million to rebuild the sewer system in
8 Jersey City. It was designed in the days when the water
9 consumption and sewerage were less. Today it would require
10 \$100 million to rebuild. Our borrowing capacity is finished,
11 to the end of the line as far as our borrowing capacity is
12 concerned with the contract to build the new School 15. We
13 have to look elsewhere to cure these conditions.

14 Because as the thousands of poor pour into Jersey City
15 and pour into Newark the person who resides in South Orange
16 has a responsibility as well as what's left of the middle-
17 class in the cities in finding a solution to these problems.
18 The poor people coming off the farm in the South, coming
19 into Newark and Jersey City and Paterson, Elizabeth, Camden
20 and Trenton, that's not the responsibility of the people of
21 Jersey City or Newark or Trenton or Camden or Elizabeth to
22 find solutions to this problem. This is the responsibility
23 of every citizen in this state and every citizen in the
24 nation.

25 Hoover Dam which rebuilt or stimulated the agricultural

1 successes in the Southwest was built by the effort of the
2 entire nation. The Tennessee Valley Authority which was
3 put together again with the massive effort of the Federal
4 government raised the economic standards of the people in
5 that area. They could never have done this themselves.
6 So we hold that the cities cannot solve these problems
7 themselves.

8 If we don't make a massive effort on the state and
9 national level, if we don't make a full commitment, you will
10 have all the well-off people living up in suburbia -- as
11 someone has put it -- sitting on their plantations sipping
12 on their martinis, and down in the city all the poor in
13 this condition.

14 Q How many cities do you put in this classification
15 in the state of New Jersey?

16 A I would say Newark, Jersey City, Passaic, Paterson,
17 Elizabeth, Trenton, Camden. I suppose you could put Perth
18 Amboy in there in that category. Any city that has a high
19 proportion of the poor and the shrinking economic and
20 industrial base.

21 We have this terrible demand for more services by an
22 ever enlarging marginal income situation and a smaller,
23 shrinking economic and industrial base to support it.

24 Q If I may ask a hypothetical: If you could start
25 instituting programs on the state level to solve the city's

1 problem as you see it how long a time are we talking about?

2 A I don't think anyone knows the answer to that
3 question. It would depend upon: one, the size of the effort;
4 two, the quality of the effort and the determination behind
5 the effort. And these are unknowns at this hour. I have
6 no idea. And no one else does, I don't think, I am afraid.

7 Q With respect to that time table -- we conceive
8 it to be indefinite -- you indicate that you would need a
9 police force or a city -- not you specifically but a city --
10 would need a good police force in order to prevent and
11 quell riots?

12 A We need that now because I see nothing happening
13 between now and next summer and next summer we are going
14 to go through it again. Since we see nothing happening
15 to correct the sociological conditions the only hope we
16 have is to be able to enforce the law. If we can't do that
17 then we have anarchy.

18 Q Along those lines: Are there steps that you are
19 taking in terms of liaison, for example, with the State
20 Police, National Guard?

21 A We are in continuous communication with the State
22 Police.

23 Q What about the police forces of other municipalities?
24 Have you considered the Municipal Assistance Act, which I
25 believe the mayor before you invoked?

1 A We have in Hudson County a system of cooperation
 2 between all of the departments within the county. But in
 3 our city if we feel we can sense this and we sense that we
 4 can't handle this alone, I discussed this with the Attorney
 5 General and I have discussed it with the Governor and the
 6 head of the State Police, we are not going to hesitate one
 7 moment to ask for the State Police and the National Guard.
 8 Because if we for a moment demonstrate that we can't handle
 9 a situation then we have no government.

10 Q Are your local police engaged in riot training
 11 as such?

12 A Oh, by all means. And I can point with justifiable
 13 pride that we have a fine police department.

14 Q How long has that training been going on, how
 15 many years? When did you start this training?

16 A Well, the police training itself has been a
 17 tradition in Jersey City. It's a fine department. But the
 18 special riot training has developed since our experiences
 19 in 1964. That was the first year of rioting in general in
 20 the nation and the first experience we had with a riot.

21 Q What about the role of the Federal agencies, the
 22 anti-poverty agency in particular? Do you consider it a good
 23 or bad thing that those funds do not go through the city halls?

24 A Well, there are many points of view on this. My
 25 own experience is that the local governments with all their

1 infirmities, with all their failings, would be the best
2 avenues to channel these funds. Because in our system if
3 you don't like the local government you can turn it out at
4 the next election, number one. Number two, the authorities
5 in the local government take an oath of office. Number
6 three, in the political system in which we live in this
7 nation any man in public office lives in a goldfish bowl.

8 We have established bureaus and departments that would
9 not need a superstructure to be built such as the case
10 with the way the anti-poverty funds are administered now.

