

1 want to appear. If you could appear again, there is a lot
2 was very more. You have aroused a lot of interest. If you
3 we had could arrange that, we would appreciate it.

4 THE WITNESS: If Mr. Jaffe will get in touch,
5 we will set up a time.

6 By Mr. Jaffe:

7 Q There was another paper that you had that you were
8 reading from, a newspaper. Would you object to putting that
9 in the record?

10 A No. This is a copy of our Crusader, a paper we
11 put out periodically and I would like to submit this to the
12 record.

13 (EXHIBIT NO. C-19 WAS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE.)

14 Q CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Thank you, Mr. Still, for
15 coming.

16 A Well, MR. DRISCOLL: I think we are all indebted to
17 you.

18 (Witness excused.)

19 Whereupon,

20 DONALD M. WENDELL
21 called as a witness, first duly sworn, testified as follows:

22 EXAMINATION

23 By Mr. Jaffe:

24 Q I know you have to be in New York by one and we
25

1 want to apologize for keeping you waiting, but Timothy Still
2 was very informative and just took a little bit longer than
3 we had planned in setting up the schedule. We will make you
4 get out of here in time to be in New York at one, and we will
5 ask you to come back another time. Obviously we are not
6 going to have an opportunity to cover all the material we
7 would like with you.

8 Would you state for the record your occupation now?

9 A I am the acting executive director of the United
10 Community Corporation.

11 Q How long have you been associated with the United
12 Community Corporation?

13 A Since April 12, 1965.

14 Q What are your duties as head of the United Community
15 Corporation in twenty-five words or less?

16 A Well, in charge of the responsibility of conducting
17 and administering Newark's anti-poverty program and monitoring
18 the evaluation of our agencies that we subcontract programs
19 to and try to bring some money to the City of Newark.

20 Q Before we get into anything specific in that area
21 and other areas we are interested in, the Commission is inter-
22 ested in what is happening in Barringer the last day or two,
23 and Timothy Still alluded to it in his testimony. I wonder
24 if you have any thoughts on it or if you know what the
25 situation is and how it is developing.

1 A In fact, Mr. Still and I did go by there the second
2 day because we were concerned.

3 There exists in the community now a kind of panic and
4 crisis reaction even to small incidents or isolated incidents.
5 I think the incident at Barringer has been viewed by many
6 people as part of the overall picture in terms of the dis-
7 orders we had this past summer in that many people in the
8 community now are speaking up in this manner. I think this
9 helps to escalate the problems and the hostilities and the
10 antagonisms.

11 As you gentlemen know, the intent initially was not a
12 racial confrontation in the first two antagonisms. But I
13 think the community is responding this way, and even those
14 who wish to be helpful and want to return the community to
15 normalcy, it is very unfortunate for them.

16 Q Do you have the latest word of what has happened
17 down there?

18 A No. I was getting ready to dispatch some staff
19 people over there before I came over here. I would like to
20 apologize for being late. You know how things develop at
21 the UCC by looking at the paper. Everytime you turn around
22 there is another crisis staring you in the face, so I am
23 sorry I was late.

24 Q Is there any effort made by the UCC to reach into
25 the younger members of the community over at Barringer to

1 Get them involved in some sort of a dialogue?

2 A We have been reluctant to do it because of the
3 unfavorable publicity we received when we attempted to be
4 of assistance to the community, and we didn't want our roles
5 to be misinterpreted. We have gotten some feedback from the
6 youngsters. A lot of this is not reliable. They have a
7 tendency to exaggerate. Some of you deal with the law, and
8 you know when you have two witnesses you get two different
9 accounts of what occurred.

10 I plan to dispatch some staff people over there today,
11 some of our community aides who are about the same age as
12 these people, and try to get some feedback from the youngsters
13 they know and see if there is anything we can do.

14 Q Do you know of any other organization in the city,
15 whether it be through the city administration or any private
16 organization, that is active now trying to establish the
17 kind of dialogue or trying to talk to the young people
18 involved?

19 A Yes, the Human Rights Commission has been involved.
20 One of the members of that commission sits on our executive
21 committee, and Mr. Lofton was there at our last meeting that
22 we had. By her response to certain questions posed to her
23 by Mr. Arthur Jones, who is an OEO representative serving
24 on a task force to assist us to reorganize I have serious
25 questions whether or not they can handle the situation. I

1 an not speaking in terms of professionalisms. I can't
2 address myself to that, but just her response to some of the
3 questions.