11 In these various non-profit organizations what is
12 required is to build a new structure of administration.
13 That is an enormously expensive endeavor. Consequently
14 in my judgment not a sufficient amount of the dollars flow
15 actually into the hands of the poor -- the hands of the
16 poor not in the sense of spending it but in taking care of
17 those conditions which exist amongst our poor.

18 If it was up to me I would flow the Federal dollars
19 through the established authorities in the local governments.
20 Have we had a sufficient effort? My answer to that is no.

21 Why do I say I fear next summer? Because I recently
22 made a trip to speak to our local people in Trenton,
23 Commissioner Ydisaker, and correspondingly, a trip to our
24 Labor Department in Washington and our Health, Education and
25 Welfare Department, and our answer is that the Congress and

1 the legislature is again I suppose reflecting the will of
2 the people, they're not going to be too quick to appropriate
3 additional dollars. And I see no increase in the aid that
4 we are getting from the state or the nation before next
5 summer at this hour. And if we don't get some help we again
6 next summer are going to have disturbances in our cities
7 unless -- unless again we have the will to use whatever
8 force is necessary to prevent it from happening.

9 Q You speak of the summer. Is there any reason
10 why a riot could not occur in January, February or March?

11 A Well, I suppose this could happen but our
12 experience has been the agitators who precipitate the
13 riots need -- we refer to it in the military as foot
14 soldiers. They need numbers. In general the uneducated,
15 the unemployed youth, it's more difficult to get their
16 support when they're not out on the streets. And in the
17 wintertime they generally stay indoors or at recreation
18 and other activities. I would say it would be kind of
19 difficult to see a riot when the temperature is down below
20 freezing, heading toward zero.

21 Q Going back a moment to this financial assistance:
22 If you were to get financial help where would you use it?
23 What programs would you institute?

24 A Well, the biggest single effort that has to be
25 made is in the field of education. If there is an answer to

1 this problem it has to be in education and all that that
2 means. We have to educate our unemployed adults to be
3 absorbed in the technical society in which we live, becoming
4 more technical every day. We have to educate the children.
5 We are graduating boys and girls from high school in some
6 cities in this country who can't read or write. We have got
7 to improve the educational facilities.

8 We have to have more plans so that we can have smaller
9 classes. And we have to improve the salaries of our teachers
10 to attract to their profession more dedicated, talented
11 people.

12 And in general we have to improve in this country and
13 in our own city and our own state our educational facilities.
14 If there is an answer it is through education. I would
15 attack that problem first. I put that number one on the
16 list.

17 Q What about housing? Is that a problem?

18 A Housing is a problem but that is a long, long
19 term. We need a long term solution for that problem. It
20 will take a long time to find a solution to that problem.

21 Urban renewal in this nation has been a failure, urban
22 renewal in this state has been a failure, when you think of
23 the number of units that have been built in the time that
24 this program has been the law of the land.

25 Q Do you envision a role for the private businesses?

1 How can they be of help to you?

2 A Well, I am somewhat of a kind of strange politician
3 I suppose and kind of a strange mayor to say this but I have
4 been saying it for four years too: that there is nothing
5 we do in government that private enterprise cannot do better.
6 And I have attempted to approach our government in Jersey
7 City in this light, applying techniques that are used in
8 the business community.

9 If there were some way of getting private industry
10 involved in these programs legally, if the laws were such
11 that we could, you would see a tremendous improvement in
12 all these programs. Just how do you go about that?
13 I understand the laws don't permit private industry to be
14 a real partner in this, to use the energies and the wisdom
15 of private industry. Those energies and that knowledge
16 that built the industrial society that exists in our country
17 today, if there was some way we could get that energy and
18 power into the problem you would see a tremendous success
19 in the solutions to these problems. Now private industry
20 is going to become involved I don't know.

21 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: When you drive through
22 your city, at least the route you drive through
23 where slums have been knocked down very often
24 you have small industry replacing it I notice.
25 Is this successful? Is it bringing the jobs and

1 not bringing more problems? As you approach the
2 Holland Tunnel there are a lot of slums knocked
3 down there and there are a lot of small motels
4 but some industry also. Is this working?

5 THE WITNESS: That's true, Bob. It is but
6 so slowly that you're reluctant even to mention
7 that as an accomplishment. That particular area
8 we call that the Holland Tunnel Urban Renewal Site.
9 This has been on the books for 15 years. Fifteen
10 years and it is only in the last four years that
11 I point with pride that we got what's on that land
12 on it. And when I said that urban renewal has been
13 a failure I meant that while it has met with some
14 successes the expectations of what we thought it
15 would do have not been accomplished.

16 MR. GIBBONS: Mayer, along these same lines:
17 What in your judgment has been the principal
18 deterrent for industry moving to what on the surface
19 appears to be the best location in the metropolitan
20 area?

21 THE WITNESS: I would think that there are
22 other areas that are more attractive. For example,
23 with the automatic processes that we have today
24 we need large land area for a modern plant. We
25 don't have large land areas such as you have outside

1 of New Brunswick where you see J & J going down
2 Route 1. That's one reason. Two, with the
3 sociological conditions that exist in the city
4 we have fewer people left to pick up the cost of
5 providing more services for this ever enlarging
6 marginal income population. So the industries are
7 reluctant to come to the central city, not only
8 Jersey City but all the central cities, and they
9 seem inclined to go to the suburban areas where
10 there is land at a cheaper price with lower taxes.
11 And with the added feature of the automobile where
12 we don't have to live on top of the factory to
13 work they can find the pool of manpower they are
14 looking for just as easily in New Brunswick as
15 they can in Jersey City.

16 MR. GIBBONS: Does that in your judgment
17 point in the direction of not putting public
18 assisted housing in the cities and promote the
19 effort toward creating industrial space?

20 THE WITNESS: In that there is not industry
21 to support the people who are living there. I
22 would say for the city to exist you have to have
23 a balance. You have to have residential and you
24 have to have industry and that has to be in
25 balance. I can't picture Jersey City being just a

1 city of industry and the people all living up in
2 suburbia west of Essex County and commuting to
3 the city every day to work.

4 MR. GIBBONS: Why can't you envision that in
5 the automobile age?

6 THE WITNESS: Because it smacks somewhat of
7 Utopia and that existed only in the mind of
8 Thomas More as you know.

9 MR. GIBBONS: Would you feel that the
10 situation of the cities would be improved if the
11 housing and welfare functions were made state
12 functions and taken away from the municipalities?

13 THE WITNESS: No question about it. I would
14 think that the state should immediately take over
15 the educational system of our cities and it should
16 take over the welfare administration of our cities
17 for this reason: One, then it would more equitably
18 adjust the tax load to all the people in the state,
19 supporting again the sociological phenomena that
20 has taken place in the state where the poor are
21 coming to the cities. We in Jersey City should
22 be no more responsible for taking care of this
23 movement of the poor from the farms to the urban
24 area. The people in South Orange should be
25 responsible for this too. And it's not our problem,

1 it's a national problem. Secondly, the state, as
2 you know, imposes upon us in the municipalities
3 in our educational system certain restrictions,
4 certain demands. We have to build a building a
5 certain way. We can't make administrative decisions
6 in certain areas without approval of the State Board
7 of Education. And too, since they put these
8 restrictions on us they should have some of the
9 fiscal responsibility. And the fiscal responsibility
10 which they hold is the amount of school aid we get.
11 And the school aid that we get in Jersey City from
12 the state is about 10 per cent of what New York
13 City gets from the State of New York as a for
14 instance.

15 And secondly in that regard, again educating
16 the people in our city, again the poor who are
17 more difficult to train, more costly to train,
18 this again is not a local problem but a national
19 problem. The burden should be spread out throughout
20 the entire state and the nation. If we had the
21 state to take over the educational system in the
22 city and the welfare of the city this would more
23 equitably adjust the load to the backs of all our
24 citizens rather than the few who are left in the
25 hands of young
we call the burgen-...

1 be out of the cities anyhow.

2 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Would you be willing to
3 give some of your revenues to the state?

4 THE WITNESS: Some sensible amount of revenues,
5 we sure would.

6 MR. GIBBONS: Would you care to comment on
7 Commissioner Marberger's recently publicized
8 statement of desires under which he would be
9 given the power to transfer people from one
10 school district to another?

11 THE WITNESS: If the state was running the
12 school system he would have that power. But in
13 the light of the feeling and the power of the people
14 in suburbia that I sense and feel and since the
15 system under which we live and work is a democracy
16 and people in public office usually reflect the
17 will of the people as the people express in the
18 ballot box, I can't see that happening.

19 BY MR. FORTUNATO:

20 Q I wish you would elaborate for us for a little
21 bit as to just how close Jersey City did come to a riot this
22 summer.

23 A When Newark was under way on a Sunday night we had
24 bands of young men roaming through various streets in what
25 we call the Bergen-Lafayette Ward which is principally where

1 the Negro population of the city resides. They smashed some
2 windows and we sensed and felt that the tension was there.
3 The next night was Monday night and in the church hall of an
4 Episcopal church in Jersey City a fellow by the name of
5 Roy Kennix who is the Executive Director of an anti-poverty
6 program designed to rehabilitate criminals, in conjunction
7 with Father Castles, an Episcopalian priest, invited Rap
8 Brown to Jersey City to speak. And Rap gave one of his
9 talks. This is the night of July 17th, the Monday following
10 the Sunday where we had the initial disorders, the smashing
11 of the windows and where someone threw a Molotov cocktail
12 into a cab which fatally burned a passenger -- an innocent
13 passenger. That night Rap Brown told the crowd that you
14 built the city, it's your city, you should go out and burn
15 it down. Now, I am convinced that that was an attempt to
16 capitalize on this tension that existed because of the
17 Newark situation, to stir up a riot in our city. And that
18 night we had the entire police department on the street.
19 The Bergen-Lafayette Ward was an armed camp. Immediately
20 following Rap talking the next speaker got up and cautioned
21 the people, remember the police have shot guns.