4 One question was: Are any plans being made to develop
5 some kind of constructive strategy to avert any further dis-
6 orders in the city particularly since we have this climate
7 of tension? She said that the commission plans to hold its
8 monthly meetings in the community, and this response just
9 didn't address itself to the community. So I seriously
10 doubt whether they are capable of handling this situation.
11 In fact, I told the executive committee that I plan to call
12 Dr. Frederick B. Ralph, who is the executive director of
13 NIRO.

14 Q Could you explain what NIRO is?

15 A We all use these abc's. National Organization of
16 Intergroup Relations Officials of which I have been a board
17 member and the Middle Atlantic chairman. It is a group of
18 people who are professionally employed in the field of inter-
19 group relations, most of them working for governmental
20 agencies, most of them for city commissions. Some of them
21 have many, many years experience in intergroup relations.

22 I want to convene with some of them to try to discuss
23 and explore what has happened in Newark and what kind of
24 positive things have been done in other cities that might
25 lessen the possibilities of any further problems here.

1 Q Do you think that your agency the UCC, can play a
2 role in this type of riot response?

3 A I don't know if you gentlemen saw it, but drafted
4 up a letter from our president as an appeal to the community
5 through the editors of the two major dailies. We intend to
6 be involved and many of our people, staff and board members,
7 are members of the Concerned Citizens Committee. In fact,
8 Mr. Lofton and Mr. Talbott first met, and maybe half the
9 people there were UCC people. Most the people are concerned
10 about our community, and they plan an important role in most
11 of the things that happen.

12 Q What I meant, do you also conceive of yourself --
13 you said before that as a result of the participation in the
14 riot in July the UCC now has a little bit of hesitancy
15 actually to send teams of young people in to try to "cool
16 the situation." Do you feel that this is a proper hesitation,
17 a proper role by the UCC?

18 A I first want to get some advice from people I
19 consider experts. Our people, too, are not trained in
20 intergroup relations and interaction. Many of our people
21 are community people with limited education and limited
22 experience. We try to give them an opportunity through
23 employment at UCC. Before I took any action which might
24 precipitate something or be interpreted that way, I wanted
25 to get some advice from people I considered experts in the

1 field.

2 Q I gather, then, you don't have any group now that
3 is actually involved with the young people in Barringer?
4 There is no group of people who are attempting to deal on
5 an intergroup relationship basis?

6 A I have no personal knowledge.

7 MR. GIBBONS: Outside of the Board of Education.

8 MR. JAFFE: Through PTA meetings.

9 MR. GIBBONS: Through teachers.

10 By Mr. Jaffe:

11 Q I wonder if we could get back to the general question.
12 We would be interested in your opinion as to how effective
13 the UCC has been in meeting the immediate needs of the under-
14 privileged in our community in terms of the total universe
15 you have to reach and how much of the universe you think
16 you have reached and what effectiveness you had in reaching
17 that group.

18 A I think our biggest weakness to date has been
19 dealing with the young adults and the teenagers and particu-
20 larly with the youngsters that are out of school. It is
21 true we have the Upward Bound program and Youth Corps
22 programs, but they really don't address themselves to the
23 problems of the youths that are engaged in these kind of
24 activities. I would like to preface my remarks, and I hope
25 this isn't looked upon as an excuse or an alibi, but I think

1 it is important for your understanding. The United Community
2 Corporation serves the entire City of Newark. It has a
3 Community Action program of approximately fifty some odd
4 people. This includes aides in the community. Bedford
5 Stuyvesant has an action program which serves a geographical
6 area that is smaller and a population of almost half the
7 size, 268,000 people, and has a community action department
8 with 375 aides. This gives them an opportunity to hire the
9 people in the community who will be engaged in these activities
10 and use that as a way of training people, of changing attitudes.
11 They are funded for approximately \$2.1 million just for that
12 activity. We are funded somewhere in the neighborhood of
13 \$503,000, trying to serve the whole city. This hampers what
14 we can do.

15 The United Community Corporation attempts to do two things,
16 and it has affected our organization. We attempted to get
17 quality staff and at the same time we attempted to give
18 people opportunities who never had them. We try to do both
19 and we can't do both well. Very early in our existence, in
20 fact two years ago we applied to the Office of Economic
21 Opportunity for a grant to create a training institute for
22 our board members, our staff and the community at large. I
23 just heard word orally and we did receive a letter from Mr.
24 Berry that funding is imminent. So what I am trying to
25 indicate is in terms of our resources we have limited resources

1 to do the job we want to do. Also in terms of philosophy of
2 our corporation we want to do these things. We want to
3 involve the poor at several different levels -- policymaking,
4 decision making and in the design of programs and in the
5 administration of programs.