22 This demonstration of force and this demonstration of
23 a willingness to use force if we had to was the deterrent
24 that prevented us from having a riot.

25 MR. LEUCHTER: Could you tell us who that

1 indoors following speaker was, the one you referred to
2 did see as the following speaker?

3 THE WITNESS: I don't know.

4 MR. LEUCHTER: Was he a Negro, a white man?

5 THE WITNESS: I would say he was a Negro.

6 MR. LEUCHTER: A resident of the area?

7 THE WITNESS: That is so. One of the Negroes
8 attending the meeting that night.

9 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: Had this meeting been
10 set up before the riots occurred in Newark?

11 THE WITNESS: I don't know, Bishop. I don't

12 know. But we were quite dismayed that Rap Brown

13 was invited by Roy Kennix who denies he was

14 invited by Roy Kennix. We complained bitterly

15 to Sergeant Schreiber that Roy Kennix who heads

16 up this anti-poverty program would invite a

17 revolutionary to the community. And we are also

18 dismayed that it occurred in a Christian church.

19 We are also further dismayed that no other church

20 in the community spoke out against it.

21
22 BY MR. FORTUNATO:

23 Q Could you be a little more graphic insofar as
24 what the show of force was and how it was in effect made
25 visible to the people? I visualize a lot of people being

1 indoors and it is a little unclear as to actually how they
2 did see the police.

3 A Well, at that time of the year you know in the
4 city there are an awful lot of people on the street. Now,
5 we have approximately a 850-man police department. And it's
6 broken down into four tours so that just approximately 25
7 per cent of the department is working at all times. Now,
8 when you put four times as many policemen on the street with
9 additional weaponry and additional vehicles it's bound to
10 become evident that they're there. And you'd have to have
11 ridden through the Bergen-Lafayette Ward night after night,
12 day after day as we have and see and sense the feeling of
13 the people. Then ride through that same area that night
14 with that police power out and sense the feeling of the
15 people. They knew we meant business.

16 Q Does the police department of Jersey City in
17 general have a reputation for being tough, as it were?

18 A I would say the answer to that would be yes.
19 But by toughness I don't mean to imply and react to the
20 charges of police brutality. It's not that at all. They are
21 well trained and determined. They are courageous and I am
22 proud of it.

23 Q Well, do you think this reputation helps you in
24 this area of civil disorders?

25 A Oh, no question about it. But I think, and I say

1 this with all humility, the support has to come from the top
2 down. The police department has to know that the fountainhead
3 of authority, which at least is the system of authority,
4 which at least is the symbol of authority which is the mayor,
5 is behind them. And they knew that. We made our public
6 statements and we made ourselves clear in that connection.

7 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Mr. Mayor, I guess I
8 paraphrase your words, but you're saying that you
9 feel your department is tough but fair? You
10 said it was tough without --

11 THE WITNESS: Sure.

12 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: What is the technique of
13 making a police department effective and yet fair?

14 THE WITNESS: I think we got to start off
15 first with the recruitment procedures. You have
16 to one, recruit the type of man who can be
17 trained and the type of a man that you want to be
18 a policeman. This, first of all, means salaries
19 comparable with private industry. The requirements
20 and the standards that you place upon a policeman,
21 if he can get a greater economic return for his
22 labor by working for private industry, he is not
23 going to become a policeman. So we have to pay
24 well. We have to keep the standards high. We
25 have to attract the best we can, which is another

1 argument for this fiscal problem we have in the
2 city. Where do we find the dollars to do this?
3 And once you attract the best you have to have a
4 tradition in the department, which fortunately we
5 in Jersey City have -- I say that with justifiable
6 pride -- a tradition long before I became the
7 mayor.

8 Furthermore, you have to give them support.
9 The policeman has to know that the ultimate authority
10 in the community is going to support him. This I
11 think will bring about the desired result.

12 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: Mayor, are you losing to
13 your knowledge any men withdrawing from the
14 department? I've heard that because of these
15 recent disturbances certain policemen -- not from
16 Jersey City, I haven't heard it of that -- are
17 withdrawing from the increased risks perhaps. Is
18 anything like that happening in your department?

19 THE WITNESS: No, Bishop. We lose a few
20 here and there but I would say that we don't have
21 a problem in that direction. Our pay now come
22 January 1st will be just about the best in the state
23 aside from a few small municipalities that can pay
24 more or do pay more. But of the largest cities,
25 come January 1st we will have the best pay program.