6 We also want to provide support for existing agencies
7 and institutions and create a new community corps where there
8 is nobody in the community doing the job that had to be
9 done. Newark Pre-School Council is one of the bodies we
10 created and Newark Legal Services project is another.

11 Thirdly, we wanted to be the kind of corporation not to
12 become a monster administering ourselves and at the same time
13 we wanted to have responsibility, which we have not dis-
14 charged, of monitoring and evaluating programs, again because
15 of staff limitations.

16 Q Is there anybody monitoring and evaluating programs
17 now?

18 A Yes. I have a team of auditors.

19 Q Are these from the national office?

20 A No. They are consultants we have hired. OEO has
21 finally granted us permission to transfer funds from accruals
22 to allow us to bring these fellows in.

23 MR. DRISCOLL: What are their qualifications?

24 THE WITNESS: They are members of Puder & Puder,
25 the firm does our auditing, and most of them are CPA's.

1 indeed, or MR. DRISCOLL: Is anybody evaluating your
2 these substantive programs?

3 the present THE WITNESS: Yes. We have staff doing it,
4 that is but only three people. CEO is aware of this. They
5 have sent teams in to evaluate us, and we carried
6 their on some evaluations ourselves but not to the extent
7 they should be, to discover some of the deficiencies
8 and weaknesses in the programs.

9 the witness By Mr. Jaffe: that there is a double standard.

10 Q I wonder if you would like to address yourself to
11 a very broad question but one we would like to hear about.
12 What do you think the role of the UCC should be in the
13 political processes? Do you think the United Corporation
14 Council should take stands on political issues that affect
15 the citizens in this city, or do you think it is a primary
16 role of service?

17 A I think you should take a position on non-partisan
18 issues. We have a responsibility to educate the poor to
19 utilize their constitutional privileges, and to that extent
20 I think we should be involved. In fact, when I was acting
21 director the first time I had recommended to then President
22 Dean Hecker that we establish a social action committee to
23 look at community issues and, if it so desired, take a
24 position where it felt it should.

25 I think there are many issues that affect the poor and,

1 indeed, our entire community to which very few people address
2 themselves. Our educational system, the fact that we at
3 the present time have not one Negro principal, things like
4 that in the school system, 76,000 youngsters, 98 percent
5 Negro -- this is something to the minority community. Whether
6 their evaluation is correct or not or accurate or not is
7 not really the question here. But I think it reinforces in
8 their minds, in the minds of many other people that are in
9 the minority community that there is a double standard.

10 We have the issue of Mr. Parker. I think some of you
11 may have heard or read about that, the first Negro in the
12 State of New Jersey to become a Certified Public Accountant,
13 and he was a candidate for the position of secretary of the
14 school board. The other candidate, although I don't know
15 his abilities or skills or talents in terms of qualifications
16 that he proffered, certainly had less. The fact that they
17 intended to retain the present secretary as a consultant to
18 the board for the year at a salary equal to or about \$1,000
19 more than the secretary was a slap in the face to the
20 community. This is the only way I can put it.

21 I think that the administration of the city is hampered
22 in some respects because there has been in our whole
23 relationship in terms of black-white relationships a kind of
24 dialogue of deceit, as I call it, and that some of the key
25 advisors to the mayor may be saying to him things he wants

1 to hear rather than things as they really are. I am not
2 saying this is true, but I am saying maybe in terms of the
3 kind of relationships we have had in the past because I
4 know and Mr. Lofton and I were in the mayor's office after
5 Wednesday night's disturbance. We were very pointed in
6 expressing our fears for what would happen Thursday. We
7 indicated that we did not believe that this was an isolated
8 incident and that in all probability something would occur
9 the next night or the night after, and we should prepare for
10 this.

11 The mayor wanted his aides -- in fact the man's name is
12 not really important, but they said, "We are elected by the
13 people. We know the community; you don't." Mr. Lofton
14 can attest if I am not stating it as I heard it. We were
15 appalled by the attitude because as long as I have been
16 here through the United Community Corporation I think we
17 get a good deal of what the community feels and thinks,
18 different segments of the community. We have a cross section
19 of the community on our board -- almost every interest
20 group, every segment of the community.

21 The first two years I was here in Newark, the first two
22 summers, Mr. Tice and I both predicted to people there would
23 be no disturbances in 1965 or 1966 of any magnitude, but in
24 September of 1966 when I became the acting director we went
25 to Washington. Some of you may recall Operation Concern, and

1 we expressed our concern about the lack of support of the
2 cities. We expressed to all the public officials elected
3 and appointed that 1967 was going to be Newark's year. We
4 didn't say that to portend doom, but to alert them. We did
5 that in private conferences.

6 I remember when I spoke to Senator Harrison Williams he
7 said, "There is kind of a chilling logic here in what you
8 are telling us," because we were saying cities where there
9 has been calm relatively because everything was seething and
10 brewing underneath should not be penalized because there had
11 not been major disorders, and we should think in terms of
12 prevention rather than ours.

13 When \$27 million went to Watts, people were beginning
14 to think well, this is the way to get response from the
15 establishment or the power systems, this is what we will do.

16 I would like for the record to make it clear what we
17 had in Newark was much different than what happened in other
18 cities. The wrath of the people was taken out on the store
19 owners whom they felt were robbing them. It was primarily
20 looting. We didn't have the destruction and burning. There
21 were only four fires during the few days of the disturbances,
22 and none of them, according to the Fire Commissioner when I
23 queried him, was attributed directly or indirectly to the
24 looting. There was a different kind of atmosphere.

25 I also think that the mass media contributed to the

1 escalation because of the way it was portrayed over TV. It
2 looked like a carnival or a carnival atmosphere. This drew
3 more people into the area. I think that many young people
4 have said the same thing -- it is nothing new -- that there
5 has to be some kind of monitoring of the mass media so when
6 they report the news, they report it in such a way it does
7 not add to but rather diminishes the problem.

8 Finally I think we might have been out of the woods -- we
9 were a couple of times -- but Wednesday night the police were
10 the key factor -- poor judgment, indiscretion, overt -- not
11 covert -- overt racism as expressed by some of the epithets
12 they hurled at the crowd and conduct completely unbecoming
13 a law enforcement agent.

14 MR. DRISCOLL: Was this the city police?

15 THE WITNESS: The city police, the first
16 Wednesday night.

17 MR. DRISCOLL: Did you personally see cases
18 where there was racism on the part of the police?

19 THE WITNESS: Inside the police station and
20 outside.

21 MR. DRISCOLL: You were inside and outside?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes.

23 MR. DRISCOLL: And you saw it personally?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes.

25 MR. DRISCOLL: What form did it take?

1 THE WITNESS: The hurling of racial epithets,
2 cursing community people. It was going on on both
3 sides. It would be easier to relate what happened
4 that Wednesday night. That is the thing that is
5 most graphic in my mind.

6 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: How long will this take?
7 I am thinking of our promise to you.

8 THE WITNESS: About eight minutes.

9 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Can you stand those eight
10 minutes?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 We were at my house discussing corporation
13 business, and I got a call from one of our board
14 members inquiring if I knew where Timothy Still
15 was because there was something about to explode
16 outside the Fourth Precinct. Tim and I both spoke
17 to the person, Mr. Winans. We went over there
18 immediately with Mr. Lofton to the precinct. When
19 we got there, there was a crowd there but nowhere
20 near the proportions later. I couldn't judge or
21 estimate. Somewhere around 25 or 50 people crowded
22 around a car. There were people standing around
23 outside the project on the streets.

24 In the car or patrol wagon there was a man
25

1 which I found out subsequently was the cab driver,
2 the prisoner they had arrested. The people were
3 expressing orally concern that he was being trans-
4 ferred somewhere to be abused. Finally one of our
5 staff people, Mr. James Walker, got in the car
6 because we felt this was the way to avert the
7 problem right then. This was after long discussion
8 with the inspector to convince him of the wisdom
9 of this. The car remained there for some time.
10 Then Mr. Lofton and Mr. Still and I, or Mr. Robert
11 Curvin and some other people requested of the
12 inspector an opportunity to talk to him so we could
13 get the information about what would happen, and
14 because of what we thought was developing into a
15 dangerous situation. After a half hour he finally
16 agreed to meet us. We asked him whether or not he
17 had a private meeting room. He told us he didn't.
18 Mr. Lofton asked him whether or not he had an
19 interrogation room where he interrogated prisoners.
20 He informed us he did not. We later found out he
21 did.

22 We went inside and some of the community
23 people followed us in. He took us into the squad
24 room, I guess they call it, right off the foyer.
25 While he was giving his report of the arresting

1 officer's report, additional community people came
2 in. They were very incensed. They claimed they
3 witnessed this fellow being beaten and kicked outside
4 the precinct.