1 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: This would all then tie
2 in with the moral of your department.

3 THE WITNESS: Sure. And I would say this:
4 that the problem we speak of and the severity is
5 less in Jersey City than it is for example in
6 Newark. We don't have nowhere near the problem
7 in this area that the city does as a comparison.

8 MR. LAUCHTER: Mayor Whelan, you might be
9 helpful in visualizing some of the problems and how
10 you are solving them. Can you give us a racial
11 breakdown both in your general population and
12 in your public school system and possibly even in
13 your police force what is the white, nonwhite or
14 white-Negro-Puerto Rican breakdown in the population
15 of Jersey City percentagewise?

16 THE WITNESS: I would say approximately 50,000
17 which is just about 20 per cent.

18 MR. LAUCHTER: Negro?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 MR. LAUCHTER: And Puerto Rican would be
21 how much, Spanish speaking?

22 THE WITNESS: Oh, taking a guess maybe 3 per
23 cent.

24 MR. LAUCHTER: How about in the public school
25 system?

1 THE WITNESS: In the public school system I
2 would say Negro and Puerto Rican are approximately
3 70 per cent. We have a very large and fine
4 parochial school system in Jersey City. If we didn't
5 have the parochial schools in Jersey City we would
6 all have to close down and go home. If they ever
7 shut down the burden upon the school system would
8 be too great.

9 MR. LEUCHTER: What I am talking about is
10 obviously the lack of financial support strikes
11 more largely at the Negro core rather than at the
12 white core, isn't that true?

13 THE WITNESS: That's true.

14 MR. LEUCHTER: What about in the police
15 department? What's the white-Negro situation?

16 THE WITNESS: Out of approximately 850 men
17 we have 45 Negroes. We are trying to recruit
18 additional Negroes. We have difficulty attracting
19 applicants, one, to take the exam and then
20 two, applicants who would meet the standards. We
21 have tried to encourage various civil rights groups
22 and various church groups in the city who work
23 amongst the Negroes to conduct classes in preparing
24 them for an examination. We are currently having
25 an exam and we put a drive on all summer long in

1 an effort to stimulate interest on the part of
2 these groups to take the Negro young men and
3 prepare them for the Civil Service examination.
4 That met with some success but nowhere near what
5 we hoped.

6 MR. LAUCHTER: In your opinion are the Civil
7 Service standards for exams realistic and fair?

8 THE WITNESS: I would say the standards are
9 too high to enable us to attract too many Negroes
10 to the work, for this reason: One, the Negro
11 young man who can meet the standards to be a
12 policeman, with the effort that industry is making
13 to attract Negroes to industry, they could get a
14 better job in private industry. From my own
15 experience in the New Jersey Bell, as a for
16 instance, anyone who could be a policeman or fireman
17 in Jersey City could meet the standards for a cable
18 splicer or a lineman in the New Jersey Bell.

19 MR. LAUCHTER: Do you, therefore, feel that
20 the Civil Service exam standards ought to be
21 downgraded or do you feel this is dangerous?

22 THE WITNESS: Oh, no. I say if we downgrade
23 them we are going to be worse off. If anything,
24 we need a better trained policeman, we need a
25 policeman who has the understanding of the

sociological problems of our time to be more effective. If you lower the standards you are going to get a worse type of a man than you have now. I don't mean that in the sense that what we have is bad. I mean if anything we should raise the standards, raise the salaries, because the problem is becoming more and more difficult every day.

MR. LAUCHTER: What you are saying though is you would take any qualified Negro you could get your hands on?

THE WITNESS: Oh, absolutely. And be happy to take them.

CHAIRMAN LILLEY: What's the highest ranking Negro officer in your police department?

THE WITNESS: Sergeant.

CHAIRMAN LILLEY: This is a matter of taking exams also?

THE WITNESS: Examinations again. We work, as you know, under the Civil Service laws. I would say if anything we should raise the standards because there never was a worse time to be a policeman than today in America with the various interpretations of the courts. It requires a more skillful man to do the job. And in light of the

1 social problems which we have been discussing here
2 all morning it requires again a more talented
3 man to work in this area.

4 If anything, we should raise the standard.
5 Now, that's going to create a problem because then
6 it's going to be more and more difficult to
7 attract more and more Negroes. There are Negroes
8 who qualify but again, if they qualify they can
9 take positions in private industry and they don't
10 want to be a policeman. It's tough to be a police-
11 man today. It's a difficult profession.

12 MR. MEYNER: You mention that you felt it
13 was a small group that promoted this disrespect
14 for law and order and was determined to put an end
15 to our democracy as we know it. Can you identify
16 this group any more than to say they are led by
17 this person or that person? Do you have any
18 evidence or do you have any information that will
19 specify them or identify them more than a name or two?