5 MR. DRISCOLL: But you did not see it?

6 THE WITNESS: I did not see it. They came into
7 the room we were in. About eight to ten policemen
8 began to converge on the room. I told the inspector
9 that this is not the way to respond to community
10 concern. The only way they knew how to respond was
11 by demonstration of force. "These people are unarmed.
12 You have got guns, riot sticks. Why this?"
13 Finally he told the officers to leave.

14 While they were in there they were yelling
15 and screaming at the people, cursing the inspector
16 because he wouldn't unleash them, all kinds of
17 crazy things. Then things got very heated outside
18 and Tim and Bob Curvin went outside to try to talk
19 to the crowd. Mr. Lofton and I stayed inside. All
20 of a sudden something hit the side of the building.
21 I don't know what it was. When I was inside it
22 sounded like a firecracker. Without any direction,
23 because Mr. Lofton was in talking to the inspector,
24 the policemen upstairs got their riot helmets and
25 their nightsticks and charged out into the crowd.

1 At that point I ran outside. First I was
2 screaming at the inspector, "What is going on here?"
3 I ran outside to do two things: One, to see if
4 my presence would help, and also to witness what
5 took place.

6 MR. DRISCOLL: Did they go out the front door?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, right past the inspector.
8 When they went outside they were almost face to
9 face with each other. I was in the middle and I was
10 getting nervous.

11 MR. MEYNER: Isn't that an understatement?

12 THE WITNESS: Right. I have been in the trade
13 union movement where we organized a plant that was
14 owned by an alleged of the syndicate, and I have
15 also been in the civil rights movement in the South
16 and faced violence, but I was extremely nervous
17 because the community people were yelling and
18 screaming and the police with these nightsticks
19 were there, and I didn't know what was going to
20 take place. I asked the officers to please ask
21 the inspector to come out here because "We are
22 going to have an explosion right now," I was thinking.
23 While I was asking them to get the inspector out,
24 one man standing on the side of the station not in
25 mufti, a windbreaker and a dark shirt and trousers --

1 it went through my mind he might be a policeman.
2 I was just too excited to think about it. He asked
3 me who I was. I told him my name and my title and
4 the corporation I worked for. At that point I
5 thought it might be good to find out who he was. I
6 asked him and he charged toward me. Fortunately
7 the inspector was outside the building then. He
8 ordered two of his officers to remove the man, and
9 they had to do this physically by the arms. I
10 found out afterwards that he indeed was a police
11 officer, but this was the kind of response we got,
12 just attempting to assist.

13 Then we asked the inspector, and I am para-
14 phrasing because I am shortening it, to give us
15 an opportunity to talk to the people. He asked us
16 would we guarantee that we could disperse the crowd.
17 Nobody could guarantee that, and that crowd was
18 in no mood for that. We told him no, we couldn't.
19 We would attempt to channelize this energy, get
20 them down to city hall, an all-night vigil. That
21 was to get them out of the area. But knowing that
22 it would not be successful, but we did want to
23 have some kind of a protest and demonstration and
24 move them away from the precinct.

25 In a half an hour or so he consented. We

1 He gave us fifteen minutes, and he promised he would
2 have his police go back in. He stayed outside with
3 one officer or more; I don't recall. Then Mr. Curvin
4 addressed the group, Mr. Still and Mr. Lofton. The
5 essence of most of their statements was of a militant
6 nature but not inflammatory. "Justice will be done,
7 but there is a way to do it," et cetera.

8 We began to organize the march. I ran through
9 the crowd identifying my staff members and telling
10 them to look for people we knew because we were
11 having a meeting that night, not us, but a board of
12 trustees for the summer block program. This is why
13 there were so many of us in there that night. They
14 identified more members from our area boards and
15 let them help organize. We were moving away from
16 the station and people were cheering, and they
17 began to sing, "We shall not be moved." They were
18 in fact moving, and the police could see this out
19 the window. Maybe they were twenty abreast. I
20 was up at the other end of the block. We were
21 running telling the kids to join in, et cetera.

22 By this time there were more spectators, a
23 whole host of them. The police came out and the
24 crowd said, "Here they come. You can't trust them.
25 They lied to us." That is when the first stone

1 began to be thrown. I don't know what took place
2 immediately in front of the station because I was
3 up at the other end of the block.