20 THE WITNESS: No, I don't.

21 MR. MEYNER: I mean at one time we heard a
22 man by the name of McCarthy say they were all a
23 bunch of Communists. That isn't quite popular at
24 the moment now. Can you identify them? Do you have
25 any information that would identify them?

1 THE WITNESS: No, I don't. From what I read
2 in the various police reports we read and the
3 various police journals and law enforcement
4 journals and that type of thing we know who they
5 are in our own community through our police files
6 and through our own intelligence. But nationwide
7 other than what we know from public sources, the
8 Rap Browns and Stokely Carmichaels, I can't say.

9 MR. MEYNER: You have talked about the lack
10 of respect for law and order, and I judge you as
11 an authority for municipalities, not just Jersey
12 City. How do you suppose you can get a respect
13 for law and order when in some municipalities there
14 is no enforcement of building restrictions or
15 building use or tenement house laws? When a
16 tenant makes complaints, gets no action, doesn't
17 that encourage lack of respect for law enforcement?

18 THE WITNESS: By all means.

19 MR. MEYNER: Isn't there lots of that in some
20 of our cities?

21 THE WITNESS: There is an awful lot of it.
22 There is an awful lot of organized crime in this
23 nation. There is a terrible lack of regard for
24 law and order throughout the land, not only in the
25 cities. That's why I say the social crisis is

1 nationwide.

2 MR. MEYNER: We do have ordinances and we
3 do have state laws with respect to housing and
4 they are ignored in many instances.

5 THE WITNESS: No question about that.

6 MR. MEYNER: And when they are ignored the
7 person who suffers as a result of them has no
8 respect for law and order in that instance.

9 THE WITNESS: Precisely so. It's a terribly
10 bad example.

11 MR. MEYNER: Well, we have been out in
12 neighborhoods and I've talked to some of these
13 people and apparently there is no trouble at all
14 in placing a bet on the numbers, there is no
15 trouble at all in placing a bet on the horses.
16 Yet they take this for granted. Now, what should
17 we do about this insofar as it affects their
18 respect for law and order?

19 THE WITNESS: Well, I would think what we
20 have to do and what we must do is enforce all our
21 laws and in some way, some how in this nation which
22 is going down --

23 MR. MEYNER: But doesn't it start at this
24 local level?

25 THE WITNESS: Sure. No question about it.

1 We should enforce the gambling laws and we do.
2 We should enforce the housing codes. I should say
3 we try to. We should enforce the housing codes
4 and we try to do this. But these tasks are not
5 easily solved. This is a very difficult thing to
6 try to do.

7 MR. MEYNER: But isn't this the root of this
8 lack of respect for law?

9 THE WITNESS: No. I think it goes deeper
10 than that. There is a terrible moral breakdown
11 in the whole nation, the fiber of the people as
12 a whole. There is a terrible lack of respect
13 for lawful authority from every social strata
14 in our land.

15 MR. MEYNER: In other words, there are a
16 lot of people who say, well, I might as well get
17 it for nothing if I can.

18 THE WITNESS: This is true in the business
19 world as it is true in the labor world and this
20 is true, and I think we all know this when we
21 talk about the terrible rise, in organized crime
22 and the infiltration of organized crime into private
23 enterprise. How do you allow this to happen?

24 MR. MEYNER: Isn't a greater responsibility
25 on the people who run our cities to --

1 THE WITNESS: The laws are not made in the
2 city. The laws are made in the halls of the
3 legislature and in the Congress in Washington.
4 We need tougher laws to enable the law enforcement
5 agency at every level --

6 MR. MEYNER: The law says you shouldn't have
7 any gambling or you shouldn't have any number
8 playing but I dare say there isn't a city in the
9 state that you can't find a place to play a number
10 or play a horse. This is at least what I have
11 gotten as I have walked around in these cities
12 and I have talked to these people in the ghettos.
13 They say there is no problem and they are not
14 upset about it.

15 THE WITNESS: Well, I would think that what
16 you say is true, Governor. But I would also say
17 that recognizing the violations of law and
18 enforcing the law are two different things. It's
19 not so easy to apprehend the criminal. It's not
20 so easy with our court system, a court system
21 that's showing an ever increasing leniency towards
22 the criminal to get justice before the court.

23 This I hold is true at the local level, is
24 true at the state level, is true at the national
25 level. It's infiltrating private enterprise.

1 It's infiltrating into the labor movement. And
2 what we have in this country is a general breakdown
3 in the moral code.

4 And if there ever was a time that all of us,
5 regardless of our calling, should be reaffirming
6 a belief in the ideas and traditions that made
7 this country great, preaching and demanding wherever
8 we have an opportunity to influence people the
9 respect for the moral code and respect for law and
10 order, this is it.

11 These violations are true not only at the
12 local level, they're true at the state level and
13 they're true at the Federal level and they're true
14 in the business world and the labor world as well.
15 In fact, the entire fabric of our society is tainted
16 by this.

17 MR. MEYNER: Well, then it's our obligation
18 to take note of this and report on this.

19 THE WITNESS: By all means, Governor.

20 MR. LEUCHNER: Governor, I would like to, if
21 I can, read this into the record because I think
22 it illustrates what you have been saying. In
23 this morning's issue of the New York Times of
24 Tuesday, October 10 there are a couple of
25 interesting paragraphs here.

1 "Yesterday, on East 11th Street, around the
2 corner from where Linda and her hippie friend,
3 James L. Hutchinson, were killed, a man in his
4 late 30's was lounging astride a green racing
5 bicycle in the middle of the sidewalk. Several
6 young hippies were clustered about him, and as
7 they gave him money, he passed them small white
8 envelopes. 'What's he dealing -- grass, marijuana?'
9 a visitor asked.

10 " 'Not in this neighborhood,' was the reply.
11 'This isn't a grass neighborhood. That's the
12 hard stuff -- heroin.' Soon, the man on the
13 bicycle shoved a thick wad of bills into his
14 pocket and nonchalantly rode off."

15 It is amazing how policemen can never seem
16 to apprehend these people but reporters can sit
17 there openly in the middle of a city and see this
18 done right in front of their eyes and nothing
19 happens about it.

20 "Isn't this what you're referring to?"

21 MR. MEYNER: The point that bothers me is
22 in our cities probably more often than in the
23 suburban areas you see a situation where labor
24 doesn't do any work but they have to be on the job.
25 That's condoned. You see plants and factories

1 where there is an arrangement by which bets are
 2 picked up and that's under control. There is
 3 a situation where the police say oh, well, he is
 4 only a little fellow, he just picks up numbers,
 5 we are only interested in the big fellow. A
 6 fellow gets a job not on his competence but because
 7 he knows a political leader. Relatives of
 8 political leaders who have no qualifications get
 9 sumptuous jobs.

10 How can people have any respect for law and
 11 order if we don't at that level move?

12 THE WITNESS: We have to.

13 MR. MEYNER: And, of course, I say move at
 14 the state level.

15 THE WITNESS: For example, speaking of
 16 suburbia, from what I read about organized crime
 17 they're talking now about Westchester County,
 18 talking about the dope problem, not in New York
 19 City, not in Harlem, but up in White Plains. We
 20 see an alarming increase proportionately in
 21 suburbia which is frightening.

22 For a classic example is the young girl who was
 23 murdered with the hippie who came from people who
 24 had everything to hope for. So what the Governor
 25 says is true. We have terrible evils in our cities.

1 We have terrible evils in our nation that allows
2 a man like Hoffa.

3 MR. MEYNER: You have them in the suburbs.
4 They move in there because the police have not
5 been alerted to it or the citizenry have not been
6 alerted to it.

7 THE WITNESS: And I also say this in support
8 of our demands from the state -- when I say, "The
9 state," I mean the people of the state who are
10 going to have to provide the dollars and taxes
11 to solve these problems -- that the people who
12 live in suburbia who think they are secure now,
13 if these problems in Newark and in Jersey City are
14 not solved that these individuals who will commit
15 these predatory crimes are going to go to suburbia
16 in larger numbers to commit these crimes and the
17 police forces in suburban communities are no match
18 for this type of thing.

19 MR. MEYNER: Do you think we might likely
20 have to go to the point where you have a consolidated
21 police force of sections of the state, we'll say
22 for instance, Hudson County police force, Essex
23 County police force, Bergen County police force?

24 THE WITNESS: I would think that ultimately
25 to combat crime effectively we are going to have to

1 do this. In effect, I think those of us who work
2 in Government know that Hudson County should be
3 one municipality. We should have consolidation.
4 We have twelve police departments in the county,
5 not counting the County Police Department,
6 and the County Park Police Department, which makes
7 it fourteen. This doesn't make sense.

8 MR. LAUCHTER: How many years will it take,
9 Mayor, before Jersey City schools are completely,
10 which means maybe 98 per cent, black, 95 per cent?

11 THE WITNESS: I would say -- and this is
12 purely a guess, because we have no statistics
13 to bring us to a formal conclusion -- I would say
14 if we go the way we are going in the next 15 years
15 the Jersey City school system will be practically
16 all Negro.

17 MR. LAUCHTER: What do you do about this or
18 is this good, bad, indifferent?

19 THE WITNESS: I would say it's bad because
20 that means just about all the non-Negro people
21 will be out of the city --

22 MR. LAUCHTER: Or sending their children to
23 school outside the city.

24 THE WITNESS: And they will be living outside
25 the city. You will have the poor and uneducated

1 and suffering in these cities and the affluent
 2 people would be living on the outskirts of the
 3 city. This situation is going to bring on
 4 terrible, terrible problems that we won't be able
 5 to exist as a nation under the laws with which we
 6 govern ourselves with this situation existing.