4 MR. MEYNER: This is the second time they came
5 out?

6 THE WITNESS: The second time.

7 MR. MEYNER: They came out the front?

8 THE WITNESS: Right past the inspector who talked
9 to Oliver Lofton at the time, so he couldn't have
10 given them an order. I told my staff to run through
11 the crowds and tell them to cool it. There were
12 kids sitting out of windows. These guys have guns,
13 and a bullet could ricochet and kill some innocent
14 person. One youth said, "Why don't I go get so and
15 so and tell him to stop what he is doing?" Then a
16 car was set on fire and the engines came. That
17 added to it. We had quelled it the first time and
18 almost the second time. The second time there was
19 no stopping it when the police came out.

20 There were the rocks, the Molotov cocktails,
21 et cetera. By this time there were several hundred
22 people and more coming. We knew we couldn't control
23 it anymore. It was useless. This must have been
24 two o'clock in the morning. Some of our people went
25 home. Tim went home because he got hit with a rock.

1 So I left and got feeling guilty. I came back
2 about two-thirty, maybe three o'clock in the morning.
3 When I got back the streets were deserted. I think
4 four stores had been looted. I saw the Director
5 of Police standing on the steps of the precinct. I
6 went over to talk with him and share with him what
7 I thought should be his responsibility the next day.
8 The return: "The entire situation is normal. Put
9 the windows in early in the morning; get the place
10 cleaned up. Just return it to normal and don't
11 treat it as a situation because once you begin to
12 look at problems as problems they become problems."

13 While we were talking there and I was venting
14 some of my anger at what his police had done, rocks
15 came again and it went through my mind, and I told
16 everyone this because I had been in the South, paid
17 as a civil rights worker -- I wasn't going to get
18 killed up North by accident by Negroes, and I went
19 home. Those rocks weren't discriminating.

20 I think we had two opportunities to have
21 averted it on Wednesday night and I think the actions
22 of the police prevented this. I mention this because
23 I think it is key and important because you must
24 recall that the police had, through the Human Rights
25 Commission, requested the United Corporation funds

1 Commission, requested the United Corporation funds
2 for a relations institute. Our staff had informed
3 the police and the Human Rights Commission that the
4 funds are available through the Justice Department.
5 They got them directly, and they got a sizeable
6 grant, but that didn't produce the results we had
7 wanted or desired.

8 Subsequent meetings have taken place in the
9 community, city council meetings where the police
10 used unnecessary force at one I witnessed on an
11 individual but I don't know if he was a citizen
12 of the community or not. They beat him right
13 outside the city council steps, and the man was
14 physically removed by community people.

15 Another incident was the K-9 Corps where there
16 were many policemen out of uniform who were demanding
17 the K-9 and calling the people prostitutes and
18 using the other words as substitutes for that,
19 cursing the clergymen, Monsignor Hoolihan, whom I
20 knew and had a great deal of respect for. That
21 night outside of city council there was physical
22 violence, whites with tire chains and razors coming
23 at community people. I said to many people, "We
24 are not over it yet." There could be a little
25 holocaust in the city because we have received

1 information that people are arming themselves.

2 Black extremists are passing out literature of a
3 racist nature, and so are the whites.

4 I am fearful there may be an armed conflict
5 in the streets of Newark, and I tell you this,
6 gentlemen, very seriously. I hope it is averted,
7 but this is my fear because three weeks after the
8 order had been restored, or a semblance of order,
9 we had gotten reports there was an armed clash
10 right outside the court house, which is across the
11 street from us. We knew people in terms of the
12 black militants or whatever label you care to give
13 them because they could be militant reactionaries
14 rather than a militant radical -- we asked them to
15 get off the streets. We also had reports they
16 were going to fire-bomb Prudential and Bamberger's
17 and others. We tried to get our reports back to
18 them because we told them for every action there
19 was a reaction and retaliation may be of a greater
20 degree than you expect, and nothing happened. I
21 don't know if it was the results of our warnings
22 and our pipeline.

23 I am very fearful for the future.

24 By Mr. Jaffe:

25 Q We have taken a lot of your time, and I am sure we

1 would like to have you back again, and we apologize for
2 bringing you in a bit late.

3 A Thank you, gentlemen. I am sorry I have to leave.

4 - - -

5
6 C E R T I F I C A T E

7 I, JOSEPH P. READING, a Certified Shorthand Reporter
8 and Notary Public in and for the State of New Jersey, do
9 hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcript
10 of my stenographic notes to the best of my ability.

11
12 Joseph P. Reading

13 October 20, 1967

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