7 MR. LEUCHTER: When you call for a tax
 8 convention do you envision the probability that
 9 there would be no way to change this without
 10 regional school systems and, therefore, regional
 11 tax policies rather than municipal taxes? Certainly
 12 you couldn't solve this on a municipal tax basis.

13 THE WITNESS: Absolutely not. That's why
 14 immediately something we could do would be to
 15 have the state take over the educational system
 16 and take over the welfare system.

17 How do you do this? How do you get the people
 18 in the rural areas to go for this? This has to
 19 be done by reaching the conscience of the people.
 20 This has to be done by the men in public office.
 21 I have said this so many, many times. It takes
 22 a total commitment of our spiritual leaders, our
 23 business leaders, our labor leaders. The people
 24 will have to be made aware of the problem and
 25 sacrifice. What has to be sacrificed to do the job?

1 We are talking about two cars and two color
2 television sets and meanwhile we are fighting a
3 war in Vietnam and having people living in terribly
4 poor housing. We haven't really begun to sacrifice,
5 to tackle this problem.

6 We spend more money on alcoholic beverages
7 I understand from statistics than we do on
8 education. If that isn't the thumbnail of this
9 situation I don't know what is.

10 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: How would you react to
11 some kind of a state conference including tax,
12 education, labor, and all the collaboration of
13 institutions, organizations and so forth, so that
14 we create this awareness in the state? Does this
15 have feasibility in your judgment?

16 THE WITNESS: I would think if we had a
17 sufficient number of prominent and respected
18 people in this state involved in this effort it
19 might. It might.

20 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: It would have to be top
21 level. Bob, what's your reaction? I think the
22 problem is that this may be looked upon as a gimmick;
23 you know, you have everybody together and they file
24 reports and that's that. But do you think this
25 has any real, practical merit, that there be a

1 State House conference on the problems of the
2 state?

3 MR. FORTUNATO: Do you want this on the record?
4 I would say put it on.

5 MR. MEYNER: I think such a conference has to
6 be brought about by a few revelations. People have
7 to be shocked before they are ready for action.
8 Kefauver brought to the mind of people in the
9 '50-'51 period something that most of the informed
10 people knew but it shocked the uninformed and that
11 led to a certain number of changes in certain
12 areas. I know, for instance, in my own area
13 practically every club had slot machines and
14 it was accepted. But suddenly there were no more
15 slot machines. I talked to some people who used
16 to place a \$5 or \$10 bet every day. They were
17 terribly shocked to know that some gangsters at
18 high level were participants in their booty.

19 Now, usually you have to reveal something
20 that shocks people and then when you follow that
21 with the conference for action then you can hope
22 for something.

23 BISHOP DOUGHERTY: Following up on that, and
24 this is just reaching for something that will
25 create this awareness, would this shock value the

1 be accomplished if, for example, the conference
2 was televised in the state? I think some of the
3 things that we hear here are quite shocking to us.
4 Can we project this on a large screen across the
5 state?

6 MR. MEYNER: The difficulty with television
7 is you have too many prima donnas who want to
8 respond to the microphone and the camera. You
9 can do more if you have spontaneity. And how do
10 you get spontaneity? If you could stage it that
11 you got some youngster in a neighborhood who came
12 along and said well, why should I get a job after
13 school? Why should I try to save money when I see
14 that Joe Donkes down the street who collects the
15 number bets rides around in a white Cadillac and
16 doesn't have to go to school and if he gets in
17 any trouble he gets out right away? That sort of
18 thing would be rather dramatic. But how do you
19 stumble upon that sort of a person? Somehow you
20 and I know about these things but how many people
21 do know about them?

22 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid not too many and those
23 who do know, Governor, those people we want to
24 respect law and order are the ones who have an even
25 more exaggerated idea of it than really exists.

1 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: This has been very
2 interesting. We have another witness. Mayor
3 Whelan, we thank you. It has been a very revealing
4 hour and a half. We appreciate it. You have
5 helped us a lot.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you for having invited me.

7
8 CHARLES R. HOWELL, Commissioner of
9 Banking and Insurance, sworn.

10 COMMISSIONER HOWELL: Mr. Chairman, would
11 you like me to just tell you a few things that I
12 can or would you rather ask me questions?

13 MR. FORTUNATO: I think it would be better
14 if you would indicate to us in what area your
15 department has been helpful.

16 COMMISSIONER HOWELL: Well, you probably have
17 read and heard a fair amount about the problems
18 of insurance in the riot area. I thought I might
19 just bring you up to date a little bit on what the
20 situation is now.

21 We had a meeting a couple weeks ago with
22 representatives of about 25 of the insurance
23 companies that do the greatest volume in New
24 Jersey in this type of insurance, property, casualty.
25 Prior to that we had asked them to hold off on any